Farmland Investments in Tanzania:
A Local Perspective on the Political Economy of Agri-food Projects

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Abstract

Using Tanzania as a case-study, this dissertation approaches the land grab issue in Tanzania with the following two main research question: How are new farmland investments shaping political dynamics and actors’ interactions in Tanzania? And, how actors’ interactions between and within levels of governance influence farmland investments’ outcomes at the local level?

I tackle these questions by proposing an original theoretical framework which is based on two main assertions. First, local outcomes associated with farmland investments in Tanzania result from actors’ interactions. Second, these interactions are shaped by the interplay between three main elements: contingencies (C), actors’ agency (A), and structure (S). I use the acronym CAS to refer to these three elements. CAS, by combining various theoretical insights, is analytically productive because it furthers our understanding of what shapes relations among actors, and accounts for how their interactions change in time and space. It contributes significantly to the literature on land grabbing by proposing a unified analytical tool that builds up on the relational perspective that has been proposed by different scholars. In addition, CAS allows researchers to overcome misleading categorisations and to question dominant narratives that have been associated with the land grabbing literature.

This dissertation is divided into 9 chapters. After the usual literature review (Chapter 1), theoretical framework (Chapter 2) and method (Chapter 3) chapters, Chapter 4 gets into the crux of the matter by first briefly presents Tanzania’s historical trajectory, with a specific focus on land policies in order to introduce this thesis’s empirical chapters, and to situate the reader in regards to Tanzania politics. Chapter 5 analysed land policies and related politics at the national level. It highlighted
that actors’ interactions in relation to new farmland investments participate to the process of state formation. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 both adopted a local perspective to capture the impacts associated with new farmland investments in district political arenas. More specifically, chapter 6 highlighted the importance of not overstating the authority of the central state, rather insisting on the key role played by intermediaries in Rufiji district. Chapter 7, seeking to capture how a specific investment has restructured the local political agrarian economy in Missenyi district, argued that Kagera Sugar safeguards its operational profitability by creating locally mediated market relations. It led to the emergence of new local patrons who used their position to benefit and foster their own material interests at villagers’ expense. Chapter 8 adopted a micro perspective, examining the political dynamics associated with investors-related land conflicts in a village in Missenyi district. I compared and explained why actors’ interactions are different even in the same institutional context, highlighting that the same local context may produce different CASs.

In sum, this dissertation’s main findings are as follow. First, investments’ local impacts are contingent on investments’ terms of inclusion and exclusion that are constantly being negotiated between numerous actors. Second, although all actors exert their agency, their very capacity to negotiate and shape the social structure is partly influenced by structural constraints themselves. Third, it is interesting to note that specific local actors—and not necessarily the most powerful—such as district officials win almost every time, at least more than all the others. Although their place in the institutional architecture is decisive, it also shows that their capacity and ability to exert their agency is crucial: these district officials may have known better than others how to play their cards in the new Tanzanian farmland investment game. Fourth, even though processes through which new farmland investments affect the local political economy vary according to
structural components (historical and institutional legacies), in both districts, the associated local outcomes were very similar. There are few exceptions, but the general trend in Tanzania is that most of the benefits associated with new farmland investments, the commodification of land and the increase of capital flows, are captured by government officials and political elites.
Introduction

Since the global energy, food and economic crises of 2008, a new trend in foreign direct investments (FDI) has emerged and gained attention in scholarly and international development circles: investors’ rising interest in farmland in developing countries, or the so-called “land grabbing” phenomenon. According to the International Land Coalition, between 2008 and 2012, the documented land transactions could represent as much as 1.7% of the global agricultural area (Anseeuw et al. 2012). Although these figures diverge, and their validity has been questioned, these land transactions are undeniably significant and may restructure the global agricultural landscape (Margulis, McKeon, and Jr 2013, 2; HLPE 2011; Clapp 2014; OECD/ HighQuest Partners 2010).

Africa is the continent most affected by these new investments. Moreover, many African states are playing an important role in welcoming these new investors. For example, in Tanzania, the government is actively courting them, arguing that they will ensure agriculture's modernization and economic development. From 2005 to 2009, about 4 million hectares were requested for land transactions (Sulle and Nelson 2009).

This global “land rush” was first actively documented and quantified by NGOs, activists, and researchers. This literature on the phenomenon was primarily concerned with sketching a rough picture of the phenomenon at the global level. Although it contributed to raising awareness about the phenomenon, this literature suffers important epistemological problems that limit our understanding of the local impacts associated with this phenomenon (these issues are further
discussed in Chapter 1). For example, it was characterized by a prevalence of oversimplifying analyses; the use and lack of (in)valid data; the tendency to ignore local conditions, and to overestimate the positive effects of these new farmland investments on the economic growth of developing countries. These issues are of vital importance, as we must admit that, ten years after the beginning of the so-called land rush, “we actually still don't know how many land deals have been entered into, where and with what consequences” (Scoones et al. 2013, 473).

To remediate to the shortcomings of this initial literature on land grabbing, scholars have proposed and used other theoretical approaches. For instance, the critical agrarian studies scholarship, which adopts a Neo-Marxist perspective, has been prolific. This scholarship points out that classic questions in agrarian political economy—capital, labour, social differentiation and class formation—are fruitful research avenues for understanding “the prospects and impediments to the development of capitalist agriculture in developing countries” (Oya 2013b, 1535). It also draws attention to the fact that capitalist accumulation might prompt illegal, and/or coercive practices, emphasizing the important role played by political elites alongside capitalist investors in the ongoing accumulation and dispossession processes.

Although this scholarship contributed significantly to our understanding of the phenomenon, conceptual issues limit the heuristic value of some of the Neo-Marxist concepts used by the critical agrarian literature. More specifically, as many scholars have pointed out, privileging a top-down standpoint and this insistence on the determining impact of global forces tend to overlook the complex nature, the fluidity and dynamism of agrarian systems in developing countries, and the
socio-political and relational context in which they are embedded (White et al. 2012; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010; D. Hall 2013; Brent 2015).

Addressing this critique, another emerging strand of the literature on “land grabbing” has suggested shifting our perspective to better capture the local impacts associated with these new farmland investments in developing countries. Although this scholarship is eclectic, contributing scholars all emphasize the need for empirically-based, contextually situated analyses. This literature first emphasizes that institutions and historical legacies are important factors to understand local reactions to new land grabs because they play an important role in structuring local contexts. Second, it points out that an institutional perspective proves limited in explaining the variance of local reactions within the same institutional context. Property, authorities, and citizenship rules are more muddled at the local level than generally acknowledged. Therefore, in addition to the lasting impacts of institutions, this scholarship insists on the importance of adopting a relational perspective. Interrelations, historically embedded and continuously renegotiated, between elites, investors and local populations are determining factors that shape local impacts of land investments.

This dissertation adopts such a perspective, and seeks to contribute to this specific scholarship on land grabbing. Using Tanzania as a case-study, it approaches the land grab issue in Tanzania with the following two main research question: How are new farmland investments shaping political dynamics and actors’ interactions in Tanzania? And, how actors’ interactions between and within levels of governance influence farmland investments’ outcomes at the local level?
I tackle these questions by proposing an original theoretical framework which is based on two main assertions. First, local outcomes associated with farmland investments in Tanzania result from actors’ interactions. Second, these interactions are shaped by the interplay between three main elements: contingencies (C), actors’ agency (A), and structure (S). I use the acronym CAS to refer to these three elements.

Contingencies (C) are part of any social phenomena and may significantly shape structure (S) and actors’ agency (A) in a given situation. As a matter of fact, the whole “land grabbing” phenomenon can be treated as a new contingency that had greatly impacted the country’s political economy by offering access to new capital. Thus, systematically considering what is contingent matters, because contingencies led to the redefinition of actors’ interactions in every political arena I have studied.

To conceptualize structure (S) and actors’ agency (A), I propose first a discussion on historical institutionalism, and second, on Giddens’s theory of structuration. Moreover, to better defining the specificities of the political and institutional configuration that prevails in Tanzania (S), I integrated key selected concepts from the sociology of the state literature, namely the state, and infrastructural and clientelistic relations of power. I also argue that these two meta relations of power are transversal and have a significant structuring impact on actors’ agency (A).

CAS, by combining various theoretical insights, is analytically productive because it furthers our understanding of what shapes relations among actors, and accounts for how their interactions change in time and space. It contributes significantly to the literature on land grabbing by
proposing a unified analytical tool that builds up on the relational perspective that has been proposed by different scholars. In addition, CAS allows researchers to overcome misleading categorisations and to question dominant narratives that have been associated with the land grabbing literature.

Despite the very inductive nature of this project, prior to starting my fieldwork, I formulated preliminary research intuitions based on these theoretical insights. On a general level, I expected land investments to reinforce existing clientelistic, and infrastructural power relations within the community. However, my assumption was that their impacts would be mitigated by the strength of local institutions, and by the level of the central state penetration—political control—within the community. It seemed reasonable, for instance, to believe that the electoral support for the *de facto* state-party (and conversely, for the opposition) in the last two presidential elections (2010; 2015) could reveal some trends regarding the capacity of the state to impose itself on local communities.

Therefore, where institutions were historically decentralized and weak, and the central state penetration level was high, I anticipated that land investments would be met with low local resistance, leading to a centralization of land management, and the consolidation of central infrastructural powers (land titling, and mapping). Where political institutions were historically centralized and strong, and the central state penetration level was medium, I expected local resistance to be higher, leading to clientelistic and infrastructural power-sharing arrangements with local elites.
Finally, as I chose to conduct a political ethnography to study actors’ interactions, my theoretical framework is also reflective of my methodological choices (discussed in Chapter 3). It illustrates the ongoing, reflective, back-and-forth process between empirical material and theories that I have analytically favored to make sense of what I have observed during my fieldwork. My methodological approach is further presented in Chapter 3. I explain why I chose Tanzania to analyze the politics of land grabbing, my selection of cases, and the method I adopted. This research project is based on extensive field research: a nine-month political ethnography that I conducted between June 2016 and September 2017, mostly in two Tanzanian rural regions, Pwani and Kagera. I have chosen this method because of my research focus—local interactions—and because political ethnography is a well-adapted method to an inductive project, allowing the research design to evolve along with the research process.

Adopting ethnography as a method also involved important ethical, and pragmatic considerations that affected my research process, and my findings. In order to transparently assess the limits of this research project, I also highlight four specific issues that affected both my research process and object, namely: rendering the field “legible”; preserving my independence; ensuring my own and my informants’ safety; and the reproduction of unequal relations of power. In addition to participant and nonparticipant observation, I conducted over 250 semi-structured and open interviews with various stakeholders, i.e. government officials, local leaders, farmers, villagers, civil society organisations, and local and international investors.

Conducting a political ethnography allowed me to get an in-depth understanding of the social milieu I was immersed in. My fieldwork was challenging because land issues are very political
and contentious in the increasingly authoritarian context that prevails in Tanzania. As a result, conducting this fieldwork in rural areas implied many tangible impediments. Many times, I was harassed and closely monitored by district officials. They went as far as getting me and my research assistant followed, and photographed in public spaces. We were even detained twice by police officers. On several occasions, district officials also directly came and knocked to my hotel room at night, verbally threatening and accusing me of lying to villagers, trying to grab my computer and my data. Realising the implications of such harassment, I had to be very careful and made sure that my interviewees and my notes would be protected.

The fact of the matter is that, in Tanzania, district officials have informants everywhere. Sometimes, as soon as I arrived in a district, even in a village as far as two hours drive from where district authorities have their head office, I was called by district officials inquiring about my intentions and my whereabouts. It is worth noting that I followed all proper procedures to conduct research on new farmland investments in Tanzania. I obtained my research permit and my visa of residency as a researcher, and secured all official authorisations necessary prior to my arrival in districts.

Furthermore, during my research process, I uncovered hidden political dynamics that were, at the time of the study, very sensitive to many powerful actors in Tanzania. In several instances, the knowledge I acquired regarding contentious investments, actors involved, and the often dubious acquisition processes, was perceived as threatening by some of my informants. As a result, it happened that interviews were baldly transformed in intense questioning sessions from powerful informants about my aim and my findings. For example, several investors told me, rather roughly,
to stop investigating investments. “Leave it, and stop asking questions. It is better for you”. Veiled threats are intimidating, and at one point, I must admit, I became seriously concerned about my safety as a foreign researcher in Tanzania. To tell the truth, I did not expect this research project to reveal that dangerous.

Writing this dissertation and discussing my empirical findings was thus difficult in many regards. For confidentiality concerns and security reasons, and in order to ensure as much as possible informants’ safety and anonymity, my empirical discussion is focused on patterns and lessons learned rather than on describing actors’ background or their specific practices. To me, it was, and still is, an important ethical obligation. Many vulnerable local communities’ members have entrusted me with information about political and contentious actions that are threatening their safety, and to some extent, their very livelihood. What was for me a Ph.D. project was a matter of survival to them and their family. They were generous with me, and this fieldwork would have not been that prolific without their collaboration, and therefore, I consider their protection not only an ethical obligation but also a personal engagement.

Thus, it is against this background, through these theoretical lenses, and with this ethnographic method—and its associated specific challenges— that the empirical chapters of this dissertation examine actors’ interactions to analyse how they shape local outcomes associated with new farmland investments in Tanzania. The remainder of this introduction outlines the chapters of this dissertation.
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

After the usual literature review (Chapter 1), theoretical framework (Chapter 2) and method (Chapter 3) chapters, Chapter 4 gets into the crux of the matter. **Chapter 4** first briefly presents Tanzania’s historical trajectory, with a specific focus on land policies in order to introduce this thesis’s empirical chapters, and to situate the reader in regards to Tanzania politics. Second, it discusses the current political context devoting special attention to the most recent elections which were held in October 2015, and highlighting the importance of factionalism within the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)—the party in power in Tanzania since Independence.

**Chapter 5 to 8** discuss empirical data and underline the theoretical contributions of my findings. In addition, each empirical chapter of this dissertation is focused on a specific level of governance—a determined political arena—examining its political dynamics and their impacts on actors’ interactions. The national level refers to national policies that affect the whole country. The local level refers to the district as an administrative division in Tanzania, which usually comprises between 50 and 70 villages. The micro-level refers to the administrative unit of a village.

**Chapter 5** analyses Tanzania’s land policies at the national level, and how they are linked to this global investment interest for farmland in developing countries. It highlights that actors’ interactions in relation to new farmland investments and concomitantly, land policies, participate in the process of state formation. It is through them that state officials at central and local levels reinforce their authority towards local communities and investors, thereby (re)producing relations of domination and political subjects.
To illustrate this argument, I document how and why the current Tanzanian President, John Pombe Magufuli, adopted a discourse on bad investors, and created a new Land Investment Unit (LIU) to confiscate land from unproductive investors. I show that combining normative rationalities borrowed from international narratives on “land grabs”, on neo-liberal development, on historical legacies associated with the paternalistic socialist state, and from political patronage, Magufuli redefined the structure, which allows him to constitute his authority through land policies. His discourse and policies on unproductive investors legitimized targeted dispossession of land assets, hiding that the process also aimed at political retaliation.

Therefore, I argue that the creation of the LIU was a mean to establish his political power, on the national political scene but also within his own Party (CCM). Moreover, it secured the President’s control over new investors and new capital. I also contend that the revision of the National Land Policy aimed at (re)establishing the central state territorial authority over the countryside. In addition, the vagueness of the New Land Policy had important economic implications. By reaffirming the President’s discretionary power when it comes to treat with investors, all new investment projects became subject of his approval, thereby increasing his power over the business community, and increasing his control over the new capital brought by FDI.

Similarly, at the local level, I demonstrate that land planning is an authoritative practice that legitimized and constituted district officials’ powers not only towards villagers but also with new investors, allowing them to benefit from the increased commodification of land. With the implementation of the new mapping programme, district and the Ministry of Land officials recreated their identity as experts—using their proclaimed technical expertise as planners and
surveyors—to constitute their authoritative position towards villagers. The process thus generated direct access to new FDI in the district, opening new opportunities for accumulation that have been captured by district officials.

Yet, although Chapter 5 focuses on important political interactions which we need to capture to understand the local impacts associated with new farmland investments, such an understanding is not sufficient. The state is not a unitary actor, and its authority is contentious and limited. Therefore, as Migdal (1997, 2001) suggests, considering how policies and discourses are transformed by actors throughout the implementation process is crucial to understanding the impact of their interactions, and governance practices on local communities.

**Chapter 6** addresses Migdal’s advice. In it, I unpack intermediaries and study how these actors negotiate their role with investors, local populations, and investors. My claim is that intermediaries’ agency influenced local structure, which in turn affected their interactions with other actors at all levels. Demonstrating that Tanzanian central authorities lacked capacity, I insist on the dependency that exists between them and local bureaucrats. Because central state officials were dependent on local officials’ knowledge, the latter found themselves in positions of power which they used to foster their material interests with investors, and their political interests with local populations.

Yet, interactions between these actors are dynamic and change through time. In Rufiji, CAS’s inherent dynamics have changed when the central state put in place a new strategy to increase its control over, and foster productive land investments. This new strategy created an institutional
overlap, allowing central state authorities to bypass intermediaries, and increasing their authority through direct central monitoring of intermediaries’ activities with investors and local communities. However, empirically investigating the effects of this new monitoring showed that it did not protected villagers’ land rights against investors.

Rather, it forced local bureaucrats to innovate to continue benefiting from new farmland investments. They were creative in finding new ways of fostering their material interests, especially in areas where the state has limited infrastructural power. For instance, I show that the new policy on “unproductive investors” created a climate of fear among investors, which, along with the central government’s reliance on district officials to follow-up on the productivity of existing investors, gave district officials a new and interesting edge with these unproductive investors. To continue to benefit materially, they started to protect them against the central state’ threat of dispossession.

In addition, using the example of Rubada, I analyse how this new central monitoring put pressure on the agency that had to change its way of dealing with local communities. Rubada could no longer ignore decisions made by villagers. Rather, it forced Rubada to innovate to protect its interests with investors by using its position of power to exploit village leaders’ lack of knowledge, and of education regarding their land rights and legal proceedings.

Therefore, as Chapter 6 argues, institutional change had direct consequences on the way local bureaucrats and a local state agency conduct their activities. However, empirical investigation of these effects is necessary to understand how bureaucrats transformed and altered these policies
during the implementation process. These dynamics between actors’ agency and the structure transform interactions between actors, thereby also shaping the resulting local outcomes. It is a dynamic and interactive process. Each political arena has its own set of interactions—that develop through time, with this perpetual interplay between new contingencies, structure, and actors’ actions, including their institutional innovations.

Chapter 6 further claims that studying these specific sets of interactions is crucial to uncovering and explaining the repercussions of new farmland deals at the local level. For instance, by analysing several different investment projects in Rufiji district, I demonstrate that the tendency of district officers to exclude villages from land acquisition negotiations generated conflicts between investors and villagers. Villagers, being ignored, lacked information about the investor and the location of his investment, thereby creating local conflicts over boundaries and usage of the land. Also, because compensation processes were often problematic, villagers resented the company for not compensating them properly even though the company was not the sole responsible party for insufficient compensation. In the end, it was very consequential for investors because it impeded their capacity to become operational.

Finally, Chapter 6 also cautions against the risk of overlooking dynamics of differentiation, relations of power, and interactions within local communities. For instance, we should be careful about claiming that this new central monitoring led to fostering villagers’ inclusion in new farmland deals. As my findings show, because each village in Rufiji district has its own power dynamics, the results depend on the leaders’ relations with their fellow villagers, and the nature of consultative mechanisms in place.
Chapter 7 specifically describes and analyses the transformations of the local agrarian economy that have been fostered by the arrival of Kagera Sugar in Missenyi District. First, it shows that Kagera Sugar has introduced a new mode of production that at first sight echoes Glassman’s argument about semi-proletarianization of the peasantry due to capitalist penetration and concomitant processes of primitive accumulation (Glassman 2006). Yet, the arrival of the company has only affected a small proportion of peasants, and with the company’s upcoming turn towards mechanization, this effect on labour will tend to diminish.

Indeed, my findings reveal that villagers were not resisting this investor, nor were they passively being integrated into the capitalist structure as semi-proletarians: most of them have been wisely using the new conjuncture to foster their own interests. They agreed to sell their labour when they have specific needs for liquidity but resumed their traditional livelihood occupation as soon as the emergency passed. In fact, peasants have been benefiting from the arrival of Kagera Sugar. The company took to heart its corporate social responsibility, effectively contributing to improving social services and to development in surrounding local communities. It provided villagers with an economic alternative to cope with risks associated with small-scale agriculture as a mode of subsistence.

However, Chapter 7’s main claim is that it only captured part of the story. I contend that it is only through inducing and fostering local clientelistic relations at the local level that Kagera Sugar was able to protect its interests and monopoly over sugar production and distribution in the region. In sum, Kagera Sugar safeguarded its operational profitability by creating locally mediated market relations. This led to the emergence of new local patrons who used their position to benefit and
foster their own material interests at villagers’ expense. My contention is that this was the most significant restructuring impact of the arrival of the company on local dynamics.

To illustrate this, my analysis discusses how this has created winners and losers at the local level. The winners included the leaders of the outgrowers’ association, and the managers of SACCOS, who have been increasingly using their position for personal gains. Their interactions with other actors tend to be cooperative, because their inclusion serves Kagera Sugar’s interests as well as the central government and local political elites who have material and political interests in Kagera Sugar.

Similarly, district officials—as documented in previous chapters—were innovative in using their position of power to shape land management institutions to foster their material interests. Yet, their inclusion in those investment dynamics was contingent on maintaining their cooperative relation with central and local elites. To benefit from their political protection, district officials helped them to cheaply acquire valuable land for contract farming in the district.

Such a predatory system also created losers at the local level. By fostering already existing dynamics of social differentiation, it disproportionately affected the most vulnerable populations, namely migrants, youths and women. Migrants’ perpetual status as “newcomers” made them particularly vulnerable to those political schemes.

In addition, youths were particularly affected by the acute land shortage created by those dynamics. There is no land left for them to inherit, and they have limited options to earn a living. In the
medium term, it brought lasting changes in the prevailing agrarian structure. Because youths are increasingly losing their means of production, land shortage induced a class differentiation process. Consequently, there was the emergence of a new middle-class, mostly wealthy emigrants, who are hiring newly available casual laborers, mostly youths, to work on their land. Furthermore, women are too often bearers of the hidden costs of these changing agrarian dynamics. In this case, they found themselves left alone to cultivate the familial plot, feed the family, and assume child-related expenses.

Chapter 8 further delves into those local dynamics and interactions, documenting at the micro-level how the expanding presence of investors in a Tanzanian village led to local land conflicts. It seeks to explain a rather surprising finding: while village leaders defended their villagers’ land rights in one conflict, they chose to partner with political elites and investors at the expense of villagers in the other.

Focusing on the very local set of actors’ interactions structuring these conflicts in a specific Tanzanian village, I compare and explain why actors’ interactions are different even in the same institutional context. Chapter 8 thus emphasizes that local reactions are context-dependent, and not necessarily organized or constant across time and space. It also highlights that the same local context may produce different CASs. Investments affect differently the members of the same local community. Their impacts are contingent on investments’ terms of inclusion and exclusion that are constantly being negotiated between a wide range of actors.
However, as this chapter also points out, not all actors have the same power in renegotiating these norms. In this specific region, historical legacies had created latent discrimination norms that once mobilized, created structural inequalities that affect actors’ capacity to negotiate.

For instance, the analysis of the first land conflict shows that the institutional makeup influenced how actors could negotiate land issues. The way it unfolded has been structured by institutional constraints regarding the official and hierarchical process of solving land conflicts as well as historical, paternalistic relations of power which are illustrated in the interactions between district officials and village leaders. At first, district officials and Narco associated investors had the upper hand because of their position within the politico-institutional structure. Local leaders’ powers were greatly limited because of the district’s alleged tendency to collude with Narco’s investors, and officials’ denial of the conflict itself empowered local investors vis-à-vis local leaders.

Yet, the evolution of the conflict demonstrates that the CAS structuring actors’ interactions has been renegotiated by local leaders. It also exemplifies the complexity of governance structures. The MP’s involvement led to a significantly restructuring of the interactions between actors in this specific conflict. First, district officials lost their power to contain the conflict. Second, local leaders were significantly empowered since they gained a voice and support from the central level. Finally, local investors lost their strategic positioning by losing district officials’ support, and therefore found themselves lacking power. In consequence, they were disciplined by central authorities and forced to give some land back to villagers.
The second conflict unfolded differently. Even if it also affected the villagers of Village X, its trajectory diverged significantly. For instance, I contend that local leaders, in this second conflict, rendered politically salient a latent exclusionary normative institution, autochthony, which changed the structural properties of this local CAS. Concretely, they excluded a sub-set of villagers because of their “alloclothe” or “newcomer” status. This exclusion process significantly re-shaped local leaders’ position of authority towards other actors in the second conflict. Indeed, although the second conflict was structured by the same contingencies as the previous one, its internal power dynamics differed substantially. Local leaders became powerful players here since their claim to autochthony gave them political capital. They used it to partner with investors, district and military officials, and benefit from the rising value of Matawa land. Concretely by excluding Matawa villagers and denying their claims to the land they have been lawfully occupying for several years, they managed not only to foster existing socio-political differentiation but also instrumentalised it for their material benefit.

Finally, Chapter 8 highlights that indirect impacts provoked by new farmland investments in developing countries may be more significant for local communities than the direct ones. In the case of Village X, Kagera Sugar has not been directly causing local conflictual dynamics. Yet, the investor has significantly transformed the local political economy. As I will demonstrate, it had lasting consequences at the local level because it triggered local political schemes that led to land conflicts, land dispossession and social marginalisation.

I conclude this dissertation in Chapter 9 by outlining the main empirical and theoretical findings and exploring future research avenues. As already stated, each empirical chapter of this dissertation
is focused on a specific set of actors’ interactions, in a circumscribed political arena, examining in
detail the co-constitutive interplay between contingencies, structure and actors’ agency that has
shaped them. Each chapter is thus independent in itself, resulting from my use of a magnifying
glass to explain why and how actors interact the way they do in specific situations at determined
levels of governance. Yet, although analytically useful, the separation between these levels of
governance—and hence these empirical chapters—is somewhat artificial. In real life, all those
actors’ interactions are synergetic, dynamic, adaptive, co-constitutive, reactive to each other,
always changing in time and space. Therefore, all these interactions, between and within each
level, are interdependent.

Considering this dissertation’s empirical findings as a whole allows me to make a primary,
overarching argument in my concluding chapter: structure (S) is the CAS’s component that has
the greatest causal weight in shaping actors’ interactions. Although I paid close attention and
documented how actors exert their agency at all levels, the structural constraints they are facing
are decisive. Indeed, specific structural components, because of their potential to appear fixed and
immutable in space and in time, were left consistently unchallenged by actors in every political
arena I studied. I substantiate this statement in the concluding chapter with three distinct
observations that are cross-cutting to all empirical chapters: 1- structural constraints play a role in
determining the nature of actors’ relationship between governance levels; 2- structural constraints
preshaped the distribution of power among actors in every CAS analysed; 3- structural constraints
were only partially renegotiated by actors. Indeed, all actors’ interactions were somehow
influenced by clientelistic and infrastructural relations of power which remained unchallenged by
actors at all levels during my study.
In sum, this dissertation’s main findings are as follow. First, investments’ local impacts are contingent on investments’ terms of inclusion and exclusion that are constantly being negotiated between numerous actors. Second, although all actors exert their agency, their very capacity to negotiate and shape the social structure is partly influenced by structural constraints themselves. Third, even though processes through which new farmland investments affect the local political economy vary according to structural components (historical and institutional legacies), in both districts, the associated local outcomes were very similar. There are few exceptions, but the general trend in Tanzania is that most of the benefits associated with new farmland investments, the commodification of land and the increase of capital flows, are captured by government officials and political elites.

Lastly, it is interesting to note that specific local actors—and not necessarily the most powerful—such as district officials win almost every time, at least more than all the others. Although their place in the institutional architecture is decisive, it also shows that their capacity and ability to exert their agency is crucial: these district officials may have known better than others how to play their cards in the new Tanzanian farmland investment game. Other actors, namely local communities and more specifically women, youths and migrants, have also some bargaining power. They might have a poor hand, but they are learning to play their cards right. Yet, their odds of loosing are greater because they always start playing this investment game with much less cards than their adversaries.
Chapter 1: Land Grabs: what do we know? A review of the literature

The 2011 World Bank publication *Rising global interest in farmland: can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?* was a “prime mover” of the initial literature on land grabbing (Oya 2013a, 1535). At first, the global “land rush” was actively documented and quantified by NGOs, activists, and researchers. It led to “a veritable deluge [...] of op-eds, reports by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral institutions, scholarly papers, books for specialist and non-specialist readers, and articles in leading social science and general science journals” (Edelman 2013, 486).

This literature has been primarily concerned with raising awareness and sketching a rough picture of the phenomenon at the global level. Although scholars have criticized it for its lack of finesse, its contribution to our understanding of land grabbing was important. It led to the development of two main international databases on land deals, namely GRAIN’s database, and the Land Matrix,\(^1\) as well as several international governance mechanisms.\(^2\) As Scoones et al. put it: “rough-and-ready, quick-and-dirty work of this sort, is under certain conditions, necessary” (Scoones et al. 2013, 478).

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\(^1\) GRAIN is a civil society organization, while the Land Matrix is the result of an initiative of the International Land Coalition, which brings together research and funding organizations. Their aim was similar: to provide a central point of reference that presents primary information on global land deals, such as year, country, investor, size of the land deal, and type of crops. However, they employ different methodologies: while GRAIN gathers information from Internet sources and media reports, Land Matrix uses a crowd-sourcing approach.

\(^2\) Notably, the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), the World Bank (WB), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), jointly elaborated the PRAI (Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investments). In 2012, the FAO further advanced international discussions on the issue by proposing its Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of land, fisheries, and forests in the context of national food security, and more recently, in 2014, its Principles for Responsible Investments in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI). Finally, the 2013 G8’s Land Transparency Initiative was also a key international policy initiative.
The primary concern of this initial literature was quantifying and situating these land investments on a global scale. It gave rise to three powerful narratives that initially shaped our understanding of the phenomenon. First, “land grabbing” was initially conceptualized mostly in terms of global crises: financial, energy and food supply crises were depicted as its main drivers (for a discussion of the use of crisis terminology, see Woodhouse 2012). Second, its focus was on Sub-Saharan Africa (see for instance, Deininger and Byerlee 2011). Although it is true that Sub-Saharan Africa countries have been high-profile destinations for these new farmland investments, the scope of “land grabs” is global, and examples can be found in every continent. Consequently, it appears that the importance of cases from Sub-Saharan Africa was exaggerated. Third, the prevalence of foreign investors was stressed, mainly investors from countries that are not self-sufficient in food, and are looking to acquire land to address potential issues related to food security.

Accordingly, the impacts of these land deals have been mainly described as disrupting the livelihoods of peasant/small-scale farmer communities, who are powerless in the face of such strong international pressures. Many publications have focused on evaluating and assessing the implementation of such investments, discussing how they can yield advantages for developing countries, and issuing recommendations for achieving “win-win” solutions (IIED 2012; Anseeuw et al. 2012; HLPE 2011; German, Schoneveld, and Mwangi 2011; Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 2010; Amanor 2012; Van Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Otsuki, Schoneveld, and Zoomers 2017; Zoomers and Otsuki 2017).

Also, the phenomenon of “land grabbing” has captured the attention of globalization studies scholars, who have stressed the need to more systematically study its impacts on international
governance. For instance, in their collection, Margulis and his collaborators (2013, 3) situate land grabbing as symptomatic (and amplifying) of deeper structural changes that feature simultaneously the de-territorialization and commodification of sovereign national territory across much of the globe, and the partial geographical relocation of global agricultural production”. Sassen (2013, 26) asserts that we observe a “deep disjunction”: the conceptualization of land is shifting from embedded into the concept of sovereign territories to the notion of a commodity in the global market. Similarly, Margulis and Porter (2013) challenge the utility of the core-periphery international relations framework to understand the issue, stressing how land grabbing led to the emergence of concomitant complex networks of transnational governance. Sebastian and Warner (2014) contend that drivers of the land rush must be understood in terms of geopolitical imperialism, i.e. a way for rich countries to secure access to raw resources.

However, this insistence on global governance, impacts, and drivers tends to obscure the fact that we are still unable to precisely quantify the “real” scope of global land grabbing. Figures diverge; for instance, in Africa, Anseeuw et al (2012, vii) report 1217 agricultural land deals amounting to 83.2 million hectares, the “equivalent of 1.7% of the world's agricultural area”. In 2011, a report by the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security (HLPE 2011) estimates that between 50 and 80 million hectares have been targeted by land deals. The World Bank in 2010 approximated the number at 45 million hectares while Oxfam in 2012 reported that 227 million hectares have been grabbed (Margulis, McKeon, and Jr 2013, 2). The lack of consistent data underscores the epistemological shortcomings of these literatures.
A first epistemological problem arises from the lack of consensus about the meaning and definition of a “land grab” (Scoones et al. 2013, 475; Cotula 2012, 652). Although the term has been widely used in the literature and media reports, no clear definition of what should be considered as a land grab has been provided. Raising further confusion, databases use different indicators: Land Matrix records only land deals that are over 200 hectares, but GRAIN accounts for deals involving “large areas of land”.

Second, scholars have also disputed the conceptual validity of defining land deals only through scale lenses. As noted by Oya (2013a, 1552), this focus reveals an important underlying presumption of most of the literature: large-scale farms are assumed to be having the most significant effects. However, this assumption should be questioned, as the significance and impacts of land deals are likely to be context-dependent, the scale being only one indicator among others. Edelman (2013, 488) also criticizes this “fetishization of hectares” contending that it leads to an oversimplification of the investment process, and to ignoring issues related to capitalization, supply chains, and labour relations (see also Baglioni and Gibbon (2013, 1560). Moreover, the emphasis on land grabbing tends to mask other important, entangled dynamics of acquisition that are simultaneously at play, such as “water grabbing” and “green grabbing” (i.e., see Special Issue on Green Grabbing published by *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 39, no. 2, 2012; Davis, Rulli, and D’Odorico 2015; Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013; Woodhouse 2012; Franco, Mehta, and Veldwisch 2013; Mehta, Gert, and Franco 2012; Rulli, Saviori, and D’Odorico 2013).

Third, the prevailing narrative on land grabbing oversimplifies land grabs. They do not happen in a historical and political vacuum (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013; Pedersen 2016b; Wily 2012). These
dynamics are embedded in country-specific historical, political and economic experiences that are, at best partially acknowledged in most accounts, if they are even acknowledged at all. Additionally, their socioeconomic impacts vary. Depictions of rural communities as uniform and coherent underestimate dynamics of social differentiation. For instance, Woodhouse (2012b) points out how the issue of internal migration has been overlooked in analyses of land grabbing’s socioeconomic effects. Scholars have also stressed that gender and generational impacts have not been sufficiently studied or considered in the current debate (Scoones et al. 2013; Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013). It should be noted, however, that this issue has been increasingly addressed in recent works (Chung 2015; Manji 1996; Mbilinyi 2016; Rousseau, Gautier, and Wardell 2017; Dancer and Tsikata 2015; Ahmed 2016; Fitzgerald 2017).

Fourth, although international drivers and actors are important, considering their role alone is reductive. Endogenous factors ought to be considered as well: population growth, migration, environmental degradation, ethnic conflicts, and the role of national governments in attracting and promoting land investments (Davis, Rulli, and D’Odorico 2015; Cotula 2013). We also have to appreciate the fact that government strategy evolves over time and according to context. The recent decision of the Ethiopian government to cancel leases to foreign investors that have failed to meet their contractual objectives or the decision of the Tanzanian government to issue a moratorium and new guidelines on biofuel investments constitute compelling examples (Davison 2013; Nelson, Sulle, and Lekaita 2012). Consequently, investigating institutional plurality is key to understanding the processes through which land deals materialize (Cotula 2012; Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013).
Fifth, the validity of data itself raises many problems. Databases tend to include “defective data points” which refer to “cancelled, delayed, scaled-back or non-existent deals” (Edelman 2013, 487), leading to important contradictions and confusion in the literature. As previously mentioned, many of these reported “land grabs” have failed, or are facing significant difficulties becoming operational (Keene et al. 2015; Nolte, Chamberlain, and Giger 2016; G. Martin and Arvind Palat 2014; Woertz 2013b; Johansson et al. 2016; Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2013). For instance, in their analysis of land deals in Tanzania, Locher and Sulle (2014) found a huge gap between land deals announced and land deals concluded, pointing out that only 30 percent of all projects have been officially implemented. In addition to misleading information, they highlight that the imprecise status of land deals in databases oversimplifies complex and crucial information about land acquisitions.

Finally, reproduction of data is problematic, with incomplete references making old data look “newer than they actually are”. The fact that most analyses and policy discussions on “land grabbing” are still using these numbers makes them prone to serious critiques of their legitimacy. As noted by Edelman, “many researchers acknowledge the obvious—that land deal data is frequently problematical—but they then go on and analyze those data as if they were generated in a highly rigorous way” (Edelman 2013, 489).

These issues are of vital importance. In his systematic review of 176 publications on land grabs in Africa, for the period between 2005 and 2013, Oya (2013a, 1543) was unable to find a single study that has used a “rigorous baseline” and a “before-after comparison” to assess impacts. He further notes that only “37% of peer-reviewed publications contain primary evidence collected by the
authors”. Lastly, it is worth remarking that those data are not value-free, and who does the sourcing and what are their epistemological interests are crucial questions that are, too often, not addressed (Edelman 2013; Margulis, McKeon, and Jr 2013).

In sum, there are several issues associated with this initial literature on “land grabbing”, namely the prevalence of oversimplifying analyses; use and lack of (in)-valid data; and the tendency to ignore local conditions. To remediate these shortcomings, scholars have proposed using different approaches. In particular, the critical agrarian studies scholarship, which adopts a Neo-Marxist perspective, has been prolific, and several scholars have used these theoretical lenses. The next section highlights and discusses this literature’s main contributions.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CRITICAL AGRARIAN STUDIES
Generally speaking, Neo-Marxist scholars contend that global capital expansion and the constant quest for new investments frontiers (i.e. global land grabbing phenomenon) have created new neoliberal enclosures in developing countries (McMichael 2012, 2013; Glassman 2006; Harvey 2003; Akram-Lodhi 2007; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010). This scholarship points out that classic questions in agrarian political economy—capital, labour, social differentiation and class formation—are fruitful research avenues for understanding “the prospects and impediments to the development of capitalist agriculture in developing countries” (Oya 2013b, 1535).

Glassman, for instance, observes that semi-proletarianization of the peasantry in developing countries is increasingly becoming the norm. He claims that it can be explained because “primitive accumulation is not a phase of capitalist development but rather a process which is ontologically
necessary for capitalist production” (Glassman 2006, 616). Drawing on Neo-Marxist works, he argues that proletarianization is a contingent outcome of specific class struggles, rather than a core feature of primitive accumulation. Thus, in the current context, to reduce costs associated with unionization, the dynamics of primitive accumulation favor semi-proletarianization through “a constant destabilization of any permanent agricultural labor force” (Glassman 2006, 619).

This new neoliberal enclosure does not reform capitalist social property relations but aims at intensifying already existing ones. Hence, according to Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010), global capital put most peasants of developing countries in-between two modes of production, where they ensure their survival through the cultivation of their own plots while at the same time selling their labour to capitalists who have acquired large parcels of land for mechanized production.

This semi-inclusion of developing countries’ peasantry in the capitalist system is possible because of the emergence of what Akram-Lodhi calls a “bifurcated agrarian structure”. It is considered bifurcated because it is defined by the coexistence of an “emerging export-oriented capitalist agricultural sub-sector” and a resilient “subsistence-oriented peasant producer sub-sector” (Akram-Lodhi 2007, 1447). Contract farming schemes, for example, illustrate well this “bifurcated agrarian structure” and many scholars have been documenting how contract farmers are pushed towards indebtedness and exploited through new contractual relations (Oya 2012; Vicol 2017; Burnod and al. 2015; West and Haug 2017).

This scholarship also draws attention to the fact that capitalist accumulation might prompt illegal, and/or coercive practices. Harvey (2003, 158) claims that “capitalism [still today] internalizes
cannibalistic as well as predatory and fraudulent practices”. He captures this extra-economic aspect of dispossession with his concept of “accumulation by dispossession” (ABD). It emphasizes the important role played by political elites alongside capitalist investors in the ongoing accumulation and dispossession processes. Several scholars have used ABD to study the local impacts of investments (Borras 2011; Levien 2012; Benjamin, Maganga, and Abdallah 2009; Beban and Gorman 2017, Theodory 2017). For example, Levien (2012, 940) refines Harvey's ABD concept, insisting that its analytical utility stems foremost from seeing it as a political process which uses extra-economic means to overcome barriers to accumulation.

However, conceptual issues limit the heuristic value of some of these Neo-Marxist concepts. For instance, Hall (2013) highlights that both Marx's concept of primitive accumulation and Harvey's ABD have contested meaning, and they have both been used inconsistently in the literature. While some scholars have conflated them, others have contrasted them starkly. Others have been using them loosely without even discussing their broader theoretical implications.

In addition to being clouded by the proliferation of different usages, these concepts are based on unquestioned assumptions that limit their utility. For instance, the framing of the current phenomenon of “land grabbing” as resulting from global crises is problematic. Scholars have cautioned against the risks of inferring that global forces are the sole triggers of new land investments and that global capitalism is directly restructuring the local agrarian context of developing countries. Schoenberger et al. (2017, 718), reviewing the literature on land investments in Southeast Asia, note that empirical evidence shows rather the importance of “history, context-specificity and surprising, contingent and contradictory motivations for land grabbing rather than
the one that emphasises unification and common global drivers”. This critique has been made by several other scholars who have shown that situating land investments in their socio-political and historical context is key to understanding how they materialize and unfold at the local level, and their restructuring impacts on the local political economy (Wily 2012; White et al. 2012; Cotula 2013; Baglioni and Gibbon 2013).

Moreover, the assumption that large-scale land investments play an important role in creating a cheap labour force is increasingly problematic. Indeed, the question of labour deserves to be re-investigated considering dominant agricultural models of production. Li (2011), for example, shows how the World Bank's rationale, according to which welcoming investors will help developing countries to reduce poverty by creating employment opportunities, is flawed. She argues that since firms' agricultural competitive advantage comes primarily from mechanization in the current globalized context, less and less labour is needed. Thus, empirical evidence of the local impacts associated with recent investments increasingly contradicts the argument that penetration of capitalism in rural areas of developing countries aims to create reserves of cheap labour. Rather, the emerging trend is that investors grab peasants' resources, such as land, but are not interested in their labour (Li 2011, 286). Reviewing this literature, Hall (2013, 1596) makes a similar observation: “land grab research, however, generally sees people dispossessed by land acquisitions as a ‘surplus population’ with limited prospects of finding work, and finds few indications of a ‘strategy’ to generate a labour reserve”.

Furthermore, as highlighted by Hall (2013, 1597), “assuming that land grabs go on in areas 'outside' capitalism can also lead to mischaracterizations of the politics of and resistance to land
grabbing”. For example, Akram-Lodhi’s suggestion that we observe the emergence of a bifurcated agrarian structure might lead to overlooking how the imbrication (rather than coexistence) of different modes of production are restructuring the agrarian system.

Finally, new capital does not necessarily lead to full privatization. As Lofchie (2014) convincingly demonstrates with the Tanzanian case, Tanzania's economy was never fully privatized, and the partial privatisation led rather to the creation of new rent opportunities for elites. Therefore, it seems relevant to ask why we should assume that new farmland investments would, this time, lead to full privatization and to global capitalism’s all-encompassing penetration in rural contexts of developing countries.

Indeed, this insistence on the determining impact of global forces tends to underestimate actors’ agency. Seeing peasants as either passive victims of market forces, or as actively resisting them is misleading. In fact, my empirical findings point out that resilience is their primary capacity. They are adapting to new politico-economic conditions while at the same time seeking to extricate themselves to ensure their survival. Similarly, Rutten et al. note that peasants’ reactions vary greatly depending on the local context and existing configurations of power, which affect their bargaining power with other actors (Rutten et al. 2017). Peasants, thus, have some bargaining power—albeit sometimes greatly limited; they do negotiate. They might have a poor hand, but they are learning to play their cards right. Following the suggestion of Peters, without falling into the trap of overemphasizing peasants’ agency and power, we need to broaden our investigation to document empirically how negotiation processes between actors implicated in new investments “limit or end negotiation and flexibility for certain social groups or categories” (Peters 2004, 269).
Seeking to address these shortcomings, another strand of the literature on “land grabbing” has suggested that shifting our perspective is key to understand the local impacts associated with these new farmland investments in developing countries. Privileging a top-down standpoint tends to overlook the complex nature, the fluidity and dynamism of agrarian systems in developing countries, and the socio-political and relational context in which they are embedded (White et al. 2012; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010; D. Hall 2013; Brent 2015). Indeed, micro-politics, social interactions, relations of power, and local context are important considerations when trying to understand what is going on at the local level. Although this scholarship is eclectic, contributing scholars all stress the need for more situated and empirical analyses.

**FOCUS ON MICRO-POLITICS, INTERACTIONS AND RELATIONS OF POWER**

A number of scholars have called into question the assumption that global land grabbing necessary leads “local people” to engage in resistance activities. Indeed, the variance of local reactions appears to be context dependent. For example, Castellanos-Navarrete and Jansen's study of reactions in Chiapas, Mexico, and Purdon's comparison of the implementation process of biofuel investments in two different Tanzanian communities draw attention to how conditions of incorporation affect local outcomes (Castellanos-Navarrete and Jansen 2015; Purdon 2013). This line of inquiry emphasizes the importance of not assuming that political reactions to land grabs are necessarily organized or constant across time and space, and argues for the need to empirically document local reactions in order to differentiate them (Borras and Franco 2013; Borras 2011; Mamonova 2015; Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2015). Hence, if reactions to land deals should be locally contextualized in order to be understood and differentiated, a key question is: what factors influence these local contexts?
The first factors that should be systematically considered are institutions and historical legacies because they play an important role in structuring local contexts. This argument relates to Boone’s contention that national rural land institutions determine “patterned variations in the structure and political character of land-related competition and conflict” (Boone 2014, 3). Adopting a structuralist perspective on how local land regime and institutions determine land politics, Boone argues that differentiating between neo-customary and statist land tenure regimes is helpful in understanding “patterns of land-related conflict and broader political dynamics” (Boone 2014, 189, 2017). For example, in Tanzania, the absence/dismantling of institutionalized neo-customary authorities since the Arusha declaration3 has led to the prevalence of a national statist land tenure regime. Concretely, this means that the role played by the central state is assumed to be direct both in land allocation and in solving land conflict dynamics, which are consequently likely to be played out at the national level (Boone and Nyeme 2015, 70).

With regards to resistance to land deals, Vermeulen and Cotula (2010) made the same assessment by remarking that the lack of national economic or institutional alternatives and political marginalization still constitute important hindering factors for local mobilization. Similarly, Mamonova (2015, 617) argues that the passivity of Ukrainian peasants depends on the peasantry’s inclusion in land deals, but should also be understood within the national institutional background, and historical legacies of Soviet collective farms.

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3 The Arusha Declaration (1967)—the Tanzanian Policy on Socialism and Self Reliance—presented the Tanzania’s vision for African Socialism and was implemented after independence.
Although it is true that national institutions structure local reactions to some extent, they are not sufficient to fully explain them and prove limited in explaining the variance of local reactions within the same institutional context. Property, authorities, and citizenship rules are more muddled at the local level than generally acknowledged. There is also a need to recognize actors’ agency and capacity to navigate institutional constraints in order to foster their interests, and to explain the uneven local character of contemporary land deals (Hunsberger et al. 2014). For instance, reviewing the evolution of global institutional spaces, McKeon (2013) remarks that the considerable international mediatisation of land grabs has created new windows of opportunities for social movements. Although it is true that global institutions constrain local actors, they also offer new opportunities, i.e. strengthen their capacity to strategically and successfully frame their resistance and advance their agenda in the national context.

As several scholars have claimed, it is thus useful to think of local contexts as not only historically shaped by institutions, but also as resulting from dynamic relational processes (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013; Wily 2012; Martiniello 2015; Pedersen 2016a; Amanor 2012). The state and local communities constantly renegotiate their interactions, and this negotiation process influences both local reactions and communities’ possibilities of resistance. Martiniello (2015) demonstrates that war and post-war reconstruction in Acholiland, Uganda, has a lasting impact on the way peasants relate to both the land and the state and is key to understanding the local resistance to current land deals. Sampat (2015, 771) argues that communities’ resistance to the state’s special economic zone (SEZ) in India is illustrative of their increasingly divergent conception of livelihood, and of their relationship with land and resources.
Yet, a relational standpoint draws attention to the key role played by the state. As noted earlier, the state’s involvement in land deals is not purely developmental or economically motivated. Therefore, the state’s political interests deserve systematic analytical inquiry in order to fully understand how investments are also politically embedded within the national political economy. Regarding state actors and political elites, Wolford et al. (2013) and Sikor and Lund (2009) have demonstrated that they may play an important facilitating role in these land investments, participating actively in processes of dispossession, and of capitalist accumulation.

However, this focus on political elites partnering with investors to be part of the capitalist transformation only tells one part of the story. It is also crucial to consider the state's desire to strengthen its political and territorial authority over the periphery with these land investments (Lavers and Boamah 2016; Lavers 2012b; Wolford et al. 2013; R. Hall and Kepe 2017; Brent 2015; Sampat 2015; Regassa, Hizekiel, and Korf 2018). Consequently, the territorial logic of the state as well as its political interests are increasingly interwoven with processes of capital accumulation. Land investments participate not only in global capital accumulation but are embedded in broader processes of constituting the state’s authority and sovereignty, and provoke systemic political changes for which we must account.

In addition, the state is not a unitary actor. Thus, there is a need to unpack these political configurations in order to differentiate power struggles that are at play within the state and their impacts on political relationships. For example, Mkodzongi (2016) and Ubink (2008) demonstrate that the land reform in Zimbabwe has led to the reconfiguration of rural authority, thereby empowering local traditional chiefs in their dealings with investors and the central state. Local
chiefs tend to defend their constituents' interests because their allegiance is crucial to legitimizing their political authority. Conversely, in Ghana, Anaafo and Guba (2017) show that local authorities assume a completely different role. Partnering with investors and the central state, rural chiefs are mostly protecting their own interests in investment ventures, taking advantage of their power position to dispossess and alienate the poorest and most marginalized farmers: women, pastoralists, and migrant farmers. Similarly, Locher et al. (2012) show that legal rights are embedded in power relations in Tanzania, increasing the vulnerability of the local population, whose livelihood is threatened not only by international investments but also by local political elites' agenda.

Building on these findings, scholars have proposed relational analytical frameworks to understand and study the local outcomes associated with land investments. For instance, Buur et al. (2017) suggest focusing on interactions between three sets of actors—ruling elites, investors, and local populations—to analyze implementation processes of land investments. According to them, looking at those simultaneous relations between those actors helps to understand divergent actors' interests, and how potential material and non-material exchanges determine the degree of convergence of their positions. This convergence of interest is a key factor in understanding how investment projects unfold at the local level (Buur, Nystrand, and Pedersen 2017, 4). Relatedly, Rutten et al. (2017, 892) explore five models of relations that local populations can develop with other actors: interdependency with investors; shared interests and identity; tactical relations with state officials; relations with specialists in violence; and relations with supra-local civil society groups. They argue that determining smallholders' bargaining power towards other actors helps to predict local reception of land deals.
To conclude, in addition to the lasting impacts of institutions both global and national—and associated normative structures—complex interrelations, historically embedded and continuously renegotiated, between elites, investors and local populations are determining factors that shape local impacts of land investments. Seeking to contribute to this literature, the next chapter, chapter 2, proposes an original theoretical framework, which combines various insights that are theoretically productive to foster our understanding of the impacts of agri-food projects on local political dynamics. Moreover, as I chose to conduct a political ethnography to study actors’ interactions, my theoretical framework is also reflective of my methodological choices (discussed in Chapter 3). It illustrates the ongoing, reflective, back-and-forth process between empirical material and theories that I have analytically favored to make sense of what I have observed during my fieldwork.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework: combining agency, structure and contingencies

My theoretical framework purposefully adopts a perspective of “analytic eclecticism”. Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 412) define it as “an intellectual stance a researcher can adopt when pursuing research that engages, but does not fit neatly within, established research traditions in a given discipline or field”. It involves two elements. First, my research process was foremost pragmatic, reflecting what Sil and Katzenstein call “epistemological agnosticism”. It followed from a desire to engage with various research traditions to better explain and make sense of empirical data. Second, it was also holistic. I favored a “broad scope analytical process”, seeking to not only engage but also to trace the complexity of the issues studied in order to understand how distinctive mechanisms interact, and how they explain actors’ practices (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).

I understand theories as specific lenses that are helpful in making sense of the world, but only if we acknowledge that they are by nature limitative—they circumscribe what we can see—and incomplete—they are never comprehensive enough. I argue that using a set of sociological and political theoretical insights is helpful in exposing the complexity of the social world, contributing to an explanation of actors’ social practices that have been observed in analytically circumscribed, spatialized and temporal situations.

I adopt an ontological standpoint which understands the world as a social and historical construction. Epistemologically, I depart from the positivist perspective which assumes that reality is out there and can be objectively observed and defined (Weaver 1995, 46). Conversely, I
agree with the claim that every social fact, including knowledge, is the result of actors' subjectivity and interpretation (Levine 2008; Smith 2004).

I propose two main assertions. **First, local outcomes associated with farmland investments in Tanzania result from actors’ interactions.** I agree with White et al.’s proposal to consider how “the micro-politics of negotiations of land control, access and exclusion [that] are played out at the local level” (White et al. 2012, 633). Referring to “Bernstein’s ‘Marxian haiku’—Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? What do they do with it? (Bernstein 2010, 22)”, they suggest adding a fifth key question—what do they do to each other?—to capture the relational and political side associated with new farmland investments (White et al. 2012, 621).

Indeed, local interactions are context-dependent, and not necessarily organized or constant across time and space: they are dynamic relational processes. They are contingent on investments’ terms of inclusion and exclusion that are constantly being negotiated between a wide range of actors—local, national, transnational, and international (Borras and Franco 2013; R. Hall et al. 2015; Purdon 2013; Castellanos-Navarrete and Jansen 2015). Therefore, my first contention is that actors’ interactions are determining the local outcomes associated with new farmland investments. A crucial question then is, what shapes these interactions? This brings us to my second assertion.

**My second main assertion is that these interactions are shaped by the interplay between three main elements: contingencies (C), actors’ agency (A), structure (S).** As a shortcut, I will use the acronym CAS to refer to these three elements. CASs produce the distribution of power among actors, which is structurally inegalitarian. In addition, CASs are context-dependent: the same local
Context may produce different CASs. Yet, nothing is static within a given CAS. Dynamics may change relatively quickly, because of the interplay between its three constitutive elements. My claim is that analysing given local CASs, and how they develop through time and space, is key to grasping and differentiating actors’ interactions that shape the local outcomes associated with new farmland investments. My theoretical framework conceptualises CAS, and its constitutive elements.

Contingencies (C) are part of any social phenomena and may significantly impact structure (S) and actors’ agency (A) in a given situation. As a matter of fact, the whole “land grabbing” phenomenon can be treated as a new contingency that had greatly impacted the country’s political economy by offering access to new capital. As this dissertation demonstrates, new farmland investments led to redefine actors’ interactions at every governance level, in every political arena studied. Moreover, as I will show in Chapter 8, small contingencies, such as an increase in land prices, or the unexpected involvement of a MP, are highly significant analytically even if they only provoked changes at the micro level. Indeed, these changes offered new windows of opportunities that actors can and do seize to influence structural properties of given CASs. Consequently, I follow Sibeon’s recommendation and my analysis also systematically considers the importance of fortuity or social chance in any given social situation (Sibeon 1999).

Drawing on the works of Ermakoff (2015, 69), I define contingencies through their “essential causal indeterminacy” that is both exogenous and endogenous to the systems of interactions I analyse. This definition coalesces three considerations. First, contingencies pay attention to “disruptions that are exogenous to the system of action being considered”, and as a result, they can
be partly considered as happenstaces. Yet, and second, this is reductive because indeterminacy is never properly exogenous. As noted by Ermakoff (2015, 66): “it is also a property intrinsic to processes and events […] in numerous instances, it is endogenous to the system of action it disrupts”. As a result, contingencies could always be better understood in studying the causality through an analysis of the endogenous. Therefore, using contingencies as an analytical category circumscribes the analysis. Yet, even if we can unpack the endogenous, the causality of contingencies can never be fully explained because contingencies also remained, by essence, and this is the third point, linked to the fundamental uncertainty of human agency. “Against all odds, an individual can opt for a line of conduct eschewing the grips of conditioning factors” (Ermakoff 2015, 76).

In sum, contingencies then have both exogenous and endogenous properties, but are also essentially characterized by their causal indeterminacy. Within CAS, contingencies matter and are analytically important for their shaping effects on actors’ interactions within a specific and analytically circumscribed system of interactions. Acknowledging this indeterminacy of social phenomena is crucial in grasping and explaining actors’ interactions and their variance in time and in space.

To conceptualize structure (S) and actors’ agency (A), I propose first a discussion on historical institutionalism, and second, on Giddens’s theory of structuration. Third, to better define the specificities of the political and institutional configuration that prevails in Tanzania (S), I draw on key selected concepts from the sociology of the state literature, namely the state, and infrastructural and clientelistic relations of power.
I argue that two meta relations of power, clientelistic and infrastructural, are transversal to all political arenas and have a significant structuring impact on actors’ agency (A). Although this contention on relations of power may appear deterministic, it is worth noting that my claim is not that they are exotic or permanent features of the Tanzanian political configuration. Rather, my contention is that they might be, during a given period of time, consistent, transversal, preeminent and significantly shaping actors’ interactions.

CONCEPTUALISING CAS: “S” AND “A”

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

New institutionalism is a theoretical framework based upon the assumption that institutional frameworks are central to understand any political phenomenon because they both constrain actors' choices and offer opportunities by delimiting what is possible, and what is not (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 7). Three main schools of thought are normally differentiated within new institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 32; Hall and Taylor 1996, 939). Although I agree with Lowndes and Robert's argument that delimitations between these three schools may prove rather porous and artificial, they still “paint quite different pictures of the political world” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936).

This research project draws on the insights of the historical institutionalist school. This school of thought appears the best suited for three reasons. First, historical institutionalists emphasize the structuring impact of institutions from a broader perspective than rational-choice institutionalists. Second, they have devoted considerable attention to the state as a complex set of institutions, and
the state is a very important actor regarding farmland investments. Third, they propose an approach that is more integrative, allowing to also take into accounts relevant insights from the rational-choice and sociological institutionalisms (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 938). As argued by Hall and Taylor:

> Historical institutionalism stands in an especially pivotal position. Many of the arguments recently produced by this school could readily be translated into rational choice terms, while others display clear openings toward the new institutionalism in sociology. The best of these analyses already effect something of integration, for instance, by showing how historical actors select new institutions for instrumental purposes, much as a rational choice analysis would predict, but draw them from a menu of alternatives that is made historically available through the mechanisms specified by sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, 957)

Historical institutionalism defines institutions as “formal and informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 947) and focuses on the historical processes through which the institutional structure is constituted. One of its core assumptions is that institutions involve uneven distribution of power. Thus, it gives great importance to the study of the role played by institutions in enforcing asymmetrical power relations (Hall and Taylor 1996, 940–41). It highlights three mechanisms to explain how institutions work and constrain individuals' choices: rules (both formal and informal), practices and narratives. Rules specifically refer to laws and sanctions, and are imposed through coercive mechanisms. Practices are associated with moral norms and obligations, enforcing and constituting at the same time the normative framework that gives cohesion and coherence to actors' actions. Finally, narratives are the reflection of a shared understanding (common beliefs and cognitive schemes) that is culturally constituted and commands compliance because of its “taken-for-granted” feature (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 52; Scott 2001, 60).
Institutional plurality is a key feature of post-colonial regimes, and brings the necessity to explore and account for competing claims to institutional legitimacy to the forefront of any institutional perspective. As mentioned by Sikor and Lund: “In post-colonial contexts, property regimes are negotiable and fluid to some degree because of the multiplicity of institutions competing to sanction and validate (competing) claims in attempts to gain authority for themselves” (Sikor and Lund 2009, 4). The social practices seeking to legitimize actors' actions are thus key to understand how institutional legitimacy is constituted and change through time and space.

Moreover, institutions are functionally differentiated, leading to structural asymmetry. Consequently, this requires also acknowledging the socially negotiated nature of the concepts used in institutional struggles for legitimacy, such as property, private, public, ownership, legitimate, etc.:

When policy is resisted, embraced, or diverted, such concepts become central reference points in the political debate. They appear stable, but in the larger claims for a livelihood and a position in life, people struggle over the local, idiomatic meaning of these concepts (Sikor and Lund 2009, 8).

Thus, historical institutionalism is helpful in conceptualizing how political institutions may structure local configurations of power and impact actors' agency. Yet, historical institutionalism does not pay enough attention to the co-constitutive dynamic that is at play between structure/institutions and actors’ agency. To address this shortcoming, I also discuss and integrate useful insights from Giddens’s theory of structuration.
Giddens (2004) insists on the interplay between social practices and social systems. His compelling critique of functionalism and structuralism points out the need to better consider actors’ agency in the production and reproduction of social structure. For Giddens, social systems have structural properties—symbolic, dominant, and legitimizing— and express forms of domination and power.

Giddens dismisses the very idea of objective external constraints that structure actors’ actions. Instead, he argues for an interactionist view of social systems which are at the same time constraining and produced through social action with his idea of the duality of the structure. Thus, Giddens suggests that human agency and social structure are co-constitutive: through agents’ social actions, the social structure is produced and reproduced. As Giddens puts it, “Society only has form, and that form only has effects on people, insofar as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do” (Giddens and Pierson 1998, 77).

Regarding agency, Giddens calls into question the concept of intentionality. Instead, he speaks of practical and discursive consciousness to emphasize the fact that much of quotidian activity is not purposefully motivated. For him, human agency refers to agents’ capabilities in doing things, not necessarily to their intentions. Therefore, “agency concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently” (Giddens 2004, 9). As Olivier de Sardan (2015, 41) puts it: “[Giddens’s] agency designates the margin of appreciation and margin of manoeuvre available to all social actors, irrespective of the constraints under which they operate”.

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Giddens also emphasizes that agents’ actions may have unintended consequences, which is a direct consequence of actors’ unintentional and routinized actions. In his words: “repetitive activities, located in one context of time and space, have regularized consequences, unintended by those who engage in those activities, in more or less 'distant' time-space contexts” (Giddens 2004, 14).

Although some structural properties are best understood as resulting from the duality of the social system—human agency and structure are co-constitutive is also significant and important to acknowledge that some of them are perceived by agents as objective external constraints. Socially constructed constraints may become objectified through time, and when it occurs, it hinders agents’ capacity not only to change them, but also to question their very objective nature (Berger and Luckmann 1968). For instance, even if they were, at one point in time-space, physical constraints may become almost immutable: their objectivation is so complete that actors generally conceive of them as given and inflexible.

Furthermore, Giddens’ definition of unintended consequences of human actions is somewhat limiting. They do not always result from non-intentional and routinized actions: they might also be unanticipated collateral effects of purposeful social practices. Indeed, actors may rationally and purposefully exert their agency but their capacity to control fully the consequences of their own agency is limited. As Diana Coole puts it “the operation of agentic capacities…will always exceed the agency exercised by rational subjects, even as these subjects “acquire differential agentic capacities depending upon their intersubjective context” (Coole (2005) qtd in Bennett; Bennett 2005, 453).
Historical institutionalism and Giddens’ theory of structuration are helpful starting points to understand how I conceptualize structure and agency. However, these theories’ scope remains broad and general. It is also crucial to specify some key institutional/structural features of the Tanzanian political configuration to better conceptualise CASs in the Tanzanian context.

**INSIGHTS FROM THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE STATE LITERATURE**

**THE STATE**

The state is a key concept for this research project. The Tanzanian state is powerful in the land sector, institutionally, historically, and ideationally. This statement is further elaborated in Chapter 4. In brief, under Julius Nyerere, the first Tanzanian President after Independence, Tanzania adopted a socialist vision and the state was socially understood and constructed through its paternalistic stance. Villagisation was a large-scale engineering project aiming at spatializing the state’s authority, making its subjects legible, and forcing them into a development path that was deemed the “right one” (Scott 1998).

It had lasting consequences: between five and thirteen million Tanzanians were forcefully displaced by the state in the 1970s, and although it was not a successful operation, it deeply impacted spatial relations all over Tanzania (Lorgen 2000; Hyden 1980; Schneider 2014). Access to land is still crucial in Tanzania: most Tanzanians live in rural areas and practice subsistence agriculture. Yet, land rights, either neocustomary or private, are insecure. Not only does all land still belong to the President, the President has also the power to revoke and attribute land rights
for “public interest”. Therefore, an examination of farmland investments in Tanzania requires *de facto* interrogating state officials’ interests and practices.

An important scholarship on the nature of African states has highlighted the importance of shifting from state-centric perspectives to understand governance practices (Rasmussen and Strøh Varming 2016). It has called attention to the fragmented and contentious authority of the state, highlighting the importance of delving into its multiple and competing authorities, each endowed with their own agenda, and interests. Indeed, it is key consider the effects of this contentious and uneven state authority on actors’ interactions.

The state is shaped as much by its ideal of a coherent image as by state officials’ practices and “and the changing relationship between them” (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, 19). It is thus a process: images and practices condition the flow of power. I agree with Hagmann and Péclard, and adopt Schlichte's definition of statehood as “a field of power whose confines are decided upon with means of violence, and whose dynamics are marked by the ideal of a coherent, coercive, territorial organization as well as by the practices of social actors” (Schlichte 2005, 106, qtd in Hagmann and Péclard 2010, 546).

Several concepts have been proposed in the literature to help better explain how the nature of the African state influences its governance practices. For instance, Hagmann and Péclard (2010) propose the notion of “negotiated statehood”. This framework highlights the utility of pondering four elements for the study of the African state: its historicity; its embeddedness in society; the fact that it is constituted as much by policies and institutions as “imageries, symbols and
discourses”; and finally, the relational nature of its power. In addition, this framework argues that departing from the conjoined influence of material resources, which vary in time and space and are unevenly distributed among actors, and symbolic repertoires, existing or invented, is useful to understanding domination and imposition of political authority (Hagmann and Péclard 2010, 547).

Another example is Migdal’s state-in-society approach (1997, 2001) which highlights the crucial importance of disaggregating the state in order to understand the practical consequences of its fragmented and contentious authority. It draws attention to how the state's strategy is always altered or transformed by actors throughout the implementation process. The gap between central directives and their implementation in local settings is the outcome of “continuing struggle over meaning and territorial and social divisions” in order to structure the “spatial configurations of meaning” (Migdal 2001, 26).

This theoretical standpoint draws attention to the gap between central directives and their implementation in local settings in a context of limited and contentious state power. It also insists on the importance of acknowledging how local actors always alter and negotiate central state strategies of implementation. As claimed by Migdal (2001), investigating this implementation process allows an understanding of state actors’ interests and rationale to distinguish differentiated social practices. Moreover, it emphasizes the dynamic character of social struggles which determine them and their outcomes.

It is also worth noting that the scholarship on land investments has also stressed the importance of recognizing that the state is not a unitary actor. Several scholars looking at the local impacts of
land investments have pointed out the need to unpack political configurations in order to differentiate power struggles that are at play within the state and their impacts on political relationships (Wolford et al. 2013; Pedersen 2016a; Buur, Nystrand, and Pedersen 2017; Cotula 2012; Peluso and Lund 2011).

Finally, as argued by Pedersen (2016), actors’ agency at all levels should be systematically empirically investigated because governance processes are more contingent than usually acknowledged. In addition, as Hunsberger et al. (2014) rightly stress, to further understand the diversity of local reactions, we need recognizing that local communities, such as the state, are not homogenous units. Capturing the local differentiation dynamics at play are important in explaining variance. Thus, there is a multiplicity of actors involved in land investments, and the role they play and their interests should be investigated more thoroughly.

CLIENTELISTIC RELATIONS OF POWER AND THE INFRASTRUCTURAL POWER OF THE STATE

The political configuration that prevails in Tanzania is shaped by relations of power, that I operationalize under two meta-types: clientelistic and infrastructural. My argument is that these two relations of power constitute inherent normative institutions of the Tanzanian political economy, and should be systematically considered in relation to new farmland investments. To put it simply, new investments lead to commodification of land and new capital flows. Since clientelistic and infrastructural relations of power are preeminent, transversal, and intertwined, new farmland investments create incentives for state officials to use them to produce their political authority, which is key to access/create new accumulation opportunities.
First, agri-food projects have implications on clientelistic networks. In addition to the increase in revenues generated by the rent/sale of the land, they may foster the development of new infrastructures, or create local employment. Given the importance of clientelistic practices in many African states, and the blurring of limits between the private and public spheres, investors are likely to get involved in the web of informal clientelistic networks to increase return on investments. Of course, there is variance and power dynamics underlying actors’ integration and opportunities within a given political economy, and its associated clientelistic networks.

The importance of clientelistic networks in Tanzania is partly explained by its historical trajectory. States' origins and conditions of formation are not universals (Vu 2010). Historical circumstances and specific constraints have modeled the process of state formation in Africa, giving birth to institutional specificities. As Jeffrey Herbst demonstrates, the costs of expanding authority for rulers in Africa, from the pre-colonial to the postcolonial period, were heavily constrained by structural factors such as the geography, low people density, and availability of land (Herbst 2000). During the colonial period, the state's structure and territory were imposed from outside and rested only on tenuous links with the society it governed (Migdal 1997). One of the challenges for post-colonial African states was then the creation of such links with their society in order to gain their legitimacy. Yet, the process was constrained by their limited authority, weak institutions, and scarce resources.

Neopatrimonialism was a concept developed in reference to this hybrid type of governance constituted of a mix of impersonal, standardized governance apparatus and of patrimonial practices (van de Walle 2001, 16; Bruhbs 2011). The origin of the neopatrimonial concept could be found
in the governance systems described by Max Weber. Patrimonialism, in its pure form, combines diverse domination activities linked to tradition, such as clientelism, patronage, corruption, etc. Jean-François Médard adapted this concept by adding the prefix neo- to describe contemporary Cameroonian politics (Bruhbs 2011, 30). The main rupture lies in the fact that “neopatrimonialism” refers to practices that borrow in part to precolonial polities, but which are embedded in the formal apparatus of the “modern” Weberian state, both colonial and postcolonial. Hence, neopatrimonialism refers to a hybrid type of governance constituted of a mix of rational governance apparatus, and of patrimonial practices (van de Walle 2001, 16).

Neopatrimonialism first provided colonizers an inexpensive way of governing, especially when the state did not have enough capacity to establish legitimate control over its whole territory (Berman 1998). Many of its features were replicated by postcolonial state elites (Bayart 1989; Young 1994). An important element of neopatrimonial governance is the blurred demarcation between the public and the private sphere. Jean-François Bayart uses the concept “politics of the belly” to describe state elites' behavior, who seek to maintain their hegemony by grabbing, accumulating and partially redistributing public resources and wealth (Bayart 1989). Bayart, Ellis and Hibou have also argued that we now observe in some African states not only the blurring of limits between public and private spheres but also between the legal and criminal. Criminal networks offer new resource opportunities to state actors, a phenomenon they name the criminalisation of the state (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 2009). It participates to the same logic. Since state elites concentrate the distribution of their resources to specific networks, this governance strategy helps it to reduce their costs, and safeguards their hegemony.
This model of governance leads to political processes that are informal and fragmented. Emmanuel Terray’s metaphor of the air conditioner and the veranda illustrates well the phenomenon: “The first is the face of modern state power, bureaucratic omnipotence and technical expertise – the avatar of modernity; the second is the scene of the real business of government by a logic which is no longer that of efficiency, but of share-out” (Berman 1998, 335). In addition, as van de Walle shows, the extraordinary durability of neopatrimonial regimes even in times of economic crisis is in part explained by the ruler’s strategic decisions. For instance, by implementing partial economic and political reforms, rulers manage to both respond to international pressures for good governance and preserve their political power (van de Walle 2001, 46).

Lastly, it is worth noting that neopatrimonial dynamics and networks are part of a shared perception of the role of the state for many social actors. As Berman states, though perhaps in a way that is too systematic and not nuanced enough: “The contradiction of the politics of the belly is that both rich and poor, elites and masses, share the opportunistic and materialistic view of the politics and the state” (Berman 1998, 338). Of course, there is variance and power dynamics underlying actors’ integration and possibilities within the political economy and its associated neopatrimonial networks.

Although this discussion on neopatrimonialism is helpful to better understand the specificities of African states’ origins and the role played by neopatrimonial relations of power in relation to state-building, these practices are not fixed or inner components of the Tanzanian state identity. It is important to avoid the trap of essentialising governance in African states as if they constitute
“special cases”. As noted by Oliver de Sardan (2015, 35), the use of an overaggregated concept such as neopatrimonialism masks the diversity of practices.

Thus, I prefer using clientelistic relations of power than neopatrimonial practices to avoid associating them to a specific model of governance such as neopatrimonialism that generalises my observations to the entire Tanzanian political economy. Simply, I term clientelistic relations of power to name these empirically observed relationships that resemble this relation of client to patron, with the client giving political or financial support to a patron in exchange for some personal, political or economic privilege or benefits (Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Scott 1972; Stokes 2011).

Second, the question of the state's capacity in practice to implement its own rules and policies is relevant to the African context (Mann 1984). Because of their specific mode of constitution, African states have had difficulty establishing control over their whole territory and population. Pastoral groups, for instance, have traditionally escaped the state's control because of their peripheral location and their nomadic livelihood (Hyden 1980; Herbst 2000). For the state, as Scott argues, increasing the legibility (for example, through land titling, mapping, census, taxation) of these populations was crucial to asserting and strengthening its political control and legitimacy (Scott 1998).

Yet, as Scott also adds, many states have failed to achieve these objectives. Accordingly, Herbst has shown that expanding authority for rulers in Africa, from the precolonial to the postcolonial period, was heavily constrained by structural factors such as the geography, low population
density, availability of land, and the resources at its disposal (Herbst 2000). Consequently, an important challenge for African states still is to build their authority over their whole territory. This pattern was already at play during the colonial period. Scholars such as Sara Berry (1993) showed the variation in colonial states’ attempts at broadcasting their authority over their entire territory. As Berry coined it, this was often “hegemony on a shoestring”, whereby “the presence of the state in rural economies has been intrusive rather than hegemonic” (Berry 1993, 22).

Regarding land investments in Africa, scholars have argued that the state’s involvement in land deals is not purely developmental or economically motivated: it is also often intertwined with the state officials’ desire to strengthen their political and territorial authority over the periphery (Lavers 2012a; Nalepa, Short Gianotti, and Bauer 2017; Wolford et al. 2013; R. Hall and Kepe 2017; Lavers and Boamah 2016). For example, Lavers and Boamah (2016) contend that agricultural investments might be used by the state to constitute its infrastructural power over an illegible society. As such, these deals contribute to the transformation of the state itself. As argued by Wolford et al., “land deals are nothing more or less than transformations in the ground on which states are formed” (Wolford et al. 2013, 194).

In addition, further cogent evidence of the relevance of Scott’s argument is found in mapping and land titling programmes that are currently implemented in many African states. Land policies are not necessarily reflective of, or based upon pre-existing patterns of sovereignty, rather, they are producing these patterns (Lund 2011). As Lund (2011, 893) states, “land reform policies can be seen as efforts to control people and space: to produce and regulate political subjects, property and territory”. Fogelman and Bassett (2017, 257), looking at the case of Lesotho, make a similar
argument proposing to use Latour’s concept of inscription devices to understand how the state exerts political power through mapping. Their study shows that one of the goals of the Land Act 2010 was of “remaking land as an alienable commodity”. Similarly, Lund (2013) uses the concept of territorialisation to look at how policy reforms are intertwined with control of space in Ghana, both becoming key justification tools for state’s authority. Thus, mapping and titling participate in the creative process of state formation: they are constitutive processes that produce state authority (Lund and Boone 2013; Lund 2013; Fogelman and Bassett 2017). Scholars from the critical geography tradition have also put forward similar arguments (Wainwright and Bryan 2009; Harley 2001; Galeana 2018; Gordon, Gurdian, and Hale 2003; Elden 2013).

Therefore, land investments are intrinsically linked to land mapping and titling initiatives in Tanzania because authority over mapping and titling is key to establish state officials’ power over land administration and investment negotiations. Infrastructural relations of power refer to this will of Tanzanian central authorities to assert their control over the countryside by rendering it more “legible” and hence, administrable. The level of state penetration is therefore an indicator of the infrastructural power of the central state.

Through these theoretical lenses, my empirical chapters examine actors’ interactions and analyse how they shape local outcomes associated with new farmland investments in Tanzania. The following chapter, Chapter 3, presents the methodological choices of this research. After discussing the case selection, it defines the method that I used—a political ethnography—and argues that it bears significant advantages for studying local political configurations. It concludes
by stressing crucial ethical and pragmatic considerations, and discussing the limits of this research project.
Chapter 3: Methodological choices and considerations

The choice of Tanzania to analyze the politics of land grabbing is advantageous for several reasons. First, it is a country with abundant natural resources and the agricultural sector employs 74% of its labour force. Given the size of the agricultural sector, it offers a large variety of sites to observe and analyze the politics of land grabbing. Second, its government is actively courting investors, contending that they will ensure agriculture's modernization and economic development. Developing the agricultural sector is defined as a high priority in the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan 2011/12-2015/16. As stated by the then president of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete: “aggressive investment promotion and proper land use planning and property rights management” are key to attain the 10% growth rate from 2010 to 2015 (Planning Commission, President’s Office 2012, ii). Consequently, Tanzania has welcomed over the last few years numerous international investors, and concluded a large number of land transactions. Third, as in neighboring East African states, the implementation of these investment projects has revealed problematic, especially at local level. Yet, in spite of the failure of several recent farmland projects, the Tanzanian state officials’ positive development narrative associated with farmland investments remains surprisingly resilient (Engström and Hajdu 2018).

Furthermore, Tanzania stands out from countries because of the specificities of its historical and current socio-political trajectory. As already stated earlier and discussed more in detail in Chapter 4, the country went through an enormous large-scale engineering project which was implemented by its first President, Julius Nyerere. Still today, it is difficult to evaluate the consequences of this villagisation programme on spatial relations all over Tanzania. Nevertheless, the enormous scope of the project gives us an indication of its lasting impact: between five and thirteen millions of
Tanzanians were forcefully displaced by the state in the 1970s (Lorgen 2000; Hyden 1980; Schneider 2014). Tanzania is thus an almost unique case: only Ethiopia and Mozambique have undertaken similar spatial reorganisation projects of their rural populations in the 70s.

Second, Tanzania’s current President, John Pombe Magufuli who was elected in November 2015, makes the Tanzanian case even more interesting (see Chapter 4). Initially praised for his highly mediatized, top-priority fight against corruption, Magufuli’s election was internationally perceived as an encouraging shift towards more democratic governance in Tanzania—including land rights management. For instance, in regards to large-scale farmland investments, Magufuli has favored an aggressive stance towards unproductive investors, which is unparalleled in neighbouring countries. Yet, Magufuli’s recent shift towards increasingly authoritarian governance with the implementation of repressive policies and a closing room for political dissent shows that further investigation is needed to fully capture the political meaning of such action (this argument is further developed in Chapter 5).

**CASE SELECTION**

Focusing exclusively on agri-food projects that are operational since at least 5 years, I initially identified two investors in two different regions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name of the company</th>
<th>Main crops</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Kagera Sugar Plantation</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>Kagera</td>
<td>Missenyi</td>
<td>Near Bukoba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Eurovistaa Trading Co. Ltd</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>Pwani</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>Mkongo South and Kilimani</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The choice of those two regions was motivated by a desire to determine and compare the impact of land investments in different local political contexts. Missenyi is a district located in the Kagera region, on the west side of Victoria Lake, in the north of the country, near Rwanda. At the arrival of the Germans, the region was inhabited by Bantu people, and divided into nine different kingdoms. Political power was thus centralized and social life highly hierarchized and regulated. Local kings in Kagera region remained in power until the independence of Tanzania in 1961 (Reining 1962; Carlson 1993). Livelihood strategies and the ecology of the region are highly influenced by the proximity of the lake, which is the biggest in Africa. As a result, many small-scale farmers combine fishing and agriculture to sustain their livelihood. Politically, although the party-state, the the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) won the 2010 and the 2015 elections, votes for the main opposition party CHADEMA remain important and constant, accounting for 36.1% (2010) and 37% (2015) of the vote (NEC 2016).

Rufiji district is located south of Dar-Es-Salaam on the East coast, and is part of Pwani region. It has the particularity of being one of the first district that was targeted by Nyerere’s villagisation programme (Angwazi and Ndulu 1973). The district is sparsely populated, and local political management was historically, and still is, decentralized. Population is mainly constituted of small-scale farmers (85%) who live in villages. Agriculture is rain-fed, and rotational (Mwakaje 2012).
Rufiji is one of the most targeted regions for new agri-business investments in Tanzania because of its fertile arable lands. The Rufiji river, the largest in Tanzania, crosses the district, provoking seasonal floods, which are generally seen as having negative impacts for large-scale agricultural production. However, local farmers perceive them positively, and have accordingly adapted their agricultural strategy (Perfect, Majule, and FAO 2010, 8; Sandberg 1974). Moreover, it is the only district in Tanzania where land management and development are controlled by a regional organization (Rubada1) which was specifically constituted to this aim in 1975.

Traditionally, the CCM appears to have been very strong in this region. For example, in the 2010 elections, only 17% of people in Pwani region voted for an opposition party. However, interestingly, the 2015 elections were illustrative of a political shift, as CHADEMA has posed a serious challenge to CCM by gaining 45% of the vote. CCM managed to keep its grip on the region, but only by a margin of 8% (NEC 2016). Lack of empirical data limit our understanding of this political shift, but it might be associated with the corruption scandal in which Rubada has been embroiled recently (Ally 2016).

As previously discussed in Chapter 2, data on farmland investments in Sub-Saharan Africa is piecemeal, incomplete, and contradictory. Therefore, planning fieldwork from abroad is difficult—if not impossible—since access to valid data on existing land deals is greatly limited. Thus, researchers need flexibility as their objects of investigation might change through the research process.

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1“The Rufiji Development Authority (Rubada) is a corporate body established by the Act of Parliament No.5 of 1975. The Authority is charged with multi-sectoral responsibility of promoting, regulating, coordinating and facilitating, sustainable and balanced long-term ecological and social-economic development activities in the sector of Energy, Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry, Tourism and Environment in the Rufiji Basin.” (Rubada 2013)
My selection of cases evolved during the research process. To illustrate this point concretely, during my fieldwork, I discovered that in one of my targeted regions of study, all official operational investments had been abandoned by investors many years ago, without the government’s official records having been updated. Officially then, there were no “land grab” in the region. My initial and planned object of study—the investment project identified prior to fieldwork—was in fact non-existent.

Still, I started investigating. I discovered a complex, hidden, politically contentious world of farmland investment projects. Interestingly, all ongoing processes of land acquisition for new investment projects were not acknowledged by authorities, and very contentious politically. Consequently, my methodological choices and the flexibility of my research design proved crucial in gaining insights into the complex farmland investment game at play in this region.

In the end, I investigated the only operational investment project in Kagera region—Kagera Sugar which has been made by a Tanzanian company, Superdoll. In Pwani region, I decided to examine both acquisition processes for new projects, and operationalisation processes for failed investments. In total, I looked at five distinct investment projects that were targeting land in six different villages specifically in Rufiji District (see Table 1: Cases description).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the case</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Actors involved</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Status of the land before transfer</th>
<th>Status of the land transfer and of the investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kagera Sugar</td>
<td>Missenyi</td>
<td>Central state, investor, District authorities, local investors (outgrowers)</td>
<td>Sugar production</td>
<td>Part of what is now Kagera was previously a state-owned estate; village land</td>
<td>Transfer of land completed, operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Agricultural Products</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>Central state, district authorities, investor</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>Village land</td>
<td>Transfer of land completed, non-operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurovistaa Inc.</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>TIC, Central state, District authorities</td>
<td>Initially sunflower, switches to maize</td>
<td>Village land</td>
<td>Transfer of land completed, non-operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukuliro Farm Holdings</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>TIC, Central state, District authorities involved later on</td>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>Village land</td>
<td>Transfer of land completed, non-operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rufiji Sugar, Agro-Forest, Mohammed Entreprises</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>Rubada and district authorities</td>
<td>Sugar production</td>
<td>Village land</td>
<td>Transfer of land in process, non operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontiline</td>
<td>Rufiji</td>
<td>Rubada and district authorities</td>
<td>Sugar production</td>
<td>Village land</td>
<td>Transfer of land in process, non operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONDUCTING A POLITICAL ETHNOGRAPHY**

The project is based on extensive field research: a nine-month political ethnography that I conducted between June 2016 and September 2017, mostly in two Tanzanian rural regions, Pwani and Kagera. I conducted the interviews with government officials and investors alone, but I hired a Tanzanian research assistant (RA) to work with me while conducting interviews with local communities. My first encounter with my RA was contingent. When we first met, he was a Tanzanian student in communication studies at the University of Kampala, Uganda. His sister was the manager of the hotel I was staying at, and she introduced him to me. I initially hired him because he speaks fluently Kihaya, Kiswahili and English, and was born in Kagera region. In the Summer of 2016, we started working together and our collaboration lasted about five months.

My RA’s assistance was invaluable, as he helped me to read social situations, get a better understanding of the local realities, and also, came to have a very good understanding of my research project, my aim and my interests. He is brilliant and has excellent communication and
analytical skills. During such a challenging fieldwork, he became a friend and an ally. We mutually protected one another. With time, he also became passionate about my research project and our findings, and very interested in getting a better understanding of all these hidden political dynamics we were discovering together, and of their impacts on local communities we were interviewing. It is why I chose to hire him again when I went to Rufiji: we had developed a fruitful working relationship and it was comforting to have someone I could trust with me in such politically and physically challenging research contexts.

My choice of conducting a political ethnography was justified on the basis of my research focus—local interactions—and because political ethnography is a well-adapted method to an inductive project, allowing the research design to evolve along with the research process. As already showed for the case selection, this flexibility was crucial. The next section of this chapter further presents and discusses my methodological approach.

Political ethnography involves the researcher participating in the daily reality, observing, listening, watching, asking, in order to grasp what is going on, and to get a detailed understanding of her research object. Thus, ethnography has traditionally been understood as participant observation² and immersion in the field of study. Wacquant's definition of ethnography is often quoted as a reference in the literature:

social research based on the close-up, on-the-ground observation of people and institutions in real time and space, in which the investigator embeds herself near (or within) the phenomenon as to detect how and why agents on the scene act, think, and feel the way they do (Wacquant 2003, qtd in Auyero 2006, 5).

² Speaking of participant observation in the context of my fieldwork aims at acknowledging that my presence itself in rural Tanzanian areas made me an actor in the social phenomena I was studying. Voluntarily or not, my actions had unexpected consequences, and I exerted an influence on other actors.
Although Wacquant’s definition is a useful starting point, it remains rather vague. I prefer O'Reilly's critical minimal definition for its precision and because it acknowledges reflexivity as an embedded component of using ethnography as a method:

Ethnography is iterative-inductive research (that evolves in design through the study), drawing on a family of methods, involving direct and sustained contacts with human agents, within the context of their daily lives (and cultures), watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions, and producing a richly written account that respects the irreducibility of human experience, that acknowledges the role of theory, as well as the researcher's own role, and that views human as part object/part subject (O'Reilly 2005, 3).

Recently, however, this traditional understanding of ethnography has been increasingly challenged by scholars who argue for the need to go beyond, and for conceptualizing political ethnography not only as immersion in the field of study, but also as a sensibility. Engaging in political ethnography as a sensibility, in the words of Schatz, means adopting “an approach that cares—with the possible emotional engagement that implies—to glean the meanings that the people under study attribute to their social and political reality” (Schatz 2009, 5).

Although undertaking ethnography as a sensibility is necessarily conjoined with a traditional ethnography, conceptually, it commands different ontological and epistemological assumptions. Ontologically, it requires seeing social reality as a continuous socially constructed process, where truths are relative, partial and contingent. Complete knowledge of a phenomenon simply does not exist. In addition, it rejects the neutrality assumption of positivist ontology: knowledge is co-constituted and intersubjective, “coproduced in unique, often fleeting, power-laden, and deeply context-dependent relationships” (Schatz 2009, 15).
Epistemologically, it challenges the dichotomy between the observer and the observed, nuancing their interactions and their relationship to each other by acknowledging their complexity, and their dynamic and adaptive character. Finally, it involves recognizing the performative aspect of every human interaction and acknowledging the limitations of what can be observed. As Schatz notes: “what is discoverable is the type of performance that the researched choose to offer the researcher” (Schatz 2009, 12). The work of the researcher thus is to make sense, gather and triangulate information in order to provide an empirically grounded account of her research object.

One limitation of the ethnographic method is its difficulty in producing generalizable results. However, as Tilly (2006) remarks, generalization is not one of the primary concerns of the political ethnographer because his point of focus is on processes, rather than correlations and comparative statistics. Moreover, ethnographic studies often produce evidence “that call into question generalizations produced or meanings assigned by other research traditions” (Schatz 2009, 10).

In the collection edited by Schatz, *Political ethnography: what immersion contributes to the study of power*, contributors illustrate with their own field experience how political ethnography as a method enriches the study of politics, convincingly demonstrating its potential for future research in political science. For example, Jourde (2009) draws attention to the disciplinary effect of categories, causal pathways and main concepts of mainstream political science. He shows how adopting this method may help uncover what he calls the UPO (unidentified political objects), and lead to new ways of categorizing and conceptualizing. Schatzberg (2009) highlights the limits of a Western understanding of political causation. He explains how, by being open-minded to other perceptions of reality, his ethnographic work led him to discover alternative causal explanations.
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In sum, to use Schatz’s words (2009, 4), ethnography allows “an empirically sound, theoretically vibrant, epistemologically innovative, and normatively grounded study of politics”. Therefore, adopting an ethnographic method bears significant advantages as it allows gathering grounded empirical evidence, possibilities for conceptual refinement, and theory building.

**THE LIMITS OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT**

Researching the local impacts associated with new farmland investments is politically contentious in Tanzania. As a result, my fieldwork for this research was challenging because my efforts to uncover these hidden political dynamics were at best perceived by some informants as annoying, sometimes upsetting; at worse they were perceived as threatening their very interests associated with these investment projects.

In addition, adopting ethnography as a method involved important ethical, and pragmatic considerations that affected my research process and my findings. Reflexivity thus was key as I was continuously and as transparently as possible assessing my position in the field and its impact on my research process and findings (Berger 2015; Wood 2007; Irwin 2006; Deane and Stevano 2016). In order to transparently assess the limits of this research project, the following sections consider four specific issues: rendering the field “legible”; preserving my independence; ensuring my own and my informants’ safety; and the reproduction of unequal relations of power.

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3 Reflexivity here can be defined as "the process of continual internal dialogue and critical self-evaluation of researcher's positionality as well as active acknowledgment and explicit recognition that this position may affect the research process and outcome" (Berger 2015, 220).
Although Scott (1998) primarily develops the concept of “legibility” to discuss the capacity of the state “to see and read”, his concept greatly captures as well the reality of a researcher starting his fieldwork in a foreign country. Indeed, increasing the legibility of the field was an important challenge for me throughout my fieldwork.

A trivial example that illustrates this is the inexistence of maps in most rural areas of Tanzania. Maps, boundaries and roads are all part of local knowledge. Orientation between villages, boundaries, and mapping the investment in relation to villages surrounding it were all tiny challenges associated with increasing my capacity at better seeing and reading the local context.

Another example is my initially limited understanding of some key political notions in the Tanzanian context. Concepts such as consultation, agreement and democracy were at first framed by my Western conceptual framework, and this Western framing influenced my reading of some social situations. It takes time to question my own unacknowledged assumptions about meaning, and it has an impact on how I conducted my first interviews. This could have led to important biases if left unchallenged.

The same is true, and perhaps even more important, in relation to actors’ interactions with each other, and with me. The normative structure regulating social interactions differs from one country to another. Reading people reactions, contextualising their interactions, understanding the hidden signification of expressions, words, and ways of behaving is part of a time-consuming learning process. In practice, as I became increasingly aware, what sometimes appeared to me as petty
details might prove of paramount importance to my informants. For instance, in most Tanzanian rural communities, I had to introduce yourself and clarified why I was there. It is a way to secure both access to informants and your safety during the research process.

Failing to do so may have important consequences, and could even threaten your life. For instance, the whole country was shocked in October 2016 when three Tanzanian researchers were brutally attacked by a group of villagers near Dodoma. They were slashed with axes and machetes before being burned in their car (Ubwani 2016). After investigation, the police discovered that the attack was triggered by these villagers’ belief that the researchers were “witches”. They failed to introduce themselves to village leaders, thereby leaving room for ontological uncertainty and ambiguity about their intentions and motives.

Moreover, getting access to marginalised communities is a complicated matter. A lot of small details matter, and might influence how I was perceived, and more importantly, what story they choose to tell me. To give a concrete example, arriving by car in a Tanzanian village is often the first clue that the community will use to determine your socio-political status. In the most remote communities, it is common for villagers to associate cars with government’s agents. If the community reads you as being with the Tanzanian government, gaining villagers’ trust becomes almost impossible. Similarly, being introduced to the local population through local elites is likely to provoke both mistrust and fear towards the researcher, as possible retaliation from the politically powerful may be very threatening to local people. Local elites may even use this as a strategy to surreptitiously discredit me especially if they are trying to conceal information. Therefore, as
Cramer and al. (2016) contend, the risk of losing independence is tangible for the researcher inattentive to the fact that the opposition of elites to independent research may affect his access to the subordinate class. Concretely, it could have limited my access to villagers which is very problematic because my research focus was on how local dynamics impacted and were influenced by new farmland investments.

One way my research assistant and I found to mitigate this was to always introduce ourselves and our research project to the leaders of a given village first. We informed them about our intention to conduct interviews with villagers, but always remained very vague about the “when”. Waiting a couple of days or even weeks before coming back to conduct the interviews with villagers often secured our independence from leaders who would have otherwise insisted on accompanying us in the village.

In addition, we adopted the villagers’ main mode of transportation to move around: walking. People were sometimes very surprised to see a “mzungu”—a foreigner in Swahili—walking through the bush under a burning sun to speak to them. They were used to seeing wealthy “mzungu” moving around in cars, be they investors or tourists. I believe it may have changed their perception of who I was and helped me somehow to gain their trust. Moreover, walking bore other advantages as I often met interesting people along the way, and got a better understanding of villagers’ day-to-day reality.

ENSURING MY OWN AND MY INFORMANTS’ SAFETY

Another very crucial challenge associated with the legibility of the field for a researcher relates to
his own safety. Sometimes, misinterpreting informants’ reactions has put me in real danger. For example, once, in Rufiji district, I was speaking with district officials in order to get information about one specific investor. I wanted to visit the investment site but these officials were very reluctant to let me, even though they never said so directly. Everything became a complicated matter. We argued, discussed, and finally I complied with some of their demands—such a hiring their motorbike drivers at an exorbitant price—to get their approval. In the end, after a rather long negotiating process, we left and went to the investment site.

My initial assumption was that they did not wanted us to visit the farm because they wanted to hide the investor’s lack of commitment to operationalise his investment. That proved only partly true. Later on, I found out that this specific investor was in conflict with the administrators of Rufiji National Park, with which his farmland has shared boundaries. He acquired land that was reserved land, through his clientelistic networks, which created a legal problem between district and National Park authorities. The conflict had escalated, and at the moment of my visit to his farm, Rufiji National Park guards had been instructed to shoot anyone seen on this land located near the Park’s borders.

Concretely then, by visiting this specific investment site, we were putting ourselves in danger of getting shot, without even understanding the risk. This whole episode made me realize two crucial things. First, the political game at play is sometimes bigger than what I even anticipate as a foreign researcher. Second, for these district officials, hiding this contentious conflict was more valuable than ensuring my safety. Consequently, the fact that elites may manipulate information for a
variety of reasons implied not only the risks of losing my independence and having my results biased by their interests, but also tangible risks to my safety.

Furthermore, safety risks were substantial not only for me, but also for my informants. Tanzania is still an authoritarian state. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, since Magufuli came into power in late October 2015, authoritarian tendencies have been increasing: detention of opposition leaders, banning of public demonstrations, policy changes in media regulations, increased control of social media, numerous uninvestigated cases of people speaking against the government who have disappeared or have been arrested, etc. Political violence is a real issue. Corruption is also widespread, rule of law is problematic and for many Tanzanians, defending their rights is a tricky matter, which requires financial and political capital that most of them do not have.

In this context, I soon realized the importance of the question of informed consent. This created an important and constant ethical dilemma for me during my whole fieldwork: How to conduct independent research and gather the views of marginalized farmers while at the same time ensuring my own and my informants’ safety? In some cases, people agreed to speak with me about some very political issues. I protected their anonymity and the confidentiality of the information they trusted me with. However, it is undisputable that many informants also remained silent about some of the most pressing issues for fear of political retaliation and violence.

Thus, it is not easy to assess which story I had access to, or what is missing from it even if I did triangulate information. As a consequence, it is important to acknowledge that my findings are limited somewhat by the impacts of the political context prevailing at the time of my fieldwork,
and all of its underlying implications on relations of power, on people’s perceptions, on what they dared denounce or speak about and what they did not.

REPRODUCING UNEQUAL RELATIONS OF POWER

In addition, my positionality and the relations of power it involved, has marked all my interactions with my informants as well as my research process and findings. Even though I did not intend to, I reproduced relations of power throughout my fieldwork. I am a Western, young, white, and educated woman. I have options that are not available to most people I met and interviewed. The most obvious of these is that I can travel to Tanzania to study these investment projects, entering and leaving the country as I please.

My power position was thus inaccessible for most of my informants, including government officials. How then do we assess this impact on the relationship the researcher developed with her informants? How did all these power inequalities shape their expectations, their answers, their very interactions with me?

They do indeed have critical consequences. Assessing them though is a complicated matter. On one hand, I do believe that my informants were speaking more freely with me because they were conscious, as I came to be, of my position as a foreigner to the field of study. My very position gave me a status independent of the clientelistic and political networks that regulate their social life. My perceived independence provided them with an opportunity to voice their concerns more freely. Being listened to was thus an important unanticipated benefit of their participation in my research.
Yet, at the same time, I created expectations that were impossible for me to meet. For instance, I realised that my listening and my very presence and interest in those land issues gave local communities hope that things would change. They were expecting me to raise awareness about the most pressing issues they were facing, i.e. land dispossession, land issues, land conflicts, violence, indebtedment, social inequalities, etc. Many overestimated both my political powers and my commitment to get politically engaged in those issues. Often, I felt as much powerless as they do, in the face of predatory, clientelistic and sometimes violent practices.

However, it is true that my position as a “mzungu” gave me privileged access to key actors, to government officials, and to information. There is an informal law of secrecy surrounding most farmland investments I have been investigating in Tanzania. At one point, continuously interviewing different actors, at various levels, and triangulating information bore fruit. For instance, in Rufiji district, by gathering, using and cross-checking villages’ maps with the information provided by the Tanzanian Investment Centre and investors, I succeeded in mapping all ongoing investment projects. Yet, the fact that I am white, and thus very visible in rural Tanzanian settings also made things more difficult. Sometimes, I walked in the bush several hours in order to avoid local and district officials controlling my access to informants.

Furthermore, unequal access to information affected my research object, even involuntarily. For example, in some instances, my questions about investment projects put me in a position where local communities knew less about what was going on than I did. This was the case in a small village I researched. The Chairman of this village in collusion with some local leaders had agreed
to sell the village land to an investor, without consulting or securing the consent of the villagers. As a result, villagers were unaware of the deal. This created an important ethical dilemma for me.

Rightly, villagers started asking me questions. After all, I was there to investigate the impacts of an investor who had acquired their land without them knowing it. They quickly understood that this would lead to their displacement by government officials, dispossessing them at the same time from their rights to this land. The matter was even more delicate because I knew that this specific farmland project was not tentative. It had already been approved by the Ministry of Land, and was currently being reviewed by the President himself. In this context, how much information should I share? How is my information-sharing having an impact on the course of events? How do I assess this impact on my research object?

Those are important and thorny questions. Therefore, I must acknowledge that first, my presence had an impact in the field and on the very object I studied, and second, that it is impossible to fully measure the scope of that impact. It is inevitable, and a constitutive part of the research process. Research is subjective, knowledge-building is interactive, and there might be unexpected consequences to our purposeful actions.

Yet, in the interest of transparency, it is important to clarify my standpoint when such situations occurred. I chose to always share information with affected communities. Probably, my presence in the field led to villagers being more informed about new investment projects, and also about their rights to land, and possibly, led them to subsequently challenge their local leaders on these issues.
In sum, this research implied critical ethical challenges that had an impact on knowledge production. Indeed, as this discussion highlighted and acknowledged, knowledge production is an intersubjective process, bound temporally and spatially.
Chapter 4: In brief, the legacies of historical land management in Tanzania and the potency of factional struggles within the CCM

In order to introduce this thesis’ empirical chapters, and to situate the reader with regards to Tanzanian politics, this chapter first briefly introduces Tanzania’s historical trajectory, with a specific focus on land policies. This historical overview is crucial for understanding the land rights regime that prevails in Tanzania today. It helps to elucidate the lasting paternalistic character of the relationship between the Tanzanian state and its citizens and explain why local resistance against the state in relation to land management is generally low.

Second, it discusses the political context, devoting special attention to the most recent elections which were held in October 2015. The 2015 elections were a key moment in Tanzania politics, exemplifying the intensity and the potency of factional struggles within the CCM. Following an era of relative liberalisation and an increase in political freedoms and rights throughout the country, the eruption of several corruption scandals illustrated that serious power struggles were at play within the CCM, rendering the balance between its political factions even more precarious than before. This political factionalism is a key variable in Tanzania to explain the centralisation of land management, and to capture clientelistic relationships between levels of governance. Moreover, it shows and takes into account the fact that Tanzania is experiencing a shift towards increasingly authoritarian governance, with the implementation of repressive policies and a closing room for political dissent under its fifth government.
Access to land was and remains to this day a crucial and salient political question in Tanzania, as most Tanzanians live in rural areas and practice subsistence agriculture. The Tanzanian territory is approximately 945,087 square kilometers, with an estimated arable land area of 888,200 square kilometers. Despite the large amount of land, low rainfall and poor soil fertility explain low population density and the prevalence of shifting cultivation and pastoralism (World Bank 2010).

Already during the colonial era, land was a political question in Tanganyika. The Land Ordinance of 1923, established by the British colonial administration, was instrumental in centralizing Tanzania’s land management. Following its enactment, the colonial governor became solely responsible for land allocation (Shivji 1992, 2006). Later, British authorities, following the recommendation of the African Royal Commission 1953-1955, sought to render effective another policy titled *The Individualization, Titling and Registration (ITR)* which aimed at transforming customary land management to allow private ownership of land in Tanzania.

Julius Nyerere, the charismatic leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), vigorously opposed this colonial land commercialization initiative. It became part of the political grievances fueling Tanzania’s fight for independence. In his 1958 pamphlet, *Mali ya Taifa*, Nyerere already presented his vision of what should be the land management precepts of Tanzania:

> In a country such as Tanzania, where, generally speaking, the Africans are poor and the foreigners are rich, it is quite possible that, within eighty or a hundred years, if the poor African were allowed to sell his land, all the land in Tanganyika would belong to wealthy immigrants, and the local people would be tenants. But even if there were no rich foreigners in this country, there would emerge rich and clever Tanganyikans. If we allow land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika and all the others would be tenants. (Julius Nyerere 1966, qtd in Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (LRRRI) 2010, 10)
Under Julius Nyerere’s leadership, in 1961, Tanganyika won its independence from Great Britain. Tanzania itself was created in 1963 with the union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika. Inspired by the Soviet experience, Nyerere established in the newly formed Tanzania a socialist-inspired system of governance, based on the full powers of a single party. Nyerere’s approach was paternalistic: only enlightened leaders were thought to have the ability to guide their people in development. This choice was further justified by the lingering distrust of European institutions, largely due to the colonial era, and the fear that political dissent might hurt the country’s economic development (Ekeh 1975; Constant Martin 1988).

After Independence, the new Tanzanian state implemented two new land policies: The 1967 Land Acquisition Act no. 47 which was followed by the well-known the 1975 Ujamaa Village Act No. 21. The ujamaa policy—or villagisation—was first presented by Nyerere as a means to improve the living conditions of the poorest, and to involve and empower the peasantry in its own development. The villagisation project envisioned the relocation of Tanzanian rural populations into government-created villages that were deemed more suitable for development—in terms of planning, infrastructure and social services. Politically, the policy also aimed to increase the state’s power over Tanzanian rural regions (Schneider 2004; Fouéré 2011; Lorgen 2000; Iliffe 1979; Hyden 1980). Finally, this policy made the Tanzanian state (with the President’s prerogative) the sole owner of all Tanzanian land.

Yet, in spite of Nyerere’s official discourse and vision, villagisation was a national project violently imposed on Tanzania’s rural population. As noted by Young (1988), this policy, its
ideational background and the way it was implemented echoed the colonial practices so virulently decried by Nyerere. Schneider (2004, 347) also highlights this paradox between Nyerere’s discourse and practices, when he explains that: “on the question of Nyerere's role in ujamaa/villagisation, [...] the President was central in driving rural development into coercive directions, which, at other times, he so forcefully spoke out against”.

Indeed, speaking of a “forced Tanzanian villagisation” would be more accurate, as the ujamaa policy led to the forceful displacement of a large part of the Tanzanian population in the 1970s (Ingle 1970). Although the policy proved a failure, its impact was undeniably significant and had lasting impacts on spatial relations all over Tanzania. Estimates are that it led to the displacement of no less than 66.6% of the population (Young 1997, 113–44). In addition, villagisation’s effect on the land tenure system was pernicious. As noted by Swantz (1996), “In Tanzania [...] many people were settled on land belonging to other villagers and were uncertain of future claims to the land. The commodification of village land in Tanzania was one of the many unintended consequences of villagisation resulting from the disruption of the land tenure system” (Swantz 1996, 147 qtd in Lorgen 2000, 185).

**Bankruptcy and Liberalisation**

From the beginning of the 1980s, the Tanzanian socialist welfare state imagined by Nyerere proved inviable. An important financial crisis, combined with general state bankruptcy, forced Nyerere to ask for international support. In fact, the Tanzanian state could no longer financially support its development projects and the needs of its population. International financial institutions, heavily influenced by the prevailing neoliberal ideology at the time, conditioned aid and loans on the
implementation of structural adjustment plans. Nyerere initially rejected their conditions, but finally accepted that Tanzania needed help. Refusing to implement the requested reforms himself, he resigned in 1985.

The succeeding President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, accepted the structural adjustment plan. He liberalized the economy (free trade and privatisation of state entreprises), introduced a multi-party political system, reduced the size of the state and substantially limited government expenditures in public services. In addition to demanding the liberalisation of the economy and the democratization of governance, the IMF and the World Bank also mandated the abolition of subsidies to agriculture that were perceived as economically inefficient. Thus, fertilizer subsidies were completely abolished in 1994-1995. The withdrawal of the state from agriculture put Tanzanian farmers into an even more precarious situation: the liberalisation period led to a significant decline in the country’s agricultural productivity and production (Skarstein 2005, 340–44).

These neoliberal reforms did not have the desired impacts (Maruba 2008, 62–64; Lofchie 2014). Concretely, politically, the CCM remained the unchallenged ruling party in Tanzania — the CCM was created in 1977, following the union of TANU, with the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP—the ruling party in Zanzibar).

Economically, structural adjustment led to the growing political use of these international funds to ensure the stability of the ruling Tanzanian elite, and at the same time, a significant withdrawal of the state in social and development policies (van de Walle 2001, 96). The state’s lack of
accountability to its donors and citizens, and the fact that not fulfilling the conditions imposed did not diminish the international aid granted partly explains this outcome.

As the financial crisis worsened, civil servants took advantage of their governmental positions to engage in rent-seeking through permits, quotas, taxes, and subsidies and also put in place mechanisms that allowed them to increase their personal income. For instance, the privatisation of state-owned companies and national estates benefited many influential Tanzanians (Lofchie 2014, 23–24). Corruption was rampant: Transparency International, in its 2018 Corruption Perception Index, gave Tanzania a score of 36 in terms of transparency, on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). The country is ranked 99 out of 180 countries (Transparency International 2018).

This propensity for corruption is also evidenced in popular language. Indeed, the initials of the party, the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi), are commonly reappropriated to reformulate the name of the party by the population. For instance, Tanzanians prefer to talk about Chukua Chako Mapema (take yours as fast as you can) or Chama Cha Majangili (the party of crooks) (Tripp 1997, 180). Similarly, to denounce the fact that several officials use their position in the government and their access to public resources to enrich themselves personally, Tanzanians have renamed the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) as the Personal Economic Survival Programme. Or, as most official government vehicles registered in Tanzania start with the initials SU, these letters were interpreted as Suka Ule, an expression in Swahili which means that to survive, one must bribe (Mliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990, 47; 93).
In addition, the gradual withdrawal of the Tanzanian state from social affairs led to the deterioration of public services. For example, in 1969, 90% of the urban population had access to drinking water. This number drastically decreased from the 1980s to only 56% in 1993. Also, the purchasing power of the civil service fell by 94% in real dollars between 1969 and 1985 (Tripp 1997). In addition, primary school attendance, which was 98% in 1980 was at 70% in 1997 (Pinkney 2001). As Tripp describes it: “Schools in Bugurini and Manzese [a neighborhood of Dar es Salaam] had virtually no textbooks, notebooks, charts, or even desks or chairs. Nor did they have equipment with which to teach vocational skills” (Tripp 1997, 130).

This socialist state’s failure and the turn towards liberalisation had not only dramatic effects on the economy, but also on the relationship between the state and the citizens. Since the Nyerere era, the post-colonial state was built primarily as a source of profit distribution to ensure social equality and a national project of socio-economic development. By failing at that very function in the 1980s and the 1990s, the state lost its credibility, and this led to citizens’ progressive disengagement from the state entity (Ayoade 1988; Tripp 1997).

Land rights remained at the heart of the newly liberalised government's concerns. However, new land laws departed from Nyerere’s socialist vision. Rather, heavily influenced by neoliberal precepts, they promoted private and individual land rights as a means to foster smallholders’ productivity, reduce poverty and ensure economic growth (Skarstein 2005). More specifically, this vision led to two new Land Acts: the Land Act No.4 and the Village Land Act No. 5. They were ratified in 1999, and became effective in 2001, invalidating the 1923 colonial law. Unlike the previous British law, these new Land Acts established the legal equivalence of granted and
customary land rights (Sulle and Nelson 2009, 37). Another important innovation of this new legislative land framework was that foreigners were now able to acquire derivative Tanzanian land rights. Although these laws still constitute to this day the legal framework governing land rights and ownership in Tanzania, a process of revising the National Land Policy is currently underway (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on the land policies).

In sum, the Tanzanian state model that emerged during this liberalisation period was characterized by its hybridity, its blurred boundaries between public and private spheres, and its lack of capacity. Borrowing Mbembe’s expression (2010), Tanzania’s governance became, and still is characterized by its “political diffraction”. The term diffraction is borrowed from physics, literally meaning an optical phenomenon of deviation. Adapting it, Mbembe speaks of the great social diffraction: “This diffraction of society led to the informalization of social and economic relations, unprecedented fragmentation of the field of rules and norms, and a process of deinstitutionalization that has not spared the state itself” (Mbembe 2010, 24).

However, it is worth noting that the period of political and economic liberalisation also gradually led to increase political freedoms in the country. Corruption issues and mismanagement of public funds are increasingly denounced and condemned by national media, and Tanzania’s civil society. This more liberalised political context reached its climax in the period right before the 2015 elections.

This could be partly explained as well by the fact that, under the presidency of Jakaya Kikwete—from 2005 to 2015, the CCM became embroiled in many significant corruption scandals, which
were virulently denounced in national media, and by opposition parties. Among the most important, was the “Richmond scandal” over the improper attribution of a contract to a US-based electricity company, which led to the resignation of the government’s Prime Minister, Edward Lowassa. Later on, in 2014, the “Escrow scandal” shocked the nation when a multi million-dollar corruption scheme within the government was exposed. Documents and reports showed that two senior Tanzanian politicians had taken and transferred into offshore accounts about 180US$ million from the Bank of Tanzania. In addition to forcing the resignation of two senior ministers, and the attorney-general, the scandal implicated many important businessman, politicians and judges (Cooksey 2017, 2012; Tanzanian Affairs 2008; Tanzania Daily News 2017; The Guardian 2014).

Thus, CCM’s tarnished image posed a tangible threat to the party’s hold on power, especially in regards to the upcoming 2015 elections. Just before the 2015 elections, Kikwete’s legitimacy was very weak, and approval ratings of his government historically low (Roop and Weghorst 2016). CCM’s fear was that it might be the end of the its fifty-fours years of ruling.

POLITICAL FACTIONALISM, THE 2015 ELECTIONS, AND TANZANIA’S POLITICS UNDER MAGUFULI

Regarding the 2015 elections, CCM’s elites were divided over the nomination of their presidential candidate. Although the party’s former Prime Minister, Edward Lowassa, was initially a potential presidential candidate, the CCM ultimately decided against him. The fact that Lowassa had to resign following the Richmond scandal, and the increased popular criticism of the CCM forced the party to identify another potential candidate.
The CCM found a Presidential candidate, John Pombe Magufuli, who was the Minister of Works since 2010. Magufuli has cultivated an “honest reputation” within the government and by the population for his efficiency and his capacity to “get things done”. CCM’s strategy was thus decided: nominating “a virtual unknown to carry it into the presidential election” as a way around growing national criticism, and the party’s damaged reputation (“CCM Springs Surprise” 2015).

Following the CCM’s decision not to make him their Presidential candidate, Lowassa defected to the Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (Chadema), and became the main opposition leader. Despite Lowassa’s previous implication in the Richmond Scandal, he was successful in unifying Tanzanian opposition. Indeed, for the 2015 elections, four opposition parties grouped together under Lowassa’s leadership. This opposition coalition was named Ukawa and posed the toughest challenge to CCM since Independence.

The 2015 elections were characterized by a high-turnout, as 67.34% of voters went to the polls (Roop and Weghorst 2016, 172). On October 25th, 2015, the CCM, with Magufuli, won the Tanzanian general election with 58.5% of the vote. Although CCM secured its victory, the competition was historically tight as Chadema managed to secure about 40% of the vote. It is interesting to note that its presidential candidate strategy proved successful in allowing the Party to remain in power (Roop and Weghorst 2016; Brewin 2016).

Yet, once elected, the assumption that Magufuli was the compromise candidate, subservient to the CCM, was immediately thrown into question. Magufuli adopted a strong stance towards
corruption, even targeting CCM members. For instance, he started his presidency by arresting several senior government officials for corruption charges and allegations:

[In the year of his presidency] Many heads have rolled. […] Those who have felt the new intolerance of waste and corruption include the Director General of the Tanzanian Ports Authority, Awadhi Massawe; its Board Chairman, Professor Joseph Msambichaka; and most of the members of the Board. The head of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), Edward Hosea, was shown the door, and the head of the Tanzania Revenue Authority, Rished Bade, his deputy and other senior TRA officials were unceremoniously ousted. (“Push-Ups and Pushback” 2016).

As substantiated in Chapter 5, this move was not only populist, but also served as an effective political tool used by Magufuli to establish his political authority within the CCM, thereby disciplining both political elites and the Tanzanian business community.

However, after three years of governing, it is worth noting that Magufuli’s “bulldozer” approach has relaxed, and he is now more open to political compromises. His position within the party is still fragile, and it seems that he has decided to choose his battles carefully. In order to build and maintain his authority within the Party, he must be careful about challenging too deeply Tanzania’s “well-established settlement between the business and political elites” (“The Bulldozer’s Light Tread” 2016; “How Real the Zeal?” 2015).

Lastly, on a more general note, Magufuli’s governance has been characterized by an increased emphasis on state-led development compared to the more neoliberal approaches of past administrations. Tanzania has also taken a more authoritarian turn. Illustrative of Magufuli’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies, in 2017, during the swearing-in of the new Information Minister, Harrison Mwakyembe, the President directly warned journalists: “I would like to tell media owners - be careful, watch it. If you think you have that kind of freedom, [it is] not to that
extent,” (Reuters 2017). As a matter of fact, Tanzania’s fifth government is increasingly closing space for dissent, with the banning of political rallies, harassment and even arrest of opposition political leaders, the toughening of laws overseeing media, the suspension of several newspapers and radio stations, and the recent passing of draconian legislation such as the Cybercrime Law, the Statistics Act and the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations.

In light of this political context, the next chapter, Chapter 5 analyses government officials’ interactions and practices regarding new land policies in Tanzania, insisting on the importance of the dynamic interplay between structure and actors’ agency to explain them.
Chapter 5: The national political arena

Land Policies and Investments in Tanzania: Political Tools to (Re)Assert State Authority

Chapter 5 examines and discusses the interplay between agency (A) and structure (S) that is shaping government officials’ interactions and practices at the national and local levels. I show that, despite the fact that international and national rhetoric on land and investment policies appear to converge in Tanzania, there are important discrepancies between actors’ practices and discourses that inform land policies. Understanding these discrepancies require us examining the politics inherent to the CAS structuring actors’ interactions.

I argue that state officials are first and foremost skilled bricoleurs who seize opportunities opened-up by contingencies to exert their agency to (re)shape the structure. They combine diverse normative rationalities—neo-liberal development, capitalist exploitation, state-bureaucratic control, developmental paternalism, political clientelism—to justify institutional innovations that are key to establish their control and power over land management. This creative process strengthens their political authority, which is key to capturing new economic opportunities associated with new land investors and justifying contentious political actions. In addition, by asserting their authority over land through various land policies, state officials produce relations of domination and political subjects. This process participates in the creative process of state formation. Therefore, land policies should be studied as constitutive processes that (re)produce state authority (Lund and Boone 2013; Lund 2011, 2013; Fogelman and Bassett 2017).

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1 A first version of this chapter was published in Mambo, Bélair, Joanny, 2017. “Land policies: Questioning discrepancies between discourse and practices in Tanzania”, Mambo!, vol. XIV, (2).
This perspective is illustrated with three recent examples that illustrate well how land policies are political tools that participate to the process of state formation. The first two examples, the discourse of the central state on productive investors and the review process of the National Land Policy, focus on the national level. More specifically, I examine how and why the President and central state officials are designing and implementing new land policies.

At the central level, institutional innovations (i.e. the creation of a new Land Investment Unit (LIU), and the revision of the National Land Policy) are ways for the current President—as it was for previous ones—to legitimize and consolidate his political power, on the national political scene but also within his own Party, the CCM. Moreover, they are tools to assert central state powers over land management, and its territorial authority over the countryside. His discourse and policies on bad investors allow him to use land dispossession as a political tool to discipline potential political opponents.

Illustrating similar dynamics at the local level, the third example examines the local implementation in two regions of the Programme for planning, surveying and land titling in Tanzania (PPSL). It shows that district officials are also seeking to strengthen their authority through land policies. I discuss how planning and mapping village land are authoritative practices that enhance their powers not only towards villagers but also with new investors. It is key for them to secure access and benefits associated with the increasing commodification of land.
THE APPARENT CONVERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RHETORIC ON LAND POLICIES

In Sub-Saharan Africa, much of the poorest people live in rural areas and practice subsistence agriculture. Consequently, agriculture development is often portrayed as the sector which has the highest potential to both favor economic growth and poverty reduction. Tanzania’s top policy-makers adhere to this vision and have prioritized agricultural development in their recent policies. As highlighted by the National Development Vision 2025, the main policy-framework guiding governmental action, increasing productivity in the agriculture will “transform the economy towards competitiveness” (The Tanzania Five Year Development Plan 2011-2015, Planning Commission, President’s Office 2012).

As already briefly stated in Chapter 4, although this focus on the potential of agriculture for development is in continuity with past Tanzanian policies initiatives, recent policies are envisioned in a different political context. Departing from Nyerere’s socialist experimentation, Tanzania now has a liberalized economy that adopts and reproduces a dominant international narrative influenced by “global processes that aim to shift agriculture towards an industrial scale, responding to global market demands” (Sulle 2016, 116).

Consequently, the state conceptualises agricultural development differently: rather than emphasizing development through direct state intervention for smallholders’ economic empowerment, the priority is now on investors and commercial agricultural development which will foster agricultural productivity through spillovers and technology transfers. As argued by

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2 As discussed in Chapter 4, Julius Nyerere was the first Tanzanian President after Independence, and he stayed in power from 1964 to 1985. He promoted an ideology of African socialism, known as Ujamaa.
Sulle (2016), recent agricultural policy initiatives that have been implemented in Tanzania all illustrate this paradigm shift, such as Kilimo Kwanza (2009), South Agricultural Growth Corridor (SACGOT, 2010), New Alliance for Food Security and nutrition initiative (New Alliance, 2012), Big Results Now (BRN, 2012), and the National Agriculture Policy (NAP, 2013).

Most of these recent agricultural policies are rooted within a national framework: Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty or MKUKUTA.\(^3\) MKUKUTA I and II were in fact agreements over strategic funding of policies resulting from a dialogue undertaken between major donors, international institutions such as the IMF and the WB, and the Tanzanian government (Tripp 2012). Both MKUKUTAs’ plan of action for agricultural development prioritized surveying, registering and issuing land titles, reviewing periodically the Land Act and associated laws to make them more inclusive, and “instituting measures to promote conducive and enabling business environment” (PPSL Ministry of Land, Housing and Human settlements development 2015, 6).

MKUKUTA II ended in 2015. It was followed by the new National Five-Year Development Plan 2016/17—2020/21 (NFYDP 2016/17—2020/21), which integrated previous MKUKUTA planning frameworks. Regarding land, similarly to MKUKUTA II, the NFYDP 2016/17—2020/21 states that “the current land policy […] does not facilitate industrialization”, highlighting that land acquisition processes are too costly and lengthy, thereby imposing on investors high transaction costs which are deterring new investments. Established priorities regarding land and agricultural

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\(^3\) There were two Mkukuta. Mkukuta I cover the period 2005-2010, and Mkukuta II, 2010-2015.
development are similar. However, they are now defined in terms of land planning, formalization of land rights, and centralization of land management for investments.

Nationally, the dominant discourse on agricultural development is aligned with these national development frameworks, highly influenced by neo-liberal narratives on economic development. Moreover, land policies have become crucial tools to foster this development agenda. The Ministry of Land often reiterates in various national media the government’s commitment to ensure agricultural and economic development and reduce land conflicts through its Ministry’s ambitious land titling and land use map programme. According to the official rhetoric, planning, surveying and mapping land in Tanzania is both promoting security of land tenure for citizens and fostering land investments. Moreover, the Ministry of Land has initiated in 2015 the process of drafting a new land policy that officially aims at “ensuring that all citizens of Tanzania enjoy equitable land rights to enable them to participate effectively in economic development, job creation, and poverty reduction” (The National Land Policy, Official Draft 2016).

This apparent convergence is hardly surprising. Indeed, since the 1980s, Tanzania, as a heavily donor-dependent country, has eagerly embraced neoliberal ideas and discourse in a variety of domains including national land policies. As consequences, its land policies are often depicted as being shaped by its close relationship with its main international donors and international institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This role played by international institutions and actors in shaping African politics has been criticized in the literature. Scholars have argued that aid dependency induces lasting impacts that are not

However, the extent to which these international pressures are influencing the Tanzanian government has also been thrown into question. For the Tanzanian case, scholars have discussed how, as a semi-authoritarian state, Tanzania's governance system displays some enduring ideational features associated to its socialist past, such as the conception of the role played by the state in development and the prevalence of top-down governance practices. This line of argument contends that these legacies are crucial to apprehending current policies (Greco 2016; Haulle 2015; Provini and Schlimmer 2016; Exner et al. 2015).

Yet, although international influence and norms, and historical legacies, have undoubtedly an influence on the framing of Tanzanian land policies, they are not the only factors that we need to account for. My argument is that actors draw upon and instrumentalise these normative rationalities when they implement institutional change. The next sections show and describe how the President and top officials from the Ministry of Land have influenced and shaped the structure through land policies (S), a process that allows them to produce their authority and legitimacy.

**EXAMPLE 1: TALKING ABOUT “PRODUCTIVE INVESTORS”: A CLEVER POLITICAL STRATEGY**

Since the arrival in power of Magufuli in October 2015, the need to welcome “productive investors” is omnipresent in Tanzanian news. Investors who have acquired land and failed to develop their assets are publicly criticized by the central government in national media. They are
depicted as Machiavellian “tycoons [...] hoarding big portions of land” thereby impeding the economic development of the country. In a strong statement, the Ministry of Land has declared:

We will seize all the land pieces, which were legally acquired but had never been developed or are now used other than the prime-purpose [...] We cannot allow our people to continue to suffer at the expense of investors [...] There are few people who are not supporting what am doing since I annulled their lands. This will not make me stop; I will continue freezing all the land, which have been abandoned by investors regardless of their status and nationality (Mulisa 2016).

This discursive innovation nuanced the “welcoming investors” of the international rhetoric about agricultural development but did not fundamentally question the central government’s official commitment to use agricultural FDI to foster socioeconomic rural development. In addition, it conveys an image of a very powerful and efficient central state, which can punish investors’ deviant behaviour.

However, the capacity of the government to act on its discourse is uncertain. The main agency dealing with foreign investors regarding land investments, the Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC), proudly branded as the efficient Tanzanian one-stop shop for foreign investors, suffers from an important lack of financial and human resources. It incapacitates it to effectively overlook all steps associated with the evaluation and follow-up of investment projects.

With only two officials who oversee, evaluate and follow-up on all investment projects, TIC's data about agricultural investments is either missing or incomplete (Bélair 2016, interview research officer, Tanzanian Investment Center). For example, in Rufiji District, according to TIC, three investors have operational investments: Eurovistaa Inc, Safe Agricultural Investments, and Lukulo Farm Holdings. Investigating these three investments in the field, I discovered that all
information about investors that TIC had provided me was incorrect/inaccurate: all registered investors have left the country and have never managed to start production.

Eurovistaa Inc. is a telling example. According to TIC, the company is currently operational and doing well. However, the company had moved three years ago from the address in TIC file and has no longer a permanent office in Tanzania (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and observations). In addition, Eurovistaa Inc. has never started farming operations despite TIC’s claim. In fact, the business is facing several difficulties which affect its ability to be operational, but TIC is apparently unaware of Eurovistaa Inc.’s issues. For instance, one of the owners died in India last year, causing uncertainties about the future of the business and its management. Eurovistaa Inc. has also failed to meet its financial obligations with the TIB Development Bank of Tanzania (TIB Bank), which has granted it an important loan for its farming activities. Therefore, in August 2016, Eurovistaa Inc. was placed under receivership for defaulting its loan repayment. Eurovistaa Inc. is no longer the legal holder of the land it acquired: the TIB Bank now owns the derivative land title that was issued by TIC (Bélair 2016, interview lawyer of CRB). So, if the government’s main agency handling investors lacks capacity, it is legitimate to wonder if and how the government intends to act upon its discourse on bad investors.

Perhaps, from the standpoint of the state, this is not even a relevant question since the discourse fulfils a political mission that might be deemed more crucial than questions associated with its pragmatic implications. Indeed, as argued by Schlimmer (2018), this discourse is populist and may illustrate the fact that the government is seeking legitimacy by linking its actions to historical and politically salient questions of citizenship and national ownership. Indeed, it helps to convey the
image of a strong government committed to protecting its vulnerable local and mostly rural population from the internationally and nationally criticized practices associated to land grabbing.

Yet, this captures only part of the story. The political utility of such a discourse is much more subversive. First, the central state’s demonization of bad and foreign investors obscures the role it has itself played and continues to play in dispossessing rural communities from their access to land to favor investors and political friends. It is a deliberate misdirection. Second, it provides a rationale for centralizing power over land investments, which is key in asserting political control in Tanzania (Andreoni 2017; Jacob and Pedersen 2018; Cooksey 2012). For instance, the new President took two decisive actions regarding management of land investments since his arrival in power. First, he revoked the appointment of TIC’s executive director who was appointed by the previous President in 2013. Second, in May 2016, he created a new Land Investment Unit (LIU), which was put under the purview of the Ministry of Land. Officially, the decision was motivated by the desire to remediate to TIC's lack of efficiency.

The creation of LIU implied an important institutional overlap since the new unit has a similar mandate to TIC. Moreover, LIU, as it is directly under the authority of the Ministry of Land, allows the President to interfere and use his discretionary power for land allocation to domestic and foreign investors. In short, the narrative on unproductive investors has led to a significant increase of the President’s control over land investments in the country.

In fact, this new LIU has been very active in 2017. According to the Ministry of Land, as of August 2017, about 110 parcels of land have been taken back from unproductive investors across the
country. The interesting fact is that investors’ rights to land are not necessarily revoked because they are not productive. It could also be that they are considered political threats to Magufuli’s regime and need to be disciplined.

It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which this policy on unproductive investors is used to this end since a climate of fear was prevailing amongst investors in Tanzania in 2016-2017. Moreover, information on LIU’s land confiscations is kept secretive: very few have been made public. Nonetheless, although most investors I met refused to disclose any information on their land holdings because of the politically sensitive context, my interviews reveal that some of them are in precarious situations with the current government. My findings show also that even land holdings and land acquisitions projects of successful and established Tanzanian investors are kept on hold by the President himself.

Furthermore, the few publicly disclosed cases support this conjecture. For instance, the former Prime Minister Fredrick Sumaye has seen his farms in Dar es Salaam and Morogoro regions being seized by the Ministry of Land. He has publicly claimed that it was politically motivated to force him to return to the CCM (Matandiko 2017). Another example is provided by the case of a previously successful Tanzanian investor, Yusuf Manji. There was an issue regarding land owned by Manji in Coco Beach, Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam. Apparently, the President wanted to take it back for public use. Even though Manji finally complied and apologized publicly, he initially resisted the presidential directive. His resistance put him in legal trouble. Not only did the President

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4 It should be noted here that the Ministry of Land has refused to disclose the list of confiscated parcels of land and of investors that have been targeted by this policy on unproductive investments. See: Bélair 2017, officer LIU.

5 Based on the interviews I conducted with several investors during my fieldwork from June 2016 to March 2017, and from August 2017 to September 2017.
order directly the revocation of his land rights on his farm in Kigamboni, the following day, CCM stripped him of his counsellor seat. In addition, the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) closed his offices for unpaid taxes, and he was accused of drug trafficking and other illegal operations. He spent about two months in prison until the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) announced that finally, all charges were dropped. The exact reasons behind this political harassment remained unclear, as is the exact nature of the issue between this specific investor and the President.

Nevertheless, these examples show that powers over land management are crucial political tools in Tanzania: not only for the economic opportunities associated with investors’ new capital, but also to discipline the political and business community. Given that the President’s position within CCM is still fragile, it seems plausible to assert that as he is struggling to constitute and assert its power within the Party. Practices associated with land confiscations play thus a performative role. The President shows that he is not afraid of using all means at his disposal in the government apparatus to discipline potential dissidents or opponents (see discussion on 2015 elections and on political factionalism within the CCM in Chapter 4).

In sum, combining normative institutions borrowed from international narratives on “land grabs”, on neo-liberal development, on historical legacies associated to the paternalistic socialist state, and from political clientelism, Magufuli is creating a hybrid institutional assemblage (S) composed of various normative institutions that allows him to constitute his authority through land policies. The creation of LIU is a way for him to establish its political power, on the national political scene but also within his own Party (CCM). Moreover, it ensures the President’s control over new investors,
and new capital. Finally, his discourse and policies on unproductive investors legitimize targeted dispossession of land assets, hiding that the process also aims at political retaliation.

Concomitant to this discourse, the central state has also undertaken the revision of the Tanzania National Land Policy. After presenting the legal framework governing land rights in Tanzania, the following section discusses how this new National Land Policy establishes the central state's territorial authority over the countryside, which is also key to control new capital associated to land investments.

**LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING LAND RIGHTS AND OWNERSHIP IN TANZANIA**

In Tanzania, legally, all land belongs to the President: “all land […] is public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of citizens” (Government of Tanzania 1995). There are three legal categories of land: general land, reserved land and village land. The Tanzania National Land Policy 1995 lays the general principles of land management, and has been followed by the enactment of several acts which constitute Tanzania land legislative framework.6

Reserved lands include national parks, forests and marine environments that are parts of national efforts to conserve wildlife. Village land refers to land which is collectively owned by residents of a given village, and is under the authority of the village’s council. General land is a residual category: everything that is not reserved or village land falls into general land, including land deemed available for investments.

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6 General and reserved land are governed by the Land Act no.4 1999, while the Village Land Act no.5 1999 regulates village land.
Acquiring or leasing land usually involves central agencies and the Ministry of Land. In practice, the process is the following: villagers have agreed willingly or not to give up their village land rights, and this parcel of land has been transferred permanently to general land. In addition, Tanzanian investors can obtain rights of occupancy on general land. Foreigners, however, can only be granted derivative rights of occupancy. Consequently, they must pass through the TIC which remains legally the ultimate holder of land rights on their behalf.

**Example 2: Why a New Land Policy?**

The process of reviewing the 1995 Land Policy started in August 2015, but the rationale for the timing of this change remains unclear. The document states that it was triggered by “a changing national and global context, which has induced changes in the requirements for the land sector” (The National Land Policy, Official Draft 2016, 6). Although it mentions population growth as a factor contributing to change in land dynamics, it does not explain further any other factors. Considering the NFYDP 2016/17—2020/21, it could be assumed that the government’s decision to revise the land policy is officially justified because of the belief that “current land policies impede industrialization”.

However, the official draft of this New Land Policy does not address the systemic pitfalls of previous land policies, such as the presence of multiple competing authorities when it comes to land administration, nor does it provide viable solutions to the issues associated with insecurity of

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7 In Rufiji, the detailed process through which these forceful land acquisitions were done varied. Nevertheless, my findings show that in all my cases, consultations with villagers were mostly procedural and coercive. Thus, villages’ right to consent was consistently disregarded, and their approval or refusal of investment projects, inconsequential.
tenure and overlapping institutional structures over land allocation, administration and dispute settlements.

Indeed, several contradictions are found in the policy regarding land administration and division of powers. For example, in the policy objective 4.1, point ii states that the Commissioner for land (district level) is the sole authority, but point iv later asserts that village councils should administer land with the approval of village authorities. Moreover, the policy remains silent on ownership systems, categories of land, and land administration bodies and powers.

In addition, the approach towards investors is confusing. Although objective 4.2.3, point iv states that non-citizen and foreign companies are not allowed to own land, objective 4.4.3, point v states that the policy should facilitate the acquisition of rights of occupancy for investors rather than derivative rights (The National Land Policy, Official Draft 2016, 38–41). Also, the document insists that this policy is limiting the size of land that can be acquired for investment purpose, but nowhere in the whole document is the size limit stipulated (Bélair 2017, interviews CSOs).

Moreover, it should be noted that the discretionary power of the central state regarding land allocation and administration remains unquestioned. Indeed, the new Land Policy still affirms that “all land […] is public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of citizens” and that “the President may equally acquire land for Public purpose or revoke a right of occupancy for breach of conditions” (The National Land Policy, Official Draft 2016, 38–41). It leaves room for ambiguity and interpretation which have caused in the past several land conflicts and legal issues.
Interestingly, these contradictions and problems with land policies are nothing new in Tanzania: these same points were raised by scholars following the enactment of the previous land policies—1999 Village Land Act and Land Act. Issa G. Shivji, who directed the Presidential Commission of Inquiry in land matters, reported on most of these issues, including overlapping land rights; villagers' lack of real power; arbitrary land allocation; incompetence and corruption of officials; and costly and inefficient procedures of land administration (Shivji 1992). Furthermore, several scholars have already denounced the dangers of not defining “central interest” and the vagueness of the general land category in the 1999 land policies. Sundet (2005), in a FAO report, pointed out that vague terms were potential means that the central state intended to use to dispossess lawfully Tanzanians to favor investors. Both Shivji (1992) and Coldham (1995) also cautioned about underlying intentions of the government hidden behind the 1999 land policies, denouncing the whole process as rather spurious.

Given that the above-mentioned problems are still not addressed with this New Land Policy, it seems then relevant to ask: 1- Why did the government not use this opportunity to review and address systemic land administration problems?; and 2- What were the central state’s underlying motivations to initiate this review process?

In fact, even though officially the new Land Policy is framed as a way to achieve sustainable and inclusive rural development and economic growth, it seems that motivations are above all political. Indeed, in addition to further centralizing powers of the central state over land management, and creating attractive conditions for agricultural FDI, it appears to be first and foremost a tool to assert the central state power over the countryside.
Indeed, the central state—and specifically top officials from the Ministry of Land and the President are using capitalist rationalities and neoliberal development narrative to increase their infrastructural powers and establish their political authority, which are key in capturing the benefits of the land commodification associated with new farmland investments. Indeed, the intentional vagueness of the New Land Policy has important economic implications. By reaffirming the President’s discretionary power when it comes to dealing concretely with investors, it makes in practice all new investment projects tributary of his approval, thereby increasing his power over the business community, and guaranteeing its control over the new capital brought by FDI.

Moreover, one important innovation of this new land policy is that it allows disempowering villages' authorities, whose powers were clearly stipulated in the 1999 Village Land Act. Since villages' power over their land is a very sensitive political question in Tanzania, the central state is careful though in not disempowering them straightforwardly. Rather, it is through contradictory statements on village land governance that a pragmatic centralization of powers is introduced in this new Land Policy. On paper, villagers are still administering land but now they will be put under the purview of a new state agent at the village level who will work directly with the District Commissioner for land (DC). This is significant because DCs are directly accountable to central authorities and named by the President himself.

Furthermore, the central state legitimizes this move towards centralization through its adoption of a paternalistic discourse, anchored in socialist historical legacies. The official narrative as stated in the NYPD 2016/17—2020/21 is that Tanzania's failure to have a good macroeconomic performance has been partly a consequence of the "inadequate assimilation of the national
development priorities to local level” (see Tanzania Development Vision 2025; Planning Commission 1999). It shares striking resemblances with the long-established narrative that has been dominating development conception in Tanzania since Independence: Tanzanians need guidance from the state to ensure the country’s socio-economic development (Sulle and Nelson 2009, 36). In short, failure to meet socio-economic development expectations is consistently attributed to villagers' misunderstanding of the central economic priorities regarding land development.

In sum, drawing on diverse normative institutions, the President and top officials from the Ministry of Land are justifying contentious political practices associated to land policies. Thus, the New Land Policy and the discourse on productive investors are not reproducing past patterns or determined by international norms: they are rather innovative ways of producing the state’s authority and legitimacy in the national economic and political scene.

Furthermore, at the local level, land policies also offer new opportunities to district officials. The next section investigates how they also innovatively use the new conjuncture to strengthen their position of authority towards both villagers and investors. This third example focuses on local officials’ practices associated with the mapping and planning village land programme in two different Tanzanian regions, Pwani and Kagera.

**EXAMPLE 3: MAPPING VILLAGES OR HOW DISTRICT OFFICIALS CONSTITUTE THEIR AUTHORITY TOWARDS VILLAGERS AND INVESTORS**

The Ministry of Land’s Programme for planning, surveying and land titling in Tanzania (PPSL) aims to reduce unplanned settlements, decrease land conflicts, increase the use of land as a
collateral for loans among smallholders, and facilitate land administration (registration and revenue collection) (PPSL 2015, 4). Regarding village land, PPSL envisages a sequence that starts with providing villages with land-use plans (VLUPs), before issuing titles in the form of a certificate of customary rights of occupancy (CCROs) to villagers. Land-use plans are conceived as tools for planning and guiding land development, and they usually have a ten-year period of validity. The programme explicitly states that processes of planning, surveying and titling rural land will be undertaken in partnership with local communities, thereby “increasing public awareness on land-related policies, laws, and guidelines”, and contributing to local “capacity building and training” on land management (PPSL 2015, 4).

I found that villagers are usually involved to some extent in the process of drafting their land-use plan, as the process requires each village to name two representatives to collaborate with the district planner and surveying experts from the district and the Ministry of Land. However, their influence over the process and its outcomes is minimal. The planners and surveyors have the final authority over mapping, leading to practices of consultation that are more procedural than collaborative because villagers are not allowed to significantly contribute to the process or to contest higher authorities.

For example, in a village in Pwani region, sunshine at a specific time of the day was traditionally used to identify village demarcations. The village representatives asked the planning team to wait for the “right timing” for them to identify correctly the boundaries of their village. Their request was refused and therefore, the boundaries were delimited approximately. Unsurprisingly, it led to a problematic land-use map because the identified boundaries were wrong, leading to village land
loss. Despite repeated demands from the village for correctives to their land-use map and an explanation of the problem with the mapping process, they were unable to achieve any change. The Ministry of Land resolved the issue by deciding that changes are not allowed (Bélair 2016, interviews local leaders Rufiji district). Although every village has specific experiences, I consider this example illustrative of general trends in Missenyi and Rufiji District as I heard similar stories in almost all seventeen villages I have visited.

In addition, the Ministry of Land put forward a cadastral mapping of villages that does not necessarily consider historical and local understandings of demarcations. Thus, mapping practices currently undergoing in Tanzania share resemblances to the way villagisation was conceived and implemented in the 1970s, therefore demonstrating the lasting impact of socialist rationalities of domination. These practices convey the idea that peasants need to be educated by the state: they need to be taught planning in a productive way in order to ensure socio-economic development. They need guidance because they do not necessarily understand what is good for them. In fact, Scott’s argument (1998) according to which villagisation in Tanzania was a large-scale engineering project is still very relevant to understand the way the state is implementing its current land-planning programme.

Indeed, the Ministry of Land favors an idea of what a developed village should look like, privileging straight boundaries over historical demarcations, thereby leading to villages’ land dispossession (Bélair 2016, interview district official, Missenyi district). For instance, in Kagera region, several villages have ended up losing parts of their land. Among other examples, one of the villages received its land-use plan and village land title in 2015. However, the leaders quickly
realized that the boundaries were flawed, and a whole section of their village was missing from the map. The VLUP draws a straight line rather than the curve which was necessary to include this part of the village. Following a village meeting, the village collectively decided to refuse the map provided to them.

When the leaders raised the issue with the district and explained why they refused to recognize the validity of their VLUP, they were threatened. The district made clear to them that by refusing to agree with this land-use plan, their village may end up losing all its land. Powerless, the leaders were afraid of the consequences of their resistance. They complied and signed the document, preferring losing a part of their village land than risking losing it all (Bélair 2016, interview local leaders Missenyi district). According to the district officials I interviewed, conflicts over determined boundaries resulting from the planning process are common issues in the district (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews Missenyi district officials).

Villages’ apparent compliance⁸ can here be explained by the inherited socialist, paternalistic and top-down vision of governance that still prevails in Tanzania. Officials at all levels still acknowledge the central government as the uncontested authority over land matters since according to the law “all land is vested in the powers of the President in Tanzania”. As one district land officer working in Kagera region explained to me:

The government is trying to involve rural communities in planning and mapping processes, but in the end, the government is the only legitimate authority when it comes to land. If people do not understand what is good for them, the government must [and has the right to] use its power for the public good (Bélair 2016, interview Missenyi district official).

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⁸ It is important to note that I do not imply here that villagers are passive victims of higher authorities. My findings show that despite their limited powers, they also resist and subvert official policies. However, I do not discuss this aspect in this chapter because my focus is on state officials’ practices.
In sum, the government should not only provide guidance and a legal framework: if required, it must educate and discipline Tanzanians. This bears noticeable resemblances with the practices associated with the implementation of the villagisation policy under Nyerere's socialist government. It is illustrative of how mapping practices at the local level are influenced by different normative institutions: state-bureaucratic control, developmental paternalism, and neo-liberal development. Furthermore, the process is consolidating officials’ political authority.

In the cases analysed here, it is through their powers with VLUPs, district officials position themselves towards villagers. The argument made by Schneider (2014) in his analysis of the government’s practices during villagisation appears to be applicable to current practices: planning is used in Tanzania as an “authoritative practice to legitimize officials’ powers”. It is also performative: planning is a “key discursive practice in which the positionalities of officials and peasants were [are] performed and fabricated” (Schneider 2014, 126).

In the current context, district officials’ position was somewhat weakened by the Village Land Act of 1999, which decentralized powers over land management to village entities, the Village Council and the Village Assembly (Sundet 2005). With the implementation of this mapping programme, district and the Ministry of Land officials are thus recreating and performing their identity as experts—using their proclaimed technical expertise as planners and surveyors—to (re)constitute their authoritative position. Thus, district officials used VLUPs not only to establish their control over land management but also as constitutive tools of their authority. In addition, (re)constituting
their powers over villages regarding land offers valuable opportunities to capture and build lucrative relationships with investors.

The next section examines in detail how district officials constitute their position of authority towards villagers to benefit from the increased commodification of land. It is worth noting that although my analysis is limited to two districts, Schlimmer (2017) came to a similar conclusion in her study that compares three investment projects in two other Tanzanian districts, Kilolo and Bagamoyo.

**COMMODIFICATION OF LAND AND CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION**

District officials’ actions can only be understood by also considering how capitalist exploitation is a normative institution that informs and motivates their practices. Investors provide new capital in a country which urgently needs it. A local lucrative business in Tanzania is associated with dynamics of land control and this welcoming of foreign land investors. District officials benefit financially at several levels from the arrival of new investors in their area: development levy, taxes, and disguised bribes are paid at different steps during the “acquiring land” process.

**DISPOSSESSION AND FORCEFUL ATTRIBUTION OF VILLAGE LAND IN RUFIFI DISTRICT**

In Rufiji District, Pwani region, nearly all village land has been surveyed. Out of 38 villages, only four do not have their land certificates, mostly because some boundaries conflicts with neighbouring villages are not solved yet (Bélair 2016, interview officer Rufiji district). All villages have demarcated land for investments in their VLUP, but usually this land is not developed, and currently not used by villagers.
Rufiji is part of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), and thus, one of the most targeted districts for land investments in Tanzania. Numerous investors are looking to acquire village land for their agricultural projects. In addition, most of them are interested in acquiring fertile and cleared land, located near water sources, and therefore find themselves in direct competition with villagers to gain access to this valuable land.

However, investors lack local knowledge, and therefore, are highly dependent on local state officials when it comes to the process of selecting and acquiring suitable land. This relation with investors empowers district officials and provides them with incentives to benefit financially from their position as village land-use planning authorities. District officials' power allows them to free valuable village land requested by investors, and then to formalize this change by modifying accordingly the village land-use plan. Their involvement and help are not free: district officials charged facilitation fees to investors for their assistance in making the desired land available for investment. For example, in the case of Frontiline—an investor in Rufiji district—Walwa (2017, 13) reports that district officials have charged the company TSH25,000 (US$ 15.60) per hectare.

In practice, the process created important confusion at the local level. According to my interviews with villagers and local leaders, the information regarding the location of investments was kept ambiguous during meetings between investors, district officials, and villagers. Most villagers assumed that the investor had acquired land in the area demarcated for investment in their land-use plan, when in practice the investor had acquired land somewhere else in the village because district officials could adjust the land-use plan subsequently.
This was the case for all investments projects I investigated where the land transfer had been completed— Lukuliro Farm Holdings (Kipugira area), Eurovistaa Inc (Mkongo and Kilimani), and Safe Agricultural Products (Nyamwage). In addition, my interviews with village leaders and villagers indicate the prevalence of similar dynamics for projects that are still in the process of land acquisition—Rufiji Sugar/Agro-Forests/METL Group and Frontline.

For the specific case of Rufiji Sugar/Agro-Forests/METL Group, investors’ interests were concentrated in parcels of land located near the Rufiji river banks, which is a very fertile area, with easy access to water. For the exact same reasons, it is also where most villagers have historically settled and currently live. Therefore, if this project is carried out, it will entail the displacement and relocation of villagers who never agreed to make this land available for investment in their VLUP.

In sum, the subversion process of VLUPs in Rufiji tends to lead not only to dispossession but also to the forceful attribution of villages' most valuable land to investors. Rufiji district officials have originally subverted the very function of village land-use plans. Instead of providing security of land tenure to villages through their semi-static nature, they are in practice used as flexible tools to strengthen district officials power over village land, giving them priority access to new possibilities for personal accumulation through third parties' investments.
Although interests of local officials are similar in Missenyi district, Kagera region, district officials’ way of proceeding is different. Missenyi district was not one district prioritized for the PPSL programme. It is a relatively new district which was created in 2007. It comprises 77 villages, and from this, 72 villages have been surveyed but none of them have received their VLUP (Bélair 2016, interview officer Missenyi district).

The arrival of Kagera Sugar in 2004—the only large-scale investor in the district— is an important explaining factor (this point is elaborated in Chapter 7 and 8). Since Kagera Sugar started operations, land scarcity has become more acute in the district, not because of the investor’ acquisition of land, but rather because of its contract farming programme—outgrowers’ scheme. A direct consequence of this programme was to attract several local investors, who have decided to produce sugarcane for the company. Since these investors are looking to acquire land, it has increased land scarcity and induced a surge in prices for land in villages surrounding Kagera Sugar.

These new dynamics of increased competition for land have opened new accumulation opportunities for district officials (see also Theodory 2017), especially because of their power position as mapping authorities. However, instead of subverting the function of land-use plans after they have been established as district officials do in Rufiji, in Missenyi, dispossession of land occurs right at the beginning of the mapping process. This way of proceeding is rather

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9 Kagera Sugar has acquired land during the privatisation process of national estates, and as such, much of its acquired land was already demarcated. Although the company was involved in some boundary conflicts with surrounding villages, these conflicts were peacefully solved.
advantageous regarding new investments because it frees land while protecting investors at the same time from being involved in conflicts with local populations.

The process is also economically motivated. Indeed, in most cases where villages ending up losing land with this process, the contentious missing village land had already been reattributed to local investors by district officials. To use Fogelman and Bassett’s expression (2017, 257), official maps are thus “remaking land as an alienable commodity” and thereby, constituting district officials’ territorial authority.

Therefore, Missenyi district officials' key role as mapping authorities positions them politically not only towards villagers but also towards new investors. Since they are asserting their political power and authority through their role of mapping experts, investors are now required to obtain the district authorization for all land acquisitions. That was not possible when villages’ leaders were the deciding authorities over their village land.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter documented how state officials, at central and local levels, cleverly seized new opportunities (A) opened up by contingencies (C)—such as the growing investment interest for land in Tanzania, and this international development push to title and map land—to (re)shape the structure (S) of land management. More specifically, I argued that the creation of LIU is a way for the President to legitimize and consolidate his political power, on the national political scene but also within his own Party, the CCM. His discourse and policies on bad investors allow him to use land dispossession as a political tool to discipline potential political opponents. Similarly, the
revision of the National Land Policy aims to constitute central state powers over land management, and its territorial authority over the countryside. District officials are also seeking to strengthen their authority through land policies. I have discussed how planning and mapping village land are authoritative practices that enhance their powers not only towards villagers but also with new investors. It is key for them to secure access and benefits associated with the increasing commodification of land.

Thus, combining normative institutions borrowed from international narratives on land grabs, on neo-liberal development, on capitalist exploitation, on historical legacies associated to the paternalistic socialist state, and from political clientelistic dynamics, state officials are crafting land policies in a way that justify centralization of power, and contentious political actions. These examples illustrate how state officials strengthen their authority over land and contribute to our understanding of how land policies participate to the complex and continuous process of state formation in Tanzania.
Chapter 6: Rufiji district, a local political arena

Land investments in Tanzania: assessing the role of state brokers

Chapter 6 shows that we should not overestimate the capacity of central state officials. Given the fragmented and contentious nature of authority, state intermediaries also play an important role in negotiating norms and institutions to foster their own interests. More specifically, this chapter compares the involvement of two Tanzanian state agencies in land acquisition in Rufiji district, in the context of the central government’s new strategy on productive investors. I unpack bureaucrats

Figure 1: Lanscape of selected investments Rufiji District 2016-2017

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as a group of actors to analyse flows of power within the state. My analysis shows that the central state’s weak infrastructural power and resulting lack of local knowledge, and, conversely, local bureaucrats’ possession of these valuable resources, reverses the flow of power from local to central. Therefore, this chapter documents how intermediaries exert their agency (A) in renegotiating the structure (S) in Rufiji district. It illustrates this argument by two distinct examples.

First, I examine how district officials started partnering and protecting unproductive investors from central state’s dispossession to maintain and protect their clientelistic relationship with investors. Second, I document how Rubada, a state agency, redefined itself and its mandate in one of the most targeted regions for land investments. In addition to using its position of power to exploit village leaders’ lack of knowledge, Rubada started voluntarily misleading central authorities on investors to facilitate land acquisition processes and preserve its intermediary position with investors in the district.

In addition, Rufiji’s cases underscore the role played by structural constraints in determining the nature of this relationship between governance levels. Where institutions were historically decentralized and weak, and the central state lacks capacity, as in Rufiji district, actors’ interactions between levels tend to be competitive and subversive. As this chapter contends, the competitive and subversive nature of these actors’ interactions is crucial to explain the local outcomes associated with new farmland investments in Rufiji district. More specifically, I show that interactions between central state officials, and bureaucrats have a local pervasive effect. Instead of protecting vulnerable populations, central monitoring process fosters institutional innovations
that protects local bureaucrats’ opportunities for accumulation with investors, to the detriment of local populations.

Moreover, the quasi-systematic presence of local bureaucrats\(^2\) as intermediaries is key in understanding the relation investors develop with local communities. Because of the presence of state brokers, interactions between villagers and investors is almost inexistent, since investors delegate to intermediaries the negotiation process. This exclusion of village authorities is likely to generate conflictual dynamics at local level and may impede the investor’s capacity to become operational.

As discussed in Chapter 5, since the arrival in power of President John Pombe Magufuli in October 2015, the need to welcome productive investors is omnipresent in Tanzanian news. Investors who have acquired land and failed to develop their assets are publicly criticised by the central government in national media. The government’s pledge to fight unproductive investors is also closely linked with the President’s highly mediated vow to deter rampant corruption. Already in his first year of presidency, the President, nicknamed the bulldozer for his style of governance, made clear his position of no mercy on corrupt officials. In addition to investigate numerous state institutions and agencies, he sacked several senior officials accused of embezzling or mismanaging funds (Ng’wanakilala 2016). Clientelistic practices are common in the land sector in Tanzania (Kamuzora, Ngindo, and Mutasingwa 2009), and several investors have acquired important parcels of land through their political networks for speculative purposes without having the intention of

\(^2\) My analysis identifies two distinct groups of local bureaucrats in Rufiji district: district officials, and Rubada officials. These local bureaucrats are appointed, paid and accountable to the central state. This contrasts with village leaders in Tanzania, who are elected by villagers, but are unpaid.
developing and operationalizing their investment. Thus, this discourse against corruption underlies the denunciation of unproductive investors.

Moreover, this central discursive position fulfils three important political missions that strengthened the government’s legitimacy at both national and international levels. First, it conveys an image of a strong government committed to protecting its vulnerable local and mostly rural population from unproductive investors. Second, it demonstrates its serious intent to use agricultural domestic and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to foster socioeconomic rural development. From this official standpoint, corrupt practices are clearly associated with economic inefficiency, and should be hampered. Third, it creates a climate of fear among investors in the country. The President is perceived as efficient, but also impulsive and unpredictable. Consequently, investors who have undeveloped assets are afraid of losing their land rights.

In sum, this discourse illustrates the government’s commitment to increasing its control over land investments. To achieve its objective, the central state recently implemented institutional changes. The next section reviews how one of these changes has affected interactions between local and central state officials. Indeed, the creation of a new institution, the Land Investment Unit (LIU) which is overlapping with an existing institution, the Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC), has weakened Rufiji district officials’ position with investors. However, as I also demonstrate, these local bureaucrats innovated to maintain and protect their relationship with investors. Capitalizing on their local knowledge, they started partnering and protecting unproductive investors from central state’s dispossession.
REVERSING THE FLOW OF POWER IN A CONTEXT OF LIMITED STATE POWER

A POTEMKIN STATE INVESTMENT AGENCY

The Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC) was created in 1997 by the Tanzania Investment Act. TIC is mostly an investment facilitator and it aims to encourage investments in the country by attracting foreign investors and promoting Tanzania as a business-friendly country. In addition to offering fiscal advantages to investors, TIC brands itself as a “one stop shop”, offering investors support and facilitating obtainment of all necessary licenses and permits. Also, TIC has created a land bank which in theory allows the agency to match available land to investor's needs. The parcels of land included in this land bank are generally claimed free from local conflicts because the land has already been transferred from village land to general land (Belair 2016, interview official TIC, Tanzania Invest 2016).

However, since TIC’s land bank is incomplete, the process of finding land for investor is in practice reversed. Concretely, investors identify land they want to acquire first, and then use TIC to formalise their access to this land. Therefore, the process is political: TIC can be used to legitimate politically driven land transactions. For instance, in Rufiji district, TIC was directly involved with three foreign investors. In these three cases, land acquisitions were characterised by a top-down fashion process involving political interference from Tanzanian top officials. Villagers were informed during a village meeting only once the deal has been concluded, and the contract signed. They did not take part to consultations or discussions with the investor.

3 This alludes to Allina-Pisano's analysis that shows that in Ukraine and Russia, after 1989, privatization of land occurred but produced only a “facade of rural ownership”, what she called a “modern Potemkin village” (Allina-Pisano 2008, 3–5).
Moreover, TIC lacks the capacity to play its role on following-up and monitoring land investments. There are only two researchers in charge of evaluating viability of investments projects and ensure monitoring (Bélair 2016, interview official TIC). Practically, it is an impossible task given the size of the country and the number of investment projects approved or under evaluation in Tanzania. Unsurprisingly then, TIC failed to follow-up on Rufiji’s investors, and currently all these investments are non-operational.

As already stated in chapter 5, the new President brought two changes regarding TIC. First, he revoked the appointment of TIC’s executive director who had been appointed by the previous President in 2013. Second, the President created a new Land Investment Unit (LIU) under the purview of the Ministry of Land. Officially, the decision was motivated by the desire to remediate to TIC’s lack of efficiency.

To clearly understand the impact of these changes, it is helpful to clarify the nature of the previous relationship between these two central institutions. The Ministry of Land is a key institution regarding land management in Tanzania because it is the issuing authority of land titles. Officially, the relationship between TIC and the Ministry of Land should be collaborative since TIC needs to involve the Ministry of Land to get derivative land titles for foreign investors, and the Ministry of Land used to transfer parcels of land available for investments to TIC’s land bank. Since the Ministry of Land is responsible for recovering land from commercial investors that have failed to develop their assets, it plays a direct role in managing available parcels of land for commercial development, but was delegating this responsibility to TIC.
However, with the creation of LIU, the Ministry of Land now intends to handle directly investment projects. In short, TIC’s failure to follow-up and monitor investors is depicted as the cause of the commercial underdevelopment of several pieces of land available for investments throughout the country. Therefore, instead of transferring land confiscated by the Ministry of Land to TIC, it has been decided that the Ministry of Land will now manage by itself these parcels of land available to investors (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews officials TIC and LIU).

Thus, the creation of LIU implies an important institutional overlap since the new unit has a similar mandate to TIC. In addition, LIU allows the President to interfere directly and use his discretionary power for land allocation to investors. For example, in October 2016, he allocated through LIU 10,000 hectares free of charge to a Tanzanian investor, Bakhresa. This land was confiscated by the Ministry of Land from an unproductive investor in the Coast region. The decision appeared to have been based on the President’s perception of Bakhresa as an example of a productive investor. Speaking of the company, he stated: “you are the best example of businesspeople we want […] the best tax payer and you have created many employment opportunities” (Mbashiru 2016).

**HOW DISTRICT OFFICIALS CAPITALISE ON THEIR LOCAL KNOWLEDGE**

Since TIC lacks capacity, it depends on district authorities regarding investment projects because they have a much better understanding of the specificities of the local context. This dependency has significantly empowered district officials, creating opportunities to foster their material interests.
All land acquisitions through TIC in Rufiji district that I investigated involved political interference. As explained earlier, it means that instead of TIC allocating available and suitable parcels of land from its land bank to investors, investors rather used TIC to formalise their rights to desired land. In this process, TIC must collaborate with district authorities and it usually mandates them to demarcate the requested land, inform, consult and secure villages’ approval. This process generated revenues for district officials because of their involvement in several steps—land identification, land mapping, organization of consultations with villagers, etc.—for which they asked investors’ financial contribution. Consequently, district authorities had a direct material interest at satisfying investors by ensuring the concretization of land deals with the concerned villages.

In practice, it led district officials to disregard village authorities on land rights. Even though they did consult the villages, villages’ approval or refusal was in practice inconsequential. In all three acquisitions I investigated involving TIC in Rufiji district, concerned villages—both village leaders and villagers—were opposed and refused the land deals, but the land transfers were nonetheless approved and completed. Yet, as my analysis shows, excluding village administrations is likely to create conflictual dynamics at the local level, and potentially may impede investors’ capacity to become operational.

Also, this way of proceeding generates important confusion at the local level. Some villagers are not even aware that their land has been leased to an investor. Even when they are informed, because they were excluded from the negotiation, they lack knowledge about the investor and it prevents them from holding investors accountable and monitoring expected benefits. For instance, villagers
and local leaders are usually denied access to the contract and the terms of the agreement. Even basic information, such as the name of the investor and his contact details, are kept secret. In fact, villagers use nicknames to speak about these investors, which illustrates their lack of information.

Moreover, it creates tensions between local populations and investors. An investor that I will refer to as “Investor A”, for the purpose of anonymity, is a representative case in this regard. The company acquired 3,060 ha of land for maize and rice production in 2005. Although the village was not consulted before TIC’s approval of the land transfer, the village eventually was convinced that the investor’s presence would contribute to village development. The investor promised several things to villagers: to provide material for schools and to build classrooms, to expand the health centre, to ensure access to electricity and to provide employment to villagers. None of these promises was fulfilled (Bélair 2017, interviews local leaders, Rufiji).

A first conflictual issue emerged with the compensation process. Since the land acquired was already occupied by farmers, the arrival of the investor required their displacement. According to the Tanzanian law, in such cases, farmers are entitled to receive compensation for their land. Displaced farmers were offered in 2005 a compensation amount. The company gave the compensation amount to TIC, and TIC delegated the responsibility to compensate farmers to the district. Thus, the district on behalf of the company offered farmers TSH45,000 (US$20,14) for every five acres without any compensation for the crops they had already planted or their mango trees. This offer was so low that most farmers were insulted and refused. Nothing happened afterwards: apparently, the district kept the money and it was the end of this compensation process.
This compensation process led to frictions between the company and the villagers. On one side, villagers resented the company for what they perceive as an unfair treatment. On the other side, the company claimed that it was a victim as well since they gave a fair amount to compensate farmers directly to TIC (Bélair 2016, interview Company A). Although the role played by the district and TIC in this compensation is unclear, the fact remains that compensation issues affected negatively the relationship between investors and farmers.

The process of starting agricultural production also generated conflicts. Since villagers were not consulted and properly informed about the land acquisition, boundaries between the land owned by the investor and the villagers remained blurred. In the case of Investor A, this confusion over boundaries created practical problems. After acquiring the land, the company started its operations and planted a small area with maize—between 300 and 700ha. However, their first harvest was a loss because, according to the company, about two-third of their harvest was stolen by villagers. Villagers denied this accusation. According to them, the company pretended to cultivate its land but was in fact cultivating the plots that had already been prepared by villagers. So, villagers were not stealing from the company but harvesting their own crops. Although what really happened is uncertain, the conflict escalated to the point where one person working for the company shot some farmers apparently caught stealing crops, and one of them got a bullet in the leg. Subsequently, the company lost all local credibility. These combined tensions drove the investor to stop production, and the land was abandoned one year later, in 2006. The investor left his farming equipment in the village, but himself never came back.
As this discussion illustrates, the tendency of district officers to exclude villages from land acquisition negotiations tends to generate conflicts between investors and villagers. Villagers, being ignored, lack information about the investor and the location of his investment, thereby creating local conflicts over boundaries and usage of the land. Also, because compensation processes are often problematic, villagers tend to resent the company for not compensating them properly even though the company may not be the sole responsible party for insufficient compensation. In the end, it may have important consequences for investors, and impede their capacity to become operational, as was the case with Investor A.

**DISTRICT OFFICIALS: GAMING THE SYSTEM**

The centralization process of land management with the creation of the Ministry of Land’s LIU not only disempowers TIC, but it can also weaken the position of district officials. Indeed, this centralization allows the central state to bypass district authorities and proceed with investors directly in a typical top-down process. Consequently, district officials lost their upper hand in the game, and this institutional change reduced significantly their capacity to benefit materially from new investors. However, as I claim in the next section, district officials were very innovative in finding new ways of fostering their material interests, especially in areas where the state has limited infrastructural power.

**A NEW STRATEGY: THE PROTECTION OF UNPRODUCTIVE INVESTORS**

“For us, they [Investor B] will do nothing. It is just a show”, *Rufiji farmer, 2016*

Even though its new strategy allows the central state to bypass district authorities regarding land acquisitions, it still relies on district officials to follow-up on the productivity of existing investors.
This relation of reliance allows district officials to preserve their power with current investors. In addition, the President’s pledge to fight unproductive investors created a climate of fear among investors. Consequently, some investors who have undeveloped assets are afraid of losing their land rights. This situation gives district officials a new and interesting edge with these unproductive investors.

Using two examples in Rufiji district—Investor B and Investor C—I draw attention to how the district official discourse on investors’ operationalization of projects is contradicted by the reality on the ground. I argue that this discrepancy can be explained by considering district officials’ strategy to benefit materially from investors. In fact, partnering and protecting unproductive investors from central state’s dispossession give them access to new opportunities for accumulation, and compensate for their exclusion from land acquisition processes. Mostly district officials ask for financial compensation from investors (development levy, taxes and disguised bribes), in exchange for their protection against the central state’s threat of dispossession.

THE CASE OF INVESTOR B

Investor B acquired 3,000 ha in Rufiji in 2004 to grow sugarcane. The company is local and owned by Tanzanians. It acquired the land directly from the village and this acquisition forced the displacement of about fifty to sixty families. The district was involved in a compensation process that was highly contentious. Furthermore, the company did not respect the development promises

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4 Numerous compensation issues are worth mentioning. First, it started only in 2013, so about nine years after the eviction of farmers. Second, only people living near the main road were offered compensation, the others were simply ignored. Third, the amount offered by the company to farmers was ridiculously low, and the loss of land itself was not compensated. (Bélair 2016, fieldnotes and interviews villagers Rufiji District)
it made, never started operations, and eventually disappeared from Rufiji. Consequently, several farmers felt they were treated unfairly and the company acquired a bad reputation locally.

However, recently, the owner of the company came back to Rufiji district. According to district officials and local leaders, Investor B has shown a renewed interest and is now committed to starting its commercial operations by clearing its land to prepare for cultivation. In short, the company is depicted as a promising investor who will soon become productive.

Yet, villagers show serious doubt about this official narrative. They believe Investor B is primarily motivated to be active because he is afraid of the President’s threat regarding unproductive investors. Thus, they attribute Investor B’s motivation to the fear of losing its rights to the land. My field observations tend to support villagers’ interpretation. Instead of using tractors as it could be expected in similar cases of commercial agricultural ventures, Investor B made an agreement with the village chairman to hire youths to clear his land by hand. The least we can say is that this way of proceeding for a such a big parcel, 3,000 ha (7,400 acres), is far from being optimal. In the words of one farmer: “they [the youths hired by the Chairman on behalf of the company] use primitive tools such as panga [machete]. To us, they [Investor B] will do nothing. It is just a show” (Bélair 2016, interview farmer Rufiji).

Although Investor B’s real motivations remain subject to speculation, the significance of this example lies in showing the process through which the company has established partnerships with district officials and local leaders to protect itself from central state’s dispossession. When I asked district officials about Investor B, they depicted him as being committed and operational. I
interpret this discourse as one that aims at protecting the company, and district officials’ interests with it. Without a doubt, officials are aware, as are villagers, that Investor B’s current land clearing operations are seriously contradicting his claim and commitment to become commercially productive.

THE CASE OF INVESTOR C

Investor C provides another illustrative example. The company has acquired about 5,000 ha in Rufiji for rice cultivation in 2015 through TIC. The process of this deal was particularly top-down and secretive. At local level, the process of acquisition was so obscure that both villagers and leaders don’t know how the company acquired this land (Bélair 2016, interview land rights monitor Rufiji). The location of the land acquired itself is surprisingly imprecise in official documents: the affected villages are not identified (Bélair 2016, interview TIC).

Operationalizing agricultural operations on this specific land is problematic for many reasons. First of all, the land acquired is in a very remote and undeveloped area of the district. To reach it, which I did, one needs to cross a small artisanal bridge over the Rufiji River and then to drive about 28km on a narrow, sandy road. Clearly, lack of infrastructural development is challenging for any investor who wants to develop commercial agriculture. There is no electricity, no water, and the roads are not sufficiently developed to allow regular transportation.

Moreover, before being able to cultivate this land, it would require a fair amount of investment. As I saw when I visited this investment site, the land is an uncleared and wild bush, except for a tiny part where the investor brought a container, dug a well, and built the guard’s house.
Since Investor C’s land has shared boundaries with the Selous National Park, the presence of wild animals—such as elephants, lions, monkeys, hippopotamuses, is likely to disrupt agricultural activities. Unsurprisingly then, the investor has not done much except for enlarging a few kilometres of the road leading to his land, and establishing a precarious base camp. Moreover, it appears that all operations have stopped since February 2016.
Despite these facts, district officials that I interviewed in November 2016 insist on how this investor is productively engaged in this agricultural venture. According to them, the company is committed to being operational soon, and currently active in developing the road to reach its land to start agricultural production (Bélair 2016, interview official Rufiji District).

This contradiction between my field observations and district officials’ discourse is striking. I came to the conclusion that protecting this investor from central state’s dispossession threat may explain this discrepancy. District officials are more concerned about protecting their interests with this investor than by his eventual capacity to become productive. This would explain why they continue praising the investor’s commitment despite being aware of major challenges to develop agricultural activities on this land anytime soon.

To conclude, the central state has put in place a new strategy to increase its control over, and foster productive land investments. In Rufiji, it created an institutional overlap which has side-lined district elites and reduced their opportunities for accumulation with investors. However, since the state has weak infrastructural power, it still relies on them to monitor and follow-up on investors. I demonstrated that district officials used this power to foster their own material interests. By offering protection against the central state’s threat of dispossession, district officials innovated by proposing a new valuable administrative service to unproductive investors: though fragmented and incomplete, data suggest that they may have lied to central government officials to cover-up investors’ unproductivity. This innovation fosters district officials’ material interests because it
creates and establishes their usefulness to investors, who have to financially compensate them for their assistance (mostly in the form of disguised bribes).

Besides this, the centralization strategy of the central state has also led it to monitor closely some local state agencies dealing with land investors in Rufiji. The next section analyses the local impacts of this new central monitoring. I argue that it might have a pervasive local effect. Instead of protecting vulnerable populations, it fosters institutional innovations that aim to protect local officials’ opportunities for accumulation with investors.

THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF CENTRAL MONITORING: FORCING LOCAL OFFICIALS TO INNOVATE TO SAFEGUARD THEIR MATERIAL INTERESTS

AMBIGUOUS AT BEST, ILLEGITIMATE AT WORST: HOW AN AGENCY CAN REINVENT ITSELF AS A LAND BROKER

Rubada, a state agency that redefined itself and its mandate in one of the most targeted regions for land investments, provides a fascinating illustration of the consequences of the state’s lack of capacity on policy implementation. To apprehend the complexity of the relational prism through which Rubada interacts with other state actors, investors and local populations, historical contextualizing is needed.

Rubada, or the Rufiji Basin Development Authority, is a national agency that was established in 1975 by Parliament Act No. 5. Broadly defined, its mission was initially to promote, regulate, coordinate and facilitate all development activities in the Rufiji Basin. Rubada was created amid an optimistic development buzz in the Rufiji region with the ambitious Stiegler Gorge Project. It is worth noting that this narrative about the tremendous potential of the Rufiji basin for socio-
economic development has been part of the national narrative since the colonial period. Numerous ambitious development projects⁵ have been undertaken in the region in hope of taming the Rufiji river for commercial irrigation or generating hydro-electricity. Rubada’s initial mandate was thus to coordinate Tanzania’s partnerships with international donors and institutions for the development of Rufiji region (Hoag 2003, 183). However, in the end, all these ambitious development projects failed. The implementation of the structural adjustment programme and economic liberalization at the end of the 80s marked the end of this era of large-scale projects with the abandonment of the Stiegler Gorge Project.

Consequently, Rubada’s mission became unclear, but the agency was not dismantled. The turn towards privatization at the end of the 1990s, and the new focus on attracting investors to promote agricultural development provided new opportunities for Rubada. Echoing what neoinstitutionalists call “institutional stickiness”, Rubada’s officials found a way of reinventing their agency and justifying its existence. In fact, they broadened its mission (Rubada 2013, 4). A wider conception of Rufiji development was put forward, in which the focus on the Rufiji river was replaced by a focus on land. Fostering land investments and attracting new investors in Rufiji region became in practice Rubada’s new mandate. Yet, this reorientation was never properly officialised by the central government. Consequently, still to this day, the agency lacks legitimacy at local and central government levels. At worse, Rubada is perceived illegitimate; at best, ambiguous.

⁵ The most important of those projects were: The Rufiji mechanised cultivation scheme (British colonial period—1948-1956); The Rufiji Basin Survey (FAO—1953); The Stiegler Gorge project (Tanzanian government and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)—1971-1984). See Hoag (2003).
At first, Rubada managed to become a very attractive agency for investors since it acts as a broker to deal on their behalf with villages, district and the different ministries. The agency was relatively successful in branding itself as the turnkey agency for land investments in Rufiji district until the 2015 corruption scandal with investors. In April 2015, senior officials of Rubada were put under investigation over the disappearance of TSH 3.2 billion of development funds (roughly US$1.5 million). According to the report, investors’ money was not channelled through Rubada accounts: “the officials received TSH2.7 billion from investors who wanted to work in various projects in the basin, but only TSH714 millions was tracked to Rubada accounts” (Mwalimu 2015). Swindled investors never got the land they paid for, and their money simply vanished.

Subsequently, the relationship between the central government and the agency has become arduous as top officials have politically ostracised Rubada. For instance, its number of employees has diminished drastically: from about 500 employees in the 1990s, the agency has now less than 50. Moreover, it has received no funding at all from the central government since 2015. Rubada’s offices in Dar es Salam fall into decrepitude, a situation which is a telling contrast with TIC’s and the Ministry of Land’s LIU newly renovated offices.

Nonetheless, Rubada is still a very active actor in land investments in Rufiji district. In addition, facilitating land acquisition for companies has become its only way to generate new revenues. The agency is involved in about twenty investment projects. While most of them are still in the preliminary phases of land acquisition, some are at the Ministry of Land, waiting for the completion of the land transfer process (Bélair 2016, interview Rubada). Even if the government announced in September 2017 its decision to dismantle Rubada and to transfer the remaining
employees to the Ministry of Agriculture, the agency is likely to continue to be active in Rufiji to honour and implement its contractual obligations with investors (Bélair 2016, interview Rubada). Therefore, the President and the Ministry of Land must still deal with Rubada’s presence.

To deal with Rubada, the central government has directed a close monitoring of Rubada’s activities by the Ministry of Land. For instance, the agency must be accompanied by district officials for every meeting with villagers, and their presence is required during negotiations and villages’ general assemblies. In addition, the Ministry of Land has recently sent delegates to every village which had signed a contract involving Rubada to validate the villages’ acceptation of land investments (Bélair 2016, interview official Rufiji District). This central oversight aims to ensure that the agency is carrying out its activities with investors properly.

**Central Monitoring and Subversion**

Even if Rubada lost 90% of its staff in the last decade or so, Rubada officials have an extensive local knowledge of Rufiji district—the agency has been active there for over forty years—and therefore, it does not rely on district officials as TIC does. In practice, when it comes to land acquisitions, Rubada arranges meetings directly with village leaders. Villages leaders are thus always involved in the negotiation and can establish their conditions for the lease of the land. Yet, while such a process empowers village leaders, we should be careful to claim that it is more inclusive for villagers.

My field observations suggest that each village in Rufiji district has its own power dynamics, and the result depends on the leaders’ relations with the villagers and the nature of consultative
mechanisms. I noticed that some leaders favor very transparent processes and villages assemblies are called to openly discuss the investor, the development conditions to be met, and the possible advantages of this investment for the community. The discussion and the final decision to lease land or not is thus taken in a concerted and relatively democratic way. However, in other villages, I noticed that leaders use their position of authority to negotiate privately with Rubada and investors. They keep these transactions secret and refuse to answer villagers’ questions during meetings. Therefore, these villagers are often not aware of their land having been leased, have no information about the investor, and do not know the terms of the contract. In practice then, for land acquired in this fashion, it is highly likely that the local outcomes of land deals will be similar to the ones observed with TIC or LIU.

Before being centrally monitored, Rubada used to collaborate with the district to make sure that land was leased to investors, with or without villages’ approval. For instance, in one specific village that I visited, the leaders were approached by Rubada and an investor in 2013. The collective decision was to refuse the investor for two reasons. First, the land the investor wanted to acquire was bigger than the land available for investors in the village’s land use plan. Second, the village was suspicious of Rubada. They distrusted the agency: “We don’t recognise Rubada’s authority and we don’t want to deal with them. From what we know, Rubada’s mandate is to help developing the Rufiji river but it is not what they do. They tend to partner with investors and to not protect people’ rights” (Bélair 2016, interview local leaders Rufiji). Yet, these leaders learned accidently while they were at the district office that their land was leased to this investor despite the village’s clear opposition. It means that Rubada ignored the village’s decision, and colluded with district officials to proceed with the land transaction.
However, the close monitoring on Rubada’s activities has led the Ministry of Land to revise all of Rubada’s land deals in Rufiji district. In some instances, it led to acknowledge the illegality of some land transactions and to recognise villages’ authority and land rights. The case of this village illustrates the concrete consequences of this central follow-up and monitoring. When the villagers learned that their land was leased despite their refusal, they were shocked. They wrote a letter to the Ministry of Land in 2013 to inform it that their rights were denied by the district and Rubada, and that they, as villagers, considered this transaction illegal. The villagers themselves never got follow-up on this. Nonetheless, according to my interviews with both Rubada and the district, the village’s refusal was acknowledged by the Ministry of Land during its revision of land transactions involving Rubada. Consequently, the transaction was invalidated, and the village finally kept its land rights.

Yet, this outcome appears exceptional. In fact, the Ministry of Land’s primary goal is to monitor Rubada to avoid a new corruption scandal with investors. Most of its follow-up on land deals involving Rubada were procedural and conducted only with villages’ executive committee, and selected leaders. Thus, the monitoring process itself does not deal with the issue of local leaders, who have sold village land on villagers’ behalf without properly informing or consulting them.

In short, the process overlooks consequences of asymmetrical power within villages. Nevertheless, the new monitoring of the Ministry of Land on Rubada puts pressure on the agency that could not anymore ignore decisions made by villagers. In addition, the agency is under a lot of financial pressure as the central government has cut off its operational funding. Concretely, as I explain below, it forced Rubada to innovate to protect its interests with investors in a context where the
agency must secure villages’ consent before being able to proceed with the land transfer for investment. Therefore, this monitoring process that at first may seem to encourage accountability to local communities has in fact pushed the state agency involved to innovate to protect its own interests.

In practice, the agency started to use its position of power to exploit village leaders’ lack of knowledge and of education regarding their land rights and legal proceedings to advance its own interests. Most of village leaders I have interviewed do not know that once their land is transferred to the category of general land, it is gone forever. They usually assume that if the investor is not productive, they will be able to get back their land rights, which is not the case. Moreover, they lack information about the market value of their land and assets, the laws governing their land rights and the compensation process.

Since Rubada’s main source of revenue is its services as a broker for investors, it has a direct interest in satisfying investors and finding the land they request for their investments, even though it might imply lying to village leaders. For instance, they will agree to certain conditions with the villages’ leaders but they will not include them in the official contract with the company. Concretely, numerous villagers have told me that one trick used by Rubada is to write down a bilingual version of the contract. Yet, the content of the Kiswahili contract will include villages’ requests while the English one—which is used as the official and legally binding contract will not. This way Rubada can secure villages’ approval by agreeing to all their demands regarding the investor’s acquisition, without imposing any constraining development conditions on the investor.
In addition, Rubada is not only tricking villages to secure its interests, but it is also voluntarily misleading central authorities on investors to facilitate land acquisition processes. As explained earlier, Rubada is struggling for its financial and political survival. Facilitating land acquisition for companies is its only way to generate new revenues. Therefore, Rubada is inclined to support investors, even though it implies misinforming the Ministry of Land.

For example, since 2011, Rubada has been officially working with two different companies that are looking to acquire land for sugar production: Investor D and Investor E. Yet, these two companies are in fact the same. Rubada and the company’s director were afraid that they were asking too much land at once and the Ministry of Land might refuse to allocate such a large area to only one investor—it represents over 25,000 hectares. It is why they created two businesses to avoid suspicion and facilitate the process to obtain land titles (Bélair 2016, interview Rubada liaison Rufiji). The district was complicit in this case. Moreover, the fact that the company has been struggling financially, and does not have the financial capacity to develop such an ambitious project does not appear to be a concern for Rubada or the district, but should be since it might impede the investor’s capacity to be productive.

Therefore, this shows that the central state’s strategy to foster productive investors has not been internalised by these bureaucrats. Their interest lies instead in the perspective of short-term material gains from their partnership with new investors. Local officials’ interests in these cases are not necessarily protecting investors, and can instead be attributed to their lack of capacity or lack of interest. Yet, my observations in the field contradict this argument. In Rufiji district, local officials are omnipresent and exert strict control over activities within their territory and villages.
The constant resistance of district officials to allow me to visit sites of land investments, recurrent inconsistencies between the district’s discourse on investors and their practices, the law of secrecy regarding investors, and villagers’ perceptions and observations, support my hypothesis.

As this discussion shows, central monitoring has direct consequences on the way a local state agency conducts its activities regarding land investments. However, empirical investigation of these effects is necessary to understand how bureaucrats alter these policies during the implementation process. As illustrated in this case, local officials innovated to promote their interests with investors, even though it implied voluntarily misleading and tricking both village and central authorities. Moreover, my analysis highlights the fact that including villages administrations within processes of acquisition is not sufficient to avoid conflictual dynamics between villagers and the investor. This finding points out the crucial importance of acknowledging power dynamics within villages—more specifically leaders’ accountability to villagers—to analyse the nature of the potential relationship between investor and villagers.

CONCLUSION

Based on my empirical findings in Rufiji district, this chapter first showed that the central state’s weak infrastructural power may reverse the flow of power, empowering local bureaucrats towards their counterparts. I argued that the fragmented and contentious authority in Tanzania can impact power relations in the field of land deals. My analysis reiterates the importance of recognizing that the hegemonic project of many African states is contentious, dynamic and incomplete (Mamdani 1996; Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 982). Furthermore, it shows that investigating empirically how
local actors transform central structuration processes remains highly relevant to understand governance practices in Africa (Mamdani 1996)

In this chapter, I unpacked the local CAS to study how intermediaries have innovatively seized opportunities (C) to subvert central directives (A), thereby modifying the local structure (S), which in turn affected their interactions with other actors at the local and central governance levels. Demonstrating that Tanzanian central authorities lacked capacity, I emphasized the dependency that exists between them and local bureaucrats. Because central state officials were dependent on local officials’ knowledge, the latter found themselves in positions of power which they used to foster their material interests with investors, and their political interests with local populations. As documented in this chapter, in Rufiji district, actors’ interactions between levels are mostly competitive and subversive. The nature of this relationship between officials at central and local levels further explains the local impacts associated with new farmland investments that I have documented at the local level.

Second, I showed that, rather than protecting vulnerable populations, central monitoring might foster institutional innovations that aimed at protecting local bureaucrats’ opportunities for accumulation with investors. The fact that local officials acted as state brokers damaged the relationship investors developed with local communities. It generated confusion because local communities were not consulted and lacked information about new investment projects. Being excluded from the negotiation process, the local population tended to resist investors. As a result, conflictual dynamics emerged when these investors started operations. Therefore, chapter 6 argued
that bypassing local communities is consequential: it might even impede the capacity of the investor to become operational.

However, competitive interactions between central and local governance levels also opened up possibilities for local communities to protect and safeguard their land rights as I have demonstrated in this chapter. But then, this outcome is contingent on the nature of actors’ interactions at the micro-level. It is possible only if local leaders favor transparent governance procedures, and are accountable to villagers.
Chapter 7: Missenyi district, a local political arena

Productive “land grabs” in Tanzania: How important are protected domestic markets and clientelistic relations?¹

Chapter 7 analyses how a specific farmland investment has significantly restructured the local political agrarian economy of Missenyi district. It adopts a local perspective and focuses on a specific investor, Kagera Sugar. In addition, it shows that actors’ political interactions between central and local levels are not always subversive or competitive (as discussed in Chapter 6), they can also be collaborative and interdependent. I claim that this interdependency is key because it became the very condition that underlies actors’ position of authority at the local level.

Furthermore, although this chapter illustrates how actors exert their agency to subvert or modify the structure in order to foster their interests, it also evidences that not all actors have the same capacity to influence it. There are structural inequalities in the distribution of power. As a result, it is primarily actors who hold enough power capital—political elites, investors and government officials—who can renegotiate the structure to further their political and material interests. Marginalised actors, because of their limited political capital, such as migrant workers, women, and youths are often left out of this negotiation game, with very little leeway to influence the structure.

¹ An initial version of this chapter was published online as Bélair, Joanny. 2017. “Agricultural investments in Tanzania: economic opportunities or new forms of exploitation?”, Open democracy: Beyond Slavery. 13 November 2017. [https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond-trafficking-and-slavery/agricultural-investments-in-tanzania-economic-opportunities-or-new-forms/]
My fieldwork has led me to make two important observations. First, I noticed that projects which involve local investors tend to be operational while projects involving exclusively foreign investors tend to fail or to be delayed during the implementation process. Second, I observed that local markets—not necessarily global markets—constitute interesting opportunities for new investors who do not want to export their production to global markets. For example, in the two regions I studied, new investments in agricultural production are centered around sugar projects. The fact that the domestic sugar market is protected in Tanzania makes it an attractive venture for new farmland investments. These insights raise interesting questions. When and why do land grabs materialize? And why do local investors appear to be more successful than foreign investors? Are these considerations determinant of the local impacts associated with specific investments and how?

To further explore these questions, this chapter proposes a case-study analysis of one of these investments, a large-scale operational land deal I have studied, which is also a local investor case. Kagera Sugar is the biggest operational investor in Missenyi District, Kagera region, and is often praised by the current government as a model investor. Officially, it is owned by a Tanzanian company, Superdoll, which acquired the land in 2004. Acquisition of new land by Kagera Sugar lacks transparency, and as a result, the exact number of hectares hold by Kagera Sugar remains elusive. Approximately, according to the district, the company has rights on about 25,000 hectares. Superdoll made substantial infrastructural investments and managed to position Kagera Sugar as one of the key players in the national Tanzanian sugar industry. The company is often quoted in the news as a successful example of national agricultural investment and is currently expanding
its operations (Bélair 2016, interview chief of operations Kagera Sugar; The Guardian Reporter 2017; Polycarp 2018).

This chapter makes three main points. First, I examine Tanzania’s politics of sugar and highlight how Kagera Sugar’s political relations secure its operational profitability. Because Tanzania’s sugar producers are not internationally competitive—lacking technology and having insufficient productivity, they would be unlikely to survive in an open international market—having a local, protected market is a matter of survival for them.

Second, I contend that these mediated market relations are conditioning the company’s impact on local communities. It is only through inducing and fostering local clientelistic relations at the local level that Kagera Sugar can protect its interests and its monopoly over sugar production and distribution in the region. This has lasting impacts on the local population, as local patrons are also seeking to benefit from the arrival of Kagera Sugar in the district, in order to foster their own material interests, at the expense of those of the local population. I illustrate the argument by discussing the contract farming scheme, and how district officials have captured land formalization processes.

Third, I highlight how such a predatory system is furthering pre-existing dynamics of social differentiation, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable populations, namely migrants, youths and women. Therefore, my analysis shows that the interactions between new capital, national and local politics, and domestic markets affect investments’ operationalization. Similarly to Hansen et al. (2016) and McCarthy et al (2012), I demonstrate that considering the effects of
“non-market mediated systems of economic exchange”\(^2\) is key to capturing investments’ local outcomes.

**Kagera Sugar: How Do Peasants Cope?**

Part of what is now Kagera Sugar’s land was initially allocated to an Indian investor during colonial times for sugar production, but was nationalized in 1975 under Nyerere’s government. The state’s sugar enterprise was never fully operational, and productivity was low, due to mismanagement, corruption, and lack of maintenance and funding (Bélair 2016, interview chief of operations, Kagera Sugar). The government’s sugar factory was bombed during the Tanzania-Uganda war in 1978-1979, and completely abandoned in the 1980s, remaining inactive until the arrival of Kagera Sugar in 2004. Most of the estate was thus left unoccupied for about twenty-five years, and local communities started using it. According to the law, the government should have compensated these communities before selling the land to the company because locals have been occupying it for numerous years, and therefore, had acquired rights of occupancy. Yet no such compensation was given.

The delicate task of making peace with surrounding communities was thus left to the company. It was a successful process for two reasons. On one side, villagers knew that the land had previously been government land, and they were ready to negotiate with the company. On the other side, the company was concerned with the importance of building good relationships with the surrounding communities. According to my interviews, the few land conflicts that emerged with the company’s arrival in the district were quickly and peacefully resolved.

\(^2\) I wish to thank Mark Schwartz for proposing this expression to characterize those dynamics.
The fact that Kagera Sugar established a good reputation locally also helped. Superdoll made substantial infrastructural investments and provides employment opportunities and social development to local communities. Amongst other things, the company gives access to villagers from the region to excellent health services through its health facilities, to clean water, to a private primary school, and contributes sporadically financially and in-kind to some villages’ infrastructural projects. Furthermore, in addition to providing direct employment at the factory and on its plantations, Kagera Sugar has put in place a programme of contract farming—a outgrowers’ scheme.

In 2016, the company gave me a guided tour of its factory, plantation sites, and main buildings. My guide was eager to show me the nice houses in which qualified and managerial staff resided and emphasised how much Kagera Sugar prioritised the well-being of its employees. After being offered a five-star meal at the company’s restaurant, I also visited the company’s hospital, primary school, and new mosque, which are all almost free of charge for employees and surrounding communities. Overall, the tour gave the impression that, beyond the aim to become competitive by improving its technology and efficiency, the company was also concerned with providing good working conditions for its employees in order to increase its retention rate, and with developing fruitful relations with the surrounding local communities by offering good employment opportunities.

Yet, a closer examination of the working conditions at Kagera Sugar told a very different story than the fairytale picture painted by the company tour. The reality is that managerial or professional positions are very few, and most local people only have access to low-paid jobs, such as cane-
cutting or seeding. It also became very clear to me that, in order to access higher-paid positions – and therefore better working conditions – a diploma was not the only prerequisite: a certain degree of political connections with the company were needed as well (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews farmers and villagers from nine villages, Kagera region).

Low-paid workers do not live in the nice houses I encountered during my tour; they live in labour camps, which look like little slums, isolated in the middle of the plantation. Their houses are built with whatever material is available. Working conditions are harsh, and salaries are very low. Local people can tell when someone starts working for the company because newly hired lower-rung workers “tend to slim up very quickly” (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and observations).

During their workday, the company transports workers from one part of the plantation to another using big open trucks, similar to the overcrowded trucks that transport cattle. Not only is transport uncomfortable, but it is also a risky venture. Fights and knife attacks occur frequently during these commutes. Women are the most vulnerable: in addition to being subjected to sexual harassment, they are verbally abused and sometimes, even threatened with rape. These precarious work conditions do not align with the rosy picture painted by the company tour.

Moreover, the company’s impact on local livelihoods should not be overstated. Local peasants are neither fully nor forcefully incorporated; they can also choose to opt in and out from this new mode of production. This flexibility stems partly from the fact that Kagera Sugar is struggling to recruit employees for low-paid, low-qualified jobs (Bélair 2016, interview human resources manager Kagera Sugar). Missenyi district was initially part of the Haya kingdoms, and people who identify
themselves as Haya place a high cultural value on education. Throughout Tanzania, Haya people are generally acknowledged as among the most highly educated (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and observations). Therefore, in addition to the fact that working conditions are difficult, locals are reluctant to do these jobs because they are not valued socially. As a consequence, the company must recruit and hire employees from other Tanzanian regions, and deal with a constant turnover of its non-qualified workforce. Most of the company’s workers who live in the plantation are employees not native to this region. In contrast, local workers usually prefer living at their houses in neighbouring villages, even if it necessitates travelling to the plantation every day (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews farmers and villagers from nine villages, Kagera region).

Consequently, while it is true that they are adapting to new politico-economic conditions, most villagers I interviewed are preserving their independence from the company. Farmers are attached to their land, and their livelihood. Although they appreciate the working opportunities offered by Kagera Sugar, locally, my interviews revealed that working for the company remains seen primarily as an option. They work for the company when they need cash to pay school fees, or to buy farm inputs, or when the harvest was not as good as expected. However, as soon as their situation improves, most of them resume their work at their familial farms.

Thus, farmers like the flexibility and independence of being small-scale farmers, even if it sometimes means barely producing enough to ensure their survival. In addition to being culturally valued, land is peasants’ safety net. As Li (2011, 295) puts it: “In the absence of national welfare provisions, even a tiny patch of land is a crucial safety net”. My observations concur with Li’s
statement: few villagers are willing to give up their safety net and their livelihood option to integrate themselves into a new mode of production, such as the one proposed by the company.

In sum, Kagera Sugar has introduced a new mode of production that at first sight echoes Glassman’s argument about semi-proletarianization of the peasantry due to capitalist penetration and concomitant processes of primitive accumulation (Glassman 2006). Yet, the arrival of the company is only affecting a small proportion of peasants, and with the company’s upcoming turn towards mechanization, this effect on labour will tend to diminish (see on labour effect, Li 2011). Villagers are not resisting this investor, nor are they passively being integrated into the capitalist structure as semi-proletarians: most of them are using the new conjuncture wisely to foster their own interests. They agree to sell their labour when they have specific needs for liquidities but resume their traditional livelihood occupations as soon as the emergency has passed.

In fact, peasants are benefitting from the arrival of Kagera Sugar. The company has taken to heart its corporate social responsibility, effectively contributing to improving social services and to development in surrounding local communities (Belair 2016-2017, fieldwork notes, interviews and observations). It provides them with an economic alternative to cope with risks associated with small-scale agriculture as a mode of subsistence.

Nevertheless, this is far from capturing the extent to which the arrival of the company is affecting local communities. In the next sections, I argue that Kagera Sugar safeguards its operational profitability because it partakes in clientelistic dynamics at the national level which creates mediated market relations. Kagera Sugar produces and fosters these clientelistic dynamics at the
local level. My main argument is that the most significant impact associated with the arrival of the company for local communities is the emergence of new local patrons. They are using their position to benefit and foster their material interests at their expense.

**LOCAL CLIENTELISTIC RELATIONS RESTRUCTURE THE LOCAL AGRARIAN SYSTEM**

**TANZANIA’S POLITICS OF SUGAR**

The sugar market is highly regulated in Tanzania. Tanzania’s sugar producers are not competitive on international markets because they lack technology and have insufficient productivity. Therefore, they would be unlikely to survive in a free and open international market. Moreover, there are only four operational sugar companies in Tanzania, and national production is insufficient to fulfil national demand. To alleviate the deficit, every year, the government issues import licences to a few selected traders. The government’s tight control on sugar imports is also a way of protecting domestic sugar industries. This protected sugar market makes the sugar business a lucrative political venture. The sugar crisis of 2016 illustrates how control over sugar production and distribution is political in Tanzania.

When John Pombe Magufuli—the current Tanzanian President—assumed office in November 2015, he clearly stated his intention of fighting corruption in the country. One of his first targets was the allegedly corrupt and political business associated with the issuance of sugar import permits. To retake control, Magufuli’s government precluded the Tanzania Sugar Board from issuing sugar import permits for 2016, and transferred this responsibility to the Prime Minister’s office, which is under his direct control. Concretely, it means that the Sugar Board’s power has been restricted to a recommendation role. Delivering import permits henceforth lies within the
Prime Minister’s office (Bélair 2016, interview programme manager, Sugar Board of Tanzania). This not only created delays, but also a national sugar crisis in the country. In early 2016, Tanzania experienced a significant sugar shortage which lasted several weeks. Sugar prices peaked and the so-called sugar crisis became a national issue, highly publicized by national media (i.e. Tairo 2016; Kamndaya 2016; “Tanzania: Politics of Sugar – First Toughest Test Magufuli Govt to Face Head On” 2016).

Businessmen who had stocks of sugar hoarded their reserves to benefit from this artificially created surge in prices. The government publicly blamed them for the whole crisis, severely condemning their hoarding practices, insisting that they were not only hurting the country’s economy, but also the national interest. It is impossible to say if the government deliberately created this shortage to favor political friends—those whose held sugar inventory or sugar import permits or if it was just incompetence and lack of foresight. The full story behind Magufuli’s motivation and efforts remains obscure. Possibly, Magufuli was pressured by fellow CCM politicians, who have shares in national sugar companies to reorganize the trading business to their advantage (Kamndaya 2016).

What is certain is that resolving this crisis allowed the government to carefully choose the few businessmen who would have sugar import permits in the country. The president’s newly asserted direct control over sugar not only protected the current oligopoly over production and distribution, but opened up new possibilities for certain national producers to acquire importation and trading permits.
My claim is that this whole sugar crisis—created and solved by Magufuli’s government—was more than an economic problem; it was a clever political move. Given the visibility of the crisis in national media, it established Magufuli’s reputation as a populist and efficient leader. More importantly, under the cover of fighting corruption, Magufuli managed to establish his authority over clientelistic trading networks associated with sugar imports and distribution (Andreoni 2017, 33). Furthermore, this recent sugar crisis indicates the political importance of sugar in Tanzania. In addition to being one of the top-priorities for new agricultural investments (“Tanzania Invest” 2016), the market in which sugar companies operate is tightly regulated, and access to produce, transform, and distribute sugar is facilitated by political connections in Tanzania.

**WHO OWNS KAGERA SUGAR?**

It is worth noting that Kagera sugar is the only national sugar producer that still has the possibility to expand horizontally because, contrary to its competitors, Kagera Sugar can acquire new land, and benefit from unlimited access to water for irrigation because of the proximity of an important, underexploited water source, the Kagera River. In the medium run, the company is thus expected to expand and capture important shares of the national market (Bélair 2016, interview chief of operations, Kagera Sugar; Bélair 2016, interview programme officer Sugar Board of Tanzania). Building good relations with local communities was thus an astute strategy. It facilitated the expansion of Kagera Sugar, allowing the company to acquire new land directly with surrounding villages.

It also permits Kagera Sugar to bypass district authorities when it acquires new land. After negotiating with village leaders, Kagera Sugar’s land acquisitions are directly formalized with the
Ministry of Land. As a consequence, the company’s total land holdings remain elusive to district officials, who are excluded from the process, being only informed later by the company itself (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews Missenyi district official).

Information flows are thus reversed: the district is dependent on the company for information on its land acquisitions. It is a very different local situation that the one documented in Chapter 6 where investors are dependent on Rufiji district officials regarding land acquisitions. This political exemption is highly significant in the Tanzanian context. It indicates that Superdoll has political connections that give it direct access to, and preferential treatment from central authorities. They allow the company to bypass the local governance structure. At the local level, several of my respondents account for this by stating that the owners on paper are not the true owners. There is a persistent local allegation that Kagera Sugar is connected to a former high-level CCM politician. Although rumours are difficult to confirm, West and Haug’s investigation of Mtibwa Sugar Estate in Kilombero—which is also owned by Superdoll—shows that similar allegations were made by locals there (West and Haug 2017, 13).

Another telling element that demonstrates how Kagera Sugar benefits from political support is the fact that, unlike other sugar companies in the country who compete directly with each other because of geographical proximity, Kagera benefits from a complete monopoly on sugar production and transformation in the Kagera region. All attempts to establish competitive industries have encountered political complications, and all projects were forced to be abandoned in the end (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and observations).
In addition, Kagera Sugar is the only sugar company with an outgrower programme that contracts with only one outgrower association. It is worth noting that other sugar companies in Tanzania, such as Kilombero Sugar Company, must treat with a proliferation of outgrowers’ associations: this creates stiff competition and the necessity for the company to negotiate with contract farmers, which is obviously costly and demanding in terms of management (see Mmari 2015; Bélair 2016, interview programme officer, Sugar Board of Tanzania). It is therefore advantageous for the company to co-opt the Association’s leaders and SACCOS’s managers in order to ensure that they can decide both the price and the conditionalities to buy sugarcane from outgrowers. These newly formed local elites are of course also benefiting financially from their compliance.

Therefore, Kagera Sugar’s monopoly over sugar production and transformation in Missenyi district is politically protected because the company partakes in clientelistic dynamics at the national level. At the local level, this political protection allows the company to co-opt the leaders of the outgrowers’ association and leaders of the microfinance programme managing its outgrowers programme. As the next section shows, this is key to understanding the impacts of the company’s contract farming programme.

**MONOPOLISTIC MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACT FARMING**

As mentioned earlier, the company’s production has not reached its full potential, and consequently, Kagera Sugar put in place an outgrowers’ scheme in 2007-2008. Buying sugarcane

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3 SACCOS (Savings and Cooperative credit unions) are Tanzanian microfinance organizations that provide micro-credit services in rural areas. They are constituted, registered, regulated and supervised under the 2003 Co-operative Societies Act. As of 2013, there were 5,559 SACCOS active in all regions of Tanzania (Anania and Gikuri 2015). It is worth noting that although they are part of a national microcredit scheme, regional offices are locally independently managed.
from outgrowers aims to compensate for the company’s deficit in production because its milling capacity is larger than its production of sugarcane. Contract farming has been an interesting economic opportunity in the region because the company provides a market—which is almost nonexistent for other crops—and guarantees the price. Consequently, several local small and medium-scale farmers have decided to acquire land to produce sugarcane.

The business is highly regulated. Outgrowers must be registered with Kaziba, the only outgrowers’ association that contracts with Kagera Sugar in the region. In theory, Kaziba is responsible for providing outgrowers with training, improved seeds, fertiliser, and services to transport and harvest sugarcane. The association is also negotiating the price at which outgrowers sell sugarcane to the company. In 2016, there were 384 registered outgrowers with Kaziba (Bélair 2017, interview with Kaziba, the outgrowers’ association).

These outgrowers come from different backgrounds. The majority are local (Haya), live in Missenyi district, and have invested in small-scale sugarcane plantations (1-15 ha) on their own land to supplement their farming revenues. If they acquire more land, they usually do so with their village leaders (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and observations). Yet, some outgrowers native to the region have also acquired larger parcels of land (50 ha and more) for their sugarcane plantations. These outgrowers are native to the region but have left Kagera to live in bigger cities, such as Dar es Salaam or Mwanza. They usually have financial resources, access to capital and political connections in Kagera region. Recently, they played off their political influence to make new and substantial land acquisitions to take advantage of local investment opportunities.
These investors belong to a different social category—that I term here the wealthy emigrants. They have political relations with local and national political networks, and this has helped them to make new land acquisitions. Usually, these medium-scale, elite investors engage local managers to oversee their plantations and business operations, only visiting the region in person intermittently.

While Kaziba was initially created by farmers themselves to increase their bargaining power with the company, it seems that the association’s leaders are increasingly working for themselves, using their position within the company for personal gains (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and observations). This has of course resulted in a number of problems; these include a lack of transparency in negotiation processes; delays in payment; unfulfilled commitments to provide training and access to inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizer; problems with transport; and increasing membership and operations fees.

Outgrowers do not face all the same difficulties. According to my interviews, the ones that have the biggest plantations and political connections are usually better off: they are less affected by transport issues, delays in payment, and access to inputs. Moreover, they usually have access to sufficient capital, and are independent of SACCOS, the micro-finance agency that has the monopoly on the provision of small loans to outgrowers in the district.

However, this is not the case for most small-scale outgrowers, who must cope with collusion dynamics between Kaziba and SACCOS. SACCOS provides loans at very high interest rates and does little to promote sound financial management. For instance, outgrowers are strongly encouraged by their association to contract loans for their start-up but are almost forbidden from
paying back their loan in one payment. SACCOS prefers that they pay in multiple instalments over a longer period. In the words of one outgrower I interviewed:

> When you get a loan with SACCOS, you [have] to pay very high interest rates and they are blocking or reimbursing your loan at once when you get the money. They want you to go by instalments. SACCOS is even sometimes taking up my money directly from what the company should pay me, without even consulting me. How is it possible? I got a loan once with them, and I will never do it again. I hate SACCOS. I got a loan of TSH3 millions [US$ 2,000] for 6 months. I had to pay TSH800,000 [US$ 533] in interests. I paid all at once, but I will never do it again (Bélair 2017, interview outgrower village 4).

This institutional push towards indebtedness has put several outgrowers in a difficult financial position. Once the fees to Kaziba and the repayment of the SACCOS loan are deducted from their sales to the company, most of them are left with almost nothing. One of my informants told me that many outgrowers can’t even afford to send their children to school.

In short, the story of contract farming here doesn’t match the institutional narrative (Deininger and Byerlee 2011) that praises microcredit initiatives and contract farming schemes for empowering farmers economically. As noted by Vicol (2017, 157) in his analysis of contract farming in India, outgrowers are not excluded; rather they are adversely included. This echoes findings from other recent studies on how farmers are unfavorably incorporated in contract farming schemes (Oya 2012; De Schutter 2011; Burnod and al. 2015; West and Haug 2017). Moreover, SACCOS’s monopoly tends to support McMichael’s contention that debt relations are increasingly being used as disciplining tools (McMichael 2013, 674).

Lastly, contestation or challenging the established order does not appear to be tolerated. For example, the previous District Commissioner, being himself an outgrower, started to militate and negotiate for the creation of a new association in Missenyi district in 2014. His efforts came to an
abrupt end when he was transferred directly by the President to a new district and replaced by a more compliant public servant (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and interviews with outgrowers). The company and central political patrons thus preserve their advantage: having co-opted both Kaziba and SACCOS’ leaders has important financial payoffs because it gives them total control over contract farming in the district.

Yet, collusion dynamics are not merely affecting contract farming. As the next section demonstrates, outgrowers’ rising demand for land has also created new economic incentives for land control. In Kagera, it led district officials to capture land formalization processes, and unlawfully dispossess villagers from their land rights. Despite being illegal, their practices are tolerated by higher government authorities because they benefit other actors, namely wealthy emigrants interested in acquiring the district’s most valuable land at cheap prices for contract farming. To use the metaphor of the politics of the belly (Bayart 1989): district officials can have their share of the cake, if they help others eat.

**District Officials’ Capture Of Land Formalization Processes**

In fact, this rising demand for land has caused prices to soar, which has in turn created adverse consequences for villagers. For instance, most farmers do not have land titles and are therefore very vulnerable to land dispossession. Examples of local leaders or district authorities using their position of power to dispossess villagers from their land rights are all too common in the surrounding villages, especially since leasing village land to outgrowers has become lucrative business. In addition, the process of land titling itself has become very difficult and highly political. People who want their land surveyed and titled must pay district officials. The legality of this
process and of the costs associated with it remain intentionally ambiguous. Most local villagers do not have the financial resources to afford titling, which is the only available option for protecting their land rights. As already discussed in Chapter 5, in Missenyi, district officials have been very innovative and have subverted land formalization processes to capture the economic benefits arising from land commodification.

A second strategy that has been used by district officials to free valuable land is administrative transfer. Officially, this transfer process is regulated by the Local Government Act 2003 which designates district officials as the planning authorities. Legally, the process implies a shift in the land regulatory framework: rather than being regulated by the Village Land Act, the newly created town falls under the legal provisions provided for in the Urban Land Act 2007. It also implies that villagers’ rights to land—certificates of customary rights of occupancy (CCROs)—are acquired by the state during the process. Villagers should thus either be compensated, resettled or offered the option to buy land in the newly created town.

Concretely, by changing the status of what was previously village land, the process administratively dispossesses villagers from their rights to manage this land. Although villagers are compensated by the Tanzanian state—which has delegated this responsibility to the district—they lost their village land rights through this administrative change. Indeed, as a consequence of this land transfer, affected villagers must sell their land to the state at fixed and below-market prices. In addition, the land added-value resulting from this administrative transfer is captured by district authorities (not villagers). Most of affected villagers cannot afford to buy back their
ancestral land. Furthermore, through this process, district officials replaced village authorities regarding the management of these “newly created” parcels of land.

The government rationale is that: the village should be planned properly to become a town, and the planning process not only modifies the land administrative status, it also increases its market value. This idea of planning is also linked to this persistent idea of the paternalistic Tanzanian state, which assumes that only the central state can properly plan village land, and that it is the role of the government to guide villagers—or “backward peasants”—into socio-economic development when villages expand.

In Missenyi, in 2017, district authorities have requested that a village called Bunazi become a town. The motivations behind the administrative transfer remain unclear. Bunazi is neither the biggest village nor the most populated settlement in the area. Yet, significantly, Bunazi is a village located near Kagera Sugar, and therefore, has valuable land for wealthy emigrants interesting in becoming outgrowers for the company.

Changing the administrative status of Bunazi is thus an innovative way of benefitting from the rising value of land, because it allows district officials to legally dispossess villagers from their land rights, and to re-allocate this confiscated land at market value to new occupants—investors, or political friends. Bunazi villagers believe that district authorities came up with this transfer plan because they already had buyers for the land to be vacated (Bélair 2017, interviews villagers, village 5).
All these administrative practices to dispossess peasants are coherent with Akram-Lodhi’s argument. He contends that dispossession by accumulation entails two complementary political modes of forcible separation: in addition to dominant classes appropriating for themselves the land market, they often seek to structure land commodification reforms to capture the allocation of resources (Akram-Lodhi 2007, 1444). Peluso and Lund (2011, 670) have also highlighted how the dual role played by land authorities, who are both regulators and rent-seekers, is key to understanding processes of dispossession.

As previously stated, it is interesting to see that district officials’ capture of land formalization processes is usually a way of leasing this land to wealthy emigrants who are also part of the local political elite. Local political elite here refers to those who have connections either with the CCM regional administration or the district administration, and as such, benefit of political protection and of preferential treatment in regards to land attribution and land titling (Bélair 2016-2017, fields notes, interviews and observations).

Also, this local political elite benefits from its political connections at the central level: valuable land allocation is apparently part of central patrons’ redistributive strategy. For district officials, this complicit relation not only gives them authority to proceed, but also political protection, even when their actions are illegal and violent. Higher authorities simply turn a blind eye because they benefit from the process.

These clientelistic relations regarding land management in Kagera district are not a completely new phenomenon. Shivji documented in 1992 that Kagera villagers’ most common complaints
regarding land management were arbitrary government allocations coupled with alienation of rural and village lands (Shivji 1992, 28-30). Thus, despite the liberalisation process in the 1990s and the implementation of the Village Land Act, government officials’ practices associated with land management have not changed much. The fact that Bryceson’s comment on the situation in 1991 is still relevant today is illustrative:

Ironically, it is the state itself or its agents, that have become the target of farmers' grievances. State agents, exercising their largely unsupervised discretionary powers, can engage in corrupt practices for the enhancement of their land-holdings or commercial interests. On the other hand, the state, both at national and regional levels, acting in the name of 'public interests' can, in the eyes of local farmers, be trampling on their customary rights to land. (Bryceson 1991, 3, qtd in Shivji 1992, 116)

However, the extent to which administrative processes are now creatively used to disposess villagers from their land rights is new in Missenyi district and directly results from the economic opportunities associated with the arrival of Kagera Sugar in the district.

As the next section discusses, the political capture of land formalization processes leads to significant restructuring of the agrarian system in the district, changing social dynamics and production processes, and fostering already existing dynamics of social differentiation. The most vulnerable populations, namely migrants, youth and women, are affected disproportionately, becoming the silent victims of the predatory system.
THE EASIEST PREY: MIGRANTS, YOUTHS, WOMEN

MIGRANTS ARE NOT ‘REAL VILLAGERS’

In Kagera region, there are more and more Tanzanian migrants, but also foreigners, for different reasons; for instance, Kagera sugar hires labourers from other regions for its low-paid jobs. In addition, due to conflicts, the region has also welcomed migrants from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi during the past decades. Finally, the Tanzania-Uganda war in 1978-1979 forced people to move out and subsequently return to the district, creating dynamics of internal migration. Despite this, the proportion of migrants in the district remains small; most villagers in the district identify themselves as Haya people, and have been living there for many generations (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and observations).

Most migrants have established themselves on the outskirts of villages, where land was still undeveloped and available at the time of their arrival. Some of them have been living in the district for more than three generations and have acquired customary rights of occupancy (CROs) on the land they cultivate. However, in certain villages, these migrants are not fully integrated; important dynamics of social differentiation exclude villagers based on their origin. As chapter 8 will demonstrate, local discrimination against migrants may become an issue at the village level in Tanzania, especially when prices and investors’ interest for village land increased. In practice, this means that migrants are particularly vulnerable to district officials’ machinations to free up land for outgrowers in the district.
With the acute land shortage, there is not enough land left for youths to inherit. Villagers see this as an important problem because it restructures the traditional relationship to land, according to which land was bequeathed from father to son. Most villagers express great concern that they will not be able to leave any land to their children. In addition, according to my interviews, this is often understood as an important cause of youth unemployment. Indeed, youths in the district have few options to earn a living. They can work for Kagera Sugar, but as explained earlier, this is not a culturally valued option. They can also engage in small businesses. Several of them have decided to become “boda boda” drivers (motorcycle drivers). Yet, this option is seen as transitory because the possibility of making a decent livelihood from it is limited.

Finally, a last possibility is to work for outgrowers. This option is for young and strong people since they are usually hired for physically demanding work such as clearing land, or weeding. They usually deal with the land manager over the task to accomplish beforehand. Salaries are negotiated according to the task, not on the time spent at doing it. Therefore, if the task is undervalued, there is a risk of working for almost nothing. Moreover, since it is casual labour, there is no employment security, no equipment provided, and no insurance. Workers I have interviewed had chosen this option because it gives them more flexibility in terms of working hours compared to working at Kagera Sugar.

The proliferation of youths working casually on outgrowers’ plantations illustrates an important class differentiation process that is underway in the district: there is the emergence of a new middle-class, mostly wealthy emigrants, who are hiring labourers to work on their land. This
dynamic is indicative of a profound change in the agrarian structure: Missenyi youths are increasingly losing their means of production, thereby relying on casual labour to survive.

Regarding women, few apply to work for the company. Cultural norms greatly restrict their possibilities for seeking work outside the household, as Tanzanian cultural norms expect women to work on the familial land, take care of domestic chores, and assume all children-related expenses (Bélair 2016-2017, field notes and observations). In addition, land scarcity caused changes in familial labour systems. Because land is insufficient, men increasingly seek work outside. One might think that men’s salaries at least permit their families to survive. Yet, my field observations lead me to nuance this assumption. Several married women I interviewed confided to me that their “working away” husband contributes very little to familial obligations. In addition, it is common for men to not disclose their real earnings to their wife, because they want to keep flexibility for their personal expenses (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews farmers and villagers from nine villages, Kagera region). Concretely, it means that women are too often bearers of the hidden costs of changing agrarian dynamics. As Glassman (2006, 618) notes: women’s unpaid social reproductive labour is an important aspect of extra-economic accumulation fostered by changing agrarian dynamics.

CONCLUSION
Departing from a global standpoint to analyse the impacts of “land grabbing” in Tanzania, this chapter has used a case-study approach, focusing on a local investor, to explore the conditions under which new agricultural investments become operational. I have argued that for the case of Kagera Sugar, two important and interrelated factors explain its success in securing its operational
profitability. The existence of a protected local market allows the company to foster non-market mediated systems of economic exchange at both central and local level. This is key for the company not only to ensuring its profitability, but also to surviving, because it protects its monopoly over sugar production and distribution in the district.

Second, I have looked at the consequences of these arrangements at the local level. Because Kagera Sugar induces and fosters clientelistic relations at the local level, it has led to the emergence of many local patrons who are seeking to foster their own material interests at the expense of local communities. This is the most significant restructuring impact associated with the arrival of the investor in the district.

It creates winners and losers at the local level. The winners include leaders of the outgrowers’ association, and the managers of SACCOS, who have been increasingly using their position for personal gains. They are allowed to do so because they partake in clientelistic dynamics that serve Kagera Sugar’s interests as well as the central government and local political elites that have an interest in Kagera Sugar.

In addition, district officials have been benefiting from land scarcity and the recent surge in land prices. They have captured the process of land formalization not only for their own benefit, but also to serve elites’ interests in cheaply acquiring valuable land for contract farming in the district. Finally, I have highlighted how such a predatory system has reinforced already existing dynamics of social differentiation, and is adversely affecting the most vulnerable populations, namely migrants, youths and women.
Chapter 8: Village politics, or a micro political arena

Negotiating inclusion by exclusion, or how to secure “eating” from farmland investments in Tanzania\(^1\)

This chapter focuses on the impacts of land investments at the micro-level, by analysing and comparing how two land conflicts that have resulted from the increased presence of investors in a specific village, Village X\(^2\), located in Kagera region, have unfolded. As documented in Chapter 7, during my research I discovered that the local impacts associated with the arrival of a new investor—Kagera Sugar—were far more extensive than I first anticipated. In addition to attracting numerous new Tanzanian investors in the district, it transformed in several ways the local political economy. Land prices have peaked in surrounding villages because of increased land scarcity in the district, the company’s contract farming programme has induced class differentiation dynamics, and district officials have found innovative ways of capturing land formalization processes to free land for local investors and political friends. This, in turn, has fostered local land conflicts.

Moreover, I noticed that village leaders’ reactions to these local land investors vary. Consequently, their involvement in land conflicts differs not only from one village to another but also within the same village. For instance, Village X is involved in two important land conflicts related to the arrival of these new investors. Interestingly, village leaders have defended their villagers’ land

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\(^1\) This chapter has been submitted for publication to *African Affairs*.

\(^2\) In order to protect confidentiality, and ensure my informants’ safety, the village and sub-villages’ names have been anonymized.
rights in one land conflict but chose instead to partner with political elites and investors to foster their material interests at the expense of a sub-set of villagers in the other.

In addition to showing that local reactions cannot be assumed to be constant in time and space, this finding raises two questions: Why do two land conflicts, that have occurred in the same village and have been caused by similar investment dynamics, have different trajectories? And how do actors—villagers, village leaders, district officials—negotiate their inclusion in investment dynamics?

**WHAT DO WE KNOW: WHAT SHAPES LOCAL REACTIONS TO LAND INVESTMENTS?**

To answer these questions, the existing scholarship highlights three key elements. The first is the role played by institutions and historical legacies in structuring the range of possibilities for local reactions. According to this perspective, we would expect land conflicts occurring in the same institutional context to have the same trajectory, and lead to the same local results. Yet, it was not the case for the land conflicts examined in this chapter. My analysis shows that what matters is not only how informal and formal institutions shape actors’ possibility to “hold power” (Gray 2018; Greco 2017), actors are also constantly renegotiating norms and institutions through their interactions.

Therefore, the second key element to understand how these land conflicts unfold at the local level is actors’ political interactions within and between different levels of governance. As claimed by Pedersen (2016), actors’ agency at all levels should be systematically empirically investigated because governance processes are more contingent than usually acknowledged. However, that
does not mean that all actors have the same power in renegotiating these norms. As I show in this chapter, historical legacies may create structural inequalities that affect some actors’ capacity to negotiate.

Moreover, as I have argued in my theoretical chapter (chapter 2), the state is composed of multiple and competing authorities. We need to unpack it to inquire what are state officials’ interests and to understand how relations of power within the state are played out (Wolford et al. 2013). Furthermore, as Hunsberger et al. (2014) rightly stress, to further understand the diversity of local reactions, we need recognizing that local communities, as the state, are not homogenous units. Capturing local differentiation dynamics at play is important to explain variance.

The third crucial element to consider is the politics of belonging because they structure local claims to land and determine who has the legitimacy to make them. As scholars have documented in Africa and elsewhere, the claims to autochthony are highly political because they induce dynamics of social differentiation within local contexts that actors may use to foster their interests (Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Dunn 2009; Côté and Mitchell 2017; Bayart, Geschiere, and Nyamnjoh 2001).

Recent works have emphasized how the instrumentalization of autochthony is key to understand not only land conflicts but also the local impacts of land investments (Wittig 2017; Badiey 2013; Bromwich 2018). More specifically, considering local leaders’ claims to being “sons of the soil” helps understanding how they negotiate their position of power within the local context and with actors at other levels of governance. For example, Mkodzongi (2016) shows that local chiefs’ claim to ancestral autochthony has been crucial in this process of legitimizing their political
authority in the context of new investments. In Ghana, both Anaafo and Guba (2017) and Ubink (2008) show that local authorities are taking advantage of their proclaimed autochthonous status to partner with state and investors in order to dispossess and alienate the poorest and most marginalized farmers.

However, it is worth noting that for the specific case of Tanzania, the literature generally assumes that this variable should not play a role.³ Autochthony is depicted as being not politically salient in land conflicts because of historical legacies: Nyerere’s *ujamaa* policy led to the resettlement of about five million rural Tanzanian during the 1970s, thereby deeply restructuring relations to land and making autochthony claims irrelevant (Hyden 1980; Lorgen 2000; Boone and Nyeme 2015; Malipula 2014).

I draw on these insights to analyse and compare how these two land conflicts that have resulted from the increased presence of investors in Village X have unfolded at the local level. The chapter is divided as follow. After presenting the case study, I analyse how, in these two land conflicts, specific CASs have developed and influenced actors’ interactions. My analysis shows that actors constantly renegotiate the social structure, which makes their interactions and the resulting distribution of power highly contingent and dynamic.

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³ The only exception in this regard would be the persistence and prominence of land conflicts between farmers and pastoralists everywhere in the country. But even in these conflicts, autochthony is rarely invoked. Most commonly, they are seen as resulting from competing livelihood visions, and illustrating divergent ways to relate to the land (i.e. Walwa 2017; Mwamfupe 2015; Benjaminsen, Maganga, and Abdallah 2009).
**CASE STUDY: VILLAGE X IN KAGERA REGION**

Village X is a village of about 9,000 people located in the north of Tanzania, west of the Lake Victoria, south of Uganda. Even though the region has reliable and high rainfalls, soils are of mixed fertility which means that land scarcity has long been an important problem in the region (Reining 1962, 72).

Village X existed long before the colonization of Tanzania and was originally part of the Haya Kingdoms. When Germans arrived, the region was inhabited by Haya people, and divided into nine different kingdoms. Political power was centralized and social life highly hierarchized and regulated. Local kings in Kagera region remained in power until the Independence of Tanzania in 1961 (Reining 1962; Carlson 1993).

Historically, Haya land was mostly allocated through inheritance on an individual basis. As documented by Reining (1962, 62–64), in the Haya traditional system, about 66% of land “[was] reallocated through heritance or pre-heritance between landowners and their heirs (men and sons)”. Familial clans were thus especially important in land management (Maruo 2002). In addition, the **mukama** (the King) had also exclusive prerogatives regarding land, that were instated through what was known as the **nyarubanja** system. **Nyarubanja** is the category of land that was under the King’s control. Because he became the owner of land without heirs, and could transfer individual/clan land to **nyarubanja**, the king used land allocation to enforce client-patron relationships, and ensure political stability. As Reining explains: “[The king could single] out a block of bibanja and their occupants […] designating them tenants of his appointee.” (Reining 1962, 66). That way, Haya landowners became tenants of the King’s political appointee, and political appointees, clients of the King. Land attribution through this **nyarubanja** system was significant: estimates are that about
20% of Haya land was allocated in form of royal gifts. The remaining land (about 10%) was subject to the market system, sold and bought by interested buyers and sellers (Reining 1962).

At Independence, President Julius Nyerere dismantled Haya kingdoms. In theory, their administrative powers were abolished, and the villages’ administrative apparatus re-organized with the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Indeed, nowadays, village administration in Tanzania is responsible for managing village land. According to the Village Land Act No.5 of 1999, village land refers to land which is collectively owned by residents of a given village and is vested in the village council (VC) which is appointed by the village assembly (VA). According to the law, the VC is not allowed to allocate land without prior approval of the VA. The VA—which includes all adult village residents—meets every three months to discuss village issues and endorse village leaders’ decisions. This structure should theoretically ensure direct accountability of leaders to villagers (Greco 2016, 24).

In addition, a village executive officer (VEO), a non-elected employee of the state, is named by the District executive director (DED) in each village and assumes diverse administrative functions, including formal allocation of land and issuing land titles. Because of the nomination process, VEOs are primarily accountable to the district administration.

However, in Tanzania, there is a blurring of limits between political and administrative functions of state employees since Independence (Tordoff 1965). In practice then, non-elected employees of the state, even though they have official non-political administrative functions, are not only

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4. In Tanzania, legally, all land belongs to the President. There are three legal categories of land: general land, reserved land, and village land.
accountable to their administrative superiors, but also to their politically nominated hierarchical superiors. VEOs are thus in practice informally subordinated and accountable to the District Commissioner (DC). The DC in Tanzania is politically nominated, directly appointed by the President. He is the highest authority at the district level, and exerts a considerable influence on district management. Therefore, we should be cautious about assuming that VCs and VEOs are accountable to villagers. In addition, it is worth noting that some VEOs and village leaders are seeking to take advantage of their administrative powers for personal benefit (Fitzgerald 2017, 25–26).

In Village X, in addition to population growth and the decreasing fertility of land, land scarcity has been exacerbated in the last fifteen years (Theodory 2017, 276). Indeed, Village X is now surrounded by investment projects. On one side, there is a sugar plantation and a sugar factory of about 25,000ha—Kagera Sugar. The company has put in place a contract farming scheme, which has attracted numerous small and medium-scale investors who have also acquired land from surrounding villages for sugarcane production.

On the other side, a national parastatal agency, the National Ranching Company (Narco), has rights on 60,000ha of land. Narco has started in 2002 the process of subdividing and leasing this land to national investors engaged in the livestock business. Therefore, Village X is now sharing boundaries with several of Narco associated investors, whose presence accentuates pressure on vital resources such as grazing areas for cattle and access to water.
This multiplication of investors has reinforced the importance of formalizing land boundaries, but this process has revealed to be highly contentious. Village X received its land-use plan and village land title in 2015 from district officials. However, village leaders consider that the officially recognized village boundaries were flawed, thereby causing village’s land dispossession.

The confusion stems from the fact that land claimed by both Narco and Kagera Sugar was left idle for several decades, and villagers have thus started using it. According to Tanzanian law, if villagers have been occupying and using land for twelve years or more, this land should become village land (The 1999 Village Land Act, 1999, 44). Yet, in this case, this law appears to have been disregarded. It is therefore unclear now if the contentious land belongs to Village X or not, and how and whether the law will be enforced. Consequently, village boundaries have remained contested to this day in Village X, leading to land conflicts between villagers and those investors.

**CONFLICT 1: VILLAGE X AGAINST MISSENYI RANCH**

The conflict between Missenyi Ranch and Village X has started around 2006 and has been ongoing for several years. Contentious land boundaries are the root cause of this ongoing conflict. Village X claims that all land up to River Y belongs to them while Narco asserts that it owns the land since 1969.

Narco is a parastatal organization under the Ministry of Agriculture, which is registered under the Company Act of Tanzania. The agency was created in 1967 with the enactment of the Arusha

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5 The multiplication of investors is not the only factor having contributed to this pressure to formalize and title land. Indeed, collaborative international and national initiatives to secure small-scale farmers’ land rights have also led to formalization programmes of land rights.
Declaration. Nyerere’s government decided to reattribute to Narco the land that was previously assigned to the “Groundnut scheme” by British colonial authorities. Thus, Narco inherited rights of occupancy on about 600,000ha of land throughout the whole country (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews Narco officials).

Narco is profit-oriented: its mission is to commercialize land under its control. Usually, Narco proceeds through joint ventures with commercial livestock investors. In 2002, a central Cabinet directive obliged Narco to subdivide some parts of its ranches into blocks and to sublease them to Tanzanian investors. The rationale underlying this change was to give land access to small and medium scale Tanzanian investors to foster livestock production. In addition to leasing its land at low cost, Narco was also tasked with overseeing these new commercial ventures by providing training and sharing its expertise (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews Narco officials).

This directive led Narco to lease more than half of its land—about 370,000 out of 600,000 hectares. In Missenyi district where Village X is located, Narco's land—about 60,000 ha— was divided into twenty-two blocks that were subsequently leased to different investors. These blocks constitute now what is known locally as the Missenyi Ranch (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews Narco officials).

‘BOTTLING UP’ THE CONFLICT AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL

As stated earlier, land boundaries are the problem. The leaders of Village X argue that five blocks of Missenyi Ranch are located on their village land. Therefore, the village’s grievance is that first, it should have been consulted before being dispossessed of its land, and second, compensated for its loss.
This contested land has vital importance for villagers, especially in the current context of acute land scarcity. Most of them combine animal husbandry and farming activities. Access to water and pasture in this context is crucial. The arrival of these five Narco associated investors deprived the village of access to an important area that was previously commonly and freely used by herders for grazing. In addition, the location of these investors’ blocks restrains villagers’ access to water (river Y), which is very problematic during the dry season because local herders lack alternative options for watering animals.

Consequently, relations between villagers and investors’ employees became tense and highly conflictual. It led to an increase of violence between them: several accounts of beatings and killings have been reported in the conflictual area. The village’s leadership tried to solve the conflict at first directly with the concerned investors. For instance, the village Chairman frequently visited the blocks in 2008-2009 to voice villagers’ concerns and attempt to defend their rights by speaking directly with investors’ representatives. This process was unsuccessful because investors kept refusing to acknowledge village’s authority on the contested land.

Furthermore, the village Chairman’s personal involvement in the conflict triggered an escalation of violence: he was ambushed and violently attacked by people associated with these investors in retaliation for his activism (Bélair 2016-2017, local leaders Village X). This failure to solve the conflict through local negotiations forced the village leadership to start official procedures of conflict solving.
This conflictual nature of the relationship between Narco associated investors and local communities contrasts sharply with the relationship, documented in chapter 7, that Kagera Sugar has developed with local communities. The company has developed a collaborative relation with local communities because it, first, needs casual labour, and it is to its advantage to establish cordial relationships with surrounding communities. Second, cultivating a good reputation locally has been key to facilitate Kagera Sugar’s negotiations over new land acquisitions with nearby villages’ administrations.

When such a land conflict occurs in Tanzania, if local resolution of the conflict is unsuccessful as it was in this case, villages are required to follow a highly hierarchical process. First, they should address their grievances to the competent authorities at the district level. If the district is unable to solve the conflict, it involves regional authorities. Only if regional authorities are incapable of finding a solution, then the conflict is filed within the national conflict registry and it becomes the responsibility of the Ministry of Land. In practice, very few land conflicts in Tanzania reach the ultimate central level during the resolution process: most of them are solved at lower administrative levels (Bélair, interview Ministry of Land, 2016).

This static structure for solving land conflicts creates an opportunity for local actors to have a voice at the national level as argued by Boone (2014), but this outcome is only possible if all actors involved agree to recognize the existence of the conflict, and to move it up in the chain of command. Concomitantly, it also means that such conflicts can get stuck at a certain level, contained by designated authorities. This is what happened with this conflict at first: district
authorities did not acknowledge the conflict, and consequently, the conflict remained bottled up at the district level for about ten years.

Concretely, Village X’s leaders raised their issues with Missenyi ranch’s investors several times at the district level. District officials asked them to prove that investors were illegally using village land to graze their animals. The village’s leaders did try to build their case: when investors and cows were illegally grazing on the contested land, they called district officials and asked them to come witness the problem. Yet, every time, when district officials arrived, investors and their cows had disappeared from the contested pasture. Therefore, the district concluded that leaders were mistaken and that investors were not guilty of any wrongdoing (Bélair 2017, interview local leaders, Village X).

However, from the village leaders’ angle, it was clear that someone—working at the district level, or even a villager—was colluding with these investors and informing them of the district’s upcoming visits thereby allowing investors to hide before the arrival of officials. Several villagers also believe that investors were bribing district officials to turn a blind eye on the issue. This hide-and-seek game went on for some months. Seeing that the conflict resolution was not progressing, the leaders tried to raise the issue directly to the regional office. However, they were denied the right to file a complaint on the basis that the district had refused to acknowledge the conflict. They also informed their CCM Member of Parliament (MP) of the problem but did not obtain any significant support until very recently (Bélair 2017, interview local leaders, Village X).
How a MP can change a conflict trajectory

The prevailing local perception is that MPs do not typically get involved in village issues unless they have an incentive to do so (Belair 2016-2017, field notes and observations). Usually, incentives are political, either because of pressures from top-officials or concerns for re-election, but they also can be of economic nature especially when influent members of the Tanzanian business community who have interests at stake are urging for action. As this villager states about the role of the MP in this conflict (with Missenyi ranch):

> When we raise issues [i.e. conflict] at meetings, leaders promise but nothing is never really done. They provide no solution. Our leaders are facing important challenges with Missenyi Ranch. For me, the central government [here, she is probably referring to Narco as a government agency] has sold us. It is hard to solve since people implicated: investors and MPs are never around. It is always only their representatives. Our leaders have failed but I don’t blame them. The problem is our MP who doesn’t do anything. (Bélair 2017, interview farmer, Missenyi district).

Thus, the conflict was stuck at the district level until 2016, until the somehow unexpected intervention of the MP, which altered significantly its trajectory. Village X is part of Nkenge Constituency,\(^6\) which is firmly CCM. The current Member of Parliament (MP) for Nkenge is Diodorus Buberwa Kamala (CCM). Kamala was an influential member of the CCM and was Nkenge MP from 2000 to 2010. However, Kamala was ousted out from the CCM, failing to secure its parliamentary nomination from the Party in Nkenge constituency for the 2010 elections (The Economist, Intelligence Unit 2010; Mande 2010). The exact nature of the issue that Kamala had with the CCM’s leading faction at that time remains elusive. Possible, Kamala found himself on the wrong side after a change of the leading faction within the CCM.

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\(^6\) Politically, Tanzania is divided into constituencies. During national elections, each constituency elects a Member of Parliament.
He then held several positions abroad, including Minister for East African Cooperation and Ambassador to Belgium, the Netherlands, and the European Community Luxembourg (Parliament of Tanzania website. [http://www.parliament.go.tz/polis/index.php/members/80]). During Kamala’s absence, Assumpter Mshama (CCM) won Nkenge constituency and was its MP from 2010 to 2015. When Kamala finished his international mandate, he came back in Kagera region and was the CCM candidate in the Nkenge constituency for the 2015 elections. It is unclear how to Kamala managed to be back into CCM’s good graces, but it appears that since 2015, he managed to realign himself with the dominant faction of the Party.

During the 2015 elections, the main opposition in Nkenge came from Chadema’s candidate, Fortunatus Rugalabamu Valerian. Kamala’s political campaign was based on his promise to bring development and changes for Nkenge residents. For instance, he promised to help to solve the numerous land conflicts, ensure access to health services, and to oversee the unfinished development of important roads for commercial activities (Elias 2015). He won the 2015 election with 39,769 votes against Valerian who secured 27,848 votes (“Tanzania Parliamentary Results 2015” 2015).

Nonetheless, since the last 2015 election, Kamala decided to take this land conflict at the central level, thereby altering significantly this conflict trajectory. Kamala’s involvement triggered the interest to this conflict of several high-ranking officials from different ministries—Ministry of Livestock, Prime Minister Office, and Ministry of Land among others—whose officials visited the village in January 2017. They called a meeting with villagers and Missenyi ranch’s investors,

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7 After the 2015 elections, Ms. Mshama left the region as the CCM nominated her Kibaha Town Council Commissioner (Kibaha District is located in Pwani region).
stating that the land of these contentious blocks was unlawfully occupied and should be given back to Village X. The meeting was tumultuous as investors contested this decision, but in the end, they complied and agreed to give back the land to Village X.

Since this meeting, the resolution process has started and involves a multiplicity of actors from different governance levels, including central, regional, district and local, in addition to Narco and its associated investors. The conflict has not been solved as of 2017, and the land transfer is still in the administrative process. As a matter of fact, what will be the outcome of this resolution process is unclear. Nevertheless, villagers are now hopeful: their grievances have been heard, and they believe that central authorities are committed to finding a solution. Moreover, investors have already given back some of the contentious Missenyi ranch’s blocks to villagers. This effectively means that investors cannot block access to the river or graze their cattle on these contentious blocks (village land) as they did before with the district’s protection.

In sum, this specific conflict was somehow created by external contingent events, including a situation of acute scarcity of land caused by increased investors’ interest for this land, and the 2002 policy that forced Narco to sublease its land to national investors. My analysis shows that the institutional makeup influenced how actors could negotiate land issues. The way it unfolded has been structured by institutional constraints regarding the official and hierarchical process of solving land conflicts as well as historical, paternalistic relations of power which are illustrated in the interactions between district officials and village leaders.
At first, district officials and Narco associated investors had the upper hand because of their position within the politico-institutional structure. Local leaders’ powers were greatly limited because of the district’s alleged tendency to collude with Narco’s investors, and officials’ denial of the conflict itself empowered local investors vis-à-vis local leaders.

Yet, the evolution of the conflict shows that the CAS structuring actors’ interactions is contingent and dynamic. It also exemplifies the complexity of governance structures. The MP’s involvement led to significantly restructure the power play between actors in this specific conflict. My understanding is that these local investors were using illegally village land, and bribing district officials to turn a blind eye and protect them. District officials also played a role in preventing local leaders to inform higher authorities of the conflict, and of their grievances. Without the intervention of the MP, it is very likely that this land conflict would have remained unknown at regional and central levels, and that investors would have continued to use the contentious blocks with the complicity of district authorities.

Therefore, it is only with the involvement of the MP that these local investors got caught. To avoid problems, district officials played innocent, as if they were not aware. In addition, they lost their power to contain the conflict. As a result, local investors lost their strategic positioning by losing district officials’ support, and therefore found themselves lacking power. In consequence, they were blamed and disciplined by central authorities and forced to give back some blocks of land to villagers. Local leaders, for their part, were significantly empowered since they gained a voice and support from the central level.
However, as the next section demonstrates, land conflicts, even if they occur in the same village, do not necessarily unfold similarly. While this second conflict also affects villagers of Village X, its trajectory differs from the previous conflict. In this case, local leaders have rendered the “autochthonous norm” politically salient to discriminate fellow villagers, thereby fostering social differentiation and producing political exclusion.

**CONFLICT 2: INSTRUMENTALIZING BELONGING TO DISCREDIT TANZANIAN VILLAGERS’ PROPERTY CLAIMS**

As mentioned earlier and documented in chapter 7, near Village X, there is a sugar plantation and a sugar factory—Kagera Sugar owned by a Tanzanian company, Superdoll. Kagera Sugar acquired land rights on about 25,000 hectares in 2004 as part of the privatisation process of Tanzanian estates early 2000s. Although Kagera Sugar was involved in some boundary conflicts with surrounding villages, these conflicts were peacefully solved (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews local leaders of nine surrounding villages).

In addition to providing direct employment at the factory and on its plantations, Kagera Sugar has put in place a programme of contract farming—the outgrowers’ scheme. This has been an interesting economic opportunity in the region because the company guarantees both the price and the market for sugarcane. Consequently, several local small and medium-scale investors have decided to acquire land to produce sugarcane. It has also attracted a specific category of outgrowers, that I labelled the wealthy emigrants in chapter 7. This rising demand created adverse consequences by increasing pressure on land, which was already a scarce resource. Since the land demarcation process is contentious, and boundaries are not always consensual, new land conflicts have emerged between some wealthy emigrants and villages located near the company.
The next section examines more specifically such land conflicts by focusing on Matawa, a sub-village of Village X. Matawa’s location makes its land very interesting for outgrowers looking in for selling sugarcane to Kagera Sugar. It is fertile and located near the company, which allows outgrowers to decrease their operating costs because they can use the company’s resources for harvesting and transporting sugarcane. Few surrounding sub-villages have this comparative advantage.

**NEWCOMERS—OR ALLOCHTHONES— ARE NOT “REAL” VILLAGERS**

As previously stated, Village X was historically part of the Haya kingdoms. Consequently, most villagers identify themselves as Haya and have been living there for many generations. Even though most of the villagers in Village X are originally born and raised in the village, a small proportion comes from other regions. Although these newcomers have been living in Matawa for more than three generations, they have never been fully integrated into village politics. Important dynamics of social differentiation exclude villagers based on their origin. An elder originally from Kigoma—the Muha ethnic group—who has been living in the village for nine years provides an illustration of the problem during village’s meetings: “When I go to meetings, I am not allowed to voice my opinions about village’s issues. They [village’s leaders] told us [newcomers] to shut up because these issues do not concern us. We are [forever] foreigners” (Bélair 2017, interview farmer Missenyi District). For Matawa, this discrimination is politically significant because most villagers are Tanzanians coming from other regions.

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8. The name of the sub-village has been changed to protect the informants' anonymity.
Yet, their allochthonous status was not an issue in regard to their claims to Village X land when they settled down in the region, some thirty years ago. Village X’s leadership welcomed them, and gave them parcels of land. Matawa sub-village was then officially acknowledged as part of Village X, and Matawa villagers were duly fulfilling their socio-political obligations despite the fact that they were sidelined at village meetings.

However, recently, because this land has taken up value with the arrival of Kagera Sugar in the region, the village leaders have changed their attitude towards Matawa villagers. They do not recognize anymore the existence of the Matawa sub-village, except for the collection of development fees. In the words of one of my informants: “When they [Village X’s leaders] are asked about if some people live in the area, they say no, it is only a bush with wild animals”. Another informant expresses how this unexpected rejection from Village X’s leaders remains puzzling for Matawa villagers: “We don't understand why these leaders are mistreating us. Once they got our votes, they forgot about us and even say that we don't exist” (Bélair 2017, interviews farmers Missenyi District). Politically, the perpetual “newcomer” status of Matawa villagers explain why Village X’s leaders can discriminate them in regard to their land rights.

Institutionally, as also observed by Greco in other Tanzanian villages (2017, 175), it is because of the overlap between formal and informal practices of land allocation and distribution that Matawa villagers found themselves in such a vulnerable position. This means that we should not overstate the impacts induced by the Arusha Declaration in Haya land. In most villages, it led to an overlap between the traditional and the official system of local governance, meaning that although a new administrative apparatus was created and imposed at Independence, land remained also managed
informally by familial clans and allocated through inheritance in Kagera region. To give a concrete example of this overlap, in this specific village, the Chairman allocates landless villagers, or widows, parcels of land. In exchange, they pay him a tribute every year, depending on their harvest (Belair 2016, interviews and fieldnotes). It departs from the official administrative system for village land allocation, and creates a relation of political dependency that is not without echoing the pre-colonial nyarubanja system (see note 4).

The existence of this overlap demonstrates that the capacity of Nyerere’s regime to eliminate traditional governance systems prevailing in Haya land was overstated. As documented by Maruo (2002), the implementation of the ujamaa policy in Haya villages led to few consequential changes. Since Haya were already settled and politically organised in densely populated settlements, land commissioners simply renamed existing villages rather than creating new ones in the region. This is not specific to Haya region, and scholars have documented these uneven effects of villagization in Tanzania (Cliffe and et al. 1975; Schneider 2014). For instance, similar dynamics were observed in areas where political power was already centralized, such as the Kilimanjaro and Arusha regions, in which holders of power in precolonial times continued to assert, albeit informally, some form of authority over their communities (Gray 2018; Zecki 1979).

Therefore, in this case, allochthones’ capacity to exert their agency (A) is heavily constrained by historical and institutional legacies: pre-determined prevailing structural inequalities explain why distribution of power is unequal among actors within this local CAS. In fact, Matawa land is currently being sold to new investors by district officials sometimes in collusion with Village X’s
VEO, and possibly with some of its leaders.⁹ Apparently, eight politically well-connected wealthy emigrants have already bought parcels of Matawa land and are waiting for the villagers to vacate the area to start production. Because their land rights and even their presence in this location are not acknowledged any longer by Village X leaders, Matawa villagers are very vulnerable to illegal political pressures. District officials often resort to violence and intimidation to force villagers to leave the area. They are normally backed up by military people during these illegal operations.¹⁰

Recently, two main eviction—2008, 2016—events took place in Matawa. These dynamics are politically very contentious, and hidden. I had to be very careful while investigating this case because Village X’s leadership, district and military officials were convincingly threatening Matawa villagers. Some even told me that they feared for their lives if they spoke about what was happening. I was myself intimidated by district officials, and also detained to validate my research permit and my whereabouts.

**Eviction and politics of intimidation: “Government is like a machete: both sides cut”**

In 2008, allochthones were forcefully evicted through an intervention coordinated by the District Commissioner (DC) in collaboration with the military. It led to an unlawful change of the boundaries of Matawa sub-village, which caused a loss of village land. Subsequently, several investors started production on the vacated area. It created a climate of fear and villagers who had the possibility to move out did. After 2008, the only remaining villagers in Matawa were those

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⁹ In Missenyi district, similar dynamics in other villages have been documented by scholars: village land is sold without the consent of affected villagers (see Theodory 2017: 277).

¹⁰ Through a historical analysis, Ringquist (2012, 6) argues convincingly that since Independence, the Tanzanian state and the military have constituted a collaborative relationship because the military has been incorporated into the state’s political structure through sharing-benefits processes.
lacking such option, often because they had moved from far away or had no family living nearby (Belair 2016-2017, fieldnotes and interviews).

More recently, in July 2016, a second operation took place. Again, it was orchestrated by the DC in collaboration with military officials. No one was displaced though, but several people were arrested for various reasons. The intervention is locally remembered for its violent character since the army even used tear gas—*mabomb ya machozi*—against unarmed villagers. Most arrested people were fined and freed later, but the illegal migrants who were caught during the operation did not come back to the sub-village (Belair 2016-2017, fieldnotes and interviews).

In addition to these two major events, intimidation operations have been common during the whole period. The DC generally comes at night with soldiers to intimidate villagers and tell them that they are unlawfully living on this land. District and military officials use two rationales to justify their actions. Either they claim that this sub-village hides illegal migrants—non-Tanzanians—and they should be arrested and deported, or they would say that Matawa land is part of reserved land for protected forests, and therefore illegally occupied by villagers. In the local context, these arguments are unconvincing since there are only two forest reserves which are registered in the district, and Matawa is not part of them. In addition, most villagers are Tanzanian “migrants” or “newcomers”, not illegal migrants (Bélair 2016-2017, interviews villagers Missenyi District).

Yet, as so-called “migrants” or “allochthones” or “newcomers”, villagers from this sub-village are disempowered vis-à-vis these authorities and have been complying, trying to avoid problems. Matawa villagers fear district and military officials even though they suspect that such harassment
is illegal. They lack political power and information to defend their rights. Moreover, to understand their reactions, one should consider the political history of Tanzania, and how people still perceive government’s authorities as providers but also as the ultimate decision-makers. The country which went a massive state-led villagisation programme which displaced forcefully about five million rural Tanzanian during the 70s (Hyden 1980; Lorgen 2000). As a woman states eloquently: “Serikali ni serikali [government is the government]. If the government tells you that you must go, you should go. Government is like a machete: both sides cut” (Bélair 2017, interview farmer Matawa sub-village). In this context, since the district represents the central government, it is hard for vulnerable villagers to contest its authority.

To understand this local conflict and its specific trajectory, considering how local leaders have instrumentalised and render politically salient autochthonous identity to redefine their authority towards other actors is crucial. Although the conflict was structured by the same contingencies that the previous one, its internal power dynamics differ substantially because of the structure. Local elites are powerful players here since their claim to autochthony gave them political capital. They use it to influence the structure, a process that permits them to partner with investors, district and military officials, and benefit from the rising value of Matawa land. Concretely by excluding Matawa villagers and denying their claims to the land they have been lawfully occupying for several years, they are not only fostering existing socio-political differentiation but also instrumentalising it for material benefit.

Their instrumentalisation of the authochtonous norm also redefines their political interactions with other actors. While district officials' inaction and collusion with investors were the leaders’ objects
of grievance in the other conflict, here, Village X’s leaders have developed in this conflict a relatively complicit relationship with them. Since they are the higher local authorities over all Village X land, including Matawa, their agreement to lease this land allows the District to cover up the illegality of these transactions because it can claim that the village has agreed. Therefore, leaders’ position towards Matawa villagers empowers them towards other actors. It permits them to be part of the land dispossession process without fearing political costs and provides a new opportunity to materially benefit from this increased interest for Matawa land by powerful wealthy emigrants. In sum, they managed to acquire sufficient power to be part of this lucrative game, and they use it.

Therefore, the structure is also especially relevant here to understand why, in the first place, this latent institutional differentiation norm is accessible to the local leaders of this village. It is because of historical and institutional legacies that they have the possibility to draw upon and make the authochtonous norm politically salient. It would have not been possible for instance in Rufiji, because the district is relatively new, and has been populated recently mostly by Tanzanian migrants who are now known locally as Warufiji (people from Rufiji). Thus, because the arrival of communities in Rufiji district is much more recent, local communities cannot claim ancestral rights to their land. Furthermore, this makes Warufiji much more vulnerable to land dispossession.

It also explains why allochthones are structurally excluded from this power game. As already mentionned, actors’ capacity (A) to negotiate the structure (S) depends on how much power they hold within a given institutional setting. Although everyone has this ability to negotiate social structure, pre-existing structural inequalities affect actors’ possibilities to exert their agency in a
given CAS. As I showed in this chapter, allochthones’ capacity to renegotiate the social structure is very constrained.

Indeed, Matawa villagers found themselves in an unbearable situation since they are institutionally and politically excluded, their land and even their human rights are continuously denied. They occupy a subordinated position in Village X because of their political status. Their situation remains contained at the very local level, with few prospects of getting visibility at higher levels. As a matter of fact, there is no official record of even the existence of Matawa sub-village. Furthermore, as of November 2017, the sub-village does not exist anymore. A last eviction operation took place early November. All remaining villagers were forcefully displaced and their houses were burned down by military and district officials. The disappearance of Matawa sub-village was witnessed by the author’s informants and research assistants. With this last violent eviction, all proofs of authorities’ wrongdoings were efficiently obliterated.

What is particularly interesting with this second land conflict is that it illustrates the contingent temporality of such political discrimination. It is when local leaders have both interest and possibility that they instrumentalise latent institutional differentiation dynamics to secure their inclusion in investment dynamics. The process is thus more dynamic in time and space than what an institutional perspective would suggest. Local leaders rendered the authochtonous norm politically salient at a specific point in time, because contingencies (arrival and interest of new investors) make it interesting to do so. Authochtony was not politically salient in regards to land rights before in this specific village. Authochtony is not necessarily politically salient in
neighbouring villages. Authochtony is therefore a structuring and exclusionary norm, and its effects are uneven in time and space and depend on actors’ agency.

**CONCLUSION**

To conclude, this chapter documented how the arrival of new local investors in a Tanzanian village has fostered local land conflicts. Moreover, it sought to explain why local leaders chose to defend their fellow villagers in one land conflict, but to discriminate them in the other one. Showing the limits of an exclusive institutional focus to explain variance, I argued that considering the dynamic and interactive process through which actors renegotiate norms and institutions is analytically fruitful to uncover actors’ interactions that have shaped the differentiated trajectories of these two conflicts.

First, I drew attention to how local leaders’ actions may contribute to identity building when they are transforming the normative structure to foster their material interests. That was the case in this village with the new political saliency of the “autochthonous status”. In the first conflict, it explained why local leaders defended these villagers’ rights, and why they were able to mobilize political resources to restart the conflict-solving process. In the second conflict, it elucidated why they chose on the contrary to discredit affected villagers’ property claims in order to secure their inclusion in new investment dynamics, and why those villagers remain powerless face to these predatory practices. It is a significant finding for the Tanzanian case. To my knowledge, although frequently studied in other African countries, this is one of the first contributions documenting how Tanzanian a sub-set of local actors instrumentalise the autochthonous norm to produce political discrimination regarding local land rights.
Second, I showed that the historical institutional structure, albeit informal and overlapping with the post-colonial administrative one, predetermined which actors can negotiate their power position within this local CAS. Therefore, the relative weight of structural constraints in explaining actors’ interactions within a given CAS may change depending on the context.

Third, my analysis contributed to the scholarship on “land grabbing” by highlighting that indirect impacts provoked by new farmland investments in developing countries may be more significant for local communities than the direct ones. For example, Kagera Sugar has not been causing directly causing local conflictual dynamics. However, the arrival of the investor has significantly transformed the local political economy. It has lasting consequences at the local level because it triggered local political schemes that led to land conflicts, land dispossession and social marginalisation.

Lastly, this micro-level analysis makes generalisation of these findings difficult. An interesting future research avenue would be of analysing and comparing similar local land conflicts in neighbouring villages of Missenyi district and other regions of Tanzania to uncover whether and how local actors transform and render politically salient new norms, and how this process shape their conflictual interactions.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

To conclude, to foster our understanding of the land grabbing phenomenon, this dissertation adopted a relational perspective and argued that interrelations, historically embedded and continuously renegotiated, between elites, investors and local populations are shaping factors of land investments’ local outcomes. By offering empirically-based and contextually situated analyses of the local impacts associated with new farmland investments in Tanzania, it sought to answer its main research questions which were: How are new farmland investments shaping political dynamics and actors’ interactions in Tanzania? And, how actors’ interactions between and within levels of governance influence farmland investments’ outcomes at the local level?

This conclusion is divided into two sections: one which outlines the main empirical and theoretical findings and the other which explores future research avenues. The first section is divided in two parts. It first discusses the theoretical contribution of the dissertation; then, it presents the overarching findings and makes an overarching argument. More specifically, it claims that the structural component of CAS has the greatest influence on the interactions amongst actors, which is then substantiated by three distinct observations that are transversal to all empirical chapters. The second and final section of this conclusion offers avenues for future research that emerged from this project.
THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

I argued that actors’ interactions are resulting from the dynamic interplay between structure (S), contingencies (C) and actors’ agency (A), which I termed CAS. To further conceptualise CAS’s three constitutive elements, I drew on and amalgamated various theoretical insights asserting the fertility of analytical eclecticism as a perspective.

First, I insisted on the importance of capturing contingencies’ effects. Contingencies have both exogenous and endogenous properties, but are also essentially characterized by their causal indeterminacy. Within CAS, contingencies matter and are analytically important for their shaping effects on actors’ interactions within a specific and analytically circumscribed system of interactions. I argue that acknowledging the indeterminacy of social phenomena is crucial in grasping and explaining actors’ interactions and their variance in time and in space. As a matter of fact, the whole “land grabbing” phenomenon is nothing more than a new contingency that has greatly impacted the country’s political economy by offering access to new capital. As this dissertation has demonstrated, new farmland investments have led to redefining CASs’ inherent dynamics in every political arena I studied.

Second, to define structure (S) and actors’ agency (A), I drew on historical institutionalism and Giddens’ theory of structuration. Historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes and Roberts 2013; Scott 2001) was helpful in conceptualizing how political institutions may structure local configurations of power and impact actors’ agency. Yet, it does not pay enough attention to the co-constitutive dynamic that is at play between structure and actors’ agency.
To remediate this shortcoming, I used Giddens’s suggestion that through agents’ social actions, the social structure is produced and reproduced. Giddens (2004) dismisses the very idea of objective external constraints that structure actors’ actions. Instead, he argues for an interactionist view of social systems which are at the same time constrained and produced through social action with his idea of the duality of the structure. However, I drew attention to the fact that although some structural properties are best understood as resulting from the duality of the social system, socially constructed constraints may become objectified through time. When it occurs, it hinders agents’ capacity not only to change them, but also to question their very objective nature.

Third, to further define the structure within the Tanzanian political configuration, I integrated key concepts from the sociology of the state literature—the state, and infrastructural and clientelistic relations of power. I maintained that clientelistic and infrastructural relations of power are inherent normative institutions of the Tanzanian political economy that deserved systematic and explicit attention.

Finally, drawing on Migdal’s works, I also cautioned against the analytical risk of assuming that actors—the state, investors, local communities— are uniform and unitary, emphasizing instead how authority is always contentious and fragmented. Actors constantly renegotiate their alliances and interactions, making distribution of power between them more contingent in time and space than usually assumed by an exclusively institutional perspective. In sum, CAS, by combining various theoretical insights, is analytically productive because it furthers our understanding of what shapes relations and interactions among actors, and takes into account how these interactions change in time and space.
CAS is an analytical framework that contributes significantly to the literature on land grabbing. First, it is a unified analytical tool that builds up on the relational perspective that has been put forward by different scholars to study land grabbing. It permits explaining and situating actors’ interactions in their respective temporality and spatiality. In addition, CAS is a multi-level analytical tool that fosters our understanding of governance dynamics, and how they are imbricated and interdependent. It is essential to understand and explain why in similar institutional environments, we may find divergent investments’ outcomes or trajectories. Therefore, it is well adapted and appropriate to analyse similar investment dynamics in other developing countries.

Second, CAS allows researchers to overcome misleading categorisations and to question dominant narratives that have been associated with the land grabbing literature. For instance, by focusing on what is shaping actors’ interactions, it throws into question the relevance of differentiating between foreign and local investors. My findings indicate that investors’ country of origin is less relevant than their level of integration within the host country’s political economy—and their interactions with other actors—to understand investments’ local impacts. This analytical shift is much needed. Many of my cases illustrate how such binary categorisations are oversimplified: numerous foreign investors partner with local investors; partnerships change through time; and local and foreign investors alike are diversifying their funding sources, which often include international portfolios with investors from many different countries.

Moreover, my analysis highlights the mismatch between the official narrative that attributed the phenomenon to the 2008 food, economic and energy crises, and what is really happening. Although investors’ renewed interest in farmland is most probably related to this global attractiveness and
discourse on farmland a being a safe and lucrative financial asset, it remains a narrow structural frame that cannot account for the complexity and diversity of the empirical outcomes observed in targeted countries. Global investment dynamics are interwoven with other international and national economic development initiatives—socio-economic development strategies, land policies, and titling and mapping—and with numerous local political and economic dynamics, that are themselves embedded within the socio-historical trajectory of the host countries. Structure is context-dependent, composed from various institutions, and vary in time and space because it is constantly negotiated by actors. Thus, unpacking CASs’ inherent dynamics in every political arena is crucial to an integrated and nuanced analysis of its structuring effects on actors’ interactions.

OVERARCHING FINDINGS AND ARGUMENT
This dissertation made several empirical findings. Chapter 5 analysed land policies and related politics at the national level. It highlighted that actors’ interactions in relation to new farmland investments participate to the process of state formation. It is through them that state officials at central and local levels reinforce their authority towards local communities and investors, thereby (re)producing relations of domination and political subjects.

Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 both adopted a local perspective to capture the impacts associated with new farmland investments in district political arenas. More specifically, chapter 6 highlighted the importance of not overstating the authority of the central state, rather insisting on the key role played by intermediaries in Rufiji district. In it, I documented how institutional change had direct consequences on the way local bureaucrats and a local state agency conduct their activities. This interplay between structure and actors’ agency transform interactions between actors, thereby also
shaping the resulting local outcomes. It is a dynamic and interactive process. Each level of governance has its own set of interactions—that develop through time, with this perpetual interplay between new contingencies, structure and actors’ actions.

Chapter 7 sought to capture how a specific investment has restructured the local political agrarian economy in Missenyi district. I argued that Kagera Sugar safeguards its operational profitability by creating locally mediated market relations which led to the emergence of new local patrons who used their position to benefit and foster their own material interests at villagers’ expense. This was the most significant restructuring impact of the arrival of the company in the district.

Lastly, Chapter 8 adopted a micro perspective, examining the political dynamics associated with investors-related land conflicts in a village in Missenyi district. I compared and explained why actors’ interactions are different even in the same institutional context, highlighting that the same local context may produce different CASs. Investments affect differently the members of a same local community. Their impacts are contingent on investments’ terms of inclusion and exclusion that are constantly being negotiated between a wide range of actors.

Although I paid close attention and documented how social action is used by actors at all levels to renegotiate the various structural constraints they are facing, all chapters showed that constant features of the structure are heavily structuring. Thus, considering this dissertation’s empirical findings as a whole allows me to make a primary, overarching argument: the structural component (S) of CAS has the greatest causal weight in shaping actors’ interactions. My claim is not that structural constraints are immutable, deterministic or fixed in time and space. Rather, my
contention is that specific structural components, because of their potential to appear fixed and immutable in space and in time, were left consistently unchallenged by actors at every level of governance. The following sections substantiate this statement by illustrating it with three distinct observations that are cross-cutting to all empirical chapters.

**SYNERGY OF ACTORS’ INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AND WITHIN LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE**

First, structural components play a role in shaping the nature of the relationship between governance levels. All empirical chapters gave us insights on how the nature of actors’ interactions between levels of governance—collaborative or competitive—may generate impacts at the local level. Indeed, assessing and evaluating the local outcomes associated with new farmland investments require considering the synergy of all these investment-related actors’ interactions between and within different levels (local, district, central, international). The nature of these interactions is partially predicted by structure constraints such as historical institutional legacies, and the central state penetration level. It explains why interactions between local and central government officials differ in Rufiji district from the ones in Missenyi district.

In Rufiji district, my initial expectation was that where institutions were historically decentralized and weak, and the central state penetration level is high, land investments would meet with low local resistance, leading to a centralization of land management and to the consolidation of central infrastructural powers (i.e. land titling and village mapping). My findings led me to nuance this initial research intuition. First, the central state penetration level in Rufiji was not as high as expected even if institutions were historically decentralized and weak. Second and relatedly, in a
context where state authority is contentious and limited, the process of state formation is further fragmented.

In Rufiji district, the consolidation of infrastructural powers has been partially captured by local officials. It is illustrated in Chapter 6: partnering and protecting unproductive investors from central state’s dispossession give local officials access to new opportunities for accumulation. Thus, Rufiji’s cases underscore that where institutions were historically decentralized and weak, and the central state penetration level is medium-low, actors’ interactions between levels tend to be competitive and subversive.

The nature of this relationship between officials at central and local levels further explains the local impacts associated with new farmland investments that I have documented at the local level. As explained in Chapter 6, the fact that local officials acted as state brokers impacted negatively the relationship investors developed with local communities. It generated confusion because local communities were not consulted, and lacked information about new investment projects. Being excluded from the negotiation process, local population tended to resist investors. As a result, conflictual dynamics emerged when these investors started operations. Therefore, Chapter 6 argued that bypassing local communities is consequential: it might even impede the capacity of the investor to become operational.

However, competitive interactions between actors at the central and local governance levels may open up possibilities for local communities to protect and safeguard their land rights as I have also demonstrated in this chapter. But then, this outcome is contingent on the nature of actors’
interactions at the micro-level. It is possible only if local leaders favor transparent governance procedures, and are accountable to villagers.

In Missenyi district, my research intuition was different. Since the state penetration level is medium and political institutions were historically centralized and strong, I expected local resistance to be higher, leading to clientelistic and infrastructural power-sharing arrangements with local elites. My research intuition was partly confirmed by my findings. As chapter 7 argued, the absence of intermediaries, a protected domestic market, and the collaborative interactions between the investor and central government officials have created market mediated relations that are beneficial to Kagera Sugar: it protects its profitability. Indeed, I documented how the arrival of Kagera Sugar in Missenyi district has mostly resulted in the cooptation of local elites. It led to distinct outcomes.

First, the absence of intermediaries tended to influence positively the relationship this investor developed with local communities: interactions became collaborative. In return for contributing to local development projects, infrastructural development, and providing employment, the company needs villages’ collaboration for its new land acquisitions, and their economic participation as contractual and occasional labour. Second, these mediated market relations and this cooptation process had negative impacts on local communities. They led to the emergence of many new local patrons who fostered their own material interests at their expense. As a consequence, transformations in the agrarian political economy induced by Kagera Sugar also triggered local political schemes that led to land conflicts, land dispossession and social marginalisation within local communities.
Second, the political structure preshaped the distribution of power among actors in every CAS analysed. Not all actors are equal in their capacity to grasp investment-induced opportunities to renegotiate the structural constraints they endure. As already mentioned, actors’ capacity (A) to negotiate these structural components (S) depends on how much power they already hold within a given institutional setting. Although theoretically everyone has this capacity to negotiate, pre-existing structural inequalities affect actors’ power within a given CAS. Indeed, my empirical findings revealed that actors who hold more power, such as government officials, local and national political elites, and investors—had the greatest capacity to renegotiate the social structure in order to foster their political and material interests.

For instance, in Chapter 5 and 6, I showed that new farmland investments created opportunities, mostly grasped by state officials at both the central and local governance levels to produce their political authority. Their institutional position favored them to access/create new accumulation opportunities associated with the commodification of land and new capital flows. In addition, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, actors who hold a great amount of political power, such as the President, have a greater flexibility in not only navigating institutional constraints, but also in innovating institutionally.

Chapter 7 and 8 indicate that the historical institutional structure in Kagera region, albeit informal and overlapping with the official institutional structure, impacted which and how actors can negotiate their power position within the local CASs. For instance, Chapter 7 shows that power differentiation between actors depends on their political authority. The local political elite, district
officials, the leaders of the outgrowers’ association, and the managers of SACCOS were all able to negotiate the social structure because of their institutional position.

In chapter 8, I also established that at the micro-level, village leaders are also seeking to strengthen their position of authority in order to secure their inclusion in new investment dynamics. Furthermore, it is because of these leaders’ formal and informal institutional position of authority that this opportunity to negotiate their inclusion in investment dynamics arose. In contrast, powerless actors, such as migrants, women and youths, have few opportunities to renegotiate the prevailing social structure. Therefore, the empirical findings of both chapter 7 and 8 illustrated that actors’ capacity to exert their agency (A) is different, and heavily constrained by pre-existing structural inequalities in the distribution of power.

Furthermore, these findings are coherent with my initial research intuitions. Structural features are more likely to be influencing the distribution of power among actors in a context that was historically politically centralised and hierarchised, such as Kagera region, than in a context where historically, there was no such institutionalised structure. In Rufiji, it would have been impossible for local leaders to instrumentalise authochtony to discriminate their fellow villagers (as in chapter 8) because such a latent discrimination norm does not exist in the first place: everyone is allochton. It also means that the relative balance between CAS’s inherent elements changes according to the context studied.
UNQUESTIONED AND UNCHALLENGED CLIENTELISTIC RELATIONS OF POWER

Third, structural components are only partially renegotiated by actors: there are relations of power that remain unquestioned and unchallenged by actors at all levels, in every political arena, during a given time period. For instance, empirical findings illustrated that all actors’ interactions were somehow constrained by clientelistic relations of power. In addition, state infrastructural relations of power were important at all levels. The state infrastructural power revealed crucial in the Tanzanian context to establish government officials’ legitimacy and authority, which was necessary to build clientelistic relations with investors.

As demonstrated in Chapter 5, Magufuli and his government’s actions must be understood in regard to the constraining effects of the CCM’s factionalism, and of the clientelistic nature of the Tanzanian state. Political power in Tanzania is also much about controlling clientelistic networks. In regard to new farmland investments, clientelist practices are intrinsically linked to the state infrastructural power. My claim was that the creation of the LIU and the revision of the new Land Policy were attempts at establishing the central state’s infrastructural authority. State officials’ attempts at increasing their infrastructural power must also be understood in relation to clientelistic practices: they are instrumental in politically controlling and capturing the economic benefits associated with the arrival of new investors in Tanzania.

Similarly, in Chapter 6, I discussed how local state officials and intermediaries sought to strengthen their position of authority in order to capture some of the benefits associated with the arrival of new investors in the district. They navigate the structure and subvert central institutions to foster their material interests. Interestingly, the importance of material interests and of
establishing clientelistic interactions with new investors to establish their political authority remains unquestioned. It means that at the local level too, clientelistic relations of power are heavily constraining: not only do they shape actors’ interactions and practices, they are also constitutive of the normative structure that partly shapes their interpretation of the social world.

Chapter 7 also illustrated this point by highlighting that clientelistic relations of power had a very pervasive local effect, restructuring the whole local agrarian political economy. As I have argued, clientelistic relations are further crucial for investors because they can become a matter of survival: the cooptation of local elites and officials was decisive for Kagera Sugar to maintain its operational profitability.

Lastly, Chapter 8 argued that clientelistic relations may also have an impact on identity-building. In the first conflict, local leaders were angry of being dispossessed, and denounced collusion dynamics between Narco associated investors and district officials. Yet, when the opportunity came along, they grasped it. To negotiate their inclusion in investment dynamics and partake the clientelistic game at play, local leaders discriminated against and excluded a sub-set of villagers—the migrants.

To sum up, this dissertation’s main findings are as follow. First, investments’ local impacts are contingent on investments’ terms of inclusion and exclusion that are constantly being negotiated between numerous actors. Second, although all actors exert their agency, their very capacity to negotiate and shape the social structure is partly determined by structural constraints themselves. Third, even though processes through which new farmland investments affect the local political
economy vary according to the structure (historical and institutional legacies), in both districts, the associated local outcomes were very similar. There are few exceptions, but the general trend in Tanzania is that most of the benefits associated with new farmland investments, the commodification of land and the increase of capital flows, are captured by government officials and political elites. Therefore, based on these findings, how are new farmland investments shaping political dynamics and actors’ interactions in Tanzania? And, how actors’ interactions between and within levels of governance influence farmland investments’ outcomes at the local level?

New farmland investments should be analysed as contingencies, that are both exogenous and endogenous disruptions to the analysed systems of interactions. Contingencies open new opportunities for actors to exert their agency, and through their actions, to renegotiate the structural component of CAS. We need documenting empirically these negotiation processes because CASs are context-dependent, and should be unpacked in every political arena to capture how they shape interactions between actors. At all levels, actors exert their agency to renegotiate structural constraints but their capacity to shape it is limited by pre-existing structural inequalities in the distribution of power. The structure is therefore heavily constraining, it influences the nature of actors’ relationship within and between governance levels, preshapes the distribution of power among actors, and remains partly unquestioned by actors.

On a more general level, my findings highlighted that the arrival of new investors in Tanzania has created winners and losers. Winners are actors who already hold power and authority within their respective political arena—the President, political elites and investors who are aligned with the dominant faction of the CCM—or actors that have been able to redefine their authority in regards
to land management—district officials, Rubada’s officials, local elites. Moreover, it is interesting to note that specific local actors—and not necessarily the most powerful—such as district officials have won almost every time, at least more than all the others. Although their place in the institutional architecture is decisive, it also shows that their capacity and ability to exert their agency is crucial: these district officials may have known better than others how to play their cards in the new Tanzanian farmland investment game. Other actors, namely local communities and more specifically women, youths and migrants, have also some bargaining power. As I stated before, they might have a poor hand, but they are learning to play their cards right. However, to put it simply, my analysis points out that their odds of loosing are greater because they always start playing this investment game with much less cards than their adversaries.

Yet, there are still so many things we do not know about how these new investment dynamics transform local dynamics. In the course of this project, two specific research avenues appeared to me as especially relevant, interesting and promising. I conclude by briefly presenting each of them.

**PROMISING RESEARCH AVENUES**

**A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY OUTLOOK: COMBINING SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL/HEALTH ANALYTICAL LENSES**

First, in this dissertation, I used socio-economic and political analytical lenses to examine how the arrival of new investors impacted local dynamics. Although relevant, this focus led me to overlook other key dimensions such as environment or health issues associated with new farmland investment projects in developing countries. These dimensions are also eminently political. New domination mechanisms related to health issues and environmental changes might generate new
mobilizations of those who are excluded-weakened-marginalized, or new incentives for actors to transform the prevailing social structure to foster their interests.

Kagera Sugar is a case in point. I disregarded many consequences associated with the arrival of the company. For instance, although the company provides water for free, water is often contaminated with chemical products and fertilizers that are used to treat sugarcane. There is to my knowledge no study of how it impacts the health of local communities drinking it, or the quality and nutritional value of the staple crops they are growing.

In addition, even if the company has built roads that facilitated transportation and fostered socio-economic development, most of these new roads are not made out of concrete, but rather highly compact sand roads. Concretely, when trucks carrying sugarcane are circulating, considerable amount of dust is raised from the ground, polluting and deteriorating the air local communities are breathing. Moreover, even if the introduction of sugarcane production had positive impacts in fostering and developing the local economy of Missenyi district, this local focus on sugarcane affects food security of those communities. In case of important drought—as it was the case in the Fall 2016/Winter 2017 when there was no rainy season—there was a shortage of food in the whole district. The situation was judged critical enough for district officials to pass a special law forbidding people from selling food outside the district as a desperate measure to contain the situation. Sugarcane is not a staple food. I could not help but think at that moment that if the company had grown maize instead, and used its irrigation capacity to this end, starvation will have been avoided.
Thus, an interesting future research avenue should consider environmental and health impacts of such farmland projects, including a critical analysis of the choice of commercial crops that are favored. Collaborative and interdisciplinary research that would integrate these aspects alongside a socio-economic and political analysis such as the one I have done in this research project would nuance and further expand our understanding of the transformation on local dynamics induced by these new investment dynamics.

UNPACKING AND DIFFERENTIATING INVESTORS’ PROFILES AND STRATEGIES

Second, the scholarship on land investments, and my dissertation, focus on the outcomes of such projects but tend to overlook and oversimplify investors’ interests (i.e., see Woertz 2013b; Salerno 2014; Goetz 2015; Brautigam 2015). The key question of investors’ incentives arose more sharply during my fieldwork. First, investors’ motives in developing large-scale agricultural production in underdeveloped regions of Tanzania remains puzzling. Tanzania’s investment climate is increasingly difficult for reasons that include long and overlapping bureaucratic procedures, corruption, risky political context, insecure land rights, lack of infrastructural development, and limited national markets. Often, land is acquired in remote and underdeveloped areas that have no electricity, or water, and only poorly developed roads that do not allow regular commercial transportation. Clearly, new investors face important political and infrastructural challenges that reduce their productivity potential in the short run and appear to offset the advantages of acquiring cheap land in developing countries. These observations run against conventional wisdom: a common premise of the literature on FDI is that investors try to mitigate risks and reduce costs when they invest.
Moreover, some foreign investors are better at managing these structural constraints than others. For instance, out of the six investment projects I investigated in Tanzania, foreign investors who have prior local knowledge of the institutional context or who partner with local investors tend to be more successful than other investors. This observation raises two important and related questions that I did not address in this dissertation. The first is why do political risks, corruption and weak infrastructure not systematically deter new farmland investments? Second, why are some investors better at operationalizing their investments in unfavorable contexts than others? Therefore, I believe that another very interesting and promising research avenue would be of researching how foreign investors’ profiles, strategies and integration within a given host country’s political economy affect their capacity to operationalize their agricultural investments.

Lastly, as a final thought to conclude this dissertation, I want to stress that although this dissertation helped us better understanding the local outcomes associated with new farmland investments in Tanzania, it also opened a Pandora’s box. Many puzzles are left to research, understand and analyse.
References


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Appendix A: Ethics approval notice
Appendix B- Questions for interviews

A. Interviews with Investment officials

Government vision on land investments
1. Why are land investments so important for economic growth and development in Tanzania?
2. What do you think about press coverage of the "land grab"?
3. What do you think about press coverage of the "Rubada corruption scandal"?
4. What are the main targeted areas for land investments?
5. How does the government decide how much land should be leased?
6. Do some regions attract more investments than others?
7. What is the approval process for investment projects? Are financial viability and capacity of investors evaluated?
8. What types of land are usually leased?
9. How do they know whether land is unused if frequently pastoralists do not use land for grazing for a year or more?
10. Do you have data on a) land already leased to investors? b) land identified for investors?
11. Are land lease contracts publicly available? Do you have an example of contract?
12. What is SACGOT? Is it implemented? Successful?
13. What are your responsibilities regarding land administration?
14. What should be the role of central government officials regarding land administration?
15. What should be the role of district officials regarding land administration?
16. What should be the role of local officials regarding land administration?

Implementation and regulations
1. Do Tanzania benefit from investment as expected?
2. What happen to the land leased when investments projects failed?
3. According to you, what are the necessary conditions for the success of agri-food projects?
4. What are the consequences for the investor if he does not respect the contract terms?
5. Are there differences between foreign and domestic investors?
6. How are communities consulted about land leased to investors?
7. How are they compensated?
8. What are the terms of the contracts regarding socio-development in the community? Are investors required to compensate local populations? Build infrastructures? Teach farming practices? Provide local jobs?
9. What happen if investors do not fulfill their obligations?
10. How is monitoring ensured?

Ideational
1. From your point of view, what are the biggest issues for agricultural development in Tanzania?
2. How can farmers' productivity be improved?
3. Do you think foreign land investments contribute to socio-economic development?
4. Do you think the government's strategy on land investments helps small-scale holders? Herders?
5. What should be the government strategy to ensure socio-economic development? Agricultural development?

B. Interviews with district officials

Responsibilities:
1. What are your responsibilities regarding land administration?
2. How are responsibilities divided between federal and regional governments?
3. What should be your role?
4. What should be the role of local officials regarding land administration?
5. What should be the role of central government officials regarding land administration?
6. What is the role of TIC (Tanzanian Investment Center)?
7. What are your interactions with TIC (Tanzanian Investment Center)?
8. Have you heard about the SACGOT Initiative (Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania)?
9. What are the SACGOT implications for your district?
10. Are you involved in direct negotiation with land investors? If yes, which ones, and for which projects?
11. What is the role of municipalities in land administration?
12. Do customary authorities play a role in land administration?

District Agriculture Development Plan and land investments
1. What are the targeted areas for land investments in the district?
2. How does the administration decide how much land should be leased?
3. Do some areas attract more investments than others?
4. Do you have investment targets? Who set the objectives?
5. What types of land are usually leased?
6. Do you have data on a) land already leased to investors? b) land identified for investors?
7. How land available to investments is determined? Who is responsible?
8. What is the process by which investors acquire land?
9. How ownership of the land is determined? What is the mapping process? Who is responsible?
10. Can investors rent land directly with municipalities? With farmers?
11. Why so many investments have failed?
12. According to you, what are the necessary conditions for the success of agri-food projects?
13. How large-scale projects in Rufiji can avoid the pitfalls of previous projects? How do identify and mitigate the flood risks? (Rufiji officials and RUBADA)
14. Can you give me more details about the dam project in the Rufiji lower valley? *(Rufiji officials and RUBADA)*

**Conflict**
1. Which level of government is responsible for guaranteeing the rights of farmers to agricultural land?
2. Have land conflicts increase over the last years?
3. What are the main causes of land conflicts?
4. What is the judicial process to solve a land conflict?
5. Do conflicts sometimes occur between people and investors? Why? How are they solved?
6. Do conflicts sometimes occur between farmers and herders? Different local groups? Why? How are they solved?
7. What happens if investors do not respect their contractual obligations (socio-economic development)?

**Ideational**
1. From your point of view, what are the biggest issues for agricultural development in Tanzania?
2. How can farmers' productivity be improved?
3. Do you think foreign land investments contribute to socio-economic development?
4. Do you think the government's strategy on land investments helps small-scale holders? Herders?
5. What should be the government strategy to ensure socio-economic development? Agricultural development?

C. Interviews with local officials

**Responsibilities:**
1. What are your responsibilities regarding land administration?
2. How are responsibilities divided between districts and local governments?
3. What are your interactions with the regional government?
4. What is the role of TIC (Tanzanian Investment Center)?
5. What are your interactions with TIC (Tanzanian Investment Center)?
6. Have you heard about the SACGOT Initiative (Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania)?
7. What are the SACGOT implications for your municipality?
8. Are you involved in direct negotiation with land investors? If yes, which ones, and for which projects?
9. Do customary authorities play a role in land administration?
10. What should be the role of local officials regarding land administration?
11. What should be the role of district officials regarding land administration?
12. What should be the role of central government officials regarding land administration?
**District Agriculture Development Plan and land investments**

1. What are the targeted areas for land investments in the municipality?
2. How does the administration decide how much land should be leased?
3. Do some areas attract more investments than others?
4. Do you have investment targets? Who set the objectives?
5. What types of land are usually leased?
6. Do you have data on a) land already leased to investors? b) land identified for investors?
7. How land available to investments is determined? Who is responsible?
8. What is the process by which investors acquire land?
9. How ownership of the land is determined? What is the mapping process? Who is responsible?
10. Why so many investments have failed?
11. According to you, what are the necessary conditions for the success of agri-food projects?

**Conflict**

1. Do you get involved in solving land conflicts?
2. What is the process to solve land conflicts?
3. Have land conflicts increase over the last years?
4. What are the main causes of land conflicts?
5. Do conflicts sometimes occur between people and investors? Why? How are they solved?
6. Do conflicts sometimes occur between farmers and herders? Different local groups? Why? How are they solved?
7. What happens if investors do not respect their contractual obligations (socio-economic development)?

**Ideational**

1. From your point of view, what are the biggest issues for agricultural development in Tanzania?
2. How can farmers' productivity be improved?
3. Do you think foreign land investments contribute to socio-economic development?
4. Do you think the government's strategy on land investments helps small-scale holders? Herders?
5. What should be the government strategy to ensure socio-economic development? Agricultural development?

**D. Interviews with residents of case-study sites**

**Background**

1. Were you born here? When did you move here? Where from?
2. Do you have a wife/wives?
3. Is your wife/wives from here? When did she/they move here? Where from?
   Why?
4. How many children do you have?
5. How old are they?
6. Do they go to school? Do they help you farming?
7. What are your wife/wives their responsibilities in the household?
8. What are your responsibilities in the household?
9. Who inherit the land if you die? Your wife/wives? Your daughter(s)? Your son(s)?
10. What happen when your son(s) get married? Your daughter (s)?
11. Do you want your son to become a farmer?
12. What future do you want for you children?
13. Are/were your parents farmers?
14. Did the villagisation programme affect you or your family?
15. How did the Tanzania-Uganda War affect you or your family? *(Kagera region only)*

**Religious affiliations**
1. Do you go regularly to Church/Mosque?
2. Do you sometimes consult religious leaders? Why?
3. What are the differences between your religious beliefs and the others in the ward?
4. Are there witches in the ward? What are their powers?
5. How do you feel towards them?
6. Do you consult them sometimes? Why?

**Ethnicity**
1. With which ethnic group would you identify yourself?
2. What are the differences between your ethnic group and the others in the ward?
3. Have there ever been conflicts because of ethnicity?
4. Which group arrived in the area first?
5. What was the impact of the arrival of refugees from Rwanda and from Uganda?
   *(Kagera region only)*
6. Do you feel that everyone, regardless of their ethnicity, has the same rights?
7. What is your relationship with pastoral people? *(to farmers)*
8. What is your relationship with farmers? *(to pastoral people)*
9. What is your relationship with the local government? The CCM?
10. What do you think of their way of living? *(to both farmers and pastoral people)*
11. Do you have conflicts sometimes over land?
12. If you have a dispute with your neighbor and you need someone to settle the matters, who would you consult?

**Livelihood**
1. What are your main occupations? Farming? Fishing? Business?
2. How much land do you have?
3. How did you get your land?
4. If you decide to leave elsewhere for a while, can you keep your ownership rights to your land?
5. Who will inherit the land if you die?
6. Do you rent in or out land?
7. Who owns the land you rent? *(if applicable)*
8. Can you sell/mortgage the land?
9. Do you have a land certificate? Are women and men on the land certificate? Who is on it in case of polygamy?
10. Do many people rent out their land?
11. Is landlessness an issue? Is a something new or was it also the case when you were young?
13. Do you have irrigated land?
14. What crops do you grow?
15. Do you use improved seeds or fertilizer? Where do you get them? From who? Why not?
16. Do you hire wage labour?
17. Do you sell your produce? Where?
18. How has the price of these crops been recently?
19. Have prices affected your choice of crops?
20. What about prices of inputs?
21. Does the presence of new investors affect prices?
22. How much of your annual food requirements do you produce yourself?
23. If your harvest is insufficient, what do you do?
   a. Go to the ward/village head office?
   b. Go to someone else?
   c. Go to relatives?
   d. Look for wage labour?
   e. Rent out your land?
24. If you had more money to invest, will you farm differently?
25. How do you evaluate the quality of a land?
26. Do you migrate for work? Does anyone you know?

*Investments and ideational*

1. What impact has the investment had?
2. What was the land previously used for?
3. Do you know anyone who has had their land taken for investors?
4. Did they receive compensation?
5. What have those who lost land to investors done?
6. Did the community approve the land leasing? Why?
7. Did you support it?
8. If people had said no, would the lease have been stopped?
9. Do you feel that the investment was beneficial for local development? Why or Why not?
10. Are you better or worse off than before the investment?
11. Have other people benefitted more than you?
12. What sorts of jobs have the investors provided?
13. Who have access to those jobs? Are the workers engaged locally? Are some people excluded? Why? Have some people better chances of getting a job? Why?
14. Have they provided any training?
15. Do the workers have contracts or day labour?
16. How are the wages?
17. From your point of view, what are the biggest issues for agricultural development in your ward?
18. Do you think foreign land investments contribute to socio-economic development?
19. According to you, what are the necessary conditions for the success of agri-food projects?

**Politics**

1. Are you involved with a farmers' cooperative or with a NGO?
2. What do they do? Why are you involved?
3. What the local government does for farmers/ pastoral groups?
4. How are you consulted on important issues for your community?
5. What happen if you disagree with local government? Can you express your concerns? Where?
6. What do you think of the 2015 elections?
7. Are you a member of the CCM party?
8. As any opposition party campaigned in your community?
9. What changes do you think an opposition party can make?

**E. Interviews with NGOs**

1. What is your mission and objectives?
2. What should be the government strategy to ensure socio-economic development? Agricultural development?
3. What is your opinion on government's land policy and administration?
4. What does Tanzania gain from land investments?
5. Why is the government pursuing investment as a strategy?
6. What are the main issues encountered by farmers?
7. Is land scarcity an important issue for the community?
8. Do women have land rights?
10. Do you think the government's strategy on land investments helps small-scale holders? Herders?
11. Does everyone in the community benefit from investments? Are some people excluded? Why?
12. What are the impacts of investments on smallholders’ access to markets? Commercialisation? Food security?

**F. Interviews with Investors**
1. Why do you decided to invest in Tanzania?
2. How did you identify the land leased?
3. Which level of government do you apply to?
4. What was the process to acquire the land?
5. How, and with who, did you negotiate the contract?
6. What are the terms of the lease? Lease fee? Exemptions? Obligations?
   Development projects?
7. What is the duration of the contract?
8. Did you experience problems while acquiring the land?
9. Did you have to pay bribes?
10. How long does it take between initiating negotiation, and starting production?
11. Are there discrepancies between the terms of contract and the reality on the field?
12. Have you manage to start production?
13. What are the challenges for production?
14. What are you growing? What was the initial plan? Has it changed? (if applicable)
15. Did you have conflicts over land use with local people? Why?
16. Where do you market your production?
17. Is it financially viable to export from Tanzania?
18. How many people do you hire annually? How many jobs are permanent? temporary?
19. Do you have problems with workers?
20. What is your hiring process? Do you hire from the local community or elsewhere? Why?
21. Do you provide training to workers?
22. Is all the land leased actually under production?
23. Are your operations economically viable?
24. Do you plan to expand your activities? Acquire more land?
25. Do you plan to stay in Tanzania? Why not?
Appendix C: List of selected interviews

Bélair Joanny, programme officer CSO Tawla, Section Mwanza, 08.2016
Bélair Joanny, local leaders Missenyi district, 08. 2016
Bélair Joanny, district officer, Missenyi district, Land department, 08.2016
Bélair Joanny, district official, Missenyi district, 08.2016/ 02.2017
Bélair Joanny, village extension officer village 3, 08.2016
Bélair Joanny, chief of operations Kagera Sugar, 08.2016.
Bélair Joanny, town planner Kagera region, 08.2016
Bélair Joanny, employees, Kagera Sugar 08.2016
Bélair Joanny, local leaders village 1, 08.2016
Bélair Joanny, field notes, and interviews with outgrowers, 08.2016-03.2017
Bélair Joanny, farmers and villagers from nine villages, Kagera region, 08.2016-03.2017
Bélair Joanny, chairman village 2, 09.2016
Bélair Joanny, research officer, Tanzanian Investment Center, 09.2016
Bélair Joanny, human resources manager, Kagera Sugar, 09.2016
Bélair Joanny, official Rubada, 09.2016
Bélair Joanny, officials Ministry of Land, 09.2016
Bélair Joanny, local leaders, sub-village 1, 09.2016
Bélair Joanny, TIC officer in the planning department, 10.2016.
Bélair Joanny, programme manager, Sugar Board of Tanzania, 10.2016
Bélair Joanny, programme officer B Haki Ardhi, 10.2016
Bélair Joanny, district officer, Rufiji district, Land department, 11.2016
Bélair Joanny, district official, Rufiji district, 11.2016
Bélair Joanny, lawyer of CRB, 12.2016
Bélair Joanny, local leaders Rufiji district, 12.2016
Bélair Joanny, local leaders village 3, 01.2017
Bélair Joanny, local leaders sub-village, 01.2017
Bélair Joanny, outgrower, village 4, 01.2017
Bélair Joanny, livestock officer, village 4, 01.2017
Bélair Joanny, villagers, village 5, 01-02.2017
Bélair Joanny, group of villagers, village 6, 02.2017
Bélair Joanny, chairman village 5, 02.2017
Bélair Joanny, farmer Missenyi district, 02.2017.
Bélair Joanny, farmer, Matawa sub-village, 02.2017.
Bélair Joanny, district official, Missenyi district, 02.2017
Bélair Joanny, director CSO Tawla, 02.2017
Bélair Joanny, programme officer A Haki Ardhi, 02.2017
Bélair Joanny, official Land Investment Unit, 08.2017