GENDERING CANADA’S WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH?

MILITARIZED MASCULINITY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF COLLABORATION IN
THE KANDAHAR PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

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Abstract

When Canada took on the leadership role of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (K-PRT) in Afghanistan, the liberation of women and children via multi-departmental collaboration was promoted by the government as a critical goal of the operation. Research from the fields of public administration, international development, and critical security studies hypothesizes that collaborative approaches to governance, particularly in fragile states, ensures that greater resources are available to address human rights issues, including gender equality. It is therefore surprising that the gendered implications of Canada’s collaborative governance commitments within the K-PRT have not been deeply explored. Through a feminist frame analysis, informed by critical and post-structural feminist theory, this dissertation asks whether the Canadian collaborative approach permits more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality. Framing the case of the K-PRT from a feminist perspective, this dissertation identifies the hegemony of masculinity within the policy context that guided the Canadian collaborative approaches in Kandahar, highlighting how international guidelines for collaboration legitimized the leadership of the military and instrumentalized gender for militarized purposes. It also exposes the masculine structure of the K-PRT, identifying how the design of the PRT favoured the might of the military, and presented the exceptionalism of women as the only marker of gender. Finally, this dissertation highlights the narrative of masculinity that is threaded throughout the K-PRT, working to normalize the militarization of civilian departments and actors implicated within the Canadian collaborative approach. The application of a gender lens to the case of the K-PRT reveals the necessity of feminist analysis of collaborative approaches, as these are increasingly being seen as best practices for addressing state fragility worldwide.
For Corey
Acknowledgements

This thesis would not be in the shape it is today if it were not for my supervisor, Dr. Claire Turenne Sjolander. From the very beginning, Claire has been a steady hand as I developed my project, conducted the research, and put my scattered thoughts into words. There were many days when I thought my ideas weren’t worth much, or that my abilities weren’t up to snuff, but Claire continuously gave me the courage to persevere. I always knew I wanted to write this dissertation, and it was Claire’s guidance that helped me form it into the finished product I am proud to present today.

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## Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>One Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan/Pakistan Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATIP</td>
<td>Access to Information and Privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-NAP</td>
<td>Canadian National Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADEM</td>
<td>International Civilian Response Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIC</td>
<td>Canadian Council for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civilian-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civ-Mil</td>
<td>Civilian-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civ-Pol</td>
<td>Civilian Police Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Correctional Service Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFATD</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFS</td>
<td>Failed and Fragile State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIAP</td>
<td>Feminist International Assistance Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>Global Affairs Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPSF</td>
<td>Global Peace and Security Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Policy Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>K-PRT</td>
<td>Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAF</td>
<td>Kandahar Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLIP</td>
<td>Kandahar Local Initiatives Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Memorandum to Cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTFU</td>
<td>“Man the fuck up”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSI</td>
<td>North-South Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick-Impact Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>REB</td>
<td>Research Ethics Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoCK</td>
<td>Representative of Canada in Kandahar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWC</td>
<td>Status of Women Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOG</td>
<td>Whole-of-Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace and Security</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 “Masculinity is how you survive.”

“Jessica” did two years in Afghanistan; most people only do one. For a person to be under such stress for so long, the body reacts badly. The mantra she recited day after day, through which she managed to survive those two long years, was MTFU – “man the fuck up” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). For Jessica, an experienced technical advisor, consultant, and former Canadian diplomat working on health and gender equality programs in Afghanistan, this mindset was necessary and transformational. Necessary in the sense that without steeling her mind to the violence and death around her each day she was in Kabul and Kandahar, she would not have made it through a day, a week, a month, a year, let alone two. Transformational in the sense that when Jessica completed her two years and returned home, she was no longer the same person she was before she left. But this transformation wasn’t positive. In her words, “I miss the person I was before that experience, but I wouldn’t give up that experience” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). The person before was much more confident, much surer of herself, but also, much more naïve about the world.

Before her time working with Canada’s civilian contingent in Kabul and Kandahar, you could put Jessica in a stressful situation and it would be no problem. Before Afghanistan, she led a task force to address H1N1, the influenza outbreak known as the swine flu that reached its most deadly in 2009. But now? You give her a little bit of stress, and as her doctors have explained, her fight or flight reaction triggers almost immediately. They tell her that when you’re in fight or flight
for so long, as she was while living and working in Kabul and Kandahar, only the smallest amount of stress puts her back into fight, flight, or in her case, freeze. As she has come to realize recently when she returned to school, she can’t think as clearly or work things out like she used to. As she sees it, her brain doesn’t work like it once did, and she is unsure if it ever will. It is a constant source of frustration.

Jessica told me of a few instances where her mantra of MTFU was truly necessary. The first instance she remembers clearly, linked as it is to the intense frustration and hunger she was feeling at the time. While she was away from home, two nieces and a nephew were born into her family. During this period, she was working at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (K-PRT) and would call her family at dinnertime, as it was morning in Canada for them, and she would spend a few minutes chatting to her family members, hearing about the developments and goings-on at home, and showing them she was alright. On one particular evening, she was speaking to her new nephew when her location was rocketed. Rather than fear setting in, triggering those human reactions of fight or flight, Jessica’s first reaction was frustration – the call with her family was dropped and she was left alone listening to the rocket impacts outside. She remembers thinking in this moment, “I wonder if they deliver pizza, I’m so annoyed and so hungry” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). Since she couldn’t leave to find food due to the imminent and clear danger unfolding outside, she was left to seethe alone without a meal until morning.

The second incident occurred closer to the end of her time in Afghanistan, when she had returned to Kabul and was living in the embassy. This was in early 2012, and attacks were becoming far more common in the largest city in Afghanistan, reminding her of what she endured in Kandahar. She and her colleagues were required to live most of their days inside the embassy for protection, and it felt like a bunker. One Sunday afternoon in April, rocket attacks were
occurring outside from about 2 pm to 8 pm, leaving the kitchen of the embassy non-functional for most of the day, with no food to be found on the premises. It became yet another day where Jessica felt the acute sense of hunger and frustration zap her of her mental faculties. Then, at about 1:30 am, the attacks began again. Jessica was awoken but she simply tried to roll over and fall back asleep, thinking it’s too early and there’s been too much fighting for one day. This time, however, a new staff member at the embassy could be heard out in the hallway, screaming and running through the halls looking for a head-of-unit staff member like Jessica – the fighting had finally been too much for this individual, and they were having a panic attack over the day’s events. Jessica’s annoyance boiled over, and she remembers thinking “MTFU buddy, I am not leaving my bed unless someone makes me!” (personal communication, August 11, 2016).

Jessica tells me these are the emotions that take over in a place like Afghanistan, especially in the more volatile and violent province of Kandahar. This is the mindset that sets in; “shut up, stop, MTFU buddy. Grow a pair, you can’t be freaking out like a friggin’ sissy” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). But as Jessica knows only too well, you MTFU until you crack. You MTFU until you crash, and you crash hard. You can only remain hardened for so long, before you begin to lose yourself. While you’re there, “you shut down and you do it, you don’t realize the damage it is doing to you until it is too late, nobody warns you” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). As Jessica recounts, most of the civilians she worked with daily found the mantra of MTFU at some point, but none of them knew the extent to which it would change them. And as she remembers, “the friends who felt, really struggled” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). For Jessica, and for other civilian personnel not used to the constant threats of war, “masculinity is how you survive” (personal communication, August 11, 2016).
The normalcy of this mantra, the normalcy of the fighting and the stoic, masculine response to it, is one that looks stark once you return home. Once you pull away from the battlefields and the constant stress and fear of having to brace for impact, the thought of shutting down your feelings for the sake of survival seems absurd. In his national bestseller, The dogs are eating them now: our war in Afghanistan, the Globe and Mail journalist Graeme Smith recounts his journey into his own version of MTFU and the pain and horror that is left when you come back from it. He writes:

The world needs to understand what happened and draw lessons from this debacle—and the only way of reaching those conclusions is by visceral immersion. You must get down in the dust and shit. I spent a lot of days smelling the death, getting sunburns. The charred flesh of suicide bombers got stuck in the treads of my shoes. I was shot at, bombed, rocketed, mortared, chased through narrow streets. I took photographs, recorded audio, filled a suitcase with leather-bound notebooks. I filed the material into folders on my computer, and later took a leave of absence from my job so I could sit quietly and let the echoes settle. I tried to pick out scenes and bits of dialogue that might help you understand. This was a healthy process. The nightmares faded, and I stopped obsessing about the tactical properties of every room. Eventually I could attend a fireworks show without feeling nauseous. My anxiety eased, not only because I spent time away from the battlefields but also because this writing project left me feeling less burdened. I could stop giving angry speeches about the war as I distilled my experience into these pages. (Smith 2015, 9)
Smith’s process, from visceral immersion to difficult emotional extraction through the catharsis of his writing, reveals the necessary (for survival) and transformative (destructive) weight of military life in a dangerous fragile state.

This kind of human transformation, one that can debilitate and cripple those who venture into war zones and are not military-trained, or “soldiered” (Whitworth 2004), begs the question of why a diplomat and a journalist—and many other civilians like them—were put in such a situation to begin with. Why were Canadian civilian government officials, such as those from the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), documenters and journalists such as Smith, and others from partner organizations like NGOs, brought into Afghanistan, and especially Kandahar, to conduct their work? What was their purpose in Kandahar alongside the more typically militarized Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian Forces (CF), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Correctional Services Canada (CSC)? When Jessica and Smith were in Afghanistan, Canada had made a series of decisions to ensure that not just military personnel and

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1 In Canada, Afghanistan is considered to be a ‘fragile state’, yet a definition of the term is not universally agreed upon. Indeed, according to Patrick and Brown (2007, 4), “beyond the general recognition that fragile states are overwhelmingly poor and exhibit severe sovereignty deficiencies, there is little international consensus about how to define and measure the phenomenon, and about which countries merit the label.” They look at several different research endeavours regarding fragile state definition and conclude, “one might distinguish among several categories of weak states, each of which presents distinctive challenges and require differentiated approaches” (Patrick and Brown 2007, 5). These different scenarios, coupled with the recipient government’s desire and capacity to deliver the goods associated with effective statehood, will determine the level and form of involvement of donor governments (Patrick and Brown 2007, 5). For Baranyi and Powell (2005b, 1), conceptions of state fragility converge around two ideas: “First, fragility refers to certain states’ inability and/or unwillingness to provide essential public goods like protection from external threats, rule of law and basic social services to most of their citizens. Second, fragility is a matter of degree—ranging from states that have ceased to exist in all but name and cannot provide protection or welfare to anyone, to certain states that can deliver most public goods to most of their citizens.” Baranyi and Paducel (2012) as well as Banerjee (2009; 2010) note that weak state authority and legitimacy, manifesting in a lack of confidence toward the state and government in the eyes of its citizens, also define fragile states.

2 Throughout the writing of this dissertation, the departments of CIDA and DFAIT have undergone several transformations, beginning with their amalgamation in 2014 to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). At the time of submission of the dissertation in 2018, the combined department was known as Global Affairs Canada (GAC).
military responses were being implemented on the ground – there was a push for a collaborative governance approach that included the knowledge and expertise of development and diplomatic personnel as well, along with reporters and communications experts to help tell the story of Kandahar to Canadians back home. What did this push for collaboration hope to accomplish?

These questions direct us to the political decisions being made around a collaborative governance approach between civilian and military departments in Kandahar. Indeed, Canada’s commitments in Afghanistan and Kandahar, which began following the events of September 11th, 2001, faced a complex set of challenges that a collaborative approach to governance across the Canadian foreign policy departments was ideally designed to address. At this time, as Canada was making decisions on how to engage in Afghanistan alongside its American allies, there came an opportunity to be a military leader via NATO and the United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the war-riddled southern province of Kandahar. But Canada wanted to be more than a military leader: it wanted to put a distinctly Canadian stamp on the work done there. What developed from this leadership opportunity was an increasingly public discussion that interlaced Canada’s perceived military role as saviors of the women and girls of Afghanistan with the policy goal of attaining peace in Kandahar more efficiently and effectively through collaboration: first, through the 3D approach (which stood for Defence, Diplomacy, and Development) supported by former Prime Minister Paul Martin’s Liberals, and later through the whole-of-government approach (WOG), also referred to as “1C” or One Canada, and finally through the Comprehensive Approach (CA), both of which were supported by former Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservatives.

For many within the Canadian government, as well as critical analysts of collaborative approaches to governance at the time (Patrick and Brown 2007; Travers and Owen 2008), the test
of Canada’s collaborative approaches in Kandahar meant a true test of the collaborative limits of Canadian foreign policy, and a test of the models’ ability to overcome the most difficult aspects of state fragility, including the ability to integrate transformative gender equality strategies. Prior to 2013, the K-PRT, and the Afghanistan Task Force system across the departments that supported it, was seen “as the gold standard for joined-up approaches” (Baranyi and Khan 2016, 237). Some were optimistic that the collaborative model demonstrated in Kandahar could be extrapolated to solve development, diplomacy and defence issues in other fragile and conflict-affected states (OECD 2012, 12), while others remained skeptical that such an extreme case could be applied elsewhere from the outset. The optimistic view, however, did not last beyond the end of Canada’s last Conservative government, as critiques from NGOs and academics began to mount regarding the wider applicability of Afghanistan’s collaborative example (Baranyi and Khan 2016, 237-238; see also Banerjee 2008; 2010; 2013; Brown 2008; CCIC 2006; Swiss 2012), not to mention the critiques that identified the K-PRT as a definitive failure of Canada’s ability to collaborate across departments in the field (Brown 2016; Saideman 2014). And as Canada transitioned from a Conservative to Liberal government once again with the election of the Trudeau Liberals in 2015, Afghanistan and the K-PRT fell out of favour as a beacon of collaborative governance in action, particularly as related to issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment, yet the idea of collaboration – whether 3D, WOG, or CA – remains a method of governance tied closely to discussions about transformative gender equality strategies in Canadian responses to state fragility.

1.2 In the Beginning: Political Rhetoric on Collaboration and the Gendered Narrative

For Canadian politicians, discussions about Kandahar often included discussions about the role of collaboration amongst stakeholders and the plight of women and children in the country.
Speaking about the next phase of official development assistance in Afghanistan in 2010, Minister of International Cooperation Beverley Oda devoted a substantial portion of her speech to the development of women and girls. The speech was largely celebrating Canada’s role in bringing change to Afghanistan, a country known for being bitterly embroiled in more than 30 years of conflict and on the receiving end of near constant international intervention. Minister Oda highlighted that Canada’s particular contributions reflected strong collaboration amongst the various departments, and were in healthcare, education, and humanitarian assistance, but the real successes were showcased in the substantial increase in girls attending school, in women receiving access to microfinance and other loans, and in women becoming a part of the political process (Oda 2010). Canada’s influential role was featured as the direct reason behind these successes; indeed, Canada’s “continued commitment to advancing the cause of women and girls in Afghanistan would be crucial to ensuring a brighter future for all Afghans” (Oda 2010). Similarly, in 2012, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird and Rona Ambrose, Minister for Public Works and Government Services and Minister for Status of Women, issued a joint statement on the standing of women’s rights in Afghanistan, noting that “the protection and advancement of women’s rights has been, and continues to be, a key pillar of Canada’s foreign policy. This is especially true in Afghanistan, where promoting and protecting human rights, including women’s rights, is a central theme of Canada’s post-2011 engagement” (DFAIT 2012).

This is not the first instance of high-ranking Canadian ministers highlighting the importance of rescuing Afghanistan’s women and girls. Research by Claire Turenne Sjolander and colleagues (see Smith and Turenne Sjolander 2013, and Turenne Sjolander and Trevenen 2011) have identified previous occasions where women and girls have figured prominently in public rhetoric surrounding Canadian foreign commitments overseas, particularly in Afghanistan.
However, what is unique about this time in Canadian rhetoric was the number of ministers, across many different departments, making these same comments. Indeed, speeches by Oda, Baird, Ambrose, Oda’s successor as Minister for International Cooperation Julian Fantino (2012), and former Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006, 2007), to name a few, have on numerous occasions made direct reference to the plight of Afghan women and children in relation to Canadian collaborative military intervention, diplomatic relations, and development programming. In 2006, when discussing the humanitarian effort displayed by the CF in the country, Harper remarked, “already a great deal has been accomplished. Reconstruction is reducing poverty; millions of people are now able to vote; women are enjoying greater rights and economic opportunities that could have been imagined under the Taliban regime; and of Afghan children who are now in school studying the same things Canadian kids are learning back home” (Harper 2006). In 2007, during an official visit to Kandahar Province, Harper presented the positive correlation between the plight of Afghan women and children and Canada’s collaborative involvement much more plainly: “This progress hasn't all been achieved by men and women in uniform. But none of it could have been achieved unless you had put yourselves on the line. Because of you, the people of Afghanistan have seen the institution of democratic elections, the stirring of human rights and freedoms for women, the construction of schools, healthcare facilities and the basic infrastructure of a functional economy” (Harper 2007). In 2012, during a speech to the Economic Club of Canada, Fantino highlighted a personal, paternal connection to Canada’s intervention in Afghanistan: “On a trip to Afghanistan as Associate Minister of Defence, I saw young Afghan girls heading to school, wearing their backpacks. And it reminded me of my own grandchildren. I was impressed then, and I remain so, knowing that these girls were going to school because of the assistance Canada provided” (Fantino 2012).
For these high-ranking ministers, when the measured successes regarding the changing social and economic status of women and children in Afghanistan were discussed or written about, they were almost always directly tied to Canada’s involvement, and its collaborative approach to aid. This discursive use of the plight of Afghan women and children has been argued to be a deliberate, politically charged action by feminists (Enloe 1990, 2000b, 2014; Ferguson 2005). As noted by Turenne Sjolander and Trevenen (2011, 102-103), Afghan women and children figure prominently within a narrative of Canada as a ‘good international citizen’ and a ‘protector of the weak,’ akin to the model of a “stern but righteous father who must protect his family.” The use of this narrative is a common trend, an irony, and a danger of the post-September 11th context, say Mazurana et. al. (2005, 21-22). Through such narratives, “those who have been campaigning for the protection and promotion of women’s and girls’ human rights and for increased gender awareness in international relations and intervention are now seeing these same agendas manipulated to validate military invasion and occupation” (Mazurana et. al. 2005, 21-22). As highlighted by Smith and Turenne Sjolander (2013, xxv), and demonstrated in the speeches above, many of “the speeches of Stephen Harper are value-laden and replete with constructions of Canada informed by assumptions that are gendered, racialized, and colonial”.

1.2.1 The Gendered Narrative in Kandahar

This trend continued through Canada’s collaborative military, development, and diplomatic involvement in Afghanistan, when Canada transitioned from a national focus in Kabul to the 3D approach in 2005, then to the WOG and CA approaches of the K-PRT from 2008 through to 2011. The 3D, WOG, and CA approaches are highly similar policy implementation processes that were designed to militarily secure, politically democratize, reconstruct, and develop the highly
insecure southern region of Afghanistan. With this transition, discussion of the gender equality issue in Afghanistan became connected to the comprehensive, collaborative approaches that Canada proudly took on. The K-PRT, located in the deeply conflict-affected southern province of Kandahar where insurgent attacks were much more common than in the Afghan capital of Kabul, still saw much of the Canadian political focus trained on the “noble” and “moral” work being done to improve the lives of the vulnerable populations of the region, particularly women and children. During the Governor General’s speech from the throne to the House of Commons on October 16, 2007, Canada’s collaborative approach in Afghanistan was linked directly to the improvement of Afghan children, describing the connection between security, development, and the education of Afghan boys and girls:

Nowhere is Canada making a difference more clearly than in Afghanistan. Canada has joined the United Nations-sanctioned mission in Afghanistan because it is noble and necessary. Canadians understand that development and security go hand in hand. Without security, there can be no humanitarian aid, no reconstruction and no democratic development. Progress will be slow, but our efforts are bearing fruit. There is no better measure of this progress than the four million Afghan boys and two million girls who can dream of a better future because they now go to school. (Governor General 2007)

There is some debate among scholars whether the 3D, WOG, and CA approaches are one and the same despite their differing names and corresponding meanings. “3D” highlights only the three major departments originally implicated in Canada’s role in Kandahar (CIDA, DFAIT, and DND/CF), whereas “WOG” includes the additional departments of Correctional Services Canada, and the RCMP, among others. This point is elaborated further in the thesis. In Canada, “whole-of-government/WOG”, “3D”, “One Canada/1C” and “Comprehensive Approach” are terms with similar meanings that are often used interchangeably, but “WOG” became the term of choice following the Manley Report commissioned by the Conservative government (Travers and Owen 2008, 686-688). This dissertation highlights the discursive change in terminology from “3D” to “WOG” and finally to “CA”, and the gendered and collaborative implications that resulted from this change.
There is a clear link made between the moral obligation to transform the social fabric of Afghanistan and the elements of the collaborative approach—security, development, and democracy—by the highest political figure in Canada.

This explicit connection between Canada’s collaborative approach and Afghanistan’s improvement is interesting, as four days before the Speech from the Throne, on October 12, 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper publicly announced that an independent, non-partisan panel would be convened to present options to Parliament regarding the decision to extend Canada’s mission in Afghanistan beyond 2009. At the time, Canada had already been leading the K-PRT under the 3D design as part of the NATO-sanctioned ISAF mission for two years, and had been working to integrate “about 350 personnel, including CF elements, a political director from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), three development officers from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), two officers of Correctional Service Canada and nine civilian police led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)” (Cox 2007, 2). With Harper’s announcement, however, there was clear intention on behalf of the Canadian government to pursue a continuation of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan through a WOG approach, and remain in Kandahar. Harper emphasized in his announcement that despite giving the panel, led by John Manley and staffed by Pamela Wallin, Derek Burney, Paul Tellier and Jake Epp, a series of options to discuss that included the choice to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2009, the following, politically salient considerations needed to be addressed:

Whatever future path we choose in Afghanistan, it must respect the sacrifices Canadians have made there. We have made considerable progress in improving the lives of the Afghan people, at great expense to our troops and our treasury. We must also be cognizant of the risk of a return to chaos in Afghanistan, and of the potential regional and international
implications. We must also bear in mind our obligations to the United Nations and our NATO allies. And, of course, whatever direction we choose, it must consider the implications for Canada's international reputation. (Harper 2007)

With these politically-charged and security-focused pressures, it seemed more probable, and indeed it was decided, that Canada remain in Kandahar under new civilian leadership beyond 2009 to focus on reconstruction, development, and diplomatic engagement with the support of Canada’s troops through to 2011. And the health, education, treatment and livelihoods of the women and children of Kandahar remained a prominent political focus during this time.

1.3 Focus of the Dissertation: Building to the Research Question

In reading these speeches and learning about the political context of Canada’s intervention in Afghanistan, I was prompted to ask: why did the paternal saviour narrative – the one that pushed Canada’s military obligation to assist Afghan women and children in need of protection – continue to be used to bolster support of the Canadian collaborative approach in Kandahar? This question is what began my academic inquiry into Canada’s collaborative governance approach in Afghanistan. The question of why the hypermasculine “hero” narrative of intervening to save Afghan women and children was used to encourage support for Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar has not been thoroughly explored. It directly implicates the question of “gender” in the work of the K-PRT due to the presence of women in the narrative and the evoking of masculine, militarized tropes, and asks us to explore where the concept of gender fits in the policy contexts, internal structures and departmental narratives of the Canadian collaborative approach. The 3D, WOG, and CA approaches themselves, all comprehensive, collaborative policy implementation tools with roots in public administration, are often used under different names and through slightly
different iterations in areas of conflict where expanded resources of governance are required. From a normative perspective, approaches such as these would appear to be the ideal way to integrate truly transformational gender equality strategies to address the social and economic issues local women and children face, and therefore a model to be used to explore structural understandings of the concept of gender. With so many Canadian foreign policy departments collaborating on an overarching moral objective – to bring positive change to the Afghan people, particularly women and children – the financial and human resources existed to make a transformational change regarding gender equality in Kandahar. Thus, my dissertation research leads me to pose the following question:

How does the Canadian whole-of-government approach in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, which creates a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permit more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality?

This dissertation explores the involvement of the three major Canadian foreign intervention departments in the K-PRT: the former CIDA, the former DFAIT, and DND along with the CF – plus the RCMP and CSC that were brought in as the Canadian collaborative approach evolved over the years. The dissertation research frames their roles within the K-PRT (from the 3D approach through to the WOG and CA approaches) from a critical, post-structural feminist position informed by theories of collaboration from public administration, international development, and critical security studies, and asks whether the hegemony of masculinity, in particular hypermasculinity as reflected in militarism and militarization, affects the departments’ ability to
implement gender equality strategies to address the rhetorically important issue of the plight of Afghan women and children. I hypothesize that despite the emphasis on collaboration and the implementation of civilian leadership over the course of Canada’s six years in Kandahar, the hegemony of masculinity encourages the increasing militarization of the civilian departments in collaboration, heightens the de facto power of the military, and incites the subsequent devaluation of gender equality policy and long-term transformational gender equality programming in Canada’s collaborative approach.

Throughout the dissertation, I analyze the K-PRT as a single case study where the design of Canada’s collaborative approach changed from a siloed, 3D design to a policy coherent WOG design, with a few small nomenclature changes with 1C and CA, in the later stages of its evolution. Throughout these changes, one overarching narrative becomes clearer via the feminist framing of Canada’s collaborative approach: that Canada wanted its comprehensive approach to be civilian-led, and that in this push for civilian leadership in collaboration, Canada opened the doors for the militarization of civilian departments, policies, projects, and institutions in Kandahar. The result of this narrative of collaboration is that it erases “gender” in the sense that men and masculinity become the norm, women are viewed as victims or extraneous to collaboration, and feminine characteristics are relegated to the background as unnecessary and exceptional in a hypermasculine, militarized collaborative approach. What remains is a normalized and legitimized culture of masculinity in collaboration that maintains its hegemony through policy implementation, structural design, and narrative storytelling that reflects militarized masculinity as the dominant and expected response, and all other gendered constructs, including femininity, as the submissive, unnecessary and unexpected “gendered” addition.

1.4 Structure of the Dissertation
1.4.1 Part One: Theory on Collaboration and Feminist Methodology

This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One discusses the theoretical and methodological basis of the project itself. Chapter Two explores the various theories surrounding collaboration from public administration, international development studies, and critical security studies via a critique based in critical, post-structural feminist theory. From the dissertation research question, the case study of the K-PRT presents an opportunity to analyze the theory of collaborative approaches through a gender lens. By implicating issues of gender equality in the motivation to remain in Kandahar and maintain leadership of the ISAF mission and the K-PRT, there appeared an opening to discursively explore the appearance of gender equality strategies across all the departments involved. By following the “gender thread” through political speeches, government reports, internal departmental documents, civil society and NGO reviews, access to information and privacy (ATIP) requests, and interviews with government personnel connected to the K-PRT, a critical, post-structural feminist frame analysis reveals the gendered power imbalances within Canada’s collaborative approach. By focusing on the need to improve the plight of Afghanistan’s women and children through the push for civilian-led collaboration within the K-PRT, the Canadian government welcomed, unknowingly or not, the need for critical analysis surrounding their commitment to both policy collaboration and gender equality. The amalgamation of critical, post-structural feminist theory with theory on collaborative approaches from public administration, international development studies and critical security studies permits this dissertation to address what is hidden: the gendered nature of collaborative approaches to governance.
From this critique, Chapter Three presents a discussion of the chosen feminist method of analysis for the case study, including an outline of the elements of a feminist research ethic, the usefulness of a critical feminist frame analysis, and the reasoning behind the selection of a single case study and the role of the researcher in the various data collection elements of the case. Canada spent a great deal of time and resources developing their collaborative governance approach in Kandahar to transition from 3D to WOG to CA, building upon the structural makeup of the process by adding in centralized leadership through the Privy Council Office (PCO), unifying policy goals for the stakeholder departments to work toward, and implicating more government departments to support the work of the original three Ds of CIDA, DFAIT and DND – and the CF. With this structural expansion, questions surrounding the balance of power within the approach must be addressed. Canada’s political focus on the betterment of the lives of Afghanistan’s women and children did not wane as the models of collaboration changed within the PRT, and “equality between women and men” continued to play a strong role in the design of Canadian foreign policy throughout that time. With the theoretical potential of a collaborative approach providing greater space to address the needs of Kandahar’s population, where was gender found? Were the different departments discussing gender in their work, and if so, what did those discussions entail? What policies did they abide by to ensure gender was present, and which structures did they work within to implement gender equality work? Did collaborative programming ensure that gender held a prominent place in implementation? A feminist research ethic, informed by critical, post-structural feminist theory, provides the clearest analytical frame through which to view, dissect, and analyze these questions.

What is unique about feminist-informed frame analysis is that it “is self-reflective, critical, political, and versed in multiple theoretical frameworks in order to enable the researcher to ‘see’
those people and processes lost in gaps, silences, margins, and peripheries” (Ackerly and True 2010, 22). Indeed, as Ferguson (2005, 13) highlights, feminism permits the understanding that “rhetoric is never merely rhetoric; it constructs a particular (if incomplete) worldview that enables us to see certain connections, yet occludes others. Like a picture frame, the rhetorical framing of political issues shapes and contextualizes the perspective of the audience.” This dissertation harnesses a feminist research ethic, informed by critical, post-structural feminist theory and research, that conducts a frame analysis in order to attend to power, boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, relationships, and the situatedness of the researcher within the research process (Ackerly and True 2010). By attending to these research issues, I am able to generate answers that “have the potential to make visible the invisible, to give voice to the voiceless, to make central analyses that are marginalized or neglected by mainstream lines of inquiry, and to bring to our attention processes and institutions that have been absent in the mainstream of our disciplines” (Ackerly and True 2010, 57-58). I generate new details surrounding Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar via applying a gender-framed lens to a variety of written documents: ATIPs, affidavits, government websites and publications, internal government reports and evaluations, civil society and NGO reviews; and oral texts: semi-structured interviews with current and former employees of the Canadian government who were a part of the operation of Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar in various capacities. The interview participants ranged from development practitioners, to mid- to high-level government department leaders, to members of the military conducting tours in Kandahar. The unifying factors for all participants in this study were: a) their

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4 Stienstra, Turenne Sjolander, and Smith (2003, 7-10) highlight the broader feminist approaches that inform such a research ethic, such as ‘feminist empiricism’, ‘feminist standpoint’, ‘feminist critical theory’, and ‘feminist postmodernism’. They note that these are the approaches most discussed in international relations, however they remain applicable within the field of public administration as well, particularly in discussion of foreign policy.
involvement in and understanding of the K-PRT, and/or b) their strategic policy work on gender equality.

1.4.2 Part Two: Policy Context, Structure of Collaboration, and Gendered Narrative

Part Two discursively analyzes the empirical case study in detail. In Chapter Four, I investigate the policy context within which the K-PRT is situated, and explore the gendered policy outcomes of hegemonic masculinity for Canada’s WOG approach. Through a discursive study of international regulations on WOG, civ-mil and civ-pol cooperation, the role and positionality of development and gender policy, and the narrative of militarized masculinity as a prerequisite for civilian personnel, I argue that militarization of the WOG approach in Kandahar is legitimized, and that the role and positionality of women and other gendered conceptualizations are instrumentalized in support of that legitimization. In Chapter Five, I dive into the structure of the K-PRT, and the effect hegemonic masculinity has on the framing of Canada’s WOG approach. By discursively analyzing the division of responsibility of the major Canadian departmental players in Kandahar, the focus on gender parity – known as “equality between women and men” by the military, the conflation of “women” with “gender” and the sidelined priority of gender equality policy and programming, I argue that a power imbalance occurs where the division of leadership favours military might and militarization, and reinforces the exceptionalism of women and other gendered conceptualizations. In Chapter Six, I address the narrative of collaboration that has existed throughout the lifespan of the Canadian K-PRT, and investigate the ways hegemonic masculinity normalizes militarization in collaboration. Through a discursive reading of the Afghan wartime context, the Western gendered language of war and its communication through official
Canadian media channels, and the narrative of women, girls and children as passive victims of insurgency and Afghan men, I argue that Western militarized masculinity is construed as dominant and necessary, and all other gendered constructs within the collaborative approach are seen as submissive and extraneous to the hegemonic masculine status quo.

1.4.3 Part Three: Conclusion

Finally, Part Three concludes the dissertation and discusses what the case study chapters reveal: that the policy context surrounding Kandahar, the collaborative structure of the K-PRT, and the gendered narrative of collaboration encourages the normalization of militarized masculine approaches to collaboration, and thereby subverts the importance of women, feminine characteristics, and ultimately, gender equality policy and programming. The hegemony of masculinity works through policy, structure, and narrative to ensure that militarized masculine power maintains its perch atop the gendered hierarchy within the collaborative governance processes of the K-PRT. In addition to addressing this hegemonic masculine power in the context of Kandahar, the concluding chapter highlights the trend toward the popularization of collaborative approaches for addressing issues of security in Canadian foreign policy and the real concern regarding the militarization of these processes. It recaps the policy context of the K-PRT, the increasingly civilian-led structure of Canada’s collaborative approach, and the overarching narrative of collaboration, and reasserts the importance of a feminist-informed gender frame for revealing how, through the example of Canada in Kandahar, collaboration can in fact work to normalize militarized responses to state fragility in civilian departments in fragile and conflict-affected states.
1.5 The Nexus of Gender and Collaboration

This dissertation began as a question surrounding the gendered narrative of saving the women and children of Afghanistan, particularly through the collaborative efforts of the Canadian PRT in Kandahar. I wanted to know why this narrative persisted into Canada’s development of a comprehensive approach to state fragility due to conflict, and how this narrative contributed to or retracted from effective commitments by Canada to alleviate issues of gender equality for Afghanistan. What has transpired, however, is that this thesis has endeavoured to conduct an inquiry into the hegemonic masculine policies, structures, and narratives that uphold the collaborative approach in Kandahar. In particular, it interrogates how conceptualizations of masculinity influence the public perception of the approach as one that appears theoretically holistic, gender-sensitive and equal, rather than one in which hypermasculine traits such as violence, aggression, female subordination and the legitimization of the military and militarized processes are normalized and erased from view. With whole-of-government and the comprehensive approach becoming the methods of choice in Canadian and international responses to fragile and conflict affected states, this inquiry becomes all the more important for understanding how militarized hypermasculinities have the potential to erase alternative approaches to peacebuilding and institutional capacity building, particularly those that support the inclusion of women as more than victims. In the chapters that follow, I present a feminist roadmap of literature, method, evidence and analysis that addresses the research question of how Canada’s collaborative approach created an environment that supported gender equality policy and programming. In so doing, I paint a picture of what the Canadian collaborative environment looked like for gender equality programming within the K-PRT, revealing that Canada’s collaborative
approach was constituted by and supported the hegemony of masculinities, resulting in the sidelining of gender equality policy and programming.
2 Literature Review: Theories of Collaboration Interrogated by Feminism

When Canada entered Kandahar via the Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2005, the approach that was to be taken was known as “3D”, comprising the equal participation and collaboration of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) – “Development”, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) – “Diplomacy”, and the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence (CF and DND) – “Defence”. Through the transformations guided by the Manley Panel in 2008, Canada transitioned to a whole-of-government (WOG) approach, also known amongst the inner political circle of the Conservative party as 1C or One Canada, amplifying the leadership role of the civilian contingent in Kandahar alongside the military arm of the approach. This was done via the Privy Council Office and by creating six Priorities and three Signature Projects to focus the increasingly integrated 3D departments. When Canada handed over the PRT to the Americans in 2011, the collaborative approach was known as much by the label of WOG as “CA”, the comprehensive approach, demonstrating the perceived integration of the original 3D departments along with several others, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). Throughout this collaborative focus, Canada’s role in Afghanistan transitioned from definitively military, wherein the country was a supporting ally to the Americans with Operation Enduring Freedom, then a leader with NATO’s ISAF mission, to increasingly civilian through the management of the K-PRT, the directives of the Manley Panel, and the collaboration of several civilian departments alongside the military.
From the start to the finish of Canada’s leadership role in the K-PRT, collaboration remained the most important policy target. Canada’s International Policy Statement, released in 2005, repeatedly stressed the importance of a comprehensive collaborative approach to assisting conflict-affected nations worldwide, insisting that the “Government of Canada believes that an integrated ‘3D’ approach, combining diplomacy, defence and development, is the best strategy for supporting states that suffer from a broad range of interconnected problems” (Government of Canada 2005, 20). With the convening of the Manley Panel in late 2007 and the release of its report in 2008, increasing the coherence and solidifying the civilian leadership of the Canadian collaborative approach in Kandahar became a baseline target. The Manley Report (Manley et. al. 2008, 26) states:

While we acknowledge the courage and professionalism of the civilians posted to Kandahar, the Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar also displays signs of the fragmentation and uncoordinated effort that prevail throughout the programming of international development aid in Afghanistan. Effectiveness would be enhanced by aligning national and departmental priorities and operations more closely—and more collaboratively. We also believe that the Provincial Reconstruction Team, sooner rather than later, should be placed under civilian leadership.

In both the first and final Quarterly Reports to Parliament, emphasis on the importance of adhering to a civilian-led comprehensive approach is present. In the first Quarterly Report encompassing the quarter ending in June 2008, Canada refers to the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit in which the international community of NATO allies pledged to adhere to a comprehensive approach, “bringing together military and civilian efforts” (Government of Canada 2008a, 4). By September of 2011, the commitment to civilian-led comprehensiveness had become ingrained, with the
fourteenth and final Quarterly Report noting that since 2008, Canada had adopted and honed “a more comprehensive Canadian strategy in order to enhance Canada’s presence on the ground and have a greater strategic effect” (Government of Canada 2011, 4).

Comprehensive, collaborative approaches to governance are theorized in literature from public administration, international relations, international development, and security studies to be more holistic and egalitarian than other forms of governance, as these approaches tend to bring typically standalone governance models and their efficiency processes together. This is what was suggested in the official policy statements and reports when Canada chose to conduct 3D-to-WOG-to-CA work in Kandahar through the PRT. As such, this increased egalitarianism theoretically provides room for work on gender equality and women’s rights, as is frequently discussed in the same policy statements and reports surrounding Canada’s work in Kandahar. This theme has informed my research question as to whether the collaborative approach permitted more attention to policy and planning on gender equality, and also encourages a deeper investigation into the theory behind its reasoning. The 2005 International Policy Statement (25) states:

Gender equality will be a crosscutting theme. Empowering women to participate fully in the political and economic activities of their communities is an MDG [Millennium Development Goal] in its own right and is essential to achieving poverty reduction. Canada has been a leader among donors in promoting gender equality, both as a global issue and as a practical matter in implementing programs and projects. Across all five sectors [health, education, governance, indigenous private sector development and the environment], gender equality will be systematically integrated into programming. The focus will be on equal participation of women as decision makers, on their full human rights, and on their equal access to and control over community and household assets.
The Manley Report (2008) and the Quarterly Reports to Parliament make frequent references to the treatment of women by the Taliban, and the low economic, political and social involvement of women as a rallying point for the overhaul of Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar, while also highlighting the many opportunities taken through the collaborative approach to gain insight from women’s organizations both in Afghanistan and Canada. In the final Quarterly Report, statistics on the numbers of women reached or empowered in the education, health, governance, and economic sectors are cited extensively as evidence of the successful implementation of Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar (Government of Canada 2011).

By interrogating the theories on collaboration that shed light on Canada’s comprehensive approach in Kandahar through a critical, post-structural feminist lens, I argue that these theories struggle to recognize the hegemony of masculinity in governance processes, and have difficulty accounting for the normalization of the militarization of collaborative governance processes in wartime contexts. Because of this, attempts to apply such collaborative theory for policy on gender equality and women’s empowerment will only scratch the surface, struggle to address the root causes of systemic gender inequality that uphold hierarchies of masculinity, and will not be transformational. Without a gendered understanding of the context, structures, and narratives that constitute and are shaped by collaborative governance theory and policy, any focus on marginalized groups such as women will be undertaken on the sidelines at best, and discounted at worst.

2.1 Feminist Analysis of Collaboration

The concept of “gender” is a social construct that is not natural or biological, and varies over time and across cultures (Connell 2005; Mazurana et. al. 2005, 13). Moreover, it is “shaped
by and helps shape concepts and experiences of ethnicity, race, class, poverty level, and age” (Mazurana et. al. 2005, 13). Supported by scholarship on intersectionality, this understanding of gender critiques essentialist binaries, and focuses on the complexity and fluidity within and across differences (Parpart and Zalewski 2008, 13). This understanding goes against the many essentialist accounts of men, and of masculinity, that suggest a naturalness to male aggressiveness, assertiveness, and ultimately, violence in situations of conflict (Whitworth 2004, 153). Essentialist arguments posit that soldiering and other typically masculine roles, like police work and public roles in capitalist firms, the bureaucracy, and politics, are natural activities of men where they can channel their aggression outward into the defence of economy, community, and state (Whitworth 2004, 153). From an intersectional position, Whitworth (2004, 153) argues, “essentialism is a deeply pessimistic position because most essentialists assume that the possibilities for individual, institutional, or societal transformation are so limited.” In reality, it is more useful analytically to think in terms of multiple masculinities and femininities arranged in a power-imbalanced hierarchy, and that in different times and places, communities and institutions, any one vision of masculinity may predominate over others as well as all forms of femininity, thus becoming hegemonic\(^5\) (Whitworth 2004, 154). As Whitworth (2004, 154-155) summarizes, “the form different masculinities take, and whether one of the competing forms becomes hegemonic, is not determined in advance as a result of some natural characteristics. Rather, it is the result of social practices. Masculinities – like femininities – are, in short, created.” In conflict-affected contexts, and similarly in collaborative governance contexts, these created masculinities are born, developed, and maintained by certain hegemonic masculinities such as militarized demonstrations

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\(^5\) Connell (1995; 2005) argues that while there can be multiple forms of masculinity and femininity underlying the concept of gender and the struggle for power that one singular form of these has over all others, there can be no corresponding form of hegemonic femininity: all forms of femininity are in some ways subordinate (see also Whitworth 2010, 175n20).
of masculinity nurtured by soldiering practices, framed by military-style or corporatist structures and institutions, and perpetuated by narratives that demonstrate male and masculine dominance⁶.

The benefit of applying a critical, post-structural feminist analysis to theories of collaboration is that such an analysis can serve to highlight what these theories take for granted and consider “normal” (Wibben 2011, 12) in collaborative processes. This is especially salient given the increased attention that is being paid to collaborative governance processes in the Canadian and international political spheres, thus sparking a greater research interest from academics in public administration, international relations, international development, security studies, and other cross-cutting disciplines. The theories interrogated here assume gender neutrality by not interrogating the overarching use of "they" when discussing public servants or other actors that are the subject of collaborative theory generation – as the hegemony of prevailing masculine social structures can easily construe this as a male "they". What a feminist analysis deciphers is this normalized perceived “neutrality” and highlights the gendered (and racial, social, economic, and other identity markers) power imbalances that are present beneath the surface when gender is neutralized: that “gender” is often conflated with “women”, and to be gender neutral is to defer to Western conceptualizations of masculinity as the everyday norm.

⁶ Militarized and corporatist masculinity are two defined forms of hegemonic masculinity that share many similar characteristics but often show up in distinct contexts: both derive their power from elitism and the illusion that one has succeeded by rising through the ranks, both are associated with certain uniforms that demonstrate conformity and efficiency, and both are supported by and exhibited through structures that encourage the wasting of softer, more feminine emotions in favour of hard-lined aggression and stoicism. However, they are not the same, in that militarized masculinity necessarily requires some form of violence – through the act of soldiering through basic training and boot camps to the inevitable job duty of maiming and killing an enemy – to complete the militarized masculine profile, while corporatist masculinity does not require this characteristic (though it is not uncommon to find less state-sanctioned forms of violence within this culture – domestic violence, substance abuse and subversive forms of bigotry often permeate). Corporatist masculinity most often appears in contexts where warfare is not consistently present, but has had a lasting effect on a culture: the annals of Wall Street, the playing fields and dressing rooms of sports teams, or the chambers of government (see Connell 1993 for an overview of the various forms of hegemonic masculinity in modern world history).
The sociologist R. W. Connell (1987; 1995; 2005) has conducted extensive research on the pervasiveness—the hegemony—of masculinity, and how the concept of masculinity itself is not an isolated and static object to be taken at face value, but is rather an aspect of a much larger social context. It cannot be considered a singular object as well: in any given culture and society at any given time, including Western culture, multiple masculinities exist and are reshaped through relational processes. Ultimately, various forms of masculinity exist in hierarchical contrast to various forms of femininity, and are social constructs that exist within the Western concept of gender. Due to the hegemonic nature of masculinities, certain masculine characteristics are considered the norm within society, such as strength, assertiveness, and aggression, and it is the femininities, such as weakness, gentility, and victimhood that constitute the outward appearance of “gender”. When I discuss “gender” in this dissertation, I refer “to the socially learned behaviors, repeated performances, and idealized expectations that are associated with and distinguish between the proscribed gender roles of masculinity and femininity” (Peterson and Runyan 2010, 2). Moreover, gender does not simply refer to distinct corporeal male and female roles, but also to how objects, non-human beings, groups, institutions, and even states are gendered (Peterson and Runyan 2010, 3). It is for these reasons that “women are traditionally associated with childbearing, child rearing, emotional caretaking, and responsibility for the physical maintenance of the household”, whereas “men are associated with the activities of wage labor, physical prowess, intellectual achievements, and political agency” (Peterson and Runyan 2010, 12). Masculine characteristics, due to their association with public space, are institutionalized in Western culture, and thus appear natural and even normative to the good governance of society. Thus, it is not abnormal to find gendered narratives of female victimhood as natural, moral, and pervasive in
collaborative theory and in governance structures like the Canadian collaborative approach in Kandahar.

This understanding of gender is used to interrogate the theories of collaboration that assume neutrality and thus permit the normalization of hegemonic masculinity. Indeed, theorists within these fields have attempted to grapple with gender issues in their research, but only to interrogate the place of women in structures of collaboration. This interrogation upholds the idea of gender as being only related to women, and does little to engage with the institutionalized structures that normalize this gender perspective. Gazley (2008, 48) notes that “while it has long been established that women can bring a different set of interpersonal skills to group dynamics than men, the impact this difference has on interorganizational or intersectoral dynamics is not clear at all”. Moreover, “very little gender-related research has occurred in either the public or nonprofit sectors that attempts to link gender to organizational outcomes with a high degree of methodological rigor” (Gazley 2008, 48). Gazley (2008, 49) recommends that “scholars who wish to investigate the association between gender and collaborative tendencies might consider several questions, including how the gender of public and nonprofit executives influences both their rate of entry into partnership and the attitudes about the advantages or disadvantages of collaboration that precede or follow these joint efforts”. This critique is unique and rare in the field of collaborative public management, yet it only asks about the gender of the individuals engaging in the collaborative process, and does not investigate how the process itself is gendered in favour of the Western hegemonic masculine worldview.

Calls for a gender sensitive analysis of collaborative approaches from within the field remain gender essentialist—that is, they assume that incorporating a women’s perspective is sufficient for bringing a new viewpoint into a field constituted by masculinity and historically dominated by
men. These essentializing perspectives suggest a naturalness to male strength, power and aggression in society, and in turn suggest a naturalness to female docility in the public sphere (Whitworth 2004, 153). A feminist analysis pushes past essentialisms and explores the structures of collaboration from a position that understands gender as fluid, relational, and contextually dependent. The choice to train a feminist lens on theories of collaboration is intentional, as this lens provides a response to concerns that considering “gender” is thereby taking the traditional and normative feminist focus away from the subject of “woman”, and targets the assumption that if a theory considers the plight of women, it is addressing issues of gender. Using this specific gender lens, I am able to explore the theories of collaboration in order to identify areas where they can more critically engage with what is typically understood as normal, natural, and inevitable: hegemonic masculinity.

2.2 Structural Power and Theories of Masculinities, including Hegemonic Masculinity

Research on masculinities and the concept of hegemonic masculinity begins from the position that gender not only concerns our bodies, emotions, and intimate relationships, but also represents a significant “aspect of public, institutional life, of the way companies, governments, education systems and mass media function” (Connell 2008, viii; see also Enloe 2000a, 2000b). In R.W. Connell’s formative work Masculinities (1995; 2005), our current Western cultural understanding of gender is given full analysis. In this work, Connell (2005, 67-71) explains the characteristics of gender, and masculinity specifically, as a fluid, relational, temporally and culturally specific identity marker. Masculinity is an aspect of a larger societal structure,
constituted only in its contrast to femininity, that has only recently been consciously identified in history (Connell 2005, 67-68). Connell (2005, 71) stresses:

Rather than attempting to define masculinity as an object (a natural character type, a behavioural average, a norm), we need to focus on the processes and relationships through which men and women conduct gendered lives. ‘Masculinity’, to the extent the term can be briefly defined at all, is simultaneously a place in gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality and culture.

As such, gender broadly speaking, and masculinity in specific, is the relational marker through which we organize our daily lives. Moreover, it is associated with elite, Western, upper-class, race-privileged, and heterosexual characteristics of masculinity as the norm (Runyan and Peterson 2014, 159-160). This marker is so pervasive, so hegemonic, that we do not recognize it outright, nor do we recognize the power it holds over our social determination, including how it constitutes our social institutions and our bureaucratic structures.

Thus, this research considers the costs that hegemonic masculinity has on the relational bureaucratic structures of the Canadian collaborative approach, including how these structures fit within a larger social context determined by Western masculinities, and the narrative effect hegemonic masculinity has on the social actors that work within the collaborative approach. This research targets the conceptualizations of militarized and corporatist masculinities as the gender markers that work to maintain the hegemony of masculinity in collaboration in the K-PRT. It is these forms of masculinity that reflect the structures and operations of the K-PRT, given its context in an area deeply affected by war and patriarchal social and religious order, while other forms of
gender fall below. The concept of multiple masculinities is explained by Connell (2008, xii) who notes,

[Not] all men share equally in the dividend of benefits, services and income that flows to men collectively from patriarchal gender arrangements. Some gain great benefits – and in no period of history have the rewards for the privileged been so great. Other groups of men pay heavy costs – in unemployment, violence, prejudice, exclusion and injury. In the mixed civil wars and military interventions that seem characteristic of the post-cold-war international order, men from poor, working-class or peasant backgrounds fire most of the guns and stop most of the bullets.

The intersectional acknowledgement that gender is at once not a fixed or static identity and a concept that is constituted by race, class, ability, nationality, and other social markers is a key component of post-structural studies of masculinities (Connell 2005, 75-76). As such, gender must be understood as intersectionally relational and highly dependent on the context within which it is being studied (Stienstra, Turenne Sjolander and Smith 2003, 9).

Masculinities research charges that the link between men and power—hegemonic masculinity—is reinforced and maintained by its foundation in the modern international gender order (Connell 2008, xiii). Connell’s (2008, xiii) extensive research on this subject has led to the suggestion that the world is now best understood as the scene of competing market patriarchies, linked antagonistically through the arenas of media, commodity and finance markets, diplomacy and war. The core power holders are the elites of transnational corporations and major states, overwhelmingly men, who embody variations on a technocratic, power-oriented masculinity. The patriarchal dividend from innumerable local gender economies is
concentrated in their hands, manifest in the unprecedented wealth of the contemporary super-rich and their almost unbelievably wasteful lifestyle.

Hegemonic masculinity is reproduced daily through our social institutions and bureaucratic structures, including in our continued pursuit of organizational collaboration. It is propped up by what Connell (2008, xiii; see also Enloe 2000a, 2000b, 2014; Runyan and Peterson 2014, 160) describes as “allied groups”, on which the stability of hegemonic masculinity rests: “the comprador masculinities of middle management, the politicians of client states, the wives of the corporate elite, the exemplars of muscular masculinity in commercial sports, the mercenaries of the security services (who have replaced the citizen-soldiers of earlier regimes) and the organic intellectuals of the market world – the advertising agents, fashion gurus and entertainers who fill the media with an apparently ever-changing but deeply repetitive gender display”7. In this way, hegemonic masculinity maintains its position in society through relational superiority to perceived lesser forms of masculinity, and all forms of femininity.

The concept of hegemony comes from Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of class relations, and “refers to the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life” (Connell 2005, 77). It has been harnessed by many feminist scholars looking to understand, analyze, and challenge the masculine structures that constitute our bureaucratic institutions in the post-9/11 international political landscape (Enloe 2000a, 2000b, 2014; Parpart and Zalewski, 2008; Runyan and Peterson 2014; Whitworth 2003, 2004, 2008). Parpart and Zalewski (2008, 11) elaborate on how hegemonic masculinity disrupts our comfortable belief that all men wield similar masculinist power:

7 See also extensive research by Cynthia Enloe, particularly her works Bananas, Beaches and Bases (2000b, 2014), and Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000a).
This form of masculinity is associated with practices, discourses and institutions linked to hegemonic male power, which, while continually contested and reconfigured, is designed to maintain the link to masculinist power, rather than its mere content. Those who threaten this link through sexuality, race, ethnicity or behaviour are excluded from the charmed circle of hegemonic male bonding and become comprehensible only as subordinate and marginalized masculinities/men.

When post-structural, critical feminism identified that gender and sex are not one and the same, we were given the theoretical and methodological tools to see that “hegemonic masculinity does not simply relate to biologically sexed men; it might also include women and ‘other’ men as well as the non-corporeal and the non-human” (Parpart and Zalewski 2008, 11; see also Wilcox 2011, 596). From this critical point in feminist history, we could look at institutions, structures, and even states as inherently gendered.

This understanding is useful for interrogating theory on collaboration that stresses the value of increased integration of government departments, organizations, and private companies as a way to increase the positive effects of service delivery; in the case of the K-PRT, it is particularly useful for understanding the increasingly integrated relationship between military and civilian departments during the bureaucratic transition from a military- to civilian-led collaborative approach. Kronsell (2006, 109) notes that within institutions like the military, there is often a silence surrounding gender relations. Indeed, “silence on gender is a determining characteristic of institutions of hegemonic masculinity” and “indicates a normality and simply ‘how things are’” since talking about gender would expose systemic inequalities and challenge systems of privilege (Kronsell 2006, 109). Male bodies and their “natural” propensity for militarized aggression are the standards of normality, equated with what it is to be considered a “person”, leaving the only
“gender” to be connected to the female body and that which is identified as feminine (Kronsell 2006, 109). As such, male bodies become transparent while female bodies become hyper-corporeal; masculinity is thus not visible, but is simply the norm. Moreover, the form of masculinity that collaboration privileges in wartime or otherwise unstable social, political and environmental contexts exudes physical strength and militarized attitudes that lead to the protector/protected view of typically vulnerable populations like women and children (Whitworth 2004, 154). As this type of masculinity associates the private sphere with femininity and the public sphere with masculinity (Peterson and Runyan 2010, 12), it follows that only masculine characteristics may infiltrate the public sphere in the context of war.

The civilian bureaucratic institutions that collaborate with the military in the K-PRT exist in the public, traditionally male-dominated, and masculinized political sphere, and therefore can be interpreted to value “individuals, institutions, and practices associated with masculinity (men, states, war-making, wealth production)” over “individuals, institutions, and practices associated with femininity (women, local or international political formations, peace-making, and poverty reduction)” (Peterson and Runyan 2010, 13). Thus, a logical progression legitimized by hegemonic masculinity would be the militarization of processes such as the comprehensive approach in Kandahar. When it comes to allocating resources, or addressing complex policy issues, such as issues of gender equality in fragile and conflict-affected states, the qualifier of gender and a gender-sensitive analysis are not the natural choices of civilian and military actors working collaboratively on the ground. Moreover, broader societal perceptions of collaborative approaches to state fragility will naturally gravitate to militarized solutions, given that the connection between the two appears to be logical. This natural and logical connection requires constant maintenance, as collaborative theory will espouse and critical feminist theory will confirm. Indeed, in the case of the K-PRT, a
feminist analysis exposes the valuing of masculine characteristics for the operation of the collaborative approach to be heightened in the civilian departments, particularly following the Manley Report.

2.3 Theories of Collaboration

The concept of collaboration is most prominently found in the academic fields of public management and public policy. It is also studied in the fields of international relations, international development, and security studies, surrounding its increasing application in fragile and conflict affected states. I identify through feminist theoretical analysis that due to its focus on resource sharing and better cooperation regarding complex policy issues, collaboration should be the ideal process through which to approach responses to gender equality where they are most needed; a gender analysis reveals the potentially transformative effect it could have on vulnerable populations like women and children. Collaboration, as it is defined in each separate academic field, must be explored through the feminist recognition of the pervasiveness and normalized power of masculinity and the emphasized practice of militarized, hypermasculinity in times of war. In the paragraphs that follow, I will map out the different bodies of theory on collaboration, from collaborative public management theory, to collaborative governance, to specific discussions of whole-of-government and PRT construction, and finally to the emerging comprehensive approach and interrogate these bodies of theory from the feminist lens outlined above. It is important to note that throughout the following discussion, these theories of collaboration deal with cross-sector collaboration on a grand scale, from government departments to private and non-profit partnership to civil society participation (Blomgren Bingham and O’Leary 2008; O’Leary and Blomgren Bingham 2009). For the purposes of this thesis, however, focus will be paid most intently to the
collaboration between government departments in order to understand the impact of the 3D/WOG/CA approach on Canadian government efforts to deal with gender inequality in Kandahar.

2.3.1 Collaborative Public Management

Theories of collaboration are a part of a larger theoretical debate championed by the field of public administration, specifically public management (Ansell and Gash 2008, Blomgren Bingham, O’Leary, and Carlson 2008; Mamuji 2012; O’Leary et. al 2009; O’Leary and Blomgren Bingham 2009; O’Leary and Gerard 2012; O’Leary and Vij 2012; Vigoda and Gilboa 2002). Within this term, “public managers who work collaboratively find themselves not solely as unitary leaders of unitary organizations. Instead, they often find themselves facilitating and operating in multiorganizational networked arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations” (O’Leary et. al. 2009, 1). Collaboration can come in a multitude of forms, often described on a continuum, from cooperation (the level being the most informal and autonomous), to coordination, to collaboration, and beyond to service delivery (the least informal and least autonomous level) (Bryson and Crosby 2008; Blomgren Bingham, O’Leary, and Carlson 2008, 6; O’Leary et. al. 2009, 4-5; Vigoda and Gilboa 2002, 101). Thinking about the concept in this way, collaboration “is best examined as a dynamic or emergent process rather than a static condition” (O’Leary et. al. 2009, 5). The emergence of collaboration in public management literature can be attributed to the growing need to understand increasing numbers of “arrangements that bring together actors across sectoral boundaries” that address “environmental turbulence and the failure of single sectors to address increasingly complex public problems” (Spekkink and Boons 2016, 613). Canada’s application of a collaborative approach through 3D, WOG and CA
within the K-PRT reflects an attempt to implement the ideals of this definition, with political support for multi-organizational engagement in a difficult, highly dangerous social and cultural context, where many stakeholders (both national and international) are involved, with the ultimate shared policy goal of an improved way of life for the citizens of Kandahar province.

In the case of the K-PRT, from 2005 to 2008 there was an attempt at a high degree of collaborative effort between the separate yet rhetorically equal departments of CIDA, DFAIT and DND/CF, and from 2008 to 2011 these same departments extended their commitment into the service delivery level with the release of the Manley Panel’s report and the addition of CSC, the RCMP, the Department of Justice and other smaller players, and the political emphasis on civilian management of the PRT and policy delivery through the six Priorities and three Signature Projects. This comprehensive unification of the departments through their work on policy and programming meant that a high degree of centralized collaborative public management had to be coordinated and maintained. This transition to more formal collaborative public management work, including the transition of power from military actors to public servants, had gendered implications for how the PRT was managed, particularly as the typical structure of a PRT, which was first devised by the United States, was as a military entity to be commanded by a military officer, usually a lieutenant colonel, and the K-PRT remained similarly structured throughout its Canadian residency (Canada 2008, 23; Holland 2010, 278).

2.3.1.1 Masculine Might: Militarized and Corporatized Masculinity

The resilience and increasing bureaucratic centralization of the PRT structure is tied to the pervasiveness of masculine hierarchy and the strength of Western military imposition. Hegemonic masculinity and the various masculinities of Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar find
their connection in the ways hegemony is achieved and maintained. Connell (2005, 77, emphasis in original) describes the process, noting that

hegemony is likely to be established only if there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective if not individual. So the top levels of business, the military and government provide a fairly convincing corporate display of masculinity, still very little shaken by feminist women or dissenting men. It is the successful claim to authority, more than direct violence, that is the mark of hegemony (though violence often underpins or supports authority).

The structural and institutionalized violence (or simply the pretence for violence) of militarized and corporate forms of masculinity become normalized through militarized collaborative responses to issues of state fragility, and demonstrate the successful claim to authority Connell speaks of. The power and authority that masculinity finds within processes of collaboration in fragile states is reproduced and reinforced through the outwardly aggressive and typically violent characteristics of militarization and corporatization. This process, however natural and culturally acceptable it appears on the surface, is a highly political one due to its hand in erasing women, feminine characteristics, and thus the complete picture of gender, from comprehensive approaches to state fragility (Ahall 2016, 12; Enloe 2000a, 2000b). Speaking broadly, Enloe (2000b, 3; emphasis in original) elaborates that “ignoring women on the landscape of international politics perpetuates the notion that certain power relations are merely a matter of taste and culture. Paying serious attention to women can expose how much power it takes to maintain the international political system in its present form”. Shining a bright light on women and gender provides an avenue to understand how hegemonic masculinity is simultaneously reinforced by and holds power
over collaborative governance processes, and to discover just how great that relational power
dynamic is.

Understanding the power of militarization and militarized masculinity begins with
recognizing that it is derived from and sustained by characteristics such as violence and aggression,
individual conformity to military discipline and cohesion, aggressive heterosexism, misogyny,
homophobia, and racism (Whitworth 2004, 16; 2008, 113). In collaborative approaches to fragile
states, hegemonic masculinity is deeply tied into the process of “soldiering” (Enloe 2000a, 2000b;
Whitworth 2004, 2008): the creation of warriors (both men and women) through the valuing of
hypermasculine characteristics. The soldering process doesn’t begin when an individual joins a
military, security, police or peacekeeping operation, but much earlier in life through Western
socialization processes that value ideas associated with being a warrior (Enloe 2000a; Whitworth
2004, 160). Indeed, processes of militarization like soldiering do not only take place in the obvious
military contexts and places but, in fact, the list of what can be militarised is virtually endless
(Enloe 2000a, 4). In other words, notes Ahall (2016, 7), “processes of militarisation can be found
anywhere in the everyday”. Through such platforms as family norms, movies, television, male
(and female) role models, books, news outlets, social media, and games, society supports the
pervasive and prescriptive moral tale that the military, and increasingly militarized corporate
systems like the police, are the ultimate harbingers of manliness (Whitworth 2004, 160). Through
this process, the role of women and the characteristics of femininity are devalued.

Consider basic training, the process through which young men and women are soldiered
and masculinized: myths of manhood such as courage and endurance, physical and psychological
strength, rationality, toughness, obedience, discipline, patriotism, lack of squeamishness,
avoidance of certain (feminine) emotions such as fear, sadness, uncertainty, guilt, remorse, and
grief, and heterosexual competency are used to transform an individual into a physically strong, emotionally impermeable beacon of highly specific and privileged hypermasculinity (Whitworth 2004, 160; 2008, 114). Thus, successful and respected soldiers, “having been trained in the ideals of hypermasculinity, learn there is little place in the military family for them to express emotions or reactions that do not accord with those ideals” (Whitworth 2008, 116). In addition to their internal transformation, they are expected to conform outwardly through a narrative curated by their hairstyles (shaved heads) and their dress (identical uniforms, with markings that indicate only hierarchical differences between soldiers), erasing any trace of “otherness”: homosexuality, non-whiteness, and femininity (Whitworth 2004, 161-162). In other words, revealing any “othering” attributes of their humanity, however fleeting or obvious, reduces their power as commanders of hegemonic masculinity.

Applying this interpretation to theory on collaboration, the process of militarization is not unique to militarized institutions, although it is cultivated most plainly in such structures. Public institutions that engage in the collaborative process in highly militarized contexts will inevitably display hypermasculine characteristics as a result of the hegemony of masculinity. The perceived moral and natural authority of militarized responses to unstable situations is expected, and institutions that do not reflect militarized hypermasculinity, or rely heavily on the support of militarized structures, are considered less capable and thus less trustworthy than those that do. This is particularly interesting given that collaborative public management theory suggests that “prosperous civic societies practically seek higher levels of cooperation among their members to increase general ‘public goods’ and to improve the welfare and well-being of large communities. Collaboration is thus frequently referred to as another mechanism for conflict management” (Vigoda and Gilboa 2002, 101). However, “collaboration represents a longer-range ideology
which, to be successful, must gain the support of senior decision makers, leading public officials, and experienced managers in governmental agencies” (Vigoda and Gilboa 2002, 101). This may prove to be a difficult task, as bureaucratic theory suggests that “governors and public administrators do not graciously yield power and authority to others” (Vigoda and Gilboa 2002, 103-104). Indeed, research has shown that with collaboration, “many public managers are both unitary leaders of unitary organizations and work with other organizations and with the public through networks. As such, public managers must work with both autonomy and interdependence, and they must be both authoritative and participative” (O’Leary et. al. 2009, 12; emphasis in original).

Thus, there arises a paradox in which collaborative public management may in fact bring about conflict, particularly within highly formal and dependent networks of public managers (O’Leary et. al. 2009, 12). Critical feminist analysis of this paradox suggests that the conflict that arises between collaborative entities will find the power dynamic shifted toward the entity that exhibits hypermasculine, militarized traits. Collaborative processes such as the WOG approach, therefore, can be prone to conflict due to their more complicated structure without effective management, and such conflict will defer power to militarized responses. Mitigation of such potential for conflict was evident in the Canadian collaborative approach in Kandahar. As noted by Patrick and Brown (2007, 60), Canada’s collaborative approach was highly complicated and involved several vertically-structured departments working horizontally, and strived for an egalitarian balance across them. Yet the concern was “not that each agency’s contribution be roughly proportional but that interventions be informed by whole of government principles – even when some departments are more out in front than others – and that involvement is sufficiently flexible to ramp various components up (or down) as circumstances change” (Patrick and Brown...
2007, 61). Particularly following the release of the Manley Panel’s report, management of Canada’s collaborative approach became highly centralized through the PCO and the establishment of the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF), and through the leadership position of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), a role held by a single high-level civilian manager that reported directly to the Prime Minister via the PCO and coordinator David Mulroney. Given the conflict-affected context within which the K-PRT was operating, the centralization of civilian power can be seen as an attempt at elevating the corporatist structure of public service institutions alongside the militarized tendencies that maintain the hegemony of masculinity. As noted by O’Leary et. al (2009, 10-11), there is no one best way to organize for collaboration as it is dependent on the context, but “the presence of a lead organization, acting as system controller or facilitator, is often a critical element of network management”. The structuring of collaborative networks of public actors into a hierarchy is a common outcome of collaborative management approaches (O’Leary et. al. 2009, 11), and those public actors that demonstrate characteristics of masculinity that befit the context within which they are acting will find themselves at the pinnacle of that hierarchy.

Other ways the changing nature and characteristics of the K-PRT are reflected in the literature can be found in the question of legitimacy: for collaboration in public management to be sustainable, it must find unifying ways to maintain the strong connection between often competing departments and stakeholders. For Tschirhart, Amezqua and Anker (2009) and Fleishman (2009, 32-34), theories that explain the longevity and legitimacy of collaborative management approaches include resource dependency, common purpose, shared beliefs, political interests, and catalytic actors. In the case of the K-PRT, these theories help us recognize the evidence of pursuit of longevity as Canada’s collaborative approach grew more integrated and centralized over the six
years it was implemented in the K-PRT. The researchers note that of these theories, “resource dependency is probably the most well-developed theory of interorganizational partnership” (Fleishman 2009, 32). Not only is resource sharing and resource dependency at the core of many of the challenges faced by agencies and organizations attempting to collaborate, but it is also at the centre of collaborations where partners achieve outcomes that often go beyond the capabilities of any one partner (Tschirhart, Amezcua and Anker 2009, 15). Resource sharing and the institutionalization of resource dependency, channelled through a single civilian governing body with catalytic actors, and a common political and policy-supported purpose, can be more easily managed and determined to be legitimate when these commonalities and collaborations reflect the hegemonic structure within which they are being enacted.

As theory suggests one of the strongest paradoxes of collaboration is that managers must act as both autonomous leaders and collegial partners, and their departments must find ways to co-exist and co-labour with their various counterparts despite their deeply institutionalized autonomy, mandated resource dependency cannot mitigate conflict on its own. Research on power dynamics in collaboration, including research conducted by scholars of interorganizational coordination, finds that “organizations prefer autonomy to dependence” (Fleishman 2009, 33), and will always seek ways to remain in control of their own resources. Theories of collaboration suggest finding a common purpose, where organizations form strong network linkages through similar, compatible, or congruous goals, identifying shared beliefs, where finding similarities in values and attitudes makes the formation of interorganizational linkages more probable, and highlighting organizational political interests, where organizations can ultimately gain political legitimacy or authority (Fleishman 2009, 33-34). Critical feminist analysis posits that these approaches, particularly in fragile contexts, will only mitigate conflict and aversion to dependence insofar as
they propose hypermasculine avenues for connection that reflect characteristics of corporatism and militarism, as these avenues hold the most power and appear as the most natural, and serve to legitimize the collaboration given the context within which it is being operationalized.

By maintaining the hegemony of masculinity through the valued characteristics of militarized and corporate hypermasculinity and normalizing the blending of militarism in collaboration, any individuals or institutions that show signs of “otherness” – femininity, non-whiteness, homosexuality, or the divisible characteristics associated with these – would not achieve or maintain power over the processes of collaboration for long. Their inability to exhibit hypermasculine characteristics will result in their inability to appear trustworthy in situations of instability, fragility, and conflict. Collaborative theory serves to erase “gender” as it is tied to “women”, thereby normalizing the institutionalization of militarism and militarization. It is important at this juncture to identify the differences between militarization and militarism as highlighted by a critical feminist lens. As noted by Ahall (2016, 7) and Shepherd (2015, xxv), militarism is “the belief that the most appropriate solution to a problem or response to an event is the military one”, and militarization is “the process by which beings or things become associated with the military or take on military characteristics”. As Ahall (2016, 6) highlights, “it is important to note that militarism as a ‘belief’ indicates awareness and a consciousness”, which is a key distinction from the typically unconscious and “natural” process of militarization. Militarization, which is not specifically found in the military alone but is a normalized process that can be found everywhere and in the everyday, contributes to the support of militarism in collaborative approaches theoretically meant to see equal sharing of resources, policies, and power across all players. As such, “gender” becomes proportionately marginalized and found only where it is non-invasive, and has no real power to effect institutional, cultural, structural, or social transformation.
In addition to the field’s theoretical weakness in addressing the gendered nature of collaborative hierarchies, the literature on collaborative public management reveals that the field has been slow to keep up with studying the practical application of collaboration in real world situations (Vigoda and Gilboa 2002, Blomgren Bingham and O’Leary 2008, O’Leary and Blomgren Bingham 2009). This has implications for how theory on collaboration can assess the “success” of approaches like Canada’s in Kandahar, as there is currently not enough data analysis available to compare. As such, not only is broad understanding of collaboration unclear across the field, but collaborative public management remains “an idea that […] lacks a common lens or definition, and […] is often studied without the benefit of examining parallel literatures in sister fields” (O’Leary et. al 2009, 3). Indeed, Vigoda and Gilboa (2002, 107) recognize the problem with building theory on collaboration is due to the lack of empirical research spanning collaborative approaches on a variety of different levels of government. They note that the state of the field can conclude that “beyond the global, regional, and even the national levels, a local governance view is the most applicable and realistic for practical and theoretical reasons. To date most collaborative projects reported in the scientific literature have been conducted in this environment, so our present knowledge relies heavily on such experiences” (Vigoda and Gilboa 2002, 107). There is an empirical understanding across the field that the outcomes of collaboration at the local governance level “are manifested directly to the people. The results are more clearly observed by public stakeholders, who also develop a sense of attachment, concern, and criticism toward these programs. In the longer run these endeavors may evince relevancy and compatibility in national or federal domains” (Vigoda and Gilboa 2002, 107). These results point to the benefit of continuing to conduct collaborative approaches to governance at the local level, as it is ideal for “urban planning, rural development, limited ecological problems (e.g., water use and purification,
waste treatment), welfare initiatives, education projects and initiatives, or transportation plans that concern residents of a defined area” (Vigoda and Gilboa 2002, 109).

Given the lack of real world research above the local governance level, the case of Canada’s K-PRT provides a unique example to be studied by the field of collaborative public management in that much of the work of the K-PRT was applied at the local level but designed at the federal, and it was bilateral: it was applied in Kandahar via processes laid out by the 3D departments of the PRT and carried forward through the federally-mandated and distinctly Canadian six Priorities and three Signature Projects set out by the Manley Report for the benefit of local government to shore up the democratic structures and livelihoods of local Afghans. As the Kandahar PRT (along with other Canadian applications of the collaborative approach in fragile and conflict affected states, such as Haiti8) was a test of the highest magnitude as it was a militarized test of the Canadian collaborative approach, it broaches both the local governance and national governance levels, and crosses international borders with Canada and Afghanistan working collaboratively on public policy issues. As Vigoda and Gilboa (2002, 109) note, “theory and experience frequently suggest that smaller-scale initiatives at the local government level have the advantage of becoming indicators or facilitators of wider initiatives in national or federal circles”. The Canadian management of the K-PRT could provide a useful case study for the understanding of how smaller-scale initiatives at the local government level are tied to, influenced by and in the case of the K-PRT, controlled by international, Western values and resources, particularly in cases where the recipient populations are affected by conflict.

This uniqueness of the K-PRT example highlights the final paradox addressed by the recent collaborative public management literature: that of its relatively weak discussion of “collaborative

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8 See Baranyi and Paducel 2012.
governance”, “a term used to describe the integration of reasoned discussions by citizens and other residents into the decision making of public representatives” (O’Leary and Blomgren Bingham 2009, 267). The K-PRT was situated in and constituted by a particularly militarized, hypermasculine context given the location of the PRT in relation to Taliban insurgency, and the design of the PRT to reflect the structures and hierarchies of a military base. These elements directly contributed to the management and redesign of the PRT over the years. Solutions such as increased media access, a communications contingent directed by DFAIT, and attempts by Canadian leadership to encourage Afghan public management approaches were just a few of the attempts made to incorporate local Afghan and Canadian citizens into the daily operations of the K-PRT (see chapter six on the narrative of the K-PRT dictated by Canada at home and abroad). As noted by O’Leary and Blomgren Bingham (2009, 267), “there is a need to assess collaborative processes, focusing on their impact on the people they were meant to serve”. For collaborative public management, research on these assessment tools are still in their earliest stages of development and do not provide an avenue for me to fully answer my research question, partly because “assessing collaboration is of necessity an interdisciplinary enterprise” (O’Leary and Blomgren Bingham 2009, 267). Theory on collaborative governance may be able to shed more light on unique cases of collaboration like the K-PRT.

2.3.2 Collaborative Governance

Research and theory coming out of this subset of public administration focuses more thoroughly on the involvement of various contributors to the act of governing, paying special attention to the networks that are developed between government, the private sector, NGOs and CSOs, and interested and vested citizens and individuals. As noted by Lester and Reckhow (2013,
the new globalized economic reality has upset traditional forms of governing in the Western world. Indeed, “the archetypical bureaucratic state agency—with clearly defined jurisdicitional and functional boundaries—has been challenged by new modes of governing such as market-based organizations drawn from the New Public Management (NPM) approach, public–private partnerships, and coordinated citizen participation through deliberative processes” (Lester and Reckhow 2013, 116), to name a few. This restructuring has allowed for non-state actors, such as organized interest groups, private industry, and citizens, to engage in acts of governing with increasing legitimacy (Lester and Reckhow 2013, 116). However, scholars agree that “the shift toward governance and away from government may result in decision-making paralysis and diminished political accountability. Rather than a full retreat of bureaucracy, we increasingly see an amalgamation of administrative forms, including hybrids of traditional bureaucracies, market driven organizations, and governance networks incorporating broader participation” (Lester and Reckhow 2013, 116, emphasis in original).

From a critical feminist reading, theory on collaborative governance both recognizes and cautions the transformation of traditional governance structures, in which access to government processes and actors has typically remained difficult and where those processes and actors have typically favoured men or masculine characteristics. It can be argued that collaborative governance theory conflates the “bureaucracy” with masculinity. Reformulating how governance processes occur is therefore cautioned to be incremental so as not to upset traditional bureaucratic operations. This is interesting, as access to government is increasing, which is a positive for women's advocacy groups and groups advocating for gender issues related to non-binary gender rights and trans rights. There is a note of protectionism highlighted in the theory, that when read from a feminist perspective shows that it is arguing to keep some semblance of restricted access, allowing for the
bureaucracy to choose who it does its business with. Typically, that business partnership will reflect the hegemony of masculinity and the types of masculinity that reflect the non-disruption of bureaucratic processes along a path of least resistance.

Ansell and Gash (2008, 544) suggest that a more agreeable perspective on the increased trend in governance-style collaboration can be argued, springing from “the growth of knowledge and institutional capacity. As knowledge becomes increasingly specialized and distributed and as institutional infrastructures become more complex and interdependent, the demand for collaboration increases”. The focus is on capacity building, and they define collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell and Gash 2008, 544). In such forums, “a common objective in these situations is to establish structures and processes that facilitate collaborative dynamics among diverse participants that in turn can enhance the quality of decisions made and implemented” (Choi and Robertson 2014, 495). Yet a critical feminist reading of this theoretical analysis would ask which diverse participants would gain access to collaborative governance forums, and what kind of power these diverse participants would have in the face of traditional bureaucratic processes built and maintained by hegemonic masculinity. These questions become more striking when considering the ways that capacity building in collaborative governance was encouraged in the K-PRT: Canada’s work in Kandahar often entailed training and collaboration with the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, meetings with Kandahar government officials and local humanitarian and civil society organizations, and close contact with Canada’s American counterparts in USAID and the US military, among other NATO allies. In addition, the Canadian
departments in Kandahar were bound by international guidelines on how to engage a variety of personnel—civilian and military—in Afghanistan (OCHA 2008, Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group 2008). Canada’s position in Kandahar, as it was elsewhere in Afghanistan, was always dictated by international law, multilateral cooperation, and local custom, of which the overarching frame of reference was directed through the hegemony of militarized masculinity. This is supported in the collaborative governance literature, which “presents substantial evidence that environmental and organizational variables affect collaboration by public organizations” (Esteve et. al. 2012, 931).

Esteve et. al. (2012, 929-931) present an overview of theoretical evidence that showcases the impact of environmental and organizational factors on the success of collaboration. They note that research on the ways environments affect the creation and development of collaboration include focusing on the existence of complex problems, wherein public organizations are more likely to develop collaborations that take advantage of the capabilities of other organizations; the presence of conflict between stakeholders, wherein collaboration between public organizations must occur in order to effectively respond to the competing investors; the distance between public organizations, wherein areas such as capitals and other large urban areas promote greater collaboration simply due to proximity (Esteve et. al. 2012, 929-930). Yet this research does not account for the underlying gendered and power-imbalanced contexts, structures and narratives that make up the environments that influence and are influenced by collaborative governance. Regarding research on how organizational factors affect collaboration, they highlight studies that suggest public organizations that are formed as quasi-autonomous executive agencies can be more collaborative than those that are embedded in government departments due to their relatively increased freedom; public organizations with clearer standardized procedures for collaboration
will collaborate more readily; public organizations which have successfully collaborated in the past will be more prone to repeat the experience in future; and larger public organizations will collaborate more often as they have the resources to afford any risks and costs that come with collaborative processes (Esteve et al. 2012, 930-931). These examples, generated in recent years in the subfield of collaborative governance, assist in explaining the determinants of interorganizational collaboration in the public sector but do not go far enough to help us understand the invisible motivations of those determinants, such as the hegemony of masculinity and its ability to normalize hypermasculine approaches to collaboration.

As was noted by the collaborative public management literature, “a range of terms are often used interchangeably with collaborative governance. Such terms include participatory management, interactive policy making, stakeholder governance, and collaborative management” (Ansell and Gash 2008, 548). For scholars of collaborative governance, the term ‘governance’ is preferred over ‘management’ “because it is broader and encompasses various aspects of the governing process, including planning, policy making, and management” (Ansell and Gash 2008, 548). Yet this literature falls into the same trap that captures collaborative public management: it avoids interrogating collaboration through a theoretical lens that accounts for the hegemony of environmental and organizational atmospheres that promote power imbalances and inequality through the normalization of hypermasculinity. Nor does it distinguish between those actors with legitimized power (for example, established bureaucracies) and those with less power (such as women's organizations, advocacy groups, civil society organizationss and NGOs that target "niche" issues. It also suffers from a lack of empirical evidence through which to test its theoretical claims. As noted by Choi and Robertson (2014, 497), “collaborative governance is intended to provide an egalitarian forum in which participants, endowed with substantive authority to make
collective decisions, deliberate on the matter at hand in an effort to reach consensus on a mutually satisfactory solution”. For collaborative governance theorists, under the right circumstances “a collaborative governance approach can lead to increased government accountability, greater civic engagement, consistent downstream implementation, and most importantly, higher levels of process and program success” (Johnston et. al. 2010, 700). This assertion is difficult to test without analyzing how the collaborative governance approach is affected by hegemonic masculinity, or without applicable case studies. Indeed, like the field of collaborative public management, “much of the theory base underlying collaborative governance is largely heuristic in nature, based on general insights about the conditions required for success rather than on rigorous empirical evidence demonstrating consistent relationships between particular features of collaborative governance systems and their consequences” (Choi and Robertson 2014, 496). This suggests that researchers working within this field do not test their theories thoroughly enough, and seem to avoid interaction with broader theory at the very least in order to inform their assertions.

As such, evidence to support successful collaborative governance is limited in several ways. Esteve et. al. (2012, 931) note that the field is narrowly focused in two areas: on specific fields of activity, rather than exploring the range of fields where collaboration could occur, and on considering collaboration only within the public sector, rather than looking beyond the bureaucracy to understand how collaboration occurs across the public, private, and non-profit sectors. Moreover, the reality of collaborative governance is that different stakeholders often have varying levels of both formal and informal power in the decision-making process, often due to “structural position (e.g., formal authority), need imbalance (e.g., skills, information, money), importance imbalance (e.g., strategic centrality), and day-to-day activities (points of power inherent in the relationship process)” (Huxham and Beech 2008, 563; see also Choi and Robertson
From a feminist perspective, these forms of power are also influenced by gender relations, with the most likely power brokers exhibiting masculine characteristics that maintain the hegemony of masculinity in the public sphere. These power imbalances inevitably lead to a lack of trust among stakeholders in partnership, which is the bedrock of collaborative governance, say Johnston et. al. (2010). They note that successful collaborative governance is difficult to achieve, as “it depends on creating a deliberative climate that fosters trust, shared commitment, mutual accountability, and a willingness to share risk” (Johnston et. al. 2010, 700). For collaboration to be successful, both in finding legitimacy and in remaining sustainable, “stakeholders must be convinced that the process is free from behind the scenes manipulation and that safeguards are in place to check the disproportionate influence of powerful stakeholders” (Johnston et. al. 2010, 700).

Highlighting the connection between an imbalance of power and a lack of trust amongst collaborative players is important for feminist theory development regarding collaboration, particularly as related to the case study of the K-PRT. The many different organizations involved in the K-PRT not only included Canadian government departments, but also local Afghan government and humanitarian organizations in Kandahar, multilateral NATO allies such as the US, and international governing bodies such as the UN. Thus, collaborative work had to occur across departments at varying levels of power, and with varying policy and program interests. Within this vein, researchers have noted a “goals paradox”, which “suggests that both congruence and diversity in organizations’ goals influence success in collaboration” (Vangen and Huxham 2011, 732). Between congruence and diversity, “congruence of organizational goals is argued to be essential because joint goals for the collaboration can be easily aligned to partners’ goals and this [therefore] increases their commitment to the collaboration”, and ultimately guarantees their
success (Vangen and Huxham 2011, 732). Yet, diversity of organizational expertise and resources is considered to be essential to gaining truly synergistic advantage from collaboration, which in turn implies diversity in the goals of organizations (Vangen and Huxham 2011, 732). Through feminist analysis, the favouring of congruence over diversity becomes clearer, as the pervasiveness of masculine relations in collaboration encourages conformity to the goals of the collaborator with the most institutionalized power, which is determined through its exertion of hypermasculine characteristics. Showing a diversity of interests and goals is not normal, not mainstream, and it makes collaboration less easy to commit to. If collaboration is the ultimate goal, then alignment of collaborative goals will be encouraged, and likely encouraged most wholeheartedly through normalized hegemonic channels as the paths of least resistance – and these channels will reliably look masculine, according to feminist analysis. Thus, as was seen in the literature on collaborative public management, the goals paradox could easily lead to conflict between organizations due to differing levels of power, varying expectations, differing views on policy implementation tools, or agreement that may never move beyond a rhetorical commitment (Vangen and Huxham 2011, 732). The determining factor for how this paradox can be broken, says feminist analysis, is which collaborator follows most closely the channels of hegemonic power to mitigate conflict and produce results congruent with hegemonic masculinity.

Ultimately, the subfield of collaborative governance remains isolated from other disciplines researching and developing theory on collaboration (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh 2011), much in the same way collaborative public management struggles to speak across academic lines. Work by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011, 2-3) to broaden the definition of collaborative governance attempts to capture “a fuller range of emergent forms of cross-boundary governance, extending beyond the conventional focus on the public manager or the formal public
sector”, and allow “collaborative governance to be used as a broader analytic construct in public administration and enables distinctions among different applications, classes, and scales”. This work, like the research in collaborative public management, is still ongoing, and would benefit from a feminist lens to assist it in developing theory on power imbalances, and environmental and organization influences on collaboration. There is, however, specific research on Canada’s various collaborative approaches in international relations and international development literature that is more directly applicable to the case study of the K-PRT, and is useful via a feminist analysis for understanding Canada’s collaborative approaches in Kandahar.

2.3.2.1 3D, Whole of Government, and the specificities of a PRT

Research surrounding the concepts of “3D” and “whole of government” pertain directly to Canada’s work in Kandahar through the PRT. The concepts of 3D and WOG grew out of foundational research in public administration and has since expanded into several academic fields under many different names. Theorists working on these concepts come from a variety of academic backgrounds, and have explored the elements behind its many iterations, such as horizontal policy coordination, horizontal integration (Mamuji 2012), integrated peacebuilding (Travers and Owen 2008), the new stabilization agenda (Muggah 2014), participatory management, interactive policymaking, stakeholder governance, collaborative management, collaborative governance, network governance, collaborative networks (see Ansell and Gash 2008, 548; Mamuji 2012, 209), and joined-up government (Patrick and Brown 2007; Mischen 2015). Furthermore, Canadian international development scholars have studied collaborative approaches in detail through various edited volumes (Brown 2012a; Brown, den Heyer and Black 2016; Brown and Grävingholt 2016) and through a special issue of the American Review of Canadian Studies, which brought together
scholars from political science, public administration, and security studies to explore Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan in detail, addressing the concepts of 3D, WOG, counterinsurgency, and the structural elements of the PRT. Additionally, a recent doctoral survey of the operationalization of WOG in relation to fragile states succeeded in developing an interdisciplinary framework of operational incentives and barriers to implementation (Baechler 2016). From this body of literature, I explore in greater detail the connection between civilian and military departments and organizations, and the nature of collaboration across these vastly different structures through a feminist lens. As the research from collaborative public management and collaborative governance served as a place to start exploring concepts of collaboration, this research serves to hone in on an effective analysis of the dissertation case study. Taken mainly from international development and security studies, this literature highlights, via a feminist analysis, the ways environmental and organizational contexts, structures and narratives, resource sharing, and unified policy and programmatic goals affect cooperative collaboration in specific civil-military cases in failed, fragile and conflict-affected states.

The growing international focus on 3D and WOG approaches coincided with increased attention paid to failed and fragile states following 9/11. The rationale was that these particular states, with their increased potential for harbouring terrorists and promoting international conflict, required more than a military response from the international community. According to the OECD (2006, 7), “fragile states face problems in a wide range of domains (e.g., provision of physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and the delivery of social services), indicating the need for a mix of actors, instruments, incentives and interventions”. Desrosiers and Lagassé (2009, 667) note that concern with state fragility was a vibrant research program in security studies in the 1990s, with links between state fragility and threats to
international stability being increasingly identified by the security studies community. It wasn’t until the attacks of September 11, 2001 that failed and fragile states became explicitly linked with international security: “given their inability or unwillingness to control their territory and secure their borders, FFS [failed and fragile states] could serve as safe havens for transnational terrorist organisations, as Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia had done for Al Qaeda” (Desrosiers and Lagassé 2009, 667). Organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD DAC began to place failed and fragile states higher on their list of priorities, while “the international community proclaimed the importance of holistically responding to state fragility” (Desrosiers and Lagassé 2009, 668). The OECD supported this principle when it called on DAC member nations to adopt a WOG approach to all failed, fragile and conflict-affected state interventions, with the underlying concept that “state fragility could only be effectively addressed when key government departments worked synergistically, with common goals and objectives in mind” (Desrosiers and Lagassé 2009, 668; see also OECD 2006; 2007; 2012). As such, much of the research coming out of international development studies and security studies focused on fragile states as “the crux of today’s development challenge and an increasing source of potential threats to global security” (Patrick and Brown 2007, 1; Travers and Owen 2008, 689).

For large international organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, and many UN agencies, the understanding is that within failed, fragile and conflict-affected states, “the political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others” (OECD 2006, 7; see also Patrick and Brown 2007, 1). Thus, collaborative approaches like Canada’s 3D, WOG, and CA are viewed as favourable, given that, according to the OECD, they offer the potential to conduct long-term development and stability work in fragile states at a lower overall fiscal cost, they reduce of risk of these objectives either being compromised or simply not
being met, and they increase the legitimacy of collaborative policies and activities in the eyes of the recipient country, resulting in a positive response from local populations, organizations and governments (OECD 2006, 7). Researchers suggest that to bolster, reform or reconstruct failed, fragile and conflict-affected states, efforts by donor countries “must simultaneously address security and stability, good governance, and development needs” (Patrick and Brown 2007, 1). Moreover, “to do so effectively, donors must draw on a wide range of capabilities and instruments spanning traditionally independent spheres of diplomacy, development, and defense (the 3Ds), as well as trade, finance, intelligence, and others”, and that “these elements of engagement should be consciously aligned so as to be mutually reinforcing” (Patrick and Brown 2007, 1). Yet, a greater emphasis on the role of the security sector in WOG approaches is clear, as the OECD notes that “greater coherence between security and development policies is a key to establishing an effective WGA [whole of government approach] to fragile states”, and “as a result, security actors and objectives related to the security domain are increasingly included in the development debate, as are economic actors, justice departments and others” (OECD 2006, 7). As theorists in international development studies will attest—and this is thoroughly explored in relation to the K-PRT in the chapters to follow—this increased focus and valuing of the security arm of collaborative approaches will almost inevitably devalue tried and tested approaches to development and aid effectiveness (Brown 2012b; Carrier and Tiessen 2013; den Heyer 2012; Simpson 2007; Swiss 2012).

Researchers in international development and security studies will talk of “policy coherence” in relation to collaborative approaches such as 3D, WOG, and CA (Brown 2012b; Cameron 2016; Patrick and Brown 2007). According to Brown (2012b, 9), “there are several levels of potential coherence, including: 1) between various aid/development policies of a specific donor;
2) between a donor’s aid/development policies and its other policies, both foreign and domestic; 3) between the donor country and the recipient country’s policies; and 4) between various donors’ aid/development policies”. Of these four categorizations of policy coherence, international discussions focus almost exclusively on the second level, wherein internal government departments that focus outward, such as those of development, diplomacy and defence, find their policy goals aligned (Brown 2012b, 9). Theoretically, these researchers argue that the concept of policy coherence is a good one: “a government’s departments should not work at cross-purposes but rather coordinate and cooperate toward common policy goals. The resulting whole-of-government approach can therefore harness resources more effectively to achieve government objectives, however they are defined” (Brown 2012b, 9). Indeed, if one is thinking solely of development, policy coherence “recognizes that more than just aid is required for development, including reforms to the global trading system” (Brown 2012b, 9). This is reflected in the international community’s call for collaborative approaches to fragile states, and is seen throughout Canada’s 3D/WOG/CA approach through the K-PRT.

However, within structures such as PRTs, policy coherence and the sharing of resources often mean the channeling of development into the security agenda. Indeed, the very conceptualization of PRTs as structures that facilitate civil-military cooperation encourages this channeling of policy goals and resources (Holland 2009, 10; 2010, 278; Petrik 2016). Their similar structure to a military base and their commandment by a lieutenant colonel or other high-ranking military official naturally predisposes the space to be conceptualized as a military-controlled area, despite military and civilian personnel being considered as equal within its scope (Holland 2010, 278; Petrik 2016). Holland (2009, 10; 2010, 278) notes that typically, a PRT will have between 60-100 civilian personnel supported by several hundred combat-ready soldiers. This means that,
“because of their predominant numbers and the dangerous environment, the military members of the PRT must perform development and governance tasks themselves, as well as fight the insurgents and provide protection to the civilians once they venture ‘beyond the wire’ to do their work” (Holland 2010, 278). Indeed, Mamuji (2012, 211; see also Banerjee 2008, 2009) notes that with the establishment of Canadian leadership of the K-PRT, there came “the introduction of quick impact projects (QIPs), where military personnel would engage in short-term and small-scale ‘hearts and minds’ efforts”. This has gendered implications, as increased military involvement in civilian projects demonstrate the hegemony of hypermasculinity in collaboration. The progression of the K-PRT from 3D to WOG to CA, with the consolidation of leadership under civilian actors and the development of large-scale Signature Projects and Priorities, would not necessarily disrupt this hegemony as the prevailing structure and narratives of the PRT are influenced by a greater Western masculine context.

Clearly, the very characteristics of a PRT, from the hierarchical command structure to the greater numbers of combat troops, encourage a disequilibrium between military and civilian actors engaging in collaboration and encourage a greater demonstration of militarized, hypermasculine characteristics. Research from security studies and international development have noted this phenomenon thoroughly, highlighting that in addition to the power of the military to harness the processes of collaboration, “the competing interests that emerge from the simultaneous pursuit of political, commercial, security, and development goals tend to disfavour an orientation based mainly on effective development assistance – especially in conflict-affected countries and ‘fragile states’” (Brown and Raddatz 2012, 334-335). Many theorists have found that in the context of failing, fragile and conflict-affected states, “governments often instrumentalize aid for non-development purposes, potentially via a whole-of-government approach, and invoke ‘feel-good’
development issues or effectiveness concerns to legitimize self-interested measures that do not constitute improvements on previous policies or are unlikely to improve the impact of aid from a development perspective” (Brown and Raddatz 2012, 335; see also Brown 2012b; 2016; den Heyer 2012; Swiss 2012; 2016). For these researchers, the legitimization that collaborative approaches find comes from the shoring up of military policy and resources against long-term development and reconstruction, and the pursuit of national interest at the expense of sustainable, locally-driven development work. This squares with feminist analysis that argues that the lasting hegemony of masculinity to dictate our public and private interactions is upheld via those interactions and processes that reflect militarized and corporate displays of masculine power.

2.3.3 The Comprehensive Approach

With the global trend only continuing to support collaboration through collaborative approaches such as 3D, WOG, and CA, this thorough research becomes all the more important for rigorous analysis of empirical evidence, with the goal of improving both collaborative practice and theory in the long-term. This phenomenon includes Canada as well. Indeed, Travers and Owen (2008, 686-687) note that:

Whatever the initial motives for adopting an integrated approach, it fits well with Canada’s history of military and humanitarian commitments. Equally, Canada is not alone in making this shift. The move towards comprehensive solutions to state failure is a broader trend in international politics and is well supported by academic research. This approach is more than a passing fad and is likely to shape future peacebuilding efforts.

The most recent iteration of Canada’s collaborative approach is known as the Comprehensive Approach, or CA. Much research on CA has been undertaken in recent years by Canadian security
studies scholars. This research is best demonstrated through the edited volume *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach* (Rostek and Gizewski, 2011). This volume contributes to the compilation of a large and ever-expanding body of literature, and argues “that an evolution in thinking is underway as governments and multilateral institutions look for more effective ways of addressing security/humanitarian challenges” (Gammer 2012, 2; see also Gammer 2013, 211). Research surrounding the comprehensive approach focuses on security, the military, and stabilization missions far more than the previously highlighted bodies of literature, with analysis extending as far back as the period following the end of the Cold War (Gizewski 2011; Nossal 2011, 1). Building on the development of concepts such as collaborative public management and governance approaches, doctrines of counterinsurgency (COIN)\(^9\) and civil-military (and similarly, civil-police, or “civ-pol”) cooperation (CIMIC)\(^10\), the Three Block War model, 3D, WOG, and the experience of PRTs, researchers studying CA train their line of questioning towards the blurring line between war-fighting and post-conflict peace support operations, and on the growing recognition among foreign policy planners that a more coordinated and holistic approach to security operations is needed (Ball and Febbraro 2011, 25-26; Gammer 2012, 2; Gizewski 2011, 15-16; Nossal 2011, 1). Canadian scholars studying CA seek

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\(^9\) Counterinsurgency, or COIN, is defined by the US Government’s Counterinsurgency Guide (US Government 2009, 2) as “the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective elements, with military forces playing an enabling role. COIN is an extremely complex undertaking, which demands of policy makers a detailed understanding of their own specialist field, but also a broad knowledge of a wide variety of related disciplines”.

\(^10\) According to the United States Institute of Peace (2018), civil-military cooperation, or CIMIC, is a “broad term that covers a variety of collaborative relationships between civilian and military actors in a conflict environment. Civilian actors may include government officials, staff from international organizations, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations. Civ-mil cooperation ranges from occasional informational meetings to comprehensive programs where civilian and military partners share planning and implementation. Cooperation can be controversial, as the military may see civilians as unduly complicating their mission, and civilians—especially in the humanitarian field—may think that any association with the military will compromise their impartiality and threaten their personal safety. However, most experts see civ-mil cooperation as necessary to provide the security, knowledge, and skills needed to help transform a conflict into an enduring peace”.

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to understand the different roles that foreign policy planners, the non-governmental sector, and the private sector play in ensuring that the operations of government agencies such as the armed forces, the foreign ministry, the development assistance agency, and others involved in stabilization missions, such as national police forces, become less fragmented and discrete (Nossal 2011, 1). Overall, this body of literature explores the growing belief within the public service that in “today’s security environment, durable and sustainable responses to security challenges – both at home and abroad – are unlikely to be achieved through the efforts of any single agency or organization” (Gizewski 2011, 13).

Research surrounding CA has been appropriately critical, with most scholars arguing that “the continued development of the concept depends deeply on breaking down the barriers which can impede the creation of constructive relationships between organizations” (Nossal 2011, 2-3). Canadian security studies researchers highlight the power imbalances that impede egalitarian relationships between the various departments and stakeholders of the comprehensive approach, including addressing concerns over the excessive military influence in the development of the approach and how to establish inter-organizational trust and best practices (Ball and Febbraro 2011; Nossal 2011; Vavro and Roy, 2011), stressing that successful comprehensive approaches must find ways to work with local populations, rather than for them, to achieve sustainable results (Koros and He, 2011; Nossal 2011), and in the case of fragile and conflict-affected states, recommending that effective approaches must be based on a solid knowledge of societal networks, an understanding of principles of non-linearity and flexibility and the development of a wide and varying knowledge base that can be efficiently marshalled and applied to problems when required (Nossal 2011; Roy 2011). Most interestingly is the focus on the often-overbearing role of the Canadian military: “while the military may be a key enabler of the CA, complexity demands
mobilizing all possible actors to contribute to both defining the problem confronted and to executing the programs designed to ameliorate it. In this regard, continued refinement of the CA is essential” (Nossal 2011, 6). As research on CA continues to push the concept forward, academics are finding that the most effective models of the approach use mixed methods, harness a variety of knowledge bases (from a variety of stakeholders) to assess complex situations, and recognize that designing future approaches cannot place the military at the centre of command. Indeed, with the transition from the 3D approach to the WOG approach in Kandahar, we saw a push for increased civilian-military collaboration, facilitated through the establishment of the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) within the former DFAIT, and the close working relationships of the commander of the CF and the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) in Afghanistan (Gammer 2012; 2013). What this literature remains uncritical of, however, is how the collaborating departments alongside the military are inevitably affected my hypermasculine, militarized contexts, structures and narratives that the military promotes, and that uphold and are maintained by the hegemony of masculinity.

As was seen through the exploration of various literature on collaboration here, the basic building blocks of CA have existed for quite some time. What is unique to this conceptualization, however, is the increased formal articulation of, and concerted efforts to develop, implement and institutionalize, the concept, particularly in Canada (Gizewski 2011, 14). Thus, the prominent position that the military and militarized collaborative processes hold in both the approach and its analysis is of growing importance. As was noted elsewhere, but is particularly salient to studies of CA, growing political and bureaucratic interest in the concept “is largely a function of the evolving security environment – an environment which has increased both the need for such an approach and, at the same time, the capacity to practice it (particularly given developments in information
and communication technologies)” (Gizewski 2011, 14). Like with collaborative public management and collaborative governance, many definitions of the approach exist. Of these definitions, each agree that CA can be useful as a means of achieving greater awareness and interaction with other agencies and organizations, that the approach can be an essential means of facilitating greater organizational cooperation in attaining security objectives, and that collaborative interaction, and the information, understanding and organizational synergies that can be gained from use of the approach, can be useful as a means of enhancing the prospects for sound decision-making and coherent, integrated and effective responses to security challenges (Gizewski 2011, 14; see also Ball and Febbraro 2011). With the heightened focus on security and the role of the military, however, these definitions require a feminist analysis to investigate the effect that security narratives and military structures have on collaborating departments and organizations.

Most critiques surrounding the role of the military and the focus on security in the comprehensive approach are cautionary, stressing that “with the flood of [civilian] actors invading the modern operational space, the implementation [of] more harmonized, de-conflicted and synchronized programming would most assuredly benefit the recipients” (Vavro and Roy 2011, 36). Ball and Febbraro (2011, 27) note that “within the new security environment, not only is there a broader range of players than was the case in the past; militaries themselves are taking on a broader range of non-traditional, non-war-fighting functions, such as reconstruction and development projects, in order to address the new and increasingly complex challenges”. This shift has been slow, but since the end of the Cold War there has been an increasingly salient role for the military in humanitarian aid operations, as the number of complex humanitarian crises has risen within failed and failing states (Ball and Febbraro 2011, 27). With the gift of hindsight, Vavro and Roy (2011, 35-36) highlight that the shifting security paradigm towards CA permits researchers to
see the ways that coordinated efforts historically found success in events such as the Malayan Emergency, the British approach in Kenya, both World Wars, and even the Boer War; not to mention the peace enforcement missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the recent campaigns by NATO countries in Iraq and Afghanistan, Canada included. Yet despite the evidence that these coordinated efforts found greater success due to their joined-up nature, research shows that the development of CA has faced many hurdles that, through a feminist lens, reveal the hegemony of hypermasculine, militarized forms of masculinity (Vavro and Roy 2011, 43).

The biggest impediments to the progression of the approach include a) the continued perception that it is a military initiative that demands military leadership, resulting in militarized dominance issues that breed a lack of trust between collaborating organizations, and ultimately b) the inability to focus on the future to sustain reconstruction and development efforts beyond the quick-impact projects that militaries typically use to win the hearts and minds of locals (Vavro and Roy 2011, 43-45). Ball and Febbraro (2011, 29-32), in their research surrounding effective civil-military cooperation, note that the difficult relationship between the military and the NGO community is predicated on five overarching sources of tension: “1) organizational structure and culture; 2) tasks and ways of accomplishing them; 3) definitions of success and time frames; 4) abilities to exert influence and control information; and 5) control of resources”. Of these five, organizational structure and culture is the most prominent, with the hierarchical, authoritarian, and centralized style of management that characterizes the military overpowering the often diffuse, flattened hierarchy of NGOs and their proclivity for consensus-based and decentralized decision-making (Ball and Febbraro 2011, 29). In addition, militaries are often composed of young men, typically between the ages of 19 and 22 and of a uniracial background, whereas NGOs have members that are typically women, range in age from their 20s to 40s, and have very diverse ethnic
and racial backgrounds, leading to frequent—and gendered—misunderstandings and miscommunications between the two organizational structures (Ball and Febbraro 2011, 30). And as militaries are frequently used to fill gaps in personnel due to urgent requirements, such as providing security escorts for development and diplomatic personnel, the overlap between vastly different organizations only continues to become further institutionalized and entrenched within CA (Vavro and Roy 2011, 43). Moreover, quite ironically, this emphasis on military centrality is reflected in the research methodology surrounding CA, as the perception that it is a military approach “is associated with the amount of resources militaries have massed to study the concept” (Vavro and Roy 2011, 43). For CA to grow both as a mode of action and as a research subject, it must be approached from new vantage points and modes of thought that challenge the centrality of the military, the hierarchical and authoritarian might of its structure, and the latent effects of its hypermasculine structure on collaborating partners.

From their critical approach to studying CA, security studies researchers provide normative suggestions for how the approach ought to be designed and implemented. Gizewski (2011, 15; emphasis in original) provides a summary of what the field professes for the future of CA: a ‘fully functional’ CA would feature proactive engagement between actors (if possible ahead of a crisis), so as to ensure more coordinated approaches and nuanced responses to complex situations. It would reflect shared understanding between parties, whether military or civilian; thus optimizing the effectiveness of partner capabilities, distinct professional, technical and cultural disciplines, and discrete values and perceptions. It would feature outcome-based thinking – with participants involved in operations focusing on what is required to deliver the desired end state when planning and conducting activities. Moreover, it would be characterized by a culture of collaborative working, generated through personal contact, human networking and mutual trust.
Indeed, such understanding is critical for building the institutional familiarity between participants necessary for the effective function of the approach. Yet considering these recommendations through a feminist lens that accounts for imbalances in power, the possibility remains that for institutional players attempting to work collaboratively, the one which most closely demonstrates the hegemony of masculinity will exert more power over the relationship.

These suggestions come from the many critiques that have assessed past Canadian and international examples of CA to be sporadic and ad hoc in nature (Gizewski 2011, 17). Canadian collaborative responses, including the K-PRT, were found to be driven by a high sense of urgency and stitched together quickly in response to immediate challenges and crises, featured makeshift institutional mechanisms, structures and processes, required the full and active support of top political leaders and bureaucrats, and were of relatively limited duration (Gizewski 2011, 17). The central position of the military, in both its overbearing position within the comprehensive approach and its pursuit of research and development of it, became the centre of much of this critique. From a feminist perspective, this central position of the military and the prioritization of militarized collaborative processes are inevitable outcomes of hegemonic masculinity, particularly when there is little planning or organization involved in the development of a collaborative approach: in such instances, the pervasive and normalized effects of militarized masculinity will take hold of the steering wheel. The role and positionality of the military, and the power imbalances inherent in resource sharing, departmental trust and unified policy goals in collaborative processes like CA—which continues to find favour both in Canada and internationally as the ideal response to issues of state fragility, failed and failing states, and conflict-affected regions—must be explored with a much-needed gender-focused lens.

2.4 Conclusion
Each of the bodies of literature on collaboration detailed in this chapter have demonstrated that they are missing an analytical element that could help them assess why structural power imbalances and conflicts occur when attempting to collaborate over resources and complex policy directives, why the might of the military is seemingly inevitable within collaborative approaches in the context of war, and why there appears a subsequent lack of trust of organizations that become dependent on military leadership. This analytical element, provided by feminist theory on masculinities, permits the interrogation of the obstacles that affect the legitimization of collaborative approaches, from short-term unsustainability to interorganizational conflict. These theories begin to push our conceptualization of power within collaboration, and highlight how institutions of varying sizes, resources, personnel, and policies will inevitably clash, be taken over by, or become subsumed within other organizations as the collaborative approach gains legitimacy. What they do not do is provide an answer to why those organizations or arrangements that find power within collaborative approaches will time and again reflect the hegemonic masculinity of corporatized and militarized characteristics of leadership, hierarchy, tight management, structure, and narrative.

Cynthia Enloe (2005, 280) provides a challenge to skeptical researchers who say feminists are on the wrong track: “what if patriarchy is the ‘Big Picture’?” She presses: “what if a principal engine of causality in societal conflict – and its chances for long-term resolution – is the contested, interlocking constructions of public and private masculinized privilege?” (Enloe 2005, 282). In exploring the literature on collaboration through a critical post-structural feminist lens, I am disrupting what we understand to be normal in comprehensive approaches like the Canadian collaborative approach in Kandahar from a gender-sensitive position. This lens reveals the
importance of understanding the power of hegemonic masculinity in collaborative responses to cases of state fragility and conflict. For the Kandahar PRT, it allows me to ask what gender looks like, where it is found, and how it is utilized to address issues of gender equality in Canada’s collaborative approach as a core component of the process, and not as a marginalized addition. The power of hegemonic masculinity, and the role of varying hypermasculinities in maintaining that power, ensure that any reference to “gender” is in pursuit of “women” and their perception as victims, and in erasing the “other” – feminine, non-Western – that stands in the way of militarism. In the following chapter, I move beyond why it is important to explore the comprehensive approach from a gender perspective, to how: I design a feminist research ethic as a methodological approach and use a critical feminist frame analysis that is informed by the theories described here.
3 Feminist Methodology: Gender as a Frame for Collaboration

In the previous chapter, I explored how literature based in critical, post-structural feminism is able to highlight the explanatory inadequacies of literature on collaboration from public administration, international relations and international development for the case of Canada’s PRT in Kandahar. Critical, post-structural feminist theory is a necessary avenue through which to interrogate these bodies of literature, as it reveals the gendered power dynamics maintained through hegemonic masculinity that are inherent in complex policy structures like the WOG approach. This body of theory also directly allows me to answer my research question, and as such, I will present how this theoretical lens is applied to the case study of the K-PRT in this dissertation. What are the methodological processes that constitute a critical, post-structural feminist analysis? How does this methodology allow me to answer the research question of this dissertation: How did the Canadian whole-of-government approach in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, which created a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permit more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality? In this chapter, I discuss the feminist research ethic that I have devised for my research, and explain the utility of a feminist frame analysis for an exploration of the case study. Following this, I lay out my case study—the Canadian whole-of-government management of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team from 2005 to 2011—and the methodological elements—texts derived from official government sources and interviews with military and civilian K-PRT participants—required to conduct the feminist frame analysis.
3.1 Feminist Research Ethic: Theory and Practice

A feminist research ethic is informed by several bodies of feminist theory and research,\textsuperscript{11} and is a methodological commitment that guides the researcher to attend to such concepts as the power of epistemology, the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, relationships, and the situatedness of the researcher within the research process (Acklerly and True 2010, 2). Moreover, Ackerly and True (2010, 2) note that a feminist research ethic is a “normative commitment to transforming the social order in order to promote gender justice”. For my research, my feminist research ethic is informed specifically by critical feminist theory and post-structural (also often referred to as postmodern\textsuperscript{12}) feminism, as these two fields of feminist research best permit me to interrogate and answer my research question vis-à-vis the bodies of literature on collaboration.

Post-structural feminism as a methodology embraces skepticism: it works to interrogate and disrupt “the idea of any universal basis for reason, science, progress, or even the subject” (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 240). It engages with the social world from a discursive level, arguing that gender is a social and linguistic construction that hinges on a specific time and place, determined by existing social ideas and conceptions of what being a ‘woman’ or a ‘man’ means (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 240-241). This frame of reference permits post-structural feminism to approach research through emphasizing the temporary and fragile nature of social constructions, and thus also pinpoint the harm or benefit these temporary constructions have on social contexts, structures,

\textsuperscript{11} Stienstra, Turenne Sjolander, and Smith (2003, 7-10) highlight the broader feminist approaches that inform such a research ethic originate in feminist literature, and include ‘feminist empiricism’, ‘feminist standpoint’, ‘feminist critical theory’, and ‘feminist postmodernism’. They note that these are the feminist approaches most discussed in international relations, however they remain applicable within the field of public administration as well, particularly in discussion of foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{12} See Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 240, where poststructural feminism and postmodern feminism are discussed in tandem.
and narratives. In the case of Canada’s PRT in Kandahar, critical feminism as a methodology directs the empirical analysis to the location of gender – in all its varied constructions – in relation to the collaborative approach and the militarized context within which that approach is pursued.

Critical feminism builds on the normative goals of feminist research overall, and “uses critical inquiry and reflection on social injustice by way of gender analysis, to transform, and not simply explain, the social order” (Ackerly and True 2010, 2, emphasis in original). Because of this normative aspect, critical feminist theory “encourages opening new lines of inquiry versus simply ‘filling the gaps’ in already established disciplinary terrains” (Ackerly and True 2010, 2). It is this element of critical feminism that adds to my feminist research ethic: in order to answer my research question, I required a methodology that looked at the Canadian collaborative approach in Kandahar from a new perspective, particularly as the case of the K-PRT involved issues of women’s rights and gender equality at the policy and programming level. Using a post-structural feminist lens as the basis of my skepticism, the critical feminist position permitted me to engage with the case of the K-PRT as one that should be problematized from a gender perspective: why does the K-PRT look the way it does, and why did it develop from 3D to WOG to CA? What was the international context surrounding the K-PRT that contributed to its design? What narratives maintained the militarized social and structural order of the K-PRT? Why is the plight of Afghan women and girls so important in the context of the K-PRT, and how did their role factor into the collaborative approach the Canadian departments undertook? These guiding questions drove the bulk of my attempt to answer the research question of whether the Canadian WOG approach in the K-PRT, which created a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permitted more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality.
Critical feminism’s contribution to my feminist research ethic is its crucial focus on how to ascertain the gendered power imbalances inherent in my case study of the K-PRT. Critical feminism does not necessarily mean a gender analysis is used just as gender analysis isn’t necessarily feminist\(^\text{13}\), but for my case study, following the “gender thread” throughout the discursive tapestry of Canada’s K-PRT meant I could answer my research question through problematizing an aspect of the WOG approach that received a considerable degree of policy and programming focus from a feminist position. According to Ackerly and True (2010, 26):

Gender analysis is a conceptual toolkit for noticing the epistemological power that binary gender and heterosexuality constructs of man/woman, and sex/gender have on our understanding of a range of political and social phenomena including, for instance, freedom/vulnerability, war/peace, public/private, reason/emotion, mind/body, objective/subjective knowledge (Butler [1990]1999). In particular gender analysis reveals the power of epistemology to mask important differences, inequalities, and domination and to construct the language through which we understand our experience.

This frame of reference allowed me to conduct interviews and read government text from an understanding of the K-PRT narrative as predicated on the hegemonic socio-cultural perspective of gender as embedded in binaries that infer a power imbalance in favour of masculinity, particularly in the context of war. As was discussed in the previous chapter, it is naturalized and normalized that we see these binaries, particularly when considering issues of state fragility, from

\(^{13}\) It is important to understand that an analytical focus on gender is only feminist if it considers the power imbalances inherent in the concept of gender itself, particularly considering the power hierarchy that hegemonic masculinity encourages. According to Ahall (2016, 4), “discussing ‘the political’ from a feminist perspective, it is important to reiterate that an analytical focus on gender is not necessarily feminist”. A feminist perspective puts politics – and thereby power – at the core of the analysis in a way that a gender analysis does not (Ahall 2016, 4; Enloe 2010, xi–xii). A feminist approach typically designates the woman (being) as the subject of its analysis, whereas a gender approach designates gender (concept) as the focus of its analysis, but the understanding of the power imbalances and relational nature of gender is only realized through a feminist lens.
a gendered position that is built on both societal expectation and personal experience: when we think of war, we often think of masculine conceptualizations like strength, force, aggression, protection, weaponry, killing, lack of remorse and stoicismin; when we think of peace, we think of feminine conceptualizations such as kindness, softness, development aid, long-term reconstruction, education, expressions of love and sadness, and emotional responses to devastation. The utility of critical feminist gender analysis for my case study was that it provided a clear roadmap to highlight these associations, and allowed me to interrogate why they are considered normal in the policy implementation of the K-PRT.

3.1.1 Critical, Post-Structural Feminism, Discourse Analysis, and Frame Analysis

This feminist research ethic encircles my entire methodological approach to this project. As it demands a critical skepticism that looks for new avenues of interrogation, my project engages in frame analysis, which “explores how meanings are produced through the use of language and categorization” (Ackerly and True 2010, 209) via analysis of social texts in an attempt to ascertain the overarching narrative of the K-PRT and its relation to gender. These social texts include official written documentation produced by the Canadian government departments of the K-PRT, and interviews conducted with military and civilian personnel engaged in the Canadian WOG approach. Frame analysis has seen increased attention by feminist scholars in recent years, particularly through the moniker Critical Frame Analysis (CFA), which “was developed to analyze and address discursive power dynamics connected to policy making” (van der Haar and Verloo

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However, this form of frame analysis is more suited to large datasets, with open codes used to characterize text, computer software programs to store and organize the codes, and multi-person research teams to sift through and analyze the results (van der Haar and Verloo 2016). Researchers van der Haar and Verloo applied the specific CFA methodology to two large research projects that set out to describe and analyze comparatively and systematically how gender equality is framed as a policy problem across Europe, and have since been working to track its overall application in varying feminist projects internationally (van der Haar and Verloo 2016).

Frame analysis is closely associated with and deeply informed by discourse analysis, which “seeks to analyze the meanings embedded in texts that reflect other discourses and indeed the broader discursive environment in which language constructs both meaning and power relations” (Ackerly and True 2010, 208-209). Both frame analysis and discourse analysis recognize that “discourse and framing can be the ‘subject’ of analysis in questions about how social movements or policymakers frame their arguments” and are useful for critical feminist skepticism in that they identify that the ‘subject’ – the way social discourse is framed – and the ‘analysis’ of such – the production of a frame with which to view social discourse – are inextricably linked (Ackerly and True 2010, 209). Yet I elect to use frame analysis rather than discourse analysis in its purest form, as “discourse analysis is also a way of looking closely at text (whether that text originates in oral or written form) in order to understand the meaning of the words” (Ackerly and True 2010, 209). Rather than a close reading of the social texts – the written documents and spoken interviews – related to Canada in Kandahar, I focus on the way the texts reflect a “master frame” (Ackerly and True 2010, 210-211) around which militarism and the militarization of civilian approaches to state fragility are normalized in the policy, structure, and narrative of the K-PRT. When I produce a
frame informed by critical, post-structural feminism to further interrogate this social discourse, I learn about how such normalization reflects unequal gendered power dynamics between players within the K-PRT.

Understanding frame analysis requires an understanding of discourse analysis due to their methodological similarities. Discourse analysis does not attempt to search for an absolute truth in its methodology; rather, it “claims that through language people engage in constructing the social world” (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 232). It works from an understanding that all social constructs, including such constructs as the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach, are developed, maintained, and promoted through social discourses of a particular place and time, whether they are official statements, reports, or other written documents; or conversations, interviews, or other spoken expressions. When studying a case like the K-PRT that is steeped in militarism and militarization, discourse analysis informs my frame analysis by being “the process through which we read these events, how we might consider these militarised events ‘just normal’, forming part of common sense, the sense of ‘but that is just what we do’” (Ahall 2016, 10). Frame analysis and discourse analysis are interested in how masculinities—and in the case of the K-PRT, militarized masculinity—make lasting impressions on our policy, our programming, and our everyday lives; such analyses are interested in the politics involved when there is little space to resist these maneuvers, as in a war zone or other conflict-affected place; and are interested in the gendered aspects of such processes of normalization, of how militarization links to and ultimately manipulates ideas about both femininity and masculinity (Ahall 2016, 10; see also Enloe 2000a, 2000b, 2014).

It is important to detail the underlying methodological assumptions of discourse analysis that informs my framing of the case of the K-PRT:
1. Language is used for a variety of functions and has a variety of consequences.
2. Language is both constructed and constructive.
3. The same phenomenon can be described in several different ways.
4. Consequently, there will be considerable variations in the accounts of it.
5. There is no foolproof way yet of handling these variations or of distinguishing accounts which are ‘literal’ or ‘accurate’ from those which are rhetorical or incorrect, thus avoiding the problem of variation which faces researchers working with a more ‘realistic’ language model.
6. The constructive and flexible ways in which language is used should themselves be a central subject of study (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 232-233).

According to Yanow (1996), discourse analyses are valuable for the interpretation of discursive products, such as texts of varying formality, conversations, speeches, and policies, from multiple directions. I frame the discursive products of the K-PRT and the Canadian WOG approach from a place of skepticism regarding gender; that is, I continually ask in my feminist research ethic how gender plays a role in the narrative devised by the designers, actors and communicators of the K-PRT. This includes not only what was said in interviews with military personnel and public servants and what was produced in the official written narrative of the Canadian WOG approach, but also in how the approach was arranged; revealed in how the WOG approach was designed and carried out over the six-year span Canada spent in Kandahar. As noted by Griffin (2009, 31), “a gender-discourse analysis is a research agenda that does not simply accept or seek to explain the status quo of power relations in contemporary global governance, but instead challenges the gendered foundations on which hierarchies, centres and discursive structures are built”. Through
frame analysis, I challenge the policy, structure, and narrative of the K-PRT through the frame of gender.

Discourses “produce identities, meanings, desires, and thus power and are embodied in a multitude of practices, institutions, identities, norms, rules and disciplinary procedures” (Griffin 2009, 28, emphasis in original). Thus, our social and institutional structures, and our understandings of them, are constructed, relational, political, and never neutral: they cannot express any rational, objective and static ‘truth’ (Griffin 2009, 28). The key element to conducting a feminist-informed frame analysis defined by gender is to recognize the relational, hierarchical and power imbalanced aspects of common forms of human discourse production: people tend to understand themselves and others in relation to their social understandings, their upbringing, their immediate environments, and their distinctive knowledges based in gendered hierarchies that imply masculine power and feminine submission, and through these relations, produce written work, films and photography, create artwork, speeches and presentations, and engage in dialogue that maintain and reproduce these gendered hierarchies and power relationships. As such, “to frame analysis in objectivity is problematic because it is to assume that humans have perfect knowledge of, access to and control over their environment, history and future.” (Griffin 2009, 29). Discourses are never static, nor are they owned; they are formulated and reformulated in the social sphere, amongst the many actors and institutions that build and rely on the discourse to provide consistency and structure to our world (Yanow 1996, 5). This includes the place of the researcher: I situate my feminist knowledge of gender within my application of frame analysis. I interrogate the case of the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach through a perspective of gender that is situationally dependent on my knowledge, the knowledge of my interview participants, and
the socio-cultural context within which the official narrative of the K-PRT was developed and implemented.

3.1.2 Self-Reflexivity

The utility of frame analysis informed by the methodological design of discourse analysis is that it allows me to remain skeptical not only of the case itself, but of the theoretical basis—my informed understanding of gender—on which my analysis of the case rests. This reflects the inextricable link between subject and analysis that was noted earlier in the chapter. As noted by Wilcox (2011, 596), feminists have “used the concept of gender to argue that not only are practices of international security based on certain gender discourses, but that the ways in which we study security are also gendered—that the knowing subject is an embodied subject”. This skepticism of the theoretical basis is two-fold: I remain cognizant of social definitions of gender held by my interview participants, and I compare the external definitions of gender I interact with in the interviews and through the reading of texts against my own internal definition of gender as a researcher with academic training in gender-based theory and methods of analysis. In other words, I employ self-reflexivity in my feminist research ethic (Ackerly and True 2010; Doucet and Mauthner 2005; Ferguson 2005; Wibben 2011). Being self-reflexive allows the researcher to recognize the potential gender biases inherent in the participant and the researcher herself, in addition to recognizing the same within a discursive product. In this dissertation, this is considered from several angles. First, I recognize that military personnel and civilian policy actors implementing K-PRT policy will inevitably have a worldview, fashioned by their experiences and education in Western culture and society, through which they interpret the policy they are given. Moreover, I recognize that texts, including policies, are embedded within the culture and society
that creates them, as well as framed within the structural interpretation of the society for which they are written (as is the case for most foreign policy, including the policy directives of the K-PRT). Finally, I remain self-reflexive of my role as the researcher: I am a young, white, cishet\textsuperscript{15}, female academic with considerable training in feminist theory and methodology, but who has no on-the-ground experience in Kandahar, Afghanistan, nor has worked within a WOG culture for a Canadian government department in a fragile or conflict-affected context.

This has meant that throughout the research, I have been able to recognize certain discursive elements related to gender and women more readily than I have discursive elements surrounding collaborative power relationships between different Canadian government departments, or the power relationships between Canadian WOG personnel and local Afghan actors. As such, I framed my analysis between feminism and theories of collaboration to draw out recurring discourses related to gender and power at the international level (the policy context within which the K-PRT was situated), the structural level (the design of the K-PRT itself), and the narrative level (the collaborative relationships between military, civilian, and local actors in the K-PRT). These discursive levels are reflected in the chapters that follow, and attempt to reveal a highly self-reflexive attempt to frame the gendered discursive tapestry of the K-PRT and the Canadian WOG approach that reflects both critical, post-structural feminist theory and theory on collaboration from public administration, international relations, and international development arenas.

3.1.3 Frame Analysis and Hegemonic Masculinity

\textsuperscript{15} Cishet, used as both an adjective and a noun, describes a person who is both cisgender and heterosexual. “Cishet” is the combination of the terms “cisgender” and “heterosexual”. A person is cisgender if they identify with their assigned-at-birth gender; in the case of the researcher, a female who identifies as a woman. A person is heterosexual if they are attracted exclusively to people of the opposite sex; in the case of the researcher, a female who is attracted to males.
In framing my analysis via the “linguistic texts” and “utterances” (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009) of the K-PRT, when coupled with a feminist theoretical lens, I highlight a particular form of hegemonic masculine discourse that commands our broad understanding of the Canadian WOG approach in Kandahar. As “discourses develop historically and socially according to interrelated economic, social, geographical and linguistic trajectories”, it is expected that certain discourses will have greater control over our collective social conceptualizations than others – mainstream trajectories will derive a mainstream discourse (Griffin 2009, 29). These hegemonic discourses will differ from place to place and from time to time, but always will have invisible control over our collective understanding of that which is considered “normal”. To dissect and analyze these discourses reveals that even though they may seem solid, established and even concrete, they are always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their production (Griffin 2009, 29; Howarth et al. 2000, 4). The hegemonic masculine discourse of the Canadian WOG approach in the K-PRT creates meaning, identity and behaviour through the articulation and re-articulation of certain knowledges that favour hypermasculine forms of identity performance and structural expression: there is a constant battle being waged in this articulation to maintain the visibility—and therefore the normality—of those characteristics that value hypermasculinity while hiding the characteristics that contest it.

As noted by Griffin (2009, 30), the methodology of discourse analysis is “invariably specific to the subject under consideration”. Through framing the case of the K-PRT via a lens informed by critical, post-structural feminism, it encourages self-reflection and discursive attention to be paid to collaborative theories from a perspective that values gender. I reframe the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach as a particular institutionalized form of public collaboration.
in the context of a fragile state that is influenced by and supports hegemonic masculinity through the normalization of militarization and hypermasculinity. Without feminism, this interpretation of the K-PRT remains concealed, hiding the ethnocentricity and sexism of its assumptions through a governance discourse that appears to utter objective realities. For example, as is highlighted in the speeches interrogated in the introduction, it is common to see official discussion of the seemingly level playing field for men and women in uniform, the equal participation of all government departments involved in the K-PRT, and a particular emphasis paid to balancing the need for development, diplomacy, and defence in Kandahar through shared policy directives. Not to mention the deeply paternalistic push to “save the women and children” of Afghanistan that is cited in these speeches and elsewhere in the discourse of the K-PRT. Through the feminist framing I employ, the K-PRT is shown to reproduce a particular hegemonic masculine context, structure, and narrative through specific militarized hypermasculine discursive practices that encourage and uphold hypermasculine identities, meanings and behaviours. In so doing, the K-PRT “creates a ‘reality’ to match the limits of that which it can perceive as possible” (Griffin 2009, 30): given its context (embedded within a conflict-affected state and an international system of state power relations), its structure (designed as a military endeavour) and narrative (conveyed in terms that reinforce militarism and militarization), it must naturally be governed by the hegemony of militarized masculinity.

3.2 Account of the Research

To answer the question of how the Canadian WOG approach in the K-PRT, which created a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permitted more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality, and to investigate the K-PRT
and Canada’s WOG approach as a context that was constituted by and supported the hegemony of masculinity, I elected to focus solely on the single case of the K-PRT and qualitatively explore the case in terms of the phases of the Canadian WOG approach from 3D, to WOG, to CA, punctuated by the changes brought about by the Manley Report. The research question above, and the investigation it drives, is distinctly feminist in that it looks at a particularly well studied area (Canada’s role in Kandahar) from a frame that highlights gendered power hierarchies; it encourages the search for the women and their gendered experience within the case, and it strives to remain accountable to the feminist normative cause of transforming the understanding of a case so that those on the margins (typically women and intersectionally-identified minorities) can benefit (Ackerly and True 2010). As such, diving into the single case of the K-PRT and qualitatively parsing out its longitudinal transformations permits me to answer the research question via a feminist agenda.

3.2.1 Single Case

Case studies are useful qualitative research designs for highly complex social and cultural situations (Rudestam and Newton 2007, 50). Given the complex contextual, structural, and narrative makeup of the K-PRT, and its design transformations during Canada’s leadership period from 2005 to 2011, a single case research design is appropriate. Ackerly and True (2010, 129) detail that single case studies are useful when the research question requires the exploration of a topic “about which there has been very little related research, particularly when the subject is an experience or concept previously invisible or comprehended in only a superficial or anecdotal way”. For feminist researchers, the single case study is a common method for exploring social phenomena that have yet to be studied from a feminist perspective (Ackerly and True 2010, 131),
thus, the selection of the single case of the K-PRT meets the research criteria for critical, post-structural feminist analysis: it is a case that has yet to be studied from a feminist perspective using gender-based analysis techniques, and is also a case that demonstrates the utility of collaborative literature in highlighting Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar as an example of collaborative governance in action.

3.2.2 Methodological Elements

Accessing enough single case study data to analyze the discursive tapestry of the K-PRT via a feminist lens, and therefore answer the research question of how the Canadian WOG approach permitted more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality, required my gathering of multiple units of analysis: 1) publicly available government reports, speeches, and policy documents, as well as reports, studies, guidelines, and reviews by NGOs and international organizations; 2) primary archival data through Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests, which included emails, affidavits, statistical summaries and reports; and 3) interviews with military personnel and civil servants who were present at the K-PRT or involved in the design and implementation of the WOG processes therein. Given that I would be conducting interviews in addition to archival research of publicly available documents and ATIP requests, I submitted my project to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board (REB) at the University of Ottawa, and was granted approval to commence the research on January 20, 2015\textsuperscript{16}. I parsed my dissertation research into three phases: 1) collecting, reading, framing and analyzing publicly available linguistic texts; 2) collecting, reading, framing and analyzing ATIP requests;

\textsuperscript{16} Please see Appendix F for the Social Sciences and Humanities REB Certificate of Ethics Approval for this dissertation research.
and 3) conducting, transcribing, framing and analyzing interviews. Given the dynamic nature of qualitative research—it is typically conceptualized as linear or circular, but rarely follows such neatly laid out plans (Ackerly and True 2010, 43)—the three phases outlined above were often visited and revisited as the research process unfolded. For example, while I was accessing and collecting publicly available documents, I placed my requests for various ATIPs; while I reviewed the ATIP requests I received, I began building rapport with various facilitators and gatekeepers, setting appointments with potential interview participants, and conducting interviews; while I was conducting interviews, I returned to previously collected and analyzed documents to review them alongside any new data I had gathered.

3.2.2.1 Public Documents

I began the data gathering for my dissertation research where I had the most open access: the websites owned and operated by the implicated major WOG departments of CIDA, DFAIT, DND/CF, the RCMP, and Canada’s Afghanistan website (which chronicled the WOG approach taken), in addition to the sites of Status of Women Canada (SWC), Correctional Service Canada (CSC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Given that my research question was focused on Canada’s WOG approach and its support of gender equality policy and programming, I investigated these sites for WOG documentation that made mention of gender equality policy and programming. From these sites, I downloaded PDFs of the International Policy Statement (2005), the Manley Report (2008), the Quarterly Reports to Parliament, evaluations, departmental performance reports (DPRs), and reports on plans and priorities (RPPs) spanning the years Canada was in Kandahar, from 2005 to 2011. From here, I conducted a frame analysis based in critical, post-structural feminism, looking for discursive evidence of the “gender thread” of the tapestry: I
conducted a category search for “gendered” terms including “gender”, “women”, and “girls” in relation to “normalized” terms such as “military”, “WOG”, “collaboration”, “security”, “insurgency”, and “war”. I detail the full frame typologies and search criteria used to identify the gender thread of the K-PRT in Appendix A.

During this phase, I also accessed the websites of Canadian civil society and non-government organizations to capture any external reviews of Canada’s WOG approach in the K-PRT. Given my research question, I investigated the websites and downloaded PDF copies of reports and reviews that focused on the K-PRT and its relation to gender equality policy and programming. As such, I collected reports and reviews from the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) and the North-South Institute (NSI), as these organizations conducted research and produced reports on WOG and gender equality. I also visited the websites of international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to understand the broader context within which Canada’s WOG approach in the K-PRT fell, and collected PDF documents outlining international guidelines for how to operate WOG processes in fragile states. Due to the dynamic nature of this phase, more publicly available data was being released to the public as I was conducting research, and I returned to the then-DFATD website in March of 2015 to download the PDF copy of the Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program following its release that year. On these documents, I conducted the same frame analysis using the typologies I highlight in Appendix A.

3.2.2.2 ATIPs
Once I gained a broad understanding of the discursive landscape of the K-PRT through the collection and feminist-informed frame analysis of publicly available documents, I turned my investigation to the primary archival documents that could only be gained through petitioning the Canadian government for information via ATIP requests. Search parameters for the ATIP requests were developed through the frame established by the nexus between collaborative governance theory and critical, post-structural feminism, and thus involved an exploration of previously published requests as released per the directives of the Treasury Board of Canada’s Access to Information Manual\textsuperscript{17}. I had spoken with facilitators in my network (a professor at Carleton University, and another at Queen’s University) about the lengthy delay that often befalls original ATIP requests, and so I elected to investigate previously published requests for evidence of any information released about Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar with reference to gender equality policy and programming. All previously released ATIP requests were discoverable on the same government-supported search engine\textsuperscript{18}, so I was able to peruse through requests made to the former CIDA, the former DFAIT, DND and the CF, and the other departments involved in the operations and policy implementation of the K-PRT. The search spanned the years 2002-2012 with a specific focus on the years 2005 to 2011; this 10-year span allowed for the accounting of potentially important documents covering overlapping years, or covering years prior to or following the K-PRT that either detailed its early stages or reported on its final stages. I used the same search terms as in the publicly available documents for continuity of content, direct relevance to my research question, and stronger saturation of results. In addition to the search terms detailed in the collection of the publicly available documents, I also added the terms “Kandahar”, “PRT”,

\textsuperscript{17} At the time of writing, the Manual can be found at \url{https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html}.

\textsuperscript{18} At the time of writing, the search engine can be found at \url{http://open.canada.ca/en/search/ati?_ga=2.225187475.885955980.1497553951-633900155.1496074132}. 

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“Provincial Reconstruction Team” and “Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team” as the search engine covered the entire collection of previously released ATIP requests, and I needed to be certain I was collecting only those that related to my case study.19

I elected to search for relevant previously released ATIPs from the former CIDA and DFAIT, as my frame analysis of the publicly available documents revealed that these departments each historically dealt with gender equality policy and programming in fragile and conflict affected states and had the lead on governance issues of the Canadian WOG approach in Kandahar, respectively. This choice allowed me to directly address my research question of how the Canadian WOG approach in the K-PRT, which created a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permitted more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality. Following my search using the Government of Canada’s ATIP search engine, I noted 156 broadly relevant ATIP requests for my research question from the former CIDA and former DFAIT, with 37 requests having explicit reference to Canada’s WOG approach in the K-PRT and gender equality policy and programming.20 I submitted a request for these 37 ATIPs, and over the course of 18 months from the initial request, I received all 37 ATIPs on three separate CD ROM disks from the Government of Canada (January 2014 to July 2015). I conducted a feminist-informed frame analysis on the 37 ATIP requests using the discursive search criteria detailed in Appendix A, while also noting that each ATIP varied in the quality and quantity of its contents. Qualitatively, included in the ATIPs were financial information, disclosed emails, affidavits, government contract details, project details, ministerial briefing notes, PowerPoint presentations, invoices, expense claims and meal receipts, ministerial trip itineraries, and project reviews and

19 See Appendix A for the full list of search terms, categorized through Feminist Frame Analysis.
20 See Appendix B for the full detailed list of the 37 specifically relevant ATIP requests to the dissertation. Throughout the dissertation, when I cite specific ATIP sections (a specific report or email, for example), they have all been sourced from these 37 relevant document packages.
audits. A detailed list of the specifics of the analyzed ATIPs is found in Appendix B. Quantitatively, the ATIPs also varied in length, in number of the documents inside, and in the amount of redaction of content. Given that I conducted a frame analysis where both subject and analysis are given equal weight due to their indivisible connection, these quantitative characteristics (page length, number of documents, and amount of redaction) of the ATIPs were given the same weight of consideration as the qualitative characteristics (type of written text). To frame the discursive tapestry of the K-PRT from a gender perspective, it is just as important to note what is missing in the texts as to note what is there and how much is present, as this analysis more rigorously illuminates the gendered power dynamics of the narrative.

I analyzed the public and ATIP documents by following the “gender thread” throughout, and doing a search of terms such as “women” and “gender”. I applied a critical feminist lens to them, looking for the frequency of gendered words, the variety, and the context within which they were used: for example, in many of the documents and on websites belonging to DND and the CF, mention of women was limited, and was in the context of gender parity within the organizations (a balance of numbers between women and men in service); for the former CIDA, gendered terms were the most frequent across all the departments, and arose in relation to projects or programs that involved reaching populations or counting how many women and girls were reached, and frequently came in the context of determining why program and project work in Kandahar was not feasible (such as being unable to reach women and girls in a population under wartime duress); for the former DFAIT, language around gender was instrumental, and often reflected ideals and goals to be attained, from policy statements, to communications documents, to affidavits and official reports. In the case of DFAIT, gendered language often did not directly refer to project outcomes
or parity goals, but rather on platitudes surrounding the need for Canada to be in Kandahar to ensure the rescue and transformation of life for Afghan girls and women.

### 3.2.2.3 Interviews

As the ATIP requests were delivered, I continued to collect and analyze publicly available documents and worked simultaneously to begin preparations for and to conduct interviews with military and civilian participants in the K-PRT. As a feminist researcher, “interviews are an important source of information because they can provide an in-depth, detailed account of how gendered practices are actually carried out within institutions as well as of how gendered identities are constructed and contested” (Kronsell 2006, 121). Moreover, interviews are an excellent methodological tool for producing oral histories from information that only those with certain experiences can know, as in the case of the K-PRT (Ackerly and True 2010, 168). As such, the interviews were an important addition to the data collection phase of the research, as they illuminated personal accounts and highlighted hidden power dynamics within the larger gendered narrative of hegemonic masculinity in the WOG approach of the K-PRT. Because of the sensitivity of such accounts, I have anonymized my participants and have numerically coded them in my research, and in the writing of this dissertation have referred to them by alternative names. In the recruitment text mandated by the Certificate of Ethics Approval, it is noted that all interview participants were guaranteed full confidentiality, and this has been upheld throughout the research and writing of this dissertation.

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21 See Appendix C: Recruitment Text.
I approached the planning and execution of the interviews through a combination of “quota”, “theoretical” and “snowball” source selection and the use of gatekeepers. Quota sampling is useful when a researcher “wants to get the views of people from a range of categories” (Ackerly and True 2010, 156); in the case of the K-PRT, I wanted to speak with interview participants from the former CIDA, the former DFAIT, and DND/CF, as these were the three major departments that operated across all the iterations of Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar, from 3D to WOG to CA. Accessing actors from these three departments across the full time frame of Canada’s leadership of the K-PRT from 2005 to 2011 allowed for a consistent pool of sources to address the research question of how the Canadian WOG approach in the K-PRT, which created a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permitted more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality. I endeavoured to access interview participants with some degree of authority within the K-PRT, as I wanted to understand how significantly they collaborated with other individuals across department lines. Theoretical source selection was useful here as I had existing theoretical and empirical knowledge of the case (Ackerly and True 2010, 156) and my research of collaborative literature and the publicly available documents of the K-PRT indicated that individuals who held higher ranks among their peers would have a higher degree of access to other departments for collaborative purposes. Thus, I used my networks of academic peers, facilitators, and activists to expedite introductions for more well-known potential interview participants.

Yet due to the somewhat secretive nature of the case of the K-PRT (as evidenced in the redaction of ATIP requests and the lack of published names of actors in the publicly available documents), I used gatekeepers and snowball source selection to gain access to some difficult-to-reach high-level actors, or unknown actors with a high degree of collaborative access within the
K-PRT. As noted by Ackerly and True (2010, 157), “because feminists are often studying hidden phenomena, our interview subject-participants may also be hidden or hard to find, known to each other, but not publicly known”. The benefit of gatekeepers and snowball source selection is that a gatekeeper can introduce a researcher to a range of potential interview participants, and snowball source selection reflects the act of recommending other unknown potential participants following an interview (Ackerly and True 2010, 157, 233). However, both of these source selection techniques come with bias: gatekeepers are often experts, and it may be that “prospective subject-participants have in common that they are known to the gatekeeper” and thus requires the feminist researcher to consider gatekeepers in their contexts and understand their power amongst the interview participants they suggest (Ackerly and True 2010, 233). Similarly, with snowball source selection, the chain of recommendations extends from individual to individual within a particular circle of expertise, and requires the feminist researcher to be aware of the attributes or characteristics of recommended interview participants and whether their inclusion in the study would be beneficial to the answering of the research question (Ackerly and True 2010, 157). As such, I selected my interview participants through a mix of gatekeepers, quota, theoretical and snowball source selection, my own professional networks, and through name discovery from my initial analysis of the publicly available and ATIP texts. Overall, I could access interview participants while remaining in the relative safety of Canada’s Capital Region, as the K-PRT had been passed to the Americans in 2011 and most military personnel and public servants had returned to Canada to take on other federal government roles, or had moved on to different postings and tours outside of Kandahar and Kabul and could be accessed via the internet.

To avoid my own implicit biases related to my understanding of the case of the K-PRT and my knowledge of gender, and to practice the self-reflexivity laid out in my feminist research ethic,
I elected to conduct semi-structured interviews. I wrote a script template of open-ended, in-depth interview questions in a semi-structured interview format that could be adapted to each interview participant based on their context and knowledge of the K-PRT\textsuperscript{22}. Open-ended, “semi-structured, in-depth interviews allow guided focus, but also the ability of the subject-participant to give answers that do not conform to the researchers’ (known or unknown) expectations” (Ackerly and True 2010, 168). Berry (2002, 679) notes that to succeed in this form of interviewing, one must ultimately be an excellent conversationalist. From a feminist lens, this means being cognizant of posing questions that do not close off answers: interview participants were encouraged to discuss issues of gender in the K-PRT freely, and when participants felt particularly stumped on a topic, or admitted to not having access to or power over policy or programming related to gender equality, I was able to ask why or how this came to be. I ensured that during each interview I focused not on the question of “what does this mean?”, but rather the question of “what are they trying to tell me?” from an open, engaged, conversational position (Ackerly and True 2010, 168). This allowed me to remain flexible within the interview as well as kept me from analyzing the interview in the moment.

However, there were moments in some interview situations where my intuition suggested I follow a line of reasoning or explore a topic raised by the participant in greater detail than I had originally planned at the outset. I had planned for such intuitive moments in my research design, as interviews within discourse-analytical research “differ from traditional ones, first, in that variations in the responses are as important as consistency; secondly, in that techniques which allow variations in responses rather than reducing them play a prominent part; thirdly, in that interviewees are regarded as active participants in a conversation […]”; and fourthly in that there is

\textsuperscript{22} See Appendix D: Interview Guide for the template used to conduct all interviews included in this dissertation.
no intention to use the interviews in order to reveal what goes on inside people’s minds or mirror external reality” (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 233-234). In relation to the second point, I conducted interviews or held brief, less formal discussions in person, over the phone or Skype, or exchanged email correspondence, and these responses varied in length from over 2 hours of in-depth conversation to a brief email exchange. On the third point, Ackerly and True (2010, 169) call the process “co-producing,” wherein the researcher and the participant build the data that will ultimately be most informative for the study together. This involved adapting the line of questioning or adapting my approach to questioning, where revealing my feminist theoretical goals for the research may have hindered how forthcoming a participant wished to be. For example, in a particularly prickly interview with a former DFAIT executive who oversaw the hiring processes of civilian personnel for the K-PRT, I recognized through his commanding demeanour (a masculine, and therefore normalized and favoured, characteristic) and his impatience that I was being labeled as an uninformed little girl who was wasting his time. I needed to change the conversation so that I could salvage my interview with the executive and change the relational dynamic to one where he saw me less as a weak adversary (a feminine characteristic), and more as an inquiring, interested, informed and non-threatening mind. I reflected on what I wanted to know in order to answer my research question, and followed the gender thread of his role as an overseer of civilian personnel hiring to ask him: how many men and women were hired to join the K-PRT? What sort of training did they receive? Did you look for gender quotas or gender parity in your hiring processes? Was gender a part of the decision-making process at all? Once I made this adjustment, the interview carried on smoothly. In this example, I shifted both my line of questioning and my approach to questioning in order to account for and transform the gendered power imbalance I experienced in the interview.
3.2.3 Limitations and Advantages

There were limitations to the balance of interviewees I was able to reach, both in terms of the quantity of participants and in the quality of responses gleaned from them. Regarding quantity, I had the most ease in finding, gaining access to, and agreement to participate from those who worked for the former CIDA, DND and the CF. As long as the members of the former CIDA weren’t traveling or out of the country for work, I was able to fairly easily contact, book, and conduct interviews with them and glean a substantial amount of stories from the interviews for my empirical data collection. The response rate from members of DND and the CF were similarly easy, with many military personnel willing to share candidly about their tours or involvement with Kandahar. Where I had the most difficulty was with employees of the former DFAIT: my sampling methods to reach participants had the least effect with the diplomatic contingent, resulting in this group being the smallest. Moreover, in interviews with this group of participants, most preferred to provide answers to my questions that didn’t provide detail beyond what I could glean from the publicly available or ATIP documents I was reading. There was a definitive sense that they saw me as an adversary or an outsider, rather than a collaborator, in the interview settings, and therefore didn’t share personal anecdotes or otherwise more intimate details of their work on the K-PRT that would have broadened my empirical collection of data.

I would also venture to say that my positionality as a PhD researcher with certain female and feminine characteristics acted as an advantage for the purposes of data collection. In several interviews, I was provided with documents or imagery that I would not have typically been able to access through public means or through ATIP. In each instance, I was not provided these additional sources of data until later in the interview process, once a trusting and friendly rapport
had been reached. As I had elected to conduct my interviews using performed characteristics that reflected my femininity, including kindness, deference to power, flattery, and cooperativeness, I was often able to glean additional information beyond the anecdotal evidence I was capturing from the interviews. Moreover, my identity as a feminist with a depth of knowledge on feminist theory and methodology permitted me to practice the application of a critical feminist lens more effectively than for a researcher without prior knowledge to the ways and means of such a lens: to be a feminist and to do feminism are two different things, but to do the work effectively requires a deep understanding and indeed, a belief, in the identity of feminism.

### 3.3 Discourses Identified

Between January of 2015 and November of 2016, I interviewed 35 individuals either in person, over the phone or via Skype, or via email correspondence. I was experiencing data saturation, where I was seeing repetition in the qualitative and quantitative information I was gleaning from the interviews and linguistic texts. I was also recognizing discursive trends in the data through feminist-informed frame analysis, and identified three major discursive frames in the broader narrative of the K-PRT: 1) the policy context of the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach as a process defined and reinforced on the world stage; 2) the institutionalized WOG structure that the K-PRT both was framed by and helped redesign; and 3) the narrative of collaboration that was both supported by and informed the broader structure and context of the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach. In each of these discursive frames, the hegemony of masculinity worked to a) legitimize the militarization of collaboration within the K-PRT and instrumentalize women and conceptualizations of gender; b) uphold the might of the military and its processes, and reinforce the exceptionalism of women and conceptualizations of gender; and c) encourage a gendered
narrative that holds Western, militarized masculinity as dominant and necessary, and all other gendered constructs (civilian, femininity, the Afghan other) as submissive and extraneous. In the chapters that follow, I present the evidence for, and conduct a frame analysis of, these discourses, and address the research question of how Canada’s WOG approach created a collaborative environment that supported gender equality policy and programming. Through the following chapters, I support the conclusion that the K-PRT and Canada’s collaborative approach was constituted by and supported the hegemony of militarized masculinity, resulting in the sidelining of gender equality policy and programming.
4 Policy Context: The Legitimization of Militarization and the Instrumentalization of Gender

In the previous two chapters, I outlined that a major component of Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar involved the increasing importance of policy coherence among the federal departments in theatre, and that particularly following the organization of the Manley Panel and the group’s subsequent report, the emphasis on policy coherence and the need for a deeply integrated comprehensive approach (CA) with civilian command supported by military leadership became paramount. As was highlighted in Chapter 1, researchers in security studies and international development theorized in varying ways how with policy coherence of a government’s departments through common policy goals, clear design of the processes of collaboration, and an attention to the power of the players therein, the potential of a WOG approach could be to ensure greater access to resources for the purposes of achieving collaborative goals (Brown 2012b; Cameron 2016; Patrick and Brown 2007). With the streamlining of policy goals, some scholars argue that opportunities arise to break down the barriers that impede the construction of balanced relationships between government organizations, particularly the relationships developed between civilian and military groups (Ball and Febbraro 2011; Nossal 2011; Vavro and Roy, 2011). For fragile states like Afghanistan, some stress that comprehensive approaches work best when they are based on a solid knowledge of local societal networks, a high degree of flexibility and an ability to work in a non-linear fashion, and draw on a wide and varying knowledge base that is financially supported and can be efficiently utilized when required (Nossal 2011; Roy 2011). These theoretical outlooks lend credence to the global trend toward increased use of comprehensive approaches, as noted by Travers and Owen (2008), who highlighted that Canada is also pushing toward an
increased use of integrated, whole-of-government approaches to state fragility, peacekeeping, and development. Indeed, in a telephone interview with “Liz”, a long-serving member of DFAIT’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), I was informed that Canada plans to remain committed to fragile and conflict affected states, and that the WOG model will continue to be referred to in each context as it “could give us a more complete perspective, an ability to learn from experience” (personal communication, October 26, 2016).

Yet, the security studies and international development theorists caution that with increased policy coherence comes the potential for WOG responses to be based in donor self-interest that disfavours effective, long-term development assistance (Brown 2012b; Brown and Raddatz 2012; den Heyer 2012; Swiss 2012) with heavy influence from deeply entrenched and often-overbearing military policies (Banerjee 2008, 2009; Holland 2010; Mamuji 2012; Rostek and Gizewski, 2011). This chapter explores these concerns through a critical, post-structural feminist lens to uncover what role hegemonic masculinity plays when donor self-interest and military policies are seen as the default, particularly as these theorists identify that governments that utilize the WOG approach have the potential to instrumentalize “feel-good” aid issues, such as gender equality, for non-development purposes (Brown and Raddatz 2012, 335). Indeed, the basis for my research question – how did the Canadian whole-of-government approach in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, which created a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permit more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality? – developed from the observation that Canadian politicians and policy-makers were utilizing the plight of Afghan women and children to emphasize the importance of a comprehensive policy answer to state fragility in Kandahar. In exploring the emphasis on policy coherence in the K-PRT, I answer this question in part, and identify through critical feminist analysis that the hegemony of
masculinity, actualized through the influence of the military in a wartime context, ensured the legitimization of militarization in the civilian departments, and normalized the instrumentalization of women and of “gender” for the purposes of bolstering the militarization of the WOG approach in Kandahar.

I employ a feminist analytical lens to compare several policy contexts that frame the K-PRT: the international rule of law surrounding WOG approaches, the Canadian policies that transformed the WOG approach, and the gender equality and development policies of the former CIDA that were caught up in the crosshairs. Through a discursive study of linguistic texts and interviews with military and civil servants surrounding the international regulations on WOG, CIMIC and civ-pol cooperation from the UN, the OECD and various international NGOs, the Canadian policies of the 2005 International Policy Statement and the 2008 Manley Report, and the role and positionality of development and gender policy, I argue that the narrative of militarized masculinity is increasingly seen as a prerequisite for civilian personnel in the K-PRT, and as such, militarization of the WOG approach in Kandahar is legitimized and the role and positionality of women and other gendered conceptualizations are instrumentalized in support of that legitimization. As a result, I posit that the WOG approach of the K-PRT, while focusing on greater policy coherence and a deeper commitment to comprehensive collaboration amongst players, does not make greater room to address issues of gender equality. Rather, Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar encourages and thereby normalizes the greater militarization of civilian actors and departments.

4.1 Keep them Separated: International WOG Directives
At the level of international organizations, the policies surrounding the implementation of WOG approaches in fragile states suggest less comprehensiveness and more separation when it comes to civilian and military groups working in the same area. Particularly, guidelines for conduct in a WOG setting indicate that military and humanitarian efforts should remain separated at all times. In ATIP documents retrieved from Global Affairs Canada, it was made clear by UN documentation that military and development/humanitarian work needed to remain separated for a variety of reasons, most prominently in an effort to keep aid workers safe and their work processes effective. A publication from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) titled “Guidance on coordination between armed actors and humanitarian clusters in Afghanistan” (2008) outlines clearly what they define as the best possible approach to collaboration in areas with active insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. The OCHA endorses the humanitarian cluster approach, which was established in Afghanistan in 2008 and involves the following cluster areas: Emergency Shelter and Non Food Items (ESNFI); Food Security and Agriculture (FSAC); Health; Nutrition; Protection; and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH); as well as a Refugee and Returnee Response Plan led by UNHCR. Discussion of gender is found within the Protection cluster, where there are five sub-clusters, including: Child Protection in Emergencies; Gender Based Violence; Housing; Land and Property Task Force; and Mine Action. The document states that as a result of “Afghanistan’s complex emergency operating environment, with a multitude of military and armed actors, some of which engage in relief activities, this note will guide how clusters should interact and coordinate with these actors, especially the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the international military forces (IMF), Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and Afghanistan National Police (ANP)” (OCHA 2008). The

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23 For an in-depth exploration of the clusters, see https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/inter-cluster-coordination
focus on PRTs by the OCHA suggests, first and foremost, that they are considered military operations rather than WOG operations. This is made clear by the UN designation of PRTs as unable to belong to a humanitarian cluster: “Military actors, PRTs and their personnel cannot be members of a cluster, as they are not humanitarian actors. As such, PRT and military personnel are not entitled to attend cluster meetings as of right” (OCHA 2008).

For humanitarian clusters that work directly on issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment, as outlined under the Protection cluster, the concern with PRTs focuses on safety. Both the OCHA and the United Nations’ Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group see PRTs as unsafe areas for humanitarian actors. The UN OCHA (2008) cautions,

PRT and military personnel should not be engaging in humanitarian activities and should only provide support to humanitarian assistance in last resort life saving [sic] situations and when requested by the Government of Afghanistan or the HC [Humanitarian Coordinator]. These requirements are set out in PRT ESC Policy Note Number 3 and the Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Actors in Afghanistan. As also stated in Policy Note Number 3, humanitarian assistance must not be used for the purpose of political gain, relationship building or winning hearts and minds.

The UN Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group (2008) sets out similar guidelines as related to the importance of respecting the neutrality of humanitarian operations: under Principle 2, “Respect for the neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors”, they stress that “military actors should seek to avoid operations, activities or any conduct which could compromise the independence or safety of humanitarian actors. To the greatest extent possible military operations should be conducted with a view to respecting the humanitarian operating environment”. This is a
sound argument, as in an area such as Kandahar where mistrust of Western ideals is a known phenomenon, to be seen with or to associate with an occupying military force would place any civilian humanitarian actors in real danger.

This argument is repeated extensively throughout many different UN policy guidelines and communiques. In the guidelines set out by the UN Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group it is reinforced more than once. Like Principle 2 noted above, Principle 3 encourages the separation of responsibilities between humanitarian and military actors, where “government and humanitarian actors have the primary role of providing humanitarian assistance, and the military is primarily responsible for providing security, and if necessary, basic infrastructure and urgent reconstruction assistance limited to gap-filling measures until civilian organisations are able to takeover [sic]” (Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group 2008). These principles come with a warning that speaks to the design of Canada’s WOG approach through the K-PRT, and one that many CIDA interview participants have corroborated:

Since current assistance work in Afghanistan largely entails rehabilitation and reconstruction rather than urgent life-saving activities, humanitarian actors should give careful consideration to the security risks and political implications of working with military actors or other security actors. Humanitarian actors should be aware that strategies adopted by one might have implications for others: at a local level if one agency is perceived as cooperating closely with the military the population may assume the same of other local actors. (Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group 2008)
The concern that the Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group conveyed most strongly was that with the intermingling of military and civilian humanitarian actors, local populations would be placed in harm’s way.

These UN guidelines and principles are based on research and experience from international NGOs that demonstrate the danger that humanitarian workers are placed in when they are too closely affiliated with military groups. Indeed, Project Ploughshares and the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, among other organizations, have been pointing to “the adverse effects of an ‘integrated’ whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan”, and note that “the need to clearly distinguish between, rather than integrate, development and military functions in the field is a principle that NGOs have been espousing for some time” (Siebert 2010). The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) both released statements in 2010 arguing that NGOs must remain fully separated from the military and wholly independent, through “impartiality and neutrality in delivering assistance in an equitable and impartial manner, without political conditions and without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious, or ideological nature” (Siebert 2010). If these precautions are not respected and the lines between development and military operations are blurred, says Siebert (2010), “the humanitarian enterprise itself is compromised and humanitarian workers are endangered”, resulting in the impediment of the ability of civilian humanitarian and development personnel to reach populations (CCIC 2007, 2). Siebert (2010) suggests that the “same reasoning would apply to an official development and humanitarian agency of government such as the Canadian International Development Agency, which is committed, as are its NGO counterparts, to good development principles and alleviation of poverty and suffering”.
Indeed, the communications teams under NATO found that most development organizations wanted to remain distanced from the military operation underway in Kandahar. According to Boudreau (2016, 164),

Many agencies, including the UN, fearing their own activities no matter how beneficial or neutral would render them a target, also took great pains to distance themselves from being too closely associated with the NATO military operation. Agencies were also wary of military forces’ motives. Even activities as obviously beneficial as the polio eradication campaign were suspect when connected with NATO. ‘The belief from campaign organisers was that NATO was using this as a means for their forces to collect intelligence in communities, so they wanted nothing to do with them,’ recalled one development official familiar with the program.

There is a gendered institutional distinction between military and humanitarian groups that these international guidelines and in-depth research projects point to: the opposition of masculine violence, hierarchy, dishonesty and political partisanship to feminine tranquility, equality, honesty and political neutrality as markers of these two institutions prominent in wartime contexts in fragile nations. Within these gendered institutional markers is the assumption that the military is violent, corrupt and corruptible: it cannot be trusted to care for a population or a civilian organization as its motives are to fight back against insurgency, and are in opposition to the peaceful interests of the local people it comes into contact with. Similarly, the humanitarian contingent is assumed to be ethical, peaceful and good, and to be associated with any military activity is to taint that image of purity and bring it into harm’s way – it has no place in a war zone. As such, these gendered distinctions point to the hegemony of masculinity, perpetuated through the strength of militarized and politicized masculine projections, in that the military and humanitarian groups must be
separated, otherwise the humanitarian contingent will be swallowed up within the military contingent and any semblance of feminine characteristics are subsumed within the normalized masculine characteristics that define wartime contexts in fragile states.

4.2 Bring them Together: Canada’s WOG approach

These guidelines and principles set out by international intergovernmental organizations and NGOs paint a very different picture from what Canada’s WOG approach was touting in the media and in parliament. Canadian ministers’ speeches were addressing the joint necessity of Canada’s military, diplomatic and development assets and resources for the benefit of Afghanistan’s women and children, while organizations like the UN strictly believed that humanitarian aid and military work should remain separate. The UN also made a point of placing PRTs and military personnel side by side, painted in the same light; something that Canada did not do. However, there were details to the UN’s guidelines and principles that seem to provide an opening for a WOG model such as Canada’s. From the UN Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group (2008), it is suggested that:

- military and PRT assets should only be used to support relief and humanitarian assistance when: there is no comparable civilian alternative (when all other civilian means and mechanisms are exhausted); the assets are needed to meet urgent humanitarian needs; to the extent possible there is civilian control over the operation involving the assets, as defined in the Oslo Guidelines; have the least degree of direct contact with the civilian affected population as possible with a focus on infrastructure support (electricity, roads) and indirect assistance (transport of relief goods and personnel); military assets are clearly
identified as such; the use is limited in time and scale; there is an exit strategy defining how to achieve a civilian response in the future.

These guidelines—especially the point on increasing civilian control of military and PRT assets as defined in the Oslo Guidelines\(^\text{24}\)—may help explain why Canada’s design of its PRT in Kandahar grew from a “3D” collaborative approach in the first few years to a WOG approach that reflected increasing civilian leadership and an effort to incorporate development with defence through three Signature Projects and six Priorities for policy coherence and comprehensiveness in the latter half of its existence. Below, I outline Canada’s journey into the K-PRT, the evolution of its WOG approach, and the specific policy context laid out by Canada’s International Policy Statement in 2005 and the Manley Report in 2008 that contextualized that evolution. In analyzing these texts from a critical, post structural feminist lens, I argue that in the spirit of the guidelines surrounding civilian leadership of PRT assets, Canada permitted the integration of civilian operations into military ones, thereby widening the path for the normalization and legitimization of civilian militarization.

\subsection*{4.2.1 Policy Decisions: Canada’s Journey to Kandahar and 3D/WOG/CA}

As was noted in Chapter 1, “3D”, “WOG” and “CA” are the official terms used in Canada to describe the applied collaborative administration efforts seen in Kandahar; however, the overall concept of collaboration spans the field of public administration in literature on horizontality, horizontal policy coordination, and horizontal integration (Mamuji 2012, 209). In these public

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Oslo Guidelines, officially known as the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, were created to establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in international disaster relief operations (OCHA 2007).}
\end{itemize}}
administration models, collaboration is usually described in two-part terms such as participatory management, interactive policymaking, stakeholder governance, collaborative management, collaborative governance, network governance, or collaborative networks (Ansell and Gash 2008, 548; Mamuji 2012, 209). Patrick and Brown (2007) and Mischen (2015) have also noted it being called joined-up government. Indeed, O’Leary et. al. (2009, 3) suggest that the broad idea of collaboration in public administration resonates across the field, but lacks a common lens or definition. As is exemplified by the many different terms used to describe the idea, it results in an unclear understanding of policy collaboration and tentative definitions at best. It also leaves the concept open to a variety of interpretations by governments seeking to use and apply its methodology. However, what is clear across the many definitions, and particularly with WOG terminology, is an emphasis on policy coherence at the strategic level.

Just a few months prior to the election of the Harper Conservatives in 2006, and under the direction of Paul Martin’s Liberal government, Canada’s primarily military involvement in Kabul moved to the 3D approach in Kandahar, implicating CIDA, DFAIT, and DND/CF on what was, on paper, to be a relatively equal footing. Initially, the 3D approach called for Canada’s commitments in Kandahar to broadly combine the focus of the three major branches of foreign policy governance—development, diplomacy and defence—on one single overarching objective: to improve the lives of Afghan men, women and children. Along with contributions from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Correctional Services Canada (CSC), and the Department of Justice, the Canadian leadership role in Kandahar was made official by the Liberal government’s International Policy Statement (IPS) (Baranyi and Paducel 2012; Government of Canada 2005; 25 Canada took on the task of directing the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team in August 2005 (Government of Canada 2012b), while the Canadian Federal Election that brought in Stephen Harper’s Conservative government occurred in January 2006.
Travers and Owen (2008, 685) and Warnock (2009, 38; see also Warnock 2008) note that Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan has spanned three different Prime Ministers and has evolved considerably over time, but it was only in 2005 with Paul Martin’s Liberals that Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan officially combined military, political, and development assistance (Holland 2009, 2010; Government of Canada 2005; 2012b; Stein and Lang 2007). Indeed, “what began as a contribution to operation Enduring Freedom in the aftermath of 9/11 has since transformed into postconflict reconstruction, counterinsurgency warfare, and nationbuilding”, centered on the province of Kandahar (Travers and Owen 2008, 685).

According to Brown (2007, 213), Canada’s IPS was the country’s first attempt at grand policy coherence, and “reflected then prime minister Paul Martin's desire to provide more direction and unity of purpose to government departments that play a role in Canada's international affairs”. Brown (2007, 214) highlights that this document reveals starkly the uneasy cohabitation of two schools of thought for development: that of advancing the donor’s interests on the world stage with that of an altruistic ethical concern for those nations with the most need. Throughout the chapter on development, Brown (2007, 215-216) notes that it becomes clear that the winning ideology reflects the first school of thought, with multiple references to “our interests” and “Canadian interests” being made; commentary on Canada’s safety and security being tied to development becomes prominent; and the notion that Canada must recoup its reputation on the world stage is revealed as a strong theme – indeed, the title of the 2005 IPS is “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World”. Reading this document through a feminist lens, masculine characteristics of strength, pride, power, and influence abound. There is a strong desire to emphasize a redesign of Canada internationally, with the outward appearance of a “Canadian values” stamp entrenched in a superiority and morality that places Canada at the top of a predetermined hierarchy of nations. The
only mention of gender equality, and the mainstreaming of such across all policy areas, is found in the chapter on development.

Gender equality is stated in a few places in the development chapter to be a “crosscutting theme” (Government of Canada 2005, 22; 25). Yet given that it is only mentioned in the development chapter a handful of times, and only as related to development, gender equality was not truly mainstreamed in Canada’s first attempt at policy coherence. This reflects Brown’s analysis of the IPS as a poor indicator of policy coherence. He notes,

The fact that the IPS was released in five separate booklets, four of which were produced by different departments (CIDA, Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Defence), suggests at the outset that the government has not made much progress in policy integration. A close reading of the four thematic chapters confirms that the content of the Statement (or more accurately statements) does little more than pay lip service to policy coherence. (Brown 2007, 224)

Moreover, Brown speculates on the value of policy coherence for CIDA in the long run, asking whether such an approach would benefit the department. He writes,

The interaction of policy in two (or more) directions would lead to compromise. When Canada's and developing countries' interests diverge, as they do on the protection of Canadian markets, which interests would be sacrificed to meet the others? It is hard to imagine the government subordinating Canadian interests to foreign ones. If past experiences are any indication, foreign aid will not trump foreign affairs or international trade. (Brown 2007, 224)
Brown’s arguments also point to the hegemony of masculinity when analyzed from a feminist position. “Gender” equality in the IPS reflected only the addition of women to the development process, and the empowerment of women to participate in political or economic activities – areas traditionally viewed as under the purview of men. This essentialist gender focus is also only found in the section on development, as textual analysis found no other traces of the terms “gender” or “gender equality” throughout the entirety of the statement. This observation, coupled with Brown’s position that any compromise on policy coherence would subsume the development portion in favour of foreign affairs and trade, indicates that the different departments are gendered: development policy, and particularly policy on gender equality, will rarely be prioritized ahead of the more hard-lined positions on security, international trade and diplomacy. Moreover, true policy coherence will not occur, but rather, there will be a subjugation of the more feminine-leaning policies found in development in favour of the more masculine-leaning policies found in economic and diplomatic engagement and defence strategy.

The subsequent Conservative governments headed by Stephen Harper deepened the mechanisms of policy coherence into WOG engagement within a small group of high-priority states, particularly Afghanistan and Haiti (Baranyi and Paducel 2012, 108). At the time, the design of the K-PRT was looked at as security-first for all departments involved, despite talk of the equal balance (and equal prioritization of process) of the “three D’s”. This is illustrated by the way the design of the K-PRT was described by Colleen Swords, former Assistant Deputy Minister, International Security Branch and Political Director with DFAIT, in a 2007 affidavit26. In the affidavit she states,

26 In 2007, Colleen Swords was Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) of DFAIT, and submitted evidence for the federal court case of Amnesty International Canada and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) vs. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of CAF, the Minister of National Defence and the Attorney General of Canada. According to
I am informed by Wendy Gilmour, Director of the Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs, that since August 2005, a Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) has operated in Kandahar City. The PRT brings together elements from the Canadian Forces (CF), Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Correctional Services Canada, and civilian police led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in an integrated Canadian effort. Approximately 350 personnel, of whom over 300 are engaged in critical support and administrative services and security protection, are based at the PRT site at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City. The PRT assists the Afghan government to develop the capacity necessary to extend its authority throughout Kandahar Province, through assisting in the stabilization and development of the region. It helps to monitor security, promotes Afghan government policies and priorities with local authorities, and facilitates security sector reforms. In addition, the Canadian Government maintains an embassy in Kabul with currently 24 Canada-based staff. At Kandahar Air Field, 3 civilian staff (CIDA and DFAIT) are providing development and political advice to the Force Commanders. (Swords Affidavit 2007, 3-4)

The description identifies the nature of the PRT structure as one that is led by the military and focused primarily on improving the security situation and the capacity-building of the Afghan government to this end, while being supported by civilian staff with particular expertise. The

the International Crimes Database (2013), at the beginning of 2007, there were allegations that Afghan prisoners who were captured by Canadian forces and transferred to Afghan custody were tortured. On February 21st 2007, the lawsuit was filed in order to halt the transfer of Afghan prisoners. Plaintiffs asked for a review of the Canadian prisoner transfer policy, and claimed that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should provide protection to the Afghan prisoners. The case was dismissed, and in March 2008, a federal judge stated that the Afghan prisoners have rights under both the Afghan Constitution and international law, but that they did not have rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in December 2008.
civilian staff are necessary for the PRT to succeed, yet the PRT can only succeed if the civilian experts defer to the security context within which they are situated. On the issue of policy coherence, it appeared that the K-PRT had yet to find a balance.

Attempts at policy alignment, or at the very least, policy communication, were made from the start of Canada’s involvement in Kandahar. Civilian necessity within the PRT was solidified financially in the early days, when in 2005 the Government of Canada allocated $500 million in funding over five years for the creation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). The reasoning behind the creation of this task force and fund was to bridge the gap between defence and development:

The Government of Canada created the GPSF to close a policy/funding gap and an institutional gap in Canada’s ability to provide a timely, integrated package of assistance to countries in crisis. Historically, Canada’s response to countries in crisis focused on defence and development. The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had little capacity to meet demand for the third ‘D’, diplomacy. Such requirements were dealt with on an ad hoc basis and put pressures on CIDA’s budget. The GPSF responded to the policy/funding gap by creating two new programs, the Global Peace and Security Programme (GPSP) and the Global Peace Operations Programme (GPOP). […] The Government of Canada created the START Secretariat to close the institutional gap so that Canada could respond to crises with an integrated package of assistance. (ATIP GPSF Final Report 2007, 604)

In both the START Secretariat and the GPSF, the focus was on peace and security support from civilian lines of expertise and funding.
Some of the ways START and the GPSF financially legitimized the civilian support of military approaches in Kandahar, and furthered the militarization of civilian responses in turn, were through increasing the capacity of the Afghan National Police to promote law and order in key districts of Kandahar Province, increasing the capacity of and access to the justice system in Kandahar, and in increasing the capacity of the corrections system in Kandahar to help bring prisons and detention centres closer to international standards and ensure the appropriate treatment of prisoners and detainees (START 2008, 8). Afghanistan wasn’t the only focus of START and the GPSF, but where they were concerned with Afghanistan and Kandahar, they narrowed in on ways that the civilian expertise of the sixty-six staff members could be harnessed to bolster the security and law enforcement work being done in the region primarily by Canadian military, police, and corrections services. This is corroborated by broader academic research on Canada’s PRT in Kandahar that points to the ways the “3D” bureaucratic cultures and politics clashed over military-style approaches. For Swiss (2016, 195), where gender and security did cross over in Kandahar, it was in limited programs and was not considered official development assistance (ODA) but rather coded as a military financial expense. He notes,

In the absence of a concrete integration of gender and security into CIDA programmes, the former DFAIT’s programming from 2006 to 2014 under its Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) and Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) demonstrated the most overt commitment to the gender and security issues in the Canadian context. START and the GPSF funded certain security-related initiatives addressing women and security, but some of these programmes would not qualify as ODA if they involve military aid, certain types of support to policing, or counterterrorism activities.
According to Saideman (2014, 56), “DFAIT had no culture or tradition for undertaking expeditions of this kind. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had no experience in shorter term projects directed at the subnational level. Most development aid went through multinational organisations and the Afghan government, whereas the priority of the Canadian Forces was Kandahar”. In the context of Kandahar, in the early days of the PRT it made logical sense to defer to the expertise and focus of the military to lead the way into a WOG approach there, particularly as the design of such an approach for Canada was one that had never been undertaken before. The expertise of the military in fragile states was positioned as a natural starting point for civilians entering an area of extreme danger like Kandahar.

The hegemony of defence processes only increased following the death of DFAIT official Glyn Berry on January 15, 2006. He had been the senior DFAIT official working at the K-PRT at the time, and while out “over the wire”, had been killed by a suicide attack. Following this, civilian restrictions at the PRT tightened, with force protection measures moving to ensure that “the few civilians at the PRT could rarely engage the population, and only with a significant number of Canadian troops” (Saideman 2014, 56). For Saideman, this extreme restriction of civilian personnel at the PRT could also be seen as an opportunity in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), a military-focused form of policy coherence:

On the other hand, this did facilitate civil–military integration in some important ways since the military personnel at the PRT had to be the implementers of the civilian efforts, given the constraints facing the civilians. So, if CIDA or DFAIT officials had a project, they had to plan it out with the military side and often see it carried to completion by the folks in uniform. (Saideman 2014, 56-57)
From a feminist perspective, the direction that was being mapped for policy coherence in the K-PRT exhibited a skewed affinity for militarized approaches to collaboration that seemed to leave those civilians with particular expertise in development and gender equality without their typical toolkits. In a move to protect untrained civilians from the dangers of warfare, the WOG approach of the K-PRT and the dangerous context within which it operated also moved to shelter those actors with “softer” skills related to addressing gender equality from the realities of Kandahar while placing military actors as the face of Canadian development assistance.

In an interview with “Kamala”, a former CIDA manager who worked in the K-PRT within the Kandahar Local Initiatives Program on various projects from 2010 to 2011, including on projects related to gender equality and women’s empowerment, she described her living and working conditions as a military base first and foremost, and despite the collaborative emphasis, she found that her work as a civilian was affected by this design: “The K-PRT was like a small military base, with high security – in many ways it was a small expat town within Kandahar where local employees would come in each day” (personal communication, July 28, 2015). Instead of being able to work “over the wire” in the communities surrounding the K-PRT, Kamala found that the only way to interact with local Afghans working on projects with the Canadians was for them to come to her. This design had gendered implications, in that for many local Afghans, the social and cultural context meant that associating with Western foreigners was a danger in and of itself, and for Afghan women, being granted the freedom to leave the compound to work with foreign interlopers would have been slim to none. Kamala also faced lengthy military commutes in armed convoys, and within those, she was only able to move freely between the KAF and the K-PRT. In this way, CIDA placed the onus on the locals to come to work at the K-PRT, and she was discouraged from and rarely visited the projects in the field; she tells me “it was not mandatory,
and it minimized risk” (personal communication, July 28, 2015). Indeed, it minimized the risk for civilian CIDA personnel, but greatly increased the risk for their local partners, particularly women.

There were attempts made on the civilian side to relieve the restrictive structure imposed on departments normally permitted more freedom in their approach to development and reconstruction work. However, there was also the perception that the civilian side of the WOG approach in Kandahar was inadequate, not to mention the ongoing political opposition to Canada’s military commitment there (McCutcheon and Derksen 2007, 94; Saideman 2014, 57). Indeed, by 2007, the civilian aspect of the WOG approach at the K-PRT became the intense focus of high-level actors at the political level in Ottawa. As such, the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (the “Manley Report”) (2008), commissioned by the Conservative government in the fall of 2007, marked a turning point in Canada’s WOG approach in Afghanistan. According to Saideman (2014, 59), and highlighted by evidence presented here, “the early stages of the Canadian civilian effort were shaped by the risks on the ground”, which led into how the civilian aspect of the WOG approach was orchestrated in later years. Saideman (2014, 57) notes that one of the leading factors for the creation of the Panel was to gain Liberal party support for the extension of the military mission in Kandahar: the leading member and namesake of the Manley Panel was John Manley, a prominent Liberal and former Minister of Industry, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former Deputy Prime Minister. Among some of the decisions made by the Panel were a call for cabinet-level involvement to improve the WOG comprehensiveness between the implicated agencies, which included the development of the Afghanistan Task Force led by Deputy Minister David Mulroney, and the stipulation of Quarterly Reports to Parliament so that those at the political level could keep an eye on the work the Canadians were doing in Kandahar (Saideman 2014, 58). With the culmination of the review by
the Manley Panel and the release of the subsequent report in early 2008, the Government of Canada refocused the civilian efforts of the K-PRT through six official Priorities and three official Signature Projects in Afghanistan.

According to the description given by the Government of Canada (2010), the six Priorities are “in keeping with proven Canadian strengths and consistent with Afghan objectives and the efforts of the international community”, thereby bringing the civilian commitments in line with Canadian military efforts there. Four of the six Priorities focus on Kandahar, and consist of (1) maintaining a more secure environment and establishing law and order by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police, and supporting complementary efforts in the areas of justice and corrections; (2) providing jobs, education, and essential services, like water; (3) providing humanitarian assistance to people in need, including refugees; and (4) enhancing the management and security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, while Priorities five and six focus on Afghanistan at the national level, and consist of (5) building Afghan institutions that are central to the Kandahar Priorities and support democratic processes such as elections; and (6) contributing to Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts aimed at weakening the insurgency and fostering a sustainable peace (Government of Canada 2010). These priorities combine the expertise of the original “3D” departments on issues of security, governance, and humanitarian aid, and bring to the forefront the WOG approach through targeted policy areas that are significantly militarized.

Of the three Signature Projects, two are Kandahar-specific. These are the (1) repairing of the Dahla Dam and irrigation system, which is located on the outskirts of Kandahar City, and (2) expanding educational opportunities in Kandahar Province for women and girls (Government of Canada 2012a). The third Signature Project holds a national focus, and consists of (3) eradicating
polio across the country. The most visible of the K-PRT Signature Projects, the repair of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system, was slated to ensure a secure irrigation water supply to the majority of the population, generating 10,000 seasonal jobs and revitalizing the area’s once robust agro-economy by providing farmers with irrigated land (Holland 2010, 282). It was one of the most distinctly “WOG” of all the Signature Projects, as it “required extensive cooperation between civilians and military, as security had to be provided for those doing the repair work, CIDA needed to plan and fund the project, and DFAIT had to facilitate the negotiations with the various local actors, including security companies” (Saideman 2014, 60). Arguably, it is also one of the most gendered, as it required a heavy security presence, and created highly masculine jobs in the male-dominated agricultural and construction sectors of Kandahar. Indeed, according to Holland (2010, 282),

In January 2009 the project entered its implementation phase when the Canadian International Development Agency awarded the contract for the Dahla Dam repairs to a joint venture, SNC-Lavalin and Hydrosult. Work on the project, however, did not begin until several months after the contract’s award, because of the need to contract with a private security firm before the consultants could venture out into the field.

The Government of Canada (2012a) claims, “as of June 30, 2010, over 2,012 jobs have been created in the rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system. Since then, many more have been created in the construction sector”. According to news reports, 20% of the $50 million earmarked for the project went directly to private security firms (Watson 2012; McDiarmid 2013). Moreover, the project never saw completion by the time Canada passed off the K-PRT to the

27 For a detailed timeline of Canada’s commitments in Kandahar, see http://www.international.gc.ca/afghanistan/history-histoire.aspx?lang=eng#a2007
United States in 2011 (Watson 2012; McDiarmid 2013). This is confirmed in ATIPs retrieved from the former CIDA that note the contract dates for SNC-Lavalin extend from December 23, 2008 to April 30, 2012 (ATIP 2012-00529). Canada’s payments to SNC-Lavalin and Hydrosult went over their budget of $44 million by early 2012, and there was no clear indication of breakdown of costs for gender specialists or social/cultural impact considerations related to women and girls (ATIP 2012-00542).

Regarding the Signature Project on education for women and girls in Kandahar, it was projected that Canada would “invest up to $12 million over three years to build, expand, or repair 50 schools in key districts of Kandahar province and to build the capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Education to deliver quality educational services” (Holland 2010, 282). Immediately it is evident that this project, while targeted for gender equality politically and in the media, focused more intently on the act of building the schools and counting the number of female teachers and girl students, which is an essentialist tactic that is used to show the “gender box” has been ticked on a development program or project (Tiessen 2015). It is unclear if the educational curriculum and teacher training programs were adequately assessed for their ability to address gender inequality, or if this was intended. At the very least, the programs are reported to be reviewed under “robust international audit practices and controls”, including “external and internal monitoring, external and internal audits, multi-donor evaluations and supervising missions and regular quarterly financial and narrative reporting” (ATIP 2011-00166, 71). ATIPed documents and emails providing a response to a Canadian Press article by Steve Rennie (2011) about the failures of the Education Signature Project highlight the increase in the number of female teachers trained and the number of girls receiving an education, as well as the greater number of schools being used, rehabilitated, and built with the help of CIDA funding (ATIP 2011-00166). These
documents and emails do not provide any detail on whether there were assessments of school locations in relation to local populations, a concern with gendered implications related to safety and accessibility for girls and women, or if assessments were made regarding curriculum or teacher training specifically for girls and women in Kandahar.

It was documented that the project was limited by the capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Education to staff schools and to assess their construction (Holland 2010, 282), the cultural and social aversion to transformations of a Western nature, and the lack of monitoring and evaluation that could be effectively done by CIDA in theatre. As noted in ATIPed emails sent by Amy Mills, Communications Personnel for the Afghanistan/Pakistan Task Force at CIDA, it was verified that no CIDA staff visited the schools as they would have been required to do so via conspicuous military convoys (ATIP 2011-00166, 40-43). CIDA’s Locally Engaged Staff (LES) were the only actors to access any of the schools, as they would not attract Taliban attention and therefore keep the schools, and the teachers and children within, safer. As of December 2009, funds to build additional schools were transferred by CIDA to the Afghan Ministry of Education, but had not been allocated by the Ministry to any specific work (Holland 2010, 282). According to the Government of Canada (2012a), more than $90 million has gone toward the project, and within the construction target of 50 schools, a total of 26 schools have been built, with another 27 under construction, and over 2500 participants have received teacher training. However, according to an ATIPed memo dated February 10, 2011, closer to 96 schools have been rehabilitated or used, with 39 schools built under the target of 50 set out by the Signature Project (ATIP 2011-00166, 3-5). Another email from CIDA Development Officer for Education Tara Painter noted that the total number of schools built by 2011 was 41 out of 50 (ATIP 2011-00166, 38). The confusion surrounding how many schools were built and how many were rehabilitated and in operation was
further exacerbated by the large amount of redaction in the ATIPed documents; it wasn’t clear which count was the most accurate (ATIP 2012-00542). Another limitation, noted by Saideman (2014, 61), was a key point of tension “between the plans of the civilian projects and the changing deployment of the Canadian Forces” surrounding this Signature Project: what the civilian departments deemed important, such as the building of schools, the education of girls and the training of female teachers, and the delivery of basic services to vulnerable populations, did not consistently match up with the goals of DND and the CF.

The Kandahar-specific Priorities and Signature Projects, while meant to increase policy coherence and the capacity of the civilian side of the PRT, concurrently increased the militarization of the work being conducted by the civilian departments: the WOG approach was effectively “tightened” up by the directives of the Manley Report, yet the capacity of the Canadian civilian departments – specifically CIDA – became significantly diminished in the process. According to “Rick”, who worked in the Ottawa offices of DFAIT during Canada’s leadership in Kandahar, the WOG approach was “pre-Manley”, and he’d been writing WOG strategy for years before the panel was put together (personal communication, August 31, 2016). The issue was that before Manley, the departments had been working in isolation with bridges, which he said was “never a good strategy” (personal communication, August 31, 2016). He told me that the qualitative leap in 3D to WOG policy coherence began as early as 2005, with Ottawa-based individuals like himself looking to start with objectives rather than departmental processes, and then bring resources from the various departments to meet those objectives (personal communication, August 31, 2016). It was only with the Manley Report that the organizing principle of WOG went public. For Rick, this was a design that was always focused on providing cover for the government: beneath the policy objectives were calls for more battle groups, more boots on the ground, and increased financial
investments for counterinsurgency, but the six Priorities and three Signature Projects provided “a plan that was pre-cooked”, and “set out a way for the government to be successful” (personal communication, August 31, 2016). It was a design that intended to prioritize the military from the outset, and that prioritization only continued with the support of DFAIT and to the chagrin of CIDA. As “Catherine”, a former CIDA Director, tells it, “Manley was supported basically by people from DFAIT, who were of a different time, and for years when I was at CIDA, we were regarded as ‘hippies in Birkenstocks’. And the CIDA people regarded Foreign Affairs as ‘yes, minister’ types” (personal communication, May 5, 2015).

For Jessica, the former health specialist at the Canadian Embassy in Kabul, she was always given the impression that the military meant well, but they just didn’t know development (personal communication, August 11, 2016). She thought that the military seemed to believe that development wasn’t a real profession, and she had to work with the military many times to stop doing humanitarian work because it would get people killed, or put targets on the heads of local people. Jessica believed she had to play the role of referee, and pull the military back, and have them listen to development advisors to stop them making things worse when they are trying to help (personal communication, August 11, 2016). Jessica observed the same thing in DFAIT: “foreign service officers definitely think they are better than development officers, they don’t think it is real work” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). She felt she was always engaged in a dynamic with DFAIT personnel where she was perceived as the slower, second cousin in the family, and she was given no respect because she was perceived to be a “tree hugger” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). The structural design of the PRT and the context of Kandahar seemed to exacerbate this, leaving Jessica to feel that CIDA was being “feminized” by its departmental counterparts. For her, the structure of the PRT and the narrative that it conveyed
meant that individual civil servants had to adapt, or die: as Jessica told me, “Masculinity is how you survive!” (personal communication, August 11, 2016).

The push for policy coherence that supported military approaches to fragile state development and reconstruction is reflected in the shift in CIDA financials pre- and post-Manley, and highlight the views of the DFAIT and CIDA staffers more acutely. According to Baranyi and Paducel (2012, 112):

In early 2008 Harper instructed officials to implement the Manley Report’s central recommendation: that Canada should more closely integrate its WOG resources in Afghanistan, particularly by redirecting at least 50 per cent of Canada’s development assistance to Kandahar to support the almost 3,000 Canadian military personnel there.

Thus, roughly halfway through Canada’s collaborative governance commitment in Kandahar, funds earmarked for development became redefined as security funds. Indeed, data collected by Baranyi and Paducel (2012, 112–13) “suggests that Canada spent about $9 billion in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2010, of which about $7.8 billion (87 per cent) went to military operations via the Department of National Defence (DND) and only $1.23 billion (13 per cent) to humanitarian and development via CIDA and OGDs [other government departments].” As well, the projects that this money supported bypassed many Afghan state institutions in an attempt to put a Canadian stamp on short-term development in Kandahar and “win the hearts and minds” of local Afghans, resulting in an undermining of the legitimacy of the Afghan state and its ability to deliver core public services to its population, not to mention a diversion from the long-term development approaches typically employed by CIDA (Banerjee 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; Baranyi and Paducel 2012, 114).

From a feminist position, the roles, perspectives, and financial obligations of DFAIT and CIDA reflect the normalization of militarized WOG design based in a push for policy coherence
along the path of least resistance: with the public release and application of the Manley Report in 2008, the 3D collaborative effort led by DND became repackaged as the WOG approach to acknowledge the transition of coordination from DND through to the various separate departments themselves, to the PCO and the individual leadership of David Mulroney. This terminology change was accompanied by a new strategic policy focus on the six Priorities and three Signature Projects, of which DND, CIDA and DFAIT turned their resources and attention to, and officially implicated the additional contributing departments of the Department of Justice, the CSC and the RCMP as well as civil-society organizations. This allowed the Conservative government to set the process apart from its Liberal predecessors, and synchronize it with global identification of the collaborative process. The Conservative government also knew it internally and more specifically as 1C, or One Canada, to emphasize the synchronized connection across all the Canadian departments involved, but more importantly to see the process as distinctly “Canadian” (Siebert 2010). In many ways, this transformation legitimized the militarization of the civilian departments further, rather than tempering the influence of the military or the hegemony of militarized masculinity. By deferring to the approaches, structures and hierarchies of the military, Canada’s WOG approach became “more efficient” under the guise of policy coherence through civilian leadership.

4.3 Military by Design: from 3D, to the WOG and CA Approaches

As noted by Buchan (2010, 75), “Canada’s Afghanistan effort constitutes the first time in 50 years that Canadian soldiers have been engaged in sustained combat operations, and the scale of Canadian diplomatic and development engagement is, if not unprecedented, certainly of an order of magnitude greater than most deployments of the past decades”. The new management
model of WOG in Kandahar warranted massive parliamentary and cabinet oversight through the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan (CCOA) and the Parliamentary Committee on Afghanistan (PCOA) – both of which were recommended by the Manley Panel as a “strong guide” for the transition from “3D” to WOG (Buchan 2010, 75). What was interesting about the creation of these committees was the increased civilian oversight, and increased management, of the collaborative process, along with increased insight into the operations of the CF. As Buchan (2010, 76) highlights, “in this context, one notable element was the way Ministers from civilian departments were given an opportunity to understand the operational challenges the Canadian Forces (CF) is facing”. Facing an increasing insurgency and narrowing the policy focus through the Signature Projects and Priorities, the logical approach to the transition to civilian leadership in Kandahar was through the lessons learned from the military-led 3D approach, and to adapt the new civilian leadership roles to these lessons.

Through the transition work of the CCOA and PCOA came the designation of the Privy Council Office’s Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) and the position of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (the RoCK); the ATF was the institutional mainspring driving the government’s policies on Afghanistan, was led by a small elite of public servants, and was supported by both the Prime Minister and the Clerk of the Privy Council Office (PCO) (Gammer 2013), and the RoCK served as the principal negotiator with officials, international institutions, NGOs and military partners in Kandahar, providing strategic guidance to Canada's team of diplomats and development officers, as well as to police and corrections officials while working in partnership with the Canadian Forces (CBC 2009). The ATF and RoCK worked to coordinate the PRT from Ottawa and Kandahar, respectively. The ATF was made up of a dedicated twenty-five-person team tasked with strategic policy development and integration, and coordination of the departments tasked with
delivering that policy (Buchan 2010, 77). It was developed largely because there was concern that the other departments wouldn’t take direction from their peer in DFAIT, particularly DND and the CF, and that a higher magnitude of leadership was required. As the Manley Report (2008, 28) articulated: “Separate departmental task forces are not the answer to inadequate coordination of Canadian activities. These coordinating efforts would have stronger effect, and achieve greater cross-government coherence, if they were led by the Prime Minister, supported by a cabinet committee and staffed by a single full-time task force”. This conclusion indicates the difficulty that was the coordination of the major WOG departments in Kandahar. Moreover, as Buchan (2010, 77) highlights, “this reflected the reality that other departments – and, in particular, the CF, which was dominant on the ground, protective of its area of professional expertise, and under the leadership of a particularly dynamic Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) – [were] not meekly accepting the DFAIT coordinating mandate. This demonstrates the extent to which departmental ‘silos’ are robust”. This has gendered implications, as the hegemony of Canada’s military and the entrenched militarized approaches of the K-PRT would not be easily adapted or transformed.

Hence the development of the position of RoCK in Kandahar as a way for Ottawa to “improve the integration of the civilian effort on the ground” (Saideman 2014, 58). Saideman’s framing of this role for the K-PRT highlights the hegemony of militarized masculinity, as it indicates that the civilian contingent in Kandahar required greater oversight through its far more significant transition to “effective operational levels” than its military counterpart. And the position of the RoCK reflects this low confidence for – and from a gender lens, a highlighting of the abnormality of – civilian ways of doing things in a conflict zone: “The RoCK was given authority over all Canadian civilians in Kandahar, led the PRT, and worked closely with the commander of Canadian Forces in Kandahar” (Saideman 2014, 58). By the end of Canada’s role
in Kandahar, the RoCK wasn’t the only civilian at the PRT to work closely in a highly militarized, integrated manner with the military: “civilians were put into the military’s command structure with representatives in Task Force Kandahar’s planning and policy division (J-5), its intel branch (J-3), and media relations” (Saideman 2014, 59). By 2011, the RoCK had attained some budgetary authority – despite most of the financial decision-making remaining with CIDA – and had greater influence over the police work in Kandahar (Saideman 2014, 59). Buchan’s (2010, 76) perspective on the cabinet-level committee and ATF, and the position of the RoCK, is a positive one, wherein he identifies the set-up as ‘neutral’:

Structurally, it meant that neither of the traditional departmental leads on complex missions (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces) could control the process, ensuring instead that they collaborated on an equal footing. This limited the likelihood of either the civilian or the military viewpoint being imposed, encouraging instead compromise and accommodation. In a counterinsurgency, where the military account for the vast majority of resources employed but the ultimate objectives are non-military in nature, this appears to be an approach possessing merit.

Yet Buchan makes a point in his argument that is disrupted by a gender lens: that in a counterinsurgency, such as was the case in Kandahar, despite the fact that the military accounts for most resources utilized, the objectives are not military in nature. Given the evidence for the role of the RoCK alongside military command in a context that is highly militarized, and the placement of civilians within military command structures, this neutrality could not have been achieved; rather, a militarization of civilian processes and leadership roles is more likely.
This gendered reading of the situation is given merit in an interview with “Jim”, a former ADM from DND. Jim casually quipped when I asked him about the effectiveness of the PRT as time progressed in Kandahar, “yes, we had a PRT, yes we were technically to do things, but the PRT was not really the central piece of Canada’s mission to Kandahar, if I could put it that way” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). I probed him for more detail, and he told me about the superiority of the military component from the get-go:

The Canadian decision to undertake the PRT in Kandahar was put forward as a compliment to undertaking the combat mission. In order to potentially address the concerns of those who would not want to take just a combat mission, but would want to assist – so they were presented hand in hand in order to make the whole package more acceptable politically. So, yes, the Department of Foreign Affairs and CIDA would have been involved in those discussions; how enthusiastic they were is a question you’d have to ask them. (Personal communication, September 19, 2016)

And ask them I did: their personal recollections of their work in – or their view of – CIDA at the PRT in Kandahar and Canada’s WOG approach more broadly reveals a deep frustration with the militarized style of operations civilians needed to conform to. Many highlighted in reports and other publications that they were particularly frustrated with quick-impact project work that left long-term transformational work, such as gender equality-related projects, on the backburner. It forced many well-trained gender experts to focus in on short-term women-focused projects, with parity rather than equality as the target, that they remained skeptical of. Further still, it turned others away from Kandahar all together. The civilian perspective on the WOG approach in Kandahar, especially from the development side, was grim, and highlighted the increasing militarization of civilian approaches to state fragility.
According to Échec à la Guerre (2009, 96), a coalition of Quebec civil society organizations concerned about the growing role of war in Canadian foreign policy and the rise of an official militaristic discourse in Canada, the transformation of Canada’s military to reflect its counterpart to the south has been occurring since the early 1990s, but has hastened since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. They suggest that it was made official in 2005 with the release of the Liberal government’s International Policy Statement (IPS), “whose ‘3D’ approach, linking diplomacy, defence and development, marked the new militaristic turn in Canadian foreign policy” (Échec à la Guerre 2009, 96). They note that in 2005, the same year that Canada moved its military focus from Kabul to Kandahar, “Paul Martin’s Liberal government announced the largest increase in the Canadian military budget since the Second World War: an increase of $12.8 billion over 5 years” (Échec à la Guerre 2009, 97). Along with this significant financial increase, they noted that the IPS “indicated that this money would be used to increase regular forces by 5,000 soldiers, and reserve forces by 3,000 soldiers, as well as to purchase various equipment that would double the Canadian army’s rapid intervention capacity abroad” (Échec à la Guerre 2009, 97). This is all the more concerning given that Échec à la Guerre discovered statements from Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier claiming he “was happy to be able to hunt down the terrorist ‘scumbags’ and finally see the Canadian army play its true role of ‘being able to kill people’” (Échec à la Guerre 2009, 97).

For NGOs and coalitions of civil society members like Échec à la Guerre, the promotion of the melding of humanitarian aid with military approaches drew deep concern. Échec à la Guerre (2009, 103) highlight that “for all foreign interveners, the amounts invested in military spending are ten to fifteen times greater than those allocated to development assistance. This is also true for Canada. In 2006-07, Canadian military intervention in Afghanistan cost $1.4 billion, while $100
million was allocated to ‘assistance’ for that country”. This imbalance in the financing for DND, the CF, DFAIT and CIDA in Kandahar reflects the increasingly normalized expectation that the military would be present or in charge of much of the development programming taking place in theatre – particularly after the Manley Panel called for the development of the Signature Projects that required little deep-rooted, long-term development intervention. NGOs and civil society groups loudly supported the parameters and guidelines put in place by the UN to keep humanitarian aid workers and militaries separated, with statements like: “The role of armies isn’t to do humanitarian work or to rebuild the countries they occupy. […] We must reject the ‘army/development assistance’ and ‘army/humanitarian assistance’ amalgams, because they are deceitful and in no way produce the promised results” (Échec à la Guerre 2009, 104). The dichotomy between the military and development was seen to be the starkest, and from a critical feminist perspective, this has gendered implications for the political goals of addressing gender inequality in Kandahar. Those working on gender issues were typically found in NGOs and working within CIDA, and it was these civilian actors who faced the most frustration with the increasing militarization of Canada’s WOG approach.

4.4 Gender Equality: CIDA and the Sidelining of (Gender in) Development

Ultimately, what took place through the Manley Report was a deliberate sidelining of the typical long-term (and gendered) processes of development in Kandahar via an emphasis on greater policy coherence. This emphasis on policy coherence favoured the militarized approaches that had been tried and tested through the 3D model, noting the greater attention that needed to be paid to integrating civilian departments and actors into military-style programming and structures.
This had adverse effects on the role of gender equality policy and programming for development in Kandahar, as addressing gender equality was seen as a long-term, complicated add-on that couldn’t be incorporated into the already difficult project work in theatre. This is seen in both the narrative reported from all of my interview participants across the three Ds, and in financial and evaluative reports following our exit from Kandahar.

The position of CIDA in Kandahar was one that was instrumentalized to support the increased policy coherence around militarized processes for WOG: as CIDA was the department typically focused on gender, it was caught up in the WOG effort not as an equal contributor, but as a political pawn to demonstrate a gender equality focus in Kandahar that lacked institutional substance. In my interview with Catherine, she argued that the shifting funds, timelines and priorities were a political tactic that resulted in the burying of CIDA and its work on gender, setting Canada on a path to losing a belief in common purposes and public good:

When the new government came in in 2006, they did not like the words ‘gender equality’ – it was ‘equality between women and men’. And so there were a number of challenges there, because you have an agency [CIDA] that says its overarching objective is gender mainstreaming facing a government that doesn’t believe in poverty reduction, doesn’t believe in gender equality and what it means. And doesn’t understand what capacity development means. You can’t use those words. So this government has buried CIDA deeper and deeper. So now, it’s very hard for Canadians to understand – because its buried deeply inside DFATD [now GAC] – that the budget has been dramatically reduced, that the staff has been cut by at least a third. I’m not even up to date, it may be even more than that. Part of that was that this is a government that does not believe in government. Doesn’t believe in common purposes and public good. (Personal communication, May 5, 2015)
As was noted in Chapter 1, many researchers on the topic of policy coherence (Brown and Raddatz 2012, 335; see also Baranyi and Paducel 2012; Brown 2012b; den Heyer 2012; Swiss 2012) have identified that governments like the Conservative Canadian one during Canada’s leadership role in Kandahar often instrumentalize aid for non-development purposes under the guise of policy coherence “in order to invoke ‘feel-good’ development issues or effectiveness concerns to legitimize self-interested measures that do not constitute improvements on previous policies or are unlikely to improve the impact of aid from a development perspective.” For Catherine, her past experience led her to believe that CIDA’s aid was intricately tied up in the transformations of the K-PRT.

Catherine reminded me that the typical approach used by CIDA in developing nations almost always involved long-term, generational planning and investment in the local capacity-builders to maintain the project work long after the Canadians had left. But with Afghanistan, “it was reduced, it had changed the kind of investment that CIDA makes from ‘let’s think about where we want to be in 20 years in this country and in this sector, so that we are gradually working for and transferring the capacity to manage the sector better to the country that’s there’, to ‘now we’re counting outputs’. They don’t want to know ‘what have we achieved regarding life-expectancy over a 10-year period in country X’, but rather ‘how many vitamin A capsules have we distributed, and if we extrapolate from that, could we save 6 million lives?’” (personal communication, May 5, 2015). Catherine’s view on the departmental transformation of CIDA is supported by an ATIP document on the formative evaluation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force’s (START) Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), a funding envelope for international

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28 To advance the peace and security priorities of the Government of Canada, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) leads Canadian government engagement in complex political-security crises in fragile and
assistance programming in WOG responses to fragile and conflict affected states. In the evaluation, it was noted that “failed and fragile states are complex, high-risk environments in which to run projects, and by their very nature require long-term funding commitments. Many GPSF projects have had to operate within a six-month timeframe or less” (ATIP GPSF Final Report 2007, 600).

By CIDA’s own admission, this type of time frame would not be conducive to any effective development programming, let alone programming focused on gender equality or women’s empowerment. And it was this type of time frame that was mandated through the Manley Report.

Catherine’s perspective on development was honed over a long career through her own commitments to research and implementation. Her views on Kandahar exhibit the kind of frustration informed by a long-term and passionate commitment to effective development. She explains,

Okay, so what we know about development is there’s a difference between development and charity. Development is about increasing people’s capacity to manage their own lives in a way that thrives. A decent quality of life. You want to teach them to survive, you want them to participate in the modern economy and have decent work. The whole-of-government approach turned out to be – as I heard – basically cabinet ministers sitting around talking about Afghanistan as if it were Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. (Personal communication, May 5, 2015)

conflict-affected states. START also coordinates whole-of-government responses to crises, including natural disasters (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 2015).
Catherine saw the WOG approach in Kandahar as far too imposing of Western values, composed of streamlined, impersonal responses to issues defined by Canada, and not by the local population. She elaborates,

They are operating under the assumption that they could control things. My experience in development is that you have to think in 20 year terms because that’s a generation. I didn’t pick the number 20 out of thin air, it’s a generational change. And you’re looking at changing behaviour first and hoping that attitudes will follow. So, some nice people sitting around the cabinet table are flown into a country on a helicopter, and seeing Canadian army controlling everything where we made the rules. You have to look at a country. You can’t go faster than they can go. And you see, what we’ve tried to do is not sustainable. (Personal communication, May 5, 2015)

Development practitioners like Catherine, with decades of experience behind her, could see the sidelining of development occurring in Kandahar, and could see the inevitable problems that would arise from working under short timelines with militarized methods. This has implications for Canada’s focus on gender equality in Kandahar, as without the benefit of long-term investment in a community, to build capacity and trust, the ability to also mainstream a gender equality component into the work was reduced. As development work was already seen by those in power in Canada’s WOG approach as complicated and out of the realm of normal operations in a conflict zone, including gender equality work only added a layer of complexity that the K-PRT would not address.

Indeed, in the Final Report on the review of the GPSF and START in 2007, accessed through ATIP from GAC, it was pointed out that due to short-term constraints there was little
evidence of gender equality and gender mainstreaming: “The evaluators found little evidence that projects had undertaken gender analysis to assess the differing effects of interventions on women and men, girls and boys. […] International experience has shown that failure to mainstream gender equality can compromise project results” (ATIP GPSF Capacity Check Final Report 2007, 617).

Moreover, these short-term constraints were also highlighted in a Task Force Kandahar lessons learned workshop and report, retrieved by ATIP from DND, as having a negative effect on the sustainable outcome of development projects with a human component. The report notes:

All departments felt that they were frequently driving their GIRD [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] partners, rather than letting them take the lead. Too often ISAF dominated the planning, prioritizing and implementing functions that should have been driven by GIRD. In many cases, the international community’s interest in getting results superseded the medium and longer term goal of developing GIRD’s capacity to connect to its people and deliver services. (Task Force Kandahar 2011, 6)

The short-term focus favoured by military approaches to fragile states deterred a gender equality focus due to its view as being complicated and beyond the purview of a collaborative approach focused on quick-impact Signature Projects and Priorities. This problem is exemplified by a unique experience for Kamala, the former manager and gender specialist in CIDA’s KLIP program in Canada’s final year in Kandahar. Kamala recalled that she “underwent intensive military training before leaving for Kandahar” yet that training only lasted for 5 days in Kingston, Ontario, followed by a frontier scenario to test the training, which included CIDA presenting their findings to the head of the military contingent running the training session (personal communication, July 28, 2015).
Viewing Kamala’s interview through a critical, post structural feminist lens, it becomes apparent that her experience in preparation for Kandahar was gendered, and led her to perceive her role as a CIDA civilian as less important or significant than that of her military counterparts. She seemed to perceive her typical development training in comparison to her military training to mean that she couldn’t produce results as quickly as the military. As she told me about the final stage of her military training, conducting real-world scenarios that she could face in Kandahar in the relative safety of Fort Irwin, California, she recalled, “the military complain about civilians being slow, with no discipline, however we were well prepared!” (personal communication, July 28, 2015). I noticed this sentiment – the view that development workers weren’t stellar examples of public service efficiency – from Jim, the former ADM in Public Affairs at DND. Jim’s view of CIDA was “an organization that was not mainstream in the public service. Very few people went to work for them, there were a lot of consultants. They kind of did their own thing, and no one ever measured their effectiveness” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Jim believed that it was with the Kandahar PRT that CIDA hit its turning point. For Jim, “with the evolution of WOG, that was a bit of a transformation for CIDA. And I think that began at Kandahar. And that speaks to some extent to the genesis of WOG, because CIDA was always exclusively Africa-focused up to that point. And so you know, with Afghanistan and Haiti it started to broaden out beyond Africa” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). For Kamala, who was internal to CIDA, and Jim, who was external, the same sentiment was expressed: that CIDA needed to be brought up to speed and organized in a military sense in order to be effective in Kandahar, and be seen as an effective department amongst its government peers. The place of CIDA’s more typical long-term approaches to development would not fit with the short-term perspective of the K-PRT.
The focus by the Manley Panel on policy coherence heightened this sentiment and separated long-term development policies from the short-term work encouraged in Kandahar, leaving typical development organizations from being able to operate at full development capacity. In an ATIP document on the evaluation of START and the GPSF, it was highlighted that the “Terms and Conditions under which the GPSF has been obliged to operate have prevented it from making long-term commitments, thereby undermining its capacity to fulfill its mandate in a manner consistent with the OECD principles” (ATIP GPSF Final Report 2007, 609). These terms and conditions included the GPSF being informed of its spending authority on a yearly basis, and even then it was not informed until halfway through the year. This resulted in one START staff member being recorded as saying, “‘How do you plan, if you don’t have a budget from year-to-year, let alone plan multi-year initiatives?’” (ATIP GPSF Final Report 2007, 609). The report noted that the longest horizon for GPSF projects in Haiti, Sudan, Afghanistan, and International Peacekeeping and Peace Operations was 18 months, “too short a time to demonstrate results at the outcome level” (ATIP GPSF Final Report 2007, 609).

Along with the GPSF, CIDA’s focus shifted drastically to short-term and large-scale politicized projects that left it no longer able to conduct its typical gender equality work. This was rationalized as CIDA not being able to make an impact in Kandahar, given that the timeline for Canada’s commitment in Kandahar was never fully understood. In a presentation on “Securing Development” provided to me by “Doug”, a retired Colonel and member of the communications team for DFAIT, he noted that before the Manley Report, CIDA exhibited a lack of overall capacity “to make a significant impact in Kandahar on its own” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). After the Manley Report, shared and clear objectives enabled CIDA “to harness necessary diplomatic and security resources on a Whole-of-Government basis” with “unified on-the-ground
civ/mil planning enabling CIDA to make [a] substantial increase in programming in Kandahar” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Through the policy coherence encouraged by the Manley Panel, the long-term objectives of CIDA’s development agenda were deemphasized in favour of the short-term approaches normalized within DND and the CF. This meant that addressing issues of gender equality had no real institutional substance or support, as gender-focused development required the kind of long-term and trust-built approaches that military-style project management would not support.

4.5 Conclusion

“Simone”, a former gender specialist with CIDA, highlights the narrow focus that Canada’s WOG approach – despite emphasizing policy coherence – took in Kandahar. She noted the difference between CIDA’s work in Afghanistan pre- and post-Manley Report: in her tours of Afghanistan prior to the Manley Report, she never worked directly with the PRT: “from a development point of view, we were in the entire country; from the DND point of view, we were in Kandahar. CIDA supported national programs” (personal communication, August 26, 2016). She told me about some of the initiatives CIDA was involved with in Afghanistan on a national level, including the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), set up in 2002: “the Afghan government put their own strategy together, and asked for support from partners and donors. In the end they were supported by five donors that provided into a basket of funding that amounted to $1.4 billion, including Canada” (personal communication, August 26, 2016). The ARTF continues to operate today, and provides a coordinated financing mechanism for the Government of Afghanistan's budget and priority national investment projects (ARTF 2018). It continues to be the largest single source of on-budget financing for Afghanistan’s development, delivering results
within key sectors including education, health, agriculture, rural development, infrastructure, and governance, and is supported by 34 donors and administered by the World Bank (ARTF 2018).

According to Simone, while she was a part of CIDA, and prior to the convening of the Manley Panel, the fund was used across many provinces, including Kandahar. It was invested toward things with a gender equality focus such as better management of teaching, and the bolstering of human resources in education including the hiring of administrators and teachers, with a focus on hiring women. It was meant to help develop the capacity of the local communities to support their own reconstruction and development, and paid special attention to the Afghan context: Simone noted that it considered the cultural issue that “girls needed to be taught by women after age nine or so, and the same goes for the health context – girls will not go to male doctors unless it is hands-off” (personal communication, August 26, 2016). Due to women having a lack of mobility in Afghanistan, being barred from going anywhere in public unaccompanied, Simone recalled that efforts were made to hire medical professionals that were partners across sexed lines: husband and wife, brother and sister (personal communication, August 26, 2016). Simone noted that this focus was facilitated by the fact that gender had its own funding pillar in Afghanistan from CIDA for a while, alongside education: there was specific funding for girls in school and for vocational programs for women. CIDA funded organizations like the World University Service of Canada (WUSC) and CARE, which had vocational and educational programs that featured direct gender funding (CIDA 2007; personal communication, August 26, 2016).

Yet after the Manley Report came out, CIDA’s priorities changed and the dedicated program pillar for gender equality was absorbed into other areas in line with the six Priorities and three Signature Projects. As Simone lamented, “when it [gender equality] becomes a part of livelihoods or education, its impact is reduced” (personal communication, August 26, 2016).
CIDA’s national work with the ATRF and WUSC and CARE shifted as well, and moves were made to turn CIDA’s focus toward programming that was Kandahar-specific first and foremost. The focus on policy coherence from civilian leadership that aligned with DND and the CF, and the integration of long-term and gender equality-dedicated civilian approaches into short-term ones that reflected a heightened military influence, helped normalize and legitimize the militarization of civilian departments in Kandahar. The transition from “3D” and Canada’s IPS in 2005 to “WOG”, “1C” and “CA” with the Manley Report in 2008 brought with it a greater emphasis on militarized approaches as more “effective” than those approaches espoused by organizations and departments working on development aid and humanitarian assistance, though this view has since fallen out of favour with the transition from a Conservative to Liberal government in Ottawa. The international rule of law on WOG, which emphasized the separation of military and humanitarian styles of management, was manipulated by Canada’s WOG policies to permit the militarization of civilian responses to state fragility, and the instrumentalization of women and “gender” in pursuit of that militarization.

In the chapter that follows, I turn to the effect that this policy context, driven by a need for greater policy coherence, had on the WOG structure of the K-PRT. With a critical, post structural feminist analysis pointing to the imbalance of power between the implicated WOG departments skewing toward the military and those departments and actors who embrace a militarized WOG culture, I argue that even with the transition to civilian leadership, the K-PRT favoured characteristics of military might and tightened corporate management. This in turn led to the reinforcement of the narrative of women and of “gender” and “gender equality” as exceptional to the function of the Canadian WOG approach, and indeed, was unnecessary for the safe and effective operation of the PRT. As I will elucidate, this analysis argues that the Canadian WOG
approach in Kandahar does not permit more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality due to the PRT structure reflecting a design that upholds militarized masculinity as the norm, and true collaborative governance as a smokescreen for the militarization of civilians and civilian departments.
5 Collaborative Structure: Military Might and the Exceptionalism of Gender

In Chapter 3, I laid out how the intent to create greater policy coherence in the K-PRT through the transformations brought about by the Manley Panel contributed to the increased militarization of civilian departments and their programming. I highlighted how the international rule of law on WOG approaches indicated a separation needed between humanitarian aid and military operations unless the approach maintained civilian leadership, and that through Canada’s 2005 IPS and 2008 Manley Report, this rule of law was viewed as an opportunity to increase civilian leadership of the K-PRT through policy coherence and thereby permit the amalgamation of military and civilian personnel. Yet with this transformation, I also noted that the path of least resistance, as feminist theory on hegemonic masculinity tells us, is one that encourages continued militarized collaborative solutions to state fragility, rather than turning away from such approaches. This, in turn, meant that there was in fact less room for attention to be paid to issues of gender equality in Kandahar as the association of gender issues was abnormal to the need for efficient collaborative operation of the K-PRT – a partial answer to my research question of whether the Canadian WOG approach of the K-PRT, which theoretically created a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permitted more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality. As such, issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment were present, but unsubstantiated institutionally and often instrumentalized for the push for greater policy coherence and increased efficiency in the K-PRT.

In this chapter, I will build on the argument of Chapter 3 to address how the push for policy coherence affected the WOG structure of the K-PRT itself. As post-structural feminist theory
reveals, the relational bureaucratic structures that make up Canadian governance exist within a hierarchy that is maintained by hegemonic masculinity: the structures we exist within and rely on daily fit within a larger social context determined by Western masculinity, and in the case of Kandahar, the context is supported and upheld by a form of militarized hypermasculinity that is reflected in the structure of the K-PRT. To reiterate, Connell (2008, xxi) and Whitworth (2010, 175n20) note that everywhere masculinity exists within a hierarchy of gender relations, with certain forms of masculinity benefiting from the hierarchical relationship over others, and over all forms of femininity. This hierarchy of gender relations is reflected in our institutions, in that the dividends – the benefits, services, and incomes – of patriarchal gender arrangements that favour masculinities are not received equally by men; the most privileged men, those who exhibit cisgender, white, economically upper class, and educated characteristics, receive most of the benefits, while those men and women who outwardly demonstrate their otherness from the white, male, cisgender and able-bodied norm face most of the disadvantages. Similarly, these institutions are propped up by those individuals that stand to benefit from the patriarchal hierarchical arrangement but may not be members of the “inner circle” of power: the comprador masculinities of middle management in civilian and military roles, the politicians of client states, corporate and military women, the mercenaries of security services, and the communications gurus who continue to provide the media with a gender display that upholds the gender hierarchy (Connell 2008, xiii; see also Enloe 2000a, 2000b, 2014; Runyan and Peterson 2014, 160). It is this understanding of the power of masculinity – its hegemony – that allows us to interrogate its impact on the institutional structures of the K-PRT.

In this chapter, I dive into the institutional structure of the K-PRT, constituted by both the separate institutions that contributed finances and actors to the operation of the K-PRT and the
collaborative design of the K-PRT itself, and investigate the effect hegemonic masculinity has on the framing of Canada’s WOG approach. By discursively analyzing the division of responsibility of the major Canadian departmental players in Kandahar from the 3D approach to the WOG approach, the focus on gender parity by the military, the conflation of “women” with “gender” and the sidelined priority of gender equality policy and programming, I argue that a power imbalance occurs where the division of leadership favours military might and militarization, and reinforces the exceptionalism of women and other gendered conceptualizations. Building on Chapter 3, this chapter, in part, answers the research question – how does the Canadian WOG approach in the K-PRT, which theoretically created a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permit more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality? – by identifying that through a PRT design that is military first and foremost, the hegemony of militarized masculinity is left unchecked, and the urge for collaborative design of the K-PRT is actually a smokescreen for the militarization of civilians and civilian departments, and the WOG approach overall.

5.1 “Afghanistan is a very difficult experience”

This was the first thing that Jessica, the health and gender specialist with the Canadian Embassy in Kabul in 2010, said to me as we set out to conduct our interview in August of 2016. We met via Skype and dove right into her perspective on Kandahar, even though she made sure to tell me several times that she had only set foot there for about ten days in total. She explained that it was tough living by its very design, and since she was coming to Kandahar from the relative comfort of the Canadian embassy in Kabul, she had little understanding of what it took to survive there. Her experience of Afghanistan thus far had been inside the walls of the embassy for about
four weeks, and her trip to Kandahar, from the moment she left to the moment she returned, felt like nothing she’d ever experienced before (personal communication, August 11, 2016). Jessica arrived in Kandahar in 2010, well after the Manley Panel had convened and their report published. The extent of her expectations in Kandahar were that she would be in a far more militarized context than Kabul, even after the Manley Report stipulated the civilian leadership changes and policy coherence of the three Signature Projects and six Priorities in Canada’s WOG approach.

Jessica explained that to get to Canada’s areas of Kandahar, you had to fly into Kandahar Airfield (KAF), then go by helicopter or over land to the PRT. This segment of travel, a common commute for many Canadian civilians working there, was the most nerve-wracking for Jessica, as this was the first time she encountered truly militarized travel. In a military convoy, she found herself wondering if she would get hit during her commute, and often, this commute could take an hour or more for safety concerns. She told me that to take a helicopter was certainly quicker and easier, but you could still get shot down just in your attempt to get to the office. And even as she became more familiarized with her surroundings and got settled into her work, this uncomfortable, stressful life-or-death feeling permeated every waking moment of her day, and stuck with her for the rest of her time in Kandahar (personal communication, August 11, 2016). Yet despite the discomfort of it, military transport was the typical form of commuter travel for all Canadian individuals, military and civilian, working in Kandahar; often to work on programs and projects that required collaboration between the KAF and the K-PRT. One couldn’t travel anywhere without a military escort, and certainly couldn’t travel in a vehicle that was ill-equipped for the dangers of insurgency. To wake up, dress for war, and step out into the dry desert heat and into your Chinook or armoured Jeep to get to your next meeting or training session illustrated the influence the military had over the daily routines of civilians in Kandahar. Military elements made
up the bulk of daily life, including such simple precautions as militarized travel and military escorts, sleeping in military barracks, and dressing in protective and conformist gear, and contributed to the normalization of militarized masculinity in the collaborative approach taken in Kandahar.

Jessica’s recollections are confirmed in an affidavit provided by Colleen Swords in 2007, who declared:

The dangerous security situation in Kandahar requires, as a matter of practice, that civilian members of the PRT as well as those based at Kandahar Airfield not leave these bases to perform their functions without the physical protection provided by CF escort. This includes the travel by CSC officers to visit detention facilities as part of their capacity building project. This physical protection is therefore essential to the ability of the Canadian Government to conduct its operations related to programming of reconstruction, development, and training in support of the Afghan Government in Kandahar Province. The requirement for physical protection by the CF during travel outside the PRT or Kandahar air field applies equally to any other Canadian government personnel visiting either from our embassy in Kabul or from Canada. If Canada were to cease its development, reconstruction and diplomatic efforts in Kandahar province, our ability to fulfill our commitments to the Government of Afghanistan and the international community would be severely restricted. (Swords Affidavit 2007, 12-13)

As this statement makes clear, much of this normalization was in response to the dangers of the region, but at the same time, this same dangerous context was also reason for Canada to apply the 3D, WOG, and CA approaches to Kandahar. The necessity of the military in a region such as
Kandahar, as Canada attempted to provide development assistance and conduct diplomatic relationship-building with local government, was argued the moment individual public servants arrived: imminent, constant danger of the Taliban insurgency meant that there would be no collaboration without first securing the area, and maintaining that security through simple precautions every day as civilians and military personnel went about their work. So how did the various departments approach the goals of policy coherence mandated in the K-PRT within such a volatile setting? In the pages that follow, I outline the different ways the departments approached collaboration in Kandahar, and how these different approaches reflected a hierarchical masculine WOG structure that favoured military responses over civilian ones.

5.2 A Tale of Different Departments: How CIDA, DND and DFAIT Structured their WOG Responses

At the broadest stroke, it was clear from the early days of the PRT that the major departments of CIDA, DFAIT and DND weren’t working together on policy and programming initiatives in Kandahar. Prior to the integration prompted by the Manley Report, the departments were working in Kandahar from within their own “ivory towers”, and operating through processes unique and distinct to each. As Hampson (2012) notes, “A casual perusal of CIDA, DFAIT, and DND departmental websites underscores the lack of coherence in our policymaking priorities. Individually, they tell a tale of particular department priorities and endeavors and how each is aiming to meet them”. Digging behind the departmental websites and into the public management and policy decisions they were making regarding Kandahar, each department organized their management processes individually by building up their own Afghanistan-focused task forces. However, what was interesting about this approach was how the civilian departments struggled
with this design, while the military did not. According to Buchan (2010, 78), DFAIT and CIDA each set up units in the 60- to 80-person range, led at the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) level, yet the significant growing pains of these task forces highlighted that, unlike the military, civilian departments lack a rapidly accessible reserve of personnel to deploy into such conflict-affected arenas as Kandahar.

Moreover, the civilian departments tasked with developing special Afghanistan units were wary of such a need from the beginning. Buchan (2010, 78) highlights that the planning process for these task forces was intermittently a source of friction, as the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command’s (CEFCOM) desire to produce a detailed WOG operational plan “was seen by civilian departments as a military effort to impose its own way of doing business, and was met with a combination of suspicion and reluctance to engage”. In an interview with Jim, the former DND ADM of Public Affairs who dealt with much of the military procurement and communications, including the IPS, from 2004 to 2009, he clarified the reasoning behind this seemingly strong push by DND for effective WOG operational plans. I asked him about how closely he worked on the International and Defence Policy Statements of 2005, and what his perspective was on the directives of the Manley Panel and subsequent report in comparison to those of the IPS, particularly regarding collaboration between departments. He told me,

Personally, I probably had a larger role than might have been the case, just given my position for a couple of reasons. One of those reasons was there was a fairly significant transformation in National Defence on government at the time, and I was a key part of both supporting the Chief of Defence Staff on that transformation and also a key advisor to the Minister. Part of the reason why it was probably more than usual because there was a real desire for there to be a public face to CF, and for the public to understand completely what
the mission with the PRT and the operations, combat operations were about. And so, I probably was more deeply involved in most of the decision making than a person in my position might have been. And also, I was very much involved in the development of the IPS from a conceptual policy thinking perspective, but also from an actual writing and editing position. (Personal communication, September 19, 2016)

Jim’s first-hand account of how important the IPS and the WOG goals were to DND reveals how strongly the push for public acceptance of the PRT was at the time, and how influential DND was on the issue of policy coherence.

As such, when I asked Jim about how this influence played against the civilian departments of the PRT, he validated my question on whether they pushed back against the military’s development of the WOG approach, stating that, in his opinion, WOG was embraced by DND but not by DFAIT or CIDA in the sense that he understood the concept. He told me, “WOG is kind of an interesting expression, because it was not easy nor wholly embraced by everybody. Including some of the departments that you would think would have been embracing it – Foreign Affairs is an example. And CIDA as well. I mean, it’s one thing to participate, but to actually have ‘WOG’ as a concept, is a different thing. That was never achieved in 2006, until I left” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). I pressed him on his perspective, asking him to clarify what his understanding of WOG was. Did he have a lot of collaborative contact with the civilian departments as he was making WOG decisions via the IPS? He admitted he didn’t, and told me “no, there was very limited contact with my counterparts. But I was fortunate enough to be involved in a lot of the more senior level discussions, interdepartmentally. I was present. And a participant in those decisions” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). For Jim, WOG was an approach that should have been better received by all the implicated departments, yet at
the same time, in the early days of its development it appeared it wasn’t necessary for top decision-makers at DND to regularly interact with their departmental counterparts.

Given that Jim was involved in interdepartmental discussions at the senior level, I was curious to hear his views on the presence and importance of gender equality policy and programming. I asked Jim if the issue of gender equality appeared in his work, and if it was considered a mainstreamed priority by DND. He responded that to him, the Government of Canada was a gender-blind institution, one that was and remains the most gender-equal government he has had the pleasure to work with, in the sense that it mattered not what your gender was, just that you could do the job. In that regard, the combat mission was the dominant component for DND. When it came to a policy focus on gender equality, he stressed that for DND, it was not the central piece of Canada’s mission to Kandahar (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Overall, Jim felt that there was very little deep-rooted understanding of the cultural differences between Canada and Afghanistan from DFAIT and CIDA, whereas he believed Gen. Hillier and the military had a good sense of the culture from a gendered standpoint. Canada was there to save Afghanistan’s women and girls, who had been downtrodden for so long, and Jim believed strongly in this. He commented, “actually I would suggest to you that I don’t think CIDA really cared about Afghanistan. I just don’t think they cared. And Foreign Affairs probably not much more” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Jim’s testimony reveals that there is a tendency in public organizations like government departments, and particularly militarized departments like DND, to assume that gender neutrality is possible; yet what occurs is a conflation of “gender” with “women”, and that when an individual or organization highlights neutrality, they are masking the gendered (and racial, social, economic, and other identity markers) power imbalances that are present beneath the surface. What tends to occur, if an organization is focused on issues
surrounding gender equality, is that they will focus on issues facing women alone, rather than looking to address gender imbalances that affect men and women and to find solutions that implicate all members of a gender imbalanced society.

Did this focus on women as “gender” occur across the WOG departments working in the K-PRT? Was there much room to address “gender” at all when neutrality was valued at DND, the most influential department in the early 3D years, and as Jim noted, the issue of gender equality did not present as a pressing issue? Jim’s comment about CIDA and DFAIT “not caring” about Afghanistan presents a good investigatory avenue to start from. When these departments were brought in to the 3D/WOG approach in Kandahar, they were already focused on many different geographic areas on a wide variety of foreign policy and development issues, and the large financial and political focus on Kandahar came to them almost as if out of left field. Although as the WOG approach progressed and transformed with the Manley Panel, DFAIT’s perspective on Kandahar fell more into line with DND’s. As noted by David Mulroney, the former PCO Deputy Minister responsible for the inter-departmental Afghanistan Task Force and former Secretary to the Manley Panel,

The civilians at Foreign Affairs and CIDA believed that they were engaged in classic reconstruction work. Their efforts to rebuild a war-torn region would be supported by the security presence of the Canadian Forces. And for the civilians, Afghanistan was only one of a number of priorities, a list that also included commitments in Haiti and Darfur. As a result, the civilian mission to Kandahar was not adequately resourced with people, becoming instead largely a matter of chequebook diplomacy. Asked to define the mission, civilians would rattle off the long list of UN-sponsored projects they were helping to fund. (Mulroney 2015, 251)
When CIDA’s funding was directly affected by the major focus on Kandahar, their pushback against it was not borne from caring too little about the Afghan context, but rather a deep concern that military usurpation or absorption of their development funds would result in shallow, unresponsive and disrespectful programs and project work.

Nipa Banerjee, a former head of aid for CIDA, argues that the issues that troubled her and her colleagues circled around “winning the hearts and minds” of Afghans through military-managed development work. According to Banerjee (2010), this was work that CIDA wouldn’t normally touch because it didn’t come from their planning, and it didn’t permit the ownership of projects by local populations. She critically states:

Canadian aid is politicized and militarized, as clearly reflected in the prescriptive and self-serving nature of aid supporting political and military objectives of Canada as a troop-contributing country. A disproportionate amount of aid is directed to the province of Kandahar, where Canadian troops have been fighting the insurgency. Development investment concentration in Kandahar has had little impact on legitimacy or institution building, even at the provincial level. Unfortunately, even Canadian efforts to win hearts and minds have failed in rural Kandahar, where our soldiers have operated since early 2006 and where they have never been made to feel welcome. (Banerjee 2010, 49)

Banerjee’s largest concern lies with the transition to the Signature Projects following the Manley Report in early 2008. She writes, “the wisdom was lost with the introduction of ‘signature’ projects, with Canadian stamps on them, for increasing the visibility of Canada in Afghanistan. […] The concept of signature projects, pushing Canadian visibility, does nothing to earn longer term legitimacy for the Afghan state institutions and violates the local ownership principle”
(Banerjee 2009, 69-70). The role of the military in supporting these Signature Projects was a large part of the problem for Banerjee, as the military’s presence and control over the Signature Projects meant that development workers seemed invisible from, and thus unable to effectively reach, the populations that stood to benefit from the projects’ outcomes.

These crossed wires between CIDA and the military had gendered implications. According to “Shaqayeq”, a former CIDA contractor with a Canadian NGO, “whole-of-government was a fallacy, people weren’t talking to each other” (personal communication, August 23, 2016). As a result, Shaqayeq saw first-hand how military approaches to development work ended up isolating women on the Canadian as well as Afghan side: the military put a lot of effort into consulting with local elders in Kandahar, who were usually men, which left Canadian female personnel out of the loop due to local custom and social traditions separating women from men. This also left Afghan women undervalued and left out of the official WOG processes, as they could not participate in official decision-making due to the local custom (personal communication, August 23, 2016). For Simone, the former Gender Advisor for CIDA, this inability to agree, let alone speak the same language on gender, was a massive hindrance to her work. Simone recalled that she had reached out to the PRT a few times regarding issues of gender, citing a real difficulty hiring female staff and placing women in positions of power in order to build Afghan capacity on gender equality (personal communication, August 26, 2016). This difficulty stemmed from the real danger to their lives, as most Afghan women knew that they could easily be killed for suspicion of colluding with Westerners. Simone lamented, “what could I tell them as gender advisor?” (personal communication, August 26, 2016). The most engagement she saw from women in Kandahar was through small businesses set up by Canadian women who had traveled there to support women’s independent work: the most common were little shops and craft stalls for women, found mainly in
the military market where expat numbers were in the high thousands and where USAID had created a project supporting women entrepreneurs (personal communication, August 26, 2016). Within the PRT, it was a different story: Simone told me she would have been shocked if the same flourishing women’s markets were found there, as the people in Kandahar were so afraid of the Taliban that they knew not to associate with the PRT (personal communication, August 26, 2016).

Simone attributed her gender-based struggles with the PRT to its inability to engage effectively with the cultural makeup of the Kandahar region:

The Pashtuns were far more strict than the Tajiks, the Uzbeks or even the Hajaras. In Bamiyan province there were women ministers, but never in Pashtun areas – remember the diversity of the country – these were completely different cultures. For example, in Mazar-i-Sharif it would be somewhat better for women than in Kandahar. The Taliban were basically a minority group of the Pashtun, which was the largest cultural group in the Kandahar region. (Personal communication, August 26, 2016)

Because of this incredibly diverse collection of cultures across Afghanistan, with Kandahar hosting the strictest and least cooperative group regarding gender equality, it was a very foreign concept; Simone recalled having to explain it within a Quranic conceptualization – “this is what the Quran says!” (personal communication, August 26, 2016). Overall, Simone regarded her time as a Gender Advisor for the Kandahar PRT as a waste of her talents: while the Taliban was influential, Canada focused on all-male shuras29 to guide diplomatic decision-making in the region, with very few

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29 A shura, also known as a jirga, is a form of governance practiced in the rural and urban areas of Kandahar. It is a traditional assembly of (typically male) leaders that make decisions by consensus and according to the teachings of Pashtunwali, a non-written ethical code and traditional lifestyle which the indigenous Pashtun people of Afghanistan follow. It predates modern-day written or fixed laws, and is conducted to settle disputes among the Pashtun people but to a lesser extent among other nearby groups that have been influenced by Pashtuns.
mixed or all-female shuras organized and implemented. To Simone, Kandahar was always more backward on the issue of gender equality than the rest of the country, and Canada’s PRT was working along these backward lines, rather than looking for inroads across and against them.

Indeed, ATIP evidence suggests that CIDA had very little engagement with the local population of Kandahar while operating through the PRT. In a CIDA scoping mission report entitled “Working Towards the Advancement of Women and Gender Equality in Afghanistan” from June 2006, it was highlighted on the second page that “the Mission Team did not undertake the following tasks since they were not within the Mission’s mandate: Travel outside of Kabul (security concerns); Identify new projects for CIDA to fund; Evaluate GE integration in CIDA’s projects or evaluate CIDA’s gender-specific programming; Address GE issues concerning CIDA’s programming in Kandahar” (ATIP Afghanistan Program Asia Branch 2006, 2). Moreover, when the report assessed the gender equality capacity of donors to Afghanistan, they noted that gender coordination groups were not strategic enough in their coordination efforts, that information sharing was disorganized, that there were different approaches, visions and institutional priorities on gender, and that gender advisors often lacked sectoral specialization and seniority (ATIP Afghanistan Program Asia Branch 2006, 18). From the outset, it appeared that CIDA was prepared to avoid doing any gender equality related work in Kandahar given the seemingly insurmountable blockades to effective programming.

This frustrated Simone, to the point that she left her job as a Gender Advisor while CIDA was in Kandahar. She recalls that while she worked with the CIDA ATF and the PRT, she conducted a gender assessment where she met with stakeholders and came up with recommendations for Kandahar, knowing that there was a large amount of gender-based violence that CIDA could address. She recalls: “There was a great need for women’s shelters, but the easier
projects were chosen all the time, above anything that was strategic. These projects were usually recommended by men. It was so much easier to do health or education, it was an easier sell! They would rather go easy than do something a little bit different, something that required a bit of risk” (personal communication, August 26, 2016). In the end, almost none of what Simone recommended was funded, particularly the projects that were spearheaded by the Afghan diaspora. It wasn’t just Simone’s lack of influence that frustrated her, it was that as Gender Advisor she could see gender inequalities everywhere in the PRT. She felt coddled and stifled by the paternalistic influence of DND, and the way CIDA seemed to favour the way DND managed the PRT; she exclaimed, “we don’t expect that of our international development agency!” (personal communication, August 26, 2016). Simone suggested that CIDA didn’t know how to properly assess the Dahla Dam Signature Project from a gender perspective, despite her calls for a specialist to be incorporated into the engineering team, or for the team to be trained to look for gendered power dynamics in the populations that stood to benefit from the Dam. Nor did DND know how to deal with the fact that many Afghan men were frustrated and uneducated, leading to domestic violence, or that many boys in Kandahar, as well as girls, were being kept in bondage as slaves, sexual or otherwise: an aspect of gender inequality that was overlooked as it didn’t directly relate to women or girls (personal communication, August 26, 2016). For Simone, the opportunities to address true gender inequality issues and conditions were present in Kandahar, but the influence of DND and its militarized approaches stifled these chances for CIDA to do so.

5.3 Attempting to Come Together: Civ-Mil, Civ-Pol, COIN, The Manley Report, and the RoCK
Despite the international calls to keep military and humanitarian aid work separate, and the issues surrounding crossed wires and mixed signals on WOG and gender equality within Canada’s PRT, attempts were made to successfully integrate civilian and military processes from the early days in Kandahar through to the end. As was addressed in Chapter 3, given the policy context and the military setting that surrounded the PRT, these attempts would naturally skew in favour of military solutions. One such example is COIN methodology, or counter-insurgency processes supported by civil-military (also abbreviated as civ-mil or civ-pol) cooperation, aimed at preparing the local population to take over the responsibility of their own security. According to Lavender (2015), COIN methodology in Kandahar was a highly militarized endeavour, despite the need of civilian support to ensure its success. Lavender (2015, 54-55) explains that the key to the COIN methodology is the emphasis on developing an ‘indigenous capacity’ to assume security, governance and development activities. Based on ‘quick-impact’ stabilization activities (such as putting in wells or rehabilitating schools), the pace and expected results must necessarily be immediate and short term, with security and stabilization activities mutually reinforcing each other through the ‘clear-hold-build-transfer’ phases of a COIN campaign. A civ-mil WoG effort is clearly required in order to support and deliver COIN. It is also evident that key aspects of COIN overlap with development, in particular where aid agencies like CIDA or USAID focus on improving the capacity of government to deliver basic services to vulnerable, poor and often marginalized populations.

The similarities between COIN methodology and traditional CIDA development processes are clear. They both share a similar purpose in seeking to build local capacity, and they share a similar methodology in targeting an indigenous-led approach where local ownership is the procedural goal.
Where they differ is in the pace of delivery and in who delivers it; a concern highlighted by Banerjee above. Lavender (2015, 55-56) provides an example of this discrepancy:

while it may be quite easy to follow through on a request from the district or provincial authorities to rehabilitate a school using local contractors, it takes a good deal of time to recruit, train, and place education ministry officials and teachers in the provinces, districts and rural communities, develop the curriculum, and improve the financial systems so that teachers can be paid. While both COIN and development put the local officials in the drivers’ seat, the pace and timing for sustained delivery of a basic service is quite different.

Within the fragile context of Kandahar, the delivery of COIN methodology through military personnel at a pace that does not reflect CIDA development processes that work to build trust and generational capacity amongst the local population was a perceived ideal approach for the PRT.

What definitively solidified the push toward militarized collaboration, with emphasis on quick-impact and short-term civ-mil, civ-pol and COIN methodologies, was the Manley Report. Civ-mil and civ-pol collaboration became cemented in policy with the six Priorities and three Signature Projects, and was led into existence with the creation of the RoCK as an equal counterpart to the Commander of the CF. According to DFAIT communications specialist Doug, it “re-calibrated the mission and set in place the foundation for more effective communications from a WOG perspective” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). With the Manley Report, WOG became viewed as synonymous with COIN, civ-mil and civ-pol cooperation, emphasizing military procedures for those involved in its implementation. Doug’s role became one of high importance, as communications between the K-PRT and the various collaborative departments back on Canadian soil increased significantly. This included PR reporting to the
Canadian public such as “regular tech briefings, Quarterly Reports to Parliament beginning from June 2008; and benchmarks delivered from September 2008” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Along with multiple committees at the cabinet and parliamentary level being established, and the civilian role of the RoCK designed to work as the counterpart to the military director in theatre, Doug recalled to me that the Manley Report mandated partnership with the US to increase the number of troops at the PRT by one thousand, increasing the number of helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by August of 2008, and overall a thoroughly integrated civ-mil and civ-pol planning model where no decision could be made without the express permission of the military counterpart (personal communication, September 19, 2016). As such, the Manley Panel reinforced the might of the military in the structure of the WOG approach at the K-PRT. This is demonstrated in the highly militarized outcomes of the civ-mil and civ-pol collaboration encouraged in the K-PRT:

Canada has helped to improve the size of the Afghan National Army in Kandahar from a single, limited, brigade, to three. The various press reports suggest that there have been real improvements in what the Afghan National Army can do and how it has performed in the field. Canadians, civilian and military, have trained over 2,800 police offers since 2008. Of the various civilians at the PRT, the police trainers were viewed as the most flexible. They were able to deploy to dangerous areas with fewer restrictions and with less micro-management from Ottawa than the other civilians. It included the joint deployment of civilian police officers from Canada alongside Canadian military police, in outposts with Afghan National Police. The officers came from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), provincial police forces (Ontario Provincial Police, Sûreté du Québec) and municipal police – with the RCMP apparently having the lead. (Saideman 2014, 60).
Following the directives of the Manley Report, developing the COIN capacity of the local population became a core tenet of Canada’s WOG approach, reflecting the general trend toward increased militarization.

Moreover, the Manley Report solidified the evolution of the Canadian WOG approach in Kandahar to one that centralized the rapid increase in speed on project outputs. Problems highlighted by a former political director for the PRT included “differing departmental approaches to command, the lack of civilian headquarters in Kandahar, and an interdepartmental process ill-suited to rapid decision-making” (Nossal 2011, 5). The creation of the RoCK ensured that Canada’s WOG processes raced to meet the pace of the militarized COIN, civ-mil and civ-pol approaches, effectively creating a civilian position that reflected “a degree of ‘mission command’ on the civilian side, so that a greater proportion of military and civilian coordination could take place in theatre” (Nossal 2011, 5). With these changes, the hegemony – the power – of the military was upheld, and the effect of militarized masculinity was felt. For the aforementioned former political director with DFAIT in Kandahar, this transformation became the basis for WOG best practice: “the key lessons for consideration when mounting future ‘whole-of-government’ missions include: ensuring that there is a unity of civilian leadership; creating a culture of mission command among civilian departments as well as within the military; and paying greater attention to joint civilian-military planning” (Nossal 2011, 5-6). Indeed, the effect of the military component of Canada’s WOG approach in Afghanistan needs to be understood as an effect greater than the K-PRT itself, due in part to the perceived and documented unique wartime situation that Kandahar presented for Canada. Though current trends for WOG in Canada do not point to the level of militarization experienced in Kandahar, the lesson of Kandahar remains to point to the ease at
which the effect of militarization has on the operationalization and management of WOG approaches in certain fragile, conflict-affected contexts.

For those working within the communications branch of DFAIT’s Kandahar commitments, it was important to emphasize the unique wartime situation of Kandahar to the Canadian public. Returning to my interview with Doug, the retired Colonel and former communications member of DFAIT’s Afghanistan Task Force, he provided me with the details of a presentation he had made November 10, 2010 to Defence Public Affairs Officers about the DND communications piece of the mission from a WOG perspective. In this presentation, he informed the PA Officers that the Afghan mission really offers no serious base of comparison in our history, not just in our modern history.

By the end of the combat mission in summer 2011, the conflict will [have been] as long as World War One and World War Two combined; NATO engaged in ground combat for the first time in its sixty-year history; we’ve lost more soldiers than any time since Korea; the mission [was] at strategic distance and up to twelve time zones away; it [was] for the most part in full public view and full public international view; there [was] active enemy Info Ops; and throughout about half of it, [we] managed during a time of minority government.

(Personal communication, September 19, 2016)

For Doug, Kandahar was a serious commitment for the Canadian military, and one that required clear definition for the public to understand: the military aspect of Kandahar took precedence over the civilian work within the K-PRT (personal communication, September 19, 2016). The emphasis on the “out-of-the-ordinary”-ness of Kandahar for Canada’s military is interesting, as this could be said for any modern military engagement – yet it appeared important to the DFAIT
communications team (a civilian role) that this information be delivered consistently and in as many ways as possible.

Evidence of this out-of-the-ordinary war is found in an ATIP document of several emails between DFAIT officials related to the issue of Afghan detainees and Canada’s role in their handling. In an email dated October 15, 2006, there is reference to the extreme difficulty Afghanistan’s National Army and ISAF were having in controlling the terrorist insurgency, particularly in the South. As a result, the Afghan National Police were engaged to conduct counter-terrorism activities, despite their lack of proper training and their small numbers. As noted in the email,

In the south, the police have borne much of the brunt of the insurgency. Minister [of Interior Zarar] Moqbil notes that the ANP are supposed ‘to enforce laws, not fight’ in a counter-insurgency. Their mission should be to establish order and regain the trust of the people, said Moqbil. However, given the security situation in the south, the police are unavoidably drawn into conflict, even if only to defend themselves when attacked. Due to insufficient numbers of ANA and ISAF forces, ANP often end up as de facto first responders, especially out in the districts. They are frequently attacked at checkpoints and district centres, ambushed along highways and struck by IEDs. They have thus been forced into performing a frontline, paramilitary function for which they are poorly trained and underequipped -- no armoured vehicles, and not enough weapons or ammunition. As a result, the police have suffered heavy casualties. (ATIP ANP Aux Police and LOTFA Email 2006, 2-3)

With this, the ANP proposed to increase the number of auxiliary police in the South, and particularly in Kandahar, with the Canadian RCMP contingent at KAF and the PRT tasked with
training them in COIN methodology. In the email, a proposal was highlighted for Canada to resume contribution to the Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan (LOTFA), but Canada had not made any commitments to resuming funding for this military and police-focused pool of funds as of 2006. By the mid-point in our commitment to the K-PRT, it was clear that a militarized response was becoming increasingly necessary, and was bleeding into the civ-pol and civilian responses to policy and programming issues in Kandahar.

This perspective was echoed by others in DFAIT, where “Margaret”, a high-level director of the Afghanistan Task Force, told me that the “impact of Iraq was a strong influence on Afghanistan”, and that our entrance into Afghanistan was only to deal with the threat of terrorism when it affected Canada directly (personal communication, June 10, 2015). Conceptually, the design of the K-PRT for DFAIT was focused on “winning the hearts and minds” of local Afghans, and we entered only to execute short-term military goals with the support of Foreign Affairs (personal communication, June 10, 2015). From the perspective of those at the top at DFAIT, the PRT had to be military-led with a nod to civilian participation: Margaret stressed in our interview that “we went to Kandahar to stabilize – not to conduct aggressive fighting – and ultimately to solidify the control of NATO through the 3-block war model. We always intended it to be 3D at once, despite there being no protocols for civilians in war zones” (personal communication, June 10, 2015). As was explored in Chapter 3, the 3D model of collaboration was definitively siloed into three, with the military on the leading pillar and diplomacy and development supporting the military as the other two. Their work was to be “separate but equal”, yet given the fragile context of Kandahar, the approach of the military pillar was viewed as the most normalized, and eventually institutionalized, collaborative approach.
DFAIT’s perspective of the Canadian engagement in Kandahar spanned many different iterations but always reinforced the necessary strength of the militarized culture and approach to the collaborative work being done in theatre. In my interview with Doug, he laid out the structural design of our WOG approach in Kandahar, emphasizing the importance of maintaining military leadership in conjunction with civilian counterparts throughout. He tells me:

Let’s walk through the mission evolution and how we transitioned from what I characterize as periods of cooperation-coordination-coherence over a period 2006-07-08. The Afghanistan mission challenges have grown more complex. And, since 2001, how we do business in Ottawa has been driven by needs from the field. For example, we have moved from: Up to and including 2006 (‘3D’ cooperation), a military-led planning process (Jan 2006, Glynn Berry killed; no civilians in the South!); In 2007 (inter-departmental coordination), a military-led planning process with OGD [other government department] consultation; From 2008 (whole-of-government coherence), an integrated, field-driven planning process co-signed by the CF Commander and the Representative of Canada in Kandahar. (Personal communication, September 19, 2016)

For those on the civilian side of the PRT, both as part of its WOG structural design and its policy and programmatic implementation, the role of the military remained permanent throughout each iteration. Looking at Doug’s summary from 3D, where the military led, to WOG, where the civilian and military contingents worked in tandem, there was never a time where the civilian side took complete charge of the collaborative process. Military leadership was reduced to a partnership between the CF Commander and the RoCK, but spending for militarized approaches such as the quick-impact projects that were meant to “win the hearts and minds” of Afghans and a transformation of the 3D approach to the WOG approach saw the development of the three
Signature Projects and the six Priorities that would synthesize the collaborative approach over issues that could be militarily solved, or at least attempted to be solved, with little transformation needed by the military.

In the affidavit of Colleen Swords, she specifically cites the 2006 Riga Summit by NATO as a driving factor of the design of Canada’s PRT – one that places a significant focus on securitization and stabilization, then reconstruction. From the Declaration of the Riga Summit: “There can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and no development without security. […] Provincial Reconstruction Teams are increasingly at the leading edge of NATO’s effort, supported by military forces capable of providing the security and stability needed to foster civilian activity” (ATIP Riga Summit 2006; Swords Affidavit 2007, 5). Across the design of the PRT, from its initial development as a 3D approach designed after the 3-block war model, through the WOG model introduced by the Manley Panel, to the final iteration as a civilian-led, military co-supported, and overall militarized collaborative endeavor, it was and remains clear that the military was seen as necessary and normal by both the civilian and military leadership in charge. In this way, the structural design of Canada’s WOG approach within the K-PRT effectively supported the hegemony of militarized masculinity. What did this mean for gender equality policy and programming? In the following section, I highlight how gender equality policy and programming became secondary to the military mission of the K-PRT, and that this sidelining reinforced the perspective that women and “gender” were the exception, and frequently unnecessary, in Kandahar.

5.4 Gender Equality Policy and Programming Becomes Secondary
With policy coherence solidified by the Manley Report, ensuring that military-style approaches to collaboration are institutionalized, and the civilian organizations facing the effects of that militarization, what happened to gender equality policy and programming? Moreover, when gender is conflated with women, and the work of gender equality becomes quick fixes and checkboxes related to saving the women rather than educating Canadians and Afghans alike on the finer points of gender inequality and human rights, we see that gender equality policy and programming becomes secondary to the security and stabilization tasks at hand. In other words, when we begin with the critical feminist question of “where are the women?”, we find that their presence is viewed as external to the tasks outlined within the K-PRT. They became the checkbox programs and projects that were used alongside security, yet were showcased front-and-centre as a socio-cultural win for the Western solution to conflict of the WOG approach.

How the policies and programs aimed at gender equality became secondary “checkbox” items in the Canadian WOG approach was through tying women’s programming and policy with poverty, hunger, unemployment and underemployment, lack of education, and other socio-cultural failings of a conflict affected state. These policies and programs addressed the symptoms of a fragile state that are predominantly felt by local women. Moreover, the measurement of success of these programs was often quantitative alone, analyzing how many women and girls were included in the outcome of the projects rather than assessing the sustainability and longevity of the results of the programs through both qualitative and quantitative tools. Thus, the programs that were promoted at the PRT dealt with women’s work within the family and small-scale financing. Some clear examples come from the Swords affidavit:

[I]n support of an initiative led by the Afghan Ministry of Education, Canada is helping to implement a girls’ education project, establishing up to 4,000 community-based schools
and training 9,000 new female school teachers; 120,000 schoolchildren (85% are girls) are already benefiting from these programs. Microfinance programs have allowed more than 300,000 Afghans (72% women) to start their own businesses such as tailor shops, grocery stores, or to buy land and animals to better support themselves and their families. Canada is the leading donor country to this initiative, having contributed $40 million since the program began in 2003. (Swords Affidavit 2007, 7)

These projects were seen to support and enhance the security and counterinsurgency focus that had been our original entrance into Kandahar, by addressing the issues of “women’s employment” and “girls’ education” as supports for the crucial security work being done through the K-PRT.

The focus on women, as opposed to gender, was a common theme across funding models. Additionally, a focus on small-scale and short-term projects were highlighted as the commitment made to women across Afghanistan, including Kandahar. In an ATIP of an omnibus Q & A on Canada’s commitments in Afghanistan, in response to the question “What is Canada doing to help the women of Afghanistan?”, the suggested responses included a $56 million dollar contribution to the Microfinance Investment Support Facility, “providing small loans to over 335,000 Afghans, three-quarters of whom are women”, a $14.5 million dollar investment in a Girls Primary Education program, with a goal to develop 4000 community-based schools and conduct training for 9,000 teachers, of whom 4000 will be new female teachers, with benefits targeting 120,000 children in 11 provinces, and support from CIDA on the Strengthening the Rule of Law project, where justice professionals were to be trained in gender equality principles to improve women’s access to protection under the justice system (ATIP Counter Narcotics in Afghanistan 2007 [2014], 124). In each case, the programs focused on women’s empowerment from the view that they were victims of their socio-cultural context: each program was not directly focused on women alone,
and never fully addressed the cultural context that kept women subdued and restricted from self-determination. Men’s and women’s funding was disaggregated not to aid in the delivery of the funds from a gender equality starting point, but in order to track how the funds were used, and by whom.

The strains of these policy and program designs – the short-term, non-transformational focus and the disaggregated quantitative targets – were most deeply felt by CIDA and their gender personnel both at the PRT and outside of it. As my interview participant “Hank”, a former Director General for Humanitarian Aid and Peacebuilding at CIDA, informed me, prior to Afghanistan, CIDA made it a priority to mainstream “gender” into the work that they conducted. He remembered in his time there that in addition to putting pressure on local partners to include gender guidelines in all the humanitarian work that they conducted, CIDA always backed up the pressure with money: they would construct entire accounts around setting up gender units, employing a gender specialist, or designing a set of expectations surrounding gender equality for current field staff. Hank noted that this design expectation didn’t go away when Afghanistan became both a financial and policy priority for CIDA:

And, as we scrutinize the work that was being done in Afghanistan, of course this was foremost in our mind: how can we ensure, under the conditions that prevail, and without putting anybody at risk – because a lot of the people who were working for civil society organizations and working for international agencies like the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] were Afghans themselves – a duty of care for that kind of a situation. You can have a very strong policy position, but you have to be mindful of
the consequences. The duty of care\(^{30}\) needs a lot more attention than it is getting from the Canadian government these days. (Personal communication, June 29, 2015)

For Hank and other CIDA staffers like him, the immediate concern upon the policy refocus toward Kandahar was that CIDA’s typical gender equality approach would not have the effect it would typically have on projects in non-conflict affected areas, and that CIDA staffers and their contractors would be placed directly in harm’s way due to the military priority in the K-PRT.

This concern appears justified, as in my discussion with Rick with the Afghanistan Task Force at DFAIT, he confirmed that most development programming, and even more so the programming related to gender equality, was seen as secondary at the PRT. He told me there was a “real intellectual desire to ensure that programming was gender-sensitive – cases of education, agriculture, infrastructure particularly because they were easier to program with gender in mind” (personal communication, August 31, 2016). His note about incorporating gender where it was easiest is telling, in that a critical feminist analysis will tell us that the hegemony of military approaches will redirect gender issues or women’s issues into the areas that appear most feminine in their design: coupling it to projects in education, agriculture and infrastructure do not have the same masculine connotations as COIN methodology, civ-mil, or civ-pol responses to conflict do.

In his perspective, he applauded the ambition of the gender equality goal, noting that “it is great to have a focus on a very specific thing that has the potential to have a tremendous legacy; had [the Dahla Dam project] been perfect it would have immeasurably improved the lives of many people, same with [the Polio Eradication and Education projects]” (personal communication, August 31, 2016).

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\(^{30}\) In our discussion, Hank was referring to the concept from tort law, which states that a duty of care is a legal obligation that is imposed on an individual requiring adherence to a standard of reasonable care while performing any acts that could foreseeably harm others.
2016). He stressed that from the perspective of DFAIT, “we are not always able to be as ambitious in our support for development projects – we just don’t have the flex to spend $50 million on development – from 40,000 feet, it is good not to be risk averse”, and he also cautioned that it can be “challenging: alongside that focus comes a much higher degree of accountability. It should take twenty years, not six years if you want to be loyal to your ambition” (personal communication, August 31, 2016).

I presented this information anonymously to another of my interview participants, Simone, who was a former Gender Advisor for CIDA’s Afghanistan Task Force, wherein I asked for her perspective on the DFAIT view that gender equality policy and programming was only to be incorporated where it was easiest, and not into the security commitments in the region. She responded in frustration that she and her colleagues didn’t have access to DFAIT or control over the big budget items where the CIDA money was going. She remembered feeling irritated at the time that she couldn’t identify who was making the big decisions regarding funding, or why CIDA’s gender people couldn’t aid in the decision-making on “big-ticket items” (personal communication, August 31, 2016). Simone’s frustration at the way gender was handled in Afghanistan permeated our entire discussion, both over email and in person. She told me,

Remember that Canadian development engagement in Afghanistan was mainly outside Kandahar as it was difficult to do development work while being shot at. My memory was that the initial push into Afghanistan was, “save the women and children” of Afghanistan, hence one pillar of the program was devoted to women and children. After the Manley Report, that pillar was in fact dropped, on his report's recommendation. And vast resources were moved to the three Signature Projects - one was a huge Dam project. (Personal communication, August 26, 2016).
For Simone, this was the source of her annoyance, as she ended up leaving her position with CIDA over it: that any gender programming in Kandahar was incredibly difficult to keep track of or implement. By the time she left her position, funding for gender programs had shifted to Kabul, and any programs left in Kandahar were dwindling with the increased focus on the Signature Projects. Where funding remained for gender in Kandahar, it came through the UN and Canadian input was extremely limited. Simone felt handcuffed in her role as a Gender Advisor in the highly militarized climate of Kandahar (personal communication, August 26, 2016).

For most of the development practitioners I interviewed, the setting of Kandahar didn’t provide enough investment opportunity for development project work: as was highlighted in Chapter 3, the commitment to community development and a lengthy investment of money and gender expertise is necessary in fragile and conflict-affected states to ensure long-term, sustainable development results. In an interview with “Wajmah,” an Afghan national and former Human Rights Program Officer with the Open Society Afghanistan (OSA), she discussed how in Kandahar, the security situation meant that “community involvement was low from the beginning of the projects; communities were not aware of how these programs were defined” (personal communication, July 7, 2016). From her experience, when a community has ownership over a project or program from the outset, its success rate climbs. Canada’s involvement in Kandahar had a distinctly Canadian stamp on it, with a “winning the hearts and minds” directive that came from a highly militarized approach. Projects like the Signature Projects, according to Wajmah, were more about changing the physical landscape rather than the socio-cultural situation for women, and for her, it was never good enough to simply count the women involved or affected by a project or program (personal communication, July 7, 2016). She stressed, “in a province like Kandahar, the location of buildings and schools is so important. Before you even build them, you need to
raise awareness of the importance of school for young girls in the communities” and you need to consult the local authorities, who would ideally know how many schools are needed, and where they can be best utilized (personal communication, July 7, 2016). In the case of Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar, Wajmah observed that “every women’s issue was project-based – it cannot be a project! There is never enough time – workshops, projects that take even a year is not enough time to approach development – of course in terms of money and resources” (personal communication, July 7, 2016).

Indeed, CIDA’s mandate called for much longer-term commitments to development than the time frame of the WOG approach in Kandahar allowed. In a document retrieved by ATIP called In Harm’s Way: The Comprehensive Approach: Perspectives from the Field, edited by Commander Dave Woycheshin, CIDA staffer Anne Lavender provides some insight into a development practitioner’s perspective on Canada’s counterinsurgency mission in Kandahar. She highlights the five pillars that CIDA would abide by in all their development work:

Based on the principles of aid effectiveness in the Paris Declaration, supplemented by the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development, development interventions emphasize five key principles: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability. Capacity development, or developing the partner government and civil society capacity to decide, lead and implement at the national, local and community levels, is central to all development assistance efforts and key to sustainability. […] Development programming, consistently implemented over a period of many years, results in empowered local partners with the capacity to meet the basic needs of their populations, thereby reducing poverty.
Development results, necessarily, are medium to long term, given the challenge of building local capacity. (Lavender 2015, 55, emphasis in original)

This was the perspective on development that all CIDA staffers held upon entrance into Kandahar, and their disappointment at what was expected of them within the highly militarized WOG approach at the PRT was shared across all the development practitioners I interviewed.

In Catherine’s words, “CIDA is meant to enter an area and build a relationship, take deliberate pauses and readjust frameworks to continue building on good practices for the area. This was not what was done in Afghanistan” (personal communication, May 5, 2015). Catherine’s position as a long-time former Director and gender expert at CIDA made her perspective on CIDA’s failures in Kandahar more valuable than most, as she highlighted to me that CIDA was unique in its collaboration with Status of Women Canada, and had made gender equality a major policy strand since 1984 (personal communication, May 5, 2015). In her view, development is not meant to be quick, and gender equality policy must be brought in slowly. Development practitioners must reach out to the population, and look for the “change makers” within. Forcing a society, especially one as difficult as Kandahar, to adopt gender equality policy and changes is impossible in the short-term, and must be handled carefully in the long term; ideally over a 20-year period – a generation (personal communication, May 5, 2015). CIDA’s collective frustration with the structure of the K-PRT, and staff apprehension to accept the types of gender equality policy and programming that they were mandated to conduct through the WOG approach, indicates a reluctance to accept what DFAIT and DND/CAF had: an increased militarization to the civilian component of the PRT, and the subsequent sidelining of gender equality policy and programming within that component.
Yet, it was CIDA’s sole responsibility to conduct gender equality assessments, and implement gender equality policy and programming in Kandahar. Due to CIDA’s unique experience with gender equality for several decades, they did have gender equality people embedded in Kandahar through their own Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force (APTF). “Eva”, an interview participant who worked at the Director level within the task force in its later years, explained that CIDA’s APTF was the development side of the larger Afghanistan Task Force that reported directly to the PCO. According to her, the APTF was meant to be a mini-CIDA within Kandahar, with its own team of specialists, including those working on gender, as well as monitoring results. What was unique about the APTF was that all the staff were housed under one roof in an attempt to be more coherent and holistic on the WOG approach mandated in Kandahar. In Eva’s words, the “APTF functioned as a matrix, not as a siloed operation” (personal communication, May 21, 2015). Within the task force, different positions were assigned to different development areas that CIDA wanted to focus on while entrenched in Kandahar. What was most exciting for Eva was that, in the early years of the APTF, the gender specialist was thought of as part of the planning team, and they used whole-of-government scoping and planning missions on governance, education, gender, and health over a period of 3 years to ensure all of those missions had gender angles to them (personal communication, May 21, 2015). Eva’s optimism at the potential of Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar for gender equality was at its strongest when CIDA could operate as normal with some autonomy through the APTF.

This typical CIDA planning approach was sidelined following the Manley Report in 2008. The work that had been done by CIDA, however relevant, had to be shifted to a responsive focus on the Signature Projects within Kandahar, and fall in line with the six Priorities. The gender
dimensions were limited, and the broad utility of gender advisors became secondary. In Eva’s words,

> When the Manley Panel came together, it put a stop to this planning and really shifted the focus to the Kandahar-specific Signature Projects. Lots of CIDA people moved to working on or in Kandahar, and the focus shifted from a holistic, proactive approach to a more top-down, leadership approach. CIDA was responding, not advising. (Personal communication, May 21, 2015)

According to Eva, the most interesting work related to education development was not to be found in the Education Signature Project, but in a separate national project on curriculum development: this was joint with the Afghan government, and included developing teacher training, ministerial capacity, and strengthening colleges around the country, and most importantly, it included the most interesting gender work (personal communication, May 21, 2015). This was a national focus, however, and the Signature Projects turned CIDA’s focus to Kandahar. Moreover, with the focus shifting to Kandahar, CIDA found it had trouble ramping up interest for project work there: “before Manley there were lots of Canadian organizations interested in Afghanistan, and using the unsolicited proposal process (USP), hundreds of organizations were coming to CIDA. Once it shifted, proposals had to include Kandahar because that was where the money was going” (personal communication, May 21, 2015). Importantly, organizations with a gender focus on programming dropped off, as Kandahar was widely seen as a context within which gender equality work would be difficult to conduct due to safety concerns for the civilians – an issue that the international rule of law on WOG attempted to address, as was covered in Chapter 3.
This perspective was confirmed by Jessica, the health and gender specialist with the Canadian embassy that spent ten days in Kandahar. She noted that at the PRT, the design was such that gender equality programming could not be perceived as a priority. She recalled, “the idea of doing gender work in Kandahar was difficult to imagine – good luck finding women much less empowering them. There’s only so much you can do in an environment like that. Canada didn’t have sufficient gender expertise in Kandahar to really do something” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). Jessica noted that with CIDA shifting to Kandahar and the changes in proposals coming in to accommodate the financial redirection, gender experts did not go to Kandahar: “the only way we went to Kandahar was if we received proposals to go there, but I can’t remember any specific proposals we decided to fund. I doubt there were any, because you need outreach to encourage people to apply. Most would have had some tie to Kabul” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). And even so, with civilian personnel mobility beyond the PRT tied to the military, “you had to think about the people around you when you went out, their job was to die to keep you safe. If you go outside the wire, are you willing to put all those lives at risk? On one hand you feel frustrated because you can’t do your job, can’t go anywhere, but on the other hand, do I want to risk other people’s lives for this?” (personal communication, August 11, 2016). For development practitioners focused on gender equality, the design of the PRT made very little sense for them to operate as normal, and any opportunity to engage in gender equality work felt far beyond the reach of those enclosed behind the wire due to the sense that such work was not a priority within the K-PRT, and would be seen as an unnecessary risk for those who were required to go out into harm’s way to get the work done.

Despite this operational obstacle, gender specialists continued to conduct work from afar under the auspices of the task force. But for them, there was a clear shift in priority due to the
emphasis on WOG. Development practitioners and gender specialists at CIDA began to see WOG and military-style responses to state fragility as one and the same, and by the time Canada was set to leave Kandahar, WOG and gender were seen as two separate things. For Eva, this change occurred most prominently when CIDA’s focus was shifted away from Afghanistan as a whole, and toward Kandahar in specific. She told me, “gender was being mainstreamed in a holistic, national way – not just Kandahar – and we were interested in broader government bodies like the electoral commission, and the ministry of education. When the national focus was lost, we also lost this gender mainstreaming focus” (personal communication, May 21, 2015). Before the focus narrowed, Eva was working on gender scoping across different project areas around Kabul with several gender specialists. By 2009, Eva believed CIDA’s gender scoping approach to Afghanistan was at its strongest, particularly as at the time, President Karzai was in the spotlight over his apparent support for a piece of legislation affiliated with the female-suppressive Sharia Law\(^{31}\). Eva saw this as a great opportunity to bring their gender scoping work to the forefront: “gender and WOG was usually thought of separately, but the Sharia law crisis was huge. It gave the task force the resources to tackle it; everyone agreed that scoping for gender should happen. Normally the agency does not move fast, but only in this context [the quick impact nature of WOG] could you move this quickly” (personal communication, May 21, 2015). Eva identified the potential for the utility of a gender sensitive approach within WOG, despite the rushed timeline that civilian development practitioners were increasingly associating with the military.

Yet even with the pressure for quick results, the ministry capacity to do this work in Kandahar simply wasn’t there. The divide between gender and WOG remained: “CIDA just had

\(^{31}\) President Hamid Karzai had been accused of rushing the signing of legislation affiliated with Sharia Law that affects the Shiite community of Afghanistan, which legalizes the rape of a wife by her husband by allowing men to force sexual intercourse on their spouses.
no presence in Kandahar, except in the area of policing, led by CANADEM\(^\text{32}\), where we sent a few technical assistants to advise on policing and gender. To work on these things you needed an institutional base, which is why we often worked with NGOs” (personal communication, May 21, 2015). The commitment to militarized responses to state fragility, coupled with the unrealistic timelines for immersive gender scoping, left many CIDA gender specialists feeling helpless or used by the PRT. Eva simply couldn’t find the connection between WOG and gender, despite her efforts to fit them together:

They were happening at the same time, but there was no link as far as I could tell. The motivation for WOG was political – it wasn’t even for saving money – it was about having a big splash, about scaling up very quickly. It was not about development, not about the poor or supporting the Afghan government. I spent a lot of time in meetings, competing with big egos, but it was all political and organizational too. They used gender when it was convenient; and at different levels, gender meant different things to different people. Gender was very much a CIDA thing; there were some women from DFAIT interested in a rights-based area, but other departments really didn’t care. Gender was CIDA things, development things, with only a little bit on policing and border security. (Personal communication, May 21, 2015)

The design of the PRT was such that for those who I spoke with from CIDA, discussing gender was a point of frustration, or a point of sadness for them. Like Eva identified, they simply couldn’t

\(^\text{32}\) As defined on the CANADEM website, the International Civilian Response Corps was established in 1996 with Canadian Government start-up funding, and “is an international not-for-profit NGO dedicated to advancing international peace and security through the rostering, rapid mobilization, and mission management of experts committed to International Service with the UN, other IGOs, NGOs, and governments” (CANADEM 2018).
find their place within the WOG approach at the PRT, and believed that their expertise was only welcome when it didn’t interfere with the larger, military mission at hand.

By Canada’s final year in Kandahar, CIDA and its gender specialists were working closely with DND and DFAIT to deliver aid through the Kandahar Local Initiatives Program (KLIP), mostly delivering Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) that had little input from local authorities, women, or NGOs, and provided little sustainable approaches beyond Canada’s short-term heavy-handedness. Kamala, the former manager with CIDA’s KLIP program, highlighted some of the gender-specific QIP projects in Kandahar as focusing on “women, water and health”, “computer training for girls”, or ensuring “education transport for girls and female teachers” (personal communication, July 28, 2015). She stressed that a lot of the programming dealt with providing women access to education, such as through developing women’s changing rooms at Kandahar University, to the economy, through programming focused on animal husbandry, or to the electoral process, through funding associations that provided civic education for the local population (personal communication, July 28, 2015). Kamala noted that for a project to receive KLIP funding, it had to reference gender equality – specifically, “equality between women and men” – but it also needed to be time- and cost-effective: the time for a KLIP project varied between six months and one year, and there were almost always strict budget constraints (personal communication, July 28, 2015). These restrictions were costly for long-term development and in-depth gender analysis.

Hank, the former Director General of Humanitarian Aid and Gender Equality at CIDA, articulated CIDA’s frustrations within WOG more broadly, “I’m not transgressing when it comes to Canadian foreign policy, but if there’s an interesting opportunity I’m going to pursue it. There’s no scope for that [in WOG]. The major interventions, probably all interventions are all scripted in Ottawa, they’re approved at the PCO level or the PMO level and they’re – you can’t deviate from that
script, which I think highly limits us! And that begs the question: how useful are our policy positions anyway?” (personal communication, June 29, 2015). CIDA’s perceived incapacity to do its best gender equality work in Kandahar permeated into the realm of its utility within the broader WOG suite of government departments.

Ultimately, CIDA’s ineffectiveness on gender equality at the K-PRT came to rest on the WOG design itself, and the argument that war and humanitarian work, particularly on gender, couldn’t mesh due to real safety issues – highlighting the position at the international policy level with organizations like the UN and the OECD. The manifestation of the might of the military in the case of the Kandahar WOG experiment indicated that gender equality work was doomed from the start: where war and insurgency has lived for over 3 decades, so naturally will it continue to live unabated and unchecked if not for equal militarized measure against it. The military response in Kandahar was necessary and was the highest priority because Kandahar was dangerous. Any effort to conduct development work or pursue diplomatic engagement needed to abide by the might of the military, or face its obsolescence in the context of Kandahar. This reality was not lost on those higher up in CIDA, as Hank made clear in our discussion of CIDA’s role there:

So, we were able to work significantly and I think meaningfully and were able to pursue gender objectives. But there were certain areas where there was still a great deal of insurgency; it was a no-go for anybody. We had a duty of care – we couldn’t compel, we couldn’t express the expectation that the representatives of our operating partners would be able to go into these areas just because they were Afghans. I think we were guarded in our expectations. That said, I think we did a good job. That we upheld our policy principles and our policy objectives. (personal communication, June 29, 2015).
Hank knew there was only so much a civilian organization with long-term policy goals could do under the auspices of the Afghanistan Pakistan Task Force and the wider WOG approach. Hank felt positive about the ultimate contribution CIDA made in Kandahar, but for others the negative outweighed the positive.

Shaqayeq, a former gender researcher and contractor for CIDA in Afghanistan, felt strongly about the wasted potential that was CIDA’s WOG commitment on gender equality in Kandahar. She was particularly troubled by the dangers of the military doing development work, and the sidelining of the typical processes CIDA would put in place. In her view, the design of the PRT was such that the military would inevitably have to do the work of the civilians, or the civilians would have to become militarized, despite evidence that winning hearts and minds was nearly impossible in Kandahar (personal communication, August 23, 2016). This came from a personal event that cemented her view that civilian and military roles should remain clearly defined and separate:

Dr. Jackie Kirk, whose expertise was in the education of girls in conflict zones, felt that the conflation of military and development was not helpful, and it put the lives of women and development workers at risk. Her death in Kandahar highlights this. The narrative of the liberation of Afghan women was a problematic one; a Western ideal that was being imposed. The discourse was inappropriate, and it made it harder for Afghan human rights activists who were women to do their work: they were suddenly aligned with a Western agenda. Grassroots work was an Afghan thing, but suddenly it wasn’t theirs anymore, it was co-opted by the Western military. It resulted in increased targeting of Afghan women activists. It was also very disingenuous – they were using Afghan women for their own political purpose, to justify violence! (Personal communication, August 23, 2016)
For Shaqayeq, the K-PRT was no place for development work to take place, because it would never find success. It would be better to leave the development practitioners and activists to their own accord, and safely away from the militarized spotlight created by Canada’s WOG engagement in Kandahar.

The design of the Canadian PRT in Kandahar, beginning with the leadership of the military during the 3D approach to its transformation to WOG and a comprehensive militarized set of policy goals with the Manley Report, was a true manifestation of the hegemony of hypermasculinity. It continually justified its own highly militarized existence due to the constant threat of danger, and through the use of gender equality policy and programming as a supporter of the militarized approach. Women’s exceptional existence within the machinations of the PRT, and their exceptional deaths as Shaqayeq highlighted, became political tools in support of a WOG approach that naturalized a military response to conflict and state fragility. The consequences of such cyclical justification became clearer once Canada had left Kandahar, discovered in the analysis of cumulative reports and evaluations and previously unpublished ATIP documents: that the K-PRT contributed to the justification of militarization of Canada’s WOG approach, and permitted the instrumentalization of women and gender equality policy for military gain. On the other side of the coin, those involved in the military felt differently about the structural changes made official by the Manley Report.

For my interview participants affiliated with the military in Kandahar, the structural changes brought on by the Manley Report were seen as a blessing for operational effectiveness. For “Luke”, an intelligence officer with two tours at the K-PRT under his belt, including time spent as an advisor to the RoCK, the Manley Report institutionalized a military connection with those on the development and diplomacy sides in a way that removed Ottawa’s tendency toward
micromanagement from the picture (personal communication, June 3, 2015). For Luke, it cleared the way for military-style oversight to be brought to theatre with civilian leadership on the ground. These transformations resulted in changes to civilian organizations that would have typically only been seen in the military. According to Saideman (2014, 61-62), the effects of the legitimization of a militaristic approach to WOG had resulted in five major structural changes to DFAIT and CIDA: 1) civilians deployed to combat zones were starting to see similar protections as the military, such as health insurance, treatment of post-traumatic stress, and benefits packages; 2) there was more delegation on the civilian side through the RoCK, rather than having Ottawa-based agencies determine when civilians could and could not go outside the wire; 3) training increased over time as the civilian contingent learned to adapt to military styles of training; 4) locating civilian and military personnel in close operating quarters began to be seen as integral to the smooth operation of the PRT, as relationships were fostered, teams were integrated, and perspectives were understood, if not always agreed upon, across departmental lines; and 5) civilian personnel were tasked with finding ways to argue for the integration of military processes as a positive for their departments, acting as interlocutors following the leadership of the RoCK. These changes marked frustrating turning points for CIDA, and to a lesser extent DFAIT, and a major win for DND and the CF. These five points of progression are explored in greater detail in Chapter 5, where an investigation of the effect of the policy and structural changes of the K-PRT on the narrative experiences of civilian and military personnel is undertaken.

In short, the significance of the Manley Report was that it transformed the siloed 3D approach in Kandahar into a process driven by short-term Canadianized goals that reflected a greater attempt at policy coherence on the military level, rather than long-term commitments to development and diplomacy where responses to gender inequality and the difficulties faced by
women and girls could be meaningfully addressed. It legitimized militarized, hypermasculine responses to development issues in Kandahar, maintaining the “quick-impact” COIN methodology and tying civilian leadership to military leadership. The significance of this was not lost on the military, who lauded the Manley Report in a 2011 document, retrieved by ATIP, and released by Task Force Kandahar out of ISAF’s Regional Command South:

The 2008 Manley Report provided the context and rationale for Canada’s largest foreign policy involvement since the Korean War. Led by the PCO, Canada’s WoG effort operated under a Memorandum to Cabinet (MC) that provided strategic vision and six priorities for participating government departments. This document represented Canada’s grand strategy for Afghanistan. (ATIP TFK 2011, 1)

With major political players such as David Mulroney and Stephen Harper calling for the legitimization of militarization, the military’s de facto leadership appeared almost unquestionable. Mulroney writes in his latest book that he was “lucky enough to serve as secretary to Manley and his panel, and was later tasked with implementing their recommendations as the head of a special task force based in Ottawa” (2015, 252). In his role as secretary to the Manley Panel, Mulroney aimed to “bring greater coordination to a Canadian mission in Afghanistan that was uneasily and unevenly divided between the Canadian Forces on the one side and civilians led by Foreign Affairs and CIDA on the other” by finding a way to build a “clear, achievable and worthy Canadian engagement in Kandahar” (2015, 251; 292). In his book, he states that his concern was just as much political as it was operational, and the Canadian stamp and rapid pace provided by acquiescing to military responses provided just the approach that Stephen Harper would approve of (Mulroney 2015). The position of the RoCK, mentioned in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter,
was arguably the most important change made to achieve the civilian transfer of power mandated by the Manley Report.

5.4.1 The Role of the RoCK in the Legitimization of Militarization and the Instrumentalization of Gender

The role of the RoCK found its strength in the relationship it shared with the Commander of the CF. The first civilian to hold this position, Elissa Golberg, had a particularly amiable relationship with her counterpart, Brigadier-General Denis Thompson. Gammer (2012, 6) describes the imposing force they created right out of the gate:

Golberg, with support from Mulroney and [Arif] Lalani [Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan], began by imposing a rigorous interface between civilian agencies and military forces. She and Thompson shared an office and worked exceptionally well together. To improve coordination, Golberg instituted weekly meetings at the Governor of Kandahar’s office and biweekly meetings between Correction Services, RCMP, CIDA, Public Safety Canada and CSIS. During those meetings, Brigadier-General Thompson would take the lead on security issues while Golberg would take the lead on governance issues. This arrangement broke new ground for both military and civilian personnel.

The environment Golberg and Thompson promoted demonstrated a highly regulated and managed structural context, with a strong emphasis on the integration of military and civilian personnel that reflected military-style ways of working. As Gammer (2012, 6) goes on to note,

Golberg, with Thompson’s support, redressed the imbalance between civilian and military financial authority and access to resources. Golberg was given signing authority for CIDA
and the Kandahar Local Initiative Program (KLIP) – a project designed to increase the capacity of Afghan government institutions and civil organizations as well as to complete local reconstruction projects. Improved access to financial resources was complemented by ‘leaner, quicker program response mechanisms’ initiated through Golberg’s office.

The standard, long-term and integrated development and reconstruction approach that CIDA normally implemented was overturned through streamlined, top-down management spearheaded by the RoCK, the CF, and those in the PCO back in Ottawa.

This had the effect of making it appear that the K-PRT was now able to engage in development work with a greater degree of freedom. With the bureaucratic siloing of the former 3D approach transformed, CIDA could go out into communities in and around Kandahar with a military escort and begin getting things done. But as CIDA personnel have described to me, the gender equality projects they wanted and needed to do in the region could not be supported by such a development model, as the new Canadian stamp it displayed held little regard for the deep-rooted cultural issues Afghans in Kandahar faced. Indeed, Canada had a strategy, and strong leadership from the RoCK and the Commander of the CF to facilitate it, but this strategy proved to do little more than steamroll over the communities it claimed to assist. Speaking with two former RoCKs, I learned that a large part of their responsibility was to direct the actors at the PRT towards recognizing the six Priorities and three Signature Projects, and advancing the NATO mission (personal communication, August 25, 2016). The Manley Report was their main focus, with the 47 benchmarks of the Priorities and Signature Projects their specific targets. For the RoCK and the CF, the long-term needs of Afghans fell far down the list of priorities as they were bound by benchmarks and procedures of a strategy that put a Canadian face on the development of Kandahar.
For long-term CIDA personnel like “Jane”, who was with the K-PRT near the end of Canada’s leadership, the structured approach brought forward by the Manley Report was more of a frustrating hindrance rather than a freeing transformation to her work. Jane described to me:

I mean, it worked fairly well, even though there were some issues with it. The governing document was a memorandum to cabinet that had to be signed off by all the departments that were implicated, and the memorandum to cabinet was full of flowery touchy-feely stuff, and it wasn’t very tangible and the expected results were not really results. And there was a whole matrix that was developed for reporting that wasn’t really aligned with our results-based management policy, which is a Treasury Board policy, but that’s because the people who write memorandums to cabinet are policy analysts. They’re not people who know how to articulate and manage and deliver results. (Personal communication, July 8, 2015)

This meant that Jane’s job, as a CIDA professional with experience in long-term development processes under her belt, became more complicated as she needed to ensure that the “stabilization” work she was now tasked with doing didn’t veer too far from development principles. She recalled:

And so at the operational level it’s where the rubber hit the road, so there would be some irritants, and our job was to minimize those. For instance, the commander was all about building schools, and I kept saying “We can’t build schools and then think that some of them will work!” You need to get the teachers, you need to get the recurring costs, and the thing is that these schools need to be based on where the district and the province have decided they need to be, not because you’ve cleared this village and they’ve asked for a school! No! (Personal communication, July 8, 2015)
This rapid decision-making became a part of the development and diplomatic processes in Kandahar to the degree that CIDA’s functioning became derailed; quick-impact work was a consequence of the way the Manley Panel conceptualized the mission in Kandahar and the problems that were confronted by Canadian forces there. It needed to ensure the least damage was being done to the population, rather than pushing ahead on complicated but necessary long-term projects that included gender equality. As such, there was room for critique of Canada’s so-called WOG approach, given that for so many civilians, the WOG approach actually stifled their ability to work and deterred them from wanting to collaborate with their military counterparts. In the section that follows, I highlight the critiques collected from academics and practitioners, and present the militarized obstacles they identify for true WOG collaboration.

5.5 Obstacles to Collaboration and their Deference to Militarization

In an interview with “Jay”, an academic who studies Canada’s military role in Afghanistan, I am given a first-hand perspective on the various academic assessments of Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar. Of all these studies drawing varying conclusions regarding the effectiveness, success, and potential of Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar, Jay tells me he believes the overall perspective is that it failed on the development and diplomacy sides due to the overwhelming presence of the defence segment (personal communication, March 27, 2015). In his view, there was never a doubt that WOG was an utter failure for CIDA, and that there were two missions: one military, and the other to fulfill the six Priorities and three Signature Projects set out by the Manley Report (personal communication, March 27, 2015). To Jay, there was a clear divide between the civilian and military components to Canada’s WOG approach, resulting in an internal battle between and across departments that the military was clearly winning (personal
For academics like Jay studying Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar, the overwhelming effect of Canada’s military and its influence within the K-PRT both during the 3D years and in the WOG years was undeniable. Indeed, the point of WOG in Kandahar was the military: the attempt by Manley was to “make efficient” the idea of a PRT with WOG as a central tenet, but what it did was reduce the effectiveness of the siloed approaches originally set out in the 3D approach, with CIDA doing its long-term development work, DFAIT working with local governments, and the military securing the area and fighting insurgents.

This sentiment was confirmed to me by an interview participant, “Matt”, who worked in Kandahar as the former Education Advisor for CIDA. Matt told me that as Canada was winding down its presence in Kandahar in preparation for handing off the PRT’s development programs to the Americans, he was chiefly in charge of managing the building and repairing of schools, the teacher training academy, and working collaboratively with the military of Canada and the United States (personal communication, August 21, 2016). Due to this breadth of responsibility, and the large amount of time spent with the military in a military setting (he lived within the K-PRT and was often working from 8 am to 2 am), his job often felt like it was ticking off boxes regarding gender while his main role was to support the military (personal communication, August 21, 2016). The baseline data on gender that he used in his day-to-day operations as the Education Advisor often revolved around quantitative markers and sex-disaggregated data, such as enrolment percentages between boys and girls in school with parity being the goal, the testing results of boys and girls, teacher training targets for 200 women to receive training, and providing dormitories for female teachers in order to keep them safe. Matt’s ultimate goal was to set up an easy transfer between CIDA and his counterpart in USAID, and quantifiable markers on gender parity was all he could offer given the short time-frame and the lack of Canada ever knowing how long it was
going to stay in Kandahar. Yet, Matt was also liaising with two different militaries, all with different timelines from his own: he recalled that CIDA had attempted to follow a long-term timeline according to their development practices, but the military worked on short rotations, so discrepancies would easily arise (personal communication, August 21, 2016). He noted that with the direction of the Manley Report and the collaboration encouraged between the military and civilian contingents, they all wanted to achieve the same goals; what differed between them was the means to the goals. Ultimately, Matt informed me that any difficulties he faced were absolved and any arguments he had were tempered when he could demonstrate that CIDA’s timelines matched those of the military. Matt’s close working relationship with a high-level general in the CF forced him to adopt a different mindset at KAF: he wanted to balance what the military needed to do as well as what CIDA needed to do, yet the military was forceful, while CIDA was more grassroots (personal communication, August 21, 2016). With Matt’s time in Kandahar ending and his large number of responsibilities as Education Advisor stretching him thin, he found that deferring to military solutions smoothed the collaborative process.

When looking at the structure of the K-PRT from a critical feminist perspective, this outcome for CIDA makes logical sense. The position of the military in a setting like Kandahar, backed by international rule of law and the institutionalization of policy coherence that lines up with military-style solutions to state fragility, ensures that the hegemony of masculinity is maintained and its effect is felt on departments that work on more feminine, and thus gendered, issues of state fragility. As noted by Gammer (2012, 7),

Of all the line departments, DND was best prepared to enter the conflict in Afghanistan in its initial phase. DND was, to paraphrase Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier, the de facto lead department of the 3Ds. Within the military, the recommendations of the Manley Panel
and the creation of the ATF [Afghanistan Task Force] were widely seen as part of a sophisticated public relations exercise to provided [sic] ministers with political cover. Some high-ranking Canadian Forces members thought that the Manley Report ‘was for the town [Ottawa] and not the mission’ (source confidential). To further complicate matters, the military’s strategy was bound by an alliance (NATO) command structure. Canada’s six priorities were candidly described by a senior level officer as ‘antithetical to the international dimension of the conflict as seen through the eyes of a four-star general running a war’ (source confidential).

Despite the efforts of the Manley Report to turn the leadership of the K-PRT over to the civilian side, all it managed to do was support the militarization of the civilians. The transformations brought about by the Manley Report and the development of high-level coordination in the ATF was disliked not only by CIDA, but by DND for its push away from traditional counter-insurgency work and the traditional role of DND as the true head of operations.

With the increased power granted by the Manley Report to civilian leaders alongside the military in theatre, and the expectation that all parties would adapt to a military-style way of doing things post-Manley, the role of policy actors became all the more important for the militarization of the civilian contingent to become normalized. For instance, the leadership of Stephen Wallace as Vice President of CIDA’s Afghanistan Task Force was a powerful force in steering development personnel toward a militarized model for programming in Kandahar. Gammer (2012, 8-9) chronicles:

While not a popular sentiment in his department, Wallace acknowledged that CIDA and other civilian components of the Kandahar mission had a lot to learn from the military.
Wallace pointed out that when operations are run from the field, as military missions usually are, those at the center of those operations are ‘always right unless you can prove them wrong’ (personal communication, 8 June 2010). Wallace benefited from the inclusion of two military officers at CIDA’s ATF offices while, in Kandahar, the RoCK was shifting the policy center of gravity to ‘match what the military was already doing’ (personal communication, 8 June 2010). From Wallace’s perspective, this transformation, necessitated by field-level requirements to operate on a real-time footing, ‘gave you more power and legitimacy’ (personal communication, 8 June 2010).

Yet as Gammer notes, and as was detailed earlier in this chapter, this sentiment was not popular amongst Wallace’s CIDA staff. Their training and passion for development work, as demonstrated in many of the interviews with CIDA personnel, would not normally have led to them working in a conflict zone such as Kandahar. Moreover, their desire to conduct long-term development work meant that their presence in Kandahar felt empty and devoid of commitment: with the inability to work outside the PRT without a military escort, or the safety to engage deeply and meaningfully with the local population, they were often left to implement projects from within the confines of the military base or send military personnel in their stead. How did CIDA review this when they left Kandahar? In 2015, CIDA released its long-awaited review of its Afghanistan Program. In the final pages of this chapter, I turn to their internal analyses and the 2015 review to ascertain how the department saw its work on gender equality truly unfold in Kandahar.

5.6 Shifting Funds and Missed Development Targets: The CIDA Review
Evidence of the financial commitment to security and military endeavours in Kandahar, with redirection of development funds to Kandahar-specific programming, is seen in some of the programs and projects Canada focused on at the PRT. As of 2007, DND had accrued a cost of mission at $2.1 billion, with an additional incremental cost of $1.8 billion through to 2009, while DFAIT had accrued costs related to the Canadian Embassy, PRT operations, and the GPSF at approximately $84 million. CIDA, meanwhile, showed consistent allocation of development assistance from 2001 to 2011 at $100 million per year, with an additional $200 million to be spent over 2007 and 2008 – the time of the Manley Panel’s convening and the implementation of the WOG approach (ATIP Counter Narcotics in Afghanistan 2007 [2014], 118). Moreover, there is evidence that CIDA’s funding for Afghanistan fed into dealing with prisoners, detainees, and the construction and maintenance of prisons and holding cells. For example, in an ATIP document chronicling the emails sent between PRT officials regarding the handling of detainees in 2007, it was revealed that CIDA, along with the UK and Belgium, and using the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as the implementing agency, paid for renovation of a wing of the Pul-e-Charkhi prison for high-value prisoners (ATIP Allied detention facilities email 2007, 1). Similarly, in Kandahar province, much investment has been made into the training of personnel for the Sarposa prison. As noted by Saideman (2014, 59), CIDA remained reluctant to support this effort, stating they “don’t do prisons”, but had the decision made for them following a series of prison attacks and jailbreaks from Sarposa prison beginning in 2008. According to Doug, following the attack on Sarposa in June of 2008, Canada “agreed collectively on a response, we advocated in support of clear Afghan actions, we rapidly dedicated additional funding, we targeted the efforts of Correctional Services Canada, DND engineers and DFAIT officials deployed to Kandahar on the problem, we communicated succinctly to Afghans and Canadians our response,
and we have since solicited the support of international partners for corrections efforts” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). The volatile context of Kandahar, coupled with the transition triggered by the Manley Report, saw CIDA drawn deeper – alongside DFAIT – into supporting military and security related activities.

Indeed, CIDA’s Interim Strategy for Afghanistan 2006-2008 recognized that instability and insecurity would last far longer than any Canadian engagement could fathom. It states,

Although great strides have been made, it is clear that Afghanistan will remain insecure for years to come with the political and social context in the country difficult to predict. Accordingly, CIDA will need to assess the results of the national programs and initiatives on an ongoing basis in order to realign its commitments where appropriate. The assessments will examine the following aspects: the fluidity of the situation; other donors’ contributions and involvement; emerging needs or phasing out of programs/pillars; where appropriate, channelling funds directly to the GoA [Government of Afghanistan] rather than through trust funds; and, should security [allow], engaging Canadian institutions and individuals directly. (CIDA 2006, 25)

Prior to the Manley Report, CIDA followed the stipulations of the 2005 International Development Statement. It looked ahead both in the long-term and medium-term. They recognized that, given the security environment, “it would be prudent and imperative for CIDA programming to engage in gender specific programming to advance women’s position in the longer term”, and “it is clear that Afghanistan requires more focused and strategic gender programming in order to build government awareness of gender issues and to maximize impact so Afghan women are true beneficiaries” (CIDA 2006, 25; 26). Yet, at least in Kandahar, this was not the case.
CIDA’s long awaited *Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program*, released in 2015, revealed how little focus was paid to long-term development programming in Kandahar related to gender equality. It highlighted that in response to the Manley Report, CIDA shifted its development programming from the national level to 50% programming focused in Kandahar (DFATD 2015, 2). Interestingly, and as has been reflected in several CIDA interviews, the Evaluation noted that from 2008 to 2011, the strategy was a concentration on stabilization in Kandahar, and after Canada’s exit from the PRT in 2011, the focus was able to return to a humanitarian, social sector and gender equality-oriented program (DFATD 2015, 2). During the stabilization phase, the Evaluation reported that “in economic growth, human rights and governance, little substantive change beyond the project level was observed” (DFATD 2015, 2). Meanwhile, gender equality results were mainly found in the social sectors through improved access to services, but there remained limited improvements for women related to human rights and their role in decision-making (DFATD 2015, 3). Overall, the Evaluation concluded that “there were more short-term achievements than long-term development results”, and that longer time frames are needed for societal changes (DFATD 2015, 3). These conclusions match the concerns expressed by the many CIDA personnel that were involved in the Kandahar PRT.

Interestingly, the Evaluation also notes that CIDA had the knowledge and experience to implement complex, long-term, gender focused projects in fragile and conflict-affected states, but were unable to carry out this work; again, reflecting the concerns expressed by the CIDA personnel that attended to the K-PRT. It states, “despite CIDA’s comprehensive toolkits for results and risk management, there was a lack of specific guidance on how to identify, document or manage risks in a fragile and conflict context beyond the project level” (DFATD 2015, 3). This reflects the frustration CIDA personnel were feeling at the PRT, when they were forced to conduct their work...
under the auspices of the military and a militarized WOG approach put in place by the Manley Panel. Moreover, it recognizes that even though “major efficiency issues that affected overall Program performance, such as staff mobility in a conflict environment, rotation, and centralized decision-making, were only addressed from 2008-2011 when the Whole of Government approach was implemented”, the sustainability of development results, such as building local capacity and ownership, required “more time than foreseen in military stabilization theories” (DFATD 2015, 3). In the end, as was expressed by the CIDA personnel in theatre, CIDA was relegated to supporting the military effort, and any attempt at focusing solely on gender equality in Kandahar was seen as secondary to the priorities at hand.

5.7 Conclusion

The hegemony of militarized masculinity in Kandahar meant that individuals working at the PRT needed to reflect military characteristics in order to work effectively in a WOG environment. Hypermasculine characteristics that include tough leadership, blanket solutions that do not engage in grassroots collaboration, compromise or even discussion, and certainly a lack of engagement with local populations on issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment existed in the diplomatic and development solutions to the Manley-mandated Signature Projects and Priorities. In my interview with Rick, the former Deputy Director of the Afghanistan Task Force who remained in the Ottawa offices at DFAIT, he conveyed that his number one concern was policy effectiveness achieved through engaging effectively with the Afghan government and other stakeholders (personal communication, August 31, 2016). For him, this was best achieved through strategic staffing choices: assigning women to the PRT seemed to allow for greater success, as it targeted the gender parity issue, but it wasn’t his number one concern: when searching
for particular individuals for assignments, the first people weeded out were “missionary types”, regardless of whether you identified as a man or a woman (personal communication, August 31, 2016).

He told me, “You are not going to change the world – I am looking out for your mental well-being – if you are going in expecting a change in the lives of girls, you are deluded and you need to protect yourself from that” (personal communication, August 31, 2016). He was forceful on the issue of getting the staffing decision right:

We were going for incremental change that may or may not happen, so you needed to steel yourself to not feeling dejected because you will feel that way while there. Your job is not to make people’s lives better, it is to provide advice to the government in support of its interests; the government can reject or accept that advice, and your job is the quality of that advice. In the end, what is the role of the public service whether in Canada or abroad? (Personal communication, August 31, 2016).

For Rick, DFAIT had a duty to the Canadian government to bring in individuals to Kandahar who could withstand the tough environment, and not “get soft” on issues that didn’t fit within the parameters of the job. To him, Kandahar was a strategic moment in Canadian diplomatic history, and we needed to conduct ourselves accordingly. And that conduct was dictated by the hegemony of militarized masculinity.

Yet START and the GPSF noted issues with this model of staffing as early as 2007, where DFAIT’s organizational culture was shown to reward Foreign Service officers for their policy acumen, but impede “the recruitment and retention of programming officers with the right combination of skills for the major new programs now supported by the GPSP” (ATIP GPSF Final
Report 2007, 612). At the time, START recognized that the rotational nature of most Foreign Service officer positions in the department compounded the problem: where they wanted to focus their hiring was on individuals with expertise in program management, gender analysis, procurement, training, institution/capacity building and security (military and police) (ATIP GPSF Final Report 2007, 612). They believed that “while project managers may come and go, these specialists would serve as a fixed resource, preserving the corporate memory of the program” (ATIP GPSF Final Report 2007, 612). Along with staffing difficulties that reflected the short-term focus and militarization of the WOG approach at the PRT, the training of staff was similarly ad hoc and unorganized when reviewed in 2007:

A few short courses will not provide these [Foreign Service] officers with the skills and experience needed to design, manage, monitor and evaluate complex, high-risk projects in failed and fragile states. Some suggested the need for a team approach, such as the one at CIDA, where specialists in different areas provide support to program officers. Whether or not the Secretariat adopts this model, program officers will need ongoing training and a wider variety of learning opportunities. Mentoring and coaching in needs assessment, project design, RBM, monitoring, and gender analysis would be helpful to some. (ATIP GPSF Final Report 2007, 613)

But as the Summative Evaluation made clear, CIDA’s typical development capacities were severely reduced. There was little likelihood that START was able to enact a similar approach given the constraints delivered by the militarized WOG approach of the Kandahar PRT.

What these observations and discussions surrounding staffing at the K-PRT point to is the narrative of collaboration reflected, and favoured, visual and linguistic representations of
militarized masculinity. Following the push for policy coherence and the institutionalization of hypermasculine approaches to collaboration within the K-PRT structure, what remained to support the hegemony of masculinity in Canada’s WOG approach was the underlying narrative of Western militarized masculinity as dominant, necessary, and normal in the context of insurgency warfare in Kandahar. While the Manley Report ensured that the structural changes of the three Signature Projects and the six Priorities engulfed Canada’s civilian departments in a short-term, quick-impact military-style collaborative response to state fragility, what it also did was ensure that the only narrative that would maintain military hegemony needed to reflect hypermasculine characteristics, and subdue those “gendered” characteristics – that often revealed the individual humanity in the personnel of the K-PRT – and label them as unnecessary and often antithetical to the WOG mission. In the next chapter, I tackle this narrative through a critical, post-structural feminist frame analysis of interviews and texts, and reveal the damage such a narrative can cause on true equal collaboration amongst departments, and the repression it ensures of gender equality policy and programming in Kandahar.
6 Narrative of Collaboration: The Normalization of Militarized Masculinity

In the previous chapter, I highlighted how the push for policy coherence through the directives of the Manley Report affected the WOG structure of the K-PRT, resulting in it upholding the hegemony of masculinity through the legitimization of militarized responses to state fragility in Kandahar. From 3D to WOG to CA, there remained a power imbalance across the implicated Canadian departments in theatre, with the military remaining the most powerful department in Kandahar while the other departments deferred to the might it exuded. This power imbalance contributed to the reinforcement of the gendered concept that women and feminine institutional characteristics, such as a focus on long-term, generational and culturally sensitive development work on gender equality, were exceptional to the mission of Canada’s WOG approach, and indeed, seen as unnecessary given the wartime context within which much of the collaborative work was being done. In both the policy context and the design of Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar, a narrative predicated on the grand idea of collaboration runs throughout that aids in the maintenance of hegemonic masculine power. In this chapter, I will delve into this narrative more thoroughly to highlight the ways in which it works to uphold a power hierarchy that serves to make some departmental players, their ideas, and their processes, more important and more valued in Kandahar than others, while simultaneously reinforcing the institutionalized importance of collaboration amongst the departments. In this way, I will offer a response to the research question – how does the Canadian whole-of-government approach in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, which creates a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permit more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender
equality? – by demonstrating how the overarching narrative, perpetuated by both the actors working within the K-PRT and the official communications tools used to convey Canada’s WOG processes to the people back home, encouraged a tightening up of masculine styles of military and corporate management, leaving little room for attention to be paid to working meaningfully on issues of gender equality.

Critical feminist theory has identified that the gendered narrative that serves to reinforce the hegemony of masculinity works along a binary that begins at the concept of public/private, where the public sphere is the realm of men and of masculinity, and the private sphere is the realm of women and femininity (Peterson and Runyan 2010). This dichotomy presents the notion that women are traditionally associated with caregiving, emotionally laborious roles in the private sphere, whereas men are associated with the public activities of wage labour, physical and rational prowess, intellectual achievements, and political and military agency (Peterson and Runyan 2010, 12). Masculine characteristics, due to their association with public space, are institutionalized in Western culture, and thus appear natural and even normative to the good governance of society. As such, feminine characteristics, due to their opposition to the concept of public space, present as “gender”, in that when we identify gender equality issues or point out other obvious gendered traits, we typically are pointing to issues and traits that reflect women and femininity. When understood with an intersectional analysis, this narrative dichotomy sets those men and masculine institutions that exhibit traits of heterosexuality and heteronormativity, cis-genderedness, able-bodiedness, whiteness, and economic prowess as the top of the social hierarchy, whereas those men, women, and feminine institutions who do not exhibit these traits, and indeed exhibit traits that are contrary – and thus threatening – to these valued characteristics, are found further down the patriarchal totem pole.
This narrative is nurtured in conflict-affected contexts through the hypermasculine traits of the military and its proclivity for militarization, as these created masculinities are born, developed, and maintained by the demonstrated power of soldiering practices, housed in military-style structures and institutions, and perpetuated by individuals and institutions that exude maleness and masculine dominance. As has been discussed throughout the dissertation, even with the increasing bureaucratic centralization and policy coherence of the K-PRT structure, Canada’s WOG approach was not immune to the pervasiveness of military hierarchy and the strength of Western military imposition. The hegemony of militarized masculinity in Canada’s WOG approach occurred through the military’s “successful claim to authority” in the context of Kandahar, supported by the correspondence between the Western cultural ideal of military might and the institutional power of the military in an area deeply affected by war (Connell 2005, 77). This process, however natural and culturally acceptable it appears on the surface, is a highly political one due to its hand in erasing women, feminine characteristics, and thus the complete picture of gender, from comprehensive approaches to state fragility (Ahall 2016, 12; Enloe 2000a, 2000b). Speaking broadly, Enloe (2000b, 3; emphasis in original) elaborates that “ignoring women on the landscape of international politics perpetuates the notion that certain power relations are merely a matter of taste and culture. Paying serious attention to women can expose how much power it takes to maintain the international political system in its present form”. I highlight the gendered narrative of collaboration as experienced and perpetuated by both men and women in the K-PRT, as well as the official narrative presented by the communications tools of the Quarterly Reports to Parliament to the Canadian and international public, to reveal how hegemonic masculinity is simultaneously reinforced by and holds power over collaborative governance processes that favour militarization.
Understanding the power of militarization and militarized masculinity begins with recognizing that it is derived from and sustained by narratives and acts of violence and aggression, individual conformity to military discipline and cohesion, and aggressive heterosexism, to name a few (Whitworth 2004, 16; 2008, 113). As was discussed earlier, feminist theory highlights that one of the most prominent ways that this power is legitimized is through the process of “soldiering” (Enloe 2000a, 2000b; Whitworth 2004, 2008): the creation of warriors (both men and women) through the valuing of hypermasculine characteristics. For example, in basic training, young men and women are taught to embody myths of manhood such as courage and endurance; physical and psychological strength; rationality; toughness; obedience; discipline; patriotism; lack of squeamishness; avoidance of certain (feminine) emotions such as fear, sadness, uncertainty, guilt, remorse, and grief; and heterosexual competency (Whitworth 2004, 160; 2008, 114). Thus, successful and respected soldiers, “having been trained in the ideals of hypermasculinity, learn there is little place in the military family for them to express emotions or reactions that do not accord with those ideals” (Whitworth 2008, 116). In addition to their internal transformation, they are expected to conform outwardly through a narrative curated by their hairstyles (shaved heads) and their dress (identical uniforms, with markings that indicate only hierarchical differences between soldiers), erasing any trace of “otherness”: homosexuality, non-whiteness, and femininity (Whitworth 2004, 161-162). In other words, revealing any “othering” attributes of their humanity, however fleeting or obvious, reduces their power as commanders of hegemonic masculinity. I argue that the power of this narrative captures both those within the military and civilian sides of the K-PRT, in that civilians are expected to conform to the characteristics and outward indicators of hypermasculinity that are demonstrated daily by the Canadian military in Kandahar.
In this chapter, I elucidate that the narrative of collaboration that was both supported by and informed the broader structure and context of the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach encouraged a gendered narrative that holds Western, militarized masculinity as dominant and necessary, and all other gendered constructs (civilian, femininity, the Afghan other) as submissive and unnecessary. Through a feminist frame analysis of interviews with civilian and military actors in the K-PRT and the official communications tools for Canada’s WOG approach, including the Quarterly Reports to Parliament, I highlight how the narrative tropes of the Afghan wartime context, the positioning of women as passive victims and feminine characteristics as external to collaboration, and the official communication of a Western gendered language of war serve to support the notion that Western militarized masculinity is necessary for Canada’s WOG approach.

6.1 The Three Narratives of Hegemonic Masculinity

I was sitting in the courtyard of Global Affairs Canada on July 8, 2015, recording a highly informative interview with Jane, the CIDA staffer who worked in Kandahar during Canada’s final months there, discussing her thoughts on collaboration with her military and diplomatic counterparts when one of Jane’s colleagues from Kandahar happened to step out into the hot July sun for a mid-afternoon break. Jane was thrilled to see him, and told me she couldn’t believe our luck at having crossed paths with him given our topic of discussion. She asked me if I would like to get a few words from him on the record. I agreed, but only if he wouldn’t mind being recorded. She called him over, saying “have you got, like, thirty seconds? I didn’t want to interrupt your nice conversation here. I’m being interviewed by a PhD student.” He seemed interested, and replied saying, “that’s okay, yeah, please!” Jane informed him quickly about me and my work, and he responded he was happy to speak with me.
He and Jane let me know that he worked on the “bigger picture” while in Kandahar, but did have some “fun anecdotes” about gender that he would be happy to share. I noted this phrasing and dichotomy between the “big picture” and “gender” in my notebook. He recalled one story about a meeting held during former Governor General David Johnston’s visit to Kandahar in November 2010. In attendance were the RoCK, the Governor General, the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and members of an Afghan activist organization. It was an important meeting, and he “wanted to make sure we had a broad group of young Kandahar activists come in and talk,” including Afghan women. He asked his friend, Fawaaz, who ran the Afghan organization in attendance if he could bring some women to the meeting, saying “it would be really important to bring them because I want to give a clear picture of what’s happening” (personal communication, July 8, 2015). This point was interesting from a feminist position, as it indicated that a clear picture of the situation in Kandahar could not be ascertained without the voices of women, and that these voices needed to be amplified and valued. Similarly, the suggestion of adding women’s voices at the last minute indicated that this was not something that was built into the protocols for collaboration, and that the clear picture may not have always been able to be seen.

The meeting was held in a bar set traditionally and formally for tea, much like a shura or jirga, and the men, including the Governor General, were seated on dusted floors. A woman in a burka representing the Afghan organization entered the bar and proceeded to remove her veils, which seemed to catch Jane’s colleague off guard. He told me, “this fully veiled woman proceeds to take off all of her veils, because now she’s in a Western, private setting, so she can, and – it’s the contrast, it’s immediate, because suddenly you have this very young woman, and she’s got make-up on, and her hair is perfectly done; you don’t know what you’re expecting” (personal
communication, July 8, 2015). The display of femininity appeared jarring to Jane’s colleague seemingly because outside of a private setting, Afghan women do not reveal their appearance in public. Moreover, given the military context of Kandahar and the official nature of the meeting, displays of femininity were likely rare, and displays of masculinity were more commonly the norm in high-level meetings with ministers, military leaders and heads of organizations, even amongst Western women invited to participate.

Jane’s colleague explained that they held the entire meeting in a very traditional Afghan manner, where only the men speak, so by the end of the official discussion the young woman hadn’t said a word. He remembered, “I’m really bugged by the fact that we’ve got the Governor General here – I mean, this is a great opportunity to engage a young woman!” Being cognizant of the cultural context in which the meeting was taking place, yet also wanting to reinforce positive messages about what women can do, Jane’s colleague asked Fawaaz if he could ask the young woman a question. He was given permission, and he remembered asking her about the elections. As she responded to him, he recalled, “she’s just the smartest, most eloquent participant. And as she talks for fifteen minutes, it’s very structured, it’s very intelligent, it dominates the entire conversation, and she’s brilliant. Like, just brilliant”. Jane’s colleague’s surprise at the young woman’s intelligence was jarring - why was he so surprised she was eloquent and educated? What were his preconceptions about her? Was it that the ideals of rationality and discipline are considered to be masculine characteristics reserved for those who conform to the patriarchal structures of educational opportunity in the region? Indeed, asking a man for permission to speak to a woman references the social norms common to official meetings in Kandahar.

As the discussion continued, they reached the topic of life with the Taliban, and the young woman told him, as he paraphrased, “I appreciate elections, you know it’s great that every four
years, I, as a woman, now go vote. But the problem is, none of this has changed my life. I couldn’t walk to the market when the Taliban were here and I can’t walk to the market now. We have so much farther to go. So, it’s fine to talk about elections, but, just because we have had a successful election, don’t pretend that things are so much better here for women” (personal communication, July 8, 2015). Jane’s colleague was moved; he told me, “of course we know that, but it’s always really powerful when you hear that sentiment from somebody who’s been living in the environment”. He recalled that the RoCK was especially impressed by the young woman, telling him he was so glad they’d asked her a question. The “clear picture” the young woman had painted for the Canadian men in the room had been captured to a degree, because her presence – her exceptionalism – had been felt. Her presence in that meeting was considered an abnormal and uncommon occurrence given the hegemonic nature of masculinity in that place and at that time, so her appearance – both amongst the men in the room and her feminine characteristics – were striking.

Jane’s colleague concluded his brief time with us in the courtyard lamenting that they never learned the young woman’s history, noting that in Kandahar, “as soon as you scratched the surface, you found amazing, capable, highly educated men and women” (personal communication, July 8, 2015). He left Jane and I sitting in the warm sun, Jane praising his efforts, and me thinking about the gendered implications of his story. There are three gendered narratives at play that support the striking nature of Jane’s colleague’s story, and serve to illustrate the hegemony of militarized masculinity in the K-PRT. The first speaks to the Western view of the cultural context in which the K-PRT was situated: Afghanistan has experienced war for centuries, and has been controlled by men of various Islamic and Pashtun tribes since well before the arrival of the Canadians in late 2001. The perception of those working at the K-PRT, civilian and military, was that Afghanistan,
and the deeply religious Pashtun region of Kandahar, was a wartime society that required solutions for its problems that reflected its culture of insurgency – in other words, military solutions and militarized collaborative engagements amongst the Canadians at the K-PRT were necessary.

The second narrative builds from the first: there is the perception of women and of femininity, both exhibited in the local Afghan context and through Canadian women working within the K-PRT, as exceptional and extraordinary. This was particularly evident in the story above: Jane’s colleague’s awe of the young Afghan woman in the meeting highlights this, as it reveals that there is an expectation of women to be passive, uneducated, or at the very least, unintelligent in the context of Canada’s official WOG approach in Kandahar. I highlight how this narrative extends to the Canadian women of the K-PRT as well, in that to be seen as a woman or to display feminine characteristics was to highlight your extraneousness or the unnecessary presence of unneeded traits. It was better, indeed more normalized, to conform to the masculine militarized stereotypes of war, or to cover up your femaleness beneath lengths of cloth, than to directly deal with profoundly gendered contexts within the K-PRT and beyond into Kandahar. Women needed to be masculinized to have any authority within the operations of the K-PRT, or as was evidenced in the story by Jane’s colleague, they needed to be invited to participate in the official collaborative processes of Canada’s WOG approach. To disrupt this gendered narrative was to become exceptional, to become extraordinary, in a deeply masculine context.

The final narrative thread at work is the Western, gendered language of war, communicated officially to Canada and the world by communications professionals with the K-PRT and colloquially amongst the civilian and military actors of the K-PRT, in a way that bolsters the necessity of militarization and the hegemony of masculinity in the K-PRT. As was highlighted in previous chapters, the narrative of collaboration is complicated by a wartime context and a
gendered narrative that encourages personnel to fit within the structure of their surroundings: the culture of war and the threat of insurgency in the K-PRT is ever-present, and because of this, there is no choice but to conform to militarized responses to state fragility and exhibit traits of hypermasculinity for personal protection and preservation. This is the reality for the Canadian military, civ-pol (including both the RCMP and CSC), and civilian members of CIDA and DFAIT, as well as the reality for the local Afghans the Canadians worked with. This was the reality communicated to the Canadian public by communications officials from the start of Canada’s involvement in Kandahar in 2005, and this language of war continued to weave its way into the other WOG departments as Canada’s collaborative commitment deepened through the Manley Report in 2008 and onward to our relinquishing of the K-PRT to the Americans in 2011. This chapter explores these three narratives through information collected from interviews, ATIPs and public documents that reflect how Canada’s overarching narrative of collaboration for the K-PRT also supported a gendered narrative that worked to uphold militarized masculinity as the norm for the actors and the WOG structure in Kandahar.

6.1.1 The Afghan Context and the Western, Gendered Narrative

For Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar, the narrative that supported the hegemony of militarized masculinity in the K-PRT hung on the concept that Afghanistan presented as one of the worst cases of state fragility globally that had a long road to travel before it could be considered independent and secure. A well-defined example of this narrative comes from the affidavit of Colleen Swords, a former ADM of DFAIT, who states,
Afghanistan faces myriad challenges before stability is assured. A 2004 report by the United Nations (the *Common Country Assessment for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan* […] ) indicated that it was the seventh poorest nation in the world and had suffered from its recent history of civil war, Soviet occupation, mujahedeen resistance, fragmentation of power and the rise of Islamic extremism. According to the information contained in the report, poverty in Afghanistan is deeply entrenched. Low incomes, socio-cultural traditions that severely restrict women’s opportunities, poor quality of education, continued threats from the burgeoning drug economy and criminality are all challenges to security and stability in Afghanistan. (Swords Affidavit 2007, 2)

The position of this DFAIT ADM in 2007 reflected the narrative that Afghanistan was struggling to achieve the standards of Western development and security that became expected of it following the September 11th attacks in the United States. Canada’s role in this regard was that of paternal military saviour, as the following passage highlights:

> Canada is playing a vital role in the security and development of Afghanistan. With approximately 2500 members of the Canadian Forces, concentrated primarily in Kandahar province, and numerous Canadian Government officials serving in both Kabul and Kandahar, Canada is bringing about real changes in a society long ravaged by strife. The role of Canada and its allies is critical to addressing such security threats and thus enabling the economic development of Afghan society. (Swords Affidavit 2007, 2)

From this passage, a critical post-structural feminist discourse analysis tells us that Canada’s role is to engage with the security threats imposed by Afghanistan – poverty, insurgency, restrictive socio-cultural practices that affect women and encourage gender inequality, criminal activity and
the drug trade – in order to bring Afghanistan into the twenty-first century. Further, such an analysis will identify that a military response to these security threats is seen as necessary to ensure economic transformation for Afghanistan, as is reflected in a passage from an ATIP document surrounding Canada’s counter-narcotics commitments in Kandahar. In the document, it was outlined that “Canada is in Afghanistan to pursue our security interests, ensure Canadian leadership in world affairs, and to help Afghanistan to rebuild” (ATIP Counter Narcotics in Afghanistan 2014, 77). This position denotes a centrality to Canada in Kandahar, placing Canada’s Western and paternalistic security, political and military interests as dominant, with Afghanistan’s development and reconstruction concerns coming in second.

In an ATIP of an omnibus Q & A on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, in response to the question, “Is Canada’s mission too heavily weighted towards security at the expense of development and reconstruction activities?”, the following answer was highlighted: “Security is the first step to long-lasting and sustainable development. We have to spend money on security. Otherwise no reconstruction or development will be possible.” And in response to the question, “Why is Canada making such significant contributions to Afghanistan?”, the following answer was highlighted: “We have the means and a moral obligation to help Afghanistan rebuild so that its people can live a better life free from the threat of oppression and violence” (ATIP Counter Narcotics in Afghanistan 2014, 111-112). The connection between gender and security was channeled through gender’s association with development: without security, Canadian assistance couldn’t possibly reach the local populations, including the women and children. Canada consistently vocalized that security in Kandahar took precedence over development and reconstruction work, where much of the attention could feasibly be paid to gender equality policy and programming – as was outlined in the previous chapter. And for security to be properly
attended to prior to conducting any reconstruction or development work, a military focus upheld by a militarized narrative needed to be given to the K-PRT above all other possible iterations of the collaborative approach.

6.1.1.1 Kandahar’s Militarized Reality

Since Canada’s arrival in Kandahar in 2005, the narrative surrounding the region has identified it to be one of the most dangerous and highly militarized provinces in Afghanistan: it is consistently prone to insurgent attacks, and in recent history has seen more than 2500 Canadian soldiers stationed there to conduct combat-intensive ground operations and counterinsurgency work (Holland 2009, 3-11; Kirkey and Ostroy 2010, 200; Murray and McCoy 2010, 172; Stein and Lang 2007). As noted by Holland (2009, vii), the stability of Afghanistan “has been complicated by nearly three decades of armed conflict and repeated regime change that virtually destroyed the institutions on which democracy and the rule of law are based: the judiciary, the police, the legislature, the executive, local government and the civil service”. Despite acquiring a constitution and elected president in 2004, and a parliament in 2005, “the rise of non-insurgent criminal activity, including the kidnapping industry and the narcotics trade, has made many Afghans feel less secure than they felt before and is undermining public confidence in the government and the international community” (Holland 2009, vii-viii; see also Banerjee 2009; 2010). In this way, Canada has identified Kandahar as a consistently dangerous region that requires military occupation to address the daily challenge of security for local populations in the province.

Canada has also identified that Afghanistan on the whole is a nation beset by some of the poorest conditions for its inhabitants, with a lack of both skilled workers and a legal framework to
make the country desirable to foreign investment (Holland 2009, ix). Canadian scholars and practitioners have considered the effect that Afghanistan’s poverty and disorder has on its female population, underscoring the increased issues faced by women and children affected by poverty and violence. As noted by Banerjee (2010, 49):

Afghanistan is still ranked 181st out of 182 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index. Forty-two percent of the people in Afghanistan live under the poverty line (income of under $1 a day). Less than half of primary-school-age children have never been to a class. Eighty-five percent of the women are illiterate, and gender parity in the society is poor by several indicators. The country has the second-highest maternal and infant mortality rates in the world.

As was noted above, these sex-disaggregated indicators are often highlighted in order to disclose a country’s progress for development; it permitted Western nations to understand how security issues such as poverty, mortality, illiteracy, and education rates affected men and women differently. Yet Western-imposed ideas of social organization were generally rejected by the local population of Kandahar, with women’s equality being one of the most widely vilified Western social norms. This perspective resonated globally; the Afghan reality for women was seen in Canada and other Western nations as stark. In my interview with Wajmah, she noted how it was clear within society in Kandahar that the idea of gender itself was very sensitive (personal communication, July 7, 2016). She stressed that the responsibilities of boys and girls in the family and in public life are ingrained from childhood, with girls being taught to work in the home and get married; without outside intervention, these girls would not think that they have a right to

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33 Disaggregated data showing the positioning of Afghan women separate from men began to be tracked following the first United Nations conference on women in 1975 (Peterson and Runyan 2010, 4).
education (personal communication, July 7, 2016). Even now, says Wajmah, it is extremely difficult to examine gender in a country like Afghanistan, and there are people in parliament who are still against its discussion: “when you discuss gender, the risk of men losing power is brought to light” (personal communication, July 7, 2016). Wajmah drove the point that culture and tradition in a country like Afghanistan run incredibly deep, and not only in the villages of Kandahar: for example, if you were identified as an outsider and a military officer, this was a double strike against your character as people would certainly find you to be untrustworthy with these social markers (personal communication, July 7, 2016). Any discussion of women’s issues or gender equality in Kandahar would require a lot of time and a lot of strategy, with the use of informal social gatherings and the capacity building of local women to bolster such long-term goals (personal communication, July 7, 2016).

The everyday reality for women in Kandahar was identified as particularly stark from a Western gendered perspective. This viewpoint was shared by Catherine, the former gender expert and Director at CIDA, who told me that “young women under Taliban rule only went outside wearing their burka, and at your age had osteopenia, if not osteoporosis because they had no vitamin D” (personal communication, May 5, 2015). When discussing the role of women in Afghanistan, Catherine focused in on the detrimental effects of wearing a burka, particularly for poor women in areas like Kandahar province. She asked me whether I had tried on a burka, to which I told her no. She responded, “I’ve tried a burka. First of all, they’re expensive, and they have to meet certain criteria. You have to wear it, and if you’re in a poor family, you have one burka for every woman in the family. Your aunt, your mother, yourself. And if your aunt has tuberculosis, you have tuberculosis too, because you’re wearing the same burka, and it covers your face. Plus, it has a slit in the front—it doesn’t have Velcro, doesn’t have a button—so as you walk,
your vision is obstructed, you’re clutching your burka in your hand; everything is about the burka” (personal communication, May 5, 2015). This viewpoint articulates the Western understanding of Afghan women as routinely victimized, not only directly by the men in their lives and the constant threat of war and a culture of insurgency, but by the indirect effects of what Western men and women would consider gender-discriminatory clothing that the combined power of their culture, society and religion forced them to wear. This perspective on Afghan women’s multiple sites of victimization was one of the most prominent within the narrative surrounding Afghanistan’s wartime context, and was often used to justify Canada’s entrance into Kandahar, as was discussed at the outset of this dissertation.

This aspect of the gendered narrative permeated the work of the Canadians on the ground in Kandahar. Canadian civilians and military personnel often interacted with local Afghans in the region; indeed, it was a necessity of the K-PRT’s commitment to building the capacity of the local governance structure of Kandahar. Understanding the local context for both men and women was a requirement for everyone for thorough work to be conducted. Yet the dangers of the Taliban and the gendered roles of the local men and women meant that often, Canadians had to work much harder to convince them to trust in the foreign contingent and develop working relationships that could stand the test of insurgency, particularly related to addressing issues of gender equality. The narrative of war, threaded by the threat of war due to insurgency, meant that progress toward trust was often slow, halted, or reversed. For Jane, it was clear that any work devoted to gender equality was a discomfort to both the local communities and institutions like the Taliban: “one of the things that was frustrating for the Taliban was that we would give local communities these ideas, and so they would do things like make threats to the community, and say, ‘if we see you talking to the coalition, we’re going to come and get you.’ And they sometimes did do that” (personal
communication, July 8, 2015). Bringing Western ideas of gender equality to a region so deeply entrenched in war, violence, and a religion with distinct gender roles for its followers, was a difficulty that most development practitioners felt was insurmountable not only for moral reasons, but for practical reasons as well, given the time frame and the context for Canada in Kandahar.

For Jane, she saw her work on gender to be the largest struggle for her Afghan counterparts: “The provincial officials that we worked with kind of, you know, accommodated it. Because they know that accommodating gender means opening the door to all of the decentralized funding that we had access to, so even if you’re working in the Afghan context, there’s an accommodation of the gender stuff at the official level” (personal communication, July 8, 2015). Western and Afghan views on gender equated to ticking off boxes to receive funding or complete a project or program. The underlying narrative of Kandahar’s wartime struggles meant that for stakeholders on both sides, the point of conducting gender equality work was not to achieve gender equality per se: Afghans accepted that it was a requirement for funding and grudgingly accepted it, while Canadian military and civilian members of the K-PRT checked it off on the list of items to cover in the attempt to conduct collaborative work on the Signature Projects or Priorities mandated by the Manley Panel for Kandahar. Moreover, overt displays of “gender” – of femininity or of femaleness – were often viewed on both sides as unnecessary and exceptional within Kandahar’s militarized context. Jane provides an example: following a governance meeting “outside the wire” with the Canadian commander and local Kandahar governance officials, Jane tells me she decided to remove her hijab while waiting for a ride back to Kandahar City with the Americans. Yet as she went to say goodbye, she came across the Canadian commander, the district governor of Kandahar and the chief of police without her hair covered. Instinctually, she threw up her hands in a last-ditch effort to cover her head, but the men had seen her: “I realized, ‘oh my god what have I done’”
And the chief of police looked disgruntled, he took off his—one of these Palestinian sort of scarves—and gave it to me. And I quickly put it on! And so, we have pictures of me standing next to the district governor and the chief of police, and I’m hiding my head and face” (personal communication, July 8, 2015). Jane found herself apologizing profusely through a translator, but the damage had been done. The power of the narrative at that moment was that even though Jane was working amongst male peers in a context where she was accepted as an equal, she was only accepted as one if she covered her body to hide her femininity, her femaleness – her gender – from public view.

CIDA recognized the steep uphill climb they faced in a country context that did not look kindly on assertions of gender equality, attempting to address women’s issues and gender equality within a narrative that encouraged and reinforced the militarization of the collaborative approach in Kandahar. In a 2006 report from CIDA’s Asia Branch on a scoping mission in Afghanistan, retrieved via ATIP, it recognized that a highly strategic approach would be needed to address gender equality:

Perhaps the most urgent need is to support the Government and society in promoting gender equality at policy and institutional levels. This could involve various types of initiatives directed at supporting and influencing strategically-located stakeholders, within senior levels of government and outside of government, and developing their capacity to promote change. (ATIP Afghanistan Program Asia Branch 2006, 18)

Recognizing the difficulty they faced in addressing a narrative that did not value gender equality, CIDA identified criteria to assess where to focus funding priorities related to gender. Such criteria included identifying a consistency with GoA and CIDA priorities, if there was socio-political
sensitivity and acceptability, if the administrative level of effort required to achieve results was high enough, whether there was ease or difficulty of implementation, and if the capacity of potential partners was high enough to even approach the topic of gender equality (ATIP Afghanistan Program Asia Branch 2006, 19). Kandahar’s wartime context was such that to even broach the subject of gender equality, there needed to be significant capacity already established to carry the narrative into the mainstream – and thereby combat the militarized narrative that deferred the need for addressing gender equality issues outside the scope of Canada’s WOG approach.

6.1.1.2 Militarization and the Canadian Reality in Kandahar

By the time Canada entered the leadership position of NATO’s ISAF in Kandahar, and committed to working collaboratively across departments through the K-PRT, it was fully aware of the local context and the expectation of war; there were no pretences over why Canada was in this heavily-embattled southern region of Afghanistan. The role of the Canadian military, and the power it wielded in Afghanistan, was placed under a microscope in Kandahar. And for the civilian departments of DFAIT and CIDA, it was revealed in ATIP documents that they knew that their role – through government bodies and funds such as the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) – was to support the Canadian military leadership effort there and to close the gaps in programming for support of securitization of fragile states for development. In the formative evaluation of the GPSF, retrieved through ATIP, the civilian organizations recognized two WOG departmental strategic objectives for the fund: 1) to create a more secure world safe from the threats of fragile states, terrorism and international crime; and 2) building a new multilateralism that responds to the new challenges of globalization.
The collaborative narrative for Kandahar clearly identified security as the highest priority for Canada’s WOG approach.

On paper, PRTs are highly militarized collaborative entities, as they are commanded by a military officer, usually a lieutenant colonel, and are similarly structured to a military base (Canada 2008, 23; Holland 2010, 278). It is premised on the concept of strategic collaboration in its broadest form, which recognizes that “for peace and stability operations there is great interconnectedness between political, security, governance, and development dimensions” (Mamuji 2012, 210). Yet the power of the military in the context of Afghanistan, and of Kandahar specifically, was clear and natural to anyone watching from at home and abroad. Despite the transition from a 3D approach with specific military leadership to one of policy cohesiveness through the three Signature Projects and the six Priorities, the military continued to maintain hegemonic influence over the decision-making and implementation of policy and programming due to the overarching narrative that Afghanistan, and Kandahar, continually faced the threat of war. For David Mulroney, the former Deputy Minister responsible for the Afghanistan Task Force in the Privy Council Office and Secretary of the Manley Panel, Kandahar was every bit as military-focused as Canada’s previous recent engagements in Afghanistan. In his book Middle Power, Middle Kingdom (2015, 251) he wrote,

Kandahar was a classic counter-insurgency campaign in which Canada’s civilian contributions such as diplomatic engagement, the training of local officials and massive development spending were tools to support what the military saw as a far more important combat mission. For the Canadian Forces, the Kandahar mission was a long-awaited opportunity to re-equip and repurpose a military that was anxious to prove itself as something more than a peacekeeping force.
According to Mulroney’s assessment, Canada’s military position in Kandahar was never in doubt, even within the WOG approach.

Like Canada’s top PCO civilian of the K-PRT, those in civilian positions within DND and CIDA recognized that Canada’s transition to Kandahar would primarily be a military endeavour simply because it was the natural ongoing approach in the region. According to Luke, the former intelligence officer with DND, the collaborative approach needed to be driven by the military because “this is just how it had to be” (personal communication, June 3, 2015). For him, there needed to be an acceptance of the militarization of the PRT, so that you could turn your focus to your work and to maintaining relationships with your coworkers in a highly stressful work environment. When I asked him about whether he was able to coordinate on an equal footing with his CIDA and DFAIT counterparts, he seemed to take offence to the question. He believed in the collaborative and comprehensive nature of the PRT from a militarized platform, telling me in an email, “The PRT acted as a team, we supported the other parts of the PRT all the time as the normal way of doing business. [Military coordination] occurred daily both formally and informally and although we were separate in some respects when it came to getting things done there were no departments, just the PRT and the mission we had as a [WOG] entity. Your question seems to imply, whether you realize or not, greater separation than was there. We all worked together as one entity, although with the occasional argument” (personal communication, June 3, 2015). The narrative of collaboration he addressed was one that recognized the natural leadership of the military, and recognized the militarized nature of Kandahar: collaboration was possible and encouraged, but not without adhering to military approaches to getting the work done.

This same perspective was shared by Kamala, the CIDA manager of the Kandahar Local Initiatives Program from 2010 to 2011. Kamala reflected the collaborative narrative that at the
PRT, you only survived through constant communication with your counterparts outside of your department, and that the DND communications officer was the most important link between all the different teams and individuals. She described the K-PRT as “close quarters”, and said that with “being in each other’s faces all the time”, they knew they had to be cooperative and defer to the expertise of the military (personal communication, July 28, 2015). Similarly, Luke stressed to me that the WOG approach was a work in progress that needed to be constantly maintained through an individual’s ability to be amiable with their counterparts, both Canadian and Afghan, from the various government departments and national and international organizations living and working in close quarters under the threat of insurgency (personal communication, June 3, 2015).

Considering the gendered narrative surrounding Kandahar’s wartime context, the best way for a Canadian actor, civilian or military, to be amiable and get on with their tour was to defer to the characteristics that befit a military outfit: hypermasculinity encompassed the natural leadership qualities that were needed for WOG to succeed in Kandahar.

In my interview with “Jim”, the former ADM from DND, he noted the powerful narrative and structural influence of DND on DFAIT and CIDA as Canada was moving into the K-PRT:

The departments – Foreign Affairs and CIDA – did not have experience sending people into heavy situations. I mean, people must have training, they must understand what the whistles are, and have a willingness to go – those types of things. So, Foreign Affairs had always had people in hazardous places, but in their own construct if I can call it that way. And this was now getting them outside of that construct, into a different construct. (Personal communication, September 19, 2016)
This was especially clear for non-military actors, and particularly those that were women, and served to highlight how the militarized narrative highlighted women and “gender” as exceptional to Canada’s WOG approach. In my interview with Jessica, she described to me her living and working conditions with the Canadian Forces at the PRT for ten days in July 2010, during the time the US was beginning to move in and replace the Canadian military contingent. At the time, there were many more people than normal at the PRT, sharing sparse living conditions, bland food, and enduring the “moon dust” landscape of the desert and frequently broken equipment in an environment far more militarized than she was used to in Kabul (personal communication, August 11, 2016). She found it intimidating as a civilian to enter a military base, and as a woman, she felt she stood out like a sore thumb: she tended to get a lot of what she called “respectful attention” from Canadian and American military men (personal communication, August 11, 2016).

This attention was dealt with in an official manner: the PRT was very strict about non-fraternization, and was a dry establishment; a woman could never be alone in a room with the door closed with a man, and Jessica rarely saw alcohol present in social gatherings (personal communication, August 11, 2016). The gendered narrative presented at the PRT painted Canadian women, like the Afghan women they were there to help, as passive objects to be protected: the non-fraternization rules of the PRT indicated that for a woman to be alone with a man, whether sober or otherwise, would result in official punishment for all parties involved. Even in such professional settings, for the female-identified Canadians working in Kandahar, the appearance of their identity as women, and the presentation of feminine characteristics, was exceptional. The gendered narrative of the PRT served to uphold the hegemony of militarized masculinity for Canadians in their everyday interactions while at the K-PRT, reflecting the institutionalized militarization of Canada’s WOG approach.
6.1.2 The Gendered Narrative of Women

When it comes to perceptions of women in the K-PRT, the narrative never seemed to stray far beyond the binary notion of women and femininity as exceptional to the WOG approach: women were conflated with “gender”, and were highlighted as victims or as extras against a wartime backdrop. This narrative underscores the power of hegemonic masculinity in a setting like Kandahar, as it reveals the perception that a woman working in the K-PRT needed to conform to the aggressive male tendencies that characterize the soldier persona, but it also reveals the discomfort that is felt when a woman conforms: she is no longer fitting into the typical vision of a woman in war, which is to be feminine, passive, and frequently a victim. It is an invisible narrative that affects every aspect of the day-to-day life and management of the PRT. For one of my interview participants who held the highest civilian position at the PRT, the RoCK, intercepting that narrative was rarely easy. This particular RoCK told me they saw the importance of a gender perspective in the collaborative approach to Afghanistan, particularly as they were responsible for the development personnel as well as diplomacy issues and collaborating with the commander of the CAF (personal communication, November 7, 2016). However, this applied gender perspective only extended to the concept of protecting and saving the women of the region, and only where it was appropriate and if the community was receptive. The RoCK argued for its use in areas such as addressing the needs of the female Sarposa prison population, or in Kandahar City initiatives where gender discussion was a bit easier than out in the rural areas of Kandahar province, though they conceded the city was still very conservative from a Western perspective (personal communication, November 7, 2016).
The appearance of masculinity and femininity in Kandahar often saw the line drawn between the military and the civilians in the field. When I asked Jane for her take on the importance of gender equality in Kandahar for all the people she worked with, military and civilian, she paused a moment before answering:

Well I mean it wasn’t important for most of the people we were working with, particularly on the military side. For the Canadian military, it’s because it was a non-issue. Our women were seen as men and were functioning like men, and accepted as men by the Afghans, and so our military women were, you know, it wasn’t an issue. For the civilians, I had to wear a hijab and any civilian woman that would interact with the Afghans had to wear a hijab. And of course, you know, long sleeves and everything is all covered. We wore our normal clothes, but we just made sure we had long sleeves. And then we put the hijab on. (Personal communication, July 8, 2015)

The Western gendered narrative instilled the perception of Canadian women as conforming to the roles of men when acting within a military setting, or they were expected to cover any visible indications of their femininity. Indeed, when gender issues were considered by Canada in Kandahar, they were limited to the civilian side of leadership, says one RoCK. There wasn’t always a gender discussion to be had whenever they sat down to discuss K-PRT business with the commander of the CAF, but when there was, it was expected that the RoCK would do the heavy lifting (personal communication, November 7, 2016). According to this RoCK, the CAF tried to be as gender sensitive as their training would allow, harkening back to experience gained in places such as Haiti and Bosnia, and leaning on civilians for expert support and advice. They would apply their knowledge as the “pointy end” of CIMIC teams to missions where they distributed wheat seed to women farmers, or addressing the community security requirements of women for the
celebration of Eid. Ultimately, when I asked about the CAF really understanding gender in such a context, the RoCK lamented, “18-year-old privates would not have understood their gendered position” (personal communication, November 7, 2016). As we closed out our interview, the RoCK said what most of my civilian interview participants have said time and again: “with more time we could have been much more conclusive” (personal communication, November 7, 2016).

The frame within which the RoCK was operating, as was discussed in the previous chapters, was one of short-term policy coherence where the structure of the K-PRT supported a militarized narrative. There was not enough room within that frame to engage in meaningful gender equality work, as much as the RoCK recognized its importance.

The militarized narrative of Kandahar, as feminist theory attests, ensures that the concept of “gender” is conflated with women, as this conceptualization is identifiable against the normalized and therefore invisible masculine characteristics that dominate militarized structures like the K-PRT. For example, the successor to the RoCK I interviewed above explained to me how certain projects were designed to advance gender equality, yet when I asked about their involvement in such projects, they couldn’t remember exactly how many. They described forty-seven different benchmarks for the same number of projects they were briefed on at the K-PRT, and identified that maybe two or three were related to gender equality. We discussed the education Signature Project, where the RoCK stressed how important it was to teach girls; however they admitted to not being involved in the design of that project nor were they able to stay on top of the minute details, and furthermore, there was ideological backlash from the community that made the design of it difficult (personal communication, August 25, 2016). Given the time constraints and limits to information on their position, they couldn’t go any lower than the strategic level, and stressed that when it came to gender equality, CIDA took control (personal communication,
August 25, 2016). When the RoCK did discuss gender equality programming with me, they focused in on how the programming benefited women, and provided an example of how the CSC programming had a gender component where female corrections officers were trained by women. This response by the RoCK fit with the militarized narrative of Kandahar; where gender equality initiatives were found, it was in ensuring more women were trained in militarized pursuits that reflected hypermasculine characteristics not unlike those cultivated in developing soldiers.

For this RoCK, they told me they did what they could regarding working on gender equality initiatives in Kandahar, such as focusing on educating girls through the education-focused Signature Project, or staging a female shura alongside the official one held by the male elders in the region. They saw this as a compromise, and ultimately, a best practice, between the Western values held by the Canadians and the gender-segregated values held by the Afghans (personal communication, August 25, 2016). Yet, this example only serves to highlight the gendered hierarchy that was upheld by the narrative surrounding women in Kandahar: by coupling gender equality to larger issues, such as education, or by pairing a women’s shura with the official men’s shura, the larger goal of societal transformation for gender equality is not broached. These activities only serve to pay lip service to the goal, and have no real effect on the societal and structural designs already in place that reflect patriarchal and militarized WOG approaches. The policy and programming solutions the RoCK identified did not give women any agency in their ability to contribute to society in Kandahar; without those in leadership positions understanding the deeper gendered narrative that normalizes male power and militarization, giving women their own shura, or educating girls, does not contribute to the long-term, sustainable transformation of gender norms.
The narrative of women as passive victims or exceptional in the Canadian WOG context manifested in plans to help women that were not disruptive to the local context, that fit the masculine narrative, and didn’t interfere with the militarization deemed necessary for the Kandahar PRT. This was the narrative most commonly found amongst those working for DND and CAF in the PRT when I probed about gender equality in my interviews. For “Linda”, a member of the CAF who did two tours in Kandahar, the first “kinetic” in 2007 and the second as “non-kinetic intelligence” in 2010, the goal of women’s rights was extremely important in a place like Kandahar, and at the PRT she told me that staff were always looking for ways to support local women. She told me about some of the initiatives that stood out for her, which included the Thursday markets at the PRT where local Afghan women could sell their crafts, several visits to women’s prisons, where Linda learned that most incarcerated women were there because they disobeyed their husbands or other male family members (personal communication, June 11, 2015). These initiatives were more kindnesses than full-fledged policy solutions, however, and did not have the goal of affecting socio-cultural change in Kandahar, or influencing the direction of local governmental processes.

We discussed Linda’s memories of the Thursday market in more detail, as she had the fondest memories of interacting with local women there. One of the market items that Linda was most excited about was the Arghand brand of beauty products. Developed as a cooperative by Sarah Chayes, an American and former NPR reporter who remained in Kandahar to assist with local development and who Linda met on her first tour of Kandahar in 2007, the Arghand beauty brand employed local women in Kandahar, sold their products only within Afghanistan, and ensured all the proceeds returned to the cooperative (personal communication, June 11, 2015). Linda reiterated many times to me in our interview how much the Arghand cooperative felt like
an “oasis in the desert”, and was a real treat for her and her colleagues once a week at the PRT. The market, and the women’s stands, didn’t infiltrate or affect the daily operations of the PRT that much, and Linda didn’t have much hand in their operation; once she’d returned to Canada she didn’t see or hear from them again (personal communication, June 11, 2015).

Local Afghan women figured prominently in stories like Linda’s, where they were invited to participate as a treat amongst the daily operation of the PRT but were not active agents of grander development projects related to women’s empowerment or gender equality. Returning to my interview with Luke, this is what he found to be objectively true. As a DND advisor to two different RoCKs while on his two tours, Luke liked to recommend to them that Afghan women be involved in areas that they could be reasonably and easily included (personal communication, June 3, 2015). But in general, the participation of Afghan women was a peripheral focus at best. He mentioned that during his second tour, they hired a female interpreter to “make a point” in meetings with local Afghan leaders in Kandahar. They found that with this tactic, the men would “babble in front of women because they were of no consequence”, leading the Canadians to capture more detail than they may have received if they had used a male interpreter. In this instance, the femaleness of the interpreter worked to the favour of the WOG mission, in that her presence (or indeed, her invisibility in the presence of men) worked diplomatically and militarily in the Canadians’ favour.

Even the very absence of gender equality experts on staff at the K-PRT highlights how low down the priority list a focus on policy and programming on gender equality was. In my attempt to interview as many knowledgeable gender experts from the WOG departments as possible, I endeavoured to speak with roughly ten different CIDA employees who had each been connected to Kandahar or Afghanistan at large during Canada’s time leading the PRT, and who had each
been tasked with gender equality to some degree in their work. Almost all of them declined to be interviewed due to their having little to no understanding or connection with gender equality programming or policy in Kandahar. One respondent, “Alexandre”, responded in an email to me saying “I'd be happy to talk to you about my work in Kandahar but I was posted on the frontline, in a rural district, implementing stabilization projects that had very little gender components. You'd be better off talking to colleagues who have implemented health, education and economic development projects” (personal communication, May 24, 2015). Another respondent, “Calluna”, forwarded my email request with a title that highlighted how out-of-the-ordinary gender equality work was in Kandahar: “And now for something completely different - research request from PhD candidate at U of O – Kandahar” (personal communication, September 22, 2015). These two CIDA experts, although not heavily experienced in areas of gender equality, both had enough experience with it through CIDA to be considered expert-level, and were either not involved with it at all in Kandahar, or passed my request on down the chain.

Others worked remotely on gender equality with CIDA for the K-PRT, but nonetheless seemed reserved about speaking on the topic when I reached out for comment. A respondent and gender expert, “Kalya”, made it clear in an email to me that she would be happy to speak on the topic more generally, but that she “did not do any travel to Kandahar during [her] time with the Task Force”, and she expressed her concern that her experience would not be particularly relevant (personal communication, July 20, 2015). Another gender expert, “Amanda”, who was particularly difficult to pin down, came close to discussing her role with CIDA in the K-PRT, however tenuous, after she asked for a sense of my interview questions. However, that was the extent of our exchange. After providing her with my questions in writing, I never heard back (personal
communication, September 9, 2015). A Senior Gender Equality Specialist, who I was particularly interested to speak with, never returned my emails or calls at all.

This was particularly common for CIDA gender advisors or specialists, in that they had some say in the work going on in Kandahar from a gender perspective, but never set foot at the KAF or the K-PRT. For some this was a major impediment to the work they could have done there. One gender advisor I did manage to speak with, Simone, informed me in an email that her “connection and any communication with the PRT in Afghanistan were negligible at best as [her] work was more with the NGO and multi-lateral sector. [She] only stayed with the ATF for a few months, as [she] did not approve of how they were working and decided to not extend [her] contract” (personal communication, August 26, 2016). Finally, most CIDA gender experts worked on the national level, rather than specifically with Kandahar or the K-PRT, as was the case with “Molly”, who was a part of CIDA’s Gender Equality Thematic and Sector Specialists’ Division. She graciously told me she “would be happy to speak with [me] generally about [her] experience working on gender but cannot speak to the particular work in Kandahar as [she] was not involved to any substantial degree” (personal communication, September 8, 2015). In all cases, CIDA’s rather large contingent of gender equality experts, advisors and specialists approached Kandahar with a wide berth, or were never invested in the specific workings of the K-PRT at all. Considering this information using feminist frame analysis, it is evident that searching for “gender” in Kandahar, in the sense that gender equality policy and programming was given significant investment and institutional support, was akin to finding a needle in a haystack.

6.1.2.1 “Gender” Parity and the Low Priority of “Gender and Development” Work
Ultimately, the narrative that served to conflate “women” with “gender” appeared to be pervasive across Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar. The common perspective from the gender experts I interviewed was that for people engaged in the work in Kandahar, the concept of gender equalled women alone. When there was project work to be done with a “gender” focus, it usually meant that the focus would be on women’s empowerment to the status of men in society, or finding “gender parity”: the quantitative balance of women and men on a project, in a military outfit, or at the leadership level. For CIDA staffer Jane, who worked on both sides of the civil-military divide in the final year of the K-PRT, the conflation of “gender” with “women” and the shallow focus on parity between women and men was most pronounced when Canadian civilians were assisting in the handover of PRT control to the Americans in 2011. Following the structural changes brought about from the Manley Panel which significantly adjusted CIDAs position in Canada’s WOG approach, there came with the Americans a whole new way of doing things that was nowhere near the CIDA approach to gender:

One of the things that I found with the Americans is that they brought their way of work, including how they understood the concept of gender. And they didn’t even use the correct terminology. They had something called the FES – the Female Engagement Strategy. So, I tried to explain to RC South, who were leading it, and the people who were tasked to do it were women – but they were Marines. They were ‘Rrrrr!’ – butchy women! And they were all about you know, going and banging on doors and getting information that we need. I tried to tell them ‘No! That is not how things work!’ And I said, starting with the actual terminology, ‘It has to be “Gender”!’ They said, ‘Why is that?’ I said, ‘Because it’s not just about the women! You can’t just walk into these women’s compounds and expect them to be comfortable with you! So, using the concept of gender means that you have to
approach the entire community, and then there were certain things that you can do with the men and certain things that you can do with the women. (Personal communication, July 8, 2015)

Jane’s frustration with RC South, made up of Canadians and Americans at the time of her stay in Kandahar, reflects how the militarized narrative affected how actors understood the concept of “gender”. Further, it shows just how exceptional women and conceptualizations of femininity were within the K-PRT context: working on gender equality meant sending in hypermasculine women to assist local women who were predominantly painted as victims of their own culture, a patriarchal approach espoused by military doctrine no matter the gender of the actors within.

Jane’s frustration culminated in her view that “it was generally only the development donors, so the USAID.s of this world, that actually cared about gender” (personal communication, July 8, 2015). Jane’s perception was that “the other groups that were involved, so we had Corrections Services Canada and then we had our colleagues from DFAIT, they didn’t really have a gender focus. Or, they didn’t really care about gender” (personal communication, July 8, 2015). This was a common perception among those working on development at the K-PRT through CIDA. Indeed, the frustration was institutionalized into an overarching narrative: at the time of Canada’s WOG leadership in Kandahar, the Conservative Canadian government was quietly touting that aid contractors drop the terminology of “gender equality” from their applications, and instead use the phrase “equality between women and men” (Tiessen and Carrier 2015). Tiessen and Carrier (2015) demonstrate in their research how the simple change from “gender equality” to “equality between women and men” in the Canadian policy vernacular is an insidious narrative change that bars Canada from developing robust policy and programming that supports transformative approaches to gender inequality at home and abroad. In an interview I conducted
with a professor who studies women in the military, she stressed that in her research on DND and the CAF, “gender equality” usually meant removing barriers and restrictions to women in the military, and that striving for parity between women and men often equated to gender mainstreaming (personal communication, May 27, 2015). This understanding of gender in Kandahar was most apparent with the military personnel of varying ranks that I interviewed. When I asked Luke, the intelligence officer and advisor to the RoCK on two tours at the K-PRT, about his perspective on gender equality in the PRT, he told me that Canadian women were involved at every level, with the highest women often being the most realistic – in other words, demonstrated the most masculine characteristics. The equation of women with gender was apparent in his response. He told me that most development officers were women, and often very young women at that, and that for both of his tours he saw more women than men in theatre, which he believed was a point of pride for Canada and a success of gender equality efforts back home (personal communication, June 3, 2015).

The departments with greater institutionalized masculinity, such as DND, the CAF, and the RCMP, laid out the language of “equality between women and men” in their training manuals, translating into action (when it was necessary) amongst their personnel in Kandahar. As noted by Gould (2014, 93), a journalist who traced his experience with Canadian civpol training in Kandahar, “‘Every society creates certain expectations about what women and men can and should do or say or how they can or should act,’ reads the opening sentence to a section in the CivPol training manual on women’s rights. ‘As Peace Operations personnel, it is your job to promote high standards of equality between men and women.’” The military approached the design of their gender equality component in Kandahar in much the same way as the civ-pol contingent from the RCMP. In my interview with Jim, the ADM of Public Affairs with DND from 2004 and 2009, our
discussion on the importance of gender equality in the PRT was clear: the question was not so much about gender equality, but rather parity between women and men. Jim noted that it was a consideration through all the PRT planning, for the senior management at DND, and for General Hillier. But he made sure I understood: “when I say gender, what I really mean is sex—was there a balance between the sexes, so that in theatre we saw, to the best of our abilities, a 50/50 balance between men and women?” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Jim let me know that most senior staff were sensitive to, and supportive of, this balance. To his recollection, when any planning with other departments occurred, the departments always considered, at the very least, parity between women and men. In his own sphere at DND, there were many female public affairs officers. However, from his own observation he couldn’t recall any female officers for the combat operation with the CAF at the PRT (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Whether there were none, he simply didn’t see for himself, or he couldn’t remember seeing any women in combat roles, is unclear.

As our interview continued, he wanted to make it very clear how the procedural focus on parity between women and men was a part of Canada’s long history of being “one of the most gender-equal institutions” he had ever experienced (personal communication, September 19, 2016). He believed that in his forty-year period of employment with the Government of Canada, it “mattered not what one’s gender was. The only consideration was, can you do the job. And gender absolutely had nothing else to do with it” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). The erasure of gender, and therefore of women and of feminine characteristics, was prominent in this narrative. This point was driven into stark clarity by Margaret, a former Director General with DFAIT and the ATF, who I interviewed in 2015: “What was our overriding goal? What was the Government of Canada’s goal? Ousting Taliban and installing a stable Afghan government! There
was an inherent security focus to ensure Afghanistan was no longer a haven for terrorists. It was not to put girls in school. That came after the Manley Report with the Signature Projects” (personal communication, June 10, 2015). It was clear from the DFAIT, DND and CF perspectives that gender just wasn’t a factor in Canada’s decision-making with regard to the Kandahar PRT. So much so, that Margaret continued: “mommies and babies were never the mission! We had huge difficulty with CIDA; they had all the money and wanted to do nothing but mommies and babies” (personal communication, June 10, 2015). The narrative of women in the K-PRT as victims, or as exceptions to the normal operation of Canada’s WOG approach, is highly visible in this commentary: to highlight one’s gender was to highlight one’s exceptional characteristics beyond what was required of the job, and when gender was highlighted, it related to feminine characteristics such as motherhood.

6.1.3 The Official Canadian Narrative: The Western, Gendered Language of War

The prioritization of policy coherence in the Manley Report that led to the structural push toward militarism and the militarization of civilian approaches, discussed in chapters 3 and 4, coupled with the gendered narrative of war highlighted in this chapter, fed into the communications approach taken by the DFAIT ATF. Along with the official WOG departments engaged in security, development and diplomacy initiatives with the K-PRT, there was a contingent of communications officers and media officials who took up residency with the civil servants and military personnel to convey the official story back home. For the Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) working on communicating the official word to the media out of Kandahar, the stories that were the most popular and most reported on by the Canadian media were related to Canada’s military work there.
As Doug informed me, the PAOs were constantly “fighting the ‘security soundbite’”, saying that war and negativity topped all other news stories coming out of the region (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Doug believed the media to be lazy, always looking for a tragedy or failure to report on and ignite interest in their work, and the modest incremental improvements or small wins occurring more readily at the K-PRT didn’t interest them. As time progressed in Kandahar, and Canada’s WOG position became clearer following the direction of the Manley Report, the strategy behind delivering the “right” message to the media grew more developed and drew the narrative of gender equality into the fold. In a NATO report on the Canadian communications portion of the PRT by Boudreau (2016, 116), General Hillier was quoted as saying that the military “recognised from the start that information, its management and its use was a strategic weapon for us,” and that it “would build confidence with Afghans at large, potential and real warring factions, warlords, politicians, entrepreneurs and leaders from disparate parts of their society, including women”. The communication strategy of the PRT, which included media relations as well as the Quarterly Reports to Parliament, was to attempt to highlight the feel-good stories of collaboration to bolster support for the continued military engagement ongoing in Kandahar as well as gain support for the six Priorities and three Signature Projects mandated by the Manley Panel. This narrative simultaneously encouraged the collaboration of the WOG departments and upheld the hegemony of militarized masculinity through the use of military tropes.

The various tasks of the K-PRT’s official communications team included liaising with the local and international media, releasing official news stories, composing official releases for government publications, and compiling the data and writing the Afghanistan Quarterly Reports to Parliament following the new communication mandates of the Manley Report in 2008. The
communication structure for Canada in Kandahar consisted of media and PAOs embedded into the PRT to support the dissemination of news and control the content being released to the Canadian, and international, public. As noted by Boudreau (2016, 158), the K-PRT “had at its peak as many as 20 media at once but regularly 5-10 media at a time, splitting their embedded time at Kandahar Air Field, outside the wire with the Task Force and with the Provincial Reconstruction Team”. In my interview with Doug, he provided me with the details of a presentation he had made November 10, 2010 to Defence Public Affairs Officers about the communications piece of the mission from a WOG perspective. He recalled that the objectives of the comms group were significantly expanded following the release of the Manley Report, and were to “maintain and build public support for our involvement, raise awareness and understanding of the new priorities and agenda, manage expectations of what can be accomplished by 2011, inform Canadians of the full scope of our role and activities through frank and frequent communications, build awareness and understanding that our role is part of a coordinated, international commitment, and inform the Afghan population of our work through both Canadian and Afghan voices” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). Following the Manley Panel, the importance of communicating the narrative of collaboration to the Canadian and international public increased significantly, with extensive focus on conveying its strengths, successes, and wins as they related to the comprehensive structure and policy coherence of the K-PRT.

The key task of the communications personnel following the Manley Report was to increase their reporting on the successes in Kandahar to Canada and Afghanistan: “Between the Manley Panel’s report and the summer of 2008, four large memoranda to cabinet were developed that had virtually unheard of timelines, and one of them was entitled ‘Engaging Canadians’, which enclosed the comms strategy. It has three main thrust lines: communications writ large (with
Canadians and Afghans), communicating with international audiences, and communicating with Parliamentarians” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). The way the communications strategy was going to show more Canadian successes in Kandahar involved “eighteen new, major initiatives and five continuing initiatives to undertake in Canada, twelve major new initiatives in Afghanistan, and six activity streams internationally. Some of these initiatives included such things as expanding the roster of civilian spokespeople, establishing a civilian imagery gathering capability, multimedia tours to small and medium-sized Canadian cities, and capturing before, during, and after imagery” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). From Doug’s recollections, it appeared that with Manley there came a greater emphasis on highlighting the civilian aspects of the K-PRT to demonstrate that the WOG approach was not just a military endeavour. Yet Doug also told me about how this goal proved to be the most difficult to achieve, given the overarching influence of the military, even after the changes from Manley were implemented.

Doug pointed to the utility of broadcasting the humanitarian aspects of the Canadian WOG approach in Kandahar as a way to bolster Canadian support for Canada’s work with the K-PRT and combat the influence of the military. He referred to a significant data point in the 2009 polling data used by the communications team: there was relatively low awareness by Canadians for the many NATO and UN allies in Afghanistan. He told me in our interview, “the polling data clearly show that when Canadians are informed that this is a UN mission, that we are engaged there with a large number of international allies, and that we are doing valuable development work, mission support numbers go up” (Personal communication, September 19, 2016). Doug saw the utility of tying the development work being done at the PRT to the military work in the official communications coming out of Kandahar. The narrative was being developed to consciously build
support for the military mission through the good image of development. This tactic carries forward from the experiences of civilian personnel in the K-PRT that have been highlighted throughout this dissertation, who found their processes and their daily experiences shaped by the hegemonic strength of the military.

Communication of Canada’s humanitarian and diplomatic successes was built into the K-PRT in a highly visible and WOG-integrated way, particularly following the Manley Report. According to one of the RoCKs I interviewed, the value of the Manley Panel came from its’ creation of the civilian leadership position itself as a communications tool for the rest of the civilian staff, who, prior to the report’s release, were never clear on why they were there with the military in the first place. The RoCK told me that their first order of business in such a high-level position was to:

Explain ‘why’ to both the military and the civilian staff: why would we risk their lives to go to a meeting at the governor’s compound? When we went out, we always discussed our orders, and would make a point of explaining why we were leaving the PRT to the CF. Before Manley, this was never communicated, and there was a real lack of understanding. I noticed that they appreciated knowing where they were going and why, and that the PRT soldiers had a high sense of fulfilment because they could now see the benefits. (Personal communication, November 7, 2016).

Along with the communications tool of the RoCK being officially placed at the top of the command structure in Kandahar, the consolidation of the Canadian communications side was well underway following the Manley Report. As Doug told me, “we consolidated Afghanistan-related content on a single website onto which we incorporated interactive elements and more videos and photos from
the field” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). As WOG was ramping up post-Manley, so too was the ability to convey a positive-leaning narrative of collaboration to the Canadians at home and in theatre.

The launch of the three Signature Projects and the six Priorities for Afghanistan were tied to the increased communications push, as well as the development and release of the Quarterly Reports to Parliament. In addition, there was the development of the RANA radio station located in Kingston, Ontario and broadcast to Kandahar and Kabul, increased outreach efforts to academics and influencers, posting of videos and podcasts online, and development of posters, podium covers, pamphlets, backdrops and tableaus all to be displayed at public outreach events and job fairs. All of these efforts were conveyed publicly online through the launch of the WOG website, “Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan”, at \texttt{www.afghanistan.gc.ca}. As Doug recalled to me, “after the initial rush, we started to more proactively push out to media in Canada and abroad, stakeholders, our missions and others on a regular basis; multimedia products, along with stories from the field, interactive maps, videos of technical briefings and so on. We made videos available on the Web (on YouTube for example) and as podcasts through iTunes and other channels” (personal communication, September 19, 2016). In screenshots of the WOG website as it appeared in 2009 that Doug had brought to our interview, he showed the effort that was being placed on providing a positive narrative of collaboration, both visual and written, to the Canadian public about the work being done in Afghanistan. For the communications team, the Quarterly Reports to Parliament became a major aspect of their work, both in conducting the research and writing the documents, and in ensuring that the documents were seen by Canadians at home and in the

\footnote{34 For more detail on these visuals, please refer to Appendix E, where screenshots and photographs of the communications tools can be found.}
field, and broadcast internationally. Ultimately, all of the communications products developed by the team had some public relations lean to them, and focused on conveying a narrative of successful collaboration – yet also telling a story of military success overall.

### 6.1.3.1 The Quarterly Reports to Parliament, Gender Equality, and the Narrative of Security

The Quarterly Reports were the Canadian government’s opportunity to present to parliament, and the Canadian public at large, their perspective on the objectives and projects of the K-PRT, particularly the three Signature Projects and the six Priorities for Afghanistan. Through feminist frame analysis, within the goal of conveying a narrative of collaboration, the Quarterly Reports reveal in their language a continued marginalization of gender equality efforts in favour of using women and children to justify increased militarization and securitization of the K-PRT. This argument has been made by other critical feminist scholars in other areas of Canadian foreign policy, such as the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health put forward by the Harper Conservatives and in Canadian official development assistance (ODA) (Carrier and Tiessen 2013; Swiss 2012). Within the larger goal of conveying the narrative of collaboration through the Quarterly Reports, discussion of gender equality policy and programming remained minimal and was conveyed through language arguing for the “saving the women and children” as a support for increased securitization of the Kandahar region.

In the Quarterly Reports, the communications team demonstrate a concern for security first and foremost, arguing that any WOG collaboration in Afghanistan required securing the area before taking on diplomacy and development projects, and addressing the security concerns of the international community over Afghanistan itself. Indeed, the first Quarterly Report from February
2007 highlighted that “the challenges in Afghanistan are complex and diverse. The security situation will continue to be challenging. Political, social and economic development will be difficult until there is more stability and security” (Government of Canada 2007, 5). The Quarterly Report further highlights that “Canada’s objectives – like those of the Afghan government and our international partners – are focused firmly on the longer term and the future. We believe in the Afghan people and in their desire to have a country where security, development and good governance replace the chaos, violence and destitution of the past” (Government of Canada 2007, 5). This dedication to the Afghan people, however, is underscored by the security threat Afghanistan poses to Canada and its allies, and how this threat effects and is received by Canada itself. Securing and developing Afghanistan is not simply an altruistic “humane internationalist” mission by Canada, but an assurance that inhabitants of Afghanistan will not return to countries in the West with acts of terrorism (Black 2014). The Quarterly Report stresses its obligation in this regard: “we have a responsibility to inform Canadians – those who serve on the front lines in Afghanistan, who establish the security and provide aid and development assistance, and the Canadian public at large – of the results of our military, diplomatic, development and reconstruction efforts. Canadians want to know whether there is progress being made and how we measure that progress. They have a right to know” (Government of Canada 2007, 5–6).

This narrative is interesting, as previous critical feminist research on this topic has highlighted that Canada places itself in a paternalistic, patriarchal relationship with Afghanistan (Turenne Sjolander 2013; Turenne Sjolander and Trevenen 2011). Beyond Canada’s commitments to the K-PRT and the people of Afghanistan, is Canada’s promise to its Western allies that it would do its part to protect the world from these barbaric “others” who dwell in this conflict-ridden part of the world (Turenne Sjolander 2013). Turenne Sjolander (2013, 249) has identified this Othering
of the Afghan people in many of Prime Minister Harper’s speeches, noting that “through these portrayals, Afghan women and children have no agency; they are constructed as backward and subjugated, in need of rescue from Canadian (Western) men.” This conceptualization, first identified by Chandra Mohanty in 1984, also brings to light the Western world’s patronizing binary view of the “Third World” as a place of ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized women, who are seen in opposition to the educated, independent, and empowered Western woman (Turenne Sjolander 2013, 249). This understanding naturally requires that men in the Third World, and in Afghanistan, be “consistently painted as devoid of humanity and, as a result, as somehow subhuman, or even non-human. They stand as the antithesis of progress and development (at least, as these are defined in Canada and the West)” (Turenne Sjolander 2013, 250). Throughout the Quarterly Reports, this is where Canada makes the connection to gender, or more specifically to the victimhood of Afghan women and children, regarding its WOG role in Kandahar.

Liam Swiss (2012, 135) has argued that there has been a “securitization” of Canadian aid, and that “it has been conducted at the expense of other development objectives in Canada’s aid program, including its nearly thirty-five-year focus on women’s rights and gender equality.” This argument reflects the position of this dissertation on the hegemony of militarized masculinity in Canada’s WOG approach, and the argument that such hegemony construes militarized collaborative responses to state fragility as normal and necessary, and all other gendered constructs – most notably women and femininity – as submissive and extraneous to effective collaboration.35

35 More recent arguments by Swiss and Barry (2017) suggest that coding of development projects and funds by the Canadian government reveal that a securitization did not in fact occur, and that funds earmarked for gender-integrated and gender-standalone work remained steady through the Harper Conservative years. However, the authors recognize that their dataset is purely quantitative, and would benefit from further qualitative analysis of document content regarding project documentation. Though, their research does suggest that internal resistance to political changes in project coding is possible, and presents an interesting avenue for further qualitative research.
In discussing the work of Canada’s WOG approach as seen in the K-PRT, the 2007 Quarterly Report makes clear the necessity of the large number of military troops stationed in Kandahar to protect the program:

The environment in which our troops and personnel are working is extremely difficult and dangerous. The insurgents, with their methods of violence and terror, are present throughout the area. They seek ruthlessly and relentlessly to disrupt all efforts toward achieving normalcy and progress. They do this through violence and intimidation, including by attacking Afghan government officials, labourers, teachers, women and children. (Government of Canada 2007, 8)

Furthermore, subsequent Quarterly Reports highlight an ever-expanding presence of foreign troops in the region (Government of Canada 2009b). Discussion of gender is relegated to the victimized bodies of Afghanistan’s women and children. Moreover, the mention of government officials, labourers, and teachers alongside this distinction suggests the extraneous view of Afghan women by the Canadian government – their identities are as women and children, and not as defined by their professions or other community and societal roles. From this reading, it is apparent that the narrative of Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar conveys a need to rescue and protect what it considered to be the vulnerable and helpless female and youth demographics. In the September 2008 Quarterly Report, the Canadian government stated this explicitly as part of its list of priorities and benchmarks through to 2011 and the end of Canada’s leadership of the K-PRT. Under the priority in which Canada pledges to “provide humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons,” Afghan women are singled out as among those with the most chronic disadvantages (Government of Canada 2008b, 6).
Throughout the Quarterly Reports, it was commonly highlighted that Canada made renewed financial commitments to strengthen Afghanistan’s rule of law, including increasing spending on the military and security measures, and improving the prisons in Kandahar. This common reporting highlights the normalization of militarization and the hegemony of militarized masculinity within the K-PRT. The March 2009 Quarterly Report explicitly stated that “improving the rule of law means improving police and prisons. More than that, it means improving Afghanistan’s justice system with more capable judges and lawyers. It means suppressing corruption. And it means enabling the greater exercise of human rights – including the rights of women and girls” (Government of Canada 2009a, 2). As was demonstrated by Swiss (2012) regarding gender equality in Afghanistan and by Carrier and Tiessen (2013) regarding the Conservative harnessing of the Muskoka Initiative, this statement in the report underscores the use of gender equality, specifically the rights of women and girls, as a policy instrument to justify the increase in spending on military and security measures in Kandahar. From a feminist reading, this sort of reasoning displayed to the Canadian public is meant to create a direct and positive connection between militarization and securitization and the human rights of Afghan women and girls.

One can view the reporting on literacy programs in the Quarterly Reports as an example of how they demonstrate a narrative of collaboration that also supports the hegemony of militarized masculine power. In the June 2009 Quarterly Report, the Canadian government highlights that progress was made in “literacy training for Afghan National Police; vocational training; and approval of a $1.5-million skills-for-employment project at the Kandahar Technical School, an initiative to develop market-relevant skills among young men and women” (Government of Canada 2009b, 6). As part of the Signature Projects, most of Canada’s money continued to go to
building and repairing the pledged fifty schools, but a good portion of the allocated funds also went to the Afghan National Police, a security-based and military-trained Afghan institution. Any funds for women were mentioned as an addition, and reported as external to the normal operations of Canada’s WOG approach. Later in 2009, the Canadian government reported increased funding for the creation and training of a new group of women officers to guard female inmates at Kandahar City’s Sarpoza prison (Government of Canada 2009c, 7). As noted earlier in the chapter, by Swiss (2012), and identified in the priorities examined above, the discussion of increased military spending for women or to benefit women reflects a narrative of collaboration that also seeks to convey to the Canadian public the necessity of militarized WOG approaches in fragile states.

6.2 Conclusion

By 2011, the communications tactics encouraged by the Manley Report and developed and produced by the communications team were being implemented, but in a rather lop-sided way: DND, the CF, and the RCMP were having their stories heard and their wins and struggles shared, but how these stories, wins and struggles connected to the departments that worked on diplomacy or development was not made explicitly clear. Indeed, Task Force Kandahar produced a report from their 2011 Kandahar Lessons Learned Workshop, obtained through ATIP, that highlighted the best practice of embedded media for DND, but noted that the other departments would benefit from a similar program or the ability to tap into the DND program (ATIP Task Force Kandahar 2011, 13). They also noted how certain tendencies and processes from the program favoured military stories over all others: “Media tend to focus on the negative and, as a result, broadcast news agencies frequently demand that their reporters remain on KAF in case there is a ramp
ceremony. There is little video coverage of important stories outside the wire” (ATIP Task Force Kandahar 2011, 13). Moreover, the report recognized:

As demonstrated by DND, an effective communication strategy requires the tools to capture imagery and the freedom to engage the media as events arise. Because the CF has dedicated imagery capability (Combat Camera) and permission to tell their story, “military” stories dominated the press. The other departments have no imagery capability and must go through a complex process for approval to speak to media; as a result their stories were almost unheard. (ATIP Task Force Kandahar 2011, 14)

The ability of the military to not only convey their stories, but to also find affinity from those back home for the stories that can only come from combat missions (such as a soldier’s untimely death), speak to the power of the narrative of war. Moreover, it speaks to the hegemony of militarized masculinity not only in a wartime setting like Kandahar, but in the everyday lives of Canadians waiting to hear news from the K-PRT.

Throughout Canada’s collaborative efforts in Kandahar, from the days of 3D, to WOG, to CA and the takeover by the US, the narrative of collaboration conveyed by the actors in theatre and by the communications tools of the K-PRT also upheld hegemonic masculine power through military tropes, the valuing of military responses, and the politicizing of gender programs targeted at women and girls to place a positive spin on the need for Canada’s expanding military presence and increasing security responses in Kandahar. Within the narrative of collaboration, there existed an underlying assumption that displays of dominant Western militarized masculinity were normal and necessary, and any displays of submissive gendered constructs such as women themselves or more feminine individual and institutional characteristics were seen as abnormal and unnecessary.
to the unfolding of good governance in a fragile province such as Kandahar. Through gendered accounts of interpersonal behaviour that reflect the effects of “soldiering”, a view of Kandahar as inherently militarized, and the official story told by communications specialists and their linguistic and visual tools, the narrative of collaboration in the K-PRT is revealed as one that is also so hypermasculine that it restricts individual behaviour and shapes militarized structures. In the K-PRT, civilian and military actors needed to fit into a military structure, and so accepted and perpetuated a narrative of militarized masculinity that saw women as external, femininity as unnecessary, and militarized masculinity as the only way to survive the dangerous context of Kandahar.
7 Conclusion: Militarization as Best Practice?

Immediately following Canada’s exit from Kandahar in 2011, the Canadian WOG approach was seen as a model to the world. Gammer (2012) noted that in particular, the leadership of Golberg and Thompson as the RoCK had a large impact on the way the approach was delivered, and drew a lot of attention internationally. He highlighted that “in comparison to other NATO members, Canada’s PRTs achieved the highest civilian to military ratio which resulted in more effective engagement. When NATO ratified its Comprehensive Approach at the Bucharest summit of April 2008, many of Canada’s NATO partners expressed interest in learning more about the PRTs established on the ATF’s watch” (Gammer 2012, 8). Yet as has been demonstrated, the militarization of Canada’s WOG approach meant that civilian departments, CIDA in particular, were procedurally and contextually stifled and saw increased militarization themselves. The WOG approach has since become increasingly popular in Canada (and worldwide) as a policy implementation tool, and is used frequently to address complex policy issues, many of which cut across traditional vertical program structures, wherein an increasing number of entities are required to work together for resolution, and often require various types of interventions simultaneously (Mamuji 2012, 209). At an event on the rule of law in WOG approaches to fragile states at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 2016, a former Chief of Staff to the Deputy Minister of the PCO ATF made it clear that fragile states will remain a priority for Canada, and that WOG approaches will continue to be used to address them as they can be tailored to the issue at hand (personal communication, October 26, 2016). The results of the WOG approach in Kandahar, particularly its use of centralized civilian control, coordinated task forces, and the political investment in policy cohesion, continue to be looked upon as lessons – both positive and negative – for future WOG
approaches for Canada’s commitments on the world stage (Buchan 2010, 79; personal communication, October 26, 2016).

Yet the conclusions drawn from this dissertation indicate that Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar, while demonstrably collaborative in the results of the experiment identified above, also ensured in that collaboration the hegemony of masculinity through the legitimization and normalization of militarized civilian responses to state fragility. From the first collaborative design of the 3D approach, in which development, diplomacy, and defence worked side by side with defence taking a de facto lead within the military-designed K-PRT, to the convening of the Manley Panel and the subsequent Report that mandated concentrated civilian leadership through the PCO and a whole-of-government focus on the three Signature Projects and six Priorities for Afghanistan, Canada’s collaborative approach deferred to the might of the military within the wartime context in Kandahar, and permitted the subjugation of long-term, gender equality policy and programming in favour of those which reflected short-term, quick impact military design. A feminist frame analysis, informed by feminist theory that permits the view of gender as a patriarchal hierarchy inclusive of masculinities, femininities, and other intersectional identity markers such as race, class, and ability, revealed this understanding of the case of Canada’s K-PRT. At the outset of this dissertation, I asked: How does the Canadian whole-of-government approach in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, which creates a collaborative environment for civilian and military government departments, permit more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality? From this question, I hypothesized: despite the emphasis on collaboration and the implementation of civilian leadership over the course of Canada’s six years in Kandahar, a critical, post-structural feminist frame analysis will reveal the
increasing militarization of collaboration and the subsequent devaluation of policy on gender equality and women’s empowerment in Canada’s WOG approach.

In Part One of the thesis, the context for why and how this dissertation came to be was laid out. Chapter Two, the literature review, revealed that certain bodies of research on collaboration were insufficient to analyze Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar through a gender lens. Researchers in security studies and international development provided the most convincing theories surrounding how through policy coherence, clear collaborative design, and a concerted attention to power, WOG had the potential to ensure greater access to resources for achieving socially transformative goals (Brown 2012b; Cameron 2016; Patrick and Brown 2007). More specifically, others argued that opportunities arise in collaboration to break down the barriers that impede the construction of balanced relationships between government organizations, particularly the relationships developed between civilian and military groups (Ball and Febbraro 2011; Nossal 2011; Vavro and Roy, 2011). Still others stressed that comprehensive approaches work best when they are based on a solid knowledge of local societal networks, a high degree of flexibility and an ability to work in a non-linear fashion, and draw on a wide and varying knowledge base that is financially supported and can be efficiently utilized when required (Nossal 2011; Roy 2011). What this study added to this literature was a feminist, post-structural lens with which to explore how the power dynamics within collaborative governance often followed gendered lines, swaying toward the hegemony of militarized and corporate forms of masculinity that dictate how and for whom money is spent, which knowledge is the most valuable, and which social networks hold the most political clout to move a partnership forward.

Through this lens informed by critical, post-structural feminist theory, Chapter Two turned its attention to gendered power, and the understanding of gendered hierarchies inherent in
institutions (both public and private) that reflect hegemonic masculinity, and identified that research from international development and security studies could be harnessed to better understand the case of Canada’s K-PRT through a gender-sensitive lens. In Chapter Three, the exploration of feminist methodology revealed why it is important to examine cases on collaborative public administration from a gender perspective, as an understanding of gender includes all facets and intersections of identity, from masculinities to femininities, and the K-PRT reflected a political need to implicate women and gender equality in order to encourage departmental collaboration. Moreover, the chapter demonstrated how the method of feminist frame analysis allowed me to reveal certain gendered contexts, structures and narratives that shaped Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar.

Part Two of the thesis took a magnifying glass, framed in gender, to the case of Canada’s K-PRT. I considered the case of the K-PRT from its 3D beginnings in late 2005 to its WOG and CA ending in early 2011, identifying its transformative moments in the 2005 IPS and the 2008 Manley Report, as well as the emphasis on official communication through such tools as the Quarterly Reports to Parliament. In this section, I identified three major discursive frames in the broader narrative of the Canada’s WOG approach: 1) the policy context of the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach as a process defined and reinforced on the world stage; 2) the institutionalized WOG structure that the K-PRT both was framed by and helped redesign; and 3) the narrative of collaboration that was both supported by and informed the broader structure and context of the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach. In each of these discursive frames, the hegemony of masculinity worked to a) legitimize the militarization of collaboration within the K-PRT and instrumentalize women and conceptualizations of gender; b) uphold the might of the military and its processes, and reinforce the exceptionalism of women and conceptualizations of
gender; and c) encourage an official gendered narrative that holds Western, militarized masculinity as dominant, normal and necessary, and all other gendered constructs (civilian, femininity, the Afghan other) as submissive, unnecessary and extraneous.

In Chapter Four, I investigated the policy context within which the K-PRT is situated, and explored the gendered policy outcomes of hegemonic masculinity for Canada’s WOG approach. Through a discursive study of international regulations on WOG, civ-mil and civ-pol cooperation, the role and positionality of development and gender policy, and the narrative of militarized masculinity as a prerequisite for civilian personnel, I presented a response to the research question that militarization of the WOG approach in Kandahar is legitimized, and that the role and positionality of women and other gendered conceptualizations are instrumentalized in support of that legitimization. In Chapter Five, I investigated the WOG structure of the K-PRT, and the effect hegemonic masculinity has on the framing of Canada’s collaborative approach. By discursively analyzing the division of responsibility of the major Canadian departmental players in Kandahar, the focus on gender parity, or “equality between women and men” by the military, the conflation of “women” with “gender” and the sidelined priority of gender equality policy and programming, I presented the response that a power imbalance occurs where the division of leadership favours military might and militarization, and reinforces the exceptionalism of women and other gendered conceptualizations. In Chapter Six, I addressed the narrative of collaboration that has existed throughout the lifespan of the Canadian K-PRT, and investigated the ways hegemonic masculinity normalizes militarization in collaboration. Through a discursive reading of the Afghan wartime context, the Western gendered language of war and its communication through official Canadian reporting channels, and the narrative of women, girls and children as passive victims of insurgency and Afghan masculinity, I presented the argument that Western militarized masculinity is
construed as dominant and necessary, and all other gendered constructs within the collaborative approach are seen as submissive and extraneous to the hegemonic masculine status quo. Overall, following the prompt of the research question and the guidance of the hypothesis, I presented the conclusion that the K-PRT and Canada’s WOG approach was constituted by and supported the hegemony of militarized masculinity resulting in the sidelining of gender equality policy and programming.

Given that Canada’s WOG approach has become a lesson for the world and will continue to be used in various designs on issues of international importance going forward, what lessons can be drawn from the case of the K-PRT? Researchers like Buchan (2010, 79) and Saideman (2014, 63-64) point to three broad lessons from a collaborative and military perspective: first, for civilians and military personnel to operate well on the ground, civil-military coordination needs to be attended to at the highest levels of government, through a person or a body that has both meaningful authority and a degree of impartiality, such as a Prime Ministerial appointee or a designate from the PCO, or similar. For these researchers, this recommendation comes from the fact that “stovepiped” departments do not coordinate or cooperate well, and solutions such as the designation of a RoCK and the development of the three Signature Projects and six Priorities helped to mitigate these stovepipes. Second, internal issue-specific structures such as interdepartmental coordinating committees focused on a particular mission work to promote frequent civ-mil and civ-pol cooperation, and can help foster a unified perspective (Buchan 2010, 79). Bodies like the Afghanistan Pakistan Task Force within CIDA and the PCO’s ATF would qualify as structures that enhance unification on policy issues, and the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) housed in GAC is a more recent example (Saideman 2014, 63-64). Third, civilians in collaboration with the military must be thought of differently: it would
be prudent to plan for military responses and train civilian partners in advance, simply because of the fact that militaries have reserves of redundancies ready to deploy at any time, whereas civilian departments have minimal available staff and require greater investment into the training of their employees to go on militarized expeditions (Saideman 2014, 63-64). These recommendations, however, reflect a critical view of Canada’s WOG approach with the K-PRT that does not apply a gender-sensitive lens.

For these researchers, from a collaborative and military perspective overall, “at the strategic and political level, the whole of government approach being taken with respect to Afghanistan does not offer a real template for future civil-military missions” (Buchan 2010, 79). Indeed, Saideman (2014, 63-64) notes that because Afghanistan is one of the poorest, most corrupt countries in the world, “the nature of the context and of the effort makes it very hard to measure progress”. Yet when a feminist lens is applied, attuned to the intricacies of gender and the hegemony of militarized masculinity within Canada’s collaborative approaches, what the case of the K-PRT does do is offer a magnifying glass into the issues that militarized masculinity present us when attempting to coordinate the military with civilian outfits such as the militarization of the development and diplomacy arms of the Canadian government and the sidelining of gender equality policy and programming. For development practitioners attuned to gender and to the needs of the local community, as Wajmah was, this lens is integral, as it points to whether they should enter the region at all: “I understand that security and counterinsurgency work is important, and if I know that in such a place I can’t change anything, can’t access the population, I wouldn’t go there” (personal communication, July 7, 2016). Wajmah recognized that engaging with a community in Kandahar through the military would not foster trust, and as a woman working with
a Western military, she would have a very slim chance of reaching the male elders of a community in the hope of contacting the women and children.

The effect of hegemonic masculinity in Kandahar was such that those who were “gendered” – the development practitioners, the women, the men engaged in civilian activities perceived to be feminine – were hyper-aware of how difficult it was to get their work done. For Wajmah, she told me that as a woman raising issues of gender equality usually with other women in Kandahar, she could rarely find success, and realistically, there was a need for male actors well versed in gender to bring awareness and affect change amongst the men (personal communication, July 7, 2016). Jane recounted a story to me, near the end of her time in Kandahar, where a male Afghan elder stood in front of the provincial health representative for Kandahar, who had the support of the Canadian development contingent, and asked for more medical facilities and clinics for the women in his community (personal communication, July 8, 2015). She was thrilled; she recalled:

What that demonstrated to me, it was evidence that the engagement strategy that we had, which was to work at the community level and have our soldiers go in and sit down and have tea with these community elders and talk to them, establish trust and build relationships and by so doing, influence what they saw as their development priorities, had worked. That’s mission accomplished! (Personal communication, July 8, 2015)

Being able to see “gender” in men, to see a transformation of masculine perspectives in the local population or to see men step forward and push for the amelioration of gender inequality in the difficult, militarized context of Kandahar, represented the highest of expectations for development practitioners working on gender equality.
Ultimately, the view of Canada’s collaborative approach in Kandahar as a beacon of best practice has fallen out of favour amongst academics, practitioners, and government personnel alike. Many of these critics came to recognize that the model presented by the K-PRT is not well adapted to other cases of state fragility, given the uniquely militarized nature of Kandahar. Indeed, Baranyi and Paducel argued in 2012 that the effectiveness and securitization of aid varied significantly across the very different Canadian WOG examples of the time (Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan), with the most highly securitized and least aid effective example being Afghanistan, primarily due to its deeply war-affected context. In 2016, Baranyi and Khan noted in an expanded study of fragile and conflict-affected states that Canada’s involvement can be characterized as existing along a spectrum of development-security relationships that runs from complete securitization at one end to consistent conflict sensitivity at the other, with no two examples of collaboration reflecting the same outcomes. This recognition seemed to reach those in power in Ottawa as well, as following the end of Canada’s role in Kandahar, many of Canada’s other WOG cases were placed under review. As reported by Baranyi and Khan (2016, 248), beginning in 2012, Canada scaled down its aid program in Afghanistan, in line with the reduction of Western forces on the ground; it announced a freeze on new Canadian aid to Haiti in January 2013, pending a review of the apparently slim development results on the ground; and around the same time, then Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird declared that Canada would not be dragged into “another Afghanistan” in Mali (see Murray 2013), while development programming in Pakistan and Sudan, as well as the West Bank and Gaza, were also placed under review.

With the transition from the Harper Conservative government to the Trudeau Liberal government in 2015, the view of Canada’s WOG commitments in Kandahar as a reference point for future collaborative governance design had virtually disappeared from official discourse,
particularly surrounding policy related to gender equality and women’s empowerment. The differences between the two governments are striking in many aspects, including the Trudeau government placing increased importance on evidence-based policy making and its commitment to support UN peace operations, peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts (Baranyi and Khan 2016, 250). It is also relevant to mention the repeated commitments made to feminist principles by the Trudeau Liberals, such as achieving gender parity in the Cabinet in 2015, and in 2017, the release of the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), the announcement of the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peacekeeping, and the updated National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP). In these latest commitments, there is no mention of Canada’s WOG operations in Afghanistan as a positive example for cross-departmental collaboration, even with the new C-NAP citing its commitment to WOG principles in its application of the UN WPS Agenda (Global Affairs Canada 2017a, 2017b; Trudeau 2017). Despite Afghanistan no longer being lauded as a best practice, the hegemony of hypermasculinity and militarization within the Canadian collaborative approach remain a concern going forward, as Canada continues to identify collaborative governance approaches like the WOG approach as the best way to address the myriad issues that face fragile and conflict-affected states. This dissertation suggests that the consideration of the policy designs, management structures and narrative makeup of the case of the K-PRT through a gender lens should be acknowledged as a broader warning regarding the applicability of collaborative governance approaches beyond the particular context of Kandahar. In other words: a gender lens is necessary to highlight how easy it is for WOG and other collaborative forms of governance to be co-opted by the hegemony of hypermasculinity in instances where collaboration exists in highly militarized contexts.
What has become evident through research following the end of Canada’s WOG commitments in Kandahar is that despite a noted decrease in the securitization of aid through collaborative approaches to governance in other Canadian examples (Haiti, Sudan, Pakistan, Mali, Ethiopia, Bangladesh), there is still evidence that those areas affected most seriously by violent conflict, insurgency, and war (Afghanistan, the West Bank and Gaza) are more likely to see securitization and even militarization of development processes (Baranyi and Khan 2016; Brown 2016). Further gender-based research on these examples of the Canadian collaborative approach in action would be beneficial to our understanding of the hegemony of masculinity and the influence of militarism and militarization of civilian responses to state fragility. The grand lesson that can be gleaned from Canada’s WOG approach in Kandahar, when viewed through a gender-sensitive lens, reflects the hope of the development practitioners interviewed here: in the conscious uncoupling of men, masculinity, and militarism. As Cynthia Enloe (2000a, 10) has articulated, “a militarizing maneuver can look like a dance, not a struggle, even though the dance might be among unequal partners”. The effect of militarization and the power of hegemonic masculinity is that it is subtle, hidden from the frame of “gender”, and often unconscious: like Enloe’s metaphor of a dance, in which two partners, often unequal, work in tandem through non-verbal cues to reach an equilibrium and a structure that maintains the flow of movement with the music. Within the K-PRT, the equilibrium reached reflected the militarization of civilian departments and individuals in an attempt to design a collaborative approach that was efficient and effective. What resulted was a militarizing maneuver that pushed gender equality policy and programming off the dance floor. When the frame of gender is used to illuminate the dance of militarization, when the normalization of militarization is drawn into view, there is a chance that those most indoctrinated can begin to reposition themselves, retrain their feet and hands, and learn new dance steps that
work to disrupt and dismantle the gendered hierarchies inherent in militarized contexts. Collaborative approaches like the Canadian WOG approach do have the theoretical potential of permitting space for transformational gender equality policy and programming, as long as it is recognized that they harbour power relations and demonstrate discourses that favour hegemonic masculinity in their policy, structure, and narrative. Then we can begin to frame collaboration from a place that recognizes that hegemonic masculinity has the strength to tip the power scales, and conceptualize the design of an approach that adds weight to gender equality.
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Heather A. Smith, and Deborah Stienstra, eds. *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.


Appendices

Appendix A

Feminist Frame Analysis Search Terms

For publicly accessible written documents and ATIPs with the Government of Canada.

Category: Gender
Terms:
“gender”
“women”
“woman”
“girl”
“girls”
“children”
“equality”

Category: Kandahar
Terms:
“Afghanistan”
“collaboration”
“comprehensive”
“comprehensive approach”
“CA”
“whole of government”
“whole-of-government”
“WOG”
“Provincial Reconstruction Team”
“PRT”
“military”
“security”
“insurgency”
“war”
“RoCK”
“Representative of Canada in Kandahar”
“KAF”
“Kandahar Airfield”
Appendix B

Relevant ATIP Requests for the Dissertation

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<th>Number</th>
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<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Number of Pages Disclosed</th>
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<td>2.</td>
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<td>A-2011-00291</td>
<td>Lists of briefing notes prepared for, or submitted to, the Minister responsible for CIDA from September 1, 2011, to date (October 17, 2011)</td>
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<td>A-2011-00292</td>
<td>All documents showing cost of staffing and other cost for the creation of the Afghanistan Working Group at CIDA.</td>
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<td>Records regarding Canada's position and/or decision to participate militarily in Afghanistan. Specifically, records that include Canada-US relations and interdepartmentally with DND. Timeframe: September 19 to 26, 2001.</td>
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<td>A-2011-00543</td>
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<td>A-2012-00065</td>
<td>Several request for Memos to President: T-20108 Afghanistan Program Evaluation; T-21585 Engagement in Afghanistan post - 2014; T-21319 Review of the fourteenth and final progress report on Canada's engagement in Afghanistan (July to December 2011).</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>A-2012-00215</td>
<td>CIDA Doc#19573-EMMAP Afghanistan Country Strategy Options</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>A-2012-00627</td>
<td>A list of all memos prepared for the Minister of International Cooperation, from December 1st, 2007 to September 30th, 2010.</td>
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<td>A-2012-00733</td>
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<td>Obtain complete copy of QP notes and memorandums - D0303W2012 INFORMATION - Requested updates and briefings on CIDA's Programming in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>A-2012-00197</td>
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<td>Post-project reviews and audits for the Kandahar Rapid Village Development Plan and also, documents outlining the decision making process for any proposed project renewal.</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>A-2013-00002</td>
<td>All of CIDA's reporting activities, regarding this monitoring and due diligence on the ground in the five countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Mali, Sudan, and Tanzania).</td>
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Hello, my name is Sarah Tuckey, and I am a PhD Candidate in Public Administration at the University of Ottawa, studying under the direction of Dr. Claire Turenne Sjolander. I am conducting research on the presence of gender equality policy and programming in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (K-PRT) from 2005 to 2011, and I am interested in speaking with you about your personal experience working on any programs, projects, or policy documents that pertained to gender equality in the K-PRT.

As an interview participant, you will meet with me privately to share a conversation about your experiences working on the K-PRT. The meetings will last from 30 minutes to two hours, depending on how our discussion progresses. I will ask some questions in a semi-structured manner in order to guide the interview, however I encourage you to speak freely with me about your experiences working on gender equality issues pertaining to the K-PRT. You can choose to share as little or as much as you wish, as your confidentiality is guaranteed. Your name will never be used within the research or any publications that may result, and any identifying factors (such as names of colleagues, specific locations, or other personal identifiers) will be changed.

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your participation in this study.

Sarah Tuckey

Sarah Tuckey
PhD Candidate, Public Administration
School of Political Studies
University of Ottawa
Appendix D

Interview Guide

Goal departments: 1) the Department of National Defence, 2) the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 3) the former Canadian International Development Agency, 4) the Department of Justice, 5) Correctional Services Canada, 6) Status of Women Canada, 7) the Department of Finance Canada, and 8) the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Target roles: Desk officers, Directors, and Directors General. If necessary, access to Assistant Deputy Ministers will be attained when information on policy development and implementation initiatives is required.

Questions: (open-ended; discreet; to be asked after rapport is built)

1. What projects were you tasked with working on as part of the Kandahar PRT? Please explain them in detail. Did you work on any gender equality projects? 
   GOAL: looking for mention of gender equality and its level of priority.

2. Did you collaborate on any gender equality projects with other departments involved in the Kandahar PRT? Did the collaboration hinder or help your work? Why? 
   GOAL: exploring the benefit of a whole-of-government approach to gender equality work.
3. How important was gender equality in the day-to-day discussions surrounding your department's work on the Kandahar PRT? Did you consider gender equality to be an important priority in your work?

GOAL: assessing the level of importance given to gender equality within the daily operations of the managing departments of the Kandahar PRT.

4. Please describe your personal experience of working on collaborative gender equality projects or programs related to the Kandahar PRT. Do you feel that you were making progress on gender equality in your work?

GOAL: looking for effectiveness of the whole-of-government approach on gender equality in the Kandahar PRT operations.

What do I want to know?

- Validation of documentary analysis
- Personal reflection on experiences of stakeholders in the various government departments in control of the Kandahar PRT
- Evidence of gender equality as a deliberate forethought in the programs and projects of the Kandahar PRT
- To identify if gender equality issues experienced overlap between whole-of-government departments
- What gender equality meant in each department/project of the Kandahar PRT
- What gender equality projects looked like/what gender equality aspects looked like within other projects
- How whole-of-government processes and principles aided or hindered gender equality work
Appendix E

Examples of Communications Visuals

Used for the Launch of the Three Signature Projects and the Six Priorities for Afghanistan
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<th>Media Centre</th>
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<td>Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada</td>
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<td>One Canadian soldier killed in an explosive device strike</td>
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<td>Canada Announces $12 Million in Additional Support for Rule of Law in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Background: Canada’s Support of the Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>Exhibit on Canadian mission in Afghanistan to be on display at the Red River Exhibition</td>
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<td>Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada</td>
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<td>Statement by the Minister of National Defence on the death of Private Alexandre Pelquin</td>
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<td>Minister Oda Launches National Tour of Exhibit on Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Media Advisory: Minister Oda to Address the Federation of Canadian Municipalities</td>
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<td>Fourth Quarterly Report on Afghanistan Released</td>
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<td>2 June 2009</td>
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Appendix F

Social Sciences and Humanities REB Certificate of Ethics Approval

Certificate of Ethics Approval
Social Science and Humanities REB

Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claire</td>
<td>Tureene-Sjolander</td>
<td>Social Sciences / Political Science</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sarah</td>
<td>Tockey</td>
<td>Social Sciences / Political Science</td>
<td>Student Researcher</td>
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File Number: 10-14-04

Type of Project: PhD Thesis

Title: Gender and Canada’s Whole-of-Government Approach: the Integration of Gender Equality in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team

Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy) | Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy) | Approval Type
01/20/2015                  | 01/19/2016               | Is

(Ex: Approval, Ih: Approval for initial stage only)

Special Conditions / Comments:
N/A