

***Second Generation Return Migrants:  
The New Face of Brain Circulation in the Caribbean?***

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## **Abstract**

*The research on migration patterns has generally focused on the implications of mass movements of people from sending countries in the global South to receiving countries in the global North. The experiences and impact on sending countries such as developing nations in Caribbean region have been largely overlooked due to their small populations.*

*Starting in the post-World War II era, tens of thousands of labour migrants left the Caribbean in search of economic prosperity. But an increasing number are now returning to their homeland. The potential for these migrants to represent a significant return flow to the Caribbean is not insignificant. Among the returnees is a small cohort of highly skilled second generation immigrants. The premise is that return migration takes place not only among first generation immigrants but also their children who were born or raised abroad.*

*This thesis explores the contribution that these second generation return migrants are making to Caribbean migration patterns, and their potential to contribute economically and socially to the region. The research is based on an extensive review of literature on return migration as well as focused data collection from 18 second generation return migrants to various countries in the Caribbean. Collectively, this mix-method approach culminates in a migration narrative that suggests that second generation return migrants are poised to become an ever more important group of return migrants to the Caribbean.*

*This narrative has important implications for CARICOM governments. Where once the loss of the best minds from the region was reason for concern, now there is a potential for the Caribbean to benefit from the investments made to the North. There is new reason for CARICOM governments to put in place tailored policies that attract young pre-retirement professionals with much to offer the region. While efforts to entice the return of wealthy retirees have born some positive results, perhaps CARICOM governments could recognize and facilitate the return of second generation immigrants to the region.*

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*Firstly, my supervisor Gordon Betcherman whose expertise in labour economics, migration, and emerging economies provided much guidance to the thesis. He gave me the space to explore an issue that is close to my heart, while steering me through broader issues related to labour market migration. I thank him for his patience during the many stops and starts with this project during the challenging Covid pandemic. I am also thankful to the contributions of the readers Christina Clark-Kazak and Stephen Baranyi. They took time out of their busy schedules to review the thesis.*

*The Covid-19 pandemic created many challenges with completing the fieldwork associated with this research. I turned to some of the individuals in my research network, one of which was Dr. Glenford Howes in Barbados. When I asked him to help me find participants for the research, he did not hesitate. I am extremely grateful.*

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**Acronyms**

CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
OECD	Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
SGRM	Second generation return migration
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

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## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

The movement of people in search of better economic conditions and more secure living environments has been part of human history since the beginning of time (Özden, 2011). My own family history is a microcosm of this phenomenon. My parents arrived in Canada in 1965 with two children and US\$1000, and hope of a new life. My father heard that Canada needed mechanics. He applied and was approved for a work visa, packed up his family and followed a dream.

Decades before, his father travelled from Barbados to work in the sugar cane fields in Trinidad, which was the hub of the booming sugar industry in the West Indies in the early 1900s. His uncle went to Panama to work on the Panama Canal along with 75,000 men and women enticed to a dream of greater economic opportunities. And hundreds of years prior, their ancestors were taken from West Africa in bondage to work in sugar cane fields across the West Indies to fulfill the dreams of distant British, French, Spanish, and Dutch empires.

These migration stories have been repeated at family gatherings around the globe. And, the movement of labourers have captivated scholars and researchers from various disciplines over the centuries – anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and economists. One theory is that the basis for international migration is essentially an economic one, linked to the inequality between countries (Flynn, 2013; Özden, 2011; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Ritzer and Dean, 2015; Tsuda, 2009). Other theories explain migration as a relationship between push-and-pull factors, and the impact of that relationship on sending and receiving countries (Mahabir, 2007;

Plaza and Henry, 2006; Ritzer and Dean, 2006). Regardless of the theory, all too often the migration narrative focuses on the implications of mass international migration on the economies and social structures of destination countries in the North, since migration flows have been primarily from the global South to the global North.

This thesis attempts to shift the narrative, albeit in a minor way, to a migration narrative that looks at the flow from the global North to the global South, focusing on a small cohort of second generation immigrants of Caribbean descent relocating to the homes of their immigrant parents. In the literature, these migrants are called *second generation return migrants*<sup>1</sup>.

A strong motivation for this research is to add to prior research that has largely focused on the non-economic issues and the behaviours and experiences of second generation return migrants to the Caribbean.

It explores the movement of these second generation immigrants who represent a potentially new pattern of return migration to the Caribbean. It examines in more detail the economic impact of this return migration trend on Caribbean countries and the migrants themselves.

Until the late 1990s, this cohort had not been the focus of study. While some of these migrants had been interviewed as part of broader samples of returnees, the potential of this cohort to represent a significant return flow has been largely overlooked.

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<sup>1</sup> The term *second generation return migrants* also includes the children of first generation immigrants who left the region at a young age (under 10 years old) and were raised in the global North, since they exhibit similar characteristics as second generation immigrants.

## 1.1 Research questions

Some second generation immigrants are returning to their parents' birthplace in the Caribbean in their adult years to enter the labour market. The extent to which this return phenomenon is happening is the basis for this research which attempts to understand better their motivation for returning as well as their experiences and contributions to the region once they return. Just as their parents left their homeland in search of an economic dream, the 'return' of second generation immigrants could be part of a new migration narrative linked to a complex dream that intertwines ancestral rejuvenation with economic opportunity. The research is based on a model of labour migration that assumes that migrants would return to their countries of origin (Byron, 2000).

Second generation return migration (SGRM) offers great potential to the Caribbean, since second generation immigrants bring with them education, connections to the North, and often an entrepreneurial spirit. Their return was discussed by Caribbean scholars in the early 2000s.

The return flows of these global skilled and professional workers, albeit selective and numerically small in most cases, deserves our attention for their potential to serve as 'brain gains', or 'brain circulations', which go some way to offset the 'brain drain' (Conway and Potter, 2009, 5).

The following four research questions are being used to delve into this phenomenon more closely – see Annex A for the Research Matrix that provides the framework for the research:

**Question 1:** What are the political, economic and social structures and networks in the country in the North and the country in the Caribbean that encourage second generation immigrants to relocate (i.e. push-pull factors)?

**Question 2:** What are the patterns in SGRM across the Caribbean region (i.e. destination of returnees)?

**Question 3:** What is the economic and social status of second generation return migrants in their new homes in the Caribbean?

**Question 4:** What measures can the region employ to incentivize SGRM?

Collectively, these four questions explore the contribution that second generation return migrants are making to Caribbean migration patterns, and their potential to contribute economically to the region. The premise is that return migration takes place not only among first generation immigrants but also their children who were born or raised in the destination countries of their parents.

The research confirms that some migration flows are characterized by the movement of people who relocate to the South for geo-political reasons or historical connections, or, what modern-day researchers define as processes of rejuvenation of diasporic family links to the global South (Bronfman, 2007; Castles, 2005; Christou, 2011; Conway, 2009; Potter, 2009; Tsuda, 2007).

Migration stories have always been a defining feature of the Caribbean. The region's colonial past and subsequent decolonialization process are among the factors that have facilitated centuries old movement of labour migrants in search of wealth and prosperity (Byron and Condon, 1996). While the region grew out of an inward flow of European colonizers and African slaves between the 15<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was defined by an outward flow of labour to the North, usually to the very colonial ties that caused the initial

inward flow. The concept of *brain drain* became part of the discourse around Caribbean migration since many of its 20<sup>th</sup> century migrants were skilled workers enticed to employment opportunities abroad by liberal immigration policies in the North (Bristol, 2010). The argument around brain drain has been that skilled labour plays a critical role in the sustainable development of a developing country, and any significant and long-term loss of this labour threatens the economic and social progress of the country (Economic Commission LAC Migration, 2006). However, in recent years, the concept of *brain drain* has been replaced by *brain circulation* or *transnationalism* which explores transnational communities that result from the linkages established between ethnic societies formed from migration.

Now, return migration flows of first generation immigrants and second generation immigrants has re-emerged as a new dimension of 21<sup>st</sup> century global labour patterns (Byron, 2000; Castles and Kosacks, 1973; Castles and Miller 1993; Gmelch, 1980; Thomas-Hope, 1999; Tsuda, 2009).

## **1.2 How this research could be used**

If indeed SGRM has the potential to impact the economies of the Caribbean, then the migration narrative that speaks of brain drain from the region will need to be updated to acknowledge that brain circulation as a new reality, thereby validating theories of the cyclical nature of migration patterns in the region. The narrative would confirm that where once the loss of the best minds from the region was reason for concern, now with SGRM, there is a potential for the Caribbean to benefit from the investments it made to the North when it provided a rich supply of skilled first generation immigrants starting in the 60s.

Perhaps, there is new reason for Caribbean governments to put in place tailored policies that attract young pre-retirement second generation immigrants with much to offer the region. Since there has been some positive results when these government enticed the return of wealthy retirees, then recognizing and facilitating the return of second generation immigrants could be even more beneficial.

### **1.3 Structure of the thesis**

The thesis is organised in seven chapters. Following this first chapter, which outlines the purpose and structure of the thesis, Chapter 2: Background/Context outlines the history, socio-economic and political context, and developmental challenges facing the Caribbean region. Chapter 3: Caribbean Labour Migration Patterns explores migration as a tool for development, outlines the push-pull framework often used to explain the migration process, and outlines key migration trends in the region. In Chapter 4: Methodology, the research questions, methodology, assumptions and limitations are presented. Chapter 5: Literature Review of SGRM presents possible theoretical frameworks to explain SGRM, summarizes past studies on SGRM to the Caribbean and beyond, and identifies knowledge gaps that provide a rationale for the research conducted in this thesis. Chapter 6: Findings and Analysis summarizes the findings from the data collected from interviews and an e-survey that led to a non-random sample of second generation return migrants to the Caribbean. Chapter 7: Conclusion and Summary offers some conclusions on the potential impact of SGRM on the region, including the potential to reverse brain drain from the region, and contribute to regional economic growth.

## **Chapter 2: Background/Context**

### **2.1 Historical context**

For many people, the Caribbean engenders a vision of paradise with its pristine beaches lined with coconut trees, and home to some of the most spectacular coral reefs in the world. But the region is more than this simplistic idyllic picture. It is in fact a complex layering of social, economic, political, and environmental settings that make it one of the most sought-after places to visit and live in.

With this picture in mind, it is hard to believe that Caribbean was born out of a violent period that annihilated Indigenous peoples, followed by a torturous and oppressive period of slavery and colonialization from English, French, Spanish, Danish, Dutch, and Portuguese powers. This included conflict not only with the Indigenous peoples and the slaves, but also between the colonizers themselves. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, European warfare resulted in St. Lucia changing hands between the English and the French seven times within half a century (“Embassy of St. Lucia,” n.d.). This history was the genesis for several waves of migration in and out of the region that continue to define the region today.

Starting in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the first wave of European immigrants came to the region with the definitive goal of using sugar and cheap slave labour to generate great wealth for their homelands (Knight and Palmer, 1989). There is no shortage of studies and research recounting the slave trade era. The eventual emancipation of slaves in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, created an economic chaos for sugar plantation owners who needed a hardworking low-waged labour

force to work on the plantations. The British led efforts to acquire cheap labour initially from China (estimated at 115,000 between 1847 and 1879), and then from India (estimated at half a million between 1838 and 1917) in the form of indentured or contract labourers (Knight and Palmer, 1989). The result was a large number of unskilled workers from various ethnic backgrounds who worked at tedious and inhumane tasks in harsh environments, often alongside former African slaves (Thompson, 2015).

The colonial and post-colonial experience has been a defining feature of the Caribbean that has lasted for almost 500 years of the region's recorded history and affecting the region in profound ways. It has resulted in a period of decolonization that brought many opportunities for Caribbean nations as well as new migration patterns that now includes involvement of the United States in the region.

For example, during the decolonization process, the United States saw the Caribbean as an important geopolitical area that could serve its hegemonic aspirations. It made direct military interventions including military bases (Pelligrino, 2015) as well as investments in agriculture and infrastructure, all to enhance and protect its interests in the region (Bronfman, 2017; Thompson, 2015).

For the North, the strategic importance of the Caribbean lies in its position along the main sea lanes between North and South America and Europe. This positioning has enhanced the “nature, direction and magnitude of migration in the Caribbean” (Economic Commission for LAC, 2006, 1). These migration patterns are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

## **2.2 Current social, economic, and political context**

The Caribbean has traditionally been understood to be the islands dotting the Caribbean Sea. Over the years, the definition has expanded beyond a geographical hallmark to be complex social and cultural relationships rooted in its colonial past (Bronfman, 2017; Richardson, 1989; Thompson, 2015). Some speak about the region from a linguistic perspective. But this does not do justice to the region because the English, French, Spanish and Dutch Caribbean have few social commonalities other than geography. Nor is it accurate to speak of the region as simply small island nations. This nomenclature does not explain why Guyana and Suriname (continental territories located in South America) are often considered to be part of the Caribbean because of their ethno-cultural relationship with Trinidad, or why Belize (located in Central America) is also considered part of the Caribbean due to its shared Indigenous relationship with the Indigenous Garifuna people of St. Vincent. While Guyana, French Guiana, Belize, and Suriname might not be included in a narrow geographic definition of the Caribbean, their shared experience and present relations with the Caribbean islands justify their inclusion in the broader definition of Caribbean (Richardson, 1989; Thompson, 2015).

This expanded definition of the Caribbean has implications not only for the regional movement of its peoples but also for international migration. For example, it is not unusual to see migrants leave one country, but return to another country in the region while still considering it as a move home. As articulated in Chapter 5 and 6, this pattern of return is being repeated by some second generation immigrants.

Using the United Nations definition of *Latin America and the Caribbean*, the total population of the 29 countries and territories that make up the Caribbean was 43.2 million in 2018, varying in size from 11 million in each of Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti to almost 5,000 inhabitants in Montserrat (World Bank, 2018).

The size of the countries in the Caribbean is a key defining feature of the region that helps to explain the relatively small magnitude of migration patterns, especially among second generation return migrants.

The three larger countries (Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti) make up more than three quarter of the entire region. And, about 44 percent of the countries have populations under 100,000. Size in itself is just one variable in explaining the region. Their economies lack diversity and were largely developed out of an agricultural tradition, typically based on a single export crop – sugar cane and bananas were the preferences (Thompson, 2015).

### **2.3 Regional integration**

To overcome the challenges associated with their small size, the lack of economic diversity, and their dependence on foreign markets, Caribbean nations have been exploring regional integration, since the early years following independence. The short-lived West Indies Federation<sup>2</sup> was the genesis for regional discussions that eventually gave birth in 1974 to the

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<sup>2</sup> The West Indies Federation was a political union that existed from January 1958 to May 1962 to create a political unit that would be independent from Britain. Its primary concern was with integrating the economies of its members, pursuing functional cooperation across a wide range of areas and, in a more

Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional block that now consists of 15 Member States and five Associate Members<sup>3</sup>. The block extends beyond a geographical grouping of the islands in the Caribbean Sea to include parts of Central and South America.

Regional integration was a major accomplishment for CARICOM. It was formed as an economic and political community that would work together to shape policies for the region and encourage economic growth and trade. However, political unity has been resisted by almost all countries, especially the small island nations that remain wary that they would be swallowed up geographically and demographically by the larger countries. After winning independence, naturally, it was difficult to concede sovereignty for a wider regional good. Today, CARICOM focuses on three main objectives: promoting economic integration and cooperation among its members, ensuring that the benefits of integration are equitably shared, and coordinating foreign policy.

One initiative that demonstrates its common objective is the launch of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy in 2005 to promote the free movement of professional and skilled persons, starting with graduates of the University of the West Indies. While not in itself a solution to labour market weakness, this important step addresses structural limitations associated with labour mobility and has the potential to strengthen the region's global

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limited way, coordinating foreign policy. However, before that could happen, the Federation collapsed due to internal political conflicts over how it would be governed.

<sup>3</sup> There are 15 Member States – Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago; and, five Associate Members – Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos that are British overseas territories.

positioning. In particular, it could make the region more enticing to second generation immigrants of Caribbean ancestry who could have access to the labour markets of more countries in the region.

With the introduction of CARICOM, Member States now understand that real independence will probably be more easily achieved through a shared experience of interdependence to manage their common interests in a global world. (Thompson, 2015).

The research in this thesis focuses primarily on CARICOM Member States rather than the wider definition of the Caribbean making up Latin America and the Caribbean. Table 1 includes selected demographic and economic statistics profiling the 15 Member States and five Associate Members.

The Member States, with all of their unique migration and social structures, are adding a new dimension to the region. For example, while Belize resembles other Caribbean countries by way of its colonial experiences, its geographic location introduces a unique element to the migration equation (Babcock and Conway, 2000). In the 1980s, a large flow of asylum seekers from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala entered Belize due to political and economic crises in those countries. Also, recent political unrest in Venezuela have resulted in an estimated 40,000 migrants entering Trinidad and Tobago, and unknown numbers crossing the border to Guyana (BBC, 2019). In fact, out of all Caribbean islands, Trinidad and Tobago has received the greatest number of asylum-seekers from Venezuela in 2018 (IOM, 2018b).

**Table 1: Selected demographic and economic statistics for CARICOM Members**

Country	Population (2019)	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	HDI value (2019)	GNI Per Capita (Atlas, USD\$, 2019)	Main Economic Activities
Anguilla	17,422	91	-	-	Tourism, international banking
Antigua and Barbuda	96,286	447	0.778	16,600	Tourism
Bahamas	385,640	13,880	0.814	33,460	Tourism, international banking
Barbados	286,641	430	0.814	17,380	Light industry, tourism
Belize	383,071	22,966	0.716	4,480	Tourism, agriculture (sugar, bananas)
Bermuda	71,176	54	-	117,730	International banking, tourism
British Virgin Islands	35,802	151	-	-	Tourism, international banking
Cayman Islands	59,613	264	-	47,320 (2017)	Tourism, International banking
Dominica	71,625	751	0.742	7,920	Agriculture, tourism
Grenada	111,454	349	0.779	9,840	Tourism
Guyana	779,004	214,969	0.682	6,630	Mining (bauxite and gold), agriculture (sugar), oil
Haiti	11,123,176	27,750	0.510	1,330	Remittances
Jamaica	2,934,855	10,945	0.734	5,320	Tourism, remittances
Montserrat	4,993	102	-	-	Tourism
St. Kitts and Nevis	52,441	261	0.779	19,290	Tourism
St. Lucia	181,889	616	0.759	11,020	Tourism
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	120,210	389	0.738	7,460	Tourism, construction, banana production
Suriname	575,991	164	0.738	5,420	Mining (gold), oil
Trinidad and Tobago	1,365,000	5128	0.796	17,010	Energy production (oil and gas)
Turks and Caicos	53,701	948	-	28,340 (2017)	Tourism, international banking

Source: *United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2019*

*Central Intelligence Agency, 2019*

*Human Development Report Office 2020*

*World Bank, 2019*

Over the past two decades agricultural production is playing a less important role in defining their economies. But the region continues to rely on economies dependent on single industries and open markets to generate wealth. In Trinidad and Tobago, the energy sector represents about 40 percent of GDP, while many of the small island nations (Jamaica, St. Lucia, Barbados,

the Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, etc.) rely heavily on tourism. For example, in St. Lucia, tourism represents 65 percent of GDP (CIA, 2009). Similarly, in Bermuda and five of six British Overseas Territories (Anguilla, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands), offshore financial services play a singly important role in their economies (CIA, 2019). These industries will no doubt have implications for the labour markets second generation return migrants will enter upon their return.

In all cases, their economies are characterized by high involvement of foreign investments, often in the form of transnational corporations; high ratio of international trade to national product; high concentration of exports to developed countries; high import of food, manufactured goods, technology and managerial skills; high levels of external borrowing and debt financing; high level of expatriate ownership of land; and high expatriate control of production, distribution and exchange (Bronfman, 2007; Thompson, 2015). There is a deep-seated imbalance in the region's economic situation. "The prevailing view is that most Caribbean countries are endowed with natural resources, but they are restricted in their capacity for economic diversity" (Thompson, 2015, 103). It appears that the single-focused sugar industry during slavery has been replaced by monopoly and foreign ownership. But this focus on foreign investments and foreign ownership helps the region maintain a connection with the North that often serves labour migrants well.

Over the years, the Caribbean has adopted various strategies to promote growth and prosperity. One of its most important achievements in recent decades is the creation of an education and training system, inherited from its colonial history, that has enabled the vast

majority of its young people to access primary and secondary education. The system includes a network of colleges and universities that offer flexible degree and diploma programmes blending a strong Caribbean character and selected global principles (Hickling-Hudson, 2004). While the existence of a college and university network is not likely to motivate migrants returning to the Caribbean, the findings highlighted in Chapters 5 and 6 will show that second generation returnees are in fact benefiting from CARICOM's college and university system.

Today, most Caribbean countries are classified as middle- or upper middle income, where tourism along with the offshore banking have contributed greatly to their prosperity. However, much of the money spent by tourists or generated by overseas banking does not accrue to the people of the Caribbean but rather to foreign companies and investors (Thompson, 2015).

There are four countries in the region having high-income status (Bahamas, Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago). In fact, Trinidad and Tobago with a population of 1.3 million and per capita GNI of US\$16,020 is described as having a "sophisticated economy for a country of its size" (Commonwealth, 2016), and paradoxically, has a weak tourism sector. Also, St. Kitts and Nevis only moved into high-income status for the first time in 2018. Haiti, with a per capita GNI of US\$1,360, is the only country in the region with low-income status (World Bank, 2018). See Table 1 for details.


Despite these promising economic prospects in key countries, generally, CARICOM Member States struggle with the long existing challenges of weak economies with limited absorptive capacity, persistent poverty, an education-employment skills mis-match, and high unemployment, especially among youth and women. The medium age for the region is 30.2

years, compared to 37.9 for North America and 41.4 for Europe (CARICOM Secretariat, 2017).

This younger age relative to the North provides some context to the return of second generation immigrants who themselves tend to be younger than previous returnees.

With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, youth unemployment rates are between 18 and 47 percent, which are twice to three times the rates for adults. Youth account for 28 to 50 percent of all unemployed persons (UNDP, 2016). And it is worth noting that female youth unemployment is usually significantly higher than males, despite having higher educational achievement. See Figure 1 for unemployment rates among adults and youth for selected countries.

**Figure 1: Unemployment rates for Caribbean adults and youth, by gender, selected countries, 2015**



Source: CARICOM Regional Statistical Database, 2015

Further, youth seeking to enter the labour market for the first time often find the length of transition from school to work demotivating. In a survey conducted by the Statistical Institute

of Jamaica and the International Labour Organization, in 2013, youth from the poorest quintile took as long as 73 months to transition to employment, while youth from wealthier quintiles took 50 months (CARICOM Secretariat, 2017). This point will prove important when compared to the return of second generation immigrants who share their age profile and are trying to enter these weak labour markets.

In the same way that the economic standing of the Caribbean has been defined by colonialization, so too has its political landscape. It is defined by a diversity of political experiences “shaped by deep political ties to former and present colonizers” (Bronfman, 2010). Thompson (2015) argues that the “political balkanisation of the region” is the main reason that true integration continues to be a regional challenge. But, despite this fragmented history, the region is viewed as one of the most stable political territories in the world. The process of democratization, considered one of the major goals of decolonization, has largely been a success. Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Kitts and Nevis have the highest degree of electoral freedom ratings in the Caribbean because of their strong democratic traditions (Freedom House, 2016). As the literature review in Chapter 5 will show, countries with more stable democratic and political institutions are more likely to attract migrants than those in continual turmoil.

Caribbean nations all have unique experiences along the colonialization process. And, they have all employed various survival strategies in their common drive for sovereignty from hegemonic powers that started with early European powers, and ceding to power by the United States. The region has struggled to translate its strategic advantages into economic growth for all while at

the same time maintaining the regional integrity and political sovereignty of each individual country (Thompson, 2015). However, central among its survival strategies has been an openness to migration (Bulmer-Thomas, 2012; Byron and Condon, 1996). This openness is a key factor in the new patterns of return migration that will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3.

#### **2.4 Development opportunities and global positioning**

What does the future of CARICOM look like? And how might this future impact second generation return migrants?

The 2008 world economic slowdown hit the small, open economies of CARICOM hard, mainly due to the collapse of the tourism industry and a drop in oil prices. It “abruptly changed the Caribbean growth experience from positive to negative in seven countries” (UNDP, 2016, 139). CARICOM members have since rebounded slightly, but growth still remains below its peak. Many governments tried to spend their way out of financial crises which caused deficits to rise. The result has been a string of defaults – debts averaged 70 percent of GDP in 2012 (Economist, 2014). Among the worst economies are Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Grenada, Jamaica, and St. Kitts and Nevis. They are being forced by international donors to restructure their debts. But, despite debt restructuring plans, economic prospects for some in the region have become quite severe, and the economic crisis from Covid-19 is expected to significantly hamper recovery. In an emergency meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government in January 2020, Secretary-General LaRocque mentioned the “adverse social and economic effects that the Covid-19 pandemic has wrought on the Community” (Morgan, 2021).

Further, some of the countries have acquired a questionable reputation in international financial management and with illicit movement of people and drugs. Many are known as tax havens, casino resorts and places for drug-trafficking, money-laundering and other similar activities (Bronfman, 2007; Thompson, 2015).

But this is a region defined by strategies of survival. While it is true that colonialization has had an instrumental effect on the region, “it is not the passive recipient of outside forces” and historical change (Bronfman, 2007, 5). Many are now trying to diversify their economies and stimulate sustainable growth. The private sector is taking a leadership role. The challenge will be to create domestic industries that generate jobs and boost economic growth -- and “to rely less on government as a source of employment and growth” (The Economist, 2015, 37).

Several large and emerging sectors have the potential to generate jobs, entrepreneurship opportunities, and increase economic growth – examples include, renewal energy projects in response to an expanding interest in replacing the high cost of electricity fueled by diesel; construction, and repairs and maintenance linked to renewable energy projects as well as repairs in the wake of environmental vulnerabilities; niche tourism that combines eco-tourism with arts and culture; agriculture and agro-food industry that includes cannabis-related products in areas such as medical marijuana, lotions, cosmetic products, and cannabis-related tourism (CARICOM, 2015). Could these industries act as emerging markets for the next wave of second generation return migrants?

Its social and cultural industries also tell a story of creativity and innovation that are of deep and fundamental significance to the region. For example, this small region has produced two Nobel Prize Laureates for literature (Derek Walcott and V.S Naipaul) and a Nobel Prize Laureate for Economics (Sir Arthur Lewis) as well as the renowned Marxist thinker and historian C.L.R. James, and anti-colonial thinker Franz Fanon. Also, it is characterized by linguistic heterogeneity and complexity that outmatches other regions of its size. Further, Caribbean music forms — reggae, calypso, salsa, merengue, rumba — have gained worldwide prestige and acceptance and influenced other musical styles across the globe. And the region is home to world class athleticism having produced the fastest man and fastest woman in the world (Usain Bolt and Shelly-Ann Fraser).

All of these cultural aspects of the region contribute to how it defines itself and where it gets its inspiration. Its culture is a motivating factor for people of Caribbean ancestry living abroad, thereby creating strong connections between the region and its diaspora.

The nations of the Caribbean have always been full participants in a globalized world. Bronfman (2007, 5) noted that “[g]lobalization has not just happened to the Caribbean. The Caribbean has participated in the making of globalization”. With an openness to migration and trade, they have played an understated contribution to the economic development of Europe and the United States, and participated in the internationalization of labour (Bulmer-Thomas, 2012).

Recently, new economic relationships are being defined by China's economic presence in the Caribbean which has grown significantly in the last decade. Just as the United States saw

strategic advantages to investing in the Caribbean in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, so too is China looking at the region as part of its long-term geo-political strategy. China's Belt and Road Initiative provides an avenue for investments that will expand its relationship in the region.

The Caribbean has a 500-year history of colonialism, but a 50-year history towards independence and democracy. These last 50 years may not be a sufficient time to see the full transformation of the political, economic and social systems in the region (Thompson, 2015). However, what has been consistent throughout the 550 years is the role migration has played in its development and success. It seems that at each stage of its evolution, its people leave or return in response. The next chapter will explore the key migration patterns of the people as they employ transnational strategies to survive in an increasingly global world thereby setting the stage for the 'return' of second generation immigrants.

### **Chapter 3: Caribbean labour migration patterns**

Migration influences virtually all aspects of the Caribbean's economic, social, and political systems. It is one of the Caribbean's survival strategies that helps to explain its development and underdevelopment as well as its successes and failures. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the role of migration in the development of the region and ends with an expanded definition of return migration, including an introduction to the 'return' of second generation immigrants to their parents' ancestral homeland.

#### **3.1 Migration and development**

Cross-border migration of people is not new or unique to any particular region. In 2018, an estimated 244 million people migrated across borders to live in countries outside their birthplace, representing an increase of 57 percent since 2000 (IOM, 2018a)

There are various reasons that people leave their place of birth to move to strange lands. Most move from the global South to the global North, where one theory proposes that, the basis for migration is essentially economic, linked to inequality in the distribution of job opportunities, income, and living conditions between countries (Flynn, 2013; Özden, 2011; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Ritzer and Dean, 2015; Tsuda, 2009). Migrants make strategic life decisions intended to improve their lives and that of their families.

If migration is truly key to the economic well-being of individual families, then does it also hold true that it contributes to the economic development of nations? Since economic development is at the core of nation-building, then by deduction it is important to understand the extent to

which migration contributes to development in sending and receiving countries. Most migration scholars would agree that migration can be a tool for development.

The impact on receiving countries has been well-researched. Their governments understand that to prosper economically, nations need all types of labour – highly paid skilled workers and professionals, low-paid semi-skilled workers, and unskilled workers (Ritzer and Dean, 2015). Even modern economies understand that when businesses cannot find the skills they need, they look abroad to ensure their businesses can grow, innovate, and stay competitive (Middleton, 2011). Overall, the economies of the North have grown historically, and are likely to continue to grow, as a result of immigration (Ritzer and Dean, 2015; Schaeffer, 2016).

Rather than looking at development broadly, a number of scholars have researched the effects of migration on governance and institutional development in the country that the migrant leaves as well as the country where that migrant goes to. Özden (2011) concluded that emigration has had a positive impact on political institutions and a negative impact on economic institutions in the sending country. Another study (Spilimbergo, 2009) concluded that foreign students returning to their home country have a positive impact on democracy, but only if they studied in a democratic country.

For sending countries, especially small developing nations, out-migration of skilled and unskilled workers (the brain drain effect) has the potential to affect economies, especially in the short term, because the departure “create[s] deficits in the reservoir of human resources”

(Ritzer and Dean, 2016, 266). These economies suffer economically due primarily to their inability to compete in the global marketplace (Bristol, 2010; Thomas-Hope, 2000).

These are among the reasons why labour migration, with all of its challenges and opportunities, costs and benefits, continues to be a defining feature of the economic development of nations, especially small developing nations. Moreover, “increasing globalization at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century make integration in global networks, facilitated by international migration, an imperative for development” (Thomas-Hope, 2000, 1.2.12). Indeed, one cannot understand globalization without a firm understanding of how migration affects development.

The migration-development nexus is at the core of the complex relationship between sending and receiving countries. Bristol (2010) argues that when migration focuses on the impact on people and their freedoms then the movement of people with their skills is a tool for the development. Further, we now understand that the economic benefits of migration go well beyond the remittances migrants send back to their home countries or the wealth generated by destination countries from a more expansive labour market pool. And, recent analysis of international mobilities reveals social and cultural ramifications on sending and receiving countries which in turn have implications for development (Babcock, 2015; Castles, 2003; Tsuda, 2009).

### 3.2 Push-pull factors – Explaining the migration process

A combination of *push and pull factors* is often used as a framework to explain the different forces at play in the migration process, including return migration (Mahabir, 2007; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Ritzer and Dean, 2006).

On the one hand, return migration can be explained by *push factors* that contribute to the decision to leave one's home (that is, the place where the migrant currently resides). In past years, the fall of empires or colonial regimes have been well-documented as push factors to explain the migration narrative (Tsuda, 2009). Similarly, Clemens (2009) noted that a surge in the arrival of skilled workers in the United States often occurs in association with major political and economic upheaval in the sending country. Now, modern-day push factors that explain return migration include government policies such as economic conditions or labour market practices that restrict employment opportunities or that result in layoffs, and social conditions such as ethnic discrimination, persecution, or social exclusion in the country that the migrant is leaving (Gmelch, 1980; Jain, 2010; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Tsuda, 2009). Indeed, a desire for freedom from violence, fear, racial marginalization, political oppression, uncertainty, and economic insecurity are among the push factors that are drivers of return migration.

On the other hand, return migration can also be explained by *pull factors* that contribute to the decision to move to a new home. This includes liberal immigration laws or policies, emerging markets, or ethnic consciousness and cultural linkages, that all work to entice migrants to return to their homeland (Gmelch, 1980; Jain, 2010; King and Christou, 2011; Mahabir, n.d.; Mishra, n.d.; Plaza and Henry, 2006).

Generally, the factors that influence the decision to move can be grouped into four categories: political factors; economic and labour market factors; social or cultural factors; and familial and personal factors. It appears that non-economic factors such as strong family ties and the “desire to be in the company of one's own kin and longtime friends” have always been more important drivers of return migration than economic factors such as periods of boom-and-bust (Gmelch, 1980, 139). Even in a more modern-day context, returning home continues to be influenced by non-economic factors (Byron, 2000; Jain, 2010).

Thomas-Hope (2000, 1.2.1) offers a slightly different perspective to the push-pull framework, arguing that Caribbean “migration is not a passive reaction to internal ‘pushes’ and external ‘pulls’.” Rather, it is entirely related to globalization and technological advances that allows for transnational households or transnational communities. For example, she argues that the demand for labour for large-scale projects in the Caribbean, driven by transnationalism in the tourism and energy sectors, has formed the basis for return migration. Byron (2000) shares this view that the return of younger migrants is largely due to the burgeoning service sector and the internationalization of the tourism, retailing, and high-tech sectors.

Similarly, globalization has contributed to regional integration of CARICOM nations and is facilitating migration routes within the regional block as well as an expanded view of return migration where migrants return not strictly to their place of birth but to the larger region.

### **3.3 Key migration patterns in the Caribbean**

As noted earlier, the migration narrative has in the past focused primarily on the movement of people from the global South to the global North. And, all too often, the narrative obsesses over the implications of large-scale international migration for the economies and social structures of the destination countries in the North. While this flow has been by far the most studied aspect of international migration (Özden, 2005), this is changing as scholars in the South add to the body of research on North-South migration as well as South-South migration trends.

The research highlighted here attempts to contribute to this body of work with a discussion of the implications of return migration to the global South, specifically the small nations in CARICOM. Further, it explores the migration flow of a small cohort of a population, that is, second generation return migrants, who move for economic reasons, geo-political reasons, historical connections, or as a result of a process of rejuvenation of diasporic family links to the global South.

It begins by exploring the post-World War II destinations of Caribbean migrants which have varied from country-to-country over the years, depending on demand for labour, social conditions, environmental factors, colonialization and political relationships (as articulated in Chapter 2). Today, Caribbean migrants can be characterized as labourers and business people, accompanying persons, students, refugees and asylum seekers, and those trafficked; and by various patterns of migration – temporary, repetitive, and permanent. For the most part, this

research will attempt to concentrate on labour migrants, although as the literature suggests, the reasons for migrating are often multi-faceted.

The Caribbean is a microcosm of international labour migration patterns. It is defined by the movement of people into and out of the region in response to economic and political events. These movements have resulted in a vibrant body of research showing consistent but complex patterns of flows of people, goods, and money across borders (Babcock, 2000, 72; Bronfman, 2007; Mandle, 2011; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Thomas-Hope, 1999).

This section starts by outlining the patterns of migration that have given rise to the study of return migration, and specifically SGRM.

Starting in 1492, when Europeans explored, conquered, and colonized other parts of the world, the flow of Caribbean migration, while largely enforced, was primarily inward. However, the flow reversed when a small number of migrants left the region in response to the “dissolution of the global geo-political arrangement that emerged out of the post-World War II period” (Plaza and Henry, 2006, 41).

In the years following independence, the outward flow of labour migrants continued, initially facilitated by legislation that conferred British nationality on the citizens of the Commonwealth<sup>4</sup>. Eventually, greater numbers of Caribbean people left the region in search of

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<sup>4</sup> The British Nationality Act of 1948 had conferred unrestricted entry and the right to live and work in the UK upon all citizens of the UK and the colonies and citizens of the Commonwealth. However, the

their own wealth and prosperity (Abenaty, 2006; Byron and Condon, 1996). In this regard, the Caribbean has been an important source of labour for the North, a phenomenon that is at the core of understanding the magnitude and potential 'return' of second generation immigrants to the region.

Caribbean labour migrants tended to go to countries where they had a shared colonial history (Byron and Condon, 1996). For example, the islands of Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and other former British slave posts, have been the source of labourers for Canada and the United Kingdom (Commonwealth members). The highest migration levels to the United Kingdom were reached between 1955 and 1962 (Abenaty, 2006).

Decolonization was also a key factor in facilitating the movement of labour migrants (Schaeffer, 2016). Coupled with a growing demand for labour in North America and the United Kingdom, decolonization opened up new windows of opportunities for Caribbean labourers. There were also similar but more modest movements of labour to France from the overseas *departements* of Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana (Knight and Palmer, 1989).

Eventually these opportunities produced deep connections between the Caribbean and the United Kingdom and France, and between the Caribbean and North America. But, while thousands of Caribbean people initially migrated to the United Kingdom, when it implemented

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Commonwealth Immigrant's Act of 1962 began to impose controls on the entry of anyone born outside of the UK who was not a citizen.

immigration policies to curtail migration from its former colonies, Caribbean migrants turned even more so to the United States and Canada.

In fact, foreign policy of the United States during decolonialization that saw strategic investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and military bases in the Caribbean, resulted in social and economic connection that greatly influenced the flow of migration between the Caribbean and the United States. As a result, the United States became the most popular destination for labour migrants from the Caribbean<sup>5</sup>, in the last several decades, followed by Canada and the United Kingdom. (Pelligrino, 2000; Zong and Batalova, 2019).

In Canada, the first wave of Caribbean labour migrants arrived between 1900 to 1960 corresponding with post-World War I economic expansion and the West Indian Domestic Scheme, a program established to attract women from Jamaica and Barbados to work as domestic workers. From 1960 to 1971, the liberalization of the Canadian Immigration Act defined the second wave that favoured the admission of skilled workers to fill labour gaps in selected sectors such as nurses, teachers, and mechanics. But the vast majority of Caribbean people arrived in the third wave after the 1971 multiculturalism policy that was introduced by then Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Castles and Miller, 2003; Flynn, 2013; Thomas-Hope, 2000). By the mid-80's, the flow started to weaken as immigration policies tightened.

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<sup>5</sup> Refers to Caribbean migration from the 29 countries and territories that make up the Caribbean as defined by Latin America and the Caribbean.

**Table 2: Number of landed immigrants/admissions of permanent residents to Canada<sup>6</sup>, selected CARICOM countries**

Country	Landed Immigrants				Admissions of Permanent Residents				
	1966 <sup>1</sup>	1976 <sup>1</sup>	1986 <sup>1</sup>	1996 <sup>1</sup>	2015 <sup>2</sup>	2016 <sup>2</sup>	2017 <sup>2</sup>	2018 <sup>2</sup>	2019 <sup>2</sup>
Antigua and Barbuda	50	140	59	17	55	45	80	90	95
The Bahamas	30	59	25	30	80	80	120	180	180
Barbados	699	618	256	164	145	140	200	185	235
Bermuda	198	70	32	21	-	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	1,407	7,267	4,688	3,305	3,415	3,560	3,830	3,875	3,360
Montserrat	-	22	13	10	8	-	-	-	-
Saint Lucia	52	82	96	106	440	330	385	320	235
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	185	335	217	257	485	425	475	360	275
Trinidad and Tobago	1,127	2,401	928	2,196	345	320	375	510	480

Source: (1) Statistics Canada data (Country refers to 'country of last residence')

(2) Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada, Program data (Country refers to 'country of citizenship'; Preliminary data that is subject to change)

Table 2 illustrates the ebb and flow in immigration numbers for selected CARICOM countries as immigration policies changed. While there are some exceptions, Jamaica is a good representation of the flow of Caribbean immigrants to Canada. Note the increase from 1966 to 1976, from 1,407 to 7,267 migrants, corresponding with the liberalization of Canadian immigration policies during that period. By 1986, the number drops off significantly to 4,688, corresponding with the tightening of immigration policies. Then by 1996, the number levels off even more. While the definition of immigrants changed to 'permanent residents', in most countries, the number of Caribbean migrants entering Canada stabilizes never to rebound to 1976 levels.

<sup>6</sup> In 2002, the definition of immigrant changed from 'landed immigrant' to 'permanent residence' in response to security improvements following 9/11. The two terms mean the same thing – people who have been granted the right to live in Canada permanently.

In general, greater opportunities in North America and the United Kingdom, coupled with a failure of the Caribbean region to solve many of its pressing economic and social problems, resulted in a significant departure of its workers. The majority of migrants in this period were long-term or permanent migrants. However, over time, a number of contract workers were solicited and favoured by the North to work in the agricultural sector.

The continued and growing demand for cheap labour in the formal and informal sectors in North America and parts of Europe has continued to attract large numbers of Caribbean migrants (United Nations Secretariat, 2006), although at a much lower rate than in the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Emigration from the Caribbean region as a whole was an estimated 7 million in 2013, representing an emigration rate of 15.5 percent, four times higher than Latin America (IOM, 2017).

While the data varies by sending and receiving countries, over the years, Caribbean migrants to Canada tended to have a high level of education “as indicated by the fact that most persons enumerating in 1981 had received ten or more years of schooling” (Thomas-Hope, 2009, 19). Also, a significant percentage of migrants entered as students. Using 1996 data in Table 2 as an example, of a total of 3,305 immigrants from Jamaica, 46 percent were destined for the labour force while 53 percent entered as students (Statistics Canada data). Caribbean migrants continue to have relatively high levels of education as demonstrated by migration data for Jamaicans emigrating to the United States in 2000 – of the total number of Jamaicans age 15 and over, 7 percent had only a primary education, 47 percent had secondary education, and 45 had tertiary level education (Thomas-Hope, 2009).

The culminative effect confirms that “migration has become deeply embedded in the psyche of Caribbean peoples over the past century and a half” (Thomas-Hope, 2000, 1.2.1) and has evolved as the main avenue for upward mobility for its labour migrants (Plaza and Henry, 2006). Even with the shifting discourse on globalization and migration, it is difficult to see a time when international migration will no longer play an important role in shaping the cultural and economic climate of the Caribbean.

But some argue that the high rate of migration out of the region has exacerbated regional imbalances with the North and created a new source of dependence and great vulnerability, as witnessed by the brain drain effect (Plaza and Henry, 2006).

### **3.4 Brain drain effect**

CARICOM nations have consistently had among the highest emigration rates of workers in the world (IOM, 2018b). In Guyana and Jamaica, for example, 89 and 85 percent, respectively, of skilled labourers emigrated to countries within the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) from 1965 to 2000 – twelve times higher than emigration rates of high-income countries and eight times the world average (Docquier and Marfouk, 2005). As a point of further comparison, in 2000, the emigration rate of skilled persons was 43.2 percent in states with populations below 1.5 million, compared with 7.4 percent for developing countries as a whole. In general, small developing nations, like those in CARICOM, lose more of their skilled workers than developed nations.

The outward flow of workers from the region has a potential to negatively impact these small developing countries. The argument is that the continued depletion of skilled labour deprives the region of much needed qualified staff whose education and training was likely achieved at considerable expense to its taxpayers. Since qualified professionals play a critical role in sustainable development, their loss threatens to hinder economic and social progress (Economic Commission for LAC, 2006). For example, when countries lose medical practitioners, it makes it difficult for them to provide quality health care, or when they lose engineers, it makes it difficult for them to develop infrastructure. Further, out-migration causes small states to lose productivity, and the people remaining at home have limited opportunities to make use of new technologies (Ritzer and Dean, 2015). Indeed, it is legitimate to question the loss of young, healthy, and ambitious Caribbean migrants, and the gains that could have been made if they had not left the region.

Mahabir (2007) proposes that the tendency for Caribbean countries to lose a disproportionate number of educated and skilled persons through migration is caused by inadequate institutional capacity and the inability of the region to address issues associated with brain drain, individually and collectively. It is often the case that these inadequate institutions, whether at national or regional levels, result in poor labour market outcomes for graduates. That is why Thomas-Hope (2002) noted that migration from the Caribbean usually takes place in one of three critical stages in their career: after graduation from high school, after graduation from a tertiary education institution, or after a few years of working experience.

Several scholars have concluded that this high level of skills depletion or brain drain from the region outweighs any advantages accrued (Beine et al. 2008, Bristol, 2010; Downes, 2006).

But, the fact that the best minds of the region leave is not solely problematic. While labour migrants leave with skills and strip away current and future investments in education that could benefit their country's future growth, they often contribute remittances that inject much needed revenue in communities (Bristol, 2010; Gmelch, 1980; Mandle, 2011; Potter, 2006). Further, the loss of the skilled labour may be only temporary since many younger migrants and retirees may choose to return to their home countries.

Intuitively, there is much to be gained by individuals and the community when migrants develop skills and perspectives from abroad, and return to small island nations, especially when the migrants are students or persons early in their professional lives. Upon their return, they bring with them resources and knowledge that have the potential to benefit economies.

CARICOM governments recognize that return migrants can make important contributions to their communities. They bring foreign currency, innovation and knowledge, they hire builders and tradespeople to build or renovate family homes. And, some returnees may enter the labour market as professionals or labourers, to work in the growing tourism and service sector, or with an entrepreneurial spirit that can help to rejuvenate communities (Thomas-Hope, 1999; Gmelch, 1980; Plaza and Henry, 2006). This point will be discussed further in Chapter 5 that provides an extensive literature review on SGRM that will explore the potential for the 'return' of second generation immigrants to contribute to CARICOM's labour market.

## **Chapter 4: Methodology**

The research presented in this thesis will attempt to add to the small body of scholarly articles by authors who have explored the 'return' of second generation immigrants to the Caribbean. It is designed to answer four questions:

1. What are the political, economic and social structures and networks in the countries in the North and the countries in the Caribbean that encourage second generation immigrants to relocate (i.e. push-pull factors)?
2. What are the patterns in SGRM across the Caribbean region (i.e. destination of migrants)?
3. What is the economic and social status of second generation return migrants in their new homes in the Caribbean?
4. What measures can the region employ to incentivize SGRM?

Collectively, these questions will explore the contribution that second generation return migrants are making to Caribbean migration patterns, and their potential to contribute economically and socially to the region. The first question is intended to test the factors that influenced second generation immigrants to leave their country of birth (push factors), or that incentivized them to move to the region (pull factors). The second question is intended to explore the places that second generation migrants relocate to, such as their parents' place of birth or the broader region. The third question is intended to test the economic and social impact on the region. And the fourth question is intended seek to understand whether there

are measures that governments could employ to incentivize second generation migrants to return to the region thereby assisting with their successful entry into the labour market.

The research uses a mixed-method approach consisting of a literature review and focused data collection (using in-depth interviews and an e-survey) from second generation immigrants who have relocated to the Caribbean.

The literature reviewed includes a wide range of scholarly papers by leading authors from the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Greece, and beyond as well as a selection of policy documents and print media that covered topics related to international migration, international development, and international political economy. The vast majority of papers were specific to the Caribbean, however, a number of them touched on issues beyond a narrow understanding of the region.

It should be noted that the Caribbean as a whole, but specifically, the CARICOM Member States that are the focus of this research, suffers from significant data limitations. All too often, data for the smaller countries are not disaggregated from the broader definition for Latin America and the Caribbean. Or sub-regional statistics for the Caribbean include larger countries such as Cuba and Dominican Republic which are not included in this research. Further, many of the scholarly articles on the topic of SGRM tended to come from the early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This may be a reflection of the difficulty in accessing funding for a sub-region that is often overlooked because of the small size of its populations.

To be eligible to participate in the research, participants had to have been born to at least one Caribbean parent, but were themselves born outside of the Caribbean or had left the Caribbean prior to 10 years old. Therefore, they would have spent their formative years outside the region. Then, these second generation immigrants would have relocated to the Caribbean in their adult years to live or work.

When potential participants were identified, they were offered the option of an interview or an e-survey. Anyone participating in an interview or e-survey were invited to solicit, on a voluntary basis, other participants in their networks.

Participants had to complete a consent form which was incorporated in the e-survey design, or provided electronically or in print format prior to being interviewed. The consent form included basic information about the purpose of the research, the time commitment, confidentiality and data protection measures, what the informant could expect from their participation as well as contact information to ask further information about the research and any concerns.

Those participants completing the e-survey questions had to scroll through the consent form and accept its content prior to starting the questionnaire. The extent to which any of these respondents read the information in the form is unknown. On the other hand, all of the interviewees were provided detailed information about the form to seek their consent to be interviewed. And all interviewees signed and returned the consent form to the Principal Researcher without hesitation. The extent to which the interviewees read or retained the

consent form is largely unknown. However, they all commented that they were entirely comfortable with participating in the research because they either knew the Principal Researcher or the person in the Principal Researcher's network who had solicited their participation. It is important to note that in the Caribbean, social networks play a critical role in building trust which often have more validity than information in a formal way such as the format used in this consent form.

The interview consisted of open-ended questions that were posed during an informal but structured discussion to allow the informant to tell their story their way. The Principal Researcher conducted all of the interviews and used a semi-structured Interview Guide to conduct the interviews. See Annex B for the Interview Guide.

In the e-survey, there were 38 forced-choice and 10 open-ended questions (see Annex C for a mock-up of the e-survey). The flow and essence of the questions closely matched the probe questions in the Interview Guide which were divided into five categories:

- Basic profile of the participants such as their parents' place of birth, their place of birth, age, gender, education, and area of study;
- Status of the participant prior to moving to the Caribbean such as country of residence, employment status, sector of employment, occupational field, and employment income;
- When and why the participant decided to move, and where in the Caribbean;
- Employment experiences of the participant while in the Caribbean such as length of time to find employment, employment status, sector of employment, occupational field, employment income, and level of satisfaction; and

- Experience with integrating into Caribbean life such as participation in social and cultural activities in the community.

It was always anticipated that this unique cohort of migrants would be a small and exclusive group of participants in labour market migration. Initially, the intention was to start interviews and e-surveys with informants from the Principal Researcher's network (including, individuals who were known to the researcher, individuals who the researcher had met during previous visits to the Caribbean, or individuals who were friends of friends). This would be followed by snowball sampling to collect up to 15 interviewees and up to 30 e-survey questionnaires.

The Principal Researcher had planned on conducting fieldwork in the Caribbean to improve the likelihood of conducting face-to-face meetings in the places where these migrants live. For example, the intention was to tap into contacts at the University of the West Indies, social networks or associations in the region while focusing on Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadine, and Trinidad and Tobago. Also, the Principal Researcher had hoped to meet officials in various ministries to access information and data that was not in the public domain.

However, the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic brought the fieldwork to an abrupt halt in March 2020, ending any possibility of face-to-face meetings. Many of the potential contacts had been affected by lockdowns in their respective countries that resulted in the upending of social networks. The Principal Researcher made the decision to return to Canada and not actively seek out participants during the early days of the pandemic.

When it became clear that the window of opportunity to interview potential returnees had closed, in May 2020, the methodology for the fieldwork was revisited by soliciting other researchers and community advocates to assist with the identification of second generation returnees, rather than attempting to meet returnees directly.

Generally, the pandemic restricted the ability to secure a substantive number of initial participants. In the end, the fieldwork started with only three returnees who were known to the Principal Researcher.

The lack of a large initial list of participants limited opportunities to rely on snowball sampling to meet the targets. Ultimately, informants were recommended by friends, a professional associate, or by other informants. The Principal Researcher also used social media to reach out to Caribbean associations in Ottawa to entice participation in the e-survey.

By December 2020, ten interviews were conducted by the Principal Researcher (out of an initial target of 15) and eight e-surveys were completed (out of an initial target of 30), from February 1 to December 31, 2020. The interviews were conducted primarily using the telephone or the WhatsApp platform. One interview was conducted face-to-face in St. Vincent and the Grenadines prior to the Covid-19 pandemic lockdown, and one interview was conducted face-to-face (and socially distanced) in Ottawa during the pandemic. Interviews took on average 39 minutes and e-surveys took on average 12 minutes to complete.

The methodology used to collect the data could have resulted in a selection bias. For example, a significant number of interviewees were identified by a professional associate. This could have resulted in a sample skewed towards his characteristics and status.

Generally, the pandemic had no impact on the migration stories of those interviewed. Only one migrant mentioned the pandemic, and this person had migrated to the Caribbean region within a year of this research. In fact, the migrant noted that she was more comfortable being in the Caribbean during the pandemic than in the North where the number of cases were more acute. Another migrant had returned to her place of birth for what was supposed to be a short visit, but was stranded there due to border closures. Other interviewees had migrated to the region well before the pandemic and had either already returned to their country of birth or were permanently established in the Caribbean with no intention of returning to the North.

In the case of the e-survey participants, six of the surveys were completed prior to the full onset of the pandemic and two were completed well after the pandemic was in effect, and after participants had been permanently established in the region.

The 18 participants resulted in a non-random sample of individuals born in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and who had migrated to eight countries in the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago). There were five survey participants who were born in the Caribbean but had migrated to Canada or the United Kingdom prior to turning 10 years old.

The interview guide and the e-survey were designed to allow for consistent types of data collected from the interviews and the questionnaire. And both were designed to corroborate or dispute the findings from the literature review. When the data collected from the sample did not corroborate the findings in the literature the difference was explained, where possible.

As the data collected from the interviews and e-survey emanates from a small non-random sample of second generation return migrants, it is understood that the data may not be representative of the characteristics of this unique cohort of migrants. However, considerable care was taken to ensure that the information collected reflected the region, as best as possible. As a result, the countries from where participants migrated were three of the larger countries in the region (Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Barbados) as well as several smaller countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bermuda, Monserrat, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines). In Chapter 6, the demographic analysis of the sample provides further information on why the sample should not be considered as representative of the region.

The analysis was conducted using primarily qualitative techniques. For example, the analysis of the narratives from the interviews was carried out by categorizing themes and notable passages relative to the research questions. Qualitative or textual information from open-ended questions from the e-survey was interpreted and combined with the narratives from the interviews, where possible. The analysis was also conducted using basic quantitative techniques which are presented in tables, charts, or using averages and percentages only to simplify the presentation of the information, rather than to suggest a broader representation of the sample.

## **Chapter 5: Literature review on return migration including SGRM to the Caribbean**

It is true that even after decades of leaving their home, Caribbean people often envisioned a time when they would return to their homeland. This is consistent with various theories of labour migration that assume that some migrants will return to their countries of origin (Byron, 2000; Castles and Kosacks, 1973; Castles and Miller 1993; Gmelch, 1980; Thomas-Hope, 1999; Tsuda, 2009). But, the nature of the migration-return process has various dimensions and has morphed over time, facilitated by the transnationalization of the global economy (Plaza and Henry, 2006).

### **5.1 Return migration**

The literature suggests that the movement of labour out of the Caribbean (as articulated in Chapter 3) has indeed started to reverse with a noticeable number of immigrants returning to their country of birth (Thomas-Hope, 2009). Early research placed returnees into two categories – those who return prior to retirement, usually to earn a living in the region, and those who return at retirement. But contemporary scholars use a more sophisticated classification of return migrants (Byron and Condon, 1996; King and Christou, 2011; Plaza and Henry, 2006):

- individuals who have left the labour market and returned as retirees;
- those who have returned to live in the country of origin as a result of successfully meeting their income goals, ranging from highly qualified professionals to labourers such as temporary seasonal workers;
- individuals who have returned in order to take advantage of improved economic and/or political conditions;

- migrants who failed to meet their income goals;
- those who have returned for socio-cultural reasons, including family care and support;
- and
- those who have been forcefully returned or deported.

It would be instructive to know how many migrants fall into each of these categories. However, the data on return migration is the most difficult aspect of the migration cycle to quantify because most countries gather information on incoming migrants, but less so on returning citizens or their descendants (Özden, 2011; Ritzer, 2015; Thomas-Hope, 2009). Indeed, when returning migrants pass through customs and immigration, it is practically impossible to differentiate them from immigrants returning for a visit. This explains why a number of CARICOM nations have established returning national programs or initiatives – to be better able to monitor the return migration phenomenon.

In 1993, the Government of Jamaica was the first CARICOM country to launch the Return of Residence Programme with the direct objective of facilitating Jamaicans returning home to retire, work or invest, thereby “jump-starting the poor economy through the influx of foreign currency” (Plaza and Henry, 2006, 12). In 1994, it added the Return of Talent Programme to fill professional positions in the public sector. This program offered financial incentives such as one-way air fares for the migrant and immediate family members, up to 50 percent of the cost of shipping household goods, a one-time re-entry subsidy, two-year medical and accident insurance, and monthly salary subsidies. Fifty-nine (59) return migrants were accepted in this program.

Barbados followed with a similar program, the Barbadian Charter for Returning and Overseas Nationals, in response to the contribution of early return migrants to the transition to independence (Plaza and Henry, 2006). Over the years, other CARICOM countries have launched similar programs – specifically, in Belize and Grenada – while others do not have specific programs but provide various concessions to returnees. Further, some countries also allow the children and spouses of citizens (domestic or those living abroad) to apply for citizenship, also called citizenship by descent (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Overview of return migration programs in CARICOM, selected countries**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Name of Program / Initiative</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	Various tax and customs concessions and opportunities for citizenship by descent
Barbados	Barbadian Charter for Returning and Overseas Nationals (xxxx) Returning National Programme / Barbados Network Programme (1990s) Opportunities for citizenship by descent
Belize	<i>Qualified Retired Persons (Incentives) Act</i>
Dominica	Various tax and customs concessions and opportunities for citizenship by descent
Grenada	Welcome Home Programme (2002)
Haiti	<i>Act on the privileges granted to the original Haitians enjoying another nationality to their descendants (1987)</i>
Jamaica	Return of Residence Programme (1993) Return of Talent Programme (1994) Opportunities for citizenship by descent
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Various tax and customs concessions starting in 2014
Saint Lucia	Various tax and customs concessions
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Various tax and customs concessions starting and opportunities for citizenship by descent
Suriname	<i>Law Persons of Surinamese Descent</i>
Trinidad and Tobago	Various tax and customs concessions starting in 1994 and opportunities for citizenship by descent

Source: Various websites and documents of CARICOM ministries responsible for immigration, foreign affairs, or taxation.

Most of the returning national programs involved the creation of a new unit in the ministry responsible for migration issues to encourage and track the arrival of returnees. These programs also included duty free concessions (customs and value added taxes) to returning residents that would allow them to import personal and household effects and tools upon returning. In general, these programs have been received by return migrants with mixed results.

Only Haiti and Suriname have passed laws that award benefits to return migrants and their descendants. The Haitian law grants returnees the right to reside and work in Haiti without a permit, the fundamental rights of Haitian citizens, and the right to acquire real estate under favourable conditions. The Surinamese law grants returnees the right to reside and work in Suriname for up to 12 months without the need for permits, and to call upon the help of Surinamese consular services in any country in the world.

It is interesting to note that while some of the programs and laws were designed to improve labour market participation, Downes (2006) notes that many have often been implemented in a piecemeal manner, the measures have been too costly, or the programs have been inadequate. Indeed, the impact on the new homes of return migrants gets mixed reviews in the literature. It seems that even the act of returnees making contributions to their new communities can have negative effects by driving up housing prices, putting demands on local communities for health care and other social services, and generally “creat[ing] pressure on scarce resources” (Plaza and Henry, 2006, 65). Also, there are a number of studies that have concluded that the return

home can also lead to unanticipated negative results when employment proves difficult to find, wages are lower than expected, and working conditions are poorer than those in labour markets in the North (Gmelch, 1980; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Thomas-Hope, 2002).

Thinking in more detail about the number who return to the Caribbean, the assumption is that that number would correlate with peaks in out-migration patterns following World War II. In this regard, the main sources of return migrants were the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada (Thomas-Hope, 2009). From demographic data extrapolated from the Caribbean-born population in the United Kingdom, Abenaty (2006, 106) noted that the relocation of Caribbean migrants from the United Kingdom to their country of origin from 1966 to 1991 “represented the largest voluntary return of migrants from a single destination that the Caribbean has ever witnessed.”

Therefore, the first significant wave of Caribbean returnees began with those returning home in the mid-1960s (Abenaty, 2006; Plaza, 2002), typically when migrants were around retirement age. As illustrated in Table 3, the number of returnees has been gathering momentum overtime as the Caribbean diaspora grows and ages. In all but two countries (Bahamas and Bermuda), there is a steady increase to the 1991-2001 period.

The data in Table 3 is reflective of the challenges associated with identifying return migrants. A number of countries did not have available data on the number of returnees, namely Grenada, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. In addition, in some countries the data was unavailable for certain years, namely Bermuda and Dominica.

**Table 3: Return migrants by year of return, selected countries**

Country	Before 1980	1980-1990	1991-2001	Unknown	Total
Antigua and Barbuda	935	1,091	2,287	883	5,197
Bahamas	-	6,915	6,644	-	13,559
Barbados	2,871	2,659	5,104	-	10,634
Belize	877	1,072	2,923	-	4,872
Bermuda	-	2,810	1,323	-	4,133
Dominica	-	11,828	503		12,583
Jamaica	8,894	9,450	27,794	9,450	55,589
Montserrat	153	108	575	63	898
Saint Kitts and Nevis	621	738	2,408	117	3,884
Saint Lucia	1,343	1,439	4,318	2,494	9,596
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-	-	4,221	66,132	70,353

*Source: Population Census for the relevant countries, 2000-01 (Data unavailable for Grenada, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago)*

Prior to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Census data from a number of selected countries revealed telling information about the reasons that migrants return to the Caribbean. As illustrated in Table 4, the main reason for returning was a desire to live in the place regarded as home. In two of the smaller countries in the region, Monserrat and Antigua and Barbuda, this reason was given by more than 50 percent of the returnees, and in all countries this reason was given by more than one-third of the returnees. Jamaica recorded the largest percentage of retired returnees (18 percent). And, starting a business or employment registered relatively low on the reason for returning for return migrants. It will be interesting to observe whether this reason registers among the sample of second generation returnees discussed in Chapter 6.


**Table 4: Percentage of return migrants to the Caribbean by reason for returning, selected countries**

	It's Home	Family	Home-sick	Achieved goals	Start a business	Work	Retired	Health	Weather	De-ported	Other	Un-known	Total
Antigua and Barbuda	51	33	5	-	1	-	3	-	-	1	6	-	5,197
Dominica	38	39	2	-	2	-	6	-	-	1	12	-	12,583
Grenada	36	39	-	-	2	-	12	-	-	1	10	-	7,278
Jamaica	41		-	8		2	18	6	2	3	8	12	55,589
Montserrat	54	31	5	-	1	-	3	-	-	1	5	-	898
St. Kitts and Nevis	42	36	-	-	2	-	6	-	-	1	13	-	3,884
St. Lucia	36	44	-	-	1	-	7	-	-	1	11	-	9,596
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	3	4	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	89	70,353

Source: Population Census for the relevant countries, 2000-01 (Data unavailable for Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago)

Further, looking at migration data collected from the 2001 Census for Jamaica, Figure 3 shows the progressively larger numbers of returnees in the 65 plus age group leading up to 1990-1999. This confirms the research conducted to date that indicates that returnees tended to be in retirement age. Byron (2000) also concluded that a disproportionately high number of returnees from the United Kingdom during this time were 60 years or older. However, he found that returnees from Canada and the United States were largely under 45 years old, consisting primarily of returnees from seasonal agricultural programs.

**Figure 3: Number of return migrants by age group, Jamaica, 2001**



Source: Jamaica Population Census, 2001

Thomas-Hope (2002) looked at return migration data from Canada and the United States to four CARICOM countries and found that more than half of the population entered the labour market as paid employees or as self-employed persons, suggesting that these returnees were able to find employment even though they did not see their return as being motivated by employment. Chapter 5 will add further perspective on the reasons that people return to the Caribbean, but it appears that the reasons for returning are closely related to the age of the migrants as well as the country to which they are returning.

From the large body of research on the many variations on the theme of returning, the characteristics of Caribbean returnees have been described as diverse. Some migrants have returned on a permanent basis while retaining dual citizenship and maintaining multiple connections to their homeland and their home abroad (Byron and Condon, 1996; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Schiller et al, 1985). As some of these returnees age, they use their dual citizenships or other ties to the North to re-return to the North in search of better medical care, to reunite with children and grand-children, or to escape the rising levels of crime and social instability in certain countries in the Caribbean (Plaza and Henry, 2006).

Also, there are a significant number of Caribbean migrants who travelled abroad to study. Some acquired employment abroad after studying and stayed. However, having spent a number of years abroad studying and working, they decided to return to their place of birth with credentials and experience. Upon their return, they started businesses or worked in high profile positions in the government, suggesting the success of return migration programs like the one implemented in Jamaica. Similarly, in a study on return migration to Barbados, Byron (2000)

found that most returnees pursued self-employment, in industries related to accommodation, transportation, boutiques, restaurants, and bars to serve the local or tourism industry. Among these returnees were a handful of trained nurses and midwives who had been recruited from the British National Health Service to work in the Barbadian health care system.

## 5.2 Circular migration and transnational movements

Caribbean return migration is best explained by complex, yet often quite ordinary relationships between return migrants and their homelands. It appears that return migration is not simply the final outcome in the migration process, but rather, one of perhaps many transnational movements. Indeed, many Caribbean migrants maintain residences in both sending and receiving countries and their years abroad may be filled with frequent trips back for vacations to maintain familial and social networks (Byron and Condon, 1996; Plaza and Henry, 2006). So, the simplistic depiction of one-directional migration with a countervailing movement back may not be illustrative of the realities of Caribbean people in an increasingly interconnected world (Plaza, 2008).

Most contemporary scholars now argue that Caribbean migration is best characterized as a cyclical pattern of people leaving and returning (Babcock, 2000; Bronfman, 2007; Mandle, 2011; Plaza, 2008; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Potter, 2005; Schiller, 1995; Thomas-Hope, 2000, Tsuda, 2009). This movement back and forth, often with benefits to both sending and receiving countries, is referred to in the literature as *transnational migration*. It is in fact the true face of Caribbean migration. “Transnational migration is the process by which immigrants forge and

sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Schiller et al, 1995, 48). King and Christou (2011) prefer to use the term “return mobilities” to describe these patterns of movement.

All of these scholars have found that the practice and consequences of transnationalism vary among different groups with distance, economics, and politics playing important roles in determining levels of transnational activity (Levitt et al, 2005). This may explain why Caribbean transnational migration is so prominent, as the region has experienced relative political stability over the last five decades, and for those migrating to Canada and the United States, proximity to the region makes frequent movement easy and affordable. In addition, improved communication technologies that have allowed for accessible real-time electronic communications has become the basis of transnationalism. Further, as several CARICOM Member States move to middle- and high-income status, and the economic balance between the place of origin and the place of destination changes, this may be a factor in increasing the tendency toward transnationalism.

Circling back to the brain drain issue, these scholars now use the terms brain circulation or ‘beneficial brain drain’ to define a two-way or multiple directional movement of talented individuals (Solimano, 2008).

What does this all mean for the study of SGRM? It suggests that while previous studies of return migration to the Caribbean included only passing references to younger migrants accompanying their parents (Byron, 2000; Gmelch, 1980; Stracken, 1983), a new model of

return migration is emerging that provides an opportunity to look more specifically at the movement of young pre-retirement migrants returning on their own initiative. Several authors were leading the way in studying this new model in Caribbean migration: Abenaty, Conway, Henry, Plaza, Phillips, Potter, and Reynolds. Their research is examined in below.

The issue is whether the overall migration process produces net losses or net gains for the countries affected, especially when circular migration is factored into the equation. The future of return migration to the Caribbean is still very much unknown. But, it will no doubt include an expanded definition of return migration consistent with various categories of circular or cyclical migration with various mobilities and age groups. The new definition will help to shift the focus away from the first tranche of returnees, who tended to be retirees, to the second tranche of returnees with a much longer career potential, more active participation in the labour market, and perhaps an interest in establishing a business. This is the next step in the migration-return process. One such circular migration pattern is the movement of second generation immigrants who return as younger professionals or transnational migrants born and socialized abroad, but migrating to their parents' birth place on their own initiative. They could represent a new international migration trend who could play a role in shaping the cultural and economic climate of the Caribbean.

### **5.3 Review of literature on second generation return migration**

Starting from the premise that Caribbean migration “was not necessarily permanent” (Bronfman, 2007, 7), migration patterns in 21<sup>st</sup> CARICOM are extremely complex and can now

be expanded to include new patterns of return migration, along with the traditional return migration phenomenon; specifically, new patterns that extend into future generations to include the children of first generation migrants. These children are familiar with their parents' home because they have usually made frequent trips back 'home' for vacations. Therefore, they identify with their parent's home as being their home also.

The phrases *second generation return migration* or *foreign-born returning nationals* have emerged in the literature to describe this reverse migration trend (King and Christou, 2014; Phillips, 2006; Plaza, 2008; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Potter, 2005; Potter et al., 2009; Reynolds, 2011). There is a small body of research, conducted mostly in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that explored the experiences of second generation immigrants of Caribbean descent who had returned to the region in their labour market years to live and work.

This new cohort of returnees tend to have a much longer career potential than the retired returnees of years' past, since many possess some kind of university qualification, professional accreditation, business acumen, skills and technical expertise, innovative new ideas, or computing experiences. This should make their arrival in developing countries particularly important for policy makers concerned with economic development and growth.

Before reviewing the characteristics of these new returnees, it is prudent to explore five theories that could help to explain the phenomenon of SGRM as reflected in the literature on migration circulation – all of which have their roots in the classic push-pull framework as well as roots in the conceptual frameworks that explain return migration.

#### 5.4 Theoretical frameworks explaining return migration, including SGRM

The push-pull framework is often used to explain the migration process. However, a number of migration scholars have proposed more sophisticated frameworks to better articulate the nuances associated with return migrations, and in particular, the 'return' of second generation immigrants to their parents' homeland. Five frameworks are noted as follows:

*Neoclassical economics:* Neoclassical economic theory views return migration as a cost-benefit analysis. The rational actor makes a decision to move based on maximizing lifetime earnings (Flynn, 2013; Özden, 2011; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Ritzer and Dean, 2015; Tsuda, 2009).

Therefore, the propensity to migrate is based on a desire to increase economic opportunities or to generate upward mobility. In this regard, under neoclassical economic theory, there is evidence of labour migration that is conducive with periods of boom-and-bust in sending and receiving countries that push or pull labourers in either direction.

In the case of second generation returnees, their decision to move to their parent's birthplace might result from perceived greater economic opportunities there relative to opportunities in their place of birth or where they spent their formative years.

*Neoliberalism:* In the literature on return migration several scholars have identified the effects of neoliberal policies in the North on migrants' decisions to return to their place of birth (Bristol, 2010; Bronfman, 2007; Gmelch, 1980; Nurse, 2004; Potter, 2009; Watson, 1982). While neoliberalism can mean different things to different people, generally, it refers to austerity measures that have led to cutbacks in social programs, barriers to immigration, shifting focus of

labour market programs and policies, and other constraints to the rights of workers. All too often, immigrants are more negatively affected by such policies.

It is well-documented that many first generation immigrants experience alienation and settlement challenges in their new homes. The assumption was that the second generation would assimilate more easily than their first generation parents (Conway and Potter, 2009). However, there is growing evidence in migration research that second generation immigrants may also be experiencing these challenges since they have higher expectations of their birthplace. The literature suggests that some of the austerities policies noted above may be affecting their feelings of exclusion which results in them experiencing discrimination or racism, poor labour market outcomes, shrinking access to public services such as education, or general dissatisfaction with Western lifestyles, especially in large metropolitan cities (Levitt, 2007; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Reynolds, 2011). These factors may not on their own cause a second generation immigrant to relocate to their parent's homeland, but they may be contributing factors that push the second generation immigrant to look beyond the borders of their home.

*Globalization:* Globalization has always been a feature of the migration process. It follows that return migrants might make decisions to return based on factors related to globalization because it changes the relationship between countries. As globalization shifts the economic, social, and political relationship between sending and receiving countries, then Caribbean migrants might move in response to the "changing character of Caribbean society and its relationship to global society" (Plaza and Henry, 2006, 31). One example of this changing relationship is the increase in the income status of some countries in the Caribbean relative to

those in the North, resulting largely from global integration. This improvement in the living standard of CARICOM countries is an example of the relationship between migration and development, that may be affecting the decision to return by first generation returnees and perhaps even second generation return migrants (Gmelch, 1980; Jain, 2010; Mahabir, n.d.; Mishra, n.d.; Plaza, 2008).

Globalization is also reflected in the internationalization of industries (e.g. tourism, high-tech, retailing) that has given rise to the prominence of transnational corporations. This feature of globalization could be an important driver in explaining the migration patterns of young pre-retirement second generation immigrants employed in transnational companies. Because they tend to be more mobile, they do not hesitate to pursue employment abroad within established transnational employment networks.

*Transnationalism:* Transnational communities are those that are globally dispersed but identify with a specific ethnicity, and relate to both sending countries in which a migrant resides and the home country from which a migrant or their ancestors originated.

Return migration, and especially SGRM, is consistent with the theory of transnationalism.

Indeed, studying SGRM offers a more complete view of the concept of transnationalism referenced by Plaza (2006) and King and Christou (2009), Tsuda (2009), and Reynolds (2011).

The complexities of 21<sup>st</sup> century migration processes fit into a framework of a transnational movement of people because it explains the multiple ties and interactions that link people and their social networks across borders. In this context, second generation return migrants would

see their move to the Caribbean as a global phenomenon tied together by communications, transportation networks and organizations that reach across international borders (King and Christou, 2014; Plaza and Henry, 2006; Potter et al, 2009; Schiller, 1995; Tsuda, 2009). Further, in an era of globalization, second generation immigrants may not view their transnational movement as permanent, but rather a process of continual circulation (Jain, 2010).

*Diaspora studies:* Although closely related to transnationalism, diasporas generally refer to more historically embedded migration patterns of people of common ancestry dispersed across a wide range of locations. While there are various forms of diasporas, the Jewish diaspora represents one of the more recognized dispersion of people, and fit the classic definition of ethnopolitical diasporas (Tsuda, 2009). But diasporas can also be defined by colonial and imperial expansion. King and Christou (2011, 456) refer to diaspora studies as a “two-thousand-year-old term whose public and academic popularity has been resuscitated in recent years” to explain new forms of Greek, Caribbean, Turkish, and other socio-cultural migration patterns.

These theories, while overlapping, suggest that second generation returnees to the Caribbean may not be permanent residents in any one country, but could continually move across borders in response to external factors – economic opportunity, austerity policies, globalization, transnational industries, or ethnicity. Further, some second generation return migrants may “leave and return to the sending country a number of times during their lifetime thereby establishing multiple residences” (Conway and Potter, 2009; Plaza and Henry, 2006, 223). For this reason, transnationalism may have particular relevance as a framework for the research and may be the best framework for explaining SGRM to the Caribbean.

### **5.5 Potential magnitude of second generation return migrants**

Just as the data on return migration is difficult to quantify, so to is the data on the returning offspring of first generation immigrants. The difficulty in identifying them from migration data is increased by the fact that their parents' identity is not typically collected at the time of immigration. Therefore, accessing migration data to determine who among those returning are second generation immigrants is next to impossible. Further, even those islands that monitor return migrants may not distinguish between Caribbean-born nationals and their foreign-born offspring. And finally, the difficulty in tracking returning migrants lies in the transnational lifestyles of some modern day returnees.

It may be possible to estimate the potential size of second generation return migrants by examining the population of the children of first generation Caribbean migrants living in countries outside of their parents place of birth. Since not all of these children will return to their parents' homeland, the research would need to take into consideration the percentage of these children that could become 'return' migrants. This approach is the most reasonable method to estimate the magnitude of second generation return migrants.

What is clear is that in countries with a high percentage of Caribbean immigrants, such as Canada, the United States, and parts of Western Europe, there is likely a significant number of second generation immigrants and therefore, greater potential for return migration to the Caribbean. There is clearly further research needed here to dig deeper into population databases to document the number of second generation immigrants, and better understand

the extent to which they have in the past and could in the future engage in transnational movements.

One example of this potential comes from an analysis of the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain. A study of this survey by Plaza and Henry (2006, 221) found that 53 percent of the Caribbean population in the working age group of 16 to 59 were born in Britain. This percentage is no doubt one potential source of return migrants to the Caribbean.

## **5.6 Past studies and their findings**

Much of the research on SGRM to the Caribbean was conducted in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. While this research represents a relatively small body of work, it did reveal some important characteristics about these transnational migrants.

They are not the typical migrants associated with mass movements across international borders, as is often discussed in the mass media or in contemporary studies on migration patterns. As presented below, the number of second generation return migrants are small pockets of highly skilled workers in the prime of their careers. But, the magnitude of the numbers, while small in comparison to other migration patterns, when compared to the size of the countries and territories they are returning to, has the potential to be meaningful. And further, the region they are returning to, despite having seen improvements in its economic status, still experiences significant economic and social challenges that are putting pressure on its institutions and limiting inclusive growth.

Five of the most relevant studies are summarized below.

**Abenaty** (2006) was one of the first scholars to research SGRM to the Caribbean. In 1996, he interviewed 28 returnees who had returned to St. Lucia between 1972 and 1995 (16 of whom had returned before retirement age) and 10 British-born or British-reared migrants (that is, second generation return migrants) who had returned between 1976 and 1995<sup>7</sup>. Their average age upon arriving in St. Lucia was 25. The migrants consisted primarily of young women with professional qualifications or transferable skills. But, both groups of returnees and second generation return migrants considered employment and financial independence as essential to their settlement and integration process. Most of the returnees were self-employed. The return of their parents was instrumental in motivating these British-born respondents to relocate.

From another research project conducted by **Potter and Phillips** in 2001, they used a targeted group of second generation return migrants from OECD countries to St. Lucia and Barbados to study some basic characteristics of the group<sup>8</sup>. The migrants had returned to St. Lucia and Barbados at a median age of 35.5 and 30 years, respectively. Second generation return migrants to St. Lucia were primarily male while returnees to Barbados were primarily female. Both were highly influenced to return by their first generation immigrant parents. The majority were college or university educated and were employed in professional, semi-professional or skilled jobs in their new homes. Only one returnee was unemployed at the time of the

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<sup>7</sup> The data was based on oral history interviews related to a wider study of St. Lucians in Britain and in St. Lucia.

<sup>8</sup> The data was drawn from 15 open-ended, semi-structured interviews of returning nationals to St. Lucia from October 1999 to February 2000 and 25 foreign-born or foreign-born nationals to Barbados.

interview. Figure 4 shows the occupations of the returnees to St. Lucia and Barbados-’, by gender.

**Figure 4: Occupations of second generation return migrants to St. Lucia and Barbados, by gender**

St. Lucia (n=15)	
<p><i>Males</i></p> <p>Self-employed (3)</p> <p>Assistant manager of a hotel</p> <p>Part-time barman</p> <p>Civil engineer</p> <p>Head of watersports at a hotel</p> <p>Car sales executive (2)</p> <p>Office manager</p>	<p><i>Females</i></p> <p>Public sector manager</p> <p>Secretary/personal assistant</p> <p>Hotel office manager</p> <p>Unemployed</p>
Barbados (n=25)	
<p><i>Males</i></p> <p>Mechanic</p> <p>Waiter</p> <p>Barman</p> <p>Fashion business</p>	<p><i>Females</i></p> <p>Legal secretary</p> <p>Secretary</p> <p>Personnel officer</p> <p>Solicitor</p> <p>Secretary</p> <p>Computer network administrator</p> <p>Guest house manager</p> <p>Accounts manager</p> <p>Chef</p> <p>Restaurant manager</p> <p>Psychologist</p> <p>Graphic designer</p> <p>Airline ground staff</p> <p>Unemployed (2)</p> <p>Unstated (6)</p>

Source: Sample from study conducted by Potter and Phillips in 2001

Potter and Phillip’s research identified several ‘push and pull’ factors such as racism or displeasure with the educational system in their birth country (push) or starting a business or reconnecting with family and home (pull).

In 2002, **Plaza** studied second generation return migrants starting from life history interview data from a project that explored transnational patterns of Caribbean families and households in Britain from the 1950s to 2000. Using a non-random sample of individuals and a snowball technique from initial contacts, a sample of 60 families were interviewed between 1995 and 1997. The interviews yielded a sample of 20 second-generation return migrants between the ages of 27 and 44 who had parents born in the Caribbean that had immigrated to Britain<sup>9</sup>. All of the migrants had completed a minimum of a bachelor's degree in Britain. These migrants had 'returned' to Jamaica and Barbados

**Reynolds** (2011, 536) added to the body of research<sup>10</sup> on SGRM to explore the various ways that second generation return migrants "maintain, negotiate and curtail relational ties with family members left behind in Britain". The migrants ranged in age from 22 to 30 years old. The majority of them had some form of university education, vocational/technical qualifications, professional qualifications, skills and experience and/or some years of work experience. Many of the returnees used their family and social contacts to find employment or to develop business opportunities.

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<sup>9</sup> Twelve of the participants in the sample had emigrated to Britain under the age of 12 (consistent with the broader definition of second generation return migrants) and eight were born in Britain.

<sup>10</sup> The research consisted of 108 interviews collected in two periods of research spanning several years. The first comprised 30 interviews conducted between 2003 and 2005 with Caribbean second-generation young adults from Britain, Canada, and the US living in Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and St. Kitts and Nevis as well as 50 interviews with family members. The second period comprised a further 28 interviews conducted in 2007 with second and third generation return migrants in Jamaica.

She dispels some of Potter's and Plaza's findings that the reason second generation immigrants return is primarily cultural attachment to their parents' homeland. Reynold's (536) found that while many of the migrants did return to their parents' home, there were "discernible patterns of return" to region-wide Caribbean countries and that their decision to return has more to do with practical matters, such as needing affordable childcare, improving their children's quality of life, "intimate unions formed with local residents" or "improved employment prospects in Caribbean territories".

In her study, it was common for participants to return to countries that offered greater employment opportunities, such as in the tourism industry in Jamaica and Barbados. Also, some of her returnees migrated to countries to work in areas that reflected their personal and professional interests. Further, she noted that the second generation migrants felt that they were in a better position to use their skills and qualifications to set up their own businesses and develop their entrepreneurial skills in the Caribbean.

**Conway, Potter, and Reynolds** (2012) conducted a study of 40 young return migrants in Trinidad and Tobago, 15 of whom were second generation return migrants<sup>11</sup>. The objective of this study was to explore the concept of 'social remittances' among return migrants, defined by looking not at their remittances or investments, but at transnational practices and what they

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<sup>11</sup> The study used 40 semi-structured interviews conducted between October 2004 and June 2005. The sample consisted of 15 migrants who were second generation return migrants. Nine were born in the North or six were born in Trinidad but taken overseas by their first-generation emigrating parent(s) as babies or as young children. The remaining 15 migrants in the study were 'regular' return migrants who had left Trinidad and Tobago in their teens and early 20s and who had stayed away from Trinidad and Tobago for 12 years or more

mean for the infusion of social capital and non-monetary remittances in the homelands to which they are returning. The framework for the study was designed to explore these social capital contributions of migrants at retirement, in mid-life and in mid-career.

Unfortunately, the authors did not distinguish return migrant from second generation return migrants in their analysis. However, they noted that most migrants had returned to Trinidad and Tobago in their 30s and 40s, midway through their careers. And, most were characterized as having college or tertiary level education. The jobs that the returnees were doing in Trinidad included, accountants, administrators, managers, IT professionals, private consultants, artists, architects and health practitioners. Several had eventually started their own businesses or consultancy firms once they had become established in Trinidad. Their decision to return was influenced or encouraged by personal, familial and career factors.

These are five of the most relevant studies on the return of second generation migrants to CARICOM nations. There are other studies involving second generation return migrants conducted by these and other authors, using for the most part the same data sets. They focused largely on issues related to race, identity, family bonds, and other socialization and settlement issues associated with relocating to their parents' home. Relevant aspects of their findings are referenced throughout this literature review.

As concluded by Conway and Potter (2009, 15) “[i]t is likely that this relatively invisible and under-reported aspect of contemporary global migration – namely, the young returning *next generations* – will be found to be more prevalent than anticipated or expected”.

There appears to have been a lull in the study of this small cohort of migrants since the last study by Conway, Potter and St. Bernard in 2012. Perhaps, interest in delving further into their impact on the region will grow as their numbers grow. Indeed, there already exists a significant body of research on SGRM in regions outside of the Caribbean – the focus of the following section.

### **5.7 Similarities and differences with other emerging markets**

Return migration has been the subject of considerable study globally, with countries such as Italy, Greece, Mexico, Ireland, and Turkey being of considerable interest. And, patterns of SGRM are of particular interest in emerging economies in Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, and Taiwan as well as other more developed countries that are experiencing stagnant growth and social ills, such as Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Turkey. Similar to the Caribbean, the first wave of these returnees was more likely to be retirees.

But, more recently, younger second generation return migrants at the beginning of their careers are being enticed to return or are returning on their own initiative based on ancestral ties as well as factors related to employability. Taiwan is a notable example of a country that has lured back better trained and more experienced labour migrants to its research and development sector (Ritzer, 2015). Do these migrants share similar characteristics with second generation return migrants to the Caribbean?

The following three studies are summarized below to compare with the Caribbean context:

Greece: King and Christou are two scholars who have taken a great interest in second generation return migrants to Greece (Christou, 2009; Christou, 2011; King and Christou, 2011; King and Christou, 2014). Their research focuses on how these return migrants are adapting to the ancestral homeland left by parents, who were “quintessential economic migrants fleeing poverty” in search of economic stability abroad (King and Christou, 2014, 89). Many of the migrants in their research returned to Greece to experience transnational lives, not as part of a whole-family relocation, but more commonly independent of their parents. Their motivation to move was primarily based on emotional connections or socio-cultural assimilation to an ancestral homeland. Migration patterns often included frequent and multiple re-returns back to their place of birth due to disorganization, corruption, xenophobia, difficulty in integrating in Greek society, general disaffection with everyday life in Greece, and a failed sense of home, identity, place and belonging.

Similar to second generation Caribbean migrants, the Greek returnees were highly educated, most at the university level. They “were not attracted to Greece by employment opportunities or good wages”, but rather they sacrificed well-paid jobs and solid career prospects to migrate to Greece. Some either moved within transnational companies or international organizations, or were able to acquire academic posts in Greek universities, American franchise campuses, and international schools (King and Christou, 2014, 89).

India: Jain (2010) conducted a qualitative study looking at the economic and personal reasons that high-skilled, second generation Indian Americans returned to India, the ancestral home of

their parents.<sup>12</sup> The respondents grew up in professional, middle-class families in the United States, and were graduates of prestigious universities in the United States or had worked in internationally recognized organizations in information and technology, finance, and media prior to moving to India. They found jobs in India using professional and school-based networks.

These migrants did not relocate to India because of a job loss in their place of birth, but rather, most left good paying jobs before moving to India. Indeed, Jain (2010, 5) found that all respondents saw the prospect of “exciting professional career pathways in India as an important factor in influencing their 'return' migration decisions”.

Jain concluded that the motivation of second generation return migrants to move to India was mostly due to dramatic changes in India’s political and economic environment, which resulted in growth rates that greatly exceed those in the global North and skills shortages that could not be filled with only local talent. However, he noted that the political and economic environment were a necessary condition, but not sufficient. In fact, an emotional attachment to India also explained their move. Further, most participants planned to return to the United States in three to five years, confirming the transnational mobility of these second generation return migrants.

Hong Kong: In her doctoral dissertation, Li explored the question of second-generation return migration to Hong Kong by assessing the impact of a pilot project entitled, *Admission Scheme*

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<sup>12</sup> Jain conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with a non-random sample of 48 second-generation Indian American professionals with United States citizenship living in three cities in India. The interviews started in July 2007 and continued through the summer of 2008 and the spring of 2009.

*for the Second Generation of Chinese Hong Kong Permanent Residents*, launched by the Hong Kong government in 2015 to attract second generation migrants to return to Hong Kong.

Applicants to the program had to be born overseas, young or middle-aged, highly-educated and highly-skilled and with at least one parent originally from Hong Kong.

Li's thesis conducted an extensive review of the literature on the post-return experiences, psychological re-adaptation outcomes, and re-emigration plan of second-generation return migrants<sup>13</sup>. She proposed that existing theories of return migration applied to the return migration of Hong Kong's second generation immigrants were largely unknown when considering that these Eurocentric theories may not be applicable to Asian countries.

Among the many findings, Li (2018, 192) concluded that "no single theoretical framework was sufficient to explain the phenomenon of return migration to HK". However, transnationalism seemed to be the most suitable lens for looking at second-generation return migration to Hong Kong. Further, second-generation return migration was seen as a process to use transnational capital to achieve specific life goals at a certain stage in life.

## **5.8 Summary of the literature and knowledge gaps**

All of the studies highlighted above, Caribbean and non-Caribbean, add rich qualitative data on the experiences of second generation return migrants.

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<sup>13</sup> Li recruited 16 second generation return migrants who participated in interviews along with 321 second generation return migrants who completed questionnaires on their reasons and experiences with relocating to Hong Kong.

The literature suggests that there are several types of second generation return migrants with varying degrees of motivation for moving. There are some who return primarily based on socio-cultural factors associated with ancestral linkages to their parents' homeland. There are some who are your classic labour migrants going to skilled or semi-skilled jobs in response to improved economic status in the homeland of their parents. And, there are some who are not true returnees but are transnational migrants who will live transnational lifestyles linked to a business or occupation that will allow them to work in their parents' homeland at various times of the year. It appears that this transnational mobility is a determining characteristic of the new 21<sup>st</sup> century return migrant.

However, these prior studies, especially the Caribbean studies, tended to focus on non-economic issues that inform migration behaviour and experiences, such as the advantages of the move; the process of settlement, adjustment, and reintegration; their sense of belonging to a place; and their relationships with family in sending and receiving countries (Abenaty, 2006; Byron, 2000; Reynolds, 2008; Potter, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2008).

Some of the prior research covered basic information about whether second generation return migrants were employed and in what sector they were employed in their new homes. And, some studies noted the tendency for second generation return migrants to become entrepreneurs in their new home. The Caribbean studies also revealed that second generation return migrants offered benefits to their new home as they entered the labour market with skills, knowledge and experiences that filled key labour market shortages in the region.

However, the research tended to provide minimal details about the economic contribution second generation return migrants were making to the broader labour market. This is a major limitation in the current literature on SGRM because it does not take advantage of the employment potential of second generation return migrants, and it only refers to general interest in entrepreneurial aspirations, job creation and innovation. Therefore the potential impact on economic growth is generalized.

Since the argument had already been made by several migration scholars that “returnees have in the past, and are likely in the future, to play extremely significant roles in the region’s development” (Potter, 2005, 5), then a logical next step in this argument is to determine the impact of an increase in the return flow of highly skilled migrants who happen to be second generation immigrants. This argument needs to be viewed in light of a continuing “dependence on non-Caribbean persons to meet the skill needs”, despite improvements in the educational attainment of the region’s labour force (Downes, 2006, 11).

The next chapter attempts to add to the small body of work by Abenaty, Conway, Henry, Phillips, Plaza, Potter, and Reynolds by exploring whether this small pre-retirement cohort of returnees is using its experiences and skills developed in their country of birth to contribute to the development of the region.

## **Chapter 6: Findings from a sample of second generation return migrants**

In this chapter the migration narratives of a small non-random sample of second generation return migrants are analyzed and compared with the findings from the literature review in Chapter 5. The analysis will show that despite being a small non-representative sample of second generation return migrants to the Caribbean, there are some consistencies between the migration stories from this sample and the findings in the literature review.

The data collected from the sample is based on responses from 18 second generation migrants, eight collected from an e-survey and ten collected from detailed interviews. It uses their words or e-responses to highlight their stories in a qualitative manner.

The analysis of the participants' migration narratives was carried out by categorizing themes and notable passages from the interviews against the four research questions. Therefore, the extracts from the interview have been selected as examples of commonly expressed views among informants, or themes that corroborate findings from the literature review. In those instances where the narratives were unique perspectives, not reflected in the literature review, then this is noted in the text.

To maintain anonymity, the names of the migrants have been omitted, and where identities could be at risk through institutional affiliations, the names of the institutions have been redacted.

### **6.1 Demographic characteristics of the sample (prior to migrating to the Caribbean)**

The sample included second generation return migrants who had returned to the Caribbean between 1987 and 2019, with slightly more than half (10 out of 18 migrants) migrating in the last decade. The fact that this sample includes second generation return migrants from almost 35 years ago is not surprising. CARICOM immigration ministries have documented return migration to the Caribbean prior to 1980 (see [Table 3](#)). It would follow that some of the offspring of return migrants might also be included in these early returnees. Further, the literature review speaks of migration being embedded in the psyche of Caribbean people. However, it is true that second generation immigrants returning to the Caribbean 35 years ago would have returned to a region very different than today's Caribbean.

Thirteen second generation migrants were born in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and had relocated to eight countries in the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago). There were also five migrants who were born in the Caribbean (Barbados, Montserrat, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago), but had left the region at a young age (under 10 years old), and subsequently returned in their adult years. The literature speaks about the incidents of Caribbean-born but foreign-raised children spending their formative years in the North after their parents had migrated abroad. [Tables 5 and 6](#) highlight these findings.

**Table 5: Place of birth of sampled second generation return migrants**

Place of birth	# of participants		
	E-survey	Interview	Total
Canada	3	3	6
United Kingdom	2	3	5
United States	0	2	2
Caribbean*	3	2	5
Total	8	10	18

<sup>1</sup> In the literature, these returnees are considered second generation because they spent their formative years in the North.

**Table 6: Destination of sampled second generation return migrants**

Destination	# of participants		
	E-survey	Interview	Total
Antigua and Barbuda	1	0	1
Bahamas <sup>1</sup>	0	1	1
Barbados	3	2	5
Bermuda <sup>2</sup>	0	1	1
Jamaica	0	1	1
Montserrat <sup>1</sup>	0	3	3
St. Lucia	1	1	2
St. Vincent and the Grenadines <sup>1</sup>	1	1	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2	0	2
Total	8	10	18

<sup>1</sup> One migrant had initially migrated to the Bahamas then moved to Barbados to study. One migrant had initially migrated to Montserrat but then moved to Barbados following the eruption of the volcano. One migrant had initially migrated to Barbados then moved to St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

<sup>2</sup> While Bermuda was used as a base, the migrant also worked in other countries in the Caribbean, namely, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana.

The sample shows a familiar source of second generation return migrants noted in the literature review (see Table 5). That is, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States were common destinations of Caribbean migrants throughout the post-colonial era, and therefore, common sources of second generation return migrants to the Caribbean. The fact that the number of Canadians in the sample is higher than the number from the United States (which represents the destination of the largest number of first generation migrants from the Caribbean) is likely explained by researcher bias.

The destination of the sample of second generation returnees is also conducive with the findings in the literature (see Table 6). However, there was a low count of participants migrating to Trinidad and Tobago, and only one participant who had relocated to Jamaica. These are two of the larger countries in CARICOM and a major source of first generation immigrants in the North. Therefore, a more representative sample would have had more migrants returning from these countries. Further, the three return migrants to Montserrat are surprising but not unexplainable. While Montserrat is one of the smallest islands in the region, the eruption of the Soufrière Hills volcano in 1995, and ongoing volcanic activity over the years, created an environmental disaster that resulted in a massive exodus of citizens to Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in the region. The fact that many of these children are now returning to help rebuild the country is understandable.

In all cases, both parents of the migrants were born in the Caribbean, and most of the parents had migrated to the North at some point in their lives. The majority of these parents had stayed abroad, never to return to the region. It is interesting to note that the parents of these migrants were born in countries across the region and beyond the countries to where their children returned (see Table 6). In particular, St. Kitts and Nevis and Guyana were among the birthplaces of the parents but not a destination of the second generation migrant. This fact is reflective of the interconnectedness of the region. Indeed, one of the interviewees commented on this by noting that her family was “a product of a lot of migration” (Survey Participant, 2020). This phenomenon is also well documented in the literature on Caribbean migration.

## **6.2 Socio-economic characteristics of the sample**

### ***Gender***

There were 11 female participants in the sample, six male participants, and one participant who identified as 'other'. The fact that 61 percent of the sample is female cannot be explained by the literature, and is more likely to be a reflection of the non-random nature of the sampling methodology.

### ***Age***

The sample of participants were born between 1958 and 2001, therefore ranging from 62 to 19 years old at the time of the research. They had migrated to the Caribbean between the ages of 24 and 49 years old, but 15 out of the 18 respondents had migrated to the region when they were under 40 years old (see Table 7). The mean age was 31.8 years old which is conducive with much of the literature on second generation return migrants. These migrants returned to the region in their 20s, 30s, and 40s after acquiring higher education, and at a point in their careers when they were beginning or in the middle of their labour market years.

### ***Education***

At the time of migration, all but five of the 18 migrants had achieved their highest level of education beyond high school. This included migrants with undergraduate degrees in Political Science and Women's Studies, Law, Business, and English as well as postgraduate degrees in Geography, Clinical Psychology and Business.

**Table 7: Basic socio-economic and demographic characteristics (N=18)***(at time of migrating)*

<b>Gender</b>			
Female	11	<b>Age</b>	
Male	6	Under 20	2
Other	1	20s	7
		30s	5
		40s	4
<b>Highest level of education</b>		<b>Area of study</b>	
High school	4	Arts/Social Science	6
College	1	Economics/Business/Finance	3
University – under graduate	7	Law	2
University – graduate	5	Sciences/Applied Sciences	1
Other	1	Health/Medicine	1
		N/A	4
		Other	1
<b>Year migrating to region</b>		<b>Years living/lived in the Caribbean</b>	
1980s	1	Under 1 year	5
1990s	5	1-5 years	5
2000s	3	6-10 years	1
2010s	9	11-15 years	2
		16-20 years	0
		20 + years	5
<b>Type of employment</b>		<b>Occupation sector</b>	
Full-time	13	NGO	2
Part-time	2	Private	11
Unemployed	3	Public	3
		N/A	2
<b>Occupational field</b>		<b>Mother &amp; father's place of birth</b>	
Agriculture	2	Bahamas	2
Education	4	Barbados	10
Clinical psychology	1	Guyana	1
Food distribution	1	Jamaica	4
Finance	4	Montserrat	5
Service-sales	1	St. Kitts and Nevis	1
Construction	1	St. Lucia	5
Property assessment	1	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	4
International development	1	Trinidad and Tobago	4
Project management	1		
N/A	1		

Some second generation return migrants had gone on to pursue higher education after relocating to the region by taking advantage of the regional network of universities, and the generally high regard for education across the region. At the time of this research, one migrant had recently been accepted at the University of West Indies, Cavehill Campus in Barbados in a PhD program.

While the migrants in this sample were more likely to be highly educated or highly skilled, there was a small number (4) whose highest level of education was high school. Three of these migrants were male and one had identified as 'other'; two had worked in Agriculture, one in Construction, and one in Food Transportation. All but one had incomes under CAD\$24,000.

The sample shows similar educational levels as the young migrants mentioned by Conway, Potter, and Phillips who note that second generation return migrants were "likely to be more skilled and better endowed with stocks of social and cultural capital than their more elderly returnee counterparts were in the past" (Conway and Potter, 2009, pg. 5).

### ***Employment status***

At the time of migration, the sample showed a number of recurrent themes with regard to the employment status of these young migrants. The majority (13 out of 18) had been employed in a full- or part-time capacity and more than half of them had worked in the private sector prior to migrating to the Caribbean. Only three in the sample had worked in the public sector and two had been employed in the not-for-profit sector. In general, these migrants left good-paying jobs to seek opportunities in the Caribbean.

One young female migrant with an undergraduate degree in International Development was working as a full-time employee with an NGO in Canada. At 30 years old, she decided to accept a one-year assignment with the Government of St. Lucia to work on a project funded by a Canadian international development agency. The internship paid for her transportation, food, and shelter.

In another case, a commercial banker in the United Kingdom decided that she needed a change in lifestyle so left her €70,000 job to relocate to the Caribbean to start anew.

There was also a migration story from a young migrant who found it difficult to find a job in the United States despite having a Masters in Business Administration. She had always wanted to move to the Bahamas, the home of her parents. At 20 years old, she relocated in search of employment.

One migrant had recently lost her US\$70,000 job at as a commercial banker in the United States. At 30, she moved on a whim to the home of her Barbadian mother in search of a less stressful lifestyle.

Finally, another migrant had an opportunity to join a new venture that would be based in Bermuda in the financial planning sector. He left a well-paying job in the financial sector in Toronto to pursue this opportunity.

### **6.3 Analysis of research questions**

#### **6.3.1 Question 1 – What are the political, economic and social structures and networks in the country in the North and the country in the Caribbean that encourage second generation immigrants to relocate (i.e. push-pull factors)?**

This research was interested in the factors that influenced second generation immigrants to leave their country of birth (push), or that incentivized them to move to the Caribbean (pull).

This question is important because, in the case of the pull factors, they could have implications for any strategies or policies CARICOM governments use to brand itself to highly motivated second generation immigrants. Similar to the programs they implemented in the 90s to attract mostly retired returnees, there may be opportunities to attract young retirees in the middle of their careers.

In the literature there were strong links to several push-pull factors that influenced the decisions made by second generation return migrants. On the one hand, the literature pointed to the unintended impact of some policies in the North that led second generation immigrants to feel unwelcome in their place of birth, or policies that limited their ability to fully participate in the labour market (push factors). On the other hand, factors such culture, identity, home and belonging (pull) may be having an impact on their decision. Some of these push-pull factors can be observed in the sample of 18 returnees.

From the sampled participants, the top three push factors were (see Figure 5):


- Did not feel at home in my country of birth

- Unhappy with my lifestyle in the North
- Unhappy with job opportunities in my home

And the top three pull factors were:

- To connect with my heritage/culture/homeland
- To accept a job offer
- To be closer to family

**Figure 5: Top three reasons for moving to the Caribbean (N=18)**



With regard to the **push factors**, several migrants commented on their general unhappiness with the lifestyle in the country where they were born or were raised. For example, one migrant noted her busy lifestyle and the lack of time for herself. Another spoke about racism and the desire to raise her Black son in a place where he would not be judged by the colour of

his skin. Racial disenfranchisement was noted by several migrants who noted that they endured racism in school and in the job market. Two narratives stand out as examples of this:

My motivation [for moving to Barbados] was a combination of prejudice and discrimination.....My experience with racial discrimination in England was numerous micro-aggressions in every work setting I ever worked in.....I worked in a number of other places – in psychiatric hospitals, I worked in libraries, I worked in insurance companies. I’m talking about temporary jobs when I started. I can’t say that there’s one job that I did not experience either overt racism or a number of micro-aggressions....I saw it in banks. I grew up with the belief that our family was just in the UK to get an education. I was destined to be somewhere else.....whether it be Barbados or elsewhere, that the UK wasn’t really our country.

*(Female who returned in 1994 at 24 years old)*

When you’re in the UK, when you’re going into the job market, you have to be so conscious of even the simplest thing like your name. Your name alone will somehow not even get you through the door. So, you have people who are changing their children’s names to things like Mary or Rose because it gets you through the door. You don’t have as many unconscious biases. One of the things I always say to people as well is ...you don’t really realize you’re black until you go to the UK or the USA or somewhere that is predominantly a white nation. Because when you’re in the Caribbean everybody is black. You see examples of yourself. Your doctor is black. Your Prime Minister is Black. Those are some of the things that people devalue when you compare the Caribbean to elsewhere. But there is value in that because your level of esteem is a lot higher. And just believing in yourself that that is also possible for you. Compared to the UK where you have loads of students who are coming out of university and packing shelves.

*(Female who returned in 2019 at 35 years old)*

Five migrants commented on the fact that they left the North after completing their schooling and not being able to find a job, losing their job, or dissatisfaction with their employment. This dissatisfaction was a push factor that contributed to their decision to move to the Caribbean.

With regard to **pull factors**, the positive light in which these migrants saw their parents' home was an overwhelming factor in their decision to relocate. While it is possible that these factors may be overstated, they illustrate a strong desire to reorient their lives to a home they romanticized from their parents' connections to the region. The narratives from two sampled migrants are reflective of this sentiment:

Most people would think of the US as a land flowing with milk and honey. But for some reason it just seemed like a gigantic place that was not home. And I guess in making my decision to move back, I thought about being able to help at home. In the US you're a small fish in a big pond. But in a smaller place in the region, you would be able to have more impact to be able to help your country develop a little further. So that was always in my mind as I was growing up. For some reason, the US, I don't know, didn't appeal to me as much as it might others.

*(Female who returned in 2011 at 20 years old)*

I came back with that hunger to want to know about the island, and also to want to help it develop.

*(Female who returned in 2019 at 35 years old)*

This is an extremely important point that permeates across retired migrants as well as younger migrants. Indeed, these emotions are consistent with the literature on return migration where political, economic and social structures and networks in the country of birth have encouraged both return migrants and second generation immigrants to migrate.

It is interesting to note that the majority of the migrants in the sample (94 percent) who had stayed in the region either permanently or temporarily noted that they were either 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied' with their move. Even one migrant who had relocated to the region

involuntarily had still recorded his satisfaction with the move. Another migrant commented on the time she had used in Montserrat to work on personal projects:

I think moving to the Caribbean is the best decision I ever made. I would do it again. I was satisfied with it the first couple of years. I would not have had the time in England to accomplish some of the things that I have done in Montserrat.

*(Female who returned in 2012 at 27 years old)*

The sample does not fully corroborate the findings from the literature review that emerging markets of the Caribbean could be a pull factor in the decision of migrants to move to the region. There was only one migrant in the sample who suggested that his move to the region was an opportunity to enter a growing financial market in the region:

They flew me down to Bermuda. He said, I want you and I to build this business....I went down there and helped build a multi-million dollar business from nothing. We had a division called Canadians living abroad. We did financial planning for ex-pats living abroad. We were situated in Bermuda and we had another office in Trinidad. We travelled to Barbados, Bahamas, Trinidad, and Guyana....I had an opportunity to travel throughout the islands....I never considered doing work out of Jamaica because that country wasn't in [the same] economic situation.

*(Male who returned in 1996 at 31 years old)*

**6.3.2 Question 2** – What are the patterns in SGRM across the Caribbean region (i.e. destination of returnees)?

The research sought to better understand whether second generation immigrants were more likely to go to the home of their first generation immigrant parents or elsewhere in the broader region. This question is important because it helps to understand patterns in the flow of second generation return migration across the region. Understanding these patterns would help

CARICOM governments better plan for their return, and perhaps design strategies that could entice their move at the national or regional level.

Migration data has revealed that Caribbean people have migrated from all of CARICOM's 20 Member States, so it should not be surprising that this sample would include second generation immigrants from many of the 20 countries. Indeed, the 18 migrants came from eight of the 20 Member States, and had familial connections to 10 of the 20 countries.

The majority of migrants (72 percent or 13 out of 18 migrants) moved back to the home of one of their parents.

For example, two of the migrants who relocated to Montserrat, saw their moves as an exercise in community building in response to the volcanic explosion that caused most Montserratians to evacuate the island unexpectedly and under duress. Their interest in returning to Montserrat to rebuild after the environmental destruction did not transfer to the broader region.

Another migrant accepted an internship in St. Lucia despite a reduction in pay. She felt that living and working with the people in her mother's place of birth was an opportunity that she could not overlook. She noted that if the job had been offered in another Caribbean country, she was not certain that she would have taken it with the same level of vigour and interest.

However, there were five second generation return migrants in the sample who saw the broader region as a place where they could live and work.

The first migrant moved to Barbados, her mother's place of birth, and tried for four years to secure a work permit and citizenship there<sup>14</sup>. When these efforts failed, she eventually secured citizenship in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, her father's place of birth. She has since lived and worked in her father's birthplace, while visiting regularly her mother's birthplace. Eventually, she returned to the United States just prior to the Covid pandemic and has stayed there due to travel restrictions.

The second migrant took advantage of a transfer with a transnational company to relocate to Barbados, his parents' place of birth. He eventually decided to move permanently to the island, working with another company that had a stronger regional presence. He is now travelling with this company across the region, and fully integrated in Caribbean life, which he says is offering him a greater opportunity to be closer to his new home.

The third migrant described herself as a 'regionalist.' Initially, she moved to the Bahamas, her parents' birthplace, but eventually moved to Barbados to pursue higher education at the Cavehill campus of the University of the West Indies.

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<sup>14</sup> While many CARICOM countries have provisions for the offspring of Caribbean citizens to apply for citizenship (see Figure 2), this particular case was complicated by the lack of documentation of her mother's place of birth who had relocated at a young age from Barbados to another country in the region. This restricted her ability to receive a work permit for Barbados.

The fourth migrant used Bermuda as a base to conduct business in four other countries in the region. None of the five countries he worked in were the birthplace of his parents.

And the fifth migrant returned to Montserrat in the late 80's. However, when the volcano erupted in 1995 and the Barbados government offered Montserratians the opportunity to move there, she moved and eventually stayed permanently. She noted that she felt like "a child of the diaspora". She notes that now she has lived in Barbados longer than England, her birthplace, and longer than the birthplace of her parents.

Therefore, while many second generation migrants had their eyes squarely set on the home of their parents', transnational interests sometimes factored into their decisions to move or relocate within the region.

One migrant noted that she had applied to many jobs in Montserrat before leaving the UK. But, before receiving an offer, she did a number of freelance consultancies in the United Kingdom to help her through the transition. While not physically in the United Kingdom, she was still getting paid by a British company. This gave her a buffer until she found full time employment in Montserrat. She gradually reduced her workload as she integrated fully into Caribbean life.

Another migrant noted that while she was extremely satisfied with her initial move to the Caribbean, and that she had no intention of returning to the United States on a permanent basis, she continued to work remotely for a company in the United States while maintaining full time employment in the region:

Thankfully, I have citizenship in the US so was able to apply for remote opportunities in the US. So that worked out well.

*(Female who returned in 2011 at 20 years old)*

This same migrant said that she could see herself travelling back to the United States for short periods of time to set up some sort of an income-generating business, recognizing that there were a lot more opportunities to do so in the United States than in the Caribbean.

There was one unique migration story from a migrant who had a full time job with a food transportation company, but had explored opportunities to start a new business venture in Jamaica over the course of several decades. He used his connections in the North, including in China, and his connections in Jamaica to attempt several business ventures.

It is clear that some of these migrants had a strong desire to participate in transnational migration and were actively orchestrating options to move back and forth between their country of birth and the region. This phenomenon is consistent with the research on transnationalism noted by several scholars. They clearly saw themselves as having a transnational identity. Indeed, one migrant spoke directly about this concept when explaining how to ensure a successful move to the region:

Don't see the island as a trap. We live in a global world. And, by virtue of technology, the Caribbean can be your base. But that doesn't stop you from working in the UK or working in the US. Your skills will speak for you.

*(Female who returned in 2019 at 35 years old)*

**6.3.3 Question 3** – What is the economic and social status of second generation return migrants in their new homes in the Caribbean?

The research sought to better understand the social and economic status of second generation return migrants in their new homes. Specifically, it explored their socio-cultural integration and labour market prospects. This question was intended to determine whether second generation return migrants are making meaningful contributions to the economy and their communities, and perhaps the broader region. This was an ambitious agenda. The analysis used their involvement in social and cultural activities as a proxy for social impact. And it used employment income as a proxy for economic growth.

#### ***Employment status of second generation return migrants***

The weaknesses associated with using employment income in this manner is recognized as a weakness in the methodology resulting from limitations in the data collection. A larger sample might have led to richer data that would have included narratives of migrants involved in creating businesses in their new homes. This would have allowed for a more thorough approach that could explore contributions to job creation or technological innovation thereby having a more substantial and sustainable impact on economic growth. Therefore, any conclusions in the thesis related to economic impact should be tempered to recognize this limitation.

It should be noted that much of the literature on second generation return migrants has speculated on the potential for returnees to play a significant role in the development of the region. While this limited sample may not be able to corroborate these findings and provide a definitive answer to this research question, the sample suggests that the impact of these migrants on the region is not entirely insignificant. Further, it appears that the impact may not

be linear. In the notes that follow, most of the migrants reported that relocating to the region resulted in a short period of unemployment or underemployment, including significant reductions in their salary prior to regaining a level of employment reflective of prior or perceived earnings.

Generally, upon moving to the Caribbean, these second generation returnees were employed in the private sector (61 percent or 11 out of 18 migrants), with public sector employment (mostly in education) being the next popular response (6 out of 18 migrants). There was only one migrant employed in the NGO sector in the region.

**Table 8: Sectors in which sampled second generation migrants are/were employed (after relocating to the Caribbean)**

<b>Sector<sup>1</sup></b>	<b># of migrants</b>
Education	6
Banking/finance	2
Business	2
Service - tourism	2
Arts	1
Environmental science	1
Sport	1
N/A	3
Total	18

<sup>1</sup> Represents the last or most significant employment of the migrant recognizing that some were employed in multiple jobs over the course of their stay in the region.

All but three migrants found employment in the same sector as the one they left behind in the North. Education was the most reported sector, followed by the business, banking/finance, and tourism (see Table 8).

The sample also reveals that all but one of the migrants found employment in the region, generally within a short period of time. The range was between zero months and 36 months to find employment, for an average of 7.5 months. In fact, half of them found employment right away or had employment lined up before migrating. There were only three out of the 18 migrants who took more than one year to find employment, and one migrant who used his time in the region to explore various business ventures. These observations are entirely consistent with the labour market prospects of young people in the Caribbean. However, it may not reflect the weaknesses in Caribbean economies that Downes (2006) notes have led to limited absorptive capacity of its labour markets.

Despite this positive outcome, three quarters of the participants noted that the move to the Caribbean initially had not improved their employment income. But these young migrants were able to navigate their way through the labour market, and eventually made enough money to live comfortably. Most reported a decrease in earnings of between 2 percent and 50 percent.

The narratives of two migrants are as follows:

Jobs in the government [of Montserrat] are not well paid. The job at the Bank of Montserrat was good enough, but it would not have been as much as in England. It was about XCD\$100,000<sup>15</sup> and in England, the head of Internal Auditor would have been about €70,000.... The pay is not equivalent. I paid a huge financial price for my move, plus professional development, physically, mentally.....  
*(Female who returned in 2012 at 27 years old)*

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<sup>15</sup> XCD\$100 is equivalent to about US\$40 or CAD\$50.

When I first started working in Barbados, those first two months with an entrepreneur, it was a cut in pay, but it was reasonable for what I was doing. But when I started working with the school system [four months later], I was earning the same amount of money that I used to earn as an undergrad working for McDonald's. So I took a big cut.  
*(Female who returned in 1994 at 24 years old)*

Even though these migration experiences resulted in initial underemployment or a reduction in salary, a consistent theme from most migrants was that making comparisons in pre- and post-migration salaries was not helpful or possible because it did not take into consideration the lower cost of living in certain countries in the region, and the personal, cultural, and emotional benefits to living in the region. For example, the cost of living in countries such as Montserrat and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are generally considered much lower than the typical metropolitan city in the North. A lower cost of living and therefore greater disposable income contributed to general satisfaction with the amount of money they were making. This is summarized in the narratives of three migrants:

The easiest thing to do is to get on to a price or currency comparison and punch in how much you would have owned in the UK and convert that to EC [dollars]. But that's where you fall down because it's never going to be the same. One of the key things is to also look at things from another perspective. For example, when I applied to this job, I was up against one other person. In the UK, you would have been up against maybe a hundred other people.

*(Female who returned in 1994 at 24 years old)*

I definitely had more disposal income in Montserrat. But Montserrat wasn't like London. I used to love to go to the theatre, the art galleries, exhibition, performances, the malls, Piccadilly circus, and that was gone. But I adjusted. I thought it was worth it.

*(Female who returned in 1985 at 31 years old)*

I took more than a 50 percent decrease in pay. I have this conversation with my mom very often because she's always comparing what I make in XCD to US. So, say it's XCD\$100, and she says that's less than US\$50. I tell her what do I need here. And why are you comparing US dollars. I don't make US dollars and I don't live in a country that gives US dollar. I make XCD dollars and compared to what everyone else makes in XCD dollars, I make more money than most of them. And that I'm grateful for, if nothing to toot my horn about. And obviously for me it's way less than what I made in America. I very quickly had to learn was to stop comparing. There's no comparison. My lifestyle in New York was that I drove a Mercedes-Benz and I literally traded in my car every two years. It was a lifestyle I didn't need. I felt like I needed it because it's almost forced upon you in some of these cities. You make more money so you spend more money. You're competing against your peers.

*(Female who returned in 2016 at 30 years old)*

There were however 16 percent (3 out of 18) of the migrants who mentioned that the amount of money they made in their new home was not a livable wage. These three migrants were returning to countries typically considered as upper high income countries (Bahamas and Bermuda) or the high income country of Barbados. One migrant described it as follows:

If I'm comparing it to what I was making in the US, I would say that I was making significantly more [in the US]. However, it was not a livable wage, because of the high cost of living in the Bahamas.

*(Female who returned in 2011 at 20 years old)*

However, another migrant noted that his migration to the region resulted in a significant increase in his income:

There was a substantial increase in my income – I would say double the amount. Tax free, US dollars. By the time I left I was living in a condo on a private bay. I had an opportunity to work with very influential and very smart people.

*(Male who returned in 1996 at 31 years old)*

Collectively, what do these narratives say about the employability of second generation return migrants to the Caribbean? Two stories stand out as compelling observations of their employability relative to the Montserrat's demand for skilled labour. One migrant had worked in the banking sector in England, and had made a decision to move to Montserrat for a slower paced lifestyle. But the needs of her small island state were stronger than her personal needs.

In November 2019, I went to Montserrat to relax for a year. I got a job right away. I never got to relax. I was not actively looking, but they were looking for me.  
*(Female who returned in 2012 at 27 years old)*

Similarly, one migrant had planned on moving to Montserrat in the 1980s, whether she had a job or not. In the end, her relocation helped fill a need in the islands education system:

I don't even think I applied. I simply wrote a letter saying that I was coming back to Montserrat, was there anything available? I got a letter back saying that they were happy to have me teach.  
*(Female who returned in 1985 at 31 years old)*

In addition, within these migration stories, there are young migrants who over the years have made significant contributions to the health sciences, education, and the arts.

One migrant completed her Masters degree in Clinical Psychology in England and worked in a hospital before setting her eyes on returning to her parents' birthplace. She had initially planned on making a temporary move to Barbados but over time, and after several employment opportunities in the school system, she went on to complete her PhD in Adolescent Psychology. She is now a professor at the University of West Indies and imparting her expertise onto others in the region.

Another migrant initially returned to Montserrat when she was working as a high school drama teacher following her undergraduate degree in theatre. She worked in this field in England and then in Montserrat for a total of 41 years. Over the years, and after subsequently moving to Barbados, she completed a Masters and PhD in Education at the University of West Indies. She has trained teachers across the region. She is a writer and a leading cultural artist who has worked at the community college and university level. She is now considered an important member of the artist community in Barbados and the broader region.

These second generation migrants were generally satisfied with their decisions to relocate to the region – all but one noted that they were satisfied or very satisfied with their move. And, over time, many become satisfied with their employment status, even though at the beginning they might have been happier with higher earnings. It is worth noting however that their integration into the labour market was looked upon negatively by some local people who felt that migrants were taking the job of a ‘real’ Caribbean person.

Their satisfaction is reflected in the fact that the majority of second generation returnees (67 percent or 12 out of 18 migrants) have stayed in the region on a permanent basis. There was only one migrant who speculated that she would return to the United Kingdom, despite her initial dream to relocate permanently. And five others had already returned to their homes in the North at the time of the interview.

In general, these narratives suggest that the absorptive capacity in the labour market for these second generation return migrants is relatively strong. Whether this economic capacity translates across the broader region is not as definitive a conclusion.

***Socio-cultural integration of second generation return migrants***

In addition to the economic impact of some of these second generation return migrants, many of them have made significant contributions to the social fabric in their destination countries as well as the broader Caribbean. In fact, their active participation in the social and cultural spaces of the homes of their parents was the rule, not the exception.

All respondents indicated that they had participated in activities in the community other than employment. The following two migrants mentioned activities such as cultural events, church life, sporting and physical activities, or taking courses:

I did other things. I joined the gym. And, I had a friend who was Barbadian who was in the Rotary Club. I used to go to meet people that way. I remember specifically because that it was through my connections there that I was able to do a careers program at the first school I worked at...The Rotary Club member was volunteer. Over the course of six weeks, different professionals came and spoke to the children about how to get into the industry, what qualifications you need, what the experience was like.....I attended church a little bit, but more so later, not so much initially.

*(Female who returned in 1994 at 24 years old)*

I do a lot with pageantry. I have an organization called [xxx] which includes teenage pageants and holistic development for young girls. And that is satisfying. And I recently wrote a book, a poetry book. I don't think I would have had the time to that in England, or the mind frame. That was one of the main reasons I went back, to write. I love writing.

*(Female who returned in 2012 at 27 years old)*

That's not to suggest that they did not face challenges integrating into the community. Many spoke about culture shock, lack of certain types of food, or the slow pace of life. But most seemed prepared to adjust to a Caribbean lifestyle that was very different than the lifestyle in the country where they spent their formative years. They noted the need to accept the culture, its people, the slower pace, and to not have unrealistic expectations. One migrant to Barbados summarized her integration experience this way:

I was much more tolerant because I grew up with Bajan parents. I probably grew up more Barbadian in England than I would have if I had grown up here. So, a lot of the behaviours that someone else who was from England without a Barbadian culture probably would not tolerate. Things like being overlooked or things like wasting time in queues forever ...those kind of behaviours, I knew that they were part of the culture. I just dealt with it and then moved on.

*(Female who returned in 1994 at 24 years old)*

In addition to the above activities, some second generation migrants made or are making significant contributions to their communities by volunteering. Indeed, some tended to see themselves as agents of change. For example, one migrant is volunteering as the Chairman of the [xxxx] with the aim of helping young Barbadians become Olympians. Other volunteer activities are showcased in the following narratives from four migrants:

I'm on the Board of [xxxx]. It is responsible for organizing all of the festivities. .... I'm also on the Board of [xxxx]. We focus on culture and heritage. Basically, I'm very much interested in the history of Monserrat but, teaching it to our youth, positioning myself in places where I can have an impact on preserving our culture.

*(Female who returned in 2019 at 35 years old)*

My first year, I wanted to put my foot in the community and get to know people..... There is the Hub, which is an organization for children to be able to tap into the arts. I did offer by time by volunteering last season. I took time with the dancers, because I did dance as well, and the performances to make sure they had enough stage presence. So I got to volunteer with the children for a couple of years....The kids reach out to me now whenever they need help with any performances they are doing. I would like to get to the place where I can offer my acting classes on a regular basis to the kids.  
*(Female who returned in 2016 at 30 years old)*

I did not find a job right away....My Bachelors is in entrepreneurship. So, what I started doing is helping people develop their business plans – small business or entrepreneurs. I started helping them for free, just so that I had something to do.....I continue to volunteer. I provide the same services I was providing when I had originally come home with business plans for entrepreneurs and small business. But now there's a slight fee, it's nothing ridiculous, to develop investment proposals. It's a lot of time to develop investment proposals. This is something that I think I want to continue.....but I want to focus specifically on creative and cultural entrepreneurship, the area of my PhD. I want to be able to do this on a larger scale to develop cultural businesses within the region.  
*(Female who returned in 2011 at 20 years old)*

The platform has made a significant impact on the community. It is a one stop shop at the moment that most people go to find anything pertaining to the island. It has made a lot more people more patriotic, focus less on the tragedy and more about moving forward. Everything that I do tends to be around culture and heritage.....The last thing I did that was quite significant was to create a week of activity for the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the volcano. One of the things I'm working on at the moment is a commemoration of King Arrow's death. I'm also working on a 'men against cancer' initiative. I'm also working to see what kind of festival we can actually have. I also did a pageant last year.... the whole point was to promote body positivity.  
*(Female who returned in 2012 at 27 years old)*

Generally, these migrants noted that they were very satisfied with their integration process which was made possible by strong friendships and by the community. There was only one migrant who expressed dissatisfaction with her ability to integrate socially into the community.

Their narratives are further confirmation of the potential impact that second generation migrants can have on the Caribbean's social fabric. Generally, when they relocated to the region, their socio-cultural impact was as important to them as their labour market participation.

#### **6.3.4 Question 4 – What measures can the region employ to incentivize SGRM?**

The research also sought to better understand whether there were measures that governments could put in place to incentivize second generation immigrants to return to the region, thereby assisting with their successful entry into the labour market and society. This question is important because it could help CARICOM governments modernize their return migrant programs to better respond to the needs of all return migrants, including second generation immigrants.

From the sample of 18 return migrants, the majority, about two thirds of the migrants, did not specifically identify a role for governments in ensuring that their relocation was successful. In fact, they spoke about their personal responsibility such as the need to make a plan, to connect with friends and family, to be open-minded, and to be tenacious and determined. Two migrants did mention the possible use of an association of second generation return migrants to act as a support group, however, they also noted that using social media could also be an effective tool.

Most importantly, most of these migrants suggested that anyone returning to the Caribbean needed to accept the Caribbean's unique culture, political structures, and bureaucratic institutions. One migrant summarized this as follows:

If you are of Caribbean background, you will know that they are very traditional and very old school. I have accepted the cultural [laws and rules] of the Caribbean.... I understand that it is what it is....If you're going to make this move, be connected to your culture and understand the Caribbean culture, no matter which island you decide to go to, know what that is...the politics of it and the bureaucracy of it.... Accept what the culture has and understand it's not going to be the way American stuff is handled.  
*(Female who returned in 2016 at 30 years old)*

This statement is echoed by others in the sample who recognized the need to walk a fine line between acceptance of Caribbean norms and values relative to the skills they learned from the North, some of which they thought could benefit the region.

Four second generation return migrants did see a role for governments in incentivizing their return. Among their suggestions were:

- Making it easier for migrants to get citizenship so they could work legally;
- Encouraging second generation return migrants to become digital nomads with Caribbean countries as their base;
- Exploring taxation schemes that minimize the tax exposure of migrants that want to be transnational citizens;
- Making human resource processes more flexible so migrants can arrive with a job offer in hand;
- Discouraging xenophobia; and

- Helping migrants to access social services such as health care, child care, and education, and having a single point of contact to make the information easily accessible.

One migrant in particular has been trying to start new business ventures in Jamaica over the past two decades. He noted the lack of government support, and in some cases direct attempts to block his efforts by government officials and business leaders.

Whether the programs established by CARICOM governments over the years (as highlighted in [Figure 2](#)) apply to second generation return migrants differ from country to country. However, the fact that they exist suggests that these governments recognize their value in investing in the return migration of the Caribbean diaspora. Perhaps there is a need for these programs to be expanded more broadly to younger second generation immigrants.

With the responses to these four research questions, there is a migration narrative that has emerged from the 18 migrants in this sample that suggests that second generation return migrants are poised to become an ever more important group of return migrants to the region.

These migrants tended to be disenfranchised with their lives in the North. Some see the home of their parents as a possible place to experience a new life. But some are willing to try to forge transnational links between the North and the Caribbean. Therefore, they live and work in multiple locations and try to retain multiple identities and options as they become strategically flexible global citizens. While they are willing to take a leap by migrating to a place that they know largely through the eyes of their parents, they also know that when they moved to the

Caribbean, they would inevitably have to accept the region with all of its limitations, norms and values, that are very different than the places they left behind. They are not waiting for the government to help them with the transition, but they know that their transition would require the support of friends, family, and above all, having an open mind.

With regard to their employment prospects, these migrants often took a significant cut in pay when they relocated to the region. However, with determination and over a relatively short period of time, they became full participants in the labour market, usually in the sector that they left in the North. Further, their labour market participation was not insignificant. Most of these migrants went on to hold positions that were highly skilled in a range of sectors typically representing growth areas for the region, such as education, banking and finance, and business.

## **Chapter 7: Summary and conclusion**

Since the late 1990s, there has been an increased interest in the experiences of second generation return migrants to the Caribbean. A small group of scholars conducted a handful of studies of this unique cohort of young migrants taking an interest in their parents' homeland. While the research has been meaningful, for the most part, it did not focus on the economic and social impact of these migrants on the region.

This thesis attempts to add to that small body of work by focusing on the labour market experiences of these migrants. It recognizes the limitations inherent in such a small sample and related weaknesses in the approach used to explore economic impact. However, with these limitations in mind, the research suggests that the impact of second generation return migrants on Caribbean societies and economies is not entirely insignificant.

### **7.1 Proposed theoretical framework to explain SGRM**

In Chapter 5, five theoretical frameworks are outlined to explain return migration. While they are all rooted in the classic push-pull framework, their importance lies in the lens used to explain the return. They suggest that second generation immigrants move in response to economic opportunity, austerity policies, globalization, transnational industries, or ethnicity.

There are nuanced messages throughout the thesis to highlight the relevance and weight that should be placed on any of these frameworks. For example, the literature and sample suggest that second generation return migrants see opportunities in the emerging markets of the

Caribbean as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for migration. Therefore, using neoclassical economics – which explains migration as a cost-benefit analysis – would be a limiting way to explain SGRM. Further, their decision to move does not seem to be simply a matter of emotional connections to their ethnicity and ancestral homeland. Similarly, discontent with their lives in the North and related issues of assimilation and racism are narrow ways to look at their decision to migrate to the Caribbean. These second generation immigrants migrate for a variety of reasons that are a combination of a complex set of push and pull factors. For these reasons, this thesis rejects diasporic studies and neoliberalism as frameworks for explaining SGRM.

Indeed, second generation return migrants tend to be highly educated, and in many cases, have highly skilled qualifications as well as connections to the North. While they are full participants in the global world, more importantly, the incidence of transnational movements is much more relevant to their lives than globalization. Some re-return to the North on a permanent basis, while others consider returning on a temporary basis, with plans to live transnational lives. Or, they remain in the Caribbean and consider using it as a base while pursuing contractual interests abroad. Therefore, the view that return migration is a one-dimensional action practiced and completed only by first generation migrants is unsupported. For these reasons, this thesis proposes transnationalism as the theoretical framework that best defines SGRM.

In the past, the Caribbean region has been primarily an exporter of labour with brain drain being a defining feature of these countries. The title of this thesis asks whether second

generation return migration represents the new face of brain circulation in the region. The migration pattern of this sample of Caribbean descendants concludes that there is a trend towards reversing the high levels of brain drain experienced since post-World War II. While numerically small, the transnational tendencies of these workers is validation that the classic view of brain drain will need to be replaced with the concept of brain circulation or transnationalism.

## **7.2 Considerations for CARICOM governments**

CARICOM governments have long understood that international migration is at the core of Caribbean identity. They have employed a range of measures to manage migration flows with the aim of strengthening their ability to compete in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. They know that retaining and attracting the best and brightest is key to their success.

There are already patterns of return migration to the region with the return of retirees. But their efforts do not offer a framework for attracting skilled individuals in their productive years (Bristol, 2010). There is an argument to be made that more can be done to first, inspire, train, and retain its youthful population, and second, attract young and qualified professionals from abroad to contribute new and emerging markets.

As transnationalism becomes a new reality for the region, CARICOM governments are poised to benefit from this new migration trend by recouping the investments made when the region lost skilled workers in post-World War II era. But more work is needed to ensure that any efforts to attract second generation return migrants pay off. Because, even if second generation

immigrants can be attracted to the region, they may need some support to ensure that their return leads to effective integration, even if that return involves transnational movements between the North and the Caribbean. Further, efforts to attract workers from abroad cannot displace the labour market prospects of the younger local members of society.

CARICOM governments and their people need not worry that the return of second generation immigrants will significantly alter the demographic structure of these relatively small Caribbean societies. This small cohort of migrants has made the decision to move to the region while fully embracing the uniqueness of the Caribbean's social and economic fabric. They have not expressed a desire to fundamentally change these structures.

Already, a number of CARICOM government are leading the way by encouraging young migrants with Caribbean ancestry to come home. In September 2020, the Government of Barbados announced that it would table a new bill and implement reforms to its immigration policies to tackle a declining birth rate and address a human resource deficit of 80,000 persons. The bill will provide options for descendants of Barbadians to obtain citizenship (Rawlins-Bentham, 2020). The Governments of Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines already allow foreign-born children of citizens to apply for citizenship.

Also, to attract people to Barbados during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Government of Barbados announced an initiative to encourage northerners to work in Barbados for up to a year. A special Welcome Stamp Visa is being offered for remote workers who want to work and live in Barbados. These temporary migrants must work for an employer in the North earning at least

US\$50,000 per year. They will have to pay a US\$2,000 application fee and must have health insurance. As of October 2020, over 2,000 people had been approved for the visa. The view is that these temporary migrants may not want to leave at the end of the year and may encourage others to visit or work in Barbados. Further, during the year, they will contribute to the economy by acquiring accommodation, purchasing food, and participating in community activities. While this initiative is not targeted specifically at second generation immigrants, it may have the unintended consequence of appealing to the transnational lives of second generation immigrants.

Other CARICOM governments may want to consider implementing tailored policies such as the above-mentioned to attract young professionals with much to offer the region. And, they may want to consider policies and programs that encourage entrepreneurs to start businesses, thereby creating jobs and sparking interest in new markets.

CARICOM governments surely recognize that migration is a normal human phenomenon that needs governance. In addition to facilitating more regular and controlled channels for the movement of labour migrants, these governments need to put in place mechanisms to track and document the return of second generation migrants.

### **7.3 Concluding remarks**

This thesis supports the view that the migration of second generation immigrants is contributing to new migration patterns to the Caribbean, and that these migrants may offer some potential to contribute to the economic development of the region. But, a more in-depth

study that uses longitudinal migration data could help to track the long term impact of their move on earnings, on job creation, on innovation, and on the broader economy and society. Such a study would add much needed data on the true magnitude of the phenomenon and the characteristics of the second generation immigrants participating in this migration pattern. This would help researchers and policymakers better design policies and programs to respond to SGRM.

Even without this longitudinal research, the contribution of second generation return migrants should not be viewed as insignificant. Indeed, SGRM could be a new pattern that will lead to the repatriation of human capital. The question that still needs to be answered is whether SGRM can do for the Caribbean what immigration policies did for the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States in the post-war era.

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## Annex A: Research matrix

Research questions	Sub-questions	Data/information sources
1. What are the political, economic and social structures and networks in the country of birth and the home country encouraging the migration?	a) What are the push-pull factors? What factors in the North contribute to the decision of second generation return migrants to leave their country of birth?	Document review, Interviews and e-survey
	b) Are emerging markets in small nations in the Caribbean enticing SGRM?	Document review, interviews and e-survey
	c) Are there similar patterns of SGRM in other emerging markets or MICs?	Document review
2. What are the patterns in the SGRM flows across the region?	d) What is the potential magnitude of this migration pattern from the global North to the Caribbean?	Population data for selected countries in the global North
	e) Are SGRM more likely to go to the home of their parents (first generation migrants) or elsewhere in the region?	Interviews and e-survey
3. What is the economic and social status of second generation return migrants in their new homes?	f) Do SGRM find gainful employment in the region?	Interviews and e-survey
	g) Do SGRM plan to stay in the region?	Interviews and e-survey
	h) Do SGRMs feel that they are part of or contributing to their new community?	Interviews and e-survey
4. What measures should Caribbean governments employ to incentivize SGRM?		Interviews and e-survey

## Annex B: Interview guide

### 1. Introduction / Icebreaker

*General info about the study, privacy issues, how info will be used, etc*

- The Principal Investigator will introduce herself and provide of background information about the survey and thank the interviewee for participating. She will confirm whether the interviewee falls within the definition of a second generation return migrant.
- She will let the interviewee know that the discussion will take you about 45 minutes and outline the confidentiality provisions.
- She will determine whether interviewee is comfortable with being recorded and will give the interviewee the consent form for signature and answer any questions.

### 2. Background information about your parents

*Tell me about your mother and father's birthplace and whether or when they left the Caribbean. Where did they migrate to? And what year?*

PROBE QUESTIONS:

- Was your mother/father born in the Caribbean, in what country? Year of birth?
- Did she/he at any time leave the Caribbean for an extended period? Did she/he return? When?

### 3. Your profile

*Tell me about yourself. Your place of birth, age, area of study?*

PROBE QUESTIONS:

- Were you born outside of the Caribbean? Where, what country?
- What is your date of birth? Month and year?
- Which gender group do you identify with?
- What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- In what area did you study?

### 4. Prior to your move to the Caribbean

*Tell me about where you were living before you decided to move to the Caribbean as a second generation return migrant and your economic status at that time.*

PROBE QUESTIONS

- Prior to moving to the Caribbean, in what country were you living?
- What was your employment status? In what sector (public/private/NGO) were you employed and in what field?
- What was your approximate employment income (local dollars)

## 5. Your decision to move to the Caribbean

*Tell me about when and why you decided to move to the Caribbean. Did you stay in the Caribbean? If not, what are the main reasons for leaving?*

### PROBE QUESTION

- In what year and month did you move to the Caribbean?
- Top three reasons that you decided to move to the Caribbean?
- Expectation about the length of the move?
- How long did you live in the Caribbean?
- Where are you living now?
- Main reasons for not staying in the Caribbean, and overall satisfaction with your move.

## 6. Employment status in the Caribbean

*Tell me about your employment status while in the Caribbean.*

### PROBE QUESTION

- Did you start working right away?
- Length of time to find employment?
- Did move result in an improvement your earnings? By how much?
- Current employment status in the Caribbean? In what sector? And what field?
- Main reasons no longer working (or never worked)? Level of satisfaction with work experience. Suggestions for making experience more satisfying?

## 7. Integration into Caribbean life

*Beyond employment, tell me about your experience with integrating into Caribbean life?*

### PROBE QUESTION

- Did you participate in other activities in your community? Volunteering, education, etc.?
- Overall satisfaction with your integration into the community?
- What factors contributed to making your integration in the community (dis)satisfying?

## 8. Conclusion

*Wrap-up*

### PROBE QUESTION

- Do you have any suggestions on how second generation return migrants could be supported in their move to the Caribbean.
- Are you aware of any other family or friends who have made similar moves to the Caribbean?
- Provide an opportunity for interviewee to go back and add more to a previous question, or to provide any additional observations.
- Ask if there are any follow up questions.
- Interviewer to outline next steps for the research.

**Annex C: Mock-up of E-survey questionnaire****Your profile**

*This section asks questions about your parents, your place of birth, and the migration experiences of you and your parents to and from the Caribbean.*

1. Was your mother born in the Caribbean\*
  - Yes
  - No
2. In what country was your mother born? \*
3. Did she at any time leave the Caribbean for an extended period?
  - Yes
  - No
  - Other (please specify)
4. Is she currently living in the Caribbean? \*
  - Yes
  - No
5. Was your father born in the Caribbean? \*
  - Yes
  - No
6. In what country was your father born? \*
7. Did he at any time leave the Caribbean for an extended period?
  - Yes
  - No
  - Other (please specify)
8. Is he currently living in the Caribbean? \*
  - Yes
  - No
9. In what country were you born? \*
10. What is your month and year of birth? \* (MM/YYYY)
11. Which gender group do you most identify with?
  - Female
  - Male
  - LGBTQ+2

- Would rather not say

12. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- High school
- College
- Undergraduate degree
- Post-graduate degree
- Other (please specify)

13. What was your primary area of study?

- Arts/Social science
- Economics/Business/Finance
- Sciences/Applied sciences
- Health/Medicine
- Other (please specify)

#### Prior to moving to the Caribbean

*This section of the questionnaire asks questions about you, just prior to your move to the Caribbean.*

14. Prior to moving to the Caribbean, in what country were you living? \*

15. Prior to moving to the Caribbean, what was your employment status?

- Student
- Unemployed
- Employed - full time
- Employed - part time/contract
- Self-employed
- Other (please specify)

16. Prior to moving to the Caribbean, in what sector were you employed?

- NGO sector
- Public sector
- Private sector
- N/A
- Other (please specify)

17. Prior to moving to the Caribbean, in what occupational field were you working?

- Agriculture
- Business
- Education
- Finance
- Health

- Information, communications and technology
- Sciences/engineering
- Service - entertainment
- Service - sales
- Service - tourism
- N/A
- Other (please specify)

18. Prior to moving to the Caribbean, what was your employment income? \* (local dollars)

- Under \$10,000
- \$10,000 - \$24,999
- \$25,000 - \$49,999
- \$50,000 - \$74,999
- \$75,000 - \$99,999
- \$100,000 - \$149,999
- \$150,000 and over

#### Your decision to move to the Caribbean

*This section of the questionnaire asks questions about when and why you decided to move to the Caribbean.*

19. In what month/year did you move to the Caribbean? \* (MM/YYYY)

20. To what country in the Caribbean did you move? \*

21. What were the top three reasons that you decided to move to the Caribbean? \*

- I accepted a job offer
- I wanted to find a job
- I wanted to start a new business
- I wanted to study
- I wanted to be closer to family
- I followed my partner
- I wanted to connect with my heritage/culture/homeland
- I wanted to raise my children there
- I wanted to live in warmer climate
- I was unhappy with job opportunities in my country of birth
- I was unhappy with the lifestyle in my country of birth
- The cost of living was too high in my country of birth
- I did not feel at home in my country of birth
- I experienced racism or prejudice in my country of birth
- Other (please specify)

22. Did you expect that your move to the Caribbean would be permanent or temporary?
- Permanent
  - Temporary
  - Did not think about or did not know in advance
23. Are you still living in the Caribbean? \*
- Yes
  - No
  - Other (please specify)
24. How long did you live in the Caribbean?
25. What was the main reason that you did not stay in the Caribbean? \*
- I accepted a job opportunity outside of the Caribbean
  - I followed my partner who wanted to/had to leave the Caribbean
  - I was not making enough money in the Caribbean
  - I did not feel welcome in the Caribbean
  - I never planned to stay in the Caribbean
  - Other (please specify)
26. How could your stay in the Caribbean have been extended?
- More/better government support
  - More/better family or community support
  - Better planning on my part
  - I was happy with the length of my stay
  - Other (please specify)
27. How satisfied were you with your move to the Caribbean?
- Very satisfied
  - Satisfied
  - Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
  - Dissatisfied
  - Very dissatisfied

### Your employment status while in the Caribbean

*This section of the questionnaire asks questions about your employment experiences while in the Caribbean.*

28. When you first moved to the Caribbean did you start working right away? \*

- Yes
- No

29. How long did it take you to find employment? Number of months

30. When you started working in the Caribbean, did the move initially improve your employment income?

- Yes
- No
- Stayed the same
- Percentage increase/
- decrease

31. By what percent did your salary increase/decrease?

32. Are you still working in the Caribbean? \*

- Yes
- No, never found employment
- No, found employment only temporarily

33. In what sector are/were you employed?

- NGO sector
- Private sector
- Public sector
- Not applicable
- Other (please specify)

34. In what occupational field are/were you employed?

- Agriculture
- Business
- Education
- Finance
- Health
- Information, communications and technology
- Sciences/engineering
- Service - entertainment
- Service - sales
- Service - tourism
- Not applicable
- Other (please specify)

35. How satisfied are/were you with your work experience in the Caribbean?

- Very satisfied
- Satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Dissatisfied
- Very dissatisfied

36. How could your work experience in the Caribbean have been/be more satisfying?

- More/better government support
- More/better family or community support
- Better planning on my part
- Higher earnings
- Higher level of education or training
- Other (please specify)
- Your employment status

37. What do you understand to be the main reason that you are no longer working (or never worked) in the Caribbean?

- I lost my job
- I was over-qualified or employers were unwilling to pay me the salary I was worth
- I was under-qualified or employers were looking for more experience
- There was a lack of employment opportunities
- I did not have the right connections
- I did not have a work permit
- I did not have citizenship
- N/A
- Other (please specify)

#### Your integration into Caribbean life

*This section of the questionnaire asks questions about your experience with integrating into Caribbean life.*

38. Apart from working in the Caribbean, did you participate in other activities in your community? \*

- Volunteering
- Attending education and/or training sessions
- Participating/organizing social events
- Other (please specify)

39. How satisfied are/were you with your integration into the community?

- Very satisfied
- Satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Dissatisfied
- Very dissatisfied

40. What factors contributed to making your integration in the community (dis)satisfying?

- Friendships/community
- Family support
- Cultural events
- Lifestyle choices
- Workplace activities
- Other (please specify)

*\* Indicates mandatory fields*