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NL-339 (r. 82/08)
THE NOTION OF HISTORICITY IN HEIDEGGER

by Kwasi Agyemang

Thesis presented to the Department of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Ottawa, Ontario, 1983

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In this thesis, I have tried to interpret the notion of historicity in Heidegger. However, I did not initially begin the thesis with this attempt in mind. Rather, it was arrived at in the course of my research. My initial attempt was directed as constructing and showing the unity of Heidegger's thought -- a controversial matter which has been, and still is, the centre of dispute among Heideggerian scholars -- by using his notion of historicity. But as research progressed, it soon became clear to me that Heidegger's notion of historicity itself cannot be taken for granted. Therefore it must first be delineated. With that done, I can use it to construct and show the unity of Heidegger's thought.

But the problem of interpreting Heidegger's notion of historicity undoubtedly amounts to interpreting Heidegger's entire preoccupation with his hermeneutics of the meaning of Being. In other words, Heidegger's philosophical concern with the meaning of Being became my prime and major concern too, since his interpretation of the meaning of Being is, in my view, nothing but an interpretation of the historicity of Being. In view of this, my prime and major concern in the thesis came to be directed at interpreting the notion of historicity in Heidegger.

At the same time, however, I did not give up my initial attempt, which was aimed at constructing and showing the unity of Heidegger's thought by taking recourse to his notion of historicity even though it came to assume a secondary and
Four. Chapter Three examines Being's toponymies, and Chapter Two talks about man's ontological facticities, while Chapter One serves as an introduction to the issues with which the thesis is concerned. Chapter Six is the last one, and it meditates on the entire work; so there are six chapters in all.

To restate my aims in the thesis, there are two of them -- a major one and a minor one. The major aim is to interpret Heidegger's notion of historicity. The minor one is to use Heidegger's notion of historicity -- having been interpreted -- to show the unity of Heidegger's thought.
minor role, and Chapter Five deals with it.

In view of these two attempts, the thesis has two objectives which it aims to accomplish -- a major objective and a minor one -- with the former being an interpretation of Heidegger's notion of historicity, and the latter, a construction and demonstration of the unity of Heidegger's thought by taking recourse to his notion of historicity. Historicity itself has been interpreted here as an event of "self-becoming" in that Being simultaneously unconceals itself in beings and conceals itself from them, but it happens in both the determination of the temporalization of time, and also in the need and use both Being and Time make of man in and by whom both Being and Time respectively come to be what they already are. In other words, historicity is that event in and through which Being presences itself in the determination of Time, and Time extends itself in the determination of Being. But both happen in, through and by man, of whom both stand in need and make use in historicizing their respective nature -- Time temporalizing the unity of its three ecstases in the historicity of Being, and Being historicizing its self-unconcealing self-concealing nature in the temporalization of Time. In short, man brings Being and Time to become the self each, in its own nature, already is, and he, in so doing, brings himself to be the self he already is. Thus, the historicity of Being, or of man, or of Time's self-temporalization, is co-present with, and co-affective with, the rest. This co-historicizing of Being, Time and man is dealt with in Chapter
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Very often, if not always, many good people and institutions generally offer their help in the preparation of even a meagre dissertation. In my case, I got both; and by way of personal acknowledgement, I wish to thank the Universities of Ottawa and Saint Paul for letting me use their institutions.

For personal direction, I must thank Professor Yvon Lafrance for introducing me to the Greek world, and Professor Jerzy A. Wojciechowski for his ecology of knowledge and philosophy of culture. Their personal friendship and advice have helped me greatly. Most of all, however, I am dearly grateful to my thesis Supervisor, Professor David Carr, without whom this thesis would have been impossible. Also, I wish to thank Professor Benoit Garceau, my thesis advisor, whose helpful suggestions also helped me.

All in all, however, I am alone responsible, and therefore solely to be held for whatever the thesis contains.
CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Kwasi Agyemang was born on September 16, 1947 in Ghana. He began his university education in Hamburg Universität, West Germany, but finished at York University where he received his Bachelor of Arts Honours degree with concentration in Philosophy in 1976. He received his Master of Arts degree in Philosophy from the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, in 1978, and Licentiate in Philosophy from the University of Saint Paul, Ottawa.
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PREFACE

Man and History

History is profoundly human. Only man, as opposed to other beings, is intrinsically and distinctively historical. History's human ipseity and exclusivity illuminate man's obsessive preoccupation with the old, as manifested in his perennial concern with such historical matters as archeology, philology, paleontology, etc., and even stories or chronicles.

That history is as human as the converse is a critical concern, but only to the extent that history is characterized as "...the general concatenation of human actions, considered as much in their execution as in their products (institutions and cultural forms) insofar as they are grouped into detachable connected ensembles called civilizations."¹

Thus characterized, history may be submitted to two types of examinations: that of the objective science of history, that is, historiology (*Geschichtswissenschaft*), and the philosophical type. From the standpoint of the former, efforts

are bent on reconstituting, as objectively as possible, the unfolding of past significant human activities as embodied in civilization, tradition, customs, documentations, in short in all forms of Bildung and Paideia. From the point of view of the latter, there are, further, two perspectives -- the speculative approach to philosophy of history and the critical approach.

According to the speculative approach to philosophy of history, there is, in human beings, a transcendent dimension with respect to history and it is only on this level that personal destiny can receive true meaning and content; further, the history of individual existence is totally absorbed in the universal history of the transcendent totality. Such a speculative view of history poses itself as being part of a larger concern which constitutes human history teleologically, eschatologically, universally as pregnant with meaning and purposes. Here, we are dealing with a philosophy of history which is at once and identically: metaphysics, interpretation of the absolute; ontology, interpretation of Being; theology, interpretation of the Being of God; anthropology, interpretation of the Being of man; logic, developed system of the constitutive categories of reality; (and of reality insofar as absolute); and philosophy of history, interpretation of the meaning (sens) of history (in its two-fold sense of significance and direction) and of its Being. 2

In the critical approach to philosophy of history, it is contended that the focus must be on the clarification of the nature of the historian's inquiry, and also of the

2. Ibid., p. 7.
concepts and fundamental beliefs historians use to do history. The critical direction is drawn parallel to philosophy of science to the effect that philosophical investigation into the affairs of historians and history -- like "positivism" -- is believed to, and must, be "scientific," not "metaphysical," in its search for a way -- approach and method -- to clarify, criticize and analyze the basic beliefs and concepts historians employ in their inquiry. Put differently, the critical direction to philosophy of history operates on the conviction that there are as much general concepts, beliefs, and laws embodied in, and governing, the regularity of historians' attempts to reconstitute significant human past actions. This is due to the recognition and acceptance that the way by which Homo historicus is studied by historians, could be made parallel to or modelled after the way philosophers of science do theirs respecting scientists and science. Committed to, and following such a conviction, critical philosophers of history impose upon themselves such science-related questions as: "Can history be objective?"3 "How does the historian explain the past?" What is the relationship of history to the natural sciences?"4 and many more.

But despite all that, and all the various ways by which history is studied (in historiography or science of history,


4. Ibid.
speculative, critical, materialist approaches, or even chronicle), all work on the fundamental fact that man, and man alone, is exclusively and intrinsically historical in his being. Every perspective on history by which Homo historicus is studied, affirms the irrevocable fact of historical exclusivity of human existence.

Therefore, that man in his very being is uniquely and intrinsically historical is unequivocal, but why and how is this so? In what respect, in what manner and whence does man attain his exclusive existential historicality? Viewed from its ground, what is history at all? What is the basis and element of history? Out of what ground do the roots of—and through them—all the variegated views of history receive their foundation and animation?

Undoubtedly, these are pressing questions in answer to which human existence itself must, first, be made an issue; then it must be penetrated to uncover the grounds from which it obtains its exclusive historicality. But such an endeavour leads one straight into what Heidegger calls Geschichtlichkeit. For Heidegger's notion of historicity addresses itself, among other issues, to such concerns and explorations as those raised above. What Heidegger says about history, therefore, necessitates, in my view, paying critical attention to the issues he raises.

5. The words history, historicity and historicity are used here without explanation, although the context in which each is used makes them quite understandable and meaningful. Yet more shall be said about their respective technical senses in the context in which each is employed so as to render each more clearer, especially in Chapter Six.
The Need for an Inquiry into the Notion of Historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) in Heidegger

In the Heideggerian corpus, historicity -- of the leading concepts -- is the least researched and articulated. Philosophically speaking, this is very serious indeed. For its fundamental importance in Heidegger undoubtedly commands critical attention.

In most of the English-speaking world, the worst even prevails. The need for serious research into Heidegger's notion of historicity itself is even made beside the point. For, firmly convinced that the sole legitimate problems into which philosophy of history ought to probe seriously are those raised by the critical theories about history, most English-speaking philosophers of history are too quickly committed to the belief that speculative theories about history must be denigrated. Concomitant with such a sustained belief is the suspicious look often taken at a theory such as Heidegger's that purports to be foundational. To them, this is another piece of "metaphysics" of history; therefore, it is another piece of historical anathema and obsolete obscurantism.

Among "friends" of speculative philosophy of history, and even Heideggerians, a similar lack of serious research

6. A history of this is well provided for in Prof. Walsh's Introduction; see his Philosophy of History (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 11-29. Prof. Nash also observes that "the tendency in contemporary discussions of philosophy of history is to bypass the speculative concerns of the classical philosophers of history..." Nash, p. xi.
into Heidegger's notion of historicity prevails, although for different reasons. This, in my view, is predominantly owing to the "impossible" language and the peculiar mode of thinking Heidegger employs in presenting his thoughts on \textit{Geschichtlichkeit}. The language, especially in his later works, is poetic and metaphoric. His mode of thinking is, to use Professor Erasmus Schöfer's expression,\textsuperscript{7} "figura etymologica" "metalogical forms of neologisms and linguistic specialities." On account of this, doubt is often entertained in regard even to the presence of any notion of historicity at all in Heidegger's later works. For history -- that is, Heidegger's \textit{Geschichtlichkeit} -- is enunciated in the elegies and hymns of poets. But this can be deceiving, not to mention how annoying and stifling it appears to some.

Even at places\textsuperscript{8} where Heidegger's notion of historicity is examined, it is mostly confined to \textit{Being and Time}, thus giving the impression that all Heidegger has to say about history finished there. On the contrary, however, Heidegger's entire philosophical preoccupation with the interpretation of the historicity of Being, in which that of man is rooted,

\textsuperscript{7} Erasmus Schöfer, "Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical Specialities" in \textit{On Heidegger and Language}, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 289-293, 296-297, 299-301. (Hereafter cited as Kockelmans, followed by page number(s).)

\textsuperscript{8} An example of what is intended here can be found in, say, Prof. Calvin O. Schrag's paper, "Phenomenology, Ontology and History in the Philosophy of Heidegger," \textit{Revue Internationale de Philosophie}, vol. 44, no. 2 (1958), pp. 117-132.
attains more comprehensive treatment in his later works. Although Heidegger began this interpretation provisionally in *Being and Time*, the rest is done after it. Therefore, a thorough exegesis of his notion of historicity -- that is, the historicity of Being, therefore that of man also, since rooted in it -- must not only accommodate *Being and Time* but must also go beyond it. This is the attempt the thesis mainly undertakes, hoping to provide a comprehensive exegesis of Heidegger's notion of historicity.

This objective was, however, arrived at at a later stage in the course of my research. Initially, all my efforts in composing the thesis had aimed at finding a way to demonstrate the unity of Heidegger's thought, an issue which is currently at stake, and which has been a centre of controversy among Heideggerian scholars, and I planned to do it by using Heidegger's notion of historicity. For Heidegger, for one thing, stopped using the word "Geschichtlichkeit" itself in his later writings, although one finds it to be central in his earlier work *Being and Time*. On account of this, doubt is even entertained as to the presence of historicity itself in Heidegger's later works. For example, "It should be asked [Pöggler writes], does not the word "historicity" -- this leading concept of *Sein und Zeit* disguise the starting point of Heidegger's later work?"[^9]

But, as research progressed, it became more compelling that Heidegger's notion of historicity itself must not be taken

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for granted, but must first be delineated, after which it may be used as a means to show the unity of Heidegger's thought. But this in turn turned out to be more involved, complex and demanding than at first perceived. For it called for a comprehensive examination of Heidegger's entire philosophy which centres on his interpretation of the meaning of Being. In other words, the problem of Heidegger's entire hermeneutics of Being became the main focus of my investigation, thus rendering my initial objective more of a subsidiary issue. For Heidegger's entire hermeneutics of Being is, in my view, an interpretation of the historicity of Being. Thus, in tackling the problem of Heidegger's hermeneutics of Being, the task of the historicity of Being, naturally, became the main objective at which this thesis came to be directed. Faced then with the problem of the historicity of Being, interpreting Heidegger's entire philosophy thus comes to be my principal concern. But I did not, at the same time, give up my initial attempt which was aimed at using Heidegger's notion of historicity to show the unity of Heidegger's thought. Rather, this initial attempt eventually assumed a subsidiary and a minor position. In view of all these, I came to have two objectives – a major and a minor objective -- which the thesis attempts to accomplish. My major aim is to interpret the notion of historicity in Heidegger and the minor one is to use that notion -- thus interpreted and delineated -- to show the unity of Heidegger's thought.
A Construction of Heidegger's Notion of Historicity in His Later Works (Ch. 5); and Its Relevance vis-a-vis "Ontic" Histories (Ch. 6)

Although the principal objective of the thesis eventually came to be an interpretation of Heidegger's notion of historicity, the initial commitment had been to construct and show the unity of Heidegger's thought by using Heidegger's notion of historicity in an attempt to answer either those who prefer to see early and later Heidegger as two different Heideggers, or those who maintain that Heidegger's notion of historicity diffused everywhere in his earlier work, *Being and Time*, somehow got disguised or is at least absent in his later works. This initial commitment now assumes a secondary position, although it is not given up completely. Chapter Five takes up this secondary issue and attempts to construct Heidegger's notion of historicity, but in light of, and in keeping with, those insights Heidegger articulates in *Being and Time*. The provisionality of human historicality (that is, *Being and Time*) is made evident here, although it is complemented by a much higher one, that of Being. This is undertaken in Chapter Five. The plan by which such an endeavour is embarked upon, however, is to interpret those fundamentals that are common and essential to both early and later Heidegger. In other words, Heidegger shows in *Being and Time* that Time is the hidden basis of man's historicity, and it is that which renders possible the unity of man's Existentiality, Facticity and Forfeiture. Existentiality, Heidegger maintains, has its primary meaning in the future, that of facticity is in the having-been. Forfeiture
or Fallingness represents the present as the actual presencing of both existentiality and facticity. Thus, presencing comes as the actual and explicit stretching along (that is, the actual historiciz-ing) of man's existentiality-facticity. These fundamental insights about human existense (that is, human historicity) in early Heidegger are shown to be quite present and reiterated in later Heidegger also but all are couched in poetic expressions. Therefore, they have to be dismantled from Heidegger's interpretation of his favourite poets and also shown to be not only a reiteration of human historicality in Being and Time but also a completion of what was otherwise left provisional there. This attempt of mine is not new, for Father Richardson, in his monumental book on Heidegger, has shown the reiteration of human historicality as enunciated in Being and Time in Heidegger's interpretation of the poets. What I have done, however, is to go beyond just that and show that the provisionality of human historicality in Being and Time, rather, becomes more evident and gains completion also only when situated within the historicity of Being. But this is accomplished in later Heidegger in his interpretation of Hölderlin and Stephan George. Thus, Heidegger is right to say of himself that "...only by way of what Heidegger I (early Heidegger) has thought...does one gain access to what is to be thought by

Heidegger II [later Heidegger]. But the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II. "11 I do not, of course, claim anything in this advancement, even if it is successfully done. My main objective here in Chapter Five is to incorporate into his later works Heidegger's fundamental insights on human historicality unfolded in his earlier works, thereby showing, with his notion of historicity, the unity of thought or of the matter he thinks, in both Heideggers, I and II, or earlier and later. With this much done, the provisionality of Being and Time and its completion in Heidegger's later works, would have been shown, thereby dispelling misgivings often associated with: 1. the unity of thought in the two Heideggers, and 2. the presence of any notion of historicity (diffused everywhere in Being and Time) in Heidegger II.

Heidegger maintains that "to think is to confine yourself to a single thought..."12 and his thought is a "...single pathway bound"13 "...that stands still like a star in the world's sky."14 As little as this may be true of others, this is certainly true of him and this is the belief or assumption with which I approached Heidegger in Chapter Five. Heidegger's own theory of Seinsverständnis teaches that men never do anything without implicitly fore-having, fore-seeing and

11. Ibid., p. xxii.


13. Ibid., p. 3.

fore-conceiving (i.e., future possibilities or "prejudices" for Gadamer) that which gets worked out explicitly, so Heidegger's own philosophy teaches that there is no such thing as presuppositionless approach to doing things (philosophy or otherwise).

Chapter Six is the last one. It conducts a brief summary of what the thesis has attempted to accomplish. In addition, it meditates on the entire work by way of discussing the problem of relevance and significance Heidegger's ontological history -- Geschichtlichkeit -- has vis-a-vis historiology. In sum, there are six chapters in all. Chapter One serves as an introduction to the thesis. Chapter Two deals with the "ontological facticities" in general terms. The toponymies of being are studied in Chapter Three, and Chapter Four exhibits their historicity. Chapter Five talks about Heidegger I and II, and tries to show the unity of Heidegger's thought. Chapter Six meditates on the whole work. Appendix A, "To Kindred Ones" and Appendix B, "Words," can be found at the end of Chapter Six.

Methodology

Naturally, there are several ways to interpret Heidegger. At first, I tried to analyze those fundamental concepts upon which Heidegger depends to do his interpretation of Being, but this proved to be so difficult that I would either have to make him talk nonsense or try some other method. After numerous other attempts, I found out that the best
method for me is to try and listen to what Heidegger himself is saying in his own writings, and to assemble and colligate those that are recurrent, systematic, thematic and most fundamental in his interpretation of what he understands by the nature or truth of Being and how it comes to pass, and the extent to which man and Time become co-players in all these.

After experimenting with argumentative method, I decided it could not help me bring out what it is that Heidegger, in my view, is really saying, or not saying. I tried it but I found myself saying for him what he himself would not say, and I could not also use logical reasoning to invoke deductions about what Heidegger is saying. I have to hear him in his writings because I want to bring out and to light what historicity, for Heidegger, is all about; or what it really is. Although today to ask the question: what is X?, has been declared spurious by other philosophers, I had to ask and search for what Heidegger actually means by the historicity of Being, that is, the presencing of Being unto itself. In this, my own best recourse was to listen attentively to him and dialogue closely with him in order that I be able to interpret, that is, to articulate, what he is really saying in respect of how Being, determined by Time, comes to pass; how Being, in this, takes man with it, and how Ereignis enters into the whole threefold co-

historicizing event of Being, man and Time. For me, the best way to accomplish my mission was the dialogical and expository one.

Through the libraries of St. Paul, Universities of Ottawa, Toronto and York, I have been able to obtain at least all the translated works that are available in English, and most of the untranslated ones which are obtainable; although Heidegger's Gesamtwrke, is, so far as I am aware, still not wholly finished in spite of the fact that several volumes have already been published. Bent wholly on bringing out and into light what Heidegger really means by the historicity of Being, my dialogical and expository method could, naturally, not be critical, if by critical one means exposing what is lacking, wrong and deficient in Heidegger, because this is not my concern at all. I only want to make him clearer as much as I possibly can and in so far as the historicity of Being is concerned. One could, of course, debate him in the light of other philosophers and I tried it where necessary if the course of my work, but I did not make it a habit because I believe that one should better be clear on precisely what Heidegger is saying or not saying before situating him within the context of, e.g., "representationimal thinking" he himself seeks to overcome. If I had anything at all to contribute in the case of Heidegger, my services would have been fruitful if I helped make clearer even a word of what he has been, throughout his philosophical preoccupation, most concerned with, namely the historicity of Being; so
I am extremely ambitious in respect only of trying to bring out and into light what this very word "historicity" means. I want to try to expose it, so to speak, and make clear what it really is for Heidegger, and to this I have, at the expense of other methods, devoted all my attention. Sometimes I have even been repetitive but it is something one can hardly avoid when interpreting Heidegger because his principal theme everywhere is the historicity of Being, and this happens even where he is talking about Art, poetry, Language, man, Time, etc. Thus, what one says about what Heidegger says about Art naturally comes up again when one is talking about, say, man, language or poetry; hence, the advent of repetitiveness. But if this would contribute anything, given which one can be a little bit clearer on what Heidegger is saying about the historicity of Being, then, in my view, it is not completely worthless. This is why I have, to the exclusion of other important methods, adopted a dialogical and expository position, which naturally has its shortcomings; but I am still firmly convinced that it is the best way for me to try to make Heidegger's notion of historicity a bit more clearer. My only wish is to try to bring this notion out and bring it to light. I do not, of course, deny that I would, in isolating this sole grand wish, miss other factors that may be likewise crucial, but I do not want to forfeit or capitulate on it, since that is what I principally want to contribute in the area of Heideggerian studies.
To repeat my objectives in this thesis, let it be remembered that there are two objectives — a major objective and a minor one. 1. The major objective is to interpret the notion of historicity in Heidegger. 2. The minor one is to use the notion of historicity to show the unity of Heidegger's thought.
CHAPTER ONE

MAIN INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Nature of Being, Time and Man

What Being is, for Heidegger, may be gathered from what he says of it. What he says of it may, in turn, be obtained from the "events" to which Heidegger takes recourse in interpreting the historicity of Being. The "events" in my view are: Language, Art, Death, Seinsverständnis, Thinking, "Mit-sein," Poetry, Tradition, Temporality and Historicity. Simply put, they are called "Toponymies of Being."¹ It is from the perspective of these toponymies

¹. Toponymy combines topos and onoma, and together name-place is rendered. By toponymy then, name-place is meant. Both Heidegger (Poetry, Language, Thought, p.12), and Pöggeler ("Heidegger's topology of Being" in Man and World, 11 (1969), pp. 331-56), use topology instead of toponymy to mean the same thing. Professor Alphonse de Waelhens of Louvain uses "The Kingdom of Being" ("Reflections On Heidegger's Development" in International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1965), p. 499). But toponymy, as name-place, brings out exactly where Being comes to presence. The whereabouts of its actual presencing is
that Heidegger elucidates what Being, for him, means. Thus, in order to gather what Heidegger says of Being, or means by it, these toponymies must be examined. In other words, it is in the interpretation of these toponymies that Heidegger's entire philosophical preoccupation with the hermeneutics of Being consists. Thus, these toponymies must be studied thoroughly, and Chapter Three does just that.

Heidegger puts forth one of his celebrated statements, the "dass es gibt Sein," "dass es gibt Zeit" ("dass es gibt Welt") as early as in Sein und Zeit (1927), but speaks more thematically of the "es" that "gibt" as das Ereignis in Zur Sache des Denkens (1969). "Das Ereignis vereignet...." No doubt, this is not easy to understand and Heidegger, in his earlier writings, is not helpful on this. "There is Being," "there is Time," or

its toponymies although this can mean man also, as the topos of Being (or "Being-topos"). But to avoid confusion and ambiguity, topology is retained but only as topos, thereby referring only to man, as "Being-topos," and it is distinguished from toponymy as name-place indicating the whereabouts of Being's presencing. Toponymy is the author's own invention.

2. This is, in my view, another way of saying "es gibt Sein," so what is said about the "es gibt Sein" covers it also. Therefore, there is no need to repeat the same thing all over again.


"it gives Being" or "it gives Time," all of which are used as suitable translations of the "dass es gibt Sein," "dass es gibt Zeit," do not say much either. However, in Identität und Differenz, Heidegger gives a useful hint about the es gibt Sein when he says that "das Ereignis vereinigt Mensch und Sein in ihr wesenhaftes Zusammen." Wesen in the Wesenhaftes stipulates that Sein as in the vereinigt is so done as to indicate something -- its essential togetherness with man -- about its essence or nature. Nature or essence here shall help a bit because Heidegger, in his later writings, has had more to say on the nature of Being.

However, before entering into the examination of the nature of Being, one must note that man also enters into the whole interpretation in "das Ereignis vereinigt Mensch und Sein in ihr wesenhaftes Zusammen." Das Ereignis (appropriation) gives man and Being to their essential (wesenhaftes) togetherness; (Zusammen). In order to make anything out of this das Ereignis and what it does to man and Being in the vereinigt, the nature of Being, on which Heidegger says much in his later writings, and also the nature of man that always goes with that of Being (both respective natures) must be examined. For it is hoped that such a way of approaching them would help one understand the dass es gibt Sein, or the dass es gibt Welt or the dass es gibt Zeit. In simple terms what

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
they are, what their respective natures are, will help one understand the giving es that gibt, as well as the Being and man as indicated in the versusign.

So far, the points reached are five: 1. Heidegger's "dass es gibt" Sein, "dass es gibt" Zeit must be articulated, 2. In order to articulate them, their (Being and Time) respective natures must be examined first; 3. For, it is in relation to their nature that there is es gibt after all; 4. But the nature of Being, though it is not known yet, has man entangled in it; 5. Therefore, man, or the nature of man, also comes into the whole es gibt interpretation. The next stage is to do the interpreting.

1.2 The Interpretation

When Heidegger says of Being that "there is Being" or "it gives Being," or of Time that "there is Time" or "it gives Time," he is expressing something about their respective natures. The most recurrent theme in all Heidegger's interpretation of the truth or nature of Being is summed up in the "Anaximander Fragment" as "As it [Being] reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws." What this says only recapitulates Heidegger's interpretation of Being in his later writings.

7. For Being and the description of its nature, see "The Anaximander Fragment" in Early Greek Thinking, pp. 13-58. For Time, and also of Being again, see the whole lecture in On Time and Being, pp. 1-24.

8. Early Greek Thinking, p. 26. (This particular quotation is from the translation of "Der Spruch des Anaximander" from Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950.)
as "Unverborgenheit." "As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws." Such is Being's nature. "Being...holds to its truth and keeps to itself. This keeping to itself is the way it reveals itself...." 9 "As it provides the unconcealment of beings it founds the concealment of Being. Concealment remains characteristic of that denial by which it keeps to itself." 10 Heidegger goes on to say explicitly that "We may call this luminous keeping to itself in the truth of its essence the epoché of Being." 11 But what do all these mean?

"The luminous keeping to itself" indicates one singular event of Being herein called its "epoché." The luminosity is a sort of lightening appertuity of Being as "Unverborgenheit" (unconcealment), but this takes place in its self-withdrawal, as "Verborgenheit" (concealment). "The luminous keeping to itself as "Unverborgenheit-Verborgenheit" is a singular event, otherwise described in terms of "presencing." 12 But what is the sense of all these, and how does "Being presence?"

Answers to these questions will ensue shortly, but for now, Time too should have its turn.

When Heidegger says of Time that "there is Time" or that "it gives Time," here again he is expressing something about the nature of Time. Although Heidegger has had more to say on Time in other writings, his lectures on Zur Sache

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. On Time and Being, the entire lecture.
des Denkens (1951-1969, translated as On Time and Being) makes Time one of the most important themes of the lecture. This book is more appropriate to dwell on in articulating the nature of Time, as Heidegger gives it to be understood because it is especially talked about in light of the es that gibt Zeit and also in the context of its determination of the presencing of Being. In Being and Time, Heidegger spoke about Time in the context of his interpretation of the Being of man and there found the unity of human existence in Time, herein called "Temporality." The famous expression one is left with in Being and Time regarding Temporality is that "it temporalizes itself." Later, the same is expressed in regard to Time as "Time Times itself" or that "Time extends itself." What is the sense of all these, and how does "Time time itself?"

So far, the "dass es gibt Zeit," "dass es gibt Sein," have led to the formulation of the foregoing observations, in which the senses, the dass es gibt Sein, the es gibt Zeit, must be thought out. What does it mean to say of Time that "Time times" or what does it mean to say of Being that Being presences itself? These are now the issues at stake. To say of Time that it times itself, or of Being that it presences itself is, as said earlier, to indicate something about their respective natures according to which Being comes to pass or comes to be, or that Time

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14. On Time and Being, the whole lecture.
comes to pass or comes to be. Of course, Heidegger himself does not use these expressions, namely that Time comes to pass or comes to be, or Being comes to be, but there must be some other way to make them clearer. To say of Being and Time (or either) that they come to pass or come to be seems to assert that they probably come out of nothing to be something, or out of one thing to be some other thing, in which case they come to be or come to stand enduringly or substantively as if they are, by nature, things. Yet Heidegger insists everywhere that neither Being nor Time is a thing, that neither can be reified.  

Rather, they are that by which temporal things or entities come to be, so to avoid any such misunderstanding Heidegger prefers to express the dass es gibt Sein, the dass es gibt Zeit, respectively by the verbs "presences" or "presenting," for Being, and "extends" or "extending," for Time. In other words, to say of Being that dass es gibt Sein means that it comes to pass or that it comes to be. But to say of Being that it comes to be, in turn, means, for Heidegger, that Being presences. The same is true of Time; that is, to say of Time that dass es gibt Zeit, means also that it comes to pass or that it comes to be, but to say of Time that it comes to be means that Time extends. This, hopefully, seeks to avoid

15. On Time and Being, p. 3. (a paraphrase).
16. Ibid., pp. 3, 10. (a paraphrase).
17. Ibid., pp. 4-10.
18. Ibid., p. 19.
19. Time, here, is, however, not any time, but what he calls "True Time." Ibid., p. 17.
any possible misunderstanding which seeks to reify Being or Time, for neither of them is, for Heidegger, a thing and neither can be perceived as a thing as such. The same is true of the es in the es gibt. Neither can it be perceived as a "hypokeimenon" in any sense, grammatical or ontological. But to say of Being that it presences or Time that it extends is like a clause whose sense awaits completeness and clarification, and Heidegger, in this respect, is again not helpful. For all he adds to that is: Being presences itself (presencing presences)\textsuperscript{20} or Time extends itself (Time times)\textsuperscript{21} but the mere addition of itself to them, on the surface of things, just does not of itself say much, yet this self-presencing of Being, or self-extending of Time, hits at the very core of what will be interpreted later as the historicity of Being or the temporalization of Time. For it expresses what Heidegger means by the truth of Being which, in turn, consists, to use Heidegger's expression, in the self-unconcealing self-concealing nature of Being.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, this nature of Being is the truth of Being, and both are expressed in Being's simultaneous self-unconcealing self-concealing event.

Put differently, Heidegger explicates the presencing of Being in the fact that Being, by nature, simultaneously unconceals and conceals itself. It is by this simultaneous "singular" event that beings come to be. When Being unconceals

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{21} On the Way to Language, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{22} "The Anaximander Fragment," Early Greek Thinking, pp. 26-58.
itself in beings, it withdraws back unto itself, thus withholding itself from them. For it is itself, not a thing, and cannot or must not be perceived as such, but it is rather that by which things are, or come forth to be what they are. That Being presences, therefore, means that Being unconceals itself in beings but conceals itself, at once, that is, withdraws back unto itself from beings; so, as it unconceals itself in beings, Being conceals itself from them simultaneously.

That, for Heidegger, expresses the truth of Being, or the nature of Being. Failure to perceive this truth or nature of Being, is what, in Heidegger's mind, has led to the charge of Seinsvergessenheit which he makes against "metaphysics." But this truth or nature of Being reveals that the expression, "Being presences itself," only states that Being, as it were, comes out of itself but only to go back unto itself. In other words, Being unconceals itself in beings, but only to conceal itself at once from them; so the self-presencing of Being only expresses that event by which Being, as it were, comes out of itself but only to go back, at once, unto itself. Therefore, the points of Being's departure and arrival seem to have a circular structure in that the two points are one and the same, the itself that Heidegger added to the expression, "Being presences itself." Thus, it is in coming out of itself, that Being, at long last, goes nowhere other than its very own self to which it withdraws. For, the self from which Being departs and the self to which it withdraws are one and the same structural self, which is no other than Being itself,
and this eventful circular process of coming to be the self that Being already is, describes, in my view, what shall be termed later as the historicity of Being. For now, let it be said that the historicity of Being shall therefore consist in the coming and retrieving of Being unto itself. In short, historicity shall be interpreted as "Become thyself." This interpretation is, of course, not quite clear yet. Moreover, one can misunderstand it very easily for the simple reason that this "become thyself event" by which Being supposedly comes from itself and withdraws unto itself, gives the impression as if this self-retrieving event is a watertight, closed, roundabout event. That the self-becoming event is circular in structure is true, but it is not a closed, roundabout circumference in which it goes round and comes right back to the point where it started. It is not a restricted recoiling journey on a rebound, but a kind of revealing structural constitution in the event of which Being unconceals itself in beings but never stays there to be one of them; hence, it withdraws simultaneously from them unto itself because Being does not come to endure substantially like a being or beings. Thus, any notion of closedness or unfreedom must be eliminated from the circular event by which Being presences itself. The circularity here only indicates a structural constitution of Being's nature. The same observation is true of time. The expression, "Time extends itself," also expresses the temporalization or the "historicity of Time," an event by which Time works out the unity of its three ecstases, but
only to become the self it already is. Admittedly, it is a bit awkward to even talk about the "historicity of time" especially when Heidegger himself does not use such an expression anywhere in his writings. But the expression, the historicity of Time, is used to express what Heidegger, in his own words, would express by: "the temporalization of Time," or that "Time times," or "temportionality temporalizes itself," none of which is easy to readily understand. Like Being's Geschick, Time's case is, likewise, one of a structural constitution. Heidegger insists that "Being and Time determine each other reciprocally..." and the whole lecture in On Time and Being is devoted to showing the mutual determining reciprocity of Being and Time vis-à-vis man and das Ereignis. When Being unconceals and conceals itself, it does so in the extending of time. So is the case with Time. When Time times, or extends itself, it does so in the unconcealing-concealing presencing of Being. How Time does its self-extending event is what is here interpreted as "the historicity of Time."

Time, however, is not just past, present and future as is normally conceived. Time for Heidegger, is "four dimensional," consisting of its three ecstases, past, present, and future, and their unity. Their unity, for Heidegger, is the most fundamental one,

25. On Time and Being, p. 3.
26. Ibid., p. 15.
for Heidegger claims that it sends each of the ecstases to their own. In other words, Time is not a thing in time but that by which there are temporal things.

To recapitulate, the following are the points reached so far: On Being: 1. comes to be, or comes to pass; 2. that means Being presences; 3. 2, in turn, means Being presences itself, e.g., presencing presences; 4. 3, in turn, means Being un conceals itself and conceals itself simultaneously. 5. Thus, the self-un concealing of Being is at once the self-concealing of Being, which means, Being comes from itself — un concealing itself in beings — and withdraws back unto itself — concealing itself from beings. 6. This is the nature of Being but this nature, in accordance to which Being, as it were, comes from, and retrieves itself, is what is described here as the structural self-constitution of Being, namely, "Become thyself," which is historicity.

On Time: In sum, the same structural self-constitution described above in respect of Being holds for time also; except for the fact that Time here is: 1. Four-dimensional, consisting not only of its three ecstases, past, present, and future, but of their unity also. 2. It is, rather, their unity which is most fundamental for Heidegger, because it is the unity which gives to each what each is; that is, it is their unity which determines them respectively. 3. Time, like Being, is not a thing.

27. Ibid.

27a. Ibid., p. 3.
Before the nature of Time is clearly articulated, it suffices to say now that the \textit{dass es gibt Sein} can be spoken of as hitting at the very core of Being's nature; a nature which is found to be a structurally circular self-constitution in that Being comes to be itself in simultaneously coming from itself\textsuperscript{1} - self-unconcealment in beings -- and retrieving itself -- self-concealment from beings.

The \textit{dass es gibt Zeit} also hits at the very core of Time's nature. The nature of Time is indicated in what Heidegger says of Time that "Time times" or "Time extends itself." Repeatedly, Heidegger insists that "...Time itself is nothing temporal, no more than it is something that it is."\textsuperscript{28} This being so, then temporal things are not Time, but are \textit{in} Time, and Time is not one of them. But what then does "Time times" mean or "the self-extending...?"\textsuperscript{29} The self-extending of Time, or that "Time times" lies in "...a mutual giving to one another of future, past, and present, that is, to their unity."\textsuperscript{30} "In future, in past, in the present (the fourth, that is, their unity) that giving brings about to each its own presencing...."\textsuperscript{31} Time is the unity of the three -- past, present, future -- and Heidegger calls it "True Time"\textsuperscript{32} and

\begin{enumerate}
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 15.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
the unity is the fourth, and it is their "fourth-unity," which extends itself by bringing the three to one another, and Heidegger calls it the "nearing nearness." Thus, "the future, being the not yet present, at the same time gives and brings about what is no longer present, the past, and conversely what has been, the past, also offers future to itself, and the reciprocal relation of both at the same time gives and brings about the present." Now, to put it in simpler terms, normally one sees past as past, dead and gone. Heidegger argues against that. What is past is, for him, not what is dead, gone, and finished, but what has-been (Gewesenheit). Yet he says: "What has been offers future to itself." Thus understood, then what has been is not past as dead, gone and (Vergangenheit) finished, but Gewesenheit, and has future in itself. Conversely, future too has what has been in itself, just as what has been has future in itself, thus Heidegger writes:

Approaching, being not yet present, at the same time gives and brings about what is no longer present, the past, and conversely what has been offers future to itself. The reciprocal relation of both at the same time gives and brings about present.

We say [Heidegger, goes on] 'at the same time' and thus ascribe a time character to the mutual giving to one another of future, past and present, that is, to their own unity.

33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 13.
36. Ibid. (a paraphrase, see footnote 37).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
What one has here then is that having-been is as much futural as the converse, and it is the reciprocity obtaining between having-been and future, and conversely future and having-been that indicates the inclusion of present, thus giving the unity of the three ecstases: having-been, present and future. Otherwise put, Heidegger writes:

Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart zeigen die phänomenalen Charaktere des "Auf-sich-zu," des "Zurück auf," des"Begegnenlassens von." Die Phänomena des zu... auf... bei... offenbaren die Zeitlichkeit als das ekstatikon schlechthin. ZEITLICHKEIT IST DAS URSPRÜNGLICHE "AUSSER-SICH" AN UND FÜR SICH SELBST. Wir nennen daher die charakterisierten Phänomene Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart die Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit.39

Temporality here (in Being and Time) is the unity of the three ecstases, but in spite of the fact that Heidegger tells one what Temporality is, one has yet to know what "Temporality temporalizes itself" means, even though one is closer to being clear on it than before. Temporality temporalizes itself" (Sein und Zeit, 1927); "Time times" (Unterwegs zur Sprache, 1959)

"Time extends itself". (Zur Sache des Denkens, 1969) -- all say the same thing about the nature of time, as the "es gibt Zeit."

What does "Time times" mean? What does "Temporality temporalizing itself" mean? Literally, it means just what it says namely that the unity of the three ecstases is temporality, and the actual,

39. Sein und Zeit, pp. 328-329. ("The future, the character of having been and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the 'towards oneself', the 'back to', and the 'letting oneself be-encountered by'. The phenomena of the 'towards--' the 'to---' and the 'alongside--' make temporality manifest as the ekstatikon, pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the present, the "ecstases" of temporality.")
explicit equiprimordial extending of the three together in unity is the verbal temporalizing of the noun temporality. For, future here plays the most prominent part that wheels the movement, so the forward movement to itself is the towards itself that is characterized in the "for itself," the "für sich selbst." Time heading on the way to and for itself is Time realizing itself; that is, Time coming unto itself, as "Become thyself." Time's self-becoming is Time's self-extending, and that is its nature, as Time times itself. It is believed that the "Ausser-sich," the out-of-itself, in "Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprüngliche 'Ausser-sich' 'an' and 'für sich' selbst."⁴⁰ may be interpreted parallel to Being, coming out of itself in self-unconcealment, but the "out" in the coming out of itself must not be understood in the sense of self-alienation nor self-externalization. The "out" indicates an action being done, so it is an "out" in the sense that Time is still in itself, hence the "an," that is, being (still) in itself; while at the same time, being-in-action, the action of temporalizing itself. The "wherefrom" and "where to" are structurally one in one action of being out-in-and-for-itself. Time itself is both that towards which, and for the sake of which, Time is "out" but still "in" itself and "for" itself. This being "out," "in," and "for" itself is simply like this: Time "is on a way to" itself. The "is on the way to" is indicated in the verbal sense of temporalizing (or timing Time) Temporal—

⁴⁰ Sein und Zeit, p. 329.
ity itself. Or, Time times Time. Temporality temporalizes temporality. The "out," "in," and "for" all in unity at one and the same time describe the active present indicative verbal sense of -ing, temporality's self-temporalizing, or Time's self-timing. Time times thus means Time is "out-in-and-for" itself. Structurally its self-constitution is a singular event. Such is time's nature. In sum then, Heidegger sees past as "having-been." By that he means that which has already been, but lies ahead approaching as "the possible," and not the bygone. The character and sense of it is futural, so past, as having-been, is effectively an integral part of future, and as such it has the character of that towards which, and for the sake of which, Temporality temporalizes itself or Time times itself. In fact, it is one and the same, because it is integrated into that future possibility towards and pending which one approaches or is yet approaching. But the present is already included in this "having-been-future" or the converse, in their reciprocal determination of one another, but as "being-alongside." 41 Their unity is the presencing of each unto itself, and in this, there may be what Heidegger terms as "an irresolute making present" 42 or a resolute one. The former is characterized as "inauthentic." 43 The latter is "authentic," 43a and Heidegger says in respect of

41. Being and Time, p. 387. ("This Way of Being-alongside is the present.")
42. Ibid., p. 388.
43. Ibid.
43a. Ibid.
the latter, the resolute authentic one whose making present stems primarily from the future, that "The authentic coming-towards-onself of anticipatory resolutelyness is at the same time a coming-back to one's ownmost Self which has been thrown...." 44 ("Das eigene Auf-sich-zukommen der vorlaufenden Entschossenheit ist zumal ein Zurückkommen auf das eigenste, in seine Vereinzelung geworfene Selbst."). 44a. "Diese Ekstase ermöglicht es dass das Dasein entschlossen das Seiende das es schon ist, übernehmen kann." 45

Making-present resolutely out of future, hence authentically, is the self-coming of Temporality, or Time unto itself, that is, Time timing itself, or "Temporality temporalizing itself." Otherwise put, present-ing itself is the "Time times." Thus, the very verbal act of present-ing, or the advance of the unity of Time's or Temporality's three ecstases, is the actual and explicit working out of the unity of "Time timing itself" or "Temporality temporalizing itself." Such is what is described here as Time, coming unto itself, Temporality coming unto itself, and this is, in my interpretation, its historicity. Thus, historicity, here again, in "dass es gibt Zeit" is "Become thyself," an event which describes how "Time times" itself; that is, it comes to be the self it already is.

44. Ibid., p. 338.
44a. Ibid., p. 339.
45. Ibid. ("This ecstasie makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is.")
1.3 Man (as Seinsverständnis), the Historicity of Seinsverständnis Serving and Staging the Historicity of Being and Time

As said earlier, man also enters into the whole dass es gibt Zeit, dass es gibt Sein picture. For Heidegger says, "Das Ereignis vereinigt Mensch und Sein in ihr wesenhaftes zusammen." This must also have something to do with man's own nature (Wesen) just as the same is the case with Time and Being, so the problem now is to seek out the nature of man.

In Heidegger, the view of man is very ambiguous. On the one hand, Heidegger sees man as a being among others, and in this respect he writes: "Offenbar ist der Mensch etwas Seiendes. Als dieses gehört er wie der Stein, der Baum, der Adler in das Ganze des Seins." This is the one view of man, as an entity. But he is more than that. Heidegger gives to man a distinctive feature which makes man different from other beings, although he is still a being. This added distinctive feature is what Heidegger calls "Seinsverständnis." In order to get a hold on man's nature, its unique feature must be the only significant feature one must examine in this respect, because it is the only feature that distinguishes him from others, and may thus lead one to what man essentially is. But in order to do this, that is, to put one's finger on man's nature

46. Identität und Differenz, p. 103.

47. Ibid., p. 94. ("Man is, obviously, something of a being. As such, he belongs to the totality of beings, like the stone, the three, or the eagle.")

48. In Sein und Zeit, p. 5.
by taking recourse to the examination of man's distinctive feature, Seinsverständnis one has to be cautioned so as not to look for it (Seinsverständnis) in terms of its being a thing, another being (biologically, e.g., heart, feet or head, or materially, e.g., stone, tree, etc.) like man himself because Seinsverständnis is not a thing but what it literally is, namely, an understanding of Being.

Hence, man's distinctive feature is not any being but his understanding of Being. This being the case, one must notice that man's distinctiveness lies in his relation to Being, e.g., Being that he understands — Seinsverständnis. No other being except man has this, but what really is this understanding of Being? There is a bit of uneasiness in answering this question, because Heidegger maintains that one already knows, in a question, for example, or in an inquiry, that very thing for which one is seeking. Though that in-built, or better yet, fore-knowledge, may be dim, unclear, or vague, one nevertheless knows what one is, at the same time, seeking. Were this untrue, one could not even ask the question to begin with, or begin one's inquiry to start with. But, however difficult it is to convince one of this, Heidegger still insists that:

49. See #2 of Being and Time. Heidegger, for example, writes that "Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity..." (p.24).
"Dieses durchschnittliche und vage Seinsverständnis ist ein Faktum... Wir bewegen uns immer schon in einem Seinsverständnis." 50

But if one understands already what one seeks to understand, if one knows already what one seeks to know, if one already has what one seeks to have, then why bother? (If one already is what one becomes, then why become what one already is? Why must Being bother to come to be what it is, which we describe here as "Become thyself," which is historicity? Why does Being presence itself? If Time is what it already is, why does Time time itself? If temporality is what it already is, the unity of its ecstases, why does Temporality temporalize Temporality?) This is the aporeia and it is the same aporeia Plato had posed in the *Meno* about research or learning, and it is a question that has haunted philosophy ever since then until now, but to which Heidegger has his own retort. Heidegger's own answer, which repeats Nietzsche's "become thyself" is what has been interpreted here as historicity, but more on this, that is, on both Heidegger's answer, Plato and others, will be offered elsewhere in the thesis.

Coming back to the question: if one already understands or knows what one seeks to understand or know, then why bother?, the foregoing observations may help. One bothers because just as its description indicates, what is understood already in what one is seeking to understand, is a fore-

50. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 5. ("However, this vague understanding of Being is still a fact.... We always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being.")
understanding that one fore-has, fore-sees and fore-conceives, and Heidegger makes these "Vorhaben, Vorsicht and Vorgriff", the three structural components of understanding. Therefore, an understanding of Being, Seinsverständnis, is a fore-having, fore-seeing and a fore-conception of Being. Hence, the distinctive feature of man is that man alone fore-has, fore-sees and fore-conceives Being, "Denn erst der Mensch, offen für das Sein, lässt dieses als Anwesen ankommen." Man alone has this pre-ontological understanding, thus he alone has an openness to Being, and lets Being come to presence. This, of course, does not say anything about man's nature that is being sought here, but it only tells one that man lets Being he fore-has, fore-sees and fore-conceives come to pass in him. Therefore, man is: 1. the place in whom Being comes to pass, 2. he who lets Being come to pass, 3. he who fore-has, fore-sees and fore-conceives Being, and 4. he of whom Being is in need, and 5. he who is used by Being to come to pass, therefore, 6. "Im Menschen waltet ein Gehören zum Sein, welches Gehören auf das Sein hört, weil es diesem übereignet ist." Ereignet comes up again, because, as one recalls, it has been said before that "Das Ereignis vereignet Mensch und Sein in ihr wesenhaftes Zusammen" and "Mensch und Sein sind

51. Sein und Zeit, p. 150.

52. Identität und Differenz, p. 95. ("For it is man, open towards Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence.")

53. Ibid., p. 94. ("In man, prevails a belonging to Being, a belonging which hears Being because it is appropriated to Being.")

54. Ibid., p. 103.
Needless to say, it is from the perspective of Ereignis that Being's nature got articulated in the es gibt Sein and the same holds for Time in the dass es gibt Zeit, so the same must be done here with respect to man, since Ereignis appropriates man also to attain himself. To this effect, Heidegger writes: "Appropriation [Ereignis] grants to mortals their abode within their nature."\(^56\) Mortal, here, is naturally a name for man because only man for Heidegger is mortal, Heidegger writes: "Man exists as a mortal. He is called mortal because he can die. To be able to die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies...."\(^57\) "Animals [Heidegger goes on] cannot die."\(^58\) "The animal perishes."\(^59\) What all these mean is not the issue here, although it will become so elsewhere. The concern here is the stipulating of mortals as denoting men; therefore, a reformulation of: "Appropriation grants to mortals their abode within their nature," would be: Appropriation grants men their abode within their nature. The nature of man must be thought from the perspective of Appropriation because it is that which grants men their abode within their nature. This means Appropriation

\(^{55}\) Ibid, p. 95.

\(^{56}\) On the Way to Language, p. 128.

\(^{57}\) Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 222.


\(^{59}\) Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 178.
makes man homely, that is, suitably fitting for his nature, that is, for being himself. In other words, Appropriation makes man appropriate for being himself; hence Heidegger writes: "Appropriation...gathers mortals into the appropriate-ness of their own nature and there holds them." But why? Because "Appropriation, needing and using man's appropriations, allows Saying to reach speech." Appropriation appropriates man only for need and use so that Saying can come to pass, that is, to reach speaking, and man is he who does the speaking of Saying.

All these, no doubt, are unclear. But assuming Saying is language or Being, which, of course, it really is, then one gets the following: (1) Appropriation appropriates man, means Appropriation needs and uses man. (2) Appropriation needs and uses man so that Being comes to speaking. (3) Man is he who does the speaking, so Appropriation needs and uses man so that Being comes to speaking in the speaking of man. But wherein lies the human nature herein sought for? The answer lies in this:

Appropriation, in beholding human nature, makes mortals appropriate for that which avows itself from everywhere to man in Saying, which points toward the concealed. Man's the listener, being made appropriate for Saying, has this distinguishing character, that it releases human nature to its own, but only in order that man as he who speaks, that he who says, may encounter and answer Saying in virtue of what is his property...The encountering saying of mortals is answering. Every spoken word is already an answer: counter saying.

60. On the Way to Language, pp. 128-129.
61. Ibid., p. 129.
coming to encounter, listening Saying. When mortals are made appropriate for Saying, human nature is released into that needfulness out of which man is used for bringing soundless Saying to the sound of language. Appropriation, needing and using man's appropriations, allows Saying to reach speech. The way to language belongs to Saying determined by Appropriation. 62

Much is condensed in this long quotation, but in seeking the nature of man, one is given here all one needs. Man is given to be (a) a listener, (b) encounterer, (c) hearer, (d) speaker, (e) counter-speaker, (f) listener-saying, (g) the used and the needed. Man is a-g, all for one reason, to bring soundless Saying (Being) to pass in him, that is, in his speech. Doing a-g is what releases human nature into its own. The nature of man is therefore put in being "used" and needed, by which Heidegger means: "To use," means first, to let a thing be what it is and how it is. To let it be this way requires that the used thing be cared for in its essential nature."63 "The User [Heidegger continues] lets the used thing enter into the property of its own nature, and there preserves it....Using commends the used thing to its own nature and essence."64 Being used and needed by Appropriation, therefore, grants to man his nature. What man is, is being needed and used. How he exists this being needed and used, is by listening, hearing, encountering the Soundless (Saying) Being, thus, fore-having it, fore-conceiving it, fore-seeing

62. Ibid., p. 129, emphasis added.
63. What is Called Thinking?, p. 191.
64. Ibid., pp. 195-196.
it, and then letting the received Being thus fore-had, fore-seen, and fore-conceived already, come to presence in him, that is, either by speaking, poetizing, "Art-ing," Thinking, etc., so his role here is only in the bringing of Being in speech, Art, Poetry, etc., etc., as a messenger or bringer of Being. It is in doing this that his Being lies. Hence, man's Being is in the bringing to pass of Being in him and by him. "By him" means it is man who speaks in the speaking of Language, thinks in Thinking, can die in death, poetizes in Poetry, works in the work of Art. "In him," means all these take place in man and man only because he is the only being among beings who can fore-have, fore-see and fore-conceive Being, thanks to his distinctive Seinsverständnis. Seinsverständnis enables man to fore-understand Being, that is, he alone has pre-ontological understanding, however vague that may be.

Now, the question as to why one bothers to understand what one already has an understanding of, may be raised again. If one already understands what one seeks to understand, then why bother? Having travelled carefully up to this point, one can see that what one fore-has, for example, in language, is what one has already received by listening, hearing, encountering, and in so doing, has thus fore-had the received already. But man, having received what it is that (Being) he has received (be it in Art, Language, Poetry, Thinking, etc.), therefore fore-having it, nevertheless has yet to let what it is that he has received come to pass in himself and by him, e.g., in his speech if it is language, in the work of Art if
it is in Art, etc., etc. Such is man's Being. Receiving (which has more "hows" to it, e.g., listening, hearing, etc.) and bringing the received to pass, is man's Being. For it is that for which he is needed and used, and in so being attains to his nature. Hence, bringing to pass one's own understanding one has fore-had already amounts to working out explicitly and actually what is already there in understanding. Understanding something, therefore, does not mean one never pre-understood what it is that one seeks, or comes to understand. No, that is not so, because were it so, understanding of any sort would be impossible to begin with. It rather means coming to have explicit and actual understanding of what one pre-understood before, but may have been forgotten, vague or tainted with one's prejudices or preconceptions. Understanding something, then, is "understanding understanding understanding" (very reminiscent of temporality temporalizing temporality or Being presencing (itself) Being), that is, the last one being the explicit and actual understanding one has come to have, the middle one being the understand-ing verbal activity itself, by whose "-ing" the last one is obtained, and the first one being the pre-understanding one already fore-had in advance and before beginning the middle one and arriving at the last one. Hence, it is understanding coming unto itself as "Become thyself" (historicity), and such is the historicity of understanding (of which Gadamer, through Heidegger's ontology and Dilthey's methodological and epistemological hermeneutics, is a renowned proponent today).
But the nature of man as presented above -- being the topos of Being -- is more of a later Heidegger than Heidegger as one knows in Being and Time. For Heidegger, in Sein und Zeit, says explicitly that: "Das 'Wesen' des Dasein liegt in seiner Existenz....Das 'Wesen' dieses Seienden liegt in seinem Zu-sein" and there is no mention of Ereignis and its gibt here at all. Besides, Seinsverständnis is a Being and Time theme, not Heidegger II; therefore, it is not thought of in terms of receptivity, listening, hearing; encountering, etc., etc., of Appropriating. True, the whole interpretation would appear either that Seinsverständnis in Being and Time is transplanted into later Heidegger, or that Being and Time is suffering needless encroachment from later Heidegger.

Basically, two concerns are raised here: 1. The "essence" of man (If one wishes to talk about "essentialism") lies in his existence, as opposed to its being thought in the light of Das Ereignis. 2. That understanding is a case of man's openness and disclosedness to his future possibilities, and it is by which man projects himself in anticipatory resoluteness upon his own-most future possibilities, e.g., death; and not again thought in relation to Das Ereignis. In short, existence and understanding, as thought in Being and Time, make man's being more a possibility than anything else, and Heidegger himself says that: "Dasein ist je seine Möglichkeit.

65. Sein und Zeit, p. 42. ("The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence....The 'essence' of this entity lies in its 'to be'.")
keit...."66 so man is essentially its can-be possibilities. This interpretation is not disputed at all, but instead elaborated and given even more thorough illumination in the later Heidegger: how? First of all, the interpretation given in relation to Das Ereignis is, in my view, not incompatible with what one gets in Being and Time; hence proving consistency or inconsistency is not called for. On account of this, it remains to be shown how Being and Time gains its comprehensive adequation in later Heidegger as interpreted above. Secondly, it is admitted that in Being and Time man is not interpreted from the point of view of das Ereignis, and not so much of Being itself also as of Zeitlichkeit. As much true such a view may be, the reason, however, is not because such is impossible, although it is difficult and also liable to incur protest from those who think that that attempt would be stretching Being and Time too much and too far to what is beyond it. But it is difficult to deny that human existence, for Heidegger, is finite, and its finitude, in Heidegger's view, is founded upon the temporality of human existence itself. In other words, it is true of Heidegger (earlier or later) that temporality is that openness which renders human existence finite. This being true, the main points then are two: 1. to show what human existence itself is, and 2. to show its temporality—basis. After having shown these, then it would be much easier to situate it within the context of the inter-

66. Ibid. (Dasein is its possibility.)
pretation given above of later Heidegger.

Man is he whose being is bounded by a beginning and an end. To this effect, Heidegger writes: "Erst das Seiende 'Zwischen' Geburt und Tod stellt das gesuchte Ganze dar. ... Allein der Tod ist doch nur das 'Ende' des Daseins. ... das andere 'Ende' aber ist der 'Anfang' die 'Geburt'." 67 All these must, of course, be taken formally for purposes of explanation only. Given the two ends, existence is the "betweenness" 68 of the two which Heidegger describes as: "...die Erstreckung des Daseins ZWISCHEN Geburt und Tod." 69 But this whole "betweenness" is, as possibilities, to be stretched along and the actual stretching along is a projection man is making upon his "betweenness," that is, his possibilities. Existing then is disclosedness of man's "betweenness" as he discloses them through and through. But the "Ende" and the "Anfang," apart from their formal aspects, are not two separate and independent ends for Heidegger because death, for him, begins at birth, end also begins at the beginning and vice versa, since as born, one for Heidegger is already dying. For he writes: "Das faktische Dasein existiert gebürtig, and gebürtig stirbt es auch schon im Sinne des Seins zum Tode." 70 But death is funda-

67. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 373. ("Only that being which is 'between' birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking....But death is only the 'end' of Dasein....the other 'end', however, is the 'beginning', the 'birth'.")


69. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 373.

70. Ibid., p. 374. ("Factual Dasein exists as born; and as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-Death.")
mentally man's ownmost possibility, an open one, which is constantly being existed, authentically or not, so it is ontologically man's ownmost Da as the existing possible, the ontological not-yet, but it is the ontological possible which he is "already-in" as man's "Gewesenheit," because it (death, for Heidegger), is man's Gewesenheit. Hence both the not-yet and the having-been, in this regard, are together in the unity of "betweenness." In Being and Time Heidegger calls the latter Facticity (Faktizität), the former Existentiality (Existenzialität), and the present for him as falling (Verfallen). But "Der primäre existenziale Sinn der Faktizität liegt in der Gewesenheit." [Existenzialität] ihr primärer Sinn ist die Zukunft.

Now, one sees how the three ecstases of time come up here again in Gewesenheit and Zukunft with Gegewartigen already included.

71. Sein und Zeit, p. 328.
72. Ibid., p. 328. ("The primary existential sense of facticity lies in the having-been.")
73. Ibid., p. 327. ("The primary sense of existentiality is in the future.")
74. Ibid., p. 328. ("On the other hand, we lack such an indication for the third idea which is constitutive for care -- the Being-alongside which falls. This should not instead signify that falling is not also grounded in temporality; it should instead give us a hint that making-present, as the primary basis (meaning) for falling into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves remains included in the future and in having been and is included in them in the mode of primordial temporality." emphasis added.)
as ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit presencing the unity of Existenzialität, Faktizität, and Verfallen. In respect of this, Heidegger writes: "Die Zeitlichkeit ermöglicht die Einheit von Existenz, Faktizität und Verfallen und konstituiert so ursprünglich die Ganzheit der Sorgestruktur." Temporality temporalizing the unity of its three ecstases thus makes possible the existing, or stretching along, of the unity of man's (here called care) having-been-facticity (Gewessenheit-Faktizität) his future-existentiality (Zukunft-Existentialität), his making-present fallingness (Gegenwärtigen-Verfallen), which together constitute the existing of man's existence. But existing, thus temporali-
zed, is the bringing out (that is, the existing), of man's Gewesenheit which is at once man's "Entworfenheit" thus making man's Being a thrown-projection. "...GEWORFENEN ENTWURF...sie ist ein Konstitutivum der Struktur der Sorge." \[75\] If the ontological structure of human existence is founded upon temporality, as described above, and if this human existence as temporality-founded is a thrown-projection, in that man projects (as Entworfenheit) himself but upon his own possibilities that are his Gewordenheit, because they are his Gewordenheit Being, then human existence itself is a projection of man upon his own Gewesenheit possibilities he is in-already, as Gewordenheit.

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75. Ibid. ("Temporality renders possible the unity of existence, facticity and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care.")

76. Ibid., p. 223. ("...thrown projection. This is something that is constitutive of the structure of care.")
Thus, what man has already and is in already is precisely what man fore-has, and in fore-having which, he projects (Entworfenen) himself upon them because they are, as his yet-to-be Gewesenheit-Geworfenheit possibilities. But fore-having something, as shown above (e.g., fore-conceiving or fore-seeing something), is exactly what Heidegger talks about in his later works vis-a-vis das Ereignis and Being. Needless to say, fore-having is, in Heidegger's later works, known to be indicative of man's "Encountering-Receptivity-Being," in which man receives Being (e.g., language) by listening, hearing, encountering, etc., vis-a-vis das Ereignis; and what man has thus fore-had, fore-conceived and fore-seen is Being, but he has fore-had it only as "something" yet to be brought forth, that is, to let it come to pass in him and by him. Given all these observations, it is appropriate now to ask the following rhetorical questions: would all these not be impossible without man's distinctive Seinsverständnis (with its fore-anatomy, fore-having, foresight and fore-conception) which makes it possible for man to be able to do his functional commissioning of what it is that he receives? This being so, then is one not brought right back in the same observations, according to which man already fore-has what he brings forth? Such being the case, then is it not the same as having a pre-ontological encounter with, or pre-ontological understanding of what it is that one brings or is bringing to understand, seeks or is seeking to understand? Is it not like seeking to know what one already knows? Is it not like coming to have what one already fore-has? Is
it not like becoming or coming to be what one already is?

Naturally, the answer to each of these rhetorical questions is: "yes, it is," yet it is still not said in Being and Time that these fore-having encountering-experience of Being take place, and that Being is received and man is appropriated for it, fore-having it, re-having it, pre-ontologically encountering it, needed and used for the appropriation of Being, etc., etc. All are, of course, true but it is because Being and Time is a preparatory work leading to something higher, Being and Ereignis, none of which has thematically been touched upon yet. But even if one wishes to stay with Being and Time's view of existence, it can still be appropriately asked: is not existing itself (the existing of one's existence) the bringing (in Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, etc., etc.) to pass of Being, resolutely or not, authentically or not, as indicated in what Heidegger calls "metaphysics"? But if this is true, then, according to the interpretation being made here, it would certainly mean therefore that man must have already fore-had or fore-received Being, and in fore-receiving which his existing comes as the letting-out-or coming to pass of Being he had already fore-received. All these observations are, of course, true in Heidegger II, but one can still ask: where does one find in Being and Time a statement as to where man fore-had Being (that is, fore-received Being) from, and how? Simply, one does not find it in Being
and Time (except for the limited hint about Tradition which is handed down to one), because Being and Time does not comprehensively (and deliberately so) touch those themes. Although in respect of death, Mit-sein, temporality, etc., one can find in Being and Time that they are as man's Schicksal, and Tradition, for instance, is given as handed down to (thus fore-received by) one; all in all, however, one unfortunately has to wait for later Heidegger to say that:

The things for which we owe thanks are not things we have from ourselves. They are given to us. We receive many gifts, of many kinds. But the highest and really most lasting gift given to us is always our essential nature, with which we are gifted in such a way that we are what we are only through it. That is why we owe thanks for this endowment, first and unceasingly."

At any rate, after having shown that human existence is a thrown-projection and having shown that this Geworfeneit-Entworfenheit human existence is temporality-founded, and having finally shown that the latter is observed as: (a) coming to have what one already fore-had, or (b) becoming or coming to be what one already is, or reconstituting what one is already pre-constituted of, or (c) having a pre-ontological encounter with, or pre-ontological understanding of what one comes, or is coming to understand (all of them, a, b and c, say the same thing), it ought to be apparent by now that the Being of man as is interpreted in Being and Time is repeatedly found in later Heidegger also. Although such is not readily apparent, and

77. What is Called Thinking?, p. 142, emphasis added.
interpretation is needed not only to articulate and illuminate Heidegger I in Heidegger II, but also to show that the former gains comprehensive elaboration and incorporation in the latter.

Now, coming back to understanding, it is proper also to show how its interpretation in *Being and Time* gains comprehensive treatment in later Heidegger. Understanding of Being unquestionably constitutes the unique Being of man. By it, man is able to anticipate or project himself upon, or is able to fore-disclose to himself, his future possibilities, so it has more to do with disclosedness and projecting towards the future. In regard to this, Heidegger, explicitly, says in italics that: "Ursprünglich existenzial gefasst, besagt Verstehen: ENTWERFEND-SEIN ZU EINEM SEINKÖNNEN WORUMWILLEN JE DAS DASEIN EXISTIERT." 78

One can, in respect of this, contend that understanding deals with "projecting," "disclosedness," openness, "potentiality-to-be" and possibilities, not in terms of encountering, listening, hearing, etc., etc., vis-à-vis das Ereignis. Although such a contention is true of *Being and Time*, yet if looked at very closely, one can still ask: what really are the Seinkönnen, Entschlossenheit, Entworfenheit, Möglichkeit, etc.? All naturally indicate what man can-be and has yet-to-be and they emphasize only the futural projecting character of human existence in relation to its "being-there." However, the existential character of projecting as has been noted, is one thing;

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78. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 336 (capitals added). ("Understanding, spoken of in a way which is primordially existent, means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which any Dasein exists.")
another -- but both of which man is constituted -- is throwness, Geworfenheit as Gewesenheit. "Entworfenheit-Geworfenheit" as one, constitutes man's existence. Given the preceding investigation, one can see that all that is associated with understanding in Being and Time is not denied, but rather affirmed insofar as in later Heidegger also there are in place both the "Gewesenheit-Entworfenheit" constitutional characters of human existence. Insofar as the bringing of Being, after man has fore-received it, is an unconcealment of Being, therefore that of man also, since rooted in the latter, and insofar as such is as man's "can-be," as man's future possibility; and insofar as such can be done in a moment of vision, resolutely or not, authentically or not, the whole process is an event of disclosure, of projecting and of existing man's not-yet possibilities in that he can flee them or meet them boldly.

Here again, Being, in later Heidegger, is the theme, so the interpretation takes a higher form that transcends the view in Being and Time according to which self-disclosure of man is taken to mean just that, as if or giving the impression that such is possible in the absence of the disclosure of Being by which the former (that of man) is made possible to begin with. In later Heidegger, it becomes apparent that there can be no self-disclosure of man without disclosing as well that (Being) in whose disclosure man's own self-disclosure consists and is rendered possible therefrom. Although this observation is there in Being and Time, it does not, comparatively speaking, enjoy as much perspicuity
or conspicuity as found in the later writings. On account of these, there is a great tendency to see human self-disclosure in *Being and Time* as a unilateral *Unverborgenheit*, but such is impossible without *Seinsunverbogenheit*. On account of this tendency, there is the danger to "existentialize" the interpretation of understanding in *Being and Time* as though such notions as *Entschlossenheit*, *Möglichkeit*, *Befindlichkeit*, *Entworfenheit*, *Zukunft*, *Entwerfend-Sein*, *Seinkönnen*, *Offenhalten Augenblick*, *Vorlaufen* and others ((*Being and Time* themes) are the only estimation in terms of which understanding, as given in *Being and Time*, must be understood and limited to.

But understanding is, above all, man's unique constitution that makes him more than just a being among others. It is that which -- given its structural components -- enables him to be what he distinctively and essentially is. It is man's unique Being which enables him to disclose Being and to be capable of that disclosure, in disclosing which he discloses himself therein, resolutely or not, authentically or not. It has, given its fore-anatomies, a structure of projection, a character of being able to anticipate, a character of an openness to Being and to oneself, and a structure that gives to man the potentiality to listen, to hear, to prepare, to be open and stay open, to receive, to encounter, to submit and to undergo the experience with Being via appropriation. For man is the only being given to be able to do, and be all these, thanks to his unique constitutive being -- *Seinsverständnis*. 
All in all, however, Heidegger's "werde was du bist" has been interpreted here as the circular structural constitution in that the self (Time, Being, man, as understanding) becomes what it already is, "Become thyself," as historicity. The structural constitutive circularity one finds in Plato, for example, seeking to know what one already knows, or Nietzsche, Zarathustra "coming to be thyself," is what Heidegger is advancing here in his own way. In arguing against those who deny the circular structural constitution either of man's Being (e.g. Zarathustra's self-becoming), or of understanding understanding itself in its hermeneutical situation -- those who, Heidegger says, have a common sensical misunderstanding of understanding. Heidegger writes that:

When one talks of the "circle" in understanding, one expresses a failure to recognize two things: (1) that understanding as such makes up a basic kind of Dasein's Being, (2) that this Being is constituted as care. To deny the circle, to make a secret of it, or even to want to overcome it, means finally to reinforce this failure. We must rather endeavour to leap into the "circle," primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being.

Having said this, Heidegger then asks: "Does it not then become altogether patent in the end that this problem of fundamental ontology [meaning investigations done in Being and

79. Sein und Zeit, p. 145.

80. For example, Being and Time, p. 363. (What common sense wishes to eliminate...circular being....")

81. Ibid.
Time] which we have broached, is one which moves in a 'circle'?\textsuperscript{82} Anyway, more on this shall come elsewhere, but it is proper now to maintain that the circle is only a structural constitution of human existence in that man, a thrown-projected being, projects himself upon what he is already thrown into, or temporality temporalizes the unity of its own ecstases; or Being unconceals and conceals itself. At any rate, "Become thyself" is, in a nutshell, interpreted in all (i.e., in understanding, working-out the unity of its forestructures as based on that of time, Being presencing itself, as based on that of time) as historicity.

"Become thyself" then is historicity, for "it [Dasein, for example] stretches itself along in such a way that its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching along,"\textsuperscript{83} and its thorough examination is undertaken in Chapter Four. For now, however, the following observations are the conclusions reached so far:

(1) Being presences itself, that is, historicizes, in what Heidegger calls the extending of Time, and Time extends itself in the presencing of Being. The elucidation of this mutual determination of Being and Time is, as said above, carried out in Chapter Four.

(2) Now it suffices only to say that historicity involves a circular structure involving a hermeneutic task of becoming what, man as Seinsverständnis, Being or Time already is. The presencing or historicizing of Being unto itself in its self-upconcealing self-concealing event, which is determined

\textsuperscript{82} Being and Time, p. 362; \textit{Sein und Zeit}, p. 314.

\textsuperscript{83} Being and Time, p. 426.
in the extending of Time unto itself in working out the unity of its three ecstatics, is what describes historicity as "Become thyself."

(3) In this, Being comes to be what it already is, and what it already is, is what it has been, and what it has been, is what it is yet to become, and in becoming which Being structurally only becomes what it already is, which is nothing else but working out its "future-has-been-possibility." Working out explicitly this hermeneutic circular structure of becoming itself in its future-has-been-possibility, is therefore Being's historicity.

(4) Time is its "how-determinant" by which such is rendered possible. The reverse is also true of Time. The extending of Time is, as it were, carried forth and illuminated by the presencing or historicity of Being.

(5) But both Time and Being, determining each other, need the "use" of man to bear them out; thus man also enters, by necessity, into the whole event.

(6) But those events in which the historicities of Being and Time take place are language, tradition, in short, its toponymies.

(7) Thus, in exhibiting the historicity of Being, and naturally of Time also, Chapter Four would exhibit the historicity of Being's toponymies.

(8) Hence, the historicity of Being in language, for instance, would mean exhibiting the historicity of Language, that is, how Being or Language comes unto itself in language, the latter being the speaking of man; or exhibiting how Being comes unto itself in language when language comes unto itself in the speaking of man.

(9) In all these events, the position of man, in Heidegger, is very ambiguous. Heidegger maintains that man dwells in the neighbourhood of Being. He maintains further that it is by man that Being comes to be, that is, presences. The latter makes man the medium, or the means, in using which Being comes to be, therefore his role here is purely functional, and it is in so being that his entire Being con-

84. Man is able to perform this functional role on account of his constitutive Being, Seinsverständnis. Its structural components allow man to be able to fore-have, foresee and fore-conceive what he is yet to project upon himself, or to anticipate his future possibilities. More on this can be found in Chapter Four where man, Being and Time, conceived respectively as Seinsverständnis, Historicity and Temporality, receive detailed study.
sists. The former only speaks of the locus of man which is put in Being. But interpreted rightly, the locus of man only expresses the place in which Being comes to be. In other words, the presencing of Being happens in man, and by man, so he is both the place in which Being comes to be, and the means by whom Being comes to be. In view of being these two, man has been interpreted here as the topos of Being. By topos, the Aristotelian\textsuperscript{85} two senses of 1. organon and 2. locus are meant, and both, combined in topos, serve well to bring out the dual instrumental and locational dimensions of man's Being.

(10) But man, being the topos of Being, naturally has an affective relationship to Being. In other words, it is by man, and in man, that Being comes to be, that is, presences, and it is in so being that man, in turn, attains his Being, so it is in the bringing of Being unto itself that man's Being lies. Therefore, it is by bringing Being unto itself that man brings himself unto himself, so the historicity or presencing of Being is at once the historicity or presencing of man. Man brings himself to become himself in bringing Being to become itself, or man comes unto himself in the coming of Being unto itself.

(11) In view of this co-effective relationship between Being and man, Being's toponymies come out as man's "ontological facticities" as well. These toponymies of Being are what Heidegger calls Facts, in regard to which he writes: "Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's Facticity."\textsuperscript{86} They are man's "ontological facticities" with which Chapter Two is concerned in general terms.

\textsuperscript{85} Aristotle's logical treatise has passed under the title of Organon, or "instrument" of science of which the most important ones are Prior and Posterior Analytics and Topica. In the latter, Aristotle speaks of the modes of reasoning which, while syllogistically correct, fall short of the conditions he sets forth for scientific accuracy. Yet he nevertheless sees it as an organon, or instrument, of dialectical syllogism or reasoning and this is what the whole of Topica is about. In this sense, Topoi, from which Topica was formed, is seen as an organon but in Books II-VII.3, the term Topoi is described as "commonplaces" of argument, or of general principles of probability or of endoxa. Thus, the two senses of "common places" of Topoi and "organon" come out in Aristotle's treatise in Topica and these two senses of "organon" and "common place" are herein intended.

\textsuperscript{86} Being and Time, p. 82.
(12) With this mutual and simultaneous affectedness of the historicity of Being, Time and man, Heidegger everywhere gives them to be understood as, such, that is, as being co-affective of, and co-present with one another, since neither comes to presence without the others. But it is das Ereignis that gives them all to their own.

Of it, Heidegger says that it is the "Singulare tantum." Heidegger does not say much about das Ereignis except that it is "that region which regions all." But das Ereignis may be interpreted here to be the "unifying unity" that, as the "giving event," stages the presencing of all, Being, Time and man, bringing about to each its own nature: (a) In terms of Being, the giving gives its nature which is indicated in the truth of Being -- self-unconcealing self-concealing event. (b) In terms of Time, the giving gives its extending in which the unity of its three ecstases is worked out explicitly in Time timing itself. (c) In terms of man, the giving appropriates him in working-out explicitly the unity of understanding's fore-anatomy in understanding understanding itself. In all, the giving gives each to become what each essentially is. Thus, das Ereignis appropriates all to the "Werde, was du bist" -- historicity. The "unifying unity" gives a Time character to mutual giving to one another the explicit working-out of the unity of Time's three ecstases (having been, future and present) thereby staging Time as that openness wherein (c, above) the temporality of understanding

87. Identity and Difference, p. 101 in German and p. 36 in English.

88. "Gelassenheit," as Discourse on Thinking, p.66.
understanding itself takes place in the finite presencing of (a, above) the historicity of Being. The "unifying unity" gives the historicity of Being (a, above) wherein (b, above) Time timing itself in the unity of its three ecstatics, takes place in presencing (c, above).

In simpler terms, *das Ereignis* may be seen as that "unifying unity" unifying at one and the same time the events of a, b, and c, in that it appropriates c to bring forth the mutual determination of the presencing of a and b, thereby giving to each its nature. Therefore, the "unifying unity" is the appropriation that appropriates all, each unto its own, that is why Heidegger sees it as "that region which regions all." 89

1.4 The Notion of Historicity as a Hermeneutical Structure of Self-Becoming, or Self-Presencing of Being, Time and Man. Circular Structure Not Closed but Free and Open

The interpretation that historicity is an event by which Being presences itself, or comes to be the self it already is, or that "Time times" itself in working-out explicitly the unity of its three ecstatics, past, present and future, or that man projects himself upon his has-been ontological ecstaticities or ontological possibilities, does not in any way mean that any of these is predetermined and restricted as if it is a watertight, closed happening, although there is a great tendency for one to see the event of historicity as a closed event. Yet the whole process is a free and open task.

89. Ibid.
Nevertheless, more explanation is needed to clarify the entire event. One cannot, for example, deny an element of fate (Schicksal) that accompanies the way Heidegger describes the historicity of Being, that is, the self-presencing of Being, or of Time and of Man. Being is (if one may be permitted to speak of "is" at all) only insofar as it is unconcealing and concealing itself, therefore it is as an unconcealing-concealing Geschick. This is Being's nature and it cannot not (that is, refuse to) be its nature. To the extent that such is true, it can be claimed that Being is fated to be itself, that is, it is destined to unconceal and conceal itself, to come to be what it is, by nature. But that is all there is to say about the fateful nature of Being. A clear distinction must be drawn between two important things prevailing in the historicity of Being, described as self-presencing: 1. That there is an element of Geschick inherent in the nature of Being's self-presencing, is undeniable, because Being by nature cannot but come to be itself. On the other hand, the entire self-presencing event can take a course in which Being comes to be itself not authentically as its nature stipulates or can presence itself but reservedly. An example of Being's reserved presencing can be found in Chapter Five in the interpretation of Stefan George's poem, "Words." Here, the withdrawing unto itself became a unique sort of its unconcealment that made the poet come home sad and empty-handed with no treasure in his hand, because he had no name for it. The "un-presencing" or the absence of Name, which meant the disappearance of the treasure in the poet's hand, was at once a presencing, but a peculiar one though.
Peculiar because Name (Being) never came; he never got a name for the treasure. Name never presented so the treasure disappeared at once because of lack of name, and this lack of name was an un-presencing of Being, therefore an absence of name for it (the poet's treasure), and the poet-wanderer lost his treasure and came home looking sad and empty-handed. But this "un-presencing," this "self-withholding," this self-concealing of Being, was at once a presencing after all, because it is precisely in this very absence or lack of name, in this "not-coming presencing" self-withholding lack of name, this self-concealment of Being, that the poet learns Renunciation. More on this, however, can be found in Chapter Five, but for now it suffices to say that Being's presencing here was exactly the opposite of the "usual" self-unconcealing, and the self-concealing. In other words, it is exactly the opposite, so Being's self-unconcealing self-concealing Geschick is not closed and unfree but Being may present itself anyhow. In other words, Being's historicity can come to pass anyhow it chooses and it can also be just as inauthentic, in which case Being comes to be either as (on the one hand) meant by man, e.g., transcendental subject, Geist, etc., or as reified as being this or that thing or (on the other hand) as authentic as it is in itself.

However, just as it is possible for Being to unconceal and conceal itself anyhow, or conversely to conceal and unconceal itself anyhow, authentically or not, so must one understand that the whole event of Being's historicity is not a closed, predetermined happening. Therefore, 2. Being's self-presencing or self-unpresencing is an open possibility of Being in that it can
project itself upon its open possibilities anyhow, and authentically or inauthentically. In view of this, it is very critical to distinguish two things happening here: 1. the active presencing or unpresenc-ing event itself that can happen anyhow from 2. the (Geschick) nature of Being. Its nature (the latter) is to unconceal and conceal itself or to do the converse, and this is what is described as historicity. But the actual, explicit, and active event itself (hence the hyphen in the verb presenc-ing or unpresenc-ing, understood in the present indicative active sense) is not historicity but historiciz-ing, and historiciz-ing is not a predetermined, closed event, but an open free task. The distinction here then is between historicity and historicizing. The latter is an open possibility in assuming which Being can (the word "can" here should eliminate any understanding of unfreedom and restrictiveness from the happening of the event) become itself anyhow, and authentically or not. The former describes the nature of Being, not the presenc-ing event itself. Thus, historicity is not historiciz-ing, and vice-versa, and they must be distinguished as such. While the former describes the nature of Being, insofar as it is destined to be none other than itself, the latter describes Being's actual, explicit and active happen-ing event itself which is but an open free possibility. The noun must be distinguished from the verb. Historicity must be distinguished from historiciz-ing, and fate (Geschick) must be distinguished from a can-be open possibility, because their character and sense are not one and the same thing, since a verb is not a noun and vice-versa. Nevertheless, the claim that, struc-
turally, historicity is a hermeneutical circular event in that Being comes to be what it already is, appears to deny any notion of openness, or that its possibilities are open and free. Although attempts have been made to distinguish historicity from historiciz-ing, noun from verb, fate from a free and an open possibility, yet there seems to be a detection of contradiction here in the claim that historicity is a circular event in that Being comes to be, or Being cannot be but, itself.

One can justifiably claim that if Being cannot not be itself, and that historicity is the circular event by which Being comes to be what it already is, then this rules out completely any invocation of freedom to be otherwise than it already is or can be, therefore the sense of can be invoked herein, is insignificant, since there is really no openness or freedom here to be otherwise. The so-called possibilities then seem to be consummated, in the final analysis, in the itself that Being comes to be, therefore the whole notion of historicity being circular and open at the same time is contradictory. If historicity is circular, then it is not open, if it is the latter, then it is not the former. Otherwise, what is the meaning of the itself that it withdraws unto in concealing itself, and comes from in unconcealing itself, an unconcealing-concealing event which is characterized structurally here as circular? Or what is the meaning of circularity as intended here?

Taking the last question first (since it seems to be the troubling point here), one must not understand circularity here as indicating a case in which one travels from, say, point A and goes round about to end up right back at where one started,
that is, point A again. That is circular, but that is not what circularity means here. Circularity may have several meanings but what is meant here indicates something like a distance between two points, say A and B, on which, if one were to travel, would travel from one point, A, to another point, B. But in as much as one would rather wish to describe that as constituting a line, straight or not, such is, unfortunately, not the case, because, as strange as such may be, the two points, A and B, are constitutively one and the same thing, despite the fact that there is a distance between them. What point B is, is not different in structural constitution from what point A is, and yet there is a distance between them. In going from point A to point B, it is therefore like going from one point to another but on the same line. It is like going from oneself to oneself, yet there is a betweenness that distances the self to which one is going from the self from which one is coming (An example is Time's being "out of," "in," and "for" itself [cf. ausser-sich, an-sich und für-sich] 90.) All these stem from the fact that the two selves, though distanced, are structurally and constitutively the same. Such is the nature of the circularity intended here. It is purely a structural constitution.

Taking a typical Heideggerian work to articulate this notion of structural constitutional circularity, one must recall Heidegger's interpretation of, say, Death. Death, he insists everywhere, is not as one normally takes it to be, namely a termination of life. It is a Fact, an ontologi-

90. Sein und Zeit, p. 329.
cal Fact of human existence, and it is what he describes as a potentiality for authentic existence. Death is, for Heidegger, man's potentiality for being a whole and he sees it as man's utmost possibility that delivers man unto himself. But death is not something one someday suffers, because, as born, one, for Heidegger, is already dying. Hence, it is man's possibility but one that he is already assuming insofar as man is, that is, it is something (if it can be spoken of as "something" at all) man is already exist-ing, but this exist-ing can be just as authentic or inauthentic. Death then is given as an ontological possibility of man, an open one, in that he is free to exist it anyhow. Yet no matter how man exists it, death is also an inescapable fact of human existence. Hence, there are, on the one hand, an element of openness and freedom in the how, that is, the way and manner man exists (his exist-ing of) death, and, on the other hand, a sense of fate invoked in man's inability to escape his own most possibility, death, regardless of how he exists it; even though man can freely exist death anyhow. But where is the alleged circularity?

To illustrate it in the form of a drawing, let, in the line drawn here (A→B), A represents one point and B, the other, and let A be the point from which man begins (exists) his existence. Let B represent the point at which man's utmost Being (e.g., death) is realized. If point B is death and point A is, say, the beginning of human existence, Heidegger's point is that death begins at point A,
that is, at the beginning of human existence; because, as born, one is already dying. Hence point B is in and begins at point A, as well as vice versa. Therefore, the points (the beginning) from which man begins his existence and (the end, i.e., death) that utmost possibility toward which man projects himself, both mark a departure in which man comes from the self unto the very same self, hence the invocation of the idea of circularity talked about here. The two ends or points are not really different for Heidegger although they are distanced. Yet "It [Dasein] stretches itself along in such a way that its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching along."91 Since both points are one and in unity, the distance between them is most crucial because it is the "betweenness" which, as it were, connects the two points, A and B (or say, birth and death). Man is (that is, his Being is), this "betweenness" which he stretches along and it is this stretching along event that is described as historicizing because it is exist-ing itself; and existing is the bringing forth or the disclosing of man's own Being. It is the actual and explicit presencing of the end and the beginning at the same time in unity; and such actual and explicit disclosing stretching along of man's "betweenness" cannot be any way seen as a closed activity at all because it is the fulfilling of man's possibilities in that he can exist or become it anyhow.

The end, e.g., death, is already in the beginning and

man is already thrown into it as that which is there to be
yet taken to, but it is there in the beginning already being
taken to, so it is an "already-being in," (Gewesenheit-Gewordenheit).

Das faktische Dasein existiert gebürtig, und gebürtig stirbt
es auch schon im Sinne des Seins zum Tode. Beide "Enden"
und ihr "Zwischen" sind, solange das Dasein faktisch existiert,
und sie sind, wie es auf dem Grunde des Seins
des Daseins als Sorge einzig möglich ist. In der Einheit
von Gewordenheit und flüchtigem, bzw. vorlaufendem Sein
zum Tode "hängen" Geburt und Tod daseinsmässig "zusammen."
Als Sorge ist das Dasein das "Zwischen." 92

Thus, if the beginning and end, e.g., birth and death,
are one in the "betweenness," then man is this betweenness.

But this is where time comes in. If again, point B represents
what man is yet to be, e.g., his ownmost future possibility,
i.e., death, and calls it by Heidegger's ontological name
Existentiality, whose meaning lies in the future, and if
point A is past, but past as "having been-in already" and calls
it by Heidegger's ontological name, Facticity, one can see
that past as having-been-in-already and future are one, be-
because point B, future is already included in, and begins at
Point A, and it is being existed simultaneously with present
and having-been, and yet it is as if it is yet to be existed.
The present, however, is the actual and explicit existing
of the whole line itself, that is, the unity of past and future,

92. Sein und Zeit, p. 374. ("Factual Dasein exists
as born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense
of Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein factically exists,
both the "ends" and their "between" are, and they are in the
only way which is possible on the basis of Dasein's Being
as care. Thrownness and that Being towards death in which
one either flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and
in this unity birth and death are "connected" in a way
characteristic of Dasein. As care, Dasein is the "between.")
( emphasis added)
as birth and death, and present is the betweenness, so the unity of time's three ecstases is actually in the present indicative, active presenc-ing, that is, exist-ing (hence the hyphen) of the betweenness with which Heidegger calls stretch-ing along, and which is called here exist-ing or becom-ing. Yet what man is becoming, or existing, is himself (the point B which is already included in point A, so that together one gets "betweenness") that is, his possibilities (death, tradition, etc.) he already is. This is not to say that he is not becoming something new but the same old self he al-ready was. Nor is this meant to say that the existing of man's betweenness which he is, is a closed-in circle. What he already is, is what he is already constituted, it is what he is thrown into and which begins not at a later date or at different time as one, for instance, usually sees death by fleeing it; but begins right at the beginning. Hence what he already is, only indicates an ontological structural constitution in that what man is coming to, is what he is already thrown into, as already-being-in.

The betweenness is rather the actual and explicit exist-ing, Heidegger prefers presencing, or (in Being and Time) stretching along. This is why Heidegger writes: "Die spezifische Bewegtheit des erstreckten Sicherstreckens nennen wir das Geschehen des Daseins"\(^{93}\) (very noticeable here is the fact that

\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 375. ("The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its historicizing."
the word being stressed here is historicizing, not historicity because the noun is not the verb and while the noun is given as a gift, i.e., death, its presencing is an open free task, full of possibilities free and open, and man can exist or stretch it anyhow).

Again, one must notice that what man (here called Dasein) stretches along is himself. It is himself that he stretches along, not another's, but what then is this himself, or Sicherstreckens in the case of Dasein? Is it not what Dasein already is? Is it not what it is in-already? Is it not what it is already thrown into? Is it not what Heidegger describes as already-being-in? Is it not death, tradition, Language, temporality, etc., into which Dasein is thrown (Geworfenheit)?

"In der Einheit von Geworfenheit und flüchtigem, bzw. vorlaufendem Sein zum Tode 'hängen' Geburt und Tod daseinsmüsig 'zusammen'. Als Sorge ist das Dasein das Zwischen." 94 Is it not all those ontological facticities, temporality, death, Language, Mit-sein, etc., etc., of which man is already constituted, as being-in-already?

The answer to these rhetorical questions is, of course, "yes, it is," but the most significant point these rhetorical questions seek to convey is that "das Geschehen des Daseins," 95 must not be taken to be Geschichtlichkeit itself because the actual presencing of the latter is the former and this is

94. Ibid., p. 374. ("Throwness and Being towards death in which one either flees or anticipates it, form a unity, and in this unity birth and death are 'connected' in a way characteristic of Dasein. As Care, Dasein is the 'between'.")

95. Ibid., p. 375. ("The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches along, we call its historicizing.")
why Heidegger is able to use such expressions as "Time times," 96 
"space spaces" 96a or "temporality temporalizes itself," 97 
"the historicizing of historicity," 98 "Language speaks," 99 
"world worlds," 100 and many such expressions.

One can, in view of this important distinction, understand why Heidegger, in almost all his writings, especially his writings on the pre-Socratics, has taken so much pain attempting to describe Being in terms both of its active-presencing event, and also as presence. "Presence presences" or "the presencing of what is present," 101 "The saying speaks of what is presence and its presencing," 102 all these unfamiliar expressions are meant to show that "Being is presence in its presencing." In other words, the verb is the actual unconcealing-concealing event or its converse which comes to pass. It is historicizing, whereas the noun presence is a designation of the nature of Being as presence, that is, as historicity. But it is historicity that historicizes, or presence that presences itself. The noun historicity, or presence, is not a thing though. The noun is a description of the nature of Being which is actively invoked in the verbal

96. On the Way to Language, p. 106. 96a. Ibid.

97. Being and Time, p. 401; Sein und Zeit, p. 350.

98. Being and Time, p. 440; Sein und Zeit, p. 388.


101. Early Greek Thinking, pp. 36-37.

102. Ibid., a translation of Anaximander's fragment in Holzwege, Der Spruch des Anaximander.
sense of the -ing, so even though the noun is not the verb, it is the noun that presences, that is, gives us the verb.

It is impossible actually to separate them except, of course, for explanatory purposes as exhibited here. But another way of explaining it is that the noun, presence, is like, say, death, language, the ontological facticities, none of which is a thing or things. But each is a "house" or a "shelter" of Being and Being presences itself in them because death, or language, itself is what presences Being. Presence and presencing are ontologically one and the same but the latter is the actual coming to be -- the unconcealing-concealing or its converse -- of the former. But the verb is, as contradictory as it may seem, not the noun because the noun is like death, tradition or any of the ontological facticities, all of which are given to man as his Schicksal. But Geschehen is not fate, closed and pretermined destiny about which man is unfree and cannot do anything. The verb or Geschehen is be-ing, or exist-ing and the difference is that it is open, free and full of possibilities, man can (because he is able to and free to) exist it anyhow. He can, for example, flee from death or meet it boldly. He can choose to be in the "they" and prattle; or can be his truer self and let language speak through him. In short, existing is not closed and predetermined but free and open. Existing is disclosedness, while existence, the noun, is given. But to emphasize more on the stretching itself along, the most fundamental point lies not so much (although equally and primoridially fundamental too) in the two extreme points, the "from-which" and the
"towards-which," as in "the betweenness" of the wherefrom and the whereto. The betweenness is what is, as said earlier, herein called the exist-ing, putting more emphasis on the present indicative active sense, because exist-ing, is the actual (though equiprimordial with having-been and future), and explicit presencing of, that is, the actual and explicit projection of man upon his own being, in that he is free and open to be it, that is, to exist it anyhow. Thus, exist-ing itself is not tied down to this or that, but it is as disclosedness or presenc-ing, always (man) projecting himself anyhow upon his possibilities. But it must also be remembered as well that in as much as exist-ing itself is free and open, and it is man's possibilities that can be fulfilled anyhow, it is also true that that (e.g., death) upon which man is projecting himself is not some strange other thing, but that (e.g., death) which man's being is already constituted and into which he already-thrown, as already-in. Hence, exist-ing, which is described here as historiciz-ing is, at once, an existing of both points A and B; and it describes coming to constitute, or better yet, it is constitut-ing that (e.g., death or Tradition etc.) of which man's being is already structurally pre-constituted right at the onset.

It must be remembered, however, that historicity -- which has been interstated here as an event by which man (exists) comes to be the self he already is, or Being comes to be the self it already is -- does not have in it any notion according to which neither man nor Being would be unfree and
restricted in fulfilling his or its utmost possibilities. The circularity that is involved in the coming of the self unto itself is not a closed one, but a constitutive structural ontological fact in that the two points of a beginning (self-unconcealment and self-concealment or the converse) and an end (or the converse) (assuming one can speak in those terms) are really one in structural constitution. Each constitutes the other, and both are existed simultaneously, so the "where-from" and the "where-to" constitute one singular, equiprimordial event in existing. Existing is the actual and explicit free and open fulfillment of man's possibilities that can be done anyhow. The same is true of Being also but there can be no historicity, man's or Being's without time determining it. Time must therefore necessarily enter into the picture. How time determines the historicity of Being or of man is expressed in its self-temporalization, but this is interpreted more fully in Chapter Four.
CHAPTER TWO

THE MAIN ISSUES

2.0 A Short Introduction

Chapter One -- which is an introduction to the thesis -- has made, among others, two most fundamental claims, namely that 1. existence, as noun, is historicity and historicity is, in turn, described as a hermeneutical circular structure in which the self, be it man, Being or Time, comes to be what it already is; and 2. that existing -- with emphasis on the present indicative active sense -- as a verb, is the Happening historicity event itself, which is described here as historicizing, the noun, historicity.

Given 1 and 2, an important distinction has been made between the noun historicity and the verb historicizing, and as odd as it may seem, one can use both the noun and the verb to say that: "man historicizes his historicity," or that Temporality temporali-izes its temporality or Time times itself. No doubt such expressions are themselves Heideggerian, and one has only to turn to Being and Time, sections 64, 74 and 75, to find them all over, or On the Way to Language, page 106 to find the latter one. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger writes:

Die spezifische Bewegtheit des ERSTRECKTEN SICHERSTRECKENS nennen wir das GESCHEHEN des Daseins. Die Frage nach dem "Zusammenhang" des Daseins ist das ontologische Problem seines Geschehens. Die Freilegung der GESCHEHENSGERÜCKTEN UND IHR EXIS-
That there is a distinction to be carefully drawn between the verb, *Geschichte*, and the noun, *Geschichtlichkeit*, is fundamental in understanding the structural constitution of historicity either of man's, Being's or Time's. This is why one finds "strange" expressions as "Temporality temporizing itself," "historiciz-ing of historicity," etc. What this distinction brings out is that the verb historiciz-ing itself is what Heidegger describes as the actual, specific or explicit stretching along, in that man stretches himself along its possibilities, and thus historiciz-ing in the verbal sense, is a disclosing (an open and a free), activity that can be (existed) done anyhow. Historiciz-ing is, in fact, the free and open projection of man on his possibilities, so it is not a closed but a disclosing aperture.

But the noun, historicity itself, is different although it is not a name of anything or any being as such. The noun, historicity itself, is the fateful ground constituting man's utmost Being because "...das Sein des Daseins grundsätzlich geschichtlich ist..." so historicity is, as Schicksal, what constitutes man's being, and he cannot not be what he is already constitutive of. Man cannot but be it (historicity) but how he (be) exists it, is another question.

1. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 375. ("The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its historicizing. The question of Dasein's 'connectedness' is the ontological problem of Dasein's historicizing. To lay bare the structure of historicizing, and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one had achieved an ontological understanding of historicity.")

2. Ibid., p. 392. ("...Dasein's Being is in principle historical.")
Man can be it, that is, historicize it, anyhow, because being it, is freedom, openness and disclosedness in that man can -- because he is able to -- anticipate himself, project himself, stretch himself in any way he wishes, but he cannot not be it. Hence, in sum, the distinction drawn between historiciz-ing and historicity is only a formal distinction drawn between:

1. freedom and fate, 2. openness-disclosedness, and a given destined structural constitution, 3. the actual and explicit stretch-ing along, and that which is so done, 4. exist-ing and existence, 5. an open free task, and a gift or fate.

Chapter Two deals with what has been called in this disserta-
tion the ontological facticities. They all are nouns as is historicity. They are as gifts or destinies given to man and man fatefully constitutes or receives them. Heidegger writes that:

They are given to us, of many kinds. But the highest and really most lasting gift given to us is always our essential nature with which we are gifted in such a way that we are what we are only through it. That is why we owe thanks for this endowment, first and unceasingly.

The point being made here, however, is that they are not gifts one can dispense with. Like death or historicity, for example, they are, as Schicksal. As facticity,

Der Begriff der "Faktizität" beschliesst in sich: das In-
der-Welt-Sein eines "innerweltlichen" Seienden, so zwar, dass sich dieses Seiende verstehen kann als in einem "Geschick" verhaftet mit dem Sein des Seienden, das ihm inner-
halt seiner eigenen Welt begegnet.

3. What is Called Thinking?, p. 142, emphasis added.

4. Sein und Zeit p. 56, emphasis added. ("The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity "within-the-world" has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself
They are the very ontological constitution of man's being and he cannot not be (exist) them, being or existing them is, however, another matter. Very constitutive of man's own most being, the ontological facticities are man's given possibilities which, once born, he is already existing. Death is a prime example of the ontological facticities, for "Das Sterben gründet hinsichtlich seiner ontologischen Möglichkeit in der Sorge"\(^5\) (care) and "Das Dasein stirbt faktisch, solange as existsit..."\(^6\) Death is, in Heidegger's words, man's own "Da"\(^7\) and so is tradition which, as man's heritage, is handed down to him and he takes to it as immediately as is the case with death. The same is true of all the facticities, because "If Dasein [man] exists, it [man] has already been thrown into its possibility"\(^8\) and Heidegger goes on to say: "...Ich bin-gewesen."\(^9\) They are called facticities because they constitute man's Being as something in which he already finds himself. Heidegger describes it as "already-being-in." For example, man is already in death, in tradition, etc., but death is constitutively man's own most Being -- as his own most possibility -- upon which he may project (exist) himself in bold

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5. Ibid., p. 252. ("Dying is grounded in Care as its ontological possibility.")

6. Ibid., p. 251. "Dasein is dying as long as it exists."

7. Ibid., p. 391.


9. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 328. ("I am as having-been.")
acceptance of it as in anticipatory resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) or shrug it off being indifferent to it. But (existing) projecting oneself upon one's possibilities, e.g., death, in which one had already-being-in, is existing itself, because it is the actual assumption of man's constitutive Being, e.g., death, to which he is free and open, and it can be done anyhow.

But it can also be argued that other things such as a human head, brain, fatherhood or motherhood can be used in place of what is herein called ontological facticities. Besides, Heidegger himself does not explicitly call them ontological facticities, although he describes them as ontological facticities. For example, if one draws the line again from A to B: A —— B, and represents B with all the ontological facticities, e.g., death, tradition, etc., i.e.,

A —— B

Death, Tradition, Poetry, Language, Art, Historicity, Temporality, Thinking, Seinsverständnis, Mit-Sein

and says that all these ontological facticities in B are man's gifted and constitutive possibilities in which he is, as "already-being-in," can the same thing not be said of, say, man's brain, legs, or of being a father or mother? In other words, can B not be replaced by other things such as head, brains, being a father, mother, etc., and say of them that they are also man's given possibilities to which he takes as his "already-being-in?" The same case can be made. For example, one can refuse to have children and not be a father,
or mother, it is a possibility one has and can exist it in different ways. One is free in that respect. But that is all there is to it because one cannot really refuse being any of the ontological facticities, one has to exist them, although the way and manner in which one exists them is free and open. Existing them is an act of disclosing in which one is free to be true to oneself, to be bold, resolute and acknowledge one's throwness into them, or one is again free to do otherwise.

Again, a case can be made to the effect that in as much as one may likely be born, say, without brains or head, the same is not true of the ontological facticities because, as born or dead, one already has or has had them and that is the meaning of the "already-being in," and those biological things cannot be seen just as evenly without missing a significant point about the being of man. As born, one is already-in tradition, death, language, etc., even the dead was, but (how) the way and manner one (existed) exists them (projects oneself upon them, as one's own possibilities) is entirely another matter in that one is, here, free to exist them in different ways.

With the help of understanding, man can anticipate them resolutely or irresolutely, man is free in all that because existing itself is a free and an open disclosedness through and through.

Another reason why they are called facticities is that, besides being a gifted, fated constitution of man, the ontological facticities, given as "already-being-in," are man's Beings in which he is thrown. Here throwness is the critical
factor, and thrownness or being thrown becomes one of the
two basic existential characteristics of the being of man.
The other is projectness, but thrownness (Geworfenheit)
refers to the facticity of the being of man, being handed
over to him. In respect of thrownness, Heidegger thus
writes: "Imgleichen meint das 'Schon' den existenzialen zeitlichen
Seinsinn des Seienden, das, sofern es IST, je schon Geworfenes ist." 10
Heidegger continues to claim that:

\[\text{Nur weil Sorge in der Gewesenheit gründet, kann das Dasein als das geworfene Seiende, das es ist, existieren. "Solange das Dasein faktisch existiert, ist es nie vergangen, wohl aber immer schon GEWESEN im Sinne des "ich bin-gewesen." Und es KANN nur gewesen SEIN, solange es IST... Es [Dasein] "findet sich" immer nur als geworfenes Faktum.} \]

Thus, thrownness, for Heidegger, represents the existential
character of "having-been," yet this having-been is not past
(als Vergangenheit) but that which always is, as having-been.
This having-been is what Heidegger describes as facticity.
It characterizes "already-being-in." The ontological fac-
ticities, in the same way, characterize man's being as that
in which he is, as "already-being-in."

Just as in the line $\text{A} \rightarrow \text{B}$, B is already included in, and
begins at, A, e.g., as born, one is already in death, and is already

10. Ibid., p. 328, emphasis added. ("Likewise, with the 'already' we have in view the existential temporal meaning of the Being of that entity which, insofar as it is, is already something that has been thrown.")

11. Ibid., my emphasis added. ("Only because care is based on the character of 'having-been', can Dasein exist as a thrown entity which it is. 'As long as' Dasein factually exists, it is never past (Vergangen), but it always is indeed as already having been in the sense of the "I am-as-having-been." And only as long as Dasein is, can it be as having been... it never 'finds itself' except as a thrown Fact.")
dying, so is the case with the ontological facticities. Hence, they are called facticities, not that Heidegger calls them so, but because they are described as man's given Being into which he is thrown, that is, which he is "already-in." But "being-in-already" in those ontological facticities is one thing. Existing them, or taking to them is completely another thing, since here, one is free to exist them in different ways, although one cannot separate them except for explanatory purposes. For, existing is the existing of man's Being which he is "in already" (being-in-already), that is, it is the existing of those ontological facticities. Existing itself is a disclosing of those Beings (the ontological facticities) in which man is "already-in." In this disclosing act, existing comes as an unconcealing of these (man's) Beings, in regard to which man can be -- because he is free and able to be, thanks to understanding -- bold, resolute and anticipate himself, be true to himself, or he is also free to do otherwise, that is, to be untrue to himself and simply exist in the "they." As said earlier, thrownness, as having-been-in-already, is only one existential characteristic of man, the other is projectedness and both make man a "thrown-projected" Being. Heidegger's way of putting it goes thus:

Nur Seiendes, das wesenhaft in seinem Sein ZUKÜNFTIG ist, so dass es frei für seinen Tod an ihm zerschellend auf sein faktisches Da sich ZURÜCKWERFEN lassen kann, das heißt nur Seiendes, das als ZUKÜNFTIGES gleichursprünglich GEWESEN ist, Kann, sich selbst die ererbte Möglichkeit überliefernd [e.g., Tradition], die eigene GEWORFENHEIT übernehmen und
More on this, however, shall come later; now it suffices to conclude that the ontological facticities are called so because: 1. they are man's gifted and constitutive Beings in which he is, as already-being-in and already thrown into them; and they are, as his thrown-possibilities which he is existing, or yet to exist. 2. But existing is free, open and is the disclosing of man's Being happening in the disclosure of those Beings, the ontological facticities, of which he is already constituted, or into which he is already thrown. 3. The ontological facticities are man's already-being-in possibilities whose primary existential meaning in facticity lies in the character of "having-been," something that has-been in the expression of "already." 4. Yet this "already," this "having-been-in," has a character of future in Heidegger because he writes:

\textit{Die Gewesenheit entspringt der Zukunft, so zwar, dass die gewesene (besser gewesende) ZUKUNFT DIE GEGENWART AUS SICH entlässt. Dies dergestalt als gewesend-gegenwärtige Zukunft einheitliche \text{Phänomen} nennen wir die \text{ZEITLICHKEIT}.}  

12. Ibid., p. 385, emphasis added. ("Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural, so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual there, by shattering itself against death, that is, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and in the moment of vision for "its time." Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate, that is, authentic historicality.")


14. \textit{Sein und Zeit}, p. 326, emphasis added. ("The character
Having a futural/character, "having-been" facticities are, as future possibilities, hence one can describe them as "future-having-been" possibilities. It appears strange but that is what Heidegger means, and this is why those ontological facticities are described here as future-having-been possibilities given already and yet having a futural character as well.

For:

Das eigentliche Auf-sich-Zukommen der vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit ist zumal ein Zurückkommen auf das eigene, in seine Vereinzelung geworfene Selbst....Diese Ekstase ermöglicht es, dass das Dasein entschlossen das Seiende, DAS SCHON IST, übernehmen kann. 15

At any rate, this chapter relays the main issues with which the thesis deals under different headings in the remaining chapters.

2.1 Being-in-the-World, Ontological Facts, The Repetitive StructuralCircularity of Historicity and the Issue of "Becom-ing"

Throughout his philosophical works, Heidegger concerns himself with the question of the meaning of Being of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" (or better which "is in the process of having been") releases from itself the Present. The phenomenon has a unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been: we name it as Temporality.

15. Ibid., p. 339. ("The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back-to one's ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its own self....This ecstasy makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is.")
(die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein). Dealing with this question, he encounters the being of man with whom he begins his entire hermeneutics of Being. About man, Heidegger maintains that his basic state and unitary structure consists in "Being-in-the-world,"¹⁶ (in-der-Welt-Sein), in whose thorough explanation Being and Time consists.

Besides Being-in-the-world, Heidegger postulates other fundamental constituents of man, but all, nevertheless, explicate man's basic state and unitary structure: Being-in-the-world. With it, or from it, come such ontological Facts, as Mit-Sein, Sein-zum Tode and Seinsverständnis. In addition to these, there are also the Facts of Tradition, Temporality, Language, Historicity, Poetry, Art, and Thinking. Together I call them the "ontological facticities"¹⁷ of man.

The ontological facticities do not constitute Heidegger's notion of "Existentialia"¹⁸ in terms of which man's charac-

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¹⁶. Being and Time, p. 78.

¹⁷. These ontological facticities are not just simple truisms. Heidegger says that:
Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being—-one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside. The 'that-it-is' of facticity never becomes something that we come across by beholding it. (Being and Time, p. 174)

This characteristic of Dasein's Being—-this "that it is"—-is veiled in its "whence and whither," yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the thrownness of this entity into its "there"; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the "there." The expression "thrownness" is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over. (Ibid.)

¹⁸. Ibid., pp. 70-72.
ter of Being is defined. Therefore, "existentials" is not the same thing as, nor interchangeable with, what is intended here as "ontological facticities." What these ontological facticities are, and why they are called so, are elucidated elsewhere in the thesis. For now, however, it can be held that man's character of Being, defined in terms of what Heidegger calls "Existentialia" as distinguished from, and opposed to the character of being of other entities known as "categories,"

19 cannot be taken to constitute the very in-Being of man himself; which is what the ontological facticities are. The ontological facticities constitute man's "in-Being." In the first place, the character of man's "in-Being" is not man's in-Being itself of which the character is a character. For these "Beings" (ontological facticities) are the Being of man in which he already is as his Geworfenheit and Gewesenheit Da regardless of anything. For example, man is in "Death," not because he dies nor because he, as a biologically living being, is a mortal, but because he exists Death, resolutely or not, authentically or not. "Existing" Death means bringing Death to presence, or presencing Death, and man is the only being who can do that, and he can do that because here again, he is the only being so uniquely constituted as to be able to do that. That is why Heidegger writes:

...death is the shelter of Being. We call mortals mortals -- not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death. Mortals are who they are, as mortals,
present in the shelter of Being and they are the presencing relation to Being as Being. 20

A mortal is the only being who brings, and can bring, because of his unique privileged constitution, Being to presence. Man can do that because of his Seinsverständnis which, given its structural components, enables man, as an openness to Being, to open himself up for the disclosure of death (Being) in whose disclosure, man is also therein disclosed or delivered unto himself as well. In all these, man can be bold and (or) resolved to its disclosure, or flee from it. Again he is able to do even this (the latter), because of the same Seinsverständnis which enables him to anticipate himself, foresee and choose to do or fulfill his Being, and he can choose to flee the openness and disclosure of death, but this is just as fulfilling also, though irresolute and inauthentic.

Another example is Seinsverständnis itself. It is man's unique privileged constitutive Being by, in, through and with which he exists, that is, discloses himself in fulfilling his possibilities. Yet, in as much as man is in it, or better yet, man is it (his unique Being is it) and is always presupposed in all human activities, man, however, is, for the most part, still oblivious to it, and some would even deny its presence; or if not, then entreat one to get rid of it, because it prejudices one's ability to be impartial in the ascertaining and adjudication of some given facts, or state of affairs.

Secondly, if the ontological facticities are taken

to be one and the same as Heidegger's "existentialia" then difficulty arises as to why, for instance, poetry, Art, Language, etc., etc., all are included in it, since these are not so in Being and Time. But such need not be, because the ontological facticities and Heidegger's "existentialia" are not numerically or mathematically the same. Ontological facticities denote Beings in which man's being is already constituted, and of which it is the constitution. This being so, then some of them, not all of them, are brought and examined in Being and Time, e.g., death, Being-with, etc., whereas others are thematized later. But finding and grouping them all together, one finds some in Being and Time and others in later writings. In talking about the essential nature of man, Heidegger, in paraphrasing him, says "We are what we are only through what we are gifted with, our essential nature is what we are gifted with, we receive then many gifts, of many kinds."21

The gifts, of many kinds, which we receive are what is called and meant in this thesis as the ontological facticities. These gifts are: Thinking, Language, Seinsverständnis, Tradition, etc., etc. But they are not material and reifiable gifts from friends, relatives or enemies, but are ontological gifts in which man's Being is constituted, and of which it is the constitution.

Thirdly, facticity itself is a "technical" word in Heidegger and it cannot be taken in just any sense, other

than the sense or senses Heidegger himself has given to it. The word first appears in Being and Time²², Sein und Zeit.²³ Of it, Heidegger says that "Whenever Dasein is, it is a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's facticity."²⁴ But "This is a definite way of Being ... and it has a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped as a problem until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out."²⁵ Not much then can be said now, except that it cannot be denied that whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact and the facticity of this fact that Dasein is, is facticity. But then Heidegger goes on to give what that implies: "The concept of facticity implies that an entity "within-the-world" has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its "destiny" with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world."²⁵a This implication is important for three reasons: 1. In being a being whose basic Being is in Being-in-the-world, man, (Dasein here) because of the fact that he is in the world, is able to understand himself as he who is given to be in and amid (and this is man's destiny), other beings (and this could be his own kind, or say, things), in spite of himself (and Man cannot do anything about that), because the mere fact of Being-in-the-world means that one is in

²² Being and Time, p. 82.
²³ Sein und Zeit, p. 56.
²⁴ Being and Time, p. 82.
²⁵ Ibid.
²⁵a Ibid.
it with others, his kind or not. Hence, his Being is naturally bound up in his destiny with others. 2. Because of this implication, facticity brings out one fundamental dimension of the fact of Being-in-the-world, namely "Being-with" either entities or beings of his kind. 3. Another equally fundamental aspect of the fact of Being-in-the-world, is the fact of "destiny" (Geschick) and its character of the "can do nothing about" or "being bounded up with"; and this is something man himself can understand, because that is what the quotation says.

One of the most fundamental senses which "facticity," as used in the thesis, is given to have, is that it is a basic constitution of man that comes with or from the fact of Being-in-the-world. With or from Being-in-the-world, some elements of destiny (Geschick) or (Schicksal) -- (such as: 1. being born to be "something," or being born to be or become "something," or being born into something in spite of oneself, and one cannot do anything to change it, but it is that which is given for one to take to, or to be it, like it or not; 2. being given something despite oneself, and this something is so given already in advance of one that, as one's very own, as one's own Gewesenheit, a Geworfenheit, one must take to it as long as it constitutes one's ownmost Being, or as long as one is born, or as long as one exists) -- are in place here, and rightly so, the ontological facticities are given to be understood as described above. They are given as Geschick in which human existence is constituted, and of which human existing is a constitution, that is, human existing itself is the actual existing or disclosing of them.
But thus understood, then human existence is seen as though it were a predetermined, closed and unfree thing, all of which is contrary to Heidegger's view of human existence which is open, free and all possibilities, and given as if lying ahead of man waiting to be explored, or towards which man is heading and disclosing himself through and through. Human existence is free, open and is a disclosedness through and through of man's not-yet possibilities, on which he projects or can project himself in anticipatory resoluteness or can do otherwise. As difficult as it seems, this is also the sense in which the ontological facticities are given to be understood, but such needs to be shown.

Going back to facticity, it came to be fully explained in Section 29 of Being and Time: The Existential Constitution of the There. Here, facticity is explained as a characteristic of man's Being but it has already been taken up into existence. In this regard Heidegger writes:

*Faktizität ist nicht die Tatsächlichkeit des factum brutum eines Vorhandenen, sondern ein in die Existenz aufgenommener, wenngleichenzunächst abgedrängter Seinscharakter des Daseins.*

But what sort of character is it? Heidegger answers that facticity is meant to suggest the character of *thrownness.* Man is his "There," the "Whither" and "Whence," both are his, as his "there" into which he is thrown, and because of which man is this thrownness, thus Heidegger writes:

26. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 135. ("Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being one that has been taken up into existence even if proximally it has been thrust aside.")
Diesen in seinem Woher and Wohin verhüllten, aber an ihm selbst um so unverhüllter erschlossenen Seinscharakter des Daseins, dieses "Dass er ist," nennen wir die GEWORFENHEIT dieses Seienden in Sein Da, so zwar, dass es als In-der-Welt-Sein das Da ist. Der Ausdruck Geworfenheit soll die FAKTIZITÄT der ÜBERANTWORTUNG andeuten. 27

Facticity, having the existential character of thrownness, thus makes human existence a thrown-existence into which man is thrown, therefore human being becomes a thrown-being, thrown into his thrownness, that is, his thrown-existence in the world. This Geworfenheit sense of facticity is also the same sense intended in facticity being used here as "ontological facticities." The ontological facticities are therefore thrown-beings of man into which man is thrown, and they are man's Geworfenheit of which human existence is constituted as its "being there," so they are the "thereness" of man. A facticity is man's "there," "thrown there," "just lingering there" as his own Being; for example, death, temporality, etc. But what is thrownness, having been thrown, thrown into thrownness, and the like?

Having established facticity as Geworfenheit, Heidegger makes it constitute only one characteristic of human existence. The other ones; aside from thrownness as man's "Being-there," are projection and being-alongside-with. For the moment,

27. Ibid., p. 135, emphasis added. ("This characteristic of Dasein's Being, this "that it is" is veiled in its whence and "thereto" yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the thrownness of this being into its "there"; indeed it is thrown in such a manner that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the "there," the expression "thrownness" is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.")
however, thrownness is the issue and Heidegger makes its primary meaning come from what he calls "having-been." To this effect he writes: "Der primäre existenziale Sinn der Faktizität liegt in der Gewesenheit." 28 Facticity has a character of Geworfenheit, and as such its meaning lies in Gewesenheit, and these are exactly what the "gifts," the ontological facticities, are given to be understood. They are man's Being as Geworfenheit and Gewesenheit. As such, they are Facts. Man does not make them. Given in advance of man, they precede his being born into them. Man, as it were, pre-constitutes, or prepossesses them, even before being born into and actually taking to (becoming) them. Simply put, man is born into, and becomes, these ontological facticities of which he is already constituted. Man, therefore, only becomes what he already is; and it is in becoming them that he executes the circular, unitary and complete structure of becoming himself what he already is -- historicity.

Although the ontological facticities have been established as man's own Geworfenheit Being, man's own Gewesenheit to which man has already been delivered,

Heidegger maintains that human existence -- as constituted in Being-in-the-world -- is "...das Erschliessen der Geworfenheit,..." 29 that is, "the disclosing of thrownness," and what is this thrownness? It is, as established above, man's Being that

28. Ibid., p. 328.
29. Ibid., p. 137.
is "given there" (i.e., death, Tradition, temporality, etc.),
to which man has already been delivered; in other words,
this thrownness is those "Gewordenheit - Gewesenheit" Beings --
i.e., death, temporality, tradition, language, etc., etc.,
named simply here as the ontological facticities. If man's
Being or human existence is, as just said above, the dis-
closing of thrownness (das Erschliessen der Gewordenheit) and if
(Gewordenheit) thrownness has been established as the ontologi-
cal facticities, then the disclosing of thrownness amounts
precisely to the disclosing of the ontological facticities,
that is, it is the disclosing of what man has already been,
man's Gewesenheit. But it is precisely the disclosing of what
man has-already-been -- man's Gewordenheit, man's Gewesenheit
man's ontological facticities -- that is described here in
the thesis as the structural circular event according to which
man discloses, or comes to disclose (no other thing) what
he has already-been, his own Gewesenheit, his own Gewordenheit
his own ontological facticities. This is Heidegger's "Werde,
was du bist." 30 But this is the disclosing of man himself in
his own already-being self that he already is -- historicity.

It must be pointed out as well that what man has already
been, man's Gewesenheit, man's Gewordenheit, is not--just be-
cause it is ontologically what man has already-been--man's
past, understood as a bygone. For Heidegger strongly claims
that: "Die Gewesenheit entspringt der Zukunft, so zwar, dass die

30. Ibid., p. 145.
gewesene (besser gewesende) Zukunft die Gegenwart aus sich entlässt.\textsuperscript{31}

Having-been, in Heidegger, stems therefore from the future, not the bygone; so having-been has a futural character and sense, and Heidegger explains it further that:

\begin{quote}
Nur sofern Dasein überhaupt IST als ich BIN-gewesen, kann es zukünftig auf sich selbst so zukommen, dass es ZURÜCK-kommt. Eigentlich zukünftig IST das Dasein eigentlich GEWESEN. Das Vorlaufen in die äusserste und eigenste Möglichkeit ist das verstehende Zurückkommen auf das eigenste Gewesen. Dasein kann nur eigentlich gewesen SEIN, sofern es zukünftig ist. Die Gewesenhaft entspringt in gewisser Weise der Zukunft.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

Although the character and sense of having-been arises from the future, yet only insofar as there is a having-been, can there be a future as well. Hence, only insofar as there is a having-been can there be a coming towards, but having-been itself springs from a coming towards. Thus, the future, the not-yet, or the possible towards which man comes or is coming, because of which there is a coming towards, after all, is, or is possible after all, only because there has already been a having-been, the already-being there, the \textit{Da} of \textit{Dasein} from which man comes, or is coming. All these are, of course, meant to establish a reciprocity of an effective constitution of a having been and the future. For example, only

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p.326 ("The having-been springs from the future and in such a manner that the future which 'has been' or better yet a future which 'is in the process of having-been' releases from itself the present.")
\item \textsuperscript{32}Ibid. ("Only insofar as Dasein is as an 'I-am-as-having-been' can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back. As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as 'having-been'. Anticipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandably to one's ownmost 'been'. Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. The character of 'having-Been' arises, in a certain way, from the future.")
\end{itemize}
insofar as death, temporality, language, etc., etc. -- i.e.,
the ontological facticities -- all constitute man's Being-in-
already as his Gewesenheit, can man have all of them as his future,
not-yet possibilities towards which man comes or is coming.
Hence, only insofar as there is a having-been can there be the
possible, the not-yet, the future, but the sense and character
of having been also springs (entspringt) from the approaching, the
future (Zukunft). Thus, for example, only insofar as death con-
stitutes man's Being can man die, and the same is true of all
the ontological facticities. But it is rather death -- con-
stituting man's utmost possibility, man's not-yet, man's future,
and towards which man is heading, resolutely or irresolutely,
authentically or inauthentically -- which gives to human exis-
tence its projective character; hence making human existence,
a projection through and through, in which man is disclosed
unto himself, thus making human existence a projecting dis-
closedness through and through. The same thing death is,
and does to human existence, is also the case with all the
ontological facticities. For all (the ontological facticities)
are as: 1. man's having been, 2. man's possible, not-yet
future, 3. to use Heidegger's words, "the shelter" or "house"
of Being, 4. what delivers or discloses man unto himself and
in disclosing which Being is disclosed herein as well; and
in view of which the disclosure of man unto himself is at once
the disclosure of Being as well, because it is in the disclosure
of the latter that that of the former, man's, lies or is grounded
and depended upon; 5. having been Being of man, in projecting
or disclosing them man only projects or discloses what he already is, that is to say, in disclosing or projecting the ontological facticities man only projects himself upon himself, his own future possibilities which already constitute his Being as his having-been — Geworfenheit; and this coming to be the self one already is, this projecting of man upon the possibilities of which he is already constituted as his having-been is historicity — "Werde, was du bist." But having established that the ontological facticities are not only man's 1. "Gewesenheit-Geworfenheit" but are also — on account of 1. — man's 2. Entworfenheit, man's "approaching-not yet" future possibilities, one can now see that the facticities, as 2. are future possibilities upon which man can project himself in different ways. In this, man is free and open to disclose himself in projecting himself upon them.

Thus, the facticities come to constitute human existence in making it an open and a free disclosing of one's own possibilities in any way one chooses. Therefore, facticities constitute human existence equiprimarily as freedom endowing it with free and open possibilities in which man can — because he is free, open and able to do as he wishes — project himself in anticipatory boldness or otherwise. Human existence, in this sense, becomes a complete openness, full of freedom and a projecting through and through. Hence, only insofar as they are facticities, can man have not only a having-been Geworfenheit, but also a free and an open Entworfenheit, all of

34. Sein und Zeit, p. 145.
which make human existence become a complete openness, full of freedom and a projecting through and through of man's "Geworfenheit-Entworfenheit." To exist or project this "Geworfenheit-Entworfenheit" constitutes a structural circular process of "Werde, was du bist." 34a

2.1.1 A Historical Review: The Greeks

Historicity is circular in that both the points from which man begins and at which he arrives are constitutively united into a repetitive structural whole of becoming himself what he already is in Being-in-the-world. Very reminiscent of this structural repetitive wholeness of becoming himself — historicity — is the Platonic paradox in the *Meno*. 35 Plato here posed the problem of searching for knowledge one already has. Learning to have knowledge one already has appears pointless. But it is also impossible to learn to have knowledge of anything if one never had knowledge before of the thing one seeks to know. Trying to solve this puzzle, one gets entangled in a conundrum. Plato responded with his theory of *anamnesis*. But Aristotle, disenchanted on the surface of things with almost everything Platonic, tried, but in vain, to solve it with what has come down to us as "Aristotle's theory of science," 36 gathered and

34a. Ibid.

35. *Meno*, 80 D-E.

construcuted from such notions as *syllogismus*, *epagoge*, *katholou*, *mathematikai*, *symbebekt*, *kata pantos*, *kath'auto*, *nous*, etc.

Aristotle raised this Meno paradox again in *Posterior Analytics* (Bk 71a.25-30) and retorted that learning is a process of reasoning from major and minor premises to arrive at conclusions. In other words, learning is a process of *syllogismus* which involves a passage from previous knowledge, that is, "potential knowledge," to "new" or "demonstrative knowledge." Knowledge as *'epistême* for Aristotle then is "demonstrative knowledge" or the "actualized knowledge" (or "science"), but not as Plato gives *'epistême* to be understood.

For Plato, *epistême* involves a vision of reality (the

37. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk II, XIX, 100b, 5. "...alethê d'âei ἐπιστήμη kai nous, kai oudên ἐπιστῆμες ἄκριβεστερόν ἄλλο γένος ἐν οὖσσ ...." The main argument may be put thus: It is by the faculty of intuition that the first principles are apprehended. Now of the intellectual faculties that we use in the pursuit of truth some (e.g., scientific knowledge and intuition) are always true, whereas others (e.g., opinion and calculation) admit falsity; and no other kind of knowledge except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge. Also, first principles are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge involves reason. It follows that there can be no scientific knowledge of the first principles; and since nothing can be more infallible than scientific knowledge except intuition, it must be intuition that apprehends the first principles. This is evident not only from the foregoing considerations but also because the starting point of demonstration is not itself demonstration, and so the starting-point of scientific knowledge is not itself scientific knowledge. Therefore, since we possess no other infallible faculty besides scientific knowledge, the source from which such knowledge starts must be intuition. Thus it will be the primary source of scientific knowledge that apprehends the first principles, while scientific knowledge as a whole is similarly related to the whole world of facts.
Forms); but to obtain it, the self, on its own, must struggle (as Socrates does with the slave-boy in *The Meno*), to come into direct communion and have immediate acquaintance with the true beings (the Forms) themselves. Plato would thus call Aristotle's view of knowledge, seen as the "new demonstrative-actualized knowledge," *endoxa*. But having rejected Plato's Forms and almost anything that has anything to do with them, Aristotle was faced with finding his own way to tell us how one comes to have knowledge one already has, that is, how one passes from "potential knowledge" to "actualized knowledge." Through *syllogismus*, Aristotle thought he had solved the Meno paradox, but when attacked by Antisthenes and Zenocrates (the second successor, after Plato's nephew, Speusippus, to the Platonic Academy), he finally took recourse to the *Nous* in answer to them.

Zenocrates had objected that there is really no "new knowledge" obtained by the process of *syllogismus* as claimed by Aristotle. For the so-called "new or demonstrative knowledge," which, for Aristotle, is the conclusion derived from its premises, adds just nothing to the premises. Its truth and validity are already thought through the identity of these premises from which it is derived. The whole reasoning process (*syllogismus*) is therefore a repetitive and circular pro-


39. Ibid.
cess of statements proving each other, the conclusion proving the truth and validity of the premises, and the premises containing already in itself the truth and validity of the conclusion; therefore, the whole syllogistic argument of Aristotle is nothing but repetitive and circular -- so charged Zenocrates.

Antisthenes, on the other hand, charged that the whole syllogistic argument leads to a process ad infinitum, if Aristotle is pressed to show the source of his "previous or potential knowledge" which forms the premises from which the whole reasoning process begins. For Aristotle however, not every knowledge is "demonstrative knowledge," only knowledge as science is, for the previous or potential knowledge, which forms the premises of syllogism, is not demonstrable. The potential knowledge of the premise is composed of first principles which are independent of demonstration, therefore beyond and superior to "demonstrative knowledge," and these principles are (to use Aristotle's terms): 1. Axioms; 2. Hypothesis; and 3. Definition. Axioms, for Aristotle, have these characteristics: 1. indemonstrable, 2. common to all sciences, 3. necessary true, and 4. an example of an axiom is the principle of excluded middle, or every event has a cause, etc. Definitions are: 1. indemonstrable and 2. give the significance of a thing. Hypotheses are: 1. particulars, 2. indemonstrable, and 3. give the existence of a thing. Every demonstration, for Aristotle, presupposes Definition, Axioms and Hypothesis and "potential knowledge" is one
that is expressed in the major and minor premises in which these Axioms, Hypothesis and Definition are signified. "Scientific knowledge" or "demonstrative knowledge" is the conclusions arrived at through syllogismus from "potential knowledge" but since Aristotle admits 1. that not all knowledge is "scientific" or "demonstrative" (e.g., potential knowledge or the premises) and 2. that the "indemonstrable knowledge is "noetic" as opposed to "demonstrative knowledge which is "dianoetic," and 3. that the former is superior to the latter, and 4. that the latter is derived from the former, and 5. that knowledge of the former is of the Nous, then Antisthenes' charge of infinite regress is stopped at the "noetic" level of the Nous; but then, this is, no doubt, a relapse into Platonism Aristotle so vehemently rejected. For "noetic knowledge" is intuitive, and it involves immediate and direct apprehension of the true beings which is but a direct self-activity of the mind, and such is not "demonstrable" in the Aristotellean sense.

This is not the place to articulate Aristotle's theory of science (all observations on this, unless otherwise stated, come from the Topica and Prior and Posterior Analytics); it suffices to show that Aristotle, in spite of his attempts, never really escaped from the charge of circularity entangled in the Meno paradox, the paradox of learning to know what one already knows, or coming to have what one already has, or coming to be what one already is. The paradox involves a pun. To solve it entangles one in a conundrum. To leave
it, in fact, is even worse than being in a conundrum but Hei-
degger's retort on this is that the circularity and the state
of repetitiveness involved therein hits at the very core of
human existence, to escape which man, assuming it is possible,
runs away from himself in search of the very self from which
he is running.

Philosophers have, ever since, tried to deal with
the Meno paradox. But in Heidegger's eyes the circularity
only illuminates the structural repetitive state by which
man exists in the world. For man, the circle is inescapable.
For Heidegger says that: "Seiendes, dem es als In-der-Welt-Sein
um sein Sein selbst geht, hat eine ontologische Zirkelstruktur." 41
Heidegger, in this respect, warns that: "Aber in diesem Zirkel
sein vitiosum sehen und nach Wegen Ausschau halten, ihn zu vermeiden, ja
ihn auch nur als unvermeidliche Unvollkommenheit 'empfinden', heisst das

---

40. Even now, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Betti following
Schleiermacher and Dilthey's works, continue to deal with
the same issue although in terms of how understanding comes
unto, or to be itself, in hermeneutics. The issue of "become
thyself" as indicating the historicity of coming to be what
one already is, or as coming to have what one already has,
remains essentially as paradoxical as Plato described it in
the Meno. As a matter of fact, Heidegger himself seems to
be echoing Plato (Plato's theory of anamnesis) when he says
of thinking (one of Being's toponymies) that
The oldest of the old, follows behind
us in our thinking and yet it
comes to meet us.
That is why thinking holds to the
coming of what has been, and
is remembrance.
(Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 10).

41. Sein und Zeit, p. 153. ("An entity for which, as
Being-in-the-world, its Being;is itself an issue, has ontolo-
logically, a circular structure.")
But "Der 'Zirkel' im Verstehen [Heidegger goes on] gehört zur Struktur des Sinnes, welches Phänomen in der existenzialen Verfassung das Daseins...verwurzelt ist...."

It (the circle) constitutes man's Being-in-the-world. It explains human historicity by which man becomes himself what he already is.

2.1.2 A Modern View: The Nineteenth Century Precursors: Dilthey and Nietzsche

Heidegger connects his concern with history to the labours of William Dilthey and friends, e.g., Count York. He says in *Being and Time*, section 77 that "The analysis of the problem of history which we have just carried through has arisen in the process of appropriating the labours of Dilthey." Heidegger is speaking in appreciation of Dilthey's investigations into the nature of human history. One can, in this, see Dilthey's works as being fundamental and precursory to Heidegger's own work on human history.

Generally speaking, Dilthey wanted to do for the *Geisteswissenschaften* something like what Husserl, in his early stages, did for philosophy. Husserl was, in early days,

42. Ibid. ("But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up.")

43. Ibid. ("The circle in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein...")

44. *Being and Time*, p. 449.
interested in fighting what is grandly labelled as "psychology," a view according to which, to put it generally, the human person was, in terms of method and approach, studied as if man was a natural object. Psychology's deficient understanding of itself has led it into the obsession (given the success of the sciences at that time) of having to prove itself "scientific" and why not?, even physiology was making progress, let alone the natural sciences, so psychology, in its ambitious desire to progress also, that is, to be "scientific," was led to make much too presumptuous claims as to get itself into trouble with such philosophers as Frege, Brentano, Dilthey, Husserl, and others. Husserl, for one, was not just content with combating "psychology" but proceeded to rid the contents of consciousness from reification or "naturalization" by constructing a series of phenomenological methodological epoché leading ultimately to the transcendental subjectivity. Husserl would do anything to keep the latter pure and free from all "natural hypostatization."

Dilthey likewise was interested in freeing the "human sciences" from falling into what might be described as the "methodological mistake" in which methods and approaches used by the Naturwissenschaften were imported into the study of the human sciences. Hence, the problem of finding a proper methodological basis for the Geisteswissenschaften became Dilthey's major concern. Dilthey, in this concern, established the claim that the subject-matter for the human sciences, especially history, should be life, human life itself; so for Dilthey to under-
stand life became the problem. The human sciences should study man, and to study man is to study human life and to study life is to study Erlebnisse. An Erlebnis for Dilthey here is a lived-experience defined as a unit held together (Erlebnis zusammenhang) by a common meaning. Life is composed of experience that, as it were, exteriorizes itself and is held together like a sign by a meaning. For history, to think life then means to think lived-experiences man has thought, felt and done at some given point in time and place and expressed in the embodiment of institutions, books, laws, paintings, etc., and what man has thus thought, felt and done, another can understand by way of hermeneutics. Understanding of human life (Verstehen) becomes the major problem for the human sciences and the way to it is hermeneutics. Thus, when Dilthey posed his famous question, "how is historical knowledge possible?" he sought to establish a distinction between explanation which is for the natural sciences and understanding which is for the human sciences. But to understand another was not totally free from problems, because the Geisteswissenschaften fell into what might be termed a psychological empathetical intuition of life as lived by another. Understanding, through empathetical transference into another person's life, became a problem, which Heidegger sought to answer.

The presentation of Dilthey here is, no doubt, general and sketchy. But in as much as Dilthey may have had his problems, he nevertheless made important headways for posterity—especially for Heidegger. Among other things, Dilthey's
investigations postulated: 1. the finitude of human existence, hence, the temporality of experience also thus establishing the point that temporality is the basis of human historicality; 2. the temporality of understanding based on trying to understand a temporal life, or life that is finite. Hence, trying to understand another is like understanding coming to understand another's understanding; that is, understanding coming unto itself. It is like a triple understanding; that is, understanding understanding understanding, the last one being that of another's, the middle one being the exegetical or hermeneutical method, and the first one being the seeking-understanding that seeks to understand another's. Understanding coming unto itself is today the gist of hermeneutical studies in works such as Gadamer's and Ricoeur's. Although this is not the place to discuss in detail the philosophy of Dilthey, needless to say Heidegger not only appropriated the significant discoveries made by Dilthey. The finitude of human existence, as founded upon temporality, or human existence itself being described as temporality, is now Heideggerian. The temporality of understanding is now also Heideggerian and Gadamarian, but Heidegger "ontologized" Dilthey's methodological and epistemological hermeneutics. In it, Heidegger made understanding, not an understanding of another's temporal existence, but that of oneself. In Heidegger then, understanding, coming unto itself, becomes a case of self-understanding; historical
knowledge of another becomes self-knowledge, thus eliminating all the problems that come with Dilthey's "knowledge by empathetical transference." Historicizing in Heidegger's hands now becomes a matter of self-recovery in one's own open possibilities in that one comes unto oneself, that is, one freely comes to be the self one already is by freely and openly fulfilling one's possibilities.

Heidegger's ontology gives all historical existence, one's own (the dead, living or the unborn) or another's past, present and future life, all to be understood in a sense embodied in the following three senses of a tradition: (a) a tradition that is one's own, but as one that is full of one's own open possibilities, (b) a tradition that becomes the possible, the future possibility to which one has been handed, (c) a tradition into which one is already thrown, one which is one's own possible Geworfenheit and Gewesenheit, to become which one freely becomes one's own Gewesenheit and Geworfenheit. The whole thesis is devoted to interpreting this notion of "history" as a self-becoming event. Heidegger himself does to his own tradition, from the pre-Socratics through to Dilthey and Nietzsche, what he means by historicizing; that is, he recovers himself in it, because the western tradition is his tradition as his own Geworfenheit and Gewesenheit he appropriates. His own way of doing philosophy (as a history of Being's historicity), is a very good example of what he himself means by historicity -- self-appropriation, finding himself, in his own tradition.

No doubt, Nietzsche also influenced Heidegger in many
ways but a brief overview of how Heidegger appropriates Nietzsche in the area of history is what is pertinent here. In "Wer ist Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" Heidegger's appropriation of himself in Nietzsche takes the form of what he calls "the convalescent, who has been asked to turn unto himself," that is, to come back home. "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" becomes a work of homecoming, and its major problem for Heidegger is "How one becomes what one already is" in "the eternal recurrence of the same" which involves a situational structural circularity, not a closed one, but one in which there emerges openings of possibilities of a genuine existential-historical turning in unto oneself as though one was lost before. Homecoming then becomes Nietzsche's "Become thyself" as self-reappropriating which is a revelation and disclosure of one's genuine self. Needless to say, this is Heidegger finding himself, and the translation of this interpretation into being the way and manner Heidegger himself gives his "history" to be understood, is self-evident. For his "history" is likewise a homecoming unto oneself by existing, that is, disclosing one's own possibilities and not another's. Nietzsche also, like Dilthey, advanced the finitude of human existence and, in his The Use and Abuse of History saw history as having more to do with the critical than with both the antiquarian and monumental interests. Doing history thus comes to be not so much a concern with the past as it is with the future and the present, and the

44. In Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen, Neske, 1954).
future here is not another's but one's own. Again, that this observation is now Heideggerian is without doubt, and it shall become clearer later on in the thesis. It suffices to claim now that Heidegger's notion of his "history" evolved out of existing his own possibilities as impregnated in his tradition, but a tradition that is his own Gewesenheit and Geworfenheit and as such described here as his own ontological facticity. Heidegger constitutes his tradition in re-constituting it.

That of which man is already constituted, in Heidegger's eyes, is those ontological facticities into which he is born. Man is them, born into them, but only to become them, and in becoming them he only becomes what he already is. More at stake, however, is the issue of becoming, for the ontological facticities themselves are like gifts. They are given to man to become them, but becoming them is a task, not a gift, so while historicity itself is a gift, historicizing is a task. While temporality itself is a gift, temporalizing is a task. While tradition itself is a gift, retrieving oneself in it is a task. Language is a gift, but speech (speaking) is a task and the same is true of all the ontological facticities.

Becoming itself is therefore an existential task; for in becoming himself -- historicizing -- man can become himself "authentically or inauthentically." 45 In the former,

45. These terms, in my view, carry no moral denotation or connotation, although such may be inferred. They only indicate the manner by which man, ontologically, performs his functional duty of "shepherding Being." (See Richardson, pp. 524-525 for the Shepherding of Being.)
man becomes der Hirt of Being's historicity,\textsuperscript{46} from which he attains his own. In the latter, man becomes der Herr,\textsuperscript{47} of Being's historicity from which he, likewise, attains his own. Since man's historicity depends upon Being's, and since it is by man that Being historicizes, the manner by which Being is allowed to historicize accordingly affects that of man also.

Man can "metaphycisize"\textsuperscript{48} or "phenomenologize"\textsuperscript{49} the historicity of Being, therefore his own historicity also, since the latter is rooted in, and depended upon the former. But in either case, man never escapes the ontological fact

\textsuperscript{46} Richardson, pp. 524-525.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} By this is meant letting Being come to pass not authentically, as Being is in itself, but inauthentically as mastered and "meant" by man. An example of metaphysics, and the rule of metaphysics, began when Plato, over twenty-five hundred years ago, introduced his theory of ideas to account for almost everything that is. From there, the oblivion of Being got started, and it became either God in the medieval times, or ego, Geist, subject, etc. In a word, man became the master, maker and ruler of everything that is. Man became der Herr of Being, not der Hirt. Our atomic ego is also an example of the rule of metaphysics where man presumptuously raises himself to the level of apotheosis.

\textsuperscript{49} This is contrasted with "metaphysics." For Heidegger, the pre-Socratic thinkers allowed Being to come to pass as it was in itself and not as "meant" by man; and so did the poets for whom Heidegger has great reverence. Phenomenology, here, has nothing to do with Husserl's programmatic phenomenology. It is used here only to accord with phenomenology's cry to: "Let things appear as they are in themselves." In this man assumes his functional role as der Hirt of Being and lets it come to pass as it is in itself, not as man wants and masters it.
that he is, and becomes, himself only in and because of the historicity of Being, authentically (phenomenologically), or inauthentically (metaphysically). For man's authentic or inauthentic historicizing of himself is rooted in, and depended upon, Being itself, although man is so constituted as to be able to affect the manner by which (that is, how), Being historicizes itself. However, historicity, ipso facto, is Being, man attains his historicity only because he exists in (historicity) Being and is used for Being's self-unconcealing self-concealing historicity; and it is for these and because of which he attains his own (historicity) Being. In short, man is historical because of Being.

2.2 Man's Privileged Constitution: "Seinsverständnis"

Seinsverständnis is considered here as one of man's ontological facticities. Heidegger, in section 31 of Sein und Zeit, describes it as "Das Da-sein" and says of understanding that: "Verstehen ist das existenziale Sein des eigenen Seinkönnens des Daseins selbst, so zwar, dass dieses Sein an ihm selbst das Woran des mit ihm selbst Seins erschliesst." Man, of whose Being understanding is a constitution, becomes—because of this constitutive

50. Sein und Zeit, p. 142.
51. Ibid., p. 144. ("Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own ability-for-Being; and it is such that this Being discloses in itself what its being is capable of.")
Being, understanding -- a being in whom ability to do and have an open and free self-disclosure capability, is invested. This is because of the constitutive structure of understanding itself by virtue of which understanding has in itself a structure which enables man to be a projecting Being. Structurally, it consists of a unity of three components: "fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception."

52 Heidegger maintains that "...Dasein is its 'there'," and it is this "there" upon which man projects, so the projection of man is a projection upon his own "there," because the "there" on which man projects himself is his own.

But man is able to do this, because of the structure of understanding which enables man to fore-disclose his own "there" in advance and in anticipation of himself. For, because of understanding's structural constitutive components of "Vorhabe, Vorsicht and vorgriff," man is able to pre-see, pre-possess and pre-conceive the future, that is to say, man's own "there," even before man explicitly, actually and really comes to have, see and conceive it. Hence, by this fore-anatomy, man can fore-understand what it is that is ahead of him, what it is that is there as his possible Being, what it is that is the not-yet, and what it is that he is seeking, doing, understanding, asking, etc., etc. Thus the fore-structural components of understanding enable man to fore-understand what man, as

52. Being and Time, pp. 191-192 (for details).
53. Ibid., p. 182.
54. Sein und Zeit, p. 150.
understanding, is seeking to understand, hence giving us the formula of: Understanding understand-ing understanding. The last one is what man is seeking or seeks to understand; the middle one is the present indicative verbal activity of understand-ing itself (hence the hyphen); the first one is the fore-understanding. The fore-understanding, being the first one, is the one understanding fore-has already, and in having which, understand-ing (the middle one) is rendered possible, but possible of having or getting understanding (the last one). Hence, without the fore-anatomy of human understanding which constitutes his Being, there can be no human knowledge, no understanding, no activity, nothing, nothing at all would be humanly possible. But "everything human" is made possible because of Seinsverständnis -- a pre-understanding of Being.

Given all this, to sum up:

(1) Seinsverständnis is an understanding of Being, and man exists in the world by it.

(2) On account of its structure, man is enabled to pre-possess, fore-see and fore-conceive -- therefore can anticipate -- his future possibilities.

(3) Thus, whatever man becomes or does is made possible by virtue of his Seinsverständnis.

(4) To be able to see, for example, or see at all (for man) is, therefore, to have seen already. To hear is to have heard already in advance of what is actually heard; to bring something to pass, is to have received and pre-possessed already what man brings to pass, so man, by virtue of the fore-anatomy of his Seinsverständnis, never does nor becomes anything without having pre-possessed already in advance what it is that he actually does or becomes.

(5) Seinsverständnis is thus man's innermost privileged Being by virtue of which he is able to perform his projective anticipatory roles, his disclosedness and his functional roles,
in the event of appropriation, of listening, hearing, preparing, encountering, opening and staying open to, answering, submitting, etc., etc., and of receiving in advance, caring for and preserving, Being, and then letting it come to pass "phenomenologically" as Being is in itself.

(6) On account of Seinsverständnis, man, for example, receives -- therefore prepossesses -- in advance, language (Being), before which language (Being) having been received already in the appropriation of man and all that goes with this appropriation, is let out in and through the speech of man by speak-ing.

(7) In (6), man becomes the place in and through whom language comes to pass, that is to say, he is the one in and through whom language speaks.

(8) But man is also the one who speaks, yet he is able to speak, because he has already been spoken to, already listened, already submitted to, already heard, already been open and stayed open, already encountered, and finally already received language which speaks in, through and by him.

(9) Hence, man speaks and is indeed able to do so only because he has already been spoken to, only because his speak-ing is the speaking of language itself, only because man's speaking is listening-answering, it is a responding, in short, man's speaking is a re-speaking, it is language itself that speaks, not man.

(10) Man is only the topos of language -- but all is by virtue of, and thanks to, his unique constitutive Being, Seinsverständnis.

(11) But man can misperform, on account of the very same structural components of Seinsverständnis which enable him to anticipate himself, all these functional roles for which he is needed and used.

(12) It is by virtue of his Seinsverständnis then that man can misperform, or perform (his functional roles), the presenta-tion of -- letting Being come to pass -- Being "metaphysically" or "phenomenologically" and subsequent to which man, accord-ingly, attains his own.

2.3 The Ontological Facticities As Toponyms of Being

The ontological facticities are, as has already been shown in the preceding examinations, man's Gewesenheit and Geworfenheit and this, at the same time, also makes them spring
from Zukunft and have their character and sense in Enworfenheit. Hence, they have, or better yet, are both man's Gewesenheit and Enworfenheit as well. Constituting man's Being, "they are [in Heidegger's words, when, i.e., he was talking about Thinking, as one of man's essential nature, or Being]...gifts.... They are given to us. We receive many gifts, of many kinds. But the highest and most really lasting gift given to us is always our essential nature, with which we are gifted in such a way that we are what we are only through it."55 The same is true of all those gifts herein called ontological facticities, e.g., death, temporality, language, thinking, etc. etc. The ontological facticities are therefore seen as gifts, given to, and in advance of, man, but only to become them, and in becoming (historicizing) which man only becomes what he already is -- historicity. Historicizing is a sort of re-possession or self-retrieval in that man recovers himself. But man becomes the self that he already is -- historicity -- only in the becoming of Being unto itself -- historicity. The latter is much more fundamental since it is the ground of the former. What this means is that the disclosure of Being is what discloses or delivers man unto himself. But the disclosure of Being needs man. Just as "Language needs human speaking,"56 so is the case with all man's.

55. What is Called Thinking?, p. 142.
ontological facticities. Being needs man in whom its self-disclosure happens, and happens by him also. Thus, Being's self-disclosure needs the use of man -- herein called the topos of Being -- to disclose itself; and it is in being needed and used for the disclosure of Being that man's self-disclosure lies, because man's self-disclosure takes place, and indeed can take place, only in the disclosure of Being.

In disclosing Being, man therein discloses himself. In disclosing himself, man discloses Being. "For [taking language as an example] Language, after all, remains unmistakably bound up with human speaking."57 For "Mensch und Sein sind einander übereignet. Sie gehören einander."58 This is why (taking language again as an example) the speaking of man (Mensch) is at once language (Sein) that is speaking, or that the speaking of language (Sein) is, at once, the speaking (speech) of man (Mensch).

For, "Das Ereignis vereignet Mensch und Sein in ihr wesenhaftes zusammen,"59 and on account of this mutual belongingness, man's ontological facticities come as toponymies of Being. Death, for instance, is a toponymy of Being, or to use Heidegger's own words, a "shelter of Being,"60 but it is man's Being also, hence his ontological facticity. What in the encounter of death, for example, in a moment of vision and

57. Ibid.

58. Identität und Differenz, p. 95.

59. Ibid., p. 103.

in anticipatory resoluteness, discloses and delivers man authentically unto himself in the nakedness of finitude, is Being, in whose disclosure, and because of which, that of man is rendered possible. That of Being is what makes that of man possible, but they so belong to one another that the ontological facticities are interpreted here as being toponyms of Being also. The only difference, if any at all, is that toponyms are interpreted from the perspective of Being, while the ontological facticities are interpreted from the perspective of man. But it should be stressed that none of either man's ontological facticities or Being's toponyms is a thing, nor exists in time. The word toponym only indicates those events, not things, whose unconcealment unconceals Being. A combination of (nomos) name and (topos) place, gives us a "name-place" and it only indicates what Heidegger calls "house of Being," or "shelter of Being" that "...harbours within itself the presencing of Being." As toponyms -- as that which harbours the presencing of Being, e.g., Death -- they are man's ontological facticities as well because every one of them harbours within itself the possible disclosure of man unto himself.

63. Ibid., pp. 178-179.
2.4 The Historicity of Being and the Temporalization of Time

Heidegger's hermeneutics of the historicity of Being -- therefore of man also -- is, at once, hermeneutics of the temporalization of time. For there can be no historicity, Being's or man's, without Time. Time is the "how" determinant on whose condition historicity of man or of Being is rendered possible. In Being and Time, temporality, for example, is established as that which makes possible not only the unity of existentiality, facticity and falling, the totality of the structure of man -- care -- but temporality establishes also the finitude of human existence. Human existence itself is time-bounded and established as finite temporality on the basis of which human historicality is founded. To this effect, Heidegger writes: "...die Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit ist der verborgene Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins."64 This being said, then, it is apparent that there can be no human historicity without finite temporality that makes it possible to begin with. Human historicity is a "repetition," or as said earlier, a stretching along but a stretching along of man's "betweenness" bounded by a beginning and an end. Both are in unity in the stretching along of the "between," which is but a "finite between," and temporality temporalizing the unity of its having-been, future and present

64. Sein und Zeit, p. 386. ("...the finitude of temporality is the hidden basis of Dasein's historicity.")
makes the stretching along of man's "finite betweenness" possible. Hence in the absence of temporality temporalizing itself in the unity of its three ecstases, there can be no stretching along of man's finite betweenness, that is, there can be no historicizing of human historicality. The same is true of Being; that is, without Time determining the presencing of Being, there can be no presencing at all. Being's historicity is finite historicity, because the disclosing of Being is inherently finite, since Being is already concealing itself in unconcealing itself or unconcealing itself in concealing itself. But this is possible only when the "approaching" and "having been" are in unity with the present, and the unity of the three discloses a happening, in happening which "something" comes to pass. In simpler terms, the unconcealing concealing destiny of Being (or its converse), is self-disclosure. In this self-disclosing, the self-concealing is the approaching of the possible, and the self-unconcealing is the having-been, or the converse can be the case also. Their converse reciprocity is the present. The approaching gives and brings about the having been and conversely the having been springs from the approaching and the reciprocal converse relationship of both at the same time, brings about the present. Their unity, which is most critical, is that which brings the three into unity in the disclosing, so disclosing is the actual bringing out and to light and at the same time the unity of the having-been, the approaching and their converse reciprocity as the present, all together which constitute, at the same time, what is described as: self-
unconcealing self-concealing (or the converse), destiny of Being; that is, the historicity of Being, or the disclosing of Being.

But, as seen above, the historicity of Being, or the disclosing of Being, being the bringing forth of the unity of Time's three ecstases, also discloses the nature of Time itself described as "Time times itself," "Temporality temporalizes itself," or the "extending of Time." This means the bringing forth at the same time of the unity of time's three ecstases, the having been, the approaching and their converse reciprocity, the present. Temporality temporalizing itself thus describes the bringing forth, at the same time, the unity of the three ecstases. But this is precisely what the disclosing of Being, or the self-unconcealing self-concealing destiny of Being entails. Hence "Time timing itself" determines the unconcealing concealing destiny of Being, or the disclosure of Being. Time is the "how" determinant, the open horizon in which Being's self-disclosure happens, or by which Being's self-unconcealing self-concealing destiny happens; but the happening of the latter also means the happening of the former. Therefore "Being and Time (or Time and Being) determine each other reciprocally...."65

One important seeming confusion to be cleared up is that Time and Temporality have been used interchangeably. Also, by Time, one may understand it ontically. All these may stir up unnecessary confusion. First of all Time, as

65. On Time and Being, p. 3.
used by Heidegger, does not designate time as it is ordinarily understood for the following two reasons: 1. time is not the perishable and it is not a thing in time, thus nothing temporal, 66 2. time is ontological in the sense that it is that by which time, as temporal, is determined. Therefore it is the foundation of time as ordinarily understood. But when ontological Time is used interchangeably with Temporality, there seems to be a confusion here also. The reason for this is that Temporality (Zeitlichkeit) is used technically in Being and Time to: 1. denote the ontological meaning of man, here called care, 67 2. be that which makes possible the unity of the totality of care's structure; 68 3. be that whose finitude becomes the hidden basis of Dasein's historicity. 69 Furthermore, there are: 1. the temporality of understanding, 70 2. of state of mind, 71 3. of falling, 72 4. of discourse, 73 and many more. It is not too much exaggeration to say that Being and Time is about investigating Temporality as the horizon in terms of which the meaning of human

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66. On Time and Being, p. 3.
67. Being and Time, #65.
68. Ibid., p. 376.
70. Ibid., p. 385.
71. Ibid., p. 389.
72. Ibid., p. 396.
73. Ibid., p. 400.
existence is interpreted. Indeed, temporality is human existence itself in the sense that it gives to it its finitude.

When it is then said that "temporality temporalizing itself determines the historicity of Being," does it mean that temporality, in terms of which the meaning of human existence is interpreted in Being and Time, is the same one determining the historicity of Being? Put differently, is ontological Time that determines the historicity of Being the same as Temporality in terms of which the meaning of human existence is interpreted? The answer is yes. Yes, because both are ontological to the extent that the sense and determination of the historicity of man or of Being is interpreted and made possible in the openness of this ontological Time, and also seen as the "how determinant" of Being's historicity.

On the other hand, it is a bit odd to say that the temporalization of temporality -- in terms of which the meaning of human existence is interpreted, and renders possible both the unity of the totality of care's structure and the finitude of human existence upon which human historicity is founded -- is the same as the ontological Time Heidegger II called "True Time"\footnote{On Time and Being, p. 15.} and which is the "how-determinant" of the historicity of Being. For both being the same, then it could be said that the temporalization of temporality is that openness which renders possible the interpretation of the sense of the historicity of Being, whereas in fact,"True Time"
is what is meant here. But is temporality which denotes the ontological meaning of man the same as True time which makes possible the hermeneutics of the historicity of Being? The answer is still yes, but explanation is called for, because how this is so must be shown.

Looked at very closely, one of the recurrent themes postulated in this thesis is that there can be no human historicity in the absence of the historicity of Being. As a matter of fact, the thesis goes so far as to claim further that there can be "nothing human," or otherwise put, nothing human is possible without that (Being) which renders to man such possibility. Man is because of Being. Therefore, the interpretation of the meaning of human existence, determined by the temporalization of temporality, cannot be done without or in the absence of presupposing that (Being) which makes it possible. After all, what is this ontological meaning which temporality denotes? In respect of this, Heidegger writes: "When we inquire about the meaning of care, we are asking what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of Care...." Temporality temporalizing itself is, of course, that which makes possible the totality of care's structure. But, "taken strictly, 'meaning' signifies the 'upon which' of the primary projection of the understanding of Being." What this means is that meaning signifies

75. *Being and Time*, p. 371.
76. Ibid.
what is obtained in the projection of \textit{Seinsverst"{a}ndnis}, and the projecting of \textit{Seinsverst"{a}ndnis} is the actual and explicit working-out of the fore-structures of \textit{Seinsverst"{a}ndnis}, talked about earlier; and this is in understanding understanding itself -- Interpretation. The actual and explicit bringing forth of a message, the actual and explicit working-out of one's prejudices and presuppositions, the actual and explicit working-out of one's pre-ontological understanding, the actual and explicit projecting of oneself upon one's own fore-havings, fore-conceptions, and fore-sights; all describe one thing, namely, the actual and explicit bringing forth of the message (Being) one already has. But one can bring forth a message only if one has fore-had it already, only if one has received it already, only if it is given to one already, all of which mean that only if one's Being is constitutive of \textit{Seinsverst"{a}ndnis}. On account of this ontological constitution, man is able to receive in advance what he projects himself upon. What he has received already in advance is what he has fore-had, and in fore-having which, the received becomes man's having-been, but which is yet to be brought out or (to use the language of \textit{Being and Time}) which man has yet to project himself upon. The that "upon-which" man projects himself, is what he is already possessive of, as his having-been, whose actual and explicit projection signifies the bearing out of what man has fore-had already. In short, "man, to the extent he is man, listens to this message, and that happens even while man gives no particular attention to the fact that he is even listening
already to that message, man is used for hearing the message.\footnote{77} Japanese: This you called a while ago: man stands in a relation.

I: And the relation is called hermeneutical because it brings the tidings of that message.

J: This message makes claim on man that he respond to it....

I: ...to listen and belong to it as man.

J: And this is what you called \textit{being} human, if you here still admit the word "\textit{being}."

I: Man is the message-bearer of the message which the twofold's unconcealing speaks to him.\footnote{78}

In all these one is, of course, in Heidegger II, but the point is to show that the ontological meaning of man lies in "interpretation" as the actual and explicit bringing forth of the message one has already listened to, heard and received already, and having so done, brings to pass the received message. Message-bringing activity itself is interpretation, and it is what Temporality determines in terms of the unity of having-been, future and present. But the actual and explicit bringing of the message itself is exist-ing, that gets stretched along as the "betweenness" which is time-bounded by a beginning and an end, and determined by a having-been and an approaching. Exist-ing is thus a projection of the unity of the reciprocity of a having-been and an approaching and this, in turn, is a self-stretching along of man's "betweenness." But exist-ing, thus seen, is the bringing

\footnote{77}{\textit{On the Way to Language}; p. 40.}

\footnote{78}{Ibid.}
forth, that is, the projecting of man upon the unity of Temporality's three ecstases and such is how Temporality becomes that open horizon in terms of which the meaning of existing is interpreted. But existing, seen as a projecting, is the bringing forth of man himself, that is, the fulfilling and projection of man upon his own possibilities. Yet the bringing forth of man, thus seen, cannot be possible without bringing in it that (Being) which makes possible the bringing forth of man himself. In other words, the bringing forth of man in the projecting of himself upon his possibilities in existing, is, at once, the bringing forth of Being as well, and it is in doing the latter, and also because of the latter's, that man's own self-bringing or self-projecting upon his own possible, is made possible. Hence, without the latter, Being's, that of the former, man's, would be impossible because man is because of Being. Man becomes what it is that he becomes because of Being. Man speaks because language (Being) speaks. Man's speaking is thus a re-speaking of what was spoken to him, of what he listened to, of what he heard, of what he received, and in doing all these, and because of all these, he is able to speak at all. This is again why man's speaking is a "repetition." But speaking is existing and if speaking is a "repetition," then existing is a "repetition." By "repetition," saying or doing again what one has said or done, is not what is meant. "Repetition" is being oneself, doing what gives to one one's Being, one's essential nature, and speaking, for man, is being himself, that is to say, doing what
gives to him his Being, his essential nature. Hence, speaking is be-ing oneself, and be-ing oneself, for man, is exist-ing, and exist-ing is man's essence; this essence lies in disclosing Being, in disclosing which, man 1. discloses himself therein, 2. exists his essential nature which consists in disclosing Being, and from it, disclosing himself therein also.

Having in mind this interpretation, one can now go back to positively answer the question put earlier without being afraid, namely: Is Temporality which denotes the ontological meaning of man the same as "True time" which determines the historicity of Being? The answer is still yes, because the ontological meaning of man has been found to consist in interpretation -- (man) projecting himself upon his own having been, approaching and their reciprocity. This, in turn, has been found to be exist-ing. Exist-ing, in turn, has been found to be bringing forth of man himself. This, in turn, has been found to be also a bringing forth of Being. This latter one is, in turn, what brings forth the bringing forth of man himself. Thus, if Temporality denotes the ontological meaning of man, and the latter is couched in and made possible by, the disclosure of Being, then Temporality -- interpreted here in Being and Time only in the light of human existence and not of Being -- certainly has more to do here with the disclosure of Being by man whose existence is temporality-determined. Hence, if Temporality (Heidegger of Being and Time) is used interchangeably with "True Time"
(Heidegger in *On Time and Being*, later Heidegger) everything else is the same except for one thing: namely that the former is done in regard to man, whereas the latter is done in regard to Being. After all, when the latter is done, the former also comes into it also, because the historicity or disclosure of Being needs the "use" of the historicity or disclosure of man. For language needs human speaking to speak but there is human speaking only because language speaks.

Another seeming confusion one must note is the expression "the historicity of Time." Nowhere does Heidegger say that, but that is not to say that Time cannot be so interpreted as to have in it a manner of disclosing itself given which such a self-disclosing manner can be described as its historicity. As odd and uncomfortable as it may seem to have such an expression as "the historicity of Time," it is not odd and uncomfortable for Heideggerians to find such expression as "Time times," "Temporality temporizes" or "Time extends." Heidegger, by these, only describes the way and manner according to which Time or Temporality, composed of the unity of its three ecstases, works-out explicitly and actually, the unity of its ecstases. This explicit and actual working-out of the unity of 1. its having-been, 2. the approaching future, and 3. their converse relational reciprocity, present as "being-along-side-with as the making-present," all in unity, is what Heidegger describes79 as

79. *Being and Time*, #65.
"Temporality temporalizing itself," "Time times," the self-extending of Time, etc., etc. All these mean one thing: the disclosing nature of Time, and this is precisely what is here described as the historicity of Time.

Such is the extending of time, that is, the historicity of time which naturally means that of Being also. The latter's historicity lies in what Heidegger calls "presencing." By it he means the present indicative active sense in which Being simultaneously unconceals and conceals itself or does the converse and in virtue of which beings come to be. But the presencing of Being takes place in the extending of time and the extending of time also takes place in the presencing of Being. Both determine each other in historicizing their respective future-having-been, time in the unity of its three ecstases, Being in its unconcealing concealing destiny.

2.5 Man and His Ontological Facticities:
A Summary

(1) Man is (that is, his Being lies in) constituting them. But they are given there in advance of man before which, being thrown into them, he exists them, and in existing which he executes the circular, unitary and complete structure of becoming himself that he already is -- historicity.

(2) Thus, in constituting the self that he already is -- historicity -- man only constitutes his ontological facticities.

(3) Given already in advance of him, those ontological facticities constitute man's having-been. Having-been, into which he is thrown, of which he is constituted, is the

80. On Time and Being, pp. 3-24.
ontological Fact which Heidegger, in Being and Time, designates by "facticity" (Faktizität).\(^{81}\)

(4) Man's having been in this sense is therefore his facticity. It expresses the sense of "having-been-in-already," but given as Da-gewesenheit, having been is what man is yet to be or become, because Gewesenheit springs from the future.

(5) Thus, its real character and sense, for Heidegger, are in the future.

(6) Future, however, is what Heidegger calls man's "potentiality-for-Being."\(^{82}\) It lies ahead of man as the approaching. It is that upon which he is yet to project, or projects himself, and the "ontological name" Heidegger gives to this notion of projection future in Being and Time is "existentiality."\(^{83}\)

(7) Thus he writes: "self-projection upon the 'for-the-sake-of-oneself' is grounded in the future and is an essential characteristic of existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality is the future."\(^{84}\)

(8) Hence, "...the temporal meaning of existentiality (future) and facticity (having been) is indicated by the expressions 'before' and 'already'."\(^{85}\)

(9) But present is already included in the converse reciprocity of both as the actual presencing or existing of both future-existentiality and past-facticity, and Heidegger calls this "fallenness."\(^{86}\)

(10) "Falling," therefore, expresses (as present, Heidegger calls it "primordial temporality")\(^{87}\) man's actual concernful dealings with things in his everyday life and it is thus the actual making-present of his "future-has-been," ("existentiality-facticity"). To this effect Heidegger writes that fallenness "...should give us a hint that making-present, as the primary basis for falling into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves, remains included in the future and in having been, and is included in

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82. Being and Time, p. 375.
83. Ibid., p. 375.
84. Ibid., pp. 375-376.
85. Ibid., p. 376.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
these in the mode of primordial temporality." 88

(11) Time (true time which Heidegger calls Temporality), then, "...makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care (man)." 89

(12) But "Temporality" is "not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporalizes itself." 90 It stretches itself along, "...out of future, the having been, and the present." 91 It extends itself in making-present (presencing), its "future-having-been," and in extending which, together and simultaneous with the presencing of Being, beings come to be.

(13) But none of the ontological facticities is an entity. Each is given as man's facticity (having been). But as facticity (having been), they have their sense in Existentiality (future), since man is yet to exist (become) them; and in existing, that is, in becoming (the actual making-present, or presencing which is Falliingness) them, he exists (becomes or historicizes) the unity of his structural complete Being which Heidegger calls "care" in Being and Time.

2.6 Man as the Topos of Being:
A Summary

Man's place in Heidegger's hermeneutics of Being is, no doubt, critical. As seen already, Heidegger places man at the service of Being.

(1) He simply calls him "the message-bearer" 92 by which he expresses the nature of man as consisting in being the "topos" 93 of Being.

(2) It is in so being that man is, and becomes what he is. As a functionary, man is der Hirt but can become der Herr of Being.

88. Ibid., my emphasis.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p. 377.
91. Ibid., p. 376, my emphasis.
93. The senses of "place" and "organon" (the Aristotelian sense of instrumentality as seen in his Topica) are intended here.
(3) He (as message-bearer) does this by undergoing experience with Being as described in the previous pages, such as receiving Being, preserving and caring for it, and letting it come to pass in and by him.

(4) He is able to do this by reason of his constitutive Being -- Seinsverständnis. Its fore-anatomy enables him to perform his functional role as a bearer of Being, and it is that for which he -- being the topos of Being -- is given, appropriated and used.

(5) Thus it is in the service of Being -- its historicity -- that man's Being is placed.

(6) Making man the topos of Being, however, Heidegger makes man's locus vis-a-vis Being become crucial. Heidegger names man Da-sein of which he says it is "an entity having the character of being its 'there' in such a way that whether explicitly or not it finds itself in its thrownness." 94

(7) Appropriately, Heidegger not only roots the being of man (as topos of Being) in Being, but also roots the dwelling place (locus) of man there too.

(8) This is why man's ontological facticities are Being's toponymies as well. Metaphorically speaking, Being is like a big sea into which man is born and thrown but dwells freely in the buoyancy, currents, tides and movements of the sea.

(9) Man is thus both the da for the sake of Being's self-unconcealing self-concealing historicity, therefore for his also; and furthermore, the Da in Being.

CHAPTER THREE

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL FACTICITIES
DISCLOSED AS TOPOYNAMIES OF BEING

3.0 A Short Introduction

The main issue advanced in the preceding chapter are seven in all.

(1) Being-in-the-world is a basic constitution of man. From it, or with it, come other basic constituents such as historicality, death, temporality, Mit-Sein, Seinsverständnis, tradition, Thinking, language, Art and poetry.

(2) Together, they are called ontological facticities. Their nature is such that they constitute the Being of man in a way Heidegger describes as "already-having-been-in." Man is thrown into being them. As "having-been-already-in" they are given as man's innermost possibilities in which his existing becomes a disclosedness or a fulfilling of them. Even though they are given already, they have a futural character, because they are, as future possibilities yet to be existed, so it is as if they are, though given already, yet lying ahead as a given-already future possibility which is yet to be existed.

(3) Existing them is a task, to assume which man is free to exist them anyhow, resolutely or not, authentically or not. But no matter how it is existed, existing them is self-revelation, or self-retrieval, which is described here as historicity.

(4) Time determines man's self-disclosedness or historicity. It unites man's having-been-in-already, Heidegger describes as facticity, future, also described as Existentiality, and
present as forfeiture. Present is the actual and explicit self-disclosing of man which is called existing, in that having-been and future are united in forfeiture in which man is con-cernfully realizing himself anyhow but with time being the horizon of that self-disclosure. The temporalization of time is thus at once the historicizing of historicity, that is, the self-disclosure and fulfilling of man's ownmost Beings.

(5) Man's privileged constitutive Being, Seinsverständnis, enables man to exist his possibilities anyhow, resolutely or not, authentically or not. It enables man to anticipate himself, project himself, to eliminate distances, to fore-see, fore-have and to fore-conceive his future possibilities. By it, existing itself becomes freedom for man, in that he is free and open to exist his existence anyhow.

(6) Man is a topos of Being. He is where Being unconceals and conceals itself. He is also who is used for that unconcealing-concealing event. Man is in Being, his ontological facticities. These facticities are sometimes called by Heidegger "the shelter of Being," "the house of Being," etc., but they are called here "toponymies of Being." By it, what is meant here is that they are events whose disclosure discloses: 1. Being, 2. the Being of man who is used to disclose Being, and 3. the extending of time which determines the disclosures of 1 and 2 and itself by means of working out the unity of its three ecstases. In short, toponymy signifies not a thing or things but Being-events, such as language which Heidegger calls "the house of Being," or death, which he calls "the shelter of Being." Their presencing is, at once, a presencing of Being in itself in them. True enough, some may raise objections to, say, how does death presence itself, which would mean the presencing of Being in death? Or, how can, say, Mit-Sein be seen as a Being event in that its presencing amounts to the presencing of Being in it? But does Heidegger say anything about the presencing of Mit-sein? Does he say anything about the presencing of death, of poetry, of art, of language, of Seinsverständnis, etc. etc.? Of course not, but it cannot be denied also that death discloses Being, that language discloses Being, that Art discloses Being, that historicity itself is the presencing of Being, that poetry discloses Being, that Mit-Sein is the actual presencing of Being, etc. Again, one can strongly object that Heidegger does not talk about the historicity of Time and there is no such thing in Heidegger. Inasmuch as this is true, it is also true that Heidegger talks about "the extending of time" or "temporality temporalizing itself." The temporalization of time is what is described here as the presencing of time, that is, the extending of time unto itself but such is what is meant here by the term historicity, hence the expression, the historicity of time, which seemingly appears strange.
(7) At any rate, man's ontological facticities are also Being's toponymies. For, "Mensch und Sein sind einander übereignet. Sie gehören einander," ¹ and the disclosure or historicity of one, amounts to the disclosure of the other. Man brings the disclosure of Being to pass, but Being needs the use of man also, and the presencing of Being in its toponymies amounts to the disclosure of man in his possibilities, that is, facticities.

Chapter three discusses Being's toponymies showing:
1. their nature, 2. how man constitutes them as his ontological facticities, and 3. how they "shelter" or "house" Being. This chapter also interprets man's ontological facticities as toponymies of Being. As toponymies, their historicity is the historicity of Being itself, as it simultaneously unconceals and conceals itself in them. Heidegger calls them "house(s)"² of Being or "shelter"³ of Being. However, they are interpreted here as toponymies (name-places) of Being.

3.1 The Toponymy of Death

In Heidegger's eyes, death is, profoundly, a unique human problem, inseparably bound up with the very being of man. "Only man dies,"⁴ says Heidegger. He goes on to say that "we now call mortals mortals -- not because their earthly life comes to an end but because they are capable of death as death. Mortals are who they are, as mortals,

1. Identität und Differenz, p. 95.
4. Ibid., p. 178.
present in the shelter of Being. They are the presencing relation to Being as Being."\(^5\)

Only men die. By this Heidegger means: "to die means to be capable of death as death."\(^6\) Animals, for him, do not die. Heidegger says they simply "perish."\(^7\) But just what does it mean to say of man that only he can die -- that is, only man is capable of death, as death? In the case of man, the fundamental issue here hinges on the claim that: "Only men die because they can"; that is, it is because they are capable of death, as death, that they are mortal. But what is death itself? Heidegger calls it "the shelter of Being,"\(^8\) and says of it that, "... death harbours within itself the presencing of Being,"\(^9\) and of man, Heidegger says that "mortals are who they are, as mortals, present in the shelter of Being. They are the presencing relation to Being as Being."\(^10\)

Death thus conceived is not a discontinuation of human existence. Death is Being. It is its toponymy or "shelter" or "house." It is the whereabouts of Being's presencing. Presencing here means the historicity of Being, so the presencing of Being unto itself in death means the historicity

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5. Ibid., p. 179.
6. Ibid., p. 178.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 179.
10. Ibid., p. 179.
of Being, in death, or the historicity of death, or the coming of death unto itself. All these mean the self-unconcealing, self-concealing (or its converse) historicity of Being (death) of which man is its topos. Man brings all to pass; that is, Death presences, reveals itself to man, and conceals itself from him, that is, withdraws unto itself from him (or its converse). Thus, the presencing of Death unto itself in man is the bring- ing of Death unto itself in and by man, and this, in the moment of vision and in anticipatory resoluteness, amounts to the seeing, that is to say, disclosing of death by man when he brings its presencing to pass.

But to "see" death does not mean to die as perishing. It is not an end to human existence at all. To "see," or disclose, Death is to "see" Being, and of this only men are capable. Only man dies, and this means only man can "see" Being. Only man can have an affective and intimate relation to Being, as Death. This is what Heidegger means by: "They [mortals] are the presencing relation to Being as Beings." But to "see" or disclose Being, which means to be capable of death, is a task, not of the eye nor of the mind, but of one that puts at stake the very Being of man. "For to be a human being [says Heidegger] means to be, on earth as a mortal," and a mortal is he who can die, that is, can "see" or disclose death as death. In the case of death, Heidegger makes man's Being consist in "seeing," that is to say,

11. Ibid.

lla. Ibid., p. 147.
disclosing it. For *can* die means *can* "see" or disclose death as death; but just what does it mean, for Heidegger, to hinge man's entire Being on "seeing," that is, on disclosing?

That man is able to "see" at all depends entirely on the fact that he had "seen" already, so claims Heidegger. For he writes: "Only when a man has seen already does he truly see. To see is to have seen. What is seen has arrived and remains for him in sight. A seer has always already seen. Having seen in advance he sees into the future. He sees the future tense out of the perfect."\(^{12}\) If to see is to have seen already, then *seeing* is, as it were, a *re-seeing*. For the latter is made possible by reason of the former, but what is it that one had seen already and on which actual explicit seeing, that is, *re-seeing*, depends? Heidegger answers that "what is seen in such a seeing can only be what comes to presence in unconcealment."\(^{13}\)

On that account, "to have seen" is related to self-illuminating presencing. Seeing is determined, not by the eye, but by the lighting of Being. Presence within the lighting articulates all the human sense. The essence of seeing, as "to have seen," is to know. Knowledge is *remembrance* of Being. That is why *Mnemosyne* is the mother of the muses. Knowledge is not science in the modern sense. Knowledge is thoughtful maintenance of Being's preserve.\(^{14}\)

Only men *can* die. This means only man "sees" or discloses death. But to see is to have seen already. That which

\(^{12}\) Early Greek Thinking, p. 34 from *Der Spruch des Anaximander* in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 5th ed. 1972), my emphasis.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 36.
one had already seen is the presencing of Being, that is (in this particular case), Death. Thus, man is the only being in, before and by whom, Death (Being) presences. For he is capable of being all that. This capability stems from man's constitutive Being -- Seinsverständnis. Its fore-structures -- fore-having, foresight, fore-conception -- enable man to preserve what he had already seen, that is to say, he is able to fore-have what he is actually yet to have; he is able to fore-see what he is actually yet to see; he is able to fore-conceive what he is actually yet to conceive, so whatever man projects in an actual explicit manner is something he had had, seen, and conceived already beforehand, preserved in memory, the mother of muses. In the case of death, however, man, for the most part, exists as though it is something he does not already fore-have, fore-see, and fore-conceive, and for that matter, stays indifferent and oblivious to it. It is at this point that "to have seen" comes as "a remembrance"\(^{14a}\) or re-seeing of what man had already seen, had and conceived and preserved in mother mnemosyne. In this re-seeing man is, as it were, called to let lie before him what was already there before him, but to which he irresolutely remains indifferent and oblivious for the most part in his everydayness. It is as if man is called "to remember" (as the quotation above says).\(^{14b}\) This "being called" is, to use Heidegger's term, "appropriation," that is, man is appropriated to re-see what already lay there before him gathered together and kept in mother memory; and "what is seen [as Heidegger says] in such a seeing can only be what comes

\(^{14a}\) Ibid.

\(^{14b}\) Ibid.
to presence in unconcealment,¹⁵ that is, Death as Being. When man re-sees or remembers Death, it simply is a matter of home-coming unto, or retrieving, himself he already is, but to which he remains indifferent, irresolute and forgotten for the most part of his everydayness. In a word, he is called to become himself as though he were lost in this sort of re-seeing. Seeing or disclosing Death (Being) then amounts to a return from self-oblivion to self-recollection -- the retrieving of oneself which is nothing else but historicity. This is, rather, obtained from, and happens in the return of Being (Death) from self-unconcealment unto itself in self-concealment (or its converse)--that is, its historicity. Thus, the historicity of Being (Death) -- its self-unconcealment self-concealment happening (or its converse)-- is that from which man gets his historicity.

3.2 The Toponymy of Tradition

Tradition, in Heidegger's eyes, is one's origin. "But origin [says Heidegger] always comes to meet us from the future."¹⁶ It lies never behind but before us. One finds oneself retrieving oneself in it. In Heidegger's case, he finds himself historiologically in the Western tradition which begins from Homer; he needs to go back to the remotest antiquity to recover or discover himself in the sayings of most of the pre-Socratic thinkers. Following this is what Heidegger sees as "the metaphysics of Being." It began, in his view, with

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¹⁵. Ibid., p. 34.
Plato, and finished with Nietzsche who is an expression of today's "needy time." Heidegger's own historiographical retrieval of Western tradition is a clear indication of his notion of historicity. It is self-recovery and this is how he did it.

3.2.1 Insights into Some Fragments and Concepts of the Pre-Socratic Thinkers

Heidegger thinks that thinking historically is "ontic" and needs "ontological" foundation. In other words, the former is history, as science, and the latter is historicity. In his case, he is concerned with both, but more so with the latter. This means thinking, not the thought, but the "un-thought." Therefore, thinking in terms of historicity consists in thinking the unthought in the thought, or in saying the un-said in the said, and not just repeating the said. Such is Heidegger's belief, and it is with it that he approaches those with whom he dialogues and calls this thinking "das andenkende Denken." It is the one that re-collects, seeks origins, thinks deep down to the ground of the thought, to the roots of metaphysics.

In "Holzwege," Heidegger considers what is often thought to be the oldest fragment of Western thinking: "Der Spruch des Anaximanders".

17. What is Called Thinking?, p. 76-77.
...the source from which existing things derive their existence is also that to which they return at their destruction, according to necessity, for they give justice and make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time. 18

In Heidegger's view, this fragment still says something to us but "only in thoughtful dialogue [he says] with what it says can it be translated." 19 "Thoughtful translation to what comes to speech in this fragment is a leap over an abyss. The abyss does not consist merely of the chronological or historical distance of two-and-a-half millenia. It is wider and deeper." 20 Mostly, Heidegger takes issue with: genesis, origin (onta or osia), beings (dike) (adike) and others. About "origin," Heidegger "repeats" Anaximander. Heidegger says of it (origin), that "But origin always comes to meet us from the future," 21 and there is always a "...mutual calling of origin and future." 22 Anaximander, in Heidegger's view, also sees origin in the same manner. For, in his case also, it is where things are heading, therefore it comes to meet things


Diels translates: "Woraus aber das Werden ist den seienenden Dingen, in das hinein geschieht auch ihr. Vergehen nach der Schuldigkeit; denn sie zahlen einander gerechte Strafe und Busse für ihre Ungerechtigkeit nach der zeit Anordnung." Ibid.

19. Early Greek Thinking, p. 19 (translation of "Der Spruch..."").

20. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 12.
from the future. In both Heidegger and Anaximander, origin comes as if it lies ahead, in front of things, and towards which things are approaching. The fundamental sense, according to Heidegger's interpretation, which Anaximander conveys with origin, is that its sense is futural and that "there is always a mutual calling of origin and future." 22a

With this interpretation, Heidegger naturally departs from traditional interpretation according to which Anaximander's fragment is always interpreted in the light of cosmogony and cosmology -- that origin is from where things come into being and into which they pass away in the ordinance of time, and things recompense for injustice for encroachment, and this origin, which is the first principle of everything that is, is apeiron. Heidegger, of course, does not dispute this interpretation. It is the thought, but he thinks the unthought.

Heidegger places historicity in the task of retrieving one's own "having-been-future," of which future plays a very fundamental role. Traditionally, history is seen as having everything to do with the past. But Heidegger reverses this view. He makes history hinge on the future. Past, for him, becomes an integral constituent of future, and not past, as past, dead and gone. Therefore, past becomes something towards which man is heading. Past thus comes to meet man from the future. But past is one's origin. It is one's "has-been." Thus, past, being one's "has-been origin," nevertheless lies ahead in front of man, and thus comes to meet man from ahead of him -- the future. With this interpretation,

22a. Ibid.
Heidegger retrieves or discovers himself in Anaximander, departing from the "orthodox interpretation." He does the same thing with dikē and adikē. Heidegger makes them correspond to the self-unconcealment self-concealment historicity of Being. "As it reveals itself in being, Being withdraws."23 

"Dikē, thought on the basis of Being as presencing, is the ordering and enjoining of Order. Adikē, disjunction, is Disorder."24 The latter corresponds to the withdrawal of Being from beings unto itself, and the former, the revelation of Being in beings. Such, in Heidegger's view, is the truth of Being. Heidegger retrieves himself also in Heracleitus' Fragment B.50: Lógos

When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning, it is wise within the same Meaning to say:
One is All.25

In Heidegger's view, something fundamental remains unthought still in Heracleitus' Fragment B.50. In Akouein, "hearing" and "having heard" say the same of lógos. To hear, for Heidegger, means to have heard already. Thus, he writes: "hearing and having heard, 'omologein,' say the same, of lógos."26 By lógos, Heidegger does not mean discourse, account, law, explanation, word, or any of the multifarious meanings lógos

23. Early Greek Thinking, p. 26 (translation of "Der Spruch...").

24. Ibid., p. 43.


Diels translates: "Haben sie nicht mich, sondern den Sinn vernommen, so ist es weise, dem Sinne gemäss zu sagen, alles sei eins." Ibid.

26. Early Greek Thinking, p. 59 (translation of "Der Spruch...").
is traditionally given to mean. \( \text{Lógos} \), in Heidegger, means that of which hearing and saying are the sort of things they are. In other words, \( \text{lógos} \) is what one hears in hearing, and says* in (saying) speech. In Heideggerian phraseology, \( \text{lógos} \) comes to pass in hearing and in saying, but in the hearing and saying of man. "What \( \text{lógos} \) is [Heidegger claims], we gather it from \( \text{légein} \)."\(^{27}\) \( \text{Légein} \), in turn, means, for Heidegger, "...the laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself and others."\(^{28}\) "The middle voice, \( \text{légemathai} \), means to lay oneself down in the gathering to rest."\(^{29}\) In simple terms, it means "...bringing-together-into-lying-before...."\(^{30}\)

Hearing is what Heidegger calls "...gathered hearkening,"\(^{31}\) but both \( \text{légein} \) and \( \text{akouein} \) are of \( \text{lógos} \). Heidegger's interpretation takes \( \text{légein} \) and \( \text{akouein} \) to"belong together because "hearing [he says] is actually the gathering of oneself which composes itself on hearing the pronouncement and its claim."\(^{32}\) That is to say, hearing is of the saying of \( \text{lógos} \). For the saying of \( \text{lógos} \) makes the claim upon man and demands hearing, that is "hearkening attunement."

But the saying of man -- which is already the saying

\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 60.
\(^{28}\) Ibid.
\(^{29}\) Ibid.
\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 61.
\(^{31}\) Ibid., p. 65.
\(^{32}\) Ibid.
of lógos -- conversely means hearing of lógos, that is, man speaks, because he has already heard the saying of lógos, hence to speak or be able to do so presupposes or implies to have heard already the saying of lógos. Thus, just as to hear presupposes the saying of lógos, to speak, likewise, presupposes the hearing of lógos. Therefore, hearing (akouein) and speaking or saying (légein) belong together in the sense that both are of the same thing, lógos. Thus, to speak is to have heard already the saying of lógos, and to hear is to have already been spoken to in the hearing of lógos. Omológein thus means, for Heidegger, the same saying of lógos that man hears and says.

Heidegger's main points are as follows: a) It is to lógos that both hearing (akouein) and saying (légein) belong. b) For hearing is the hearing of the saying of lógos and saying is the saying of the hearing of lógos. c) The saying of man thus presupposes b) both the hearing of lógos and the saying of lógos. Thus, in the case of man, to speak or be able to speak at all is to have already been spoken to, and to hear also means to have already heard -- (omológein) the same thing, that is, the saying of lógos.

Such, in Heidegger's view, is what fragment B.50 (Heracleitus) says. For Heracleitus, in Heidegger's eyes, says "ouk émou ãllâ..." that "not to me should you listen but ..."33 to something else "ãllâ tou lógou," 34 but to lógos.

33. Ibid., p. 67.
34. Ibid.
With this interpretation, Heidegger finds himself retrieving the unthought side of Heracleitus' Fragment B.50. Heidegger's views on language, thinking, poetry and art illuminate this Heracleitean fragment in much the same manner as interpreted above. All these -- language, thinking, art, poetry, all the ontological facticities -- are fateful gifts that take place in man in the event of das Ereignis. Man, for Heidegger, receives them, preserves them, cares for them and then lets them come to pass in and by him. Thus he is only the vehicle of their presencing; that is, man is only the messenger who, having received, kept and cared for, Being, lets out the presencing of Being in him. Man's speaking, for instance, is therefore the saying of language that comes to pass in his speaking. So is poetry. Man's poetizing is, likewise, the coming-to-pass of Being, and the same is true of all man's ontological facticities. One can see how Heidegger "Heideggerizes" (that is, thinks the unthought side of), some fragments of the pre-Socratic thinkers. To him, they understood the functional role of man vis-à-vis Being and Ereignis. Man's entire Being was placed at the service of Being's historicity. This, for Heidegger, is that from which man gets his own essential nature, as the topos of Being. For man, in Heidegger's eyes, sees because he had already seen, hears because he had already heard, speaks because he had already been spoken to, knows because he had already known -- all of which mean that man always fore-has, fore-sees, and fore-conceives that which he comes to bear out in poetry, thinking, language, art, tradition, death,
historicity, temporality and all those toponymies of Being. 
In simpler terms, man pre-constitutes what he comes to re-
constitute explicitly, so his actual, explicit "ontic" activi-
ties are based on, and presuppose, his prior experience with 
that from which he ontologically received those activities.
The pre-Socratic thinkers, in his mind, understood this essen-
tial nature of man vis-a-vis Being and the It that "gives 
it." Heracleitus enjoins man not to listen to him but to
lógos, and Parmenides' Fragment III, in Heidegger's eyes,
immates the same thing (Parmenides Fragment III "For think-
ing and Being are the same.").

35 In this, Heidegger has
Parmenides saying the same thing as already pronounced in
Heracleitus' Fragment B.50. Traditionally, both are seen
as poles apart but Heidegger intimates that Thinking and Being
belong together. Heidegger traces the origin of Thinking (noein)
to légein. From this, Heidegger derives his view of "letting-
lie-before." Thinking, for Heidegger, then means letting-
lie-before. He dwells on auto (dasselbe) of noein and einai
to interpret that "Thinking and the thought it is are the
same. For without the being in relation to which it is ut-
tered, you cannot find thinking." Heidegger holds intact
the traditional interpretation summed up in Bishop Berkeley's
"Esse est percipi." This means, in "metaphysical terms,"

35. Ibid., p. 79. "Tō gēr aútō noein ēstin te kai einai." 
Denken und Sein." Ibid.

36. Early Greek Thinking, p. 79 (translation of "Der
Spruch..."").

37. Ibid., p. 82.
"Being is being represented. It is by virtue of representing that Being is." 38 Heidegger's interpretation traces the belongingness of noe in and 'e on from lege in. To this effect he writes:

Noe in, whose belonging-together with 'e on we should like to contemplate, is grounded in and comes to presence from lege in. In lege in, the letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing occurs. Only as thus lying-before can what is present as such admit the noe in, the taking-heed-of. Accordingly, the noema as nooumenon of the noe in is already a legomenon of the lege in. 39

With lege in being that to which being ('e on) and Thinking (noe in) belong, Heidegger makes Parmenides say the same thing as has Heracleitus in Fragment B.50. For, with lege in, Heracleitus' "logos" comes into play, since "what logos is, [Heidegger says], we gather from lege in," 40 and "lege in properly means the laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself and others." 41

Légein and akoue in also belong together in the sense that both are of logos. Heidegger says of Heracleitus that the "all is one," 42 (en panta) intimates the "omolégein, to say the same," 43 that is to say, that légein and akoue in are of logos Saying is the saying of logos. Hearing is also of the saying of logos.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 89.
40. Ibid., p. 60.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 59.
43. Ibid.
Having thus established the mutual and simultaneous identity of hearing (akouein) and saying (legein), in terms of logos, Heidegger retrieves the idea that man, in akouein and legein lets-lie-before-him, what he receives in the event of appropriation, not from man, but from the event that gives it. Having thus received, man then preserves and cares for the Received (Being), and then lets-come-to-pass in and by him the Received (Being). That is man's role. His Being consists just in that. Man is able to perform this functional role in which his entire Being consists, by reason of his Seinsverständnis. Its fore-structures enable him to exist his Being which consists in being the topos of Being. Such is how Heidegger retrieves the unthought of Parmenides and Heracleitus. They come to presence in him when he recovers himself in them.

3.3.2 A Sketch for a History of Being as Metaphysics

Heracleitus says "Nature loves to hide its essence." Heidegger thinks that the truth of this saying is what escaped "metaphysics." In Heidegger's eyes, the truth of Being lies in revealing itself in beings and simultaneously hiding itself from them. The presencing of Being in such truth is its historicity, but "metaphysics," ever since Plato, has been one-

44. The following is derived from Heidegger's Nietzsche, vol. II.

sided. It took hold only of Being's revelation, and forgot its self-hiding, nature. On this account, metaphysics thought of Being as something that comes to stand enduringly and substantially. Therefore, metaphysics represents Being as being(s).

...Metaphysics [Heidegger writes] never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question; Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representing beings as being;...It refers to Being and means beings as beings.46

But when he undertakes his sketch for a history of Being, as metaphysics, Heidegger's main interest lies only in showing just how metaphysics came to represent Being. Heidegger's insights into the history of Being begin with his pre-Socratic investigations. He retrieves Anaximander's apeiron, through Heracleitus' logos, hen panta, aletheia, physis, Parmenides' moira, ousia -- all saying the same thing about the truth of Being. After the pre-Socratics, however, Being was elevated to the level of agathon in the hands of Plato. Its perceivability is reached only through eidos which became the aitia of the mundane world of appearances and becoming. Aristotle took Being from there and gave it the form of entelecheia as energia and logically as the hypokeimenon which becomes the subject of predication of everything. From then on, the scholastics had it in the form of creator - ens creatum the "really real" which is the "causa prima," creator of every-

thing that is. In a word, the scholastics took the theological view of Being as handed down to them by Aristotle and saw Being not as identical with philosophy (as the study of the first principle of everything with which the First Philosophy [metaphysics] is concerned), but with theology, as the study of God. Philosophy, here, became theology or theosophy. But theosophy came back down to earth again with the birth of modern philosophy beginning from Descartes, as "certitude" in his *ego cogito cogitationes*. Leibniz continued the ancient-medieval division of Being in *Essentia*, "what-quiddity," and *Existentia*, "that-quiddity," vis-a-vis his *monad* in *perceptio-appetitus*. Then Kant represented it in his Transcendental Unity of Apperception from which beings are determined and made to stand together. Unity becomes the condition of synthesis and connection of beings; and then as the will that wills nothing but its own dutiful will. Hegel absolutized the will. Being became an absolute *Geist* whose representation integrated all particular wills unto itself. But it became will, as love, in Schelling, will to power -- external recurrence of the same -- in Nietzsche, the last metaphysician to whose thought modern world of "Enframing" (*Ge-stell*) gives expression. It is the presumptuous world in which "God is dead," and in place of whom man sits in judgement of everything that is. It is the technological age of the world-picture wherein everything is a picture of man. In Heidegger's view that, in brief, surveys the metaphysical voyage of Being as it reveals itself in the West.
3.3 The Toponyms of Art, Poetry, Thinking and Language

These toponyms of Being have been grouped together here for the sole reason that the coming of Being unto itself in each of them operates on the same basis as the others. In view of this sameness, only one of them (Art), using it as an example for all -- to avoid repetition which is too much already -- will be examined.

Art, for Heidegger, reveals Being. In it, Being comes to pass. The same is true of language, thinking, poetry and of all Being's toponyms. In Art, Heidegger claims there happens what he calls: "The setting up of a world [and] the setting forth of Earth."47 These, he claims, "...are two essential features of the work-being of the work of Art. They belong together, however, in the unity of the work -- being."48 "The world [he says] is a self-disclosing openness... [while] the earth is...self-secluding..."49 and concealing. The latter represents the "setting forth of earth," the former, "the setting up of a world." Their unity invokes a struggle. The world, Heidegger writes, "as self-opening, cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keeps it there."49a The opposition of world and earth is

47. Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 48, 49.
48. Ibid., p. 48.
49. Ibid.
49a. Ibid., p. 49.
a striving."50 That which instigates this striving in the
setting up of a world and setting forth the earth, is the
work in the work of art. For, Heidegger claims that "the
work-being of the work consists in the fighting of the battle
between world and earth."51 "Setting up a world and setting
forth the earth, the work accomplishes this striving."52 But
work is human activity, so mortal or man enters into the pic-
ture. It is by his suffering that work is engendered, and
for which earth and world enter into the battle to set forth the
work of man in that earth and world enter into a struggle
in the work of art. Heidegger says of art that it is ";...the
happening of truth. This happening we think of as the fight-
ing of the conflict between world and earth."53 "In the work,
the happening of truth is at work."54

In simpler terms, the setting up of a world and the
setting forth of the earth may be interpreted to represent
the nature of the happening of truth -- that is, the presenc-
ing of Being. The presencing of Being consists in unconcealing
and concealing itself of which the latter represents the self-
secluding nature of the earth, the former the self-disclosing
nature of a world. "...truth [Heidegger writes] is the oppo-

50. Ibid., p. 49.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 57.
54. Ibid., p. 58.
sition of clearing and concealing,"\textsuperscript{55} that is, the self-
unconcealing and self-concealing nature of Being. "Truth
[he says] happens only by establishing itself in the conflict
and sphere, opened up by truth itself."\textsuperscript{56} It is by virtue
of this conflict of the setting up of a world and the setting
forth of the earth -- that is the self-unconcealing self-
concealing nature of Being -- in the work that truth origi-
nates, that is, Being comes to pass. "Art lets truth origi-
nate"\textsuperscript{57} writes Heidegger, that is, Art is where Being comes
unto itself. Art is Being's toponymy. "Art [in Heidegger's
words] then is the becoming and happening of truth"\textsuperscript{58} and
"truth is the truth of Being."\textsuperscript{59}

The setting up of a world and the setting forth of
the earth only describe the nature of Being's presencing --
that is, the coming of Being unto itself, or in other terms,
the origination of truth. Truth originates by the opposition
and struggle of earth and world. This means Being comes unto
itself in unconcealing itself in beings and concealing itself
simultaneously from them. This self-unconcealing self-
concealing happening of Being is the truth of Being, that
is, it is its nature. What art does is to describe and bring
to light this unconcealing-concealing truth of Being. Heidegger

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 77.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 81.
only uses metaphors to describe the truth of Being in taking recourse to: "the setting up of a world" and "the setting forth of the earth" and many more, but only to describe and illuminate the unconcealing-concealing truth of Being. The reason for his use of metaphorical and poetic language at this point in his thinking is presumably because he has "undergone an experience with language." 60

Work, in the work of Art, plays a very prominent role. It is that in which the "conflict of earth and world" takes place. Interpretatively, work is that function through which Being comes to pass or, to use Heidegger's language, "world worlds." 61 The "worlding of world" he says is "...the face-to-face encounter of the world's fourfold." 62 The fourfold, being men, as mortals, earth, sky and divinities, belong together in a mutual appropriation by the event of appropriation (das Ereignis) and expropriation unto their respective selves by the same event.

In simpler terms, Being comes to pass in the work of Art. It is by man (his work) that it comes to pass. It comes to pass in unconcealing itself (the setting up of a world) and concealing itself (the setting forth of the earth). Work, being the function through which Being comes to pass, is man's role. That makes him the topos of Being's coming to pass. Earth and world only describe the truth of Being. The truth of Being

60. On the Way to Language, p. 57.
is its self-unconcealing-self-concealing happening (or its converse). The role of divinities is as functional as that of men. They carry forth messages from the godhead. Heidegger says: "The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead."\(^{63}\) Interpretatively, the godhead may be taken to represent das Ereignis. It appropriates all, the four-fold, each playing its dutiful part, and in playing which Being comes to pass.

In Art, man, in the event of appropriation, receives what he brings to pass in the work of art. What he brings to pass is the coming to pass of Being, in and from which something, a being, comes to stand in the work of art. The coming to pass of Being manifests the truth of Being -- unconcealing and concealing itself at once. This truth is what art describes in opposing earth to world. Man receives from the messengers of the godhead -- divinities -- what is sent by them from the godhead. Thus, all the fourfold enter into what goes to engender the coming to pass of Being. Heidegger puts it as thus: "The fouring presences as the worlding of world."\(^{64}\)

The same event takes place in the toponymies of poetry, thinking and language. Man in the event of appropriation, receives, as in art, what he brings to pass. What he brings to pass is the coming to pass of Being. The coming to pass of Being is manifested in the truth of Being. The truth of Being is its self-unconcealing-self-concealing event (or its converse). Art describes this truth in metaphor-

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\(^{63}\) Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 178.

\(^{64}\) Ibid.; p. 180.
cal terms of "the setting up of a world," and "the setting forth of the earth," that is, pinching earth against world in a mutual conflict of the self-opening up of a world and the self-sheltering, secluding nature of earth. The gods from whom man receives the gift of Being have as much functional role as man. They are messengers of the godhead. (In Stefan George's poem "Words," the twilit norn is posed as an ancient goddess of fate who draws up names. It is from her that the poet waits to get names for his treasure.) The role of man is to receive Being, preserve it, take care of it and let it come to pass in and by him. This role is functional in all, art, poetry, thinking, language, and in all Being's toponymies.

Heidegger interprets some fragments of the pre-Socratics (e.g., Heracleitus' B.50, Parmenides' Fragment III and others) only to describe and illuminate the functional role man plays in being Being's topos. In retrieving himself from those pre-Socratic thinkers, Heidegger describes man's functional role in terms like: "letting-lie-gathered-together-before-oneself-and-taking-to-heart being is beings." 65


Diels translates: "Notig ist zu sagen und zu denken, dass nur das Seiende ist; den Sein ist; ein Nichts dagegen ist nicht; das heisse ich dich wohl beherzigen. Denn das ist der este Weg der Forschung, von dem ich dich Fernhalte. Aber dan... Bahn gibt." (continued)
sees Parmenides' Fragment B.6 and III as saying the same thing as said in Heracleitus' Fragment B.50. All describe the functional role of man in receiving Being, tendering and preserving it in mother muses Mnemosyne and then letting it come to pass in and by him. His own Being consists in just this, being the topos of Being. Man's Being consists in bringing Being to pass, and in so being brings his own Being to pass. This happens in all Being's toponymies.

3.4 The Toponymies of Time, Historicity and "Seinsverständnis"

Historicity is Being's toponymy. It is identical with the coming to pass of Being. This historicity is finite. Being reveals itself in beings and simultaneously withdraws from them unto itself. Time determines it. The historicity of Being has been so much talked about in the previous chapter that saying all again is, in my view, unnecessary, so only fundamentals shall be touched on here. The same shall be the case with Time (and with man and his Seinsverständnis). Time is the unity of its three ecstases — having been, present, future. Time works out explicitly the unity of its three ecstases. The coming of Time unto itself amounts to working

My translation: It is necessary [Heidegger translates: it is useful...] to say and think that Being is; for, to be is possible, and not to be is impossible. This I bid you to consider, for I forbid you from the latter way of seeking. I also forbid you from that way along which wandering mortals ...against itself." (emphasis added)
out explicitly its three ecstatics but this happens in the historicity of Being.

The finitude of Being's historicity is determined by Time. Time temporalizing its three ecstatics is determined by Being. Being and Time determine one another. The coming of time unto itself amounts to the coming of Being unto itself, and the reverse is the same. At the centre of both, however, is man. Man is his Seinsverständnis. Seinsverständnis consists of its fore-structures—fore-having, fore-seeing and fore-conception. Its historicity consists in understanding coming unto itself. This means working out its own fore-structures. Working it out explicitly means the coming to pass of Being which naturally means also that of time. More elaboration on the historicity of Time, Seinsverständnis and historicity, as Being, however, is carried out in the next chapter. All are, however, toponymies in and where Being comes to pass.

3.5 The Toponymy of Being-in-With

Being-with is Being's toponymy. It is characteristic of man's everyday existence. Indeed, it is existing itself, and existing, in the present indicative sense, means the coming to pass of Being in the existent, man, who brings it to pass. Heidegger writes that "Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with," this "...has an existential-ontological meaning."66

"Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even

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66. Being and Time, p. 156.
when factically no Other is present -- at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world, "67 so "...Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world."68

Being-with is the actual, explicit making-present of the ecstases of temporality -- having-been, future, and their reverse reciprocity. Ontologically, it is "primordial temporality"69 in which Being's, Time's or man's "has-been-future" gets executed. Ontologically speaking, Being-with is present which unites in itself having-been, future and their reverse reciprocity, so it is that facticity in which man busies himself engaged in all sorts of ontic everyday activities. Being-with is a toponymy in and where Being comes to pass. It is the presencing of Being in man who may let it come to pass authentically or inauthentically, resolutely or irresolutely.

68. Ibid., p. 157.
69. Ibid., p. 376.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE HISTORICITY OF BEING, AS DISCLOSED
IN ITS TOPOYMIES

4.1 A Short Introduction

Chapter Three has established seven things.

(1) The relationship that exists between man and Being. Man brings Being to be, that is, to presence. This is man's Being. It consists in just that, bringing Being to be. From it, he, in turn, gets his Being. Hence it is from the use and need Being makes of man, when man brings Being to be, that man attains his own.

(2) Being and man belong together in bringing each to attain its own or his own. Because of this, man's ontological facticities are also described as Being's toponymies.

(3) The nature of each toponymy, or facticity, has been examined, showing: a) what they respectively are, b) how they harbour or "shelter" or "house" Being, c) how they are man's Gewesenheit and Geworfenheit Being which are as his given possibilities, Entworfenheit as well.

(4) Art, Thinking, Poetry and Language have been grouped together to avoid too many repetitions because their nature's vis-a-vis Being, Ereignis and man are the same.

(5) Time is interpreted to be (the "how") the temporal openness where Being presences, but Time also extends itself in the presencing of Being.

(6) Historicity is Being itself because it is the presencing of Being. Put differently, the historicizing (presencing) of historicity (Being) is historicity (Being) itself, so historicity is Being itself.

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(7) Man's constitutive privileged Being that: a) distinguishes him from other beings, b) enables him to fore-have, fore-see and fore-conceive his future possibilities and exist them anyhow, c) constitutes his ability to receive Being, care for it, fore-have it, fore-see it, fore-conceive it before letting Being out explicitly is Seinsverständnis. In other words, it is that which enables man to be the topos of Being.

This chapter (Chapter Four) examines the historicity of Being as disclosed in its toponymies. Historicity is, as everywhere, identified as "Become thyself," the meaning of which is indicated in the becoming of Being unto itself in, say, language, when language comes unto itself in language (speech of man); or when Being comes unto itself in any of its toponymies. This process of self-becoming constitutes the historicity of Being's self-unconcealing self-concealing event. Such is the truth or destiny of Being. However, it historicizes its self-unconcealing self-concealing nature in the extending of Time. Time extends the unity of its three ecstases in the historicity of Being. Man, however, is the "centre" of both Being's finite historicity and that of time. Ereignis is the "singulare tantum" that appropriates all to their own. The historicity of Being, Time or man is co-constitutive, co-effective of, and co-present with, one another.

Assuming all these (everything said up to now, namely the notion of historicity as "Become thyself" "Werde was du bist"¹ according to which Being, Time and man, as Seinsverständnis, each comes unto itself in their own respective ways, in that "Werde was du bist" of each is co-constitutive, co-effective

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¹ Sein und Zeit, p. 145.
of, and co-present with one another were the case), were true also of Heidegger's hermeneutics of them, one nevertheless must, just for the sake of argument, justify such interpretation also.

It is not secret to find in Heidegger's writings such expressions as: "Being unconceals and conceals itself," "Being presences itself as presencing," "Being as presence is presencing," "Being comes to be, or comes to pass," "Being reveals itself and withholds itself," "Being discloses and withdraws itself," etc., etc. But what do all these really mean or say? One can answer that all these describe the nature of Being, or the truth of Being. One is right to answer that, and Heidegger would have no difficulty in saying that himself, but then another question arises. Why is the nature or truth of Being, as described above, described as historicity of Being -- a description according to which Being comes unto itself it already is? Can it not be called something else, say, the "Chronicle of Being" or the "biography of Being."

It could, if it could be so interpreted and justified in Heidegger, but the reason for calling my interpretation of the truth or nature of Being, its historicity, must be shown to be so justifiable in Heidegger that Heidegger himself would agree to the interpretation.

To do this, there may be many ways, but there is, in my view, one Heideggerian way that stands out -- namely, the way via Time. That Time is very critical in Heidegger is without question. For, without Time, there can be no "Werde war du bist," no self-presencing, no "Die specifische
Bewegtheit des ERSTRECKTEN SICHERSTRECKENS nennen wir das GESCHEHEN des Daseins,² no self-unconcealing, self-concealing GESCHEHEN des Seins," in short, no historicity, man's or Being's. Time is the hidden basis upon which or that open horizon in terms of which the historicity of Being, or of man, is determined and interpreted as "Werde was du bist."

As has been shown on several occasions in the thesis, by Time Heidegger does not mean any one of its three ecstases, or anything temporal that itself exists in time. Rather, Heidegger means the unity of Time's three ecstases, past, future and present. Their unity is Time; Time, thus, comes to have a "four-dimensionality" in Heidegger -- past, future, present and their unity. Their unity is the fourth one, and it is what is most fundamental in all for Heidegger, because he says that it is "...that giving which brings about to each its own presencing, holds them apart thus opened and so holds them towards one another in the nearness by which the three dimensions remain near one another."³ He calls the fourth one, that is, the unity "nearing nearness"⁴ and says of it that "Nearing nearness has the character of denial and withholding. It unifies in advance the ways in which what has been, what is about to be, and the present reach out towards each other."⁵

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2. Ibid., p. 375, emphasis added.
3. On Time and Being, p. 15.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
What all these mean has been explained in the preceding examinations, but to briefly recapitulate what Heidegger is saying here, one must note that: 1. What has been has the sense of Geworfenheit. Geworfenheit is Heidegger's Gewesenheit. 2. What is about to be is the "Approaching," and it is the "not-yet present" and the sense of it is the future, as Heidegger's Entworfenheit (im Wurf, Entwurf). 3. "Approaching, being not yet present, at the same time gives and brings about what is no longer present, the past, and conversely what has been offers future to itself. The reciprocal relation of both at the same time gives and brings about the present." What present, in other words, means is what he describes (in Sein und Zeit, page 328) as "Gegenwärtigen." Notice that it is not just present, as Gegenwart, but "making-present" or (presencing) as Gegenwärtigen. But as presencing, or making-present, it is the making-present equiprimordially of itself, having-been and future. Heidegger designates making-present (as presenc-ing) as (Ursprünglichen Zeitlichkeit), that is, "primordial temporality." Such, in brief, describes the nature and character of Heidegger's ontological Time; now, how does that become the hidden basis of human historicality as claimed, "...die

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6a. Ibid., p. 13.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit, ist der verborgene Grund der Geschicht-
lichkeit des Daseins?" 10 In other words, how does Time (herein
called Temporality) determine human historicality? Likewise
how does Time determine Being's historicity?

4. Human historicity, or Being's, is finite. Its
finitude lies in the fact of its temporality, not ephem-
erality, but that it is time-bounded, and has a "beginning"
and an "end," in between which human existence is the actual
and explicit exist-ing of the "betweenness" which is a tem-
porality. Being's self-presencing is also a finite presencing
in that the whole presencing event is temporal, not ephemeral,
but that in presencing, Being has the character of denying
and withholding itself in its self-disclosure, so it is time-
bounded by the event of coming to presence and to absence
at the same time, or to unconcealment and to concealment at
the same time in that doing not one but both (in fact "both"
cannot really be said here because it (the event) is not two
things taking place, but one and a singular event) is the
actual and explicit self-presenc-ing itself.

5. But: a) "das Ende" 11 is not a finishing but "the
Approaching" 12 as "the not-yet future." 13 b) "Aber das andere
Ende, der Anfang" 14 is not a beginning but a Gewesenheit as

10. Sein und Zeit, p. 386.
11. Ibid., p. 373.
13. Ibid.
"gewesen sein. 15 "Und es (Dasein) KANN nur gewesen SEIN, solange es ist." 16
c) "Approaching, being the not yet present, at the same time gives
and brings about what is no longer present, past and conversely
what has been, offers future to itself." 17   d) Making-present,
or presencing, of a, b and c is present as "Gegwärtigen." 18

e) Human existence, given a to d, goes like thus: "Zukunft,
Gewesenheit, Gegenwärt zeigen die phänomenalen Charaktere des 'Auf-sich-zu', des
'Zurück auf' des 'Begegnet-lassen von'." 19 In other words, human exist-
tence is a going towards from and a going back to oneself. Existing thus "...holds within them that mysterious quality that we
can walk them forward and backward, and that indeed only the way
back will lead us forward." 20 There is therefore a "...mutual
calling of origin and future" 21 because "...origin always comes
to meet us from the future." 22 The self to which one goes and
the self from which one comes, in Entworfenheit and Geworfenheit
is the same self, hence the going towards from and the coming
back to or from, the self one already is, describes, in

15. Ibid., p. 328.

16. Ibid., emphasis added.


19. Ibid., pp. 328-329. ("The future, the having been,
the present, show the phenomenal characteristic of the 'towards
oneself', the 'back to oneself' and the letting oneself be
encountered by." emphasis added)


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 10.
my view, the event according to which one comes from, and goes
towards, the same self one already is, herein interpreted as
"Become thyself," "Werde was du bist." Needless to say, the unity
of Time's ecstases -- in view of which the having been, the
approaching, and their converse relational reciprocity, the
present, all are the "how determinants" -- is that in terms
of which the "Werde was du bist" is interpreted. 1. Future
is the forward to, 2. having been is the backwards to, the
same self one already is, and present, as making-present
(Gegenwärtigen) is the equiprimordial exist-ing of itself, 1
and 2 as the letting-oneself be encountered by (Begegnenlassens
von) or Being-along-side-with. But this, although having
shown in respect of human existence that Time determines it,
does not show yet that the same is true of Being itself.

It has been maintained that the historicity of Being
takes place in its toponymies (or "houses" or "shelters")
and the presencing of Being in them amounts to their respec-
tive presencing as well. Nevertheless, it must be remembered
always that Time everywhere determines the historicity of
Being when such takes place in them, that is, in the toponym-
ies. Now, it remains to be shown how Time determines the
historicity of Being in Art, Language, Poetry, Thinking, in
short, in all its toponymies.

Taking poetry, for example, Heidegger says of poetry
that it is a "projective Saying." 23 "What poetry, as illumina-

ting projection, unfolds of unconcealedness and projects ahead into the design of the figure, is the Open which poetry lets happen, and indeed in such a way that only now, in the midst of beings, the Open brings beings to shine and ring out." 24 Having said that, namely that poetry is "illuminating projection," Heidegger quickly moves to add that "Projection is the release of a throw by which unconcealedness submits and infuses itself into what is as such." 25 Needless to say, the two fundamental expressions, "projecting saying as "re-
leased from thrownness" immediately draw one's attention to Heidegger's interpretation of "Geworfenheit-Gewesenheit" as "Entworfenheit," both of which are interpreted as determined by Time's Approaching" for the latter, and having-been for the former. It has been said several times that there can be no projecting without thrownness out of which such takes place, whereas thrownness itself springs from projecting as Approaching.

Now what is this "Open that opens up and in opening which beings shine forth and ring out?" And how does the Open do its Opening, in opening which there comes a clearing of, that is to say, an unconcealedness of what is? (quotation above) Heidegger answers that: "Rather, the opening up of the Open, and the clearing of what is, happens only as the

24. Ibid., p. 72.
25. Ibid., p. 73.
openness is projected, sketched out, that makes advent in throneness. Here again, one sees that projection is of throneness, and throneness is of projection, and their converse relational reciprocity is the presencing (present) of both in the "illuminating projecting" which poetry is. Apparently, "Time timing itself" is at work here. Such provides that open and free horizon wherein projection is the projection of what is yet to come (future). But what is yet to come, comes from Time's having-been. Both in force and at the same time, determining one another, is present, in that the three together in unity equiprimordially determine poetry as "illuminating projecting."

Looked at from another perspective, Heidegger explicitly calls the kind of historicity this thesis has been describing "...the destiny of a Providence, or as we now call it: History." Heidegger (in here) was elucidating the poetic journey abroad and Homecoming in his interpretation of Hölderlin in "Remembrance of the Poet." What the poet had journeyed abroad for is what Heidegger here calls "the Reserved" and about the "Reserved" Heidegger says: "That then which has already been given and is yet at the same time being withheld, is called the Reserved." Here again, the having been and

26. Ibid. 71.
27. Existence and Being p. 244.
28. Ibid. p. 245.
29. Ibid.
the not yet come up as constitutive of one another and it is the "destiny of a Providence" he calls "History." The unity of Time's gestations, being present here is self-evident— "The not-yet-still-being-withheld Approaching" (future) and "what has already been given" (past) and retrieving their converse relational reciprocity includes the present in them.

In Language it is the same. "Language [Heidegger says], by naming beings for the first time, just brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to their being from out of their being. Such saying is a projecting of the clearing....Projecting is the release of the throw..." Here again, projecting is a way towards, but out of thrownness. In talking about "the way" (in "the nature of language") in how to undergo an experience with poetry, Thinking, and Language, Heidegger says that:

What is necessary here is not only that on our chosen way we stay within the neighbourhood of poetry and Thinking. We also must look about us in this neighbourhood, to see whether and in what manner it shows us something that transforms our relation to language. But of the way which is to lead us to the source of this possibility, it was said that it leads us only to where we already are....The way allows us to reach what concerns us, in that domain where we are already staying. Why then, one may ask, still find a way to it?...[If one recalls, this is the same question asked earlier in respect of understanding as to why seek to understand what one already fore-understands? Or why seek to know what one already knows? Or why become what one already is? Well, Heidegger now asks: Why then, one may ask, still

30. Ibid., p. 244.
find a way to it, that is, to where we already are, if, in fact, we really already are at the same place we are finding a way to?) Answer: because where we already are, we are in such a way that at the same time we are not there, because we ourselves have not yet properly reached what concerns our being, nor even approached it. The way that lets us reach where we already are, differing from all other ways, calls for an escort that runs far ahead.33

This is no doubt a long quotation, but it describes in clear terms the same not yet Approaching (future), the where we already are (past) and at the same time we have not yet properly reached our being (present) as described everywhere in the thesis.

Present is included in "the at the same time" as this: we are: 1. where we already are (past) but 2. not there yet (future), both being one -- being here and not here -- or, the reverse, 2. we are not there yet (future) at where 1. we already are (past), both being one, at the same time, gives present as consisting in the relational reverse reciprocity of 1 and 2, or conversely of 2 and 1. Their converse reciprocity, being in 1 and 2; or 2 and 1 at the same time, is present. That is why present is described as "Being-along-side-with"34 or "falling."34a But falling, in Being and Time, describes that mode of Being in which Dasein is Mit-dasein or Mit-daseinden, in short, it is a Mit-sein. In Being with, man is busy engaged in his everyday concernful dealings with entities of his kind or otherwise. It is presencing as "making-present,"34b Gegenwärtigen.34c

33. On the Way to Language, p. 93, emphasis added.
34. Being and Time, pp. 375, 377, or as "making-present."
    Ibid., p. 376.
34a. Ibid., p. 376.
34b. Ibid.
34c. Sein und Zeit, p. 278.
Anyway, Heidegger is saying (in the long quotation) that in language, poetry, Art or in Thinking, where one already is, is where one is, at the same time, approaching, all of which goes to demonstrate the temporal horizon in terms of which the presencing of Being in Language, Thinking, Poetry and Art (in all the toponymies) is determined. In Language and Poetry, for example, Heidegger insists that: "The encountering saying of mortals is answering. Every spoken word is already an answer: counter-saying..."35 In all, what man says is what he has had already, and in fore-having which he re-says it. In here as in everywhere the already having been and the projecting Approaching are in place. In thinking, the same is the case. Heidegger says that: "When we think what is most thought-provoking we think properly. When we, in thinking, are gathered and concentrated on the most thought-provoking, then we dwell where all recalling thought is gathered."36 Thinking properly or thinking what is most thought-provoking is recalling, but recalling is always of what one already has had, and in fore-having which one projects it in recalling thought. Here again, the having-been and projecting are in place. In Art, the same thing is the case. Heidegger says: "Art then is the becoming and happening of truth."37 and then Heidegger goes on to ask and answer:

36. What is Called Thinking?, p. 143.
"Does truth, then, arise out of nothing?...Truth is never gathered from objects that are present and ordinary. Rather, the opening up of the Open and the clearing of what is, happens only as the openness is projected...that makes its advent in thrownness." \(^{38}\) Here again, projecting and the having-been thrownness are in place, and the same goes for all the toponymies.

In respect of Tradition, Heidegger, for instance, says that:

The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factual possibilities of authentic existing, and disclosing them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one...\(^{39}\)

Here also, the resolute projecting of possibilities being disclosed in terms of coming back to one's thrownness, "Das entschlossene Zürückkommen auf die Geworfenheit..." \(^{40}\) is in place.

The same is true of all the toponymies. Being historicizes in them in the same manner described as a "thrown-projecting." Time is the "how-determinant," or that open horizon in terms of which the historicity of Being in its toponymies is carried out. The unity of Time's three ecstases provided the determination of the disclosing of Being in its toponymies in the manner of projecting itself from its own thrownness, in that the "not-yet-Approaching" (projecting) is always out of the having-been (thrownness) and vice versa.

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38. Ibid.


40. Sein und Zeit, p. 383. ("in one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness...")
but all together constitute (the presencing) the disclosing event in and through which Being comes to presence.
But in this thrown-projecting or projectingthrownness manner in and through which Being presences, also lies the temporalization of the unity of Time's ecstases.

Given all the interpretation done above, it is believed to be apparent now that Time is the basis upon which the historicities of Being and man are determined, but determined in such a manner that, in it, the resulting release of what actually takes place in respect of either Being or of man is: "Werde was du bist," 41 a becoming according to which Being becomes what it already and essentially is, and so is man also, hence, the advent of my interpretation described in the illumination of "Become thyself" (of man, Being or of Time itself) — historicity.

The historicities of Being's toponymies are to be shown in the next pages in this chapter (Chapter four). Immediately preceding this is the interpretation of the historicities of Art, Language, Poetry and Thinking. In this, the reader is advised to keep in mind the following seven points (repeated many times in the thesis). The seven points only sum up the relationship of Being, Time and man (Seinsverständnis) insofar as their respective historicities are related to one another in the presencing of Being in its toponymies, or of man in his-ontological facticities.

41. Ibid., p. 145.
4.2 Historicity: Being, Time and Man

(1) Being and Time determine one another. The entire lecture *On Time and Being* establishes this fact.

(2) Being historicizes itself in its toponymies in the temporalization of time, and time temporalizes itself in the historicity of Being.

(3) Both are not beings, nor are they in time. But the temporalization of Being's historicity (Being's finite-historicity) and the historicizing of Time's temporality (Time's finite-temporality) need the use of man.

(4) Man is the topos of Being (the locus and organon) appropriated for both the finite-historicity and finite-temporality of Being and Time.

(5) Man exists his "Being-topos" by virtue of his *Seinsverständnis*. *Seinsverständnis* is the "centre" by which Being and Time co-historicize their respective "having-been-future." In other words, it is in man that the finite-historicity of both Being and Time via the historicity of *Seinsverständnis* happen. The historicity of *Seinsverständnis* consists in understanding coming unto itself. This lies in working out explicitly its fore-structures -- fore-sight, fore-having and fore-conception.

(6) But every such undertaking is tantamount to the presencing of Being unto itself in man. For Heidegger himself says in *Being and Time* that: "All our efforts in the existential analytic serve one aim of finding a possibility of answering the question of the meaning of Being in general. To work out this question we need to delimit that very phenomenon in which something like Being becomes accessible -- the phenomenon of the understanding of Being." In other words, every historicity of *Seinsverständnis* amounts also to the historicity of Being, but every historicity of Being amounts to the temporalization of Time.

(7) Therefore, the historicity of man (that is, the historicity of *Seinsverständnis*) or of Being or of time (or any one of them) is at once co-present with, co-affective and co-constitutive of one another. It is therefore a co-historicizing of all, each unto itself. How such is the case is shown in the following pages.

42. *Being and Time*, p. 424.
4.3 The Historicities of Art, Language, Poetry and Thinking

Like Seinsverständnis, historicity and temporality, these (art, language, poetry and thinking) are man's ontological facticities. All are integral constituents of Being-in-the-world. As ontological facticities, they are Being's toponymies as well. But Art, Thinking, Poetry and Language have been grouped together here for the sole reason that the historicity of one (say, poetry or language) operates on the same basis as the others.

Thinking, in Heidegger's eyes, is Art. He shows in What is Called Thinking? that Thinking -- which, like all the ontological facticities ("...is in no way of man's making or within his power..., but a fateful submission to a power which comes from what the Greeks called Poiesis (poesy) and Techne..."

43) is "...handicraft par excellence."\(^{44}\) But, as Heidegger claims, "all art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry."\(^{45}\)

Projective saying [he says] is poetry..., poetry is the saying of the unconcealedness of what is. Actual language at any given moment is the happening of this saying, in which a people's world historically arises,... Projective saying is saying,

\(^{43}\) What is Called Thinking?; p. 22.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 23.

\(^{45}\) Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 72.
which, in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsaying as such into a world.\footnote{Ibid., p. 74.}

Thus, "language itself [in Heidegger's eyes] is poetry in the essential sense."\footnote{Ibid.}

Essentially speaking, Art, Thinking, Poetry and Language -- "...as the setting-into-work of truth..."\footnote{Ibid.} -- are the same.

Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the work. To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap...\footnote{Ibid., pp. 77-78.}

is Art. Thus, "Art bestows and grounds being,"\footnote{Ibid., p. 76-77.} and "Language alone brings what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time. Where there is no language,...there is also no openness of what is..."\footnote{Ibid., p. 73.} thus, "only where there is language, is there world...."\footnote{"Hölderlin and the essence of poetry," in Existence and Being, p. 276.} Poetry, in turn, is a form of language for Heidegger which "...as illuminating projection, unfolds of unconcealedness and projects ahead into the design of the figure, is the Open which poetry lets happen, and indeed in such a way that only now, in the midst of beings, the Open
brings beings to shine and ring out." In the case of Thinking, Heidegger says of it that "when thought's courage stems from the bidding of Being, then destiny's language thrives."

All are essentially the same to the effect that man, by virtue of his privileged Seinsverständnis, is the "Being-topos" of their historicity -- the historicity of Being in them. In other words, man, by being the topos (locus and organon), of Being, brings out the coming of Being unto itself (historicity) in Art, Language, Poetry and Thinking. To show how, Heidegger takes recourse to Parmenides' Fragment 6: "One should both say and think that being is."

Parmenides attacked the "Pluralist" view (e.g., Heraclitus and his disciple, Cratylos, and others, who held a pluralistic view of the ultimate principle of the cosmos), claiming that it is, in principle, impossible to think and say that which is not (To me on ). For there is no such thing as not-being. Thinking and saying then, is of being alone. But such classic interpretation is not what Heidegger thinks. For thinking, for Heidegger, means the "bidding of Being..."

54. Ibid., p. 5.

Diels translates: "Nötig ist zu sagen und denken dass nur das Seiende ist; denn Sein ist, ein Nichts dagegen ist nicht..." Ibid.
56. What is Called Thinking?, p. 168.
and is it of the "unthought" in a thinker's thought. "The unthought [he says] is the greatest gift that thinking can bestow to man," and to think the unthought is to "...magnify still further what is great in..." a thinker. Such is the view with which Heidegger retrieves Parmenides and others.

In retrieving Parmenides, in order to show how Being comes unto itself in Poetry, Language, Art and Thinking, Heidegger first takes issue with chre. Etymologically speaking, it comes from a thematic verb "chrao or chresthai" in a passive middle voice (athematic), both in the present indicative sense, meaning "to give the needful answer." Heidegger maintains that it comes from "cheir," meaning "hand," "giving a hand to," in chrao, which in the middle voice, lends itself to "having to use" myself for something in lending a hand, that is, to use myself for something. Chre thus means "to

58. What is Called Thinking?, p. 76.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., p. 77.
61. Ibid., p. 186.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. "To use [says Heidegger] means, first, to let a thing be what it is, and how it is. To let it be this way requires that the used thing be cared for in its essential nature -- we do so by responding to the demands which the used thing makes manifest in a given distance." Ibid., p. 191. "Using commends the used thing to its own nature and essence. In this way there is concealed a command, a calling. In the chre of Parmenides' saying, a call is identified, although it is not thought out, much less explicated." Ibid., p. 196.
use,"65 "it is useful,"66 "it is needful,"67 all of which imply, in Heidegger's eyes, "fitting response."68

Heidegger then understands legein from the meaning of logos, from which legein comes and with which "Latin's legere"69 is identified. But legere for Heidegger means "to lay,"70 and to lay is to lay before us, or lay out, lay to. Thus legein from logos, and as legere means "laying before, laying out or to," so legein is "laying."71 Therefore, "chrè to legèin..." then means "It is useful: to lay, to let lie before us...."72

Then comes noein. "Noein [he says] is taking something to heart."73 By this he means, "thanc[thanc means memory], devotion, memory."74 When all is said and done, however, Heidegger understands Parmenides' Fragment Six: "Chrè to legein te noein t' èon èmmenai," as "Useful to let-lie-before-us so [the] taking-to-heart also: beings in Being."75

65. Ibid., p. 191.
66. Ibid., p. 196.
67. Ibid., p. 189.
68. Ibid., p. 187.
69. Ibid., p. 198.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p. 199.
73. Ibid., p. 203.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., pp. 225, 228.
Thus understood, the whole fragment is interpreted by Heidegger in terms of man's functional role, as the "being-topos," vis-à-vis Being and Ereignis. In other words, Heidegger places man at the centre of Being's historicity. Ereignis, he claims, appropriates both Being and Time to their own. But man stands in all "the events of givingness" as the topos: He is so constituted that he exists precisely as the topos whose need and use bring about the giving of Being and Time. It is precisely in so existing, that his being consists; placed at the centre, however, man, ontologically is Seinsverständnis. For it is by virtue of it that he is able, in the event of appropriation, to perform his functional role (Being-topos) for the historicity of Being, Time and therefore his own, since it is rooted in theirs.

In the event of the "es gibt Zeit," "es gibt Sein," however, man, when appropriated, responds piously to the claim made upon him. To this effect, Heidegger says that "The way is appropriating," 76 and

we [men] respond to the way only by remaining under-way. To be underway on the way in order to clear the way....In order to get underway, we do have to set out. This is meant in a double sense: for one thing, we have to open ourselves to the emerging prospect and direction of the way itself; and then, we must get on the way, that is, must take the steps by which alone the way becomes a way. 77

Heidegger elsewhere describes the same event as undergoing

76. On the Way to Language, p. 129 (emphasis added).

an experience with something.

To undergo an experience with something—be it a thing, a person, or a god—means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhels and transforms us. When we talk of 'undergoing' an experience we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that comes about, comes to pass, happens. 78

It is "Appropriating that appropriates man" 79 and in response to which he undergoes an experience.

It is in undergoing such an appropriating experience that man — in "Chè to légēin to noein t'ón ōmnēnai" — "lets-lie-before-him-and-takes-to-heart" Language, poetry, Thinking, and Art. Heidegger is of the view that man receives Language, Art, Thinking, Poetry and, as a matter of fact, all his ontological facticities in the event of appropriation. For this man, in Heidegger's eyes, is so constituted as to be able to do so, and he identifies this ability with "memory" 80 which, he says, "...is the gathering of thought." 81 Memory, for Heidegger, is what renders it possible for man to reconstitute

80. What is Called Thinking?, p. 3.
81. Ibid., pp. 3, 10, 11. "Dame Memory is Mnemosyne, Mother of the Muses...which is the gathering of recollection, thinking back. It safely keeps and keeps concealed within it that to which as each given time thought must be given before all else, in everything that essentially is, everything that appeals to us as what has being and has been in being." Ibid., p. 11.
his "has-been" and what he is "yet-to-be." This, no doubt, is a manifestation of the nature of Seinsverständnis.

Man is he who brings out Being's historicity. To bear out Being, man must have pre-possessed it; thus must have received it. The reception of Being is what Heidegger describes as undergoing experience with "something"; that "something" befalls man, strikes him, comes over him, overwhelms and transforms him; all of which are not of man's making but in undergoing which he receives the gift of Being. Having thus received Being, man (as message-bearer) owing to "Mother Memory" keeps it, safeguards it; thus pre-possessing it before bearing it out.

Such interpretation elucidates Heidegger's cumbersome expression: "Letting-lie-before-man-and-taking-to-heart." As said earlier, Heidegger understands to lègein, as laying before us. This indicates the receiving of Being by man. Submitting to this laying out, man receives Being and this in turn indicates letting the received Being lie before him. Then comes noeln of which he says: "Noeln implies a perceiving which never was nor is mere receiving of something. The noeln perceives beforehand by taking to mind and heart. The heart is the wardship guarding which lies before us." 82 The heart, that is, taking-to-heart, which he says comes from "noeln," is "thanc." 83 By this, Heidegger understands "devotion,"

82. Ibid., p. 207.
83. Ibid., p. 203.
Taking-to-heart then means the keeping, safeguarding and caring of the received Being. But the receiving and caring of the received Being only begins man's functional duty as a bearer of Being. For such undertaking only stipulates that man is already possessive of Being. In other words, this means that man, by virtue of the fore-anatomy of Seinsverständnis has already "fore-had," "for-seen," and "fore-conceived" Being. Next (although it is simultaneous with receptivity-aspect of it) to this is bearing Being out explicitly. This takes place when, for example, man, in the case of language, speaks. It is therefore in the speaking of man that language comes to pass. But man speaks, and is indeed able to speak at all only because his speaking is, in fact, the speaking of language itself that speaks via the speaking of man. In this, man is only a vehicle by whom language speaks.

Strictly speaking then it is language itself that speaks, not man. This is what Heidegger means by his celebrated dictum: "Language speaks." 85 Man speaks because language speaks, but Language speaks in the speaking of man. "Language needs human speaking..." 86 in order to come unto itself. Thus it is man who, through his speaking, brings Language unto itself. The historicity of language, that is, the coming of language unto itself takes place in the speaking of man. But the speak-

84. Ibid.


ing of man is the speaking of language, so man speaks only because he had already been spoken to; already heard, or listened to, the speaking of language; already received Language and caring it in "Mother memory": thus already fore-

had, fore-conceived and fore-seen language -- thanks to the fore-anatomy of his Seinsverständnis -- that is, he (man) had already "let-lie-before-him and taking-to-heart" the gift of language, and then let-come-to-pass, the speaking of language through him. Such acts of receptivity, guardianship, preservation, tendering and caring the received, and letting the received Being lie-gathered-together before him, thus, fore-having, fore-seeing and fore-conceiving the received Being in his Seinsverständnis, and (then) letting the received Being come to pass in, through and by him, explain man's functional role in Heidegger's interpretation of Parmenides' "Chré to légèin te noein t'èon..." that is "letting-lie-before-him and taking-to-heart." But all these instrumental functional acts are made possible by virtue of the fact that man is so constituted as to be able -- this is due to his constitutive structure of Seinsverständnis -- to perform these acts. Such is that in which man's Being consists. Man is "Being-topos." He comes unto himself in the coming of Being unto itself. He is historical, only because Being is. The coming of Being unto itself in language is when language comes unto itself in and through the speaking of man; and the same is true of Art, Thinking and Poetry. All operate on the same procedure. In all, man is the topos of Being's historicity
when Being comes unto itself in its toponymies. It is in so being that he attains his own. The historicity of Seinsverständnis, as said earlier, lies in the coming of understanding unto itself. This in turn consists in working out explicitly its "has-been" fore-structures in which man had already "let-lie-before-him," and "taken-to-heart" the received Being after which he executes as well the explicit working out of the "has-been" fore-structures of understanding by letting-coming-to-pass the presencing of the received Being, that is, bearing out Being's historicity in its toponymies (e.g., in Language, Art, etc.). Therefore, the historicity of Seinsverständnis means the historicity of Being, and both in turn also mean that of Time as well, since the historicities of Being and Man, and the temporalization of the unity of time's three ecstases, are co-constitutive of one another. That of Time and Being determine each other in that respect and man gets his determination by being the topos (locus and organon) of their historicity. It is therefore a co-historizing of all, each unto itself. Man, as a topos of Being and Time, constitutes the historicity of his Seinsverständnis when understanding comes unto itself. In it, Being is received and let out, thus coming unto itself in unconcealing and concealing itself simultaneously, (or its converse), and naturally, that of time, temporalizing the unity of its three ecstases -- having been, present and future -- is invoked therein. Man, as the topos, is therefore the centre. Time, as the "how-determinant" determines Being's historicity. Being, as presencing, presences both
the historicity of man and the temporalization of time. Man is appropriated for both. It is from all of these, that is, the historicity of Being, in which that of Time and man are invoked, that beings are and come to be what they are. Next to these come ἐμμεναι and ὥν.

ἐμμεναι is an older form of ἐμαι, and means to-be, and ὥν is Being. ὥν, ἐμμεναι are, grammatically speaking, the object of the whole sentence. But they are not so for Heidegger, and he understands both as "beings in Being," that is, beings coming-to-be by Being. Thus understood, the whole Fragment comes as follows: "It is useful to let-lie-before-us and so the taking-to-heart also: beings in Being." In simple terms, all mean as follows: man receives Being, safeguards and keeps it, cares for it and lets it come to pass in and by him. It is by all these that beings come to pass in and by him. It is by all these that beings come to be. The cumbersome "let-lie-gather-together-before" only describes the topos nature of how man receives, safeguards, keeps, cares for, Being in the fore-anatomy of Seinsverständnis as "mother muses." The "taking-to-heart" only expresses man's devotional caring vocation in which his Being consists. It is on the grounds of his "taking-to-heart" devotional Being that man is seen as the topos of Being. Man's performance of this "Chrè τὸ λέγειν τῇ ὥν ἐμμεναι," that is,

87. What is Called Thinking?, see pp. 220-224.

88. Ibid., see pp. 221-225, 228.
"It is useful to let lie before us and taking to heart: beings in Being," that beings come to be, but only in the coming to pass of Being in, through and by man.

4.4 The Historicity of Being-in-Tradition

Like the others, tradition is man's ontological facticity. He is thrown into it but only to become it. As both thrown and projected, human existence re-constitutes that of which it is already constituted. The process here, as everywhere, expresses the same hermeneutical circular structure of retrieving man's own "factual has-been-thrownness" but in which projected future possibility is inherent as well.

Heidegger's own "Overcoming of Metaphysics" is an example of retrieving oneself in and from one's own has-beenness (past). Tradition (the Western one, of course) preceded him. But being born into or (as Heidegger would say) "thrown" into it in spite of himself, it is as if it was given to him as a gift. As facticity, however, Tradition is his past Being, ahead of whom it is given, but for him to retrieve himself and in retrieving which he recovers the

89. "Überwindung der Metaphysik" from "Vorträge und Aufsätze" does not mean defeating and leaving behind something thus overcome. It means incorporating or appropriating something for use, hoping to cast new light on or elevate it. This is what Heidegger speaks of as "The Task of Destroying the history of ontology" in Being and Time. Here again "Destrucktion" as "Überwindung" does not, in the absolute negative sense, mean wrecking or tearing down something, but, in the strictest Heideggerian sense, finding oneself in one's has-been Tradition. For him, it simply means self-recovery or discovery, and this, in my view, is his view of historicity -- "Become thyself."
self he already is. Self-retrieving is historicity. For it executes and completes the repetitive circular structure of explicitly working out one's own has-beenness.

As one's own has-beenness, Tradition remains futural. For it is yet to be taken up. It is as though it is waiting around for one to take up. Thus, it is future has-beenness. Working it out explicitly, that is, retrieving oneself in and from it, represents self-becoming and such is Heidegger's notion of historicity. It is finding oneself in one's own has-beenness as what one, nevertheless, already is. Doing historiological investigation of history, for Heidegger, then amounts to the same process of self-retrieval, in doing which what one finds or retrieves or recovers is one's very self, not another's, as "philosophy of history" would have it.

Historiological investigations of history, when founded on historicity, for Heidegger, is therefore not tied to the Lebenszusammenhänge of another. It is reconstitution, but of oneself in one's own has-been facticity, not another's. It is understanding oneself in one's factual has-beenness. It is self-becoming, in that origin and destination are the same self from which one comes and unto which one be-comes. It is retrieving one's own Tradition.

But Tradition is Being's toponymy as well. The self-becoming of man unto himself in retrieving his Tradition is, in fact, the self-becoming of Being unto itself in its toponymy, Tradition. Man exists for this. He is only the topos (locus and organon) of the coming of Being unto itself in Tradition. It is therein, and in so being, that his own historicity
consists.

Comparatively speaking, just as language (as Being's toponymy) comes unto itself in the speaking of man; or just as Being comes unto itself in language when language (as Being's toponymy) comes unto itself in the speaking of man, so does Tradition. Tradition (as Being's toponymy) comes unto itself in the thinking of man when retrieving his Tradition; or Being comes unto itself in Tradition when Tradition (as Being's toponymy) comes unto itself in the thinking of man. In the West, the coming of Being unto itself in Tradition is indicated in its being thought by, say, the pre-Socratics as: Apeiron, logos, henpanta, aletheia, etc. and as Idea-agathon in Plato, energia in Aristotle, to Descartes' concern for certitude, down to the "last man," Nietzsche's Wille zur Macht, and lastly to Heidegger himself, as presencing -- the historicity of revealing and withholding itself in beings and from beings (or its converse). Heidegger, for that matter, could think of the entire western tradition as "metaphysics" -- a history of Being's historicity. For he sees Tradition as a toponymy of Being, and he says of it "...that what is handed down to us by tradition...comes towards us because we are its captives and destined to it." The historicity of Tradition therefore consists in the coming of Tradition unto itself in the thinking of man; or in the coming of Being unto itself in Tradition (its toponymy) in

90. What is Called Thinking?, p. 46.
91. Ibid., p. 76.
the thinking of man. His (man's) historicity is, therefore, and strictly speaking, the historicity of Being. He is, and becomes, whatever he is, only because of Being.

4.5 The Historicity of Being-in-Death

Being-in-or-unto-Death is man's ontological facticity. As facticity, it is his possibility as well. He is both thrown into his factual existence and projected unto his future possibility. As facticity, Death is man's "has-been" Being. As possibility, Death is man's "not-yet" Being, but both are one and the same. For man's thrown-facticity and projected-possibility constitute man's "future-has-been," in whose actual presencing represents the inclusion of the present as primordial temporality. The actual presencing of man's "future-has-been" is historicity.

Every historicity of man, however, represents also that of Being itself from which man, as topos, gets his historicity. Thus, the historicity of Death, properly speaking, is the coming of Being unto itself in it as its toponymy. Man, as a topos, is only used for that, and from which he comes unto himself in it as his ontological facticity. Death, thus spoken of, precludes its being perceived simply as a termination of life. It is that by which man gets delivered over unto himself -- historicity. In the language of Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of Death as: "The possibility
of authentic existence,"92 or "...potentiality-for-Being-itself."93

Like the other ontological facticities, however, man's Seinsverständnis enables him to assume his functional role, as a topos, in bringing out the presencing of Being resolutely or irresolutely in its toponymy, Death. By means of the forestructure of Seinsverständnis man is able, in a moment of vision, to project himself in resolute anticipation of his future-possibility, Death. From this projective and bold anticipation, Death (Being) discloses itself to him in listening-attunement. In Death, its historicity therefore happens, like others, in man when he authentically and boldly comports himself to it and exists it accordingly and understandingly. In this man always understands himself authentically as a sojourning mortal for whom Death is disclosed as his own most possibility. In Heidegger's words, "Dasein (as man) discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility,"94 Death. Thus "...Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-Death, is so to comport ourselves towards death that in this Being, and for it, death reveals itself as a possibility. Our terminology for such Being towards this possibility is anticipation of this possibility."95

93. Ibid., p. 318.
94. Ibid., p. 307.
95. Ibid., p. 306.
The historicity of Death thus lies in its revelation to man and simultaneous withdrawal from him in such a manner that man, as the topos (locus and organon) comports himself boldly and authentically in anticipation of Death as its possibility. Thus, Heidegger writes that "Being-towards-death is anticipation of a potentiality -- for-Being of that entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its own uttermost possibility." **96**

"Anticipation [therefore] turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being -- that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence." **97** The coming of Being unto itself in Death, or the historicity of Death consists therefore in its revelation to, and withdrawal from, man; who, by being the topos of such an event, is also disclosed unto himself therefrom; and thereby comports himself resolutely and authentically to such disclosing in anticipation of Death as his ownmost factual possibility. It is the coming of (Being) Death unto itself in the coming of man unto himself. Man brings (Being) Death to be in order to bring himself to be in authentic constant anticipation of it (Death) as his own possibility.

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96. Ibid., p. 307, emphasis added.

97. Ibid.
4.6 The Historicity of Being-With

Like the rest, *Mitsein* is man's ontological facticity. Like them again it is an integral constituent of Being-in-the-world. Man is thrown into them and pre-constitutes them but only to reconstitute them in becoming the very constitutive Being he already is. The ontological constitutions of man are both his facticities and possibilities. They are, as facticities and possibilities, both thrown and projected. As thrown facticities, they are man's "has-been-Being." As projected-possibilities, they are man's "future-Being." Thus, as both thrown-facticities and projected-possibilities, these ontological facticities are man's "future-has-been," in existing which he reconstitutes what he is already constituted, that is to say, he becomes the self he already is -- historicity.

*Mitsein* is presencing, that is, the actual presencing of Being unto himself in the presencing of man unto himself. For man, it describes his everyday preoccupation and concernful dealings with other beings (his kind or otherwise) amid which he is thrown, despite himself, and with which he, likewise, deals in his everyday activities. *Mitsein* is thus the actual existing itself of which present, as presencing, is representative. In other words, *Mitsein* is the actual working out equiprimordially of man's "future-has-been," so it is the explicit presencing of man's thrown-facticity and projected-possibility. *Mitsein* is "present," it is the between of having been, as man's factual having-been, and of future, as man's future-
possibility. Existing (in the present indicative active sense of -ing) expresses the actual and explicit presencing of Being (as mitsein), therefore of man also since he is its topos. In the language of Being and Time, Heidegger, in regard to mitsein, seen as present or presencing, writes that:

The unity of the horizontal schemata of future, present and having been, is grounded in the ecstatical unity of temporality. The horizon of temporality as a whole determines the whereupon (woraufhin) factically existing entities are essentially disclosed. With one's factical Being-there, a potentiality-for-Being is in each case projected in the horizon of the future; one's "Being-already" is disclosed in the horizon of having-been; and that with which one concerns oneself is discovered in the horizon of the present.98

Just as the Present arises in the unity of the temporalizing of temporality out of the future and having been, the horizon of a Present temporalizes itself equiprimordially with those of the future and of having been.99

Temporalizing is present, and present is mitsein. For, all constitute man's everyday preoccupation and concernful dealings with others in which case such involvement expresses actual and explicit existing of his Being, that is, the actual and explicit existing (presencing) equiprimordially of his having-been future. Thus it is the actual and explicit becoming, equiprimordial with future and having-been, of man unto himself, and this naturally amounts also to the historicity of Being itself.

But mitsein also expresses man's "...lostness in the 'they', that factical potentiality-for-Being which is closest

98. Ibid., p. 416.
99. Ibid., p. 417.
to it (the tasks, rules and standards, the urgency and extent, of concernful and solicitous Being-in-the-world)...."\textsuperscript{100} In this, "Dasein (man) makes no choice, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensures itself in inauthenticity."\textsuperscript{101} From an ontological standpoint, this sort of Being is not less or more of anything than the authentic one. For both express the two basic modes which indicate and attest man's authentic and inauthentic existence. Man can be either; but both express that primordial temporality (present), equiprimordial with future and having-been, in which man (exists) becomes the self he already is, authentically or not, resolutely or not. Both are, again, due to Being. But given these two basic modes, man's historicity, therefore Being's also, may be authentic or inauthentic; neither of which bears any moral association. In either, man, nevertheless, remains the topos of Being's historicity, that from which he gets his historicity. Inauthenticity only expresses a particular mode of the historicity of \textit{mitsein}. Its attestation is brought about by the historicity of Death which delivers man unto himself authentically. In general terms, and ontologically speaking, \textit{mitsein} is primordial temporality and it is thus the equiprimordial \textit{presencing} of man's "having-been-future," in \textit{presencing} which Being comes unto itself in the coming of man unto himself.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 312.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORICITY IN HEIDEGGER II:

A Hermeneutical Construction of the Notion of

Historicity in Heidegger's Later Works

5.1 A Short Introduction

Chapter Four has shown the historicity of Being as Being unconceals and conceals itself in its toponymies. Three facts are established here.

(1) Being presences itself in its toponymies, so their presencing is, in fact, the presencing of Being itself. The speaking of language, for instance, is the presencing of Being in language, and the same is true of all the toponymies.

(2) Time, naturally, determines the presencing of Being in its toponymies in extending the unity of its three ecstases; but such is likewise done in the presencing of Being.

(3) But man is in the centre of all these. He brings Being to presence in the temporalization of time, and in so doing, brings himself to be.

This chapter seeks to construct the notion of historicity in Heidegger II.

Heidegger's thinking is a sort of "...single pathway bound."¹ Heidegger himself maintains that "every thinker

1. Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 3.
thinks only one thought," and "to think is to confine yourself to a single thought that stands still like a star in the World's sky." This is, no doubt, true of Heidegger, although it may not be so in the case of others. Equally true of him also is his acknowledgement that "...all true thought remains open to more than one interpretation -- and this is by reason of its nature."

By reason of its nature, Heidegger's "das andenkende Denken" has been interpreted in many ways, and speaking of Heidegger in chronological terms, scholars today talk of Heidegger I and Heidegger II. The former consists of his so-called earlier works beginning from the "Der Zeitbegriff" essay (1916) through Sein und Zeit (1927), Was ist Metaphysik (1929),

2. What is Called Thinking?, p. 50.
7. The whole of Father Richardson's great work, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought is organized around such lines. See also Kaufman's Existentialism: "Above all, there are two Heideggers...the early and the late one..." (p. 36).
Vom Wesen des Grundes (1929) down to the middle of the nineteen-thirties. The latter begins with the so-called "Kehre" (spoken of for the first time in his published writing in 1947 in Letter on Humanism, p. 71) and all his subsequent works.

All in all, however, Heidegger's works are mostly organized around Heidegger I and II, and no difficulty is mentioned in locating Heidegger's notion of historicity in Heidegger I. In these earlier works, Heidegger's notion of historicity is everywhere, and looms so abundantly conspicuous, especially in Being and Time, that even critics get spellbound and tantalized by it until disappointed.

With Heidegger II, however, the situation is completely different. While critics have no time to waste on poetic language, even "Friends of Heidegger" suddenly find themselves in a quandary wondering what has become of so fundamental a notion as that of Geschichtlichkeit of which so many ambitious minds were captivated in Heidegger I. In Heidegger II, even the word "history" itself is hardly mentioned. Also, it is replaced by, and couched in, expressions from which any ontic (ordinary or customary) notion of history is hardly discernable.

Strangely enough, Heidegger puts "history" in unorthodox places -- for example, in Poetry and Art -- where it is least expected. The language he uses to present it is so poetic and metaphoric, that it is not improper to say of Heidegger 8.

that he has no taste for "the language of history." Concepts he uses to examine history are: "sending," "granting," "homecoming," "event," "appropriating" and many more. But this, no doubt, incenses even his sympathizers, let alone critics.

In Heidegger's mind, however, he believed himself to have reached a point in his single pathway where he has "undergone an experience with language." This means a transformed relationship between man and language. Thus Heidegger writes: "We who speak language may thereupon become transformed by such experiences, from one day to the next or in the course of time." Such, presumably, explains Heidegger's own transformed relationship to language. But if one accepts Heidegger's metamorphic "undergoing experience with language" -- something which is inherent within the matter of his thinking itself -- in the course of his single thought, then this should be so in its own terms; that is, one should also accept Heidegger's thinking as a stretch of a "single pathway bound" that confines itself to a single thought, and in the course

9. On the Way to Language, p. 57. Heidegger explains that:

To undergo an experience with something -- be it a thing, a person, a god -- means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us. When we talk of "undergoing" an experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that comes about, comes to pass, happens.

10. Ibid.

of which he underwent an experience with language. If, again, one accepts that such a view vis-à-vis Heidegger's single thought, then one should again accept his own insistence that "...only by way of what 'Heidegger I' has thought does one gain access to what is to be thought by 'Heidegger II'. But the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II."¹² Such being his contention, then Heidegger is right to say of himself that I have left an earlier standpoint, not in order to exchange it for another one, but because even the former standpoint was merely a way-station along a way. The lasting element in thinking is the way. And ways of thinking hold within them that mysterious quality that we can walk them forward and backward, and that indeed only the way back will lead us forward,¹³ for there is always a "...mutual calling of origin and future."¹⁴

With this insight into Heidegger's way of thinking, it is misleading to say of Heidegger II that it -- in terms of the matter of thinking itself -- does not have, or has less of, what Heidegger I has. The subsidiary and minor aim of this dissertation is to exhibit the presence of Heidegger's notion of historicity in Heidegger II and use it to show the unity of his thought as a single pathway bound. But first it has to be located and extrapolated. Second, it has to

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¹⁴ Ibid.
be constructed but done in keeping with Heidegger's own way of thinking, and with Heidegger I -- Being and Time. Third, it has to be so furnished as to not only illuminate the single pathway of both Heidegger I and II, but so as to be able to answer also to the quandary and misgivings with which Heidegger's notion of historicity in Heidegger II is associated. Such is the task of this chapter.

5.2 The Way To Do It

The problem of historicity in Heidegger II is extremely complex and thorny. It is entangled in problems of language, poetry, thinking and art. All are diffused, especially in the essays in Holzwege (1950), Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954), Unterwegs zur Sprache (1959), Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (1944), and many more in his later lectures. From among these lectures, pertinent topics are arbitrarily selected for constructing Heidegger's notion of historicity as enunciated in his later works; and what is exhibited here is interpretation.

5.3 Heidegger and Poets

Heidegger's admiration for poets is not secret, and of them he is most reverential of "Fredrich Hölderlin (1770-1843)." In Heidegger's view, Hölderlin differs from all

15. Werner Brock, Existence and Being (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Gateway edition, 1949), p. 167 (hereafter cited as Existence and Being, followed by page number(s).)
earlier great poets by being 'the poet of the poet', i.e., the poet who, "meditating throughout his work upon the very nature of poetry, was destined to put it into words."  
Hölderlin thus poetizes on poetry itself. But poets, for Heidegger, have a mission for which they are sent to undertake. Heidegger claims that "poets are the mortals who, singing earnestly of the wine-god, sense the trace of the fugitive gods' tracks, and so trace for their kindred/mortals the way toward the turning." In non-poetic terms, Heidegger interprets the functional role of poets as exemplifying that of men. Poets, for him, are messengers of him from whom they receive the message, for whom they carry the message, and at whose service they are placed. In a word, poets are a topos, like the Greek god Hermes who brings a message of destiny. On account of this, Heidegger assigns to them a special abode in between gods and men. Thus, he maintains that "the poets himself stands between... gods and the people. He is one who has been cast out into that Between, between gods and men. But only and for the first time in this Between is it decided who man is and where he is settling his existence. 'Poetically dwells man on this earth.'" All these only emphasize the nature of human existence, that is, that

17. Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 94.
man is a topos of Being. He exists in Being, for Being's historicity, and for his own which he obtains from that of Being.

5.4 Heidegger's Interpretation of Hölderlin's Elegy "Homecoming"

"To Kindred Ones": An Interpretation

The meaning of the elegy "Homecoming" is in the title itself, says Heidegger:

According to its title, the poem of Holderlin's tells of homecoming. That makes us think of arriving on the soil of one's homeland and meeting again the country-people of the district. The poem describes a voyage over the lake "coming from the shady Alps" to Lindau.20

Literally, homecoming is coming back home, and Heidegger takes just this literal meaning. But Heidegger builds a puzzle in this. For, even though he understands homecoming literally as said above, Heidegger maintains as well that homecoming is not simply returning home to what he calls "...a mere arrival to the land of one's birth."21 Heidegger contends that although the poem says that at home:

All seems familiar, even the hastening greetings seem the greetings of friends, each face seems congenial.22

"But as yet they are not really so. Thus they shut away what

19. "To Kindred Ones" can be found in Appendix A.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
is most their own."\textsuperscript{23} Heidegger's point here is that: "even with his arrival, the returning one has not yet reached home...home is difficult to win, they shut-away....Therefore, the newcomer still remains in search of it. Only what he seeks is already coming to meet him. It is near. But what is sought is not yet found if 'find' means to receive what is found as one's own, to be able to dwell in it as a possession."\textsuperscript{24}

The gist of the puzzle raised above only repeats the "somewhat paradoxical,"hermeneutical,circular and repetitive structure of the notion of historicity --.becoming the self one already is.

Looked at very closely, although the poem says that: "That which thou seekest is near, and already coming to meet thee."\textsuperscript{25} "Yet what is now already approaching still remains the sought-after."\textsuperscript{26} "It is still being held back."\textsuperscript{27} "It is near. But what is sought is not yet found, if 'find' means to receive what is found as one's own, to be able to dwell in it as a possession."\textsuperscript{28} "That then which has already been given and is yet at the same time being withheld is called the reserved. In the guise of what is reserved, the discovery

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 244.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 244, 245, 254, 259.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 249.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 245.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 244.
is approaching and remains still the sought-after."\textsuperscript{29} "Then homecoming really consists solely in the people of the country becoming at home in the still withheld essence of home...it consists in...learning at home to become at home."\textsuperscript{30} "The innermost essence of home is already the destiny of a Providence, as we now call it: History."\textsuperscript{31}

Signified in all these poetic and metaphoric enunciations is Heidegger's notion of historicity. Interpretation is, however, needed to articulate it.

The poem has it that the poet takes a poetic-journey abroad. He leaves home, now a wanderer. Heidegger puts it thus: "The poet must 'go over' to the 'Alpine range'; but 'loyal-mindedly' implies that out of loyalty to his homeland he will return there..."\textsuperscript{32}

Homecoming is the return into the proximity of the source. But such a return is only possible for one

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 245.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. (emphasis added). Here again, the "paradoxical" nature, or let it be said the circularity of historicity is postulated. Learning at home to become at home -- that in which homecoming really consists -- gives itself to be understood as though one never was at home to begin with. A Platonic would intimate it as learning to have knowledge one already has. But this is possible only when home has become un-homely; or that knowledge one already has, has become blurred or forgotten, or something other than vivid knowledge. But one is already at home, yet he learns to become at home where he already is. Then the main task here is the word "learning." While in the case of Plato "learning" becomes \textit{dialektos}, in Heidegger it becomes "becoming," but knowledge which ensues as a result of learning, in both cases, is \textit{Anamnesis}. Heidegger (in Early Greek Thinking, p. 36) echoes Plato in saying that "knowledge is remembrance of Being." But whether or not he realized it, Heidegger, in my view, is more Platonic in some sense than he thought.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 244 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 256.
who has previously, and perhaps for a long time now, borne on his shoulders as a wanderer the burden of the voyage, and has gone over into the source, so that he could there gather experience what the nature of the sought-for might be, and then be able to come back more experienced, as the Seeker. 33

"That is why anyone who has to forego this point of proximity [his homeland] does so regretfully." 34

Not being at home is the condition for homecoming, for the latter presupposes the former. But not being at home indicates not only the poetic-journey abroad to which one can compare what Heidegger sees as the "metaphysical voyage of the history of Being" (from Plato to the last man Nietzsche), all of which typify the same sort of homelessness and inauthenticity suggested in the poetic-wandering abroad, or what Heidegger calls "the oblivion of Being." For Heidegger, not being at home is also the sort of uncanniness or inauthenticity with which actual human (existing) existence, seen as man's "average everydayness" is associated. More clearly, it is indicative of presencing, as "primordial temporality." The voyage-making is the actual existing of human existence from which Heidegger constructs his concepts of inauthenticity and authenticity. Existing means, for Heidegger, going out of oneself (inauthenticity) but only to come back to oneself (authenticity). It is the Between of the whereto and wherefrom. It is historicizing itself. All expresses that, that from where one comes, and to where one goes, is that very

33. Ibid., pp. 258-259.
34. Ibid., p. 258.
same self of which one already is constituted. The actual explicit working out of coming from, and going to, the same self one already is, is existing one's existence, or histori-cizing one's historicity.

At any rate, however, the poetic-journey abroad is not a journey for good. It is like sojourning mortals whose existence is finite. But this is due to homecoming. Home-coming terminates the poetic-journey abroad. It gives to it its finitude. Once the journey is undertaken, homecoming is undertaken as well. Just as, as born, one is already dying as well.

Thus, homelessness and homecoming, inauthenticity and authenticity, the history of Being, as metaphysics, that is, the oblivion of Being, and das andenkende Denken, self-unconceal-ment and self-concealment, Ab-grund and Ur-grund, Ge-stell and Ge-viert, etc., either of each pair inherently has its other as its constitutive condition in such a nature that neither is, nor can be, without the other. In as much as such is the case, however, homecoming, like death, is futural and as such it is, in Heidegger's eyes, that from which one originates. To this effect, Heidegger always maintains that "origin always comes to meet us from the future".\(^{35}\) As futural then, homecoming is the origin of the poetic voyage abroad because: 1. it terminates the journey, thus endows it with its finite nature; and owing to which the journey becomes a journey

\(^{35}\) On the Way to Language, p. 10.
as such. That the journey is finite and temporal, therefore, stems from the fact that it is not for good, and this is due to homecoming. 2. On account of 1, homecoming establishes the temporal significance of the journey as something which is determined in the extending of "True Time" when Time temporalizes itself in the unity of its "has been" three ecstases -- having been-future-present (this will be shown later in due course). 3. Homecoming is the completion of the journey, thus endowing it with its wholeness in much the same manner as death establishes the possibility of Dasein's Being-a-whole. "In fact, the journey as such [in Father Richardson's words], is from the first moment a returning (homecoming) for it is only then that the poet learns to make his own what is authentically his,"36 that is, only thus does the poet become a poet as such, enriched with experience, possessing the gift of message for which he, as a poet, messenger of the gods, is commissioned to bring to his people.

5.5 The Temporality of the Poetic-Journey Abroad and Homecoming

The journey, having been made, has homecoming as its impending undertaking. Therefore, homecoming is its not-yet future possibility. In poetic terms, Heidegger's Hölderlin puts it thus: "It is the time of the gods that have fled and of the god that is coming. It is the time of need, be-

36. Richardson, p. 450.
cause it lies under a double lack and a double not: the no-
more of the gods that have fled and the not-yet of the god
that is coming." 37

The poetic-journey may be interpreted to signify also
the "metaphysical journey of the history of Being" from Plato
to Nietzsche. For both indicate cases of homelessness, in-
authenticity and oblivion of the self. It is the time when
one is away from (home) oneself. Heidegger calls it "needy
time." 38

But homecoming (for Heidegger) is the "saving leap
which his "das andenkende Denken" instigates. For homecoming
is, as he calls it, "...the return into the proximity of the
source" 39 of oneself. But it is a not-yet future possibility
of the poet which has also been given as well in advance of,
but simultaneous with, the poetic-journey itself. In a word,
homecoming is futural, but one that has already-been, there-
fore it is the poet's "having-been-future." In the language
of Being and Time, Heidegger identifies such a "past-future"
with the ontological name Existentiality. The poetic-journey
itself, into which the poet is thrown, is his having-been,
as Facticity. In advancing one, the other is advanced as
well, and the actual advancing of both "future-Existentiality"
and "having been-facticity," represents present, as presencing
(or "primordial temporality" as he calls it in Being and Time),

37. Existence and Being, p. 289, emphasis added.
38. Ibid., p. 290.
39. Ibid., p. 258.
and this is also identified with Fallingness or Forfeiture. Time, as everywhere, makes possible the unity of Existentiality, Facticity and Fallingness, and constitutes also the totality of the structure of human existence as epitomized in Heidegger's poetic interpretation of Hölderlin's elegy "Homecoming." Father Richardson sums it up as thus:

In so far as the process of poetizing involves a thinking-upon-what-is-past that comports the three directions of past-present-future, clearly the process is a temporal one. Time is the foundation of history, and therefore the process of the poet's concern is as profoundly historical as it is temporal. The law, too, which dictates this tri-dimensional structure of his poetic function, SC. which demands that he voyage abroad to experience what is foreign to his initial situation, then, return, then learn to be "at home" in his native land by thinking in abiding fashion on his experience -- the law is the 'law of (his) historicity'.

The historicity of human existence is here (as interpreted in keeping with Being and Time) indicative of the poetic-voyage abroad and homecoming. The journey is as finite as human existence. The actual undertaking of the journey is also the actual undertaking of homecoming. Both are one; but thrown as man's "future-has-been," in existing which present is represented as the equiprimordial presencing of the unity of the three ecstases of time. In other words, it is the existing or presencing of the poet's Existentiality (future), Facticity (having-been) and Fallingness (present). Not only is the historicity of man seen in Being and Time reiterated here in Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's elegy "Home-

40. Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 464.
coming, but Heidegger goes beyond it to situate the whole problematic of the historicity of human existence in that of Being. Homecoming and the poetic-voyage only express the nature of human historicity as shown in Being and Time, but the bringing of the message the poet receives is expressive of a higher historicity. Heidegger interprets this higher one in his later work, for example, "Words" (George's poem).

5.6 Interpretation of Stefan George's Poem "Words" 41

The main points conveyed by Heidegger with his interpretation of George's poem "Words" are two: 1. the historicity of Being itself which happens in the historicity of man, and 2. the historicity of human existence as portrayed in the poetic-journey abroad and his homecoming. The latter one may be seen as a reiteration of the historicity of human existence as shown in the preceding interpretation of Hölderlin's elegy "Homecoming" in light of Being and Time.

In "Words," Heidegger deals mostly with the last stanza and turns the final line into a statement which reads thus: "Where word breaks off no thing may be." 42 Like Hölderlin's homecoming, the poet in "Words" takes a poetic-journey abroad from which he experienced something. "...to experience (here)

41. "Words" can be found in Appendix B.

42. On the Way to Language, p. 141.
means to learn," and "to learn means: to becoming knowing... one who has seen, has caught sight of something, and never again loses sight of what he has caught sight of. To learn [in other words] means: to attain to such seeing...To this belongs...a journey." Just what the poet learns is renunciation. "The final stanza gives the directive." So I renounced and sadly see:  

The fundamental issue here for Heidegger is "learning renunciation." The poet first takes his poetic journey and then returns with a treasure to his own land. His own land here means his own assured area but what his poetry needs are names for what visits him in dreams or from the distance as something full of wonder. He, as a topos of Being, or as a message-bearer, brings a treasure for which he needs words. For this, he waits, hoping to get it from the ancient goddest of fate, the twilit norn who draws up names from the bourne, the well from which names are drawn for things.

The poet composes himself, remains self-assured, self-complacent, and so confident that words would be found. But the goddess searches and searches until, in Heidegger's words, it is as if "something undreamed of, something terrifying stared him in the face -- that only the word lets a thing

43. Ibid., p. 143.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
be a thing." 47 This "...bends him to the ground as the storm bends the tree." 48 Now, the poet learns that: "Where word breaks off no thing may be." But:

What is disturbing [as Heidegger writes] is the fact that with the absence of the word, the treasure disappears. Thus it is word which first holds the treasure in its presence, indeed first fetches and brings it there and preserves it. Suddenly the word shows a different higher rule. It is no longer just a name-giving grasp reaching for what is present and already portrayed, it is not only a means of portraying what lies before us. On the contrary, the word first be-stows presence, that is, Being in which things appear as beings. This different rule of the word glances abruptly at the poet. At the same time, however, the word which thus rules remains absent. Hence the treasure slips away. 49

And straight it vanished from my hand, the treasure never graced my land... 50

Where word breaks off no things may be. 51

Heidegger's point is that the poet learns something, "renunciation." By it, Heidegger means "saying" which, in the poet's case, is "self-denial." 52 By it, Heidegger means that the poet must relinquish the claim to the assurance that he will, on demand, be supplied with the name for that which he has posited as what truly is. This positing and the claim

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47. Ibid., p. 148.
48. Ibid., p. 149.
49. Ibid., p. 146.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 147.
52. Ibid.
he must now deny himself. The poet must renounce having words under his control as the portraying names for what is posited. As self-denial, renunciation is a saying which says to itself:

Where word breaks off no thing may be.

The renunciation-lesson the poet learns unfolds to him that he must give up his presumptuous, dogmatic, "metaphysical" and representational attitude to words (language) and things. He learns that it is not him but word, that, in Heidegger's words, "bethings the thing." This "bethinging" (die Bedingnis) is beyond man's power but under it he is himself controlled. Thus, the poet is brought to know himself, his essential Being, that is, he is taught a lesson by which he has now come to "see" himself as the topos of the word. What has been given to him is himself in the new insightful revelation from which he comes to know himself, who and what he is, and his place in the universe of beings and Being. He has become himself in the self-knowledge that words or language are more powerful than man, that it is language that "houses" Being and from which beings are disclosed; that he is Der Herr of word or language (Being); that he is therefore a topos of Being.

In a word, in this "renunciation lesson" the poet has come to become the self he already is (historicity), although he coloured it with presumptuousness and behaved as though he were "Der Herr" of Being. In the language of Gelassenheit,

53. Ibid., p. 151.
the poet has "been-released-from" a metaphysical representational attitude to things, and "been-released-into" the openness of that-which-regions. The poet becomes the self he already is -- historicity -- but this naturally means also the becoming of Being unto itself, for neither happens in the absence of the other. But how, in the poet's case, does Being historicize its self-unconcealing self-concealing destiny? Like the "sigetic" (that is, an overwhelming silence) seeing of Death, the self-unconcealment of Being to the poet and its simultaneous self-concealment from him, happens as though the poet had seen "something" about which he was speechless. This "something" is the presencing of an overwhelming "sigetic saying" which is, at the same time, a not-saying. Yet it has much to say but nevertheless resumes all saying into a "chime of silence." All of a sudden, the poet was spoken to by this "something" undreamed of, "something" terrifying that stared him in the face -- that only the word lets a thing be as a thing. Such describes the historicity of Being. Its language is sigetic. Its presencing is apophantic, as if being hit suddenly by Apollo; and its apophasis is transforming.

The poet goes away from home and comes back, has learned renunciation, given up his dogmatic metaphysical

54. Discourse on Thinking, p. 73.
55. Ibid., p. 72.
representation of things, enriched with experience and now, as if being born again, exists his poetic-vocation abidingly in between Being and beings: "...like the wine-god's holy priests, who go from land to land..." a poet, as Hermes, is "...the divine messenger who brings the message of destiny...". The actual explicit bearing of the message is "hermeneuein." Hermeneuein is synonymous with historicizing, for it describes the presencing (that is, the historicity) of Being in man, by man and for man, since it is from that, and in so being, that he attains his own (historicity) Being. The poetic journey abroad, his homecoming and home-abiding, all describe the hermeneutical nature of man's poetic-vocation, as a topos of Being. Such hermeneutical vocation describes Heidegger's historicity -- "Become thyself." Being a topos of Being, attains for man his (historicity)

57. Existence and Being, p. 291.
59. Ibid.
60. The same is enunciated by Nietzsche in his "Also Sprach Zarathustra." Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche in "Wer ist Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" in Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen:Neske, 1954), repeats the same observations made in regard to voyage-making and homecoming. Here also, Zarathustra leaves home at the age of thirty and goes into the mountains. Heidegger's interpretation reveals that: how one becomes what one is, and becoming what one is, are essentially a task of historicity which is a return to one's own. The convalescent (Zarathustra) is on the road to himself, so that he can say of himself who he is. But when Zarathustra is told to become himself, he recoils in horror. That horror stifles all Zarathustra's self-assurance and arrogance from the outset. He goes through the same "renunciation-lesson" the poet goes through, and from then on, Zarathustra sets out to turn in, into one's own destiny. (English translation of this version
Being when, in so being, Being comes to pass (in the case of the poet), in a startling revelation of "something" (Being) from which he "learns-renunciation." All these show that man owes his Being (historicity) to Being in that his Being consists in being its topos. The provisionality of human historicality and other explorations Heidegger advanced in Heidegger I, become more evident when seen in Heidegger II. Heidegger I only examines the historicality of human existence in the light of, to use the language of Heidegger II, a "poetic-journey abroad and Homecoming." In between both is existing. Existing (in the present indicative sense) is the presencing of both. Existing unites in itself the two beginnings of origin and destination. Both the journey-abroad and homecoming are man's future-has-been. Future (as repeated many times) represents Existentiality, that is, homecoming or Death. Has-been represents Facticity, that is, the journey itself. Future-has-been thus represents Existentiality-Facticity. Present represents the actual coming to pass of Existentiality-Facticity (or its converse) and it is Fallingness. Thus, Fallingness is the present indicative, actual and explicit equiprimordial existing of man's future-has-beenness. Time, as everywhere, is what renders such ontological analyses of human historical existence possible. But all these, nevertheless, remain under the provisionality of Heidegger I.

Heidegger II undertakes to a more comprehensive exege-

may be found in Review of Metaphysics, vol. xx, no. 3, September 1967, pp. 411-431.)
sis of this human historicality in the light of a higher one; the historicity of Being. That of man is rooted in that of Being, where man's being is essentially that of a shepherd of Being. Man takes the journey and returns, but only for the sake of being a bearer of Being. There can, and would be, no journey, no human existing, and no homecoming for man, hence, no human historicality, were it not for the sake of being the topos of Being. But this reason is articulated more comprehensively, not in the provisional work of Heidegger I, but in Heidegger II.

Unfortunately for some, however, Heidegger (II), at this point in his thinking, has undergone what he terms "an experience with language"; in which case, he claims that it is language itself that befalls, strikes—and transforms him, hence his use of "poetic and metaphoric language." To transcend Heidegger I therefore means to take recourse to this "poetic and metaphoric language" of Heidegger II and extrapolate from it the higher historicity of Being for whose eventual thematization, that of man, remains provisional in Being and Time, and in which human historicality is rooted.

To this effect Heidegger's interpretation of the poets, especially that of Hölderlin and Stefan George, provides a clearer view of the historicity of Being in which that of man (poetic-journey abroad and homecoming) is rooted. The presencing of Being in man and by him provides him also with his own. In the "renunciation-lesson," for example (ref. "Words), man "saw something," in "seeing" which he came to
"see" himself essentially as the topos of Being, as Der Hirt not Der Herr of Being. All these, in my view, become clearer in Heidegger II when Heidegger more clearly puts man where he belongs and charges him with his functional duty as the topos of Being. But Heidegger II talks more thematically about (makes a theme out of, and dwells more on), Being itself in the light of the toponymies of Language, Art, Thinking, Poetry, and of the "giving" event itself, Ereignis, all of which resist the belief that there is as much analysis of human historicality as can be found in Heidegger I. To construct and provide an analysis of human historicality from Art or Poetry, for example, is discomforting. None of these favourite topics of Heidegger II makes such an attempt inviting, but this is not to say that Heidegger II has given up the brilliant exposition of human historicality one finds in Being and Time. On the contrary, this exposé gains more articulation and becomes more comprehensive in Heidegger II, although in different language and at places where it is least expected. With Heidegger II, one becomes more assured of the completeness, source and nature of human historicality, why and how man gets it, and how he can authenticate or in-authenticate it. In Heidegger II, man's Being and place in the universe of beings and Being is rendered complete, more clearly and comprehensively in the interpretation of Being itself in its toponymies of Language, Thinking, Art, Poetry, Time and of the appropriating event itself, Ereignis. At any rate, however, Heidegger, in his letter to Father Richardson,
says, "...only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II."\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{61} Richardson, p. xxii.
CHAPTER SIX

MEDITATIONS

6.0 A Short Introduction

Chapter five has established the following conclusions:

(1) That Heidegger's thought is a unity grounded on the single theme — die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein — he thinks through and through.

(2) This Seinsfrage has man and Time entangled in it. Being and Time began it with a thorough analysis of human existence as founded upon Time. Temporality itself is the open horizon of human existence upon whose hidden basis human historicality is founded. Human historicality is described as an existing, and this, in turn, is a stretching along in that man stretches himself along his has-been-future possibilities; that is, disclosing them resolutely or not.

(3) But human historicality itself is made possible by a higher one, that of Being.

(4) To show how, Being and Time which is limited to an analysis of human historicality, must be accommodated but transcended to reach Being itself.

(5) Such is arrived at by recourse to the interpretation of language and poetry in which the notion of homecoming is invoked.

(6) Homecoming is given to consist in "learning at home to become at home."

(7) "Learning at home to become at home" describes that state of affairs in which: (a) home has become unhomely and so the poet has gone on a voyage abroad; (b) The poet, to receive the gift of Being in which he went through a "renunciation-lesson," must undertake the journey abroad and the homecoming; (c) The renunciation-lesson reveals to the poet his finitude, his limit, his powerlessness in the absence.
of a higher power in the expression: "Where word breaks off, no thing may be"; (d) Man learns that he is a speaking being, but only because language speaks; (e) Man learns that without language, no entity, including him, may be, therefore that it is by the word that he is and comes to be who he is; (f) Man learns that it is in and from the historicity of the word (Being) that man gets his historicality. Man learns that he is historical because of Being.

(8) The renunciation - lesson teaches man who and what he is -- a topos of Being -- and puts him at his place in the company of beings and Being.

(9) Man learns that he is whatever he is, whatever he becomes, all because of Being and that man is der Hirt of Being, although he can -- thanks to his constitutive privileged Being Seinsverständnis that enables him to be himself resolutely or not, authentically or not -- become der Herr of Being also.

This (Chapter Six) is the last chapter and it provides a concluding and brief summary of what the thesis contains. In addition, it meditates upon the entire work by way of discussing what relevance and significance Heidegger's ontological history -- Geschichtlichkeit -- has vis-a-vis historiology.

There are two objectives which the dissertation aimed to accomplish. Initially, the dissertation began with an attempt at showing the unity of Heidegger's thought by taking recourse to his notion of historicity -- something which has, for long, been a subject of controversy among Heideggerian scholars. This was initially the objective with which I began the thesis, but as research progressed it soon became clear to me that this leading concept itself -- Geschichtlichkeit -- cannot be taken for granted and thus must itself be examined and articulated first. Yet as I entered into it, I, again, soon realized that Geschichtlichkeit is so -- if not the most --
fundamental in Heidegger that his entire philosophical concern with the hermeneutics of Being is, in fact, an interpretation of the Geschichtlichkeit of Being. But to confront this is tantamount to confronting Heidegger's entire philosophy, which centres on his life-long preoccupation with the interpretation of the historicity of Being. This, then, came to be my first and major objective which the dissertation attempted to accomplish, namely, an interpretation of Heidegger's notion of historicity.

At the same time, however, I did not give up my initial objective which was aimed at using Heidegger's notion of historicity to show the unity of his thought which is usually broken up into early and later Heidegger or Heidegger I and Heidegger II. This objective, however, assumed a secondary and minor position, and it is examined in Chapter Five. That, in brief, was how the thesis came to have two objectives, a major and a minor one, the former being an interpretation of the notion of historicity in Heidegger, while the latter uses that interpreted notion to show the unity of thought in Heidegger I and II.

6.1 Heidegger's Notion of Historicity: The Major Objective

Heidegger talks a lot about Being. Being is his philosophical theme everywhere, for he believes that every thinker thinks one thought, and his is Being. He thinks nothing other than the historicity of Being by which he describes how Being
comes unto itself or, to use his own expressions, how Being presences itself. The presencing of Being unto itself is my interpretation of Heidegger's notion of the historicity of Being, for it unveils the truth or nature of Being.

This truth or nature of Being is expressed by Heidegger as the "es gibt Sein". The "es gibt Sein" is, in turn, indicated in the simultaneous act of unconcealing and concealing itself in and from beings of which it is not a part, nor one, nor the sum of them, but that by which beings are, or become, whatever they are. It is in respect of the simultaneous self-unconcealing self-concealing nature (or its converse) of Being that Heidegger charges western tradition with what he calls Seinsvergessenheit. Heidegger calls his western tradition "metaphysics," by which he describes the forgetful manner in which Being has been treated in the west. "Metaphysics [he says] refers to Being and means beings as beings."¹

Metaphysics, however, speaks continually and in the most various ways of Being. Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representing beings as beings. It means all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being....From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being.²

¹. "On the way back to the Ground of Metaphysics," in Kaufmann, p. 211.
². Ibid.
This, in brief, brings out Heidegger's charge of the obli-
vion of Being as metaphysics. It forgets to see the self- 
withholding aspect of Being, thus fails to grasp its truth  
which is expressed in its simultaneous self-unconcealing in 
beings and self-concealing from them as well. The truth -- 
Being's self-unconcealing self-concealing destiny (or its con-
verse) -- Heidegger insists is Being's nature. As Being re-
veals itself in beings, it simultaneously withdraws from them  
unto itself, so it does not stay enduringly or substantively  
to become one of them, nor the sum of them. It goes back un-
to itself.

Therefore, when Heidegger says that "es gibt Sein" he  
extrases by it the truth of Being, thereby indicating the  
self-unconcealing self-concealing nature of Being by which  
Being comes from, but only to come back to, itself by self-
withdrawal. It comes from itself, and goes back unto itself  
(or its converse). It unveils itself, and veils itself (or its  
converse). It unconceals itself and conceals itself (or its  
converse), all these describe the truth of Being. But the  
points from which Being comes and goes (or its converse) are  
structurally one and the same point. It is this truth, or  
nature, of Being that metaphysics failed to grasp, so in  
talking about Being, it saw it one-sidedly in its self-
revelation in beings only, but not its simultaneous self- 
withdrawal unto itself from them. Metaphysics thus rep-
resents Being in beings as though it were one of them.
Thus, it talks about Being when it means being as beings. In other words, metaphysics reified Being and lost sight completely of its simultaneous self-withdrawal event.

But when the "es gibt Sein" takes place, Being, in this, becomes itself, Being, not a being, i.e., man, or beings. When the es gibt Sein takes place, Being does not become a subject, transcendental or not, not an ego, absolute or not, not man, Übermensch or not, not any thing, not any being, but itself, Being. It is itself that it becomes, and this is what Heidegger means by "Being presences itself." But the becoming of Being unto itself, in the truth of self-unconcealing self-concealing nature (or its converse) describes, in my view, Heidegger's notion of the historicity of Being. Thus, to become the self Being already is; is its historicity. Historicity, then, is interpreted here as echoing Nietzsche's injunction to Zarathustra "Become thyself." It describes that eventful nature by which Being comes to be itself what it already is. It is what Heidegger in his later poetic interpretations describes as homecoming to one's very own source, or what he, in "Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?" describes as a return unto the essential self. How Being comes to be what it already is thus describes that situational hermeneutic structural circularity with whose interpretation Heidegger philosophically occupies himself in, say, language when he talks about how language comes unto (language) itself, or in Art, Thinking,

Poetry, or in short in all those events which have been interpreted in the thesis as toponymies of Being.

However, an exegesis of this situational hermeneutic structural circularity by which Being becomes itself what it already is, plunges me straight into Heidegger's interpretation of the historicity of Art, Tradition, Language, *Mitsein*, Poetry, *Seinsverständnis*, Thinking, Death, and Temporality -- toponymies of Being. For it is from these points of view, or better yet, from these events, that Heidegger interprets the historicity of Being, that is, how Being comes unto itself in these events. The historicity of each of these events (that is, the historicity of Being), that is, how Being comes unto itself, in each of these events is exhibited in Chapter Four, preceded, however, by their thorough examination in Chapter Three.

But anytime and anywhere Heidegger talks about the historicity of Being, or the coming of Being unto itself in any of its toponymies, three basic realities immediately stand out. These are man, Time and *Ereignis*. They are integral and affective constituents which form the quintessential fulcrum on which Heidegger's entire interpretation of the historicity of Being is founded. In examining the historicity of Being in its toponymies, they are therefore co-examined as well. For the historicity of Being is determined in the temporalization of Time, and the temporalization of Time is, in turn, determined in the historicity of Being, but both, in turn, need the "use" of man for Being to presence, that is, his-
toricize itself, and for Time to temporalize itself, that is, extend itself. Man, as it were, occupies the centre stage of all, although "das Ereignis" is the one that appropriates them all to become the self each essentially is. Man brings the historicity of Being and the temporalization of Time to become themselves, respectively, and it is in and by this serviceable-bringing function performed by man that he, in turn, brings himself to become the self he essentially is. In other words, man brings himself to become his essential self in bringing Being and Time to their respective essential selves. Thus, man's historicity is grounded upon, and rooted in, that of Being and Time. That man is historical at all is therefore owing to the "use" Being and Time make of him in historicizing and temporalizing their respective selves, but man is able to perform this "use-role" by virtue of his constitutive Being, Seinsverständnis. Its structural components -- fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception -- enable man to receive, keep and care for Being thus implicitly having it in advance -- thanks to mother memory -- before bearing it out explicitly. Thus, every "seeing," for Heidegger, comes as a re-seeing, for it is only when man had seen what it is that he comes to see that he is able to see at all. In other words, every act of man, for Heidegger, comes from a perfect tense. He insists, for example, that "Only when a man had seen does he truly see. To see is to have seen." 4 This pre-

4. "The Anaximander Fragment," in Early Greek Thinking, p. 34.
seeing which illuminates those human structural components of Seinsverstāndnis constitutes man's basic ontological state in and by which he does everything. Man, as Plato has said (e.g., research seen as Anamnesis) prepossesses what he comes to repossess, and this act of coming to have, or be, what man already has or is, is expressive of human historicality, and Time determines it. What man had (past), and comes to have (future), or what man fore-had (past) and comes to re-have (future), (or their reverse), is what Heidegger means by his notions of "Gewesenheit - Geworfenheit" -- "Enworfentheit," and this is what actually gets worked out; but it is in the actual working-out of it (present) -- which represents the present, as presencing -- that the unity of Time's three ecstases -- past, as having been, future, an integral constituent of past, and present -- becomes the equiprimordial basis upon which man historicizes, that is, structurally comes to re-constitute what he is already pre-constituted of. When Heidegger, for example, says of man that he speaks, and is, in fact, able to speak at all only because he had already been spoken to, had already heard the speaking of Language, or only because language speaks, he only means that man's speaking or speech stems from the pluperfect tense. This is because his speaking or speech is a "repetition" or a re-speaking of the speaking of language itself but all these are possible by virtue of his constitutive Being -- the structural components of Seinsverstāndnis -- which enable him to structurally re-constitute himself of what he is already pre-constituted, that is, "repeats" or "retrieves" his "future
has-beenness" -- historicity.

But what man reconstitutes, that is, what man speaks (in Language, for instance), in speaking, is the speaking of Language itself, that is, the presencing of Being, and it is in and by virtue of that, that is, the speaking of Language, that man speaks or is able to speak at all. It is, rather, by being that medium in and by which the speaking of language comes to pass in the speaking of man that man attains his own. In other words, it is by being that medium in and by which Being historicizes itself in its toponymies, that man, in turn, historicizes himself in his ontological facticities.

6.2 The Minor Objective: Historicity in Heidegger I and II

Heidegger, in Being and Time, describes the basic ontological characteristic of man (Dasein) as both thrown and projected. "Geworfenheit" describes man's thrownness: that of which man's thrown being is constituted, is that which has been handed over to man. That which is handed over to man is man's "thereness," the Da of man, and this "thereness" refers to those ontological facticities of man in which man as the Da is thrown, i.e., Tradition, Death, Language, Mitsein, historicality, etc. The "Da" or "thereness" of man thus refers to the thrownness-facticity of man, and these facticities are Being, or toponymies of Being. Man's thrownness in his "thereness" thus refers to man's thrown-
ness in Being, or those toponymies of Being which have been handed over to man in advance of him. Being, or those toponymies of Being, are man's Da or "thereness" into which he is already thrown, so man's Da or "thereness," is a Da or "thereness" in Being, hence his name "Da-sein." The "Sein" in and of which he is the Da or "thereness" is man's ontological facticity into which he is thrown. These ontological facticities are, as Being, given "there," as if lingering and waiting around preceding man's being born, or thrown into them, since they are the Schicksal (fate) of man which has been handed over, or down, to man in spite of himself.

But man is also a projected Being, a free Being. Man, in anticipatory resoluteness, is he who can freely -- because he is so constituted as to be capable of it, thanks to the structural components of Seinsverständnis-- project himself in anticipation upon his possibilities anyhow. Man, as a projected free Being, is his possibilities, and his Being is futural. "Entwerfen," "Entwurf," projection describes man's anticipatory running ahead of, and forward towards, himself, that is, his futural possibilities but the future possibilities, or himself ahead of which, and toward which man is running, are the same ontological facticities into which he is already thrown. Thus, that into which man is thrown, and upon which man freely and openly projects himself in anticipatory resoluteness, is structurally the same thing, the ontological facticities. Therefore, as both thrown and projected, man is thrown into, but only to project himself upon the same
"there," that is, his own ontological possibilities. In short, man is thrown to project himself upon (to become) the self he already is -- historicality. Put differently, he structurally comes to reconstitute what he is already preconstitutive of; the task, however, lies in the process of becoming the self he already is. Thus, becoming then is a task, free and open, not a gift; and Heidegger, in Being and Time, describes this becoming task in many such expressions as "the stretching along of man's existence" or a fateful repetition of man's "having-been," etc., all of which are founded upon finite temporality.

In other expressions, Heidegger describes basic human ontological characteristics as constitutive of what he calls facticity, existentiality and fallingness or forfeiture. Facticity represents man's "Da" or "thereness," his "being-there." Existentiality represents man's projected future possibilities, and fallingness represents the actual and explicit equiprimordial advancing of the two, but all of which are founded upon time. Heidegger characterizes facticity as past, past as having-been, and existentiality as future, and fallingness as the presencing (present) of both. Time thus makes possible the unity of man's existentiality, facticity and fallingness and is also the hidden basis of man's coming to be the self he already is -- historicality. Existing -- which is the stretching along, or a fateful repetition, or historicizing -- thus becomes the actual and explicit presencing of man's "future-has-been" which is, at once, "the temporalization of Time's temporality," that is, the extending of the unity
of Time's three ecstases, past, present and future. Such, in brief, describes human historicality as disclosed in Being and Time. Human existence is, principally, given to be understood as bounded by a beginning and an end, in between which historicality is posed as the actual stretching along, or the existing, of the two. Ontologically speaking, though, the two -- the beginning and the end -- are one, united by its hidden basis, Time. The beginning represents man's thrownness, that is, being born into it, and it expresses man's facticity as past, but past as "having-been." The end -- Death -- represents man's projected future potentiality for being a whole, and it expresses man's existentiality whose primary meaning is in the future. But present is already included in both "having-been-facticity" and "future-existentiality" as the actual explicit stretching along, or the existing of the two, and in this way makes human historicality or human existing a repetition of man's "having-been-future." Human existing or historicality thus becomes finite, and Time, temporalizing its temporality, becomes its hidden basis.

This analysis of human existence or human historicality is ipso facto understandable. Intrinsically it is complete and stands on its own; yet Heidegger sees the whole analysis of human historicality in Being and Time as a provisional work leading on to something higher; the interpretation of the historicity of Being. Why? A simple and straight-forward answer to this why is that there can be no human
historicality in the absence of the historicity of Being, for the latter is the ground and source of the former. But in as much as Being and Time provides some thoughtful hints or clues as to the fundamentality of the presencing of Being, it is elaborately limited to the analysis of human historicality, not Being's.

True enough, Being and Time, however, tells us extensively of the interpretation of human historicality but can it tell us why, that is, why human existence -- which it describes so much -- is, in its essence, historical? Can it tell us whence man attains his exclusive existential historicality? Viewed from its ground, can it tell us, out of what ground does the root of human historicality receive its foundation? Undoubtedly not, and for this reason Being and Time must be transcended by Heidegger's later works which answers to the questions raised above can be found. For Heidegger himself says, "...the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II." 5

Heidegger II begins with the so-called Kehre, the "turn" or the "reversal" which was first spoken of in "Letter on Humanism." 6 The "reversal" was not a "change" of mind, nor of the matter of thinking itself, but from Being and Time to Time and Being, and in this "change," Heidegger, presumably, suffers what he terms "undergoing an experience

5. Richardson, p. xxii.
6. Ibid., p. xvi.
with language." 7 This, he claims, means "...to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering into and submitting to it...." 8 In other words, the whole turn, "change" or "reversal" is reflected in the fact that in Being and Time Heidegger "used" language (that is, he still had his metaphysical upbringing and was under the rubric of transcendental language inherited from his western tradition) that was in keeping with his tradition, but in On Time and Being, for instance, it is the reverse: Language "used" Heidegger, so it was language that spoke, not he; thus his speaking was actually the speaking of language that claimed and befell him, and to which he, as a medium, submitted piously. Put differently, the matter of thinking itself is the same in both Heideggers I and II, yet the language of the latter is poetic, mythological and metaphoric, whereas the language in Being and Time was "traditional and transcendental." But the language of Being and Time was no longer adequate to utter and articulate something new, something "un-metaphysical" and "un-traditional," something which captured him, befell him and to which he merely responded submissively as its messenger. At this juncture, Heidegger is, more fundamentally, the medium, not the message itself, and it is in and through the former that the latter is uttered.

In Heidegger II, human historicality is reiterated

8. Ibid.
but transcended as well onto its ground-source, the historicity of Being itself; yet all are enunciated in his poetic interpretation of his favourite poets and their poems. In Hölderlin's elegy "Homecoming" and Stefan George's poem "Words," Heidegger, in my view, reiterates his analysis of human historicality, although in "different language," and also goes beyond it.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger called man care (Cura). In his later works, the nature of man is illuminated in the description of man assumed undersuch denominations as "a poet," "a mortal" or "an artist." In place of man, Heidegger uses the word poet to bring out the significance of the place, nature and the entire being of "Cura," man, in his poetic interpretation of his favourite poets. A poet, that is, man, he says, is a messenger of gods and his people. He dwells among them, and brings a message of destiny from the gods to his people. That is his place. His role is one of serviceability, serving both gods and man; and it is in occupying such a place, and in performing such a serviceable duty that his entire Being consists. Man, the poet, here is like the Greek god Hermes, a divine messenger, who brings messages of destiny. *Hermeneuein* for Heidegger means message-bringing, the carrying-forth and announcing of tidings of danger and/or a saving leap. That is man's functional role.

Heidegger then goes on to describe what man's (poet's) nature must be in order to truly perform his functional serviceable duty, that is, in order to do *hermeneuein*; but this
is, rather, a task, free and open, for which Heidegger en-
treats man to undertake strenuous preparation. Man must work
at it by being open, and staying open to listening to, or
hearing the addressing, or announcing and receiving, of the mes-
sage (Being); but all these are a task, to perform which Hei-
degger’s Holderlin warns that "language" \(^9\) or "poetry" \(^{10}\) is
"...the most dangerous of possessions." \(^{10a}\) For, the "poet [man]
is [here] exposed to the divine lightnings," \(^{11}\) from which
he receives divine gift (Being) to his people. Man (the poet),
having thus received the message (Being) preserves and cares
for it -- thanks to the Mother of the Muses, Mnemosyne --
and Heidegger, in his interpretation of Heracleitus’ Fragment
B50 and Parmenides’ Fragment VIII, \(^{12}\) describes the entire
receptivity-affair in the cumbersome expression: "letting-
lie-gathered-before-us and so-taking-to-heart-also: beings
in Being." In short, man, the message-bearer, receives Being,
preserves Being, cares for Being and lets Being come to pass
in and through him, in his speech in terms of language, for
instance; or in the work of art, or in poetry, or in any
of Being’s toponymies. In this way, man, in Heidegger’s words,
lets-lie-gathered-together-before-him, the gift of Being;
and then lets out Being in, through and by his acts. It is

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\(^9\) See Existence and Being, p. 284 for details on
the nature of language and poetry.

\(^{10}\) Ibid.

\(^{10a}\) Ibid.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) From Vorträge und Aufsätze, pp. 3-79, or in Early
Greek Thinking, pp. 59-79 and Was Heisst Denken?, the whole
lectures.
on account of this that beings come to be but out of the coming to be of Being unto itself. However, man must, in this serviceable performative function, not only be open, stay open and listen attentively and submissively to receive the gift of message (Being), but he must, before everything else, give up his dogmatic and metaphysical attitude or arrogance he holds with respect to things and let himself be "used" by the addressing event that captures and befalls him. Man, in other words, must, in the language of Gelassenheit, be "released from" metaphysical representations by which he conceives of himself as having power over things, and be "released into" that which gives to him his essence. Man must be a pure devotion and submissively dedicated to all that, and poetically interpreted, Heidegger signifies all those dedicated devotional tasks of man in the poetic-journey abroad which, at the time of danger, the poet must undertake in order to bring back to his people a message of a saving leap. Thus, Heidegger insists that "The poet must 'go over' to the 'Alpine range'; but 'loyal-mindedly' implies that out of loyalty to his homeland he will return there...." In other words, Heidegger's poetic interpretation has the poet embark upon the task of what he calls a poetic-voyage abroad. The poet (man) leaves home but only to come back home bringing a message of destiny. The poetic-journey abroad is, at once, a homecoming, a return to that very source, one's very own, from which one departed. Homecoming is, literally speaking,

coming back home, and Heidegger takes just this literal meaning. The poetic-journey abroad would not be a journey as such, if it were for good. At the very onset, it is finite, but so is human existence. There would be no meaning in either or both were it not for Death and homecoming, both of which in their own respective ways endow both with their respective temporal significance and completeness. The journey becomes complete, finite and meaningful because of Homecoming; but there would be no homecoming also had the journey not been taken, to begin with. That there is homecoming after all is therefore owing to the journey. Thus, given one, the other is given simultaneously as well with it; just as, as born, one is already dying, in advancing one, the other is advanced at once as well, but how does this poetic interpretation reiterate the analysis of human historicality Heidegger enunciates in *Being and Time*? More so, how does it go beyond it?

Time, as we have seen, is the hidden basis of human historicality, and also that upon which the unity of man's basic ontological structures, facticity, Existentiality, and forfeiture or fallingness are delineated. In the poetic interpretation of the poetic-voyage abroad and homecoming, the poetic journey itself expresses the sense of man's facticity, for it signifies the poet's "thrownness," his "there-ness" into which he, as a poet, is thrown, in spite of himself. Therefore, as facticity, it is his has-beenness (that is, his past) of which Heidegger says "he is the one who has
[already] been cast out -- out into that Between, between gods and men."\(^{14}\) "Poetically dwells man on this earth\(^{15}\) so "the poet must 'go over'...."\(^{16}\) But homecoming, like Death, looms lingering ahead as if waiting to be taken upon, for, once the journey is made, it is made, or being made as well, but it expresses the sense of the poet's impending open future possibility. It, like Death, is that towards and for which the poet is advancing; therefore, as futural, it signifies man's existentiality whose primary sense is in the poet's open future possibility. Yet it is one that has already been given in advance but simultaneous with the journey itself as well. Therefore, as one and an integral part of man's has-beenness, it is man's future-has-beenness, or man's existentiality-facticity which expresses the unity of the poetic-journey abroad-and-homecoming as being one and an integrated event wherein in advancing one, the other is simultaneously advanced as well. But fallingness or forfeiture is already included in both the journey-making-facticity (as man's has-beenness) and the homecoming-Existentiality (as man's future) as the actual and explicit advancing, that is, the equi-primordial presencing (as present) of the two. Time here also is that upon which the unity of the structure of man's ontological poetic-vocation (that is, the equivalence of the basic

\(^{14}\) Existence and Being, p. 288.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 289.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 256., emphasis added.
ontological structure of human existence) is founded. The whole poetic-vocation, like human existence, is intrinsically historical and its historicality consists in the actual and explicit advancing of man's future-has-beenness of which Time, temporalizing itself in the unity of its three ecstases, is everywhere its hidden basis. All this is (although more, for example, the description of man's nature and role, receiving, caring, etc., i.e., "Letting-lie-gathered-together-before-us-beings in-Being" is added) a reiteration of Being and Time, that is, the analysis of human historicality Heidegger unfolds in it, although it is couched here in poetic, mythological and metaphoric expressions. But that is all Being and Time, as a provisional work, has to offer; therefore it must be transcended if the historicity of Being itself is the major issue to which this dissertation addresses itself.

6.2.1 "Words"

In "Words," Heidegger's interpretation has it that the poet took the journey and made (at first) a happy return home to his proximity but he needed a name from the twilit bourn for the treasure of which he was in possession. She (the ancient goddess of fate) draws up names from the bourn, the well from which they (names) are drawn. Names are necessary and they are words that portray, that is, establish for the first time, beings or bring them to be. Standing on his own assured area, the poet composes himself, so self assured and complacent and laying on authoritative claim to the names which he is waiting to get from the goddess. He, having his dogmatic
metaphysical representational attitude to things, acts as if he is entitled to what he believes is completely and assuredly his, until the goddess searched in vain and could not get him names for his treasure. But the surprising thing was that the treasure itself disappeared for want of name(s) and the poet, dumb-founded and flabbergasted, learned that: "Where word breaks off, no thing may be." 17

From then on, the poet learns that it is words or names, not he, that have power over things, or bring them to be, and Heidegger charges that the poet "learns renunciation" in this traumatic experience. Something undreamed of, something terrifying, stared him in the face — that only the word lets a thing be as a thing, and without it, the treasure itself disappeared completely. Heidegger's point is that the poet's self-assurance and security are disturbed. The undreamed terror did bend him to the ground as a storm bends the tree, so that he may become open and stay open to a wholly different and higher rule of words under whose governance things come to be, or are what they are. The renunciation lesson from which the poet learns that words give Being to beings, rather, does not render unfruitful the entire poetic-journey abroad and its homecoming, even though the treasure, borne out of that adventure, disappeared for want of name. On the contrary, it (the whole poetic-enterprise) became more fulfilled in the renunciation lesson. How? First, the poet came to know,

17. On the Way to Language, pp. 60-61, 63-64, 67, 73, 77, 80, 82, 86, 108, 140-152, and 155.
that is, he was led to deny to himself the claim of security, arrogance and of having authority he thought he had over things; and the sense or meaning of this negative self-denial lies in (his) being transformed from seeing himself as being "der Herr" of Being, to seeing himself now as der Hirt of it. In short, he is brought to give up the metaphysical, representational arrogance and attitude he had with respect to Being and beings. He saw something, "something" terrified him, "something" that shattered his metaphysical and traditional upbringing, "something" that disturbed his entire Being, "something" that led him as if by the hand to come face to face with himself, that showed him he is not the lord but a shepherd of Being, that it is the word that "bethings" things, not he. In all these renunciation lessons, the negative self-denial the poet undergoes has to it a positive element that is equally fundamental. The poet, after suffering self-denial in the renunciation lesson, now as if purged and washed clean with hyssop, as if being born again, comes to know who he really is, his role, place and nature in the universe of Being and beings. That is the positive element. He is "released from" (the negative aspect of renunciation) conceiving of himself as der Herr of Being, and "released into" (the positive element of renunciation), seeing himself as der Hirt instead. He comes to be essentially himself -- historicity -- but only in the seeing of that "something" that is, only in the historicity of Being -- the coming or presencing of Being upon itself. Man, the poet, saw something, in seeing which, he, on account of
that came to see himself therein, so renunciation, in the positive sense, is an owning of the self, that is, a self-recovery of the poet's essential self. This is historicity, staging a turning in unto the poet's very own -- becoming the essential self he already is -- but that which otherwise got inauthenticated by the Herr-like attitude the poet previously had to things.

All these, of course, show that human historicity owes its roots to the historicity of Being upon which the former is founded. The poet left home and came back having the treasure that visited him from distant dreams in his hand, but later disappeared for want of name. The poetic-journey abroad and homecoming, with Time as its hidden basis, got completed; reiterating human historicity as enunciated in Being and Time. But then came a higher event which transcended all that, yet endowed the whole poetic-vocation with everything that makes it whatever it is.

First of all, there would be no journey-making and homecoming were it not for the sake of getting the message (Being) for whose presencing the whole poetic-vocation got undertaken, and in and from whose presencing man obtains his own. Thus, there would be no human historicity were it not for the presencing, or historicity of Being. Existing, which Heidegger terms in Being and Time as a stretching along of man's has-beenness, is both consistent and equivalent with, therefore, a reiteration of, the entire poetic-journey abroad and homecoming, all of which are founded upon Time. But the entire renunciation lesson, suffered by the poet in "seeing that
"something," in seeing which the poet, on account of that, came to see himself, his role and nature in the universe of Being and beings, is an advance of a higher rule whose fundamentality stretches past, but collaborates with, human historicality described as the existing of man's has-beenness in Being and Time, or its reiteration in man's poetic-voyage abroad and its homecoming. But also and more so, the higher rule disclosed in the renunciation lesson that "Where word breaks off no thing may be," vividly disclosed to the poet both his negative and positive self-denial from which he learned that he must, in the former, "release himself from" inauthenticating the presencing of Being, that is, give up his metaphysical der Herr-like treatment of Being, and in the latter let himself be "released into" authenticating the presencing of Being. Thus, as if being born again, the poet, again came to see, in the renunciation lesson, of himself, that with the disappearance of the word, his entire poetic-vocation appeared devoid of meaning, for his treasure that visited him from distant dreams also disappeared and therefore had nothing in his hand of which he was in possession owing to the poetic-journey abroad and homecoming. In other words, he appeared to have journeyed abroad, wandered as a stranger abroad, and have come back home naked, or empty of anything for the sake of which he departed from home to begin with. Hence, the whole poetic-vocation would have been for nothing but a waste of everything; but this was not so, thanks to the renunciation lesson. For in it, the poet, though
he never had his treasure back and therefore went home looking sad, gained himself, but purged clean of arrogance. As
if being born again, he suffered the power of the "word,"
saw his limit, his powerlessness underneath "some thing" that
did bend him to the ground like storms do to trees, and saw
that he is himself placed under a higher rule and power that
gives to everything, including himself, their respective
beings. But all these are beyond Being and Time.

Fundamentally speaking then, it is the renunciation
lesson, learned by the poet, that gives to the entire journey-
making and its homecoming its significance. The poet learned
in it the source of his own being, who he, really or essen-
tially is, the power of "something" terrifying but higher
than himself, the limit and powerlessness of his Being and
thus, making the entire poetic-vocation a meaningful onto-
logical experience to which human historicality owes whatever
makes it what it is.

6.3.1 History and Historicity

"History is the study of the past....History is indeed
the study of the human past,"18 so states Professor Florovsky.

Philosophers of history and historians agree with him. The truth of his statement is, of course, unquestionable. Questionable, however, is what is stated in the statement. That history studies human past is true, but why past and not, say, present and future? Professor Ralph Demos retorts that that would be a contradiction.

...For history [he says] restricts its concern to what is past in man's existence, to that which is dead and gone. We hear now of "instant history" but this, I dare suggest, is a contradiction; if it is instant, it is journalism and not history; if it is history, it is not instant, surely.19

Thus defined, the present (as now) appears a-historical, un-historical, or anything but historical; since it is believed that history is of the past, and past alone, and there can be no history of the present, not to mention future. But what is this human past in which the study of history consists? It is that which is "dead and gone,"20 so answers Professor Demos. It appears from this that the living and the unborn are, here again, a-historical, un-historical, or anything but historical.

(hereafter cited as Nash, followed by page number(s) ). By history here, Professor Nash has in mind both "Geschichtswissenschaften" (history as science) and (but mostly) philosophy of history.

19. Ibid., p. 281.

20. Ibid.
From such analysis it appears that historical problems or matters are therefore not of the living practicing philosopher of history, nor of the living practicing Historian himself, nor of the unborn, but of the other or others, dead and gone. Therefore, the study of history, which is the study of the past, is the study of the other(s), dead and gone. Only thus do the living and the unborn perhaps become historical beings. In a nutshell, such a view of history sees the study of human past in the context of (to use Nietzsche's terms) monumental and antiquarian interest only.

But such being the only problem of history, that it is the study of the other(s), then why study it? In other words, how does one understand oneself historically, know oneself historically, discover or recover oneself historically, see oneself and learn from oneself historically, if problems of history are those tied exclusively to the other(s) dead and gone, and not to oneself as such?

In stating the same in other words, Professor R. G. Collingwood is of the belief that the business of history is "re-enactment of thought" and in this the historian, he says, "...looks, not at, but through, to discern the thoughts within them." 21 Collingwood's main point is that the historian, in studying past events, penetrates to what he calls "the inside" and detects the thought which they (the events) express. "Strictly speaking, the historian is concerned more

with the "inside" than the "outside" of past events. This means a re-enactment or re-thinking of past thoughts which the inside of past events carries or expresses. On this view, Professor Gadamer's succinct criticism of Collingwood's "re-enactment of thought" theory of history and of all those who, in various ways, subscribe to it, is well placed. Gadamer is compelled to ask:

Who is actually behind this thinking? Who are the protagonists of history whose thinking we have to penetrate? Is it the particular intention that a man is pursuing in his action? This [he goes on] is what Collingwood seems to mean.... This depends on the assumption that his acts were done on purpose. If they were not, there can be no history of them.... But is the reconstruction of intention really an understanding of history? 22

In what sense does one understand oneself historically if the study of history is constructed on re-enacting another's thought---a thought that is based on the assumption that Caesar's crossing of River Rubicon in 49 B.C., for example, was done on purpose, therefore had thought in it or behind it which it is the business of the historian to re-enact? Even if it is assumed that the historian's findings are true, valid and generally acceptable of Caesar, it still remains to be seen how that helps one to understand oneself historically, or even another, say, Brutus, not to mention the unborn? But how about actions that are "thoughtless," or do all actions have thought in them? What becomes of those human beings (say, a poltroon or fool), of whose actions it may be

said that there are no thoughts to re-enact. This being so, 
then do they also qualify to be historical beings or not?

More disturbing questions may be asked. But when 
closely looked at, most "ontic" theories about history stem 
from the belief that man makes history, that man is himself 
the maker, master, both subject and object, of history. As 
"der Herr" of history, he can do as he pleases with it, select 
at will what constitutes history for him and can control the 
course of history. In a word, man is, and becomes, the "mea-
sure of history."

This "representational attitude" man adopts with respect 
to history, for Heidegger, is presumptuous, and falls under 
the rubric of "Metaphysics," the oblivion of Being and the 
rulé of man. Metaphysics, in Heidegger's view, teaches man 
that he is "der Herr" of everything that is. On account of 
this, he forgets himself, who he is, his place in the universe 
of Being and beings, his very source, assumes the role of 
apothesis, and submits everything, including himself, to his 
will. "Metaphysical man" wills to will. It is the will that 
wills itself. In Heidegger's mind, Plato began it and 
Nietzsche finished it.

Heidegger's view of historiological investigations of 
history, as has already been seen in the dissertation, rever-
ses those principal assumptions upon which "ontic" views of 
history are placed. Heidegger's history (Geschichtlichkeit, 
of course) first teaches that the principal meaning of his-
torical existence stems from the future, not past. Second,
the study of historical existence is of oneself, not of another or others. Third, historical existence is man's constitutive facticity, given in advance of him, into which he is thrown, but only to exist (become) it, and in existing it he histori-
cizes his own historicity in and because of that of Being.
Therefore, man factically preconstitutes his historicity even
before projectively reconstituting it. Thus, fourth, man's
historical existence is not a product of man. Man does not
make it. The reverse is, rather, the case in so far as Heideg-
ger is concerned. Heidegger places man's Being in it, under
its control, at its service and makes it the source of his
"ontic" histories. Man, then, is and becomes der Hirt not
der Herr of historicity and he gets his historicity from being
just that. Fifth, an understanding of historiographical inves-
tigation of history, since historicity is one's own Being,
is therefore self-understanding. The historiographical study
of history is the same. Historiographical knowledge is, like-
wise, self-knowledge. In a word, the task of a historiographical
study of history is the task of a free and an open, self-becoming.
It is the task of self-recovery. To explain all that the ex-
planation must follow the chronological line of thought out-
lined above.

As has abundantly been stated, Heidegger sees past,
not as past, dead and gone, but as an integral constituent
of future. He calls it "already-having-been-there," facti-
cally given "there already" in advance of man as though it
lingers "there" waiting to be taken to. Past, thus conceived,
is something impending, something towards which man is heading; therefore its sense is futural, so it is past which comes to meet man from the future. Therefore, it is a "future-past" so to speak, upon which man is, freely and openly, projecting himself.

But past, factically conceived, becomes one's own, not another's. It is given or handed down, like tradition, to one even before one is born into it. Thus, past is a pre-constitutive facticity of man, but one that he comes to reconstitute freely and openly in projecting himself upon it. "Future-past" is thus one's own Being which is a "projecting-facticity." It is a sort of "Geworfenheit im Entwurf" of which human existence is constituted. The actual, explicit existing of this sort of "projected-thrownness" Being of man is the task of freely and openly becoming the very self of which one is structurally already constituted — historicity.

History, conceived as historicity, is therefore not an object of man. Man, in Heidegger's eyes, does not make it nor control it. The reverse is rather the case, for man is and becomes what he is due to the fact that his own Being consists in being the topos of Being. Man is der Hirt of historicity.

Given all these, an understanding of history (Geschichtlichkeit is intended here) is therefore an understanding of oneself, who one is, one's place and role in the universe of Being and beings and of one's very own source. The historiological study of history is thus the study of one's own factual Being, therefore, historiological knowledge is self-
knowledge and the task of historiographical study of history is the task of self-becoming. Everyone is historical in his or her Being, not because man makes history but because man exists in, and for, historicity, since he is its topos and historical science itself is made possible by human historical existence. In other words, man is historical not because of man but because of historicity itself, that is, Being itself. Thus, Being is the source of man's Being or historicity is the source of man's historical Being.

6.4 Illustration of Heidegger's Historicity: Stefan George's Poem, "Words," Revisited

The poet went on a journey in the course of which he acquired some treasure from an obscure origin. Now he needed a name for his "rich and frail" treasure from the goddess of fate who fetches names from the bourne, the well from which the twilit norn, the ancient goddess of fate, draws up names.

...Names are necessary. They are words by which what already is and is believed to be is made so concrete and full of being that it henceforth shines and blooms and thus reigns as the beautiful everywhere in the land. The names are words that portray, and "where words are missing there can be no thing."24

The poet, in waiting for the name, composes himself in self-complacency, waiting self-assuredly for that of which he is so convinced is certainly his. Tradition has taught him to believe of himself as having power over, and entitle-

24. Ibid., p. 141.
ment to, the name. Thus, he took with him his traditional upbringing, his metaphysical representational attitude to things; until he saw "something"; something disturbing that shattered his arrogant self-confidence, "something undreamed of, something terrifying stared him in the face -- that only the word lets a thing be a thing."²⁵

From this, the poet learns a "renunciation lesson."

From the lesson "something" (Being) was disclosed to him, by him and in him, and in disclosing which he (as the topos of that "something's" disclosure) got disclosed to himself. In this self-disclosure, the poet, as it were, found himself as though he were lost before; that is, he became the self he essentially is. It is in the task of self-becoming, or homecoming to one's very own, that his historicity consists.

But such a view of history (Geschichtlichkeit, of course) has as its object something which is yet to come. Therefore, the object of Heidegger's history is "the impending," the not-yet or the possible, because future is its most primary basis, not past, as past dead and gone. Thus envisaged, then, "... the way to it [as Heidegger puts it] must in general be open if we are to go back to it historiologically."²⁶ In other words, if the object of historiography is of the possible, then the approach by which historiographical study of history is conducted must be so open and free that whatever comes or befalls man comes to him or befalls him out of its own power, not

²⁵. Ibid., p. 148.

man's. But "it is by no means patent [so says Heidegger] that anything of this sort is the case...."27 with the way historiology is studied. For, "the ways of access to them [to the sciences; in our case historiographical study of history is the issue] get 'managed' methodologically, and the conceptual structure for interpreting them is outlined."28

Heidegger's point is that the ways by which the sciences (historiographical study of history here, of course) are studied are tamed. Man, "metaphysical man," has arrogantly given unto himself a self-prescriptive watertight defined "management," full of conceptual tools, beliefs and programmes with which he studies "the possible," the not-yet. But this is like a man who, having experienced a bit of uneasiness in his health one morning, went to see his physician, hoping to find out what was wrong with him. But he went having his diagnosis done already and holding it in his hand and then asked the doctor to give him a prescription for it. But that is not all; on top of all these he specified the sort of prescription he needed. So self-assured, so prepared, his disease clearly defined, its scope and nature patently outlined, in short, like the poet in Stefan George's poem, he was so confident that everything would go as he deemed fit, or expected, until the doctor told him that it does not work that way.

Such, in Heidegger's view, is, in some respect, the case with historiographical study of history and all the

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
sciences. "Science [he says in The Age of the World Picture] becomes research through the projected plan and through the securing of that plan in the rigour of procedure."\(^{29}\) Thus, "...research into facts...is intrinsically the establishing and verifying of rule and law."\(^{30}\) In this, "...man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is."\(^{31}\) "Man brings into play his unlimited power for calculating, planning and molding of all things."\(^{32}\) The same is the case with historiographical study of history. But, if historiographical investigation of history is of the not-yet, the possible, taming the ways to it, is like taming death; that is, prescribing for oneself the ways to domesticate it. Prescribing for oneself the ways to the open and free disclosure of Being, therefore, of man also, may be correct but only at the "ontic" level. But speaking in terms of the ground or foundation of "ontic history," man, in Heidegger's view, must open himself up and stay opened for the disclosure of Being, from whose disclosure he gets his self-disclosure. Thus "management" at this level would be presumptuous.

Although Heidegger does not dispute the works of "ontic" history, he is of the belief that the task of "ontic" history

\(^{29}\) In The Question Concerning Technology, p. 120.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., p. 134.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 135.
should be grounded upon the disclosure of historical beings that "have already been." The disclosure should involve a "repetition" of the factual possibility of one's own "having-been-future," namely, one's tradition which involves the hermeneutical situation.

In this case ontic history (that is, historiological investigations of history), founded upon historicity, has "repeatable tradition" as its possible object of inquiry. The relationship between history (as historiological investigations of history) and historicity, in Heidegger, therefore becomes so intimate that there is actually no difference at all between them in terms of the task and the object which they both confront. Their task is self-disclosure which happens in the disclosure of Being, their object is the possible. Historicity is the root-source of both history and historiological investigations of history. The metaphorical analogy of Descartes is just accurate for what is intended here. Descartes, writing to Picot, who translated the Principia Philo-

33. Sein und Zeit, p. 397. ("The existential-historical source of historiology may be presented concretely by analysing the thematization which is constitutive for this science. In historiological thematizing, the main point is the cultivation of the hermeneutical situation which--once the historically existent Dasein has made its resolution--opens itself to the repetitive disclosure of what has been there.")
sophiae into French, observed: "Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree: the roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches that issue from the trunk are all the sciences..." Heidegger's hermeneutics of Being may be seen as the root from which all the sciences derive their various vitality. History, philosophy of history, or historiographical investigations of history, all derive their "source" from historicity, but the root, trunk, branches or leaves are all of the same tree: the historicity of Being.

In Heidegger's hands, however, neither historical science, philosophy of history, nor historiographical investigations of history become denigrated, but supplemented. "Historical science [in his words, for example] may thoroughly explore a period, for instance, in every possible respect, and yet never explore what history is." The latter is a work of historicity. Heidegger believes that "by way of history, a man will never find out what history is; no more than a mathematician can show by way of mathematics -- by means of his science -- what mathematics is." For "it cannot do so scientifically," since "the essence of their sphere -- history, art, poetry, language, man, God, etc. -- remains inaccessible to the sciences. At the same time, however, the sciences would constantly fall into the void if they did

34. See Kaufman, Existentialism, p. 207.
35. What is Called Thinking?, p. 32.
36. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
37. Ibid., p. 32.
not operate within these spheres." The essence of this sphere, Heidegger believes, is a higher one, a higher concern, which, by their very nature, the sciences cannot enter. It is a sphere that belongs to the ground of their being. This sphere belongs to philosophy, and as Heidegger sees it, it becomes a matter for the interpretation of the historicity of Being. "Ontic histories" (in this case) need grounding, and historicity provides that. "Ontic histories" reduce everything to a univocity of concepts, programmes, in short to a "management," but historicity must supplement it with a challenge to offer its course of investigation free and open to startling revelation -- one that man may never have thought nor dreamed of. A self-imposed disclosure with respect to retrieving oneself in one's own handed tradition only leads, to a larger extent, to seeing things presumptuously and one-sidedly. Historiographical study of history, for Heidegger, is the study of oneself that "has-been," and for Heidegger the way to it must be free and open and stay free and open for self-discovery, not closed and limited by "management." Such, in my view, is the call Heidegger enjoins historians to seriously consider. For history (all "ontic histories") without historicity is like a tree without roots.

6.5 Critical Discussions

However, in spite of Heidegger's enormous achievements

38. Ibid., p. 33.
and contributions to human knowledge in numerous disciplines, he has not, like every great philosopher, been spared criticisms and even lampoonery. For the sake of pertinence, however, only those debates deemed relevant to the area of history shall be isolated and herein examined.

As shown in the thesis, doing a historiological study of history, for Heidegger, is a task, a free and open one, which involves a "repetition" or retrieval of one's own tradition handed down to one but in which are filled possibilities one is free and open to exist them anyhow. It has already been pointed out in the thesis that Heidegger's own dealings with Anaximander, Heracleitus, Parmenides, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Hölderlin and others give an example of what doing "history" in the Heideggerian way is like. But if doing "history" (not as science which studies facts, but as finding oneself in one's own hasbeenness) -- as finding oneself freely, boldly and openly in one's own has-beenness -- is what Heidegger himself exemplifies in his treatment of Hölderlin, Kant, Parmenides, Nietzsche and others -- and this is what the thesis has, in all its facets, tried to establish and illuminate -- then there is little to be cheerful about. For such a Heideggerian way of doing "history" -- like what he had done with others -- has generated much contempt among experts for what may be mildly called "convenient selfish interpretation." Consider his book on Kant, for example, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929): while some admire Heidegger's insightful and novel interpretation, others completely repudiate
it (i.e., see Kaufmann, *Existentialism*, p. 35). Concerning his etymological treatment of some key concepts in other philosophers, e.g., "Being," "thanc," "memory," "aletheia," "physic," "onta," "chrê," "ēmmanai," "noein," "lègein," "dike," "adike," etc., etc., the following is the response in this respect:

In his later writings, the very violence he does to language suggests to a new generation that he is trying to say something new and, to use one of Rilke's favorite words, *unsäglich*: something extreme and unsayable. Heidegger's preoccupation with the roots of words, which results in false etymologies and plays on words according to his critics, gives his followers the feeling that he is going to the roots while others remain at the surface. His critique of all traditional philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, his insistence that all modern philosophic thinking is vitiated by Latin mistranslations of Greek words, and the demand that we must now recover the original experience of the earliest Greek thinkers, going back to the beginnings, communicates a sense of radicalism and occasionally even the excitement of an archaeological excavation.

As layer upon layer of misunderstanding is exposed, the reader feels that something glorious is about to come to view. Alas, it usually remains about to come to view. It is as if night had fallen when Heidegger himself is at last ready to translate the dicta of the pre-Socratics. The great discovery is made, but we cannot quite see it, not because his version looks like what we knew before -- it does not -- but because it is so very dark.39

"His detractors see him as an obscurantist whose involved constructions with their multiple plays on words conceal a mixture of banalities and falsehood."40 Concerning his interpretation of Anaximander's one surviving sentence, for example,


40. Ibid., p. 35.
"...classical philologists, including even those who yield to none in their respect for *Being and Time*, priding themselves on being friends and former pupils, are agreed that his interpretations are untenable." 41 All these and many more had led to the charge of "...a deliberate defiance of common sense and his recourse not merely to what is extraordinary -- and here we find a striking similarity with a great deal of modern fiction -- to what is pathological." 42 Not to mention the charge of not being "scientific" or of being "anti-science," names such as "obscurantist," 43 "unacademic," 44 and others are commonplace in the description of Heidegger's late works. Justifiable or not, all these stem from the way "he finds or recovers himself" in them in doing "history" the Heideggerian way.

Concerning his late works, for example, wherein Heidegger is mostly concerned with Being as disclosed in its toponymies of Art, Poetry, "Language and Thinking, as well as the *es (Ereignis)* that appropriates Being, Kaufmann has this to write:

What has provoked far more controversy than anything else he has written is the growing body of his self-interpretations. [What and where this is, the author, Kaufmann, does not say.] Most of his old pupils who felt close to him in the period of *Being and Time* insist, though for the most part

41. Ibid., p. 36.
42. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
43. Ibid., p. 35.
44. Ibid., p. 38.
not in print, that he did not mean what he now explains he meant. Some are altogether embarrassed by his later works and confine their admiration to Being and Time and such relatively early essays as, for example, What is Metaphysics? 45 Whether or not such a view or criticism of Heidegger and his works is fair, true, justifiable, is immaterial here. What counts here is that doing history the Heideggerian way, that is, a historiographical investigation of history, leaves itself open to unfavourable protest from most "experts."

Of course, a Heideggerian may wish to dismiss all that (all that Kaufmann says in his book), on the grounds that all such criticisms are based on misunderstandings; or that it is not very easy for "experts" to accept unorthodox alternatives to doing things even if such an uncustomary way does not in the least threaten habit or the "normal" way of doing things, and such is the dilemma in which Heidegger finds himself. Again, a Heideggerian, in answer to these criticisms, may answer that Heidegger himself says that he thinks not the thought, but the unthought in a thinker's thought, and this would naturally mean: to say what was unsaid in what was said. But doing this oftentimes breeds controversy as to whether or not saying or disclosing the unsaid in what was said has actually not said too much as to raise reservations in accepting the disclosed fully or its legitimacy. Needless to say, Heidegger has had enough of the criticism that he says too much of, or he says for others what they

45. Ibid., p. 36.
themselves would not dare say, on the grounds and pretext
that he is more interested in the unsaid or the unthought
in a thinker's thought. But anybody can use this excuse for
the sake of convenience and selfishness.

But such criticism really does not capture the point
Heidegger puts forth in respect of doing a historiographical
study of history. In doing a historiographical study of history
or in any interpretation, what gets disclosed, what gets said,
what gets brought out and into light, is, in Heidegger's view,
not something that was not itself there already to begin with.
It was not something one manufactures and puts there. Rather,
what gets disclosed in doing, say, a historiographical study
of history, gets disclosed freely and openly but of itself
in and through the disclosing person who has taken up the
task of exploring freely and openly "the concealed and with-
held possible." What approaches or gets unconcealed is not
something one just puts in there. It is already there, con-
cealed, withheld or withdrawn. The approaching, for Heideg-
ger, is already there, given already there as the possible
although concealed but to whose disclosure one remains free
and open because it of itself unconceals or discloses itself
in the medium of the disclosing person. Therefore, the charge
that Heidegger's interpretation of others makes those others
say more than what it is that they actually said, hence
deemed untenable, is impossible in principle. For Heideg-
ger is not saying and cannot say for them that which was not
said in and by them already; unless, of course, he made it
up out of nowhere or elsewhere.

However, saying or disclosing "the possible," the not-yet, or the approaching but concealed and withheld, is not easy, but a task; a free and open one. In this, one must let oneself not be taken over by one's own presumptuousness but must be free and open to the disclosing something itself. Yet to be free and open, stay free and open to the disclosure of the possible, makes one appear guilty of not following the "rules," the "normal" and rigorous customary ways of doing things. To the experts, it means not submitting to "management," but being different, obscure, unscientific, antilogic, anti-thinking (representational metaphysical thinking, of course), etc., etc. But should one not be free and open to the disclosing of one's has beenness, of one's own possibilities? No, the experts on Kant would repudiate Heidegger's *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, those on philosophy would repudiate Heidegger's *Der Spruch des Anaximander, Heracleitus' Logos, Parmenides' Moira* and others as untenable, because he did not submit himself to the rigour of procedure, rules, programmes, which, had he done so, would have not allowed him to "go beyond the limit," so to speak. In my view, it is impossible in principle for *das andenkende Denken* -- a thinking that recalls -- to "go beyond the limit" because recalling is always a disclosing of what had already been there, a "Gewesenheit-Geworfenheit" -- of the possible, in the event of which one, in this is free and open to do so, or even choose not to do so. Thus, what is "there" as the approaching cannot have been
"there" at all if it had not already been "thrown-there" as the "possible" for one to yet approach it in a free and open way. After all. One can recall only what had been there already, the forgotten or the vague thing, but not a brand-new or a self-manufactured thing.

Still, it may be maintained, and validly so, that it is possible for one to make up, fantasize or manufacture -- how?, is irrelevant -- anything and put it there as if it were there before. Although the "manufactured" was not already there before, and such manufacturing could not have been possible, or would be easily detected if done, should the "rules" or "managements" have been followed. But as valid as such a case is, it presupposes two things: 1. namely that the approaching, the "possible," the "not-yet," which disclosing discloses, is indubitable, a known, self-evident and unequivocal "this" or "that" and cannot be otherwise than its apodictic obviousness, so that should it be tained or tampered with in any way whatsoever, such can, given "the rules and management," then be detected or made impossible altogether; 2. that, in the event of disclosing itself, it is not the disclosing happening itself that befalls man the discloser, in and through whom the disclosing happening happens, but rather, the opposite takes place. In other words, man is here presupposed to be der Herr of the disclosing event itself, and not der hirt of it.

The first presupposition, which science calls "scientific" is what Heidegger speaks about in "The Age of the World Picture,"
saying that "science becomes research through the projected plan, and through the securing of that plan in the rigour of procedure." 46 Heidegger goes on to say that: "research into facts in the realm of nature is intrinsically the establishing and verifying of rule and law." 47 Even experiment becomes "...that methodology which, in its planning and execution, is supported and guided on the basis of the fundamental law laid down, in order to advance the facts that either verify and confirm the law or deny its confirmation." 48 This is the presupposition 1 above bears in itself, but is it not presumptuous to use an experimentation, a research, or a methodology such as described above to unconceal "the possible," the "not-yet" or "the Approaching?" Is one not limited and closed within a watertight methodology, such as described above, that eliminates all choices, all openness and all freedom in the sense that one, here, has one and only one recourse to take to in the study of the "Approaching," and that is, the laws and rules laid down for everyone, and on account of which there is, and must be, no alternative? The same presumptuousness entailed in presupposition 1 is also repeated in presupposition 2, according to which man is seen as der Herr, not der Herr, of the disclosing event itself. According to the former, man is seen as the master and maker of the disclosing event; whereas in the latter, man is a shep-

46. See The Question Concerning Technology, p. 120.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., pp. 121-122.
herd of it. Needless to say, the latter is Heidegger's position but does that position not make man a mere passive caretaker servant of the disclosing event? Yes, it does make man a caretaker servant of Being, but not a completely passive one. For submitting oneself to, listening and hearing and receiving Being and letting it come to pass is for Heidegger not only a passive but an active task also, one that is free and open but to assume which Heidegger entreats man to work at it and be open and stay open to the disclosing of Being, in and from which he is disclosed unto himself, resolutely or not, authentically or not. Going to receive and bringing a message, for man, is an active task, a free and an open one in that man, for Heidegger, is like the Greek god Hermes, a divine messenger, who receives and brings messages of destiny, and such task is not only passive but active also. For example, Heidegger describes the saying of mortals -- that is, the speaking of man -- as an answer, but it is an answer that is a "counter-saying" and not just a mere answer. Hence, the disclosing of Being, in which that of man is rooted, is not only a passive but an active task also, free and open, in that one can exist it anyhow, or can even choose not to be bothered by it. Finding oneself in one's own handed-down Tradition, that is, doing a historiographical investigation of history, is not, and cannot be an adventure intended to satisfy one's intellectual hunger or for the sake of anti-

quarian and monumental convenience and selfishness because it is a task of self-disclosing in one's own has-beenness. It is self-retrieving to which history (as science), grounded upon historicity, belongs. It is a task of das andenkende Denken that can recall only what had been given there already. It is, in his words, "...remembrance of Being."\(^{50}\)

\(^{50}\) "The Anaximander Fragment" in *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 36.
APPENDIX A

TO KINDRED ONES. 1

There amid the Alps it is still bright night and the cloud,
Writing of the Joyous, covers the night with the yawning
valley.

There, thither, rushes and roars the boisterous mountain breeze,
Steep down through the firs there gleams and dwindles a ray.
The joyously-shuddering chaos slowly hurries and struggles,
Young in appearance, yet strong, it celebrates loving strife
Beneath the rocks, it seethes and toters in the eternal lists,
For morning dawns more bacchanalian there.

For the year grows more unendingly there and the holy
Hours, the days, are more boldly ordered and mingled.
Yet the storm-bird marks the time and between
Mountains, high in the air he hovers and calls on the day.
Now too the village watches fearless from down in the depths,
And, familiar with the high, gazes up at the peaks from below.
With a presentiment of growth, for already, like lightening-
streaks, the old
Cascades are falling, the ground steams under the tumbling,
Echo sounds all about, and the imponderable workshop
Moves its arm by day and night, conferring gifts.
Meanwhile the silver heights gleam peacefully above,
Already the luminous snow up there is full of roses.
And yet higher up still above the light there dwells the pure
Blissful god rejoicing in the play of holy beams.
Silent he dwells alone, and brightly shines his countenance,
The heavenly one seems disposed to give life,
To create joy, with us, as often when, conscious of measure,
Conscious of all that breathes, hesitant too and sparing,
the god

Sends to cities and houses most genuine happiness, and gentle
Rain to open out the land, brooding clouds, and you too,
Dearest breezes, and you, soft vernal seasons,
And with slow hand makes joyful those who sorrow,
When he, the creative one, renews the seasons, and refreshes
And touches the quiet hearts of ageing people,
And works down into the depths and open out and illumines,
As he loves to do, and now once again a life begins,
Charm flowers, as before, and an immanent spirit comes,
And a joyous courage swells again the pinions.
Much spoke I to him, for whatever poets meditate or sing
Is of value chiefly to the angels and to him;
I prayed much, for love of the fatherland, so that not
Unimplored the spirit might once suddenly command us;
Much for you also who are beset with care in the fatherland,
To whom the holy gratitude smiling brings the fugitives,

People of the country! For you, whilst the lake rocked me,
And the helmsman eat calmly and praised the passage.
Far on the level of the lake was one joyous undulation
Beneath the sails, and now the town flowers and shines forth
There in the early morning, for hither from the shady Alps
The vessel comes escorted and rests now in the harbour.
Here the shore is warm, and the valleys amicably open,
Beautifully luminous with paths, gleam verdantly towards me.
Gardens stand in groups and already the glittering bud is
beginning,
And the song of the birds makes invitation to the wanderer
All seems familiar, even the hastening greeting
Seems the greeting of friends, each face seems congenial

To be sure! It is the native land, the soil of the homeland,
That which thou seekest is near, and already coming to meet thee.
And not in vain does he stand, like a son, at the wave-washed
Gate and gaze and seek loving-names for thee
With son, a wandering man, O blissful Lindau!
This is one of the hospitable gates of the land,
Tempting one to go out into the much-promising distance,
There, where wonders are, there, where the divine quarry runs,
High up the Rhine breaks its bold path down into the plains,
And forth out of the rocks the jubilant valley emerges,
In there, among the bright mountains, to wander to Como,
Or, as the day changes, down the open lake;
But me thou temptest more, O hallowed gateway!
To go home, where flowering ways are known to me,
To visit the country there and the lovely vales of Neckar,
And the woods, the green of holy trees, where the oak
Gladly keeps company with calm birches and beeches,
And a place in the mountains amicably captivates me

There they welcome me. O voice of the town, of the mother!
O thou touchest, thou stirrest old teachings in me!
Yet they are still the same! Joy and the sun still flower
with you,
O you dear ones! And almost brighter to the eye than before.
Yes! What used to be, is still! It prospers and ripens,
yet nothing
That lives and loves there, abandons faithfulness.
But the best, the discovery, that lies beneath the arc
Of holy peace, is reserved from youth and from age
Foolish is my speech. It is joy. Yet to-morrow and in
future
When we go and gave out-of-doors upon the living field,
Beneath the tree's blossoms, in the festive days of spring
Much shall I hope and speak with you on this, you dear ones!
Much have I heard of the great father and long
Kept silence above him, who refreshes the wandering season
Up there in the heights and rules over mountain-ranges,
Who presently grants to us heavenly gifts and calls
With brighter song and sends many good spirits. O tarry not,
Come, ye preserving ones! Angels of the Year! And ye,
Angels of the house, come! Into all the vein of life,
Rejoicing everything at once, let the heavenly share itself out!

Ennoble! Rejuvenate! So that no human good, no
Hour of the day may be fittingly hallowed
Without the Joyful Ones and without such joy, as now,
When lovers are reconciled, as it behoves them.
When we bless the meal, whom may I name and when we
Rest from life, each day, say, how shall I give thanks?
Shall I name the High Ones then? No god loves what is unseemly;
To grasp him, our joy is scarcely large enough.
Often we must keep silence; holy names are lacking,
Hearts beat and yet does speech still hold back?
But lyre-music lends to each hour its sounds,
And perhaps rejoices the heavenly ones who draw near.
This makes ready and thus care too is almost
Placated already — the care that entered into the joy
Cares like these, whether he wills or no, a singer
Must bear in his soul and often, but the others not.
APPENDIX B

WORDS

Wonder or dream from distant land
I carried to my country's strand
And waited till the twilit norm
Had found the name within her bourn

Then I could grasp it close and strong
It blooms and shines now the front along....

Once I returned from happy sail,
I had a prize so rich and frail,
She sought for long and tidings told:
"No like of this these depths enfold."
And straight it vanished from my hand,
The treasure never graced my land....

So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.

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Only works that are pertinent to the development of the thesis are selected and given here.


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