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The Role of the Subject as seen in Modern Social Movement Theories

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This thesis "The role of the subject as seen in modern social movements" aims at closely scrutinising the predominant and popular social movement theories since the Second World War. Through the careful analysis of the role of the subject in the predominant social movement paradigms (collective action theories, resource mobilisation theories and even identity-based theories) the subject, it is demonstrated, is all too often seen as secondary or merely a recipient of social change. The thesis concludes that an ethnomethodological perspective, in which the subject is recognised and scrutinised, will serve as a valuable tool for the analysis of social change and social movements in modern society. The works of Alberto Melucci substantiates the author's assertions.
DÉDICACE

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Table des matières

Introduction

I.1 Recent trends in Social Movement Research  5
I.2 Classical Collective Action Theories  7
I.3 Resource Mobilization Theories  10
I.4 Alain Touraine: New Social Movement Approach  13
I.5 Alberto Melucci: A Constructivist Approach  14

I - Collective Action Theories  18
  1.1 Chicago School: George Herbert Mead and Social Behaviourism  18
  1.2 Herbert Blumer: Collective Action Theory  21
  1.3 Neil Smelser: Theory of Collective Behaviour  30

II - Resource Mobilization Theories: Charles Tilly  39
  2.1 The changing social and theoretical milieu  42
  2.2 Industrialization, Modernization and Social Theory  43
  2.3 Charles Tilly  49
  2.4 Critique of political economy model  57

III - New Social Movement Approach  62
  3.1 Alain Touraine- Theoretical contribution  62
  3.2 European paradigmatic influence  64
  3.3 New Social Movements  66
  3.4 La société Programmée  68
  3.5 Theoretical Contribution  69

IV - Constructivist Approach: Alberto Melucci  80
  4.1 Theoretical Influence  80
  4.2 Critique of traditionnal paradigms  82
  4.3 Social Sciences and SM Analysis  83
  4.4 Constructivism and subjective meaning  84
  4.5 Complex Society  87
  4.6 Individuation  90
  4.7 Communication and the body  91
  4.8 Identity and sociality  93
  4.9 Collective Identity  95

V - Conclusion  102

Bibliographie  i - v


Introduction

In his book entitled The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel deCerteau maintains that the work that must be done by the "experts" and "the philosophers" found in the social sciences must «consist, in a first approximation, in bringing scientific practices and languages back towards their native land, everyday life. This return, which is today more insistent, has the paradoxical character of also being a going into exile with respect to the disciplines whose rigor is measured by the strict definition of its own limits» (deCerteau, 1984:6). His ultimate assertion, the need to return to the everyday life, requires the investigation of the role and impact which the agents of everyday life, the human subject/actor may have on society. However, sociology as a discipline is limited by the traditional empirical models it uses to acquire and implement theories of collective action. This practice, I maintain, has often neglected or over socialised the subject as a creative and formative element of society and social change. This oversight is clearly apparent in the classical paradigms of collective action and social movements. A return to exile, in other words, a return to the subject within this theoretical tradition may provide researchers with a wealth of information, not only on the subjects themselves, but also on social movements and ultimately on the discipline which seeks to examine such forms of collective action.

Recent studies of social movements and the forms of collective action therein have focused either on the structural determinants of social change, e.g. society, bureaucracies, laws, or the psychological motives and responses of the actors within social movements. These predominant theoretical studies have all too often neglected to take into account the inter-relationship between the social actors and the social
movement. This has created much theoretical opposition, which results in an immense lag in the analysis of the role and impact that the human subject has on the genesis, development and implementation of modern social movements. This “theoretical lag” I have determined is the structural/individual dichotomy found in traditional social movement research.

This structural/individual dichotomy found in traditional social movement research is a problem endemic to the sociological study of social action. According to Roberto Miguelez in *L' Analyse Des Formations Sociales*, academic sociology and subsequently the theories of social action emanating from this environment are:

traversée par un conflit paradigmatic majeur qui trouve ses racines dans la situation ontologique dans laquelle se trouve l'être humain. En effet, d'une part la socialité est le produit de l'action quotidienne des êtres humains de telle sorte que l'on peut bien parler de la production humaine de la socialité et considérer les individus comme les producteurs, les “acteurs” ou les “agents” de la socialité. Mais, d'autre part, les êtres humains sont, en tant justement qu'êtres humains, des produits de la socialité de telle sorte que l'on peut bien parler de la production sociale de l'humanité. Cette situation ontologique se répercute au niveau épistémologique et, par la suite, méthodologique, dans le dilemme suivant: faut-il privilégier l'individu et ses actions ou faut-il, par contre, privilégier le système social et ses lois? (Miguelez, 1992:328).

Roberto Miguelez proposes that the analysis of social change has all too often been plagued by the individual/structural social system conflict. For the sociological study of human action in collective action and social movements, it resulted in the subject too often being seen as simply the product or recipient of sociality.

This paradigmatic conflict is clearly reflected in the theoretical study of social movements. It is through an investigation into the evolution of social movement theories, and more specifically the concept of collective action, collective identity and
agency therein, that the dichotomous nature of social change research will become clearly apparent. I intend to demonstrate that the classical theories of collective action and social movements have in fact privileged a systemic analysis of social change. This in turn has been to the detriment of a comprehensive inquiry into the social system/individual actor interrelationship and to the creative and active contribution, which the subject has in such forms of social change.

The goal of this thesis will be to examine and highlight the role of the subject in the theoretical study of social movements. Through careful examination of the process of collective identity found in all forms of collective action, the importance of the subject's active contribution in social movements will be illustrated. I will demonstrate that the role of the subject, in many classical theories of social movements has been relegated to either a reactive component or has been socially "over socialised". This assertion will be illustrated in the exploration of the classical collective action theories (CAT), which attributes a reactive function to the individual and the collective. It will also be demonstrated that Resource mobilisation theories (RMT), although aiming to demonstrate the emancipation of the subject, it categorises and over socialises the subject within strict social boundaries such as gender, race, ethnicity and class. The New Social Movement approach (NSM) also falls prey to this over socialisation through the development of a systemic and schematic analysis of collective action. Neither of these theoretical paradigms truly renders justice to the creative and formative essence of human action in social movements, hence rendering the study of social movements and collective action incomplete.
The need and importance of incorporating an agency, identity and collective identity perspective into the study of modern social movements has steadfastly emerged during the past three decades. Strategically modern social movements such as the women's movement, gay and lesbian rights movements, ethnically based movements as well as the environmentalist movements have all recently promoted the role of agency, identity and collective identity as a formidable variable in the quest for rights and recognition. Subsequently, these movements have internally re-examined and altered their views on inner group composition to include and recognise inner group identity based diversities. These have included such identity based traits as women of colour, disabled women, BI / multi racial individuals in ethnic movements and bisexuals/transgender individuals in the gay and lesbian movements. Even movements such as the environmentalist movement, which on the surface would appear to have but one collective identity, can boast divergent identities as in the example of Eco-feminists. Where once seen as homogenous groupings, such as proposed by the Marxist class research, modern social movements and the forms of collective action therein have now emerged as a complex entity. Agency, identity and collective identity in modern social movements has become a formidable variable in the analysis of social change.

To illustrate my findings and perspective, I will present an analysis of Alberto Melucci's constructivist perspective of collective action and collective identity in modern social movements. Melucci's constructivist approach will allow us to examine the subject as an active and creative component of social change in social movements. I maintain that within Melucci's framework we can effectively analyse human action and its interrelationship with the social system. Through his concepts of needs, identity and collective identity and collective action, the development of a new and comprehensive
analysis of modern social movements which reconciles the structural/individual dichotomy appears plausible and attainable.

Melucci's theoretical contribution lies in his open critique of the classical forms of collective action theorising. He maintains that the traditional paradigms of collective action have two underlying theoretical and conceptual assumptions about collective behaviour. He asserts that CAT theories, such as those proposed by Neil Smelser and Herbert Blumer, view forms of collective action as: «the simple facts of collective action, which thus appears as action without actors, the accidental sum of individual events» Melucci then proposes that RMT theories on the other hand «derives meaning of action from its analysis of the social conditions which the actors appear to have in common. Here collective action appears as actors without action» (Melucci, 1989:18). He then puts forth a new and innovative analysis of forms of collective action in which the subject/actor through individual and collective identity constructs collective action and social movements.

Recent trends in social movement research

Recent critiques of social movement theories have claimed that «a more systematic approach to NSM's requires stronger conceptual development regarding identify, especially if the linkages between social actor and the structural changes of post-modern society are to be specified»(Johnston, Laranä and Gusfield, 1994:24). The need to incorporate identity at the collective and individual level is also propounded by Eyerman and Jamison. In their book entitled, Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, Eyerman and Jamison assert that a cognitive approach which incorporates the role of
the subject will re-direct social theory «away from the abstract universals of language, structure, action, and a system back to the context in which human beings construct their social reality»(Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:162). What these authors propose is a methodological shift to the subject. This, they maintain, will reconcile identity and the social structure, a necessary step towards the development of a comprehensive theory of social change. According to Eyerman and Jamison, this reconciliation is necessary to explain what has often been stressed as a new element of modern social movements, their simultaneous foci on identity and its subsequent influence on the culture of a given society.

This identity/cultural analysis of social movements and collective action are the building blocs of a new theoretical tradition. Authors such as Larānā, Gusfield, Johnston and Klandermas all propose that a cultural and interaction investigation of social movements must stress that social movements are not just shaped by culture; but in turn actively shape and re-shape it. As an example of the ever-increasing need for a reciprocal cultural analysis, Johnston and Klandermas point to the gay and lesbian movements. They assert that «focus on the interaction level has been the culture produced during key events such as demonstrations [...] More recently, identity movements such as the gay and lesbian movement present a more mundane interactive situations-the everyday life within the movement as the loci of cultural production. Daily interaction is a substantial part of the raison d’être of these movements»(Johnston and Klandermas, 1995:13). Therefore, according to Klandermas and Johnston, modern social movements have placed identity and its cultural impact at the centre of the analysis of social movements. The exploration of social movements must no longer centre on solely public demonstrations undertaken by social movements but, through an
identity/culture paradigm, must also focus on what was deemed "private", in other words, the everyday elements of life.

It is for this reason that reconciliation between the social system/individual identity and collective identity in the study of modern social movements must be undertaken by the social sciences. It is only when these elements are equally addressed that a comprehensive analysis of modern social movements can be achieved.

Before a proposal for future theorising on social movement and collective action can be accommodated we must look at the work and theories that have been undertaken in the past. I will commence with a brief summation of the existing paradigms Collective action theories (CAT), and the work of two renowned theorists in this theoretical tradition, Herbert Blumer and Neil Smelser. These perspectives and theorists will be discussed at length in chapter 1.

Classical Collective Action Theories

The school of thought known as collective action theories (CAT) arose in the period between WWI and WWII. Herbert Blumer, in his book (1934) An outline of Collective Behaviour, sought to explain the rise and dominance of Hitler’s’ Nazism and the recent rise in European Fascism. Herbert Blumer, according to Eyerman and Jamison, «outlined a new way of conceptualising social movements as a form of collective behaviour» (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:11). Herbert Blumer attempted to
distinguish and explain what he perceived to be «the emergence of new norms in the
“adaptive behaviour”, the problem solving and learning orientation potentially present in
spontaneous collective behaviour» (Blumer in Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:11). A social
movement for Blumer is «one with well defined objectives or goals [...] It forms a body of
traditions, a guiding set of values, a philosophy, sets of rules, a general body of
expectations» (Blumer in Lyman, 1995:62). In Herbert Blumers' perspective, social
movements, and collective action therein are responsible for the emergence of "new
social norms of behaviour" (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:11). For Blumer, new norms
of behaviour for the individual stem from the movement itself through the movement's
clearly defined goals and objectives. In brief, in Herbert Blumers' analysis of social
movements and collective action, the subject is merely responsive primarily to the
movement's internal goals and objectives and secondarily is responsive to social
change. To Blumer, social movements are: «a collective enterprise to establish a new
order of life. They have their inception in a condition of unrest» (Blumer in Lyman,
1995:60). This presents another key element to Blumers' perspective, in that social
movements are created to "counter social unrest"; hence partiality was given to the
structural determinants.

The second CAT theorist I will examine is Neil Smelser. Neil Smelser's work in
Theory of Collective Behaviour (1962) sought to integrate Blumer's approach to
collective behaviour with that of Parsonnian structural functionalism. This led to the
development of a systematic explanation for the emergence of forms of collective
behaviour. Smelser proposed two major theories – the first being that social
movements arose in order to counter "social strains" emanating from the predominant
social system and the second that collective behaviour is «guided by various kinds of
beliefs - assessment of the situation, wishes and expectations [...] The beliefs on which collective behaviour is based (we shall call them generalised beliefs) are thus akin to magical beliefs »(Smelser, 1963:8). Smelser's account of collective behaviour and subsequently of social movements will demonstrate that the subject is responsive to these social strains, therefore their motivation for action rests on the formation of generalised beliefs. The formation of such beliefs stems not from the actor/subject themselves but rather from within the movement itself. This in turn, demonstrates that the subject in Neil Smelser's theory of collective behaviour is responsive and that even the subject's belief system is determined by the social system.

Both Blumer and Smelser echo the major elements and critiques brought forth by Jean Cohen in her 1985 article Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Social Movements. Cohen claims that the CAT approach holds a distinct set of assumptions: that social strains, discontent, frustration, and aggression lead the individual to participate in collective behaviour; the crowd in CAT theories is the central referent of collective action, and that there are two distinct types of action namely institutional - conventional and non-institutional-collective behaviour (Cohen, 1985) These elements will be explored in my analysis of CAT, for they are direct indicators of the perceived role and function of the subject within forms of collective behaviour in social movements. In her article Cohen further claims that within CAT theories «the crowd was the simplest atom in the anatomy of collective behaviour. All collective behaviour theorist stress psychological reactions to breakdown, crude modes of communication, and volatile goals. This indicates an implicit bias toward regarding collective behaviour as a non-rational or irrational response to change» (Cohen, 1985:672).
As Jean Cohen indicated, the CAT approach to social movement research had attempted to show the psychological impact of collective action on individuals. If successful this could have demonstrated the inter relationship between social structures, the individual and social change. However, the result of CAT theorising is that the individual, the subject is seen as reactive to, and therefore secondary to the existing social structures. The crowd being the simplest atom of analysis in CAT effaces the individuals' identity, thoughts and feelings, hence negating its primary goals of the psychological analysis of collective behaviour for an analysis and a theory of structural change.

Resource Mobilisation Theories

The second "school of thought" which was developed to analyse social movements and forms of collective behaviour was known as the resource mobilisation approach (RMT). This paradigm was developed to explain the challenges brought about during the turbulent decade of the 1960s, including: an increase in the forms and number of moments of collective action, a massive shift towards urbanisation and a change in the goals and tactics of an ever increasing variety of social groups. The CAT analysis of collective action could no longer account for these changes. As compared to CAT, RMT theorising according to Zald and McCarthy «takes its starting point for the analysis of organisation not the individual. Thus it does not centre around the question of why individuals join social movements, the rationality or irrationality of their intentions or behaviour as participants, but rather on the effectiveness with which the movement, that is movement organisation, uses the resources in attempting to achieve their
goals» (McCarthy and Zald in Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:24). This approach therefore propounds a shift away from the perceived “psychological” analysis of CAT towards a rational actor/organisation based means/end explanation for forms of collective action. RMT theories attempted to explain the creative and active role of the subject through the analysis of the organisational capabilities of such actors. As I will maintain, RMT's reliance on the subject/actors strategic and instrumental rationality for social action falls short of a comprehensive analysis of the motives for participation in collective action and social movements.

Jean Cohen's analysis of RMT theories also stresses the attainment of goals for the organisation. She maintains that RMT «analyses collective action in terms of the logic of strategic interaction and cost-benefit calculations [...] collective action involves the rational pursuit of interest by groups» (Cohen, 1985:675). The RMT approach proposes that social groups such as the women's movement, the ecological movement, movements based on race and ethnicity become interest or lobby groups. These interest/lobby groups, by the desire to attain specific goals, mobilise in order to attain benefits from the state/bureaucracies or those in positions of power. Collective action on the part of these groups is guided by the rational pursuit of these goals.

In this thesis I will examine the work of Charles Tilly and his model of RMT, the political economy model. It is my perspective that his work epitomises many of the predominant elements of RMT theories, including a comprehensive synthesis of other RMT theorist such as Anthony Oberschall. Oberschall proposes a cost benefit, attainment of goods perspective as to explain collective action in social movements. Oberschall maintains that «participants tend to be self-selected from those who are
already in agreement with the goals of the leaders and sponsoring organisations and thus predisposed to follow the scenario laid down by the organisers [...] one way of including participation for obtaining a collective good is the provision of an additional private good, called selective incentive" (Oberschall, 1993:13/21). However, Charles Tilly adds to this element an attempt at a synthesis between the desire to attain collective goods by the organisation and that of the state system in society. It is for this reason that Charles Tilly will be the focus of discussion in the section on RMT, for he, more than any other theorists, attempts structure/individual reconciliation.

My analysis of Tilly's work will however demonstrate that the subject within RMT is overly socialised by their relationship to the state system. The cost benefit calculation, rational based desire to attain goods and benefits does not include the subject's identity, needs, desires or specific traits. The group within RMT also becomes the primary referent in the analysis, and therefore renders such theory inadequate as to explain individual participation in forms of collective action and social movements. The role of identity and collective identity is neglected by RMT theories. Identity amongst other pivotal characteristics of the actor/subject is all but disregarded for the analysis of the groups' organisational functions and goals. This neglect therefore also renders RMT theories primarily a theory of structural social change. For Tilly and other RMT theorists the context of social action is the focus of exploration, and not the identity of the participants.

The theoretical influence that RMT theories have had on social movement research cannot be minimised or disregarded. RMT's methodological focus on the movements' mobilisation as well as the means/end goal attainment perspective has
greatly influenced social movement research. However, what RMT fails to do, as did its predecessors, is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the how, why and what that guides individuals to participate and actively create individual and collective identities in modern social movements.

Alain Touraine: the New Social Movement Approach

The early 1970s and 1980s saw the rise in influence of a European perspective to the study of social movement, the new social movement's approach, NSM. The NSM approach arose in order to explain the rise in what can be termed as “identity based” movements and the rise in identity politics as a determinate of mobilisation. The theorist most responsible for the development of the NSM approach is Alain Touraine. Touraine’s work was pivotal to the development of a theory of collective action and social movements which sought to include the subject and their identity into the analysis of collective action. In fact, Touraine claims that, «l’individu n’est que l’unité particulière où se mêlent la vie et la pensée, l’expérience et la conscience» (Touraine, 1992:268).

Touraine proposes a theory of collective action which must take into account the subject, the actor and their identity. At first glance, Touraine’s work may appear to provide a comprehensive analysis of the subject’s creative and active participation in social movements and society. For Touraine, the subject is not «celui qui agit conformément à la place qu’il occupe dans l’organisation sociale, mais celui qui modifie l’environnement matériel et surtout social dans lequel il est placé en transformant la division du travail, les modes de décision, les rapports de domination ou les orientations
culturalles» (Touraine, 1992:268). The subject, in this light, is seen to have a formidable role and the capability for social change. In fact, what Touraine does is ‘over socialise’ the subject’s actions. Their actions are seen in opposition to the existing social structures, by what he terms to be a programmed society’s historicity. The subject/actor functions and identity are contextualized within and in opposition to historicity, the dominant cultural pattern of a programmed society. The role and actions of the subject in Touraine’s conceptualisation of social movements is therefore dependent on opposition rather than on voluntary aggregation. This, I surmise, is highly problematic for a theory of collective action and social movements, for it limits the participation, the creativity and identity of the actor/subject to once again a limited and reactive locality.

Touraine’s work however did provide a new impetus for the study of social movements through the introduction of the concept of identity to the theoretical community. However, what Touraine has neglected, and which serves to limit his theory, is that identity is not just a matter of historical necessity, but also of individual desires for emancipation and sociality.

**Alberto Melucci: The “constructivist” perspective on NSM**

The final theorist I will examine is Alberto Melucci. I have chosen Melucci because of the new perspective he brings to the study of new social movements; the constructivist perspective. A constructivist perspective addresses first how actors get involved in collective action; second, how actors construct collective action and unity; and third, how one can get at the meaning which is produced by heterogeneity and plurality (Melucci, 1989:20, 58-62). Alberto Melucci sought to create this perspective for
In the traditional analysis of collective phenomena we can find two recurrent orientations. Sometimes the emphasis has been laid on the pure factuality of collective action, which thus appears as actions without actors, an accidental sum of individual events. Crowd psychology thus emphasises imitation, irrationality, contagion, or suggestion. In the sociology of collective behaviour, collective action has been represented as a reactive response to the crisis or disorders of the social system. (Melucci, 1988:329)

With this constructivist approach, Melucci aims to dispel the notions of CAT theories in which the actor’s behaviour is seen as irrational, reactive and imitative. He also seeks to counter the predominant idea that the actor’s behaviour is guided by, or stems from the predominant social strains or social disorders. His statement “actions without actors” gives some indication of the critique he gives to CAT theories’ view on the role of the actor/subject, and one which he seeks to rectify with a constructivist perspective.

Melucci is also equally critical of RMT analysis of social movements. Melucci claims that his theoretical approach

has sought the ‘objective’ foundations of the observed phenomenon in the social structure, and has derived the action from the analysis of a social condition that the actor would seem to have in common. Here one finds an actor without action, as the gap between objective conditions and the empirically observed collective behaviours always proves impossible to prove. (Melucci, 1988:329)

Melucci criticises RMT theory for its belief that action undertaken by social actors is determined by an analysis of the observed collective behaviour. This, Melucci claims, is problematic since it ignores the subjective meaning the actors attribute to the instance of collective action. His objection rises from the fact that, besides having the lack of subjective meaning analysis, RMT ignores how actors construct their individual and collective identities. He hopes to rectify these oversights with a comprehensive theory of
social movement, which probes how actors get involved in social movements, how they construct their collective identities and the meaning that the actor/subject derives from such forms of collective action, hence a constructivist perspective.

Alberto Melucci's constructivist perspective therefore seeks to bring forth the active and creative contribution of the subject/actor into the study of new social movements. In a Meluccian constructivist perspective, the subject relationship to the social system is never instrumental. The subject and the social system are in fact interrelated in the creation of meaning. This meaning of the life world is created by the subject/actor through a process of collective identity and collective action. This guides Melucci to define social movements as instances of collective action. Collective action according to Alberto Melucci is:

the result of purposes, resources, and limits as a purposive orientation constructed by means of social relationships within a system of opportunities and constraints. It therefore cannot be considered either the simple effect of structural preconditions or the expression of values and beliefs. Individuals acting collectively "construct" their action by means of "organised" investments: they define in cognitive terms the field of possibilities and limits they perceive while at the same time activating their relationships so as to give sense to their "being together" and to the goals they pursue. (Melucci, 1995:43)

In his theory of collective action, Melucci also includes the individual and collective identity created by the actor/subject. He defines collective identity as «this process of "constructing an action system"» (Melucci, 1995:44). In turn, the inclusion of identity demonstrates the formidable and primary role to which a Meluccian perspective on social movements gives to the actor and subject.
As I have iterated, Alberto Melucci provides new conceptual frameworks to analyse social movements, which adds greatly to the fast growing sub speciality in the social sciences. His inclusion of identity from the subject's perspective adds further to this field of study. According to Larana, Johnston and Gusfield in their book (1994) *New Social Movements from Ideology to Identity* «the new social movement perspective holds that the collective search for identity is a central aspect of movement formation»(Laranâ, Johnston and Gusfield:1994:10). Melucci's contribution to the understanding of identity, especially from the subject's meaning will only serve to enrich further theoretical developments of social movement theories. As well, it will contribute a better understanding of the reciprocal nature between subjective meaning and social movements as it impacts the culture of society and to return analysis of collective phenomena to everyday life.
Chapter 1 Collective Action Theories

As outlined in the introduction, the inception of collective action theories emanated between the first and second world wars. This epoch created upsurges of social analysis that sought to explain the rise and popular appeal of German Nazism and Italian fascism. Nazism and fascism as instances of massive mobilization required an interpretation of why and how these tumultuous and horrendous forms of collective action could have had such immense impact, influence and appeal in a society that is said to be modern and civilized.

Collective action theorizing in the beginning sought to explain the psychological reasons behind such forms of massive rallies to action. The ‘psychologizing’ element of social action became the underlying premise of a new discipline in the study of social change, hence the study of collective action. Of particular interest to mid war social theorists was how and why people adhered to such mass political movements. Many theories propounded reasons such as mass hysteria and contagion as primary instigators of individual participation. The goal of the emergent collective action theories was to demonstrate the “why” that individuals took part in such social actions, by focusing on the psychological reasons and subsequently the psychological impacts of such participation. Assumed in these theories was that the Subject/ Individual was behaving in an irrational manner towards these instances of mass mobilization. Propaganda and hysteria therefore were seen as the primary reasons for participation in these massive social and political upheavals.
The recent history of collective action theories is traceable to the Chicago school of social analysis. This school, at its emergence in the early 1900s, aimed at reforming the old methodologies of classical philosophy predominant in North American universities. This development involved a theoretical shift that aimed at creating «a department in which the new pragmatic philosophy would flourish» (Coser, 1977: 344). The shift towards a pragmatic analysis henceforth became the primary foci and practice of the department of modern sociology at the Chicago school.

Amongst the most prominent social theorists to emerge from the Chicago school were John Dewey, James Tufts, George Herbert Mead and later his student Herbert Blumer. The history of collective action theories can best be understood by an analysis and influence of these prominent theorists, markedly the work of George Herbert Mead and his theory of social behaviorism. It was Mead's theory and perspective of social behaviorism that highly influenced his student Herbert Blumer to develop a theory of collective action in the late 1950s. A brief synopsis of Mead's viewpoint is therefore necessary before we can examine Herbert Blumer's theory of collective action.

Mead's main theoretical orientation was that of social psychology. A social psychological approach for Mead consisted of the study of «the activity or behavior of the individual as it lies within the social process» (Coser, 1977:334). Mead's methodology is often compared to social behaviorism. According to Lewis Coser,
Mead argued that «there can be no self apart from society, no consciousness of the self and no communication. In its turn, society is understood as a structure that emerges through an ongoing process of communicative social acts, through transaction between persons who are mutually oriented toward each other» (Coser, 1977:334). Mead therefore proposes that within social behaviourism is an analytical mode that stresses the interdependence of the subject and of the social structure. Mead's behaviourist methodology also includes the necessity of accounting for «the importance of observable behavior [...] and the covert aspects of behavior» (Ritzer, 1992:191). For Mead, society and the individual self is composed of interaction that considers the overt and covert aspects of behavior. This type of analysis would render itself to a complete analysis of an individual's behavior (overt) in society including the psychological reasoning (covert) involved in instances of collective action.

Mead's greatest contribution was, according to Lewis Coser in Masters of Sociological Thought, that his methodology could lead «to the demise, at least in sociology, of what Simmel once called the fallacy of separateness, which considers actors without reference to the interaction in which they are variously engaged» (Coser, 1977:340). For George Herbert Mead, the social structure and the individual have a meditative value and are involved in a process of social construction through communication. This communication in turn, is the basis of all social interactions. With this perspective, it may appear that Mead's behaviourist approach and methodology might propose a plausible solution to the individual/structural dichotomy outlined in the introduction. However, Mead did not
achieve this for many reasons, but primarily for his lack of inquiry into the macro societal influences on collective behavior.

According to George Ritzer, «Mead had very little to say about society, which is most generally seen by him as the ongoing process that preceded the mind and the self. Mead largely lacks a macro sense of society. Institutions are defined as little more than collective habits» (Ritzer, 1992:231). Mead unfortunately did not expand on the processes in which individuals create the social system, and tended to place all of the focus on the micro level, the individual level. This major criticism applies to most behaviorists and symbolic interactionist theories. Blumer, as we will see, attempted to rectify Mead's theoretical shortcomings. Blumer willingly accepted the "micro focus" of human interaction proposed by Mead, but in turn sought to expand on the area neglected by Mead, the macro level analysis of society.

Although Herbert Blumer was a student of George Herbert Mead, there is however a distinct difference between the teacher and the student. Herbert Blumer asserted that «Human beings act towards an object mainly in terms of the meaning that they attribute to those objects rather than to their intrinsic character» (Coser, 1977:574). For Blumer, the social structures of society have but the value that the individuals assign to it. Blumer therefore contends that the mediation process does not involve a separate social structure, for this structure is solely determined by the subject. In turn, this supports Blumer's perspective that the social structures, hence society can be an integral element of inquiry in his theory of collective action.
George Ritzer, in his text *Contemporary Sociological Theories* sums up the important differences between Mead and Blumer. Ritzer claims that Herbert Blumer «was in fact better thought as a nominalist.» (Ritzer, 1992:189) Nominalism, according to Lewis and Smith, holds that although macro-level phenomena exist, they do not have «independent and determining effects upon the consciousness of and behavior of individuals» (Lewis and Smith in Ritzer, 1992:189). Ritzer claims that Herbert Mead, «fits better into the realist camp and therefore did not mesh with the nominalist direction proposed by symbolic interactionism.» (Ritzer, 1992:189)

Mead and Blumer’s deliberation on the role of the social structure has had an immense impact on their analysis; perception and role attributed to the actor/subject. For Mead, the subject is directly linked to the mediated process within the social structure. For Blumer, the subject takes precedence over the social structure. This is reflected in Blumer’s assertions and definition of symbolic interactionism.

Blumer claims that symbolic interactionism rests foremost on three principles. These principles are as follows:

The first premise is that human beings act towards things on the basis of the meaning that the things have for them; the second, is that meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows; and third, is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, and interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters (Blumer, 1969:2).

Blumer’s proposals reflect his nominalist perceptive, hence, rendering all of society, including the social structures as a mediated process that gives primary importance to the individual. In a critique of the social sciences, Blumer claimed that «the dominant views in sociology and psychology fail, alike, to see human beings as
organisms having selves [...] in such approaches the human being becomes a mere medium through which such initiating factors operate to produce given actions» (Blumer, 1969:73).

Blumer now sought to dispel the myth of the individual as merely a medium and sought to elaborate a theory in which the human takes precedence in social action. According to George Ritzer «Blumer is in the forefront of those who are critical of this 'sociological determinism' [in which] the social action of people is treated as an outward flow or expression of forces playing on them rather than as acts which are built up by people through their interpretation of the situations in which they are placed» (Ritzer, 1992:224). It is with this in mind that Blumer developed his theory of collective action, a theory which stresses that «Human society is to be seen as consisting of acting people, and the life of a society is to be seen as consisting of their actions [...] There is no empirically observable activity in human society that does not spring from some acting unit» (Blumer, 1969:85).

Blumer’s theoretical orientation would therefore propose that the subject be distinguished and analyzed as the sum and substance of all social action. Through my analysis, I will demonstrate that Blumer relinquishes and contradicts his primary theoretical orientation in his analysis of collective action as demonstrated in social movements.

According to Herbert Blumer, collective action can be «viewed as a collective enterprise to establish a new order of life» (Blumer, 1951:199). From this definition Blumer developed a ‘typology of social movements’. Herbert Blumer claims that
there are three categories of social movement: General social movements, Specific
social movements and Expressive social movements. To each of these categories
Blumer contends there are differing specific traits and values.

In *General Social Movements*, Blumer asserts that collective action «takes
the form of general and uncoordinated efforts. They have only a general direction,
toward which they move in a slow, halting, yet persistent fashion» (Blumer in Lyman,
1995:61). As concrete example of a General Social Movement, Blumer examines
the women's movement of the late 1950's. He claims that the women's movement,
«has the general and vague aim of the emancipation of women» (Blumer in Lyman,
1995:61). Furthermore, Blumer affirms that General Social Movements are
«episodic in their career, the movement is likely to be carried on by many unknown
and obscure people who struggle in different areas without their striving and
achievements becoming generally known» (Blumer in Lyman, 1995:62). What a
General Social Movement is for Blumer is a loosely organized aggregation of
individuals, whose influence is limited, as is their organization and impact.

Blumer's second category, that of Specific Social Movements, are
characterized by defined goals, leadership and a "we" consciousness that forms a
body organization. This category, Blumer contends, has four stages of movement
development. These are: (a) social unrest, (b) popular excitement (c) formalization
and (d) institutionalization. Blumer contends that these stages are influential for
"Considering the development of the specific social movement our interest is less in
considering the stages through which it passes, than in discussing the mechanisms
and means through which such a movement is able to grow and become organized» (Blumer in Lyman, 1995:64). He therefore asserts that the process of movement institutionalization is of the greatest interest to the study of collective action within movements. Specific social movements are characterized by just that, institutionalization which in turn, gives the movement its appeal, influence and legitimacy.

Blumer also applies and stresses the importance of the processes of institutionalization to the role of the subject in Specific Social Movements. He alleges that ultimately, just as the organizational factor of the movement itself crystallizes, so does the institutionalization of the role of the individual. This is apparent in the role to which Blumer attributes the subject in the four stages outlined in specific social movements. During the period of what he declares to be social unrest, individuals are «uneasy and act in random fashion» (Blumer in Lyman, 1995:64). During the second phase, that of popular excitement, Blumer claims that there is «Increased milling [...] and more definite notions emerge as to the cause of their condition and as to what should be done in the way of social change» (Blumer in Lyman, 1995:64). The formalization stage, Blumer contends, marks the development of four specific and important elements for the individual. These are: agitation, which is a «means of exciting people and breaking down previous ways of thinking», the development of an ‘esprit de corps’ which Blumer claims is «the organization of feelings on behalf of the movement [...] a sense of belonging together», third, the development of morale, which is “a group will”, the development of an ideology which is a “body of doctrines, beliefs and myths» (Blumer in Lyman,
1995:67). The last stage, tactic is the development of "strategic goals" and institutionalization in which the individual involves 'formalized' collective behavior, which indicates, «a new set of self-conceptions» (Blumer in Lyman, 1995:68).

What we can assert from Blumer's analysis of Specific Social Movement is that there is a priority given to the analysis of the organizational elements of social movements. The predominance of organization is also applicable to the role of the subject within social movements. As the movements become progressively organized, so does the individual's thinking and acting.

Blumer's third category of social movement is labeled as 'Expressive Social Movements'. Expressive Social Movements, Blumer claims, «do not seek to change the institutions of the social order or its objective character» (Blumer in Lyman, 1995:76). Expressive Social Movements for Blumer are seen as release of expressive behavior. As an example of such movement, Blumer uses the religious and fashion movements. The Expressive Social Movement may «have profound effect on the personalities of individuals» (Blumer in Lyman, 1995:77). Their influence however is limited due to their lack of formal organization.

Blumer's 'categories of social movements' and his analysis of the role of the subject in social movements clearly demonstrate theoretical and substantive divergence in his theoretical philosophies. The subject, according to Blumer's symbolic interactionist perspective, should have occupied a position of dominance in his analysis of collective action in social movements. In fact Blumer proposes, in his
typology of social movements, that action stems from the movement itself rather than the individual. His analysis of Expressive and General social movements reflects this position. These movements' lack of 'goals', means/end thinking, and institutionalization render them not only inarticulate but also ineffective forms of collective action.

Jean Cohen's critiques of collective action theories are documented in Herbert Blumer's analysis of social movements. Cohen claims that collective action theories, such as Blumers distinguish between «two distinct kinds of action: institutional-conventional and non-institutional-collective behavior» (Cohen, 1985:672). This is clearly apparent in Blumer's analysis of social movements. Blumer openly negates the credibility and impact of what he labels General Social Movements and Expressive Social Movements. The credibility of a movement for Blumer rests in its capacity for structural organization which subsequently involves the development of a "we consciousness" for individuals. The development of the "we consciousness" necessitates the individual to «develop personalities and conceptions of themselves, representing the individual counter part of a social structure» (Blumer, 1951:202). The individual is able to maintain neither their personalities nor their self-conceptions but must relegate their individuality to adhere to the movement's ideology. The individual's action is contingent on the institutionalized form of action created by the movement. Blumer alleges that organization, the development of goals and the institutionalization of these goals is necessary as «the successful development of a movement is dependent on them» (Blumer, 1951:12).
Non-institutional collective behaviors, such as those found in general social movements and expressive social movements, lack goals and objectives, hence have solely expressive or little impact on social change. Blumer alleges that «General social movements are rather formless in organization» to which Blumer then adds "and inarticulate in expression" (Blumer, 1951:202). In his description of expressive social movements, Blumer declares that "The tension and unrest out of which they emerge are not focused upon some objective of social change that the movement seeks collectively to achieve" (Blumer, 1951:213). He maintains that their success rests on the expressive social movement's capabilities of «becoming crystallized» (Blumer, 1951:213). This indicates that Blumer's ideal of social change through collective action is contingent on the institutionalization of the individual's expressions into goals and objectives.

Jean Cohen in her article Strategy and Identity: New Theoretical paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements also claims that collective action theories traditionally view social action as the result of «resulting strains, discontent, frustration, and aggression which lead the individual to participate in collective behavior» (Cohen, 1985:672). Blumer's analysis of collective action and social movements justifies Cohen's critique. Blumer alleges that «Social action falls into two clear categories: conformity, marked by adherence to the structure, and deviance, marked by departure from it» (Blumer, 1969:74). His assertions clearly indicate a structural bias in his analysis of collective action. His presupposition indicates that before action can take place, there must be something, 'a priori',
hence being an established social system to which the individual reacts by adherence to or deviance from this system.

Blumer contends that social movements have «their inception in conditions of unrest, and derive their power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life» (Blumer, 1951:199). As Cohen has clearly indicated «Collective action theorists have focused on explaining individual participation in social movement, looking at grievances and values as responses to rapid social change» (Cohen, 1985:672). Blumer's perception reflects this focus. Blumer assumes that social movements are the result of a breakdown in established ways of life and not as we may otherwise conceive of them, as the attempt to create new practices of expression and identity through collective action.

Blumer speaks of the importance of agitation and of 'esprit de corps' in social movements. This agitation in social movement, he claims, «operates to arouse people as to make them possible recruits for the movement... it acts to loosen the hold on them of their previous attachments and to breakdown their previous ways of thinking and acting [...] More specifically, it operates to change the conception people have of themselves, and the notions they have of their rights and dues» (Blumer, 1951:206).

Blumer claims, for example, that mere agitation is not enough to sustain a movement; it must then elaborate to the formation of an 'Esprit de corps' that he describes as «the organizing of feelings on behalf of the movement» (Blumer,
Blumer explains that 'esprit de corps' is very significant for the individuals as it «serves to reinforce the new conception of himself that the individual has formed as a result of the movement and of his participation in it» (Blumer, 1951:207). What Blumer suggests is that the subject must relinquish a part of his/her identity and to accept the movement's identity. This, according to Blumer, is necessary to subscribe to the movement's goals, beliefs and ideology.

The role of the subject in Herbert Blumer's perspective definitely delineates from his symbolic interactionist orientation. His theoretical influence, that of symbolic interactionism, would assume that greater emphasis be placed on the role of the subject in the creation and implementation of collective action, collective identity within social movements. What results in my analysis of Herbert Blumer's work on collective action and social movements is a predisposition to structural analysis. This structural predisposition renders the subject, which Blumer claims to be the primary agent of social change, relegated to a secondary and reactive role in social change and social movements. Where once Blumer openly critiqued the social sciences tendency towards social determinism, the same criticism can be applied to Herbert Blumer's analysis. The subject remains secondary to the analysis of social change in collective action in his theory of collective action.
Jean Cohen’s critiques as iterated in *Strategy and Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements* are also applicable to Neil Smelser’s work on collective action. Cohen claims that the collective behavior approach stresses that social action is the result of social strains, and it is this that «leads the individual to participate in collective behavior» (Cohen, 1975:672).

Smelser, in his theoretical orientation, is enormously partisan to the importance of social strains. In fact, Smelser proposes that social strains are essential and subsequently a prerequisite for instances of collective behavior. Smelser’s adherence to the purpose and importance of social strains renders his theories to be labeled, as Cohen maintains ‘breakdown theories’. These types of theories, Cohen argues, are seen «in terms of a breakdown in the organs of social control or in the adequacy of normative integration, due to structural changes» (Cohen, 1985:672). This perspective assumes that the existing societal structures, when in a state of desequilibrium or disorder, are the primary agents of social change. This becomes evident in Smelser’ rejection of certain types of collective actions. Smelser rejects instances and demonstrations of values, rites of passages and public opinions. These Smelser claims, are not instances of collective action, for they do not emerge as a response to social strains. For Smelser, and other collective action theorists, the individual can only take action when social strains create the impetus. This reliance on social strains renders the individual/group responsive to society and its institution, which Smelser would further stipulate, is the only source of social strains. As I will demonstrate in this section, Neil Smelser leaves no latitude for individual
discourse or creativity in his investigation of collective action, but rather focuses solely on dissension towards the structures of a well established social system.

Jean Cohen also asserts that collective action theorists tend to, «view the crowd as the simplest atom in the anatomy of collective behavior» (Cohen, 1985:672). This is apparent in Smelser’s theory of collective action. Smelser predisposes the crowd as the primary source of analysis and relinquishes the importance of the subject, within this ‘crowd’. Smelser openly claims that in his theory of social action, «we no longer treat individual personalities as the principal system; we move to the analysis of the relations among actors» (Smelser, 1961:24). The subject is solely analyzed according to her/his relations amongst other actors. Smelser’s concluding remarks in his book stresses that collective behavior «often displays distinctive psychological states (e.g. the loss of personal identity)» (Smelser, 1961:383). This assertion by Smelser indicates, as does the work of Herbert Blumer, a preference to the organizational and structural importance of social action. For Smelser in particular, this entails the exclusion of individual thought processes and action in favour of an inquiry of the group.

Smelser’s analysis of collective action strongly reflects his Parsonnian structural influence. The popular critique of Talcott Parsons’ work stresses that: «Despite his commitment to viewing the social system as a system of interaction, Parsons did not take interaction as his fundamental unit in the study of the social system» (Ritzer, 1992:105). Although Smelser had hoped to examine the relationships amongst individuals in collective action, he is also predisposed towards
a structural analysis. This predisposition can be attributed his Parsonnian influence, and the systemic/ societal perspective of collective action and society.

A brief inquiry into the theories of Talcott Parsons and A.E. Schils will demonstrate their theoretical influence on the works of Smelser. Smelser's Parsonnian influence began with the premises put forth by Parsons and Schils in their (1963) book entitled *Theory of Action*. It is within these pages that Parsons and Schils professed that «The theory of action conceives of the behavior of living organisms as oriented to the attainment of ends in situations, by means of the normatively regulated expenditure of energy» (Parsons and Schils in Smelser, 1963:24). Smelser was very impressed with their methodology and added «Parsons and Schils define action from the actors' point of view. It is possible, however, to apply the same definition to a system of action composed of the interaction of two or more actors» (Smelser, 1963:24). What Parsons and Schils had developed in their theory of individual action within a social system, Smelser now sought to apply to explain instances of collective action.

The Parsonnian societal systems theory is primarily concerned with how large numbers of individuals are organized into functions. Parsons' model of a social system has become commonly known as the GAIL model (Goal attainment, Adaptation, Integration and Latency). Parsons' theory maintains that «The model of society as a system rather than a collection of disconnected parts [...] Functionalism draws attention to the mutual influence and interdependence element of society» (Hale, 1990:323). The functionalist perspective and its systematic analysis of
interdependence are clearly replicated by Neil Smelser in his model of collective action.

According to Smelser, social action, as demonstrated in collective behavior, consists of the following elements:

Components of social action

Hierarchical relations of these components

Structural strains

Generalized beliefs

The four basic components of social action for Smelser consist of:

(1) the generalized ends, or values, which provide the broadest guides to purposive social behavior; (2) the regulatory rules governing the pursuit of these goals, rules which are found in norms; (3) the mobilization of individual energy to achieve the defined ends within the normative framework. If we consider the individual person as actor, we ask how is he motivated; if we move to the social system-level, we ask how motivated individuals are organized into roles and organizations; (4) the available situational facilities which the actor utilizes as means; these include knowledge of the environment predictability of consequences of action, and tools and skills. (Smelser, 1963:24/25)

From Parsons' influence, we can see how Neil Smelser has developed a co-sympathetic system approach to the study of collective behavior. From the components of social action we can also illustrate the role Smelser gives to the individual in collective action. This role consists of adapting and altering individual norms for the norms of the organization. This is a replicate of Parsons' role theory in which the subject 'takes on' socially prescribed roles. Smelser explains that action
must be limited and restricted to the confines of what he labels 'normative frameworks'. Within these frameworks, action and motivation for action, stems not from the actor's desires and needs but rather from the terms of 'role organization'. In the basic components of social action, the subject, in Smelser's theory, is seen as reactive to and instrumentally oriented towards the needs of an 'organization'. This is evidenced in his components of social action.

In Smelser's description of collective behavior he ascertains a definite hierarchical relation amongst the components of social action. The hierarchical structure is as follows: Figure 1

```
   Norms
      |
      V
 Values
      |
      V
 Mobilization into organized roles
      |
      V
 Situational Facilities
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Smelser claims that «as we move to bottom, the concrete details of action receive increasingly more specific definition. Values provide only general notions of desirable end states, and hence are the most general guides to action [...] finally at the Situational facilities, the specification of knowledge, skills and tools lead us to the most detailed aspects of action» (Smelser, 1963:33). For Smelser, there is an empirical need to organize beliefs and norms into concrete action. It must however be clearly stated that these norms and beliefs do not stem from the individual. They
emanate from the 'societal system', which are subsequently internalized by the individual.

Smelser claims that «in connection with values [...] the relevant attitude is belief in, or commitment [...] with respect to norms, the appropriate individual attitude is conformity or deviation [...] component of organization the individual's responsibility or lack of responsibility [...] Situational facilities, one appropriate attitude is confidence or lack of confidence in our ability to predict and control the environment» (Smelser, 1963:29). The individual's role is always placed in connection with, towards, or against the social structures and its designated beliefs and norms and values. It is in this instance that the 'generating motor' of collective action, generalized beliefs can take form.

The next pivotal element of Neil Smelser analysis of collective action is the role and impact of 'social strains'. Social strains for Smelser are a prerequisite for collective action to take place. He alleges that: «Any kind of strain may be a determinant of any kind of collective behavior. The foci of structural strains constitute a class determinant which may produce a class of collective action to appear» (Smelser, 1963:49). Smelser also asserts that: «when strains exist, we might say that the components of social action are out of order and require fixing» (Smelser, 1963:67). Collective behavior for Smelser is therefore generated by social strains and motivation, for the individual is based on a generalized belief. Individuals act collectively as an attempt to fix or to regain the said "equilibrium" in the social system. As Smelser explains, collective action «is a search for solutions to
conditions of strain by moving to a more generalized level of resources. Once the generalization has taken place, attempts are made to reconstitute the meaning of the high-level component» (Smelser, 1963:71).

Smelser’s systematic analysis of collective behavior is extremely complex and hierarchical. Smelser has created a multi-level, multi-faceted system in order to explain instances of collective behavior. In a brief summary: a) general beliefs do not emerge from the population, but rather are created by the means of movement organization; b) The individual utilizes these beliefs as a ‘short circuit’ as to create the desired social changes; c) Social strains, create ambiguity d) The generalized belief, once actualized into concrete collective action, becomes omnipotent, most importantly beliefs must be paired with social strains as to constitute collective behavior. Smelser negates collective groups and activities such as concerts, rituals, religious groupings and public opinion. He claims that: «collective reaffirmation of values, rituals, festivals, ceremonial, and rites of passages [...] they are not in themselves examples of collective behavior» (Smelser, 1963:74). Smelser claims that these are instances of ‘watching’ for they lack «a body of significant ideas and sentiments about controversial issues. It is only when audiences and public opinion are linked to social strains and a generalized beliefs can they evolve into instances of collective action» (Smelser, 1963:74).

Neil Smelser’s analysis of collective action does attest to the development of societal beliefs and norms and especially to their influence in instances of collective
action. However, what is lacking in Smelser’s analysis, as was in Herbert Blumer’s, is a comprehensive examination of the subject, the actor and his/her role in collective action. The subject in collective action theories is reactive to social strains and dependent on a certain level of organizations. There is no recognition, nor any acknowledgment of the participative and creative nature of the individual within social movements.

Collective behavior theories had aimed at illustrating the psychological reasons for the participation of individuals in forms of collective action and social movements. Herbert Blumer and Neil Smelser have demonstrated that analysis of such collective behavior has primarily been at the structural, societal level. The results from collective action theories are predominantly an analysis of the social system. In the case of Neil Smelser, there is an over reliance on a ‘set equilibrium’ of the system that is to be maintained.

The decades that followed, the 1950s and early 1960s, demonstrated that collective action cannot be seen as solely a reaction to the existing order and social forces. The increasing strength and activism by such groups as the youth movement, labor, feminism and movements dealing with identity challenged the existing theoretical paradigms of collective action. Society in itself was becoming increasingly diversified and complex. To insist on maintaining the ideal of equilibrium in such complexity seemed unfeasible. Collective action theories, in short, could no longer explain the new and emerging forms of collective action. Alberto Melucci claims that «the increasing fragmentation of actors, fields and forms
of action [...] These transformations ‘disqualify’ both the image of collective actors as characters in a play and as ‘an amorphous crowd.’ (Melucci: 1988:331). A structural theory of collective action as proposed by Blumer and Smelser, an analysis in which the subject is seen as both negated and reactive to social strains can no longer be adequate in such complex society.

A new paradigm shift was becoming apparent in the study of social movements. This paradigm, known as Resource Mobilization theories, sought to alleviate the preponderance of systems analysis of social movements, and to explain the growing diversification of society and social movements. Their approach, their successes and failures will be examined in the next chapter through the work of Charles Tilly and his model of RMT, the political / economy model.
"Everything seems the same in the structure into which the detail inserts itself, and yet both its functioning and its equilibrium are changed." (deCerteau, 1984:89)

Chapter 2 - Resource Mobilization Theories

The dawning of the 1950s and early 1960s in America marked many changes in the analysis of collective action and social movements. These decades are distinguished by instances of mass mobilization that have expanded not only in number, but also in scope of interest. As such, these changes compelled modifications to the dominant theoretical paradigms of collective action and social movement proposed by the popular systems analysis. This paradigm shift, which sought to sway away from systems analysis propounded by CAT theories, would inevitably lead to greater depth and specificity for social movement theorizing. The rise in relevance, applicability and importance of Resource Mobilization Theories (RMT) sheds light not only on the changing forms of collective action and social movements, but inevitably on the new emergent society itself.

The correlation between social theory and social change will be investigated in order to demonstrate the genesis and application of the Resource Mobilization theoretical (RMT) paradigm. This will be done by stressing the massive social changes of the late 1950s and early 1960s, which are marked by instances of massive mobilization, urbanization and modernization. These have had an immense and lasting effect on how collective action and social movements are theoretically explored.

As iterated in the previous chapter on collective action theories (CAT), and as I have demonstrated in Herbert Blumer’s and Neil Smelser’s work, the inter world war period provoked a considerable rise in popularity and theoretical use of “systems
analysis" in the study of collective action and social movements. The predominance of this system's approach and its associated "equilibrium model of society", maintained that the successful functioning of any given society depended on its "integral and said natural equilibrium".

The social strain paradigms, proposed by theorists such as Talcott Parsons, and Neil Smelser sought to explain collective action by instances of social strains and the human response to such strains. Their theoretical focus maintained that individuals engaged in forms of collective behavior did so primarily to counter these instances of "social disequilibrium". From such traditional analysis, I have concluded that individuals and groups were merely seen as responding to social strains. Activism on the part of the individual was analyzed without notice and emphasis on the actors attributed subjective meaning, identity, goals, and aspirations. The movement's organization, and its own inner logic of desired and needed social equilibrium became the target of analysis, and the preferred interpretation for forms of collective action. Yet, the frequent instances of mass mobilization by a growing diversity of groups in the 1950s and early 60s particularly the trend towards urbanization and modernization would prove as Michel deCerteau claims, that the perceived social system had in fact changed, and so must the paradigms which seek to explain such social change.

The rise of social activism instigated a re-evaluation of many longstanding sociological concepts. Concepts regarding the nature of social action, and inquiry into the variables that lead to collective action, necessitated the alteration of the primary paradigms that were sought originally to explain such change. According to Miguelez, this paradigmatic shift according is a required process for any discipline that seeks to
explain social change. Míguez claims that: «Il en découle épistélogiquement que toute partition disciplinaire ne peut être, en sciences sociales, que formelle et provisoire. Il en découle méthodologiquement qu'il importe toujours, sous peine de mutiler la réalité sociale, de saisir les pratiques dans la diversité et la richesse de leurs effets articulés» (Míguez, 1992:61). A methodological shift that includes openness to diversity in practice and articulation by the actors of social movements was now emerging in social movement theorizing heralding the advent of resource mobilization theories.

The resource mobilization paradigm from its inception sought to explain the growing diversification of forms and instances of modern social movements. The increase in frequency of action, the diversity of collective groupings and action, led RMT theorists to question the predominant social strain systems analysis previously propounded by CAT theorist. Concurrently, massive social changes encouraged the creation of a wide variety of social movement organizations such as the women's movement, the civil rights movement, and the youth movement. Within these groups, there was an era of emancipation through struggle and action which had all but been ignored by the CAT paradigm. The intensity and diversification of forms of collective action could no longer be explained by the linear, simplistic reductionism of CAT's predominant use of systems analysis. It was being discovered that the old paradigm of social strains and social equilibrium, and human reaction to them was, as Míguez states, a formal and provisional form of analysis. It is with this in mind that Resource Mobilization theories sought to elaborate and explain this growing diversification in its theories of collective action and social movements.
The changing Social and Theoretical Milieu

The connection between the social structures/milieu and the changes in social movements theorizing must now be examined for, as I have previously claimed, they are intrinsically linked. Through a brief analysis of the massive social changes of these decades, we will best understand their correlation, as well as their immense effect on social movement theory. Ritchie Lowry and Robert Rankin claim that the 1960s «witnessed the development of a “new” emphasis in sociology, which was concerned more with the question of social dynamics than social equilibrium [...] The new sociologists maintained that radical change and conflict, rather than stasis and cooperation, characterized modern society» (Lowry and Rankin, 1969:596). The following examples will exemplify and substantiate Lowry and Rankin’s findings on the methodological shift in sociological analysis of collective action and social movements.

The illustrations of massive collective action presented here are taken from events occurring in the United States. Although it can be argued that these are specific to that country, I propose that they cannot be limited by geographical boundaries. It is my perspective that the form and intensity of collective action during this époque had no geographical bounds, but rather by its very nature had developed a trans-national and global character. This global character, I maintain, was greatly assisted by the arrival of television, telecommunication and satellites that simultaneously made moments of collective action in all parts of the world known and influential. Although there are many examples of collective action specific to that era, I have chosen to highlight only three. These, I conclude, represent not only the specificity of collective action during those decades, but also effectively demonstrates the shift in focus and goals of collective action and social movement theory.
It has been claimed that the late 1950s and 1960s were a time of mass mobilization brought about by extensive social changes. The three examples of social events which incited social changes are: the shift from rural to urban living, the rise in importance of the youth movements, and the increase of right-based collective action movements as exemplified in the US' Black versus White conflict.

The migration of individuals from the rural to the urban/suburban centers was particularly acute in Canada and the United States. Although this migration had begun after World War II, the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a dramatic rise in urban/suburban migration. This migration promoted many changes in the organization of social relationships and the analysis of such groupings. The move to urban centers required a re-evaluation of basic concepts such as: the nature of a community, how collective action arises in such communities, and the specific characteristics of the collective action. Historically, collective action analysis, as clearly demonstrated in the theories of collective action, were seen as resulting from social strain. The applicability of the predominant social strain analysis proved too difficult and tedious to apply in such large urban/suburban centers.

The first element of CAT's systems analysis to be challenged was the logistics of demographics. Social strain analyses precluded the ability of a systemic "control" as to maintain societal stability. As Lowry and Rankin observed «The problem of controlling collective outbursts is especially critical in modern urban society. The urban setting provides fertile soil for the sprouting of many kinds of collective experiences..."
among men”¹ (Rankin and Lowry, 1969:226). This statement attests not only to the growing demographical challenges of the urban centers, but also alludes to the growth of instances of diversified forms of collective action.

Urbanization also challenged the ideal of “controlling collective outbursts”. This ideal of control stems from the proposed social strain and equilibrium paradigm of indicative of CAT’s systems analysis. In an urban/suburban context, the applicability of the social strain ideology is increasingly difficult to apply. The sheer multitude of individuals, experiences and lifestyle renders the social strain paradigm inadequate to explain the increase in collective action. Neil Smelser, as I have demonstrated in chapter 1, proposed that social strains were essential and a mandatory prerequisite for collective action. The attribution of moments of collective action to specific social strains appears impossible within the complex and fluctuating urban/suburban areas. A specific social strain could no longer account for and effectively explain cases of mass mobilization incurred in such large urban centers. It was also powerless to account for the growing internal diversity and specificity of modern collective action groups.

The ever expanding diversification and specification of social groupings within these large urban/suburban centers also posed a major problem for the classical theoretical orientations. The new urban/suburban centers encompassed a variety of social classes, social statuses and a multitude of ethnicity in its dwellers. As well, they accentuated the disparities and differences amongst these groups. The establishment of the American suburbs exemplifies this social phenomenon. The rise of “suburbia” is directly attributed to the post WWII economic boom. These geographic areas were

¹. The term “men” is reflective of the gender specific writing of 1969
specifically designed to accommodate white middle class citizens so that they could work in the urban areas, but not reside in the core. The ethnic, racial and economic minorities had very little access to such suburban areas due to the "related costs of relocating". The social makeup of the urban/suburban centers therefore consisted in the enlargement of a certain social grouping to the urban centers through migration, and simultaneously the segregation of these groups within their own socio-economic, racial and ethnic groupings. This creation of "enclaves" led to a variety of experiences in such pivotal elements as culture and economics. Smelser's analysis in which, as Cohen claims, the crowd is the simplest atom of analysis proves to be difficult to apply. Within the crowds of the new suburban and urban areas there grew and thrived a variety of experiences and concerns. The influence of this migration to the analysis of collective action is a theme studied by Charles Tilly, one of the first proponents of RMT. His work will be analyzed in detail later in this chapter.

The second effect of this migration/segregation pattern of urbanization was demonstrated in the actual moments of collective action during the 1950s and 1960s. The US segregationist practices, the increasingly apparent economical and social disparities within the urban areas became increasingly indisputable. This, according to Lowry and Rankin had «led to rioting which has burst out on a number of occasion due to strains built up through conditions of poverty and problems of Negro-White adjustment»² (Lowry and Rankin, 1969:26). The instances of collective action, ones that were based on civil rights and ethnicity marked a dramatic change in the instances and theorizing of collective action.
An excellent example of massive collective action, was the Watts area riots of Los Angeles in 1965. The Watts region of Los Angeles clearly made evident the effects of urbanization and race relations. Lowry and Rankin explain that «The rural-urban migration phenomenon has accounted for much of the remarkable growth of Los Angeles. Not only has the city grown to a metropolis of over six million but the Black segment has grown from 75,000 in 1940 to 650,000 in 1965» (Lowry and Rankin, 1969:227). Although there is still enormous debate over the reasons for the massive Watts riots of 1965, there is no denying the impact this riot has had on the study of collective action. The growing race and ethnicity problems of the early 1960s exemplified the need to incorporate these issues into social analysis. These issues included ghettoisation, race and ethnic relations, power, access to resources (human and economic), individual and collective rights and democracy. The Watts riots, with its 34 deaths, 1,003 injured, 600 buildings destroyed by fire, 40 million dollars in damages and 3,438 adults and 514 juvenile arrests (Rankin and Lowry, 1969) all demonstrated the changing nature of modern collective action. This scale of collective action no longer could be accounted for by the simplicity of social strain/systems theory proposed by collective action theorists.

The changing nature of collective action is also clearly evident in the rise in importance of the youth movement. The University of California Berkeley campus riots also exemplified the changing nature of collective action. The Berkeley campus student demonstrations from 1957 to 1967 established, that «During this new era...many American Universities and colleges and in foreign countries, students have become much more concerned with social and political issues [...] Such actions developed into a

2 The term “Negro” is reflective of the term used for African American in 1969
crusade for the abolition of virtually all controls over student behavior and complete freedom of speech and advocacy» (Lowry and Rankin, 1969:240). The youth movement's contribution to the study of collective action was the introduction of two important and distinct points. The first point demonstrated that political and social conscience was not and is not limited by age and position of authority and power. Students, many of which did not have the right to vote, nor were in any hierarchical positions of power, were now seen as capable of instigating social change. This altered the notion of the group reacting to social change/strain, and opened up the realm of participation in social movement and collective action to incorporate many individuals and groups. This early student movement also demonstrated that the youth of America, who typically came from middle class or affluent backgrounds also had social issues, which they sought to assert. The classical theories of social strain were not applicable to this group, yet their activism remained massive and influential.

The youth movements also marked a shift towards rights based movements. Demonstrations and activism against the Vietnam War and America's occupation of Vietnam, were said to be less about the war itself and more centered on the creation and protection of social rights. These protests, it is claimed, focused on such issues as freedom of choice, free speech and action (draft). This demonstrates the ascension of rights and identity-based activism which inevitably opened the floodgates to more complex and diversified forms of collective action analysis.

As I have demonstrated, the post-war decades provoked serious reassessment regarding the need for the development of a new form of collective action and social movement theorizing. Claiming, as CAT theories had, that collective action and social
movements were simply reactions to social strains neglected many important analytical elements, such as how access to resources influenced and led those at different social positions to seek social and political change. It also shed doubt on CAT's primary assumption, which adamantly claimed that collective action demonstrated that individuals sought to counter the "natural disequilibrium" of the existing social structures. The rise of RMT analysis now sought to explain how individuals, through collective action, sought to alter the existing social system to create one more appropriate. RMT also sought to dispel the idea of the psychological reasons for collective action by proposing a means/end rational choice perspective to collective action.

Charles Tilly was one of those who sought to propose a new theory of collective action. His theoretical approach stresses the means/end thinking of individuals in the attainment of goals and resources, hence the emergence of Resource Mobilization theories. Although these theories have expanded the once limited analysis of collective action in social movements, I maintain my primary assumption that the subject is seen as secondary, reactive and bound by social structures in their examples of collective action (contextualized). This premise will now be clearly illustrated by the work of Charles Tilly.
Charles Tilly

One of the most influential and popular theories of collective action was put forth by Charles Tilly. Tilly’s work symbolizes the changing patterns, strengths and foci of modern collective action theories of the late 1950s and 1960s. This model, often referred to as the political economy model, defines social movements as “the continuation of the processes of political centralization”. Social Movements, according to Tilly «grew up with national politics», for Tilly concludes that the «emergence of national social movements [...] specializing in the struggle for power, grew in importance with the development of electoral politics, as did “parallel streams of people” who organize to raise “sustained, self-conscious challenge[s]” to existing [national] authorities» (Tilly, 1984:304). Social movements and collective action are directly linked to the nation-state which inevitably becomes the source of collective contention. This link to government or nation-state, is the primary premise of Tilly’s theory of collective action and social movement which, in turn, greatly shaped and influenced the development of the Resource Mobilization paradigm.

Charles Tilly proposes a theory that alters the view of social movements as reactive and causal examples of collective action. He proposes that social movement actually consists of «a series of demands and challenges to power-holders in the name of a social category that lacks an established political position» (Tilly, 1985:736). Tilly maintains that social movements are forms of organization that seek to alter, change, or even displace the existing forms of power, the primary social and political organization - the nation-state. This expands the once restrictive CAT perspective of the nation-state.
The nation-state is no longer seen as the source and center of social equilibrium, but rather as the focal point of social change favored by social movements.

What Tilly's model also provides, as opposed to CAT, is a stress on the importance of a rationally based means/end thinking, hence a "purpose to collective action". This purposive model, also known as the model of rational interaction has, according to Tilly, the following presuppositions about the individual's motives for participation. These being:

a fixed set of actors with a specified amount and type of information about each other's identities, actions, interests. They usually require specification of (1) the actors, (2) their interests, (3) the decision rules adopted by each actor, (4) current values of the elements of those decision rules. Those elements, in their turn, typically concern (5) probable costs of the various sequence of action that are available to each actor, (6) probable benefits of each of those sequences, (7) the capacity of each actor to sustain the cost of each sequence. Thus, crudely we explain a "single actor" participation in a social movement as a function of a choice among multiple alternatives whose relative attraction depends on a product. (Tilly, 1985:741)

This demonstrates that for Tilly, an actor/subject participation in forms of collective action and social movements depends on an equation. This equation can be summarized as (expected benefits of the action – the expected costs) multiplied x by (capacity to act). The rational actor/subject weighs the cost and benefits of his/her participation in collective action according to the benefits he/she may gain from such action. Collective action is then directed towards challenging the powers of government officials, policies and instituted laws that are governed by the nation-state. These powers also include the predominant capitalist system. Tilly claims that «Capitalism and state-making provide the context for a historically grounded analysis of collective action – of the ways in which people act together in pursuit of shared interests»(Tilly, 1981:46).
The means/end rational choice paradigm proposed by Tilly is indicative of Resource mobilization theories (RMT). There is perhaps no other social theorist that best exemplifies the RMT paradigm more than Charles Tilly. A brief outline of Tilly's work will provide us with a clear and concise outline of the rationale that has led him to the development of his political/economy model, the basis for Resource Mobilization theories.

Charles Tilly did not initially set out to study social movements. His focus was the historical basis of revolution. One of Tilly's first work was a historical account of the Vendée region of France, which in 1793 staunchly opposed the French Revolution. Tilly's inspiration was to examine the influence of the French revolution. The French Revolution, according to Tilly, was the finest example of the growth in urbanization (equated by Tilly with modernization). What Tilly found is that the peasants of the Vendée region were resisting the changes brought forth by this modernization, primarily «the relationship between general features of the social organization» (Tilly, 1964:11). Although The Vendée was a historical analysis, Tilly maintains that certain elements are applicable to all modern societies.

In The Vendée, Tilly explained that urbanization «implies changes in community organization [...] Some of the most important changes – the centralization of governmental power, the increase in importance of the bourgeoisie, the redistribution of property, and so on, - were in many respects accelerated continuations of the general process of urbanization» (Tilly, 1964:13). Tilly therefore concluded that urbanization/modernization is far less a historical event; it is a social process which
inevitably alters not only the geographical and economic nature of a region, but ultimately alters the physical and social relationships amongst individuals, hence the community. These changes to the community became the foci of Charles Tilly’s subsequent work, the study of the effects of urbanization/modernization on modern cities.

Pivotal to Tilly’s exploration of The Vendée was the effect that the social processes brought to the mobilization of the inhabitants of the region. The opposition to the massive community changes brought about by the French Revolution in the Vendée region were met with concrete forms of collective enterprise. The peasants strategically grouped to counter the modernisation of the region. For Tilley, this demonstrates that modernisation inevitably includes mobilisation of individuals who, through the rational pursuit of collective interest, strategically plan forms of collective action and have the capacity to invoke social change. This in turn places the actor’s rationally based collective enterprise at the center of Tilly’s analysis of collective action and social movement.

In his book (1974) An Urban World, Tilly sought to apply his finding of The Vendée to a modern case study of urbanization. In this attempt Tilly focused on Boston, Massachusetts and the city of Toronto, Canada. Tilly chose these cities for the massive changes they reflected, brought forth by modernization and «the diversity of cultures in North American cities» (Tilly, 1974:8). It was through the inquiry into these two cities that Tilly became increasingly interested in the division of ethnic and racial groups into social, economic and political enclaves within the larger urban setting.
Tilly sought to dispel the belief that mass urbanization eventually led to increase disorganization and the Durkheimian concept of anomie relations amongst urban dwellers. Durkheim had proposed through his concept of anomie «an explanation for the moral ills of contemporary industrial society» (Hale, 1990:149). The key problem for Durkheim had been the «lack of regulation [...] the absence of necessary regulations means that the parts of the social order are insufficiently co-ordinated» (Hale, 1990:149). As opposed to Durkheim, Tilly claimed that “The chaos of the living city” in fact, stresses interaction. Much of Tilly’s work goes into showing «that neither migration nor urban growth as such directly stimulated collective violence, but that the structural transformation of communities strongly affected the capacity of different groups of people for collective action» (Tilly, 1974:51). Tilly therefore maintains that in large urban settings, changes to social organization elicit concrete and rational forms of collective action.

Negating Durkheim’s concept of anomie became a passion for Tilly, to the extent of dedicating an entire section of his 1981 book As Sociology Meets History to this endeavor. What Tilly sought to negate was «The first historical argument we extracted from Durkheim concerned the relationship between the level of conflict and the scale, homogeneity and ideological unity of the groups involved. So far as the level of violent conflict is concerned, there seems to be nothing to it. There is no general tendency for conflict to become more widespread as differentiated organizations become prevalent» (Tilly, 1981:106). Tilly therefore sought to propose an inquiry into the influence of urbanization on small groups. He also sought to dispel the prominent theoretically assumption that large social groupings inevitably lead to increased violence and social unrest. Furthermore Tilly stressed that «Again, it is becoming less and less certain that
urbanization regularly produces "disorganization" in the forms of increased criminality, family instability, mental illness, or protest" (Tilly, 1974:52). In fact what Tilly proposed is the rational pursuit of collective goals by strategic actors. These findings were pivotal to the study of collective action in social movements, for they completely are not against the social strain”, irrational reaction by the actors and natural equilibrium stability role formerly attributed to forms of collective action.

Tilly’s finding contradicted many other long held assumptions of collective action theories. CAT theories had long stressed social strains, mass hysteria and contagion as instigators of collective action. CAT had also viewed the crowd as the smallest element of analysis in collective action. Tilly therefore proposed a model in which urbanization and the changes they brought forth lead to differing groups and forms of collective action. Collective action theories, according to Tilly, must seek to examine collective action of smaller enclaves of groups and these groups’ rationalization for collective action.

The changing patterns of collective groupings and the collective action of these groups became the primary foci of Charles Tilly’s work. By 1981, Tilly expanded on the preliminary results of An Urban World, and put forth his own theory of collective action in Class Conflict and Collective Action. (1981) It is in this book that Tilly outlines his emergent view of the changing patterns of collective action, a view which would inevitably lead to the development and reinforcement of a new form of collective action theories, Resource Mobilization.
In the development of his political economic model for collective action, Tilley continued to maintain the importance of the role of urbanization on modern forms of collective action. Tilley stressed that urbanization has an expansive and intricate meaning. For Tilley, urbanization and its social processes involves far greater than the economic model of industrialization. Tilley claims that urbanization is «a collective term for a set of changes which generally occur with the appearance and expansion of large-scale coordinated activities in a society» (Tilly, 1964:16). There are specific processes to the process of urbanization. Tilley points to four separate elements these are

**Differentiation**, as in the formation of specialized social positions, **Second, Standardization**, the development of uniform procedures and vocabularies, as an example the establishment of bureaucracies. **Third, change in the quality of social relationships** the shift towards the impersonal and simultaneously the proliferation of social relationships which cross the boundaries of family, kinship and locality. **Fourth, concentration of population**, mainly the growth of the cities. (Tilly:1964)

Associated with these four elements is the development of standardized means of control, hence the formation of the Nation-State. The nation state also becomes the common bond amongst various groups, and at times becomes the center for vying of goods by the various social groupings. Tilley also attributes a formidable role to the state itself. Tilley proposes that the state, the government and its leaders «have interests in fostering some forms of collective action, tolerating others, and eliminating still others from the scene» (Tilly, 1981b:21). Tilley therefore proposes a model in which the state becomes the center of collective action of varied groups. This model subsequently broadens the scope of analysis of collective action to include a multitude of groups and actors, and the inclusion of the state as agents of social change. This contradicts the once predominant and uni-dimensional model proposed by CAT theories which stressed social strains emanated from the social system and creates a model in which the interrelationship between state and social movements must be closely and intricately
examined.

This state social movement interrelationship is based on a model of access to resources, services and rights for a specified group acting collectively. Charles Tilly's model of collective action had at this time become a very plausible and comprehensive model to explain the growing diversification and intensification of modern collective action. This model sought to explain the shift from rural living to urbanization, the rise in rights-based movements, and the involvement of a variety of individuals. This model also incorporated for the first time not only the existence but also the role of the nation state.

Charles Tilly's contribution to the study of collective action and subsequently to the study of social movement cannot be underestimated. Tilly has managed to solicit theoretical analysis away from the CAT social strain paradigm. Tilly's work has enabled us to examine the role of individuals in collective action in a much broader perspective than the 'amorphous crowd' reacting to social desequilibrium. Tilly demonstrated that rather than an amorphous crowd, social movements consisted of groups with strategic goals, and who organized themselves for the rational pursuit of these goals. This inevitably highlights the importance of the many collectivities and of their capability for vying for social change.

Tilly second largest contribution is in his analysis that the state has an active role in the creation of collective action and in social movements. This accurately reflects the state's relationship with modern social movements. Tilly's third contribution is in the development of the role and influence of urbanization on collective action. Tilly has
immensely contributed to the expansion of a theoretical framework for the study of collective action and social movement, a framework which seeks to incorporate the ever increasing diversity and quests of a variety of social actors.

There are however limitations to Tilly's work. My critique centers on the primary question of this thesis "What is the role of the subject, the actor in Tilly's model of collective action and social movements?". My point is that Tilly, as well as CAT theorists, place the subject/ the actor in social movements within a specific context. This context is the pursuit, acquisition of and access to collective goods. I maintain that this perspective is limiting in the analysis of the role of the subject. It inevitably confines the creative and active capabilities of the subject/actor to one element, rational choice, which is just one of the many functions and reasoning for the emergence of collective action and social movements. There are many "reasons" and much rationality involved in the process of collective action and social movements, while Tilly presents but one perspective.

Tilly's economy/political model, which is based on rational choice, claims that the subject/actor contemplates the cost and benefits of participation before entering into forms of collective action. The rational actor model maintains that participation is dependent on this analysis by the actor. This reliance on purposive rational forms of action limits the analysis of collective action to a simplistic equation. This in turn limits the analysis of role and influence of the individual in collective action.

The predominance of the rational actor model, the purposive reasons for social action, neglects other equally important sources of social action on the part of the
subject/actor. In Weber's terminology, these sources could consist of traditional, value-oriented and emotional forms of action. These have equally important motivations for collective action. Tilly's reliance and dependence on the rational actor model to explain forms of collective action is problematic and somewhat simplistic. He demonstrates one of Weber's major concerns, the tendency to explain complex social phenomena by a simple cause-effect criterion. Weber's proposal, which must be incorporated into Tilly's work, is causal pluralism, defined as «searching for multiple causes for social phenomena» (Hale, 1990:509). An example and application of Tilly's methodology will demonstrate the problem with his reliance on the purposive-actor model.

We can apply Tilly's purposive actor political economy model to The Civil rights movement in the US and in Canada. If we adhere to Tilly's methodology, we would have to look at the legislative changes, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights, or employment equity programs as clear and definitive indicators of the success of collective action. This methodology would effectively demonstrate certain functions of social movements, mainly the organizational and political power skills as a social movement. However, the affective, cultural, communication, values and traditions must also be examined in order to demonstrate a greater role for the individual/actor within social movements. Consequently, it would also demonstrate the cultural impact of social movements. It is only then that we can have a comprehensive theory of collective action and social movements. Tilly's work in the end is a systemic account of collective action. Systemically aimed at the analysis of social movement and state interactions. The reliance on the purposive model of social formations is limited, as is his reliance on economic gains as the primary motivation for the integration of actors within collective enterprises and social movements.
Charles Tilly asserted that his methodology was influential in the study of social movements for it «constitutes a growing third stream in the analysis of popular collective action: taking definitions and beliefs of the participants seriously; attempting to connect the action with the interest, grievances and aspirations of everyday; and attaching great importance to the social structures which link the actors to each others, as well as to their rivals, enemies, and exploiters» (Tilly, 1981:15). Tilly had tried, but I maintain that the over reliance on the rational actor model made it impossible to truly understand many of the elements he claimed to explore. Tilly ignores the subjective meaning of collective action, the role of identity and culture, all elements which cannot be quantified and measured but remain pivotal influences for collective action. His dependence on the centrality of the state system as the foci of collective action is also incomplete and restrictive to the analysis of collective action.

The second element of my critique of Charles Tilly's theoretical orientation is his concept of the nation-state and its subsequent role in social movements and collective action. Although Tilly is correct in demonstrating the collective action/state interrelationship, he neglects certain pivotal and crucial factors within this relationship. Tilly's political economy model rests on a specific political ideological assumption that is never clearly expressed in his work. Tilly readily and unquestionably applies North American Liberal ideology, which is characterized, by the ideology of democratic equal participation, access and freedom for all its citizens. This ideology dominates Tilly's work to the neglect of an analysis of a differentiated access for different groups. This once again demonstrates RMT's disregard for the diversity and specificity of actors and groups involved in social movements. Furthermore, in Tilly's model, all social
movements have the equal and equitable power relationship with the predominant state system. This is an assumption that has been heavily refuted in modern social movements.

The liberal democratic ideology, as found in Tilly’s political economy model, suggests that there is a correlation between economic and political progress for all groups. This ideology, William Pfaff maintains is “generally conceded to be false but have become conventional, and for which no replacement is evident […] a very large discrepancy exists between what, on the one hand, serious Americans observe in certain matters and actually think about them” (Pfaff, 1989:5). Tilly does not differentiate between the ideological “access to all” and the actual limitations imposed upon certain groups during collective action. My point remains that not all social movements are capable of altering governmental policies with the same success and impact. Tilly ignores the specificity of each group and puts forth a theory in which the possibilities for social change are equal for all of the social movements involved.

The third element of contention in Charles Tilly’s work is the importance and role he attributes to the nation-state. Although Tilly attributes some formative role to the state system, its function is never truly developed. The state in Tilly’s model is a constant and static entity that is involved in an interrelationship with social movements. However, Tilly neglects the fact that the state is in itself ever changing. Urbanization, industrialization, capitalism, the very nature of bureaucratic institutions has all in turn been altered by social changes. As Ronald Landes claims “A liberal-democratic system is one in which public policies are made, on a majority basis by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections” (Landes: 1991:19). There seems to be
no mention in Tilly's work of the dynamic interrelationship between a changing
government and the changing forms of collective action. Furthermore, the nation-state
in Tilly's model remains primarily a source of opposition to cases of collective action by
social movements. It has been demonstrated that many forms of collective action are
assisted and encouraged by the state, a shining example of this being the establishment
of specific ministries to assist certain groups in their endeavors. The state is not at all
times solely the receiver of collective action. This analysis is limiting for the many times
the state will have to support collective action and social movements even if it counters
state goals.

As I have demonstrated, Charles Tilly's work encouraged the advent of
Resource Mobilization Theories. RMT became a formidable theoretical paradigm in the
1960s for the analysis of collective action and social movements. This led to the
development of a theory that recognized multiplicity of groups and propounded a greater
range of analysis for collective action than CAT theories. This led to the inclusion of
many variables that sought to explain the reasons for collective action in social
movements. However, what RMT lacks, which is evident in Charles Tilly's political
economy model, is the role of traditions, values, emotions of the actors within social
movements, hence culture. My next chapter will deal with the work of Alain Touraine
and his analysis of the subject as a social movement. Touraine's theoretical history,
namely of the French philosophical tradition, will perhaps shed greater light on the lags
in RMT theorizing.
Chapter 3 New Social Movement Approach

The third theorist and perspective that I have chosen to present is Alain Touraine. I have chosen Touraine for his work, which has become synonymous with the development of the most modern and comprehensive theoretical analysis, the New Social Movement (NSM) approach. This theoretical paradigm has led to development of a more expansive analysis of modern social movements. It encompasses, as I will demonstrate, areas which have been previously dismissed or ignored by traditional theories of collective action and social movements. Touraine's NSM approach is also central to my analysis of the role of the subject within the predominant theories of social movement research. Its importance lies in that the NSM is the genesis of a paradigmatic tradition which stresses identity as an important variable for social movement analysis. This paradigmatic shift, has in turn, become the greatest and most formidable element in the study of modern social movements and collective action.

However, what must now be noted is that Alain Touraine's theoretical contribution is not limited to, or restricted by, an analysis of the "identity paradigm". His theoretical orientation and contribution has provided a wealth of conceptual applications which have all had immense and varied appeal to the study of modern social movements. His approach has developed a comprehensive theory which sought to explain society and its historical transitions. Simultaneously his analysis has also stressed the correlation between historicity (social change and reflexivity) and the emergence of new forms of collective action. These forms of collective action have since the late 1970s emphasized collective and individual identity. Touraine's work is a formidable attempt to rectify the structural predominance and the neglect of the identity
and subjective rationale for collective action in many classical social movement theories. Touraine, although labelled as an "identity paradigm theorist", does not, as it may be assumed by the ominous title, favour identity over the social structure. Touraine proposes a systemic analysis which examines the interrelationship of social structure and identity. His work is a formidable attempt to incorporate the actors/subject identity and needs into the study of modern social movements.

Touraine's approach expands the spectrum of research and limiting analysis of collective action and social movements previously examined in this thesis, namely CAT and RMT theories. I have in the past chapters demonstrated the theoretical problems encountered in the analysis of the role of the subject/actor in contemporary collective action and social movement research. CAT theories, such as those proposed by Neil Smelser and Herbert Blumer, and the rational actor/political economy model proposed by such RMT theorists as Charles Tilly have all struggled with a comprehensive view and analysis of the subjects/actors role.

I have illustrated that CAT theories have favoured the social system and structure by proposing that collective action and social movements are the result of social strains. In turn, RMT theorists such as Charles Tilly have proposed that action stems from grievances towards, and a desire to attain specific benefits from, the dominant social system namely the state. Touraine's approach does not see the social system as an opposition field of contention for social groups/actors, as proposed by RMT, nor does he attribute instances of collective action to the social systems desequilibrium. Touraine instead proposes that the social system is created by the
actor within a specific historical social context, and that collective action and social movements emerge as result of historicity.

Another pivotal reason for choosing Alain Touraine is that his work provides a European perspective to the study of modern social movements. The previous theories, namely CAT and RMT, both have a distinctive American perspective on collective action and social movements. The American perspective favours the classification of collective action and of the actors within “special interest groups” or “political lobby groups”. This classification and methodology is distinct from the European tradition which incorporates more of the Marxist analysis of collective action.

The European tradition incorporates traditional Marxist perspective on social movements. The Marxist perspective includes the following theoretical presuppositions. It states that:

People mobilise as a result of alienation and economic exploitation to protect traditional values and a sense of community; people act rationally to achieve collective benefits; new norms and values are created as a result of participation in a movement; movement development takes place within a specific historically contingent political and economic context; state policy plays a role in determining the context within which movements unfold, affects the resource base of movements, and shapes class struggle (McGuire, McQuarie:1994,43).

The European Marxist influence will become apparent in the treatment of Touraine’s NSM theory, particularly in Touraine’s own concepts such as historicity. I have brought forth the Marxist concepts in order to shed light on the theoretical and methodological differences between the predominant American theoretical paradigms CAT and RMT and the European NSM perspective. Their differences have been the source of their own theoretical analysis. For the sake of brevity, only two of the many
reference points presented by Margit Mayer in her 1991 article Social Movement Research in the United States: A European Perspective will be examined. In this article Mayer details the theoretical specificity of the European perspective. Margit Mayer claims that European theorists, such as Alain Touraine, are: «still influenced by more or less explicit assumptions of a class-structured society and logics of material (re) production, assume that each new reproductive stage produces and is challenged by social movements that articulate historically changing social cleavages, if not the older variety of class antagonism.» (Mayer in Lyman, 1995:189).

The European perspective and class-based analysis reflects the strong and enduring Marxist traditions of European social analysis, and is apparent in Alain Touraine's work. It must however be stressed that the idea of class has with time been altered from its original Marxist inception. This change in “class” and subsequently, in class-based analysis, has been altered by the change brought forth in society, in what Touraine labels the transition from an industrialized to a programmed society. The “old class structure” Touraine declares was founded on the following assumptions: (a) That there existed two social milieux which were culturally separated from each other; (b) that social tensions resulted from the accumulation of wealth and that (c) industrialisation «was not only dominated by the heritage of the past and the pressures of the present. As it is today, it was a projection of the future, a societal model» (Touraine, 1971:31). These assumptions, Touraine claims, led to «form the historical image of the class-based society, composed by two fundamental classes, engaged in an all-out contest for power and wealth» (Touraine, 1971:32). To this image, Touraine responds and affirms that «none of these three elements making up the image is sufficient for this general conception of social conflict» (Touraine, 1971:32). Touraine therefore proposes a
concept of class, which in a “programmed society” goes well beyond the traditional opposition model of social struggles. This model Touraine claims «can no longer remain limited to the domain of labour and business, because the hold of economic power over social life is more general than ever and reaches every aspect of personal life and collective activities» (Touraine, 1971:56). Hence, the definition of class for Alain Touraine must not be limited to an economic determinism but must in a programmed society, include social life and collective activities, hence culture.

Alain Touraine was also the first to propose the idea of “New” social movements. This rests on his analysis of the change from an industrial to a programmed society. This change, Touraine asserts, has altered the basic concept of what is a social movement. Touraine claims that,

The idea of the social movement is thus new; it forms a recognition of the fact that actors do not limit themselves to reacting to situations but actually produce situations. They define themselves both by their cultural orientation and by the social conflicts in which they engaged. And by cultural orientations, I do not mean values contrary to those of one’s opponents, but on the contrary those held in common with them and defining the stakes of the conflict. The conflicts themselves are not zerosum games since they aim to transform the institutional and organisational forms of social life (Touraine, 1988:27).

Touraine therefore defines “new social movements”, within a programmed society, as examples of collective action which incorporate the subject/actors identity and aim at changing the predominant cultural orientation. New social movements however are not, according to Touraine, «des événements dramatiques et exéptionnels: ils sont de manière permanente au coeur de la vie sociale» (Touraine, 1978:45). NSMs for Touraine are a «type d’investissement, modèle culturel - que j’ai nommé son historicité […] Les mouvements sociaux ne sont pas des refus marginaux de l’ordre; ils sont les forces centrales qui luttent l’une contre l’autre pour diriger la production de la
société par elle-même, l’action des classes pour la direction de
l’historicité” (Touraine, 1978:46). Social movements and forms of collective action
therein are, for Touraine, an ongoing element of society and signify moments when
society is “working upon itself”, a pivotal element of historicity.

There are three pivotal elements to Alain Touraine’s NSM theory. These are (a)
the passage of one societal type to another, namely from an industrial society to a
programmed society (b) the subject, its identity and its subsequent role and importance
in new social movements, and (c) Touraine’s concept of historicity. These three
elements, in turn, will enable me to provide a clear and concise assessment of the role
of the subject within Touraine’s NSM theories. I hope to demonstrate that the subject
within NSM theories is allocated an important and active role. Where Touraine’s theory
is incomplete, and therefore so is the role of the subject, is that Touraine fails to expand
the role of identity to encompass how collective identities come about. This leaves the
role of the subject incomplete and contextualised. The subject in Touraine’s analysis is
contextualised to the societies’ historicity, which in turn must be expanded to include not
only, as Touraine proposes social change but also individual and collective identity
changes.

When describing Touraine’s NSM approach, Jean Cohen claims that in his
analysis accounts for social movements, Touraine provides

historically new dimensions - reflexivity regarding the creation of identity
and norms, emphasis on the democratisation of society, self limitation,
and focus on cultural issues. His work moves on two analytical levels: (1)
the elaboration of a theory of the structural and cultural dimension of
contemporary society and (2) an action-theoretical analysis of the
conflicting processes of identity formation of collective actors
Cohen, 1985:695.
It is my perspective that although Touraine does, as Cohen claims, elaborate a theory of the structural cultural dimension of society and the conflictual processes of identity formation, he neglects the “formation of collective identity” as an integral element of modern social movements and collective action. Collective identity and subsequently its impact on modern social movements remains conspicuously absent from Touraine’s analysis of new social movements.

Touraine claims that society and congruently social movements have gone through a transition which has ultimately altered the way social movement should be analysed theoretically. This transition, Touraine asserts, is the shift from an industrial society to that of a programmed society. (see figure 1)

Mouvements Sociaux et le changement de la société industrielle vers la société programmée

Source: Alain Touraine (1978) La Voix et le Regard pp 21
Touraine claims that this passage, this shift (rather than a rupture) signals «le déclin d'un certain type de rapports et de conflits de classes et la naissance d'une nouvelle génération de mouvements sociaux» (Touraine, 1978:19). These changes Touraine claims led to the demise of the "the old types of movements" which Touraine asserts were focused on «la lutte contre les contradictions» (Touraine, 1978:19). New social movement activity involves differing approaches to conflict, which involve;

la défense contre ces appareils n'est plus menée au nom des droits politiques ou des droits des travailleurs, mais au nom du droit d'une population à choisir son genre de vie, au nom de sa capacité politique, qu'on nomme souvent autogestion. L'action politique pénètre partout, dans les soins médicaux comme dans la sexualité, dans l'éducation comme dans la production d'énergie (Touraine, 1978:16).

Touraine presents a new perspective of collective action and new social movements. The "old" movements were aimed, in a classical Marxist perspective, at the existing power the economic and political apparatuses of society. In Touraine's perspective, NSM broadens the sphere of action and inevitably the concept of power. His inclusion of rights, choice, sexuality, education, and self-determination inevitably alters the primary concepts of what is "political" to including the private sphere of social life. This is perhaps one of Touraine's greatest theoretical contributions to the study of collective action and new social movements.

Ultimately, Touraine's theoretical contribution to the study of new social movements has been a shift away from the rational and reactive actions and analysis of the subject/actor in forms of collective action and social movements. This in turn, reflects many of the new forms of collective action presently seen in modern social movements. Here are a few examples of the changing nature of social movements and how Touraine's concepts have aided in their analysis.
The women's movement has since the beginning stressed that the personal aspects of social life are political. This has all but been ignored in traditional analysis of social movement. There was in these traditions a clear delineation between private activism and public activism. The women's movement was analysed through its observances of collective action, social movement organisation and lobbying activities. Similarly, many factions of the environmentalist movement have expanded their focus of action to propose that the human body, the individual, cannot be set apart from its natural environment. There is no longer, as these examples stress in modern social movements the delineation between private and public social and political action. Touraine's concept of NSM theoretically recognises this important, pivotal distinction and characteristic of new social movements. It inevitably incorporates, through identity, the private and public sphere of political, economic and social collective action.

Touraine has created a schematic to explain the interrelationship between society (cultural totality), identity, and conflict (opposition). According to Touraine there are three components to identity, these being: «(i) of the actor, (o) the definition of the opponent, (t) and the stakes, that is, the cultural totality (t)» (Touraine, 1985: 760). These three elements for Touraine define the social movement.
Touraine's analysis therefore surmises that the actor and the social movement cannot be analysed by socio-economic or political groupings, as previously proposed in CAT and RMT paradigms. Instead Touraine proposes that the subject be defined by their conflictual relationship to society's historicity. Furthermore, Touraine maintains that there are no relations amongst the actors if they are not placed in the social context. This counters many of the assumptions of CAT and RMT which proposed that the actors/subject were reactive to either social strains, or that in their quest for resources, they were placed apart and in opposition to the dominant social system. Touraine proposes that social movements are a social entity, an integral element of society. This in turn counters the traditional idea that social movements arise in order to counter either desequilibrium or problems in society. Touraine maintains that social movements are "makers" of historicity, hence society. This perspective holds that social movements are no exceptions to the rule nor can they be labelled unusual events, but rather have a constant and necessary role in the creation of any given society.

The second element of Touraine's theory of new social movements revolves around the re-definition of conflict. As stated earlier in this chapter, what Touraine
labelled the shift from an industrial society to a programmed society necessitated, in
Touraine’s perspective, a re-evaluation of the definitions regarding the nature conflict. In
an industrial society conflict was seen in Marxists terms, primarily defined as the
struggle between social classes. Touraine maintains that conflict has shifted from class
based-struggles towards the very core of social change, social movements.

Touraine claims that all too often in classical theories, social movements are
«conceived as a special type of social conflict»(Touraine,1985:750). For Touraine, this
is problematic on many levels. Firstly as Touraine explains, «many types of collective
behaviour are not social conflicts». He adds that «A conflict presupposes a clear
definition of opponents or competing actors and the resources they are fighting for or
negotiating to take control of. Such an elementary definition leaves the way open to
many different approaches but it already draws two limits which should not be
trespassed. A social conflict cannot be analysed entirely as a feature of a social system
[...] The agents of this conflict must be identified as specific social categories
(Touraine,1985:751). Touraine is proposing a critique of the predominant ideas of
traditional theories of social movements. Their predominant ideas of conflict within
these traditions ignored that the individual/subject/actor had an integral role in conflict
and subsequently that conflict emanated from the social system. For Touraine, conflict
in new social movements, with its emphasis on identity, must take into account
agency/actors. Conflict in NSM theory according to Touraine must «have in common a
reference to the “real”- that is, organised - actors and to ends which are valued by all
competitors or adversaries»(Touraine,1985:751). With the actor in mind, Touraine sets
out to examine and re-define conflict, away from its generic and social system bias to
include the subject and actor.
Touraine maintained that a programmed society encompasses different “types of conflict”. These include the (1) pursuits of collective interest (2) reconstruction of a social, cultural, political identity (3) a political force aimed at changing the rules of the game, not just the distribution of relative advantages (4) the defence of status or privileges (5) the social control of the main cultural patterns and (6) the creation of a new order. (Source Touraine, 1985) These types of conflict, Touraine asserts, «are no longer defined by level of social life but which manifest conflicting efforts to control a process of historical change, that is the passage from one cultural and societal type to another one» (Touraine, 1985:756). It is for this reason that Touraine openly defines and attributes the type of conflicts undertaken by social movements as those that «refer to conflicts around the social control of the main cultural patterns» (Touraine, 1985:760).

The social control of the main cultural patterns gives social movement a certain “permanency” and “consistency” in society. Social movements for Touraine have a social permanence regardless of their level of overt activity or their opposition. This leads Touraine to assert that methodologically social movements: « ne peut jamais être défini par un objectif ou un principe. Il n’est que l’ensemble formé pas ces trois composantes, ensemble instable, jamais complètement cohérent et presque toujours mélangé à d’autre modes d’actions collectives» (Touraine, 1978:112). Touraine proposes that social movements and collective action cannot be analysed as per “organisational features” nor the “specified goals and attainments” predominantly propounded by CAT and RMT. For Touraine, social movements are the symbolism of such organisation and goals and not their embodiment.
Touraine’s theoretical contribution leads analysis of social movements and collective action away from what Jean Cohen had termed “the amorphous crowd”. In Touraine’s perspective, movements represent and signify the predominant social changes in a programmed society. The social movement’s form and homogeneous goals have all too often been the rationale in the past for explaining and justifying cases of collective action and social movements. This analysis has given social scientists an erroneous perspective on their role and influence in society. The structure of a social movement for Touraine cannot be measured, as CAT proposes, by their mobilisation potential, nor as in RMT by the groups cost-benefit calculation actions and results.

We can surmise from Touraine’s second contribution to the study of social movements that movements do not simply arise to counter social disequilibrium or social strains but are an integral element of modern society. The movement goals and organisation are not the sum of the movement but rather is indicative of the social change. This point becomes apparent when we examine Touraine’s perspective of a social movement combined with his definition of conflict. It is at this point that Touraine explains one of the many goals of social movements, its changes to the primary cultural patterns in society, a programmed society’s historicity.

The third element in Alain Touraine’s perspective is his concept of historicity. Historicity refers to a methodology, which Touraine utilises to demonstrate «l’ impossibilité d’ une explication scientifique de la réalité sociale au niveau de l’ observation empirique, au niveau des faits sociaux» (Touraine, 1965:29). For Touraine, an empirical observation of society is impossibility and is a myth created by.
modernity and its need for empirically based analysis of social action. Consequently, Touraine proposes a concept «which defines the instruments of society's self production; the system of historical action, meaning that totality composed of social and cultural orientation, by means of which historicity exercises its dominion over society's functioning; class relations, struggles for the control of historicity and of the system of historical action» (Touraine, 1977:6). Historicity is first and foremost a process which is the result of society's self-production. It is through its historical social and cultural changes that society should be seen and analysed. The link between social movements and historicity for Touraine is that: «Nothing reveals the self-production of society more directly than the confrontation of social movements and the politics of social change» (Touraine, 1977:8). The centrality of social movements, in Touraine's concept of historicity has led him to suggest certain methodological changes to the study of NSM's. These, Touraine claims, will not only provide greater analysis of the movements themselves, but will effectively provide an alternate view of society.

Touraine proposes a three fold methodological shift for the study of social movements and collective action in a programmed society. He claims that the first element that needs to be examined and inevitably should be abandoned is the empirically based analysis of society and the promotion and use of a historical social change perspective. Touraine also maintains that social movements should be analysed as the primary example of society's self production. He then asserts the need for inclusion of identity in the analysis of social change.

What is important to add and to understand is that Touraine's concept of historicity should not be likened to an evolutionist perspective of society and in fact
directly refutes it. The evolutionist perspective Touraine maintains has led to the
development of a methodology in which «chaque acteur collectif, guidé par une volonté
et orienté par une culture et par une histoire» (Touraine, 1978:170). Touraine claims that
we must shed this evolutionist perspective for «Aujourd’hui où l’histoire est occupée
surtout par la multiplicité conflictuelle des modèles de développement,
l’historicisme triomphe, tandis que l’évolutionnisme régresse [...] La crise culturelle des
années soixante a également mis fin à l’illusion d’une évolution linéaire conduisant vers
plus d’instrumentalité, de séparation des rôles et de froideur dans la vie
sociale» (Touraine, 1978:170). Touraine proposes an historical analysis that maintains
the complexity of an interrelated social action in which there are many social actors.

To explain his concept of historicity, and by virtue society and social change,
Touraine has created a schematic summary of the “patterns of development of a
society”, the diachronic axis (vertical in schema) which represents «the state, system
 crisis, change, and conflict behaviour opposing elites to masses» (Cohen, 1985:698) and
the synchronic axis (horizontal in schema) which represents «social relations, and the
“system of historical action”- that is, the conflictual processes by which norms,
institutions, cultural patterns are created and contested by social
actors» (Cohen, 1985:698). (see insert III)
From figure III we see the interrelationship amongst the diachronic and synchronic axes. This interrelationship, this “enchaînement” as Touraine explains, is historicity which «se transforme en organisation sociale» (Touraine, 1978:103). Within Touraine’s concept of historicity lies all the historical actors. Social movements are situated at the core of the schema, where the axes meet, hence at the centre of historicity and social change.

To provide a brief summary of Touraine’s threefold approach, society must first and foremost be seen as a historical transformation (historicity) which is dynamically self-producing by social movements. These social movements include the collective identity of the subject/actors. This historicity in turn, must be the foci of any sociology of social change. Subsequently, the analysis must centre on social movements which are the primary indicators of social change. Touraine further proposes that social movements
are in themselves an integral element of social change, one which is a constant element of any given society.

This approach proposed by Touraine in fact appears convincing and able to reconcile the role of the subject in social movement theorising. He places great emphasis on the role and importance of identities in collective action and social change. His contribution, namely his perspective in which social movements propound changes and represent the changes to the primary cultural of a society, addresses the need for inclusion of the role of culture into the study of social movements and collective action. There are, however, very important discrepancies in Touraine's analysis, all of which centre around the primary question of this thesis, the role of the subject as seen in theories of contemporary social movements.

Touraine's elaboration of a theoretical standpoint, which includes the subject in the analysis of social movements, is a major breakthrough in modern sociology. He was the first theorist to include and propose that the subjects/actor's identity influences society and has a formidable role in modern social movements. However what lacks is the development of a comprehensive analysis of how this identity figures collectively in social movements. Touraine's analysis of identity remains at the primary/individual level and does not include how individual identity influences and creates collective identity. These are pivotal elements which would enable a greater understanding and analysis of the role of the subject in contemporary social movements.

Alberto Melucci propounded the same critique of Touraine's work. He claims that «Touraine pose les conditions indispensables pour définir les relations
d’autonomie et de dépendance entre les systèmes, mais qu’il lui manque une formulation théoriquement satisfaisante de ces rapports» (Melucci, 1975:364). Melucci contends that Touraine has substantially explained the role of the social system, such as historicity, identity, the subject and social movements but has yet to formulate any details of the interrelationship between such systems. This critique by Melucci is highly applicable to identity and collective identity. Touraine effectively states the importance of identity but has yet to expand on its collective purpose and processes of identity formation. This task Alberto Melucci set forth to do, to expand on the work of his teacher, Alain Touraine.

The work of Alain Touraine, the new social movement approach, has guided us towards a more comprehensive analysis of social movements. His perspective has enabled the sociological community to incorporate pivotal indicators of social change into the analysis of social movements, the subject/actor’s identity. This has permitted further analysis of these important groupings, an analysis which greatly surpasses the basic ones proposed by CAT and RMT paradigms. Touraine’s NSM approach was a vanguard theory of collective action and social movements, one which continues to be extremely theoretically influential. Alain Touraine’s work has also burgeoned in the work of subsequent theories and theorists. Alberto Melucci was a student of Touraine and expanded upon his teacher’s work to develop a theory of collective identity. His work will be analysed and examined in the following chapter.
Chapter 4 Constructivist Approach

The final theorist whom I will examine is Alberto Melucci. I have chosen Melucci because his work best symbolises and illustrates the immense transformations in social movement theorising today. This theoretical transformation, has now shifted towards a more comprehensive theoretical analysis one that inevitably includes the reciprocal nature of culture and identity. It is Alberto Melucci’s current work that best addresses these new theoretical imperatives. Melucci’s work has acquired enormous support and appeal amongst social theorists and lay persons alike who are interested in social movements and collective action. His innovative perspective, that of constructivism, has enabled the development of a different and at times radical theoretical approach to the study of social movements. Within the social movement community, his work is highly respected, for it does not profess to provide the answers to the paradigmatic problems of the classical methods, nor does it seek to eradicate the important finding of such traditional approaches. But what Melucci’s work does contribute to social movement theorising is new and innovative theoretical tools which greatly contribute to the genesis of a new approach to the study of collective action and social movements.

Margit Mayer in her analysis of Melucci’s first English book published Nomads of the Present claims that Alberto Melucci, with his constructivist perspective and methodology «recast existing theoretical approaches under a new focus and thus raised innovative concepts and frameworks to explain contemporary social movements.»(Mayer,Mimeo:1) What Alberto Melucci therefore proposes is not the eradication of the classical theories, but rather proposes a re-evaluation of the existing paradigms and the development of the conceptual frameworks within these paradigms. What Melucci aims to develop is a conceptual framework which by focusing in on the
actors/subjects within social movements will ultimately include the individual identity, collective identity and culture produced by such subjects in the production of what he terms to be a "composite action system".

This proposition by Melucci, I surmise will provide researchers with a clearer view of that the subject/actor may have in forms of modern collective action and social movements. His viewpoint subsequently comes closer to rectifying the structural/individual dichotomy iterated in the previous approaches and chapters. What Melucci ultimately achieves is a broader, yet more inclusive framework for the definition and analysis of modern social movements and the actors participation therein.

Melucci has often claimed that classical theories, such as CAT, by their reliance on classification and their predominant view of crisis and disorder (social strains) has resulted in the view of the subject/actor within social movements as being actors without action as the "accidental sum of individual events" (Melucci, 1989:18). What Melucci's primary objection in what he terms the dualistic legacy of social movement research" is that these theoretical orientations fail to "fill the gap between behaviour and meaning, between objective" conditions and "subjective" motives and orientations." (Melucci, 1995:42) This approach fails to explain how social actors "come to form a collective and recognise themselves as being part of it" (Melucci, 1992:42)

Subsequently the RMT paradigms and classical Marxist theories Melucci asserts are too focused on the structural determinants of collective action. These approaches Melucci maintains "explains why but not how a movement is established and survives; they hypothesise potential conflict without accounting for concrete collective action. The why forms of collective action occur, and the subjective meaning behind such forms of
collective action is the mainstay of Melucci's constructivist perspective. His approach Melucci maintains will no longer separate the production of meaning in collective action from the «methodological consequences in considering empirical forms of collective action.» (Melucci, 1995:43) What Melucci proposes is an analysis which accounts for action, the meaning produced by forms of collective action as it is demonstrated in actual forms of collective action.

This methodological shift for Melucci is imperative for social movements in themselves have changed in a complex society. Melucci asserts that «Contemporary social movements, more than in the past, have shifted towards a non-political terrain: the need for self-realisation in everyday life. In this respect social movements have a conflictual and antagonistic, but not a political orientation, because they challenge the logic of complex systems on cultural grounds.» (Melucci, 1989:23) The shift towards the cultural grounds of the complex society undertaken by social movements for Melucci inevitably necessitates a shift in analysis, a shift which must account for the cultural production of the actor/subject. It is for this reason that Melucci rejects the idea of the subject/actor as a unified empirical datum and prefers to stress the «plurality of perspectives, meanings and relationships which crystallise in any given collective action.» (Melucci, 1989:25) Hence, proposing a composite action system

Melucci's work was much influenced by that of his teacher Alain Touraine. Touraines' influence however cannot be said to be theoretically for Touraines' structuralist perspective was never accepted by Melucci. Where Touraines' influence is greatly seen in Melucci's work is in the role and influence of the social scientist in the analysis of collective action. Touraines had hoped to provide for the social sciences,
and for sociology a greater and predominant role in the analysis of social change. Melucci follows his teacher’s ideals, but rather than proposing role changes for sociology, Melucci proposes methodological shifts for the social scientists, which he labels as acknowledgement as an active observer. A brief analysis of Melucci’s proposal is warranted for it becomes the basis for his theoretical proposal for the study of collective action.

What Melucci maintains is that the social scientist must re-asses their primary assumptions about society and social movements and the predominant paradigms used to analyse this phenomenon. A concrete example of this re-assessment is effectively illustrated by Melucci when he examines the predominant labels and analytical tools used towards the classification and labelling of society as an entity. He claims that the terms post industrial society, the post modernism, high modernism and post Fordism and the like reflect the social sciences methodologies and desire to “label” concept. He asserts that: “Contemporary debates on post-modernism, post industrial society and the globalization of the world system very often rests on underlying theoretical assumptions that are rarely made explicit. What is often being discussed, then, is not simply the specific themes; the broader issues involved come in their wake, and with them, often, the question of the overall definition of contemporary society.” (Melucci, 1996:485) What Melucci ultimately asserts is that the social sciences, by categorising inevitably create a certain form of knowledge, and this must be stated, recognised and asserted by the community. Melucci maintains the importance and necessity of explaining the underlying assumption within a theoretical paradigm. In such Melucci proposes that the social scientist acknowledge his role as observer and their influence on the role of the knowledge created by their analysis. In turn, by his assertions Melucci in fact
proposes for the social scientist, as did Michel deCerteau, a return to the subject and a theoretical practices “back towards their native land, everyday life”.

Melucci’s theoretical critique and proposals are highly applicable to the study of modern social movements. As I have elaborated and effectively demonstrated in the previous chapters, CAT, RMT and NSM theories have all had underlying assumptions about society and of the role of the subject within social movements and collective action. These assumptions although integrated into their basic analysis are rarely made evident by these classical schools of thought. These classical theories have also had implicit assumptions about the role and constitution of social movement and subsequently the role of the subject therein. These implicit assumptions, in turn, Melucci claims have served to create a body of knowledge about social movements. CAT theories had created the knowledge, and later a theory which viewed social movements as a reactive crowd, which sought to rebel against the social systems, perceived disequilibrium. The subject within such theories were grouped as an “amorphous crowd” and analysed as such. In RMT, social movements were non-specified of collective actors which sought to acquire needed resources for a specific group. The specificity, hence identity of the individuals in this resource acquisition and endeavours were stressed primarily through in their mobilisation potential and results rather than by the subjective interest and specificity and identity of the group. The NSM approach, as proposed by Alain Touraine, had a vision of social movements as collective actors within a specific historical context which sought to control a societies history. The subject within NSM theories, although identity was included, were still relegated to a secondary and contextualised role vis-à-vis the structural historical context of society. These standpoints, and especially the lack of admission of their
underlying assumption Melucci claims, has created a specific and incomplete view of the expansive and complex role of social movements. This view Melucci negates for social movements are not political actors or global historical subjects, or at least not mainly such, but are a phenomena composed of numerous varied elements, and if their possible newness resides in their ability to make the fundamental dilemmas of this post industrial, complex or otherwise named society visible and to name them, then the knowledge that brings these phenomena to light and the language by which they are named are truly major components of these fields; they are not independent, and we as observers are not independent, of the way we construct our object and the language in which we do so. (Melucci, 1996:506)

What Melucci therefore proposes is that the social sciences acknowledge their role in the creation of a body of knowledge, which ultimately is transferred to the object of study in this instance social movements. This "self-reflexive attitude" towards knowledge Alberto Melucci claims is necessary and the first step towards a comprehensive theory for "it is no longer possible to analyse social phenomena, and social movements or collective action in particular, as phenomena that are entirely independent of the observer's position in the field."(Melucci, 1996:507) The observer, the social scientist is part of the classification of social movements, and movements are part of a social system as social networks of meanings and messages. How the messages and networks of social movements are analysed and subsequently brought forth as knowledge therefore remains a primary concern for Alberto Melucci.

Melucci's "methodology" and approach has been labelled as constructivist. Although a label in itself this approach addresses "how actors construct their collective action and unity [...] how one can get the meaning which is produced out of heterogeneity and plurality."(Mayer: Mimeo,3) The subjective meaning of the actor therefore in a constructivist perspective plays a vital role and well as being the impetus and starting point for the analysis of collective action and social movements. Mayer
claims that within this approach «Agency is treated as central by emphasising the
active, cognitive construction of collective actors and collective action»(Mayer: Mimeo,3)

As I have stated in the prior chapter Alberto Melucci inverts the analysis of
collective action and social movements. As other theorists have started their analysis,
or have inevitably concluded their analysis by the structural determinants for collective
action, Melucci proposes what can be termed “a bottoms up approach”. Melucci’s
theoretical standpoint, from the micro (individual) perspective does not entail the neglect
of the larger (micro) societal system, for one Melucci argues can never be separated
from the other. It is for this reason that Alberto Melucci’s work is of pivotal importance
to my analysis of the role of the subject in social movement theories and warrants
further investigation.

Melucci’s theoretical standpoint constructivist differs from the hermeneutic
approach once attributed to Alain Touraine. Although he does use the hermeneutic
perspective, that of subjective experiences is the starting point for the analysis of social
movement and collective action Melucci rejects that the material world is alien and
impersonal. One of Melucci’s greatest theoretical influences was the work of Ulric
Neisser and his work on (1964)Cognition and Reality. In this essay Neisser claims that
cognitive psychologists ¹ «first, must make greater effort to understand cognition as it
occurs in the ordinary environment,[...] second, it will be necessary to pay more
attention to the details of the real world in which perceivers and thinkers live, [...] third,
We may have been lavishing too much effort on hypothetical models of the mind and not
on analysing the environment that the mind has been shaped to meet.»(Neisser,1964:7)

¹ Alberto Melucci simultaneously holds a PhD in Clinical Psychology and Cultural Sociology explaining his
theoretical similarities to Ulrich Neisser.
Neisser heeding, the need to stress the ordinary environment, the social complex is one area which Melucci sought to emphasise in his work. The social system, which he labels complex society does not take precedence on the subject/actor but rather shares in a reciprocal relationship in the construction of social reality and social culture.

I will commence my analysis of Melucci's work, as I have done with the other theorists in this thesis by a brief explanation of the authors perception, hence theory on the social system. I will then demonstrate the authors perspective on the role of the subject in his theories as they relate to social movements. What will be ultimately demonstrated in Alberto Melucci's approach is that the social system, the complex society and the subject are one of the same, both part of a composite action system.

The first element of Melucci's work is an analysis of modern society, the social structure which he terms a complex society. Complex society as opposed to other classification such as industrialised, neo Fordist or even postmodern society pertains very specific changes. These changes, as opposed to other theoretical paradigms are not seen as increase in production, communication and other measurable variables. Complex society for Alberto Melucci is rooted in the everyday experiences and it is the changes in the everyday experiences, which will inevitably, be «crucial in for understanding contemporary conflicts and movements.» (Melucci, 1989:103) The experiences to which Melucci alludes to are: time (the construction of time and space inner rhythms and social rhythms), metamorphosis, which refers to the relationship to knowledge and what he terms "otherness" and communication the « forms of relationships among individuals in everyday life.» (Melucci, 1989:112) I will examine
each of these premises individual for they in turn, provide us with the analytical tool of
the complex society in which social movements and collective action arise.

Melucci places much emphasis on the concept of time. Time however is not, the
time of the artificial machine which regulates work, sleep, waking and such. This type of
time he refers to as linear, which is "the time of collective events and experiences. It is
characterised by the continuity and uniqueness of events, which follow one another in a
single direction, and are therefore viewed as irreversible. Thus we can speak of a
before and an after. We can even establish a relation of cause and effect between the
before and after." (Melucci, 1989:106) Complex society, however is marked by an end
to this linear time which Melucci claims has always incorporated a "finalistic cultural
orientation" (Melucci, 1989:104) and subsequently to future oriented action. In a
complex society time ceases to be linear and has contrasting characteristics. Time in a
complex society becomes ever increasingly inner time and is based on inner
experiences. These assertions may seem complex, but in all, that is Melucci's point
society has become complex. To place his analysis in a concrete example, that of
modern social movements, individuals in collective action cannot be reduced to a
perception of historical actors acting on a world stage. Inner time, inner experiences are
the impetus for participation of the individual. In fact the title of his 1989 book Nomads
of the Present asserts this change in the concept of time for individuals in a complex
society. It is claimed that "Participation within movements is considered a goal in itself
because, paradoxically, actors self-consciously practice in the present the future social
changes they seek. Collective actors are 'nomads of the present'. (Keane and Mier in
Melucci, 1989:6) This inevitably leads to the re-evaluation of the "why" social
movements emerge and especially contradicts the established paradigms and
perception of CAT, RMT and NSM which have all relied on a linear vision of time, hence
future oriented purposive and historical collective action. The shift to the present places more impetus and focus on the subject, for their collective action is not guided by events taking place in linear time, but rather from subjective time, an important element which must be stressed in analysis of collective action.

The second element in Melucci's analysis of a complex society is what he terms metamorphosis which refers to knowledge. According to Melucci «knowledge is increasingly reflexive. It is no longer merely a question of learning, but of learning to learn.» (Melucci, 1989:108) What Melucci is proposing is that individuals in a complex society have (a) find themselves in a multitude of memberships arising from the multiplication of social positions (B) the quantity of information that each individual emits or receives is growing at an unprecedented rate. (Melucci, 1989) What this means for the individual in a complex society is that «The pace of social change, the plurality of memberships, and the abundance of possibilities and messages thrust upon the individual all serve to weaken the traditional points of reference (church, party, race, class) on which identity is based [...] The need to re-establish continually who I am and what assures the continuity of my biography becomes stronger.» (Melucci, 1989:109)

This metamorphosis, of the multiple self and experiences in a complex society necessitates the ability to learn how to learn, adaptability and creativity of the individual. This "multiplicity" of individuals is also associated with a specificity of identity and what Melucci claims to be "individuation". He asserts that «in modern complex society, individual social actors have the chance of becoming individuals, that is, of defining themselves as distinct subjects of action irrespective of their group memberships, their situation or their heritage.» (Melucci, 1989:113) What Melucci's assertions ultimately heeds for the study of collective action is that the actor is no longer confined by the group or in as in classical Marxist analysis, their class. Identity in its individual and
collective form is now fluid and specific to the individual, and not to the social system. This in turn celebrates the individual and his/her process of individuation.

This process of individuation for Melucci counters many other analysis of the ill effects of a growing individualism in society. Individualism in modern society has been often equated with nihilism of social ties and communitarism amongst individuals in modern society. The nihilism associated with individualism is often seen as a contributor to the downfall of collective enterprises needed in such social systems as modern democracies. Melucci in fact asserts the necessity and benefits of individualism and in this respect compliments the work of Gilles Lipovetsky in *L’Ère Du Vide*. Lipovetsky claims that individualism has replaced massive revolutionary ideas and action by «accomplissant une révolution permanente du quotidien et de l’individu lui-même.» (Lipovetsky, 1983:7) This “individualism”, or as Lipovetsky labels “individuation” does not sound the death knell of democratic participation and action by individuals but rather «le procès de personnalisation introduit bien une discontinuité dans la trame historique, il poursuit néanmoins par d’ autre voies l’oeuvre qui court sur des siècles, celle de la modernité démocratique- individualiste.» (Lipovetsky, 1983:14) For Lipovetsky as for Alberto Melucci individualism does not sound the destruction of collective enterprises but rather is a comprehensive facet of modern complex society. What individuation, individualism however does bring forth is a change in perspective of the individuals participation in democratic practices such as social movements, practices which have shifted from the amorphous crowd analysis of CAT and the un-characterised lobby groups proposed by RMT, or the historical agent in NSM to one in which identity and individual needs are an intrinsic element of collective action. Individualism therefore is seen as the enlargement of opportunity for self-emancipation and action.
The third element of a complex society Melucci claims is communication. Melucci asserts that «The body is the primary medium of all communication. The 'opening' and 'closing' of the individual to the external environment can be achieved by activating and dis-activating the senses of contact with the outside world.» (Melucci, 1989:115) Communication in a Meluccian perspective therefore stems from the individual, his/her identity and consciousness. The individual is the medium in which there is communication with the outer social world. Melucci refers to this as a process in which

This oscillation between two worlds follows no causal paths from the depths to the surface or vice versa; there is no place here for the familiar determinism of nineteenth-century thought, which supposed that individual consciousness is determined either by the obscure domain of instincts or by the social order. Instead, relations are circular in a process that can be described as dynamic. Inner experience and social experience have a mutual influence on each other. (Melucci, 1989:116)

Melucci above also brings forth an important thesis for the analysis of contemporary social movement, the role of the body. The body, in its corporeal and social forms have all but been ignored from traditional sources of social movement analysis. The rise in what has been coined as "bio politics" attests to the need to incorporate the role of the body and the identity of the "social body" into the analysis of social movement and social theory in general.

Identity and the body are directly linked in modern social movements. The recent rise in such identity based movements such as the women’s movement, the gay and lesbian movements, the race and ethnically based movements and even the ecological movements all attest to the formidable role the body has in the formation of
collective identities within such groups. Norbert Elias's much influential thesis on the civilising process and the role of the body claimed that «corporeal and societal change is based on a view of the body as simultaneously social and biological» and that humans through knowledge and learning of symbols, reflexivity and communication «have enabled humans to adapt to new circumstances independent of biological changes [...] and to effectively monitor and control their behaviour, as such, is a crucial prerequisite for the development of civilised bodies.» (Schilling, 1993:153) The body therefore becomes a medium for corporeal and human expression. The body in modernity, and its associated corporeal and social identity in a complex society becomes the source of communication. The body as social and biological, is a mainstay of the identity and communication of many modern social movement. Alberto Melucci effectively incorporates the body, and the identity that results from its corporeal and social inclusion into the study of social movements.

In summary complex society for Alberto Mellucci stems from the process of individuation and is mediated through the individual. Within this process or system there is a reflexive knowledge of the inner and outer experiences of the individual. Society or a social system cannot be seen as apart form the individual and his/her experiences. This counters many of the primary proposals of classical social movement theory which stress the autonomous and at times all encompassing role and influence of the social system on forms of collective action. In a complex society identity plays a pivotal role in the individuals self identification and is brought forth into his/her sociality in the form of a process of collective identity and collective action. Identity is therefore constructed by the individual within a reciprocal relationship with a complex society. This identity is never linear nor specific but is rather discontinuous and ever changing. It simultaneously
takes into account the body and its corporeal and social dimensions. Action by
individuals is therefore individual and collective by its relationship in society. Action, as
demonstrated in social movements and instances of collective behaviour is not as
proposed by classical analysis oriented towards the achievement of means/end goals
and thinking, nor a response to social strains but is the result of individual needs,
identity and desire for expression, communication hence sociality.

This briefly summarises Alberto Melucci’s view on the social system. As I have
claimed there are no distinct lines of separation between the society and its’ subjects,
the actor. The second part of this chapter will examine Melucci’s analysis of the subject/
the actor in a complex society. As I have demonstrated for Alberto Melucci complex
society is not seen as it is in many classical social theories as outside the individual, as
an autonomous social, economic and political system. Complex society in turn, cannot
be seen as a system apart from its primary constituents and creators, the subject. In
the second part of this chapter I will examine Alberto Melucci’s ideas and concepts on
the subject, the actor. This in turn, will demonstrate the formidable role Melucci
attributes to the subject in the study of collective action in social movements. The first
will be an analysis of an underlying premise on the subject that Melucci maintains, the
need for the subject to be social, hence the concept of human sociality.

Sociality is a major premise of Alberto Melucci. Sociality, the need to express
oneself and to participate in social life is a mainstay of Melucci’s concept of social
movements, collective action. The concept of sociality as explains Roberto Miguelez is
not limited to the reproduction of the species or material gains, it is also geared towards
«en vue d’obtenir de moyens d’existence pour tous les membres du
groupe.»(Miguelez,1992:27) An individual’s sociality must therefore take into account
other needs besides biological and economic natural resources. Miguelez adds that an analysis in needs, in its extended form must be incorporated into the analysis of sociality for «la notion générale des besoins- et, corrélativement, celles des ressources destinées à les satisfaire- est, applicable à l'étude de n'importe quelle espèce animale, voire de n'importe quelle forme de vie. C'est donc par l'examen de la manière dont les êtres humains s'organisent pour obtenir leurs moyens d'existence que nous pouvons accéder à une connaissance de leur forme spécifique de socialité.» (Miguelez, 1992:27) The importance of needs and the fulfilment of such needs is for Miguelez an integral element of human sociality and is the starting point for Alberto Melucci's analysis of social movements and human participation in such forms of collective action. It is the building block of Alberto Melucci's concept of collective action which he defines as

The result of purposes, resources, and limits as a purposive orientation constructed by means of social relations within a system of opportunities and constraints. It therefore cannot be considered either the simple effects of structural preconditions or the expression of values and beliefs. Individuals acting collectively "construct" their action by means of "organised" investments; they define in cognitive terms the field of possibilities and limits they perceive while at the same time activating their relationships as to give sense to their "being together" and to the goals they pursue. The empirical unity of a social movement should be considered as a result rather than a starting point, a fact to be explained rather than evidenced. (Melucci in Johnston and Klandermans, 1995:43)

Alberto Melucci's analysis of the actor commences with an analysis of the social actors needs, identity and need for social inclusion, hence normality. Individuals needs for Melucci are, as opposed to the classical psychological or biological definition, always within a cultural field. These needs are defined «within the specific codes of the everyday cultural field in which we live and communicate.» (Melucci, 1996:24) Needs for Melucci therefore are always socially produced and in society are the result of social construction. In the context of classical psychological analysis of human needs were
referred to «as if they were natural» and asserts that «seen this way needs are reduced to biology.» (Melucci, 1996:25) Modern social movements, and their “cultural innovations” have demonstrated that «a definition of needs has emerged which treats them as the expression of a nature that resists or rebels against the social. The spontaneity of primary needs is put to stand in opposition to a society which obstructs or represses them with its apparatus of control.» (Melucci, 1996:25) This counters the classical psychological analysis in which needs were individuated processes of self examination. Needs in a Meluccian perspective are the basis for sociality. He claims that as subject within a modern society «We are no longer able to identify our needs univocally. They are part of a symbolic field filled with tensions.» (Melucci, 1996:26) Needs have an implicit social dimension. What this means is that in a Meluccian perspective «needs are a signal of something that we lack, and it is up to us to recognise these needs and to give them cultural expression.» (Melucci, 1996:28) This experience (of lacking) in turn «compels us to ask who we are; and any attempt for our an answer leads us to probe the question of our identity.» (Melucci, 1996:28) To summarise, needs for Melucci are intrinsically social and guide the individual to seek and create his her identity. Identity therefore is also a social processes.

Identity is a pivotal element of Alberto Melucci’s constructivist perspective. Identity for Melucci must again be re-defined from its psychological and biological categorisations which asserts that identity is a process of individuation. What Melucci accepts from a psychological perspective he inevitably links to sociological analysis of identity. He claims hat «Psychological and sociological research confirms that individual identity develops in a circular relationship with a system of constraints. Individuals are able to identify themselves when they have acquired the ability to distinguish themselves and the environment [...] and that the subject only becomes aware of itself as a subject
through her/his active interchanges with an external environment and through the resources/constraints offered by it. »(Melucci,1996:29) This establishes the social roots of identity, it is a reciprocal relationship between the individual and society. Identity in this perspective also becomes a communicative and independence tool within a complex society. This promotes Melucci’s primary idea that identity as a social process necessitates (through the definition of needs) (a) an identification of the self and (b) by its social nature leads to the formation of a collective identity. Collective identity is the «identity which ensures the continuity and permanence of the group or the society to which we belong. Over time, identity establishes the limits of the group with respect to its natural and social environment. It determines the membership of the individuals, it defines the requirements for joining the group, and the criteria by which its members recognise themselves and are recognised.»(Melucci,1996:30) Identity and collective identity are therefore defining principles of both modern society and collective action.

In summary needs, identity and its social demonstration, sociality as demonstrated in forms of collective action, are for Alberto Melucci social movements. It is Melucci’s perspective that «In the study of social movements action itself (not structures and opinions) should be a meaningful subject for research.»(Melucci,1992:49) This re-defines social movements from the what Melucci claims to be a “unified datum” as seen in CAT, RMT and NSM theories to that of a “composite constructed reality, which nevertheless presents itself empirically as a unity.»(Melucci,1992:48) Analysis of social movements must therefore seek to shed the predominant ideologies which sees social movements as unified empirical actors acting on a specific historical world stage. This analysis Melucci claims has created a legacy in which «two ingenious epistemological assumptions still persist and have left their mark on the study of collective phenomena. The first one is the supposition that factual unity of the
phenomenon, as perceived or believed to be there by the observer, actually exists[...]

The second assumption of social behaviour is taken as a given, as a datum obvious enough to require no further analysis. How people actually manage acting working together and becoming a “we” evades the problematic as it is taken for granted.» (Melucci(b)1996:15) Social movements have in classical theories been seen as empirical unified datum. Their analysis have in turn reflected this theoretical assumption.

I will now briefly explain how the theoretical assumption of a unified datum of analysis has permeated the analysis on modern social movements. I will then propose a Meluccian analysis. If we use the example of the women’s movement, classical theories would stress that it is composed by women and that it is the femininity, gender which binds this movement together. The measure of this movement would be seen in CAT terms as a reaction to the established patriarchal system which is characteristic of a system in disequilibrium. Women would take part in demonstrations, rallies and political works as to restore the social system to its’ natural equilibrium. In RMT theories the women’s movement would aim at the acquisition of resources, services and gains from which they have been excluded. The specificity of the internal ties and identity of women in general would take second place for it is their collective (and primarily political) endeavours which would be stressed. In NSM approach, the women’s movement would be seen as historical actors trying to take control of the existing predominant cultural social field. Action from this social movement would be determined by the historical time frame, simply put, history or herstory would dictate the impetus for action.

In a constructivist perspective the women’s movement, as do other social movements arise when there is a recognition of needs. From their individual need
women as an example will seek out others, in their process of sociality as to compliment and suffice these needs. From then other needs which may include economic, political, social, and arise from the interaction of women. From their individual needs and identities new collective needs and identities are created. In his analysis of the women’s movement Melucci’s perspective illustrates the differences between feminism and the women’s movement. He states that feminism «principally concerns that generation of women who in the earlier years of the decade were the first to utilise the public arena and who later flowed into numerous feminist institutions.» (Melucci, 1989:94) Feminism for Melucci, represents the institutional element of the women’s movement. But feminism and the women’s movement differ for

as recent empirical studies show a much more articulated variety of submerged phenomena, in which the cultural dimension predominates over direct confrontation with political institutions [...] it is within these submerged networks that the female difference becomes the basis for the elaboration of alternative symbolic codes at odds with the dominant cultural and political codes. (Melucci, 1989:94)

It is therefore the analysis of the cultural codes produced by the social movement which must be done as to effectively explain social movements. In a constructionist perspective the analysis of the networks goals is but an empirical explanation of the structural, political economic and legal action the “publicly visible mobilisation” of the feminist movement. To analyse the women’s movement one must look at the subjective meaning, identity, needs and cultural codes created, and in such is in the women’s movement.

In his analysis of the ecological movement Melucci once again stresses the need for a constructivist analysis. He claims that when we look at why the ecological issues have achieved such importance is that «we are beginning to perceive reality in different terms; our definition of individual and collective needs are changing. The ecological
problem reflects and expresses a profound change in cultural models and social
relations.» (Melucci, 1989:96) It is Melucci's perspective that the ecological debate, more
than any other social movement

highlights the cultural dimension of human experiences. We are
emerging from a model of society in which the economy was seen to
determine all aspects of social life [...] the ecological problem
democratizes the basis for of survival is no longer the system of
means (i.e. goal-oriented rationality and calculation of political
exchange), but rather ends themselves. The ends here refers to the
cultural models that guide action and structure daily life, modes of
production, exchange and consumption. (Melucci, 1989:96)

These examples and the constructivist perspective on social movement highlight
not only the social movement but in turn, highlights the often dramatic social changes in
society. A constructivist perspective of collective action and social in fact, in Melucci
perspective becomes the looking glass of society and its cultural changes.
Contemporary social movements, in Melucci's perspective operates primarily as signs,
signs and symbolic codes within the social movement and onwards towards complex
society.

There are two specific critiques of Alberto Melucci's constructivist perspective
which must be brought forth. The first rest on the symbolic nature of social movements
and its implication to the pre-political action and meta political action. The second refers
to his exclusion of power and its continued formidable influence in complex society. I
will commence with a critique of power, for it inevitably impacts onto the analysis of
political action.

According to Alberto Melucci collective action «also functions as a symbolic
multiplier » (Melucci, 1989, 88) Melucci in this case uses the example of the challenges
brought forth by the peace movement to technocratic military apparatus. What Melucci
claims is that social movements, such as the peace movement «forces apparatuses to justify themselves. It pushes them to reveal their own inner logic and the weaknesses of their own “reasons”. It makes power visible.» (Melucci, 1989:88) To make power visible is therefore a function of social movements in a complex society for «forcing it to be visible is a fundamental political achievement.» (Melucci, 1989:88). But, Melucci does not address the influence of such power on social movements, and on the formation of identity and collective identity. In fact, Melucci refers to power as being «increasingly anonymous and neutral» (Melucci, 1989:88). Therefore for Melucci, and for his constructivist perspective power is not a hierarchical formation and in fact can be said to be invisible. Melucci therefore does not bring forth a theory on how power is integrated into the creation of individual and collective identities. It basically neglects the formidable role that power plays in the formation of such, and subsequently how it is transposed into a complex society. Melucci, in turn with his neglect of power as a formidable element does not speak of the positive effects of power, such as personal power and collective power. This renders the analysis of the messages and symbols of many social movement incomplete, if we are to look at such slogans as the Black power slogans of the US’s early civil rights movements. The construction of difference a necessary and pivotal element of identity is still affected by unequal relations of power. Power therefore does have a strong effect on the individual and the collective groups’ identity and action, an element which Melucci does not effectively address in his constructivist model.

The second area is the clear delineation Melucci places between collective action and political action. What Melucci ignores is that many individual and collective identities are created from political action. One needs only to look at social movements which have used the basis of rights and citizenship for the construction of their collective
action and identities. The clearly drawn lines between the political and collective action further renders the analysis of such primary issues, as proposed by the women's movements, "The personal is political" difficult and therefore once again neglects many of the cultural codes and symbols created by such movements within the political sphere.

Although there are some serious theoretical omissions in Alberto Melucci's constructivist model of social movements, his approach brings much to the study of contemporary social movements. His approach best exemplifies the creative and active contribution of the subject to both social movements and to the larger society, social system. It clearly illustrates the interrelationship, interdependence of these pivotal elements. Classical social movement theories had in the past aimed at providing an analysis of this interdependence, but it is Melucci and his theory of collective action which puts forth the why individuals participate in social movements. Melucci still is unable to effectively bridge the individual/structural gap which plagues social movement analysis. What Melucci however is highly successful in doing is providing us with a wealth of knowledge about the creative and active role that the subject, has in contemporary social movements.
Conclusion

Throughout this thesis I have briefly explored the predominant theories on collective action and social movements since the 1930s to the present. Throughout my inquiry, I have iterated that the subject has and continues to acquire greater theoretical attention and analysis. This is substantiated by the steadfast increase in what has been termed "bio politics", in which social movements define their spectrum of action and participation based on collective and individual identity. The shift towards the subject and the inclusion of the identity paradigm into the analysis was, in traditional theories of collective action and social movements, given a secondary position in the analysis of social change. From its effaced position in CAT theories to the subject’s rise in importance and foci in a Meluccian constructivist perspective, the subject as a unit of analysis is well on the path to becoming an integral element of sociological analysis of modern social movements. The subject, the actor as a constitutive and contributive element of social movements and society, can no longer be analysed as secondary to or overly socialised by the larger social system.

However, the question remains: is there now a clear and concise theoretical paradigm capable of explaining collective action and social movements? Has Alberto Melucci achieved this? To this question even Alberto Melucci would inevitably answer no. He claims that his constructivist approach is «a venture into uncertain terrain of a theory still to be constructed» (Melucci, 1996:3). The construction of a comprehensive theory must, as I have clearly iterated, account for the role of the subject/actor in forms of collective action and social movements. I have also sought to explain that the
spectrum of the role of the subject must also be expanded. A brief review of my primary findings in the predominant theoretical paradigms will illustrate this point.

In the first chapter on Collective action theories (CAT), I have effectively explained that the subject/actor in such theoretical paradigms was given a reactive and secondary position in the analysis of collective action. CAT theories had aimed at its inception to explain the psychological reasons behind massive instances of collective action. Yet by CAT's adherence to a systems approach proposed by such theorists such as Herbert Blumer and Neil Smelser, it proposed an analysis where the actors/subject role and influence is conspicuously absent. This absence, I have surmised, stems from the predominance of a systems generalisation and classification of collective action in which action is seen arising from predominantly social strains. This perspective, although bringing forth many important theoretical innovations, relegates its primary goal, the psychological imperatives of the subject's participation in forms of collective action and social movements. This theoretical exclusion of the subject therefore renders CAT theories incomplete as a means of explaining forms of collective action and social movements.

The CAT paradigms proposed by Herbert Blumer and Neil Smelser reflect the major theoretical influences of the late 1950's and early 1960's. CAT, which is modelled after the Parsonnian systems theory, is theoretically limited in its scope and depth of analysis. Structural functionalism stresses that society functions as interrelated and synchronous parts and subsequently social movement and collective action arise as a function of this system. The function of social movements and collective action is to restore and maintain the said "equilibrium of the social system". In fact, cases of
collective action demonstrate that this equilibrium is unachievable by the sheer action of the subject. The subject within social movements, by its opposition to, or adherence to, or by their desire for emancipation and individual needs assure that equilibrium can never be achieved or desired. The subject demonstrates society's shift towards change, where equilibrium or the restoration of societal system equilibrium is but a mere reflection of a mechanistic view of society, and of social change.

The second chapter on Resource mobilisation theories (RMT) also brought forth another perspective of analysis and classification. With the work of Charles Tilly and his political economy model we saw how collective action and social movement analysis became ever increasingly specified. This specification was also indicative of the growing specificity of the movements themselves, and of the goals and demands of these groups. RMT theorising demonstrated and stressed a theoretical shift which recognised the strategic action of the subject. RMT's reliance on manifest forms of collective action, the result of movement organisation, becomes primarily an institutional account of social change. This perspective in turn, has placed the subject, the social actor, and their specificity in terms of characteristics, goals and identity and collective identity in a secondary position vis à vis the larger societal system. Action here is rationally based, and guided once again by what the larger social system dictates, in this case inequality in resource distribution.

This theoretical paradigm once again reflects the major societal and theoretical paradigms of that time period. As explained in chapter 2, the growing diversification and intensification of society itself required an analysis which could explain mass behaviour in terms of the larger social changes such as industrialisation and
urbanisation. It is in this time frame that mass mobilisation by a variety of groups came to the forefront of social analysis. The subject/actor was seen in terms of the larger group, the social movement organisation. In response, the RMT paradigm achieved a theory of organisational analysis of social movements. This organisational perspective neglected the integral and important specificity of the actor, his/her thoughts, actions and identity and the creation of collective identity as a constitutive element of social change. In RMT, social movements, such as the women’s movement, the ecological movement or ethnic based movements, are indiscriminately grouped and generically labelled, as Melucci claims, “a unified datum”. In the end, for RMT, in the structure of the social movement organisation, its organisational goals and means to achieve these goals efface the subject’s own desires and action and specificity. This in turn, renders the RMT paradigm unable to address many valuable variables in the study of social movements and collective action, namely how the specificity of the actor/subject creates forms of social change.

In the third chapter Alain Touraine’s work demonstrated the theoretical genesis towards the inclusion of the subject and especially the importance of identity in modern social movements. However, what results from Touraine’s analysis is an incomplete analysis of the role and function of identity. For Touraine, identity is a subjective process and therefore neglects how collective identity is created by individuals. This omission in turn does not address the importance of collective identity in modern social movement.

Alain Touraine’s NSM paradigm reflects the social changes of the late 1960s and 1970s. The rise in identity-based movements and subsequently their political and social
successes rendered necessary an analysis which expanded upon the predominant RMT perspective. With the successes of many social movement groups, there was a need to look beyond the rational means/end thinking, to explain their perpetuation and viability once the political, social, economic gains had been achieved. For Touraine, and for other social theorists of that time, the subject/actors identity and the role of identity emerged as a pivotal component and key to further social movement theorising. This paradigm shift however did not expand the role of the subjects/actors identity to include the creation and influence of collective identity.

Alberto Melucci expanded on identity and incorporated the role of the subject not only in forms of collective enterprises, but also sought to explain the function of collective identity in social change. It became clear within my preliminary research that Melucci was in fact proposing an expanded and comprehensive analysis of the subject/actor in forms of collective action and social movements. Through the inversion of analysis from the micro to the macro and the development of such concepts as collective identity and collective action, Melucci appeared to place much emphasis on the subject/actor as agent of social change. Melucci effectively integrates the subject/actors identity and needs (individual and collective), in his analysis of social movements.

The subject in CSM becomes the medium through which social movements should be seen and analysed. Actors are no longer seen as reactive to, or constrained by the larger social system, but constitutive of that system. Their experiences, identities, needs and desires become primary variables to explain modern social movements. This perspective in turn allows for the development of a theory of social
movement and collective action which is far more comprehensive than its predecessors. It is now the task of the social sciences to expand and further the study of social movement and the forms of collective action therein. It is my perspective that Alberto Melucci has planted the seed of a theory of social movements, which will inevitably include many elements which have been neglected in the analysis of collective action and social movements, primarily the extensive and participative role of the subject/actor.

Throughout this thesis there has also been a corollary theme which has emerged. This theme has been the pending role of the social sciences and of sociology in particular in the analysis of social change. This is made explicit in the first lines of the introduction, by Michel deCerteau’s assertion of the need for the philosophers and experts to return to the everyday life experiences the subject as a necessary and warranted theoretical shift for the social sciences. My analysis of the predominant social movement theories and the role of the subject/actor therein validate deCerteau’s advice for the social sciences. From the previous chapters we have seen that deCerteau’s vision is necessary to formulate a comprehensive theoretical paradigm. In the sociological analysis of social movement, it is easier to define overtly quantifiable variables such as movement organisation, legislative attempts, and mobilisation potential rather than the subjective meaning produced by forms of collective action. Sociology has created its own definitional vortex which has included a clear cut definition and methodology as to define and study social movements and forms of collective action. These primary assumptions must now be re-assessed, reviewed and deciphered perhaps to reveal, as my analysis of the subject has done, the discrepancies in such definitions.
In closing I must, as I have for the other theorists before me, put forth my theoretical standpoint. The inspiration for this thesis did not come only from my years of academic study and learning; it also came from what is often termed "real life" experiences. In my early adolescence I marched with my mother, aunt and a multitude of others on parliament hill for the International year of the woman. I took part, publicly/prvately voiced my support of, opposition to and indifference towards a variety of important social issues. These often did not take the form of demonstrations, speeches or rallies, and yet they remain important in themselves. To "participate in" to "march against" is just one facet of social action. Participation in social movement and collective action cannot be solely seen in forms of public activism as this simply demonstrates part of the subjects/actors role in social change. Where other equally important elements of social change lie, is in the way we speak, think, raise our children, share our lives with friends and lovers, identify ourselves and others, all reflective of what Michel deCerteau claims to be our "everyday lives". It was this perspective that led me to explore how the discipline of sociology explored these pivotal elements of social change, and subsequently how to go about exploring all the facets of social change that these movements create.
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