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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCU
PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN
AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

by Cyril J. Chiasson

Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Religious Studies

Ottawa, Canada, 1981

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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS

The discipline of psychology of religion is experiencing considerable turmoil. In a sense there has always been a psychology of religion; men of wisdom and learning have always inquired, and commented on, the religious dimension of existence and the religious behavior of man. But the beginning of the contemporary period in psychology of religion can be dated with the work of G. Stanley Hall on conversion in 1881.¹ The discipline gained attention and recognition in the famous Gifford lectures given by William James at the turn of the century.² Following James, there was a 20-year period of activity in the discipline, but this was followed by a 30-year period in which very little was published and in which few works were notable.³ Although interest in


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The discipline has increased since the fifties, there is still no clear agreement as to the proper concerns of the discipline, its nature, or even its definition.

The turmoil within the discipline has given rise to a series of fundamental questions. Shall the discipline concern itself with the study of religious behavior as a social phenomenon or as a personal expression? What should be the criterion for assessing what is and is not authentic religious behavior? What is the nature of religious experience? Shall the discipline continue to rely on traditionally-used instruments of scientific measurement? How informative is statistical analysis in the psychological study of religion and how accurate is the questionnaire or case study? How is the data of personal experience to be used and how is the interpretation of that experience to be weighed in terms of religious value and significance; stated differently, how does one evaluate the religious value and significance of personal experience?

In the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 10, pp. 84-90. As Beit-Hallahmi observes, the early enthusiasm of the discipline was short-lived; "... a little over three decades after its birth, the psychology of religion movement was dead." (p. 21)
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While any one of the questions posed would be worthy of a thesis study, the concern of the present thesis is more fundamental; it is concerned with the need for a new understanding regarding the nature and the role of psychology of religion. The hypothesis of the project is that the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin could make a major contribution toward the development of the new understanding. The project will approach the hypothesis by way of an examination of a basic concept utilized by the discipline, the concept of "religious experience." The argument will be presented that, as a concept in psychology of religion, "religious experience" has serious inadequacies for describing the religious behavior and expression of modern man.

Thus, the first chapter will begin with an examination of the manner in which William James seems to have used the concept of "religious experience." This examination will be followed by a review of the critique of psychology of religion as developed by Peter Homans of the University of Chicago. Along the lines of Homans' historical analysis, it will be argued that psychology of religion has consistently treated man and his religious expression in an encapsulated manner and that the discipline needs to find new models for approaching religious
behavior that will more adequately recognize the developmental, evolutionary character of man's total experience and expression.

The reason for the inadequacies of the concept of "religious experience", and, indeed, for the general decline of the discipline of psychology of religion, will be shown to arise from a shift within the discipline away from its traditional focus toward a new focus.

The shift in psychology of religion away from a traditional focus and the call for a new focus for the discipline have, in turn, their own causes. While the limitations of the present thesis project do not allow, nor require, an in-depth analysis of these causes (such an analysis is offered as a suggestion for further research), they underlie the call for a renewal in the discipline and can be stated briefly.

The shift in focus in psychology of religion can be seen within a broader context and that is a shift in focus within what might be called the root disciplines of psychology of religion, the disciplines of philosophy, theology and psychology. In each case, the shift involves a movement generally speaking from dualistic thought and a static interpretation of reality to unitary thought and
a processive interpretation of reality.

For philosophy, the shift in focus has been away from a Cartesian dualism (unfair to the intentions of Descartes), that has persisted well into the 20th century and that has interpreted the essence of man as a strained relationship between matter and spirit, toward a more wholistic interpretation of a human nature with inseparable constituencies.

For theology, the shift in focus has seen a movement away from an excessive supranaturalism and transcendentalism which sees God as "out there" and man "down here", toward a more transcendental-immanent interpretation of the relationship between God and man, which sees God as the ultimate dimension of human life and experience.

The shift in focus for psychology has witnessed a movement away from interpreting human behavior exclusively within the mechanistic terms of reference of behaviorism and the dualistic, conflictual model of human existence of the psychoanalytic school, and has seen, alongside of these schools, an increasing recognition of the phenomenological approach to the study of human experience and behavior as developed, for example, in the humanistic school of psychology.
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The degree of the shift in focus in each of the root disciplines is of such an extent as to prompt the call for a parallel significant shift in focus within the discipline itself. To repeat, an analysis of these processes lies beyond the perimeters of the thesis project; what is to be noted is that a new focus is being called for within psychology of religion.

A major task of the first chapter then, will be to illustrate the differences between the traditional focus of the discipline and the proposed new focus. It will be argued that the concept of "religious experience," in the traditional focus of the discipline of psychology of religion, can be associated with a dualistic, dichotomous ideology and a static interpretation of reality so that, indeed, it is appropriate to speak of religious experiences as isolated moments of reality that are distinct from all other moments of reality. In this traditional focus the concept of "religious experience" belongs to the same kind of ideology which can speak, for example, of God as being "up there" or "out there" while man is down here. It becomes difficult to use the same concept of "religious experience" in the proposed new focus of the discipline.
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without causing considerable confusion since in the new focus, characterized as it is by a unitary ideology and a processive interpretation of reality, it will be shown that it is more appropriate to speak of the religious significance of experience in general rather than of the significance of any particular religious experiences. This new focus being called for belongs to the same kind of ideology which prefers to speak of God in both transcendent and immanent terms. If, then, the concept of "religious experience" in its traditional usage has serious inadequacies for the proposed new focus of the discipline, it would seem necessary to either expand and develop the concept so that it can accommodate the new focus, or to create a new concept altogether.

In this thesis, the creation of a new concept—the concept of "religious response"—is proposed. But in either case—whether the concept of "religious experience" is retained and given an expanded meaning, or whether a new concept is created—the intention is the same, which is to seek to understand the emerging new dimensions in the religious behavior and expression of modern man.

The whole of the discussion regarding the concept of "religious experience" is a secondary concern of the
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thesis and is presented primarily to introduce and to illustrate the major argument of the thesis—that there is a need for a new understanding regarding the nature and the role of psychology of religion and that the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin could make a contribution toward the development of that new understanding.

Thus, the second and third chapters of the thesis will examine in detail the evolutionary synthesis of the French Jesuit paleontologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, in the light of the need expressed in the first chapter for a renewal of the discipline of psychology of religion under a new focus. The hypothesis is that the Teilhardian synthesis can indeed be read as a major contribution to the process of renewal in psychology of religion because it exemplifies the shift in focus being called for in the discipline. The intent of examining the Teilhardian synthesis will not be to present Teilhard as a psychologist of religion but rather to present him as one significant thinker of the twentieth century whose synthesis gives credence to the call for renewal in psychology of religion.

Thus, it will be argued that the Teilhardian
synthesis could play a major supportive and illustrative role in the process of renewal in psychology of religion.

As indicated earlier, while the argument is presented and developed in the thesis for a renewal of psychology of religion, and for an evaluation of the Teilhardian synthesis as a major contribution to that renewal, the suggestion will emerge with increasing insistence that the concept of "religious experience" cannot continue to be used in the new focus of the discipline without causing a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding since the usage of that concept is largely fixed within the context of the early period of the discipline, what in this thesis is being called the traditional focus of the discipline. Since no concept has been identified for use within the new focus being called for in the discipline, it would be necessary to either retain the concept of "religious experience" and give it an expanded meaning or, as suggested earlier, to propose the creation of a new concept such as "religious response."

The preference for, as well as the possibilities and implications in its use, of the concept of "religious response" by the discipline under the new focus as a means of removing some of the inadequacies associated
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with the continued use of the concept of "religious experience" will be discussed at the close of the first chapter.

The method that will be used in developing the hypothesis can thus be summarized in the following manner:

a) first, it will be shown that as a concept in psychology of religion, "religious experience" has serious inadequacies for describing the religious behavior and expression of modern man;

b) secondly, it will be shown that the inadequacies of the concept of "religious experience" call for a shift in focus in psychology of religion;

c) thirdly, it will be argued that the inadequacies associated with the continued use of the concept of "religious experience" could be reduced somewhat by the substitution of the concept "religious response." It will be suggested that the concept of "religious response," once its intended meaning is clear, might best be suited for a renewed psychology of religion which has fully integrated the shift in focus that is being called for within the discipline.

d) fourthly, it will be argued that the evolutionary synthesis of Teilhard de Chardin can be read as a major contribution to the process of renewal in psychology of religion because it exemplifies the shift in focus being called for in the discipline.

In short, the method of the thesis will be comparative,
anthropological and interdisciplinary. It will be comparative in its examination of a traditional focus and a new focus in the discipline of psychology of religion. It will be anthropological in its assessment of the anthropological view of the nature of man contained in the Teilhardian synthesis; indeed, the anthropological basis of the Teilhardian synthesis will be shown to be what makes it particularly valuable to the process of renewal in psychology of religion. And it will be interdisciplinary in that it will attempt to bring together, in a mutually complimentary manner, the discipline of psychology of religion and the evolutionary thought of Teilhard de Chardin.
CHAPTER I

FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE TO RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

A. Introduction

The major hypothesis of the present thesis project is that the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin can be read as a major contribution to the process of renewal of the discipline of psychology of religion. Before developing the hypothesis in the subsequent chapters of the thesis it will be the objective of this first chapter to clearly explain the issue to which the hypothesis will be presented as a response.

The issue, as it will be presented in the following pages, is that the discipline of psychology of religion is in need of renewal if it is to speak to modern man regarding his religious behavior and expression. It will be argued that the concept of "religious experience," in its traditional usage within the discipline, especially after James, has serious inadequacies for describing, and speaking to, the religious behavior and expression of modern man.

The first section of this chapter, then, will examine the manner in which William James, the father of psychology of religion, seems to have used the concept of "religious experience"; the development of the basic
concept of experience in his thought, as a background to his use of "religious experience," will be traced. It will also be shown how James was seriously misinterpreted by the discipline after him. And yet, even James's broadened understanding for the concept of "religious experience" is shown to be inadequate in the new focus that is being called for within the discipline. This shift in focus within psychology of religion will be the subject matter of the second section of the first chapter. The third and final section of the first chapter will examine in detail the concept of "religious response." Briefly stated, it will be proposed that in view of the inadequacy of the concept of "religious experience" for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man (for reasons to be explained), a new concept such as "religious response," to be rooted in a proposed new focus for the discipline, might better be suited for that purpose.

The process of renewal in psychology of religion whereby a shift in focus might occur and whereby the proposed concept of religious response might come into use is viable, it will be argued, within a comprehensive interpretation of reality as provided by the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. This argument will be developed in the second, third and fourth chapters of the thesis.
FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE TO RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

B. William James and the Concept of Religious Experience

William James's Gifford Lectures in 1901-2, published as The Varieties of Religious Experience, have become a classic and are considered by some scholars to be the major work in the field of psychology of religion. The preparation of The Varieties represented the fulfilment of a pledge James had made to his wife in 1883, shortly after his father's death, to study the value and meaning of religion as his father had understood it. But while


The Varieties was, on the one hand, an act of filial piety, it was also, on the other hand, one important step among several in the development of James's thought.

In the context of the thesis project, The Varieties will now be examined for an indication of how James understood experience and religious experience. In addition, that particular understanding will be situated within the broad outlines of James' philosophy as it developed from The Principles of Psychology, written in 1890, to A Pluralistic Universe, published in 1909. It will be shown that, while there is an evolution in James's thought with regard to his understanding of experience (and, consequently, religious experience), the discipline of psychology of religion did not integrate within itself James's broadest interpretation for experience but, rather, assumed a somewhat more limited interpretation. It will then be argued later in the chapter that a contemporary psychology of religion, with the significant shift in focus that is being called for within the discipline itself cannot remain satisfied with the concept of "religious experience" even with William James's most evolved


meaning for that concept. However, James's evolved meaning for experience can be taken as a starting point for the renewal being called for in the discipline. Thus, the concept of "religious response," as it is developed in the thesis, will contain within it the broadest meaning James had for "religious experience," and something more. That additional content could not have been perceived by James; it only emerged, it will be argued, upon awareness of the nature and degree of the shift that is being called for within psychology of religion.

At this point, it is necessary to emphasize that when the concept of "religious response" is discussed in the thesis, it is not intended to diametrically oppose the concept of "religious experience" but rather to act as a corrective for the latter (even in James's evolved understanding), to avoid the connotation it has that what is being considered are isolated moments of reality deemed religious and nothing else, and to allow for the possibility of religious significance in all moments of reality. Under such a corrective, the religious behavior, expression and self-understanding of modern man might be given fuller recognition. Such a recognition, it will be argued, requires a renewal in psychology of religion, a renewal of such an extent that the continued usage of the concept
of "religious experience," in its traditional focus at least, (post-James), would have serious inadequacies; even with James's broadest interpretation, the continued usage of the concept would cause confusion. The feasibility of the concept of "religious response" as a corrective to the concept of "religious experience" within a renewed psychology of religion should become particularly apparent when the Teilhardian synthesis is considered as a significant contribution to the process of renewal in psychology of religion.

William A. Sadler observes that James seems to have used at least two possible meanings for the term "experience"—experience as a continuous life process, and experience as "having an experience."

Sometimes James talked in terms of the former, but often when referring to religion he seems to have had the latter in mind. To have an experience suggests bringing a process to fruition. If religion means to an individual a total way of life, as James suggested, then it is confusing to speak of personal religion in terms of having experiences, which is what he and others have done.

Sadler himself does not give examples of James using the two meanings of experience; thus a number of illustrations from The Varieties will now be considered to lend support to Sadler's point. But even though Sadler's point might be

well taken, it will be argued on the one hand that James did not intend a great difference between the two meanings of experience, and, on the other hand, that the great cleavage between the two meanings—and the decidedly favoured usage of the latter meaning—developed in the discipline largely outside of James's influence. Thus, what Sadler stated—that with regard to religion, James often tended to see experience as something one undergoes—will be shown to be, if stated on the basis of The Varieties, a misreading of James when the full breadth of the evolution of his thought is taken into consideration.

But that James could have been misread, in The Varieties, is understandable when we consider the chapters on conversion. James defines religious conversion as follows:

To say that a man is "converted" means...that religious ideas, previously peripheral in his consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual centre of his energy.

The object of James's study is not the adolescent conversion experience which, along with Starbuck, he considers is essentially "a normal adolescent phenomenon, incidental to the passage from the child's small universe to the wider intellectual and spiritual life of maturity"; he prefers rather to

7 James, The Varieties, chapters IX and X, pp. 194-257.
8 Ibid., p. 201.
9 Ibid., p. 203.
study those more original forms of conversion experience which, he claims, "are more likely to be found in sporadic adult cases."\textsuperscript{10}

Among the latter type of conversions he initially identifies two kinds of conversions and names them, as Starbuck also had, the volitional type and the type by self-surrender.\textsuperscript{11} The former, as the name implies, is a somewhat intended experience in which "the regenerative change is usually gradual, and consists in the building up, piece by piece, of a new set of moral and spiritual habits";\textsuperscript{12} such experiences are "subconsciously maturing processes eventuating in results of which we suddenly grow conscious."\textsuperscript{13} In the latter type, again as the name implies, the person gives up struggling at the conscious level and, in doing so, permits the subconscious forces to take the lead;\textsuperscript{14} it is as if a new center of personal energy which has been building up in incubation for a period of time is allowed to blossom once the person ceases to

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 204.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 209.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 210. James gives, as an example of this type of conversion, the case of C.G. Finney, pp. 210-211. As this case illustrates, in this type of conversion the person comes to a certain understanding, a clarity, that has been long in the making and which, when it breaks through, cannot easily be suppressed.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 211-212.
resist it with his conscious will.\textsuperscript{15} James does not feel there is a radical difference between the two types since there is always some degree of self-surrender even in the most voluntary instances of conversion.\textsuperscript{16}

James expresses his greatest interest in still another type of conversion, the cases of instantaneous conversion.\textsuperscript{17} In instances of spontaneous conversion, (James relates several cases as examples, pp. 219-228), the persons undergoing the experience often feel they have been overwhelmed from above, that God is somehow involved in a miraculous moment.\textsuperscript{18} That such feelings are present should not be surprising, according to James, because of the nature of the experience.

It is natural that those who personally have traversed such an experience should carry away a feeling of its being a miracle rather than a natural process. Voices are often heard, lights seen, or visions witnessed; automatic motor phenomena occur; and it always seems, after the surrender of the personal will, as if an extraneous

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 213. James gives the case of David Brainerd as an example of this type of conversion, pp. 215-217. This case, and others given, are characterized by a point of exhaustion, followed by surrender, followed again by a new understanding.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 211.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 218f.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 228.
higher power had flooded in and taken possession.\footnote{19} But, while it is understandable to James that persons undergoing such instantaneous conversions would interpret them as in some way miraculous, he suggests to his audience—a suggestion certainly more controversial in his day than now—that such experiences might be explainable to some degree in psychological terms. His theory is that such moments of instant conversion might originate in the person's subconscious realm rather than in a supernatural realm.\footnote{20} Thus, under this theory, the differences between a gradual and a sudden conversion would have to do with the degree of development of the subconscious. As James states,

\ldots what makes the difference between a sudden and a gradual convert is not necessarily the presence of divine miracle in the case of one and of something less divine in that of the other, but rather a simple psychological peculiarity, the fact, namely, that in the recipient of the more instantaneous grace we have one of those Subjects who are in possession of a large region in which mental work can go on subliminally, and from which invasive experiences, abruptly upsetting the equilibrium of the primary consciousness, may come.\footnote{21}

\footnote{19} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 230.  
\footnote{20} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 234-237.  
\footnote{21} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 237.
FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE TO RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

In proffering the psychological analysis of the instantaneous and other conversion experiences, James does not intend to exclude the participation of higher powers in the phenomena; but, James insists, "if there be higher powers able to impress us, they may get access to us only through the subliminal door."²²

Up to this point several observations can be made regarding James's understanding of religious experience. While it is true to some extent that James conceived religious experiences in some instances to be isolatable, identifiable moments that are distinguishable from other moments of reality, they represent the visible consequences of a germination or incubation process, so that even in cases of instantaneous conversion, there has likely been a long period of preparation at the subconscious level for the explosion of such moments. This underlying aspect to conversion appears to have been largely ignored by psychology of religion subsequent to James. One possible explanation for this might lie in the fact that the psychology of religion movement, when it appeared as a threat to religious institutions, was taken in under the wings of religion; Beit-Hallahmi points out that the second generation of

²² Ibid., pp. 242-243.
workers in the movement were theologians first and psychologists second. Thus, James's theory of subconscious influences would have been given minimal attention by those who preferred to see a strictly supernatural origin of such experiences. Still other reasons why James's theory of subconscious influences was largely ignored will be discussed later in this chapter. What is being noted here is that even when James uses the concept of religious experience to refer to something one undergoes, he places such moments in a wider context and rarely treats them in isolation. However, Sadler's point, quoted earlier, still stands—that if religion is taken to mean a total way of life, as James most often did, "then it is confusing to speak of personal religion in terms of having experiences, which is what he and others have done." 25


24 This conclusion is even more permissible when one considers James's remarks regarding the once-born and twice born. See The Varieties, pp. 172-193, 352-353.

25 Sadler, Personality and Religion, p. 23.
FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE TO RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

But, as a corrective to Sadler, it must be said that the presence of two meanings for experience in The Varieties is more apparent than real. An examination of the development of James's thought on experience will help explain the cause of confusion.

Ralph Barton Perry has noted a three-stage evolution in James's empiricism, his philosophy of experience. 26 (Another analysis of James's empiricism that parallels Perry's analysis has been conducted by Victor Lowe.) 27 Perry's first stage was the psychological stage in which James tried to enrich the concept of experience. This attempt, however, led to the acknowledgement of certain dualities which he tried to reduce

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26 Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1958. As will be shown shortly, The Varieties appeared toward the end of the first stage and the beginning of the second, in the evolution of James's empiricism, making The Varieties both a psychological and philosophical work.

27 Victor Lowe, "William James's Pluralistic Metaphysics of Experience", in H.M. Kallen, In Commemoration of William James, 1842-1942, New York, AMS Press, c. 1967, pp. 157-177. The three stages that Lowe identifies are a) the pluralism of The Principles of Psychology in which James, recognizing the existence of dualities, understood mind as a succession of "perishing pulses of thought" (p. 159), each of these pulses being
to the common terms of experience.

... the dualities of self and not-self, of knower and known, and of idea and object, the terms of which, one or both, have in the traditional dualisms, been supposed to lie outside experience; or, if not outside, then, at any rate, upon a different plane of experience from sense and feeling.

James wanted to include these dualities in the realm of experience. The second stage in the evolution of James's philosophy of experience was the phenomenalistic phase in which he tried to have the notion of experience freed from its traditionally exclusive association with consciousness so that experience might come to embrace the

distinct entity but with a continuity between these entities; b) the theory of pure experience which James used to correct the dualism he had accepted in The Principles of Psychology between thought and the world of objects (p. 164); and c) the view he developed in the last three years of his life, the view that moments of experience relate with each other by compenetration (p. 158). With the theory of compenetration James "finally thought of the continuity exhibited by the succession of "perishing pulses of thought" as due to an actual immanence of the pulses in each other" (p. 166). James's final position, then, in Lowe's analysis, is a metaphysics of experience "which emphasized both the freedom of separate centers of experience and their power to fuse". (p. 173).

28 Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 76.
physical world as well. As Perry points out, James first identified this neutral sense of experience as "phenomenon" but later came to call it "pure experience." The third stage in the evolution of James's empiricism was the metaphysical stage in which he intended, as Perry notes,

to identify experience—thus enriched and containing within itself the dualities of knowledge and of mind and body—with the metaphysical reality.

Thus, one of the ways in which a development of thought is evident in James is in the lessening significance given to dualism. By the time he gave his presidential address to the 1894 meeting of the American Psychological Association, James had begun to abandon the dualism he had recognized in The Principles of Psychology. As Perry notes,

In the Psychology he had allowed himself the conveniences of dualism. But the whole trend of his philosophical thought both before and after the publication of the Psychology had been against the provisional makeshift. He now saw with increasing clearness that he could not

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29 Ibid., pp. 76-77, 91-100.
30 Ibid., p. 77.
31 Ibid.
hold one view as a psychologist and another as a philosopher; and as his rejection of dualism became a more and more dominant motive in his thought, he saw that he would have to correct his psychology. 32

Now it is against the background of the evolution in James's understanding of experience, as examined above, that his understanding of religious experience should be considered. We are now in a better position to understand why it is, as Sadler noted and as quoted earlier, 33 that James, when speaking of experience in general, often saw it as a continuous life process, but when speaking of experience in terms of religion, appeared to see it as isolatable moments that one undergoes, although such moments are usually placed within the broader context of an incubation process. Why there appears to be two meanings in The Varieties should now be clearer.

To begin with, it apparently was not important to James to distinguish in The Varieties between the two meanings for experience as applied to religion. It must be remembered that, to follow Perry's and Lowe's three-


stage classification of James's works, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* appeared toward the end of the psychological stage. Thus, instances when James speaks of religious experience as things one undergoes might well exemplify the understanding James had for experience in the psychological stage, the stage where he recognized certain dualities in the realm of experience and which he tried to reduce to common terms. From this perspective, the psychological perspective, he would have sought to find characteristics which are common to all religious experiences, experiences understood here as something one undergoes. On the other hand, instances when James speaks of, or implies, religious experience as a continuous life process might indicate the evolution of his understanding of experience toward the second and third stages, stages where the continuity and the interpretation of moments of experience, as well as the possibilities for novelty and

34 In *The Varieties*, James demonstrates this awareness of dualities when he describes "the general basis of all religious experience" as being "the fact that man has a dual nature, and is connected with two spheres of thought, a shallower and a profounder sphere, in either of which he may learn to live more habitually," James, *The Varieties*, p. 109.

35 These characteristics common to religious experiences are discussed by James in the conclusion to *The Varieties*, pp. 484-485, but even here the broader meaning for religious experiencing is in the contextual background.
change, are recognized. From this perspective, the philosophical perspective, he would have sought to identify characteristics of a religious life. Inasmuch as The Varieties is both a psychological and a philosophical work, it is understandable that some interpreters of the work would suggest, as Sadler does, that two meanings for experience are used. Ultimately, however, as suggested earlier, it must be said that in the context of the evolution of his thought, James seems to have most often interpreted experience as a continuous life process. To interpret James, when he speaks of experience, as meaning "having an experience", without placing it in the broader context of experience as a continuous life process, seems to be largely a misreading of James.

36 See Ralph B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, pp. 100-113.

37 James, The Varieties, pp. 464-465. "I think ... that however particular questions connected with our individual destinies may be answered, it is only by acknowledging them as genuine questions, and living in the sphere of thought which they open up, that we become profound. But to live thus is to be religious," (p.477). The whole of the chapter of philosophy in The Varieties, (chapter XVIII), reveals the philosophical perspective in James's thought where the broader meaning for experience is evident.

38 We are given another example, besides The Varieties, of how the two meanings for experience, in relation to religion, are intertwined in James's thought in a letter he wrote to a friend during the preparation of the Gifford lectures in 1890. He is explaining to
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Since The Varieties of Religious Experience has become a classic in the discipline of psychology of religion, how James understood and utilized the concept of religious experience becomes very important. It is evident that following James the larger part of the research done in the discipline understood religious experience in terms of something one undergoes rather than in terms of a continuous life process.\(^\text{39}\) It can now be argued, on the basis of the review presented earlier of the evolution of James's thought along psychological and philosophical lines, that the reason the emphasis, follow-James, was upon experience as something one undergoes,

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his correspondent what he hoped to accomplish in the lectures; in one paragraph, quoted below, the two meanings for experience can be drawn out: "The problem I have set myself is a hard one: first, to defend ... "experience" against "philosophy" as being the real backbone of the world's religious life--I mean prayer, guidance and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt, as against high and noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning; and second, to make the hearer or reader believe, what I myself inexcusably do believe, that, although all the special manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theories), yet the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important function," Henry James, ed., The Letters of William James, Vol. II, New York, Kraus Reprint Co., 1969, c. 1920, p. 127.

lies in the fact that the scholars commenting upon religion at the time of James and immediately following him were largely psychologists and not philosophers. As Beit-Hallahmi has shown, the first generation of psychologists of religion were indeed psychologists who saw religion as a subject open to the strict empirical and scientific approach of psychological investigation. The over-emphasis of this approach, and thus the over-emphasis upon the meaning of experience as something one undergoes, contributed to the decline of the discipline.

Still other reasons for the over-emphasis upon experience as something one undergoes are, on the one hand, the predominance of behaviorism in America at the turn of the century and, on the other hand, the reductionist tendency in philosophy. In any case, the consequences


of such an over-emphasis has been that the discipline finds itself with serious inadequacies for approaching the religious experience and behavior of modern man.

Sadler has suggested that the kind of psychology of religion which tries "to account for religion using a model that seeks to trace it to some unique experience constitutes often as much a hindrance as a help in research."42 While James himself is guilty of this, his broader interpretation for experience seems to have been ignored. In effect, it appears the scholars who followed immediately after James were not capable of maintaining the comprehensive approach to the study of religion that James had; their strict empirical method, as psychologists, left out the broader, open-ended approach to religion James had fostered. Thus, interest in James waned. As John McDonagh explains,

The reason for the lack of interest in James, and perhaps even outright hostility toward his thought, was that he did not fit into the positivistic and antimystical spirit of several generations of American psychologists. Deterministic explanations


42 Sadler, Personality and Religion, p. 23.
were prerequisites for scientific respectability. They would offer the hope of ultimate and final answers, which would restore the security of certitude about the causes of human behavior to scientific man. Such explanations would pave the way toward predictability, and finally, control—the ultimate power trip. James wasn't interested in that kind of trip . . . He dissented from British empiricism and logical positivism, as well as from Hegelian idealism, chiefly because they were closed systems.  

But James continues to be influential in the discipline of psychology of religion. The broad scope of his approach in the study of religion emerges anew to re-awaken interest in the discipline. Orlo Strunk observes that "it was James who promoted the humanistic spirit which has tended to reassert itself whenever the field has been in danger of annihilation via insipid scientism." However, the fact remains that there are some inherent difficulties in the way the concept of "religious experience" is interpreted in The Varieties. As Sadler states, "the language brings more confusion than light."  

45 Sadler, Personality and Religion, p. 23.
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The problem, however, is more serious than confusion surrounding the use of a term. As will be shown shortly, a shift in focus has taken place within the discipline of psychology of religion, a shift of such an extent that the continued use of the concept of "religious experience," even with James's most evolved understanding for the term, might be more of a hindrance than a help in the discipline. The meaning we have inherited for the concept of "religious experience," as employed to some degree by James and to a greater degree by the discipline after him, incorporated a notion of experience which, in the light of the shift in focus in man's self-understanding, appears less than dynamic. As Sadler explains,

Experience is not merely something which a man undergoes, it is also something which he does. Looking at this dual aspect leads to a further insight that experience is essentially a process of interaction; and it is also a creative process whereby all that a man meets is transformed by the way he receives it and acts upon it. This interaction is not just an exchange of give and take; it is a process whereby both the self and the environing world are transformed. In the primary datum of experience we need to recognize this ongoing process of interaction which in turn is structured by a system of relationships that itself is shaped by human interest and concern.

Sadler's remarks describe the kind of approach which is proposed for psychology of religion and which is calling

for a substantial shift in focus. In the traditional focus of the discipline, the concept of "religious experience" was taken by James, to some extent, and by his followers to a greater extent, to mean isolated moments of reality seen as religious and distinguished from all other moments of reality seen as non-religious. A religious experience, in this focus, is something one undergoes. But this understanding for "religious experience" is proving to be inadequate in an emerging new focus in psychology of religion that seeks to approach the religious behavior and expression of modern man. As the hypothesis is developed, it will be suggested that the concept of "religious response" is better suited for the emerging new focus. The concept of "religious response" will be explained more fully at the close of this chapter; it might be noted at this point that while "religious experience" is taken to mean something one undergoes, "religious response" will be taken to mean something one goes to, undergoes, and goes from.

In the rest of this chapter, it will be argued that psychology of religion is in need of a renewal, a renewal that will take into account the shift in focus that is being called for in the discipline. At the same time,
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William James's broader interpretation of experience, while it has inadequacies, should prove to be in substantial agreement with the discipline in its emerging new focus.

Attention will now turn to a description of the shift in focus that is occurring within psychology of religion.

C. **Shift in Focus Within Psychology of Religion**

A principle reason for the lack of clarity among psychologists of religion in defining the nature and concern of the discipline has to be the lack of consensus in defining what religion itself is. As one psychologist of religion, W.H. Clark, sees it, there are at least three reasons for this lack of consensus: a) Religious experience is a subjective and inward thing. As a consequence, when any two people talk about religion, they may not be talking about quite the same thing. b) Religion is something about which people are capable of feeling very strongly, as they also can about "democracy" for example. c) A particular definition for religion tends to be influenced by the purposes or intentions of the person who makes the definition. 47 Thus, most commentators on religion, including

psychologists of religion, will begin their work, as Clark does, with a review of several definitions of religion and then present their own. This will mean that an author's understanding of the nature of reality—of God, of man, and of their inter-relation—will be revealed to some extent in the definition he chooses or constructs and in the way he uses it. Therein lies the turmoil—the great variance in assessing what is or is not religious phenomena. One author who has analyzed the turmoil and offered concrete proposals on how to give direction to the discipline is Peter Homans of the University of Chicago.

In the mid-sixties, Homans made an astute observation on the status of psychology of religion, an observation that largely still stands. The discipline, he states, is receiving little attention from both the theologian and the psychologist. On the one hand we have the theologian insisting that "psychology of religion is psychology and not theology, and that religion, for that matter is not theology either," and, therefore, it puts

the whole matter onto the psychologist. On the other hand, the psychologist is "equally indifferent to the psychological study of religion." Both the theologian and the psychologist agree that there can be no psychology of religion without "contaminating principles basic to their respective disciplines." Homans claims this attitude of the two disciplines towards psychology of

49 Ibid. In a series of lectures given at the university of Ottawa in 1973, Homans attempted to explain what might have been a principal cause of the abandonment of psychology of religion by psychology: "The psychologists have for the most part, and in very different ways, viewed religion as unconnected with culture. They have viewed religion as unconnected with society's total way of life. To put this in another way, they have viewed it as unconnected with the basic structure of feeling and valuing associated with culture as a whole. Religion has appeared to them time and again as an encapsulated phenomenon, cut off from the other aspects of culture." James himself, in Homans' opinion is guilty of this; "William James focused his great study of the variety of religious experience upon a single version of religion, the conversion experience. The conversion experience was for James an experience in itself, to be understood apart from the specific social and symbolic manifestations of a cultural period or style. While James recognized that a tradition of self-interpretation surrounded the experiences he studied, he considered this tradition apart from other cultural circumstances. I think that this feature of James's work accounts for the lack of interest in his work on the part of those interested in theology and the history of religion." Peter Homans, "Toward Understanding Contemporaneity," in Robert Choquette, ed., Man, Religions and Freedom, Ottawa, The University of Ottawa Press, C.1974, p. 48.

50 Ibid.
religion need not continue if a new model can be developed regarding their inter-relation in any approach to, or appraisal of religious phenomena. Homans calls the model that he proposes the theology-psychology model. Since it is a basic premise of this thesis that there is a fundamental shift in focus occurring in psychology of religion, it is worthwhile examining Homans' argument as one explanation of the dynamics in the shift.

Homans puts forth the theology-psychology model where he feels two others have failed, the "psychology-of-religion" model and the "pastoral-psychology" model. The principle weakness in the psychology-of-religion model, in Homans' opinion, was that it over-emphasized the conversion experience as the human experience most laden with religious significance. William James and G. Stanley Hall brought their particular brand of functional and adaptive American psychology to the study of religion and, with the heavy weight of their influence, helped determine the items of concern, and the approach to these items, within the study of religion. Methodologically, a largely subjective

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51 As will be shown shortly, there are others besides Homans with a similar assessment and who also offer suggestions. 52 Homans, The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology, p. 56.
epistemological frame of reference was set up by the practitioners in the psychology-of-religion school so that "a particular form or type of experience properly called "religious" was simply and objectively given to the experiencing subject and was subsequently analyzed psychologically." In this manner, conversion became the favoured item of study. Conversion was treated as a human experience with religious significance completely accessible to psychological analysis; it was considered a psychic event that one passed through. In its dealings with conversion or with any other dimension of religion, the psychology-of-religion group was "not concerned professionally with institutional forms of Christianity or with theology" and, indeed, whenever it was, both were considered accessible to psychological analysis.

The pastoral-psychology model, on the other hand, approaches what had previously been the domain of the psy-

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 57.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
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Psychology of religion school with a broader basis than the premises of that school, so that the religious experience of conversion, for example, is seen in the light of psychotherapeutic technique and the psychological dynamics of human development.

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In this way the earlier notion of religious experience, understood as an event with a beginning, a middle and an end, was submitted to critical psychological analysis and related to the entire development life-span of the individual. The pastoral counseling process, claimed as a theological reality by its practitioners, is the formal heir to the conversion experiences of the psychology of religion.58

Pastoral psychology has been able to do this because it is committed to the theological presupposition "that a dimension of faith transcends all forms of religious experience." 59 This presupposition is really drawn from the theology-psychology model, as Homans points out. 60

While the two models are quite similar, there is an important difference in that the practitioner of pastoral

57 Ibid., p. 61.
58 Ibid., pp. 61-62
59 Ibid., p. 62
60 Ibid.
psychology, usually the pastor, has an obligation because of the practical nature of his work to submit his theology to some psychological analysis, whereas the practitioner of the theology-psychology model, usually an academic theologian, generally has not felt a similar obligation. Stated in another manner, the theology-psychology model is in a more objective position to recognize the proper limitations of a psycho-dynamic investigation of religious concerns, in a manner that the pastoral-psychology model might not be.

Within the theology-psychology model, theology serves the function of recognizing, and commenting upon, those dimensions of full personhood not readily recognized within the purview of psychological analysis. But at the same time, while reductionism of theological meaning is avoided, all that theology proclaims is open to the analysis and commentary by psychology. And, while theology might speak of man's essential possibilities in a manner that psychology cannot, there is no reason, in Homans' opinion

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61 Ibid.

62 Homans makes this point in the original version of the essay, as it appeared in Zygon, vol. 2, No. 1, p. 103.
why we cannot have a dynamic psychology concerned with the
self and self-transcendence; "That is to say, may we not
approach that area of human life which is the proper object
of theological study, in terms of psychological inquiry?"63
In a reply to his own question, Homans claims there are
indeed signs of such an approach in personality psychology
and humanistic psychology.

A couple of observations are in order at this
time. Firstly, Homans' theology-psychology model exem-
plifies a shift within the psychological study of religion
from an approach where the theologian or the psychologist
commented on phenomena widely deemed as religious, to an
approach where the theologian and the psychologist conduct
a dialogue on the nature of religious phenomena. Secondly,
in the dialogue between theology and psychology, psychology
is cognizant of, and comments upon within its limits, the
self-transcendence dimensions of the human; theology begins
where psychology leaves off, but the roots of its commen-
tary extend into the same data that psychology works with.
In short, there is a common anthropological base from which
both theology and psychology operate in their approach to

63 Ibid., p. 72.
religious phenomena. Thirdly, Homans' delineation of models that have emerged within psychology of religion suggests a parallel shift in understanding that has taken place with regard to the nature of religious phenomena (Pruyser shall have much to say on this point). And lastly, while Homans' theology-psychology model might well be a step in the right direction towards updating the discipline of psychology of religion, it could arguably be extended to include philosophy since, possibly, there has been as much of a shift in focus within philosophy as within psychology and theology, and since philosophy, it could be shown, is as much of a root discipline for psychology of religion as theology and psychology. Thus, while a theology-psychology model would provide for a revitalized psychology of religion and call for a radically altered understanding of religious phenomena, a philosophy-theology-psychology model would make these arguments even stronger. Furthermore, as it will become apparent in the second and third chapters, a theological anthropology as provided by the Teilhardian synthesis provides a still stronger basis for structuring such a model.

64 Homans suggests this himself. Ibid., pp. 70, 74-75.
Alongside Peter Homans' analysis of a shift in focus within the psychological study of religion, it is relevant to examine the call for such a shift in focus by Paul Pruyser,\(^{65}\) himself a psychologist of religion. The value of Pruyser's remarks is two-fold; in the first place, he analyzes the reasons for the decline of the school of psychology of religion in a fashion similar to Homans' analysis, although they have made their observations independently of each other. Secondly, and more importantly, Pruyser makes observations regarding the concept of "religious experience" that lend further credence to the argument of the thesis that there are serious inadequacies in the concept as traditionally understood and serious problems in its continued usage in the contemporary psychological study of religion.

Pruyser observes that the concept of "religious experience," as popularized by James, is based on certain premises:

a) some people have subjective experiences called "religious" of one sort or another;

b) psychology, as an empirical science, deals with experiences of people;

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c) the psychology of religion, if it is to be empirical, deals with the subjective experiences of people called "religious."\textsuperscript{66}

Notwithstanding the important contributions\textsuperscript{67} James has made to the understanding of religious behavior and experience, his understanding of the concept "religious experience" presents a problem in that it is based, as Pruyser notes, on a too-narrow emphasis, an emphasis on feelings and utter subjectivity which "cuts down on the importance of cognitive states, decisions and acts--on the very things that systematic and moral theology is interested in."\textsuperscript{68} This understanding presented a problem for the theology of the day, and it presents a problem for the psychological study of religion as it is emerging in our time. For the theology of James's day, it meant that psychology of religion could be ignored since it only treated the "very subjective, all-too-human side of religion," as Pruyser states.\textsuperscript{69} For the psychology of religion of

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 115.


\textsuperscript{68} Pruyser, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. Homans faulted the early psychology of religion in a similar fashion, op. cit., p. 53.
today, the problem is that such an understanding does not
accommodate the shift in understanding that is occurring
on the nature of religious phenomena and experience. In
short, James's concept is too narrow, in Pruyser's view.

My thesis is that James set up narrow boundaries
to the field of the psychology of religion and
that many of his successors held to these limits
without giving the matter much thought. 70

In Pruyser's analysis, psychology of religion
begins to overcome its handicap of being founded on too-
narrow premises when it opens itself up to the insights
of psychoanalysis. But the psychoanalytic studies of
religion, although they started early in this century,
have not been incorporated by psychology of religion until
recently. 71

There are several important contributions, in
Pruyser's view, that psychoanalysis can make to the study
of religion. For one thing, it can remove some of the
psychological distance between God and man; that is, it
can create "a new affinity (not identity) between God and
man which cuts across the technical distinction between

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 116.
God's transcendence and his immanence.\textsuperscript{72}

A second important contribution of psychoanalysis to the study of religion is its understanding of conflict in relation to religion.

Religion is now no longer an item or parcel of experience but a quality of an individual's experiencing the world and himself; it can be defined as a way of problem solving.

An important consequence follows from the recognition of the role of conflict in religion: "within such a framework the concept of religious experience as a state has to give way to the concept of religion as a process."\textsuperscript{74}

It is for these reasons, it will be argued later in this chapter, that the discipline of psychology of religion might best be served by replacing the concept of "religious experience" with the concept of "religious response," the latter concept being more capable of recognizing the affinity between man and God, the role of

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 117. Pruyser's point here agrees generally with that of Homans' reviewed earlier regarding the complementary roles of theology and psychology in the study of religious behavior and religious phenomena.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 118

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
conflict in personal religion, and the process dimension of religion.

It was shown earlier in the chapter that James, to some extent, recognized the role of conflict and suffering in personal religion. He insisted that personal maturation as a process cannot be a smooth one but rather is characterized by drastic upheavals that can be threatening to the individual, so that a personal religion within such a process can serve to bring the individual to a higher degree of self-realization. And yet, as Pruysen points out, James and the traditional body of psychology of religion were largely concerned with experiences popularly conceived as religious. Thus, while James was ahead of his time in recognizing the possible positive role of personal religion in carrying the individual through the upheavals of life, the discipline of psychology of religion had a too-rigid understanding of the nature of religious phenomena so that it remained incapable of recognizing the possible religious significance of the whole range of human

75 William Sadler makes this point in Personality and Religion, p. 16. As Sadler also states in a footnote, the work of Erik Erikson, particularly his Young Man Luther (New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1958) is relevant here.

76 Pruysen, p. 122.
experience. Such appreciation has only entered the discipline with the recognition of the inadequacies of the traditional focus of the discipline.

Therefore, in a contemporary psychological study of religion which, for example, opens itself to the input of psychoanalysis and which is required, in instances of its application (such as in the work of the hospital chaplain) to admit within its purview all potentially religious phenomena, there is an urgent need, in Pruyser's opinion, for the restating of a principal question. "The old question was: Which are the significant data of religious experience? The new question is: Which data of experience are of religious significance?"\textsuperscript{77}

The formulation of the new question represents an attempt to recognize that the popular conception of what is and is not religious phenomena is undergoing considerable change. Consequently, a whole range of questions with regard to religious experiencing are being raised that would never have been considered in the earlier stages of the discipline of psychology of religion. We need to ask, for example, whether there is a religious significance only in instances that are popularly identified as a religious

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
experience. Might there not be a religious significance possible in any human experience. Pruyster gives the example of a clinical psychologist working with a patient; could it not be that the patient might provide the clinical psychologist (who really isn't trained to perceive religious behavior) with religious responses without the psychologist being aware of it—and, indeed, with the patient himself not being aware of it either? It might be argued that there could not be any religious significance where there is no awareness of it. The answer to this objection is that a contemporary psychology of religion that would proceed with the perspective of Pruyster's second question could inform persons, (in a manner the clinical psychologist might not be able to), that experiences they have undergone have a meaning and a significance that are far-reaching. More than that, it might be able to assist persons to approach all experiences--indeed, to approach the process of life itself--with the view that instances of contact or communion between man and that-which-is-not-man (the absolute, by whichever title it may be identified) might not be limited to "religious experiences" in the traditional sense, but indeed might be as immediate as the

78 Ibid.
array of human experiences.

The important thing to note at this point is that Pruysrer's proposal is a critically important one in terms of this thesis. The shift in emphasis reflected in the two questions tells the story of the shift in focus that is being called for within the discipline of psychology of religion. The need for such a shift emerges from the inadequacy of the traditional focus of the discipline to approach the religious behavior and expression of modern man. In this context, the thesis will argue that Pruysrer's new question represents such a radical déparure in the traditional understanding of religious experience that a new concept should be adopted by the discipline that would be more capable of recognizing the shift in focus which is behind the formulation of Pruysrer's new question, that is to say, a concept which by intention would recognize religion as a process rather than as a state and which would accede to the possibility of a religious significance being present anywhere within the whole range of human experiencing rather than only in those isolated instances popularly identified as "religious experiences." The thesis will propose that "religious response" might serve
as that more useful concept.

The call for innovation and a new focus within the discipline has been sounded for some time. Pruyser himself states how he and some of his colleagues have felt a dissatisfaction with much of the literature of psychology of religion, a feeling "that the heart of the matter has not been reached."79 Orlo Strunk's call for a humanistic psychology of religion is certainly a plea for a re-evaluation of some of the basic premises of the discipline regarding the nature of religious phenomena.80 The discussion among psychologists, theologians and philosophers as to the nature of the relations between psychology and religion, as recorded by Joseph Havens in his book, Psychology and Religion,81 is really an attempt to make the psychological study of religion more relevant to a holistic view of man. Gabriel Moran, the educator and theologian, in a work entitled The Present Revelation,82

79 Ibid., p. 123.


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argues for a new understanding of religious experience, basing it on the inherent significance of the whole range of human experiencing.

Before turning to a study of the concept of "religious response" as a more useful concept for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man, the reader is asked to recall the brief remarks made in the Introduction to the thesis regarding what might be called the root disciplines of psychology of religion, the disciplines of philosophy, theology and psychology. While it is not the task of the thesis project to analyse the occurrence of a shift in focus within these root disciplines (that task might well be a suggestion for further research), it might be argued that such a shift in focus within the root disciplines would call forth a parallel shift in focus in psychology of religion.

D. The Concept of Religious Response

The suggestion that the concept of "religious response" might be better suited than the concept of "religious experience"--as traditionally used by psychology of religion--for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man is a secondary argument of the thesis as a whole but a major argument of the first chapter. The major argument of the thesis as a whole is that the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin can be read as a major contribution toward the development of
a new understanding in psychology of religion in its attempt to approach the religious behavior and expression of modern man. Why the Teilhardian synthesis can be read as a major contribution will be considered as the synthesis is examined in the second and third chapters. At the same time, the feasibility of the concept of "religious response" for a renewed psychology of religion should become progressively more apparent as the Teilhardian synthesis is examined.

It has been argued in this first chapter that the discipline of psychology of religion is in need of a significant shift in focus. It has been argued that the shift in focus being called for in psychology of religion is of such an extent that the concept of "religious experience," in its traditional usage, has serious inadequacies for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man. The concept of "religious response" is being suggested as the concept for the proposed new focus of the discipline which would remove the inadequacies of the concept of "religious experience"
in its traditional usage. The purpose of this section, then, is to develop more fully the meaning intended for the concept of "religious response."

A logical first question that should be addressed is, "What is the difference between religious experience and religious response?" The beginning of a reply would be to recall the distinction Pryser made between two questions with regard to religious phenomena. The first question, which represents the traditional focus of psychology of religion, asks, "Which are the significant data of religious experience?" The second question, which represents the emerging new focus of the discipline, asks, "Which data of experience are of religious significance?" The concept of "religious experience," in its traditional usage, falls within the purview of Pryser's first question. The concept of "religious response" is intended for the purview of Pryser's second question.

The subject matter of Pryser's first question is isolatable moments of reality--experience--that are deemed religious because they are in some way outside the ordinary and to some extent imbued with some Absolute or some quality of an Absolute. Such moments--which could be identified for all intents and purposes as sacred moments--
are distinguished from all other moments of reality, which are seen as ordinary and which can be described as a-religious or secular. This is the meaning for the concept of "religious experience" in the traditional focus of the discipline.

The subject matter of Pryser's second question is a religious dimension or significance which can be perceived in any experience or in experiencing itself. This does not mean, however, that all experiences, or experiencing itself, have a religious significance but rather that religious significance might emerge within the ordinary realm of reality, and not exclusively in extraordinary moments. Religious significance might be associated to extraordinary meaning found in moments of reality, but the moments themselves are ordinary and within ordinary reality. The concept of "religious response" is intended to operate within this purview.

The concept of "religious response" is not yet sufficiently accounted for in the literature of psychology of religion. What is being sought is something other than the traditional understanding of "religious experience" which consistently refers to isolatable moments of reality deemed as religious and extraordinary as distinct from non-religious and ordinary moments of reality. But even
William James's broadest understanding for "religious experience" falls short of the meaning intended for the concept of "religious response." As pointed out earlier, James could not have perceived the meaning intended for "religious response" since the concept answers to a need arising from the new focus being called for in psychology of religion. The concept of "religious response" is intended to refer to the whole mesh and inter-relatedness of human experiencing.

The circumstances in which the discipline of psychology of religion finds itself with regard to an increasing inadequacy of the concept of "religious experience" have parallels in the situation regarding research in religious studies in general. Glenn M. Vernon noted several years ago in an article entitled "The Religious "Nones": A Neglected Category," that in

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research on religious behavior there is no concept or identifying category in the literature to account for persons who don't fit in the traditional religious behavior categories of membership, attendance or some identification with a formal religious group. Thus when categories are set up in religious research regarding religious affiliation, those persons who belong to none of the traditional categories (Catholic, Protestant, Jew, etc.) are identified as "nones," which designates no religious affiliation but also adds "the gratuitous implication of a nonreligious person." 84 But, as Vernon points out, there may indeed be religious persons in the "none" group.

The "nonreligion" implication of the "none" label does not seem to find complete validation from the material which we have analyzed. Some of those characterized as "none" may, in fact, at least on certain religious measures, be more "religious" than some of those categorized as affiliated. On certain types of analyses, those usually classified as "nones" clearly fall within a "religious" category. 85

84 Ibid., p. 220.

85 Ibid., pp. 223-224. Vernon recommends that the more-neutral label of "independent" be used instead of "none" whenever the religious affiliation of subjects is identified in religious studies research. This would allow for the recognition of some characteristics possibly present in individuals who are not affiliated to any formal or institutional religion, characteristics that wouldn't be recognized by the label "none," and yet which could identify some persons as being in some way religious. See p. 229.
FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE TO RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

The parallel situation within psychology of religion is that there is no concept in the literature to recognize religious significance outside of "religious experience" when "religious experience" is understood to mean isolated moments of reality seen to be religious and extraordinary and distinct from all other moments of reality seen as non-religious and ordinary. There is no concept to describe the perception of those who might find religious significance in ordinary human experiencing. What is being argued here is that the concept of "religious response" might well play that role.

The concept of "religious experience" attends to a traditional religious consciousness in which persons undergo instances that are perceived as extraordinary or supernatural in some respects, to an extent that persons identify such moments as religious experiences. In such moments, persons perceive that the Absolute or some quality of the Absolute has broken into their personal life. But such moments are occasional occurrences in varying duration, interludes in an otherwise quite ordinary reality from which the Absolute is somewhat removed.

The concept of "religious response" attends to a quite different and presently emerging religious consciousness. John C. Hoffman has attempted to describe this
emerging religious consciousness in a recent article. 86 Hoffman argues that there is a primary religious experience which underlies both traditional and non-traditional religious consciousness. 87 This primary religious experience, while it may vary from one individual or culture to another, has some general character common throughout; it is "the awareness of the ground of existential meaning." 88 On this basis, Hoffman sees religion as "the experience of the foundational meaning in the light of which all reality comes to be understood and responded to." 89 While such primary religious experience is readily perceived within traditional religious consciousness and traditional religion, it can be and has been perceived in non-traditional religious consciousness. 90 The unique characteristic of the presently emerging, non-traditional religious consciousness, Hoffman argues, is that it is post-positivist. 91

87 Ibid., p. 349.
88 Ibid., p. 350.
89 Ibid., pp. 352-353.
90 Ibid., p. 253.
91 Ibid.
We are beginning to come out of a culture, according to Hoffman, in which we denied mystery and retreated from commitment. The rediscovery of both in a secular and technological age offers the hope for the manifestation of a more mature religious consciousness which can, in the context of our argument, identify religious significance outside of traditional religion and traditional religious consciousness. Hoffman's observations regarding the emerging post-positivist religious consciousness can be paralleled, it would seem, with the contemporary pole of the shift in focus that is occurring, as argued earlier, in psychology of religion.

Hoffman's point that there is a religious consciousness outside of traditional focuses is an important one, then, since it supports the basic premise of the thesis that the

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92 Ibid.

93 As an example of the literature in psychology of religion which perceives "religious experience" in traditional terms and which seems ignorant of the possibility of religious significance manifesting itself outside of traditional religion and traditional religious consciousness, see Peter Donovan, Interpreting Religious Experience, London, Sheldon Press, c. 1979; "When is an experience a religious one? The answer is, quite simply, when it is the sort of experience which religions are interested in, which they value or consider important. In other words, identifying experiences as religious ones requires us to look at more than just the features of certain kinds of experience. We have to know also about those systems of belief and behavior which we call religions", p. 3.
discipline of psychology of religion is in need of renewal if it is to speak to the religious behavior and expression of modern man which, indeed, often lies outside of traditional forms.

The existence of a religious consciousness outside of traditional forms is also argued from possibly an unlikely source, humanism. Humanism is commonly interpreted as being completely devoid of any religious dimension or concern but as one humanist, Peter Samson, points out in a recent article,\(^{94}\) humanism can be religious. He is opposed to the traditional definition of humanism as "a system of thought whose main interest is in the affairs of man, without reference to or dependence on the supernatural";\(^{95}\) such a definition places religion, concerned with God, and humanism, concerned with man, in opposition to each other. Samson would place religious humanism somewhere between traditional religion and secular humanism.\(^{96}\)

What distinguishes religious humanism from secular humanism, it seems, is the preservation of a sense of wonder.

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96 Ibid., p. 28.
when one has ruled out reliance on supernatural powers. There still remain basic questions, the unknowns, the mysteries of existence, of origins and destinies, which have always been associated with the God-concept, but are not necessarily tied to it or solved by it. . . . there is persistent mystery in the existence of anything: a stone, a flower, a thought, bravery, hope, the orderly cosmos itself. Indeed, there is nothing ordinary or commonplace about anything.\textsuperscript{97}

As a consequence of such a view that sees meaning in the whole of existence, those who fall within a religious humanism "see man taking a hand in the working out of his own and the universe's future, and . . . see every human holding in his or her own hands a small part of that responsibility."\textsuperscript{98}

Seen in this light it can be said that religious humanism has strong parallels in the perception called for by Teilhard in the deligation of his synthesis, as will be evident in the next two chapters. It can also be said that the traditional concept of "religious experience" would be inadequate for the perception of religious humanism that sees meaning in the whole of existence.

It would be possible to present many other authors who hold the view, like Vernon, Hoffman and Samson, that much\textsuperscript{97} \textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., pp. 28-29. For an in-depth study of the sense of wonder which has played a major influential role in the development of the present thesis project, see Sam Keen, Apology for Wonder, New York, Harper & Row; c. 1969.

\textsuperscript{98} Samson, "Can Humanism be Religious?", p. 30.
religious significance lies outside the traditional forms of religion and religious consciousness. There is no lack of documentation to support the argument that the concept of "religious experience" is simply inadequate for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man.

But what of the concept "religious response" itself—how is it to be used? The word "religious" in the concept of "religious response" is not being used in any denominational sense. The word is being used as an adjective, with respect to response, denoting a quality of action, which, while fully human, is in some way "Godly"; that is, it refers to human behavior which, while it will be described as human, will also be described as having a supra-human character, whether that be in the source, the goal or the reference of such behavior. A behavior that is supra-human in character is a behavior that is profoundly human, having those traits that are described by the humanistic school of psychology for the fully-functioning or self-actualizing person. Or, to place it in Teilhardian terms, it is behavior characterized by an inter-action at the level of centre with centre, an inter-action that brings the person along to the fullest possible humanness. (Teilhard's theory of personalization, to be examined in the third chapter of the thesis, will take up this point). For the purpose of coming to a
clear understanding of the concept of "religious response"; it is worthwhile identifying, tentatively, a minimal criteria for a behavior which is supra-human, that is fully human, in character; the same criteria would apply to the word "religious". The word "religious" then, shall be applied to human behavior which is supra-human in character, that is to say, behavior which is characterized as attentive, sensitive, tender, sacramental or celebrative. Certainly, many other characteristics could be added; the ones presented are merely suggested, tentatively, as a minimal criteria. The selection of these particular characteristics as the minimal criteria for describing religious response will be reassessed in the last chapter. In any case, not all human behavior is religious in character because not all behavior has the characteristics just mentioned. But, it should be possible to say that the more fully and authentically human the actions of a person are, the more those actions can be identified as religious, using the above criteria of attention, sensitivity, tenderness, sacramentality and celebration. These characteristics should arise naturally in the behavior of a person who perceives meaning in all of existence, who sees the secular as imbued with the sacred, who sees little distance between God and man, who sees little dichotomy and discontinuity between body and
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spirit. As will be seen in the delineation of the Teilhardian synthesis, such perception is of the whole of the phenomenon of man. It is such perception of human nature that permits the Irish moral theologian, Enda McDonagh, to speak of moral behavior as synonymous with authentic human experience, because the referent for moral behavior—God—is also the referent for that which is fully human. 99

The word "response" in the concept of "religious response"—while it suggests activity as opposed to passivity—is meant to suggest a particular kind of action. It is action prompted by awareness, a degree of perception, on the part of the "doer," the "responder;" it is action grounded more on a unitive, holistic interpretation of reality than on a dichotomous, discontinuous interpretation. It is meaningful action rather than automatic action.

C.A. Van Peursen 100 has analyzed meaningful action in a manner that closely parallels the meaning intended for "response" as it is being used in the concept of "religious response."


meaningfulness or significance of a total situation is closely interrelated with the intentional aspect presented by man when he acts or purposes this, that or the other, and so with man as an "I"... an action is meaningful when a man "undergoes" it in person, or at any rate when he can come in on it, so to speak.\(^{101}\)

The meaningful dimension in action is outward reaching and becomes the basis of disposition or orientation. As Van Peursen explains,

> We cannot understand meaningfulness as something entirely self-contained or self-supporting: there is that about it which points to further perspectives and suggests the idea of orientation. When we take an event to be meaningful, we take into account more than the circumscribable event-in-itself; we see it as a movement activated within a complex of wider interrelations.\(^{102}\)

But when this wider context is recognized—the whole of the phenomenon of man, as Teilhard would call it—the actions of the person who "sees" can become religious.

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\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 171. Van Peursen would likely agree with the remarks made earlier that life itself is synonymous with response. Consider his following remarks: "The whole human body—as a variety of writers have insisted—is seen in its true aspect only within a mobile structure. Man is never inertly passive. The most relaxed exercise of the faculty of sight, for example, is still accompanied by muscular exertion. The human body lives and goes on living only in the activity of moving towards its world. It is never just a question of movements-in-themselves but of man, who functions as mover and so is orientated towards, and involved with, something else. It is this that puts any separation between psychic occurrence and physical occurrence completely out of court." p. 188.

\(^{102}\) Ibid. In this context, see Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, c. 1958.
Again, as Van Peursen explains,

What we are contending for here is that the state of relatedness within which man functions is a religious one. Van der Leeuw makes this the setting for his anthropology. The soul, he argues with some emphasis, is basically a religious phenomenon. Eventually it comes to rely upon its own innate reserves of strength, and so is no longer a manifestation of divine power; that is the outcome of an evolutionary process. In consequence, the body is set over against the soul, as a fragment of "world." It does mean, however, that we get man as an individual, the one man discovering himself in and through what is other than himself. Even in the act of breathing he is already more than himself: he is a continuous outgoing towards the world in a mysterious interplay of forces... My consciousness is the idea of self as a knowing shared with myself: conscientia. That is to say, in myself this shared knowing occurs: self-consciousness discloses the Fellow-knower. My own individual bodiliness signifies existence as potentiality—and in this field of possibilities forces unknown by me can present themselves: the divine suffuses and interpenetrates human existence. Man is not a "finished article"; in himself he is incomplete, a mask assumed by the divine. As soon as man discovers himself as problematic, he turns himself into a part of the world. But even then he is never a simple, constituent part: there is his shame, and its covering. Man, then, never is—but he becomes. 103

The Teilhardian synthesis will provide much elaboration on the notion presented here—that man is involved in a process of evolution the full perimeters of which extend beyond that which he is, so that by participation in the process itself, especially conscious participation, man's actions, his response, become qualitatively different.

103 Van Peursen, Body, Soul, Spirit, p. 177.
from other action where conscious participation or awareness is absent. The person who becomes consciously participant in the process of evolution, which he perceives to extend beyond himself, finds his actions imbued with meaning and significance and his actions—as response—can be identified as religious to the degree that they are attentive, sensitive, tender, sacramental or celebrative. But his actions exhibit these qualities when he perceives significance within his milieu, when he perceives that the holy is within the ordinary, when he realizes that how he acts matters within such a context. In a very real sense, his actions are a response to a perceived invitation. Consequently, the deeper a person perceives the significance and meaning to be in his milieu, which he interprets as invitation, the more religious his response can be expected to be, using the criterion for "religious" given earlier. When the Teilhardian synthesis is developed, the basis for perceiving of "religious response" in these terms should be more evident.

Besides Van Peursen, the remarks of Robert B. Reeves, Jr., in his article, "The Total Response" are

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also relevant in attempting to explicate the nature of "religious response." His remarks, which parallel those of Van Peursen in many ways, are particularly useful in illustrating how "religious response" might be different from "religious experience" and how the former might remove inadequacies of the latter for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man.

Basing himself on the notion of "unitary being", the notion that interprets man as an indivisible whole in which mind and body are one and the same, Reeves argues that when man acts, he always acts with the whole of his person.

When we ask how man functions, we find that every moment of life is a moment of total response. Every stimulus that comes to us from the world about us evokes response by the whole of our being. There is no such thing as a purely physical reaction, or a purely emotional, or a purely mental, or a purely spiritual. One or another of these may be the point in the continuum that is marked by a peaking of activity, or by "which side is up", but the lines of continuity reach off into all the rest of our being and there is no part that is not in some degree involved.  

105 Ibid., p. 244
106 Ibid., p. 246-247
Reeves's reflections are made in the context of medical and pastoral care but they are relevant to the explication of the nature of "religious response" also. A person's actions in a particular situation are a total response, according to Reeves, in the sense that everything in a person's past enters his conscious or unconscious choice for action in the present. Furthermore, the choice for acting in a particular manner in the present, influenced as it is by the whole of a person's past, is also a determinant of future choices in action. 107 In short, there is a continuity from the past, through the present, to the future, which is to say there is a process of development, growth and adaption in every action of a unified being. 108

But of course not everyone sees himself as such a unified whole in such a process. Anyone who sees himself in a reality that is to any extent fixed, static or complete, or who sets up a sharp dichotomy between body and mind, matter and spirit, God and man, will likely only perceive religious significance in moments of reality that are identified as "religious experiences," that is, those

107 Ibid., pp. 247-250.
108 Ibid., p. 246.
moments that appear extraordinary and supernatural in origin. On the other hand, anyone who perceives himself to any degree to be a unified being and who sees his actions as the response of his total person to the whole of his existence is more likely to recognize religious significance as present in the very process of becoming, so that his actions have the possibility of being responses having a religious character, using the criteria for "religious" given earlier. Consequently, from the perspective of the contemporary pole in the shift in focus being called for within psychology of religion, it can be argued that there are no limits to the range of human behavior and experiencing that might be considered as "religious response" since there are no limits to the range of human behavior and experiencing that might be seen as manifesting religious significance.

Donald Gelpi, in his book, *Experiencing God, A Theology of Human Emergence*, 109 speaks of how a religious dimension arises out of human experience when human experience prompts us to formulate the question: "Does human life have any ultimate meaning and purpose?" 110 In remarks


110 Ibid., p. 109.
that recall Reeves's point about the interrelatedness and continuity of our actions, Gelpli describes the consequences of an affirmative answer to the above question:

... a positive answer to the religious question endows all one's subsequent experience with a religious character, although the religious intensity of one's personal satisfactions will, of course, be a function of the extent to which religious realities and values lie at the integrating center of one's decisions and unify all the other elements in experience.

That is to say--in the context of the concept of "religious response" that is being proposed here--when one perceives that his own milieu is imbued with religious significance, he will respond to the degree that he perceives that significance. In short, the response will be in accordance with the perceived invitation. Thus, as Gelpli states, not every human experience is a religious experience, but man's encounter with the sacred, which is to say the perceiving of religious significance, occurs within the realm of human experiencing. The sacred must manifest itself within the secular. It is for this reason that there are no limits on the range of human behavior and

111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., p. 107.
experiencing that might be seen as manifesting religious significance.

While the expression "religious response" is being used to describe human behavior which is in some way sensitive and attentive to the reality of an absolute--God, in the Christian perspective--we are forbidden to describe in any absolute sense which actions are, and which actions are not, sensitive and attentive to the reality of a God.\textsuperscript{113} We are forbidden to define such limits because we are unable, quite simply, to know and to understand the full dimensions of the presence of the God-reality in human existence. This statement, while defendable to some extent on the basis of the shift in focus within psychology of religion, will be even more defendable following the examination of the Teilhardian synthesis. If there are any limits to the range of human behavior that might be considered as religious response, the limits are in the quality of action and the maturity of actors, not in the presence or absence of a supernatural element.

\textsuperscript{113} In this regard, however, the criteria given earlier for identifying response as being religious—the criteria of attention, sensitivity, tenderness, sacramentality or celebration would be a reasonable guide.
The terms "religious response" and "religious responding" should appear, logically, in the language of those who consider their belief or behavior to be a religious response; these terms should also appear in the literature commenting on such phenomena. This statement should help demonstrate the usability of the concept of "religious response" since its operation does not differ in this respect from that of the term "religious experience." The term "religious experience" is found in the language of those who consider their belief or behavior to be a religious experience; this term appears in the literature commenting on such phenomena.

There is one element which is present in both "religious experience" and "religious response" and that is an element of interaction between the experiencer or the responder and a force or reality greater than he. The individual senses or believes himself to be participating in a dimension which, while it may involve him, extends to or originates from outside himself. But while this element is common to both "religious experience" and "religious response," there is a difference in disposition; that is, the disposition in one instance is to experience and the disposition in the other instance is to respond. The differences in disposition parallels the difference between
seeking the significance of experience deemed as religious and seeking the religious significance of all experience.

In the former, the "experiencer," there is an absence of alertness to an "inbreak" from within one's experience of the reality of the Ultimate—God, in the Christian perspective—and only attention to a "break-in" of the Ultimate coming from without and into one's awareness.

In the latter, the "responder," there is an openness—an alertness—to the reality of the Ultimate as it might present itself to one's awareness from the mesh of human experiencing. The "experiencer" undergoes (there is a significant dimension of passivity here) and the "responder" goes to, undergoes, and goes from (the significant dimensions here are the extending of one's self, and activity). 114

With response there is likely a consciousness on the part of the individual of being involved in a process and there is a conscious participation in that process. More than experience, it would seem that response, as participation in process, is the medium of personal transcendence and also of fullest contact with immanenting

114 Van Peursen's concept of undergoing an action (Body, Soul, Spirit, p. 171) seems more similar, in this comparison, to the idea of going to, undergoing, and going from.
Ultimacy (Otherness, Absolute, God) as it "inbreaks" into our awareness from the mesh of human experiencing. Religious response, in short, is an active acknowledgement of the reality of Ultimacy.

H. Summary and Conclusions

The argument of the first chapter has been that the discipline of psychology of religion is in need of renewal if it is to speak to modern man regarding his religious behavior and expression. The need for renewal has been illustrated by an examination of the manner in which the concept of "religious experience" has traditionally been used by the discipline; that usage reveals an understanding of religious experience as isolated moments of reality identified as religious and segregated from all other moments of reality. Such an interpretation of religious experience is understandable in the context of the approach to religious phenomena by the kind of psychology of religion as practiced by psychologists trained in the empirical, analytical schools of psychology. It has been shown that such a psychology of religion is at variance with the direction for the discipline that was implicit in the work of William James; James was concerned with the broader contexts of religious behavior and phenomena.

Whenever he spoke of specific religious experiences, it was usually not, despite appearances to the contrary, as
isolated experiences; he was interested in the broader contexts for such specific experiences. But James's approach, which was borne out of his abilities as both a philosopher and a psychologist, was not continued by those who succeeded him in the discipline; his successors, who were trained in the empirical, analytical kind of psychology, approached religious phenomena as something to be dissected, set to measurement, explained away. The emphasis was upon religious experiences as moments of reality separated from all other moments of reality.

The need for renewal in psychology of religion, then, is the need to return to the orientation James proposed in the study of religious phenomena. But the first chapter has argued that the renewal for the discipline shall have to extend further than James could have intended in his orientation. This argument was developed through the following stages:

a) the discipline of psychology of religion has undergone, and is undergoing, a major shift in focus in its understanding of religious phenomena and behavior; two poles in the shift are signified by two very different questions in the approach to religious phenomena. The questions, as posed by the psychologist Paul Pryser are: "Which are the significant data of religious experience?", and "Which data of experience are of religious significance?". The first question, it was suggested, can be identified with the first pole of the shift, the pole that describes a dichotomous, discontinuous interpretation of reality in which isolatable moments of reality
are called religious and considered extra-
ordinary, as distinguished from all other
moments seen as secular and ordinary. The
second question, it was suggested, can be
identified with the second contemporary pole
of the shift, the pole that describes a uni-
tive, continuous, holistic interpretation of
reality in which all experience is potentially
capable of manifesting a religious significance,
a view in which nothing is profane and every-
thing is sacred.

b) It has been argued that there is a need within
psychology of religion for a significant shift
from a generally dichotomous, discontinuous
interpretation of reality—which accounts in
large measure for perceiving isolatable moments
of reality deemed as religious and extraordinary
as distinct from non-religious, ordinary moments—
to a generally unitive, continuous, holistic in-
terpretation of reality—which in turn accounts
in large measure for the increasing tendency to
perceive all of experience as potentially having
religious significance.

At this point it is necessary to emphasize once
again a secondary argument of the thesis. It has been
shown that the discipline of psychology of religion is
in need of a significant shift in focus. The degree of
the proposed shift in focus is so extensive that, for
psychology of religion, the understanding of religious
phenomena and religious experience is radically altered.
Consequently, it has been suggested the concept "religious'
experience", coming out of a common usage that is largely
fixed within the context of the early stages of the dis-
cipline, cannot continue to be used without causing a
great deal of confusion and misunderstanding. Thus,
the argument is that the concept of "religious ex-
perience" has serious inadequacies for describing the
religious behavior and expression of modern man and
for recognizing the developmental, evolutionary character
of man's total experience and expression. It has been
suggested that the concept of "religious response" is
better suited to this task.

But the argument that the concept of "religious
response" would serve as a better concept for the new
focus in psychology of religion cannot be argued only
on the basis that the concept of "religious experience"
is inadequate; it is also necessary to show that the
concept of "religious response" conceptually parallels
an emerging unitive and synthesized interpretation of
reality in which the developmental and evolutionary
character of man's total experience and expression is
recognized. Such an interpretation of reality is pro-
vided by the theological-anthropological base of the
type of evolutionary synthesis as provided by Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin. The next two chapters will present
the major argument of the thesis, that the Teilhardian
synthesis can be read as a major contribution to the renewal of psychology of religion since it validates the terms of reference involved in that renewal—that religious behavior and phenomena today must be seen in a broader context than was possible in the traditional focus of the discipline of psychology of religion. The concept of "religious experience", as used in that traditional focus, is inadequate to approach and describe the proposed new focus of the discipline that tends to seek religious significance in the whole of human experiencing. Once the Teilhardian synthesis has been presented, and its relevance to the renewal of the discipline has been explained, then the secondary argument of the thesis should be clearer, the argument that a concept such as "religious response" is better suited than "religious experience" in its traditional focus for describing and approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man.
CHAPTER II

THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS--PART ONE

A. Introduction

The whole of the discussion in the first chapter regarding the inadequacies of the concept of "religious experience" for the emerging psychology of religion to describe the religious behavior and expression of modern man, and the proposal of the concept of "religious response" as more suitable for that role, is a secondary concern of the thesis. That discussion was intended to illustrate the need for a new understanding regarding the nature and role of psychology of religion and to prepare the way for the major argument of the thesis--to be developed in this and the next two chapters--that the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin can be read as an important contribution to a renewal of psychology of religion, to the new understanding that is being called for regarding the nature and role of the discipline. Thus, the second and third chapters of the thesis will examine in detail the evolutionary synthesis of Teilhard in the light of the need expressed in the first chapter for a renewal of the discipline in a new focus.
THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS--PART ONE

It was argued in the first chapter that the inadequacies of the concept of "religious experience," and indeed the general decline of the discipline of psychology of religion, are rooted in a shift within the discipline away from its traditional focus and that there is a need for a new focus. But while the contemporary pole of the shift in focus being called for in psychology of religion calls for a renewal in the discipline and, by consequence, calls for a unitive and synthesized interpretation of reality in which the developmental and evolutionary character of man's total experience and expression is recognized, the call for such renewal and for such interpretation of reality is more fully validated by the theological-anthropological base of the type of evolutionary synthesis as provided by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. It is intended to show in these two chapters that the Teilhardian synthesis can be read as a major contribution to the process of renewal of psychology of religion since it validates the terms of reference involved in that renewal—that religious behavior and phenomena today must be seen in a broader context than was possible in the traditional focus of the discipline of psychology of religion.
THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS--PART ONE

As the Teilhardian synthesis is developed in these two chapters, the relevancy of the synthesis to the renewal of psychology of religion should become progressively clearer; it should also become progressively clearer how the concept of "religious response" might remove some of the inadequacies of the concept of "religious experience," in its traditional usage, for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man.

The present chapter will begin with what is being called in this thesis the foundations of the Teilhardian synthesis. The synthesis, as presented, in the present chapter and the following chapter (chapter three), has four major theories. The first of these—the theory of the process of evolution—has three theories within it and all of these, it will be argued, constitute the foundations of the Teilhardian synthesis. Chapter three will examine the other three major theories of the synthesis, the theories that constitute what is being called in this thesis the dynamics of the synthesis. Each of Teilhard's theories will be examined for its contents and then for the role it plays in the overall synthesis, whether as foundations, in the case of the
first major theory, or—as dynamics in the case of the three other major theories. In chapter four, an attempt will be made to assess the contribution the four theories of the synthesis can make to the process of renewal in psychology of religion.

Before proceeding with a study of the Teilhardian synthesis, a few remarks are in order regarding Teilhard's methodology in his study of man and evolution. Because his concerns were so extensive, his methodology escapes easy description; in fact, he has been proclaimed, at different times, as a philosopher, a poet, a mystic, a theologian, a scientist, a visionary. The truth of the matter is that he cannot be identified by any one label to the exclusion of all others.

Teilhard himself insisted that he was "neither a philosopher, nor, a theologian, but a student of the 'phenomenon', a physicist in the ancient Greek sense;" he called his methodology a 'phenomenology.' Certainly he saw himself as a scientist. He was concerned with the whole phenomenon of man and for him such a project should be approachable from within the boundaries of science,


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whereas for others certain aspects of the project are the proper concerns of philosophy.

I am to my very narrow sensitive to the real, to what is factually so. My concern is to discover the conditions for such progress as is open to us and not, starting from first principles, some theoretical development of the universe. This bias means that I'll always be a philistine to the professional philosophers; but I feel that my strength lies in the fidelity with which I obey it... Others can bring me into line with the principles if they can.

\[\text{4 de Lubac, The Religion of Teilhard, p. 100}\]

We also see Teilhard's insistence that he is not dealing with metaphysics, in his theory of complexity/consciousness and, before that, his theory of creative union. See pp. 139, 174 of this thesis. In a letter to Claude Cuenot, dated 29 April, 1934, Teilhard explained his distrust of metaphysics, "It strikes me, at the moment, that there are two kinds of knowledge: an abstract, geometric, extradurational, pseudo-absolute knowledge (the world of ideas and of principles) and this kind I mistrust, instinctively— and a "real" knowledge, which consists in the conscious actuation (that is, in the extended creation) of the universe around us. The first of these two kinds of knowledge changes neither the world nor the knowing subject. The second coincides with both a perfecting of the world and an ontological growth in the knowing subject (this is especially the case with mystical knowledge).... I mistrust metaphysics (in the customary sense of the term) because I feel it is a sort of geometry. But I am ready to recognize another kind of metaphysics, which would really be a hyper-physics—or a hyper-biology." Claude Cuenot, Teilhard de Chardin, A Biographical Study, Baltimore, Helicon Press, c. 1965, 1958, p. 213.
While there are a number of commentators on Teilhard's methodology, it is unlikely that a consensus of opinion could be reached. What is to be noted is that Teilhard's synthesis, as he constructed it, was a commitment, responding to his particular perception of reality; it was a commitment to break down the generally perceived dichotomy of matter and spirit, and to construct a scientifically valid (as far as science could go) schema of evolving man in an evolving world.

In the final analysis, the assessment as to whether Teilhard's synthesis succeeds in constructing such a scientifically valid schema will depend on the view of science that is held in that assessment. A narrowly perceived science, positivist in character, such as that reflected in the behavioristic school of psychology, for example, would likely assess Teilhard's synthesis as a failure. A

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post-positivist and more open-ended science, such as that implied in the humanistic school of psychology, for example, would likely lead to an assessment of Teilhard's synthesis as at least viable. In any case, regardless of whether Teilhard's synthesis succeeds in constructing a scientifically valid schema, its importance for the present thesis project will be in the manner in which it contributes to the process of renewal in psychology of religion, the kind of renewal that is called for in the first chapter.


I believe that the universe is an evolution
I believe that evolution proceeds towards spirit
I believe that spirit is fully realized in a form of personality
I believe that the supremely personal is the universal Christ.6

The above credo begins an essay written by Teilhard de Chardin entitled, "How I believe," and dated October 28, 1934. The essay was written in response to a request by

one of Teilhard's friends, Monsignor Bruno de Solages, for a statement of his fundamental beliefs and how he came to them. 7

The detailed study of the Teilhardian synthesis will proceed by examining its principal elements. Using the above credo as an outline, the various theories and principles of the Teilhardian view of the whole phenomenon which is man will be studied, that is to say, man, his nature, his milieu. The objective will be to show how, in the Teilhardian synthesis, the whole of existence, with man as its principal, evolved expression, is a sacred reality; nothing is profane, to paraphrase Teilhard. 8 It should now be possible to assemble the elements of the Teilhardian synthesis and thereafter attempt to show that the synthesis adequately encompasses


Pruyser's new question—which data of experience are of religious significance. If successful, it should also be possible to show, by consequence, that the concept of "religious response," within a renewed psychology of religion, would be more suitable than the concept of "religious experience" for approaching Pruysers's new question.

The study of the Teilhardian synthesis shall be divided into four major sections corresponding to the four levels of Teilhard's credo quoted above; a) the process of evolution, b) the primacy of spirit and the theory of Creative Union, c) the theory of personalization, and d) the theory of Christogenesis. The study of the four major sections will proceed in the following manner. The first major section—the process of evolution—and the three theories within it, will occupy the remainder of this second chapter and represents what is being called the foundations of the synthesis. The other three major sections will be developed in the third chapter and represent what is being called the dynamics of the synthesis.

At the end of each major section an attempt will be made to interpret the significance of the particular section to the whole of the synthesis. Then, in chapter four, when the development of the major sections has been
completed, an attempt will be made to show the signifi-
cance of the whole of the synthesis for the renewal of
psychology of religion.

1) The Process of Evolution

It is not exactly clear when Teilhard embraced the
notion of evolution. On the one hand, we know his fas-
cination, from the time he was a child, with matter and
durability \(^9\) and that this fascination was rooted in a
need for the absolute; \(^10\) we might well expect that this
interest (which amounted, for Teilhard, to a vague but
persistent belief in a fundamental cosmic unity), along
with his increasing experience and study of archaeology
and paleontology, would stimulate his mind to think along
evolutionary lines. But on the other hand, Teilhard was
given a traditional training by his religious order; while
he had a burgeoning interest in science, he was finding
meaning in his classical studies and, indeed, for a time

\(^9\) This is recorded, for example, in Cuenot's
biography, Teilhard de Chardin, A Biographical Sketch,
p. 3.

\(^10\) "It was because Teilhard as a child had expressed
his obscure need for the absolute in his appetite for the
solid, the everlasting, the changeless, that he loved the
rocks and the crystals that seemed to defy time and to mock
he wondered which direction he should follow in his deeper studies;

Theology makes one think of many things, and I am beginning to see that there are so many other questions, less agreeable, perhaps, but more vital than the sciences, that I wonder whether I shall not leave science aside some day or other--unless I am told to stick to it--which is very possible.\footnote{From a letter to his parents, dated April 23, 1910. Quoted in Speaight, Teilhard de Chardin, A Biography, p. 38.}

But, as Mary and Ellen Lukas point out, there was some confusion in the period of Teilhard's priestly formation, such as the expulsion of the Jesuits from France to Jersey,\footnote{Mary and Ellen Lukas, Teilhard: The Man, the Priest, the Scientist, New York, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1977, p.27} and as a result Teilhard did not undergo a strict training in the Cartesian dichotomies of Aristotelianism;\footnote{Ibid., p. 31} he preserved a thirst for the absolute.

After his studies in Jersey, Teilhard spent the next three years--1905 to 1908--as a reader in chemistry and physics at the Jesuit College in Cairo. While in Egypt he took every occasion to go off into the desert looking for shells of fossilized bones which he would turn over to the Cairo Museum.\footnote{Ibid., p. 32} These years in Cairo seem to
have been a happy time, as his letters home suggest, but there is nothing to indicate, as Speaight points out, "the originality of genius or, still less, the stirrings of revolt... or any reaching out towards a larger synthesis of science and revealed truth. If Teilhard thought about these things he does not say so." 15

This, in spite of the fact that England had for some time been in the thick of discussion over Charles Darwin's theories. Teilhard seems to have been untouched by this discussion, either in his years of philosophy study in Jersey, or his years in Cairo, or in most of his four years of theological studies at Ore Place near Hastings. Charles Raven explains how this could have happened:

The fact is that between French and English philosophy at that time and until Bergson there was not any close contact... the cleavage between the Christian tradition and the new knowledge which characterized the whole civilization of the nineteenth century, took the form in France of a fierce intellectual and theological struggle between Catholic dogma and the critical study of Scripture and the Creeds. In this area it reached its crisis for Churchmen in the condemnation of Alfred Loisy's books in 1903. In England the battleground was over Darwin between science and religion and this had not then spread far across the Channel among Catholics. 16

15 Speaight, Teilhard de Chardin, pp. 32-33.

Consequently, Teilhard "was apparently unaware of the controversies over Darwin, or indeed of the whole subject of evolution until he was close on thirty." 17

From 1908 to 1923 Teilhard underwent important influences that were to stimulate his creative genius, a period in which he became a convinced evolutionist and in which he expressed in germinal form many of the major ideas he has become known for; those influences were the philosophies of Henri Bergson and Maurice Blondel, and the First World War.

While Teilhard was at Ore Place, he increased the depth and pace of his paleontological studies and the seed of evolutionary thinking began to take hold; "the quest for fossils and the observation of natural phenomena had, step by step, convinced Teilhard that the world was in evolution." 18 One of his teachers during this period was Edouard Le Roy (1870-1954), with whom he apparently discussed and developed his ideas on evolution. In his last book, Le Roy quotes three times from Teilhard's first


18 Speaight, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 45. See also Raven, Teilhard de Chardin, Scientist and Seer, p. 37.
published essay on evolution, "Comment se pose aujourd'hui la question de transformisme," and gives other indications of collaboration between the two men on the subject of evolution.

A most important consequence of the association between Le Roy and Teilhard was that the former introduced the latter to the writings of Henri Bergson, the philosopher of evolution, and the effect upon him was revolutionary. As Barthelemy-Madaule points out, Bergson was one of the first to argue for the spiritual dimension of biological evolution and against positivist and mechanist philosophies.

Bergson eût le mérite de dégager, parmi les premiers, la signification spirituelle de l'évolution biologique, de la maîtrise de l'homme sur la nature par la science et la technique, du progrès social enfin. C'est par là qu'il a conquis les applaudissements des auditoires avides de sortir des horizons positivistes et mécanistes; spiritualiste, il avait contre lui des disciples de Marx. Parti d'une critique de l'évolutionnisme mécaniste, il a trouvé son appui et son terrain d'élection dans la psychologie de la durée. Toute sa perspective peut être dite à bon droit métapsychologique.

19 Raven, Teilhard de Chardin, Scientist and Seer, p. 35. In France, "transformisme" was the term that corresponded with "evolution" (Raven, p. 33).

20 Ibid., p. 37.

These were very much the intentions and the orientation of Teilhard as well.

While there will be occasion, in describing the Teilhardian synthesis, to compare Teilhard's concepts with those of Bergson, a few general similarities and differences can be pointed out here. One point of similarity was an emphasis in both thinkers on process. Bergson had a metaphysics "which took account of all experience in the light of evolution; meaning that all experience was interpreted, not in terms of a static mechanics, but as process," while Teilhard had a phenomenology— a "process metaphysics," as Ian Barbour has called it— founded on the whole phenomenon of man, an approach that parallels Bergson in its focus on the developmental. Bergson sought a new philosophy, Teilhard sought a new synthesis; in so doing, both men contributed to an alternate manner of seeing reality.

In his years of reflection, Bergson elaborated a speculative endeavor along two convergent lines: one to liberate the human zoological group from a purely materialistic valuation, and the other

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to free the study of cosmic history from a radical rationalism. The first stumbling block to be cleared away, therefore, was concerned with method: revealing the limitations of the traditionally rationalistic Cartesian one and working out an alternate method of philosophizing which remade the positivistic environment of his day.\textsuperscript{24}

On the other hand, Teilhard constructed a synthesis, on what he insisted was a scientific basis, in which matter and spirit were seen as two dimensions of one reality. As H. Gouhier has pointed out, Bergson and Teilhard were similar in that both men believed in the fundamental unity of the world and the energy behind it.\textsuperscript{25}

But while both men sought an alternate manner of seeing reality, their approaches were different. For Bergson, the operation of intelligence and its crystallization into science should not be relied on without the compliment of what he called "intuition."\textsuperscript{26}

By intuition, Bergson means a penetrating perceptiveness which helps bring man to the heart of reality. . . . Intuition is a sort of intellectual sympathy which places man within something and enables him to grasp its very being. It is because reality is a process of constant creation which never has the same

\textsuperscript{24} Biondi, "Teilhard and Bergson," p. 82.


\textsuperscript{26} Biondi, "Teilhard and Bergson," p. 83.
appearance twice, but in every instant is assuming an original aspect that intellect must necessarily fail in giving absolute knowledge.\textsuperscript{27}

Teilhard's approach was rather to seek a "more scientific vision of the total cosmic reality--a wide-screen view of cosmic history."\textsuperscript{28}

But the most important difference between the two men is the manner in which they see evolution. Whereas

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 84. Rideau describes this difference between Bergson and Teilhard in the following manner: For Bergson, "the grasping of being in its truth is operated integrally by a double direct intuition, involving 'torsion' and 'reversal,' starting from abstract knowledge: intuition of the underlying ego (cf. Time and Free-will) and intuition of the underlying movement of objective reality (cf. Creative Evolution). Intuition which is 'philosophy' itself, concrete knowledge of being. Teilhard entirely rejects this approach. Although he is no less eager for concrete possession of the real, he believes that it can be obtained only at the term of a dialectical progress, that goes through all the existential stages or moments of values: science, philosophy, art, social life, moral and religious life, theology, mysticism. And this, not only in the activity of the person, but in that of all mankind in its collective history. Short of the term (individual and social) there is nothing that is not at the same time necessary and abstract, and therefore insufficient: nothing is robbed of value but everything is integrated and gathered up again" (Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 342). In Madelaine Barthelemy-Madaule's view, the difference between the two men was that Bergson attempted to reconstruct a synthesis that had been damaged by the philosophy of Kant, whereas Teilhard was seeking a new synthesis altogether. (Barthelemy-Madaule, Bergson et Teilhard de Chardin, p. 637).
Bergson sees evolution as a process of divergence, Teilhard sees it as a process of convergence:

Whereas for Bergson, evolution is driven and left open-ended, for Teilhard the most important source of propulsion is generally conceived as a goal, already existing, and thereby capable of causation. Teilhard learned much from Bergson, but he added what he believed to be a corrective, namely the notion of universal convergence. Bergson's is an evolution of divergence. It is imagined radiating from a center, and its best images, therefore, are explosion, bursting, multiplication. Evolution by convergence is Teilhard's vision. This scheme sees evolution starting from an almost infinitely distended sphere and converging on a center. Its images are totalization, unification, and synthesis. 29

The differences between an evolution of divergence and an evolution of convergence should become clearer when examining the other elements of the Teilhardian synthesis.

As Barthélemy-Madaule points out, there is a difference in the orientation of the two men:

Bergson est philosophe de métier; it est orienté vers le psychologique; nous savons qu'il récuse la synthèse. Il mène des analyses successives pour lesquelles il réunit soigneusement les documents; il fait enquête chez les savants . . . . Teilhard est savant de métier et tourné vers ce qui le dépasse, transcendant ou cosmique, beaucoup plus que vers le psychologique. Sa méthode est la synthèse. 30

29 Biondi, "Teilhard and Bergson," p. 84.
30 Barthélemy-Madaule, Bergson et Teilhard, pp. 637-638.
As a consequence of this difference in orientation, the two men also differ in their response to the whole of reality.

Bergson et Teilhard croient l'un et l'autre que l'Être est inachevé. Mais Bergson pense que cet inachèvement interdit de saisir en lui l'unité. Teilhard pense qu'un tout inachevé peut être saisi et construit totalement, à condition que la synthèse soit une hypothèse provisoire, et sans cesse remaniée. 31

But, nevertheless, despite these differences—differences that Teilhard was quite aware of, it seems—it was Bergson's Creative Evolution, which he read in 1908, that awoke Teilhard from a "fixist slumber" and that reinforced for him the notion of a world evolving in the direction of spirit. 32

Bergson, then, was one major influence upon Teilhard in the period from 1908 to 1923. The next major influence was the experience of the First World War. Teilhard was called to active service in December of 1914. 33 He quickly

31 Ibid., p. 639.

32 Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 25. On p. 294, Rideau notes Cuenot's observation that Bergson was a "catalyst" for Teilhard.

33 Speaight, Teilhard de Chardin, "In November [1914] he was declared 'good for service' and a month later, attached to the 13th section of medical orderlies, he reported for duty at Clermont-Ferrand," p. 55.
proved himself, as a stretcher-bearer, to be an exemplary and brave soldier. Claude Cuenot has recorded what Teilhard's medical major wrote of him,

Two features of his personality struck you immediately: courage and humility. ... He knew just what to say and to do in order to revive the morale of the troops at the right moment. ... In the trenches—and this showed his simplicity—he lived like the rest of the troops, and so did the officers for the matter of that. But in the rear, or just behind the front line, he insisted on carrying his knapsack. Often I heard him refuse my offer to relieve him of it, and put it in a little car. "Like the others" he replied without a moment's hesitation.34

In September of 1916, he received an army citation for having been

a model of boldness, self-abnegation and self-control. From the 15th to the 19th August he directed the teams of stretcher-bearers on the ground shaken by artillery and spattered by machine guns. On the 18th August he went to within 20 yards of the enemy lines in search of an officer who had been killed, and brought him back to the trenches.35

On 29 August 1916, he also was cited in divisional orders.

He received the Croix de Guerre on 1 September 1915, the Médaille Militaire on 24 June 1917, and, on 16 June 1920, upon the recommendation of his former regiment, was made

34 Ibid., p. 59.
Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. Teilhard's experience during the war had the effect of maturing him. Prior to the war he was still unsure of himself. Although he already had a reputation as a budding paleontologist and although he had some basic inclinations towards evolution as a theory, he had not grown much beyond the ideas he had at Hastings. He was in need of an experience to stir his thoughts anew, something to help him put it all together. The war provided that experience, as de Lubac points out,

At the front, in the shadow of death, far from the conventions of ordinary life, in the solitude of night watches, or, during intervals of rest a little behind the lines, he thought and prayed, and, looking ahead into the future, he made the offering of himself. The presence of God possessed him.

Life in the trenches acted as a catalyst for Teilhard's creative mind; in the period of the war he

36 Cuenot, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 25.
38 Lukas, Teilhard, p. 46.
39 de Lubac, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 19.
40 Cuenot, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 36.
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wrote some 20 essays which contain, in germinal form all of the major ideas he developed in later writings. Some years later, in a letter to his cousin Marguerite written from New York in 1952, Teilhard would state that "My war papers may be interesting psychologically for studying the ontogenesis of an idea, but there is nothing in them that I have not expressed more clearly at a later date." Yet he has called this period his "intellectual honeymoon." In a letter to his life-long friend and fellow Jesuit, Victor Fontoymont, dated 26 July, 1917, he spoke of his war-time experiences as analogous to a long retreat; "... these thirty months of solitary thinking, in an atmosphere of great events, has formed me, I think, in the way a long retreat does. I am becoming at the same time very realist and very mystical."  

41 These essays were published as Ecrits du Temps de la Guerre, Paris, B. Grasset, 1965. Speaight, in his biography, Teilhard de Chardin, erroneously states, on p. 75, that Teilhard wrote 13 essays during this period; he was going by the English translation, (Writings in Time of War, London, Collins, 1968, 315pp.) which only has 13 of the essays.


43 Speaight, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 75.

44 de Lubac, The Religion of Teilhard, p. 289.
Teilhard's cousin, Marguerite, in her introduction to *The Making of a Mind*, observes the manner in which Teilhard responded to the war and the effects the war had upon him.

Pierre Teilhard did more than live the war. He reflected upon it with a sharp awareness of its different aspects, of what he used to call its "dimension". . . . Pere Teilhard well knew, from his own experience, that it was here that man sometimes reached a peak of his own being and felt that there was a tremendous grandeur and significance in his actions. . . . In [the war] he saw a crisis of evolution which had to be gone through. Civilized nations, at grips with one another in a merciless struggle, were moving against the great life-current, which he already saw as an irresistible progress towards unification of the human race. 45

Teilhard himself, in his essay, "La Nostalgie du Front," one of the essays omitted in the English version of *Ecrits du Temps de la Guerre*, analyzes the particular fascination

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45 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Making of a Mind*, pp. 28-9. In "The Heart of Matter," written in 1950, Teilhard describes how the experience of the war helped remove dualities from his thought: "The atmosphere of "the Front": it was, I am quite sure, from having plunged into that atmosphere—from having been soaked in it for months on end—and precisely where it was at its most dense and heavily charged, that I ceased to notice any break (if not any difference) between "physical" and "moral" between "natural" and "artificial." The "Human-million," with its psychic temperature and its internal energy, became for me a magnitude as evolutively, and therefore, as biologically, real as a giant molecule of protein." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Heart of Matter," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Heart of Matter*, London, Collins, c. 1978, p. 31.
the war had for him; it seemed to arise from a passion for the new and the unknown;

Le "moi" énigmatique et importun qui aime obstinément le Front, je le reconnais; c'est le "moi" de l'aventure et de la recherche, celui qui veut toujours aller aux extrêmes limites du monde, pour avoir des visions neuves et rares, et pour dire qu'il est "en avant." 46

The First World War was, for Teilhard, a liberating experience; 47 the inescapable paradox was that to go to the front lines of battle was to advance the cause of peace. 48

46 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Ecrits du Temps de la Guerre, p. 231. In a footnote to this passage, the editor notes that the idea here expressed was developed further in the essay, "L'Energie Humaine." The English version of the essay, "Human Energy," appears in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, London, Collins, 1969. The passage alluded to reads as follows: "At present the majority of men do not yet understand force (the key and symbol of greater-being) except in its most primitive and savage form of war. This is perhaps why it is necessary for us to continue for some time still to manufacture even greater and more destructive weapons. For we still, alas, need these machines to translate the vital sense of attack and victory into concrete experience. But may the moment come (and it will come) when the masses realize that the true human victories are those over the mysteries of matter and life. May the moment come when the man in the street understands that there is more poetry in a mighty machine for splitting the atom than in any artillery. A decisive hour will strike for man, when the spirit of discovery absorbs the whole vital force contained in the spirit of war." pp. 135-6


48 Ibid., p. 234.
The war, then, was a second major influence upon Teilhard and the development of his thought. A third major influence, in the period from 1908 to 1923, was the philosophy of Maurice Blondel. It was one of Teilhard's lifelong friends, and a chosen confidant, Auguste Valensin, who introduced him to the thought of Blondel. Valensin had been a student of Blondel and was now a close friend. In 1919, with Teilhard's agreement, he sent a few of Teilhard's writings to Blondel for the latter's comments. What followed was an exchange of several letters between the two men, with Valensin as the intermediary. 

Bergson and the war had influenced Teilhard in his thinking on evolution; Blondel, on the other hand, by participating

49 The exchange of letters, with an introduction by Henri de Lubac, appeared as "Maurice Blondel et le Père Teilhard de Chardin, Mémoires échange en décembre 1919," in Archives de Philosophie, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1961, pp. 123-156. The exchange, with notes and commentary by Henri de Lubac, was later published as Blondel et Teilhard de Chardin, Correspondence Commentée par Henri de Lubac, Paris, Beauchesne, c. 1965. This latter work appeared in English as, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin--Maurice Blondel, Correspondence, With Notes and Commentary by Henri de Lubac, tr. W. Whiteman, New York, Herder & Herder, c. 1967, 174pp. Henri de Lubac points out that besides the essays which produced this correspondence in 1919, Blondel saw two more of Teilhard's essays—the second version of "Mon Univers" and "Pantheisme et Christianisme"—in 1925, and responded in a fashion similar to his comments in 1919. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin--Maurice Blondel, Correspondence, p. 13.
In this exchange with Teilhard, contributed to a clarification of the latter's thoughts on the subject of the Christian's appropriate response to the world—an area which is the particular concern of the fourth section of the Teilhardian synthesis, the theory of Christogenesis. Or, as Christopher Mooney has said, in commenting on the correspondence between the two men,

In the case of Teilhard these letters represent one of his earliest attempts to clarify in his own mind the relationship between Christ and the universe and the immediate implications of such a relationship in the Christian's life.50

In a short essay commenting on the underlying purpose of Teilhard's works,51 Henri de Lubac, commenting on the letters between Teilhard and Blondel, makes the following observation;

In their way they anticipate the scientific syntheses which were to blossom one after the other in the years between the wars, and they

50 Christopher Mooney, "Blondel and Teilhard de Chardin, An Exchange of Letters," in Thought, Vol. 37, No. 147, p. 545. That the letters were a clarification for Teilhard is also the opinion of de Lubac. He feels "their main contribution lies in what they have done to make the Teilhardian thought-system clear, rather than any sort of change they might have produced in Teilhard's] initial orientation." de Lubac, Teilhard de Chardin-Maurice Blondel, Correspondence, p. 13.

already contain the substance of *The Divine Milieu* and other apologetical or spiritual writings. Often lyrical, sometimes close to secrecy, lacking in neither dialectic rigor nor conceptual precision, they are a true reflection of the source and the initial buildings of his thought.  

Blondel's first major work, *L'action*, quickly gained acclaim as an important contribution to Catholic philosophy and philosophy as a whole. It was an attempt to break away from a static perception of—and consequently, a static response to—life. For Blondel, action was the very basis of existence:

There is nothing in the properly subjective life which is not act. That which is properly subjective is not only that which is conscious and known from within (every phenomenon, if correctly understood, is that); it is that which causes the fact of consciousness to be; it is the internal and ever-singular act of thinking. . . . One cannot penetrate that living reality except by

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54 "It's range of vision and scope of contents, its penetrating insight and analysis, its originality of approach to subjects of universal importance, and its skill in developing fresh arguments to expound psychological, moral, intellectual and religious problems gave it immediate recognition, and fixed its author's work." Charles E. Raven, *Teilhard de Chardin, Scientist and Seer*, pp. 40-41.

placing oneself, not in the static point of view of the understanding, but at the dynamic point of view of the will. One must try not to imagine action, because it is action itself which creates the symbols and the world of the imagination. This manner of perceiving reality was very agreeable to Teilhard and was a source of encouragement to his own thinking. Blondel's concept of action seemed to correspond with Teilhard's understanding of the biological forces of evolution. In a letter (15 February, 1955) to Claude Cuenot, written shortly before he died, he wrote of Blondel's influence:

With Blondel I had been in touch (through Auguste Valensin) for about a year (soon after World War I, around 1920). Certain features of his thought had certainly had their effect on me: the value of action (which became for me a quasi-experimental energetics of the biological forces of evolution), and the notion of pan-Christhood (at which I had arrived independently, without daring at the time, to name it so appropriately). Blondel, then, was the third major influence upon Teilhard and his thought. Each of these influences was to have a


57 As quoted in Raven, Teilhard de Chardin, Scientist and Seer, p. 44.

58 Claude Cuenot, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 39.
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bearing on the development of his theory of evolution. The study of the components of his theory shall begin shortly but it is worthwhile, before doing so, to look at some of Teilhard's remarks regarding the concept of evolution itself and to place that concept in a historical context.

As pointed out earlier, one of Teilhard's earliest essays on the subject of evolution was, "Comment se pose aujourd'hui la question de transformisme." In the few years leading up to the essay, written in 1921, Teilhard had become increasingly convinced, while studying at Ore Place and after reading Bergson's L'Evolution Creatrice, of the fact of evolution. In the essay "Comment se pose . . .," mentioned above, Teilhard makes the observation that the first generation of evolutionists (Lamarck, Darwin, and their disciples) could not "define exactly what was essentially new about their theory, and also what was strictly biological in the unsuspected connections

which they found within nature, and then sets out to make three points:

In relation to the beliefs held by the initiators of the transformist doctrine, our present views of nature reveal a biological evolution (1) much more complicated in its process than was at first thought; (2) but at the same time increasingly certain as a fact; (3) provided that it is understood as a very general relationship of physical dependence and continuity between organized forms. 61

In this important early essay, Teilhard makes a number of significant statements regarding evolution that were to be repeated and reinforced in his later writings. He defined evolution, or transformism, in the following manner:

Reduced to its essence, transformism is not a hypothesis. It is the particular expression, applied to the case of life, of the law which conditions our whole knowledge of the sensible universe; the law that we can understand nothing, in the domain of matter, except as part of a sequence or collection. 62

This sequence or collection gives rise to structure; "From the smallest detail to the hugest concentrations, our living universe (like our material universe) has a structure, and this structure can only be due to a phenomenon of

60 Teilhard de Chardin, The Vision of the Past, p. 7.
61 Ibid., p. 8.
62 Ibid., p. 25.
growth." In this last statement we have an early formulation of what was to become a prominent Teilhardian theme—the volatility, the energy, the momentum, the thrust of existence, even of matter; and this notwithstanding the fact—as Teilhard was aware even now—that the evolutionary sciences (geology and paleontology) observe only "a sequence of maxima in the movements of life and the earth's crust" and that records of the first forms of life are likely lost forever.

In a subsequent essay on the subject of evolution written some five years later (1926), entitled "The Basis and Foundations of the Idea of Evolution," Teilhard clearly defines the options open to us of either accepting or rejecting evolution, and the consequences that follow from the option chosen:

Either you must admit that nothing can enter the realm of experience without being introduced by some precursor, in which case you are entirely an evolutionist. Or else you believe that a thing can appear without being "born," and then

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63 Ibid., p. 20.

64 Ibid., p. 17.

you are starting an impossible battle with the very structure of the perceptual world. Transposed now into the realm of action, the same dilemma takes another less evident but perhaps more decisive form: Either you regard the world as a collection of physically linked beings, travelling by way of growth as a whole towards an organic consummation; and then, once more you are in your heart an evolutionist. Or else you see in the universe nothing but a system of moral and juridical relationships by which contiguous beings are associated; and then you have lost all rightful means of restraining the advance of egoistic and agnostic individualism which threatens to dissolve and sweep away the thinking zone of the earth.\footnote{66}

In the same essay Teilhard takes issue with those who feel that by attacking evolution (transformism) they are defending virtue and religion; he disagrees with the notion that the theory of evolution places "a doctrine of egoism and brutality above the virtues of goodness and altruism."\footnote{67} Such views he feels are founded on a misunderstanding of the relationship between spirit and matter. When this relationship is properly understood, the theory of transformism is seen as spiritual and moral in character rather than materialistic and atheistic.


\footnote{67} Teilhard de Chardin, \textit{The Vision of the Past}, p. 132.
Spirit and matter, commonly regarded as two opposing universes associated for no comprehensible reason, are simply two poles joined by a flux, through which the elements, however ontologically different we suppose them to be, are so governed that they can appear only in one zone; that is to say in a determined order ... everything is related to the highest; everything becomes, if not spirit, at least distant preparation, spiritualized "matter." 68

Teilhard's understanding of the relationship between matter and spirit will be examined in some detail in the second subsection—the primacy of spirit. For our purposes here, we need only note that for Teilhard, what validated the theory of transformism was its incorporation of spirit; without spirit the theory was found to become fixated on the manifestation of the material.

Before beginning the examination of the specific elements of Teilhard's overall theory of evolution, it is worthwhile to place that theory in a historical context. The idea that the world is developing is, contrary to popular belief, actually an old idea, going as far back

68 Ibid., pp. 133-4. Teilhard's thought did not always have this unitive tendency. As Emile Rideau points out, "Some passages in Teilhard (dating, it is true, from the formative period of his thought) have, nevertheless, a somewhat dualist and Platonic tone. This is particularly marked in the Hymn to Matter: 'Blessed be you, impenetrable matter: you who, interposed between our minds and the world of essences, cause us to languish with the desire to pierce through the seamless veil of phenomena' ("The spiritual power of matter," 1919, in Hymn of the Universe, p. 69)." Emile Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, A Guide to His Thought, p. 406.
as the Greeks. 69 As Bernard Delfgaauw points out, after the emergence of natural science (in which the methods of mathematics and experimentation are brought together), and after Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859), "the question is no longer as to whether evolution has taken place, but only as to how it has done so." 70 Only some fifty years before Darwin's book was published, there appeared another classic work on evolution, Lamarck's *Philosophie Zoologique*; while Darwin's work was hugely successful, Lamarck's work went largely unnoticed. The reason, in Delfgaauw's opinion, is to be found in a shift in mentality: "This suggests that between 1809 and 1859 a shift occurred in man's way of envisaging himself, life and the inanimate world. The static conception of man and the cosmos was gradually superseded by a dynamic view." 71 Teilhard's theory of evolution, then, emerged on the foundation of about a


century and a half of scientific development. 72

Although the scientific groundwork had been laid
for Teilhard to express his theory, his theory did not
meet with much receptivity within the Catholic Church.
As Delfgaauw explains, there are reasons for this:

On the one hand the idea of progress was
employed as far back as the eighteenth century
as a weapon against Christianity and the Church,
which were alleged to represent an outmoded
stage in mankind's development, and on the other
the theory of biological evolution was seized
upon by a lot of people in order to propagate
a materialistic atheism. 73

But the breach between Teilhard and the Church--one which
he always tried to bridge--on evolution was also created
by some biologists who propagated a view of the origins
of existence favoured by the Church but argued against by

Teilhard. This is the view known as creationism.

Creationism, which wants to attribute every new
form of life to a distinct act of creation,
concentrates now on two points: 1) the living
can never originate from the non-living--as
Pasteur, among others, clearly demonstrated
with his experiments concerning spontaneous
generation; 2) man can never originate from
animal, because with man, with man's free con-
sciousness, something essentially different
enters upon the scene. 74

72 Ibid., p. 58.
73 Ibid., p. 59.
74 Ibid., p. 28.
Teilhard's theory of evolution counters the argument of creationism and, as Delfgaauw has outlined it, the theory contains four basic propositions:

1) The cosmos under all its aspects, including man, is to be understood only as a continuous process of evolution, in which each phase has its distinctive period.

2) Matter is in principle conscious matter; but it requires a high degree of organization to enable it to cross the threshold beyond which it can begin to manifest itself as consciousness.

3) In matter a dual energy is operative: a tangential energy informing and controlling matter in its normal physico-chemical reactions—and a radial energy by which matter is constituted as progressively higher forms of unity.

4) There is a parallelism between complexity and interiority (consciousness).

The first proposition in Delfgaauw's outline—that the cosmos is in a continuous evolution—is implicit in the three other propositions, indeed throughout the analysis of the synthesis, and thus will not be given detailed attention here. The second, third and fourth propositions, however, will now be examined under the following respective headings: a) the theory of the "within" and "without," b) the theory of radial and tangential

75 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
energy, and c) the theory of complexity-consciousness. (These are the three theories, alluded to at the beginning of this section, that fall under the first sub-section of the Teilhardian synthesis—the process of evolution—and shall occupy the remainder of this chapter). Before beginning, it should be noted that in many of Teilhard's writings his theories appear together and inter-relatedly. For this analysis, however, treatment of the theories separately is necessary for the sake of clarity. In examining each theory, its relation to the whole synthesis will be considered. In chapter four, the significance of the whole synthesis for the renewal of psychology of religion will be examined.

a) The Theory of the "Within" and "Without"

When Teilhard's methodology is discussed, it is often noted that his methodology is basically a scientific phenomenology, a phenomenology which, as Delfgaauw puts it, "unifies the phenomena that science discloses in a number of different fields;"76 this means that his phenomenology is often criticized by any one science for overstepping the boundaries

76 Ibid., p. 42.
of that particular science. But Teilhard was not disturbed by this kind of criticism; he would only insist that we need to learn "how to see."77

One of the areas in which Teilhard had a unique manner of "seeing" was the nature of matter or the material. As will be shown momentarily, he had developed by 1922 the concept of the "within" and "without" of matter; but it is necessary to look at two of his essays written prior to 1922 in which can be seen the emergence of this concept.

In Teilhard's first major essay, "Cosmic Life,"78 completed on April 24, 1916, he placed an emphasis on the inter-relationship he observed in reality: "My starting point is the fundamental initial fact that each one of us is perforce linked by all the material, organic and psychic strands of his being to all that surrounds him."79 In this essay Teilhard sought to find what constituted the link. He depended heavily on the concept of "ether," a term since abandoned by science,80 but which he described

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77 See, for example, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 35.
80 Ibid., p. 20, editor's note.
as the "prime matter" dispersed through all things and which gave all things their identity. 81 As Teilhard was to do so often in his writings, he was seeking a reply to the obvious evidence of pluralism in existence; he sought inter-connectedness, inter-relation, some common dimensions that would tie together the individual and independent elements of existence. He felt at first that the common dimension was in matter;

When the individualization of organic and conscious monads produces folds in the basic fabric of the cosmos, it does not tear it, any more than does the separation of the atomic centres. Already, through the matter that is common to them, all living beings are but one being. 82

In another essay, written a year and a half later, entitled "Creative Union," 83 he is still speaking of ether but his understanding of the unifying dimension in existence has changed somewhat from "Cosmic Life" and, consequently, we get a refined perception of matter;

At that time I saw beings as held together principally by matter, so that, while fused together in their physical basis, they proceeded to disengage and isolate themselves in their

81 Ibid., p. 21.
82 Ibid., p. 23.
spiritual apexes. I am now looking at it from a diametrically opposite point of view. At a lower level than our souls, there are, no doubt, many interconnexions that we speak of as material. We hold together through the texture of the ether, through the impetus of the vital current, but these vast fundamental links should not be regarded as proceeding from our roots in matter. We should see them as the symptoms of far-reaching pre-spiritual union, effected, before the appearance of thought, by some form of formae cosmicae: these latter being imposed on the Multiple by a breath from on high. The ether, life, and mankind (?) are great ill-defined souls, serving as a preliminary to more perfect forms of concentration. We should say that transience is an effect, not of matter, but of Spirit. What binds the monads together is not, properly speaking, the body, but the soul. 84

At this point in his thinking, Teilhard has located the source of momentum or energy in existence in spirit, rather than in matter as he had done before. While there is a slight suggestion of dualism, he was not dismissing the significance of matter; he simply did not think that matter was capable to accounting, on its own, for the momentum that he observed in reality.

In any case, any suggestion of dualism did not remain with him for very long. In a letter dated Dec. 17,

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84 Ibid., p. 168. The term "transience" in this quote is best described by Teilhard in "Cosmic Life;" It refers to the fact that "material beings, to whatever degree of complexity they have risen . . . exercise a reciprocal influence on one another in proportion to their specific perfection," p. 21. Transience seems to describe the inter-relatedness of elements of existence.
1922, he begins to speak of the momentum in existence as a sort of consciousness and, in dropping the distinctions of matter and spirit, he speaks of this consciousness as an interior dimension to matter:

It is arbitrary in itself, and, as a matter of observation, implausible, to attribute consciousness only to men, and to regard all other beings as deprived of any "within" . . . (without asking whether this notion of purely exterior or "transitive" being is even thinkable) . . . The world cannot exist except upon a basis of thought. 85

These initially vague allusions to an interior dimension of matter are brought to a level of clarity and refinement in The Phenomenon of Man; 86 indeed, so many of Teilhard's major theories follow such an evolution—they have their first stirrings in early essays and finally reach their maturity in The Phenomenon of Man. The second chapter of this classic, "The Within of Things, " 87 begins with the conviction, on the part of Teilhard, that two opposing points of view—that of the materialists and the spiritualists—need to be brought together on a common ground—a revitalized understanding of matter:

85 From a letter to Auguste Valensin, quoted in Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 418.


87 Ibid., p. 58.
I am convinced that the two points of view require to be brought into union, and that they soon will unite in a kind of phenomenology or generalized physics in which the internal aspect of things as well as the external aspect of the world will be taken into account. Otherwise, as it appears to me, it is impossible to cover the totality of the cosmic phenomenon by one coherent explanation such as science must try to construct.88

Proceeding on the principle that when examining phenomena, we need "to discover the universal hidden beneath the exceptional."89 Teilhard reflects upon the phenomenon of consciousness in higher life-forms and is led to the following conclusion;

It is impossible to deny that, deep within ourselves, an "interior" appears at the heart of beings, as it were seen through a rent. This is enough to ensure that, in one degree or another, this "interior" should obtrude itself as existing everywhere in nature from all time. Since the stuff of the universe has an inner aspect at one point of itself, there is necessarily a double aspect to its structure, that is to say, in every region of space and time—in the same way, for instance, as it is granular, co-extensive with their Without, there is a Within to things.90

Teilhard is convinced that there is more to primitive matter than presents itself to the analysis of modern physics. Modern physics observes what he calls the mechanical layer,

88 Ibid., p. 58.
89 Ibid., p. 61. This process, for Teilhard, is synonymous with "seeing," as pointed out several times already.
90 Ibid.
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whereas beneath that there is the "biological" layer which is "necessary to explain the cosmos in succeeding stages;" this "biological" layer, which he identifies as the "within," is also given the names "spontaneity" and "consciousness." In a footnote, Teilhard defines consciousness in the following manner:

Here, and throughout this book, the term "consciousness" is taken in its widest sense to indicate every kind of psychism, from the most rudimentary forms of interior perception imaginable to the human phenomenon of reflective thought. The idea of the "within," as Teilhard describes it a few pages later, is very similar to the above notion of "consciousness," as, indeed, he intends it to be:

The "within" is used here . . . to denote the "psychic" face of that portion of the stuff of the cosmos enclosed from the beginning of time within the narrow scope of the rejuvenated earth.

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91 Ibid., p. 62.

92 Ibid. Teilhard's understanding of consciousness will be examined in his theory of complexity-consciousness.

93 Ibid., p. 78. The following are additional variations on the notion of the "within" as provided by Teilhard in writings subsequent to The Phenomenon of Man:
2. "At every degree of size and complexity, cosmic
The gradual emergence of the concept of the "within" in Teilhard's writings has now been demonstrated, but what, we might ask, prompted the emergence of the concept in his thought in the first place. There appears to be two principal factors in the development of the concept—the influence of Bergson, and the dual strains of Lamarckism and Darwinism in the contemporary debate on evolution that surrounded Teilhard.

Since Bergson's influence on Teilhard has already been seen, it is not necessary to dwell upon it at great length here. It will be recalled that Teilhard read Bergson's *Creative Evolution* in 1908; we must expect that Teilhard, at a time when he was already seeking a synthesis between things physical and things spiritual, would have been in agreement with statements from Bergson such as

particles or grains are not simply, as physics has recognized, centres of universal dynamic radiation: all of them, in addition (rather like man), have and represent a small "within" (however diffuse or even fragmentary it may be . . .), in which is reflected, at a more or less rudimentary stage, a particular representation of the world: in relation to themselves they are psychic centres—and at the same time they are infinitesimal psychic centres of the universe. In other words, consciousness is a universal molecular property; and the molecular state of the world is a manifestation of the pluralized state of some potentiality of universal consciousness." (*Centrology,* Dec. 13, 1944, in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Activation of Energy*, London, Collins, 1970, p. 101).
the following: "Matter cannot be anything but dormant spirit. . . . We must picture to ourselves an initial distension of spirit, a diffusion in time and space, which constitutes materiality."94 While Teilhard was to seek his synthesis on scientific grounds, as opposed to Bergson's philosophical approach,95 Bergson's concept of the dynamism of matter seems to have headed Teilhard in the direction of conceptualizing the notion of the "within."

The concept of the "within" was also born as a response by Teilhard to the theories of evolution existent in his day that had been popularized by Lamarck and Darwin. Basically, Lamarck's theory of evolution states that development follows from an inner need, whereas Darwin's theory states that development occurs according to chance, after the accidental coming together of elements.96

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94 Henri Bergson, in a comment to his master, Ravaissone, as quoted in Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 91.

95 See Barthélemy-Madaule, Bergson et Teilhard, pp. 637-638.

96 J.T. O'Manique, "Teilhard's Lamarckism," in The Teilhard Review, Vol. 1, p. 34. Emile Rideau also describes the differences between Lamarckism and Darwinism, as well as pointing out the limited usefulness of both theories in the light of modern science: "Modern science, using the evidence of genetics, no longer looks, like Lamarck and Darwin, to the hypothesis of exclusive exterior influences, but to the experimental study of the internal structure of living nuclei: pene-
Darwinism is much more widely accepted than Lamarckism among evolutionists, and Teilhard has been criticized for being Lamarckian because of his theory of orthogenesis, or directed evolution. Consequently, he has been dismissed by many evolutionists. As J.T. O'Manique illustrates, George Gaylord Simpson criticized Teilhard on this count:

In his review of The Phenomenon of Man he says that Teilhard called Darwinism evolution by chance and therefore considered the non-chance Lamarckian factors more important, even though he knew that most biologists consider these factors not only unimportant but non-existent.97

trating as far as the molecular level, it attributes the modifications of species to accidental disturbances of the molecule of DNA. Just as moving around the letters of the alphabet produces new words and new meanings, so a permutation of the order of the elements of DNA can produce new bacteria. Readapting, then, the theories of Lamarck or Darwin, all we have to assume is that a modification of environment or selective competition was able formerly to determine and amplify the permutations of the molecule: 'selection favours characteristics that gradually spread to the whole population' and species end by diverging through the progressive accumulation of genetic differences", Emile Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, pp. 96-97.

97 J.T. O'Manique, "Teilhard's Lamarckism," p. 40. As O'Manique points out, Simpson's review, which appeared in Scientific American, in April, 1960, was based on an early edition of the English translation of The Phenomenon of Man, in which the word "psychique" was translated as "physical" and this "distortion of Teilhard's thought apparently had some influence on Simpson's critique." ibid., footnote 2.
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But as W. Henry Kenney suggests, Teilhard really had a different meaning for the word "orthogenesis" and that, indeed, it would have been better if he had avoided the word. In any case he did not have Simpson's understanding of orthogenesis--"a tendency for evolution to continue steadily in the same direction over indefinitely prolonged periods of time regardless of influences directly involved in the interaction of organism and environment," but rather orthogenesis signified for Teilhard "that evolution on the whole is progressive, that there is a direction towards increasing complexification and consciousness."  

Theodosius Dobzhansky, a Russian-born geneticist, considers Teilhard's meaning for orthogenesis--an orientation--as generally acceptable;

Teilhard's assertion that the evolutionary process has a definite orientation must be very carefully examined. Evolutionary changes taking place at any given time are conditioned by the changes which preceded them, and they will condition the changes that take place in the future. This is especially obvious in biological evolution--the evolutionary past of a living species is, as it were, inscribed in its genes. Evolution is not a collection of independent and unrelated happenings; it is a system of interrelated events. Life could not

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99 Ibid., p. 87.
have arisen until cosmic evolution had produced at least one planet capable of supporting life. A being such as man, with a capacity for symbolic thinking and for self-awareness, could not have appeared until biological evolution had generated organisms with highly developed brains. Since certain evolutionary events could have happened only on the foundation of a series of preceding events, the history of the universe may be said to have an "orientation." We may choose to call the evolutionary time that produced man the "privileged axis" of the evolutionary process. 100

Teilhard himself, in The Phenomenon, provides his own defence to the charge that he is too Lamarckian:

In various quarters I shall be accused of showing too Lamarckian a bent in the explanations that follow, of giving an exaggerated influence to the Within in the organic arrangement of bodies. But be pleased to remember that, in the "morphogenetic" action of instinct as here understood, an essential part is left to the Darwinian play of external forces and to chance. It is only really through strokes of chance which are recognized and grasped—that is to say, psychically selected. Properly understood, the "anti-chance"

100 Theodosius Dobzhansky, The Biology of Ultimate Concern, New York, The New American Library, c. 1967, p. 117. As Dobzhansky also points out, orthogenesis, in Teilhard's sense, does not necessarily assume supernatural forces guiding evolution, as finalism does (p. 118). See also Frank Cronin, "Teilhard de Chardin's Centrogenetic Ontology," in The Teilhard Review, Vol. 11, pp. 58-64. Basing himself on Dobzhansky, Cronin notes that "Modern science's dissatisfaction with "orthogenesis" springs from its dissatisfaction with "preformism" and "finalism," rather than from any dissatisfaction with de facto orientation. It is the denial of emergent novelty and the reduction of evolution to the gradual uncovering of predetermined organic configurations ("preformism"), or the supposition as a scientific hypothesis of explanatory forces guiding evolution ("finalism") that science rightly objects to," p. 59.
of the Neo-Lamarckian is not the mere negation of Darwinian chance. On the contrary it appears as its utilisation. There is a functional complementariness between the two factors; we could call it "symbiosis".¹⁰¹

In short, as Kenney puts it, Teilhard generally "tries to steer a course between the Darwinian or chance explanation and the Lamarckian or inner-directedness explanation" for evolution.¹⁰²

In any case, the middle ground which Teilhard chose to follow required that he root, within matter, the origins of orthogenesis as he defined it. As O'Manique explains it,

The novelty produced by . . . chance mutation is, according to Teilhard, psychically selected by an inner urge which finds its source in what he refers to as the within. The within, the source of this necessary activity, is a vital principle, but it is not some mysterious entity in the being apart from its body. It is rather an integral aspect of the material organism. There is no dualism associated with Teilhard's vitalism. The concept of the within may be likened to the true Aristotelian concept of form.¹⁰³


¹⁰³ J.T. O'Manique, "Teilhard's Lamarckism", p. 36. O'Manique, in his book, Energy in Evolution, (London, The Garnstone Press, c. 1969.), elaborates on the restricted sense in which Teilhard's concept of orthogenesis can be said to include a vitalism understood as a separate entity or an outside source of energy. In fact the vitalism inherent in the concept of orthogenesis, as Teilhard uses it, can be identified with the "within" of things which, as O'Manique points out, is consciousness and affinity, pp. 60, 68-90. For a discussion of the
There is little more to be said regarding Teilhard's theory of the "within" and "without" that would not lead directly into its complementary theories of radial and tangential energy, and complexity-consciousness. Before moving on to those theories, it is necessary to note the role of the theory of the "within" and "without" in the whole of the Teilhardian synthesis.

It has been shown how Teilhard, ever since he was a child, had a love both for things physical or material and things spiritual, and how, as a scientist, he saw it as his goal to bring together the materialists and the spiritualists in accordance with his perception of a vitalized phenomena. Consequently, he was drawn to investigate the properties of matter and to seek therein for

Teilhardian understanding of orthogenesis in relation to Aristotelian philosophy, see Frank Cronin, "Teilhard de Chardin's Centrogenetic Ontology", in The Teilhard Review, Vol. 11, pp. 58-64. For a discussion of the comparison between Teilhard's concept of the "within" and the Aristotelian concept of form, see James F. Anderson, "Teilhard's Cosmological Kinship to Aristotle", in New Scholasticism, Vol. 45, pp. 584-589; "I suggest that in Teilhard's cosmo-

lgy "the within of things" plays a role analogous to Aristotle's "nature", which is, primarily, "form"" (p. 584). In addition, Anderson feels that "although Aristotle held that cosmic process is "circular" or "cyclical", his principally dynamistic orientation in "physics" points to such doctrine as Teilhard proposes" (p. 587). On this last point, that the Aristotelian idea of nature can be seen as process, and even identified with evolutionism, Claude Savary takes cautious exception to Anderson's opinion in "About Aristotle and Evolutionism" in New Scholasticism, Vol. 47, pp. 248-252.
any principle of unification that would explain what he called "the struggle in the universe between the unified multiple and the unorganized multitude." He also sought to find a thread of continuity in evolution between pre-life and life. Proceeding from his observation of the phenomenon of consciousness in man and working backwards, he was led to posit the existence of a characteristic to all matter the specific expression of which, in man, was consciousness. This characteristic he called the "within," or "interiority," "spontaneity," or even "consciousness" itself. Rideau explains Teilhard's need for the concept of the "within" in the following manner:

Behind Teilhard's position lies the logical necessity for continuity and connexion between life and its antecedents, but there is an even deeper basis in his fundamental proposition of the correspondence, and even the identity, between unity and spirit. This is a classic metaphysical notion, but Teilhard brings out the full depth of its physical consequence. The mutual affinity of the material elements in the unity of a structure seems to him even to be governed by some sort of aspiration, analogous to love.

Later it will be shown how the phenomenon of love, in the vision of Teilhard, is synonymous with an energy which is

104 Ibid., p. 67.

105 Emile Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 91.
operative, even in its most rudimentary form, in the interiority, the "within," of matter. Teilhard explains the function of the concept of the "within" in still another manner towards the close of *The Phenomenon of Man*:

To make room for thought in the world, I have needed to "interiorise" matter: to imagine an energetics of the mind, to conceive a noogenesis rising upstream against the flow of entropy; to provide evolution with a direction, a line of advance and critical points; and finally to make all things double back upon *someone*.106

This passage refers to several other concepts of Teilhard as well, all of which shall gain clarity in subsequent sections; what we need to note here is that the concept of the "within" permits Teilhard to account for the emergence of reflection in man as a logical step in evolution, placing it on a continuum with the fundamental characteristic of all matter--the "within."

b) **The Theory of Radial and Tangential Energy**

Teilhard's concept of the "within" is not fully comprehensible in itself; it must be intertwined with his theory of energy. Teilhard's notion of energy seems to have originated as far back as the first stirrings of the

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106 Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man*, p. 318. As will be shown later, this passage can also be used to explain the necessity of the concept of hominization.
concept of the "within." In an early essay entitled, "The Mystical Milieu," Teilhard speaks of the universe as being "ablaze" with an energy that pervades all existence. But his notion of energy here, in its explicit formulations, is identified with the power of God operative through an ongoing and unfinished creation. In another essay written some three months later, "Creative Union," we have a further elaboration of the involvement of God in creation, that is, "God expressed as creative union." Teilhard speaks here of an energy which is extra-cosmic in origin (even though immanent in its term), animating material elements and fusing them together by the influx of a force that is external to them—in which case the centre that unifies the monads is real and transcendent.

Teilhard's more scientific remarks on energy emerge from his awareness of the problem of entropy. This aware-

107 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Writings in Time of War, pp: 115-149.
108 Ibid., p. 129.
109 Ibid., p. 130.
111 Ibid., p. 159.
112 Ibid.
ness is evident in the essay, "Cosmic Life,"¹¹³ written, as noted earlier, in 1916, but a fuller understanding is found in "The Movements of Life,"¹¹⁴ completed in April, 1928. Here, in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, he defines entropy as

the name that physics gives to that apparently inevitable fall by which collections of corpuscles (the scene of all physico-chemical phenomena) slide, by virtue of statistical laws of probability, towards an intermediate state of diffuse agitation, a state in which all exchange of useful energy ceases on our scale of experience.¹¹⁵

Teilhard recognized this to be science's view of matter and the world, but he wondered whether science was seeing the whole picture: "So says science: and I believe in science: but up to now has science ever troubled to look at the world other than from without?"¹¹⁶ If the law of entropy explained the dissipation and deterioration of energy, he

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¹¹³ Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Cosmic Life," in Writings in Time of War, pp. 13-71, "Is matter, first and foremost, as the dissipation of energy and the disintegration of atoms would suggest, what breaks down and sinks back?" (p. 22).


¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 149.

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wished to find an explanation for the sustenance and even the increase of life. In his essay, "The Movements of Life," referred to earlier, he stated it as a future task for science to "synthesize the two apparently opposed phases of entropy and life."

Teilhard addressed himself to the task in The Phenomenon of Man, the book, but also, in an overview fashion, in an essay of the same title, completed in November of 1930. In that essay, "The Phenomenon of Man," he suggests the universe may be more complex than has been imagined;

117 "... life, on the global scale, manifests itself as a current opposed to entropy. ... Opposing the levelling play of entropy, is life, a methodical construction, ceaselessly enlarged, of a building that grows continually more improbable. Protozoa, metazoa, societies of beings, man, humanity, each a mounting defiance against entropy; each an increasingly vast exception to the habitual play of energetics and chance," Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Movements of Life," in The Vision of the Past, p. 149.

118 Ibid., p. 150.

119 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Phenomenon of Man," in The Vision of the Past, pp. 161-174. This essay is to be distinguished not only from the book of the same title, but also from another essay with the same title, completed in September, 1928, and which appears in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Science and Christ, London, Collins, c. 1968, pp. 86-97. In this essay, he refers again to the two currents of entropy and Spirit. Of the latter current (which in this essay he has given a capital "s"), he says, "Side by side with the measurable current of
The whole of its primordial excitation may be divisible into two irreversibles. One by the accumulation and conjunction of confused movements might lead to a progressive neutralization and something like disappearance of activities and freedoms; this is entropy. The other, by directed explorations and growing differentiation, might bring a freedom with no scientifically ascertainable limits (but no doubt in the direction of some new change of state analogous to that marked by the appearance of the phenomenon of man) to the truly progressive portion of the world. On the one side great numbers swallowing up unity; on the other unity born of great numbers. All this may be poetry, let us repeat, but it has the virtue of directing us towards certain exact and practical paths of progress.120

In the book, *The Phenomenon of Man*, he continues the same theme and addresses himself to what he calls the problem of the two energies, the energy of mind and the energy of matter.121 The energy of matter corresponds to the "without" of matter and operates therein, the energy of mind corresponds to the "within" of matter and operates

entropy, or running across it, there is another current, impatient of measurement; it is disguised in the material, comes to the surface of the organic, but is most clearly visible in the human. This is the imponderable current of Spirit," p. 95. Much the same passage could have been used by Teilhard to describe the "within."

120 Ibid., p. 170. In a footnote to this passage Teilhard suggests that, since life has proceeded progressively to the point where, with man, it has become reflective, this should be taken as proof that life is irreversible. An opposite conclusion, he feels, would be absurd.

therein. The two energies operate simultaneously in matter; the problem is that if the second law of thermodynamics is to be upheld, it means that the energy of matter is being gradually used up, even as it contributes to the emergence of the energy of mind, or spiritual energy. As a way out of this problem, Teilhard feels we need to alter the basic premise that the primary energy is that of matter. He proposes, then, the following solution:

We shall assume that, essentially, all energy is psychic in nature; but add that in each particular element this fundamental energy is divided into two distinct components: a tangential energy which links the element with all others of the same order (that is to say, of the same complexity and the same centricity) as itself in the universe; and a radial energy which draws it towards even greater complexity and centricity—in other words forwards. 122

In a footnote to this passage, Teilhard suggests further that there might be two sorts of tangential energy; he states,

Let it be noted in passing that the less an element is "centred" (i.e., the feeblest its radial energy) the more will its tangential energy reveal itself in powerful mechanical effects. Between strongly "centred" particles (i.e., of high radial energy) the tangential seems to become "interiorized" and to disappear from the physicist's view. Probably we have here an auxiliary principle which could help to explain the apparent conservation of energy

122 Ibid., p. 70.
in the universe. . . . We probably ought to recognize two sorts of tangential energy, one of radiation (at its maximum with the lowest radial values, as in the atom), the other of arrangement (only appreciable with the highest radial values, as in living creatures, man in particular). 123

123 Ibid., pp. 70-71. J.T. O'Manique provides some clarifying remarks to Teilhard's understanding of energy in an essay entitled, "Teilhard and Entropy," in The Teilhard Review, Vol. 2, pp. 2-10. "Tangential energy seems to correspond to the physicist's concept of available energy, or free energy as defined by the Gibbs or Helmholtz functions. It is to this form of energy that the second law of thermodynamics applies. Radial energy is the most fundamental capacity for any activity, and as such would be the internal cause of potential and kinetic energy. . . . In accordance with Teilhard's belief in a unity of mechanism and structure throughout the universe, the combination of tangential and radial energy is found, in different ratios, at all levels of development. For example, two molecules of sulphur dioxide will unite with one molecule of oxygen to form two molecules of sulphur trioxide. In Teilhardian terms, sulphur dioxide and oxygen molecules have a certain complexity and also a certain radial energy. Their radial energy is their capacity to unite, to form a more complex unit and thereby develop further. The capacity to unite itself remains constant; the fundamental forces gravitational, electrostatic and nuclear, vary as a function of distance, but not time. The law of entropy, therefore, does not apply to this capacity to unite, that is, to radial energy. The actual union of these molecules, however, takes place in a chemical reaction, and since this is an exothermic reaction (i.e., gives off heat), a definite amount of energy is lost, in accordance with the law of entropy. The reaction, therefore, involves tangential energy, the energy of arrangement. When the reaction is completed, a higher complexity exists, and consequently, a higher degree of radial energy, which gives the new molecules a capacity for further development. For Teilhard, there is a development of radial energy alongside that of complexity. This manifests itself in new affinities and more perfected affinities up to and including the deepest capacities for
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It needs to be seen that if Teilhard accepted the primacy of matter or, in terms of energy, if he placed tangential energy in a primary role rather than secondary, he then

love found in man. There is, therefore, a mutual interdependence between radial and tangential energy: Radial energy causes development, but development requires a new arrangement of elements which in turn requires tangential energy. The resulting more complex being has a new and possibly greater capacity for further development, and so the process continues... Teilhard recognizes and accepts all of this. How, then, can he say that there is anything but ultimate destruction in the future? Here Teilhard's theory of an orthogenetic development towards a final perfected state arrives at a most critical point and Teilhard is well aware of the problem... The first major point in Teilhard's thought on this matter is that the evolutionary development of complexity and consciousness is not merely a sub-effect or backwash of the total process toward's greater entropy. As stated above, from the point of view of thermodynamics it is just a backwash, but for Teilhard, in the light of a broader point of view, it is actually the main current of a truly orthogenetic process," pp. 4-6. William C. Saslaw provides an interesting view of entropy that differs slightly from the popular view with regard to its influence on the evolutionary process; in effect, his remarks make Teilhard's notion of radial energy substantially more acceptable. William C. Saslaw, "Entropy and the Universe," in The Teilhard Review, Vol. 3, pp. 76-79. "A basic problem in Teilhard de Chardin's work is the attempt to reconcile his belief in the irreversibility of evolution with the second law of thermodynamics...

Entropy is a rather difficult and subtle concept whose implications are not fully understood even by physicists... The second law states: In all closed systems which are possible in nature and which have negligible fluctuations, the probability that the entropy decreases is essentially zero; it increases or, in the extreme, remains constant, then the change is reversible... Three reasons why the second law does not apply for the universe now become apparent. Firstly, the kinematic and dynamic expansion of
would not be able to make his theory of orthogenesis (by which, as shown earlier, he meant a directional development towards progress) stand up against the law of entropy.

the universe means that it is not a closed system. Secondly, fluctuations due to the gravitational interactions are usually important in the universe (if they were not, the stars, galaxies, and clusters of galaxies would not exist). Thirdly, the nature of entropy in self-gravitating systems is itself uncertain. We conclude therefore that the second law does not necessarily contradict the hypothesis of indefinite evolution on a cosmic scale. However, although the second law does not apply directly to the universe as a whole, it almost certainly applies to life and local physics on any particular planet or solar system. For these small systems, and probably for larger ones as well, the finite energy supply, rather than entropy, is the relevant factor in preventing indefinite evolution. Finally, it is worth pointing out that if we live in a steady state or in an oscillating universe, there are very difficult problems with the hypothesis of indefinite evolution on a cosmical scale." pp. 76-78. Along the same lines, W.H. Kenney emphasizes the unanswered questions with regards to entropy; Teilhard's inventiveness rises out of a discomfort with these unanswered questions; "One might, though Teilhard does not, question the law on entropy, which is certainly verified for small, limited systems, but on the cosmic plane, the law is an immense extrapolation, which lacks sufficient evidence for certainty. Teilhard, like most scientists, takes the law of entropy as a "given" in the explanation of the cosmos. . . . The laws of energy include not only the law of dissipation of energy, entropy, but also the law of the conservation of energy. The latter law teaches that there is no-creation of energy, but that the cosmos uses up its initial energy quantum. . . . The apparently logical conclusion from the laws of the conservation and dissipation of energy is a dismal one. . . . Teilhard, with many other thinkers, cannot accept this as a final or complete picture of the cosmos. His way of both accepting and correcting the picture is a probing questioning of the fundamental assumption, the nature of energy." W.H. Kenney, A Path Through Teilhard's Phenomenon, p. 81.
It is nevertheless understandable why tangential energy might be considered as primary—or even as the only energy—by many, since it corresponds to the "without," the readily seen, dimensions of reality. The primacy of radial energy is more apparent the higher up we go on the scale of material bodies, from pre-life through to human life.124

The next step, in enquiring about the nature and operation of tangential and radial energy, should be to examine how they are held in relation. To do so would lead directly to the theory of complexity-consciousness. Before taking up that theory, however, it is necessary to note the role of the theory of radial and tangential energy within the whole of the Teilhardian synthesis.

The primacy of radial energy is the basis for Teilhard's parallel conviction of the primacy of spirit. This concept of the primacy of spirit will be examined in detail in another section; however, the following passage, from an essay written in 1948, will serve to illustrate for the moment how the concept of radial energy was essential for the overall synthesis:

There is a persistent and widespread preconception that life, which appears in the universe as something so fragile and so rare, represents no more than a chance accident, and therefore a completely secondary element in cosmogenesis. The hypothesis of "an involuting world" obviously means that this view must be reversed. Structural necessity demands, in such a world, that the vitalized portion of matter—however weak and localized it may appear—can by no means be regarded as an anomaly, nor as a subsidiary occurrence (nor, to use words one still hears, a mould or fungus); on the contrary, it corresponds to the most central and most solid axis (or, one might say, the very "apex") of the cosmic "vortex." So true is this, that at every point in space-time, whatever its curvature and confines may be, we have to see life—and therefore thought itself—as a force which is everywhere and at all times contained under pressure—and which, accordingly, is only waiting for a favourable opportunity to emerge; and once emerged, to carry its constructive processes (and with them, its interiorization) right through to the end.125

In order to be able to hold this conviction in spite of the fact of entropy, in order, that is, to explain the unique characteristic of life rising up and forward in a current counter to entropy, Teilhard envisioned that all energy was fundamentally psychic in nature and that in every element it had two components—tangential energy and radial energy;126 radial energy, which corresponds to


126 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 70.
the "within" of matter, is the energizing principle behind the increase of complexity and, as will be shown, an increase in complexity amounts to a rise in centricity or consciousness. As seen earlier, the concept of the "within" allowed Teilhard to make room for thought in the process of evolution, for the emergence of life from pre-life; radial energy, in conjunction with tangential energy (the "within" in conjunction with the "without"), is the source of momentum in that evolutionary process.

C. The Theory of Complexity-Consciousness

As with the other laws or theories of Teilhard's synthesis, there is a background to the emergence of the law of complexity-consciousness. Fundamentally, the theory of complexity-consciousness was an attempt by Teilhard to explain the continuity between non-life or pre-life and life, to explain how life rises out of matter. In his seminal essay of 1916 referred to earlier, "Cosmic Life," Teilhard expresses his conviction of this continuity but is unable to explain how this is so. He seems to root the mystery in the nature of the ether, a concept which, as pointed out, was common in the science of his day, one which he used for a while, eventually to have it replaced, it appears, with his notion of the "within";
At the origin of the compulsions that subject souls to one another and to things outside them, we meet the inevitable ether. Even though it is still impossible, at our present stage of knowledge, to say exactly what are the relationships that produce the interdependence of these two great and still (so far as we know?) distinct realities, we can be certain that life stems from matter and cannot do without it. Life appeared, and develops, as a function of the whole universe; and therefore, through something in itself, it shares in the universe's original substantial unity, and in some hidden way is involved in the over-all movement, material in basis, which constitutes the total development of the cosmos. Moreover, in its manifestations and particularly in its lower forms it can hardly be distinguished from the inanimate structures produced by what we call physico-chemical forces. In its external shape, in its internal processes, in its powers of fermentation, and in its readiness to enter into aggregations of a higher order, the monocellular being behaves in many ways like a molecule. Life appears in phenomenal continuity with the network of material determinisms and constructions.127

As is evident in the latter part of the above passage, Teilhard already had an intuition of an increasing complexity ("aggregations of a higher order") in the process of evolution.

In a subsequent essay completed a year later (two dates are given, Feb. 26 and March 22, 1917) entitled "The Struggle Against the Multitude," Teilhard's intuition

127 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Writings in Time of War, pp. 22-23.

moves ahead in clarity to the level of a concept. Describing the origins of the world of matter, he speaks of how the points or elements of the Multitude (the original condition of existence) sought each other out and united with one another.

They grouped themselves in continually more complicated and more uncommon systems, and each advance in the reduction of the centres—in other words each new victory over the Multitude—was marked by the appearance of new properties.\(^{129}\)

As the editor points out, this is Teilhard's first formulation of his law of complexity-consciousness.\(^{130}\)

In November, 1917, Teilhard completed another essay, entitled "Creative Union,"\(^{131}\) an essay that will be examined in detail in the section of the primacy of spirit. What is being noted here is Teilhard's explication of the relation between complexity and consciousness as it occurs in man.

\(^{129}\) Ibid., p. 96.

\(^{130}\) Ibid. "Here we have the first adumbration of what was later to become Teilhard's scientific theory of complexification: a being is the more complex, the greater the number of differentiated elements it includes, with more interconnexions, and forming a more fully centred organization. The complexity in the world increases, and consciousness increases with complexity."

From the constitution of his protoplasm to his muscular and nervous tissue, the most spiritual being known to science—Man—is at the same time the being that is made up of the greatest number of parts. We may say that in our world psychic perfection varies in direct ratio with organic complexity and instability.  

In an essay completed on May 6, 1923, entitled "Hominization," Teilhard sees the inter-relation of complexity and consciousness as operative in society and culture in continuity with the inter-relation of complexity and consciousness as found in biological evolution.

There will be occasion to examine the socio-cultural manifestation of Teilhard's law of complexity-consciousness in the section dealing with his theory of personalization.

As with the theory of the "without" and "within," and with the theory of radial and tangential energy, we

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132 Ibid., pp. 154-55. In a footnote to this passage, the editor notes that in the original version, Teilhard inadvertently wrote "inverse ratio" for "direct ratio."


134 Ibid., p. 60, "By developing roads, railways, aeroplanes, the press, the wireless, we think we are only amusing ourselves, or only developing our commerce, or only spreading ideas. In reality, as anyone can see who tries to put together the general design of human movements and of the movements of all physical organisms, we are quite simply continuing on a higher plane and by other means, the uninterrupted work of biological evolution."
find some of Teilhard's clearest explications of the theory of complexity-consciousness in The Phenomenon of Man. In introducing the law of complexity-consciousness, Teilhard explains his intentions in formulating such a law.

We are seeking a qualitative law of development that from sphere to sphere should be capable of explaining, first of all the invisibility, then the appearance, and then the gradual dominance of the within in comparison to the without of things. This law reveals itself once the universe is thought of as passing from State A, characterized by a very large number of very simple material elements (that is to say, with a very poor within) to State B defined by a smaller number of very complex groupings (that is to say, with a much richer within). 135

Towards the end of The Phenomenon, Teilhard states his law on the premise of the expanding universe:

Reduced to its ultimate essence, the substance of these long pages can be summed up in this simple affirmation: that if the universe, regarded sidereally, is in process of spatial expansion (from the infinitesimal to the immense), in the same way and still more clearly it presents itself to us, physico-chemically, as in process of organic involution upon itself (from the extremely simple to the extremely complex)--and moreover, this particular involution "of complexity" is experimentally bound up with a correlative increase in exteriorisation, that is to say in the psyche or consciousness. 136

135 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 66.

136 Ibid., p. 329. As Bernard Delfgaauw points out, when Teilhard speaks of complexity, the term does not mean,
On the basis of this law, and as already intimated in the concept of the "within", Teilhard is convinced that there is, in some rudimentary form, a bit of psyche in every

for him, "a juxtaposition of material particles—if it did, the stars would be complex too—but a structure which out of a large number of such particles constitutes a unity." This is based on the conviction that there are the first beginnings of consciousness in all matter. Bernard Delfgaauw, Evolution, The Theory of Teilhard de Chardin, London, Collins, Fontana Library, c. 1969, p. 65. Teilhard's law of complexity-consciousness seems basically acceptable to, and in agreement with, science (see, for example, Gaston Isaye's remarks on this in his article, "The Method of Teilhard de Chardin, a Critical Study," in New Scholasticism, Vol. 41, pp. 49-50); See also Emile Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, a Guide to His Thought, pp. 92-93; what is held in question is whether the law of complexity-consciousness can be applied as widely as he did apply it. For example, is it accurate to speak of consciousness with reference to the "within" of inanimate matter? In this context, Henri de Lubac has made some noteworthy remarks; "While his language in this connexion may be questionable, it is nevertheless the sign of an essential movement of thought; and the accusation that he includes different things in the same name, would not hold good; for it is only after making many explanations and corrections and distinctions in the words he uses, that "consciousness" thus becomes "a universal molecular property;" it is then, he says, no more than a "germ," or "segment of consciousness," a "partial interiority" at an "infinitesimal degree," because this interiority still lacks any subjectivity. It is not specifically "consciousness of self;" the "within of things" becomes consciousness in the full meaning of the word only when complexity, which makes itself increasingly felt as a counter-current to entropy, "is carried to extremely high values."" Henri de Lubac, The Religion of Teilhard de Chardin, p. 194. We should compare the above passage from The Phenomenon of Man with one of Teilhard's latest formulations of his law, as found in "The Phyletic Structure of the Human Group" completed in 1951. "Left long enough to itself, under the prolonged and universal play of chance, matter manifests the property
corpuscle, "even in those (the mega-molecules and below) whose complexity is of such a low or modest order as to render it (the psyche) imperceptible."\textsuperscript{137} The momentum towards increased complexity is the momentum of life itself "under pressure everywhere; . . . where it has succeeded in breaking through in an appreciable degree, nothing will be able to stop it carrying to the uttermost limit the process from which it has sprung."\textsuperscript{138}

of arranging itself in more and more complex groupings, and at the same time in ever-deepening layers of consciousness; this double and combined movement of physical unfolding and psychic interiorisation (or centration) once started, continuing, accelerating and growing to its utmost extent." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Appearance of Man, London, Collins, c. 1965, p. 139. In this same essay, Teilhard identifies the tendency of evolution towards increased complexity and consciousness as "the tendency to cerebration", ibid. Finally, we find a short summary statement on the law of complexity-consciousness in his essay, "The Atomism of Spirit," completed on Sept. 13, 1941; "Consciousness and complexity . . . are two aspects of one and the same reality--the centre--depending on whether we adopt a viewpoint outside or inside ourselves." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Activation of Energy, London, Collins, p. 30.


\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. The following passage, from "The Spirit of the Earth" (March 9, 1931) has a similar emphasis on the primacy of life:" . . . however unstable life may appear, however impressive its connexions with limiting space and forces of disintegration, one thing above all is certain (because it is as certain as the world!): spirit will always succeed, as it has done till now, in defying risks and determinisms. It is the indestructible part of the universe," in Pierre Teilhard de-Chardin, Human Energy, London, Collins, c. 1969, p. 41.
Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that a major difference between Teilhard and Henri Bergson in their understanding of evolution is that while Bergson saw evolution as a process of divergence, Teilhard saw it as a process of convergence. Teilhard based that conviction on the law of complexity-consciousness. In an essay written in 1945, entitled "Degrees of Scientific Certainty in the Idea of Evolution," Teilhard wonders whether the current of life, which has "never ceased globally to rise in the direction of complexity-consciousness is still continuing to rise, and if so, is its behavior divergent or convergent? And if the latter, where is it directing the axis of its course?" Teilhard's answer to his own question contains three points:

a) It is clear in the first place, that the vitalized portion of the world to which we belong has not yet stopped ascending towards the highest forms of complexity.

b) Secondly, it would appear that the seemingly divergent system of rays drawn by life in the course of its


140 Ibid., p. 194.
ascent entered, starting with man, an area in which it becomes convergent.

c) Finally, it would appear inevitable that if we are to conceive a term to this convergence, we must envisage somewhere ahead of us the emergence of some peak, corresponding to a general reflection upon themselves of the reflective elements of the earth: the formation of that peak, moreover, coinciding with a maximum of the demand for irreversibility that increases throughout the ages in the heart of man.141

Teilhard's notion of the relation between complexity and consciousness is one of his most recurrent themes. One of his most interesting applications of the law of complexity-consciousness is on the question of whether there might be life on other planets within our galaxies. In essence, his hunch is that if the evidence or data of biochemistry, anthropology (which would include the law of complexity-consciousness) and astronomy were brought together, it is practically certain that we would find signs of life in other regions of the universe.142

But possibly his most important applications of the law of complexity-consciousness is in relation to the phenomenon

141 Ibid., pp. 195-196.

of love in the experience of man. This will be explored again in the section concerning Teilhard's theory of personalization; the point being noted here is how the rise of love in the experience of man obeys the law of complexity-consciousness in Teilhard's synthesis.

Earlier, it was shown how Teilhard explained the emergence of love on the basis of the "within" of things—it would not be possible to explain how love emerges among man, he claims, "if there was no real internal propensity to unite, even at a prodigiously rudimentary level—indeed in the molecule itself." 143 Teilhard described love as an energy that is present throughout the universe:

> Love in all its subtleties is nothing more, and nothing less, than the more or less direct trace marked on the heart of the element by the psychical convergence of the universe upon itself. 144

In his essay, "The Rise of the Other," 145 completed in January, 1942, Teilhard further explained his understanding of love,


144 Ibid., p. 291.

In its most general form and from the point of view of physics, love is the internal, affectively apprehended, aspect of the affinity which links and draws together the elements of the world centre to centre. . . . Love is power of producing inter-centric relationships. It is present, therefore (at least in a rudimentary state) in all the natural centres, living and pre-living, which make up the world; and it represents, too, the most profound, most direct, and most creative form of inter-action that it is possible to conceive between those centres. Love, in fact, is the expression and the agent of universal synthesis: . . . In virtue of his extreme power of loving, combined with his extreme "centricity" (or, which comes to the same thing, his extreme complexity), man in so far as he actually loves, is the most magnificently synthesizable of all the elements ever constructed by nature. 146

The human energy of loving, then, becomes extremely important in the continuing evolution of man. The capacity and the capability for loving are affected by the complexity of the species and of the individual. Teilhard's theory of personalization, it will be shown later, is founded on the assumption that the capacity for loving increases with the complexity of the organism.

Teilhard's law of complexity-consciousness is the third and final theory, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, that falls under the first major section of the Teilhardian synthesis—the process of evolution. Before moving on to chapter three and the second major

146 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
section of the synthesis—the primacy of spirit and the theory of Creative Union—it is necessary to note the role of the theory of complexity-consciousness within the whole of the Teilhardian synthesis. It must also be explained why the first major section—the process of evolution—with its three theories, is being considered the foundations of the Teilhardian synthesis.

The role that Teilhard's notion of the law of complexity-consciousness plays in the overall synthesis cannot be isolated from the roles played by his concept of the "without" and "within" of matter and his concept of "tangential" and "radial" energy. Indeed, the law of complexity-consciousness can only stand on the foundation of the other two concepts. As shown earlier, in the building of his synthesis Teilhard needed to allow for the emergence of thought in the continuum of evolution, for the emergence of life from pre-life. Working with a consistent methodology which was, in effect, a scientific phenomenology (he called it a hyper-physics, among other names) Teilhard hypothesized that for thought, reflection, consciousness to appear as it does in man, it must have its comparable forms in all matter, even the most rudimentary forms of matter. He also hypothesized that the development along the continuum in evolution occurs because of a principle
of energy. Finally, he hypothesized that in accordance with the activation of energy, matter increased in complexity; the increase in complexity in turn increases the possibility of consciousness. In man, the potency for consciousness becomes actuality. In abbreviated form, these are Teilhard's concepts of the "within" of matter (in conjunction with the "without"), "radial" energy (in conjunction with "tangential" energy), and the law of complexity-consciousness. The law of complexity-consciousness had a particular significance in the synthesis of Teilhard. As Emile Rideau points out, Teilhard's discovery of this law marks the end of a period that was still centred on metaphysical or purely spiritual problems, and a more pronounced entry into the problem of the history of the cosmos as it approaches unity through convergence. With this new stage Teilhard evolved a more clear-cut picture of the universe.

147 On this point, see Teilhard's essay, "Hominization and Speciation," completed in 1952, in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Vision of the Past*, pp. 256-267, in which he points out that a relationship of an energizing nature is needed to bring together physics and the human phenomenon. Such a relationship was provided, he felt, "by the visible process of complexity-consciousness which, "at right angles" to entropy, irresistibly by the play of great numbers, draws a fraction of matter simultaneously to arrange and interiorize itself on itself; human socializing being, from this point of view, merely the highest phase of the "complexification" and "growth into consciousness" of the biosphere", pp. 256-257.

And, as will be evident in the section on Teilhard's theory of personalization, he was able to apply the law and its implications towards an understanding of the contemporary problems and issues of man.

To describe still another significance of the law of complexity-consciousness for the overall synthesis, it will be recalled that by ascribing a "within" to all of matter, Teilhard was observing a fundamental worth to all of existence: This fundamental worth is augmented by the complexity that follows upon the conjoint action of radial and tangential energy. The manifestation of that fundamental worth is the consciousness that corresponds to the complexity. It is exactly at this point that we move into the arena of human interaction; the three remaining sections of the Teilhardian synthesis, to be examined in chapter three, will focus on the question of human interaction from many angles.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to remark briefly on why the section just completed--the process of evolution--is being called the foundations of the Teilhardian synthesis. The reasons for doing so lie in the three theories reviewed in this section, the theory of the "within" and "without," the theory of radial and tangential energy, and the theory of complexity-consciousness. Quite simply, those three
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theories are foundational to the whole of the synthesis and are the infrastructure upon which the three other sections to be examined are built. If it can be stated that a principal fruit emerging from the Teilhardian synthesis is an increased valuation given to the whole of existence, it is also true that such valuation can only be rooted in the kind of propensity, momentum, energy which is interior to matter and which is identified by Teilhard's concepts of the "within," of radial energy, and of complexity-consciousness. The other theories that remain to be examined could not stand without the foundation provided by these three theories. Together, these three theories describe the process of evolution and it is the basic notion of the process of evolution itself--the notion that there is development and progress toward "something" in the whole of existence--which forms the base of the Teilhardian synthesis.
CHAPTER III

THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS--PART TWO

A. Introduction

With the study of Teilhard's theory of the "within" and "without," his theory of radial and tangential energy, and his law of complexity-consciousness, the foundations and groundwork for the Teilhardian synthesis were laid and, as a consequence, the contribution the whole of the synthesis could make to the process of renewal in psychology of religion began to be apparent.

From the beginning, the stated intention has been to seek a renewed psychology of religion, with its concept of religious response, for approaching what Pruyser has called the new, emerging question for the discipline--"Which data of experience are of religious significance?" It has been argued that the concept of "religious experience," as traditionally used, has serious inadequacies for dealing with Pruyser's new question. A renewed psychology of religion, with its concept of religious response, would approach all of experience to interpret a religious significance therein, whereas psychology of religion, in its traditional focus and with its concept of "religious
experience," approaches individual and isolated instances that are identified as religious experiences, seeking a significance therein.

Pruyser's new question, it has been suggested, requires a view of reality, a synthesis, sufficiently broad to encompass it. The synthesis of Teilhard, the thesis argues, might be sufficiently broad since it provides a fundamental meaning, value, worth, to the whole of existence via the theory of the "within" and "without," the theory of radial and tangential energy, and the law of complexity-consciousness. A more thorough assessment of the contributory role the Teilhardian synthesis can make to the renewal of psychology of religion will be conducted in the next chapter, once the examination of the three other major sections of the synthesis has been completed.

B. The Teilhardian Synthesis--Dynamics

With Teilhard's notion of the primacy of spirit and the theory of creative union, the thesis project moves from a study of the foundations and groundwork of the Teilhardian synthesis to the beginning of the elaboration of the dynamics of that synthesis.

It will be recalled that the model being used to examine the Teilhardian synthesis is the four-part credo provided by Teilhard himself at the beginning of an essay
he wrote in 1934 entitled, "How I Believe." The first major section of the study that has just been completed, entitled, "The Process of Evolution," corresponds to Teilhard's belief that the universe is an evolution. The second major section, being examined here, corresponds to Teilhard's belief that evolution proceeds toward spirit.

It has already been emphasized that, strictly speaking, it is hardly possible to consider any of Teilhard's concepts and theories in isolation; the fullest meaning of any one concept or theory is provided only in relation to the others. Such is the case with Teilhard's understanding of spirit. Throughout the first major section, while it was dealing specifically with three theories of Teilhard that are integral to his understanding of evolution, there was an underlying conviction of the pervasiveness and primacy of spirit in that process. Furthermore, those three theories—the theory of the "without" and "within," the theory of tangential and radial energy, and the theory of complexity-consciousness—do not tell the whole story. Those three theories are intended to provide the empirical basis, according to the Teilhardian methodology of scientific phenomenology, for postulating the primacy of spirit. And once the primacy of spirit can be defended we will have the valuing principle behind personality, that is, the.
worth of being and becoming fully human will have its validating ground. Finally, once personality and personalization have been given their full worth, the primacy of the referent that allows us to posit such worth—the supremely personal, universal Christ—should become apparent.

1. The Primacy of Spirit and the Theory of Creative Union

The urgency and gravity of the question for Teilhard as to whether the nature of the real is fundamentally material or spiritual lies in the options and priorities open to man that ride upon the answer to that question. By consequence, it is also the critical question in terms of the renewal of psychology of religion. If the nature of the real is fundamentally material, then the search for religious significance within the experience of the human would be an exercise in futility and a waste of time. Pruys's new question would become irrelevant and the old question—which are the significant data of religious experience?—would be comprehensive. Consequently, there would be no need for a new concept such as religious response within psychology of religion. Thus the manner in which Teilhard works out a reply to his ultimate question has a critical bearing on the thesis project.

It is already clear of course, from many of Teilhard's statements that were used in the previous
sections, how he answered his ultimate question on the nature of reality. The clearest statement of his reply is likely in *The Phenomenon of Man* and is quoted here again:

We shall assume that, essentially, all energy is psychic in nature; but add that in each particular element this fundamental energy is divided into two distinct components: a tangential energy which links the elements with all others of the same order (that is to say, of the same complexity and the same centricity) as itself in the universe; and a radial energy which draws it towards even greater complexity and centricity—in other words forwards.

This statement reveals two of Teilhard's convictions: that reality is primarily psychic in nature, and that matter (multiplicity)—is in evolution toward spirit, (unity) by virtue of radial energy. We are permitted to read the primacy of spirit in Teilhard's remark that all energy is essentially psychic because the two terms—spirit and psychic energy—seem to intend the same meaning. At the very least, both terms have the clear intent to mean that

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2 See W.H. Kenney, *A Path Through Teilhard's Phenomenon*, "Because Teilhard uses spirit in so many different but connected ways, it is difficult to convey his meaning by merely giving several concise definitions. Teilhard's concept of spirit seeks to transcend the usual dichotomies of spirit and matter, mind and body, psychical and physical energies. He uses the evident unity of spirit and matter in man as a paradigm for overcoming these dichotomies, but without denying or distorting the distinctions. . . . The properties associated with man's
the nature of ultimate reality is not dead matter.

As was done with the other basic ideas of Teilhard, one can turn to his early seminal essay, "Cosmic Life," written in 1916, to find an early formulation of his notion of the primacy of spirit. Using the word with a capitalized "s", Teilhard projects to the future, when the "final harmony" will have come, a time in which limitation, imperfection, evil, will have been removed. He sees enough hints in the history and experience of man to suggest "the increasing possibility of the spiritualization of the universe"; it will be a time in which "Spirit will have absorbed matter." While the use of the word "spirit" with a capitalized "s" might suggest he is referring to

spirit are: reflective consciousness or thought which transcends sensation, space and time; freedom, purpose and love." pp. 249-250. Teilhard himself in his essay, "How I Believe" gives one definition for spirit which, when it does not refer to God, seems to be his most commonly intended meaning: "By spirit I mean the spirit of synthesis and sublimation, in which is painfully concentrated, through endless attempts and setbacks, the potency of unity, scattered throughout the universal multiple: spirit which is born within, and as a function of matter." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, pp. 107-108.


4 Ibid.
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God, it seems rather that he is referring to a phenomenon of the universe, of reality; God might be the overall context for this phenomenon but there is no suggestion of any "deus ex machina" situation. This opinion is defendable when several subsequent essays by Teilhard are examined.

In "The Struggle Against the Multitude", written less than a year after "Cosmic Life", Teilhard presents, as shown earlier, the first clear formulation of the law of complexity-consciousness. And it is the properties of this law that explain the "genesis of spirit". When "spirit" is viewed at the level of man, that is as "soul", Teilhard feels this is the "starting point of a higher Spirit". Here, "spirit" with a capitalized "s" seems again to be presented in the contextual meaning of "God", but, more accurately, is intended to mean Unity—absolute convergence in opposition to absolute

5 Ibid., pp. 94-114.

6 Ibid., p. 96. With regards to the law of complexity-consciousness, there is an important footnote provided here by the editor: "When Pierre Teilhard expresses his view of the relationship between matter and spirit more precisely, he does not say that matter becomes spirit but that spirit is born upon the complexity of matter." We find one example of a more precise expression of the relationship between spirit and matter in his essay "Creative Union", in Writings in Time of War, p. 157.

7 Ibid., p. 97.
divergence. 8

...Several months after "The Struggle Against the Multitude", Teilhard completed an important essay entitled, "Creative Union", 9 an essay in which he examined the relation of matter and spirit in some depth. The thoughts therein were elaborated upon in a subsequent essay completed in March, 1924, entitled, "My Universe". 10 Both essays are

8 "Thus mankind, in its teeming mass of souls, each one of which concentrates a world, is the starting point of a higher Spirit: the Spirit that will shine forth at the point on which purified souls will concentrate, the Spirit that will represent, in its supreme simplicity, the Multitude of multitudes that have been tamed and unified. It will be the most simple because the most comprehensive, the needle-sharp peak on which the whole Multitude will have converged, there to remain suspended. It will be a Unity triumphing over Non-being: it will be α and ω." Ibid., pp. 97-98. As the editor points out, the Greek letters α and ω, the alpha and the omega, refer to Christ who, in the Apocalypse, is seen as the beginning and the end of the universe. In this respect, the contextual meaning for "Spirit" and "Unity" is God. This reference to God becomes more explicit in subsequent essays. Cf., for example, Teilhard's remarks in "The New Spirit", completed in February, 1942, in which God is explicitly identified as the ground of the relation between spirit and matter: "What is finally the most revolutionary and fruitful aspect of our present age is the relationship it has brought to light between Matter and Spirit: spirit being no longer independent of matter, or in opposition to it, but laboriously emerging from it under the attraction of God by way of synthesis and centration." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The New Spirit", in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, London, Collins, Fontana Books, c. 1964, pp. 96-97.

9 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Creative Union", in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Writings in Time of War, pp. 151-176.

also important for their statements on the role of Christ in evolution, as will be seen in the section on Christogenesis. Teilhard begins his essay, "Creative Union," by stating two presuppositions:

I accept, in the first place, as a presupposition to all that follows, that the universe is committed to a Becoming, which gradually constitutes it in its destined form, the most perfect elements of the world being produced in succession through the less perfect, starting from lower states of existence. . . . Secondly, I accept that the evolution of the universe has an absolute direction, which is towards Spirit.\textsuperscript{11}

On the basis of these two presuppositions he believed that "to explain the shape of the world means to explain the genesis of Spirit."\textsuperscript{12} Teilhard's theory of creative union is an attempt to understand this genesis.

The theory of creative union attempted to explain the genesis of Spirit by the inter-relation and interaction of matter and spirit. Teilhard explained the process in the following manner:

Initially, we must see the formative energy of the world as grappling with an infinite tendency to crumble into dust, with a thing that is by its nature (and hence by its general trend) infinitely dissociated, a sort of pure multiple.

This is the second essay to have the title of "My Universe." The first was completed in 1918.

\textsuperscript{11} Teilhard de Chardin, \textit{Writings in Time of War}, p. 154.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}
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The problem and the secret of creation consisted in reducing this power of dissociation and reversing its direction, in such a way as to produce progressively more synthesized monads. The more intimate the union effected between more diverse elements (that is, the more the Multitude was overcome) the more perfect and conscious the being that emerged. Plus esse = plus, et a pluribus, uniri. Soul, at all its degrees, was born of this progressive concentration of the primordial dust. Animation is proportionate to union.  

Essentially, the process just described is the law of complexity-consciousness, but the emphasis is placed on union and the consequences of union. "Ontological union . . . is specifically creative;" to this there are two correlative propositions, "Creation is brought about by an act of uniting; and true union cannot be effected except by creating."  

It is because of the law of complexity-consciousness that the emergence of spirit can be recognized and that the theory of creative union can be stated. In Teilhard's opinion,  

... if the most refined psychism coincides, in our universe, with the most complex material basis, then this is by structural necessity. As a result of the mechanism of evolution, the One, in the cycle of our creation, is born on

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I3 Ibid., p. 155.
I4 Ibid., p. 156.
I5 Ibid.
the multiple: the simple is formed by giving its unity to what is complex: spirit is made through the medium of matter.

Or, as he later puts it in short form, "basically, the whole of the world's psychism gravitates towards a single centre." This gravitation towards a single centre defines an evolution of convergence as opposed to an evolution of divergence, and in this respect Teilhard differed, as he himself noted, from Henri Bergson.

Teilhard also explains the dynamics of creative union by using the analogy of a pyramid, again as an attempt to illustrate the relationship between material complexity and the emergence of spirit:

Just as the wider the base of the pyramid and the more acute the angle at the apex, the higher it is, (in our universe) the created being is the more spiritual, the more closely it concentrates in itself a greater initial multiplicity.

I6 Ibid., p. 157.
I7 Ibid., p. 158.
I8 Ibid., p. 157. "Whereas the Kosmos, in Bergson's creative evolution, is seen as a radiation that spreads out from a central source, the picture of the universe we are introduced to by "Creative Union" is that of a concentration, a convergence, a centripetal confluence that originates in some infinitely distended sphere. Although both evolutionary, each theory is the converse of the other."
I9 Ibid., p. 165.
An important implication deriving from the fact that evolution moves towards spirit is that it explains, according to Teilhard, "the direction in which love should seek expression."\(^{20}\) This point will be developed in the section on the theory of personalization.

The remainder of the essay "Creative Union" discusses the role of Christ in the evolutionary process; examination of this material will be reserved for the section on Christogenesis. Teilhard's second essay in which the theory of creative union was developed was the essay entitled "My Universe."\(^{21}\)

In "My Universe", Teilhard presents his theory of creative union against the background of four basic principles. The first principle proclaims that being itself is good, "a) that it is better to be than not to

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 170.

\(^{21}\) It appears that "My Universe" was written after some dissatisfaction with "Creative Union." About a year after finishing "Creative Union," Teilhard wrote: "From the "thinking" point of view, I'm hoping to get down in a few paragraphs, as an appendix to "Creative Union," the various new points that have taken definite shape or defined themselves in my mind during the last year..." But a week later he wrote that he was giving up plans to write this appendix since "there would be too much to say." But he continued to be interested in the theory of creative union, as "My Universe" and several other essays indicate. The essence of the above remarks is taken from the editor's introduction to "Creative Union," in Writings in Time of War, pp. 151-152.
be; b) that it is better to be more than to be less."  

But, claims Teilhard, if we can accept that "complete"  
being is conscious being, then the first principle can be  
expressed more accurately in the following form: "a) That  
it is better to be conscious than not to be conscious.  
b) That it is better to be more conscious than less  
conscious." The second principle states that the universe,  
taken as a whole, "a) Has a goal. b) Cannot take the wrong  
road nor come to a halt in mid-journey." Teilhard states  
the third principle in the following manner:  

Since the world is a success (Principle 2) and  
since success consists in becoming more conscious  
(Principle 1), I conclude . . . that the universe  
ripens within itself the fruit of a certain con- 
sciousness. If we ask what essential attribute  
we demand in this highest form of consciousness,  
in this sort of higher being, in order to be able  
to recognize that it is indeed a success, we shall  
say that it must represent a state that is acquired  
for ever; in other words, we look for an absolute  
perfection.  

The fourth principle states that there is a wholeness that  
provides meaning to all of existence, an immense Unity.  

22 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Science and Christ,  
pp. 40-41.  

23 Ibid.  

24 Ibid.  

25 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
With what characteristics, then, shall I now picture to myself the terminal Reality, the only Reality that has value, that gathers up all that is absolute in my work and in the work of life? With those, inevitably, of an immense Unity. Since it is life in its totality, and not in its elements, that is infallible (Principle 2); and since all that is purest in the vital fluid developed by each monad must be concentrated in the fruit we look for from the growth of the world (Principle 3), the Absolute towards which we are ascending can wear only the face of the whole—a whole that is purified, sublimated, made conscious.26

Basing himself on these four principles Teilhard presents his theory of creative union in a formulation that differs slightly—and appears to be an improvement upon—the formulation presented in the earlier essay, "Creative Union":

Creative union is the theory that accepts this proposition: in the present evolutionary phase of the cosmos (the only phase known to us), everything happens as though the One were formed by successive unifications of the Multiple—and as though the One were more perfect, the more perfectly it centralized under itself a larger Multiple. For the elements associated by the soul in a body (and thereby raised to a higher degree of being), "plus esse est plus cum pluribus uniri"—"to be more is to be more fully united with more." For the soul itself, for the principle of unity, "plus esse est plura unire"—to be more, is more fully to unite more." For both, to receive or to communicate union is to undergo the creative influence of God, "qui creat uniendo"—"who creates by uniting."27

26 Ibid., p. 43.

27 Ibid., p. 45.
As in his essay, "Creative Union," Teilhard uses the analogy of a triangle or, more specifically, "a huge cone, whose base expands indefinitely to the rear, into darkness, while its apex rises up and concentrates even further into the light." 28 In keeping with the law of complexity-consciousness, "throughout the whole, the same creative influence makes itself felt, but always in a more conscious, more purified, more complex form." 29

Following upon the picture of the world that emerges with the theory of creative union, there are several corollaries that also emerge. The first corollary is that "all consistence comes from Spirit" 30 rather than from matter.

Throughout the vast network of universal multiplicity, from the humblest element to the most sublime, from Nature's most material constructions to the most refined products of our thought, from the smallest association of monads to the most immense organic wholes, "Everything holds together from on high."

28 Ibid., p. 48.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., p. 49. This corollary first appears as a footnote with slightly different wording, in an earlier essay entitled, "The Universal Element," completed on Feb. 21, 1919; "The consistence of being lies in spirit (the principle of union) and not in matter (the principle of disintegration)." Writings in Time of War, p. 299, footnote 9.

31 Ibid., p. 50. This statement first appears in the essay, "Operative Faith," completed on Sept. 28, 1918. Writings in Time of War, p. 240. Teilhard borrowed the phrase from Maurice Blondel.
What Teilhard is saying, quite simply, is that there is a primacy of spirit in existence. Those who are convinced of a primacy of matter have not looked high enough. "The truth is that nothing holds together except as the result of a synthesis, which means, in short, however lowly the synthesis, by a reflexion of Spirit." 32

The second corollary, following from the first, is that "every reality around us, no matter how spiritual it be, can be indefinitely broken down into terms of a nature lower than its own." 33 But the more any reality is broken down, the "less intelligible and more impoverished" 34 it becomes.

The third corollary, again following from the first, ("Everything holds together from on high"), states that matter has a value of its own.

Indeed, even if it is Spirit that constantly carries matter along and supports it in the ascent towards consciousness, it is matter, in return, that enables Spirit to subsist by constantly providing it with a point upon which to act and supplying it with nourishment. . . . The Spirit that sustains everything, itself has no reason for its being and consistence, does not "hold together," except by "causing to hold

32 ibid., p. 49.
33 ibid., p. 49.
34 Ibid., p. 50.
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...Its sublimity and richness are tied up with an organic multiplicity that it embraces, in its "solid aspect." The purity of a being's spiritual peak is in proportion to the material breadth of its base. 35

The fourth corollary is that matter and Spirit 36 should no longer be contrasted.

For those who have understood the law of "spiritualization by union," there are no longer two compartments in the universe, the spiritual and the physical; there are only two directions along one and the same road (the direction of pernicious pluralisation, and that of beneficial unification). Every being in the world stands somewhere on the slope that rises up from the shadows towards the light. In front of it, lies the effort to master and simplify its own nature; behind, the abandonment of effort in the physical and moral disintegration of its powers. 37

When matter and Spirit are seen as two directions in evolution, then the fifth corollary can be stated—-that a "fundamental and substantial unity of the universe" can be affirmed. 38

The mutual influence of Spirit and matter, the interaction of beings, the knowledge of the

35 Ibid., pp. 50-51.

36 We shall continue to use "Spirit" with a capitalized "s" since it is Teilhard's practice even though it is very evident at times, as in these passages, that "Spirit" does not refer to God as much as it refers to psychical or non-physical reality.

37 Ibid., p. 51.

38 Ibid., p. 52.
"external" world, are insoluble questions only because we give ourselves the spurious and impossible problem of trying to understand the whole through fragments of the whole, without introducing, to help us, the properties that are peculiar to the whole (as though a natural whole were not more than its parts) . . . There is no need to look for a "bridge" between natures or things in a universe in which unity (and, in consequence, complete inter-influence) is the state of equilibrium towards which beings tend as they become spiritualized.\textsuperscript{39}

As with the essay "Creative Union," the second half of "My Universe" deals with the role of Christ in evolution; thus, examination of this part of "My Universe" will be reserved for the section on Christogenesis.

The theory of creative union, particularly as explicated, with its five corollaries, in "My Universe," places the relationship of matter and spirit in the proper perspective; a perspective in which primacy is given to spirit. The primacy of spirit was initially evident to Teilhard in the reflective consciousness of man. It has already been shown how Teilhard, on the basis of the paleontological record, saw the reflective consciousness of man as the latest manifestation in evolution of the continuum of rising consciousness in existence. The theory of the within of matter, the theory of radial energy, and the law of complexity-consciousness all contributed to an

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
explication of the phenomenon of the rise of consciousness.

The theory of creative union is the firmament underneath all these theories but it also provides the overriding direction for these theories. If we can indeed observe the progressive rise of consciousness throughout evolution,

40 The relation of the theory of creative union to the other theories already examined, and, indeed, the central position that the theory of creative union holds in the overall Teilhardian synthesis, has been examined in depth by Donald P. Gray in his book, *The One and the Many: Teilhard de Chardin's Vision of Unity*, London, Burns and Oates, c. 1969. On the relation of the theory of creative union to the law of complexity-consciousness, Gray states: "The theory of creative union as expressed in these texts of 1924 already contain germinally what will later become the well known law of complexity-consciousness and the equally well known formula 'l'union differencie' ('union differentiates')..." The law of complexity-consciousness is, in its root meaning, the mutual correlation, which seeks to articulate the mutual interdependence of matter and spirit in the overall movement of evolution. Starting from the premise that reality is essentially dipolar in structure and that matter and spirit are not antagonistic to one another but rather constitute complementary principles in the construction of being, the law of complexity-consciousness assigns to matter the role of conditioning the appearance of spirit—the level of spiritualization being directly proportional to the degree of complexification of the matter involved in the composite," (Italics mine), p. 39. On the relation of the theory of creative union to the theory of radial and tangential energy, Gray states; "Tangential and radial energy thus interact to further complexify the material base which spirit requires to move forwards. This line of argument, by taking us beyond the purely passive character of spirit, established a dialectical movement of activity and passivity which recalls the theory of creative union." p. 47.
the fundamental question might well be, "Rise of consciousness towards what?" The answer, provided by the theory of creative union, becomes, "Rise of consciousness towards Spirit."

The rise of consciousness towards Spirit is a general theme of Teilhard and is to be found in many of his essays, but one of the more important in this regard is "The Spirit of the Earth," completed on March 9, 1931. A major emphasis in this essay is that it is the rise of consciousness that makes life intelligible and gives meaning to evolution;

No, the cosmos could not possibly be explained, as a dust of unconscious elements, on which life, for some incomprehensible reason, burst into flower—as an accident or as a mould. But it is fundamentally and primarily living, and its complete history is ultimately nothing but an immense psychic exercise; the slow but progressive attaining of a diffused consciousness—a gradual escape from the "material" conditions which, secondarily, veil it in an initial state of extreme plurality.


42 Ibid., p. 23. Cf. Teilhard's remarks along the same lines in "Human Energy," completed in October, 1937: "If the cosmos were basically material, it would be physically incapable of containing man. Therefore, we may conclude, (and this is the first step), that it is in its inner being made of spiritual stuff." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Human Energy," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, London, Collins, c. 1969, p. 120.
And because life is conscious, it must be, according to Teilhard, "at least partially, irreversible, and therefore superior to the inverse attractions of entropy." It is not possible, then, to imagine a death for spirit;

... One point at least seems capable of being established by analysis of the present facts; and this is that unless we make up our minds to admit that the cosmos is intrinsically an absurdity, the growth of the spirit must be taken as irreversible. "The spirit as a whole will never fall back." In other words, "In an evolutionary universe, the existence of spirit by its nature rules out the possibility of a death in which the achievements of the spirit will totally disappear or to be more precise, in which they will not survive in the form of their flowering." Such is the infinitely comforting guarantee afforded us by these few words which express a stroke of immediate and fundamental intuition: "The world would justifiably and infallibly cease to act—out of discouragement—if it became aware (in its thinking zone) that it is going to a total death. Therefore total death does not exist." 44

In a subsequent essay completed in March of 1937, entitled, "The Phenomenon of Spirituality," Teilhard spoke of spirituality as a phenomenon that is as central

43 Ibid., p. 22.

44 Ibid., p. 40. As will be shown in the section on the theory of personalization, Teilhard considered this irreversibility of the rise of spirit as a first stage in the law of the conservation of personality.

to our experience as any other: "Besides the phenomena of heat, light and the rest studied by physics, there is, just as real and natural, the phenomenon of spirituality." The phenomenon of spirit is one that very much defines our nature as human beings. "Spirit," Teilhard says, "is neither a meta- nor an epi-phenomenon; it is the phenomenon." This is in contradistinction to two other views of spirit—on the one hand, that it is something special, above and removed from the world, and on the other hand, that it is something frail, accidental, and secondary.

According to Teilhard, spirit is a pervasive phenomenon and its nature can be identified with the dimensions of the universe itself.

... Conscious beings are in truth only different local manifestations of a mass which contains them all. To the extent that it is

46 Ibid., p. 93.

47 Ibid., p. 94. A year before he wrote "The Phenomenon of Spirituality," Teilhard spoke of spirit and matter in an integral manner: "In a concrete sense there is not matter and spirit. All that exists is matter becoming spirit. There is neither spirit nor matter in the world; the "stuff of the universe" is spirit-matter. No other substance but this could produce the human molecule." In "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe" (1936), in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, pp. 57-58. As the editor points out in a footnote to this passage, Teilhard was here speaking of the universe as it appears to us, and not ontologically.

48 Ibid., p. 93.
subject to experiment, the phenomenon of spirit is not a divided mass; it displays a general manner of being, a collective state peculiar to our world. In other words, scientifically speaking, there are no spirits in nature. But there is a spirit, physically defined by a certain tension of consciousness on the surface of the earth. This animating covering of our planet may with advantage be called the biosphere—or more precisely (if we are only considering its thinking fringe) the noosphere.

Thus, the history of the earth is a history of the rise of spirit, as a "systematic passage from the unconscious to the conscious, and from the conscious to the self-conscious." This history of the rise of spirit is traced out in *The Phenomenon of Man*.

49 Ibid., p. 95. As W. Henry Kenney points out, in *A Path Through Teilhard's Phenomenon*, Teilhard was not alone in his idea of the noosphere. Many other thinkers have spoken of similar ideas but in different terms. Teilhard himself coined the word "noosphere" in 1925, according to Kenney. *A Path Through Teilhard's Phenomenon*, pp. 129, 100. But in fact the word first appears in Teilhard's essay, "Hominization," written in 1923. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Hominization," in *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Vision of the Past*, London, Collins, c. 1966, pp. 51-79. One of the earliest allusions to the noosphere, although not yet named as such, might well be the following passage from "A Note on Progress," completed in 1920: "It is Mankind as a whole, collective humanity, which is called upon to perform the definitive act whereby the total force of terrestrial evolution will be released and flourish; an act in which the full consciousness of each individual man will be sustained by that of every other man, not only the living but the dead." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "A Note on Progress," in *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man*, London, Collins, Fontana Books, 1969, p. 21.

50 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
The whole of Teilhard's classic work, The Phenomenon of Man, can be seen as a treatise on the inter-relation of spirit and matter and the primacy of spirit in that relation. The book traces the emergence of life from non-life, of thought from life, as well as the development of the noosphere, the modern world and the unfolding designs of future. The whole of the continuum of evolution, the subject of the book, is an accounting of the relation of matter and spirit. Teilhard's principle conviction regarding this relation is that "Spiritual perfection (or conscious 'centricity') and material synthesis (or complexity) are but the two aspects or connected parts of one and the same phenomenon." 51

Teilhard's crowning statement, however, on the primacy of spirit is to be found in the Postscript to The Phenomenon of Man. It is a complex statement; nevertheless, against the background of the foregoing material, its point should be clear.

51 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 66. Donald Gray, in The One and the Many, highlights Teilhard's insistence that spirit, while it is conditioned by the complexity of matter, is not merely the product of matter: "Teilhard's bipolar theory of creative union does indeed demand a respect for the function of the material base but it also argues for the primacy of the spirit which is the principle of unity of the material base and not just its accidental by-product." p. 36.
As regards the value of spirit, I would like to say that from the phenomenal point of view, to which I systematically confine myself, matter and spirit do not present themselves as "things" or "natures" but as simple related variables, of which it behoves us to determine not the secret essence but the curve in function of space and time. And I recall at this level of reflection "consciousness" presents itself and demands to be treated, not as a sort of particular and sustentent entity, but as an "effect," as the "specific effect" of complexity.

Now, within these limits, modest as they are, something very important seems to me to be furnished by experience in favour of the speculations of metaphysics.

On one side, when once we have admitted the above-mentioned transposition of the concept of consciousness, nothing any longer stops us from prolonging downwards toward the lower complexities under an invisible form the spectrum of the "within." In other words, the "psychic" shows itself subtending (at various degrees of concentration) the totality of the phenomenon.

On the other side, followed upward towards the very large complexes, the same "psychic" element from its first appearance in beings, manifests, in relation to its matrix of "complexity," a growing tendency to mastery and autonomy. At the origins of life, it would seem to have been the focus of arrangement (F 1) which, in each individual element, engenders and controls its related focus of consciousness (F 2). But, higher up, the equilibrium is reversed. Quite clearly, first from the "individual threshold of reflection"—if not before—it is F 2 which begins to take charge (by "invention") of the progress of F 1. Then, higher still, that is to say at the approaches (conjectured) of collective reflection, we find F 2 apparently breaking away from its temporo-spatial frame to join up with the supreme and universal focus Omega. After emergence comes emersion. In the perspectives of cosmic involution, not only does consciousness become co-
extensive with the universe, but the universe rests in equilibrium and consistency, in the form of thought, on a supreme pole of interiorisation.

What finer experimental basis could we have on which to found metaphysically the primacy of the spirit? 52

This is an important passage from Teilhard for many reasons. It is actually a statement of the theory of creative union by another name. It describes the dynamics of the evolution of spirit as they have previously been embodied in the theory of the "within" and "without," the theory of "radial" and "tangential" energy, and the law of complexity-consciousness. It places the origins of all existence on the same continuum with the emergence

52 Ibid., pp. 337-338. We should emphasize that while Teilhard saw his argument for the primacy of spirit as acceptable to metaphysics, he did not consider his argument to be a metaphysical one. Cf. Teilhard's remarks, shortly after completing The Phenomenon of Man, in an essay entitled, "Some Reflections of Progress," which appears in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, London, Collins, c. 1964, pp. 64-84: "Let me note there is nothing metaphysical in this. I am not seeking to define either Spirit or Matter. I am simply saying, without leaving the physical field, that the greatest discovery made in this century is probably the realization that the passage of Time may best be measured by the gradual gathering of Matter in superposed groups, of which the arrangement, ever richer and more centralized, radiates outwards from an ever more luminous fringe of liberty and interiority. The phenomenon of growing consciousness on earth, in short, is directly due to the increasingly advanced organization of more and more complicated elements, successively created by the working of chemistry and Life. At the present time I can see
of reflective consciousness and the ultimate pole of spirit—Omega. The latter part of this continuum still remains to be explored in the section on Christogenesis. The above passage also records the uniqueness of the manifestation of spirit starting with man, in which the phenomenon of reflective consciousness permits him to exert some influence, and increasingly so, upon the future direction of evolution. There will be a lot more to say on this last point shortly when Teilhard's theory of personalization is examined. Before moving on to that theory, it is necessary to note the significance of the theory of the primacy of spirit, or the theory of creative union, for the overall Teilhardian synthesis.

Teilhard's interest in the relationship between spirit and matter originates from his childhood. He had a passionate desire, as seen earlier, to find the most enduring substances; the frailty of matter led him to balance his focus in his search for absoluteness by looking beyond matter. This dual pursuit reflects the influence of both his father and mother; his father invested him with an interest in natural history and his mother, of

no more satisfactory solution of the enigma presented to us by the physical progress of the Universe." p. 69.

53 Claude Cuenot, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 2.
whom Teilhard said that he owed "le meilleur de moi-même," invested him with a love for the Sacred Heart. The significance of Teilhard is in how he brought the two interests together.

Teilhard's mind was prone to synthesis. While many thinkers have been led, by a process of analysis, to posit the primacy of matter, Teilhard, by a process of synthesis, was led to posit the primacy of spirit. Nothing else, for him, could account for the emergence of life from non-life, of reflection from non-reflection. Claude Cuenot has summarized well Teilhard's approach of synthesis for discovering spirit:

Spirit, for Teilhard, was above all a unity achieved by synthesis, by a rejection of airtight mental compartments, by allowing the free play of contrary influences, and the result, in Teilhard's own exceptionally endowed spirit, was unquestionably a synthesis in which some seemingly contradictory aspirations were to be found in harmony. In this synthesis the child of earth banded with the child of heaven, in a mystical union richer than that of monist, of pagan, or quietist, since it preserved the values of each of these without falling into their errors. The monist would annihilate his individuality in total unity, whereas it was in total unity that Teilhard would most fully realize his individual—

54 Robert Speaight, Teilhard de Chardin, p. 22. Cf. Teilhard's remarks in "How I Believe," regarding the dual interests of his life; "The originality of my belief lies in its being rooted in two domains of life which are commonly regarded as antagonistic. By upbringing and intellectual training, I belong to the 'Children of heaven'; but by temperament, and by my professional
ness. The pagan adores gods and palpable wood, stone, and metal; but for Teilhard these palpable things were but a ladder to Christ, the God-Man. Leaving the quietist gently racked in a dream of the divine, Teilhard, like Jacob wrestling with the angel, spent his days strenuously wrestling with matter until it yielded the divine.\footnote{55}

Teilhard's theory of creative union was formulated as an attempt to interpret the world in a manner that would yield the divine within matter. As Teilhard himself stated, his theory is

a sort of empirical and pragmatic explanation of the universe, conceived in my mind from the need to reconcile in a solidly coherent system scientific views on evolution (accepted as, in their essence, definitively established) with the innate urge that has impelled me to look for the Divine not in a cleavage with the physical world but through matter, and, in some sort of way, in union with matter.\footnote{56}

Teilhard felt that the theory of creative union might help reveal "the hidden constitution of being";\footnote{57} thus, rather than seeing a problem in the relation of spirit and matter,

\begin{footnotes}

\footnote{56}{Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Science and Christ, p. 44.}

\footnote{57}{Ibid., p. 45.}
\end{footnotes}
Teilhard made this relationship "the very principle by which things may be explained." Thus, by recognizing a relationship between spirit and matter in the first place, and then by positing the primacy of spirit in that relationship, (all defendable according to his scientific phenomenology), Teilhard felt he had the comprehensive synthesis he needed to give a meaning and purpose to evolution. A world-view in which matter would be posited as primary would make thought an aberration, an accident, or a peripheral phenomenon of reality; furthermore, it would remove any logic from the human struggle to progress, grow, overcome, because the whole of the process would be subject to termination, to death. "... there is no virtue in sacrifice when no higher interest is at stake." But a world-view that posits the primacy of spirit allows for the emergence of thought, and thus permanence. As Teilhard states:

58 Ibid.

59 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, pp. 40-41. Elsewhere in another essay Teilhard points out another consequential difference following upon whether it is matter or spirit that is posited as primary: "If the cosmos were basically material, it would be physically incapable of containing man. Therefore, we may conclude (and this is the first step), that it is in its inner being made of spiritual stuff." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 120.
From the moment that it admits thought, a universe can no longer be simply temporary or of limited evolution: it must by its very structure emerge into the absolute. Consequently, however unstable life may appear, however impressive its connexions with limiting space and forces of disintegration, one thing above all is certain: (because it is as certain as the world!): spirit will always succeed, as it has done till now, in defying risks and determinisms. It is the indestructible part of the universe.60

Thus, when Teilhard posited the primacy of spirit he was reporting what he perceived to be the synthesis of the phenomenon of man. It was a perception founded on his paleontological knowledge and which discerned, as a result of the approach of synthesis, the broad dimensions of reality which reached beyond the concretely observable and verifiable.

2. Hominization and the Theory of Personalization

With Teilhard's notion of the primacy of spirit and the theory of creative union the thesis project moved from the foundation and groundwork of a psychology of religious response to the beginning of the elaboration of the dynamics of that psychology. That elaboration continues now with Teilhard's concept of hominization and the theory of personalization.

60 Ibid., p. 41.
To set the stage for the present phase of the study it is necessary to recall the line of argument of the Teilhardian synthesis thus far. Starting with the most significant and distinguishing feature of the phenomenon which is man—that is, his consciousness—Teilhard posited that there is a continuum, extending backwards, from that which is recognized as consciousness in man to a characteristic of the most rudimentary forms of matter which he called the "within." This continuity is the story not only of the present, in that there is an eschalon in the complexity (and thus corresponding consciousness) in the structure of matter from the atom through to man, but it is also the story of the history of existence, from the most rudimentary, original form of existence, through to the emergence of life, and then through to the emergence of thought, that is, the consciousness of man. The theories that have been examined thus far have dealt with the progressive emergence of consciousness, or spirit, throughout evolution. Now, with the concept of hominization and the theory of personalization, Teilhard attempts to interpret what is a new situation, a new plateau in the story of evolution and that is the emergence, with man, of reflection.

When evolution attained the level of reflection in man, it also introduced freedom as a new factor in its
unfolding story. As a result, urgent new questions emerge regarding the future course of evolution. Does evolution stop with man or is it now accumulating its resources for a leap beyond man? Does man's capability for free choice endanger the future course of evolution? Are there any signs in our time of the future design of evolution concomitant with the cultural and technological contributions of man to the process? What is in store for the person and personality in the process of evolution?

From early in his career Teilhard was concerned with this sort of questioning and with the special problems man brings to the evolutionary process. In his war-time essay, "The Struggle Against the Multitude," completed in 1917, he describes some of the consequences that follow, for evolution, upon the appearance of man.

The appearance of the immortal soul produced a formidable crisis of individuation in the world, in other words, a counter-attack by the shrinking, suffering, guilty, Multitude. We have only to use our eyes to see it: a dance of particles that the Brownian movement causes to zig-zag feverishly under the microscope. In that we have an exact image--perhaps, indeed, the reality--of our restless human activity.


62 Ibid., p. 105. This passage is also an early formulation of the notion of hominization, a concept that is integral to the theory of personalization, as we shall see.
This inclination of man, of the noosphere, towards dis-association, fragmentation and multiplicity parallels the inclination to be found in matter. It has already been shown how, with matter, Teilhard felt that this inclination of matter toward multiplicity and entropy had to be inverted or transformed by spirit if indeed the growth of spirit was to continue. A similar inversion or transformation has to occur at the level of man if the growth of spirit is to continue.  

It was Teilhard's conviction that the "temporary disintegration of life is not ordered towards death but towards the more perfect realization and, if need be, the resurrection, of spirit."  

This is the process that Teilhard attempted to describe by his concept of hominization and his theory of personalization. A central part of this process, it will be shown, is the influence of love as the energy of unification.

63 On this point, see Donald Gray, The One and the Many, Teilhard de Chardin's Vision of Unity, London, Burns and Oates, c. 1969: "... if spirit is to be the unifying principle of the noosphere, its inclination towards disassociation and fragmentation must be inverted just as the inclination of matter towards multiplicity must be inverted by spirit if it is to be complexified so as to become the matrix for the growth of spirit." p. 78.

64 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Writings in Time of War, p. 105.
As a preamble to the study of hominization and personalization, it is worthwhile to point out Teilhard's position on the evolution of man himself, that is, his progress as a creature along the scale of evolution. In one of his more scientific essays, written in English, entitled, "Fossil Men. Recent Discoveries and Recent Problems," and published in Peking on Sept. 15, 1943, Teilhard observes that man's capacity for cerebralization may have reached "the maximum physico-chémical complexity allowed by the laws of matter to an isolated organism." But on a socio-cultural level, man's evolution has just begun and more and more of it is in our control a situation that Teilhard was optimistic about. He grounded his optimism on a study of pre-history and on the basis of which he foresaw the development of a "super-humanity." Teilhard's belief in a super-humanity was based on his belief in the individual and vice versa. We find an early expression of the inter-relation of these beliefs


66 Ibid., p. 125.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.
expressed in a manner that amounts to an early formulation
of the theory of personalization without naming it as such--
in "My Universe," completed on March 25, 1924, an essay
already referred to for his theory of creative union:

Gradually . . . my faith in the value of the
individual being has become more sharply defined
and enriched, until it brings me sharp up against
some universally awaited Reality. The intellectual
process is logical. Historically, I am sure, my
mind has travelled in an opposite direction.
It is not I that have laboriously discovered
the whole; it is the whole that has presented
itself to me, imposed itself on me, through a
sort of "cosmic consciousness." It is the
attraction of the whole that has set everything
in motion in me, has animated and given organic
form to everything. It is because I feel the
whole and love it passionately that I believe
in the primacy of being--and that I cannot admit
that life meets a final check--and that I cannot
look for a lesser reward than this whole itself.69

Observers of the contemporary scene might well ask
what basis Teilhard had for expressing such confidence and
optimism in the individual when all around us there is such
convincing evidence of the selfishness of man, of his
propensity for hatred, greed, destructiveness, dishonesty--
in short, the seemingly overwhelming evidence of man's
inhumanity to man. Teilhard was not ignorant of the fact
that his belief in the individual seemed so contrary to
the facts and he faced criticism on this point from every

69 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Science and Christ,
pp. 43-44.
direction. But his reply to the criticism--and his theory of personalization constitutes a reply--is a critical point in the Teilhardian synthesis because if the argument of those who say that man is, in effect, on the road to self-annihilation cannot adequately be refuted, there would be little point for continuing the struggle toward a more humane existence. How, then, does Teilhard respond to his critics and how does he set out his argument for belief in the individual?

It is necessary to begin by getting a clear understanding of a Teilhardian concept that is essential to the theory of personalization, and that is the concept of hominization. Teilhard used this concept in at least three different ways, as W.H. Kenney has pointed out. In some instances he intended it to refer to "the progressive movement of nonreflective animal life towards reflective human life." In other instances, it referred to "the evolutionary but instantaneous passing from nonreflective animal life to reflective human life." And in still other instances, it referred, within the human phase of evolution, to "the evolutionary ascent of mankind through the self-unification of socialisation to the extremely complex

and centred unity of superhumanity." All three uses are relevant to the theory of personalization; the first two uses describe the developmental stages that precede the arena where personalization is being realized, which is the human phase of evolution. "For all intents and purposes, the third usage of "hominization" is synonymous with personalization; if there is a difference, it is a difference merely in focus. As will be shown, the focus of hominization, in its third usage, is on the consequences following upon the phenomenon of thought, that is, following upon the fact that man is a reflective being. The focus of personalization is on the consequences following upon increasing union among persons, one with another. But understanding the focus of personalization requires that we understand the focus of hominization; that is to say, to understand why Teilhard had such confidence and optimism in the individual and in the increased unification of persons, we need to see how Teilhard rooted such confidence and optimism in the fact that man is a reflective being.

One does not find any overt, references by Teilhard to hominization and personalization in any of his wartime writings but certainly there are several places where the roots of these terms are identifiable. For example,
when Teilhard describes, in "The Struggle Against the Multitude," (completed in 1917), the increasing union, since the origin of existence, between originally dissociated points, and the resulting appearance of new properties from such union,\textsuperscript{71} he is describing not only the law of complexity-consciousness (as already pointed out) but he is also describing the dynamics of the emergence of thought from pre-thought; that is, he is describing hominization. Similarly, in the essay, "Creative Union," completed in November, 1917, we find an early formulation of the theory of personalization when Teilhard describes the dynamics of union of persons with persons, precisely because there exists in all beings a common centre, scattered and separable though they are in appearance, they meet together at a deeper level. The more they perfect themselves naturally and sanctify themselves in grace, the more they come together and fuse into one, within the single, unifying centre to which they aspire: and we may call that centre equally well the point upon which they converge, or the ambiance in which they float.\textsuperscript{72}


\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 175. As with the concept of hominization, we also find an early appearance of the notion of personalization in the essay, "Cosmic Life"; "Like
Even here, in these early formulations of the two concepts, we can see how, for a meeting of beings at a deeper level, there has to be thought and consciousness in such beings if maximum union is to be realized.

On May 6, 1923, Teilhard completed an essay entitled, "Hominization," in which, for the first time, he concerns himself explicitly with the phenomenon of thought. In this essay, Teilhard's three stages of the term "hominization" are in evidence. After emphasizing that he wishes to examine humanity as a phenomenon, and with a scientific rather than philosophical approach, he then points out two characteristics of man, "observed from the strictly zoological viewpoint"; the first is the very slight differentiation of man from the animal forms from which he emerged. "[Man] is very much a primate and, as such, molecules whose coming together stimulates dormant properties, so human beings fertilize and complete one another by making contact. . . . Although they never produce a network sufficiently close-knit and unified for us to be able to speak of a true collective soul, yet the interrelations of men represent an essential, cosmic, work "of nature"; they are an indispensable link in the series by which the universe moves towards its perfection." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Writings in Time of War, pp. 36-37.


74 Ibid., p. 53.
preserves with exceptional lustre the zoological characteristics of the most ancient known mammals. "75 This first characteristic, when seen in isolation from the second, can make man erroneously appear to have little significant difference from other animals; "... the absence of easily and absolutely distinctive features in the exterior physiognomy of our race easily inclined the classifiers to underestimate the scientific importance of our first appearance."76 The second characteristic of man, and the more remarkable one, is his "unique power of extending and invading,"77 that is the spreading and continual growth of the human race over the whole face of the earth. "Never, at any epoch," says Teilhard, "has a superior being occupied the earth as extensively as man."78 There are two primary reasons, according to Teilhard, for man's success in spreading over the earth where other creatures have failed, and they are a) man's ability to make tools, and b) humanity, using its instrumental control of the earth, establishes "a true organic

75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p. 54.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 56.
unity founded in itself," that is to say, there is consciousness of a bond within the human group.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 56-61.}

The next step in Teilhard's argument is a critically important one. He points out that just because man is capable of using instruments to construct or make things, it doesn't mean that what he constructs or makes, using instruments, is artificial as opposed to natural. In fact, because we have erroneously set up a division in the past between the natural and the artificial, we have failed to see that man's social and cultural development is on a continuum with his biological evolution.

It is ... because we have assumed in principle that the artificial has nothing natural about it (that is to say because we have not seen that artifice is nature humanized), that we fail to recognize vital analogies as clear as that of the bird and the aeroplane, the fish and the submarine. It is owing to this same fatal assumption that we have for years watched the astonishing system of earth, sea and air routes, postal channels, wires, cables, pulsations in the ether covering the face of the earth more closely every day without understanding. "Merely communications for business or pleasure," they repeat, "the setting up of useful commercial channels." "Not at all," we say; "something much more profound than that: the creation of a true nervous system for humanity; the elaboration of a common consciousness, on a mass scale clearly in the psychological domain and without the suppression of individuals, for the whole of humanity. By developing roads, railways, aeroplanes, the press, the wireless, we think we are only amusing ourselves, or only developing
our commerce, or only spreading ideas. In reality, as anyone can see who tries to put together the general design of human movements and of the movements of all physical organisms, we are quite simply continuing on a higher plane and by other means, the uninterrupted work of biological evolution.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{80} ibid., pp. 59-60. Cf. Teilhard's statement, along much the same lines, in his essay "Hominization and Speciation," completed in 1952: "... since we know for certain that there is a speciating quality somewhere in man, why not, once and for all, recognize and agree, despite the determined resistance of the "leaders" (nearly all non-biologists) in the sciences of man, that natural evolution and cultural evolution are one—to the extent that the latter represents the direct extension and accentuation of the general phenomenon of organic evolution in the hominized world? In man, as the psychological effect of reflexion, the technicamental becomes additive (cumulative) to a degree never reached even by insects." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Vision of the Past, p. 263. Compare this with Teilhard's statements regarding leisure: "... nothing is more unfair or a greater waste of time than to protest and fight against the increasing leisure towards which the machine is inexorably leading us. Without the very many automatic processes whose business it is to make our various bodily organs work "on their own," none of us, it is obvious, would have any "leisure" to create, to love, or to think: the necessity to look after our "metabolism" would occupy us entirely. Similarly (and allowing, of course, for all the difficulties associated with the absorption of a too sudden release of manpower) we must realize that the continually more complete industrialisation of the world is simply the human-collective form of a universal process of vitalisation which, in this as in all the other cases, can only lead, if we know the right way in which to approach it, to interiorization and freedom.” Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Man's Place in Nature, London, Collins, Fontana Books, c. 1966, pp. 104-105. Teilhard again rejects the dichotomy between "natural" and "artificial" in his essay, "The Stuff of the Universe" in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Activation of Energy, pp. 377-378. Consider also the
This insistence by Teilhard that culture is on a continuum with biological evolution is in tandem with the significance he places upon the fact that man is a thinking being. In fact, man's discovery and use of the artificial instrument, as he points out, is a direct result of reflexion, which is "the faculty possessed by every human consciousness of turning in on itself in order to recognize the conditions and mechanism of its activity." On the other hand, man's ability to spread over the face of the earth is a direct result of a phenomenon, different from but related to reflexion, which Teilhard calls "conspiration." Conspiration, he explains, is the aptitude of different consciousnesses, taken in a group, to unite (by language and countless other, more obscure links) so as to

following remarks from his essay, "The Human Rebound of Evolution and its Consequences," completed in 1948: "That Man displays powers of invention in the creative use of his reflective faculties, that is to say, acts in accordance with an inner sense of purpose, is so apparent that no one has ever thought of denying it. But this fact remained suspended in a void, and without precise significance, while Man, and his activities appeared to be isolated and as it were unattached in the bosom of Nature. The whole situation changes, if for reasons solidly bound up with the general structure of the Universe, we regard the process of hominization, with all its accoutrement of social and "artificial" arrangements, as a prolongation and organic continuance of the grand cosmic phenomenon of the vitalization of matter". Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, London, Collins, Fontana Books, c. 1964, p. 208.

81 Ibid., p. 60.
constitute a single All, in which, by way of
reflexion, each element is conscious of its
aggregation to all the rest. 82

Again, one is shown the significance Teilhard places on
the phenomenon of thought.

Thus far in this particular essay, Teilhard has
identified particular characteristics of man that stem
from the fact that he is a reflective being. Teilhard's
next step is to show that the spread of thought over the
face of the earth is a development as significant as the
spread of life itself over the face of the earth. He
introduces us here explicitly to the concept of hominization;

... what we now propose is to regard the
thinking envelope of the biosphere as of the
same order of zoological (or if you like
telluric magnitude) as the biosphere itself.
Unless we give up all attempts to restore man
to his place in the general history of earth
as a whole without damaging him or dis-
organizing it, we must place him above it,
without, however, uprooting him from it.
And this amounts to imagining, in one way or
another, above the animal biosphere a human
sphere, the sphere of reflexion, of conscious
invention, of the conscious unity of souls
(the noosphere, if you will) and to conceiving,
at the origin of this new entity, a phenomenon
of specific transformation affecting pre-
existent life: hominization. 83

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., p. 63. This appears to be the first time
that Teilhard uses the concept of the noosphere. Some
thirty years later, in his essay "The Heart of Matter,"
Hominization, that is, the phenomenon of thought and the emergence of thought from pre-thought, is of such significance for Teilhard that he feels, without it, we could not logically be able to place man in a continuum with the rest of evolution, nor would we be able to submit man to scientific study.

Humanity cannot be less than this [hominization] without losing what constitutes its most certain physical characteristics or (what would be equally deplorable) without becoming a reality impossible to place scientifically among the other terrestrial objects. Either humanity is a fact without precedent or measure; in which case it does not fit into our natural categories, and our science is valueless. Or it represents a new turn in the mounting spiral of things; and in this case we can see no other turn to correspond with it lower down except the very first organization of matter. Nothing can be compared with the coming of reflective consciousness except the appearance of consciousness itself. 84

Thus, while hominization may represent "a new turn" in evolution, it is in character with the whole of evolution;

Teilhard recalls having first used the concept in an article on Man, "written about 1927." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Heart of Matter," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Heart of Matter, London, Collins, c. 1978, p. 30. The editor, in a footnote to this passage, identifies the article as "Hominization." But he mistakenly dates it as having been written in May, 1925, when in fact, it was written in May, 1923. See The Heart of Matter, footnote 9, p. 78.

84 Ibid.
the appearance of consciousness itself is the significant
phenomenon, but it is a phenomenon that has emerged on
the building blocks of the whole of evolution. It will
be recognized that this is in keeping with Teilhard's
theory of the within and his law of complexity-consciousness,
both of which have already been examined.

85 For another statement by Teilhard on the unique-
ness but also the continuity between the emergence of
thought and the rest of evolution, see his essay, completed
in 1923, entitled "Man's Place in Nature," in Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin, The Vision of the Past, pp. 175-182.
Note particularly the following remarks: "Let us observe
the profound changes that took place in our world when
thought broke into flower and we shall recognize as
clearly as in the case of other scientific truth that
with man, it was not only one more species characterized
by certain details of the skull and limbs, appearing in
the crowd of others, it was a new state of life manifesting
itself in nature. Thought is an actual physical energy
sui generis, which has succeeded in a few hundred centuries
in covering the entire face of the earth with a network
of linked forces." p. 180. And, "Thought has never yet
been studied in the same way as the immensities of matter,
as a reality of cosmic and evolutionary nature," p. 181.
Similarly, in his essay, "The Spirit of the Earth," completed
in 1931, Teilhard explains that the phenomenon of humaniza-
tion is rooted in the very nature of the cosmos itself as
a living entity; "No, the cosmos could not possibly be
explained as a dust of unconscious elements, on which
life, for some incomprehensible reason burst into flower--
as an accident or as a mould. But it is fundamentally
and primarily living, and its complete history is ultimately
nothing but an immense psychic exercise; the slow pro-
gressive attaining of a diffused consciousness--a gradual
escape from the "material" conditions which, secondarily,
veil it in an initial state of extreme plurality." Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin, "The Spirit of the Earth," in Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 23.
Finally, in "Human Energy," completed in 1937, Teilhard
The Teilhardian Synthesis—Part Two

Teilhard's notion of hominization is further developed in several other essays. In "The Spirit of the Earth," completed in 1931, Teilhard points out a consequence, and likely the most important one, of the emergence of thought:

the biodynamical consequences of the appearance of thought in the biosphere reproduce, in a higher realm, those of the first appearance of organic life. At the birth of the biosphere the "juvenile" qualities of terrestrial matter, which thereafter became incapable of producing more life, were breathed into the universe. In the opening on its stem of the human flower, animal life in its turn probably exhausted all its power of "reflexion." Consequently no other thought could ever arise on earth beside human thought, either as a competitor or an ally. And no other thought could come to replace it either, if by some

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... describes again a progression in evolution that climaxes in reflexion: "... the spiritual layers of the universe have undergone a joint movement, drawing them towards a growing concentration of the quantity of consciousness which they contain. The appearance of the firmament would be unintelligible to the astronomer without the gyration of the nebular masses. The texture of a twig would be inexplicable without the development of the plant. Likewise, man's position in nature cannot be explained without a factor of psychic growth. No, the universe was not born without motion; its structure betrays (at least in the past) a global evolution of its mass towards an even increasing interiorization, leading finally to reflexion." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Human Energy," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, pp. 120-121.

general desertion or disappearance, it should ever be cut off. Hence this conclusion--scientifically based, we think, and inevitable: In the human spirit, as in a single irreplaceable fruit the whole life of earth—that is to say, in brief, its whole cosmic value—is gathered and sublimated. 87

Also in this essay we are given an instance of the clear relation, in Teilhard's mind, between hominization and personalization. Since it is intended to dwell on this relation in some detail, shortly, we need only quote Teilhard here: "Let us say, in fact, substituting one equivalent formula for another, that by the capital event of hominization, the most advanced portion of the cosmos has become personalized. 88 In this essay we are also shown the relation between the emergence of thought and the emergence of morality, 89 religion 90 and the question of human action in general. 91

87 Ibid., p. 28.

88 Ibid., p. 45. Compare this to the following statement in Teilhard's The Phenomenon of Man, written 10 years later: "We thus reach the personalization of the individual by the hominization of the whole group." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 193. In effect we can conclude that both processes are interdependent.

89 Ibid., p. 30.

90 Ibid., p. 44.

91 Ibid., pp. 29-31. See also The Phenomenon of Man, pp. 249-257, for a further treatment of the problem of action. We shall have occasion to examine this problem later in this section.
In the essay, "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe," completed in 1936, and which will be examined in detail in the section on personalization, Teilhard provides us with an example of when he distinguishes between types of hominization—in this case, between that which describes the emergence of thought and that which describes the emergence of human thought, or reflexion:

Reflexion, the sudden and total transition from the diffuse to the single-pointed marks and defines the coming of an absolutely new state of consciousness. With it, thought breaks into being and life, "hominized" life takes possession of the earth for a second time.93

In "The Phenomenon of Spirituality," completed in 1937,94 Teilhard speaks of hominization as "a decisive and critical point in the gradual development". from a less spiritual state to a more spiritual state.95

The different possible meanings for hominization are again brought out in Teilhard's classic work, The


93 Ibid., pp. 59-60.


95 Ibid., p. 111.
THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS--PART TWO

Phenomenon of Man,  
completed in 1940. He states;

Hominization can be accepted in the first place as the individual and instantaneous leap from instinct to thought, but it is also, in a wider sense, the progressive phyletic spiritualization in human civilization of all the forces contained in the animal world.  

It is in The Phenomenon of Man that Teilhard develops at length the notions of noogenesis and the noosphere although, up to this point, they had been briefly introduced in several of his earlier essays. These terms refer exclusively to the human, that is the present, phase of hominization. Noogenesis refers to "the engendering and subsequent development of the mind."  

The noosphere refers to the process, still going on, whereby an envelope of human thought is spreading over the earth, just as the biosphere is a membrane of living organisms covering the earth. As Teilhard puts it;

The recognition and isolation of a new era in evolution, the era of noogenesis, obliges us to distinguish correlatively a support proportionate to the operation—that is to say, yet another membrane in the majestic assembly of telluric layers. A flow ripples outward from the first spark of conscious reflection. The point of ignition grows larger. The fire spreads in

96 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man.  
97 Ibid., p. 200.  
98 Ibid., p. 201.
ever widening circles till finally the whole planet is covered with incandescence. Only one interpretation, only one name can be found worthy of this grand phenomenon. Much more coherent and just as extensive as any preceding layer, it is really a new layer, the "thinking layer," which, since its germination at the end of the Tertiary era, has spread over and above the world of plants and animals. In other words, outside and above the biosphere there is the noosphere.\footnote{99}

For Teilhard, with the arrival, and continuing development, of the noosphere—that is, with the arrival of the human phase of hominization—"we have the beginning of a new age. The earth 'gets a new skin.' Better still, it finds its soul."\footnote{100}

After tracing, through two chapters, the gradual development of the noosphere (which is to say, the steps of hominization), from the pre-hominian stage through the neolithic stage to the beginning of the modern age, Teilhard expresses the opinion that the greatest stage of hominization is the present one.

\ldots life is taking a step, and a decisive step, in us and in our environment. After the long maturation that has been steadily going on during the apparent immobility of the agricultural

\footnote{99}{Ibid., p. 202.}

\footnote{100}{Ibid.}

\footnote{101}{"The Birth of Thought" and "The Deployment of the Noosphere" in The Phenomenon of Man, pp. 181-234.}
centuries, the hour has come at last, characterized by the birth pangs inevitable in another change of state. There were the first men—those who witnessed our origin. There are others, who will witness the great scenes to the end. To us, in our brief span of life, falls the honour and good fortune of coinciding with a critical change of the noosphere.

In these confused and restless zones in which present blends with future in a world of upheaval, we stand face to face with all the grandeur, the unprecedented grandeur, of the phenomenon of man. Here if anywhere, now if ever, have we, more legitimately than any of our predecessors, the right to think that we can measure the importance and detect the direction of the process of hominization.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 236-237:}

In placing such a great value on the present stage of hominization Teilhard is leading to one of the most important areas, for this thesis, of his synthesis—the argument, (also presented in at least three other essays),\footnote{"Hominization," in \textit{The Vision of the Past}, pp. 51-79, and "Hominization and Speciation," in \textit{The Vision of the Past}, pp. 256-267, and "The Human Rebound of Evolution," in \textit{The Future of Man}, pp. 204-221.} that cultural evolution is on a continuum with biological evolution. Furthermore, it is the most vital (because it is the most conscious and most complex) stage of the hominization process. As Teilhard states, "The social phenomenon is the culmination and not the attenuation of
the biological phenomenon."\textsuperscript{104} What has changed mankind so much in the last four or five generations, says Teilhard, is that there has been an awakening; "... we have become conscious of the movement which is carrying us along, and have thereby realized the formidable problems set us by this reflective exercise of the human effort."\textsuperscript{105}

Teilhard identifies the "formidable problems" as being the "problem of action"\textsuperscript{106} in general. We recognize it in our modern world as "a feeling of futility, of being crushed by the enormities of the cosmos."\textsuperscript{107} Consciousness, in modern times, of the fact of evolution presents a new problem for man; it creates a disquiet, an uncertainty, about whether there will be "an outcome--a suitable outcome--to that evolution."\textsuperscript{108} As a consequence, Teilhard feels, modern man needs to approach the future with some assurances,

In the critical disposition of mind we shall be in from now on, one thing is clear. We shall

\textsuperscript{104} Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 237.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., pp. 249-257.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 250.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p. 252.
never bend our backs to the task that has been allotted us of pushing noogenesis onwards except on condition that the effort demanded of us has a chance of succeeding and of taking us as far as possible. An animal may rush headlong down a blind alley or towards a precipice. Man will never take a step in a direction he knows to be blocked. . . . Having got so far, what are the minimum requirements to be fulfilled before we can say that the road ahead of us is open? There is only one, but it is everything. It is that we should be assured the space and the chances to fulfil ourselves, that is to say, to progress till we arrive (directly or indirectly, individually or collectively) at the utmost limits of ourselves. . . . Unique in this respect among all the energies of the universe, consciousness is a dimension to which it is inconceivable and even contradictory to ascribe a ceiling or to suppose that it can double back upon itself. There are innumerable critical points on the way, but a halt or a reversion is impossible, and for the simple reason that every increase of internal vision is essentially the germ of a further vision which includes all the others and carries still further on.109

Thus Teilhard feels that if we understand the dynamic nature of consciousness, as verified by its onward thrust along the continuum of evolution, then we can believe

109 Ibid., p. 254. In his essay, "Human Energy," Teilhard advises us, once we become aware of our part in the process of rising consciousness, to participate ever more fully in that process and to trust in the value of our action. "Only one way remains open to us: to trust in the infallibility and finally beatifying value of the action in which we are involved. In us the world's evolution towards spirit has become conscious. Our perfection, our interest, our salvation as elements can depend therefore on nothing less than pushing this evolution forward with all our strength." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 124.
that the attainment of hominization is not without purpose or direction. But we must distinguish between an "elementary hominization" and another hominization developing above us, "a collective one of the whole species. The collective hominization follows upon the hominization of individuals. This is, in essence, a process of human socialization. Teilhard describes the process as a new postulate that replaces and extends two other postulates--the primacy of life in the universe and the primacy of reflection in life. "This is the third option--the most decisive of all--which completes the definition and clarification of my scientific

II0 Ibid., p. 334. Elsewhere, Teilhard speaks of the development of a collective human consciousness, "I do not think that I would be mistaken ... in saying that the idea is gaining ground in scientific circles, and will soon be generally accepted, that the biological process now taking place in mankind consists, specifically and essentially, in the progressive development of a collective human consciousness. It is becoming continually more evident that the general phenomenon of life can be reduced, biochemically, to the gradual building up of ultra-complex, and in consequence ultra-organized, molecular groupings. Through its axial, living portion, the universe is drifting, simultaneously and in just the same way, towards the super-complex, the super-centred, the super-conscious." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Christ the Evolver" (1942), in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, London, Collins, c. 1971, pp. 140-141. Note the emphasis on the biological nature of the development. The "collective human consciousness" (the noosphere) is, in effect, the product of the biological process of collective hominization.
position as regards the phenomenon of man. "III

Collective hominization follows upon the hominization of individuals through the process of socialization. There are two types of socialization, according to Teilhard. In his small book, Man's Place in Nature, II2 which he completed in 1949, he speaks of the socialization of expansion II3 which consists of civilization and individuation, and the socialization of compression II4 which consists of totalization and personalization. To illustrate the differences between the two types of socialization as well as their relationship, Teilhard has us consider the two hemispheres of the earth:

Supposing we imagine, inside a solid comparable to our terrestrial globe, a wave starting from the South Pole and rising up towards the North Pole. Taken over its whole course, the wave in question advances in a curved and therefore "converging" medium; and yet at the same time, during the first half of its passage (as far, that is, as the Equator) it is spreading outwards; beyond that point, however, it begins to contract upon itself. Well, then: if we follow the historical development of the noosphere, we may

III Ibid.
II3 Ibid., chapt. iv, pp. 79-95.
II4 Ibid., chapt. v, pp. 96-121.
truthfully say that it seems to conform to an exactly similar rhythm. From its origin until our own time, mankind while gathering itself together and already in the first stages of organization centred upon itself certainly went through a period of geographical expansion, during which its first concern was to multiply and inhabit the earth. And it is only quite recently that, "once the frontier was crossed," the first symptoms appeared in the world of a definitive, global, folding back upon itself of the thinking mass within a higher hemisphere: and once that has been entered, it can, under the influence of time, advance only by contracting and concentrating itself.

Thus we find a reversal of the socialization of expansion, to culminate in socialization of compression. II5

According to this model, then, the process of the hominization is represented by the same wave, continuing past the Equator and converging onto the north pole. It is not necessary, for our purposes, that we examine the socialization of expansion in any depth, but we must look at the socialization of compression since it is here that the theory of personalization is relevant.

But first, it is worth examining Teilhard's remarks on the process of socialization in general. In one of his last essays, "The Singularities of the Human

II5 Ibid., pp. 81-82. We see this model used again in "The Reflection of Energy," completed in 1952. See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Activation of Energy, p. 328.
Species, II6 completed in 1954, Teilhard tells us that we need no longer doubt the certainty and momentum of the phenomenon of socialization itself.

Multiplied by the play of reproduction, living individuals no longer align themselves only, conforming to the laws of speciation, in a system of ramified phyla. From the very lowest zoological forms they (all, though in different degrees) at the same time manifest an evident tendency to join together: sometimes by links of a mainly physiological kind, giving birth to kinds of poly-organisms (colonies of Coelenterata); and sometimes by mainly psychic links (colonies of insects) leading to true societies. No individual without a population and no population without association. II7

While we may note this phenomenon in pre-human life, with man we seem to think that the inclination toward union is accidental, in Teilhard's view. Rather, we must see human socialization, he states, as on a continuum with a biological process.

Would not the whole spectacle of the world become clearer to our eyes if only, looking what is new and extraordinary in the face, we could make up our minds to admit that, after the atoms, the molecules and the cells, it is whole animals, it is men themselves for whom the moment has now come: that the universe is now engaging them in its syntheses in order that the vortex of evolution may continue to coil on itself? II8


II7 Ibid., pp. 237-238.

II8 Ibid.
The evidence that we have not yet widely understood or embraced this point of view is in the fear, mistrust and lack of optimism in the modern human spirit. Rather than be afraid, Teilhard feels we should be reassured by the socialization process.

For, in the course of this unprecedented biographical operation of a whole species "imploding" on itself, we stand at this moment precisely at the sensitive, "equatorial" point; here the evolution of Homo sapiens, having hitherto been expansive, is now beginning to become compressive. Inevitably this change of condition, at its onset, gave us a kind of vertigo. But enlightened at last by a little more knowledge, we now see that we can face the high pressures of the upper hemisphere, which we have just entered, without fear. Without fear, I say; for, by the very mechanism of cosmogenesis the forces of planetary contraction at present being released will inevitably win our consent to more arrangement, that is to say, in the long run, to more consciousness—provided that we obey them.

Here then are the compass and road we needed and were looking for, both contained in this very simple formula:

"Under all circumstances always advance upwards, where technically, mentally and affectively everything (in us and around us) most rapidly converges."

Truly an infallible rule, since by virtue of a curve inherent in the universe itself we cannot follow it without drawing nearer (even in the thickest darkness) to some supreme and saving pole of super-consciousness. II9

II9 Ibid., p. 239.
Thus, the process of socialization, operating in tandem with the process of hominization, is a process towards increased complexity and, therefore, towards increased consciousness and towards increased union. It is a process whereby the individual is invited to unite with other individuals (in accordance with his perception of that invitation) and, as will be seen in the last section of the Teilhardian synthesis, it is union for the sake of greater humanness under the unifying tendency and design of Omega. At this point we need to understand the law and process of personalization in the convergent phase of socialization.

It has already been shown how in Teilhard's earlier essays there are indications he was developing a theory of personalization. Then, in a letter to one of his friends, Leontine Zanta, dated August 23, 1929, Teilhard reveals that he has come to a clearer understanding of the meaning of "person" and personalization,

I would like to be with you, in "the" armchair, so as to explain yet another thing to you. I mean the extraordinary development that the notion or value of the "person" has taken on in my intellectual constructions. After spending some ten years over the very simple reversal of views

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120 For example, "My Universe" (1924) in Science and Christ, pp. 43-44, and "Creative Union" (1917) in Writings in Time of War, p. 175.
on the world which consists in searching for the
consistence of the universe, that is to say of
evolution, ahead, in Spirit (and not behind, in
matter), I now perceive this other elementary
truth, namely that Spirit could never reach
fulfillment save in personality (or hyper-
personality). And thus the fundamental problem
of action ("How to save/justify the value of and
taste for progress in the eyes of reflective,
hominized consciousness?") comes down to that of
personalization ("How to save the individual human
personality, and how to conceive a personality
of the universe?"). From this fact I find myself
back at giving primacy (in the universe) to the
immortal soul and to the risen Christ; that is to
say I have rediscovered the exact Christian per-
spective, but grafted (as it should be) onto a
universal and evolutive perspective. Thenceforth
the "Person" is no longer a sort of plural and
artificial absolute. It is the bound-up product
of an immense labour of concentration. Evolution =
spiritualization = personalization.121

The above was written some five months after
Teilhard completed (February-March, 1929) an essay entitled,
"The Sense of Man."122 The essay concerns itself with what
Teilhard considers man’s need for an all-embracing God
"conceived as the supreme centre of personalization."123
Consciousness of such a need comes to the individual via
a three-step thought process which, when it is carefully
followed through, leaves the individual with the awareness

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121 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Letters to Leontine

122 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Sense of Man,"
in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Toward the Future, London,

123 Ibid., p. 36.
that without such an all-embracing God there is meaninglessness and nothingness. Teilhard's argument is as follows:

The more man, under the impulse of the sense of the human, is entranced by the idea that he may expect some great outcome from carrying further even his "secular" effort, the more will he find that he must exalt the value of personalization and of the person, which is the supreme human work. The more, again, man becomes alive to the idea of "the human function in the universe" and so attains a higher appreciation of the part played in the world by the forces of deliberate choice and consciousness, the more will he understand that the appearance on earth of reflective thought entails almost necessarily another "reflection" to complete and balance it: after the reflection of the monad upon itself, the reflection of the whole upon the monad—in other words, a revelation. Finally, the more man becomes conscious of the high seriousness and the hazards of being and is thereby led to question what rights the universe has over his freedom, the more unavoidable will he find this third conclusion—that if no tangible element can give him clear evidence of the intervention of a real term to the world (can guarantee him, that is, the existence of such a term) then no argument of his own individual reason, no agreement of other minds, however unanimous it be, can rid him of this doubt (which means the death, the physical death, of his activity and his essential zest for living): "Does the world really provide the way out of which we dream? Are we not life's dupes?" I24

What Teilhard is saying here, it seems, is that the more conscious man is of his true nature, the more conscious he

I24 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
becomes of a dialogue between his spirit and that of an all-embracing God and that, furthermore, without such an all-embracing God there would be, ultimately, meaninglessness. But when there is a consciousness of such a reality, there is an inclination in the spirit of man to move towards it. This process can be described as a dialectic of invitation and response. But the reality toward which we move is seen as the supreme centre of personalization. Thus, the matrix of our response to such a supreme centre of personalization is by becoming more fully persons and by uniting with other full persons. There is, then, a dialectic of invitation and response among men. In this context it is important to understand the dynamics of becoming more fully persons and of the union of person with person in the Teilhardian synthesis.

Those dynamics are presented in some detail in an essay Teilhard completed in 1936 entitled, "Sketch of

I25 In an essay entitled "Some Reflections On Progress," completed in 1941, Teilhard states, along similar lines, that with an increase in consciousness, the individual is brought to a fuller awareness of the values of personalization and transcendency; "Once he has been brought to accept the reality of a Noogenesis, the believer in this World will find himself compelled to allow increasing room, in his vision of the future, for the values of personalization and transcendency. Of personalization, because a Universe in process of psychic concentration is identical with a Universe that
a Personalistic Universe," and another completed in 1937 entitled, "Human Energy." Several other essays are also relevant and will be examined as well.

"Sketch of a Personalistic Universe" begins, as do so many of Teilhard's essays, with an affirmation of the primacy of reflection: "The general lines of the universe stand out and fall into groups if looked at from the position of the thinking being with whom we naturally coincide." What is original with this essay is the association Teilhard makes between man's capacity for reflection and the characteristics of personality. Fundamentally, Teilhard is attempting to discern the direction of evolution;

is acquiring a personality. And transcendency because the ultimate stage of "cosmic" personalization, if it is to be supremely consistent and unifying, cannot be conceived otherwise than as having emerged by its summit from the elements it super-personalizes as it unites them to itself." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Some Reflections on Progress," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, pp. 53-92.


As a point of departure for this attempt, I choose once more the hypothesis strongly indicated by the finding of biology, that consciousness has continuously grown through living beings, and that the reflective, personal form that it has attained in man is the most characteristic that we know.\textsuperscript{129}

This is in accordance with a discernible movement in evolution;

The fact of evolution comes to remind us that the principle movement of reality is a synthesis, in the course of which plurality manifests itself in increasingly complex and organic forms, each further degree of unification being accompanied by a growth of inner consciousness and freedom.\textsuperscript{130}

These dimensions of inner consciousness and freedom constitute, for Teilhard, personality.

Departing from man and descending towards origins, consciousness appears to grow slack and diffuse, and finally to become unidentifiable. Towards man, as we ascend the axis of time, spontaneity awakes, organizes itself, and finally reflects on itself by emerging into "personality."\textsuperscript{131}

Teilhard makes a subtle but important distinction in this essay between what he calls the "state of personality" and the "personal molecule" and the distinction between the emergence of thought and the emergence of reflexion.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 53-54.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}
THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS--PART TWO

Reflexion, the sudden and total transition from the diffuse to the single-pointed, marks and defines the coming of an absolutely new state of consciousness. With it, thought breaks into being and life, "hominized" life takes possession of the earth for a second time.

Before man, the slow maturing, by way of frail individualities, of a state of personality.

In man, by way of a critical point, the first appearance of unity, of the completed personal molecule.\(^{132}\)

Teilhard recognizes that man's capacity for reflexion, and consequently for freedom, can be the source of many obstacles to the cause of human brotherhood. Men are tempted by egoism and independence.\(^{133}\) But such temptation, he feels, is attractive to us because we fail to make a distinction; "The cause of our dislike of collectivity lies in the illusion which makes us stubbornly identify "personal" with "individual".\(^{134}\) But ultimately, there is little danger, according to Teilhard, that the majority of men would fall to such temptation.

\(^{132}\) Ibid., pp. 59-60.

\(^{133}\) Ibid., p. 62.

\(^{134}\) Ibid., p. 64. Teilhard explains the difference between the terms in his essay, "Centrology", completed in 1944: "What makes a centre "individual" is that it is distinct from the other centres that surround it. What makes it "personal" is being profoundly itself. We would instinctively be inclined to add to our ego by an increased separatism and isolation—which is an impoverishment to us. The laws of union show us that true and legitimate "egoism" consists, on the contrary,
If the world were ripe in our souls we should find equilibrium and rest in our completion. We should be able to be self-enclosed. Now the contrary is the case; we are constantly escaping from ourselves in our very effort to possess ourselves. What we love in the last resort in our personality is always "another" ahead of us. We are incomplete, unfinished. There must therefore be a way out at the end of the blind alley in which the mechanism of personalization might seem to have confined us. Despite the antipathies with which it is riddled, the human mass is not a divergent plurality, but a multiple destined once more to undergo the synthesizing process of life.  

in being united to others (provided the union be centre-to-centre, that is through love—cf. section 29); for it is only in that case that we succeed in realizing ourselves fully, without losing anything (but rather attaining the true maximum) of what makes us incomunicable. If individuality is understood in a restricted sense, as defining not the distinction between beings, but their separateness, it decreases with centrogenesis and ceases to exist (in Omega), when personality reaches it maximum." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Centrology," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Activation of Energy, p. 117.

I35 Ibid., pp. 62-63. Teilhard's belief that we are "destined once more to undergo the synthesizing process of life" is based on his conviction that mankind is experiencing what he calls a rebounding of evolution upon itself. Using the analogy of multi-staged rockets that rebound with the ignition of each new stage, he describes, in "The Formation of the Noosphere" (1947), a similar process in the development of man; "The first stage was the elaboration of lower organisms, up to and including Man, by the use and irrational combination of elementary sources of energy received or released by the planet. The second stage is the super evolution of Man, individually and collectively, by the use of refined forms of energy scientifically harnessed and applied in the bosom of the Noosphere, thanks to the co-ordinated efforts of all men working reflectively and unanimously.
We are faced, then, with a problem: on the one hand, we treasure the identity we have and fear any loss of individuality that might ensue from communication and union with others, and on the other hand, we sense the need of such communication and union to further develop the very

upon themselves. Who can say whither, coiled back upon our own organism, our combined knowledge of the atom, of hormones, of the cell and the laws of heredity will take us? Who can say what forces may be released, what radiations, what new arrangements never hitherto attempted by Nature, what formidable powers we may henceforth be able to use, for the first time in the history of the World? This is Life setting out upon a second adventure from the springboard it established when it created humankind." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Formation of the Noosphere," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, p. 183. But for such a rebounding to happen, Teilhard tells us in "The Human Rebound of Evolution" (1947), two conditions must be met; "The first . . . is that in one way or another Consciousness, the flowering of Complexity, must survive the ultimate dissolution from which nothing can save the corporeal and planetary stem which bears it. From the moment when Evolution begins to think itself it can no longer live with or further itself except by knowing itself to be irreversible—that is, to say, immortal. . . . The second condition, no more than an amplification of the first, is that the irreversibility, thus revealed and accepted, must apply not to any part, but to all that is deepest, most precious and most incommunicable in our consciousness. So that the process of vitalization in which we are engaged may be defined at its upper limit (whether we envisage the system as a whole or the destiny of each separate element within it) in terms of "ultrapersonalization." An irreversible rise towards the personal: unless it satisfies one or other of these conjoined attributes, the Universe (psycho-analytically dosed, if I may put it that way) can only become stifling for all reflective activity, that is to say, radically unsuited to any rebound of Evolution." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Human Rebound of Evolution," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, pp. 214-215.
individuality we treasure. From the perspective of seeking a renewal for psychology of religion, this is a crucial problem. As stated earlier, a renewed psychology of religion intends a comprehensive approach to the whole of reality (that is why it has been proposed to base such a psychology of religion on the Teilhardian synthesis). It is an open stance to the whole of reality in order that one may maximize his potential for perceiving—and, thus; also responding to—any manifestations of the sacred within the breadth of human experiencing. Consequently, an individual who holds back, out of a fear of loss of self, in the communicating and uniting of self with others might be incapacitating himself, to a corresponding degree, of perceiving the manifestations of the sacred inasmuch as such manifestations might occur in the whole range of intercourse among persons. Indeed, the stance of openness is the stance necessary for the advancement of the process of personalization. That is to say, a renewed psychology of religion, with its concept of religious response, intends to provide the foundation and the dynamics for the advancement of the process of personalization.

To return to Teilhard's observations, it is his opinion that man often attempts to grow by isolating himself out of a fear that communicating with others will
somehow lead to a diminishment of personality. Such a fear is removed, he claims, if we understand a principle law of union.

Man avoids communication with another because he is afraid that by sharing he will diminish his personality. He seeks to grow by isolating himself. Now if the universe is organically possible (that is to say if it does not place us by birth in a mechanically impossible position) the very opposite is true. The gift we make of our being, far from threatening our ego, must have the effect of completing it . . . true union does not fuse the elements it brings together, by mutual fertilization and adaptation it gives them a renewal of vitality. It is egoism that hardens and neutralizes the human stuff. Union differentiates.136

Thus, the problem we started off with (the opposite pull of inclinations to preserve our ego, identity and personality on the one hand, and to communicate and unite with others on the other) is provided with a solution when we realize that union with others enhances our personality rather than diminishes it.

The problem and the solution, as here presented, is given an extended treatment in an essay written some nine years (1945) after "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe" entitled "The Grand Option."137

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136 Ibid., p. 63.

Teilhard's concern in "The Grand Option" is to examine all the possible alternatives, and attempt to discern the best course to follow (that is to say, the "grand option") when considering the future of evolution and Mankind. He sees three initial alternatives: "a) pessimism or optimism; b) the optimism of withdrawal or the optimism of evolution; c) evolution in terms of the many or the unit."\textsuperscript{138} These three pairs of alternatives, according to Teilhard, offer four possibilities for us to choose from:

- to cease to act, by some form of suicide;
- to withdraw through a mystique of separation;
- to fulfill ourselves individually by egoistically segregating ourselves from the mass; or to plunge resolutely into the stream of the whole in order to become part of it.\textsuperscript{139}

But which option are we to take and on what basis shall we make our choice? What will be our criterion? We shall find our criterion, Teilhard answers, in the growth and development of a greater consciousness.

More than a century ago the physicists observed that, in the world as we know it, the fraction of unusable energy (entropy) is constantly increasing; and they found in this a mathematical

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 43. The problem examined earlier in "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe" falls primarily under the third alternative.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.
expression of the irreversibility of the cosmos. This absolute of physics has thus far not only resisted all attempts at "relativisation," but, if I am not mistaken, it tends to find its counterpart in a current moving in the opposite sense, positive and constructive, which is revealed by the study of the earth's biological past: the ascent of the Universe towards zones of increasing improbability and personality. Entropy and life; backward and forward: two complementary expressions of the arrow of time. For the purposes of human action, entropy (a mass-effect rather than a law of the unit) is without meaning. Life, on the other hand, if it is understood to be the growing interiorisation of cosmic matter, offers to our freedom of choice a precise line of direction. Confronted by the phenomenon of "socialization" in which Mankind is irresistibly involved, do we seek to know how to act that we may better conform to the secret processes of the world of which we are a part? Then of the alternatives that are offered we must choose the one which seems best able to develop and preserve in us the highest degree of consciousness."
condemned by the very fact of our existence. I42 Regarding
the second alternative—the optimism of withdrawal or the
optimism of evolution—we must ask which option is in the
direction of a higher state of consciousness. I43 Teilhard's
answer is in the direction of evolution.

... so long as the world around us continues,
even in suffering and disorder, to yield a
harvest of problems, ideas and new forces, it
is a sign that we must continue to press
forward in the conquest of matter. Any
immediate withdrawal from a world of which
the burden grows heavier every day is denied
to us, because it would certainly be pre-
mature. I44

The third alternative is between evolution in terms of
the many or evolution in terms of the unit. As Teilhard
phrases the question, "Are we to reject or accept human
socialization, elect for a divergent or a convergent
world?" I45 If we choose a divergent world, that is if
we reject socialization, then we would be admitting to
the primacy of matter over spirit, Teilhard claims.

So there is no way out, if we wish to safe-
guard the pre-eminence of the spirit, except
by taking the one road that remains to us,

I42 Ibid., p. 52.
I43 Ibid.
I44 Ibid.
which leads to the preservation and further advance of consciousness—the road of unification.I46

As in "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe," Teilhard tells us that we can make the Grand Option without fear of losing our individuality because union differentiates

By virtue of the emergence of Thought a special and novel environment has been evolved among human individuals within which they acquire the faculty of associating together, and reacting upon one another, no longer primarily for the preservation and continuance of the species but for the creation of a common consciousness. In such an environment the differentiation born of union may act upon that which is most unique and incommunicable in the individual, namely his personality. Thus socialization, whose hour seems to have sounded for Mankind, does not by any means signify the ending of the Era of the Individual upon earth, but far more its beginning.I47

Each individual in a converging Universe does not lose his identity but rather finds a completeness, "not directly in a separate consummation, but by incorporation in a higher pole of consciousness in which alone it can enter into contact with all others."I48 Thus, the Grand Option, which is to say, the choice in favour of a convergent

I46 Ibid., p. 54.
I47 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
I48 Ibid., p. 58. As will be shown in the section on Christogenesis, the "higher pole of consciousness" can be equated with Omega.
Universe, is the only choice the individual can make since it is the only choice in favour of increased consciousness; it is the choice: "that embraces, in its essence, every other constructive act in which we might look for an alternative." Furthermore, Teilhard believes that while the Grand Option is now the choice of individuals, "it is destined sooner or later to become the common choice of the mass of Mankind."咀

Teilhard, always the supreme optimist, felt that Man, standing before the Grand Option, was on the verge of a new greatness. He felt we were being born into a new world--

a world in which each thinking unit upon earth will only act (if he agrees to act) in the consciousness, become natural and instinctive to all, of furthering a work of total personalization.

I49 Or, as Teilhard puts it in "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe," "What prevents our consciousness from confirming itself to our individual consciousness is, to be brief, the presence in ourselves of a plurality which is not reduced by hominization. In the system whose logic we have accepted, humanity is not the goal of the cosmos because it is still manifold. This means that by the sole fact that evolution passes through the human personality without staying there, we are forced to place the goal of this movement, which is drawing us on, infinitely further ahead." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 65.


I51 Ibid.
When it has passed beyond what we called at the beginning its "critical point of socialization" the mass of Mankind, let this be my conclusion, will penetrate for the first time into the environment which is biologically requisite for the wholeness of its task. 152

Teilhard calls our attention, in "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe," to another dimension in the formation of personality, an important dimension since it motivates us to unite with others rather than isolate ourselves, and that is the "personal-universal" dimension.

The most uncommunicable and therefore the most precious quality of each being is that which makes him one with all the rest. It is consequently by coinciding with all the rest that we shall find the centre of ourselves. 153

And when we "coincide with all the rest," we are penetrating the environment mentioned earlier, that environment "which is biologically requisite for the wholeness of [Mankind's] task."

The wholeness of Mankind's task is, according to Teilhard, to bring the earth to the highest degree of personality. For Teilhard, the ultimate design of the universe is to become personal and we contribute to the process in our communication and union with others.

152 Ibid., p. 63.
By reason of the structure of the Weltstoff which we have already recognized, the first and also the most certain characteristic that we must expect in the final state of the universe is that it will be personal, with a personality so rich and with such control of itself that our souls can only be a frail model of it. The human monad is personal because centred. But there are infinite ways of being a centre, depending on the density of the convergent radii and the closeness of their connexion. In the completed universe, the richness and perfection of the synthesis being by hypothesis brought to their maximum, consciousness linked to this synthesis must perforce attain its highest degree. In the final shape assumed by the cosmos, personality, growing with convergence, must be at its greatest.154

As will be seen in the section on Christogenesis, one of the ways in which Teilhard refers to God is as supreme personality, the final term of a universe evolving progressively towards increased personality. All that need be noted here is that in the Teilhardian synthesis there needs to be a high degree of correspondence between the perceivable and identifiable characteristics of the final term of the universe and those particular characteristics that are identified as being most human and that have become known to us as such from the breadth of human experience. Thus, if, as Teilhard says, "the most incommunicable and therefore the most precious quality of each

154 Ibid., p. 66. Later in this essay, Teilhard states, "I do not think there is any better, or even any other natural centre of total coherence of things than the human personality." p. 89.
being is that which makes him one with all the rest," then it must also be that which makes us progressively one with the final term of the universe. And if it is by "coinciding with all the rest that we shall find the centre of ourselves," then it should logically follow that by coinciding with the final term of the universe we would find the centre of ourselves most fully. In essence this is what was previously described as the dialectic of invitation and response. The more fully personal we become, the more capable we should be of perceiving invitation and of thereby responding. Our response, in turn, augments our personality so that, as Teilhard says, "In the final shape assumed by the cosmos, personality, growing with convergence, must be at its greatest."

But how does such a progressive development happen? What is the motivating force behind human activity and what must be its nature if it is to direct human activity toward the final term? That is to say, what is the nature of human energy? In essence Teilhard tells us that the principal force behind human activity must be the energy of love.

Teilhard devotes a major section of "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe" to a study of love as the energy of personalization. He conducts a similar study, but
within the broader context of human energy in an essay so entitled; that broader context shall be examined before looking specifically at love as 'energy'.

To begin with, Teilhard speaks of a basic "energy of man" which he defines as "the always increasing portion of cosmic energy at present undergoing the recognizable influence of the centres of human activity." This general definition is given an interpretation with regards to individual persons and to all Mankind. With regards to individual persons, human energy appears under three forms: incorporated energy, controlled energy and spiritualized energy.

a) Incorporated energy is that which the slow biological evolution of the earth has gradually accumulated and harmonized in our organism of flesh and nerves: the astonishing "natural machine" of the human body.

b) Controlled energy is the energy around him which man ingeniously succeeds in dominating with physical power originating from his limbs by means of "artificial machines."

c) Spiritualized energy, lastly, is localized in the immanent zones of our free activity, and forms the stuff of our intellectual processes, affections and volitions. This energy is probably incapable of measurement, but is very real all the same, since it gains a reflective and passionate mastery of things and their relationships.


I56 Ibid.
The energy of all Mankind is the energy of the noosphere. "This energy is created at every moment by the sum of all the elementary energies accumulated on the earth's surface." The energy of individuals is important enough but it is the energy of the collective whole, the noosphere, that should draw our particular attention. We are hardly aware of the resources therein, claims Teilhard.

The truly impressive aspect of total human energy only appears when we decide to observe it from the point of view of its inner connexions. In fact elementary human energies do not operate in disorder, in obedience to merely statistical laws. Nor do they vibrate only in a well defined common direction, of which we shall have to speak later: simply in the direction of greatest consciousness. There is more to it than that. They tend to combine their individual radiations in a single pulsation, that is to say to constitute an organized whole. Until we have perceived this, we shall understand nothing about the problem of human energy.

One reason why we remain so ignorant of our energy as a collective whole is that we do not appreciate the full significance of ourselves as individuals, a significance rooted in the fact that we are reflective.

Even taken in its full grandeur, and the totality of its interconnexions which make it a natural unity of planetary dimensions, human energy might seem of no account, lost amidst the fantastic sidereal energies in which it is immersed, if it

157 Ibid., p. 116.
158 Ibid., p. 119.
THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS—PART TWO

...did not show itself to be invested with certain particular qualities.

These qualities can be recognized and confirmed by a simple consideration of the value which thought assumes, if contrasted with the crude powers of matter. These only appear with complete clarity in the perspective of duration, that is to say of evolution. . . . By the simple fact of his presence in nature, man imposes on the cosmos, first a certain stuff and then a certain structure; and the result of this dual operation is to make him, man, the most significant and the most valuable portion of the universe in the field of our experience.

"But the problem that Teilhard refers to concerning human energy is only a problem for those who are indeed aware of the significance of man and of the phenomenon of the noosphere, that collective envelope of human thought. Teilhard poses the problem in the following manner:

The energy of man . . . comes to our notice as the last factor of a vast process in which the total mass of the universe is engaged. But here two alternative possibilities face us. Has this process attained a state of equilibrium, or is it still developing? Does the noosphere represent a sort of stationary wave in which the spiritualized energy of our world is consumed and perfected at every moment, leaving nothing over? Or, on the other hand, is it animated by a movement of its own, drawing it towards concentration, that is to say towards a spiritualization of a higher order? More simply, has evolution stopped with and in man? Or does it continue through him, further, beyond ourselves?"

I59 Ibid., p. 119.
I60 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
Teilhard's answer to these questions is in the form of another question: "Why should the most essential current of life alone be static?"\textsuperscript{161} If we are aware that evolution has been a steady rise towards consciousness and reflexion, how can we be certain there is not an even greater plane of evolution ahead of us? How can we best co-operate with this possibility? By trusting the momentum, Teilhard replies,

Only one way remains open to us: to trust in the infallibility and finally beatifying value of the action in which we are involved. In us the world's evolution towards spirit has become conscious. Our perfection, our interest, our salvation as elements can depend therefore on nothing less, than pushing this evolution forward with all our strength.\textsuperscript{162}

In the context of an essay examined earlier, when Teilhard says we must push evolution "forward with all our strength," he is saying we must choose the Grand Option. Herein lies untold resources of energy when we become more aware of the evolutionary movement in which we are involved.

Up to now man has acted principally out of instinct, from day to day, without much knowledge of why or for whom he was working. Contemporaneously with the flowing into him of fresh powers, a new limitless and immeasurable field of activity is opened for his ambitions and, in some sense, for his worship. For anyone who has understood (and everyone will inevitably do so soon), the position and significance of the smallest portion of thought in nature, the fundamental matter has

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p. 122.\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p. 124.
become one of rationally assuring the progress of the world of which we form part.\textsuperscript{163}

Teilhard's next concern is how best to organize the energy of man. He begins by making two preliminary observations. The first is that there should be no distinction between physical energy and moral energy.

\textit{If, as we believe we have established, the cosmos is of spiritual stuff, then a mechanical assemblage artificially obtained, an attraction of an affective nature, progress in economic and social organization, a link by Hertzian waves, even an intellectual systematization have as much physical reality as corpuscular attractions and groupings or natural connexions forming organic bodies. Perhaps they have even more. In the cosmos that has revealed itself to our eyes there is no longer any fundamental distinction to be made between the physical and the moral. The domain of human energy is the "physico-moral."} \textsuperscript{164}

This is an important observation because it a) places the activity of man in a biological continuum with all other activity in the evolution of the universe, and b) it thereby highlights the significance of human activity in shaping the future course of evolution.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. We should not be surprised with the value Teilhard places on "being aware" when we recall that in his essay, "How I Believe," he made the following statement: "It is better, no matter what the cost, to be more conscious than less conscious. This principle, I believe, is the absolute condition of the world's existence." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "How I Believe," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., pp. 125-126. See also "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe," Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 72.
Teilhard's second observation concerning how best to organize human energy is stated as follows:

Under whatever particular form it is considered, the physico-moral obeys in its activity a double law, both essential and universal: to try everything—to its conclusion. . . . To try everything, for the sake of ever increasing knowledge and power: this is the most general formula and the highest law of human activity and morality. \( \text{I65} \)

Having made his preliminary observations, Teilhard remarks on the organization of human energy on the individual level and the collective level. On the level of the individual, the concern should be "To perfect individuals so as to confer on the group its maximum of power: this is the obvious course to follow for the final success of the operation." \( \text{I66} \) That is to say, to bring individuals to the highest degree of productivity and consciousness so that the forward movement of evolution is augmented. But this is not to be achieved at a cost of individuality and freedom. The final concern remains the fullest attainment of personality.

. . . the perfection and utility of each nucleus of human energy in relation to the whole, definitely depend on what is unique and incommunicable in the achievement of each . . . [with] the possibility of self-discovery and the freedom of.

\( \text{I65 Ibid., p. 126.} \)
\( \text{I66 Ibid., p. 127.} \)
self-differentiation, both to an ever-increasing extent.

The organization of elementary human energy, whatever its generalized methods, must culminate in the formation, within each element, of a maximum of personality.\textsuperscript{167}

Still within the level of the individual, Teilhard feels that of the three types of elementary human energy—incorporated, controlled and spiritualized—the latter is the most interesting one for organization.\textsuperscript{168} This is why, as will be seen momentarily, he places so much emphasis on the energy of love. But before examining this energy it is necessary to take a brief look at the organization of collective human energy. According to Teilhard, this is where the real problem of human energy lies.

The true problem of human energy lies in its total technical utilization. For a long time this problem necessarily remained unnoticed, since it could not be formulated till, thanks to scientific syntheses and social relationships, the dynamic unity of the noosphere was present in our minds. But today when the gathering of the human layer is taking place before our eyes, its reality decidedly enters the field of common observation. A proof, if ever there was one, that man, supposing himself to be henceforth fixed in his individual nature, sees a new and boundless field of evolution opening before him: the realm of collective creation, associations, ideas and emotions. How can we fix limits on the effects of expansion, penetration and spiritual fusion, resulting from a coherent adjustment of

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., p. 131.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., pp. 127-129.
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The human multitude? It is something to master and canalize the powers of the ether and the sea. But what is that triumph compared with the global mastery of human thought and human love? Never indeed was a more magnificent opportunity offered to the hopes and endeavours of the earth. I69

The problem is not so much in finding new ways to advance the consciousness of man but in "recognizing the significance and guessing the logical extensions of processes that are already under way." I70 Before our very eyes there is a whole web of mechanical and social connections being formed but what we need to see is that far more is happening on a psychic level.

Now this increasingly close tissue of material cohesion is only the external indication of another far more fundamental work that is at present taking place: the inner psychical organization of the noosphere. The first step towards this immanent elaboration of total human energy has taken place in the mechanical field under pressure of the most urgent necessities of life. Historical materialism, Marx would say. In order to obtain the results of collective organization and discovery necessary for their subsistence, active thinking units are automatically led to form a linked operational group: a "frontline" of humanity. I71

Thus, we are collectively undergoing a transformation on the intellectual, social and affective levels, a trans-

I69 Ibid., pp. 131-132.
I70 Ibid., p. 132.
I71 Ibid., p. 136.
formation in which; "under the combined effect of the material needs and spiritual affinities of life, humanity all around us is beginning to emerge from impersonality and assume some sort of heart and face." 172 As will be seen in the section on Christogenesis, such a "heart and face" is what Teilhard has called the supreme personality or Omega. Thus there is much more at stake than the formation of full persons. "The organization of human energy, taken as a whole, is directed and pushes us towards the ultimate formation, over and above each personal element, of a common soul of humanity." 173 At this point it is necessary to examine the energy of love since it is the principal energy in the formation of "a common soul of humanity."

In one of his war-time essays, completed in 1918, entitled, "The Eternal Feminine," 174 Teilhard writes of love in a poetic, mystical way. He personifies love and has it speak to us of its role in the history of evolution. The "I" refers to love, in the following passage, as a force

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172 Ibid., p. 137.

173 Ibid.

of unification.

In the stirring of the layers of the cosmic substance, whose nascent folds contain the promise of worlds beyond number, the first traces of my countenance could be read. Like a soul, still dormant but essential, I bestirred the original mass, almost without form, which hastened into my field of attraction; and I instilled even into the atoms, into the fathomless depths of the infinitesimal, a vague but obstinate yearning to emerge from the solitude of their nothingness and to hold fast to something outside themselves.  

As stated, this is intended to be a mystical essay; therefore, Teilhard is speaking of love here in a figurative manner.

In another essay written some twenty-six years later—"Centrology," completed in 1944—I76—Teilhard again alludes, but more cautiously, to the presence of love throughout evolution.  

Strictly speaking, love does not as yet exist in the zones of the pre-living and the non-reflective, since the centres are either not yet linked together or are only imperfectly centred. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that it is something in the way of love that is adumbrated and grows as a result of the mutual affinity which causes the particles to adhere to one another and maintains their unity during their convergent advance. In any case, the least one can say is that, through the critical threshold

I75 ibid., pp. 192-193.

of reflection, the transformation undergone by this vague inter-sympathy between the first atoms or the first living beings, as it becomes hominized, is a transformation into love. . . . In a universe whose structure is centro-complex, love is essentially nothing other than the energy proper to cosmos-genesis.\textsuperscript{177}

Such references to love as present throughout evolution are valid in the Teilhardian synthesis when a parallel is drawn between love and the "within" of things, as Teilhard does in \textit{The Phenomenon of Man}.

Considered in its full biological reality, love—that is to say, the affinity of being with being—is not peculiar to man. It is a general property of all life and as such it embraces, in its varieties and degrees, all the forms successively adopted by organized matter. . . . If there was no real internal propensity to unite, even at a prodigiously rudimentary level—indeed in the molecule itself—it would be physically impossible for love to appear higher up, with us, in "hominized" form. By rights, to be certain of its presence in ourselves, we should assume its presence, at least in an inchoate form, in everything that is.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 118-119. The neurophysiologist Paul Chauchard defends Teilhard’s allusions to love as present, in varying degrees of manifestation, throughout evolution: "A universe in process of increasing integration is a universe of love, and the energy of centration is an energy of love. The attractions and affinities in atoms and molecules, as remote as they are from love, bear some analogy to it, just as their organization bears the dimension of a consciousness. One step higher, and we have the elemental love of life, vital egotism and the social affinities of the brute. The development of the nervous system grows and personalizes love the same as it does consciousness." Paul Chauchard, \textit{Man and Cosmos}, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{178} Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, \textit{The Phenomenon of Man}, pp. 290-291.
This rootedness in the "within" of things is the general undercurrent we find in his definitions for love and his remarks on love in general. One of Teilhard's more famous definitions of love is in The Phenomenon of Man.

Love in all its subtleties is nothing more, and nothing less, than the more or less direct trace marked on the heart of the element by the psychical convergence of the universe upon itself.\[179\]

This definition is sufficiently broad to describe a common characteristic throughout all of existence, whether it refers to the "within" of things, to the power of attraction between the sexes, or to that which "draws us from ahead" in the Omega.

In his essay, "The Rise of the Other," completed in 1942, Teilhard defines love in another manner.

In its most general form and from the point of view of physics, love is the internal, affectively apprehended, aspect of the affinity which links and draws together the elements of the world, centre to centre.\[180\]

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\[179\] Ibid., p. 291. In his essay, "The Spirit of the Earth" completed in 1931, Teilhard describes love in similar terms: "Can we not say quite simply that in its essence [Love] is the attraction exercised on each unit of consciousness by the centre of the universe in the course of taking shape?" Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Spirit of the Earth," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 33.

In elaboration on this definition, Teilhard states, again alluding indirectly to a "within of things," that

Love is power of producing inter-centric relationship. It is present, therefore (at least in a rudimentary state), in all the natural centres, living and pre-living, which make up the world; and it represents, too, the most profound, the most direct, and most creative form of inter-action that it is possible to conceive between these centres. Love, in fact, is the expression and the agent of universal synthesis.

Love, again, is centric power . . .

In virtue of his extreme power of loving, combined with his extreme "centricity" (or, which comes to the same thing, his extreme complexity), man, in so far as he actually loves, is the most magnificently synthesizable of all the elements ever constructed by nature.\(^{181}\)

In fact, on the level of man, only love, in Teilhard's opinion, is capable of uniting persons in their fullest personality. As he states in The Phenomenon of Man,

Love alone is capable of uniting living beings in such a way as to complete and fulfil them, for it alone takes them and joins them by what is deepest in themselves. . . . In truth, does not every instant achieve all around us, in the couple or the team, the magic feat, the feat reputed to be contradictory, of "personalizing" by totalizing?\(^{182}\)

Elsewhere, Teilhard explains in a passage similar to the one above, that love personalizes because it unites persons

\(^{181}\) Ibid., pp. 70-71.

at centre to centre.

Only union through love and in love (using the word "love" in its widest and most real sense of "mutual internal affinity"), because it brings individuals together, not superficially and tangentially but centre to centre, can physically possess the property of not merely differentiating but also personalizing the elements which comprise it. This amounts to saying that even under the irresistible compulsion of the pressures causing it to unite, Mankind will only find and shape itself if men can learn to love one another in the very act of drawing closer.¹⁸³

It has already been shown how Teilhard considered the domain of human energy to be the "physico-moral."¹⁸⁴ The significance of this, as stated then, is that the activity of man is placed on a biological continuum with

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¹⁸³ Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Directions and Conditions of the Future," (1948), in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, pp. 244–245. Teilhard again makes this point in still another essay, "Human Unanimisation," completed in 1950: "Despite the compulsions, both geographical and psychic, which oblige men to live and think in an ever closer community, they do not necessarily love each other the more on that account--far from it . . . the human mass will only become thoroughly unified under the influence of some form of affective energy which will place the human particles in the fortunate position of being unable to love and fulfil themselves individually except by contributing in some degree to the love and fulfilment of all: to the extent, that is to say, that all are equal and integral parts of a single universe that is vitally converging." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "Human Unanimisation," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, pp. 298–299. And finally, in a similar vein, Teilhard speaks of love, in "The Grand Option" (completed in 1954), in the following manner: "... sooner or later we shall have to acknowledge that [Love] is the fundamental impulse of Life, or, if you prefer, the one
all other activity in the evolution of the universe. Human activity is thus seen as significant in shaping the future course of evolution. Now we find that Teilhard, in "Sketch of a Personalistic Universe," identifies the energy of the physico-moral realm as love.

What name should we give, always in relation to our system, to this physico-moral energy of personalization to which all activities displayed by the stuff of the universe are finally reduced? Only one name is possible, if we are to credit it with the generality and power that it should assume on rising to the cosmic order: Love.\textsuperscript{185}

Then Teilhard even goes so far as to say that "the physical structure of the universe is love."\textsuperscript{186}

natural medium in which the rising course of evolution can proceed. . . . It is through love and within love that we must look for the deepening of our deepest self, in the life-giving coming together of humankind. Love is the free and imaginative outpouring of the spirit over all unexplored paths. It links those who love in bonds that unite but do not confound, causing them to discover in their mutual contact an exaltation capable, incomparably more than any arrogance of solitude, of arousing in the heart of their being all that they possess of uniqueness and creative power." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Grand Option," in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, p. 57.


In our lives, Teilhard finds that love is manifested in three successive stages: "in woman (for man), in society, in the All--by the sense of sex, of humanity and of the cosmos."\(^\text{187}\) While these three stages are largely self-evident, Teilhard makes some particularly interesting remarks with regards to each stage. With regards to sexuality, he feels we are only beginning to give importance to "the necessary synthesis of the two principles, male and female, in the building of the human personality."\(^\text{188}\) Furthermore, he feels there is gradual reversal taking place.

\(^{186}\) Ibid. While it appears here that Teilhard is putting the two terms "physical" and "love" in an impossible combination, we get a glimpse of his meaning when we recall that at times he has spoken of the essence of the universe as being "spirit-matter," and not spirit and matter; in turn, the concept of "spirit-matter" is founded on his notion of the "within," as seen earlier. In a footnote to the above point, the editor observes that Teilhard, some three months after finishing this essay, wrote the following to a friend: "It gives me great strength, in any case, to recognize that all evolutionary effort can be explained as the justification and development of a love (of God). It is what my mother told me long ago, but it will have taken me a lifetime to integrate this truth into an organic vision of things. It is this effort of integration, I think, that the world must make in order to be converted: as a whole, our world denies personality and God because it believes in the All! Everything depends on convincing it that, on the contrary, it must believe in the personal because it believes in the All." Human Energy, p. 72.

\(^{187}\) Ibid.

\(^{188}\) Ibid., p. 73.
place in the primacy of sexual functions. "Man and woman for the child, still and for so long as life on earth has not reached maturity. But man and woman for one another, increasingly and for ever." This was more than a passing remark for Teilhard. He felt that the reversal of sexual functions was in obedience to the laws of the personal universe. He elaborates:

In the hypothesis here accepted of a universe in process of personalization, the fact that love is increasing instead of diminishing in the course of hominization, has a very natural explanation, and extension into the future. In the human individual, as we have already said, evolution does not close on itself, but continues further towards a more perfect concentration, linked with further differentiation, also obtained by union. Woman is for man, we should say, precisely the end that is capable of releasing this forward movement. Through woman and woman alone, man can escape from the isolation in which, even if perfected, he would still be in danger of being enclosed. Hence it is no longer strictly correct to say that the mesh of the universe is, in our experience, the thinking monad. The complete human molecule is already around us: a more synthesized element and more spiritualized from the start, than the individual personality. It is a duality, comprising masculine and feminine together.

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I89 Ibid.
I90 Ibid., p. 74. For an early formulation of this idea and of many other points on love contained in this essay, see Teilhard's essay, "The Eternal Feminine," completed in 1918, in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Writings in Time of War, pp. 191-202.
In addition, Teilhard predicts that in sexuality, love shall become more spiritual, without ceasing to be physical.  

But beyond the attraction of sexuality, there must be another bond drawing persons together.

The personalizing energy displayed by passionate love must . . . be completed by another form of attraction which will draw the totality of human molecules together. It is this particular form of cohesion, spread throughout the whole noosphere, that we call here "the sense of humanity." And yet, a "sense of humanity" seems to be contradictory to the experience and inclination of many in the modern world. Rather than a drawing between persons, there is often a rejection and a repulsion; the other person is a threat, a burden, or a "problem." But Teilhard feels there is a reason for this.

To explain this disturbing reaction of man to men, it is proper to observe that it does not occur at the level where one can expect to see the emergence of the sense of humanity. In the case of passionate love the attraction is produced directly from individual to individual, depending on nothing more than a chance meeting. In the case of collective links, on the other hand, the attraction can only take place between an individual and an already partially organized collectivity;

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I91 Ibid., p. 77.

I92 Ibid., p. 78. Along the same lines, see Teilhard's essay, "The Spirit of the Earth," in Human Energy, pp. 19-47.
and this is already more complicated. The man in
the street gets in my way because I collide with
him as a possible rival. I shall like him as
soon as I see him as a partner in the struggle.
In contrast to the sexual sense the sense of
humanity does not directly touch the persons as
such but is something that surrounds them. It
is simply because we do not sufficiently perceive
this something that we have the impression of
disliking one another.\textsuperscript{193}

Despite the difficulty and harshness of the modern,
mechanized world, Teilhard insists that it is by going
forward, and not retreating, that we shall contribute to
the evolution of increased consciousness and individual
freedom, every step forward being taken for the sake of
greater personalization.\textsuperscript{194} But for us to participate in
the forward process, we need to know of a "Someone" at the
culmination of that process, according to Teilhard. This
"Someone," as we shall see, is Omega\textsuperscript{a}.

The third stage of the manifestation of love in
our lives is in the All, or the cosmic sense, and here the
role of the "Someone" must be more explicitly stated, of
necessity. Teilhard defines the cosmic sense as "the
more or less confused affinity that binds us psychologically
to the All which envelops us."\textsuperscript{195} This affinity is a kind

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., pp. 80-81.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., p. 82.
of love.

Not metaphorically, but in the truest sense of the term, the cosmic sense is a kind of love, and can be nothing else. It is love, because it bears us towards a complementary and unique object of a personal nature. And it must be love because its role is to dominate by consummation the love of man for woman and the love of the human being for all other human beings. In the cosmos as I describe it here, it becomes possible, strange though the expression appears, to love the universe. It is indeed in this act alone that love can develop in boundless light and power.196

There is no danger here of our affection being spread thin because it is focused upon a centre. In a world of the universal-personal, with its laws of union,

it is no longer a question for the element of dispersing over a vast expanse, but on the contrary of centring itself, in harmony with all other centres, on an ultimate centre of all centres. To centre, that is to say to personalize, on an ultimate centre, that is to say on a supreme personality. The only way we have of responding to the obscure promptings of the cosmic sense in us is to push to its final limits a laborious interpretation of the world and of ourselves. Union by differentiation, and differentiation by union.197

Thus, any danger of our affection being too generalized disappears when we realize that the All is personalized, "that is to say a definite central figure appearing at the end of a sequence of elementary figures which acquire increasing definition."198

196 Ibid., pp. 83-84.
197 Ibid., p. 83.
198 Ibid., p. 84.
But the process of centring upon the ultimate centre, that is to say, the process of personalizing upon a supreme personality, is not without pain.

Nothing is more beatific than union attained, nothing more laborious than the pursuit of union. For three reasons at least a personalizing evolution is necessarily painful: it is basically a plurality; it advances by differentiation; it leads to metamorphoses. 199

This is the process Teilhard has described in many other places as the price we pay for a growth in consciousness, or, in this context, for an increase in personalization. As he states,

Every advance in personalization must be paid for: so much union, so much suffering. This rule of equivalence governs all transformations of spirit-matter. And nothing can permit of escape from it. 201

In his essay, "Human Energy," Teilhard remarks more explicitly on the relationship between love and Omega.

199 Ibid., p. 85.


While the study of Teilhard's notion of Omega shall be left to the section on Christogenesis, one cannot avoid making some allusions to it in an examination of his essay, "Human Energy."

To begin with, Teilhard speaks in this essay of the drawing influence of a centre of super-personality:

\[\ldots\] we have the following for the supreme goal towards which human energy is tending: an organic plurality the elements of which find the consummation of their own personality in a paroxysm of mutual union and limpidity: the whole body being supported by the unifying influence of a distinct centre of super-personality.\(^{202}\)

This is in accordance with the laws of union, the principal one of which is that union differentiates.

**Union differentiates.** In virtue of this fundamental principle, elementary personalities can, and can only affirm themselves by acceding to a psychic unity or higher soul. But this always on one condition: that the higher centre to which they come to join without mingling together has its own autonomous reality. Since there is no fusion or dissolution of the elementary personalities the centre in which they join must necessarily be distinct from them, that is to say have its own personality.\(^{203}\)

Teilhard calls this centre which must have its own personality the point Omega, which is a point of synthesis needed by the noosphere.

\[^{203}\text{Ibid., p. 144.}\]
... the noosphere in fact physically requires; for its maintenance and functioning; the existence in the universe of a true pole of psychic convergence: a centre different from all the other centres which it "super-centres" by assimilation: a personality distinct from all the personalities it perfects by uniting with them. The world would not function if there did not exist, somewhere, ahead in time and space, "a cosmic point Omega" of total synthesis.204

In the context of the Omega point, Teilhard speaks of an influence, an energy, that emerges from this Omega point to form the noosphere. He identifies this influence, this energy, as love.205

Love is by definition the word we use for attractions of a personal nature. Since once the universe has become a thinking one everything in the last resort moves in and towards personality, it is necessarily love, a kind of love, which forms and will increasingly form, in its pure state, the material of human energy.206

It will be recalled how in the preface to The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard put an emphasis upon learning how to see beyond appearances. As he put it,

... union increases only through an increase in consciousness, that is to say in vision ... To see or to perish is the very condition laid upon everything that makes up the universe by reason of the mysterious gift of existence.207

204 Ibid., p. 145.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
207 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 35.
He places the same importance on perceiving the Omega point, or the "animated universal centre of convergence." For the person who has such a perception, a unification process, through the energy of love, takes place in the person.

One consequence of perceiving an "animated universal centre of convergence" is that one can discover a deeper meaning and value to individual actions.

Omega, in which all things converge, is reciprocally that from which all things radiate. Impossible to place it as a point at the peak of the universe without at the same time diffusing its presence within each smallest advance of evolution. The meaning of this is nothing less than this: that for him who has seen it everything, however humble, provided it places itself in the line of progress, is warmed, illumined and animated, and consequently becomes an object to which he gives his whole adhesion. What was cold, dead, impersonal for him who cannot see, becomes charged for those who see not only with life but with a stronger life than theirs; in such a way that they feel themselves seized and assimilated, as they act, to a far greater degree than they themselves are seizing and assimilating.

Such a perception of the value of individual actions is the beginning of what Teilhard calls totalization because

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208 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 147. As we shall see, the manner and degree of perceiving the Absolute is a critically important factor in a psychology of religious response.

209 Ibid., pp. 147-148.

210 Ibid., p. 148. At no point does Teilhard provide us with an exact definition of what he means by totalization
the least of our actions, when animated by love, can put us in contact with the entire universe, "with the whole surface and depth of [our] being." 2II

The next step, beyond the totalization of individual actions, is the merging of actions into one single act. This is possible when individual actions are ultimately focused on one single centre, the Omega. Teilhard expresses it in the following manner.

... we are called by the music of the universe to reply, each with his own pure and incommunicable harmonic. When, as love for the All advances in our hearts, we feel stretching out beyond the diversity of our efforts and desires the bounding simplicity of an urge in which the innumerable shades of passion and action mingle in exaltation without ever becoming confused, then, within the mass formed by human energy, we shall approach the plenitude of our powers and personality. 212

Thus, when our actions are inspired not only with a love and concern for the other but with a passionate attraction to the Other, that is, Omega, then those actions become charged with a vitality and power of common purpose, of

but it is evident from the contexts of usage that it refers, in essence, to the development of potentialities to their maximum in any element or unit, (particularly man), potentialities that are most characteristic or descriptive of the nature of that element or unit.

2II Ibid.

212 Ibid., p. 150.
synthesis. That is what Teilhard calls the process of the "totalization of the individual on himself by love." 213

The third step in the totalization process is the "totalization by love of individuals in humanity." 214 This involves the transition from the individual to the collective and Teilhard considers this, as he has told us before, to be the crucial problem facing human energy. 215 When Teilhard analyzes the modern social groups of man, the various types of government, he insists that their degree of failure is because they summarily place the individual second to the primacy of pure totality in their ideologies.

In all the systems of human organization battling before our eyes, it is assumed that the final state towards which the noosphere is tending is a body without an individualized soul, a faceless organism, a diffuse humanity, an Impersonality. 216

The difficulty is that the individual is not thus motivated to unite if all he can be shown is an impersonal centre as the object of union. "In a synthesizing process, the character finally impressed on the unified elements is

213 Ibid., p. 148f.
214 Ibid., p. 150f
215 Ibid., pp. 131-132, 150.
216 Ibid., p. 151.
necessarily that which permeates the active unifying principle." 217 Consequently, if the object of union is seen to be an impersonal centre, "the units accepting it will inevitably, in spite of all efforts to the contrary, see their personality diminishing under its influence." 218 Therefore if individuals are to unite under the motivation of love, then they must be attracted by a centre of love. 219

A system formed of elements of consciousness can only cohere on a basis of immanence. Not force but love above us; and therefore, at the beginning, the recognized existence of an Omega that makes possible a universal love. 220

Teilhard envisions there would be a tremendous energy released in man if there was a global consciousness of a personal centre inviting us from ahead to unite with each other and with itself out of love. Under such a consciousness,

217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.

219 As Donald Gray states in this context, "If matter is to be redeemed by spirit from its own inherent tendency to multiplicity, spirit itself must first be redeemed from its own inherent ambiguities through a universal form of love, which must be activated by a force outside of and yet immanent in the socialization process itself." Donald Gray, The One and the Many, Teilhard de Chardin's Vision of Unity, p. 90.

220 Human Energy, p. 152.
individualities, caught in the irresistible current of human totalization, would feel themselves strengthened by the very movement that brings them together. The more they grouped themselves under a personality, the more forcibly they would themselves become personal. And quite naturally, without effort, by virtue of the properties of love.  

Earlier, it was seen that one of the laws of union is that union differentiates. Love, according to Teilhard, is merely the concrete expression of this principle. And under a consciousness of a personal centre, love not only unites without depersonalizing, "but in uniting it ultra-personalizes." The noosphere, drawn together and forward by the uniting influence of Omega from ahead--this, for Teilhard, would be the "totalization of total human energy in a total love."  

At the end of his essay "Human Energy," Teilhard has an appendix entitled, "The Principle of the Conservation of Personality," which he sees as "an axiom, an epitome and a corollary" of his views on human energy. The principle of the conservation of personality has three

221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid., p. 154.
224 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
225 Ibid., pp. 160-162.
stages. At a first stage, the principle states that "the rise of spirit in the universe is an irreversible phenomenon." This means, in essence, that from every plateau attained by consciousness, there is no retreat.

Conservation (without regression) of the highest stage of personalization acquired at each moment by life in the world: under this qualitative form, the principle suggested seems to be confirmed by all that we at present know about the historical development of nature.

This is in accordance with Teilhard's theory that throughout all of existence, there is a primacy of spirit and not matter. At a second stage, the principle states that a certain quantum of energy, in the impersonal state, is engaged in the evolution of the universe, and that it is destined to be transmuted entirely into a personal state at the end of the transformation (the quality of this "personal end-product" being moreover a function of the quality of "impersonal" material engaged at the beginning of the process).

This means that personalization is an evolutionary transformation, in which matter becomes spirit, a process whereby everything is created although nothing is lost.

Conservation (without loss), in the course of the spiritualization of the universe, of an undefined amount of power or cosmic "stuff":

226 Ibid., p. 160.
227 Ibid., p. 161.
228 Ibid.
under this absolute, quantitative form the law of conservation of personality is not directly capable of demonstration. . . . But the principle has nevertheless a use: it states that the spiritualization taking place in the cosmos must be understood as a change of physical state in the course of which a certain constant is preserved through the metamorphosis. 229

At a third stage, the principle states each individual personality retains its identity for all time, even when in union with a supreme personality, although at this point it would be in a super-personalized state. 230

"Permanence" (immortality) of individual personalities in this numerically third form. The "conservation of personality" is immediately deduced from forms 1 and 2 (qualitative and quantitative), if one takes account of the fact that each elementary person contains something unique and untransmittable in his essence. 231

Finally, Teilhard tells us that the principle of the conservation of personality is founded on a characteristic of the cosmos in general:

In the universe where spirit is considered at the same time as matter, the principle of the conservation of personality appears as the most general and satisfactory expression of the invariance of the cosmos first suspected and sought by physics on the side of the conservation of energy. 232

229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid., p. 162.
232 Ibid. It might be added that Teilhard’s principle
Thus, the principle of the conservation of personality is grounded on the permanence and permeance of the drawing influence of Omega, that is to say, the energy of love. From the beginning of the stage of hominization in evolution, the "invariance of the cosmos first suspected and sought by physics on the side of the conservation of energy" is reflected in the actualization of the tendency, in all prehominized forms, of matter towards spirit, that is towards personality. Such a tendency, Teilhard would say, is actualized through the drawing influence of the energy of love.

The review of the Teilhardian notion of hominization and the theory of personalization have now been completed. It is necessary now to consider their significance for the overall Teilhardian synthesis before turning to the final section in the review of the Teilhardian synthesis and that is the theory of Christogenesis.

Of the conservation of personality holds logically upon what he has called elsewhere, the threefold property possessed by every consciousness: "(i) of centring everything partially upon itself; (ii) of being able to centre itself upon itself constantly; and (iii) of being brought more by this very super-centration into association with all other centres surrounding it." The Phenomenon of Man, p. 284. As we are brought together more and more in association with all other centres, there is being born, Teilhard felt, a single centre which can eventually be identified with Omega. The Phenomenon of Man, p. 285.
When one traces the development, through Teilhard's essays, of the concept of hominization and the theory of personalization, a common concern is evident throughout regarding the present and future direction of evolution. His concern was spurred by the presence all around him of signs of discouragement, pessimism and despair in the human spirit over the apparent course mankind was following. In short, Teilhard was concerned with the progress of evolution.

Donald Gray, reflecting on Teilhard, stated the problem in this fashion:

... even if it is true that consciousness has been growing throughout the history of life on this planet and that it has grown enormously from the initial appearance of man up to the present, will it continue to grow in the future? ... Man now has it in his power to continue the work of complexification and thus promote the growth of consciousness in the noosphere, but he need not do so. 233

It has been shown that the law of complexity-consciousness was Teilhard's golden rule for measuring the progress of consciousness. Prior to man, this rule was uncomplicated; the more complex matter is, the higher the degree of corresponding consciousness. But with man the process is

233 Donald Gray, The One and the Many, Teilhard de Chardin's Vision of Unity, p. 91.
no longer automatic and in fact is open to a lot of ambiguity primarily because of the factor of freedom.$^{234}$ But while there is increased danger involved, there is also increased possibilities since the factor of freedom itself becomes a source of energy in the evolutionary process. As Teilhard states, "Evolution, by the very mechanism of its synthesis, charges itself with an ever-growing measure of freedom."$^{235}$ But the crucial question becomes, how is the human spirit, that of individuals and of the race, to be inspired to address itself to the forward march of evolution? How are men to overcome the forces that seem to drive them apart rather than draw them together?

Teilhard, as noted before, was a supreme optimist. In looking at the world around him, he felt there were real possibilities from which an increased consciousness for the future could emerge. His concern was to motivate men to bring about those possibilities. He felt that men had to understand themselves in the context of a continuing evolution and of a pattern within that evolution, a pattern

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234 As Gray states, "The law of complexity-consciousness ceases, with the appearance of man, to function as an indicator of automatic advance and becomes rather a guide to the possible direction of the future, an option to be decided upon by man." *Ibid.*

characterized by increasing spiritization of matter and increased unification. Once men were conscious of such processes, the motivation of inspiration to unite the ones for the sake of the All ("conspiration," Teilhard called it) would come along naturally. This is in accord with his statement that "From each new summit of consciousness that it reaches, the world never again descends... Taken as a whole, consciousness can advance but not retreat." 236

The concept of hominization is significant for the Teilhardian synthesis because it places the emergence of thought, and then of reflection, in a continuum with every other stage of evolution. Furthermore, it draws attention to the unique capability of man for reflection and to its consequences for the continuing story of evolution. It highlights the importance of the inventiveness of man and consequently his use of instruments in his contact with, and even manipulation of, the world. But most importantly, the concept of hominization describes and analyzes the present state of—and examines the emerging designs of—the development of a common consciousness, that is to say the development of the noosphere. It remarks on the process

of heightening the consciousness of individuals and, thereby, the process of extending the reach of the noosphere. A clear understanding of these processes, the dynamics of which is the subject matter of the concept of hominization, is absolutely essential to the Teilhardian synthesis because they describe the emergence of spirit from the pre-human into the human form and even the possible future forms in the development of spirit in man. In short, without a clear understanding of the past, present, and future evolution of thought, the phenomenon of spirit in man would have to be described as an anomaly in the universe, an accident in the story of evolution, a dimension of peripheral concern in an otherwise material world. The necessity of the concept of hominization is best summarized by Teilhard toward the close of *The Phenomenon of Man*:

> To make room for thought in the world, I have needed to "interiorize" matter: to imagine an energetics of the mind; to conceive a noogenesis rising upstream against the flow of entropy; to provide evolution with a direction, a line of advance and critical points; and finally to make all things double back upon someone.  

In this same passage, in the phrase "to make all things double back upon someone," lies another indication

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of the significance of the theory of personalization. Teilhard felt that for those who could see, if there was any apparent direction within the unfolding story of evolution, it was towards increased spiritization, consciousness, personality; we can use each of these terms equally well because they each describe, by a different name, a term which is ahead of us and which Teilhard most often calls the Omega Point. That is to say, whether one takes the perspective of spirit, or of consciousness, or of personality, it is possible to read the history of evolution as a story in the development towards a supreme spirit, consciousness, or personality provided one takes as his instruments for reading that history, such "living" sciences as paleontology, archeology and biology. But the particular perspective of personality finds its significance for the Teilhardian synthesis in the fact that it is psychological; it concerns itself with the dynamics of becoming most fully person, on an individual level, and most fully man on a collective level. But it also concerns itself with the dependency of those processes upon the drawing influence from ahead of a someone, or a supreme personality. It is these processes or dynamics that Teilhard attempted to describe with his theory of personalization.
THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS--PART TWO

The description of Teilhard's concern in this theory as being psychological is particularly appropriate when we recall his statement that what makes a centre a person is when it is being profoundly itself; or when we recall his insistence that union differentiates, or that union among persons must occur centre to centre; or when we recall his analysis of human energy and of love as the energy that unites; or, finally, when we recall his interpretation of the relations between man and Omega, relations which can be described as dynamics of invitation and response and which shall be examined more fully in the section on Christogenesis.

As a final word regarding the significance for the Teilhardian synthesis of the concept of hominization and the theory of personalization, it should be noted that there is an important relation between the two; the dynamics of the theory of personalization are dependent for their success upon the degree of attained hominization. The more conscious man is, that is the more hominized he is, the greater the capacity for deepest union, for personalization, both with other men and with Omega. 238

238 As pointed out earlier, we find evidence of how Teilhard held these notions in relation to each other in at least two essays; In "The Spirit of the Earth," he
3. The Theory of Christogenesis

In many of the essays that were examined in the previous sections of the Teilhardian synthesis, there was often material that related to the theory of Christogenesis. However, commentary on that material was reserved for this section since it was felt preferable to examine this theory as much as possible in isolation in order to better understand it. Consequently, study of the other theories purposely avoided leaning prematurely upon the broader notion to which they all tend, the notion of Christogenesis.

The study of Teilhard's remarks upon the Absolute and upon the role of Christ in evolution shall begin with an examination of many of Teilhard's wartime essays since they provide the foundation upon which the theory of Christogenesis is built. The study will continue with an examination of several post-warthime works that develop the basic ideas, particularly those works in which the theory itself is expounded. At the same time, the central position

states: "Let us say, in fact, substituting one equivalent formula for another, that by the capital event of hominization, the most advanced portion of the cosmos has become personalized." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 45. In The Phenomenon of Man he states: "We thus reach the personalization of the individual by the hominization of the whole group." Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 193.
the theory of Christogenesis has in the whole of the Teilhardian synthesis will be explored.

Before beginning the study of the Teilhardian material that deals with Christ and the Absolute, several points might be made as a preamble to the study of the material. The first point to be noted is that Teilhard's remarks on Christ almost always refer to him in the context of the whole of evolution; 'certainly this is the intent of the theory of Christogenesis but it is evident, it will be shown, even in Teilhard's earliest essays, before he had formulated the theory of Christogenesis.

The second point to be noted is that because Teilhard rarely speaks of Christ solely in the historical context of his birth, death and resurrection and most often in the context of the evolution of the cosmos, we find that he often slips easily from remarks on Christ to remarks on God by one of his many names (Omega, Supreme Personality, the All, etc.).

The third point to be noted is that Teilhard uses the term Omega, or Omega Point, in at least two different
ways, one scientific and the other religious. As much as possible it will be pointed out, when reviewing the material, in which way Teilhard is using the term whenever it appears.

The fourth point to be noted is that the term "Christogenesis" appears infrequently in Teilhard's writings and only in his latter essays, but there is a definite development, as will be shown, of the theory of Christogenesis throughout his writings.

As was done with Teilhard's other major theories, this study will begin by turning to his first major essay—"Cosmic Life," completed in 1916—for what appears to be an early formulation of what eventually became the theory of Christogenesis. Teilhard speaks of Christ in the context of the universe when he states that "The exclusive task of the world is the physical incorporation of the faithful in the Christ who is of God. This cardinal task is being carried out with the rigour and harmony of a natural

239 According to W.H. Kenney, Teilhard uses the term Omega, Omega Point, to mean: "1) The end point or term of the natural evolution of mankind (and therefore of the cosmos). The apex of the convergent, social and spiritual development of the earth. 2) God, pre-existent and transcendent superperson, loving and lovable, omnipresent, as the activating center, source and goal of noogenesis, a description fulfilled by the risen Christ portrayed by John and Paul." W.H. Kenney, A Path Through Teilhard's Phenomenon, p. 252.
evolution.240 And again, "Christ has a cosmic Body that extends throughout the whole universe; such is the final proposition to be borne in mind."241

By speaking of Christ in cosmic terms Teilhard is able to place all of creation and, most importantly, all of human effort within that context. He does this by stating first that Christ, to the extent that He is integral to the evolutionary process, is Himself not complete. Thus, while He is, He is also becoming. In turn the becoming dimension to Christ is the very momentum of evolution; "... it is in the continuation of this engendering that there lies the ultimate driving force behind all created activity."242 In this manner, Teilhard brings together two dimensions of reality that have often been segregated or even held in opposition

Christ is the term of even the natural evolution of living beings; evolution is holy. There we

240 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Writings in Time of War, p. 50.

241 Ibid., p. 58.

242 Ibid., p. 59. See Petro Bilaniuk, "A Theological Meditation on the Mystery of Transfiguration", in Diakonia, 8 (1973), pp. 306-331. Bilaniuk is of the opinion that the transfiguration of our Lord, mentioned in the three Synoptic Gospels, has received insufficient theological attention in Western Christianity. As a contribution toward minimizing that deficiency, he interprets Teilhard's theory of evolution, especially as it is embodied in this and similar passages, as a description of a "dynamic and progressive reality" seen as "a creature in a constant natural process of transfiguration", pp. 309-310.
have the truth that makes free, the divinely prepared cure for faithful but ardently moved minds that suffer because they cannot reconcile in themselves two almost equally imperative and vital impulses, faith in the world and faith in God.243

Teilhard's own faith in God is very intimately associated with his faith in the world. In this same essay—"Cosmic Life"—he speaks of God as intimately involved with the world.

God who is as immense and all-embracing, and at the same time as warm and intimate as a soul, is the Centre who spreads through all things; his immensity is produced by an extreme of concentration, and his rich simplicity synthesizes a culminating paroxysm of accumulated virtues.244

And again, he speaks of God as "vibrant in the ether", as working within life, and as shining through and being personified in mankind.245

Every encounter that brings me a caress, that spurs me on, that comes as a shock to me, that bruises or breaks me, is a contact with the hand of God, which assumes countless forms and yet always commands our worship.246

Teilhard's second major essay of the War, entitled, "Mastery of the World and the Kingdom of God"247 and comple-

243 Writings in Time of War, p. 59.
244 Ibid., p. 48.
245 Ibid., p. 61.
246 Ibid., p. 60.
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ted on Sept. 20, 1916, roughly follows the same theme as "Cosmic Life"--a theme, in fact, which is implicit in all of Teilhard's works because it is the basis of his synthesis--and that is the theme of the reconciliation of the secular and the sacred; rather than polarization on one or the other, he would rather see "an effort towards God that forces the blood through every single vein in the universe without exception." In this essay Teilhard speaks of God, again, in cosmic terms. "God, the personal and loving Infinite, is the Source, the motive Force and the End of the Universe. The world emerged from the heart of his creative power, laden with rich seed."

In his third essay of the War, entitled, "The Struggle Against the Multitude" and completed in 1917 (two dates are given: Feb. 26 and March 22), Teilhard attempts to describe

248 Ibid., p. 76. We find the same point made, in a quite different language, in at least two other essays: In "How I Believe", Teilhard states that "It is better, no matter what the cost, to be more conscious than less conscious". Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, p. 108. In "The Phenomenon of Spirituality", he states that "To try everything and force everything in the direction of the greatest consciousness; this, in a universe recognized to be in a state of spiritual transformation, is the general and highest law of morality; to limit force (unless for the purpose of obtaining even more force) is sin. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, p. 108.

249 Ibid., p. 81.

250 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Struggle Against the Multitude", in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Writings in Time of War, pp. 93-114.
(in a somewhat metaphysical manner, with which, in the end, he was not too satisfied) the painful process of evolution from the state of multiplicity (which, in its extreme, is nothingness) to the state of unity (which, in its extreme, is the Absolute). In this process of unification, Teilhard identifies Christ as "the principle of unity which saves our guilty word..." At about the same time as this essay was completed, Teilhard wrote, in another one of his letters to his cousin Marguerite, dated Feb. 5, 1917, that he saw Christ as the principle of unity to be applied toward the definition and organization of a total human effort in which all of our resources must be drawn together.

I can't believe that the world was given to man simply to keep him busy, as if it were a wheel to turn. There must be a precise effort to be made, a definite result to be obtained, and this must be the axis of human work and of the human lineage, serving as the support or matter of our fidelity to God, acting as the dynamic bond of our charity. Obviously, it's God (our Lord) who, ultimately, is all this. But under what human form, adopted to human becoming, does God offer himself, to be served, to be won? ... It's evidently in the natural perfecting of souls, achieved by the combined effort of all science, all aesthetic, all morality, that we must seek a way to co-ordinate the dispersed effort of human beings.

251 Ibid., p. 106.
253 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
Teilhard's next major War essay was a spiritual one entitled, "The Mystical Milieu," completed on August 13, 1917. Here again he is concerned with showing Christ and God as synonymous with the whole of the evolution of the cosmos and man's full participation in it. Teilhard was not interested in any mysticism or religious fidelity that intended to discard or escape from the world.

One must have felt deeply the pain of being plunged into that multiplicity which swirls about one and slips through one's fingers, if one is to be worthy of experiencing the rapture that transports the soul when, through the unifying influence of the universal Presence, it perceives that reality has become not merely transparent but solidly enduring. For this means that the incorruptible principle of the universe is now and for ever found, and that it extends everywhere: the world is filled, and filled with the Absolute. To see this is to be made free.

Thus, for the person who can see, (in this essay such a person is identified as a mystic), nothing is profane, everything is sacred, as Teilhard was fond of saying.

According to Teilhard, there awakens in the person who can see—the mystic—a need to respond according to the level of perception. In a passage that demonstrates quite well the dialectic of invitation and response that


255 Ibid., p. 124.
would constitute a renewed psychology of religion, with its concept of religious response, Teilhard states:

In the very first place, the perception of God present in all things presupposed in the mystic an intense zest for the Real

A little later, adherence to God active in all things, forced him to develop as wide a consciousness as possible, again of the Real

And now that he is making his way farther into the immanent God, he is tied, as a person, to an unremitting fulfilment, once again of the Real

And this can mean only one thing, that man finds himself inexorably forced, by his passion for union with God, to give things their highest possible degree of reality, whether it be in his knowledge of them and his love for them, or in their proper being. 256

This passage also illustrates, again, the importance to the Teilhardian synthesis of the process of hominization because increased spiritualization can only result from increased consciousness. In the increased awareness, or higher consciousness, of a mystic, according to Teilhard, "the higher cosmic milieu is completely personified," 257 a comprehension of reality where "... Jesus must be loved as a world." 258

256 Ibid., p. 139.
257 Ibid., p. 147.
258 Ibid., p. 150.
In his fifth essay of the War, "Creative Union," 259 completed on Nov. 10, 1917, Teilhard speaks of Christ as the "term of the world," 260 that to which all things tend. Physically speaking, there is only one dynamism in the present world, that which gathers all things to Christ. Christ is the centre to which all the successfully realized, living, elect portions of the cosmos make their way, in whom each finds its being. 261

The individual experiences the unifying power of Christ as a Centre that is both near and distant, 262 that is to say immanent and transcendent. Thus, for the person who can see, that to which he is drawing even nearer is also the drawing influence itself. This, in essence, is a definition for a principle of unity.

Teilhard discusses this principle of unity and calls it the soul of the world in his next war-time essay, also entitled, "The Soul of the World," 263 and completed in January, 1918. Generally, this essay continues the theme that is expressed in the earlier war-time essays—the theme

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260 Ibid., p. 174.

261 Ibid.

262 Ibid., p. 175.

in which Christ is spoken of in terms of the cosmos, as extensive as the universe. But Teilhard is not too clear when he elaborates on that theme in this essay. Driven by a desire to bring together "Everything (in the effort of evolution; in substance) and God who is in all things," he attempts to describe an amorphous sort of reality that man is conscious of to a degree:

... something that existed before we did and could have continued to exist without us: something in which we live, and that we cannot exhaust: something that serves us but of which we are not masters: something that will gather us up when, through death, we slip away from ourselves and our whole being seems to be evaporating. 

When he finally calls this reality "a soul of the world," he describes several qualities belonging to it; there is its quality as Absolute which presents itself to us as "a principle of stability and unity," its quality of Intimacy "which makes its substance to be truly ours and truly within us, so that while it has sovereignty over us it is at the same time our own work," its quality of Greatness, "which

264 Ibid., p. 185, footnote 1.
265 Ibid., p. 181.
266 Ibid., p. 182.
267 Ibid., pp. 183-184.
268 Ibid., p. 184.
cradles and encompasses us, which tangibly absorbs us,"\textsuperscript{269} its quality of supra-individuality, "which allows us to give our energy to a life-work in which there is no ego-centrism, and which is radiant with selflessness,"\textsuperscript{270} and finally, its quality of mystery, "rich with promises that are already, in some obscure way, fulfilled."\textsuperscript{271}

On the basis of these qualities, it would seem that Teilhard is identifying the soul of the world as God ("a Divinity is being born among us").\textsuperscript{272} But an ambiguity arises when he speaks of the soul of the world in the context of Christ. Awareness of the soul of the world should precede, Teilhard insists, an awareness of Christ,\textsuperscript{273} therefore, the two are not quite identical. Yet, while they are not identical, they are not in opposition either—"they carry their being further in the identity of one and the same Reality,"\textsuperscript{274} Teilhard claims. Thus, it appears that Teilhard is speaking of two terms of the universe—

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., p. 186.
\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., p. 187.
natural one which he calls the soul of the world, and a
supernatural one which is Christ, and each is a medium for
the manifestation of God.

This elaboration by Teilhard of a natural and
supernatural term of reality represents a duality in his
thought that was contrary to his inclination and that he
eventually rejected. The evidence that Teilhard eventually
rejected this duality is found in two sources. In October
of 1918, a few months after completing this essay, Teilhard
wrote:

In "The Soul of the World," I accepted that there
was in the \( \mathcal{K} (=\text{cosmos}) \) a natural location (zone)
of souls that was identified with \( \mathcal{X} (=\text{Christ}) \).
It would perhaps be better to see the \( \mathcal{E} (=\text{the sum-
total}) \) of souls as forming a plurality, indeterminate
in form, to which the \( \mathcal{X} (=\text{Christ}) \) is superadded
with no intermediary, even \text{rationis}. "On natural
grounds," there can be no more than the "expectation"
of a unification: without Christ, the \( \mathcal{K} (=\text{cosmos}) \)
would have no natural \( \omega (=\text{omega}) \). It would remain
open.\text{275}

Then, in another war-time essay, "Forma Christi,"\text{276} completed on December 22, 1918, Teilhard demonstrated that
he has totally removed any duality from his thought with
regards to the relation of cosmos and Absolute when he states;

\text{275 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 178. As quoted by the editor.}

248-269.}
It is . . . a mistake to distinguish in man two different attractions that influence him: one, towards a hypothetical natural end of the cosmos, and the other towards the supernatural end that awaits us in the presence of God. There is only one single centre in the universe: it is at once natural and supernatural; it impels the whole of creation along one and the same line, first towards the fullest development of consciousness, and later towards the highest degree of holiness: in other words towards Christ Jesus, personal and cosmic.277

In any case, the phrase, "soul of the world" eventually came to be identified with the noosphere in Teilhard's later writings.278 This is not surprising when we remember that soul—whether the soul of the individual or the soul of the world—was indeed a principle of unity and that the noosphere was seen as an envelope of unified consciousness.279

To recapitulate, in the war-time essays examined thus far there is a noticeable development in Teilhard's thought in his understanding of Christ in relation to the evolution of the cosmos. In his earlier essays he speaks of Christ and God interchangeably as co-extensive with--.

277 Ibid., p. 256.


although not identified with—the universe, and as the principle of unity for the universe. Teilhard then began to speak of Christ as the term of an evolving world although for a while there was some confusion as to whether he was speaking of two terms, a natural and a supernatural one. But even as he worked out the confusion and eliminated an apparent duality by emphasizing one single term or centre which was both natural and supernatural—which, in fact, was the immanent and transcendent Christ—it was nevertheless clear throughout that the term of the universe, whatever its identifiable form, acted as a convergent force drawing unity out of multiplicity; that is to say, the active, participative role of the final term within the very process of evolution became increasingly emphasized in Teilhard's understanding.

This latter understanding is one identifiable component of what became the theory of Christogenesis. One other important component makes its appearance in another wartime essay entitled, "Operative Faith," completed on September 28, 1918. (three months before "Forma Christi") This component, grounded on the theory, examined earlier, of the primacy of spirit, is the notion that spirit, by its

persasive presence in all existence, is active in multiplicity and thus gives meaning to multiplicity; that is to say, there is only apparent, and not real, disorder in our existence. 281

The chaotic appearance of the future is due to our seeing the development of the universe "the wrong way" or "from the underside" . . . If we are to appreciate the harmony of events, they must be looked at "in descending order"; . . . Looked at from this angle (that is, starting from God, who gathers us to himself) their undisciplined multitude falls into order. . . . In contrast with what we habitually feel, "everything here below hangs together from on high." 282

It is because of this notion of the active presence of spirit within multiplicity that Teilhard was able to say in his essay, "Creative Union," (completed a year before "Operative Faith") that "beings at present incompletely individualized are not beings in process of separation but beings moving towards union." 283 The same notion is also the basis for his saying in "Mon Univers," 284 completed in 1918, that

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281 Ibid., p. 240.

282 Ibid. According to the editor, Teilhard's phrase that "everything here below hangs together from on high" is a quote taken from Maurice Blondel.


284 "Mon Univers," in Ecrits du Temps de la Guerre, Paris, Editions du Seuil, c. 1965, pp. 293-307. This is one of seven essays omitted in the English translation,
Tout la cohésion et la valeur ontologique de l'Univers sont en effet suspendues à l'Esprit, qui seul lie en soi, et relie entre eux, les éléments constitutifs du Monde. 285

Teilhard felt that for the believer, or for the one who could see, Christ was the active spirit within multiplicity. In fact, for the believer who "has penetrated into Christ, the world loses for him its multiplicity, its dead weight, its rigidity, its bitterness." 286

The development in Teilhard's thought of his understanding of the relation between Christ and the universe leads to an essay of particular clarity on the subject, the last major essay of the war period entitled, "The Universal Element," 287 completed on Feb. 21, 1919. An evidently important essay for Teilhard, 288 it attempts to describe,

Writings in Time of War. Teilhard wrote another essay with the same title which was completed in March of 1924. It is to be found in English in Science and Christ, pp. 37-85.

285 Ibid., p. 305.


287 "The Universal Element," in Writings in Time of War, pp. 289-302. This is the final essay included in Writings in Time of War, but in the French version of the book, two more essays written in the war period were included.

288 In a letter to his cousin Marguerite, dated Feb. 19, 1919, Teilhard says of this essay which he was just completing: "It will, I think, be the most central exposition of my ideas that I've yet produced." Pierre Teilhard de
in a manner that is reminiscent of the earlier essay, "The Soul of the World," what man seems to perceive and need--"a universal physical element in the world, which establishes, at all times and in all things, a relationship between themselves and the Absolute--both in them and around them."\(^{289}\) Some persons have a "need for, and joy in, union with another (this Other being the universal element),"\(^{290}\) and this is cosmic consciousness,\(^{291}\) according to Teilhard.

Teilhard's understanding of the universal element went through a three-part evolution which he details in this essay. In the initial step he identified the universal element as the "Will of God, conceived as a special energy instilled into beings to animate them and order them towards their end."\(^{292}\) That understanding gradually moved to a second step where he saw the universal element as God's creative action\(^{293}\) in which God was "the soul of everything that moves, the support of everything that exists."\(^{294}\)

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The third stage in his understanding came to him as he was writing "The Mystical Milieu": "At last I found within myself the name that Christianity gives to the universal Reality I had worshipped so long: it was "the cosmic influence [life] of Christ." 295 This understanding, in which the universal element is identified as the cosmic Christ, enables Teilhard to put forward a formula that has a bearing upon, and gives meaning to, the whole of creation.

.. . in every creature there exists physically (in virtue of Christ's having been chosen to be the Head of the Universe), besides the individual material and spiritual characteristics we recognize in it, a certain relationship that all being has to Christ—a particular adaptation to Christ of created essence—something of Christ, in short, that is born and develops, and gives the whole individual (even the "natural" individual) its ultimate personality and final ontological value." 296

And inasmuch as the universe is in a continuing evolution, there is a dimension of the cosmic Christ that is still in development, "... either in isolated individuals—or still more, perhaps, in a certain human spiritual unity, of which our present society is no more than an adumbration." 297

Here again, by describing the universal element as the

295 Ibid., p. 296.
296 Ibid., p. 297.
297 Ibid., p. 298.
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cosmic Christ involved in a process of growth in the world, Teilhard is in effect putting forth an early formulation of the theory of Christogenesis. This is even more evident toward the close of this essay when Teilhard speaks of the properties of Christ, understood as the Universal Element. In summarized form, the properties of the Universal Element (Christ) are:

[It] makes the transcendent immediate; it unifies, by differentiating, the Multiple; it allows us to complete what already exists and to win full possession of what we already hold; it detaches us from the world by attaching us to it.\(^{298}\)

Described in this manner, the cosmic Christ becomes the principle of union and the source of meaning for the whole of the Teilhardian synthesis. Every individual component of the cosmos becomes significant in this perspective--everything is sacred, nothing is profane--so that "it becomes possible to use all life's forces to produce one and the same real thing,"\(^ {299}\) whether that be defined as heaven on earth, or the union of all within the One. Thus, it became important for Teilhard, once it was seen that Christ played such an elemental and essential role in the evolution of the cosmos, that the Christ fact be pronounced as broadly

\(^{298}\) Ibid., p. 301.

\(^{299}\) Ibid.
as possible.

Not only so that no chosen particle may be omitted from the Pleroma (nothing is so small as to be inessential to its totality) but so that the universe may be given its true form under the influence of Christ, we must bring about the reign of Christ even—indeed above all—in the continually nascent fringe of the world. 300

The remaining essays to be examined in this section elaborate and make explicit as a theory what in the war-time essays were early and implicit formulations of the notion of Christogenesis. But it is already becoming clear that the notion of a cosmic Christ could have a major role to play in a renewed psychology of religion as both a foundation and a dynamic for such a psychology. This point will be discussed in chapter four.

Any suggestion in the war-time essays of the relationship between Christ and the evolutionary processes of the universe was implicit and vague at best. It was only in the post-war essays when Teilhard fleshed out more and more of his synthesis with the insight he derived as a scientist that the relationship was more explicitly stated and elaborated. In effect, this progress from an implicit to explicit formulation of the relation between Christ and the universe represents a maturing in Teilhard's mind, of

300 ibid., p. 302.
a need that originated in childhood to reconcile his love of nature and his love of God. 301 The urgency of effecting such a reconciliation is the subject of an early post-war essay 302 in which he states the futility of opposing the one concern against the other: "It is useless . . . to oppose science and Christ, or to separate them as two domains alien to one another." 303 Indeed, Teilhard felt that the scientist studying matter—but who had learned how to see—could not fail to be aware "to what a degree Christ, through his Incarnation, is interior to the world, rooted in the world even in the heart of the tiniest atom." 304

Thus, while in one of his latest war-time essays, Teilhard spoke of the Universal Element which he identified as Christ, in one of his first post-war essays he spoke of the Universal Christ 305 which he identified as the "organic

301 This childhood need is recorded by Claude Cuenot in, Teilhard de Chardin, A Biographical Study, p. 7. See also Teilhard's remarks in "How I Believe," in Christianity and Evolution, p. 96, where he describes himself as both a child of heaven and child of the earth.


303 Ibid., p. 36.

304 Ibid.

centre of the entire universe." By "organic centre" he meant "the centre on which every even natural development is ultimately physically dependent." By the phrase "of the entire universe" he was referring to "all the realities on which we are physically dependent, whether in a close or a distant relationship (and that, in all probability, means the centre of all participated being)." As he had implied in earlier essays, Teilhard here wants to again place an emphasis on seeing Christ in cosmic terms in order to remove a barrier that he felt had been set up between Christian and human effort.

Human action can be related to Christ, and can co-operate in the fulfilment of Christ, not only by the intention, the fidelity and the obedience in which—as an addition—it is clothed, but also by the actual material content of the work done. . . . Human effort becomes divinisable in opere (and not in operatione), and so for the Christian the world becomes divine in its entirety.

It is in the removing of the barrier between Christian and human action that the Teilhardian synthesis effectively gives a meaning and value, potentially, to the simplest of human

307 Ibid.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid., p. 17.
actions. The critical importance of this point will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

In another early post-war essay entitled "My Universe," Teilhard clarified the notions behind the concepts of the Universal Christ and the Universal Element with still another concept, that of Christ-Omega. He first explains the term "omega," and it is immediately evident that he is describing Christ by another name.

... we are gradually introduced (from the more multiple to the less multiple) to the concept of a first, supreme centre, an omega, in which all the fibres, the threads, the generating lines, of the universe are knit together. From the point of view of the completion of the movement it governs it is a centre still in formation—a potential centre; but it is already a real centre, too, since without its attractive force operating here and now, the general stream of unification would be unable to raise up the Multiple.

And yet, if it is indeed a description of Christ by another name, it is nevertheless a description founded on a scientific interpretation of the whole of reality; that is to say, each step in the Teilhardian synthesis leads Teilhard to this perception.

310 "My Universe," in Science and Christ, pp. 37-85. This essay, completed on March 25, 1924, was the second to have this title. The first one was completed in 1918.

311 Ibid., p. 48.
In any case, Teilhard indeed proceeds, as the next step in this essay, to identify omega with Christ—"the revealed Christ is identical with omega." \(^{312}\) For Teilhard, this is merely a matter of logic within the overall synthesis. It will be recalled how in his war-time essay, "The Soul of the World," \(^{313}\) Teilhard had suggested there were two terms of the universe—a natural one and a supernatural one, but that by the time he wrote "Forma Christi" \(^{314}\) he had rejected such a duality. Here, in "My Universe," he rejects that duality absolutely.

In no case could the cosmos be conceived, and realized, without a supreme centre of spiritual consistence. It would be most unreasonable to imagine the separate creation of an atom or a group of monads, not only in view of the particular principles expressed in creative union, but simply as a matter of sound metaphysics. The goal before Creation and attained by Creation is in the first place the whole, and then, in and after the whole, all the rest. On any hypothesis, if the world is to be thinkable it must be centered. The presence, therefore, at its head, of an omega has nothing to do with the fact of its "supernatural evolution." What gives the world its "gratuitous" character is precisely that the position of universal centre has not been given to any supreme intermediary between God and the universe, but \(^{315}\) has been occupied by the Divinity himself.

\(^{312}\) Ibid., p. 54.

\(^{313}\) "The Soul of the World," in Writings in Time of War, pp. 177-190.

\(^{314}\) "Forma Christi," in Writings in Time of War, pp. 249-269.

\(^{315}\) Ibid., p. 56.
That Christ should be seen as coinciding with the universal term omega is in accord, in Teilhard’s view, with the Johannine and Pauline scriptural representations of Christ and thus, a principal attribute of Christ\textsuperscript{316} becomes “that of exerting a supreme physical influence on every cosmic reality without exception.”\textsuperscript{317} Consequently, Teilhard is able to emphasize once again the point he had made in “Note on the Universal Christ” that the barriers between Christian and human effort must be removed and, again, he is able to do so because of the identification of Christ with omega.

\textbf{... since Christ is omega, he does not restrict his organizing activity simply to one zone of our being—that of sacramental relationships and the “habitus” of virtues... his directing and informing influence runs through the whole range of human works, of material determinisms and cosmic evolutions. By convention, we call these lower processes in the universe “natural.” In reality, by virtue of Christ’s establishment as head of the cosmos, they are steeped in final purpose, in supernatural life, even to what is most palpable in their reality.}\textsuperscript{318}

Teilhard placed even more emphasis on the worth of human action once the theory of Christogenesis was clearly formulated, as will be demonstrated shortly.

\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., pp. 54, 56.
\textsuperscript{317} Ibid., p. 57.
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid., pp. 58-59.
The human side of the dynamics operative between the cosmic Christ and man are treated in a later essay, completed in 1937, entitled "Human Energy." Here, Teilhard's concern is one of motivation, the problem of action. What conditions, he asks, are necessary for the continued progression of the reflective life of man, and which, indeed, can account for the appearance of reflection in the first place. Teilhard has asked this question before but answered it primarily through his notions of hominization and socialization (although all of his major theories come into play). But here he answers his question by insisting that in the unfolding story of evolution there must always have been something from ahead attracting forth a response. If there were not, life would have expired some time ago. In essence, there has had to be a fundamental inclination towards being rather than non-being, and it is this inclination that motivates us to action.

... this fundamental preference for being, without which the world, as it attained thought, would logically have returned to dust, necessarily implies belief in some final completion of everything around us. If being is by nature holy there is no salvation except of everything that exists. We act therefore, in the final analysis, in obedience to a world, to incorporate ourselves in a world, to complete ourselves with the world.

319 "Human Energy" in Human Energy, pp. 113-162.

320 Ibid., p. 139.
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A total and totalizing end; nothing less could set the springs of our liberty in motion and bend them to it.

But this faith in the "final completion of everything around us" can only persist if it has a hope of attaining some higher form of being for humanity--"superhumanity," as Teilhard calls it, and two conditions emerge as essential for its actuation. If we are to accept and co-operate with the demands of evolution, Teilhard tells us, "the universal and superhuman end to which it is taking us must present itself to us as at the same time incorruptible and personal." This end toward which we are tending must be incorruptible because the human spirit would give up the struggle if it knew for sure that nothing survived the physical death. And it must also be personal since that is the design of our own evolution.

In us cosmic evolution is a work of personal nature. It cannot possibly end, either in itself or in our consciousness of its progress, except in an element of personal form, into which in some way or another our personalities will flow.

321 Ibid.
322 Ibid., p. 140.
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid., p. 141.
325 Ibid., p. 142.
Teilhard later describes this "element of personal form" as "a distinct centre of super-personality" and identifies it as the Omega point—"a cosmic point Omega' of total synthesis"—which the noosphere, indeed the world, "physically requires, for its maintenance and functioning."

Having identified the higher form of being toward which we tend as the Omega point, Teilhard concerns himself with what he perceives to be a certain essential energy of the world that radiates from the Omega point ("goal of unification") and finally flows back towards it; he identifies this energy as love.

The general dynamics of this energy of love were examined in the section on the theory of personalization. What is to be noted here is its origins in the Omega point. But, since Teilhard earlier identified the Omega point as the cosmic Christ, to say that love energy originates in the Omega point is to say it originates in the cosmic Christ.

326 Ibid., p. 145.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
329 Ibid.
In *The Phenomenon of Man*, Teilhard, while describing the attributes of Omega Point, speaks of the radiation of love energy from Omega as a *present reality* of Omega,\(^{330}\) preventing a conceptualization of Omega as distant and fragile. Omega must be supremely present if it is to be supremely attractive; that is to say, it could not be distant while at the same time active in the unifying processes of man.\(^{331}\) This supreme presence constitutes a first attribute of Omega which he calls actuality.\(^{332}\) A second attribute of Omega is irreversibility; that is to say, it must be non-perishable. "To satisfy the ultimate requirements of our action, Omega must be independent of the collapse of the forces with which evolution is woven."\(^{333}\) Two other attributes of Omega are autonomy and transcendence. It is autonomous in that it is the term of natural evolution, that in which the "movement of synthesis culminates."\(^{334}\) It is transcendent in that it is also outside the term of natural evolution.

When, going beyond the elements, we come to speak of the conscious Pole of the world, it is not

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\(^{330}\) *The Phenomenon of Man*, p. 294.


enough to say that it emerges from the rise of consciousness: we must add that from this genesis it has already emerged; without which it could neither subjugate into love nor fix in incorruptibility. If by its very nature it did not escape from the time and space it gathers together, it would not be Omega.\textsuperscript{335}

Omega, understood according to these characteristics, becomes the principle that explains the "persistent march towards greater consciousness, and the paradoxical solidity of what is most fragile".\textsuperscript{336} This occurs through the operation of radial energy at the core of matter, the world, which focuses on Omega and away from the tide of probability; "thus something in the cosmos escapes from entropy, and does so more and more".\textsuperscript{337} But again, as Teilhard emphasizes

\textsuperscript{335} ibid., p. 297. As a comparison, see Teilhard's 1954 essay entitled, "The Singularities of the Human Species", in which he describes Omega as having the following properties: "a) that it is objective by nature ..., that is to say corresponds not simply to an ideal extension or projection of our concepts and desires, but to a biological bringing together of our personalities. b) that it preserves everything, that is to say shows itself capable in time of gathering and consummating, in its supreme centredness, all that is most essential and incommunicable in each reflective element of the universe. c) that it preserves everything for ever, that is to say rescues evolved humanity once and for all, in one way or another, from all danger of desegregation by relapse". The Appearance of Man, p. 271.

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid., p. 298.

\textsuperscript{337} Ibid. About a year after The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard wrote, in an essay entitled, "Some Reflections on Progress", what amounts to a good summary of the relation between the world and Omega. (Note that Omega, in this case, is identified as God, not as Christ); "The sense of
in his 1944 essay, "Centrology," the whole of the operation—the operation of radial energy focusing upon Omega and thereby activating the process of noogenesis—occurs "under the influence of the radiation of Omega," what was described earlier as the unifying influence of the energy of love originating in Omega. These dynamics are precisely what the theory of Christogenesis, fully formulated, intends to describe—the radiation of love energy, originating in Omega, through the matter of the universe, bringing about ever-increased convergence of spirit back upon Omega, with particular emphasis placed on the constitutive role of human action—one might say response—within the process.

All of the material examined thus far in this section indicates a gradual emergence of the theory of Christogenesis the earth opening and exploding upwards into God; and the sense of God taking root and finding nourishment downwards into Earth. A personal, transcendent God and an evolving universe no longer forming two hostile centres of attraction, but entering into hierarchic conjunction to raise the human mass on a single tide. Such is the sublime transformation which we may with justice foresee, and which in fact is beginning to have its effect upon a growing number of minds, free-thinkers as well as believers: the idea of a spiritual evolution of the universe." The Future of Man, p. 83.


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without an explicit identification of it as such. The first appearance of the term "Christogenesis" in the Teilhardian material appears to be in The Phenomenon of Man. In an earlier essay Teilhard had referred to the Johannine and Pauline texts for examples of scriptural references where Christ is seen in cosmic terms and as having a physical supremacy over the universe. In The Phenomenon, written some sixteen years later, he appears to label what he had called the "physical potency [of] the Mystery of Christ" as the "Christogenesis of St. Paul and St. John." This Christogenesis "is nothing else and nothing less than the extension, both awaited and unhoped for, of that noogenesis in which cosmogenesis--as regards our experience--culminates;" that is to say, Christ is seen as actively

341 Ibid., p. 56.
342 The Phenomenon of Man, p. 325.
343 Ibid. The dynamics of Christogenesis, as this definition indicates, are rooted in the process of convergence that originates in cosmogenesis. Teilhard expressed the theory as a formula in his 1948 essay, "Two Principles and a Corollary (or a Weltanschauung in Three Stages)": "The whole picture... could be expressed in logical sequence by the following series of equations: Cosmos = cosmogenesis = biogenesis = individual anthropogenesis = collective anthropogenesis = Christogenesis." Toward the Future, p. 156.
present in the whole of the evolutionary process,\textsuperscript{344} a process characterized by a gradual rise in consciousness and the emergence of reflective thought, the gradual emergence of the primacy of spirit—the whole of that process culminating in the cosmic Christ. As a consequence of the dynamics of Christogenesis, "man finds himself capable of experiencing and discovering his God in the whole length, breadth and depth of the world in movement.\textsuperscript{345}

As it is expressed above in\textit{ The Phenomenon of Man}, the theory of Christogenesis has three aspects in particular that receive emphasis, to varying degrees, in every subsequent appearance of the theory in Teilhard's writings: firstly, there is the radiation of love energy, originating in Omega, through matter, as manifested by the operation of radial energy. This is the "extension" mentioned above. Secondly, there is the aspect of human action and its significance to the evolutionary process, such action motivated, ideally, by a perception of the radiation of Omega. This is the process of "cosmogenesis" mentioned above. Thirdly, there is the aspect of the Absolute Centre, the cosmic Christ, that towards which the whole of the

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{345} Ibid.
evolutionary process converges. This is the "noogenesis in which cosmogenesis . . . culminates," as expressed above.

It will be suggested in the next chapter of the thesis that these aspects of Christogenesis provide the model for the dialectic of invitation and response in a renewed psychology of religion, with its concept of religious response. In accordance with that model, it is significant that Teilhard places such importance, in most of the writings that deal with Christogenesis, upon the second aspect mentioned earlier--the aspect of human action; human action is also a primary aspect of a renewed psychology of religion.

Two years after The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard again speaks of the process of Christogenesis, this time in the context of Christian perfection. While it is a short essay--some six pages long--it is an important one since it makes quite clear the constitutive role of human action in the process of Christogenesis. Teilhard's concern in the essay is to point out that the traditional understanding of Christian perfection--detaching ourselves from the world and focusing our attention on God--was founded

on an erroneous understanding that in the world we know, nature is complete and making no progress from where it is. Thus human perfection meant escaping into the supernatural. The truth of the matter is that nature and man's powers "are still in full growth" and are not anywhere near completion.

We used to think that mankind was fully mature; in fact, it is very far from being adult--very far from being fully created; and this is true not only of its individualized values but also, and most of all, of the collective term towards which it is making its way as a result of the great phenomenon of "convergence of spirit."

Thus, in an incomplete and still-growing world, the Christian who is seeking perfection has an obligation "to support the "natural" world's further progress ahead (since a new form of nourishment, spiritual in substance, is continually to be expected from that progress)."

Teilhard cautions against a possible problem: there are some persons who, while accepting that human effort must be applied to a world that is still in process of natural growth, believe that God is still to be sought

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348 Ibid., p. 102.
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid., p. 103.
outside of this process. Rather, Teilhard suggests, the two processes must be seen in continuum so that . . .

the natural and supernatural consummations of the world envelope one another (the latter incorporating and super-animating the former), with God situated on the extended axis of the natural evolution of the whole of spirit. Christogenesis is thus seen to be the sublimation of the whole of cosmogenesis. 351

The importance of this view is that it places human effort in an elemental and essential role in the process of Christogenesis because matter, the world, becomes the medium of the progress of spirit.

At the most fundamental level, what now influences our views on the mechanics (the ascesis) of spiritualization is that spirit has ceased to be for us "anti-matter", or "extra-matter", and has become "trans-matter". As we now see it, spiritualization can no longer be affected in a breakaway from matter or out of tune with matter: it must be affected by passing through and emerging from matter. 352

351 Ibid., p. 104.

352 Ibid., pp. 105-106. For a discussion of God's immanence and transcendence as it relates to Teilhard's Christology, see Petro Bilaniuk, "The Christology of Teilhard de Chardin", in Proceedings of the Teilhard Conference 1964, New York, Fordham University, 1965, pp. 109-133. The segregation in the minds of some between love of God and love of the world might well arise from a misunderstanding of the immanence-transcendence question. Rather than an opposition between the two dimensions of the Absolute, would it not be possible, Bilaniuk suggests, "... to say that immanence and transcendence complement each other on the part of the absolutely simple pure act of the subsisting existence itself,
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Shortly after "A Note on the Concept of Christian Perfection", Teilhard placed much the same emphasis on the role of human effort in the process of Christogenesis in his essay, "Super-Humanity, Super-Christ, Super-Charity", completed in August of 1943. The foundation for the worth of human action is in the fact that "the real is charged with a divine Presence", since the universe is proceeding toward Christ-Omega and "the whole of cosmogenesis is ultimately, through anthropogenesis, expressed in a Christogenesis". If, indeed, "the real is charged with a divine Presence", then the only appropriate response is to partici-

the ground of being, that is God? . . . God is transcendent not only because he stands infinitely above, apart, and outside created, finite, and relative extra-divine reality, but also because he can by his infinite immanence penetrate, put himself in the presence of, sustain, govern, this extra-divine reality to such an infinite extent, that on the one hand he does not destroy created beings, and on the other hand "immanates" them so infinitely that he reaches into the core of their existent being to spheres where they are no more and where he alone, the infinite God, can extend his infinite transcendence. Humanly and figuratively speaking, God is infinitely transcendent not only towards the "above", but also towards the "below": "within" and "through" creatures", pp. 115-116.

354 Ibid., p. 168
355 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
pate fully in cosmic evolution.\footnote{ibid., p. 169.} It might be noted here that in the context of a renewed psychology of religion, with its concept of religious response, the perception in any individual that "the real is charged with a divine Presence" should constitute, for that individual, an invitation of an even compelling degree. With perception of the invitation comes response; the more deeply the invitation is perceived, the more religious should the response be.

Teilhard stresses the point still again in an essay written some five years later (August, 1948), entitled "My Fundamental Vision",\footnote{ibid., p. 204.} when he states:

For the man who has once thoroughly understood the nature of a world in which cosmogenesis, proceeding along the axis of anthropogenesis, culminates in a Christogenesis--for that man, everything, in every element and event of the universe, is bathed in light and warmth, everything becomes animate and a fit object for love and worship--not, indeed, directly in itself (as popular pantheism would have it) but at a deeper level than itself: that is, at the extreme and unique terms of its development.\footnote{ibid., p. 204.}
And finally, in his November, 1945, essay, "Suggestions for a New Theology", Teilhard is even more explicit in what he thinks should be man's response once he is aware of the association between the process of evolution and the dynamics of Christogenesis:

With cosmogenesis being transformed ... into Christogenesis, it is ... the very being of the world which is now being personalized. Someone, and no longer something, is in gestation in the universe. To believe and to serve was not enough: we now find that it is becoming not only possible but imperative literally to love evolution. 361

Herein lies the significance of the theory of Christogenesis for the whole of the Teilhardian synthesis—it makes most explicit the urgency of the call that mankind embrace evolution. The Teilhardian synthesis, with all of the theories examined prior to Christogenesis, already provided substantial value and meaning to the whole of existence. While each of the theories, examined in sequence, increased the validity of valuing existence, the strongest argument for doing so is provided by the theory of Christogenesis.


In a sense, the concept of the cosmic Christ is present throughout each stage of the Teilhardian synthesis because each of the major theories, while it can be argued on its own, is given its greatest validity from the perspective of the cosmic Christ calling the whole of existence to Himself. Each of the theories is given an extended significance within the synthesis when placed in the context of the theory of Christogenesis because the cosmic Christ can be identified as the source or the foundation from which or upon which each of the theories is expressed. This is one implication that can be drawn from Teilhard's series of equations, quoted earlier: "Cosmos = cosmogenesis = biogenesis = individual anthropogenesis = collective anthropogenesis = Christogenesis".\(^{362}\) It is not merely that Christogenesis is on a continuum with cosmogenesis—which it is—but also that it is the foundation of the cosmos itself.

From the perspective of the comprehensiveness of the theory of Christogenesis, the whole of existence, as suggested earlier, is given its maximum significance, a significance greater than that provided by any and all of the theories up to Christogenesis. The worth of the person and of personal action, as a consequence, are also at a maximum. This is the

\(^{362}\) Teilhard de Chardin, Toward the Future, p. 156.
point to be drawn from Teilhard's statement, quoted earlier, regarding human action:

Human action can be related to Christ, and can cooperate in the fulfilment of Christ, not only by the intention, the fidelity and the obedience in which—as an addition—it is clothed, but also by the actual material content of the work done . . . Human effort becomes 

Teilhard often insisted that we had to learn "how to see". For those who can see, along the broad outline of Teilhard's synthesis, everything is sacred and nothing is profane because of Christ's position as the single centre of the universe; from this position, Christ permeates the whole of existence. Consequently,

... in every creature there exists physically (in virtue of Christ's having been chosen to be the Head of the Universe), besides the individual material and spiritual characteristics we recognize in it, a certain relationship that all being has to Christ—a particular adaptation to Christ of created essence—something of Christ, in short, that is born and develops, and gives the whole individual (even the "natural" individual) its ultimate personality and final ontological value.

363 "Note on the Universal Christ", in *Science and Christ*, p. 17.

364 "Forma Christi", in *Writings in Time of War*, p. 256.

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The study of Teilhard's theory of Christogenesis and its significance for the whole of the synthesis has now been completed. The next chapter will examine the contribution each of the theories in the Teilhardian synthesis can make to the renewal of psychology of religion.
CHAPTER IV

THE TEILHARDIAN SYNTHESIS AND THE RENEWAL OF PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

A major premise of this thesis has been that the discipline of psychology of religion is in need of a major renewal if it is to approach the religious behavior and expression of modern man. As shown in the first chapter, that premise is based on the argument that a new shift in focus is being called for in the discipline.

The shift in focus that is proposed for psychology of religion was shown to be illustrated by the differences in two questions for the exercise of psychology of religion as phrased by the psychologist of religion, Paul Pruyser. The old question, the question of the traditional focus of the discipline, was: "Which are the significant data of religious experience?" The new question, the question of the proposed new focus of the discipline, is: "Which data of experience are of religious significance?"

As a result of the shift in focus that is proposed for psychology of religion, it was argued that there are serious inadequacies in the continued usage of the concept of "religious experience," in its traditional focus. Toward the close of the first chapter, it was suggested that the introduction of the concept of "religious response", to
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operate within the proposed new focus of the discipline could remove many of the inadequacies associated with the concept of "religious experience."

The case for renewing the discipline of psychology of religion, and for adopting the concept of "religious response" within such a renewed discipline, can be argued strongly on the basis of a need for a shift in focus in the discipline.

But an even stronger case can be made, it is argued, on the basis of the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Indeed, the hypothesis of the project is that the Teilhardian synthesis could make a major contribution to the process of renewal in psychology of religion.

The elaboration of the Teilhardian synthesis has been completed. The major theories that fall within the synthesis have been examined for their content and for the role they play in the whole of the synthesis. The purpose of the present section is to elaborate on the contribution the Teilhardian synthesis and its theories can make to the renewal of the discipline of psychology of religion.

One of the ways in which the traditional focus and the proposed new focus for the discipline of psychology
of religion differ is in their perception of reality. The traditional focus, as revealed in its usage of the concept of "religious experience," views reality in dichotomous and discontinuous terms; its perspective belongs to the same kind of ideology which can speak, for example, of God as being "up there" or "out there" while man is down here. In this perspective, it is appropriate to speak of religious experiences as isolated moments of reality that are distinct from all other moments of reality. The new focus for the discipline, as implied in the proposed concept of "religious response," views reality from the perspective of a unitive and processive ideology. In this perspective, which belongs to the same kind of ideology which prefers to speak of God in both transcendental and immanent terms, it is more appropriate to speak of the religious significance of experience in general rather than of the significance of any particular religious experiences. This is the perspective, it has been argued in chapter one, that is being called for in the proposed new focus of the discipline. This is where the Teilhardian synthesis, with all of its composite theories, can make a major contribution, it is argued, to the renewal of psychology of religion because it exemplifies
the shift in focus being called for in the discipline.

The intent of examining the Teilhardian synthesis has not been to present Teilhard as a psychologist of religion but rather to present him as one significant thinker of the twentieth century whose synthesis gives credence to the call for renewal in psychology of religion. The major theories of Teilhard's synthesis, it will now be shown, provide a basis for supporting the proposed new focus for psychology of religion, the focus that embraces Pryuser's new question, which data of experience are of religious significance?

It has been suggested earlier that the major significance of the Teilhardian synthesis is that it provides a meaning and a worth to the whole of existence. By extension, the major contribution of the Teilhardian synthesis to the process of renewal in psychology of religion is that by providing meaning and worth to the whole of existence, it validates the shift in focus of going from seeking the significance of religious experience to seeking the religious significance of experience. There is a widening of perspective for interpreting reality that is called for by the new focus in psychology of religion; the Teilhardian synthesis pro-
vides a basis for that widening of perspective. Attention will now turn to each of Teilhard's theories to illustrate how his synthesis provides a basis for widening the perspective of psychology of religion, that is, for the renewal of the discipline.

1. The Theory of the Process of Evolution

Teilhard's first major theory is that the universe is an evolution. Already, this theory has a bearing on the process of renewal in psychology of religion because it is in fundamental agreement with the proposed new focus for the discipline. In the traditional focus of psychology of religion, the discipline had an interpretation of reality that was characterized by staticism, fixation and discontinuity. The proposed new focus of the discipline, on the other hand, is characterized by momentum, process development. Teilhard's theory that the universe is an evolution lends support, by its very nature, to the call for a new focus in psychology of religion.

Teilhard's theory of the process of evolution, it will be recalled, has three sub-theories and they too have their bearing on the process of renewal in psychology of religion.
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a) The Theory of the "Within" and "Without"

Teilhard's concept of the "within" is a first step in giving a fundamental worth to all of existence; as Teilhard would say, nothing is profane. There is a continuity to be posited between the interiority of the most rudimentary forms of matter and the interiority of the most complex form of matter which is man. This continuity of interiority becomes one of the factors in postulating a unitive view of reality, the kind of view that is at the basis of the proposed new focus in psychology of religion; consequently, the concept of the "within" contributes to the validity of Pryuyser's new question. If there is a "within" characteristic to all of matter, it means that consideration must be given to the presence of interrelation in all of existence and, by consequence, to all of experience. In the context of psychology of religion, this will mean that religious significance must be sought in all of experience rather than in isolated instances.

b) The Theory of Radial and Tangential Energy

The theory of radial and tangential energy--radial energy corresponding to the "within" of matter and tangential energy to the "without" of matter--describes the manner in which an interiority is present in all of matter, that is, it describes the momentum of that interiority. In the
context of psychology of religion, the theory raises a number of suggestions or guidelines concerning the manner in which all experience should be approached, seeking religious significance therein.

It was pointed out in the first chapter that the word "religious," in this project, when used in conjunction with the word "response," would be used as an adjective in reference to response; it describes human behavior as attentive, sensitive, tender, sacramental or celebrative. If we approach all of experience with an attitude of attention, sensitivity, tenderness, and celebration, then we are approaching experience with a religious attitude.

But if we are to approach all of experience with a religious attitude, the religious significance of any experience must in turn "speak to us" of its presence or manifest itself to our perception, to our way of "seeing." Teilhard's notion of the "within," which provides a fundamental worth to all existence and consequently to all experience, creates the possibility for religious significance to manifest itself to a religious attitude. In addition, Teilhard's notion of radial energy, corresponding to the "within" actualizes the possibility of religious significance to manifest itself to a religious attitude.
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Thus, one guideline in the manner of approaching
all experience is that one should approach with a religious
attitude. Secondly, since the interiority of matter is
hidden beneath the "without," one should approach all
experience seeking hidden meaning. Thirdly, since the
radial component of energy is the spirit dimension of
reality, one should attend to the ineffable aspects of
human experience.

c) The Theory of Complexity-Consciousness

The theory, or law, of complexity-consciousness
describes the process whereby interiority increases in
matter in direct relation to the complexity of the matter
in which it appears. In the context of psychology of
religion, the theory of complexity-consciousness introduces
a new dimension, a dimension that can be called a dialectic
of invitation and response. If emphasis is to be placed
on seeking the religious significance of all of experience
and if, according to Teilhard's law, consciousness increases
according to the degree of complexity, then it should mean
that one's perception of religious significance within
experience might increase in some ratio to the degree of
complexity of such experience. (The theory of personal-
ization shall be shown to provide some weight to this
suggestion).
In the concept of "religious response," as developed in the first chapter, the word "response" is intentionally used with reference to a perceived invitation. The invitation, which ultimately means an "inbreak" of the holy into our experience, has its roots, it can be argued, in the "within" of all existence.

It was said earlier that the "within" creates the possibility for religious significance to manifest itself to the religious attitude and that radial energy, corresponding to the "within," actualizes that possibility. The "religious significance manifesting itself" is the "inbreak" of the holy in our experience and constitutes what is being called "invitation." Thus, the "within" creates the possibility of perceiving invitation and radial energy actualizes that possibility. But "invitation" is only one half of the dialectic; the other half is response.

In terms of the law of complexity-consciousness, an increase in consciousness (which rises from an increase in complexity), should mean an increase in the perception of religious significance in all of experience, that is, an increase in the perception of invitation. Correspondingly, it should also mean an increase in the degree of response. Stated in another manner, if there is perception of, and an increase in the perception of, the manifestation
of the holy in all of our experience—that is, perception of religious significance or invitation (corresponding to the presence and increase of complexity)—there should be a parallel increase in the inclination to respond to that manifestation, to that invitation (corresponding to a rise in consciousness). In short, if we perceive invitation within the matrix of our experience, we should be inclined, in the context of the law of complexity-consciousness, to respond to the degree that we perceive that invitation.

It was suggested earlier that if we approach experience with an attitude of attention, sensitivity, tenderness, and celebration, then we are approaching experience with a religious attitude. But to approach experience with a religious attitude, it is necessary that the religious significance of any experience "speak to us" of its presence or manifest itself to our perception, to our way of "seeing." It is now argued that the religious attitude, upon sensing a manifestation of the holy within some aspect of our experience (invitation) leads to a corresponding, appropriate religious response.

The theory of the process of evolution and its three sub-theories were identified in the second chapter as the foundations of the Teilhardian synthesis because
they are the infrastructure upon which the three other major theories are built. Similarly they can be described as the foundations for a process of renewal in psychology of religion because they provide a basis for finding worth and meaning in the whole of existence and, consequently, for seeking religious significance in the whole of experience.

2. The Primacy of Spirit and the Theory of Creative Union

Teilhard's notion of the primacy of spirit and the theory of creative union were identified in chapter three, along with the other two remaining theories, as the dynamics of the Teilhardian synthesis. In the context of a process of renewal for psychology of religion, they can also be identified as the dynamics of the renewed understanding of religious experience.

Teilhard was convinced of the presence and primacy of spirit within matter and the theory of creative union was an attempt to formulate that phenomenon. Thus to posit the principle of the "within" of matter was, for Teilhard, to posit the principle of spirit in matter; to say that matter has a "within" was to say that matter has spirit. By extension, positing the principle of radial energy was to posit the principle of spiritual energy. And when it is stated, according to the law of complexity-consciousness, that with an increase in complexity there is a corresponding
increase in consciousness, it is also to state that there is a corresponding increase in spirit. This conclusion is permitted on the basis of Teilhard's theory of creative union. The reader will recall Teilhard's statement, when his theory of creative union was examined, that

if the most refined psychism coincides, in our universe, with the most complex material basis, then this is by structural necessity. As a result of the mechanism of evolution, the One, in the cycle of our creation, is born on the multiple; the simple is formed by giving its unity to what is complex; spirit is made through the medium of matter.

Consequently, it can be argued that the more complex matter is, the more "spirit-ized" it is.

Now, on the level of man this relationship between spirit and matter and the primacy of spirit in that relationship is of the greatest importance. If in fact it can be stated that man is capable of perceiving the manifestation of religious significance in human experience—that is to say, capable of perceiving invitation—then that capacity for perceiving invitation increases the more "spirit-ized" man becomes. That is to say, the more "spirit-ized" man becomes, the more capable he should be of perceiving the holy. Consequently, the dialectic of

invitation and response can be described as the "become-spiritual" perceiving and responding to Spirit; furthermore, it is the "become-spiritual" perceiving and responding to Spirit in ever-increasing degrees.

This ever-increasing response to ever-increasing perception of invitation (manifestation of the holy in all of experience) is a process which can be identified with the dynamics of ongoing evolution, as Teilhard points out.

If the universe is rising progressively higher towards unity, it is therefore not only under the influence of some external force, but because in that unity the transcendent has made itself to some degree immanent . . . As soon . . . as we admit the reality of a reply coming on high, we in some way enter the order of certainty. This, however, comes about only through a mechanism not of mere subject-to-object confrontation but of contact between two centres of consciousness: it is an act no longer of cognition but of recognition: the whole complex inter-action of two beings who freely open themselves to one another and give themselves.²

Thus, the dialectic of invitation and response is grounded on the interaction of centres of consciousness, or as stated earlier, the interaction of "become-spiritual" with Spirit. However, in the section on Teilhard's theory of personalization, it is argued that when speaking of the dialectic

of invitation and response as being grounded on the interaction of centres of consciousness, this refers, in the experience of man, not only to the interaction between men and God as centres of consciousness but also among men as centres of consciousness.

Now, after having analyzed Teilhard's notion of the relation between spirit and matter and the primacy of spirit in that relation, it is more permissible to identify as religious that human behavior which is characterized as attentive, sensitive, tender, sacramental or celebrative because those characteristics are necessary if there is to be any contact between centres of consciousness, that is, if there is to be recognition and not merely cognition, if the holy (as the holy Other or as the holiness in otherness) is to be perceived and if appropriate response is to ensue. How this recognition of invitation, and response to it, can occur becomes clearer in the light of the theory of personalization.

3. Hominization and the Theory of Personalization

A major premise of the thesis project, as developed in the first chapter, is that the discipline of psychology of religion is in need of renewal if it is to approach the religious behavior and expression of modern man, or, stated in another manner, if it is to approach the whole of reality
and the full breadth of human experience to perceive therein religious significance or manifestations of the holy. In that context, the concept of "religious response" is being suggested for approaching Pruyser's new question—which data of experience are of religious significance.

A number of ways in which the Teilhardian synthesis could contribute to a process of renewal for psychology of religion have been suggested thus far. Teilhard's notion of hominization and the theory of personalization indicate further contributions the synthesis can make, especially in the context of invitation and response.

The significance for the thesis project of the concept of hominization is somewhat self-evident and straightforward and little time need be spent on it. When the word response is used in the context of "religious response," it is response to a consciously perceived invitation—and conscious perception is simply not a capacity of pre-reflective life. Thus, hominization, as a concept, describes the emergence of the capacity for reflection and perception. And when it describes the emergence of pre-reflective forms of thought it is still significant inasmuch as the capability for reflection emerges from the basic capacity for thought. Consequently, the state of hominization—of consciousness and reflective consciousness—
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is a pre-requisite to the process of personalization. This
is so, not only at the level of the individual, but also
at the collective level, the level of the noosphere. As
Teilhard says, we "reach the personalization of the indi-
vidual by the hominization of the whole group." Consequently, it is not just the consciousness of individuals
that is important; even more important is the collective
consciousness of the whole. In the language of the
Teilhardian synthesis, the greater the degree of conscious-
ness within the whole, the greater the degree of personal-
ization in individuals or the greater the capacity for
genuine union, both among persons and between persons and
Omega. By extension, in the language of a renewed
psychology of religion, the greater the degree of conscio-
sciousness within the whole, the greater the capacity,
within individuals, for perception of—and consequently,
response to—manifestations of the holy within the breadth
of human experiencing.

There is one aspect of the concept of hominization,
and thus of its significance for the thesis project, that
may not be so evident and which should be pointed out.
Teilhard understood hominization as a developmental process

3 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of
Man, p. 193.
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and not as a finished state. Consequently, in some way or another, when there is an increase in the consciousness of an individual there should be some effect upon the consciousness of the whole. And when there is an increase in the consciousness of the whole there should be some effect upon the personalizing process of individuals. As a consequence we can also speak of a developmental process in a renewed psychology of religion. In some way or another, when there is an increase, in individuals, in the perception of manifestations of the holy, there should be some effect upon the capacity for perception, of manifestations of the holy, within the whole. And when there is an increase in the capacity for perception within the whole there should be some effect upon both the perception and the response of individuals. The important thing to emphasize in all of this is the developmental process, that the movement from the less conscious to the more conscious can be equated with the movement from the less perceptive to the more perceptive and, consequently, with a movement from less responsive to more responsive. It will be recalled how Teilhard felt that man has an obligation—a biological and moral rule, he called it—to direct himself "towards the greater degree of consciousness" and that "It is better, no matter what the cost, to be more conscious than
less conscious." Might it not be possible to make a similar statement for a renewed psychology of religion, that it is better, no matter what the cost, to be more perceptive than less perceptive so that we might be more responsive rather than less responsive?

Compared to the significance for the thesis project of the concept of hominization, the significance of the theory of personalization is somewhat more involved and will require more interpretation. If it can be stated that in a renewed psychology of religion the dialectic of invitation and response is grounded on the interaction of centres of consciousness, then Teilhard's theory of personalization helps to understand the dynamics of that process.

Teilhard once said that "Spirit could never reach fulfilment save in personality (or hyper-personality)." He has also said that what makes an individual a person "is being profoundly itself." Thus when persons, that


5 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Christianity and Evolution*, p. 108. He even called this principle, "the absolute condition of the world's existence." Ibid.

is, individuals who are being profoundly themselves, interact with one another they are contributing to the spiritization process, that is, to the development and increase of spirit. But it must be an interaction of centre with centre, that is, it must be an encounter motivated by love "for it is only in that case that we succeed in realizing ourselves fully, without losing anything... of what makes us incommunicable." Furthermore, it is only through inter-communion that we bring definition to ourselves as persons because union differentiates.

Each one of us is a person because of the process of union that has preceded us; now, in our communion with other persons, we are contributing to the greater unity of the whole ahead of us, we are uniting towards supreme personality. But this process needs to be examined even more deeply. When two persons encounter one another, that is, when they meet centre to centre and under the

7 Ibid.
9 Ibid., "Union made us men by organizing the confused powers of matter under the control of a thinking spirit. It will now transform us into elements governed by some higher soul. Up to now inner union has personalized us. Now external union is going to "super-personalize" us."
motivation of love, they contribute to the personalization of each other, that is, they help to make each other more fully persons. Other ways of saying this are that they increase the consciousness of each or they bring forward the development of spirit in each. Whatever way it is expressed, what matters for a renewed psychology of religion is that such encountering between persons increases the capacity for perception, in each person, of manifestations of the holy. Consequently, the capacity for response in each person is also increased.

One point needs to be emphasized: in the context of the theory of personalization, the dialectic of invitation and response in a renewed psychology of religion should be seen as operative not only between man and the Absolute, but also among men. With regard to manifestations of the holy, little has been said thus far concerning the avenues of such manifestations; how is religious significance to be perceived in the realm of experience? Stated differently, how is the holy to manifest itself to our perception? In terms of the theory of personalization and its principle of inter-action of centre with centre, it is now argued that the more fully itself an individual is—the more fully "person" it is—then not only should such an individual have an increased capacity for perceiving
manifestations of the holy emanating directly from the Absolute, but also for perceiving such manifestations in other persons. This is the psychological equivalent of seeing Christ in the other person. And when perception of manifestations of the holy in other persons is heightened (or deepened) so, correspondingly, is the response to other persons heightened or deepened. Such heightened response in turn increases the spiritualization process of both persons.

4. The Theory of Christogenesis

If Teilhard's concept of the "within" is a first step in giving a fundamental worth to all of existence, the theory of Christogenesis is the culminating step in that valuing process. Consequently, as suggested earlier, human action gains increased significance in the context of a creation that is given maximum value such as that provided by the theory of Christogenesis. In such a context, a psychology of religion operating under a traditional focus as described in the first chapter—a focus which seeks to find the significance of religious experiences—is inadequate to approach the religious behavior and expression of modern man.

While it is recognized that modern man often does not see any great value to his milieu or his actions, that value is real, if Teilhard's synthesis can be accepted, and
must be brought to the sleeping consciousness of the masses. Persons who perceive reality along lines similar to that of Teilhard's synthesis, on the other hand, will recognize the value not only of their own actions but of the actions of all persons. For such persons—that is, for persons who know how to see, for whom everything is sacred and nothing is profane—the only adequate focus for a psychology of religion is one that seeks to find the religious significance of experience. While this point can be argued more strongly with each successive theory of the Teilhardian synthesis, the point is strongest when argued on the basis of the theory of Christogenesis.

It has been argued that a shift in focus is being called for in psychology of religion so that religious significance might be sought in the whole range of human experiencing rather than in specific experiences. The Teilhardian synthesis, it is being argued, also calls for such a shift because of the deep value it gives to the whole of existence and, by consequence, to the whole range of human experiencing. The theory of Christogenesis, by being the strongest argument in the Teilhardian synthesis
for providing maximum worth to the whole of existence, is also the strongest argument, as a consequence, for a shift in focus in the discipline of psychology of religion.

The reader will recall that in the first chapter it was suggested that one of the identifying characteristics of the emerging new focus in psychology of religion is a dialectic of invitation and response. If the disposition inherent in the emerging new focus is to seek religious significance in the whole of experience, then, consequently, the possibility arises, for persons with such a disposition, of perceiving invitation anywhere within the whole range of human experiencing and of responding to invitation when it is perceived. To perceive invitation, it will be recalled, is to perceive significance and meaning within one's milieu, to perceive the presence of the holy within the ordinary.

To respond to such invitation is to be aware that action and the quality of one's action matter. It is in this context that one can speak of religious response. It was argued that the deeper a person perceives significance and meaning to be in his milieu, which he interprets as invitation, the more his response can be expected to be religious, using the minimal criterion for religious given earlier—action or response which is characterized as attentive, sensitive, tender, sacramental or celebrative.
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The dialectic of invitation and response also emerges, and progressively so, in the Teilhardian synthesis as it is developed—a fundamental reason for reading the Teilhardian synthesis as a major contribution to the renewal of psychology of religion. Within the synthesis, the dialectic of invitation and response is most clearly manifested in the theory of Christogenesis.

When discussing the significance of the theory of personalization (along with the concept of hominization) for the thesis project, several points were made which gain increased emphasis under the theory of Christogenesis. One point concerned the relationship between growth in perception of invitation and response in the individual and growth in perception of invitation and response in the collective whole of individuals. It was suggested that when there is an increase, in individuals, in the perception of manifestations of the holy within experience, there should be some effect upon the capacity for perception, (of manifestations of the holy), within the whole. And when there is an increase in the capacity for perception in the whole there should be same effect upon both the perception and the response of individuals. This argument was posited primarily on the theory of complexity-consciousness, the concept of hominization, and the theory of personalization. It finds an even
stronger basis in the theory of Christogenesis. For the Christian at least, when there is realization not only of the fundamental worth of the whole of existence and of human action, but realization also of the central role of Christ, as Alpha and Omega, in the process of evolution, and realization of the dynamics of Christogenesis, he likely experiences an increased motivation for participation in the evolution of the world toward increased consciousness, toward the humanization of the world, as Teilhard would say. The Christian would be aware of the processes working within him and of the processes working in the whole of mankind by virtue of his contribution to those processes.

In the context of the theory of personalization, these processes working within the individual and the whole of mankind are operative when there is inter-communion between persons, centre to centre. Of course, these dynamics do not occur automatically because one is a Christian—indeed, they are present, as often as not, in the so-called secular world. (That is why caution was suggested in the first chapter, when attempting to explain the concept of "religious response", in pin-pointing the mode and the locus of religious significance in the whole range of human experiencing). What the theory of Christogenesis adds to the processes working within the individual and the whole of mankind is a maximum
degree of motivation for participating in those processes. For persons who would comprehend and accept Teilhard's theory of Christogenesis, with all of its implications, there should be increased possibilities of perceiving invitation—that is, manifestations of the holy—and, correspondingly, increased possibilities of responding to perceived invitation.

Herein lies a major significance of the theory of Christogenesis for the process of renewal in psychology of religion. Inasmuch as there are persons, inside and outside Christianity, who can agree with the basic dynamics inherent in the theory of Christogenesis, there is a need for psychology of religion to recognize the presence of religious significance, for many people, outside traditional religious consciousness. The dynamics of the theory of Christogenesis might help validate, for many persons, what is a largely non-verbalized awareness of religious significance in the whole range of human experiencing.

A second point that was made when discussing the significance of the theory of personalization for the thesis project and which gains increased emphasis under the theory of Christogenesis concerned the dynamics of invitation and response as they operate between man and the Absolute, and among men. It was argued that in terms of the theory of
personalization and its principle of inter-action of centre with centre, the more fully itself an individual is—the more fully "person" it is—then such an individual should have an increased capacity for perceiving manifestations of the holy emanating not only directly from the Absolute but also from other persons. The theory of Christogenesis adds weight to this argument; indeed, the more one embraces the concept of Christogenesis, the more he will recognize the dynamics of that concept as operating within the processes of human inter-action. That is to say, as stated many times already, he will more readily perceive invitation in his own milieu and, by consequence, will respond to that invitation with greater depth and commitment.

The dialectic of invitation and response, in short, can be based on three particular aspects of the theory of Christogenesis. These three aspects, examined earlier in the detailed study of the theory, are a) the aspect of love energy, originating in Omega, and radiating through matter, as manifested by the operation of radial energy; b) the aspect of human action and its significance to the evolutionary process, such action motivated, ideally, by a perception of the radiation of Omega; c) the aspect of the Absolute Centre, the cosmic Christ, that towards which the whole of the evolutionary process converges.
The person who interprets reality along these lines finds that he is capable, as Teilhard states, "of experiencing and discovering his God in the whole length, breadth, and depth of the world in movement".\textsuperscript{10} The only appropriate response to such perception of invitation, perception of the fact that "the real is charged with a divine Presence",\textsuperscript{11} is to participate fully in cosmic evolution.

In summary, the notion of a cosmic Christ can be interpreted as both a foundation and a dynamic in the Teilhardian synthesis. It is the concept upon which all of the theories of the synthesis rest and it is that which energizes the processes they describe. The notion of a cosmic Christ could also be interpreted as a foundation and a dynamic in the renewal of psychology of religion since it is the basis for providing maximum worth to the whole of existence (thus suggesting that religious significance be sought in the whole of experiencing rather than in any specific experiences), and it is the motivating force for fullest participation, by the individual and the collective whole, in the processes of evolution toward increased consciousness and increased unity (thus inspiring a higher quality in human action that would permit us to identify it as religious response).

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{The Phenomenon of Man}, p. 325.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Science and Christ}, p. 168.
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The purpose of the fourth chapter, following upon the
study of the major theories of the Teilhardian synthesis
conducted in the second and third chapters, has been to
assess the contribution the synthesis could make to the
process of renewal in psychology of religion.

It is now possible to conclude, upon completion of
this study, that the Teilhardian synthesis could make a
major contribution to the process of renewal in psychology
of religion. It has been shown that the Teilhardian syn-
thesis validates the seeking of religious significance in
the whole range of human experiencing. The call for a
renewal in psychology of religion gains major support from
the Teilhardian synthesis since the view of reality inherent
in the synthesis is sufficiently broad to encompass the
perimeters of Pruyser's second question — "Which data of
experience are of religious significance?"

The perspective of the synthesis should prove generally
sufficient and satisfactory for those who seek a basis for
attaching deep meaning and significance — what can be called,
in the context of this thesis, religious significancé — to
the ordinary moments of their lives, who cannot limit the
presence of such significance to those isolated moments of reality commonly identified as religious. The Teilhardian synthesis can provide this broader perspective because it sees the whole of existence as sacred. Therein lies the possibility of the Teilhardian synthesis making a major contribution to the process of renewal in psychology of religion.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The present dissertation began with the statement that the discipline of psychology of religion is experiencing considerable turmoil. True as that statement may be, the turmoil in the discipline merely reflects a deeper unrest, within a wider perspective, in the religious behavior and expression of modern man. Quite validly, one can say there is much pain in this unrest, whether it be read in what psychologists have noted to be widespread feelings of void, emptiness, purposeless, malaise in the secular man, or whether it be read in the disharmony, mistrust, bitterness that many religious writers note exists among religions, or even within religions. Confusion over the basic question of what is religion itself is still another cause of pain for many persons—some who feel lost without the clear-cut guidance of traditional institutional religion, others who feel oppressed in the practice of religion as they understand it, and still others who feel frustration at the lack of recognition given to what they feel is the presence of religious significance outside of conventional religion.

Ideally, the discipline of psychology of religion should be sufficiently broad in its scope to approach all variations of religious perception, religious questioning,
religious behavior, expression and phenomena. One of the premises of the present dissertation has been that indeed the discipline of psychology of religion, as traditionally practiced, is not sufficiently broad in its scope to approach the contemporary religious scene. It has been argued that the discipline is in need of renewal. The principal hypothesis has been that the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin can be read as a major contribution to the process of renewal being called for.

The principal hypothesis is developed in the second and third chapters of the dissertation. The argument that the discipline of psychology of religion is in need of renewal is the concern of the first chapter. Thus, the first chapter, entitled, "From Religious Experience to Religious Response", attempted to show the reasons why the discipline of psychology of religion is inadequate for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man. This inadequacy was illustrated by examining a basic concept utilized by the discipline, the concept of "religious experience". A study was conducted of how the concept was used by William James, the father of psychology of religion. When placed in the context of the development of his thought on experience in general, it appears that James most often intended the concept of "religious experience" to mean something of a
continuing process, at least something more than isolated moments of experience. The latter meaning, however, is often the one that is assumed by commentators on James to be his intended meaning. What seems to be overlooked is that even when James appears to be speaking of religious experience as isolated moments of experience, he places such moments in the context of an incubational sort of development. Consequently, he would argue that it is a mistake to consider any specific religious experiences in isolation.

Certainly, the discipline of psychology of religion after James largely interpreted "religious experience" to mean something one undergoes. It is the persistence of this interpretation, to the exclusion of any other, that leads to the assessment that the traditional focus of the discipline is inadequate for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man where, in many cases, religious significance is seen as present not only in isolated instances deemed religious but also as possibly present in the whole range of human experience.

It was pointed out that James, when properly understood, leaned in spirit toward the broader interpretation suggested for religious experience, but, for a number of reasons, that leaning was overlooked by the discipline after
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him. However, even James's most evolved understanding for the term of "religious experience" is inadequate, it was argued, for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man because of a significant shift in focus that is being called for in the discipline of psychology of religion.

This shift in focus was found to be best illustrated by the psychologist of religion, Paul Pryser. Pryser points out that the traditional focus of psychology of religion, which has for its question: "Which are the significant data of religious experience?", is incapable of appreciating the fact that many people find religious significance outside of traditionally understood religious experience. Thus, in order to recognize all potentially religious phenomena, a new focus is needed in the discipline which has for its question: "Which data of experience are of religious significance?".

Pryser's first question, it was shown, can be identified with the traditional focus of the discipline, the focus that describes a dichotomous, discontinuous interpretation of reality in which isolatable moments of reality are called religious and considered extraordinary, as distinguished from all other moments seen as secular and ordinary. Pryser's second question, it was shown, can be identi...
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fied with a new focus in psychology of religion, a focus that describes a unitive, continuous, holistic interpretation of reality in which all experience is potentially capable of manifesting a religious significance, a view in which everything is sacred and nothing is profane.

Because the shift in focus is of such an extent in psychology of religion, it was argued that the concept of "religious experience," in its traditional usage, has serious inadequacies for describing the religious behavior and expression of modern man—that is to say, of describing religious phenomena in the proposed new focus. It was argued that a new concept be adopted by the discipline that would more adequately recognize the shift in focus that is being called for, a concept that would help remove the inadequacies of the concept of "religious experience" in that regard. It was proposed that "religious response" be that new concept.

The final section of the first chapter examined the concept of "religious response" in some detail. It attempted to explain what the concept would mean, the implications of its use, and the role it might play in the renewal of psychology of religion.

The concept of "religious response" is intended to
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recognize, in a manner that the concept of "religious experience" does not, the occurrence of religious significance outside of traditional religious consciousness. The principal difference between the concept of "religious response" and the concept of "religious experience" is in the scope of each concept. The latter concept refers to something one undergoes, whereas the former concept suggests a going to, an undergoing, and a going from. "Religious response" is intended to mean being alert, to a degree that "religious experience" is not, to the manifestation of religious significance in the whole range of human experiencing and not only in isolated moments of reality identified as religious. This, it was pointed out, is a difference in disposition. In "religious experience" the disposition is to experience; in "religious response" the disposition is to respond. The differences in disposition parallel the difference between seeking the significance of experience deemed as religious and seeking the religious significance of all experience.

There are some remarks made in the first chapter regarding "religious response" that were of a tentative nature and that invited reassessment of the concept once study of the Teilhardian synthesis would be completed. Those remarks will be examined shortly, once a brief summary
of the Teilhardian synthesis and its relation to the renewal of psychology of religion has been presented.

The argument that the concept of "religious response" would serve as a better concept for the new focus being called for in psychology of religion could not be argued, it was suggested in the first chapter, only on the basis that a shift in focus is needed within the discipline. It was also necessary to show that the concept of "religious response" conceptually parallels an emerging unitive and synthesized interpretation of reality in which the developmental and evolutionary character of man's total experience and expression is recognized. While such an interpretation of reality was called for, to some extent, by the contemporary pole of the shift in focus within psychology of religion, it is more fully validated, it was argued, by the theological-anthropological base of the type of evolutionary synthesis as provided by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

The second and third chapters of the dissertation examined the Teilhardian synthesis in detail for
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the purposes; ultimately, of testing the hypothesis that the synthesis could make a major contribution to the renewal of psychology of religion.

The study of the Teilhardian synthesis proceeded under four major sections a) the process of evolution, which included a study of i) the theory of the "within" and "without," ii) the theory of radial and tangential energy; and iii) the theory of complexity-consciousness; b) the primacy of spirit and the theory of Creative Union; c) the theory of personalization; and d) the theory of Christogenesis. After each of the major sections, its significance for the whole of the synthesis was discussed.

After the study of the whole of the synthesis was completed, the contribution the synthesis could make to the process of renewal in psychology of religion was discussed in the fourth chapter. Since this was the major goal of the dissertation, it is important that the major conclusions reached be highlighted.

To appreciate a basic contribution the Teilhardian synthesis can make to the process of renewal in psychology of religion, the reader is asked to recall the
difference between the traditional focus and the new focus being called for in the discipline in their perception of reality. The traditional focus, as revealed in its usage of the concept of "religious experience," views reality in dichotomous and discontinuous terms; its perspective belongs to the same kind of ideology which can speak, for example, of God as being "up there" or "out there" while man is down here. In this perspective, it is appropriate to speak of religious experiences as isolated moments of reality that are distinct from all other moments of reality. The new focus for the discipline, as implied in the proposed concept of "religious response" views reality from the perspective of a unitive and processive ideology. In this perspective, which belongs to the same kind of ideology which prefers to speak of divine transcendence in a manner that avoids the extreme of supernaturalism, it is more appropriate to speak of religious significance of experience in general rather than of the significance of any particular religious experiences. This is the perspective that is being called for in the proposed new
focus of the discipline. This is where the Teilhardian synthesis makes a basic contribution to the renewal of psychology of religion. It is to be noted that the intent of examining the Teilhardian synthesis was not to present Teilhard as a psychologist of religion but rather to present him as one significant thinker of the twentieth century whose synthesis gives credence to the call for renewal in psychology of religion.

Another major contribution the Teilhardian synthesis can make to the renewal of psychology of religion arises from its function of providing a deep meaning and worth to the whole of existence. By doing so, it also, by extension, validates the shift in focus of going from seeking the significance of religious experience to seeking the religious significance of experience. There is a widening of perspective for interpreting reality that is called for by the emerging new focus in psychology of religion; the Teilhardian synthesis provides a basis for that widening of perspective.

The contribution that each of the major theories in the Teilhardian synthesis can make to the renewal of
psychology of religion was also discussed. The observations made with regard to each theory are essentially an elaboration, developed progressively with each succeeding theory of the synthesis, of the major contributions noted above that the whole of the synthesis can make to the renewal of psychology of religion.

One thread that links all of the theories in the synthesis and which gains substance with the development of each successive theory is the notion of invitation and response. The more this notion is identified within the synthesis, the more the contribution of the synthesis to the renewal of psychology of religion becomes apparent because the notion of invitation and response is the main component in the concept of "religious response"; it will be recalled that the concept of "religious response" is being proposed for the emerging new focus in psychology of religion as a means of removing some of the inadequacies of the concept of "religious experience", in its traditional usage, for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man.

From the theory of the "within" and "without" through to the theory of Christogenesis there is a progressive development of the notion of invitation and response. With the theory of the "within" and "without", the notion appears in its minimal form; it suggests that if there is a "within"
characteristic to all of matter, it means that considera-
tion must be given to the presence of inter-relation in all
of existence and, by consequence, to all of experience.
In the context of psychology of religion, this suggests
that religious significance be sought in all of experience
rather than in isolated instances. To perceive a "within"
in all of matter is to begin to perceive invitation as it
emanates from life itself and, thereby, awakens the call to
respond.

With the theory of Christogenesis, the notion of
invitation and response appears in its maximal form; what
had begun as an indication of the slightest kind of the
presence of invitation in the very fabric of existence
itself appears as a call of the clearest kind in the theory
of Christogenesis. The theory, in describing Christ in cosmic
terms, as the centre of the universe, as that toward which
everything tends, as both the source and end of love energy,
provides a maximum worth to the whole of existence and, by
consequence, to human action. The more a person, especially
a Christian, is aware of the comprehensiveness of the theory
of Christogenesis and the more he can embrace the synthesis
as a whole, the more likely he experiences an increased
motivation for participation in the evolution of the world
toward increased consciousness, toward what Teilhard would
call the humanization of the world. In short, the more a person perceives invitation, the more likely he is to respond.

The final conclusion reached upon completion of the study of the Teilhardian synthesis was that, indeed, the synthesis, which sees the whole of existence as sacred and thus provides a worth and meaning to the whole of reality, can be read as a major contribution to the process of renewal in psychology of religion.

Before closing the dissertation with a number of suggestions for further research, it is necessary to make additional comments on the concept of "religious response". At the close of the first chapter when a detailed discussion of the concept was undertaken, it was suggested that the word "religious", when used in the concept of "religious response", be given a minimal, tentative criteria. It was suggested that the word "religious" be applied to human behavior which is characterized as attentive, sensitive, tender, sacramental or celebrative. It was pointed out that, while many other characteristics could possibly be listed to identify behavior as religious, those presented might serve as a minimal and tentative criteria. Now that the study of the Teilhardian synthesis, and the assessment of its contribution to the renewal of psychology of religion, has been completed, the
question might well be asked whether the tentative, minimal criteria still stand. The writer wishes to conclude that they do and for several reasons: a) When the minimal criteria suggested are considered in the context of the contemporary pole of the shift in focus that is proposed for psychology of religion, the characteristics suggested fall comfortably within that perspective. Whether one seeks, in keeping with the contemporary pole of the shift in focus, to interpret reality in a dynamic, unitive, holistic fashion, or seeks to perceive the presence of the absolute in the experience of the ordinary—in each perspective one or more of the characteristics would appear to be valid and acceptable when applied to the word "religious." To take the first perspective as an example—the interpretation of man along a developmental model and within a reality seen in dynamic, unitive and holistic terms would invite a degree of attention among persons in order to be aware of all dimensions of the human that are present in each person to varying degrees. The same perspective would invite a sensitivity between persons in recognition of the feelings and emotions that are present in encounters.
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The second perspective would add to this the recognition of the possibly sacramental character of experience between persons. b) When the minimal criteria suggested are considered in the context of the Teilhardian synthesis which perceives the whole of existence as sacred, which invests a great significance in human action, and which issues an invitation in the guise of worth and meaning emanating from the whole of human experiencing, the characteristics suggested fall comfortably within this perspective also. One or more of the characteristics, from the perspective of the Teilhardian synthesis, would appear to be valid and acceptable when applied to the word "religious." As an example, a recognition that the whole of existence is sacred would invite an attention to the possible manifestation of religious significance in the whole range of experience. A recognition of the Teilhardian principle that union differentiates when such union is at the level of centre to centre would invite a sensitivity and tenderness in all intercommunion. A recognition of the theory of Christogenesis would invite a sacramental quality in human action.
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Whatever characteristics might be suggested as criteria when applied to the word "religious"—whether the ones presented here or others—they must remain tentative and minimal. They must remain tentative because it is hoped that perception into manifestations of the absolute, of holiness, of religious significance, would change with the passage of time and the accumulation of insight through experience, both for individual persons and the collective whole of persons. They must remain minimal because we can never be certain of all of the ways in which the Absolute, holiness, or religious significance might manifest itself to individual persons or the collective whole of persons.

In addition, whichever characteristics might be selected as minimal criteria to be applied to the word "religious"—whether the ones presented here or others—their selection should be based on their ability to act as bridges to instances of possible manifestations of the Absolute, holiness or religious significance in the whole range of human experiencing. In short, the characteristics are descriptive of a disposition, a disposition toward manifestations of invitation.

In essence, these are also the reasons why the discipline of psychology of religion is in need of renewal and why it must continue to develop a new focus. The tradi-
tional focus of the discipline, with its emphasis on religious experience seen as isolated moments of reality, is simply incapable of encompassing the perception of those who see a religious significance in the whole of existence, in the ordinary moments of their lives and in the whole range of human experiencing. The concept of "religious response," with its dynamic of invitation and response, is intended to encompass such perception in a renewed psychology of religion.

A number of areas for further research emerge from the present dissertation.

a) Throughout the thesis it has been argued that the discipline of psychology of religion is in need of renewal, that a shift in focus within the discipline is being called for. The basis for such a shift in focus has been defended in the first chapter. What has not been further developed and which might be suggested as one area for further research is the broader context behind a shift in focus in psychology of religion. That broader context, as indicated in the Introduction to the thesis project, is the occurrence of a shift in focus in each of what might be called the root disciplines for psychology of religion, the disciplines of philosophy, theology and psychology. To what
extent have shifts in focus occurred in the root disciplines and to what extent are they influencing a shift in focus in psychology of religion?

b) A second area for further research arises from the first. In the delineation of a shift in focus being called for in psychology of religion, and in placing the perspective of the Teilhardian synthesis alongside the perspective of the contemporary pole of the shift in focus, important questions arise regarding the use of the Teilhardian synthesis on the one hand, and the possibility of using other syntheses on the other hand, in the process of renewal of psychology of religion. To what extent would the contribution made by the Teilhardian synthesis to the renewal of psychology of religion be dependent on all of the theories of the synthesis? It is quite likely that some readers of the Teilhardian synthesis would embrace it to a limited degree—preferring, for example, to leave out the theory of Christogenesis. Notwithstanding the fact that the synthesis would be less than complete if any of its theories were left out, would it still be possible to read the restricted Teilhardian synthesis as a major contribution to the renewal of psychology of religion?
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The principal reason for exploring this possibility would be to gain the attention of those who, in seeking a synthesis with which to find meaning and significance in their milieu, might tend to reject Teilhard and his synthesis prematurely because of what they would call its overly-religious tone, an indictment that would be understandable if it were made on the basis of the theory of Christogenesis without placing that theory in the context of the whole synthesis. In view of the need to dialogue with those who reject aggressively anything that has to do with religion—according to their preconceived notions of what religion is—it would be worth examining the synthesis of other major thinkers (such as those of Marx and Whitehead, for example), with the intention of assessing the contribution they could make to the renewal of psychology of religion.

c) A third area for further study arising from the dissertation would be the concept of "religious response" itself. Beginning with the Teilhardian synthesis as a foundation and incorporating principles from other disciplines, such as humanistic psychology, that broadly parallel the principles of the synthesis, what might be the possibilities of establishing a genuine "psychology of religious
response?" What would be the farther reaches of such a psychology? How might the work of Sam Keen on the development of the sense of wonder contribute to such a psychology?

d) A fourth area for further study that arises from the dissertation is in relation to religious education. Taking as a point of departure the two questions as phrased by Paul Pruyser that illustrate the difference between the traditional and the proposed new focus in psychology of religion, it would be valuable to investigate how much of religious education is structured along the premises of the traditional focus of the discipline and how much is structured along the premises of the proposed new focus. It would also be valuable to explore the contribution a renewed psychology of religion, with some foundation in the Teilhardian synthesis, could make to religious education understood as the guidance of religious response.

e) Another area for further study arising from the dissertation would be the influence a renewed psychology of religion, along the lines suggested in this thesis, would have upon such traditional concepts as prayer, suffering, sacraments, grace, the virtues, gifts of the spirit, and others. To take grace as an example—while much work has been done in the area (Baum, Tillich, Rahner), what influ-
ence might the Teilhardian synthesis, within a renewed psychology of religion, have upon interpreting the nature and dynamics of grace? How might the perspective of seeking religious significance in the whole of human experiencing, along with Teilhard’s insistence on the sacredness of the whole of existence, affect the manner in which we understand grace?

A sixth and final area for further research arising from the dissertation is the area of Christian morality. There have been important advances made in Christian morality resulting from the influences of an improved philosophy at times, an improved theology at other times, and an improved psychology at still other times. But what might be the contribution that a renewed psychology of religion could make to the study and practice of Christian morality? How might the moral assessment of human behavior in general, and specific human acts in particular, be affected by the perspective implied in a renewed psychology of religion which seeks religious significance in the whole range of human experiencing? How might the concept of "religious response," within a renewed psychology of religion, influence the establishing of moral criteria for human acts? Could the principles of "religious response" be applied to "moral
response?" How might the concept of "religious response" influence our understanding of the development of moral sense in children?
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APPENDIX I

ABSTRACT OF

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
and the
Psychology of Religious Response
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Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and the Psychology of Religious Response

The main purpose of this study is to attempt to assess the contribution that the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin can make to the process of renewal that is being called for in psychology of religion.

The argument that psychology of religion is in need of renewal is developed in Chapter I. The chapter attempts to show that the discipline, in what is called its traditional focus, is inadequate for approaching the religious behavior and expression of modern man; this is illustrated by examining a basic concept utilized by the discipline, the concept of "religious experience". A study is conducted of how the concept was used by James and by the discipline after him.

Once the inadequacies of the discipline are demonstrated, Chapter I proceeds to examine a shift in focus which is being called for in psychology of religion.

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1 Cyril J. Chiasson, doctoral thesis presented to the Department of Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ottawa, Ontario, August 1981, xvi-374 pp.
The proposed shift in focus is shown to consist of going from a static, dichotomous, discontinuous interpretation of reality to a dynamic, unitive, continuous interpretation of reality. Also, the shift in focus is shown to be best illustrated by the difference between two questions, as phrased by Paul Pruyser: "Which are the significant data of religious experience?", was the old question, and "Which data of experience are of religious significance?", is the new question. The old question is associated with what is being called the traditional focus of the discipline, and the new question is associated with what is being called the proposed new focus.

Chapter I closed with a discussion of the concept of "religious response". A parallel is drawn between the role of the concept of "religious response" in the proposed new focus and the role of the concept of "religious experience" in the traditional focus.

Chapters II and III conduct a detailed analysis of the evolutionary synthesis of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin to assess the contribution it could make to the process of renewal in psychology of religion.

The Teilhardian synthesis is examined in four sections: a) the process of evolution, which includes
a study of i) the theory of the "within" and "without", ii) the theory of radial and tangential energy, and iii) the theory of complexity-consciousness; b) the primacy of spirit and the theory of Creative Union; c) the theory of personalization; and d) the theory of Christogenesis. Chapter II concerns itself with the first of the four major sections of Teilhard's synthesis, while Chapter III deals with the three remaining sections of the synthesis. After each of the major sections, its significance for the whole of the synthesis is discussed. In Chapter IV, there is a discussion of the contribution each of the major sections of the synthesis can make to the renewal of psychology of religion.

The study concludes that the Teilhardian synthesis can make a major contribution to the process of renewal for psychology of religion. This contribution of the synthesis arises from its function of providing deep meaning and worth to the whole of existence. By doing so, it also, by extension, validates the shift in focus of going from seeking the significance of religious experience to seeking the religious significance of experience. There is a widening of perspective for interpreting reality that is called for by the proposed new focus in psychology of reli-
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region; the Teilhardian synthesis provides a basis for that widening of perspective.