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INDIVIDUATION AS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HUSSERLIAN AND HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGIES

by Chan Wing-cheuk

Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy

UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA
OTTAWA, CANADA, 1981

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IN MEMORY OF MY FRIEND

LI FONG-CHOK
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PREFACE

Phenomenology is one of the important philosophical movements in the twentieth century. Within the field of phenomenology, one encounters again the traditional problem of the relationship between epistemology and ontology -- though in a new form. Husserl characterizes his phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy of consciousness. But, as A. de Waehlens remarks, "On ne trouvera guère, dans tout *Sein und Zeit*, dix lignes relatives à la 'structure de la connaissance sensible' (1951:371). "Or, on ne trouve pas dans *Sein und Zeit* trente lignes sur le problème de la perception, on n'en trouve pas dix sur celui du corps" (Ibid:2). Then, what is the relationship between Heidegger's fundamental-ontology and Husserl's phenomenology? Is Husserl's phenomenology of transcendental consciousness necessarily incompatible with Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology? In spite of Ernst Tugendhat's lucid analytical presentation of their concepts of truth, and Michael Theunissen's critical contrast of their doctrines of intersubjectivity, the relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological has remained unclear. In the present work, I shall try to thematize the exact relationship between these two types of phenomenology through the comparative study of Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation.
During the past years I received help and support from my family, professors and friends, without which the present work would be impossible.

In particular, I wish to express my thanks to Professor Ludwig Landgrebe. It was not only through the reading of his works that I was well informed of the present topic. His personal guidance has also shown me what is a true "Geist der Phänomenologie".

I am grateful to the DAAD for granting a research scholarship from 1978 to 1980. To Husserl-Archives in Cologne, Freiburg, and Louvain I wish to make known my appreciation for friendly help and kind permission to cite the unpublished materials.

Professor Theodore Geraets and Professor Benoît Garceau helped me not only in administrative matters but also gave me personal support.

I am deeply indebted to Professor David Carr, my co-supervisor. In addition to several inspiring suggestions, his valuable comments clarified many difficult points in this work.

Finally, to Professor Peter McCormick who directs the present work, I am thankful for his supervision, helpful advice and encouragement.
ABSTRACT

Individuation is a centuries-old problem. It is concerned with the thematization of the principles which constitute an individual qua individual and thereby distinguish it from every other individual.

Husserl and Heidegger have developed their theories of individuation within their respective phenomenological frameworks. Their contributions to the problem of individuation are less well-known because Husserl's manuscripts on this problem are mainly not yet published and secondly, Heidegger's explicit formulation of his theory of individuation can only be found in his "Marburg Lectures".

In our work we attempt to "reconstruct" systematically these two phenomenologists' theories of the individuation of things and of the ego. In addition to an expository presentation of their theories, we try to analyze their presuppositions, discuss their limitations and make a comparison in order to show that there is a positive relationship between these theories.

According to Husserl, objective space and objective time are principles of the individuation of things. But for Heidegger the principles of the individuation of things are rather the "Zeugcharakter" and "Zeugzusammenhang". Since Husserl understands "things" primarily as real objects or
things present-at-hand, and in Heidegger's early thought "things" means fundamentally tools or things ready-to-hand, we argue that Husserl's theory of the individuation of things and Heidegger's are not only not incompatible but rather complementary with each other. Indeed, it will be shown that while the underlying idea of the individuation of things present-at-hand is "Einmaligkeit", that of things ready-to-hand is "serviceability".

In Husserl's theory of the ego one can not only find the separation between the empirical and the transcendental ego but also the distinction between the non-ultimate and the absolute primal ego within the transcendental dimension. Corresponding to this hierarchy of the concepts of the ego, there are different sets of principles of the individuation of the ego. However, since the primal-I is beyond the intuitive grasp of reflection, its individuation can merely remain as an "Urfaktum".

Since Heidegger grounds the possibility and the necessity of the individuation of Dasein in temporality, time is the principle of the individuation of the ego. Owing to the formal character of time as principium individuationis, Heidegger has to conceptualize it into the phenomena of "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness". We will show that with these existential principles of individuation Heidegger provides us with the principles which can individualize the ego.
quae ego. Nevertheless, all these principles can merely individualize the ego from an "internal" standpoint. Namely, they cannot function as external criteria enabling us to differentiate two Daseins from the standpoint of a third person. Since merely within the ontological approach there is no possibility to provide any ontical external criterion, we attempt to show that by interpreting Husserl's principles of the individuation of the transcendental monad — "style of motivation", "habitualities" and "coherence of history" — as external Merkmale of the individuality of the ego we can fill up the above gap in Heidegger's theory of the individuation of Dasein. In this way we can find that there is a complementarity between Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego and Heidegger's. Indeed, such a possibility becomes understandable when we notice that while the underlying idea of Husserl's principle of the individuation of the personal ego is "Einmaligkeit", the underlying idea of Heidegger's principle of the individuation of Dasein quae self is "irreplaceability".

Since the givenness of things ready-to-hand is prior to that of things present-at-hand and objective space and objective time are respectively founded on world-space and world-time, there is a founding-relationship between Husserl's theory of the individuation of things and Heidegger's. Moreover, since consciousness is grounded upon Dasein, Husserl's
principles of the individuation of the ego can merely
function as external criteria, but Heidegger's principles
of the individuation of Dasein can individualize the ego qua
ego, a founding-relationship also exists between Husserl's
and Heidegger's theories of the individuation of the ego.

By appealing to this founding-relationship between
Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation, we
argue that, despite the methodological as well as the
topological differences between Husserlian and Heideggerian
phenomenologies, these two types of phenomenology are
necessarily inseparable from each other. That is to say,
we attempt to show that in spite of the differences between
their respective conceptions of phenomenological reduction,
eidetic reduction, phenomenon, essence and intentionality;
the opposition between Husserl's thesis of the primacy of
intuition and Heidegger's thesis of the primacy of under-
standing, and the contrast between the reflective approach
and the hermeneutical interpretational approach, the
compatibility of Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of
individuation "demonstrates" that there is a complementarity
between these two phenomenological approaches, provided that
Husserl's phenomenology is reinterpreted as a critique of
knowledge.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is two-fold. It is first an attempt to reconstruct systematically Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of the individuation of things and the ego. Secondly, by comparing these two theories we shall also try to clarify the relationship between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies.

"Individuation" has been one of the major topics in philosophy since Aristotle. The problem of individuation is the problem of finding "the determination by reason of which this individual is precisely this one in contrast to all others" (Philosophical Dictionary:195). In other words, it is the problem of working out the principle of individuation, i.e., the principle according to which we can differentiate this entity from that entity. Since as early as the Middle-Ages, philosophers have maintained that there is an essential difference between the manner of individuation of the thing and that of the ego. Such a distinction can also be found in Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation.

Indeed, in our work we shall focus entirely on Husserl's and Heidegger's views on the problem of the individuation of things and of the ego.
Insofar as the development of his theory of individuation is concerned, Husserl began to thematically attack this problem as early as 1905. But it was only around 1918 that he began to fully concentrate on this problem. As he wrote to Roman Ingarden in 1918: "arbeite ich . . . an dem ganzen ungeheuren Problem der Individuation, der Konstitution individuellen (also 'tatsächlichen') Seins überhaupt u. nach seinen wesentlichen Grundgestaltungen. Also um eine zentrale oder radikale Phänomenologie handelt es sich jetzt".¹ After his retirement Husserl took up the problem of individuation again. But while around 1918, he mainly worked on the problem of the individuation of objects, after 1930 he dealt exclusively with the problem of the individuation of the ego.² Historically speaking, Husserl's theory of individuation is a reaction to Hume's.³ So, it is no wonder that for Husserl, it is no wonder that individuation is primarily an epistemological problem.

On the other hand, Heidegger's theory of individuation is developed in the context of a fundamental ontology. In other words, for Heidegger, individuation is primarily an ontological problem. His theory of the individuation of Dasein can be found in Being and Time. But in it, is also embedded a theory of the individuation of the ready-to-hand which he explicitly formulated in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (414-415).
Since neither Husserl nor Heidegger developed their own theories of individuation in a systematic manner, our exposition is basically a reconstruction. In addition, this reconstruction is critical in nature. On the one hand, we attempt to "reconstruct" Husserl's theory of individuation by rejecting his theory of hyle and reinterpreting his "immanent time" respectively as "noematic time", "pre-immanent quasi-temporality" and "subjective time". On the other hand, we will point out that in order to fully individualize the ready-to-hand, Heidegger has to introduce "world-space" and "world-tme" as the "supplementary" principia individuationis.

Moreover, by pointing out the presuppositions and limitations of these two theories of individuation, we can not only better understand their nature, but are also able to work out their positive relationship. In answering the question: "what determines the individuality (tode ti, haecceitas, thisness, ecceity) of a thing?", Husserl and Heidegger respectively develop their own principia individuationis. However, we will see that despite differences, their theories of the individuation of things are not only not incompatible, but are definitely complementary. While Husserl develops a theory of the individuation of the thing as a perceived object, Heidegger develops a theory of the individuation of the thing as something ready-to-hand.
Hume maintains that "personal identity" is only a fiction. Phenomenologists are strongly opposed to Hume's skeptical position regarding personal identity. While Husserl attempts to show the identity of the ego primarily on the epistemological level, Heidegger tries to account for the possibility of the selfsameness of the Self from a fundamental-ontological standpoint.

Furthermore, corresponding to their different conceptions of the ego, Husserl and Heidegger develop different theories of the individuation of the ego. In re-instituting Aristotle's doctrine of the "double character of now" Husserl speaks of the "double character of the living present" (Held, 1966:31). Accordingly, Husserl breaks the ego into two: the temporal personal ego and the atemporal primal ego. It will be shown that Heidegger's theory of the individuation of Dasein is a radicalization of Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego.

In explicating the positive relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation, we shall discover that there is a founding-relationship between them.5

The relationship between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies is one of the most controversial problems within the phenomenological movement. It is well-known that Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, rejected definitely Heidegger's version of phenomenology. Herbert Spiegelberg
also poses the question: "To what extent is Heidegger a genuine phenomenologist?" (1965:347-8). But Heidegger claims that he has radicalized phenomenology. Walter Biemel points out that Heidegger intentionally interprets Husserl's phenomenology in a non-idealistic direction (1975:46-7). These two opposing attitudes towards the nature of Heidegger's phenomenology clearly show that the relationship between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies has remained unclear. "For many years now", Michael E. Zimmerman states, "scholars have been puzzled by Heidegger's version of phenomenology" (1977:261). In particular, Thomas Langan's question: "to just what extent the early Heidegger's historicization of phenomenological ontology is a valid development of Husserl's deepest inquiries into the temporality of the transcendental ego?" still awaits an answer (1970:2).

Then, should we agree with Richard Schacht that "Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian phenomenology are related in little more than name and motto; and ... there is scarcely even a remote family resemblance between them"? (1972:312) Or, should we accept D. Føllesdal's "translation-thesis" which asserts "that Heidegger's philosophy is basically isomorphic to that of Husserl's"? (1979:369).

The comparison of Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation will enable us to draw some important conclusions concerning the general relationship between these
two types of phenomenology. Indeed, the difference between Husserl's and Heidegger's approaches and solutions in their theories of individuation is not accidental. Rather, it is grounded in the methodological and the topological differences between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies. However, we will argue that these differences do not necessarily imply the incompatibility of these two types of phenomenology. By noting the founding-relationship between their theories of individuation, we will not only see in what sense Heidegger's phenomenology is a radical development of Husserl's, but also how they can be unified into a single phenomenology in a broad sense. D. McLaughley poses the question: "Does Husserl's description of the constitution of ontic meaning in consciousness complement Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' or 'fundamental thinking' so that each is incomplete now without the other?" (1976: 348). Based on our comparative study of Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation we shall answer this question affirmatively.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Briefe an Roman Ingarden, 10. As pointed out by Donn Welton, "During this period he begins reworking the lectures on time-consciousness and the first draft of Ideen II and writing what we now have as his 'Lectures on Transcendental Logic' (also called the 'Lectures on Genetic Logic')" (now is published in EJ and Hu XI (1977:55). This "genetic logic" or "transcendental aesthetic" is basically "an analysis of individuals qua individuals" (Ibid).

2. Besides a part published in Experience and Judgment, most of the manuscripts which are written by Husserl in Bernau around 1918 remain unpublished. Those which directly or indirectly concern the problem of the individuation of perceived objects are the following: AI 22 (1918), AIII 6 (1918), AIII 12 (1917/18), D5 (1917/18), D8 (1918), LII 12 (1918), LII 13 (1918), LII 14 (1918), MIII 3.VII (1918).


4. In Experience and Judgment Husserl writes: "here . . . a complete theory of individuation is not our intention" (174).

5. "Foundedness" (Fundierung) is an important notion in phenomenology. In Logical Investigations Husserl defined "foundedness" as follows: "A content of the species A is founded upon a content of the species B, if an A can by its essence . . . not exist unless a B also exists" (475).

6. By "topological difference" we mean the difference between Husserl's conception of phenomenon and Heidegger's. Namely, "topological Difference" is a difference concerning "the place of the Transcendental" (Biemel, 1977:299).
CHAPTER II

HUSSERL'S THEORY OF INDIVIDUATION

In the exposition of Husserl's theory of individuation we start with a presentation of his theory of the individuation of things. Secondly, we give a presentation of his theory of the individuation of the ego. In the third part of this chapter we will critically discuss Husserl's theory of individuation as a whole.

The problem of the individuation of things is not a discrete problem within Husserl's phenomenology. In pointing out the relationship between formal logic and the theory of the individuation of objects we will discover the position of this problem within Husserl's "transcendental logic". In addition, by clarifying the relation between essence and the individual object we will understand the limitation of the role which is played by "concrete essence" in the problem of individuation. From Husserl's notion of "this-ness" we will see that time and space are two important principles of the individuation of things. In order to see how they function as principia indiguationis, we must start with an exposition of Husserl's theory of time-constitution as well as space-constitution. Moreover, "world" and "transcendental subjectivity" are conditions for the possibility of the individuation of things. A clarification of these notions
is necessary because Husserl has his own conceptions of world and transcendental subjectivity.

According to Husserl, the way of the individuation of the ego is different, in a fundamental manner, from that of things. The clarification of his notion of "absolute individuation" will help us to better understand the nature of the problem of the individuation of the ego. Since the unity and the identity of the ego are the presuppositions of the possibility of the individuation of the ego, we have to explain how Husserl accounts for these phenomena. After pointing out the different concepts of the ego in Husserl's phenomenology, we will work out the corresponding different sets of principles of individuation.

In the section of critical discussion we will not only point out the presupposition as well as the limitation of Husserl's theory of individuation, but also attempt to show in what way this theory can be preserved even if his doctrine of immanent content is rejected.

A. The Problem of the Individuation of Things

(1) Transcendental Logic and Double Reduction

Historically speaking, Husserl's phenomenology arises from a reaction to psychologism in the philosophy of logic. In his critique of psychologism Husserl points out that the major error of psychologism lies in the confusion between ideal and real objects. On the one hand, ideal objects are repeatable and atemporal; on the other hand, real objects
are non-repeatable and temporal. While logic is a science of ideal objects, psychology is a science of real thought-processes. Accordingly, the truth of logic is apodictic certain and necessary, but the truth of psychology is contingent (LI:168-196).

It seems that there is an unbridged gap between ideal and real dimensions. However, after the introduction of transcendental-genetic phenomenology Husserl maintains that there is a "genealogical" relation between the constitution of ideal objects and that of real objects. That is to say, logic has a genetic foundation in the pre-predicative sphere of perceived objects. In fact, already in Logical Investigations Husserl pointed out that there is a "founding"-relationship between logical categorial intuition and sensible intuition. Accordingly, a complete transcendental critique of logic must go back to the constitutive account of real objects. As object of sensible experience a real object is essentially an individual.

The task of transcendental criticism of formal logic belongs to Husserl's "transcendental logic". In order to lead us from the dimension of formal logic to that of pre-predicative experience, Husserl urges us to perform the "double reduction", that is, in de Murtal's description, "a reductive procedure which moves from the judgment as such

vidualität in der formalen Analytik nichts aussagen" (Hu XVII:427). An individual can only be given in sensible experience. In addition, for a theory of individuation this double reduction is necessary because "The world in which we live and in which we carry out activities of cognition and judgment, out of which everything which becomes the substrate of a possible judgment affects us, is always already pre-given to us impregnated by the precipitate (Niedersachslag) of logical operation" (EJ:50). In other words, since our surrounding world cannot be regarded as the "original world of individuals", a procedure of regression to the individual of experience is necessary.

In short, the "formal" character of formal logic and the "theoretical garment" of our surrounding world justify the necessity of the performance of the double reduction for a theory of the individuation of perceived objects.

Although there is distinction between "object in general" and the "individual", they are not without any relationship to each other. While "object in general" can be regarded as a logical form of the individual, the individual is a concrete instance of "object in general". "Object in general" is indeed also called by Husserl "die logische Kategorie Individuum schlechthin ('absoluter' Gegenstand)" (Hu IV:34). On the other hand, individual is regarded as "die Urgegenständlichkeit" (Ibid).
According to Husserl, the "logical objects" such as "number", "proposition", etc. are also subsumed under "object in general". Indeed, Husserl also calls the "logical object" "logisches Individuum" (AI 36:127a). However, it is not the "logical individual" but rather the individual as Urgegenstand which forms the theme of Husserl's theory of the individuation of objects. Although Husserl admits that we can have "mathematische Gesetze als Gesetze der Form möglicher Individuation", in order to find out the individualizing determination of things he has to go beyond the realm of formal ontology (Hu VII:213).

(2) The Individual and Essence

An individual, according to Husserl, is a spatial-temporal existent. It is something, which exists "in this time-spot", has "thus particular duration of its own and a real content which in its essence could just as well have been present in any other time-spot" (Ideas §.2). Furthermore, it is "something which is present at this place . . ., where yet the same real thing might just as well, so far as its own essence is concerned, be present at any other place" (Ibid). This changeability also applies to its "physical shape". Accordingly, the individual is "accidental". In principle each individual is changeable. That is to say, the individual object is "contingent" (Hu XVII:381). This is the "Tatsächlich-
heit" of the individual. However, Husserl points out "that it belongs to the meaning of everything contingent that it should have essential being and therewith an Eidos to be apprehended in all its purity" (Ideas §.2). Here we find a special connection between ideal objects—essences—and real objects. Eidos or essence is an ideal object.

Accordingly, it is not a spatial-temporal existence. Nevertheless, an individual is not separable from its corresponding Eidos. "An individual object is not simply and quite generally an individual, a 'this-there' something unique; but being constituted thus and thus 'in itself' it has 'its own proper mode of being,' its own supply of essential predicables which must qualify it (qua 'Being as it is in itself')" (Ibid). Accordingly, despite the "ontological distinction" between Eidos and the individual object, Eidos is an ideal condition for the possibility of the individual object.

Husserl makes a distinction between "material essence" and "formal essence". While material essence is discovered by "eidetic variation", formal essence results from "formalization". Here what Husserl means by "Eidos" is essence in the material sense. Heidegger maintains that Eidos in the Husserlian sense is nothing but "what-ness" (Washeit) or guiddity (Ga 20:151). Indeed, according to Husserl, "'essence' indicated that which in the intimate self-being of an individual discloses to us 'what' it is" (Ideas §.3).
Eidos tells us only the "content" of the individual. Despite the intimate relationship between Eidos and the individual, i.e., each individual has its "individual essence" as "content", the way of grasping Eidos is not identical with that of the individual. While an individual is given in empirical intuition, an Eidos is grasped by essential insight or ideation. "Essential insight is still intuition, just as the eidetic object is still an object" (Ibid). But Eidos is merely an object in the sense of an ideal object. Moreover, while an individual can never be given to us in an adequate manner, an Eidos can be grasped in an adequate manner. The "profiles-structure" as essential characteristic of the way of givenness of the individual does not belong to the way of givenness of Eidos. However, both empirical intuition and essential insight grasp their respective objects in the mode of "bodily" selfhood. In addition, although these two kinds of intuition differ from each other, there is a close connection between them. While "it is certain that no essential intuition is possible without the free possibility of directing one's glance to an individual counterpart and of shaping an illustration; just as contrarywise no individual intuition is possible without the free possibility of carrying out an act of ideation and therein directing one's glance upon the corresponding essence which exemplifies itself in something individually visible" (Ibid).
Genetically speaking, intuition of the individual is prior to the intuition of Eidos.

Now we can clearly see that "das Individuum ist zwar nicht Wesen, aber es 'hat' ein Wesen, das von ihm evident-gültig aussagbar ist" (Hu XXIII:431). It is true that "Wesen ist dabei nicht 'Substanz', Substanz ist die individuelle Einheit" (AI 36:4). However, in terms of its individual essence or concrete content we are able to differentiate an individual from the individuals of another class. For example, one is able to differentiate this individual as gold from that individual as stone in terms of their respective individual essences. But since the relationship between an individual and its essence is "subsumption", "Whatever belongs to the essence of the individual can also belong to another individual" of the same region (Ideas §.2). Hence, strictly speaking, individual essence cannot function as the principle of the individuation of real objects. In order to find out the individualizing moments which will determine the this-ness of a real object, Husserl has to go beyond the dimension of concrete essence.

In the following sections we will see that, according to Husserl, "diese Individuation sich im allgemeinen Raum und der Zeit vollziehen muss" (Hu VII:213).
(3) The "This-ness" of Real Objects

From the standpoint of formal logic, the individual object is the endpoint of deconstruction: it is the "object-about-which" (Gegenstand-worüber) (FTL:202). However, formal logic itself can tell us nothing about the concrete individual, except its logical form. Hence, in order to solve the problem of individuation, Husserl has to go beyond the realm of formal logic. Furthermore, from the standpoint of material-ontology, an individual is an instance of its concrete essence. In other words, an individual object "individualizes" its concrete essence (Husserl:267). Each individual has its concrete essence. In terms of its concrete essence we are not only able to know the "content" or the "what-ness" of an individual object, but also able to speak of the "likeness" (Gleichheit) of individuals. Namely, two individual objects are "identical in content" when they have the same material essence. However, material or concrete essence is only relevant to the content of an individual object. The material or concrete essence cannot provide any information about the individuation or differentiation between two individuals which are identical in content.

In our experience an individual is given as a "Das"; it "has its absolute individuality" (Ibid:239). In other words, an individual is perceived as a "This" (Dieses). Furthermore, when we say that a stone is something identical, it does not only mean that "die aristotelische Gattung bleibt
identisch dieselbe" but that the concrete stone itself is identical (Ibid:245). Moreover, Husserl points out that "Die Form des Dies ist keine Washeit und in diesem Sinn kein Wesen. Es ist allgemein in Sinn der Form" (Hu IV:301). "This-ness" is a form but not an Eidos. Accordingly, if we also call Eidos or material essence a form, then we must distinguish two senses of "form". On the one hand, we have "form" in the sense of "Gattung", i.e., form as Eidos or essence. On the other hand, we have "form" in the sense of "Dieseheit", i.e., form as "individualizing determination" (Hu XXIII:499; Hu X:268). What a theory of individuation has to find out is "die individualisierende Bestimmung, die von dem Gegenstand prädizierbar, aber keine 'Eigenschaft' ist, kein Prädikat, dem ein Wesensmoment entspricht" (Hu XXIII:499). Accordingly, in order to solve the problem of the individuation of real objects, we cannot appeal just to concrete essence.

Here, a question might arise. According to Husserl, phenomenology is essentially eidetic. That is to say, Husserl's phenomenology is concerned only with essence or essential structure. Then how is it possible for him to provide any account for the problem of individuation? Also even Husserl himself admits that the form of individuation must be distinguished from the concrete essence. However,
although Husserl's phenomenology is eidetic in nature, it
does not imply that it is concerned only with the essence
of the individual; rather, as a "logic of experience" it
is concerned also with the essence of individuality (FTL:203).
Accordingly, the problem of individuation is not excluded
from the dimension of phenomenology in the Husserlian sense.

According to Husserl, time and space are two important
principles of the individuation of perceived objects (Hu
X:253; Hu XI:142-145). Moreover, the individuation of the
perceived object or thing is only possible within the "world
of actual experience" (EJ:171). In addition, "Kein Ding hat
in sich selbst seine Individualität" (Hu IV:299). The
possibility of the individuation of things must refer back
to the transcendental subjectivity (Ibid:301).

Since Husserl has his own conceptions of time, space,
world and transcendental subjectivity, it is necessary
for us to clarify these concepts in order to understand how
they can function as conditions of possibility of the individuation
of things. Furthermore, since an individual thing is something
identical, we have also to see how Husserl accounts for the
possibility of unity and identity of things. 4

4) Time as principium individuationis
   (a) Husserl's Concept of Time
      Historically speaking, Husserl was at first a follower
      of Brentano's philosophy of time. But his later discontent
with the latter motivated Husserl to develop his own theory of time. In a sense the rise of Husserl's own theory of time also results from his critique of Meinong's concept of time (Brough, 1969:175 ff). From the standpoint of the time of writing one can discern three main phases in Husserl's development of his own theory of time. The first period is the period in which he writes his Lectures on the Internal Time-Consciousness (1905). The second period is the period in which he writes his "Bernau-manuscripts" (1917-18). The last period is the period in which he writes the "C"-manuscripts after his retirement (1928). Indeed, in each period one can find different major themes. Eugen Fink gives us a concise characterization of them as follows:


But this description of Fink needs to be supplemented. In his Bernau-manuscripts Husserl also deals with the problem of individuation, the constitution of act-time and the omni-temporality of ideal objects (Briefe an Roman Ingarden:171-172).

In this section we mainly concentrate on Husserl's theory of time which is developed in his first period.
In order to answer the question of the "origin of time", Husserl urges us to bracket the objective, transcendent time and go back to the dimension of immanent time. This kind of bracketing is an initial form of his "transcendental-phenomenological reduction".

According to Husserl, Brentano has rightly seen that what we grasp is always a temporally extended object. For example, what we heard can still remain for a while; otherwise, it is impossible for us to apprehend a whole melody. However, in accounting for the possibility of such phenomenon Brentano appeals to the psychological law of original association. According to Brentano, this original association is basically a function of Phantasie. It not only reproduces the content which just passes but also produces a moment of past and attributes it to this content. Accordingly, the temporally extended object is given to us not only through perception but must be grasped with the help of Phantasie (Hu X:10-15; Brough, 1969:143 ff). Husserl strongly criticizes Brentano's "theory of the psychological origin of the idea of time" (PIT:35). According to Husserl, Brentano overlooks the essential distinction between "perception of a succession" and "Phantasie of a succession". In addition, Brentano fails to "distinguish between act and content" (Ibid:37). Hence, he misplaces all the temporal elements in the dimension of content. But the most serious point is that there is a
contradiction in Brentano's theory: all the moments which are supposed to be past are actually present (Ibid:38; Brough, 1969:172).

For Husserl time-consciousness is not partially perceptual and partially imaginary, but rather totally perceptual. That is to say, not only the now-point but also the just-past point as well as the next coming point are manifest features of perceptual objects. Accordingly, each phase or "Querschnitt" of time-consciousness has the three-fold structure: "retention -- primal impression -- protention". While in "primal impression" the now-point is constituted; in "retention" ("primary memory") the just-past-point is constituted and in "protention" ("primary expection") the next-coming-point is constituted (PIT:50 ff). In the case of retention we can have a continuity of retention, and in the case of protention we have a horizon or a group of protentions. Moreover, neither retention nor primal impression nor protention itself is an act. Rather, they are "moments" of an act (Hu X:§.42). In addition, all these three form an inseparable whole which is called by Husserl the "original temporal field" (Ibid:§.31). Furthermore, there is an essential distinction between "retention" and "recollection" or "secondary memory". While retention is only a moment of an act, recollection is an act. While the former belongs to the
pre-immanent dimension of consciousness, the latter belongs to the category of immanence within consciousness (Ibid:297). The same distinction also exists between "protention" and "expectation". Moreover, there is intimate relationship between retention and recollection, namely, retention is presupposition of the possibility of recollection (I I I I). Husserl also calls recollection and expectation "presentification" (Vergegenwärtigung). In contrast to Phantasie and picture-consciousness (Bildbewusstsein), recollection and expectation are "positing presentification" (setzende Vergegenwärtigung) (Hu X:107). But neither retention nor protention is a presentification. They are rather essential moments of presentation (Gegenwärtigung). In fact, the inseparable whole of retention, primal impression and protention is also later called by Husserl "living present" (lebendige Gegenwart) in the "C"-manuscripts.

The time-constituting consciousness, which has "retention-primal impression-protention" as its essential structure, is characterized by Husserl as a "flow" (Hu X:1.36) "Time is motionless and yet it flows" (PIT:89). It is the primal impression which is the absolute primordial source. But each primal impression modifies itself in retention. At the same time each retention modifies itself in retention of retention. Correlatively, each now-point is modified
into a just-past-point. At the same time each just-past-point is modified into another further past-point. However, this "flowing time" is not yet a "fixed" temporal order. It is only with the help of recollection that the constitution of "immanent objective time" is possible. "In recollection, time is indeed also given as oriented in every moment of the memory. But every point exhibits an Objective temporal which can be identified again and again" (PIT:144). But Husserl also speaks of a "transcendent objective time" or "'objective' apperceptive time" (PIT:98; EJ:256). In the constitution of "transcendent objective time" we have to introduce the operation of "objectifying apperception", in addition to the possibility of identification (PIT:164-169; EJ:255-257). Nevertheless, one can clearly see that from the standpoint of the ordering of constitution, the constitution of immanent time or subjective time has priority.

In accounting for the constitution of immanent time Husserl at first appeals to the "apprehension-content" schema. Similar to the constitution of the transcendent thing, the immanent temporal object is construed to be constituted through the combination of "temporal apprehension" and "content". According to this schematic interpretation, the content is in itself temporally neutral and all the temporal differences arise from the side of temporal apprehension. Later Husserl is forced to modify this schematic interpretation. The
reason for such a modification is two-fold. First, "Die primären Inhalte, die im Jetzt sich ausbreiten, können ihre Zeitfunktion nicht vertauschen, das Jetzt kann nicht als Nicht-Jetzt, das Nicht-Jetzt nicht as Jetzt dastehen" (Hu X:322). This means that the content cannot be arbitrarily temporally "interpreted". Secondly, "retentional consciousness includes real consciousness of the past of sound, primary remembrance of sound, and is not to be resolved into sensed sound and apprehension as memory" (PIT:54; Brough, 1969:325 ff; Holenstein, 1972:106). In accordance with this modification, time-constituting consciousness is primarily a pre-reflective rather than an objectifying performance. But it does not mean that there is no objectificational time-consciousness; for Husserl also regards "recollection" e.g., as a mode of time-consciousness (PIT:142). Moreover, despite the above modification Husserl does not abandon the schematic interpretation in accounting for the constitution of "transcendent objective time" (Hu X:120 ff).

As the constituting source of immanent time, time-constituting consciousness itself is not in the immanent time. Otherwise, there would result a "teuflischen Zirkel: die ursprünglichen zeitkonstituierenden Erlebnisse sind selbst wiederum in der Zeit" and Husserl's theory of time-constitution would be condemned to fail. In addition, Husserl has to maintain that "the flux of consciousness constitutes its own
unity" (PIT:106). That is to say, the flux of time-constituting consciousness is not constituted by another flux. Otherwise, there would result an infinite regress. According to Husserl, the time-constituting consciousness constitutes itself by its own "double intentionality". One is the "vertical intentionality" of the immanent temporal object, the other is the "horizontal intentionality" which goes through the whole flux. By means of horizontal intentionality the quasi-temporal unity of the flux is constituted. On the other hand, the vertical intentionality constitutes the immanent time (PIT:109).

However, as a "flowing time" the immanent time cannot function as the principium individuationis. Rather, in order to individualize material things, we have to appeal to "transcendent objective time".

(b) **Time as Form of the Individuation of Things**

According to Husserl, time plays the most important role in the problem of the individuation of things. The close relationship between time and individual objects can be formulated as follows: "All individual objects have a temporal duration and position; they are extended with an essential content over the original continuum of time and have, in their total essence as a general essence, a temporal extension of definite magnitude, which is their duration, and a temporal
content, which fills this duration" (EJ:184). However, it is time as categorial form of the perceptual life-world rather than physical time that can be regarded as the "irreducible form of individual realities" (Hu X:274). It is true that Husserl also calls "transcendent objective time" "natural time" (EJ:257). But here "nature" must be understood as a "Sphäre schlicht aufweisbarer Erfahrungsgegebenheiten" and not as "ein Kunstprodukt der Methode" (Hu IX:54).

As a phenomenon an individual thing is basically "something enduring" (ein Dauern des) (Hu XI:238). It is always the same within a certain temporal extension. For example, I saw a stone before. Now I see it again. It is the same stone. But how can I know that it is the same stone? Moreover, "Woher habe ich die absolute Gewissheit, dass (für) jede Phase der Dauer wirklich identisch (derselbe Stein) . . . gegeben ist? und wirklich 'dieselbe' Ausbreitung?" (Hu X:239) Clearly, as an individual thing the stone is not a species. But is also not just a phase of the duration; for a phase of the duration itself does not endure. In addition, each phase is different from the other. Furthermore, it is not that many stones endured but one stone endures. That is to say, only this stone endures. Husserl points out that the distinction between this stone and its phases of duration results only from abstraction (Ibid).
It is the same stone which extends through all its phases of duration. Each part of this extension "has" the same stone. In other words, all parts of this extension belong to one and the same stone. The stone is something identical which extends through all the manifold phases of duration. It is the one in the many. This identity of the stone is different from the identity of the species "stone". This stone is an individual. That is to say, "es ist ein *Das*, hat seine absolute Individualität, ist als Individualität gemeint, und nicht als Allgemeines" (Hu X:239). As perceived this the stone has its *Nur* (Ibid). Although the stone is essentially something identical in the temporal continuity, it cannot be identified with its temporal extension. "Das Objekt ist nicht die Ausbreitung, sondern das sichausbreitende" (Ibid:241).

From the temporal standpoint, an individual is nothing but something identical through duration. As something identical which continues, an individual is something more than the "whole of the continuity" (Ibid:241-242). However, "Identität eines Individuums ist Identität der Kontinuität einer Fülle in einer Dauer, und damit eines einigenden Substrates für konstitutive Eigenschaften" (A III.6:62). Clearly, there is an "inseparable" relation between "identity" of an individual and "temporal continuity". Without reference to the "temporal continuity" the "identity" of the individual is not possible.
In addition, the duration cannot be regarded as a real property of the individual. Namely, the individual "ist das, was dauert, und ist das Identische seiner Dauer, ist identisches Subjekt (Substrat) seiner realen Eigenschaften (und Eigenschaften überhaupt). Die Dauer selbst ist keine 'real' Eigenschaft; der Gegenstand selbst mit allen sein realen Eigenschaften ist in ihr, aber sie selbst gehört wieder nicht so zu ihm wie reale Eigenschaften" (D 5:16). Indeed, several different individuals can have the same duration. From the fact that two individuals have the same duration it is impossible for us to infer any consequence concerning the identity or the difference between their real properties. Furthermore, while real properties are in the time, "duration" itself is not in the time (Hu X:244; 261). "Andererseits ist das Reale doch nur möglich als reales seiner individuellen Dauer, es ist nur möglich als individualer Gegenstand, wenn es eine Dauer hat, und nicht nur eine Zeitlang, sondern eine Lage in der Zeit; es hat eine individuelle bestimmte Zeitlänge, eben Zeitgröße in einer absoluten Lage" (D 5:16-17). However, from the temporal determination of the individual it is impossible to get any information about the concrete essence of the individual. Hence, Husserl emphasizes that "die Aussagen über Zeitliches und besonders Zeitlage nicht Aussagen sind über das Was, das,
was er (sic. der individuelle Gegenstand) in sich selbst
ist, sondern über das Wie seiner Erstreckung in der Zeit
und Lage in der Zeit, die die identisch eine und doch nicht
verbindende Zeit ist" (D 5:17-18). The temporal continuity
is nothing real; only the identical individual in this
continuity is real. That is to say, only the "temporal
inhalt" is real (Hu X:244). As the identical in the temporal
manifold the individual is essentially a temporal object.
In other words, an individual is "in der Zeit und es ist,
sofern es eine Stelle der Zeit ausfüllt" (D 5:21).

Since the individual is a "identisches Substrat durch
alle Punkte seiner Zeitdauer hindurch, als identisches der
Unveränderung und Veränderung", temporal extension forms
the necessary condition for the possibility of individuation
(D 5:21).

Identity of an individual is "Identität in der zeitlichen
Kontinuität, ein im kontinuierlichen Fluss der Zeit und im
kontinuierlichen Fluss der Zeitfülle Identisches" (Hu X:258).
But the "temporal continuity" as "continuum of temporal points"
is different from the "continuity in the time" as well as from
the "continuum of a 'constant' change". While the "continuity
in the time" is the "unity of temporal content" which is a
"real unity", the "continuum of a 'constant' change" is a
"continuum of 'constant' differencing moments" which fills
up the "temporal continuity" (Hu X:243-244). In fact, the
"temporal continuity" is nothing but the "whole temporal extension".

We have seen how Husserl defines an "individual" from the standpoint of time. Namely, the individual is "ein Gegenstand, der dauert, das Eine und Selbe, das durch diese ganze Zeitstrecke hindurch währts" (Ibid:258). Now we have to see in what sense time can function as principle of the individuation of real objects.

First, since an individual object has a "temporal extension", the length of this "temporal extension" provides us with a criterion for the individuation of real objects. Two objects which have the same general essence but different temporal extension are two different individuals.

Secondly, an enduring individual object has not only a temporal extension but also a position in time. Namely, "mehrere reale Gegenstände können identisch dasselbe reale Wesen haben, identisch sogar dieselben Zeitstreckenwesen haben, aber dann notwendig ihre Zeitlagen verschieden" (D 5:17). Accordingly, each individual has a unique determined temporal extension. In other words, the temporal position of a real object provides us with a definite criterion for the individuation. Without the reference to the temporal position, by appealing only to the temporal extension, it is impossible for us to distinguish a melody from a repetition of it. With the help of temporal position we can also determine the temporal extension in its
individuality -- it becomes a piece of "universal time". The "universal time" as form of the individuation of real objects is essentially a "aus einmaligen Zeitstellen gebautes Stellensystem" (Hu XI:143). While "temporal extension" is repeatable, "temporal position" is non-repeatable. In this sense, temporal position is absolute (D 5:17).

So "temporal position" plus "temporal extension" provide us with a "temporal order of individual objects" (EJ:185). That is to say, temporal position and temporal extension together found temporal continuity of an individual. They are two distinguishing individualizing moments. Purely from the standpoint of succession, temporal position and temporal extension corroboratively determine the individuality of real objects. In other words, temporal position and temporal extension together form the temporal uniqueness which individualizes the temporal object.

Clearly, the temporal uniqueness of the individual object must refer to the "whole system of temporal order" -- "universal time" or "transcendent objective time". In fact, the individual as temporal object "hat als das seinen ursprünglichen Seinsmodus, den der Gegenwart, und seine nicht-ursprünglichen Modi des 'nicht mehr' (die Modi seiner Vergangenheit) und des 'noch nicht' (die Modi seiner Zukunft)" (Hu XI:416). In other words, "every individual intuited in the unity of an intuition is given in a temporal orientation,
which is the form of the givenness of all that is present in one presence" (EJ:165). The temporal extension of the individual object is between the now at which it begins to endure and the now at which it ceases to endure. It seems that here we have a paradox, for "das Objekt ändert im Zurücksinken ständig seine Zeitstelle, und sollte doch im Zurücksinken seine Zeitstelle bewahren" (Hu X:64). But, in fact, that the object sinks constantly into the past does not change its temporal position, only its distance from the actual now is modified (Ibid). The question is: how is this phenomenon possible? In other words, how is the identity of temporal position possible so that when the object no longer endures, its temporal uniqueness does not lose? Clearly, the identity of temporal position is the presupposition for the possibility of the individuation of a real object in the time. However, "In der Sphäre der Phänomene im absoluten Sinn (der phanasiologischen Mannigfaltigkeiten, der Erlebnissen vor der Objektivation) gibt es also nur Veränderung, einen ewigen flux" (Hu X:295). That is to say, time-consciousness is a constant fluss. Then, in what way is it possible to regard "Zeitbewusstsein als Form der individuellen Objektivation, als Form jeder möglichen Erscheinung"? (Ibid:294). Indeed, Husserl himself raises the following question: "Wie kommt nun aber entgegen dem Phänomen der stetigen Änderung des Zeitbewusstseins das Bewusstsein der objektiven Zeit,
und zunächst der identischen Zeitstelle und Zeitanschauung
zustände?" (Ibid:65) The answer is that despite the
constant flow of modification of consciousness, the object
which sinks into the past remains preserved apperceptively
in absolute identity and, in particular, together with the
positing as "this" experienced in the now-point.11 The
constant modification of apprehension has nothing to do
with the "as what" of the apprehension. In other words,
this modification does not touch the sense of the apprehension.
What the apprehension intends is always the same object with
its same temporal points. "It is part of the essence of the
modifying flux that this temporal position stands forth as
identical and neccessarily identical" (PIT:90). Reproductive
identification is here the ultimate ground.

"All Objektifikation takes place in time-consciousness"
(Ibid:88). This is the "wonder of time-consciousness" (Hu
X:280). The "wonderful fact" is that: "Was immer wahrgenommen
ist, was immer selbstgegeben ist als individuelles Objekt,
ist gegeben als Einheit einer absoluten nicht gegebenen
Mannigfaltigkeit" (Ibid:284). Indeed, an individual is an
identity in the temporal continuity. The identity of the
individual object is impossible without any reference "auf
einen gewissen eigentümlich geformten und verbundenen
Bewusstseinsfluss" (Ibid). Hume overlooked this "wonder of
time-consciousness". Hence, he could not properly account
for the identity of individuals. Husserl points out that "The experiencing consciousness (giving individual at first hand) is not only a flowing consciousness, spreading itself out in the flux of lived experiences, but a consciousness of an integrating consciousness. In it, therefore, ... all the continuous momentary objects join together in the unity of a single object, like the moments of consciousness in a single consciousness of" (EJ:257). The "primal synthesis" of moments of consciousness as a single "consciousness of" is possible only on the grounds of "horizontal intentionality" of time-consciousness. By means of the "retention of retention" the unity of consciousness is constituted. Furthermore, each moment of consciousness is not just a single primal impression but a primal impression with its retentional as well as protentional horizons. "The constitutive performances of the ur-impression, and the continuity of retention and protention which continually modifies it, are a single individual performance, through which alone the immanent, temporally extended object, thus a concrete individual object can be known" (Hu XI:325; Murphy, 1980:108). The retentioyal and protential horizontal structure of internal time-consciousness is the ultimate ground for the possibility of identity of individual objects. The primal synthesis of internal time-consciousness is the first presupposition for the possibility of all other syntheses of higher levels. That is why Husserl says: "In ABC der Konstitution aller
bewusstwerdenden Objektivität und der Subjektivität für sich selbst als seidend liegt hier das A" (Hu XI:125).

An individual is something identical in temporal continuity. Not only its identity is grounded in time-consciousness but also its individuality is determined by its temporal position and temporal extension. Namely, time can function as the principle of individuation because "die Zeitpunkte selbst als Zeitstellen in der einzigen Zeitordnung sind unausgleichbar verschieden, sie sind prinzipiell unwiederholbar. An dieser Unwiederholbarkeit haben nun die ganzen Gegenstände Anteil. Jeder ist er selbst und einziger als Gegenstand seines Zeitstellensystems, das dem universalen, (dem) der einzigen Zeit zugehört" (Hu XI:143). That is why Husserl has to conclude that: "Die Diesheit des Dinges ist die seines Daseins in der Zeit als Während in einer Zeitstelle, die die des Dinges ist, die seiner Dauer in der universalen Koexistenz der Dauern, mit dem dazu Gehörigen nach Simultaneit und Sukzessivität" (K III 6:224).

(c) **Time and Imaginary Objects**

With his atomistic theory of perception, Hume is unable to account for the identity and individuation of real objects on the phenomenal basis. According to Hume, our belief in the identity of the individual object originates in "imagination". "In associative imagination the transition from
one atomic perception to a resembling one is so smooth that we attribute mere temporal succession to self-identical external object" (Murphy, 1980:107). So for Hume, an "identical individual object" is merely a "fiction".

Husserl is strongly opposed to Hume's account of the identity of individual objects. He points out that "lived experiences of imagination, which are directed toward fictions, toward objectivities intended as fictions ... have no connection with the perceptions" (EJ:167). Objectivities of perception "are joined together in a unity and have reform to the unity of a single world, the objectivities of imagination fall outside this unity" (Ibid:168). In short, there is no connection between "objects of perception" and "objects of imagination".

Furthermore, among objects of perception there is a temporal ordering. But objects of imagination "have no temporal position in relation to one another" (Ibid). It is true that as acts, imaginations are ordered in the unity of experiencing conscious life; but this does not imply that there is a temporal ordering among their respective objects. In a sense "what is imagined" is also given to us as something enduring and hence in time. But this time is merely a "quasi-time". This time has the mode of "as-if". Namely, "time is certainly represented in imagination, and even represented intuitively, but it is a time without actual, strict localization of position -- it is, precisely, a
quasi-time" (Ibid:169). What individualizes real objects -- "absolute temporal position" -- is lacking in this quasi-time of fictions. Since objects of imagination lack "absolute temporal position", it is impossible to build up a temporal unity or temporal order between them. So, even the temporal comparison is impossible. However, in analogy of "quasi-time", there can be a "quasi-world". "Within such a world of imagination we have, for every individual object of imagination (as quasi-actuality), an 'individual' singulation (Vereinzelung) for every temporal point and every duration" (Ibid:172). But the "individual" in the quasi-world is only a "quasi-individual". In general, imaginary experience cannot produce any actual, real individual object (Ibid:176). "Quasi-time" also cannot function as principium individuationis for fictions, not to mention for actual, real objects.

These distinctions between "objects of perception" and "objects of imagination", "actual time" and "quasi-time", "actual world" and "quasi-world", "real individuals" "quasi-individuals" clearly show the absurdity of Humean theory of identity of an individual object. It is not only impossible to account for the identity of an actual individual by appealing to the function of imagination; even within the world of fictions, the problem of identity of a quasi-individual remains unsolvable. Accordingly, Husserl concludes "that individuation and identity of the individual, as well as the identification
founded on it, is possible only within the world of actual experience, on the basis of absolute temporal position" (EJ:173).

(5) **Space as principium individuationis**

(a) **Husserl's Concept of Space**

What Husserl means by "space" is neither a scientific construct nor a metaphysical reality. It is rather the space of perceptual life-world (Crisis:216). As "perceptual space" it does not result from abstraction.

According to Husserl, space is essentially nothing but the constituted correlate of the whole system of the kinaesthetic consciousness (D 10 IV:8). In other words, it is constituted by the body as a kinaesthetic system. Husserl points out that our body (Leib) has a double character. On the one hand, it is a being in the spatiotemporal order. On the other hand, it is the zero-point or centre of orientation (Hu IV:56, 158; Crisis:§.60; Claesges, 1964:96-97). As a being in the spatiotemporal order, our body belongs to the constituted dimension. But as the zero-point of orientation, it belongs to the constituting dimension. It is our body as centre of orientation which constitutes space.

In reference to our body as zero-point of orientation, it is possible to build up the directions of order such as "here", "there", "left" and "right" (Hu IV:158). In other words, each body as a kinaesthetic system "hat seine Nullstellung
and seine Grundrichtungen der Wandlung von diesen Stellung aus" (Hu XVI:328). In addition, both "rest" and "motion" of the changed thing must be related to "rest" and "motion" of our body as kinaesthetic system. Body as a kinaesthetic system is "necessary to the founding of rest and motion" (Cairns, 1976:18).

To our body as kinaesthetic system there belong two kinds of "Empfindung". One is called "Merkmalsempfindung" or "darstellende Empfindung" (Hu IV:58; Hu XVI:159). This is the subjective representative for the quality of individual things. Hence, it concerns primarily with the content of the individual thing. In fact, this kind of "Empfindung" is nothing but "hyletic datum". The second kind of "Empfindung" is called "Bewegungsempfindung" (Hu XVI:159). Already from the meaning of its name one knows that it has nothing to do with the content but rather concerns with the "situation" (Umstand) or "position" (Lage) of the individual object. First we have the "Stellungsempfindung" which "represents" the "dinglich extendierten Merkmalen" (Hu IV:57). Correspondingly, the kind of apprehension for "Merkmalsempfindung" is different from that for "Stellungsempfindung". While the former can be called "inhaltliche Auffassung", the latter is called "extensionale Auffassung" (Ibid). Nevertheless, these two kinds of Empfindung cooperate with each other. In the case of Leib, Husserl also speaks of "kinästhetische Empfindungen" (Ibid).
They "are directly connected, however, not with the hyletic flow which is grasped as Abschattung of the object-appearance in question, but rather with the hyletic flow which is grasped as Abschattung of the appearance of my body, more particularly, with the change (in the Abschattung of my bodily appearance) which is taken as the Abschattung of locomotion. This latter connection gives me the basis for grasping space as the continuum of loci my body can occupy, and then as the loci of other things with reference to my body" (Cairns, 1976:79).  

In the account of the constitution of space, Husserl distinguishes different levels of space. The first level is "oculomotorical space". In constituting this space only our eyes move. The second level is "tactual space". It is constituted by the whole body movement (Hu IV:147-151). Certainly, this distinction is basically an abstraction. "Der Raum, derselbe, ist visuell und taktuell" (Ibid:38). Accordingly, the major question of Husserl's theory of constitution of space is: "Wie konstituiert sich der visuelle und wieder taktuelle Raum, wofern sie überhaupt unabhängig sich konstituieren?" (Hu XVI:156).

The perceptual space is three-dimensional, but the oculomotorical field is two-dimensional (D 13 I:26). In order to reach this "visual sphere", it is necessary to perform the "visual reduction". Accordingly, what in principle
can be seen is "reduced" to the realm of "visual phantom" which is the correlate of oculomotorical kinaesthetic system (D 10 III:3). It must be noted that the phantom is also basically a kind of abstraction. "Phantom, the identical object of the several sense fields, but without causal qualities. The Phantom is accordingly not the full object of the world" (Cairns, 1976:24).

"Here" and "there", e.g., are moments of positions of the way of givenness of visual phantom. In the constitution of these moments of position, the Merkmalsempfindung plays no role. It is rather the Bewegungsempfindung which constitutes them. However, this does not imply that there is no cooperation between them. "Bei aller Konstitution von Raumdinglichkeit sind zweierlei Empfindungen mit durchaus verschiedenen konstituierenden Funktionen beteiligt" (Hu IV: 57; 37).

Being two-dimensional, the visual field has a two-fold structure: "top-bottom" and "left-right". With this two-fold structure not only the whole local order of the visual field is determined, but there results a "system of place". Clearly, this two-fold structure is purely constituted by the oculomotorical kinaesthetic function. Visual field is basically a field of coexistence (D 13 IV:1; Claesges, 1964:73). In addition, visual space is only an "extension" of visual field. Indeed, visual space is essentially a system of orientation
in which we can discern the following directions: "top", "bottom", "left" and "right".

Similar to the constitution of the visual space, the "tactual space" is constituted by the tactual kinaesthetic consciousness. One important distinction between the constitution of visual space and that of tactual space is as follows: while in constituting the visual space we can grasp the whole visual field, in constituting the tactual space it is impossible to grasp the whole tactual field (D 13 I:21). The reason is two-fold: while a "bloss augenhaftes Subjekt könnte gar keinen erscheinden Leib haben", in the realm of constitution of tactual space we encounter the body as "double reality" (Hu IV:150; Claesges, 1964:110). That is to say, in constituting tactual space the body always functions as the zero-point of orientation, on the one hand; and appears as the constituted body; on the other hand. Tactual space also differs from visual space from its being three-dimensional (i.e., plus "back-front").

Now we have to face an important question: "was macht die Identität des Raumes, der sich einmal visuell und einmal taktuell materialisiert und in der doppelter Materialisierung der eine und identische ist?" (Hu XVI:156)

Husserl answers that they are identical because "jede manuelle Betastung eines haptisch konstituierten Gegenstandes 'associative' mit sich führt ein wandelbares visuelles 'Hand'—
Objekt im Gesichtsraum . . . dessen visuelle Raumgestalt
((die des gesehenen Objektes)) . . . Übereinstimmt mit der
Gesalt des haptisch betastbaren Gegenstandes im Tastrum"  
(D 13 I:49; Claesges, 1964:114). This answer clearly
appeals to the fact that in seeing our hand in motion we
never see it as a mere object but rather as part of our
kinaesthetic system (D 10 III:37; Claesges, 1964:113).
Accordingly, the fundamental ground for the identity of
visual space and tactual space lies in the unity of visual
and tactual kinaesthetic function. Visual and tactual function
belong essentially to the same kinaesthetic system.

But how is the "universal space", i.e., "identical
objective space", constituted? We have seen that in accounting
for the constitution of transcendent objective time, Husserl
appeals to two kinds of objectification, namely, "recolleciton"
and "apperception". Similarly, in the constitution of uni-
versal space one can find again an identificational as well
as an apperceptive objectification. But, instead of recol-
lection, now we have the identification which grounds in the
possibility that "mein Leib in seiner gehenden Kinaesthen
immer wieder orientierten Raum freigibt" (D 10 I:8). On the
other hand, the apperception is now the "extensional apper-
ception".

According to Husserl, this universal space is three-
dimensional (D 10 III:14). Then how can Husserl account for
the possibility of an n-dimensional space?

In order to answer this question, let us start with a clarification of Husserl's conception of "geometry". In *Ideen I* Husserl writes that "geometry is an ontological discipline relating to an essential phase of such thinghood, the spatial-form" (§.9). For Husserl geometry is primarily a material, regional ontology rather than a formal ontology. In other words, geometry does not belong to the category of formal mathematics. In addition, "It is just as senseless to speak of differing geometries when 'geometry' names the science of the space of the world of phenomena" (LI:243). For Husserl geometry has a status like mechanics. In a letter to Paul Natrop, Husserl explains that: "da Begriffe wie räumlich, Figur, Größe, Winkel usf. nicht zu den formalen Kategorien, bzw. in den Bereich der formalen Kategorien gehören, d.h. nicht zu Begriffen derart wie: Gegenstand und Begriff, Sachverhalt und Satz, Existenz und Wahrheit, aber auch: Einheit und Vielheit, Anzahl und Ordinalzahl, Ganzes und Teil, Identität und Verschiedenheit, usw." (RI:15.III 1897) The concepts in geometry are lying outside formal logic. They are not pure formal concepts. "Die Figur ist ein Moment in der Anschauung, sie bestimmt eine innere Beschaffenheit des phänomenalen Objekts ebenso gut wie Farbe oder Glätte" (Ibid).
However, Husserl also speaks of "theory of n-dimensional manifolds, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean" which belongs to formal mathematics. Clearly, for Husserl there is a distinction between space and manifold. "Wie aber der Farbe die Kategorie Qualität entspricht . . . so entspricht dem Räumlichen die Kategorie Mannigfaltigkeit" (Ibid).

Manifold is the categorical form of space of world as phenomenon. "This manifold itself is related to 'our space', i.e., space in the ordinary sense, as its pure categorical form" (LI:243).

Only the "space-like manifold" can be n-dimensional. Space as the "order of the world as phenomenon" is essentially three-dimensional. Accordingly, only the three-dimensional Euclidean Manifold corresponds to the latter. "Geometry" in the ordinary sense or as a branch of formal mathematics is in fact only a theory of manifold and not of space as world-order.

It is the three-dimensional universal space and not the three-dimensional manifold which functions as the principle of the individuation of things. In other words, as *principium individuationis* universal objective space is not "rein mathematische Form" (A I 36:110a).

But in what sense the three-dimensional universal space individualizes material things?

(b) *Space as Form of the Individuation of Things*

We have seen how time functions as a principle of individuation of things. However, as a form of individuation,
time has an unavoidable limitation. For example, it is quite possible for two different stones to have the same duration and the same absolute temporal positions; in this case we cannot discern their respective individuality purely from the temporal standpoint. In general, through the stretch or length of duration plus absolute temporal position we can identify the real thing in regard to its succession, but for real things which coexist simultaneously time can no longer function as individualizing moment.\(^16\) "Die Zeit ist das principium individuationis in der Sukzession; es bedarf eines principium individuationis in der Koexistenz" (D 7:24).

"Müssen individualisierende Momente der Koexistenz als lokale Momente angesprochen werden, muss alle Individuation der Koexistenz uns in ein Ortsystem und zwar in ein Kontinuierliches führen? Muss es in der Koexistenz, wenn überhaupt mehrere Objekte, so mehrere gleiche Objekte geben Können, und gern gleiche, so unterschiedlich durch eine 'Räumlichkeit'? (Ibid:33) The answer is positive. That is to say, in addition to time, space must be introduced as form of the individuation of things.

But what is the manner in which space functions as principle of the individuation of things?

"Das räumliche Individuum ist das Identische im Wechsel des Orts, das Identische der Ortveränderung" (Hu X.252). Despite the possibility of change of its place, the place
of an individual is absolute in the sense that it cannot be shared by another individual. When two things are given within the same time interval, they are individualized by their different absolute places. If two real objects of the same time interval are identical with regard to their sensible qualities and both share the same spatial figure in their motion, then they are one and the same individual (Ibid).

Clearly, place can only function as the moment of individuation of thing when we do not represent it in an isolated manner but rather in an encompassing manner. In other words, as individualizing moments "zwei Orte innerhalb einer und derselben Dauer gehören zu einen 'Raum'" (Ibid:251). They "must be combined into one space in which the two bodies are located, and this requires that both be gradated in a single visual or tactile field" (EJ:186).

We have seen how time and space function as the principles of the individuation of things. "Sind Zeitlichkeit und Räumlichkeit . . . volle Prinzipien der Individuation"? (Hu X:253) The answer is not given. But Husserl asserts that "I have complete individualization only when I return to my hic et nunc" (EJ:186). Also the actual world is said to be a condition for the individuation of things. So actual world and subjectivity are also a necessary foundation for the individuation of things.
(6) **Individuation and World**

Husserl has his own conception of world. In order to see in what sense world is a condition of the individuation of things we have to start with an analysis of the nature of "world" in Husserl's sense.

(a) **Husserl's Concept of World**

To clarify the "origin of world" is one of the major tasks of Husserl's phenomenology. It is in this connection that Husserl explicitly urges us to perform the **epoché**. Certainly, "origin" for Husserl does not mean "first cause" or "sufficient reason". To solve the problem of origin of world is nothing but to answer the question: "How the world is constituted by the transcendental subjectivity?" Although Husserl, in formulating the procedure of **epoché**, employs the term "Weltvernichtung", it does not imply that his attitude is negative (Cairns, 1976:50). This term has merely methodological meaning. According to Husserl, in the natural attitude we are blind to the fact that the world itself is constitutively dependent on the transcendental subjectivity. Hence, in order to solve the problem of origin of world, it is necessary for us to overcome the natural attitude (Hus III:§.27).

Historically speaking, as early as in *Ideen I* Husserl has already discovered that world is "perceptual horizon".
Namely, it is "the objective background, from which the perceived object of the cogitatio emerges as the glance of the ego singles it out, is an objective background in a really experienceable sense" (Ideas:223). But it is only in his later years that Husserl explicitly thematizes the worldhood of world.

In order to solve the problem of origin of world, we have first to go back to the life-world. In other words, the proper clue to the constitutive critique of world itself "is this pre-given world, not as it has been determined by natural science but as the world of immediate sensuous experience" (Landgrebe, 1940:54). The pre-given world of the present age is "polluted" by the results of natural science. Namely, our world is "no longer a pure world of original experience but a world exactly determined and determinable in itself, a world within which all particular existents in advance and as a matter of course are given to us as determinable in principle, according to the methods of exact science" (EJ:49).

Accordingly, the investigation of the constitutive origin of the life-world itself must take place in the following two stages:

First, the retrogression from the pre-given surrounding world with all its sedimentations of sense, including its science and scientific determination, back to the original
life-world.

Second, the investigation of the subjective operations from which the original life-world is given (EJ:50).

In other words, first of all, we have to return from the pre-given life-world as our surrounding world to the original life-world as perceptual world; for owing to the historical-cultural development of the formation of our surrounding world, the existing things are already "coloured" by our theoretical cultural activities. They are no longer the objects of immediate experience. "And this retrogression to the original life-world is not one which simply takes for granted the world of our experience as it is given to us but rather traces the historicity clearly deposited in it to its source - it is in this historicity that the sense of a world as existing 'in itself' and objectively determinable first accrues to the world on the basis of original experience and intuition" (Ibid:45-46). Husserl terms this first stage of the two-stage retrogression "destruction" or "dismantlement" of the idealization (Ibid:47). In fact, Husserl performed two different ways of destroying or dismantling of idealization. The first is given in Crisis while the second can be found in Experience and Judgment. The first way starts with the intentional-historical reflection of the actual development of natural science. In this direction, Husserl carefully analyzes the intentional history of our modern world. In pointing out
that the scientific world is a logical construction, Husserl leads us back to the life-world as 'perceptual world which is the meaning-fundament of natural science.' The second way proceeds in the transcendental-genetic or genealogical approach. In clarifying the origin of predicative judgment which plays an important rôle in the formation of scientific theory, Husserl discloses that predicative judgment must be founded on experience. Namely, experience is the presupposition for the possibility of predicative judgment. The world of pre-predicative experience is precisely the original life-world.

Clearly, there is an ambiguity in Husserl's concept of life-world. As pointed out by David Carr, it means, on the one hand, the "pre-predicative perceptual world", on the other hand, the "cultural world" (1970:202 ff). The original life-world as pre-predicative perceptual world is essentially nothing but nature. Certainly, "nature" is here not understood in the physical sense but rather in the perceptual sense. Nevertheless, cultural world is founded on perceptual world. This clearly shows that in Husserl's theory of constitution of world the thesis of the "primacy of perception" is opérative.

Husserl points out that "there exists a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the world and, way we are conscious of things or objects" (Crisis:143). While the world itself is always given to us as horizon,
things are given as objects within the world horizon. Moreover, the world as perceptual horizon "does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it" (Ibid). Despite these differences between world and things, they are essentially inseparable from each other. Namely, "we are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon for existing objects; without particular objects of consciousness it cannot be actual" (Ibid). But world as horizon for existing objects is not one horizon among many horizons, but rather, the horizon of all horizons. That is to say, the world is the universal horizon (AVII 8:12). But how can we understand this universality of world horizon? Husserl worked out at least the following different concepts of horizon: "inner horizon", "outer horizon", "temporal horizon" as "consciousness-horizon". What is the relationship between these types of horizon and world horizon? As it is formulated by Peter McCormick and Fredrich Elliston, "Each noema is situated within an inner horizon (the other aspects of the perceived as such), an outer horizon (other possible objects of consciousness)" (1977:122). Insofar as both inner and outer horizons are perceived horizons, they belong to world horizons. But "temporal horizon" as "consciousness-horizon" is basically "noetic". Namely, it is formed purely by lived experiences of acts within the same stream of consciousness. This
horizon belongs to the world-consciousness rather than to world horizon. As world-consciousness in the transcendental sense does not belong to the world as universal horizon, temporal or consciousness-horizon in the transcendental sense also does not belong to the world horizon. After this distinction between noematic and noetic horizons we can clearly see the limitation of the universality of world horizon. Indeed, world horizon is not constituted by a single act but rather by the whole stream of consciousness. In addition, the world-apperception is essentially passive. "Der passiven Synthesis im strömenden Leben als im Wandel ständig horizonhaft Welt bewusst haben entspricht es, dass die Welt, die ständig als eine raum-zeitliche Universum bewusst, nicht thematisch konstituiert ist durch eine aktive Identifikation" (A VII 8:3). Insofar as the passive Welt-Apperzeption is grounded in time-consciousness, it is time-consciousness which is the ultimate ground for the constitution of world as universal horizon.

Husserl also characterizes world as "totality of existents" (EJ:38; Crisis:142). Ulrich Claesges maintains that this conception of world is not transcendental (1972: 85 ff). But Claesges's thesis is not justified; for Husserl explicitly points out that world as a totality of things is "infinite" and "open" (Crisis:31; 476). The world as universal horizon is identical with the world as totality
of existents (EJ:38). The "ambiguity" is merely "verbal" and not "substantial".

In the following section we will see how world as universal horizon functions as the condition of individuation.

(b) World as Condition of Individuation

According to Husserl, the individuation of things is "possible only within the world of actual experience" (EJ: 171). It is because "ein Ding allein ist unmöglich", in addition to the reason that real things can be individualized only in an actual and not imaginary or ideal world (K III 6:230). Namely, the individuation of things must be grounded in world as universal perceptual horizon also because things are given as being valid "only in such a way that we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizons" (Crisis:143).

It is true that we can speak of many different worlds and none of them is imaginary but actual. However, in this connection "world" means primarily "cultural world" or "historical world". As universal perceptual horizon world is only one and always one. Namely, "the plural makes no sense when applied to it" (Ibid).

We have seen that after the performance of double reduction we reach the dimension of individual real objects. "Original substrates are therefore individuals, individual objects and every thinkable judgment ultimately refers to
individual objects" (EJ:26). All individual real objects are connected with each other according to the temporal as well as the spatial order, i.e., they are in the same world as universal horizon.

Insofar as the way of givenness of real individuals is concerned, a real individual can only be given to us in a horizon. That is to say, its way of givenness is essentially horizonhaft. In particular, a real individual "given in experience has not only an internal horizon but also an infinite, open, external horizon of objects cogiven" (Ibid:33). Both "internal (inner) horizon" and "external (outer) horizon" are parts of the world as universal horizon. Husserl points out that prior to the active grasping of an individual real object, the "world as a whole is always already pregiven in passive certitude" (Ibid:31). However, this pregiven world as universal horizon can never be known in a "once and for all" manner. In other words, "the world, present to consciousness as horizon, has the subjective general character of truthworthiness as a horizon of existents known in general but, on that account, still not known as regards individual particularities" (Ibid:37). This "structure of known--unknown" is, according to Husserl, the fundamental structure of world-consciousness. As a consequence, each real individual, insofar as it is given to us, has always a degree of familiarity and that of unfamiliarity.
This unavoidable tension between familiarity and unfamiliarity of an individual real object is nothing but another expression of the Horizonthaftigkeit of the way of givenness of the real individual. Accordingly, a real can only acquire its individuality within the actual world.

(7) Transcendental Subjectivity and the Individuation of Things

In this section we will see how the individuation of things must be relative to the transcendental subjectivity. Insofar as Husserl has his own conception of subjectivity, we have at first to clarify its nature.

(a) Husserl's Concept of Transcendental Subjectivity

Although in the first edition of Logical Investigations Husserl rejected the idea of pure ego, there is already a kind of subjectivity which cannot be regarded as subjectivity in an empirical-psychological sense. Also this conception of subjectivity differs from any understanding of subjectivity as substratum in a metaphysical sense. Rather, this subjectivity in a phenomenological sense is a "stream of consciousness" (LI:535 ff). After the transcendental-idealistic turn he explicitly introduces an idea of pure or transcendental ego (Ideas:Ch. 4). However, Husserl does not abandon his concept of subjectivity as stream of consciousness. On the contrary, according to Husserl, the transcendental ego is inseparable from the stream of consciousness. The pure
ego is nothing but the identical pole of the stream of consciousness (CM:65-66). Certainly, subjectivity as stream of consciousness is now purified into transcendental sense.

Husserl makes a distinction between transcendental subjectivity and psychological or psychophysical subjectivity. While the former "with its constitutive life of consciousness and its transcendental abilities" belongs to the constituting dimension, the latter "as human person" with its "psychic mental process (in the psychological sense)" in psychophysical "connexion with physical organisms, which are also parts of the world", belongs to the constituted dimension (FTL:252). We have seen that world as universal horizon is also constituted by the transcendental subjectivity. As the constitutive source transcendental ego is "worldless" in the sense that it does not belong to the world. In Crisis Husserl mentions the "paradox of human subjectivity". Namely, human subjectivity is, on the one hand, a subject for the world (i.e., worldless), on the other hand, an object in the world. According to Husserl, the solution to this paradox lies in the above distinction between transcendental subjectivity and psychological subjectivity. While transcendental subjectivity as subject for the world is worldless, psychological subjectivity is part of the world (Crisis: §.53).
Husserl maintains that any confusion of these two kinds of subjectivity would not only make us blind to the possibility of transcendental-phenomenological philosophy, but lead us to commit the fallacy of transcendental psychology. That is to say, psychological subjectivity or the human psyche can never function as the transcendental-constitutive source of world. It is merely an object of transcendental apperception (FTL:99). Accordingly, in order to go back to the genuine transcendental dimension, i.e., the transcendental subjectivity, the psychological subjectivity must be put into brackets. For the possibility of transcendental-phenomenological philosophy, this "difference between empirical and transcendental subjectivity remained unavoidable" (Crisis:202).

But how then is it possible for Husserl to account for the unity between transcendental subjectivity and psychological subjectivity, if there exists such a fundamental constitutive difference between them? What is the connection between the transcendental subjectivity, which is not subject to any real, natural causal law nor psychophysical condition and the real, empirical psychological subjectivity?

Husserl himself also notices this problem and tries to solve it by appealing to the difference between "natural attitude" and "transcendental-reflective attitude". According to Husserl, it is always the same subjectivity, no matter whether
it is in the mode of psychological subjectivity or in the mode of transcendental subjectivity. Within the natural attitude it focuses on the objects in the world and forgets its own transcendental-constitutive function. Through the performance of transcendental reduction does it release itself from this status of self-oblivion and accordingly understands the objects in the world as constitutive products of its intentional-transcendental performance. In other words, within the transcendental-reflective attitude it apprehends that it is the transcendental subjectivity. As pointed by Walter Biemel, "this means that the true subject is never an object in the world, but, rather, is constantly merely a subject for the world which it constitutes. Only as long as it has not apprehended itself as transcendental subject can it understand itself as an object in the world" (1977:297).

So, as something identical, subjectivity has the transcendental as well as psychological modes. From the constitutive standpoint, the transcendental mode is more primordial. That is to say, it is only the transcendental mode which can be regarded as the true essence of subjectivity.

As a stream of consciousness, transcendental subjectivity is not only a unity but grasps itself as an I (CM:66). However, according to Husserl, this ultimate I is immortal, while the empirical subjectivity is mortal. He writes: "Des Mensch kann nicht unsterblich sein. Der Mensch
stirbt notwendig. Der Mensch hat keine weltliche Proexistenz, in der zeiträumlichen Welt war er früher nichts und wird er nacher nichts sein. Aber das transcendentale urtümliche Leben, das letztlich weitschafende Leben und dessen letztes Ich kann nicht aus dem nichts werden und in Nichts übergehen, es ist 'unsterblich', weil das Sterben dafür keinen Sinn hat" (K III 6:251a; Eley, 1962:72). Accordingly, despite the identity relationship between transcendental and empirical subjectivities there is also unavoidable difference between them.

Moreover, an analysis of Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological idealism will shed more light on his concept of transcendental subjectivity.

Historically speaking, in the period of Logical Investigations Husserl does not commit himself to any transcendental idealistic positions. But the epistemological character of his phenomenological approach is already clearly shown in the Sixth Investigation.

In Ideas Husserl writes that "the whole spatial-temporal world . . . is according to its own meaning mere intentional Being, a Being, which has merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for a consciousness" (139). That is to say, insofar as its meaning is concerned, the world is constitutively dependent on the transcendental subjectivity. This is the major thesis of Husserl's transcendental idealism.
But as pointed out by Richard Holmes, "Phenomenological idealism does not deny the actual existence of the real world (and primarily of nature) ... Its only task and accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this world" (1975:102). Accordingly, it is not correct to say that Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological idealism is a metaphysical idealism which dissolves the reality of the world into the reality of consciousness" (Ibid:99). Rather, it is an idealism of meaning, or as called by Richard Holmes, an "epistemological idealism" (Ibid:98).

As constituting source transcendental subjectivity is primarily an epistemological subject.

(b) The Transcendental Condition of the Individuation of Things

Insofar as Husserl is an idealist (though in a transcendental-phenomenological sense), he cannot, like the realist, take for granted the identity as well as the individuality of things. Rather, he must provide a constitutive account for the possibility of these phenomena. In accordance with the slogan of Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological idealism, an individual real object is essentially a "constitutive product" of transcendental subjectivity. In particular, a "thing acquires individuality only for a consciousness which claims it in a course of appearance" (Ricoeur, 1967:78). According to Husserl, the individuation of
things is "the secondary individuation of something-over-against (das Gegenüber) (Hu IV:301; Ricoeur, Ibid).
In other words, the individuation of things is a "relative" individuation.

We have seen that both objective time and objective space are "originated" in the transcendental subjectivity. Time-consciousness which constitutes objective time is basically the deepest level of transcendental subjectivity. In fact, Husserl also calls time-consciousness the absolute subjectivity (Hu X:5.36). On the other hand, in constituting objective space the kinaesthetic consciousness of transcendental subjectivity plays an important role. Moreover, even the actual world as universal horizon is nothing but the constituted correlate of transcendental subjectivity. But, in addition to all these constitutive roles, transcendental subjectivity also functions as "Individuum gebendes Bewusstsein". Namely, it is transcendental subjectivity which "gibt das Individuum, d.i., es gibt den Inhalt in der Form der Individualität" (Hu XXIII:499).

"Jedes individuelles Bewusstsein is anschaulich", hence an individual real object is given to us in its "Leibhaftigkeit", (Ibid:500). However, at each moment, it is only one aspect of a real individual which is "actually" (eigentlich) given to us. That is to say, owing to the "profile"-structure of our perception of a material
spatial thing, it is impossible for us to grasp an individual thing in all its sides at one moment. The "profile"-structure of our perception of real individual objects is not the deficiency of our human perceptual organ which might be improved in the future. Rather, this is the essential structure of the transcendent perception and hence can never be altered. That is to say, an individual thing can be given in a (réelle) transcendent manner. Nevertheless "the thing is the intuited unity that which we are conscious of as one and self-identical within the continuously ordered flow of perceptual patterns as they pass off the one into the other" (Ideas:§.41). But how does our perceptual consciousness achieve such a unity and identity of transcendent things?

Husserl agrees that neither "unity" nor "identity" is a real property which can be discovered by perception. An individual thing, as something identical, is rather "phänomenologisch definiert als eine Bewusstseinsleistung" (Holenstein, 1972:55). That is to say, the unity and identity of real things is the "Erwerbung" of transcendental consciousness or subjectivity.

It is true that we cannot have adequate evidence of an individual thing. Namely, an adequate givenness of the individual thing is only an "Idea" in the Kantian sense (Hu III:149). However, each appearing aspect has the individual object-in-itself as its Telos. Accordingly, each aspect is
given to us as an aspect of an individual thing (Bernet, 1979:124). In addition, perception is essentially apperception. Although at each moment only one aspect is actually given to us, the other aspects are cogiven to us. In other words, there is "apperceptive reference" among the different aspects. Hence, the "profile"-structure of transcendent perception does not exclude the possibility of the perceptual unity of a thing. Furthermore, thanks to the associative "coalescence" (Verschmelzung) the unity of an individual thing is already given to a passive consciousness (Ibid:125).

However, in order to see how the unity as well as the identity of things is possible, we have to understand the passive and active performance of perceptual consciousness. In particular, we have passive as well as active identification (Holenstein, 1972:56). Nevertheless, since the possibility of unity and identity of things is ultimately grounded in temporal synthesis, an analysis of the temporal constitution of unity and identity of things will sufficiently show how the transcendental subjectivity achieves the unity and identity of individual things.

First, let us see how Husserl accounts for the temporal constitution of unity of individual things.

From Husserl's theory of time-consciousness we have seen that each perceptual consciousness has its retentional and protentional structure. According to Husserl, the
"interplay" between retention, primal impression and protention is passive and automatic. By means of the retentional function the past phase of the object does not vanish, though it no longer appears. Moreover, "Es ist ein Urgesetz eben, dass jeder retentionale Verlauf -- in reiner Passivität, ohne Mitbeteiligung des aktiven Ich -- alsbald und stetig Erwartungsintentionen motiviert und damit erzeugt, die im Sinne der Stilähnlichkeit bestimmt sind" (Hu XI:323). In other words, the unity of object is constituted by the cooperation of retentional and protentional performances. "This undergoing of continuous retentional modification is the essential initial part of the constitution of an identical object, one that, in the broadest sense, persists" (FTL: 319). Since this unity is passively constituted, it is not yet the identical object. According to Husserl, an identical object is only a correlative of knowledge which presupposes the reproduction or recollection (Hu XI:327).

Then how is the identity of an object possible? According to Husserl, the identity of an object can result only from the operation of identification. Husserl also claims that identification is the fundamental form of synthesis (CM:41). Identification can be performed only on the grounds of reproduction. "Objectification is thus always an active achievement of the ego, an active believing cognizance of that of which we are aware; this something being one and
continuously the same through the continuous extension of consciousness in its duration. It is that which is identified in distinct acts which form a synthesis; in this synthesis we are aware of it as the same, as that which can always be recognized, or also as that which is freely repeatable in recollections or freely producible in perception . . . It is precisely this identity, as the correlate of an identification to be carried out in an open, boundless, and free repetition, which constitutes the pregnant concept of an object" (EJ:62). Since the possibility of an act of identification presupposes reproduction, and reproduction itself presupposes retention, identification is grounded in retention. Indeed, the consciousness of identity is grounded in the consciousness of unity. That is to say, the constitution of the identity of objects is founded on the constitution of the unity of objects.

So by means of retentional function the transcendental subjectivity constitutes the individual object as unity. Through association the transcendental subjectivity is already able to passively identify the "sameness" of an individual object. But the explicit identify of the object can only result from the act of identification which presupposes reproduction.

As something identical the individual thing has to found its possibility in the consciousness of unity as well
as in the consciousness of identity. That is to say, without the retentional and reproductive functions of transcendental subjectivity an individual thing cannot be given to us as an individual.

Now we can clearly see why Husserl says that an individual thing can only acquire its individuality in transcendental subjectivity.

Our exposition of Husserl's theory of the individuation of things is completed here.

B. The Problem of the Individuation of the Ego

(1) Absolute Individuation

The individuation of real objects or the individuation of things is called by Husserl the "secondary individuation" or "relative individuation". It is because the possibility of the individuation of things must presuppose the individuation of the ego. An ego is, par excellence, an "individual". According to Husserl, to the problem of the individuation of things "is linked a parallel problem, that of the unity of the ego, the person" (Hu VIII:174).19

Even within the mundane "personalistic attitude" Husserl regards "the person as a midpoint of a surrounding world" (Hu IV:185). All the individuality of things is relative to this subject. "Kein Ding hat in sich selbst seine Individualität" (Ibid:299). As the subject of the surrounding world, the ego does not acquire its individuality from outside.
Moreover, the principles of the individuation of the ego are different from that of things. Also "Individualität in geistigen Sinn etwas ganz anderes ist als Naturindividuation" (Hu IV: 298).

"The ego, however, is 'this one' and has individuality in and through itself" (Crisis: 218). In this sense, the individuation of the ego is an "absolute individuation" (Hu IV: 299). "For the ego, space and time are not principles of individuation" (Crisis: 218).

In the case of the individuation of things we have seen the intimate relationship between essence and things. Indeed, each individual thing can be regarded as an individual case of its individual essence or concrete essence. But there is no such relationship between essence and the ego. "Ein Ich hat keine generelle sachhaltige Eigenart" (Hu XIV: 22). Or, one has to say: "Das Ich hat seine Eigenart nicht im Sinne der Einmaligkeit der Vereinzelung eines konkreten spezifischen Wesens" (Ibid).

What then are the principles of the individuation of the ego? Before we answer this question, we have first to solve the following problem: "How is the unity and identity of the ego possible?" According to Husserl, ego is something more than a stream of consciousness. Namely, the ego is claimed to be identical throughout the stream of consciousness. It is this identical ego which has the individuality. When
the unity as well as the identity of the ego is impossible, then it is senseless for us to raise the question concerning its individuation. In fact, Husserl claims that it is "a fundamental problem of phenomenology to explain fully how every experience (e.g., every recollection) comes to have this connection with every other (e.g., a recollection has a connection with the corresponding actual perception) of the same ego or in the stream of consciousness of the same ego" (EJ:166-167).

(2) The Unity and the Identity of the Ego

Historically speaking, Husserl's theory of the unity and the identity of the ego is also a reaction to Hume's skepticistic solution to the problem of personal identity (Hu VII:157 ff). Just like his answer to the question concerning the identity of things, Hume insists that the identity of the ego results only from a fictitious belief. That is to say, according to Hume, the personal identity is merely a fictitious one and results only from the imagination (Hume, 1888:251 ff; Murphy, 1980:114).

To be sure Husserl agrees with Hume that the ego is not a metaphysical substance. In other words, an empirical or transcendental realistic solution to the problem of personal identity is also rejected by Husserl. However, according to Husserl, our subjective process is not a
discrete system. Rather, our stream of consciousness is essentially a unity.

But how is the unity of the ego possible?

Husserl maintains "dass mein apodiktisches 'ich bin' die Wesensform des Strömens hat" (E III 9:14; Held, 1966:75). All of the lived experiences of the same ego are composable in the form of stream or flux. According to Husserl, the unity of consciousness of the subjective process of the ego grounds its possibility in "Strömensintentionalität" (C 17 IV:1). We have already learnt that the time-constituting consciousness has "double intentionality". In particular, by means of the "horizontal intentionality" or "retention of retention" the time-consciousness constitutes its own unity by itself. In fact, what Husserl means by "Strömenintentionalität" is nothing but "retention" and "protention". Since each phase of consciousness within the abjective process has the "retention-protention" structure, it can grasp not only the "just-past" and the "next 'coming'" aspect of the intended object, but also the "just-past" phase and the "next coming" phase of consciousness. That is to say, each phase of consciousness has its "subjective" horizon. That is why Husserl says: "Auch von allen solchen Erlebnissen gilt offenbar, dass die aktuellen von einem 'Hof' von unaktuellen umgeben sind: der Erlebnisstrom kann nie aus lauter Aktualitäten bestehen" (Hu III:79). Accordingly, all the conscious acts
of an ego occur "in continuous enchainment" (EJ:166). In this manner "the flux of consciousness constitutes its own unity" (PIT:106). Namely, the constitution of the unity of the flux of subjective process "qua phenomenon . . . is constituted in itself" (PIT:109). It is clearly seen that there is a distinction between the constituted flux of consciousness and the constituting flux of consciousness. According to Husserl, they coincide with each other, yet not in every respect. Furthermore, "the phases of the flux of consciousness in which phases of the same flux of consciousness are phenomenally constituted cannot be identical with these constituted phases, and they are not" (Ibid:110). The constituting flux is later regarded by Husserl as "Ur-Ich". Historically speaking, Husserl's theory of self-constitution of the unity of stream of consciousness first appeared in 1905. Although at that time Husserl had already regarded the time-constituting consciousness as an "absolute subjectivity", he did not admit the idea of pure ego. The time-constituting consciousness remains "non-egological". But in 1932, Husserl explicitly rejected the non-egological conception of time-consciousness. He declared that "die wirkliche Zeitigung ist nun nicht die des Strömens, sondern des transcendental phänomenologisierenden Ich" (C 17 IV:4; Held; 1966:100). That is to say, "temporalization" is now regarded as "ichliche Leistung" (C 17 IV:5). "Der Strom
ist a priori von dem Ego zu verzeitlichen; dieses Ver-zeitlichen ist selbst strömendes; das Strömen ist immerzu im Voraus; aber auch das Ich ist im Voraus" (Ibid:6). But this does not mean that the flux results from the action of ego. On the contrary, retention for instance is not an action of ego. Rather, retentional performance is a passive "ichliche Leistung". That is to say, to regard "strömenintentionalität" as "ichliche Leistung" does not change its "passive" character. Here "ichliche Leistung" cannot be confused with "action of ego". Moreover, here "Ich" should be understood in the sense of "Ur-Ich", i.e., "Ich als letztlich fungierendes" (C 13 III:12).

According to Husserl, the transcendental subjectivity which we discover after the performance of transcendental-phenomenological reduction is not the ultimate subjectivity. "Das transzendentale 'absolute', das wir uns durch diese Reduktion herauspräpariert haben, ist in Wahrheit nicht das Letzte, es ist etwas, das sich selbst in einem gewissen tiefliegenden und völlig eigenartigen Sinn konstituiert und seine Urquelle in einem letzten und wahrhaft Absoluten hat" (Hu III:§.31). While the non-ultimate transcendental subjectivity is immanent temporal, the "Ur-Ich" is not in the immanent time. "Das Ich in seiner ursprünglichsten Ursprünglichkeit ist nicht in der Zeit (C 10:21). Accordingly, it is senseless to say that the "primal-I" is something
enduring. Through the "vertical intentionality" only the unity of the non-ultimate transcendent "ego" is constituted. The unity of "primal-I" is rather an "Einheit einer absoluten Selbstzeitigung" (Hu XV:669). It differs even from the unity of the constituted flux of consciousness. Moreover, according to Husserl, "die Identität des Ich ist nicht die bloße Identität eines Dauernden, sondern die Identität des Vollziehers -- das ist der Ichpol -- und wenn schon auch eine Dauerneinheit konstituiert, so bleibt es ein einzigartig Eigenes, was da Identität des Vollziehers heisst" (C 10:28). Certainly, the primal ego is not separable from the stream of consciousness. Rather, "das identische Ich, sich als das identische in erster Ursprünglichkeit zeitigend, in ihm eine Schichte der Affektions- und Aktionstrahlen als Schichte des Lebensstromenes sich zeitigend, dessen Identitätszentrum das Ich ist" (C 10:8). However, there is a difference between primal-I and the lived experience in the stream of consciousness. As an identical pole which goes through the whole stream of consciousness the primal-I is not an "Erlebnis" (Ibid:7). Accordingly, the identity of the ego qua "Vollzieher" is different from the identity of a lived experience.

Husserl once claimed that "Ich, der ich jetzt wahrnehme, und diese Wahrnehmung vollziehe, bin identisch derselbe, der ich mich in der Wiedererinnerung finde, als das Ich, das das Vergangene wahrgenommen hat. Die absolute Identität erkenne
ich in der Reflexion" (Hu IX:208). However, he must give up such an answer if he is to be consistent with his conception of reflection as objectification.21

Indeed, owing to the objectificational character of reflection in the Husserlian sense, the unity and identity of the primal ego can never be "proved" by appeal to reflective evidence. In order to justify the unity and identity of the primal ego, Husserl adopts a "transcendental argument" in the Kantian sense. The identity of the primal ego is regarded as "die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Einheit des Stroms und zugleich auch die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis überhaupt" (Briefe an Roman Ingarden:132).

Moreover, in his later years Husserl characterizes the whole dimension of the primal ego as an "absolute facticity" (Hu XV:385). The primal ego is "ständig fungierend und durch all ... Fungieren in Bezug auf das Fungieren dasselbe Ich, das Ich, das jede Leistung behält, nur ständig in Selbstzeitigung (A V 5:5). As "ständig Urquelle" the primal ego "ist identisch nicht durch ein 'identifizieren', sondern als ureinig Sein" (Ibid:8). Accordingly, the unity and the identity of the primal ego do not belong to the constituted dimension; hence they need no further constitutive account. On the contrary, any constitution must presuppose primal unity and primal identity as "Urgrund". Even the constituted stream of consciousness must ground its unity in the unity of the primal ego.
We have seen that how Husserl accounts for the possibility of the unity and the identity of the ego. In the following section we will give a presentation of his different sets of principles of the individuation of the ego.

(3) The Principle of the Individuation of the Ego

Despite the "postulate"-character of the primal ego the unity and identity of the primal ego is the constitutive condition of possibility of the ego as "menschliches Lebenwesen in einer animalischen Gemeinschaft" (in the naturalistic attitude), as "Person in einer Persongemeinschaft" (in the personalistic attitude), as "Monade in einer Monadengemeinschaft" (in the transcendental attitude) (Waldenfels, 1971:10). In accordance with these different ways of givenness of the ego there are different sets of principia individuationis.

In contrast to the "relative" and "secondary" individuation of things, time and space cannot function as principles of the individuation of the ego. It is true that our physical body (Körper) is located within spatiotemporality. "A body is what it is as this determined body, as a substance of 'causal' properties which is, in its own essence, spatio-temporally located" (Crises:218; our underline). However, an ego is not just its physical body. Furthermore, there is even a distinction between "our living body" (Leib) and "our physical body" (Körper). Insofar as our living body as centre of
orientation is the constitutive source of space, it cannot be individualized by appealing to space.

For the individuation of the ego as "menschliches Lebenwesen" there are two principia individuationis.

First, "physical living body" as principium individuationis: "because of the character of the physical living body", an animal individual can be distinguishable from any other animal individuals "in respect to its position in the space of physical bodies, a position which is inauthentic and which it owes to its physical, living body" (Crisis: 218).

Second, "idiopsychische Regelungen" as principium individuationis: an animal individual is distinctive with all its "psychophysically conditioned factors" (Hu IV:142; Crisis:218).

Since "person" as a "spiritual individual" is given only in a personalistic attitude, its individuation differs from that of the animal individual as the ego in the natural world. While the "psychic" ego results from the "psychologische Auffassung", the ego as "person" or a "spiritual individual" results from the "geisteszissenschaftlichen Auffassung" (Hu IV:143). In other words, person is rather the ego in the cultural-historical world.

According to Husserl, there are three principles of the individuation of the personal individual.
First, a personal individual is unique according to its style of motivation (Ricoeur, 1967:78). For Husserl, motivation is not a psychological phenomenon. Namely, it must be distinguished from the psychophysical condition. Also, motivation is not physical causality. The latter belongs to the sphere of natural science. In addition, one cannot confuse motivation with the "adequate condition" in the logical sense. Motivation is rather "die Gesetzmäßigkeit des geistigen Lebens" (Hu IV:220).

Husserl distinguishes two kinds of motivation: "rational motivation" and "associative motivation". While "rational motivation" is active, "associative motivation" is passive. "Alle geistigen Verhaltensweisen sind durch Beziehungen der Motivation, 'kausal' vernüpft" (Ibid:230). For example, I perform action A, because I have been told that action B will happen. This "because" is basically "habitual" (gewöhnheitsmässig).

"Das personale Ich konstituiert sich in der ursprünglichen Genesis nicht nur als triebhaft bestimmte Persönlichkeit, von Anfang an und immerfort auch von ursprünglichen Instinkten getriebenes und ihnen passiv folgendes, sondern auch als höheres, autonomes, freitätiges, insbesondere von Vernunftmotiven geleitetes, nicht bloss gezogenes und unfreies Ich" (Hu IV:255). That is to say, it is rational motivation which is important for the personal individuality. Clearly, the
possibility of free decision must be presupposed.

Personal individuality is nothing but the "Gesamtstil und Habitus des Subjekts" (Ibid:277). In terms of the style of rational motivation we can "define" "personlichen Eigenheiten" or "Charaktereigenschaften". To be sure, all these must be understood as "eine gewisse Regel der Entwicklung" rather than a material essence (Ibid:256). By means of his "Gesamtcharacter, der durch alle Entscheidungen und Entscheidenheiten identisch hindurchgeht", we are able to discern the individuality of the ego as person (Hu IX:215).

Second, the "selbsteigene Habitualitäten" form the individual structure of a person. The personal ego is a pole of acts. According to Husserl, "jeder Akt, 'einmalig vollzogen', ist 'Urstiftung' einer bleibenden Eigenheit, in die immanente Zeit hinein dauernd (im Sinne eines dauernden Identischen)" (Hu IV:311). That is to say, although the "finished" act sinks into the past, it does not vanish. On the contrary, it not only retains its validity but can "anticipate" further acts. Moreover, as "eine bleibende Habe" of the ego it can be "reactivated" at any time -- mainly through apperceptive association (Hu I:95). Habitualities as the "gültige cogitatione" are constantly present in the stream of consciousness, though in a unthematic manner (Bartels, 1979:62-63). The personal ego is basically a life of sedimentation of habitualities. Certainly, habitualities of
the personal ego are not "real properties". "Das sind aber nicht an ihm als wie (an) einem sachlichen Gegenstand wahrmehmungsmässig gegebene und aufweisbare sachliche Eigenschaften, sondern Beschaffenheiten, die ihm aus der Genese, aus der Tatsache, dass es den jeweiligen actus vollzogen hat, zuwachsen und nur in Rekurs auf diesen historisch ihm zugehören" (Hu IX:211). By appealing to habitualities as "Ich-Eigenheiten" we can discern a person from other persons. That is why Husserl says: "Die person, als die 'Individualität einer Subjektivität'; . . . ist bezogen auf die Sphäre der spezifischen Aktivität in Form des ego cogito" (Hu XI:18).

Finally, a personal ego is also individualized by his personal history. According to Husserl, each person "hat seine individuelle Geschichte" (Hu IV:300).

A personal ego is basically the subject of his own history. "Absolut betrachtet, hat jedes ego seine Geschichte, und es ist nur as Subjekt seiner Geschichte" (H VIII:506). A personal ego is not just an empty pole. In addition, as an identical throughout his history, the personal ego "ist seier im Werden und konstituiert in sich seine eigene Präsenz, seine eigene Vergangenheit und voraus als Horizont gerichtte offene Zukunft" (Hu IV:16). That is to say, the personal ego "constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a 'history'" (CM:75).
Since each personal ego has his particular history, the coherence of history shows the uniqueness of the personal ego. Indeed, Husserl points out that "Was die menschlichen Subjekte, die Menschen als Personen anlangt, so fährt jeder nur sich selbst ursprünglich und in konkreter Bestimmtheit und kann jeder nur sich selbst aus seiner individuellen Geschichte original verstehen" (Hu IX:488).

So, an ego as "personal unity" is individualized by "style of motivation", "habitualities" and "coherence of history" (Hu IX:212). However, here not only "person" is a mundane ego but all these principles of individuation are developed within the mundane "personalistic attitude". In other words, although here "person" is a phenomenological concept, it is not yet transcendental. To be sure, "person" is not an empirical-psychological concept. However, "the person does not have the purity of the transcendental subject. He is not the ultimate ego. He is still in the world of 'experience'" (Ricoeur, 1967:81). Indeed, the concept of "person" appears already in the realm of "phenomenological psychology". Despite its descriptive and eidetic character "phenomenological psychology" is not a "transcendental discipline". Husserl clearly makes a distinction between the "phenomenological-psychological reduction" and the "transcendental-phenomenological reduction". While the former is still operative within the world, the latter puts the validity of world into bracket.
In spite of the mundane character of "person" even within the "personalistic attitude" the personal ego is regarded by Husserl as "subject for the surrounding world". As rightly remarked by Paul Ricoeur, "Geist is nothing other than the ego of (transcendental) phenomenology, but without the light of the (transcendental) phenomenological-reduction" (Ibid:80).

After the performance of transcendental reduction, the ego is purified from its "natural reality" and becomes a "monad" in the transcendental sense. In short, the mundane personal ego becomes the transcendental monadic ego. Clearly, the "difference" between the mundane person and the transcendental monad is totally other than that between the psychic animal ego and the mundane person. Husserl points out that "as an ego in the natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental ego, but that I know about this only by executing (transcendental) phenomenological reduction" (CM:37).

Accordingly, though Husserl does not work out the principles of the individuation of the transcendental monadic ego, we can supplement this gap by developing a transcendental version of those principia individuationis for the mundane person.

First, Husserl, indeed, also speaks of "motivation in the transcendental sphere" (Ibid:75). In particular,
"the form of a motivation" is regarded as the universal law of the transcendental ego (Ibid). So the "style of motivation" can be refashioned into a principle of the individuation of the monadic ego in the transcendental sense.

Second, according to Husserl, even after the performance of "primordial reduction" "all my habitualities" remain (Ibid:104). Hence, by means of his "habitualities" as "Ego-determinations" one can discern the uniqueness of a transcendental monad.

Finally, in Crisis Husserl also admits a concept of "transcendental historicity" (188). "Die Geschichte ist das grosse Faktum des absoluten Seins" (Hu VIII:506). Hence, a "de facto transcendental ego" or "concrete transcendental ego" can be discerned by his transcendental history (CM:73).

However, we have already learnt that, according to Husserl, the transcendental ego that we discover after the performance of transcendental reduction is not yet the ultimate absolute ego. Namely, by performing the transcendental reduction "Scheinbar haben wir damit alles Subjective... und doch nicht" (L I 20:4a; Marbach, 1974:216). Why? The reason is that what "Wir haben, ist eben Seiendes, Zeitliches, und nicht alles Subjectives ist Zeitliches, ist Individuelles, in dem Sinn des durch eine einmalige Zeitstelle Individualisierten. Was wir vor allem nicht im Erlebnisstrom
haben, ist das Ich selbst" (Ibid). The primal ego as
the time-constituting ground is not in
time. "In diesem
Sinn ist es also nicht 'Seiendes', sondern das Gegenstück
für alles Seiende, nicht ein Gegenstand, sondern Urstand
für alle Gegenständlichkeit" (Ibid). Accordingly, Husserl
claims that the primal ego "sollte eigentlich nicht das Ich
heissen, und überhaupt nicht heissen, da es dann schon
gegenständlich geworden ist. Es ist das namenlos
über
allem nicht Stehende, nicht Schwebende, nicht Seiende, sondern
'Fungierende'" (Ibid).

Accordingly, Husserl makes a distinction between "die
Monade in ihrer letzten, absoluten oder Urgestalt und die
Monade als die Einheit des 'inneren Sinnes',
als in der Form der immanenten Zeit konstituierte Einheit"
(Hu XIV:46-47).

The non-ultimate transcendental ego or monad is still
"personal", i.e., has a "personal character" -- though not
in a mundane sense. But the ultimate "Ur-Ich" or absolute
ego is "pre-personal". "Das absolute Ich, das in nie zerb-
brechlicher Ständigkeit vor allem Seienden ist und alles
Seiende in sich trägt, in seiner 'Konkretion' vor allen
Konkretionen, das alles und jedes 'erdenkliche Seiende in sich
tragende, ist das erste 'ego' der Reduktion -- ein ego, das
falschlich darum so heisst, weil für es ein alter ego keinen
Sinn gibt" (Hu XI:586). As a consequence, "Ur-Ich" or the
absolute ego "is actually called 'I' only by equivocation"
However, this "Ur-Ich" has also its "individu[ality]. That is to say, the primal ego is an individual. It is because the primal ego "can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability" (Ibid:185). Nevertheless, the individuality of the primal ego is "pre-personal" -- neither "person" in a mundane nor in a transcendent[al sense. Hence, the primal ego is "persönlich überindividuell". Michael Theunissen characterizes this "individu[ality] of the primal ego as "extra-mundane" (1965:19). However, he fails to see that the non-ultimate transcendent[al ego or monad is also an extramundane individual. In other words, the transcendent[al monad is an individual too in an extramundane sense. 26

Formally speaking, each cogitation has its individuality in its "absolute" position in the immanent time. That is to say, its absolute individuation is the "Individuation der Einmaligkeit" (Hu XIV:23). This "Individuation" der Einmaligkeit" is the fundamental principle underlying all the "style or motivation", "habitualities" and "coherence of history" as principia individuationis. Indeed, while the mundane personal ego is the "constituted unity" in the mundane immanent time, the transcendent[al monadic ego is the "constituted unity" in the transcendent[al immanent time (Hu XI:587). But since even the transcendent[al immanent time is "originated" in the primal ego, the problem of the "individuation of the monad" must go
back to the primal ego (Hu XIV:35). Obviously, insofar as the primal ego itself is atemporal, its individuation differs from the "Individuation der Einmaligkeit". Accordingly, neither "the style of motivation" nor "the habitualities" nor "the coherence of history" can function as the principle of the individuation of the primal ego. The primal ego "however is 'this one' and has individuality in and through itself" (Crisis:218). That is to say, the individuation of "Ür-Ich" is an "Urfaktum". "So muss dieses Ich, das ich selbst bin, absolutes Faktum genannt werden" (Landgrebe, 1976:176).

We have now completed the exposition of Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego.

C. Critical Discussion of Husserl's Theory of Individuation

From the above exposition it is not difficult to discover that in Husserl's theory of individuation the immanent object, especially, hyle, plays an important role. While the constitution of objective time has to presuppose the immanent time, in particular, the hyletic time; in the constitution of objective space the "extensional-apprehension" of "Stellungsempfindung" is one of the necessary operations. Furthermore, insofar as the "Einmaligkeit des Daseins" of cogitationes is the underlying idea for "style of motivation" "habitualities" and "coherence of history" as principia
individuationis, it is immanent time, in particular, act-time, which is the fundamental form of the individuation of the ego as a person or monad. Here "der Begriff der Individualität ist ein zeitbezogener Begriff, was als zeitlich Seiendes nur an einer Zeitstelle (einmalig, nicht vielmalig) sein kann" (Hu XV:374). Even the transcendental monad is regarded by Husserl as "in einer monadischen Zeit einer monadischen Welt gezeitigt" (Ibid:587). Accordingly, "Durch die monadische immanent Zeitlichkeit ist also wohl eine Form der Individuation gegeben" (Ibid:376). 27

As a consequence, one can see that Husserl's theory of the individuation of things as well as theory of the individuation of the ego have to presuppose the dimension of immanent data as "mediation".

However, it is well-known that Husserl's theory of the immanent data is rejected by the noematic phenomenologists such as Aron Gurwitsch (1964:265 ff). 28 In particular, the concept of hyle is criticized to be developed under the influence of data-sensualistic psychology rather than from the descriptive standpoint. Some serious problems arise: if Husserl's concept of immanent data is rejected, does it imply then that Husserl's theory of the individuation of things and the ego would collapse? In particular, if Husserl's concept of immanent data is rejected, then "immanent time" would become an empty notion; does it imply that Husserl's theory of time-constitution should be abolished? And how
about this theory of constitution of space? Should it share the same fate? If so, then how is a phenomenological theory of constitution of time and space possible?

Furthermore, in his account for the individuation of the ego, Husserl also appeals to the absolute position of each cogitation in the immanent time. If immanent time is rejected, then how is it possible to characterize the absolute individuation of the cogitation? Consequently, how is the individuation of the monadic ego possible? Also in his distinction between the monadic ego and the primal-I Husserl makes use of the distinction between the immanent-temporal character of the monadic ego and the immanent-atemporal character of the primal I. If "immanent time" is rejected, then what can serve as the distinguishing mark between the monadic ego and the primal-I?

In the following we attempt to show that the rejection of Husserl's concept of immanent objects does not necessarily cause his theory of individuation to collapse. To achieve this aim, we try to rescue the insight of Husserl's theory of time-constitution by reinterpreting his notion of "immanent time", on the one hand; and in the case of Husserl's theory of constitution of space, we will understand "Bewegungsempfindung" primarily as Vermöglichkeit, on the other hand. Since Husserl's "immanent time" covers hyle-time and act-time, we will reinterpret "immanent time" in two directions.
As suggested by Ulrich Asmussen, Husserl's concept of "hyletic data" should be reinterpreted in a noematic manner (1957:29 ff), namely, hyletic data should be understood as belonging to the noematic side of the lived experiences. Similarly, we suggest that "immanent hyletic time" should be reinterpreted as a "noematic time". That is to say, it should be understood as a "time for noemata" rather than a "time for realle hyletic data". As pointed out by Fink in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, what concerns Husserl is mainly the constitution of hyletic time (1976:221). However, what Husserl says on the constitution of the hyletic time can be structurally preserved when it is used to account for the constitution of the noematic time. Only now the temporal content is no longer hyletic data but rather the noematic aspect of the thing. In other words, the "retention--primal impression--protention" structure of time-consciousness remains unchanged. Only under the reinterpretation, what is grasped by primal impression is no longer "Ur-hyle" but rather a noematic phase of the object. Similarly, what retention (or protention) grasps is rather the just-past (or next coming) noematic phase of the object.

Indeed, the noematic time in the above sense can also be regarded as an "immanent time" -- though in another sense. In *Idea of Phenomenology* Husserl distinguishes two senses of "immanence". On the one hand, we have "immanence" in
the *reelle* sense; on the other hand, we have "immanence" in the intentional sense. While the former "means the constituent of stream of consciousness", the latter means the "evident givenness" (Hu II:9 ff). Hyle and act are immanent in the *reelle* sense. Although thing-noema is not immanent in the *reelle* sense, it is immanent in the intentional sense. Accordingly, noematic time can legitimately be called "immanent time".

So, now the "givenness time" is no longer hyletic time but noematic time. In addition, "objective transcendent time" still grounds its possibility in "immanent time" — noematic time. But the constitution of "objective (natural) time" has no need to appeal to the schematic interpretation. Rather, it is directly constituted through the operation of "reproduction" on immanent noematic time. Namely, what is constituted by *vertical intentionality* of *time-consciousness* is primarily the noematic time; then through the "recollective identification" the objective, natural time is constituted.

Clearly, "immanent act time" cannot be reinterpreted in the above manner. However, an act as the immanent object is not a primordial phenomenological givenness. As pointed out by John Brough, Husserl's distinction between the region of immanent objects and the region of absolute consciousness "is 'metaphysical' rather than 'phenomenological'" (1969:472). But Brough did not see the source of Husserl's difficulty.
In fact, Husserl seems also to recognize that act
per se is living act ("Phänomenologie und Psychologie":487). Act
is given as an immanent object only to the objectificational
reflection. Husserl himself does not deny the objectifying
character of reflection (Ibid). Moreover, Husserl also points
out that within the dimension of reelle immanence: esse-percipi
(Hu XI:19). Accordingly, we can conclude that "act as an immanent
object" results only from the objectification of reflection.
That is to say, act in its Urstand is not an immanent object.
Also we have to conclude that "act-time" in the sense of time
for acts as immanent objects is basically a "reflective
construction". It is because Husserl errs in hypothesizing
reflective constructions or objects of reflection that
he posits the dimension of reelle objects within consciousness.

Act as an Urstand, i.e., in its livingness should be
atemporal, or quasi-temporal (but not in the sense of time
for quasi-objects). As remarked by Brough, "a single phase
of a perceptual act" should not be "intended by the 'Querschchnitt'"but is the "Querschnitt" (1969:475). In other words,
time-consciousness is not something "behind" the stream of
consciousness. Rather, time-consciousness should be under-
stood as belonging to the perceptual act. Hence, perceptual
act per se is quasi-temporal and not as an immanent object
in the reelle immanent time. The stream of consciousness
constitutes itself essentially in a pre-reflective manner.
The "livingness" of the perceptual act can be seen in its time-constituting function.

It is true that even Husserl himself recognizes that the quasi-time which is constituted by the horizontal or longitude intentionality is not a reelle immanent time. But he thinks that only the latter is act-time. However, from the above clarification we can clearly see that act per se is not in the reelle act-time.

Certainly, act can become temporal. But it is temporal only primarily in a "subjective time" which is constituted through the operation of reproductive or recollective identification. In this "subjective time" act is not yet an immanent object for reflection.

Reelle act-time results only in the attitude of objectificational reflection. That is to say, only through reflective objectification can we have "time for acts as immanent objects".

So, we can have three kinds of act-time:

(1) Quasi-time which is constituted by horizontal intentionality or retentional operation. This is the "time" for living acts.

(2) Subjective time which is constituted by reproductive or recollective operation.

(3) Reelle act-time or time for acts as immanent objects which is constituted by reflective objectification.
Since quasi-time is not time in a genuine sense and reelle act-time is basically a reflective "construction", it is subjective time in the above sense that should be understood as act-time in the proper sense. Accordingly, monadic time should be reinterpreted as subjective time in the above sense. Indeed, this reinterpretation also enables us to preserve Husserl's distinction between the nomadic ego and the primal-I. While the monadic ego is still in the monadic time, i.e., subjective time in the above sense, the prima-I is not in this monadic time.

The above reinterpretation clearly shows that Husserl's theory of time-constitution can be 'structurally' "preserved" even if his doctrine of immanent content is rejected.

We have seen that in his theory of constitution of space, Husserl makes a distinction between "Merkmalsempfindung" and "Bewegungsempfindung". The former is nothing but hyle. We have seen that it should be located on the noematic side of consciousness. But how about "Stellungsempfindung"?

As pointed out by Claesges, it has "die Bedeutung des Bewusstseins, eine bestimmte kinästhetische Situation verwirklicht zu haben" (1964:134). As "das Bewusstsein der Aktualität einer mit dem kinästhetischen System gegebenen Möglichkeit" this kind of "Empfindung" is primarily not an immanent content but rather "Vermöglichkeit" (Ibid:74). Moreover, "kinaesthetische Empfindung" is primordially nothing but "Leistung".
Accordingly, even the doctrine of immanent content is rejected, the above modification shows that Husserl's theory of constitution of space can be "preserved".

There is a fundamental idea of "individuality" underlying Husserl's theory of the individuation of things or the real object: "'Individuell' besagt Einmaligkeit des Daseins" (Hu XV:374). That is to say, the individuality of a thing is primarily understood from the "Einmaligkeit", "Nicht-Wiederholbarkeit" of its existence. "So in der Raumzeitlichkeit also in der Welt: Ein Ding, genommen in seiner jeweiligen kausalen Zuständigkeit, kann nicht ein zweites Mal da Sein" (Ibid). Accordingly, Husserl distinguishes "individuelle Differenz" from "spezifische Differenz" (Hu XI:144). Namely, in individualizing a material thing or real object we cannot merely appeal to concrete essence but rather must appeal to objective time and objective space. Also in this sense, "dass die Zeitstelle und Ortstelle als das eine konkrete Zeitgegenständlichkeit in der Sukzession und Koexistenz Individuierende nicht so etwas wie ein Merkmal ist oder gar so etwas wie eine Marke, ein Index, wodurch sich jedes Individuelle von jedem möglichen Gleichem unterscheidet" (Ibid).

Accordingly, Husserl's theory of the individuation of things is not only Vorhandenheit-orientated in the sense that it focuses primarily on natural, material things, but also in
the sense that it approaches the individuation of things from the standpoint of its existence or "Vorhandenheit".

In Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego we have seen that Husserl makes a distinction between the psychic ego, the personal ego, the transcendental monadic ego and the primal-I. While the first three are the ego in its different ways of givenness to itself, the last one is the ego in its Urstand. Such a fourfold distinction of the ego reminds us of Hegel's similar distinction between "Leben", "Individuum (person)", "Selbstbewusstsein" and "Geist" in Phenomenology of Spirit. But Husserl's "primal-I" differs from Hegel's "Geist" in its "transzendentale Individualität" (Hu XV:390). Certainly, being immanently atemporal, the primal-I is not "wie seine Erlebnisse, in der Zeit individuiert"; neither is its individuation a personal nor monadic "selbsthafte Individuation" (Fink, 1976:224). According to Husserl, "erst später kann sichtlich werden, dass das Ich des urytümlichen Strömen das absolutes Ich ist, das in sich das Ich als eigenes Ich trägt und die anderen Ich trägt als intentionale Modifikation des eigenen" (Hu XV:586). That is why he also says: "The discovery of mine precedes the discovery of 'I'" (Landgrebe, 1977:108).

With regard to this fourfold distinction of the ego, one has to ask: which one is the ego per se? Clearly, neither the psychic ego nor the personal ego. While the former is an object in the natural world, the latter is in the mundane
cultural world. Although monad is transcendental, it is not yet the absolute ego. Namely, monad is merely "transcendental" in the sense of "non-mundane". But as a unity in "monadic time" it is still a "seiendes" (Hu XV:587).

Only the atemporal primal-I can be regarded as the true transcendental absolute, i.e., the ultimate absolute ego. If Husserl is faithful to his "order of constitution", then it is only the primal-I which is the ego per se. As a consequence, Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego qua ego can attain its goal only when he solves the problem of the individuation of the primal-I.

But what is the principium individuationis according to which we can differentiate "mein urtümliches ego" from other "urtümlichen egos'? (Ibid)

We have seen that the transcendental monad is individualized by its "style of motivation", "habitualities" and "coherence of history". However, since the "Einmaligkeit des Daseins" of cogitationes is the underlying foundation of this kind of individuation, the individuality of the transcendental monad is still primarily understood as "Einmaligkeit des Daseins". Accordingly, these three principles cannot function as principles of the individuation of the atemporal primal-I. Here Husserl seems to face a "dilemma". On the one hand, if he sticks to these three principles of individuation, then what is individualized is not the ego qua ego. On the other hand, if
he maintains the possibility of the individuation of the ego qua ego; he has to go beyond all these three principles. However, owing to the limitation of Husserl's objectificational reflective approach, the whole atemporal dimension of the primal-I escapes "intuitive" grasping. Then there results that one cannot develop any principle of the individuation of the primal-I within Husserl's framework.

Indeed, for Husserl the individuation of the primal-I is only an absolute Faktum. "The fact of individuation is a final factum" (Landgrebe, 1974:117). And this "absolute monadological individuation is the prerequisite for there being any kind of differentiation between mine and yours, between the I and the thou" (Ibid).

But the problem is that insofar as the individuation of the primal-I lacks reflective evidence, as an Urfaktum it is nothing but a "postulate". As pointed out by Ludwig Landgrebe, "ob die Individualisierung nicht bloss im das anonyme 'urtümliche' Geschehen hineinprojiziert ist und damit nur den Charakter eines notwendigen Postulates hat" (1974a:279).

One might understand this "individuality" in terms of "freedom". But as Martin Bartels remarks, in Husserl's phenomenology "freedom" merely means "spontaneity" (1979:67). In other words, such a "freedom" is manifested primarily in its "time-constituting function" in its "Urgegenwart".
Insofar as even the primal-I is not separable from its Erlebnisse, the "style of motivation", the "habitualities" and the "coherence of history" can be regarded as the "Merkmale" of the individuality" of the primal ego.\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, all "style of motivation" "habitualities" and "coherence of history" can legitimately be regarded as the "external" principles of the individuation of the primal-I.

We can conclude that the important contribution of Husserl's theory of individuation lies in its account of the possibility of unity, identity and individuation of things or real objects. Also he provides us the external principles of the individuation of the ego. However, within his objectificational reflective approach, Husserl can only account for the possibility of unity, identity and individuation of the primal-I by appeal to Kantian transcendental argument. Consequently, as pointed out by Landgrebe, in answer to the question: "inwiefern kann dieses (sic. das Urströmen) in seiner Ursprünglichkeit nicht als ein diffuses Strömen gedacht werden, das selbst erst Besonderung und Vereinzelung konstituiert?" Husserl cannot provide a satisfactory answer (1974a:279).
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. As pointed out by Eugen Fink, "transcendental logic" is one of the "operative concepts" in Husserl's phenomenology (1976:185 ff). Peter McCormick rightly points out that Husserl's "transcendental logic" must be distinguished from Kant's (1971:88). The task of "transcendental logic" in Husserl's sense is nothing but a transcendental criticism of formal logic.

2. According to Husserl, "formalization" differs from "generalization.

3. "Die Logik (als formale Logik) handelt über Gegenstände überhaupt ob es Individuen sind oder Spezies" (D 5:10).

4. Indeed, Husserl himself locates the problem: "Was macht es, dass sich eine transzendente Gegenständlichkeit als Einheit für sich, als ein individuum konstituiert und gibt so einer beliebig fortführbaren kontinuierlichen Wahrnehmungsmannigfaltigkeit Einheit des Individuellen Gegenstandes?" under the title "Die Probleme der Individualisation (A I 22:3).

5. Indeed, already in his "Editor's Foreword" to the 1928 edition of "Edmund Husserl's Vorlesungen sur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins" Heidegger mentioned Husserl's work on the problem of individuation. He wrote: "Continuing studies of time-consciousness in connection with the problem of individuation, especially those undertaken since 1917, are reserved for a later publication" (PIT:15). But Heidegger did not notice that most of the appendices in PIT were written during this period. Moreover, part of the Bernau-manuscripts were published in EJ.

6. According to Husserl, the object of perception is given in the "Leibhaftigkeit".

7. Both Brough and Holenstein claim that Husserl abolishes the schematic interpretation. But John Drummond points out that "Husserl criticized this early theory of time-consciousness because there could be no denying the fact that the contents belonging to all the intentions within the momentary experience of the object are present and no intention can change that temporal
determination. Hence the idea that contents can present past and future phases is untenable, but we should note that there is no reason to extend this criticism to the apprehension of the present appearance. The grasp of the present appearance can be and is still explained in terms of the animation of contents by one of the intentions (primal impression) within the momentary experience. However, the direction to the past and future is now explained in terms of the intentional directions (retention and protention) to past and yet-to-come phases of experience rather than phases of the object" (1979:141). Husserl's assertion that "nicht jede Konstitution hat das Schema Auffassungsinhalt—Auffassung" (Hu X:7), in our opinion, should not be understood as an "evidence" for the abandonment of the schematic interpretation (as it is claimed by Brough, Rudolf Böhm and Holenstein). Rather, it should be understood in the sense that Husserl here refers rather to the "peculiar manner" of the self-constitution of the unity of time-consciousness. Namely, such a self-constitution is achieved purely by the "horizontal intentionality" or "retention of retention" which is not subject to this scheme.

8. Briefe an Roman Ingarden:122. As rightly surmised by Ingarden, one of the major concerns of Husserl's Bernau-Manuscript is to get rid of such as a "teuflischen Zirkel".

9. In A III 6 Husserl writes: "die reine Zeitform als notwendige Form aller Individualität" (51). Also: "Zeit-Form... die Bedingungen der Individuation" (Ibid).


11. Here "apperception" means basically "consciousness of an object in a non-thematical manner".

12. This "quasi-time" cannot be confused with the "quasi-temporality" of time-consciousness.

13. Similar to the temporal apperception or apprehension, the "extensional" apperception or apprehension "attribute" the "Lägemomente" such as "here", "there" to the object.
14. According to Husserl, "kinaesthetische Empfindung" is a particular class of "Bewegungsempfindung". But he poses the question: "Ob sie eine grundwesentliche neue Grundgattung von Empfindungen ausmachen oder nicht vielmehr mit den Tastempfindungen in eine obere Gattung zusammengehören, das ist eine Doktorfrage" (Hu XVI: 161). Since there is an essential difference between "kinaesthetische Empfindung" and "Tastempfindung" not only in the sense that the former has no "gegenständlicher Inhalt" as its "correspondence" and the latter does have, but, more importantly, that "kinaesthetische Empfindung" should not be understood as a kind of "Empfindung" but rather as "Leistung", such a question is "misposed".

15. Indeed, in another context, Husserl also adds the other levels e.g., he speaks of "partial cephalomotorical space" and "whole cephalomotorical space" (Hu XVI:309-311).

16. Husserl also formulates this limitation of time as the principle of individuation in the following way: "Hinsichtlich der Gleichzeitigkeit heisst es: zwei Reale von identisch demselben realen Wesen können nicht gleichzeitig sein" (D 5:17).

17. Such a difference is not an ontological difference in Heidegger's sense. See below. Heidegger also challenges the possibility of this unity between transcendental subjectivity and psychological subjectivity. He poses the following question to Husserl: "Welches ist die Seinsart dieses absoluten ego -- in welchem Sinn ist es dasselbe wie das je faktische Ich; in welchen Sinn nicht dasselbe?" (Hu IX:602).

18. Giuseppina Moneta (1976) has overlooked the function of association in her account of Husserl's theory of identity. Indeed, corresponding to the distinction between "original passivity" and "secondary passivity" we have two kinds of associative identification — association through similarity. In the case of "original passivity" the result of the associative identification is an "identical object" going through the "manifold appearances" which are similar with each other. That is to say, the function of the first kind of association through similarity lies in synthesizing the similar appearances into an one and the same object. Cf. Holenstein, 1972:70 ff. In the case of "secondary passivity", by means of the associative identification we establish automatically a "sameness" relationship through "typical similarity" between a stone we saw before and a stone now lying before me, e.g. That is to say, for the second kind of associative synthesis through similarity the 'basic unit' is 'object' and not "appearance". One may say while the first kind of association through similarity is a synthesis between appearances, the second kind between objects.


20. Holenstein seems to overlook this distinction in his criticism of Klaus Held (1972:219).
21. See below.

22. In Phänomenologische Psychologie Husserl also employs the term "monad" in the mundane level. It is also true that the term "person" in CM can be understood in the transcendental sense. But in his later years Husserl definitely reserves the term "monad" for the transcendental (constituted, non-ultimate) ego for the most part. In order to avoid the terminological confusion, here we follow Bernhard Waldenfels in using "person" in the mundane sense and understanding "monad" exclusively in the transcendental sense.

23. Certainly, here while "time" means "objective time", "space" means "objective space".


25. Both "naturalistic attitude" and "personalistic attitude", according to Husserl, belong to "natural attitude".

26. Husserl writes: "Während die Monaden seien sind, konstitutive Einheiten, in einer monadischen Zeit einer monadischen Welt gezeitigt (obschon gegenüber den Menschensubjekten und Tiersubjekten und gegenüber der Welt transzendental), ist das absolute 'ego' unzeitlich, Träger aller Zeitigungen und Zeiten, aller Seinseinheiten, aller Welten, auch in einem zweiten Sinn transzendentaler" (Hu XV:587). Here one can see that while the monad is transcendental in the sense of "non-mundane", the absolute ego is transcendental in the sense of "ultimate constitutive ground".

27. But the "individuation" of the primal ego is not subject to this "form of individuation".

28. Gurwitsch mainly objects to Husserl's "hyle". But as pointed out by Brough, that there is a dimension of immanent objects within-consciousness is überhaupt non-phenomenological (1969:472).

29. To be sure, here the term "construction" must not be understood in the bad sense.

30. Accordingly, the "extensional apprehension" will become an empty concept.
31. Martin Bartels points out that "habitualities" can merely function as the "Merkmale" of the individuality of the "pure Ich". But he overlooks that for Husserl it is the primal-I, and not the pure Ich, which is the ego qua ego, on the one hand; and not only "habitualities" but also "style of motivation" and "coherence of history" have to be understood as the "Merkmale" of the individuality of the primal ego, on the other hand (1979:64).
CHAPTER III
HEIDEGGER'S THEORY OF INDIVIDUATION

Our exposition of Heidegger's theory of individuation will be divided into four sections: first, the clarification of the transition to Heidegger's theory of individuation; second, the analytical exposition of his theory of the individuation of things; third, the presentation of his theory of the individuation of Dasein; finally, a critical discussion of Heidegger's theory of individuation as a whole.

In transition to Heidegger's theory of individuation, we have to clarify his notions of "thing" and "ego". While in his early work "thing" means primarily "something ready-to-hand", "ego" is understood as Dasein. Although Heidegger's theory of individuation does not arise under the influence of Husserl's, his notions of "things ready-to-hand" and "Dasein" are developed through the "Auseinandersetzung" with Husserl's conceptions of "things as real objects" and "transcendental ego". Accordingly, we start with a presentation of his criticism of Husserl's thesis of the primacy of perception and of Husserl's determination of the essence of transcendental consciousness.

In the problem of the individuation of things ready-to-hand "world" plays an important role. Since world in Heidegger's sense differs not only from Husserl's, but also from the traditional conception of world, it is necessary
for us to clarify his concept of world. A clarification of
the Being of things ready-to-hand will show how a tool is
individualized.

Heidegger also distinguishes the way of the individua-
tion of Dasein from that of things. It is because the
Seinsart of Dasein is not identical with that of nicht-
daseinsmässigen beings. In clarifying the Being of Dasein
we will see in what way time functions as principium
individuationis. Moreover, it will be shown how Heidegger
concretizes this principle into the phenomena of "anxiety",
"Being-toward-death", "conscience" and "resoluteness".

Finally, in the section of critical discussion, we will
not only point out the presupposition as well as the limitation
of Heidegger's theory of individuation, but we will see that
world-space and world-time must be introduced as the "supple-
mentary" principles of the individuation of things ready-
to-hand.

A. Transition to Heidegger's Theory of Individuation

We have pointed out that Husserl's theory of the indi-
vinduation of things is primarily Vorhandenen-orientated. In
his phenomenology, Husserl regards "thing" primarily as a
"sensible object". "Leibhaftigkeit" is identified as the
characteristic of "Vorhandenheit" of real objects. Also an
"object" is understood as a correlate of knowledge.
The epistemological character of Husserl's theory of individuation can also be seen in his treatment of the problem of the individuation of the ego. First, Husserl approaches the individuation of the ego from a standpoint of theoretical reflection. In accordance with his "principle of all principles" the theoretical objectificational reflection is regarded by him as the only legitimate method in his egological investigation. Moreover, corresponding to the thesis of the primacy of perception in his theory of the individuation of objects, the ego is primarily understood as a perceptual ego. In particular, from the way in which Husserl accounts for the unity and the identity of the primal ego we can clearly see that what he has in mind is primarily the cognitive function of the ego. One might say that the ego for Husserl is primarily a knowing subject in the Kantian tradition.

This epistemological character of Husserl's theory of individuation is understandable because Husserl's theory is basically a reaction to Hume's epistemological skeptical solution to the problem of individuation.

Furthermore, one can clearly see that the subject-object schema is operative in Husserl's theory of individuation. To rediscover the autonomy of objectivity of objects and the autonomy of subjectivity of the subject is one of the essential aims of Husserl's theory of individuation.
However, since Husserl's theory of individuation presupposes the subject-object schema, then not only its approach is objectificational but its principles of individuation can also not be applied to the individuals which belong to the pre-objective dimension. Indeed, the overlooking of the pre-objective dimension is one of the major criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology by Heidegger. As pointed out by Ernst Tugendhat, "Heideggers Kritik an Husserls Position betraf in erster Linie Husserls Auffassung alles menschlichen Verhaltens -- zu sich selbst und anderen Seienden -- als Intentionalität, d.h. als gegenständliches Setzen" (1967:277).

In his theory of the individuation of things, it is primarily the Zuhandenen rather than the Vorhandenen with which Heidegger is concerned. On the other hand, Heidegger understands the ego as Dasein in his theory of the individuation of the ego.

(1) The Present-at-Hand versus The Ready-at-Hand

G. Granel points out that one of the important contributions of Husserl is the fight against Vorhandenheit (1970:361). Namely, in rejecting any reduction of transcendental consciousness to the dimension of reality Husserl rescues the autonomy of transcendental subjectivity. This fight against Vorhandenheit is characterized by the bracketing of "natural attitude".
However, despite this discovery of the constitutive difference between transcendental subjectivity and world, Husserl's account of the constitution of world is still Vorhandenheit-orientated. It is true that Husserl also implicitly emphasizes the "priority" of "personalistic attitude" over "naturalistic attitude", but insists that cultural world is founded on nature in his theory of constitution of world (Hu IV: §.48).

To be sure, here nature as the "Unterlage" of cultural world is an "Erfahrungsgengegebenheit" rather than "nature in physical sense" (Hu IX:54). Nevertheless, the constitution of "Umweltding" is only secondary in the sense that it must presuppose the constitution of material things. In Ideen II an "Umweltding" is regarded by Husserl as a material thing plus "practical value" or "cultural predicate". The "material side" of "Umweltding" is more important because only this aspect is relevant for the "existence" of the whole thing.

This Vorhandenheit-orientated tendency in Husserl's theory of the constitution of world is also reflected in his thesis of the primacy of doxic attitude. According to this thesis, the doxic or theoretical attitude has a precedence over the practical attitude and the axiological attitude (Hu III:139).

This thesis of the primacy of doxic attitude is correlated with his thesis of "the universality of the logical
in the last resort that of the predicative judgment" (Ibid: §.117).

Accordingly, within this approach Husserl understands "things" primarily as things present-at-hand.

However, Heidegger points out that not only the thing in our surrounding world is primordially given as the ready-to-hand, but the present-at-hand must ground its possibility in the ready-to-hand. In granting the priority to the practical attitude, Heidegger has to limit the validity of Husserl's thesis of the universality of predicative judgment. Indeed, Heidegger makes a distinction between "interpretation" and "assertion" (or "predicative judgment") and claims the priority of "hermeneutic as" over "apophantic as" (BT:323).

According to Heidegger, "interpretation" is "grounded existentially in understanding" which is an existential structure of Dasein (Ibid:188). "In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stock a value on it, but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation" (Ibid:190-191).

On the other hand, assertion which has the senses of "pointed out", "predication" and "communication" is only a
derivative mode of "interpretation" (Ibid:196-197; 200). In other words, assertion is an existential-ontological modification of interpretation. Heidegger hence concludes that "Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action of circumspective concern" (Ibid:200). In circumspective concern we have to do with something ready-to-hand. But in a theoretical judgment we assert about something present-at-hand.

According to Heidegger, interpretation has the structure of something as something. For example, in circumspective concern we "see" something ready-to-hand as a chair, a pen, etc. This "as" is primordial because we never at first "see" it as a "naked" thing and later with the help of meaning-bestowing function add an "interpretation" to it and make it to be given as a chair, a pen, etc. This primordial "as" is called by Heidegger hermeneutical "as" (Ibid:189). But in making a predicative judgment or an assertion, this primordial "as" is modified to the "as" with which something present-at-hand is given. The latter is called by Heidegger apophantic "as" (Ibid:201).

While "hermeneutical as" is specific to the ready-to-hand, "apophantic as" is specific to the present-at-hand. That the latter is founded on the former is not only in opposition to Husserl's thesis of the universality of apophantic logic but also the thesis of the primacy of cognitive,
theoretical attitude. In addition, circumspective concern is not identical with perception. That is to say, a tool which is ready-to-hand is not at first given to us as an object of perception. Circumspective concern is rather a non-objectificational behavior. Heidegger's thesis of the primacy of circumspective concern is also against Husserl's thesis of the primacy of perception.

Since the predicative judgment or assertion are related to intuition or perception, any granting of the priority of intuition or perception would imply the primacy of apophantic as (FD:123). So, on the one hand, the primacy of the ready-to-hand implies the primacy of circumspective concern, interpretation and hermeneutical as; on the other hand, the primacy of the present-at-hand implies the primacy of perception, assertion and apophantic as.

However, Heidegger does not intend to eliminate the dimension of the present-at-hand. "Asserting", is also regarded by Heidegger as "a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is" (Ibid:260): What he is opposed to is rather the thesis that this dimension has the primacy.

We will see that it is things ready-to-hand which form the major theme of Heidegger's theory of the individuation of things.
(2) **Husserl's Forgetfulness of the Being of Subject**

In a letter to Husserl in 1927 Heidegger writes:

"There is agreement that the entity in the sense of what you call 'world' cannot be explained in its transcendental constitution by return to an entity with the same kind of Being. However, this does not mean that what makes up the place of the transcendental is not an entity at all. Rather, just this problem arises: what is the kind of Being of the entity in which the 'world' is constituted? That is the central problem of Being and Time, i.e., a fundamental ontology of Dasein. It is a matter of showing that the kind of Being of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities, all that the kind of Being, which it is, shelters right within it the possibility of transcendental condition" (Biemel, 1977:299-300).

This is an implicit critique of Husserl's concept of transcendental subjectivity. According to Heidegger, Husserl's determination of transcendental subjectivity is not adequate because it forgets the question of the Being of transcendental subjectivity.

Heidegger points out that in Husserl's philosophy there are four major characteristics of transcendental consciousness.

First, consciousness is an immanent Being. Here "immanence" means "reelle Beschlossenheit". That is to say, consciousness is immanent insofar as it is a possible object of reflection (Ga XX:142). But Heidegger maintains that "Immanenz ist keine Bestimmung des Seienden an ihn selbst hinsichtlich seines Seins, sondern eine Beziehung zwischen
Seienden innerhalb der Region Erlebnis oder Bewusstsein" (Ibid).

Second, consciousness is absolute Being in the sense of absolute givenness. "Erlebnisse sind gegenüber dem Transzendenten im absoluten Sinne da, d.h., sie stellen sich nicht indirekt, symbolisch dar, sondern sie sind an ihnen selbst erfasst" (Ibid:145). It should be noted that what Husserl primarily means is rather than "Erlebnisse" are given as absolute in the sense of "not as an identity uniting modes of appearance through perspective continua" (Ideas.§.44). However, the point of Heidegger's criticism is mainly that: to characterize consciousness as absolute givenness is only to relate a "bestimmte Art des Gegenstandseins eines Seienden der Region Erlebnis für ein anderes" (Ga XX:143). That is to say, what Husserl thematizes is not consciousness per se but rather consciousness as an object of reflection. Consequently, consciousness as absolute givenness in the above sense is not a character of "consciousness as such" but rather a characteristic of the way of givenness of consciousness to reflection.

Third, consciousness is absolute givenness in the sense of "nulla re indiget ad existendum". Here consciousness is "absolute" in a new sense. "Das Bewusstsein ist absolut in dem Sinne, dass es die Seinvoraussetzung ist, aufgrund deren überhaupt Realität sich bekunden kann" (Ibid:144).
As the constituting source of world consciousness remains unchanged even when the constituted real world vanishes. In other words, since consciousness does not depend on real world, the Being of consciousness is absolute and the Being of real world is relative. Obviously, in Husserl's philosophy there is a "Vorrang der Subjektivität vor jeder Objektivität" (Ibid:145). Heidegger complains that Husserl at this point collapses into transcendental idealism which is merely a form of Neo-Kantianism. Certainly, transcendental consciousness as absolute in this sense presupposes the subject-object schema.

Finally, consciousness is pure Being. What concerns Husserl are not the real properties of consciousness but rather the eidetic structure of consciousness. Indeed, Husserl is not interested in consciousness as a real entity. For him phenomenology is not a factual science. This overlooking of the reality-side of consciousness is characterized by Heidegger as one of the major causes that prevents Husserl from raising the question of the Being of consciousness.

Heidegger maintains that all four determinations of consciousness have nothing to do with the Being of consciousness or subjectivity. Rather, they are merely determinations which determine the region of transcendental consciousness as a transcendental region (Ibid:149). But the region-determination is not identical with the Being of consciousness. In other
words, the former is not yet ontological.

According to Heidegger, the major reason why Husserl fails to thematize the Being of transcendental consciousness lies in his theory of reflection as immanent perception. Clearly, Husserl maintains the universal methodological function of reflection in his egological investigation. However, Heidegger explicitly declares that "our immanent perception of experiences (Erlebnissen) fails to provide a clue which is ontologically adequate" (BT:226). Namely, immanent perception is only an ontical "Zugangsart" or a channel to consciousness as an entity. Heidegger's thesis can be supported by noting the following points. First, even Husserl himself admits that immanent perception is a process of objectification (Vergegenständlichung). Second, the object of an immanent perception is still an object -- immanent object. Finally, what is grasped by the immanent perception is still something temporal, i.e. in the immanent time.

In short, Heidegger accuses Husserl's transcendental idealism of neglecting the existential-ontological analytic of Dasein, despite Husserl's "phenomenological correction on the subject and consciousness" (BT:250). Nevertheless, Heidegger also admits the positive contribution of Husserl's transcendental idealism; insofar as it understands "that fact Being cannot be explained through entities" (Ibid:251).
That is to say, in claiming that objects are transcendently constituted Husserl saves the dimension of Being in an indirect manner. But just to characterize the transcendental as "un-thing-like" Husserl's transcendental idealism "is no less naive in its method than the most grossly militant realism" (Ibid: 252).

For Heidegger Husserl's subject results only from a "fanciful idealization". "The ideas of a 'pure I', and of a 'consciousness in general' are so far from including the a priori character of 'actual' subjectivity that the ontological characters of Dasein's facticity and its state of Being are either passed over or not seen at all" (Ibid: 272).

It is well-known that in the Kantian tradition transcendental consciousness is regarded as the fundamental presupposition of possibility of knowledge. We have seen that in Husserl's philosophy one can also find such a transcendental claims. But Heidegger maintains that knowing is merely a mode of Being of Dasein (Ibid: 88). In particular, it is a founded mode. Namely, "knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world" (Ibid). Knowing is basically a "Zugangsart" to the dimension of the present-at-hand. In accordance with the founded character of the present-at-hand, knowing is never the primary channel through which we have access to our world. Nevertheless, "in knowing Dasein achieves a new status of Being
(Seinstand) toward a world which has already been discovered in Dasein itself" (Ibid:90).

In addition, according to Heidegger, knowing does not belong to the "essence" of Dasein. That is to say, Dasein can well exist without any cognitive activity (Ga XXVI:161). Although knowing is the presupposition of knowledge, it is not the condition of possibility of the existence of Dasein. Accordingly, in terms of its knowing function we cannot adequately thematize the true essence of subjectivity.

According to Heidegger, Husserl's theory of person can also not provide any determination of the Being of subjectivity for the following reasons. First, "the personalistic attitude" is still imprisoned within the tendency which asks only the constitution of objectivity. Second, the Zugangssart to person is also the immanent perception. Finally, "person" for Husserl is nothing but the unity of lived experiences which does not escape the traditional definition of human being, namely, "homo animal rationale" (Ga XX:171 ff). "Dasein's Being is not to be deduced from an idea of man" (BT:225).

Accordingly, for Heidegger it is Dasein rather than transcendental subjectivity or person which forms the major theme of theory of the individuation of the ego.

B. The Problem of the Individuation of the Ready-to-Hand

In Heidegger's theory of the individuation of things ready-to-hand "world" plays an important role. Since even
in his early work Heidegger has a special understanding of "world", it is necessary for us to clarify his early conception of world.

(1) Heidegger's Concept of World as Bewandtnisganzheit

According to Heidegger, world as a phenomenon is not an idea. Neither is world identical with nature. The possibility of world does not presuppose nature. On the contrary, "Nature is itself an entity which is encountered within the world and which can be discovered in various ways and at various stages" (Ibid:93). In other words, nature results only from the "Entweltlichung" of world (Ibid:24).

Heidegger points out that we can have at least the following four meanings of "world":

1. The ontical concept of world: "World" in this sense means the totality of objects.

2. The regional-ontological concept of world: "World" in this sense signifies the region of objects.

3. The pre-ontological-existential concept of world: "World" in this sense is understood "as that 'wherein' a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'" (Ibid:93).

4. The existential-ontological concept of world: "World" in this sense designates worldhood. "'Worldhood' is an ontological concept, and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world" (Ibid:92).

Although Heidegger mainly understands the term "world" in the pre-ontological-existential sense, the worldhood of
world forms the topic of his existential-ontological analysis of world. The worldhood of world is essentially nothing but the Being of world. According to Heidegger, the kind of Being of world is "daseinsmässig". World is an existential of Dasein. That is to say, both world and Dasein share the same kind of Being. Traditionally, the Being of world is identified with the Being of res corporales. Under the idea of Being as substantiality, world has been defined as res extensa. Heidegger is strongly opposed to this traditional determination of worldhood of world. He points out that substantiality is only a characteristic of worldly beings (Ibid:127). The world itself, however, is not a being or entity in the world. There is an ontological difference between world itself and the entities in the world. But world itself is also not separable from worldly entities. Converse, "only on the basis of the phenomenon of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world be grasped ontologically" (Ibid:106). In thematizing the worldhood of world, Heidegger approaches from the following mutually related standpoints. First, he proceeds from the standpoint of the analysis of the Being of the ready-to-hand. Second, he proceeds from the standpoint of the analysis of the Being of Dasein. In order to understand Heidegger's concept of world in his earlier works, we start with an expository discussion of his analysis of worldhood in these
two directions.

Heidegger maintains that the givenness which is at first given to us is not the present-at-hand but rather the ready-to-hand. In our everyday Umwelt, what we are dealing with is the ready-to-hand. This "dealing" is essentially pre-cognitive. Hence, the ready-to-hand is primarily not given to us as an object present-at-hand. Since the world itself announces itself primarily through things ready-to-hand, the Being of world cannot be reduced to Being in Husserl's sense of objectivity (Ga XX:245).

"In anything ready-to-hand the world is always 'there', whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically" (BT:114). So the world is not only the condition of possibility of "givenness" of things ready-to-hand, but itself is "given" to us, though in a non-thematical manner. But since the world itself is not an entity but Being, it is not "given" in an ontical way (Ga XXVI:252). Then in what way is the world itself given to us? In order to answer this question we have to analyze the Being of things ready-to-hand; for "world is that in terms of which the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand" (BT:114).

First of all, reference (Verweisung) is constitutive for the ready-to-hand as equipment. "Serviceability-for", "usability", e.g., are different kinds of reference. All
these are not properties of the ready-to-hand; but rather conditions which make "it possible for the character of such an entity to be defined by its appropriateness" (Ibid:115). The structure of reference hence belongs to the Being of the ready-to-hand. Since the "givenness" of a ready-to-hand must refer to something other than itself, i.e., other things ready-to-hand, there is a certain involvement in it. Indeed, "involvement" is the essential characteristic of the Being of things ready-to-hand. Accordingly, Heidegger defines the world as the "totality of involvement" (Bewandtnisganzheit). In other words, world is the totality of the ways in which we encounter the ready-to-hand. "Welt meint die Ganzheit, die Einigung und die mögliche Zustrreuung des Seienden" (Ga XXVI:221). Accordingly, world is nothing "substantial". Indeed, Heidegger identifies world as "das Wie des Seienden" (Ibid). In reactivating the "original" meaning of φύσις als ἀφόρητη κινησιών, Heidegger makes a distinction between world in the sense of κόσμος and world in the sense of mundus. While κόσμος is nothing but a Wie, mundus is the totality of beings (Ga XXVI:222-223; VG:140-146). He claims "Welt ist ein titel für die Weise des Seins des Seienden" (Ga XXVI:221). So Heidegger's "world" is closer to the Greek conception of world rather than the medieval-modern conception of world.

As a Wie the world is a Nichts (Ibid:252). That is to say, it is a Bewegtheit. Accordingly, there is an essential
connection between world and time.

World is not only the "horizon" of things ready-to-hand but the "horizon" of Dasein. According to Heidegger, world is inseparable from Dasein. "Welt ist irgendwie relativ auf Dasein und die Weise, wie es gerade existiert" (Ibid: 221). Dasein is "defined" by Heidegger as Being-in-the-world. This "Being-in" is not understood in a spatial sense. In addition, Dasein is Being-in-the-world is not a factual statement. Rather, Being-in-the-world belongs to the essence of Dasein. World is "subjective" insofar as it has the same kind of Being of Dasein. World and Dasein together belong to the same dimension -- Being. Accordingly, it is senseless to ask the question: whether world exists before the emergence of human being? For Heidegger, there is world only when Dasein exists (BT:417).

As Being-in-the-world, Dasein has always beforehand a "familiarity" (Vertrautheit) with the world. At the same time, Dasein has already a pre-ontological understanding of world. This kind of "familiarity" and "understanding" is non-theoretical in nature. Both of them are prior to any theoretical behaviour and yet ground it. World is exactly the "place" in which (worin) this kind of "familiarity and pre-ontological "understanding" happens. World is the "whereupon" (Woraufhin) for our encounter with the beings ready-to-hand.
Accordingly, the two standpoints in thematizing the
essence of world are not only incompatible with each other
but basically complementary.

In the *Kantbook* Heidegger interprets Kant's "transcendental object=\(X\)" as the "principle of objectification" or
"horizon" which makes possible the "givenness" of objects
(K:§.24-25). As the condition of possibility for the givenness
of things ready-to-hand, world in Heidegger's sense functions
in a fashion similar to "transcendental object=\(X\)" in the above
sense. In other words, the worlding of world makes possible
the givenness of things ready-to-hand. This worlding of
world is nothing but the ontological transcending of Dasein.²

For Husserl "transcendence" means basically the intentional
cognitive activity. Namely, it is the process through which
the immanent cognition reaches the transcendent objects.
"Transcendence" in Husserl's sense is epistemological and
ontical; for what concerns him is the cognition and its
object. According to Heidegger, "ontical transcendence" is
not the "transcendence in the primordial sense". "Trans-
cendence in the primordial sense" is not a relation between
subject and object. Rather, it is the ontological moment of
Dasein. "Ontological transcendence" is ecstastical in nature.
In fact, it is nothing but the *Zeitlichkeit* of Dasein (BT:
415,ff). According to Heidegger, the ontological transcendence
forms the "freedom" of Dasein. We have seen that for Husserl
freedom means primarily spontaneity. But freedom in Heidegger's sense is not only not identical with spontaneity, but is essentially zeitlich. In addition, freedom of Dasein is basically freedom for world. In other words, world is the "Wohin" of Dasein's ontological transcendence. In transcending all the worldly entities Dasein has to move within world as Spielraum. That is to say, the ontological movement of Dasein is essentially "horizonthaftig". As the horizon of Dasein's ontological movement, world is the "limit" (Grenze) of Dasein's ontological movement. This Horizonhaftigkeit demonstrates the finitude of Dasein. Accordingly, the self-understanding of Dasein is nothing but the world-understanding. Dasein must transcend all the worldly entities in order to let them to be encountered. But as the "whither" of the ontological transcendence of Dasein, the world can only be appresented in the presence of worldly entities (Ga XX:269).

In addition, world is always given to us as "Bedeutsamkeit" (SZ:87). It is because our relation to worldly entities is a "signifying" (Bedeuten) and the world itself is nothing but the totality of these relations. It is important to note that this "signifying" cannot be understood as a subject-object relation. Rather, it is prior to the subject-object separation. Objectifying or "ontical transcendance" is only possible on the ground of our familiarity and pre-ontological understanding of world as "Bedeutsamkeit".
But to understand world as "Bedeutsamkeit" is nothing but to understand it as "Bewandtnisganzheit". Insofar as world as "Bewandtnisganzheit" and as "Bedeutsamkeit" is constitutive of the Being of equipment as equipment, it can be regarded as the most universal "Zeugzusammenhang". It is only within the world as Zeugzusammenhang that a ready-to-hand or Zeug can acquire its individuality. Moreover, we will see in the next section how world as "Bewandtnisganzheit" (or the most universal "Zeugzusammenhang") forms a principle of the individuation of things ready-to-hand.

(2) The Being and the Individuation of the Ready-to-Hand

Heidegger points out that in our Umwelt it is the ready-to-hand or equipment which we at first encounter. The kind of Being of equipment or tools is readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). From the analysis of the worldhood of world, we have seen that "the kind of reference we get in "serviceability-for", is an ontological-categorial attribute of equipment as equipment" (BT:109). That is to say, each equipment has its "Zeugcharakter". This "Zeugcharakter" belongs to its Being.

In addition, the givenness of equipment must refer to other equipment. This kind of reference is not accidental or external but rather belongs intrinsically to the Being of equipment or tools. There is no such thing as a single
tool. "Das Zeug begegnet immer innerhalb eines Zeugzusammenhangs" (Ga XXIV:414). In terms of the language of British neo-Hegelianism one might say that all the tools have "internal relation" with each other, i.e., they form together an inseparable whole. While the "totality of tools" is "internal" in each single tool, each tool itself is the whole totality of tools. That is to say, the "Zeugzusammenhang" is also constitutive for the Being of tools. Accordingly, a tool "is understood in terms of totality of involvement" (BT:189). Indeed, world as Bedeutsamkeit is the most universal totality of involvements or "Zeugzusammenhang".

As a "knot" in the "network of significance", a ready-to-hand or a tool "has the structure of something as something" (Ibid). The ready-to-hand or equipment is also something. One might ask if this "something" is identical with Husserl's "something in general". However, a closer examination will reveal that this is not the case. "Something" as the structure of things ready-to-hand is not a formal-regional category. Rather, it is a "hermeneutic schema". That is to say, it does not belong to the realm of formal logic. Indeed, "the traditional (formal) logic . . . has its foundation in an ontology of the present-at-hand" (Ibid:166-167). Moreover, since "apophantic as" is founded on "hermeneutic as", "something" as a "hermeneutic schema" grounds the "something" as a "formal-ontological category".
A thing ready-to-hand or a tool is not something in the sense of "something" present-at-hand. In fact, while the former is given to us primarily in a "practical attitude", the latter is fundamentally given to us in a "theoretical attitude". Another phenomenon which is peculiar to the givenness of "equipment" is that: "in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw (Zurückziehen) in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically" (Ibid:99). For example, for a shoemaker what primarily concerns him is not the tools themselves but rather the work -- the shoe. That is to say, as ready-to-hand equipment is always "given" to us in non-thematical manner. According to Heidegger, "If we look at Things just 'theoretically', we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand (Ibid:98). So we deal with rather than observe things ready-to-hand. Theoretical observation is not only not constitutive of the givenness of a ready-to-hand but hindrances it to be given as a ready-to-hand.

According to Heidegger, the circumspective concern which constitutes the way of access of the ready-to-hand is itself founded on the "Being-in" of Dasein. Moreover, "the things ready-to-hand with which we concern ourselves are not the cause of our concern, as if this were to arise only by the effects of entities within-the-world" (Ibid:403).

As the transcendental condition of givenness of things ready-to-hand, Dasein is primarily not merely a consciousness.
In letting things ready-to-hand be involved in the world, Dasein is not a non-participant, uninterested observer. Indeed, this "letting-something-be-involved" can be understood in an ontical as well as ontological sense. Ontically, it "signifies that within our factual concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such" (Ibid:117). Ontologically, it "is the freeing of everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand" (Ibid).

We can now clearly see that not only the Being of things ready-to-hand differs from the Being of objects or things present-at-hand, but the ways of access to them are different with each other too. As a consequence, Heidegger points out that the way of the individuation of things ready-to-hand or a tool is different from that of things present-at-hand. Then what are principles of the individuation of a tool?

Heidegger explicitly declares: "Die spezifische Diesheit eines Zeugs, seine Individuation, wenn wir das Wort in einem ganz formalen Sinne nehmen, wird nicht primär durch Raum- und Zeitstelle vorkommt, sondern der Zeugcharakter und Zeugzusammenhang ist dasjenige, was ein Zeug als je dieses betstimmt" (Ga XXV: 414-5). That is to say, the individuation of a tool lies in the role which it plays within the Zeugzusammenhang. It is its special function or way of incorporation within the world as the whole of involvements that primarily
determines the individuality of a tool.

So, according to Heidegger, there are two principles of the individuation of equipment or things ready-to-hand.

First, the "Zeugcharakter" as principium individuationis:

Heidegger points out that the "Zeugcharakter" is constituted through the "involvement". It is nothing but the special, determined way of involvement. This "bestimmtes Bewenden" is essentially the concrete "in-order-to" (um-zu) of a tool. For example, this entity -- a pen -- is "in order to write". It is important to note that this "in-order-to" is not an accidental nor a supplementary character of a tool. Rather, "das, was und wie es als dieses Seiende ist, sein Was- und Wiesein, wird durch dieses Um-zu als solches, d.h. die Bewandtnis, konstituiert" (Ibid). Since each equipment has its specific "Zeugcharakter", e.g., a pen is "in order to write", a chair is "in order to sit", according to its "Zeugcharakter" or "determined involvement" we can differentiate this entity (e.g., a pen) from that entity (e.g., a chair).

Second, the "Zeugzusammenhang" as principium individuationis:

Since all the ways of "in-order-to" such as serviceability, usability and manipulability are grounded in the "interdependence" between tools, no single tool can be separable from the "Zeugzusammenhang". "Jedes bestimmte Zeug trägt jenen Zeugzusammenhang bei sich, und nur mit Rücksicht
auf ihm ist es dieses" (Ibid:414).

We have now completed the exposition of Heidegger's theory of the individuation of things ready-to-hand. In the following sections we will see how he deals with the problem of the individuation of the ego.

C. The Problem of the Individuation of Dasein

(1) The Being of Dasein

We have seen that the major point of Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's concept of subject is the forgetfulness of the Being of subject. According to Heidegger, the "essence" of subject does not lie in its ideal-eidetic structure but rather in its "way of Being" (Weise zu sein). "The 'essence' of this entity lies in its 'to be'" (BT:67). So, in order to thematize the Being of subject we have to focus on its "Wessein".

Since Heidegger does not understand "subject" in the traditional sense of "subjectum", he introduces the term "Dasein" as substitution. Indeed, "Dasein" differs not only from "transcendental subjectivity" in Husserlian sense, but also from "I think" in Kantian sense, "spirit" in Hegel's sense, "will to power" in Nietzsche's sense, "life" in Dilthey's sense as well as "person" in Scheler's sense. In other words, "Dasein ist weder eine Verkoppelung von Verhaltungen noch ein Zusammengesetztes aus Leib, Seele und Geist wobei nach dem Sinn des Seins dieser Einheit des Zusammengesetzten
vergeblich wird; auch ist es nicht ein subjekt oder Bewusstsein, das sich gellentlich erst eine Welt zulegt, noch ist es ein Zentrum von Akten, aus dem diese hervorschiessen, wobei weder das Sein dieses Zentrums noch das Sein der Akte bestimmt ist" (Ga XX:422). Then "what is the "essence" of Dasein?

Heidegger explicitly declares that: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence" (BT:67). Existence is not a property but rather the way of Being of Dasein. In the traditional philosophy, "existence" is understood as an opposite of "essentia". As the "Wie-sein" of Dasein, existence is beyond the traditional distinction between "Was-sein" and "Dass-sein", "essentia" and "existentia". For Heidegger, "existence" is the "kind of Being toward which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow" (Ibid:32).

Moreover, Dasein is not merely an entity among entities. Its own "self-understanding" is at the same time the "understanding of Being". Also Dasein is not a "worldless" subject. Rather, it is essentially "Being-in-the-world". As a consequence, its self-understanding is also the "understanding of world". However, neither the understanding of Being nor the understanding of world is "objectificational". That is to say, the relationship between Dasein and Being, Dasein and world cannot be construed in terms of subject-object schema.
As "existence", Dasein has always to understand itself "in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not" (Ibid:33). This "non-objectificational" self-understanding belongs essentially to Dasein. In face of this possibility "Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine (je meines)" (Ibid:68). This "Jemeinigkeit" which is the essential determination of Dasein shows that Dasein is par excellence an individual.

"Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am" (Ibid:78). But for Heidegger the "Selbstheit" of Dasein must be distinguished from "das Wesen meiner selbs als dieses faktischen Individuums" (Ga XXVI:242). What Heidegger primarily deals with is "nicht die individuelle Ichheit meiner selbst", i.e., "nicht das individuelle Wesen meiner selbst, sondern das Wesen von Meineinheit und Selbstheit überhaupt" (Ibid). That is to say, the "Ausgangspunkt" of Heidegger's fundamental ontology is not a determined factual ego, but an "ego in general". Although this "ego in general" is not a determined "individual", it has "individuality" as its essential moment. Namely, "Dasein ist wesenhaft je meines" is basically an ontological expression. Accordingly, all the Wesensaussage concerning Dasein as an individual can be hold true for all factual egos.

But it is important to note that when Heidegger says that "Ichsein" as opposite to "Dasein" cannot characterize
the essence of Dasein, he means only that the ontical personal differences between factual individuals have nothing to do with the essence of Dasein. But he does not deny that Dasein is an individual. 3

For Heidegger "Dasein is an individual" is an ontological assertion. Heidegger also approaches primarily the problem of the individuation of Dasein as an ontological problem. Since ontology in Heidegger's sense is hermeneutical in nature, the ontological principles of the individuation of Dasein must have a pre-ontological foundation. Accordingly, the individuation itself is also an existential phenomenon.

As pointed out by Alberto Rosales, "existenzielle Vereinzelung geschieht nicht in der Gestalt einer Abhebung des Ich von den Mitmenschen und sonstigen Seienden auf grund der Unterscheidung von ontischen Charakteren. All das, was das Existerende auf Grund seiner Bezüge zu diesen Seienden ist bzw. nicht ist, wird dabei belanglos. Dank dieser Belanglosigkeit wird das jeweilige Existierende als solches auf es selbst und sein Sein vereinsamt" (1970:178). But as an ontological problem the individuation of Dasein is essentially related to the Being of Dasein.

We have seen some important features of the Being of Dasein. But as a whole "Dasein reveals itself as care (BT: 227). As care, Dasein is at the same time the "Selbstsorge" (with itself), "Besorge" (with worldly entities) and "Fürsorge"
(with other Daseins).

Heidegger points out that Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic. Dasein is authentic when it wins itself and inauthentic when it loses itself. "Self" is Dasein in its primordial mode (BT:68). Either Dasein in the mode of authenticity or in the mode of inauthenticity, its Being as care is already presupposed. According to Heidegger, "Dasein's totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world), as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)" (Ibid:375). But how is this primordial unity of the structure of care possible? This is the problem concerning the possibility of the selfsameness of Dasein qua Self. Since the possibility of individuation of Dasein qua Self presupposes the selfsameness or unity of the Self, Heidegger has to at first solve this problem.

(2) Temporality-and the Selfsameness of Dasein qua Self

In contrast to Husserl's epistemological approach, Heidegger explicitly states that "there is ontologically a gap separating the selfsameness of the authentically existing Self from the identity of that 'I' which maintains itself throughout its manifold experiences" (BT:168). For Heidegger the latter kind of identity is only "the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand" (Ibid:367). As something identical throughout the manifold
lived experiences, "I" is basically a "subject" which cannot characterize the selfhood of "I" qua Self. That is to say, according to Heidegger, the true "I" is the authentic existence rather than epistemological subject.

Then how is the Selfsameness of the Self or the authentic existence possible?

Heidegger points out that the possibility of the selfsameness of the Self is grounded in "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit) (Ibid: 375).

Hence, in order to see how temporality grounds the selfsameness of the Self, we have, at first, to understand Heidegger's concept of time in his earlier works.

In developing his early theory of time, Heidegger starts with a critique of the traditional theories of time. According to Heidegger, all the traditional theories of time from Aristotle's to Husserl's overlook the true essence of time. He attributes the traditional conception of time as "vulgar". The "vulgar" conception of time has the following characteristics:

1. Time is something present-at-hand. In other words, time "exists in the motion" but passes away.
2. Despite its transitory character, time is something in the soul, subject or consciousness.
3. Time belongs to the soul but not to the centre of soul. Hence, the soul itself is atemporal.
4. Time is regarded as an opposite of eternity. The temporal dimension is identified as "mundane" (irdish).
5. Time itself is regarded as a successive series of "now"-points. While the "past" is "no-longer-now" (Nicht-mehr-Jetzt), the "future" is "not-yet-now" (Noch-nicht-Jetzt).

6. Time is "infinite", i.e., with two open ends.

7. Time is "irreversible" (Ga XXVI:255; BT:424-426).

In opposition to this "vulgar" conception of time which is not only operative in traditional philosophy but also in modern sciences, Heidegger points out that the true essence of time does not lie in the "now-point" and its modifications. Rather, the original, primordial time is essentially ecstatic. "Future", "present" and "having-been" (Gewesenheit) are three different ecstases of time. They are not only inseparable from each other but also there is an interplay between them. The essence of "future" is "towards-onself"; the essence of "present" is "letting-onself-be-encountered-by"; the essence of "having-been" is "back-to" (Ga XXIV:376-7; BT:376-7).

Here one can clearly see that there is an intimate relationship between time and Dasein. But primordial time is not an entity. According to Heidegger, it is impossible to say that "time is" (Ga XX:442). Rather, time is essentially "temporalization" (Zeitigung). In this sense, time is "no-thing". In addition to its ecstatic character, time also has a horizon-character. Each ecstase has its own horizon in the sense of "Ekstema". Here "horizon" as Ekstema should not be understood in the sense of "Umkreis der Blickfeldes" but
rather in the sense of "Umschluss" (Ga XXVI:269). In *Being and Time* this non-spatial horizon as *Ekstema* is called "horizon schema" and is defined as the "whither" (Wohin) of *ecstase* (BT:416). The horizon schema of "future" is "for-the-sake-of"; the horizon schema for "present" is "in-oder-to"; the horizon schema of "having-been" is "in-face-of-which" (Wovor). The unity of all these three horizon schemata is nothing but world (Ibid).

Again the horizon-character of time shows the close connection between time and Dasein. In fact, Heidegger identifies Dasein with time. "Dasein zeitigt qua Zeit sein Sein" (Ga XX:442). Temporality is the ontological meaning of care, i.e., the Being of Dasein.6

Corresponding to the distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic modes of existence, there is also a distinction between authentic and inauthentic temporality. On the one hand, inauthentic temporality is: "forgetting (having-been) -- making-present (present) -- awaiting (future)"; on the other hand, authentic temporality is: "anticipation (future) -- moment of vision (present) -- repetition (having-been)". Although inauthentic temporality is also ecstatic, it is only authentic temporality which can be regarded as primordial time. In addition, in spite of the "Gleichzeitigkeit" of "future", "present" and "having-been" in the sense that the "future" is not later than the "present"; and the
"having-been" is not earlier than the "present", in primordial, authentic temporality the "future" has a priority. "Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been" (BT:401). Dasein is essentially "futural". "Es ist dann sein Zukunft, es kommt in diesem Zukunftig-Sein auf seine Vergangenheit und Gegenwart zurück" (Becker, 1928:221).

Accordingly, thanks to the "Zusammenspiel" between "future", "present" and "having-been" the Self "achieves" its unity. This unity is not a serial unity but rather an ecstatic unity. The "having-been" is not lost. In other words, "Gewesenheit besagt primär gerade nicht, dass das Dasein faktisch nicht mehr ist; umgekehrt, es ist gerade faktisch, was es war . . . Das Dasein kann sich seiner Vergangenheit sowenig entschlagen, wie es seinem Tod entgeht" (Ga XXIV:325). Moreover, the "future" of the Self is always already in the "having-been" of the Self. So, it is the "ecstatic interplay" between authentic future, authentic present and authentic having-been that grounds the possibility of selfsameness of the Self. Indeed, Heidegger also calls this "ecstatic interplay" the "Selbstaffektion" (K:34). "Die reine Selbstaffektion gibt die transzendenteale Ursstruktur des endlichen Selbst als eines solchen" (Ibid).

As an ecstatic unity Dasein qua Self is par excellence an individual. "Dasein ist Seiendes, das je ich ich selbst
bin, das Sein ist je meines" (SZ:§ 25). Since temporality makes possible the selfsameness of the Self, it is the condition of possibility of "the most radical individuation" of Dasein (BT:62).

However, according to Heidegger, "the transcendence of Dasein's being", i.e., the "Zeitigung" of Dasein, also implies the necessity of the most radical individuation of Dasein (Ibid). That is to say, time is also the principium individuationis of Dasein. But in what way does time individualize Dasein?

Heidegger points out that "das Dasein ist in der Jeweiligkeit, es ist das meinige" (Becker, 1928:221). The "Jeminigkeit" of Dasein is not separable from the "Jeweiligkeit" of Dasein. As being "in Wie seiner Jeweiligkeit" Dasein cannot be reducible to a "set of Ich-Eigenschaften". Accordingly, Heidegger does not understand the "individuality" of Dasein in terms of "whatness". Also, the individuation of Dasein qua Self is "absolute" in the sense that its possibility does not depend on any ontical relation to other daseinsmässige as well as nidentity being.

As existential Vollzug, the Self is nothing but existential temporality. Time as existential temporality does not add anything new to the "whatness" of Dasein; rather, it is Dasein im Wie, Dasein im Vollzug. "Time, then, is existence itself, driven towards its own absence, able to appropriate that
absence as its own and so to become its time. Time is thus the true principium individuationis, not in the usual sense of the irreversible succession of now-moments, but in the sense that in becoming one's own unique destiny, not in the form of some 'extraordinary self' but by meeting the stark possibility which levels everyone in terms of their common 'how' and yet brings each into contact with himself" (Sheehan, 1979:81).

Insofar as time "als Zeitigung sich in sich selbst einigt und vereinzelt im metaphysischen Sinne" and hence not only makes possible the unity or selvesameness of the Self but also the individuation of the Self, time is the principium individuationis (Ga XXVI:270). For Heidegger, "Diese Vereinzelung aber ist die Voraussetzung für das ursprüngliche commercium zwischen Dasein und Dasein" (Ibid).

However, to ground the possibility of individuation of Dasein qua Self in Zeitlichkeit is still formal. Hence, Heidegger has to "concretize" the individuation of the ego in the phenomena of "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness".

(a) Anxiety as principium individuationis

For Heidegger "anxiety" is not just an ontical "subjective" feeling. Rather, it is a possibility of the Being of Dasein. Under the influence of Kierkegaard, Heidegger makes a distinction between "anxiety" and "fear". While "fear" in "fear of something
in the world", "anxiety" is not "anxiety of something in
the world". In other words, while the "intentional object"
of "fear" is an entity, the "intentional object" of "anxiety"
is "nothing" (Nichts). "That in face of which" we are anxious
is "no-thing". It is also "nowhere". Anxiety has no idea
of what it is anxious. When Dasein is in the mode of anxiety,
the whole world loses its significance. On the basis of
this "insignificance" one feels "uncanny", i.e., "homeless"
(BT:§.40).

Heidegger points out that in its average everydayness
Dasein is always inauthentic. That is to say, the "Self"
is for the most part the "they-self". As inauthentic, Dasein
is absorbed in the "world of things" of its concern. In this
fallenness Dasein lost sight of its own potentiality-for-
being-itself. It "forgets" its "ownness". This falling of
Dasein into the "world of things" is a "fleeing" of Dasein
in face of itself (Ibid:225). In short, as inauthentic,
Dasein loses its "Self". It is only "das Man" and not the "ego
qua ego".

Anxiety brings Dasein back to its authentic potentiality-
for-Being-in-the-world. "That in face of which one has
anxiety (das Wovor der Angst) is Being-in-the-world as such"
(Ibid:230). In other words, it is the Being of Dasein which
is that in face of which one has anxiety. Accordingly,
anxiety is the disclosedness of the "Selbstsein" of Dasein.
In this way "anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as 'solus ipse'" (Ibid:233). That is to say, in anxiety Dasein "discovers" that it is this entity and not any other.

Clearly, anxiety does not individualize Dasein as an isolated worldless subject. Rather, it is Dasein qua Self, i.e., as Being-in-the-world in its authentic mode that which is individualized by anxiety. In individualizing Dasein, anxiety brings Dasein as they-self back to Dasein as Self.

It can be seen that anxiety as principium individuationis is purely functional and dynamic.

(b) Being-toward-Death as principium individuationis

For Heidegger "dying" is not the ending of one's life in the sense of "perishing". It is rather an existential phenomenon. Certainly, we can have biological as well as medical conceptions of death. But death is primarily a constitutive structure of Dasein. In addition, "death is in every case mine" (BT:284). One cannot replace the other's dying. Also no one can escape from dying. Rather, each Dasein has to die alone.

But insofar as Dasein exists, it has always the structure of "not-yet". Dasein itself is continuously this "not-yet". On the other hand, Dasein is also already its end. Here the term "ending" is ambiguous: first, it means "Being-at-the-end"; second, it means "Being-towards-the-end". Dasein is always its "end" in the sense of "Being-towards-the-end".
"Being-towards-death" is a prominent way of Being of Dasein. As an existential possibility of Dasein, death is always there. It stands constantly before us. However, the inauthentic, falling Dasein in its everydayness always forgets this possibility. For Dasein in its inauthentic mode "dying" is always something external; namely, it is only somebody else who dies. Although one knows that one will die sometime later but not now. This "one" is identical with "they" and not "I myself". Hence, this falling Dasein knows nothing of death as its own possibility. The existential meaning of death is consequently hidden (Ibid: 297).

It is only in the anticipatory revealing of Being-towards-death that Dasein can turn away from inauthenticity and "win back" its ownness. That is to say, in Being-towards-death "Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards to its uttermost possibility" (Ibid: 307). Being-towards-death discloses one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being. In other words, "death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one's own Dasein is an issue. In dying, it is shown mineness" (Ibid: 284). In this sense, death is "non-relational".

Accordingly, "death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself" (Ibid: 308). The uniqueness, the thiness of Dasein is found in the irrereplaceability of dying.
In Being-towards-death Dasein is radically individualized. "This individualizing is a way in which the 'there' is disclosed for existence" (Ibid). Clearly, "Being-towards-death" is also a "functional", "dynamic" principle of individuation.

(c) Conscience as principium individuationis

Heidegger does not understand the term "conscience" primarily in an ethical sense. Conscience is rather an authentic potentiality-for-Being, i.e., a way of existence. Hence, conscience is not something present-at-hand whose factual existence can be either proved or disproved.

The inauthentic Dasein loses its "Self". "Conscience summons Dasein's Self from its lostness in the 'they'" (BT: 319). That is to say, the "call of consciousness" brings the "they-self" back to the authentic "Self".

Who is the caller? According to Heidegger, it is neither God nor a special power nor the public conscience nor the world-conscience (Ibid:323). The reason is that all these candidates are ontical. The "call of conscience" is rather ontological. The caller is Dasein itself; Dasein calls itself. Both the caller and the listener are the same. But there is no vicious circle; for while the caller is Dasein as Self, the listener is Dasein as they-self. "The call is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice" (Ibid:321). This call or alien voice individualizes Dasein down to itself. Namely, der erschliesst es
als das jeweilige, vereinzelte des jeweiligen Dasein" (SZ:280).

Insofar as conscience is the way of Being of Dasein, it is, ultimately speaking, the Being of Dasein which individualizes Dasein.

(d) **Resoluteness as principium individuationis**

Heidegger points out that "Resoluteness is a distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosedness" (BT:343). The distinctiveness of resoluteness lies in the fact that the Self is disclosed in resoluteness. While in "idle talk", "curiosity" Dasein is inauthentic, in resoluteness Dasein is in truth. The truth of Dasein is the truth of existence. Here "truth" must be understood as "disclosure". Truth as disclosure differs essentially from truth as "judgmental truth" as well as "Anschauungswahrheit" in Husserl's sense (Tugendhat, 1967: 281 ff). Both "judgmental truth" and "Anschauungswahrheit" are applicable only to the dimension of things present-at-hand. None of them forms the existential structure of Dasein. But disclosure is an existential of Dasein. Resoluteness is a form of "letting-be" (BT:345).

Here "resoluteness" is essentially ontological. It differs from the ontical rational decision making. What Dasein in resoluteness has to face is essentially its existential possibility.
"Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-self" discloses the individuality of Dasein (Ibid:344). Namely, in making an existential Dasein discovers its "Jemeinigkei...".

Clearly, in functioning as a principle of individuation, resoluteness has nothing to do with the ontical character of Dasein.

Now we have seen in what ways "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness" function as principia individuationis and hence our exposition of Heidegger's theory of the individuation of Dasein is complete.

D. Critical Discussion of Heidegger's Theory of Individuation

From the above exposition we have seen that a thing ready-to-hand is primarily individualized according to its special function within the Zeugzusammenhang rather than to its position in space and time. Accordingly, not only the principles of individuation of things ready-to-hand differ from that of things present-at-hand, but their underlying foundations are different from each other. The individuality of a ready-to-hand is not primarily understood in terms of "Einmaligkeit des Daseins" but rather in terms of "speciality of function", or "particularity of serviceability".

Another important feature specific to the individuation of things ready-to-hand or equipment is that the individuality
of equipment is conditioned by the whole Zeugzusammenhang. Hubert Dreyfus and John Haugeland argue that "If what something is wholly depends on its role in some totality, then that thing can have no independent essence of its own" (1978:225). Accordingly, they claim that equipment or something ready-to-hand" can have no 'independent essence' of its own" (Ibid). However, one must note that here the expression "independent essence of its own" is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, it can mean: "essence" independent of its functional role within the whole; on the other hand, it can mean; its eigenes essence. The thesis of Dreyfus and Haugeland is justified only when we understand the meaning of this expression in the first sense.

It is true that the essence of "Washeit" of equipment, i.e., its "Zugcharakter", is constituted by its way of incorporating itself within the context of equipment. However, this does not imply that equipment, e.g., a hammer, cannot have its eigenes essence or its own "Zugcharakter" which is different from the essences of other equipment. Otherwise, it is senseless to say that equipment, e.g., a hammer, has its special function. But, clearly, since we cannot confuse the function of a hammer with the function of a nail, hammer and nail must have their respective eigene essences. Although in determining the essence of a hammer we have to refer to its "internal" relation to nails, this
does not exclude that a hammer has its "independent" essence in the sense of eigenen essence. It is true that a hammer can have no "essence" independent of its functional role within the context of equipment, but this dependency shows only the peculiar manner of determining its essence and does not mean that hammer cannot have its own essence.

Certainly, the essence of equipment is not an ideal object. It is rather the way of incorporating, i.e., "Zeugcharakter". In this sense, Heidegger states that "Die Washeit des Seienden, das uns alltäglich begegnet, ist durch den Zeugcharakter umgrenzt" (Ga XXIV:432). So, to grasp the "essence" of equipment we do not need to appeal to any procedure of idealization; rather, in our everyday practical dealing we have already understood its essence.

When Heidegger says that the individuation of equipment is not primarily determined through space and time; what he has in mind is "objective space" and "objective time". Indeed, the "Zeugzusammenhang" is "spatial" and "temporal" -- though not in an objective sense.

The spatial order of Zeugzusammenhang is called by Heidegger "world-space". According to Heidegger, world-space is not only basically relative to Dasein but is also disclosed circumspectively by Dasein. "The space which is thus disclosed with the worldhood of the world still lacks the pure multiplicity of three dimensions" (BT:145). So it differs from
the "objective space" which is "the pure 'wherein' in which positions are ordered by measurement and the situations of things are determined" (Ibid).

World-space as "the whole circumspectively orientated totality of places" belongs to things ready-to-hand (Ibid: 147). In other words, spatial involvement or "involvement in a region" belongs essentially to the way of encountering of things ready-to-hand. "Die Umweltdinge sind alle plaziert" (Ga XX:310). To be sure, here "place" is not position in the objective space but rather "das Wo der Hingehörigkeit des im besorgen Zuhandenen" (Ibid).

Moreover, Heidegger points out that "Alles Zuhandene ist zwar 'in der Zeit', innerzeitig" (Ga XXIV:434). That is to say, we can attribute "temporal predicates" such as "now", "beforehand" and "then" to things ready-to-hand. For example, we can say that "the chair is now available". The time for things ready-to-hand is called by Heidegger "world-time". World-time is not external to the ready-to-hand but rather "constitutes a within-time-ness of the ready-to-hand" (BT:472).

According to Heidegger, world-time has four structural moments, namely, "datability" (Datierbarkeit), "significance" (Bedeutsamkeit), "span" (Gespanheit) and "publicity" (Öffentlichkeit). The character of datability means that world-time is always given a dating in terms of the entities
we encounter. For example, we say: "then, when the bus comes". The character of significance shows that time is always time for something. For example, we say: "now it is time to go home". The character of span signifies that each temporal determination has an "extension". For example, we say: "then during the dinner". Finally, the character of publicity points to "Die Zugänglichkeit des Jetzt für jedermann, unbeschadet der verschiedenen Datierung" (Ga XXIV:373; 369).

Both world-space and world-time are constitutive for the way of givenness of the ready-to-hand or equipment. In addition, they also play important roles in the individuation of things ready-to-hand. For example, it is only by reference to their places that we can differentiate the "front door" from the "back door"; similarly, in term of world-time we can differentiate the "morning post" from the "evening post". Accordingly, Heidegger cannot deny the individualizing function of world-space and world-time. Certainly, the individualizing function of world-space and world-time does not primarily lie in the determination of the position of a tool in regard to its "Einmaligkeit des Daseins" but rather in regard to its "particularity of serviceability". So, only with world-space and world-time as "supplementary principia individuationis Heidegger can provide us a full theory of the individuation of things ready-to-hand.
Similar to Husserl's distinction between the absolute individuation of the ego and the relative individuation of real things, Heidegger distinguishes the way of the individuation of Dasein quas Self from that of things ready-to-hand.

Theunissen points out that Heidegger identifies "Ich ein Ich" as an "ontical indication" (ontische Angabe) (1965: 22-23; BT: §.25). Does it imply that "Jemeinigkeit" is only an ontical concept -- as maintained by Theunissen? However, Heidegger also clearly states that "Dasein ist wesenshaft je meines" (Ga XXVI:242). As a "Grundbestimmung des Daseins" "Jemeinigkeit" or "individuality" is an ontological characteristic.

In the above exposition of Heidegger's theory of the individuation of Dasein we can see that what concerns him is not Dasein merely as a factual individual but rather Dasein as Self. Indeed, the principles of the individuation of Dasein are primarily ontological. As Rosales correctly pointed out, "Das principium individuationis des Daseins ist dessen Sein selbst, ja das überhaupt, sofern es dieses Seiende in seiner Vereinzelung auf das Sein enthüllt" (1970:178). In responding to the call of conscience and running forth into the resoluteness which is ready for anxiety and towards death, the ego is individualized as ego. As Werner Marx remarked, "In this insight into the possibility of an extreme
'individualization',... Heidegger has made an important contribution to the centuries-old problem of 'individuation' (1971:97). Also the idea of "individuality" is now understood primarily in terms of "non-substitutability" rather than "Einmaligkeit des Daseins".

However, Heidegger has to face the following difficulties. First, "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness" only individualize Dasein internally.

The most important consequence of Heidegger's theory of individuation is that ego qua ego can be individualized by its existential Vollzug. That is to say, Dasein qua self is not individualized by appeal to any ontical, external principle.

But, in defining "individuality" of Dasein in terms of Zeitigung, transcendence or freedom, Heidegger does not provide us any external criterion according to which we can, from the standpoint of a third person, differentiate this particular Dasein (e.g., John) from that particular Desin (e.g., Mary). It is true that "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness" are also at the same time existentiel phenomena. However, in such a existentiel individuation each Dasein can only know that it is different from all other daseinsässige existences and nichtdaseinsässige entities. It does not therefore have a criterion to make a distinction between other Daseins (besides itself). Indeed, Heidegger
says that "In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite entities within-the-world" (BT:264). So, each Dasein can only discover its own individuality by itself. It is true that anxiety "brings one back to the pure 'that-it-is' of one's ownmost individualized thrownness", but only one's own (Ibid:394). Certainly, with his existential "solipsism" Heidegger also admits the "existence" of other Daseins. However, he fails to provide the external criterion to enable us to differentiate this Dasein from that Dasein.

Second, the inauthentic Dasein is also par excellence an individual. Despite its "existential" fallenness Dasein as das Man is also an individual -- though merely an individual in factual sense. Then what is the principle according to which we can individualize such a factual individual? Ontologically speaking, such an individuation can be said to be grounded in inauthentic temporality, and hence ultimately grounded in primordial authentic temporality. However, "individuation" in this way is still formal. But again what are the external principles of differentiation? Also what are the existentiell principles?

In order to develop a complete theory of individuation of Dasein, Heidegger has to answer these questions. However, within his fundamental-ontological approach it seems impossible
for him to provide any ontical external criterion.

It is true that one of the major contributions of Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein lies in the discovery of the dimension of "Faktizität". According to Heidegger, "Faktizität" is the fundamental structure of Dasein. But one cannot confuse "Faktizität" as the fundamental structure of Dasein with "factum brutum" in English empiricistic sense. Heidegger also agrees with the empiricists in admitting the dimension of "factum brutum". What he wants to stress is the distinction between "Faktizität as an existential" and "Tatsächlichkeit" in the sense of "factum brutum". He explicitly writes: "Faktizität ist nicht die Tatsächlichkeit des factum brutum eines Vorhandenen, sondern ein in die Existenz aufgenommener, wenngleich zunächst abgedrängter Seincharakter des Daseins" (SZ:135). That is to say, while "Faktizität" is a daseinsmässige existential, "Tatsächlichkeit" is a nichtdaseinsmässige category.

Indeed, when Husserl characterizes the primal-I as "Urfaktum", he already introduced a new kind of "Faktum" which is beyond the realm of "factum brutum". Husserl's "Urfaktum", moreover, shares with Heidegger's "Faktizität" the following commonness: neither of them "wird in einem Anschauen nie vorfindlich" (Ibid). Husserl, being imprisoned in the reflective tradition of transcendental philosophy, is unable
to positively unfold the dimension of "Urfaktum". But, by using his hermeneutical approach, the early Heidegger not only opens a new direction in transcendental philosophy, but provides us with a positive means to disclose the dimension of "Faktizität". Accordingly, this dimension of "Faktum" is no longer merely a "postulate" but rather phenomenologically accessible.

Nevertheless, in his "Hermeneutik der Faktizität" Heidegger "ontologicalizes" the dimension of "Faktizität" as "Seinkönnen". As a consequence, although Heidegger recognizes that "Faktizität" is "Die Tatsächlichkeit des Faktums Dasein, als welches jeweils jedes Dasein ist", his ontological orientation prevents him from developing any ontical external principle of the individuation of the ego from this dimension (Ibīd:56).

A similar limitation can be found in Heidegger's analysis of the "historicity" (Geschichtlichkeit) of Dasein. It is true that in opposition to the reduction of "Zusammenhang des Lebens" to "Summe der Momentanwirklichkeiten von nacheinanderankommenden und verschiedenden Erlebnissen" or "Abfolge von Erlebnissen" Heidegger rediscover the autonomy of the "historicity" of Dasein (Ibīd:373-375). However, owing to his exclusively ontological approach in phenomenology, Heidegger can merely provide an ontological understanding of the "historicity" of Dasein. Namely, he cannot develop any ontical external principle of the individuation of the ego.
from his analysis of "Seinsart des Geschichtlichen" (Ibid: 375).

Nevertheless, in claiming "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness" as existential phenomena in the individuation of the ego, Heidegger has already implicitly gone beyond the thesis that "phenomenology is ontology".

The above clarification not only shows the limitation of the fundamental-ontological approach to the theory of the individuation of the ego, but also indicates that, in order to develop a complete theory of the individuation of the ego, we also need the ontical approach.
1. "Das Sujet kann sein, was es ist, das Dasein existiert, ohne gerade Seiendes qua Objekt zu erfassen. Zum Sein-bei gehört nicht notwendig Vergegenständlichung oder gar theoretische Thematisierung" (Ga XXVI:161).

2. In his later years, Heidegger thematizes the "worldling of world" no longer from the standpoint of the ontological transcendence of Dasein. He directly unfolds it as "Geviert". This forms an important mark for his "Kehre".

3. Both Theunissen (1965) and Waldenfels (1971) believe that Heidegger's Dasein is überindividuell. However, "Dasein is an individual" is primarily not an ontical assertion but rather an ontological assertion.

4. But, clearly, Husserl's primal-I is not subject to this criticism; for as a fungierendes Ich the primal-I is not a Seiendes.

5. "Zeit 'ist' nicht, sondern zeitigt sich" (Ga XXVI:264).

6. "Das (menschliche) Dasein ... ist die Zeit selbst" (Heidegger, 'Die Zeit'; quoted in Becker, 1928:221).

7. Strictly speaking, time is rather the ontological ground for the individuation of Dasein qua self.

8. So, the "essence" of a ready-to-hand should be understood in a dynamic sense. "Die Washeit des Seienden, das uns alltäglich begegnet, ist durch den Zeugcharakter umgrenzt" (Ga XXIV:432).

9. Heidegger's concept of "world-time" is not univocal. It can also mean the time for subject (BT 471-2). However, the time for the ready-to-hand can be legitimately regarded as "world-time"; for Heidegger explicitly writes: "That time 'wherein' entities within-the-world are encountered we know as 'world-time'" (Ibid:471).

10. One might say that the "denotation" or "reference" of "Jemeinigkeit" is an ontical entity.
CHAPTER IV

FROM THE INDIVIDUATION-PROBLEMATIC TO THE COMPARISON OF HUSSERLIAN AND HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGIES

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section we attempt to work out the differences between Husserl's theory of individuation and Heidegger's. In the second section a thematization of the metholological as well as the topological differences between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies will be given. In the third section, we will see in what way Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation are complementary to each other. In the final section it will be shown how we can achieve a unity of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies.

First, we will see that Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation are not only different from each other in their "thematic objects" and their "solutions", but also in their respective ideas of individuality and methodological approaches. These differences are nothing accidental, but rather are grounded in their different formulations of phenomenology.

In order to thematize the differences between these two types of phenomenology, we will concentrate on the comparison of their respective conceptions of phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction, phenomenon, essence and intentionality. We will also try to make explicit the opposition
between Husserl's thesis of the primacy of perception as well as reflection and Heidegger's thesis of the primacy of understanding as well as hermeneutical interpretation.

Despite the differences we will attempt to show that there is also a positive relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation. In particular, it will be seen that there is a founding-relationship between them.

By using the positive relationship between their theories of individuation as a crucial example we will try to argue that there is also a positive relationship between their phenomenologies, provided that Husserl's phenomenology is reinterpreted as a critique of knowledge. But to attain this goal we have to refute the thesis of Guido Küng that Husserl's phenomenology cannot be understood as an epistemology, on the one hand; and the thesis of Calvin Schrag that Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology is an impossible dream, on the other hand. This clarification will help us to understand in an exact manner the genuine relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies.

A. The Difference Between Husserl's and Heidegger's Theories of Individuation

In our exposition and discussion of Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation we have already seen some differences between them. In this section we will
attempt to thematically work out their important differences.

First of all, in Husserl's theory of individuation the subject-object schema is operative. What concerns Husserl is the individuation of things as real objects and the individuation of the ego as subject. Also the methodological approach presupposes the subject-object separation. While the thing as object is given to us through objectifying perceptual intentionality, self-perception is identified as the objectificational reflection. On the other hand, in Heidegger's theory of individuation one can see that the subject-object schema is explicitly abolished. According to Heidegger, both things ready-to-hand and Dasein belong to the dimension which transcends the subject-object separation. For, while the ready-to-hand is not an object, Dasein is not a subject. Also the methodological approach does not presuppose the subject-object pattern. Both the circumspective concern (Umsicht) with the ready-to-hand and the self-understanding or self-disclosure is pre-objective.

In terms of Heidegger's terminology, we can say the things with which Husserl is concerned are things present-at-hand. According to Husserl, "Das Ding ist eine Regel möglicher Erscheinungen" (Hu IV:86). That is to say, Husserl understands the thing as "eine Realität", "als Einheit einer Mannigfaltigkeit geregelt zusammengehöriger Erscheinungen" (Ibid). But for Heidegger the thing is primarily understood as the ready-to-hand,
or "Umweltding". According to Heidegger, the ready-to-hand cannot be construed as "wertbehafettes Naturding" (Ga XX: 247). Rather, practical things or equipment are "essentially 'something in-order-to . . . '") (BT:97). What defines equipment is not "property" or "causal relationship" but rather its "unability" and "serviceability". In short, equipment is nothing but its functional role.

The way of givenness of things present-at-hand is different from that of things ready-to-hand. While things present-at-hand are given to us in a theoretical attitude or pure perception, things ready-to-hand is given to us primarily in the practical attitude or circumspective concern. Accordingly, while the character of the Anwesenheitsweise of things present-at-hand is "Leibhaftigkeit", the character of Anwesenheitsweise of equipment is "Zuhandenheit" (Ga XX:265 ff). That is to say, the Being of things present-at-hand is different from the Being of things ready-to-hand.

Accordingly, the way of the individuation of things present-at-hand is not identical with that of things ready-to-hand. We have shown that the idea of individuality of things present-at-hand is based on the "Einmaligkeit des Daseins" and the idea of the individuality of things ready-to-hand is based on "speciality of serviceability". Therefore, it is not accidental for Husserl to work out objective space and objective time as principles of the individuation of real objects, and also quite
logical for Heidegger to enumerate "Zeugcharakter" and "Zeugzusammenhang" as principles of the individuation of equipment.

We have seen that the spatial order as well as the temporal order of world as the universal Zeugzusammenhang must be regarded as "supplementary" principles of the individuation of things ready-to-hand. However, it is not difficult to see that world-space and world-time in Heidegger's sense are not identical with objective space and objective time in Husserl's sense. World-space and world-time are essentially pre-objective. As pointed out by Heidegger, in the world-space the "'above' is what is 'on the ceiling'; the 'below' is what is 'on the floor'; 'the behind' is what is 'at the door'; all 'whereas' are discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in everyday dealings" (BT:136-137). But position in objective space is "interpreted as the 'where' of some random Being-present-at-hand of things" (Ibid:135). In addition, in the world-space "regions are not first formed by things which are present-at-hand together: they always are ready-to-hand already in individual places" (Ibid:137). Accordingly, the remoteness and closeness of things ready-to-hand or equipment differs from the objective distance between things present-at-hand. Moreover, insofar as the "constitutive origin" is concerned, world-space and objective space have their respective sources. While world-space is "originated" in the spatiality
of Dasein, i.e., its structure of "de-severance" (Entfernung) and "directionality", objective space is constituted by kinästhetic consciousness.¹

Similarly, world-time as time for things ready-to-hand is also different from objective time. While the "present" in world-temporal sense arises from the "umsichtige Gegenwärftigung", the "present" in the objective temporal sense results from the "sinnliche Gegenwärftigung" (SZ:359; 363).

We have also shown that the "Zeugcharakter" of equipment must be distinguished from the concrete essence of real objects or things present-at-hand. "Concrete essence" itself is an ideal object and is only discovered by the procedure of eidetic seeing. However, the "Zeugcharakter" is not only not an ideal object but is always already understood in our practical concern.

Both Husserl and Heidegger claim that world is the "Boden" in which a thing is individualized. For both of them world is understood as a "horizon" of things. According to Husserl, world as universal horizon is the condition for the givenness of real objects. But world as horizon is given through the givenness of objects. According to Heidegger, world as horizon is also the condition of givenness of things ready-to-hand. Also world announces itself through worldly things. In addition, for both of them there is a "difference" between world and things. Do these similarities imply the
sameness of Husserl's world and Heidegger's? The answer is negative. Despite the above similarities there are essential differences between world in Husserl's sense and world in Heidegger's sense. First of all, while world in Husserl's sense is primarily a perceptual horizon, world in Heidegger's sense is a *Bewandtnisganzheit*. As rightly pointed out by Theunissen, "Heideggers Horizontbegriff nicht mit dem Husserls zusammenfällt. Zwar hat auch er seinen Ursprung in der reinen Phänomenologie, aber Heidegger hat Husserls Begriff des Welt Horizonts ontologisiert, indem er das ontische Moment ausschied, das diesen zum synonymen Ausdruck für das Universum qualifiziert" (1965:161). Indeed, Husserl also characterized world as totality of things. But Heidegger rejects such an ontical conception of world in characterizing the essence of world. For him the difference between world and things is ontological. But Theunissen claims that Husserl's difference between world and things is also an ontological difference: if so, then not only one must identify Husserl's world with Heidegger, but one also has to refute Heidegger's challenge that Husserl has overlooked the dimension of Being (1963:349). However, the difference between world as universal horizon and the intentional object is only a constitutive difference not an ontological difference. An ontological difference is a difference between Being and beings. Indeed, in Husserl's philosophy one can find the following
three different concepts of Being.

First, "Being" means "objectivity" (Gegenständlichkeit). As pointed out by Heidegger, "Sein heisst für ihn nichts anderes als wahres Sein, Objectivität, wahr für ein theoretisches, wissenschaftliches Erkennen" (Ga XX:165; Landgrebe, 1978:202). When Husserl speaks of the "intentional Being" of worldly things, "Being" here means "objectivity". The reason is that worldly things have "the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for a consciousness" (Idea:§.49). That is to say, since worldly things are nothing but objects for consciousness, their Being is fundamentally identical with objectivity. Indeed, even the Being of consciousness can be understood in the sense of objectivity, insofar as it is given to the objectificational reflection.

Second, "Being" means "presence-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit). "Being" in this sense is synonymous with "Dasein", "Wirklichsein" and "Existenz". When Husserl asserts that the Being of consciousness, of every stream of experience generally, though it would indeed be inevitably modified by a nullifying of the thing-world, would not be affected thereby in its own proper existence", what he has in mind is "Being" in the sense of "Vorhandenheit" (Ibid).

Third, "Being" means "subjective process". Certainly, here "subjective process" should not be understood in any empirical sense, but rather in the transcendental sense.
Indeed, Husserl explicitly identifies the "Being of subjectivity" with the "Transcendentaler Lebensprozess der Objektivierung" (Hu XIII:189).

However, it can be clearly seen that while the first and the third meanings of "Being" presuppose the subject-object separation, the second meaning of "Being" is identical with "Dass-sein". We have learnt that Being in Heidegger's sense is not only beyond the subject-object dichotomy but also has to be understood as "Wiesein". As a consequence, none of the meanings of Husserl's "Being" can be identical with Heidegger's "Being". Accordingly, Theunissen's thesis that in Husserl's philosophy the difference between world and worldly things is an ontological difference in Heideggerian sense is not justified.²

The thematization of all these distinctions shows that not only "what is individualized" but also the principles of individuation in Husserl's theory of the individuation of things differs from Heidegger's. Indeed, their theories of the individuation of things belong to different levels. While the individuation of things present-at-hand happens only within the theoretical attitude, the individuation of things ready-to-handy operates already on the practical level.

From Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's determination of the subjectivity of subject or consciousness we have
seen the difference between Husserl's and Heidegger's con-
ceptions of the ego. While Husserl's transcendental ego is
"worldless", Heidegger's Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-
world. But one can discover that both the primal-I and Dasein
are "pre-personal". Namely, both the individuality of the
primal-I and the individuality of Dasein qua Self are not
reducible to the personal difference. That is to say,
strictly speaking, personal difference contributes nothing
in the individuation of the primal-I and the individuation of
Dasein qua Self. Nevertheless, despite this similarity there
is also a gap between Husserl's theory of the individuation
of the ego and Heidegger's. It is true that both phenomen-
ologists relate the individuation of the ego to time.
However, not only are their conceptions of the ego not identical,
but their conceptions of time differ from each other too.
In Husserl's monadic time, "future" is only a reverse of
"past". This is a consequence of Husserl's thesis: "dass
die Protention umgestülpte Retention ist" (Hu XI:186; 212;
Hu X:§.26; Held, 1966:40 ff; 1972:58). As pointed out by
Klaus Held, "Husserl versteht die übergängigkeit der einzigen
ständigen Gegenwart ausschliesslich vom Ungegenwärtigwerden
her" (1972:58). Accordingly, the principles of the indivi-
duation of the ego that we can find in Husserl's phenomenology
are only those which are based on the idea of the "Individualität"
der Einmaligkeit". Indeed, Husserl himself writes: "Die
Individualität des Ich ... ist in sich nichtraumzeitlich individualisiert ... Aber ... ist in sich einmalig und hat sich selbst sein 'immanente' Zeit" (C 17 I:13). Even Husserl himself recognizes that "individualität der Einmaligkeit" cannot apply to the individuation of the ego qua ego. That is why he can only "accept" the absolute individuation of the primal-I as "Urfaktum". That is to say, owing to the "Überzeitlichkeit" of the primal-I Husserl cannot positively determine the individuality of the primal-I. However, in Heidegger's existential time "future" is not just the "reverse" of "having-been". On the contrary, the "future" has an absolute priority. In addition, in functioning as the principle of the individuation of Dasein, time does not individualize Dasein in terms of its "Einmaligkeit" but rather by its "Zukunftigkeit" or "ecstactical unity".

As a consequence of this essential difference between their conceptions of time and between their ideas of the individuality of the ego, Husserl's three principles of the individuation of the ego, namely, "style of motivation", "coherence of history" and "habitualities" cannot individualize Dasein qua Self. Furthermore, while Dasein qua Self is individualized by death, Husserl's transcendental Ur-ich is "immortal". In addition, insofar as Husserl (mis)understands Heidegger's Dasein as an anthropoporetical concept, he would
also refuse to admit "anxiety" and "conscience" as principles of the individuation of the ego (K X:2). The unique similarity lies in their emphasis on "decision". However, while Husserl's "Entscheidung" is basically ontically oriented, Heidegger's "Entschlossenheit" is concerned with existential possibilities.

Moreover, while Husserl's idea of the individuality of the ego underlying the principles, i.e., "style of motivation", "habitualities" and "coherence of history" is the "individuation of Einmaligkeit", Heidegger's idea of the individuality of the ego underlying the principles, i.e., "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness" is "individuation of irre-placeability".

Although Ur-Ich is beyond such an idea of individuality as "Einmaligkeit" and is characterized as atemporal, one cannot hence identify it with Dasein. As implicitly remarked by Heidegger, Husserl's Ur-Ich basically results from "einer egoistisch-solipsistischen Aufsteigerung der eigenen Individualität (Ga XXVI:243). One might say that Husserl's Ur-ich is more in the tradition of Fichte. That is to say, it is a "product" of the "deduction" that subject is, in principle, "unobjectifiable". Namely, I is I. But Heidegger's Dasein "ist nicht ein 'ich', sondern das Verstehende, das Selbst, d.h. bloss das jeweilige Einzelne in seiner Seiendheit" (Rosales, 1970:178).
Now we can clearly see that while Husserl approaches the problem of the individuation of the ego mainly from a transcendental standpoint, Heidegger treats the individuation of the ego as an ontological problem. Indeed, such a divergence is shown in Husserl's remark on Heidegger's *Kantbook* instead of "Seinsfrage", we should pose the question concerning "die transzendente Möglichkeit von Seienden überhaupt als Seienden für uns" (K X II:5).

In fact, all these differences between Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation are not accidental. Rather, they are all grounded in the essential distinctions between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenological approaches.

B. **Husserlian versus Heideggerian Phenomenology**

Husserl once declared, "Phenomenology, that is Heidegger and me" (Spiegelberg, 1960:352). But he rejected Heidegger's phenomenology as soon as he realized the difference between their respective phenomenologies.

In 1927, when Husserl was asked to write a short introduction to phenomenology for the fourteenth edition of *Encyclopedia Britannica*, he asked Heidegger for his co-operation. But Husserl finally abandoned Heidegger's version of the draft which was a modification of Husserl's first draft. In a letter to Roman Ingarden, Husserl wrote, "Heidegger has not grasped the whole meaning of the phenomenological
reduction" (Ibid:281). According to Husserl, Heidegger misunderstood the nature of the phenomenological reduction which is the most important concept of Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl once pointed out, "If we miss the meaning of the reduction everything is lost" ("Phenomenology and Anthropology":136). It is not difficult to see that one of the most obvious differences between these two phenomenologists lies in their disagreement over the conception of phenomenological reduction. In order to explicate the difference between Heidegger's and Husserl's phenomenologies, let us begin with a comparison of their conceptions of phenomenological reduction.

(1) Phenomenological Reduction

According to Husserl, "the real world exists, but in respect of essence is relative to the transcendental subjectivity, and in such a way that it can have its meaning as existing reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity" (Ideas:14). In order to go back to transcendental subjectivity and to see in it the source of constitution, Husserl claims that we have first to perform the phenomenological or transcendental reduction. There are two chief ways to perform the reduction, namely, the Cartesian way or the ontological way. The Cartesian way is "the search for a region where doubt is
excluded" (Sokolowski, 1964:132). And the ontological way proceeds by asserting that "reality is not autonomous and independent in itself. By its very nature, reality is correlated to subjectivity, and if we are to explain reality completely, we must take this correlation into account" (Ibid:132). In short, we can formulate Husserl's phenomenological reduction in the following way: to bracket the natural attitude and go back to transcendental subjectivity. In the natural attitude, everything is regarded as self-contained and independent of transcendental subjectivity. According to Husserl, what one sees in the natural attitude are ready-made "products" of transcendental subjectivity. What phenomenological reduction means is that we have to suspend our concern with the "products" and turn to their original "producing process", i.e., the activities of transcendent consciousness.

Hence, for Husserl, the "residuum" of the phenomenological reduction is a transcendental ego. It is a "worldless" subject (namely, an ego which is, in principle, independent of the world) in which the world and human beings are constituted as existing.

Heidegger never mentions or uses the term "phenomenological reduction" nor the term "transcendental reduction" in Being and Time. Does this mean that in Heideggerian phenomenology there is no such a methodological step?
Tugendhat provides us with an explanation. He says:

"Gerade durch die Epoché betrifft also Husserl die Dimension von Heideggers In-der-Welt-Sein. Heidegger benötigt die Epoché nicht mehr, um in die Dimension der Gegebenheitsweisen zu gelangen, weil er, nachdem sie von Husserl eröffnet wurde, von vornherein in ihr steht und die nun aus ihren eigenen Verhältnissen heraus -- nicht mehr in ausschliesslicher Orientierung auf eine Welt von Gegenständen -- entfalten kann" (1967:26).

However, the residuum of Husserl's phenomenological reduction is limited to the dimension of the ways of givenness of objects or things present-at-hand. But what Heidegger is primarily concerned with is rather the Being of beings as well as the dimension of ways of encountering of things ready-to-hand. The phenomenological reduction in Husserlian sense cannot lead us to the dimension of Being and its modifications.

With the publication of Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, we are now able to see that Heidegger also has his formulation of phenomenological reduction. Heidegger's phenomenological reduction is totally other than Husserl's. On the one hand, phenomenological reduction in Husserl's sense is "die Methode der Rückführung des phänomenologischen Blickes von der natürlichen Einstellung des in der Welt der Dinge und Personen hineinlebenden Menschen auf das transzendentale Bewusstseinsleben und die Objekte als Bewusstseinskorrelate
konstituieren" (Ga XXIV:29). For Heidegger, on the other hand, "bedeutet die phänomenologische Reduktion die Rückführung des phänomenologischen Blickes von der wie immer bestimmten Erfassung des Seienden auf des Verstehen des Seins (Entwerfen auf die Weise seiner unverborgenheit) dieses Seienden" (Ibid). While phenomenological reduction in Husserl’s sense is a procedure from the mundane to the transcendental region; phenomenological reduction in Heidegger’s sense is a procedure from the ontical to the ontological dimension. Husserl claims that phenomenological reduction is a key concept of his phenomenology. The necessity and importance of phenomenological reduction for Heidegger’s phenomenology is also indubitable.

The difference between the phenomenological reduction in Husserl’s sense and Heidegger’s sense can also be seen by pointing out their relation to eidetic reduction in a broad sense, i.e., as a procedure which leads us back to the dimension of essence. For Husserl, phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction are two different procedures. Although both are necessary for his program of transcendental phenomenology, they are in principle separable. For example, in the realm of mundane phenomenology, while the performance of eidetic reduction is necessary, there is no appeal to phenomenological reduction. But in Heidegger’s phenomenology, eidetic reduction or factual reduction is essentially
inseparable from phenomenological reduction; the former is merely a particular form of the latter. The ground for this inseparability between them lies in the identity-relation between Wesen and Being.

As rightly observed by Francis Seeburger, "The disagreement between Heidegger and Husserl does not, at this point, concern the possibility or even the 'necessity' of the phenomenological reduction, but concerns the meaning of the reduction" (1975:213-214).

In addition to his conception of phenomenological reduction, Heidegger also introduces a second methodological step -- construction. 'Construction' here is not understood in the negative sense. In other words, 'construction' in the phenomenological sense is different from 'construction' in the speculative sense. For Heidegger, phenomenological reduction is essentially a procedure of 'turning away'. As a kind of "departure", phenomenological reduction is somewhat negative. It needs a positive complement. This complement is a procedure of turning towards Being -- phenomenological construction. Phenomenological construction is necessary because Being is not accessible like beings, namely, Being is not something which exists before-hand. In order to be able to unfold Being and its structures, we need a special procedure of projection -- phenomenological construction.

In his later years, Husserl also speaks of "phenomenological construction" (Cairns, 1976:52). According to Husserl,
"phenomenological constructions" are "to be distinguished from the undisciplined constructions of non-phenomenological philosophers" (Ibid). Phenomenological construction is "the construction of phenomenological hypotheses" (Ibid). Furthermore, "phenomenological constructions are necessary wherever the object of study is not to be brought to self-givenness, e.g., in the cases of the mind of the child or of the study of death" (Ibid). To be sure, "phenomenological hypotheses" are not "hypotheses of sciences". Accordingly, phenomenological construction is not scientific construction. Phenomenological construction in Husserl's sense is rather a special technique for describing a phenomenon which goes beyond our reflection. However, whether with phenomenological construction in Husserl's sense one can unfold the structure of Being is an open question.

In addition to phenomenological construction, Heidegger also introduces the procedure of "destruction". As in the case of "construction", destruction in the phenomenological sense must not be understood in negative sense. On the contrary, phenomenological destruction is basically "ein kritischer Abbau der überkommenen und zunächst notwendig zu verwendenden Begriffe auf die Quellen, aus denen sie geschöpft" (Ga XXIV:31). In other words, it is not the negation or the annihilation of the philosophical tradition, but rather a positive appropriation (Aneignung) of its primordial meaning
Although the term of "destruction" does not appear in Husserl's phenomenology, his concept of "reactivation" in "The Origin of Geometry" shares some similarities with Heidegger's concept of destruction.

According to Husserl, "propositions, like other cultural structures, appear on the scene in the form of tradition; they claim, so to speak, to be sedimentation of a truth-meaning that can be made originally self-evident" (Crisis: 367). "Reactivation" is the procedure of making the original meaning or truth meaning of expression self-evident (Ibid: 361). Husserl points out that "history is from the start nothing other than the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of meaning" (Ibid: 371). In other words, "tradition" is essentially a process of sedimentation. Owing to the distance between the original formulation of a cultural item and the sedimentation of its meaning as well as to the "seduction of language", it is necessary for us to perform an explicative procedure in order to grasp the primordial meaning of this cultural entity (Ibid: 362). This explicative procedure of going back to primordial meaning is nothing but "reactivation".

From this concise description of the nature of "reactivation" one can nevertheless see that both reactivation and destruction are processes which lead us from sedimentated
concepts back to their original, primordial meanings by
dismantling the tradition. In addition, both the necessity
of reactivation and that of destruction are partially grounded,
on the historical or traditional distance.

However, these similarities between reactivation and
destruction do not enable us to identify them. There is an
essential difference between them: while reactivation for
Husserl is a way of explicating the sense of cultural products,
destruction for Heidegger is a kind of disclosure of Being.
In other words, Heidegger's destruction is exclusively
ontologically oriented, but Husserl's reactivation is primarily
ontically oriented.

Heidegger claims that phenomenological reduction, con-
struction, and destruction form an inseparable whole. In his
explanation of the sense of this Zusammengehörigkeit, which
can be found in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Heidegger
argues that while reduction and construction are two sides
of the same problem; construction is necessarily a destruction.
That is to say, phenomenological reduction as a departure is
nothing but the negative side of the procedure, and pheno-
menological construction as projection is the positive side
of the procedure. "Konstruktion der philosophie ist notwendig
Destruktion" because phenomenological ontological interpretation
"ist durch ihre geschichtliche Lage bestimmt und in eins damit
durch gewisse Möglichkeiten des Zugangs zum Seienden und durch
die Überlieferung der vorangegangenen Philosophie" (Ga XXIV 31). On the other hand, such a unity does not exist between phenomenological reduction, construction and reactivation in Husserl’s phenomenology.

(2) **Eidetic Reduction and the Nature of Essence**

Eidetic reduction is another important methodological step in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl explicitly states that "It is the distinctive peculiarity of phenomenology to include all sciences and all forms of knowledge in the scope of its eidetic universality" (Ideas:§.62). That is to say, "all eidetic (all unconditionally and universally valid) forms of knowledge lie enclosed in phenomenology" (Ibid). Phenomenological statements have eidetic universality. In other words, phenomenological statements are statements about eidetic structures. Phenomenology is "a rigorous sciences of Essential Being" (Ibid).

Phenomenology is not a factual science. It is not concerned with factuality or contingent structures of givenness. According to Husserl, essence or eidetic structure is an ideal object. It is not a real object. Despite the quasi-Platonic position in Logical Investigations, Eidos or essential structure is "given" to us. That is to say, Eidos is intuitive givenness. We can actually have an intuition of an Eidos. But the process through which Eidos is given is not "induction" but rather "ideation". Husserl's concept of ideation or
essential intuition is not a mystical intuition. Rather, it is a kind of categorical intuition. In addition, ideation is not a simple grasping. Rather, there are "three principal steps which pertain to the process of ideation:

1. The productive activity which consists in running through the multiplicity of variations.
2. The unitary linking in continuous coincidence.
3. The active identification which brings out the congruent over against the differences" (EJ:346-7).

In Heidegger's phenomenology there is no such methodological step. Instead, Heidegger explicitly criticizes Husserl's "eidetic reduction". According to Heidegger, Husserl's "essence" means nothing but "whatness" (Ga XX:151). It is true that "essence" in Husserl's sense is primarily understood as "species", "whatness" or "essentia". As "whatness", essence is the opposite of existence in the sense of "thatness". Accordingly, the eidetic structures are basically "gehaltliche" structures. But Heidegger points out that the essence of essence does not lie in the "whatness". Instead, the primordial sense of essence is "Wie" or "die Weise zu sein" (Ga XX:151; N II:362). Essence as Wie is prior to the distinction between whatness and thatness. "Wesen" is "das Währende", "das Fortwährende", "das Bleibende"
(VA:34). As *Wie*, "Wesen" is nothing but a *priori*. Indeed, Heidegger prefers to speak of the verbal form of "Wesen". As a verb "wesen" is identical with "währen" "weilen", and "verweilen" (VA:34: N II:404). Accordingly, the ontological structure of "essence" as "Wie" must be different from that of "essence" as "Was". Essence as *Wie* is not an ideal object. As stated by J.L. Mehta, "The essence (Wesen) . . . which concerns Heidegger is never a timeless entity" (1967:113; 368-9). As a "process" essence is "time" itself. Hence, essence as *Wie* in a sense is also non-temporal. But the non-temporality of essence as *Wie* is fundamentally different from the atemporality of an ideal object. While the atemporality of ideal objects is identical with omni-temporality which is still a mode of temporality, the non-temporality of essence as *Wie* cannot be reduced to any mode of temporality (BJ:64).

The essence that concerns Heidegger is nothing but *Sein im Wie*. Just as Being is not a universal, essence as *Wie* is also not a universal (VA:34). Essence as *Wie* is prior to the distinction between universal and particular.

Since what Heidegger is concerned with is the Ways of Being rather than *Eidos* or essential structures, there is no need for him to perform the *eidetic reduction*. However, this lacking of *eidetic reduction* does not imply that Heidegger's phenomenology becomes a factual or an empirical approach. Since
essence as *Wie* is prior to the distinction between ideality and reality, Heidegger's phenomenological approach is neither eidetic nor factual. But it is not difficult to discover that in Heidegger's phenomenology there is still a counterpart of "eidetic reduction". It is a reduction which does not lead us to essence as "Was" but rather to essence as "Wie". Such a reduction one may call "essential reduction" or "factual reduction". Indeed, it is through the performance of this reduction that we can reach the dimension of Being of things ready-to-hand, existential structure of Dasein and the truth of Being.

(3) **Intuition versus Understanding**

Otto Pöggeler construes the methodological difference between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology in terms of the contrast between "intuition" and "understanding" (1963: 69 ff).

The important role which is played by "intuition" in Husserl's phenomenology is clear. As early as in *Logical Investigations*, the thesis of the primacy of intuition is already implicit in Husserl's "phenomenological elucidation of knowledge". As pointed out by Ricoeur, the schema "meaning-intention -- meaning fulfillment" patterns Husserl's way of thinking (1967:18 ff). In clarifying the phenomena of fulfillment, Husserl, in fact, has to "pursue the analysis
of various sorts of intuition, starting with sensuous intuition, an enquiry basic to the elucidation of knowledge" (LI:669). It is because meaning-intention has its fulfillment only in intuition. Moreover, it is also true that there are distinctions between "degree of fullness of intuitive content". As Husserl points out, "we may distinguish:

1. The extent or richness of the fullness ...
2. The liveliness of the fullness ...
3. The reality-level (Realitätsgehalt) of the fullness" (LI:734-5). That is to say, "adequate perception represents an ideal" (Ibid:735). However, this does not exclude that perceptual intuition is the only legitimate source of knowledge.

The thesis of the primacy of intuition, in particular, of primordial dator intuition is later explicitly formulated by Husserl as "the principle of all principles" in Ideen I:

"that every primordial dator intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge that whatever presents itself in 'intuition' in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it goes itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself" (Ideas:§.24).

In other words, "Immediate seeing (Sehen), not merely the sensory seeing of experience, but seeing in general as primordial dator consciousness of any kind whatsoever, is
the ultimate source of justification for all rational statements (Ibid: §19). This clearly shows that "primordial dator intuition" is not co-extensive with "sensible intuition". The latter is only a kind of "primordial dator intuition". According to Husserl, "categorical intuition" is also a particular "primordial dator intuition".

In §31 of Being and Time, Heidegger thematically criticizes Husserl's thesis of the primacy of intuition.

First, Heidegger gives us an existential interpretation of sight or seeing. He states that "seeing" in the existential sense "does not mean just perceiving with the bodily eyes, but neither does it mean pure non-sensory awareness of something present-at-hand in its presence-at-hand" (BT:187). The existential significance of sight points to "the peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in themselves" (Ibid). This existential meaning of "seeing" is overlooked by traditional philosophy. "Seeing" has been identified "as a way of access to entities" (Ibid). According to Heidegger, even Husserl's concept of seeing as "das Geben und Haben eines Seienden in seiner Leibhaftigkeit" (Ga XX:113) is still imprisoned within this tradition.

Second, Heidegger is opposed to the thesis of the primacy of intuition. He points out that "all sight is grounded primarily in understanding" (BT:187). The primacy
of pure intuition "which corresponds noetically to the
priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology
has given way; for 'intuition' and 'thinking' are both
derivative of understanding, and already rather remote
ones" (Ibid). This is not only true of sensible intuition.
Heidegger maintains that "even the phenomenological 'intuition
of essences' (Wesenschau) is grounded in existential under-
standing" (BT:187). Existential understanding as disclosure
of Being has the primacy over intuition. Understanding --
including "the circumspection (Umsicht) of "concern" and
"the considerateness (Rücksicht) of solicitude", is the
existential structure of Dasein. Heidegger even identifies
Dasein with "understanding of Being" (Seinsverständnis)
(Ibid:186).

The gist of Heidegger's way of thinking concerning the
primacy of understanding over intuition can be put as follows:

(1) Intuition is ontically oriented,
(2) Understanding is ontologically oriented,
(3) Being is the ground of beings,
(4) Intuition is founded upon understanding.

However, it should be noted that Heidegger's rejection
of the thesis of the primacy of intuition does not lead him
to the denial of the possibility of objective knowledge.
With the emphasis on the priority of understanding Heidegger
merely wants to show that we have a more primordial relation with our world, which is essentially pre-cognitive and pre-theoretical. Our relation to the world through objective knowledge aims to achieve greater certainty. However, "certainty" does not imply "primordiality". In addition, objective knowledge or, in general, the cognitive attitude is basically a founded mode of relation through which we establish a contact with our world. To found knowing on understanding is not to reduce or diminish the certainty of knowledge. This founding-relationship merely shows that knowledge has an existential-ontological foundation. To be sure, merely with an existential conception of understanding, one cannot fully account for the possibility of objective knowledge. At best, understanding is only an existential-ontological condition for the possibility of objective knowledge. In order to account fully for the possibility of objective knowledge, we have to appeal to epistemological conditions.

(4) Reflection versus Hermeneutical Interpretation

In traditional transcendental philosophy reflection plays an important role. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is no exception. Indeed, Husserl claims the universal methodological function of reflection: "phenomenological method proceeds entirely through acts of reflection" (Ideas:§.77). Certainly, what Husserl has in mind is not natural reflection
but rather transcendental reflection. According to Husserl, there is an essential distinction between natural and transcendental reflection. Even within the natural attitude we perform reflection. That is to say, within the natural attitude one can discern "reflective acts" from "straightforward acts". While the latter are acts "straightforwardly" executed, the former are acts of second level. For example, what straightforward perception grasps are objects such as house, chair etc., but not the perceiving process itself. Only in a reflective act can we gain access to the perceiving process itself (CM:§15). However, this kind of reflection is basically "natural reflection". Actually, what is reflected through the natural reflection is the naive and mundane life of experience. In addition, the reflecting ego itself is also a mundane "subject"; the natural world still retains its validity. It is only in "transcendental reflection" that we put the validity of world into bracket. The transcendental reflecting ego does not belong to the world. Rather, it is a worldless "disinterested on-looker" (CM:35). To this non-participant on-looker the world becomes a cogitatum. Hence, natural reflection and transcendental reflection are similar in this thematizing function. "The proper task of reflection . . . is not to repeat the original process but to consider it and make explicit what can be found in it"
(Ibid:34). The original power which is explicated by transcendental reflection is not the naive life but rather the life of pure consciousness. It is a "critique of the transcendental ego".

Reflection is also characterized by Husserl as immanent perception, in opposition to the straightforward transcendent perception. What reflection grasps are not transcendent objects but rather immanent objects. The immanent object is included in the reflection in a reelle manner (Hu IX:§.34; Ideas:§.38). Reflection as immanent perception has a priority over transcendent perception; for reflective evidence can be adequate and apodictic. Although the later Husserl abandons the claim of adequacy of reflective evidence, the claim of apodicticity of reflective evidence remains throughout Husserl's whole life (Drummond,1975:57 ff).

However, Husserl himself also notices that reflection is essentially a process of objectification. Reflection as "immanente Objektivierung löscht das aktuelle Leben, das sie zum Objekt macht, aus. Bewusstsein und Bewusstseingehalt als Objekt ist nicht lebendiges Bewusstsein" ("Phänomenologie und Psychologie":489). That is to say, "der in der Reflektion reflektierte Pol ist nicht der lebendige Pol" (A V 5:2-3). The primal-I as a reflecting ego is always anonymous.

We have seen above that Heidegger challenges the "objectifying" character of reflection in Husserl's sense.
Accordingly, although Heidegger sticks to Husserl's idea that the phenomenological approach is essentially descriptive, he maintains that "the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation" (BT:61).

According to Heidegger, to describe something is to explicate something. It is not to impose some other things from outside. It is rather to make explicit, to thematize what is already there but still implicit and unthematized. For Heidegger, description and interpretation or explication are one and the same thing.

Hence, the term "description" for Heidegger does not denote any scientific procedure. We have to distinguish description from scientific explanation. To explain something is to reduce it to some other things as its ground. In addition, while explanation must presuppose the subject-object dichotomy, description as interpretation cannot be construed in terms of subject-object model.

Accordingly, Heidegger concludes that the function of "description as interpretation" is nothing but 'letting-something-be-seen'. "The expression "descriptive phenomenology" is tautological" (Ibid:59). For "phenomenology" in its formal sense is "a letting that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself".

If we say that it is by the introduction of his topology of phenomenology that Heidegger concretizes the formal conception
of "phenomenon", then, similarly, it is in his clarification of the nature of description that Heidegger gives us a precise characterization of the meaning of "logos". By pointing out that interpretation is the "meaning" of phenomenological description, Heidegger makes explicit the hermeneutical dimension of phenomenology. In fact, Heidegger labels his phenomenology "hermeneutical phenomenology".

In illustrating his conception of hermeneutics Heidegger remarks, "The expression 'hermeneutic' derives from the Greek verb hermeneuein. That verb is related to the noun hermeneus, which refers to the nature of the god Hermes by a playful thinking that is more compelling than the rigor of science. Hermes is the divine messenger. He brings the message of destiny, hermeneuein is that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message" (WL:29).

Historically speaking, hermeneutics first appeared as a subject in Christian theology. After Schleiermacher, hermeneutics began to be developed into an independent discipline. In Dilthey, hermeneutics became a methodology of the human sciences. Although he is influenced by Dilthey, Heidegger does not understand the term 'hermeneutics' in Dilthey's sense. As pointed out by Heidegger himself, "hermeneutics, used as an adjunct world to "phenomenology" does not have its usual meaning, methodology of interpretation, but means the interpretation itself (as such)" (Ibid:28).
In other words, the terms "hermeneutical" and "interpretative" are essentially equivalent in Heidegger.

In order to provide a more precise clarification for phenomenology, Heidegger attempts in *Being and Time* "to define the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds" (Ibid:11).

According to Heidegger, "In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a signification over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation" (BT:190-191). That is to say, there is a pre-structure essentially belonging to the nature of interpretation. Every interpretation is grounded in a pre-having, a pre-sight and a pre-conception. A pre-having is what we already have or grasp—though in an implicit manner. A pre-sight is a point of view "which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted" (BT:191; instead of "vor" we use "pre"). A pre-conception is the way in which what is to be interpreted is anonymously determined, insofar as its way of being conceived in the thematic interpretation is concerned.

We can see clearly that there is a circular structure in interpretation. One can only understand something within
a horizon. Interpretation must be already operative in
order to make possible the givenness of what is understood.
Following Schleiermacher and Dilthey, Heidegger calls this
circular structure in interpretation a "hermeneutical
circle". In terms of a part-whole model, we can formulate
it as a "dialectical relationship" (interplay) between the
whole and the part, where each gives the other meaning
(Palmer; 1967:87).

But Heidegger warns us not to regard the hermeneutical
circle as a vicious circle. In other words, we cannot
regard the pre-structuredness of interpretation as a harmful
phenomenon. Otherwise, we would totally miss the essential
nature of interpretation. For pre-understanding is the
necessary condition for the possibility of interpretation.
Here we can see that Heidegger is very opposed to the older
model of defining the essence of interpretation in terms of
the subject-object schema. As one of the basic existentials
of Dasein, "understanding" must operate within the world.
In other words, understanding is totally world-laden. Under-
standing primarily pertains to the disclosedness of the world.
In this sense, Heidegger says that understanding is the pro-
duction of world (BT:186). Heidegger points out that inter-
pretation is nothing but the working out of possibilities
which are implicit in understanding. Accordingly, interpre-
tation is not an arbitrary enterprise but must be grounded in
the temporality and the historicity of Dasein and hence in the world.

We can see that in clarifying the world the essence of interpretation, Heidegger provides an existential-ontological foundation for phenomenology. As Schrag remarked, "Heidegger's phenomenology is consistently geared to a fundamental ontology of existence" (Palmer; 1967:289).

(5) The "Topos" of Phenomenon

From its general verbal meaning, one can understand "phenomenology" as "logic of phenomena". Clearly, the extension of the term "phenomenon" will determine the thematic dimension of phenomenological research. The question concerning the Topos of phenomenon is accordingly two-fold: first, it is a question about the "place" of phenomenon (or the extension of the term "phenomenon"): second, it is a question about the topic of phenomenological research.5

Indeed, one of the most important distinctions between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology lies in their different answer to the question: "what is the Topos of phenomenon?". In order to understand the difference between their answers, let us start with an explication of Husserl's concept of phenomenon. Even before the appearance of Ideen I, Husserl had worked out his conception of phenomenon in a clear-cut manner, which serves as his final answer to the question concerning the Topos of phenomenon.
According to Husserl, the word "phenomenon" has a double-meaning: "Einerseits heisst Phänomen (im Sinne der Phänomenologie immer verstanden) die jeweilige reelle cogitatio, das reelle Bewusstsein" und fürs zweite aber auch der intentionale Inhalt des Bewusstseins, das in der betreffender Wahrnehmung, Vorstellung, Meinung Gemeinte, Wahrge- nommene, Vorgestellte als solches. Dem eigentlichen Wortsin besser entspricht der zweite Begriff von Phänomen. Es ist eben das φανέρωμα das, was erscheint" (Hu X:336). In short, "phenomenon" in Husserl's sense is nothing but the correlation of "reelles consciousness" and "its intentional content".

Husserl maintains that this concept of phenomenon is essentially different from the natural-scientific concept of phenomenon ("Phänomenologie und Psychologie" §1). "Phenomenon in natural-scientific sense" denotes "was der natürliche Mensch vor der Wissenschaft und was wir alle im praktischen Leben schlechthin gelten lassen --. die Dinge, so wie sie sich nach Eigenschaften, Zusammenhängen, Verhältnissen unmittelbar in der sinnlichen Erfahrung geben: die farbigen, glänzenden, tönenden, warmen und wie sonst immer sinnlich bestimmten Dinge" (Ibid:484). In other words, "phenomenon" in natural-scientific sense is nothing but "Naturerscheinung, schlechthin" (Ibid:485). Natural sciences is concerned only with "die realen Phänomene", "die Erfahrungspählen, sofern sie wirk- liches Sein bekunden" (Ibid:486). Accordingly, natural sciences
has nothing to say about appearances such as remembrances, dreams and Phanatasy, and pictoral appearances, insofar as they are "als Bestand des erfahrenden Bewusstsein" and not as the "sich bekundende Wirklichkeiten". That is to say, natural science is condemned to miss the dimension of "Gegebenheitsweisen" (Ibid:487).

According to Husserl, the difference between these two conceptions of phenomenon corresponds to the distinction between two different attitudes: "The natural experiencing attitude" and "the phenomenological attitude". In "the natural experiencing attitude" we grant objective reality to that which appears. But in "the phenomenological attitude" "wird die erscheinende Wirklichkeit rein als Inhalt des betreffenden Erfahrens gesetzt" (Ibid:489). Correlatively, in the natural-experiencing attitude, "Das aktuelle Leben und Erleben is zwar bewusst, aber es ist darum nicht schon erfahren und gewusst" (Ibid). It is only in the phenomenological attitude that we reflect this "Erleben" itself. Accordingly, the "purely psychic" as a phenomenon must be distinguished from the "psychic" in empirical sense. According to Husserl, any overlooking of this essential difference is condemned to commit the "fallacy of transcendental psychology" (Hu V:148; FTL:ch. 6).

We can clearly see that it is not "die Natur, die im Bewusstsein bekundet" or "das erscheinende Objektive" but rather
"das bekundende Bewusstsein" or "das Ercheinen und die Erscheinung in sich selbst, als Bewusstseinserlebnis" in transcendental sense that forms the theme of Husserlian phenomenology ("Phänomenologie und Psychologie":483). In other words, the Topos of Husserl's phenomenology is basically intentionality in its two-fold structure: Intentio and Intentum.

Although Heidegger asserts that phenomenology can be expressed in the fundamental maxim "To the things themselves" which is a slogan declared by Husserl in his Logical Investigations, he does not totally stick to Husserl's version of phenomenology. Instead of introducing his own conception of phenomenology by following Husserl's elaboration of phenomenology, Heidegger starts from an etymological analysis of the term "phenomenology".

The term "phenomenology" consists of two parts: "phēnomenon" (φαινομενον) and "logos" (λογος). In Greek, the term "φαινομενον" is derived from the verb "φαίνομαι" which means "to show itself", "to manifest itself". Thus the term "phēnomenon" signifies "that which shows itself from itself", "that which manifests itself from itself". Accordingly, "phenomena" can mean the totality of what can be brought to light.

Heidegger warns us not to confuse phenomenon with appearance. Appearance "does not mean showing-itself; it means either the announcing-itself by something which does not
show itself, but which accounces itself through something which does show itself" (BT:52). Thus, though there is a dependence-relationship between them, appearance can never be identified with phenomenon. Only what shows itself in itself can be the phenomenon of phenomenology.

But what can we call the things themselves? "What is it that phenomenology is to 'let us see'? "What is it that must be called a 'phenomenon' in a distinctive sense?" (Ibid:59).

In attempting to answer the above questions, Heidegger introduces his own topology of phenomenology. As a preliminary characterization of the topology of his phenomenology, Heidegger points out that the phenomenon of phenomenology "is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground" (Ibid). Accordingly, Heidegger maintains that it is only the Being of beings which can be called a phenomenon in a distinctive sense. The reason for this is clearly shown by Heidegger when he states: "Being can be covered so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning. Thus that which demands that it becomes a phenomenon, and which demands this in a distinctive sense and
in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object" (Ibid). Hence, for Heidegger, the phenomena of phenomenology are nothing but the Being of beings, including its meaning, modifications and derivations.

By introducing his topology of phenomenology, Heidegger concretizes the formal conception of phenomenology. Phenomenology as the science of phenomena now becomes the science of the Being of beings.

Since the explication of Being itself and the visualization of the Being of beings belong to the proper task of ontology, we can see that there must be an intimate relationship between phenomenology and ontology. Heidegger points out that phenomenology is our way of access to Being, the theme of ontology. "Only as phenomenology is ontology possible" (Ibid:60). On the other hand, since the proper extension of "phenomenon" is Being in its unconcealedness and concealment, phenomenology and ontology are two different aspects of the one and same discipline. While the term "phenomenology" characterizes more on its methodological dimension, the term "ontology" expresses more on the content of its subject-matter. However, there is no such essential connection between ontology and phenomenology in the case of Husserl. Ontology for Husserl is nothing but the science of the a priori. There are two kinds of a priori in Husserl's phenomenology:
(1) formal *a priori* (2) material, contingent *a priori* (Ideas:§.10; PTL:§.6). Accordingly, Husserl speaks of the following two types of ontology: formal ontology and material ontology. Both formal ontology and material ontology are mundane. They can be regarded as belonging to mundane phenomenology which is eidetic in nature. However, although transcendental phenomenology is also eidetic, it is not on the same level with formal ontology and material ontology. Formal ontology and material ontology can be best regarded as "clues" or "indices" to transcendental phenomenology.

In his later years, Husserl also introduces an ontology of the life-world (Crisis:§.51). This ontology is concerned with the *a priori* structure of life-world. However, this ontology of the life-world still belongs to the mundane realm and consequently is also excluded from the dimension of transcendental phenomenology.

Heidegger also speaks of *a priori*, but it is "ein Titel des Seins". According to Heidegger, *"a priori"* is identical with *"prius"*, *"πρότερον"* and "earlier". The formal meaning of *"a priori"* is: "was von vorher" or "was von früher her schon ist". Accordingly, "Das A priori ist das an etwas, was deran schon immer des Frühere ist" (Ga XX:99). Heidegger's thematicization of the temporal meaning of *"a priori"* is not accidental. For Heidegger, "Das A priori ist vielmehr charakter der Aufbaufolge im Sein des Seienden, in der Seinsstruktur"
des Seins" (Ibid:102). However, as ideal object, a priori in Husserlian sense seems to lack such a temporal meaning.

(6) Intentionality

Although Husserl objects to the opinion which understands "die Phänomenologie als eine Art Fortsetzung der Psychologie Brentanos" (Hu V:59), he admits that without Brentano's idea of intentionality his phenomenology would not be possible. However, there is also an essential difference between Husserl's and Brentano's conception of intentionality.

Brentano's main interest is to search for a criterion which enables us to distinguish psychical phenomenon from physical phenomenon. According to Brentano, intentionality is the essential characteristic of psychical phenomenon.

But clearly, Brentano's conception of intentionality is mainly psychologically oriented. That is why Landgrebe says that: "Entscheidend für den Unterschied dieser Auffassung der Intentionalität von derjenigen Husserls ist es nun, dass in Brentanos Untersuchung der intentionalen Beziehung von vornherin alle erkenntnistheoretischen Fragen bewusst ausgeschaltet sind" (1978:12). In Husserl's philosophy the notion of intentionality is primarily developed in an epistemological context. Intentionality is regarded by Husserl as the essential characteristic of consciousness; all consciousness is consciousness of something. Moreover, Husserl makes an important distinction between Intentio (or Noesis) and Intentum (or
Noema).

Heidegger totally accepts Husserl's critique of Brentano's formulation of intentionality. However, he poses the question concerning the ontological status of intentionality (Ga XX:§.62). According to Heidegger, Husserl fails to pose the question concerning the Being of intentionality. Husserl also sees "Intentionalität als gegenseitige Zugehörigkeit von Intention und Intentum" (Ibid:41). But Heidegger insists that this kind of characterization "ist nicht das letzte Wort, sondern lediglich erste Anzeige und Aufweisung eines thematischen Felde für Betrachtungen" (Ibid:61).

Instead of an epistemological conception of intentionality, Heidegger understands intentionality as behaviour toward an entity (Ibid:48; 62). In addition to his reinterpretation of intentionality as Verhalten, Heidegger also extends Husserl's conception of intentionality. In fact, he gives us two kinds of extension.

First, an extension in the horizontal dimension: Husserl's conception of intentionality is primarily epistemological. That is to say, what he is concerned with is basically cognitive intentionality. In his fundamental-ontological analysis of intentional relationship, Heidegger introduces pre-cognitive intentionality. What is given "curcumspective concern" is not a material object but a tool (or something ready-to-hand).
Second, an extension in the vertical direction: Both the pre-cognitive and cognitive intentionalities are essentially entity-oriented. However, Heidegger points out that there is also a Seinsintentionalität (Müller, 1964:103). Indeed, one can characterize Being and Time as a phenomenology of Seinsintentionalität. The central concepts in this book such as "Sorge", "Angst", and "Erschlossenheit" are different types of Seinsintentionalität. The "intentum" of these Seinsintentionalitātēn are not entities but rather Being (of Dasein). 7

Insofar as Heidegger emphasizes the primacy of pre-cognitive intentionality over cognitive intentionality, he extends the conception of ontical intentionality. In addition, with the introduction of Seinsintentionalität, he opens a new dimension of ontological intentionality.

C. Complementary Relationship Between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Theories of Individuation

From the previous section we can see that the difference between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies is quite fundamental. With regard to this fundamental divergence, what kind of conclusion should we draw insofar as the relationship between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies is concerned? Should we be satisfied with Schacht that Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s are two kinds of phenomenology and each has nothing to do with the other? (1972:314). Or,
should we follow the "translation-thesis" which is proposed by Føllesdal and J.N. Mohanty that Heidegger's phenomenology is merely an isomorphic mapping of Husserl's? (Føllesdal, 1979:365 ff; Mohanty, 1978:324 ff) In a letter to Roman Ingarden, Husserl wrote:

"Das eingehende 'Studium von Heidegger'? I kam zum Resulat, dass ich das Werk nicht dem Rahmen meiner Phänomenologie einordnen kann, leider aber auch dass ich es methodisch ganz und gar u. in Wesentlichen auch sachlich ablehnen muss" (Briefe an Roman Ingarden:56).

Should we follow Husserl in excluding Heidegger's phenomenology from the realm of phenomenology and regard Husserl's as the only orthodox phenomenology? On the other hand, Biemel points out that "Heidegger interprets Husserl in such a way that he attempts to keep him out of the idealistic perspective and protect the Aristotelian aspect of philosophizing in Husserl's work" (1975:46-7). But does such a viewpoint imply that Husserl's phenomenology would be replaced by Heidegger's? All these questions show unequivocally the difficulties in determining the relationship between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies.

In the following we attempt to show neither that these two types of phenomenology are disconnected with each other, nor that Heidegger's phenomenology is merely a translation of Husserl's; neither that Heidegger's phenomenology should be excluded from the realm of phenomenology, nor that Husserl's
phenomenology should be replaced by Heidegger's, but rather, that there is a founding-relationship between them, provided we "reinterpreted" Husserl's phenomenology as a critique of knowledge. In order to show how this is the case, we have to justify the following two theses.

First, that Heidegger's phenomenology is a radical development of Husserl's.

Second, in spite of this radicalization Husserl's phenomenology is not eliminated.

The justification of these two theses will be shown in the complementary relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation.

But in what sense are they compatible and complementary to each other?

In order to answer this question, let us start with a thematization of the positive relationship between Husserl's theory of the individuation of things and Heidegger's.

We have seen that Husserl's principles for the individuation of things are primarily concerned with material things or real objects. Accordingly, they do not cover the individuation of things ready-to-hand. However, Heidegger's principles of the individuation of things are primarily for things ready-to-hand. They are also unable to cover the individuation of things present-at-hand or real objects. Indeed, we have seen that the idea of the individuality
of real objects i.e., "Einzmaligkeit des Daseins", is different from the idea of the individuality of things ready-to-hand, i.e., "speciality of function". However, this does not mean that these two theories have nothing to do with each other and that they are merely compatible with each other only because they move on different levels. On the contrary, they are complementary to each other exactly in the sense that there is a complementary relationship between theory and praxis.

In the following we will try to point out that there is not only a founding-relationship between things present-at-hand and things ready-to-hand, but that there is also a founding-relationship between objective time and world-time, between objective space and world-space; also we will attempt to show that from the standpoint of theory of individuation, in particular, of the problem of identification, one can justify the necessity of the theory of the individuation of things present-at-hand.

In claiming the primacy of givenness of things ready-to-hand, Heidegger does not intend to eliminate the dimension of objects or things present-at-hand. Nor does he try to eliminate the "theoretical attitude" in favour of the "practical attitude". What he maintains is that the givenness of objects or things present-at-hand is not primordial but rather derivative. That is to say, according to Heidegger,
the givenness of things ready-to-hand founds the givenness of objects. Indeed, he admits "Leibhaftigkeit" as the "charakteristische Aufdringlichkeit des Naturdinges"; only he claims that "Leibhaftigkeit" is "fundiert in der Zuhandenheit" (Ga XX:266).

To be sure, Heidegger's assertion "dass die Leibhaftigkeit fundiert ist" is opposed to Husserl's thesis of the primacy of perception or the primacy of theoretical attitude (Ibid). It is also true that Husserl complains that Heidegger misunderstood the sense of the Abbau of the physical world (Cairns, 1976:18). For Husserl, even tools are beings in the sense of something identical (B I 32 II:23). That is to say, tools too need to be observed in a theoretical attitude, i.e., to be objectively grasped and explicated.

In order to settle this controversy, we have to make a distinction between the "order of givenness" and the "order of constitution". While the former is descriptive, the latter is transcendental. When Heidegger claims that things ready-to-hand is prior to things present-at-hand, it is with regard to the "order of givenness" and not to the "order of constitution". And what Husserl has in mind when he says that the material thing is the Unterlage of "Umweltding" is not the "order of givenness" but rather the "order of constitution". However, if Husserl is consistent in his cardinal affirmation at the end of Ideen II, namely "nature is relative, Geist is
absolute", or, the priority of personalistic attitude over naturalistic attitude, then it is not only necessary for him to draw the conclusion that Geist is prior to nature regarding the "order of constitution" but also that the practical thing or "Umweltding" is prior to the material thing regarding the "order of givenness". As pointed out by Landgrebe, "dass die 'personalistische' Einstellung eigentlich keine Einstellung ist, sondern die Weise des unmittelbaren Habens der Welt" (1978:161).

Accordingly, when Husserl still grants the priority to the material thing over the practical thing, he ranks the "order of constitution" over the "order of givenness" and hence departs from his descriptive finding in favour of a transcendental approach which is yet Vorhandheit-oriented.

On the other hand, in claiming the primacy of the ready-to-hand Heidegger's standpoint is purely descriptive, insofar as he fully sticks to the "order of givenness". For him there is no conflict between the "order of givenness" and the "order of constitution". Indeed, in Heidegger's philosophy there is no such "order of constitution". Instead, he speaks of the "ontological genesis" (BT:413).

According to Heidegger, an object arises only through the operation of "thematization" (Ibid:414). Here "thematization" does not mean "explication" in general sense. Rather, it is identical with the operation of "objectification".
Heidegger points out that "thematization" or "objectification" does not first posit the entities, but frees them so that one can integrate them and determine their character 'Objectively' (Ibid). That is to say, the possibility of such an operation of thematization or objectification is grounded or founded on the primordial givenness of the ready-to-hand. As a way of "Gegenwärtigung" "thematization" correlates to the "Leibhaftigkeit" of objects. While "thematization" is the "Zugangsart" to the present-at-hand, "Leibhaftigkeit" is the character of the "Anwesenheit" or "Präsenz" of the present-at-hand.

In addition to the descriptive standpoint, there is also a "logical" justification for the thesis of the primacy of the ready-to-hand. If one claims that the primordial givenness is found in material things or objects and that things ready-to-hand have only a secondary or derivative givenness, then one can hardly "explain" the "non-arbitrariness" of attributing "practical value" or "significance" to the "naked" object without appeal to non-phenomenological ground. In addition, it is also difficult to account for the possibility of the "variety" or "multiplicity" of equipments without committing oneself to a conventionistic position which is outside the realm of phenomenology.

Nevertheless, the above clarifications clearly show in what sense the present-at-hand is founded on the ready-to-
hand. This founding-relation does not imply the elimination of the dimension of objects.

Similarly, Heidegger, in maintaining the priority of the "order of givenness", claims for the primacy of givenness of world-space over objective space. According to Heidegger, it is only by means of the process of "Entweltlichung" that we can discover the "space of extended things". In other words, "When space is discovered non-circumspectively by just looking at it, the environmental region get neutralized to pure dimensions" (Ibid:147).

But in what sense does "time for the ready-to-hand" founds "objective time"?

According to Heidegger, "time for the ready-to-hand" arises from the "umsichtige Gegenwärtigung". "Die umsichtige Gegenwärtigung aber ist ein mehrfach fundiertes phänomen . . . Sie gründet in einem \textit{halten} des Zeugzusammenhangs, den besorgend das Dasein einer Möglichkeit gewärtig ist" (SZ:359). From the discussion of the structures of "datability" and "significance" of world-time, we have seen that in everyday life world-time is "measured" by means of daily events. Prior to any "objective measurement" world-time is already given to us in this way. But "objective time" which is the time for things present-at-hand is constituted by the "sinnliche Gegenwärtigung", i.e., the perceptual time-consciousness (Ibid:363).
While the structure of "umsichtige Gegenwärtigung" is: "gewärtigend-behaltenden Gegenwärtigen", the structure of "sinnliche Gegenwärtigung" is: "retention--primal impression--protention". We have seen that "Leibhaftigkeit" is founded on "Zuhandenheit". As a consequence, perception is not the primordial "Zugangssart" to the world. Corresponding to the primacy of the practical attitude over the theoretical attitude, objective time is secondary and derivative regarding the "order of givenness". Since objectification or thematization is founded on practical concern, the possibility of objective time is grounded on the possibility of world-time.

All these founding-relationships clearly show that Husserl's theory of the individuation of things must ground its possibility on Heidegger's. In this sense, Heidegger's theory of the individuation of things is a radical development of Husserl's. In his published works Heidegger did not develop a theory of the individuation of objects. But it can be understood that he regards his theory of the individuation of things ready-to-hand as a complementary development rather than an opposition or a refutation of Husserl's theory of the individuation of objects. Indeed, he also agrees that to individualize things present-at-hand or objects one has to appeal to objective space and objective time. In this sense, their theories of the individuation of things coexist
with each other.

That Heidegger's theory of individuation is a radical development of Husserl's can be more clearly seen in the relationship between their theories of the individuation of the ego.

We have seen that Husserl's principles of individuation are only applicable to the "constituted ego". The ego qua ego cannot be subject to the idea of individuality which underlies all these principles which he works out. He can only "accept" the individuation of the primal-I as an absolute Faktum. Although he clearly sees that this kind of Faktum is beyond the distinction between essence (or Eidös) and factuality, with his objectificational reflective approach, he cannot provide any "positive evidence" for the whole dimension of the primal-I. As pointed out by Landgrebe, the "postulate"-character of the primal-I reveals the limitation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology (1974:283; 1976:173). At this point Heidegger's complains that Husserl's Neo-Kantianism as a non-phenomenological element can be well understood. Indeed, to claim Ur-ich as an Urfaktum can change nothing from the fact that Ur-Ich is not a phenomenological finding but rather results from the transcendental-presuppositional method. From the historical standpoint, Husserl's assertion that "Ich bin das Urfaktum . . . das Absolute" resembles to Pichte's famous motto: "Ich bin Ich" (Hu XV:386). Namely,
"Ur-ich . . ., das dem Unterschied von ego und alter ego voraufliegt, das erst dem Plural aus sich hervorbrechen lässt . . . die Entzweitheit alles Seienden (essentia existentia) in einer Ur-Einheit, die weder 'faktisch', noch 'möglich', weder eins, not vielhaft, weder ein Exemplar, noch eine Gattung ist" is basically a metaphysical ground (Fink, 1976:223-4). Such a dimension of "Faktizität" can only be positively formulated in a non-metaphysical language by Heidegger's fundamental ontology. As pointed out by Theunissen: "Husserl verkündet die individuelle Faktizität des transzendentalen ego und beteuert ihre Verschiedenheit von der mundanen Tatsächlichkeit. Aber erst Heidegger entdeckt die Dimension, in der diese Faktizität, als die von der 'Tatsächlichkeit des factum brutum eines Vorhandenen' verschiedene Faktizität des Daseins ursprünglich beheimatet ist" (1965:159). Indeed, the individuation of the ego qua ego is disclosed in anxiety, e.g., and not just a "postulate". Accordingly, the individuation of the ego qua ego is an "erweisbares Urfaktum". Moreover, as Carl Gethmann remarked, "ist das Subjekt für Heidegger nicht konstituierend, sondern Konstitution vollziehend" (1974:123). That is to say, Dasein is not an ultimate metaphysical ground. Rather, it is the Da of Sein. In the Erschlossenheit of Being Dasein erschliesst its Self and hence is individualized. Accordingly, the ego qua ego is individualized by its Being.
Insofar as Heidegger's "Hermeneutik der Faktizität" not only can positively unfold the dimension of the ego qua ego but also provides the principles of individuation which individualize the ego qua ego, Heidegger's theory of the individuation of the ego radicalizes Husserl's. And that Heidegger's theory of individuation is a radical development of Husserl's provides us with a very important example which "demonstrates" that Heidegger's phenomenological approach is a radical development of Husserl's.

But despite this radicalization-relationship between Husserl's theory of individuation and Heidegger's, it is incorrect to say that Husserl's theory of individuation should be eliminated.

In the case of the problem of the individuation of things we have seen that Husserl's theory and Heidegger's have their respective "Geltungsbereich". Husserl's theory of the individuation of objects is not just founded on Heidegger's theory of the individuation of the ready-to-hand. Rather, his theory of the individuation of objects has its own necessity.

To precisely identify something (purely when it is regarded as something) is one of the major aims of the theory of individuation. We have seen the basic idea of the individuation of the ready-to-hand is individuation according
to speciality of function. However, with such an idea of individuation one always encounters the following problem, namely, how to differentiate this chopstick from that chopstick, e.g., that they have the same kind of function in the same *Zeugzusammenhang* prevents us from differentiating them merely by appeal to their *Zeugcharakter*. To a certain extent to appeal to their position in world-space allows us to make a distinction between them. But clearly, the idea of individuation is already changed from individuality as speciality of function to individuality as *Einmaligkeit des Daseins*.

In addition, there are cases in which neither world-space nor world-time can contribute anything. For example, by all means which we use in individualizing a ready-to-hand it is impossible to make a distinction between the bus today I take from city A to city B and the bus last week I took from city A to city B. That means, that in appealing solely to the principles of individuation of the ready-to-hand, we cannot know whether the first bus is the second bus. In order to differentiate them we have to treat them as objects and appeal to their respective endurance throughout temporal positions and their respective spatial loci throughout the entire time-period. Certainly, in the bus service whether a particular bus runs today or last Monday makes no difference. In other words, from the standpoint of practical concern,
insofar as it is a bus which performs the same function, it is the same bus. But, for example, in order to identify a particular bus which is responsible for an accident, we need the "objective observation". In this sense, the theory of the individuation of objects has its own necessity.

Accordingly, although Husserl's theory of individuation of things has an derivative character, it has its own justification. This also clearly shows in what sense his theory of the individuation of things or objects is a complement to Heidegger's theory of the individuation of the ready-to-hand.

Moreover, a similar complementary relationship also exists between Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of the individuation of the ego.

We have seen that time individualizes Dasein qua Self primarily in the sense of "Zukunftigkeit". But such an ontological principle of individuation is purely formal. In concretizing such a principle in "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness", the idea of individuality is emphasized on the aspect of "irreplaceability". For example, each Dasein qua Self is unique in its irreplaceable dying. But in our critical discussion of this theory of the individuation of the ego we have pointed out that there lacks any external criterion enabling us to differentiate two different Daseins from a standpoint of a third person.
Then there is no answer for the question: how is it possible to "know" (kennenlernen) a strange Dasein?

Within Heidegger's ontological approach and existential "solipsism" it seems impossible to provide any ontical external criterion which enables us to differentiate strange Daseins, especially when they are in the mode of inauthenticity; for Heidegger has "ontologicalized" the concept of "Faktizität".

Although Husserl's three principles of the individuation of the ego, namely, "style of motivation", "habitualities" and "coherence of history", are not able to individualize the primal-I, they can well function as external criteria in differentiating Daseins. For example, two Daseins as factual individuals -- even when they are in the mode of inauthenticity -- can be differentiated by appeal to the differences between their personal histories or the differences between their personalities which are formed by their respective habitualities. In this direction Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego -- insofar as we interpret its principles in an "external" direction -- provides a means to fill up the gap in Heidegger's theory of individuation of Dasein. Such an "external" reading of Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego not only "rescues" this theory but shows how it can be complementary to Heidegger's theory of the individuation of the ego.
Certainly, in accordance with Heidegger's "transformation" of acts, "habitualities" must be understood as intentional "Verhaltenen". Moreover, the "Zugangsart" to the "style of motivation", "habitualities" and "personal history" should be the "intersubjective Verstehen".

With these modifications Husserl's principles of the individuation of the ego forms a necessary complement to Heidegger's.

The above clarification of the necessity of Husserl's theory of the individuation of objects and the positive contribution of his theory of the individuation of the ego as well as their respective complementary relationship with Heidegger's theory of individuation provides us with an important example in "demonstrating" that in spite of Heidegger's radicalization Husserl's phenomenological approach is not eliminated.

D. The Unity of Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenologies

The above explication of the "complementary" relationship between Husserl's theory of individuation and Heidegger's exemplifies the thesis that there is a founding-relationship between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies.

But such an example only demonstrates the possibility of this thesis. Since there are non-phenomenological, metaphysical elements in Husserl's phenomenology, we cannot claim that Husserl's phenomenology is eo ipso compatible with
Heidegger's phenomenology. Rather, a "purification" of Husserl's phenomenology is necessary. Namely, we have to "reinterpret" it as a "critique of knowledge". We will see that under such a "reinterpretation" Husserl's phenomenology (as a "critique of knowledge") can be unified with Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology.

To "purify" Husserl's phenomenology as a critique of knowledge is by no means arbitrary. Rather, it is an "Aneignung" of Husserl's phenomenology. As pointed out by Tugendhat, there are two motives in Husserl's phenomenology, namely, the "dogmatic motive" and the "motive of a critique of knowledge" (1967:201-211). While the dogmatic motive represents the search for apodictic evidence or ultimate metaphysical ground, the motive of a critique of knowledge leads to the thematization of the dimension of "ways of givenness" of objects. While the former is identical with the Cartesian way, the latter corresponds to the ontological way. According to Iso Kern, there is a priority of the ontological way over the Cartesian way. Only the ontological way can yield "the sense of the phenomenological reduction . . . which Husserl ultimately always intends" (Kern, 1964:235; Drummond, 1975:48). But Tugendhat and John Drummond maintain that for Husserl these two ways are inseparable and complementary with each other (Tugendhat, 1967:202; Drummond, 1975:47-8). With regard to the actual development of Husserl's philosophy the thesis of Tugendhat and Drummond is right. However, if we try to
"purify" Husserl's phenomenology from its metaphysical
tendency and "aneignen" it as a critique of knowledge, we
have to follow Kern's thesis.

What will Husserl's phenomenology become, if we abandon
its dogmatic motive and only reactivate its motive of a
critique of knowledge?

First of all, the thesis of the primacy of perception
will lose its universal-validity in the sense that its validity
is limited to the investigation of the "objective" phenomenon,
i.e., the phenomenon which is subject to the subject-object
dichotomy. That is to say, the thesis of the primacy of
perception is given up insofar as the "order of givenness"
is concerned.

Second, as pointed out by Tugendhat, "das Wie der Konst-
titution seinerseits nicht mehr aus dem Ego-cogito begründbar
ist" (1967:217). In other words, Husserl's concept of consti-
tution here should be primarily understood as "thematization"
or "objectification" in Heidegger's sense.

It is important to note that the abandonment of the
dogmatic motive only forces Husserl to give up his idea of
phenomenology as strict science in the sense of a Cartesian
dream. This does not lead him to become a skeptic. Rather,
it reveals that phenomenology as a critique of knowledge has
as its proper task not the "restless" search for an Archimedian
point but rather the unfolding of the dimension of ways of
givenness of objects.

We have seen that in Heidegger's phenomenology there is a task of clarifying the "ontological genesis" of theoretical behaviour (Verhaltens) from the circumspective concern (Umsicht). Such a task urges us not only to thematize the ways of givenness of things ready-to-hand, but also to unfold the ways of givenness of objects. So, even from the standpoint of Heideggerian phenomenology, a critique of knowledge is necessary.

Indeed, although Heidegger rejects Husserl's thesis of the primacy of perception, insofar as the "order of givenness" is concerned, he does not deny the possibility of objective knowledge. Rather, he affirms "that knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and is founded ontically upon this states of Being" (BT:88). In his statement: "dass Leibhaftigkeit ein echter phänomenaler charakter ist, sofern ich mich nämlich in der bestimmten Zugangsart zum Seienden als bross hinsehendes Wahrnehmen aufhalte", one can clearly see that Heidegger also has to acknowledge the contribution of Husserl's phenomenology of perception (Ga, XX:300). What Heidegger insists on, in opposition to Husserl, is merely that "knowing" and "Leibhaftigkeit" are founded phenomena and intentional acts are primarily Verhaltenen rather than reelle immanent objects. Such a phenomenological correction does not imply the elimination of the dimension of consciousness.
In short, what he claims is nothing but that consciousness is founded upon Dasein (Vier Seminare:117-121). According to him, we can well have a "formal phenomenology of consciousness" (BT:151). 9

To be sure, in accordance with Heidegger's destruction of Husserl's concept of subjectivity, Husserl's idea of absolute ego must be abandoned. Indeed, such an idea arises mainly from the dogmatic motive. Time-consciousness should not be understood as an absolute subject but has to be construed as the structure of perceptual consciousness. As rightly pointed out by Brough, "a single phase of a perceptual act . . . would not be intended by the 'Querschnitt' but would be the 'Querschnitt' of time-consciousness" (1969:475). Accordingly, the "fungierende" ego in Husserl's sense should be reinterpreted as Dasein in the mode of "Erkennen". Such an epistemological reinterpretation of time-consciousness will not only preserve Husserl's insight in unfolding the structure of time-consciousness, but also conforms to Heidegger's thesis that "sinnliche Gegewährigung" is a founded phenomenon.10 Indeed, such a reinterpretation is not arbitrary. It is essentially in accordance with the "Aneignung" of the motive of a critique of knowledge without collapse into the dogmatic motive.

However, Heidegger's phenomenology is also not eo ipso compatible with Husserl's phenomenology as a critique of
knowledge. According to Heidegger, "Phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities -- ontology" (BT:61). Insofar as through phenomenology Being is thought qua Being, one can agree with him that "Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible" (Ibid:60). But it is too narrow to identify phenomenology as fundamental-ontology. In the individuation-problematic we can clearly see that not only "individual essence" or "concrete essence" is ontical, objective time and objective space as eidetic structures of perceptual life-world are also ontical. Moreover, without appealing to the ontical dimension one cannot provide any external criterion for the differentiation of Daseins as factual individuals. As rightly pointed out by Theunissen: "dass 'je ein Ich' das Dasein sei" is only a "formale Aussage" (1965: 162). Indeed, Heidegger also speaks of "Faktizität" and "historicity". But while he understands "Faktizität" as "Sein-können", "historicity" is merely regarded by him in Being and Time as an "existential". Accordingly, both terms are "inhaltlich leer". Such a "formal character" clearly shows the limitation of the ontological approach in the individuation-problematic. We have seen that Husserl's principles of the individuation of the ego (in an 'external' reading) are supplementary to such an approach. In particular, "personal history" can be regarded as an ontical concretization of the "historicity" of Dasein. Theunissen appropriately remarks:
"Das Verhältnis der wirklich phänomenologischen Phänomenologie Husserls zur Fundamental-Ontologie ist das der leeren Anzeige zur konkreten Erfüllung" (Ibid). Accordingly, in addition to an ontological phenomenology we need also an ontical phenomenology.

Based on the above clarification of the possibility of a reinterpretation of Husserl's phenomenology as a critique of knowledge and the sense of complementary relationship between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies, we can clearly see in what way these two types of phenomenology can be unified into a phenomenology in a broad sense.

A phenomenology in a broad sense is concerned not only with the pre-objective phenomenon but also with the objective phenomenon, not only with the ontological phenomenon but also with ontical phenomenon. The Zugangsart to the phenomenon is not only perception but also circumspective concern, not only reflection but also hermeneutical self-understanding.

In this connection we have to reply to the following two kinds of challenge.

First, Künig maintains that Husserl's "phenomenology as such is not the same as epistemology" (1977:345). If Künig's thesis is right, then our understanding of Husserl's phenomenology as a critique of knowledge would be impossible. But on what ground does Künig reject the identification of Husserlian phenomenology as an epistemology?
According to Künig, "Epistemology is the discipline which seeks to assess the value of our knowledge claims, while phenomenology is primarily a descriptive, not a valuative, discipline" (Ibid).

Now one can say that Künig's rejection of the understanding of Husserlian phenomenology as an epistemology is based on his own conception of epistemology. However, one has to further ask: why epistemology has to be evaluative and cannot be descriptive? Künig does not provide any answer.

As early as in Logical Investigations Husserl already developed a "phenomenological elucidation of knowledge" purely from the descriptive approach. In Idea of Phenomenology he provides us with an epistemological critique of the problem of transcendence. Here his major question is: "Soll ich mit Hume alle transcendente Objektivität auf Fiktionen reduzieren, die sich mittels der Psychologie erklären, aber nicht vernunftmässig rechtfertigen lassen?" (Hu II:20). One can clearly see that what Husserl tries to develop is exactly a descriptive theory of knowledge in opposition to Humean psychological, explanatory theory of knowledge. All this happens even prior to his transcendental turn!

Indeed, in unfolding the epistemological performance of intentionality Husserl shows us concretely how a descriptive epistemology is possible. In a sense, Husserl would say that only as phenomenology is epistemology possible. Husserlian
phenomenology without epistemology would be like Heideggerian phenomenology without ontology. So, if we do not misunderstand his thesis, then Küng's thesis is not justified.

Second, Schrag expresses doubt regarding the possibility of a hermeneutical phenomenology. According to him, since phenomenology is scientific in character and hermeneutics belongs to a historical mode of thinking, they are not only different but incompatible with each other. Therefore, Schrag claims that it is not possible to combine these two disciplines into a single subject (1967:292-3). If Schrag's thesis is correct, then not only Heidegger could no longer be regarded as a phenomenologist but our attempt to unify it with Husserl's phenomenology would become impossible.

In order to find out that whether Schrag's challenge is justified, let us start with an explication of Heidegger's reason for the introduction of hermeneutical dimension into phenomenology. According to Heidegger, Dasein is never a worldless subject but is always Being-in-the-world. Understanding is an existential of the constitution of Dasein. In other words, Dasein as Being-in-the-world is condemned to understand. Because of the historicity of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, Dasein's projection, including the self-understanding of Dasein, is essentially historical in character. Accordingly, a phenomenologist who himself is Being-in-the-world can only describe what is given to him in his "historical
understanding". Moreover, when Heidegger maintains that phenomenological description cannot be presuppositionless, he means only that there is no "pure" description of a phenomenon without some pre-understanding of it; for it is this implicit pre-understanding which makes possible for us to describe. For Heidegger the belief that we can have "pure" description independent of historical world is only a metaphysical prejudice. Actually, the old phenomenology, namely, the Munich-Göttingen Circle, sees that the proper task of phenomenology is to be the describing of ideal, timeless essential structures. But there arises a fundamental difficulty which the phenomenologists of the Munich-Göttingen Circle have to face. The difficulty is that they fail to answer the question "where does the given come from and how does it give itself to us?" without hypostatizing the essential structures, on the one hand, and positing a kind of mystical intuition, on the other hand. Of course, a phenomenologist never wants to be a metaphysician. But in order to avoid being metaphysical, phenomenology as claimed by the Munich-Göttingen Circle has to tolerate the "myth of the given" (PT:88-9;188). According to Heidegger, this difficulty in the old phenomenology results from the prejudice concerning Being, which is widespread in the whole tradition of Western thought: "The meaning of Being is what is abidingly present" (Ibid:88). It is this metaphysical prejudice which
blinds the old phenomenology from discovering the historical
world which is the inseparable horizon of any phenomeno-
logical description, and hence creates the "myth of the
given". So, as pointed out by Heidegger, the "circle" in
our understanding, i.e., the heremontical circle, cannot be
regarded as a vicious circle; for it is the very condition
of the possibility of phenomenological description. To
describe is to thematize or to make explicit what is already
implicitly given or understood. That is why Heidegger con-
cludes that the meaning of phenomenological description as
a method lies in interpretation or explication. This thesis
is the foundation for Heidegger's introduction of hermeneutical
dimension into phenomenology.

Does this introduction of hermeneutics into phenomenology
force the latter to lose its scientific character? Insofar
as the expression "to be scientific" means to recognize
what is rather than to prescribe or to speculate what ought
to be, Heidegger would agree that phenomenological description
is scientific; for this is exactly what the fundamental maxim
"To the things themselves" means. A superficial look at
Heidegger's assertion that phenomenological description is
never presuppositionless easily makes one conclude that
Heidegger can hardly maintain a scientifically oriented
phenomenology. But from a close examination of Heidegger's
assertion we can learn that the term "presupposition" here
means "pre-understanding" rather than "prejudice". "Pre-understanding" is a neutral term. The maxim of phenomenology only requires us to give up prejudices and unwarranted assumptions. Of course, there may exist some prejudices in the pre-understanding. So Heidegger tells us that in describing we must keep in mind that "our first, last and constant task is never to allow our pre-having, pre-sight, and pre-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these pre-structures in terms of things themselves" (BT:195; instead of "vpr", we use "pre"). Here we can clearly see that it is impossible to deny the scientific character of Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology. Certainly, if one claims that phenomenology is "rigorous science" as claimed by Husserl, then Heidegger surely objects that hermeneutical phenomenology can be "scientific" in this sense. According to Heidegger, to claim that phenomenology is a rigorous science which consists of eternal, timeless and ahistorical truths is based on a metaphysical prejudice originating in the Cartesian tradition (Ga XX:147).

When Schrag complains that the self-understanding which precedes the description would preclude the possibility of "reading off" the structures of phenomena as they are given, he seems to believe that there can be an ahistorical "pure given in itself" (1967:292). But, as pointed out by Heidegger
such a belief only results from a metaphysical prejudice. Schrag has to face the same difficulty in the old phenomenology.

In addition, when Schrag claims that "understanding" is always "shaping" its object in the process of knowing it and then consequently states that the existentialia of Dasein are "projected into" rather than "read out of" the phenomena, he misunderstands Heidegger's conception of understanding (Ibid). For Heidegger, it is impossible to say that the "understanding" "shapes" its "object" as in the so-called "Kantian" manner that the categories of the understanding "shape" the data given in experience. Heidegger rejects any idea of "naked" matter which is to be "shaped" in the process of understanding. Phenomena are never "meaningless" data. As rightly remarked by Merleau-Ponty, "Because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning" (1962:xix). "Understanding as an existential", "phenomena in primordial sense" and "meaning" equiprimordially constitute an inseparable whole. Schrag seems to err in trying to construe the relationship between understanding and primordial phenomena as external.

Historically speaking, even Husserl admits the hermeneutical character of phenomenology in his later years. He also calls his transcendental phenomenology the "hermeneutic of the life of consciousness" (Phenomenology and Anthropology):
140). In fact, when Husserl discovers the indispensable role played by "horizon" in phenomenology, he was already revealed the hermeneutical dimension of phenomenology in an implicit manner. In this sense Oskar Becker claims: "The tendency of hermeneutical phenomenology, though not exclusively, is toward the further concretisation of the transcendental-idealistic position of the Ideas" (Gadamer, 1976: 157).

From the above clarification we can conclude that Schrag's challenge is not justified. Moreover, we can see that Heidegger's exploration of the hermeneutical dimension of phenomenology is not only possible but also necessary.

Now we can clearly see that despite the fundamental differences between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies there is a complementarity between them, provided Husserlian phenomenology is "reinterpreted" as a critique of knowledge. In particular, such a complementarity "manifests" in the form of a founding-relationship. We can conclude that insofar as Husserlian phenomenology as a critique of knowledge is founded on Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, they form a unity.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the structure of "de-severance" and "directionality" of Dasein, see BT:138 ff. As an existential the directedness to "left" and "right" "discloses" the world-space which is not a "pure multiplicity of the three dimensions" (BT:145). In addition, since the disclosure of the world-space is not "bewusstseinsmassig" or "wahrnehmungsmassig", Heidegger's "world-space" differs from Husserl's "living-space."

2. See below: Husserl's comment on Heidegger's Kantbook.

3. For a detailed discussion of Heidegger's conception of essence and "factual reduction", see below.

4. "In his later years Heidegger performs the Destruktion no longer from the standpoint of Dasein's historicity but from the standpoint of Seinsgeschichte. This is another important mark for Heidegger's 'Kehre'."

5. These two meanings of "Topos" are first pointed out by Pöggeler. Cf. Pöggeler, 1975.

6. It should be noted that it is not only worldly objects as phenomena but also world itself as phenomenon with which Husserl is concerned. Indeed, Husserl also calls "world phenomenon" the "universal phenomenon" (Hu V:145).

7. Now we can understand why Heidegger complains that: "Die Einsicht in die Intentionalität geht nicht so weit, dass man zugleich sieht, dass des Erfassen dieser Struktur als Wesenstruktur des Daseins den ganzen Begriff des Menschen revolutionieren muss" (Ga XXVI:167); for nobody except him can unfold the dimension of Seinsintentionalität.


9. Here Heidegger affirms the contribution of the "reflective awareness".

10. Now we can concisely provide an answer to Langen's question which we mentioned in the "Introduction". We have seen that "sinnliche Gegenwärtigung" grounds its possibility in the temporality of Dasein. The "historicity" of Dasein is basically a concretization of the latter. Accordingly, the disclosure of the hermeneutical dimension of phenomenology, which presupposes the "historicity" of Dasein, is a radical development of Husserl's phenomenology. Indeed, even the most fundamental
dimension of Husserl's phenomenology - genetic phenomenology still moves within the dimension of sinnliche Gegenwärtigung. Moreover, our clarification of the founding-relationship between "sinnliche Gegenwärtigung" and "umsichtige Gegenwärtigung" shows the incorrectness of Thomas Seebohm's thesis: "Was in S. u. Z. das Gegenwärtigen ist, ist bei Husserl das 'Jetzt'. Dem Gewärtigen entspricht 'die Protention. Dem Behalten und dem wachsenden Vergessen die Retention als ein im Abfließen eben noch behalten" (1972:61).
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Our reconstruction of Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of the individuation of things as well as of the ego provides a systematic presentation of their respective insights on the centuries-old problem from their respective fragmentary treatments. Such a reconstruction not only helps us to understand the nature of their phenomenologies of individuation but also to reveal their strengths, limitations and presuppositions.

We have seen that in his theory of the individuation of things, Husserl is concerned with things present-at-hand or real objects. The concept of hyle plays an important role in this theory. In particular, the positing of the dimension of immanent objects is a presupposition in Husserl's constitutive account of time and space. However, we have shown that Husserl's theory of the constitution of time and space, and hence his theory of the individuation of things, can be refashioned without appeal to his theory of immanent objects. Such a reinterpretation can not only preserve the original insight of Husserl, but also make his theory phenomenologically more defensible.

Although Husserl explicitly enumerates only time and space as principles of the individuation of things, we have clarified
in what way world and transcendental subjectivity also form the necessary conditions for the possibility of the individuation of real objects.

In accordance with Husserl's hierarchy of the concepts of the ego, namely, the animal ego, the mundane personal ego, the transcendental monadic ego and the primal-I, we have worked out different sets of principles of the individuation of the ego. First, for the animal ego or "menschliches Wesen" we have the "physical living body" and "idiopsychische Regelungen" as the principia individuationis. Second, for the mundane personal ego there are three principles of individuation: "style of motivation", "habitualities" and "coherence of history". Third, the transcendental version of all these three principles can function as the principia individuationis for the transcendental monad. Finally, owing to the atemporal character of the primal ego, its individuation is merely regarded as an "Urfaktum".

We have learnt that, in Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego, act-time plays an important role. Since Husserl understands "act-time" merely as a time for acts as immanent objects, we proposed a reinterpretation of it. Under this reinterpretation there are three kinds of act-time. In addition to the "act-time" as the time for acts as reelle immanent objects, we have "act-time" as the time for acts in their Urstand (or the pre-immanent quasi-temporality) and
"act-time" as subjective time which is constituted by recollection. This reinterpretation of "act-time" not only provides us with a phenomenological correction of Husserl's "act-time", but also preserves all the functions that he attributes to "act-time".

In Heidegger's theory of the individuation of things, it is the ready-to-hand rather than the present-at-hand which forms the theme. According to Heidegger, a tool is not individualized by its temporal and spatial position but rather by its "Zeugcharacter" and "Zeugzusammenhang". However, we have pointed out that in order to develop a complete theory of the individuation of things ready-to-hand, world-time and world-space must be introduced as the "supplementary" principia individuationis.

Heidegger understands "ego" primarily as "Dasein", in his theory of the individuation of the ego. In clarifying Heidegger's account of the possibility of the selfsameness of the Self, we have shown in what way time functions as the principle of the individuation of Dasein qua Self. Heidegger, in concretizing this formal principle of individuation into "anxiety", "death", "conscience" and "resoluteness", provides principia individuationis which can individualize the ego qua ego. This is the most important contribution of Heidegger to the problem of the individuation of the ego. Nevertheless, we have also pointed out that Heidegger, within his exclusively
ontological orientation, fails to provide any external criterion for the identification of a particular Dasein.

In spite of their differences, Husserl's theory of the individuation of the real object is compatible with Heidegger's theory of the individuation of the ready-to-hand. This is not only because the possibility of the real object is founded on the ready-to-hand. Rather, it is also because the idea of individuality as "Einmaligkeit des Daseins" (which is the presupposition of the individuation of the real object) is a further development of the idea of individuality as "speciality of function" (which is the presupposition of the individuation of the ready-to-hand). Their complementarity is exactly the relationship between theory and praxis. Traditionally, indeed, the individuation of things by appeal to objective time and objective space has long been regarded as a "theoretical" solution.

Heidegger's destruction of the traditional, Vorhandenheit-oriented theory of subject shows that the individuation of the ego cannot appeal to the idea of individuality as "Einmaligkeit des Dasein" but rather has to appeal to the idea of individuality as "Zukunftigkeit" and as "irreplaceability". In claiming the individuation of the primal ego as Urfa\ss\um, Husserl has also gone beyond the idea of "individuation of Einmaligkeit". However, since he can only unfold the "constituted-constituting" tension in a "bad" sense, he is not able to positively thematize this dimension.
Instead, he has to appeal to the Kantian transcendental-presuppositional procedure and regard the primal-I as a Fichtean axiom. Heidegger, in thematizing Dasein qua Dasein, has not only explicated the Seinsart of human being, but also developed a theory which can individualize the ego qua ego.

Max Scheler once announced that "Jede Person als solche (jede endliche) ist als Person Individuum, nicht erst durch die besonderen Inhalte des Erlebens oder durch Leib und Raumfüllung" (Ga XX:172). Indeed, Heidegger transforms Scheler's axiom as follows: "Jedes Dasein als solche (jedes endliche) ist als Dasein Individuum, nicht erst durch die besonderen Inhalte des Erlebens oder durch Leib und Raumfüllung". Also in this way Heidegger radicalizes Husserl's theory of the individuation of the ego. However, regarding the limitation of Heidegger's ontological approach, an "external" reading of Husserl's principles of the individuation of the ego can provide an ontical concretization of Heidegger's theory. That is to say, inssofar as the "style of motivation", the "habitualities" and the "coherence of history" are reinterpreted as the external "Merkmale" of Dasein, they can well function as the principles of identification which enable us to differentiate different Daseins from the standpoint of a third person. Such a "concretization"-relationship shows in what way Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of the individuation of the ego are complementary to each other.
We have also traced the source of the differences between these two theories of individuation back to the divergences between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological approaches. Insofar as their methodological differences is concerned, they have different formulations of the phenomenological reduction as well as of the eidetic reduction. While, for Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is a procedure which leads us to the dimension of transcendental consciousness and its correlates, the phenomenological reduction in Heidegger's sense is a step which leads us to the dimension of Being and its modifications. In addition, we have contrasted "construction" in Husserl's sense to "construction" in Heidegger's sense and Husserl's "reactivation" to Heidegger's "destruction". While for Heidegger "phenomenological reduction", "construction" and "destruction" form a unitary whole, there is no such "Zusammengehörigkeit" between "phenomenological reduction", "construction" and "reactivation" in Husserl's phenomenology. Furthermore, according to Husserl, "eidetic reduction" is a procedure which leads us to the dimension of Eidos. In Heidegger's phenomenology one can find a version of "eidetic reduction" which is a process leading us to the dimension of "Wesen" in the sense of "Weise zu sein". This comparison of Husserl's and Heidegger's methodologies not only works out their methodological differences, but also shows that there is a methodology in Heidegger's phenomenology.
In accordance with their methodological differences, Husserl and Heidegger have their respective topologies of phenomenology. First, while "phenomenon" in Husserl's sense denotes transcendental consciousness and its correlates, "phenomenon" in Heidegger's sense refers to Being and its modifications. Second, for Husserl "intentionality" means primarily cognitive intentionality. In Heidegger there is not only a pre-cognitive concept of intentionality, but also a new type of intentionality -- "Seinsintentionalität".

Nevertheless, by explicating the complementarity between their theories of individuation we have shown that despite these differences there is also a positive relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies. Indeed, while Husserl's theory of individuation reveals the strength of the ontical-phenomenological approach, Heidegger's theory of individuation demonstrates the power of the ontological-phenomenological approach.

By abandoning its dogmatic motive and reactivating its motive of a critique of knowledge, we proposed an epistemological "reinterpretation" of Husserl's phenomenology. Under such a "reinterpretation" Husserl's phenomenology is shown to be founded on Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology. That is to say, phenomenological epistemology is founded on phenomenological ontology.
Based on such a founding-relationship between these two types of phenomenology, we can draw the following conclusions:

First, insofar as there is a complementary relationship between Husserl's phenomenology as a critique of knowledge and Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, Schadt's thesis that these two types of phenomenology are irrelevant to each other is not justified.

Second, since Heidegger's phenomenology is a radicalization of Husserl's, the "translation-thesis" must be rejected. In other words, the "translation thesis" is unable to adequately "reflect" the exact relationship between them.

Third, in spite of Heidegger's transformation of Husserl's phenomenology, Husserl's phenomenology is not replaced by Heidegger's. Rather, as a critique of knowledge, Husserl's phenomenology has its own necessity and autonomy.

Finally, Husserl said, "Phenomenology, that is, Heidegger and me!" This statement is confirmed by our present work. Now we can conclude that not only Husserl's and Heidegger's theories of individuation, but also their phenomenologies, are compatible with each other.
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