# Table of Contents

**Preface** ........................................................................................................................................... vii

**Abstract** ........................................................................................................................................ viii

**Acknowledgements** ...................................................................................................................... ix

**Chapter 1: Introduction** ............................................................................................................... 1

  - Liberal and Post-Liberal Peacebuilding .................................................................................... 4

  - Civil Society as Local Peacebuilding Actors ......................................................................... 7

**Chapter Overview** ....................................................................................................................... 15

**Chapter 2: Literature Review** ..................................................................................................... 18

  - Peacebuilding .......................................................................................................................... 18

    - Local Approaches to Peacebuilding .................................................................................... 22

    - Hybridity .............................................................................................................................. 31

  - Civil Society and Peacebuilding ............................................................................................. 36

  - Local Needs, Hybridization, Civil Society and Peacebuilding in the DRC ......................... 46

  - Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 54

**Chapter 3: Case Study and Theoretical Framework** ................................................................... 58

  - Case Background ................................................................................................................. 58

    - Local vs. National Causes of Conflict ............................................................................... 61

    - The Predatory Fragility of the Congolese State ................................................................. 62

    - The Emergence of Congolese Civil Society in Response to Predatory Fragility ............. 65

  - Post-Colonial Theory ............................................................................................................. 67

    - Gender ................................................................................................................................ 70

**Key Concepts** .............................................................................................................................. 71

  - Peace ...................................................................................................................................... 71

  - Peacebuilding ........................................................................................................................ 72

  - Liberal Peacebuilding ........................................................................................................... 72

  - Post-Liberal Peacebuilding .................................................................................................... 73

  - (The) Local ............................................................................................................................. 74

  - Local Knowledge .................................................................................................................. 75

  - Representation ....................................................................................................................... 76

  - Hybridity and Translation ...................................................................................................... 76

  - Agency ................................................................................................................................... 78

  - Legitimacy ............................................................................................................................ 79
# Chapter 4: Research Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Actors</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-Based Structures and Beneficiaries</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Partners</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploring the Role of Local Civil Society in Hybridized Peacebuilding Processes</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of Research Questions and Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Research Methodology</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnography</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographically Informed Methods</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Ethnic Considerations</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trauma-Informed Approach</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics and Risk</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Considerations</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positionality of the Researcher</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Selection</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Overview</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fieldwork</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observing Everyday Engagement with Peacebuilding</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation 1</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation 2</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation 3</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation of Organisational Staff with Participants and Beneficiaries</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation of Organisations and Their External Partners and Funders</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Field Visit and Additional Observations</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploring Agency through In-Depth, Semi-Structured, Interviews</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-Up Questionnaires and Interviews</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5: Organisation 1

Organisational Overview .................................................................................................................. 129

How do local civil society organisations seek to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?
.......................................................................................................................................................... 130

Programming .................................................................................................................................. 130
External Relations .............................................................................................................................. 138
Communications and Representation ................................................................................................. 144

Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions and
how? .................................................................................................................................................... 145

Beneficiaries and Members of Community-Based Structures ............................................................ 145
External Partners .............................................................................................................................. 149
Staff: Leadership, Identities and Group Dynamics ........................................................................... 154
Material Conditions .......................................................................................................................... 161
Security ............................................................................................................................................... 164

Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 166

Discursive Power .............................................................................................................................. 167
Material Resources ............................................................................................................................ 169
The Influence of Identity and Internal Dynamics ............................................................................ 169
Translating Hybridity .......................................................................................................................... 170

Chapter 6: Organisation 2

Organisational Overview .................................................................................................................. 173

How do local civil society organisations seek to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?
.......................................................................................................................................................... 175

Programming .................................................................................................................................. 175
External Relations .............................................................................................................................. 184
Communications and Events ............................................................................................................. 190

Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions, and
how? .................................................................................................................................................... 192

Beneficiaries and Members of Community Based Structures ............................................................ 192
External Partners .............................................................................................................................. 198
Staff and Leadership .......................................................................................................................... 204
Material Conditions .................................................................................................................. 211
Security .................................................................................................................................. 212
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 213
Discursive Power ..................................................................................................................... 215
Material Resources .................................................................................................................. 216
The Influence of Identity and Internal Dynamics ................................................................. 216
Translating Hybridity ............................................................................................................... 217
Chapter 7: Organisation 3 ........................................................................................................ 219
Organisational Overview ........................................................................................................ 219
How do local civil society organisations seek to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?
.................................................................................................................................................. 220
Programming ........................................................................................................................... 220
External Relations .................................................................................................................... 229
Communications and Events .................................................................................................... 240
Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions and how?
.................................................................................................................................................. 241
Beneficiaries and Members of Community-Based Structures .............................................. 241
External Partners ...................................................................................................................... 247
Staff and Leadership ................................................................................................................ 252
Material Conditions and Context ............................................................................................ 258
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 260
Discursive Power ..................................................................................................................... 262
Material Resources .................................................................................................................. 263
The Influence of Identity and Internal Dynamics ................................................................. 264
Translating Hybridity ............................................................................................................... 265
Chapter 8: Analysis and Conclusions ....................................................................................... 267
Civil Society and Peacebuilding in South Kivu .......................................................................... 270
CSOs in South Kivu: Mapping the Interests and Functions of CSOs in a State of Predatory Fragility
.................................................................................................................................................. 270
Relationships, Legitimacy and Agency .................................................................................... 275
Discursive and Material Power ................................................................................................. 279
Translating Knowledge and Interests ....................................................................................... 282
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 286
Local Civil Society Organisations as Intermediaries in Hybridized Peacebuilding ................. 287
Preface

This thesis sought and complied with all necessary approvals from the University of Ottawa’s Research Ethics Board (Research Ethics File Number (09-15-10) and the Office of Risk Management. The author is the sole contributor to this work.
Abstract

This thesis examines the role of local civil society organisations (CSOs) in representing and addressing local needs in hybridized peacebuilding processes in South Kivu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). To do so it examines how local CSOs contribute to peacebuilding efforts, as well as who and what influence those contributions. Further, it considers the potential reach of such interventions at the community, provincial and national levels.

The research for this thesis examines three locally founded and operated civil society organisations in Bukavu, South Kivu, whose efforts directly respond to known local causes of conflict in the region. Its findings demonstrate how they translate the needs and knowledge of community-level actors to external and international partners, from whom they receive funding and knowledge that support their ability to deliver peacebuilding projects that respond to those community-level needs. While their external international partners were found to maintain material power in relation to these peacebuilding interventions, the local CSOs were shown to hold significant discursive power in this role of translators and intermediaries in these processes.

These findings challenge homogenous constructions of the local presented by post-liberal peacebuilding literature. They recognize the diversity of the local including individuals or groups who have been directly impacted by an ongoing violent conflict in a fixed geographical location whose experiences of war are shaped by their identities, and who share long-term interests in potential peace. Understanding the local in this way acknowledges a spectrum of actors contributing to peacebuilding in South Kivu and invites a reconsideration of binary constructions of hybridity. Acknowledging the important role that civil society and other intermediaries play in peacebuilding offers a foundation of understanding hybridity as a process of translation rather than shock.
Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the extensive group of colleagues, friends, participants and supporters who made this thesis possible. First, I would like to acknowledge my research participants who eagerly shared their peacebuilding efforts with me in South Kivu. I find your commitment to supporting peace and human rights in very challenging contexts inspiring. I would also like to acknowledge the support that I received from other friends, colleagues and collaborators who I worked with while I was in South Kivu, especially Inge Kool for her guidance and friendship. Inge dedicated the last three years of her life to supporting victims of sexual and gender-based violence at the Panzi Hospital and was an unwavering source of support to me and other passers-through the city until her life was cut short in an accident in January 2018.

Second, I am also truly grateful to the members of my thesis advisory committee. Stephen, your continued support and encouragement, even during the dark periods of my thesis, have seen me through. I could not have finished this without you. I am also grateful to Chris Huggins for his willingness to join my committee half way through and the professional development support which he has offered me. I would also like to acknowledge the contributions of Marie-Eve Desrosiers to the early stages of this thesis which provided me with a strong foundation for my work.

This thesis has also been shaped by the contributions of several individuals and organisations. My engagement with local agency in peacebuilding was inspired by local peacebuilders who I met in Northern Uganda in 2012 and by Asset-Based Community Development which I learned about as part of a leadership course that I participated in through the Coady Institute. My ability to carry out research in the DRC was aided by professional
experience and support gained through working with Canadian organisations engaged in the DRC at the beginning of my doctoral program. One of these organisations was IMPACT Transform. Its current Executive Director Joanne Lebert played a significant role in helping me to develop my research design and was a source of consistent support during and after my fieldwork, for which I am very grateful. I wish to also extend my sincere thanks to Paul Dewar who always believed in me and gave me an opportunity to conduct advocacy on the conflict in the DRC through his parliamentary office, and to Khaled Ibrahim who facilitated my return trip to the country.

Finally, the completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the support from my friends and family, especially Claire Lemiski and my mom, Joan Van Houten, who both agreed to be part of my risk-management check-ins while I was in the field. Thank you to everyone who stuck with me throughout this process.
Chapter 1: Introduction

“Do you see the conditions that we have to work with?” the Gender Officer asked, “How are we supposed to get anything done when we spend so much time stuck in the mud?” We had set out early in the morning from Bukavu for Sange, a town in the Ruzizi Plain in South Kivu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Our driver explained that we were lucky that the weather forecast was clear for that day. Although the sun was out, it had rained the night before and the roads had been reduced to what can best be described as mud puddles. As a result, numerous transport trucks were stuck along the road, because of the road conditions and because there was only enough room for a single file of traffic along the edge of the escarpment. At several points during the trip the Executive Director and the Gender Officer had to evacuate the vehicle to negotiate our passage with oncoming trucks. At another point, everyone had to vacate the vehicle as the driver navigated a nearly impossible ledge with a stalled vehicle on one side and a large drop-off on the other side. Our 200-kilometer trip took more than five hours.

Being stuck in the mud presents a straightforward analogy for the nature of peacebuilding work undertaken by local actors in South Kivu. While these organisations have laudable missions and objectives, and highly capable staff, a lack of infrastructure and poor governance among other constraints slow or block their progress. Despite these road blocks, their staff and leaders continue to move forward, relying on their conflict management skills and local connections to advance their peacebuilding goals.

After a day of conducting interviews while the organisation’s staff met with the members of their community-based structures, we were a bit slow getting back on the road, as they visited with families and purchased produce to bring home. As a result, part of our trip home was spent in tense silence after dusk settled before arriving back in Bukavu, reflecting the insecurity that
night time brings. Security risks posed both by ongoing crisis and by the nature of their work, also hamper the effort of peacebuilding organisations. The organisation I was travelling with that day was far too familiar with these risks, as their executive director was assassinated a decade earlier and many members of their staff had been subject to arbitrary arrest by local authorities.

Engaging a range of actors across conflict affected populations to negotiate their own paths to peace has been presented by the post-liberal peacebuilding literature as an alternative approach to promoting macro-level stability and liberal peacebuilding. Civil society actors have been identified in both liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding literatures as potential intermediaries in addressing local needs and promoting local ownership in peacebuilding processes. Yet, little academic literature exists that examines the ways in which civil society actors engage with both their communities and other actors in conflict and post-conflict contexts.

This thesis explores such dynamics in the province of South Kivu, in the Eastern DRC, where failed attempts to curb systemic violence have resulted in calls for more locally driven peace. The first wave of major international conflict in the current crisis in the DRC began in 1996, when rebels backed by a coalition of regional powers led by Rwanda and Uganda moved across the country and acquired control of the country (Prunier, 2009, p. 115). In August 1998, the new president Laurent Kabila announced that he was going to dismiss all foreign forces in a bid to gain approval from the Congolese population. (Turner, 2007, p. 5). Despite the Lusaka
Peace Accord of 2002 and the continued presence of international peacekeeping forces, the Eastern half of the country remains plagued by violence.

Rebel groups have continued to operate in the area, led first by the Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), which morphed into the M23 in 2012 (Reilly & Warren, 2014). Despite the defeat of the M23 in 2013, a large range of rebel groups, including self-defence groups such as the Mai Mai, continue to target civilians in North and South Kivu. For example, in the district of Beni in North Kivu it is estimated that more than 800 civilians had been killed between 2015 and 2017 as a result of attacks led by a Ugandan rebel group ADF-Nalu with complicity and at times cooperation from the Congolese national army, the FARDC (Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) (Hojie, 2016). Indeed, the FARDC has also made a notable contribution to the ongoing violence in the region, at times perpetrating the same type of attacks as the rebel groups listed above (Deibert, 2013).

In their classic volume, Vlassenroot and Raeymakers (2004) argued that efforts to resolve these conflicts would falter should they fail to consider local causes of conflict. They suggested that the conflict in the DRC could only be understood in the context of the colonial and state policy that created a situation in which the pursuit of livelihoods resulted in the “collectively irrational context of war” (p. 22). They identified access and entitlement to economic assets as a core underlying cause of conflict (p. 33). In his chapter Vlassenroot (2004)

---

1 Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 the Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) with the mandate to supervise and implement the Ceasefire Agreement under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. MONUC was renamed the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on July 1, 2010. (MONUC, 2010).

2 MONUSCO has the mandate to carry out the protection of civilians, humanitarians and human rights defenders and assist the government of the DRC in its stabilization and peacebuilding efforts (MONUSCO, 2018; MONUSCO, 2018).

3 It is estimated that more than five million people had been killed as a result of the conflict by 2007 and that more than 400,000 women had been raped before 2008. This is in addition to other forms of structural and physical violence such a forced displacement, torture and assault.
emphasized that local causes of conflict contributed to larger scale conflict in the DRC, with a focus on access to land and ethnic cleavages. In 2010, amid worsening violence in the Eastern provinces, Autesserre confirmed that international interventions had failed to curb violence in the DRC due to an exclusion of local causes of conflict, including access to land and ethnic divisions, from peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Indicating that intervening actors were primarily trained to work at the national and international level, she contended that they “believed that their only legitimate role was to intervene at the macro level … they chose to devote their resources to working with regional and national leaders with an emphasis on organising general elections” (p. 125).

Liberal and Post-Liberal Peacebuilding

These international actors are part of what has become known as the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, which emerged out of the Cold War as the dominant international approach to peace operations. In 1992 Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali identified peacebuilding as part of a four-part approach to conflict resolution which also included preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking. His Agenda for Peace indicated that peacebuilding “may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace” (p. ara 55). This articulation became the foundation of liberal peacebuilding which emphasizes the implementation of liberal political and economic reforms (Paris, 1997).

The post-liberal approach is presented as a subsequent generation of peacebuilding, emerging after and in response to liberal peacebuilding (Baranyi, 2008 and Richmond, 2010). The literature presents the local turn at the heart of post-liberal peacebuilding as offering a
critique of liberal peacebuilding that calls for a bottom-up approach based on local needs (Richmond, 2010). Donais describes it as being communitarian in nature and “stresses the importance of traditional and social context in determining the legitimacy and appropriateness of particular visions of political order” (2012, p. 5). At the heart of these approaches is a focus on the local and local knowledge (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 772). More recent accounts of post-liberal peacebuilding have been more cautious about their claims about its emancipatory nature. A notable outcome of increased local involvement in peacebuilding in some contexts has been the emergence of hybrid and illiberal governance structures (Strand, 2008).

While some recent literature on post-liberal peacebuilding has been careful to acknowledge the heterogeneity of the local (Liden, 2011), there remains significant debate on how the local is defined. Early definitions tended to be expansive including a range of context specific actors with fluid and multiple identities, some of which aspire to liberal peace/neoliberalism, others influenced by custom, religion, history or other ideologies (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, p. 4). However, such an approach offers little foundation for identifying who has the agency and ability to participate in the full range of peacebuilding efforts. This has led to arguments that such approaches create unnecessary binaries between the local and the international that do not adequately capture the range of local actors or their approaches on the ground (Paffenholz, 2015). Such critiques have led to renewed attempts to refine the term; however, explanations remain broad and theoretical. For example, Mac Ginty (2015) suggests conceptualizing the local as an activity rather than a location. The concept of peace formation presented by Richmond and Pogodda (2016) offers a more open construction of the local, engaging with multi-layered groups of actors. However, it still does not help to identify which local actors have the agency to represent local needs in peacebuilding processes.
These accounts also downplay the importance of power and identity dynamics among peacebuilding actors, which can influence whose needs take primacy. Hellmuller suggests that the needs of national elites are often not in line with those of local actors. In contrast, she indicates that, where locality is placed at the community, district or municipal level, local agency is situated with local civil society and social movements, along with municipal actors, churches, community leaders and at times militia leaders/members (2012, p. 239).

There is also a growing body of literature on local actors, including civil society organizations, churches and armed groups, in the context of the conflict in the DRC, which has emerged in response to Autesserre’s book *The Trouble with the Congo* including many reviews and comments. In both the broader literature on local approaches to peacebuilding and the context-specific literature on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there is little inclusion of the voices of the local actors that they claim to represent. This is a significant gap, given that post-liberal peacebuilding claims to focus on “the everyday” experiences of peace and conflict by local actors (Richmond, November 2009). The absence of these voices is a significant barrier to understanding both the needs of local actors in relation to peacebuilding and identifying the capacity that already exists, at the local level, to address conflict dynamics.

This absence, and the weak consideration of local responses in both literatures, suggest that local communities passively experience conflict and external peacebuilding interventions and denies the agency of local actors to affect over conflict dynamics. In contrast, Cubitt (2013b) argues that “living life at the level of the everyday, local people have shaped peace through cooperative activity and enterprising endeavours involving significant degrees of agency often overlooked by external peacebuilders” (p.92).
This research was designed to examine local peacebuilding agency in South Kivu. It was conducted in Bukavu, the provincial capital, to access local voices and knowledge at the community, district and municipal level (Hellmuller 2013) using a moderate post-colonial approach. Undertaking this research in Bukavu demonstrated that peacebuilding occurs across many levels, extending from the local to the national and international, with many groups of actors operating as intermediaries in these spaces. This thesis defines the local as including individuals or groups who have been directly impacted by an ongoing violent conflict in a fixed geographical location whose experiences of war are shaped by their identity, and who may have a long-term interest in conflict or potential peace. Drawing on Randazzo (2016) this definition includes actors who may or may not share an interest in peace including: militia and military members, politicians, government officials and civil society.

Civil Society as Local Peacebuilding Actors

More recent contributions to post-liberal peacebuilding recognize the inevitability of international participation and intervention in peacebuilding processes, which has given rise to discussion of the emergence of hybrid peace between local and international actors implementing traditional and liberal approaches. Mac Ginty indicates that hybrid peace is the result of “the ability of liberal peace agents, networks and structures to enforce compliance with their will; the incentivising powers of liberal peace agents, networks and structures; the ability of local actors to resist, ignore or adapt liberal peace interventions; and the ability of local actors, networks and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking” (2011, p. 69). He concludes that the result of this interplay comprises local and international forces that produce hybrid peace (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 69). At the frontline in conflict affected communities, the interaction of local actors with international peacebuilding interventions represents a significant component of
what Millar (2014b) describes as practical hybridity. In practical hybridity, individuals and
groups make choices of how to perform peacebuilding functions (p. 505). If hybrid approaches
are to contribute to sustainable peace, it is necessary to understand what local needs are.

This thesis examines the hypothesis that the staff at local CSOs act as intermediaries in
hybridized peacebuilding and that the organizations are among the possible sites at which these
processes occur. By determining how to approach knowledge and interests expressed both by
internal, local actors and external actors to conflict and by determining how to distribute
resources from external actors, CSOs are shown to act as translators in these processes. As a
result, this thesis challenges the binary created in the post-liberal peacebuilding literature
between local/international and traditional/liberal actors.

This thesis selected local civil society organisations (CSOs) as the site at which to
examine local engagement in peacebuilding efforts because they were thought to include and
represent individuals or groups who had been directly impacted by ongoing violent conflict.
Further, they were selected because of the discussion of civil society in the post-liberal
peacebuilding literature as a potential site of intermediary actors in hybridized peacebuilding
processes. They were also selected because of their potential to exercise agency in addressing the
local causes of conflict. The intersection of peacebuilding and civil society more broadly in the
literature is considered in greater detail in the literature review.

The post-liberal peacebuilding literature considers CSOs as local actors in an uncritical
way. There are numerous definitions and constructions of civil society which have evolved from
early theorists including de Tocqueville, Marx and Gramsci. The divergence of these definitions
will be examined in the literature review and theoretical framework that follow. The civil society
literature itself has examined the different ways that civil society acts in conflict-affected
contexts. Pischikova and Izzi indicate that “Conflict fundamentally transforms civil society, facilitating the emergence of groups and associations that may significantly diverge from and be antithetical to peacebuilding values” (2011, p. 66). This view is also asserted by Marchetti and Tocci who add that in such contexts civil society can also act to achieve peaceful resolutions to conflict (2011, p. 1). It is also important to consider the micro-dynamics within CSOs when considering their capacity to exercise agency in peacebuilding activities. Carmody indicates that “Civil society is fractured along class, ethnic, regional, religious, gender, clan and other lines. It is a site of different overlapping social forces; some are oppositional to the state and others are deeply imbricated with it. Civil society is thus a space which reflects the social divisions of society as a whole” (Carmody, 2007, p. 16). Indeed, if CSOs are to be engaged as intermediaries in peacebuilding processes it is important to consider that not all organisations will be peace oriented and that others may be engaged with promoting the interests of certain groups along gender, ethnic or other lines. This thesis accepts that a diversity of definitions can be understood to represent peace, a discussion which is explored further in Chapter 3.

In the case of the DRC, Hellmuller indicates that local peacebuilding actors negotiate between locally-relevant activities and international priorities, torn between competing legitimacies of collaboration, resistance and attempting to twist strategies according to their own interests (2012, p. 228). There is limited literature that documents how these CSOs interact with international peacebuilding interventions, how they respond to local needs within their own communities or whose interests they represent in South Kivu. Yet, such organisations may hold the context-specific knowledge of conflict that Autesserre (2010) argues is necessary for successful peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.
The literature on both civil society as well as hybridized peacebuilding identifies the necessity for local actors to work collaboratively with international actors to address local peacebuilding needs. As Donais argues,

By treating local actors as potential agents of transformation rather than as objects to be transformed such approaches could yield significant benefits in terms of generating locally defined solutions which are likely to be more sustainable. Merging top-down with bottom-up approaches in creative and culturally sensitive ways is also likely to enhance the sense among local populations of the legitimacy of the broader peacebuilding process. (2012, p. 17).

Given the significant roles of both local and international actors in peacebuilding processes, this thesis also considers the potential for collaboration between local CSOs and international actors to foster transformative agency, through which local actors are able to address the needs of their communities in a way that address the local causes of conflict.

These observations give rise to four primary research questions that will be addressed in this thesis:

1. How do local civil society organisations seek to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?
2. Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions and how?
3. Are local civil society organisations able to address either the local or national causes of conflict?
4. What are the implications of local civil society organisations working as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding for post-liberal peacebuilding, in theory and practice?

The purpose of this research is to examine the role of local civil society actors in addressing local needs in hybridized peacebuilding processes. It attempts to understand whose interests are being addressed, how the represented groups understand their needs in relation to
peacebuilding and what methods are undertaken by local civil society actors to address those needs. Further, by examining the way in which local CSOs present the needs of the populations that they work with to external actors, it seeks to identify the contributions that local civil society actors make to hybridized peace processes and assess their capacity as intermediaries for locally-produced knowledge.

This thesis argues that CSOs in South Kivu are the site at which hybridization of local and international, traditional and liberal approaches to peacebuilding occurs. Further, it suggests that the individual actors working within these organisations negotiate that hybridity. By documenting the ways in which the CSOs adopt, defer and resist the interests and knowledge of both local and international actors it presents hybridity as translation. The ability of the CSOs to participate in this process in South Kivu at the time of research suggests that they exercise significant discursive power, while creatively navigating access to financial resources offered by their international partners who maintain broader material power in this context. These findings have two outcomes for post-liberal peacebuilding theory. First, this thesis presents an original definition of the local, arising out of the diverse range of localized actors observed engaging in peacebuilding in South Kivu, thereby moving away from a binary construction of the local and the liberal. Second, it suggests that the process of navigating local needs and knowledge and international knowledge and resources creates the foundation to understand hybridization as a process of translation rather than a shock or an organic process.

**Research Methods and Fieldwork Overview**

The analogy of being stuck on a muddy road applies as much to this research project as it does to peacebuilding in South Kivu. The initial proposal for this thesis ambitiously sought to carry out fieldwork in both South Kivu and North Kivu. It adopted an ethnographic approach
rooted in participant observation, supplemented by qualitative interviews. However, on the road to completing the thesis I encountered several roadblocks as a researcher. These included an initial attempt by the University’s Office of Risk Management to block my fieldwork due to safety concerns, higher than expected financial for doing research in the DRC, and a significant deterioration in the local security situation.

It also became increasingly clear throughout the research that providing deep ethnographic insight into local peacebuilding activities in either North or South Kivu would require much more than three months of observation and interviewing. Further, length restrictions around doctoral theses would also limit the potential to communicate such research in the formal write-up. These factors led to a focus solely on South Kivu. Rather than being read as a complete ethnography of peacebuilding activities in the region it should instead be understood as providing preliminary ethnographic observations on a complex environment. It remains my hope that I will be able to expand further on this work in the future.

The research adopted ethnographically informed qualitative methods including interviews and participant observation. It examines the contributions of three local CSOs to peacebuilding efforts and considers who and what influenced those contributions. This research was supplemented with follow-up questionnaires, the addition of interviews with other potential intermediary actors in South Kivu and additional interviews and observation conducted during my participation in a professional trip to the Eastern DRC in 2017.

This research is inspired by the book *Living with Bad Surroundings* (Finnstrom, 2008). That work presents the results of five years of anthropological fieldwork conducted in Northern Uganda, on the everyday lived experiences of the Acholi people in a context characterized by both negative peace and intermittent violent conflict. In some ways, the current environment in
the Eastern DRC is reminiscent of the situation in Northern Uganda in 2008, in terms of the context of a “security and juridical vacuum [which] has followed a prolonged war… and various bandits have seized the opportunity to harass, loot and kill” (Finnstrom, 2008, p. 3). The connections between this book and the approach taken by the current thesis will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.

Given the context of insecurity which prevails in the Eastern DRC, and the sensitive nature of the themes examined in this thesis, the names of the individual participants, their organisations and their external partners have been changed to protect their identity. The intention of this thesis is to highlight the existing capacity of local actors to contribute to peace and should not be read as a justification for ongoing failure to engage with these actors, despite any weaknesses that may be identified in their approaches in the analysis below.

**Contributions and Analysis**

By answering its four primary research questions, this thesis contributes to the literature on peacebuilding in South Kivu, post-liberal peacebuilding and civil society. First, it concludes that local CSOs in South Kivu act as intermediaries between beneficiaries and community-based structures and their external partners, translating internal and external knowledge through a process of adoption, deference and resistance. The organisations identify local needs through consistent and ongoing communication, research and analysis with their community-based structures. They use this information to develop programs and advocacy strategies which they present to their external partners. The support provided by external partners reflects a combination of their interests and capacity as well as the needs expressed by the organisations. The organisations then rely on their staff as well as their affiliated community-based structures to deliver the programs supported by their external partners.
Second, this thesis examines who and what influence the CSOs’ peacebuilding efforts. It suggests that the organisations intervene in geographical areas where they have existing connections and with religious and ethnic groups with whom they share affinity. Further, the organisations enjoy a fair amount of discursive power, reinforced by the relative elite status of their staff, which they exercise to develop and implement peacebuilding interventions while navigating difficult funding environments. It also indicates that external funders maintain material power over these peacebuilding activities by determining which organisations receive funding and how much. Finally, it demonstrates how security and the broader socio-economic and political context in South Kivu also influence the decisions and interventions of the organisations and their staff.

Third, it finds that while the majority of interventions specifically address the local causes of conflict, that they also strengthen the ability of participants and beneficiaries to resist dynamics arising out of the national causes of conflict. It demonstrates that in the context of a state characterized by predatory fragility, the organisations address gaps in peacebuilding and conflict resolution infrastructure, left by state agents who are unable or unwilling to intervene. These findings contribute to an emerging literature on the role of civil society in fragile and conflict affected states.

Finally, the findings of this thesis also have several implications for post-liberal peacebuilding theory and practice. It challenges the assumption that the contributions of local actors will necessarily be transformative or have a positive impact on broader conflict dynamics. Further as outlined above, it contributes to a more nuanced definition of the term “local” and situates hybridity as a process of translation as opposed to being enforced through a shock or occurring organically. It describes how this process is characterized by the adoption, deference
and resistance of the knowledge and interests of internal actors. It also explores how discursive and material power relations within the organisations and in their relations with other actors influence this process of translation and ultimately their contributions to peacebuilding efforts. It finds that as intermediaries these organisations enjoy a high degree of discursive power, which reinforces their role as translators. This power is mediated by the material power of external actors. These contributions challenge the binary construction of hybridity presented in the post-liberal peacebuilding literature. They also suggest that, rather than being local or international and using traditional or liberal approaches, these distinctions should be situated on intersecting axes rather as binary labels.

\textit{Chapter Overview}

This thesis begins by presenting an in-depth literature review of the post-liberal peacebuilding literature with a focus on the definition of the local, and the binary that arises the current framing of hybridized approaches to peacebuilding. It then considers literatures pertaining to the role of CSOs in peacebuilding processes. Finally, it examines the case literature on peacebuilding and civil society in the DRC. The chapter identifies gaps in the existing literature which will be addressed in the following chapters.

The third chapter outlines the post-colonial theoretical framework used, drawing from the peacebuilding and civil society literatures. It begins by providing a case overview examining civil society and peacebuilding in the Eastern DRC and South Kivu and presents the approach to certain central debates around the case literature adopted within the thesis. It continues by examining the micro-dynamics within and between local CSOs, their external partners and their beneficiaries as primary actors in hybridized peacebuilding processes. Further, it also considers several core concepts including local knowledge, representation and power as they relate to the
dynamics between and within the groups of actors described above and defines key terms including peacebuilding, hybridity, local and civil society as they will be used in the thesis. It concludes by presenting the theoretical framework and research questions for the study, which emerge at the intersection of the core concepts, actors and theories explored in the chapter.

The fourth chapter presents the methodology and provides a detailed explanation of the methods used during the fieldwork. It also outlines some of the strengths and challenges encountered throughout the research processes – notably those related to theory, methodology, risks and ethics.

Chapters, five, six and seven are the results chapters. The results chapters address each of the organisations individually. Each chapter begins by considering the goals and mission and the activities that the organisation undertakes to achieve them. They then go on to consider how the organisations collaborate with external partners and community-based structures across those activities, concluding the first half of the chapter with a consideration of how each organisation communicates their activities and collaborations to external actors. Each chapter then goes on to consider the actors and factors which influence the way in which the organisation realizes their goals and activities. They conclude by applying the theoretical framework to each case – that is, by examining how discursive and material power, and identity influence the ways in which the organisations adopt, defer and resist the knowledge and interests of internal and external actors in their peacebuilding efforts. The conclusions also consider how these efforts respond to the local and national causes of conflict in South Kivu and the DRC.

Chapter 8, the analytical chapter, consolidates the results section and answer the four primary research questions. It begins by exploring the relationships between the organisations examined in this research. The following section then goes on to situate the results within the
civil society literature particularly in relation to the role of CSOs in illiberal and fragile states. It then compares these efforts to those of three other groups of intermediary actors including international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) with offices in South Kivu, MONUSCO and representatives of the major churches in South Kivu. By doing so, it presents a strong representation of the unique contribution of local CSOs to peacebuilding in South Kivu. It goes on to examine the intersection of power and identity with the three sets of relationships, considering who and what influences the approaches and goals of local CSOs and their ability to address and challenge conflict related power dynamics rooted in historical and cultural norms. Further, it discusses the implications of these findings for post-liberal peacebuilding theory, framing how local CSOs engage in a process of translation as a core function of hybridity. It considers how discursive and material power influence these processes and concludes by reconsidering the definitions of the local and international emerging out of these findings. The chapter concludes by identifying the core contributions of this thesis to the literature and areas for future research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

This thesis examines local CSOs as a site at which hybridization occurs in peacebuilding processes, as well as the roles that their staff and members play in negotiating between local, traditional, international and liberal approaches and norms. Primarily situated in the literature on post-liberal peacebuilding, it challenges abstract notions of local needs, agency and civil society. It considers pragmatic ways in which civil society actors respond to conflict and peacebuilding at the local level and illuminates how those actors influence such processes.

This literature review considers four interconnected themes within critical approaches to peacebuilding. It begins by offering an overview of the expanding literature that discusses local approaches to peacebuilding, specifically considering the meaning of terms such as local and local ownership. It then considers how the construction of local approaches of peacebuilding have been integrated into the literature on local-liberal hybridity. This theme informs the examination of the context in which civil society actors have the agency to negotiate local needs with external peacebuilding actors. Further, it considers the existing literature on civil society in local and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding. Finally, it provides an overview of how the case thesis of the conflict in the DRC intersects with the above themes from and how the case can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of post-liberal peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding, defined as part of a broader set of international peace operations, emerged through the United Nations (UN) system after World War II. The realization of the goals in this first generation were limited by Cold War political dynamics. Richmond (2010) indicates that this generation was commonly equated with political realism and “rests on the assumption that
conflict is biological… and a limited state-centric discourse that excludes non-state actors and ignores non-state-centric issues” (Richmond, 2010, p. 17).

However, the version of peacebuilding at the foundation of contemporary debates is situated in what Baranyi (2008) and Richmond (2010) identify as second-generation peace operations. Second generation peace operations emerged as a concept and practice in international relations in the post-Cold War period as part of a set of responses to “new wars” described by Kaldor.\(^4\) Definitions presented in the peacebuilding literature are often rooted in this second generation. They revolve around “multidimensional mandates and capabilities (that) went far beyond classical Cold War UN peacekeeping (and) was codified in key multilateral documents” (Baranyi, 2008, p. 5). This includes the presentation of peacebuilding as a central concept in in 1992 in *An Agenda for Peace* published by the Secretary General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Boutros-Ghali identified peacebuilding as part of a four-part approach to conflict resolution which also included preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking. His Agenda for Peace indicates that peacebuilding “may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace” (para. 55). This framework was expanded upon by John Paul Lederach in 1997, who indicates that peacebuilding should be understood as “a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 1997). This is the most commonly accepted and cited definition across the peacebuilding literature. Since the publication of *An Agenda for Peace* peacebuilding has been incorporated into international

\(^4\) New wars are situated in identity politics and rely on a combination of guerilla warfare and counter insurgency tactics, aided by technological advancement (Kaldor, 1999).
conflict management approaches adopted by many international organisations including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN, the World Bank and the OECD.

The implementation of peacebuilding practice throughout the 1990’s was heavily influenced by the Westphalian model of the state, which represents the foundation of liberal peacebuilding. Liberal peacebuilding emphasizes the adoption of liberal political and economic reforms including the implementation of democratic elections and open markets under the model of a strong, central state (Paris, 1997). Much of the liberal peacebuilding literature and related problem-solving literature, has sought to justify and refine these approaches. In the post 9-11 period, liberal international efforts and studies turned their focus towards statebuilding with a heavy focus on the development of strong institutions in fragile and conflict affected states. Meanwhile the critical literature and practice among some international actors remained focused on post-liberal models of peacebuilding (Baranyi, 2008).

Post-liberal peacebuilding, with its emphasis on local actors, agency and the everyday, has emerged as a critique of this approach, challenging its top-down, western-imposed nature. Richmond suggests that the liberal approach is heavily driven by the requirements and perceptions of policy makers, officials and actors involved in both top-down and bottom-up visions of peace (2010, p. 23). Paffenholz (2015) adds an historical perspective by noting that discussions of the local actually emerged in the mid 1990’s in practice and in the conflict resolution literature, over a decade before the discussion emerged through the post-liberal peacebuilding literature.

There is also growing evidence of greater consideration of the local by traditionally liberal actors. Donais and McCandless (2016) identify the emergence of a global inclusivity norm, which considers the needs and participation of local actors through agreements such as the
*New Deal for Fragile and Conflict Affected States* negotiated between the OECD DAC INCAF and g7+, an inter-governmental organisation made up of 20 fragile and conflict affected countries. They argue that under the agreement there have been documented efforts to include national political and economic actors, as well as civil society representatives in the design of strategies developed to consolidate state authority. This norm is also evident in Sustainable Development Goal 16 which seeks to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN-DESA, 2016). Target 16.7 of this goal specifically seeks to “Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels” (*Ibid.*). Such changes indicate that international and traditionally liberal actors have recognized the significance of the post-liberal critique and are making efforts to adopt more inclusive and participatory approaches. However, as indicated by Donais and McCandless these emerging approaches are nascent and leave room to be developed further. Egil (2016) notes that attempts at greater inclusivity and participation of local actors in the Sustainable Development Goals has shifted the responsibility for outcomes on to developing states. This seems especially problematic in the case of many fragile and conflict-affected states, which are poorly equipped to realize those goals due to weak institutions and a lack of funds.

It is important to consider the differences between the way the local is constructed and addressed by liberal and post-liberal actors and authors. First, while liberal authors tend to situate the local at the national level, post-liberal authors tend to situate the local at the individual, household and community levels. This is evident through the liberal peace negotiations literature which examines the impact of the participation of “local actors” on peace negotiations (Zanker, 2014) (Paffenholz, 2014), without considering who those actors are, and what interests they
represent. In contrast, many post-liberal authors discuss locality as existing at the level of the everyday where individuals and groups make decisions about how to realize and resist externally-imposed and locally-driven peace initiatives (Richmond, 2010). The situation of locality also corresponds to where each of these approaches understands the location of power, with liberal peacebuilding situating power among national and international elites while post-liberal peacebuilding attempts to understand expression of power across a more diverse range of actors. Finally, while liberal approaches remain situated in the pursuit of a liberal state, post-liberal approaches offer more diverse interventions in post-conflict states and societies.

Thus, the critique of the liberal peace offered by post-liberal peacebuilding remains useful as an analytical tool in contexts such as the DRC where liberal peace interventions have failed to yield sustainable long-term peace at both the local and national level. However, as discussed below, the core concepts of this approach must be developed further in order to move from critique to a well-grounded alternative to the liberal peace in theory and practice.

**Local Approaches to Peacebuilding**

Post-liberal peacebuilding is situated within various strands of critical theory. Tadjbakhsh and Richmond indicate that critical theory opposes the liberal international model as being conservative, hegemonic and enforcing inequalities (2011, p. 226). The critical school is situated within critical international relations theory and also overlaps with post-colonial, post-structural and neo-Marxist approaches to international relations, peace and development (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 763). The local turn has sought to challenge dominant Western/Northern epistemological and ontological approaches and advances more democratic understandings of peace politics and the state and promotes a postcolonial international order (p.772). Following
post-liberal approaches, this thesis emphasizes the role of local, non-western knowledge in locally driven peacebuilding interventions.

The emphasis on local involvement in peacebuilding processes applies both to addressing localized causes of conflict as well as examining the role of local actors in peacebuilding processes. Millar (2014a) argues that local people’s perceptions and experiences of conflict, justice, security, development, empowerment, dignity, opportunity and peace itself should be considered as the starting point for any further international action that might hope to facilitate local voice, agency or emancipatory peace. Hellmuller (2013) adds nuance to this argument, suggesting that there is not only a perception gap between local and international actors in how they perceive the causes of conflict or justice and development as described above, but also in how they perceive peacebuilding.

More recent literature on the local turn has applied a critical lens to post-liberal peacebuilding, identifying gaps in the literature and seeking to clarify to some of the original concepts of the theory including the local, the everyday and agency. Finkerbusch (2016) suggests that post-liberal arguments undermine policy makers’ ability to develop innovative approaches by forcing them to become increasingly passive and status-quo oriented by relying on local norms. This highlights a divisive question within the post-liberal peacebuilding literature. While some authors are supportive of the development of inclusivity norms and the inclusion of local actors in liberal peacebuilding efforts (Donais & McCandless, 2016), others remain highly critical of such efforts, suggesting that liberal international institutions do not have the capacity to engage meaningfully with the local (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016). Yet, Paffenholz (2015) argues that for post-liberal peacebuilding to offer a meaningful alternative agenda to its liberal counterpart, it must present a more complex understanding of local and international actor
identities; avoid romanticized notions of hybrid peace governance structures; and attribute proper weight to the various layers of resistance that simultaneously respond to power schemes (p.868). Addressing these gaps would also contribute to the applicability of the local turn to peacebuilding practices more broadly.

Core questions that need to be resolved to further develop post-liberal theory and improve its adaptability to research, policy and practice include: who, what and where are “the local”? The persistent lack of clarity of the term has led to the application of a problematic binary between the local and the international and the traditional and the liberal, particularly by Richmond and his followers. Further, it complicates efforts by both liberal and post-liberal authors, researchers and practitioners to develop and implement strategies that address local needs since where the local is situated, and who is understood to constitute the local greatly impacts what and whose needs are being addressed. As a result, a great deal of the recent literature on post-liberal peacebuilding has been dedicated to answering these questions.

The question of where the local is located tends to be treated conceptually rather than grounded within specific geographical confines. Mac Ginty (2015) argues that the local does not lie principally in geography, instead it lies in the systems of thinking that many of us in the global North have developed over centuries (p.841). The concept most often applied to answer the question of the where the local is located is the idea of the everyday. For example, Cubitt (2013b) argues that, living life at the level of the everyday, local people have shaped peace through cooperative activity and enterprising endeavours involving significant degrees of agency often overlooked by external peacebuilders. (p.92). Richmond (November 2009) notes that the everyday is often deployed in postcolonial or post-structural literatures to uncover structural or discursive forms of violence, to emphasize resistance and solidarity in the face of sovereignty
and forms of power, bio-politics and governmentality (p.325). Unfortunately, situating the local in the everyday does not provide any more clarity of how to identify or engage with it.

Randazzo identifies two challenges to situating the local in the everyday. First, she indicates that framing the everyday as a starting point for bottom-up practices requires a form of identity making through which agency is identified. This raises the question of how to select actors who engage at the local level. Second, she argues that it is inconsistent with the local turn’s own theoretical preference for blurring identity boundaries and for fostering interconnectedness and plurality (2016, p. 1356). Examining peacebuilding from a bottom-up or ethnographic perspective provides an opportunity to examine how a range of actors relate to peacebuilding activities in their daily lives. However, as Randazzo suggests it is important to avoid constructing the local in a way that it only includes a romanticised vision that is only extended to actors whom are not formally engaged in peace and conflict dynamics. Indeed, the everyday can also include the activities of individuals formally participating in peace and conflict including, militia and military members, politicians, government officials and civil society. Engaging with the everyday in a way that examines the routine engagement of actors in peace and conflict activities, in both formal and informal ways, presents an opportunity to consider the diversity of needs and agency that exist in a given context. At the same time the everyday has the potential to acknowledge the broad range of actors who are present in everyday peacebuilding contexts who may play fluid roles shifting between promoting peace in some contexts while aggravating conflict in others. It also highlights the need to identify a specific location to be examined to avoid conceptual vagueness.

Defining specific geographical boundaries by designating borders or population sizes may be challenging in conflict affected contexts because conflict-related migratory patterns may
contribute to frequent changes in these measurements. Conflict also impacts the way that places are lived in and governed which can change perception of place and who or what is local. As Mac Ginty (2015) points out this may also exclude diaspora members who may also represent local voices in peacebuilding processes in certain contexts. Thus, it may be more useful to identify spaces where the local may be found. This could include spaces of various sizes including households; neighbourhoods; local institutions such as schools, health centres, courts, and government buildings or; more broadly where war and violent conflict occur. The local may also reside outside of these spaces with individuals with significant lived experiences of a given war. This may be addressed by stipulating a fixed period in which a particular locality is examined or by finding ways to engage with local residents who have recently left a given location.

The second, and more problematic question facing post-liberal peacebuilding, is how to define the identity of the local. In other words, who is the local? This is a topic of significant debate within the literature. This overlaps with questions of power, agency and identity. Where locality is placed at the national level authors often attribute agency to national political, economic and military elites. However, Hellmuller suggests that the needs of national elites are often not in line with those of local actors (2012, p. 239). In contrast, where locality is placed at the community, district or municipal levels, local agency is situated with local civil society and social movements, along with municipal actors, churches, community leaders and at times militia leaders/members. Mitchell suggests that it is important to consider the aims and aspirations of grassroots interests so that elite negotiated peace agreement do not collapse through a lack of local support or through the elite’s misreading of what the crucial issues might be (2012, p. 17). Indeed, there is an emerging literature on the role of grassroots organisations and CSOs in
peacebuilding processes which investigates the potential that these groups hold for societal
transformation (Richmond 2011a; Donais, 2012; Van Leuwen, 2008).

There are very few articles that specifically attempt to define local identity, reflecting
post-liberal discomfort with essentializations. Work on this question tends to focus on a specific
group of actors, exploring whether they represent the local in peacebuilding. For example, there
has been a fair amount of debate around whether local and national CSOs represent the local.
Authors such as Donais (2012) present CSOs as a potential site at which the international can
engage with the local, whereas Vogel worries that civil society support is frequently confused
with the representation and inclusion of local voices in the peacebuilding discourse. Instead, he
argues that “international support steers civil society discourses and fosters the adoption of
global agendas, thus making civil society part of a transnational governance process rather than a
counter-voice to it” (2016, p. 2).

There has also been limited discussion of the engagement of local peace committees in
peacebuilding processes. These groups operate at the community level and represent another set
of formally or informally organised community-level actors who are considered to have agency
in peacebuilding processes at the local level. Odendaal indicates that local peace committees are
a type of inclusive forum that operate “at the subnational level that provides a platform for the
collective local leadership to accept joint responsibility for building peace” (2013, p. 6). van
Tongeren indicates that “In many conflict-affected countries peace committees have an impact
on local communities by keeping the violence down, solving community problems and
empowering local actors to become peacebuilders” (2013, p. 39). Odendaal adds that these
committees can contribute in several ways including the “prevention of the occurrence or
recurrence of violence, an acknowledgement that local patterns of exclusion and discrimination
have to be transformed, a commitment to collaborate in that transformation and joint action in dealing with the most threatening and urgent problems facing the community” (p.9).

The distinction between local CSOs and local peace committees is important to this research for two reasons. First, in a practical sense, local CSOs are often located in urban centres and have strong connections with international actors, while local peace committees are located at the community level with more limited access to resources and foreign partners. As a result, in South Kivu many of the larger CSOs establish local peace committees and other community-based structures as satellites to provide community level conflict analysis and help to deliver their projects. Second, acknowledging the geographical situation, size and resources of these two groups begins to disaggregate the meaning of the term local into more identifiable actors.

There is growing consensus that local organisations including CSOs and local peace committees can represent the local among other actors in what Richmond and Pogodda have termed peace formation. They indicate that “Peace formation processes can be defined as the mobilisation of formal or informal, public or hidden, indigenous of local agents of peacebuilding, conflict, resolution, development or peace actors in customary, religious, cultural, social or local governance settings… They exercise subaltern, critical agency through a range of local to internationally scaled networks” (2016, p. 9). The broadening of the scope of potential actors at the site of the local within the concept of peace formation presents a broader base of actors to be considered when engaging the local but does not provide any additional clarity to the question of what, where or who the local might be.

Other authors also note the importance of recognizing instrumentalisation of the term local. Kappler suggests that actors engage in processes of delocalisation and re-localisation in an effort gain authority and legitimacy in peacebuilding processes. She concludes that delocalisation
supports claims to authority and neutrality, while re-localisation serves as a way of acting as
gatekeepers and translators between international actors and the communities intervened in
(2015, p. 885). Further, Hirbringer and Simons suggest that “if claims about the local are always
politically embedded, this requires an approach which strives towards awareness for the
conflicting processes through which representations of the local are negotiated, in order to
unearth how the co-production of facts and values about the local intersects with political
dynamics” (2015, p. 437). These contributions stress the importance of power analysis in post-
liberal peacebuilding.

Literature addressing both questions of where and who are the local highlight that locality
is a fluid concept which includes a diverse range of actors across a variety of settings. Similar
dynamics may also be observed within the international identity. This problematizes the use of
two binary terms when identifying peacebuilding actors, as it offers little information about the
power, agency and other identities of the actors considered within those groups.

This offers a partial explanation for why much of the theoretical literature on post-
liberal peacebuilding includes calls for the inclusion of local voices in peacebuilding processes
while these voices remain silent in the work of many of these authors. The absence of these
voices makes it difficult to understand how the needs of local actors are different from what is
being provided through external interventions. It also remains difficult to assess what are
perceived as local causes of conflict. It is relevant to note that some case studies have been
published which are situated within the broad umbrella of post-liberal peacebuilding which begin
to provide some of this voice. For example, Strand (2008) provides an overview of the perceived
outcomes of international peacekeeping efforts from local actors in Afghanistan. Such case
studies demonstrate that it is possible to access these voices and explore some of the dynamics
between local and international actors, however they are not substantive enough to contribute to the development of post-liberal peacebuilding theory. Rather, they contribute to a more meso body of literature that explores the disconnections between local views and internationally-driven peacebuilding in specific instances.

Further, much of the literature on local peacebuilding also fails to consider the dynamics within and between local actors. For example, little research exists on how gender equality is captured within post-liberal peacebuilding approaches, ignoring how pre-existing dynamics might influence which sets of local needs are represented and how. In addition, little consideration has been given to how different groups might compete for power in heterogeneous societies such as the DRC, where multiple ethnic groups compete for resources and representation. The existence of such dynamics within or between groups may impact efforts to implement post-liberal approaches as uneven representation could complicate dynamics of inequality already exacerbated by ongoing conflicts. The need to address these dynamics is overlooked by broader theoretical concerns related to the definition of the local.

Despite the absence of a clear definition in that regard, the term is used within the post-liberal literature to inform another one of its core concepts, hybridity. The consideration of hybridity arose from a recognition of the continued participation of external actors in peacebuilding processes alongside national and local ones, leading to hybridized peace processes. Both national elites and CSOs are important as sites for the hybridization of local and liberal peacebuilding norms. These groups are the key actors who implement and interact with peacebuilding interventions.
Hybridity

This acknowledgement that peacebuilding requires both external and local agency to address both local and structural causes of conflict. This has resulted in the emergence of discussion considering the nature and desirability of local-liberal hybridity.

Hybridity was initially used in biology to denote the cross-breeding of different animal or plant species (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 221). In the social sciences, hybridity is associated with post colonial thought. Nadarajah and Rampton (2015) note that in the 19th century the concept attempted to address anxieties of colonial and imperial societies faced with the prospects of a plural world. In the twentieth century discourses on hybridity took a cultural turn and were divided between forms of organic essentialism and internationalist constructivism. Hybridity sought to eschew fixed notions of identity such as race and ethnicity through a critical lens particularly associated with various strains of postcolonial studies (2015, p. 54). Mac Ginty and Richmond add that the notion of hybridity developed through the work of “Colonial anthropologists and later post-colonialist scholars of various disciplinary hues (who) charted how colonial encounters of subjugation, extraction and control depended on a series of cautious interactions, uneasy truces and the lending and borrowing between cultures” (2016, p. 222).

In the post-liberal peacebuilding literature, hybridization can be understood as the process through which “actors reshape the norms, institutions and activities in question by means of everyday practices such as verbal interaction, action and even overt conflict” (Richmond & Mitchell, 2012, p. 33). Belloni indicates that hybridity represents the need to move beyond the ontological and methodological dominance of Western actors and approaches and to engage with bottom-up local views of politics and societies (2012, p. 32). He frames hybridization as the shaping of democratic liberal institutions by traditional and customary forms of governance.
While these contributions acknowledge the potential for models of government and peace that extend beyond liberal democracies, they generally stop short of identifying what these alternatives entail, likely arising out of post-liberalism’s insistence on the use of context specific information. This thesis provides examples of how local power and knowledge are used in peacebuilding interventions in South Kivu, highlighting some potential areas that they differ from liberal peace interventions in that context, without attempting to provide a framework that can broadly be applied to other contexts.

More theoretically, Richmond suggests that hybridization represents both the interactions of international, local, liberal and traditional power and knowledge (2011, p. 12) and that “hybridity in terms of peace represents both the capacity of international liberal and local peacebuilding actors and projects to engage with each other” (2011, p. 17). This explanation adds to the actor-focused idea of hybridity, by considering how power and knowledge influence the actions of both local and international actors as well as the relationship between the two groups. The examination of political arrangements considers how peacebuilding processes can be governed in a way that creates the coexistence of local and liberal approaches. Donais (2012) argues that ultimately, both liberal and post-liberal approaches represent incomplete strategies for building stable, sustainable peace. If peacebuilding requires that the resources of both insiders and outsiders be mobilized towards a common end, then successful peace processes must almost necessarily end in negotiated hybridity which is achieved through a process of consensus-building (2012, p. 13).

Millar notes that many authors view hybridity as something to be planned through peacebuilding processes. However, he suggests that this view fails to recognize the different contexts in which hybridization occurs. He presents a disaggregated hybridity theory, which
distinguishes between institutional, practical, ritual and conceptual hybridity and demands that attention be paid to the mediating role concepts play in the interpretation and experience of all administered institutions (2014a, p. 502). Institutional hybridity represents the combination of different institutional approaches from two or more actors, for example ones that are internationally planned but locally implemented. Practical hybridity reflects the everyday choice of both local and international actors of how to perform peacebuilding functions, which may be rooted in acceptance, subversion, modification or resistance. Ritual hybridity is the mixing of symbol and ceremony to form new ritual forms or appropriation and deployment of existing ritual for new purposes. Finally, conceptual hybridity occurs everywhere and at almost all times, and, as such, all concepts are in some way hybrid having evolved over generations and through long interaction with ideas from other places and peoples (Millar, 2014a, p. 505).

Disaggregated hybridity theory recognizes “that international efforts to administer hybrid governance, are unlikely to produce predictable local experiences but may have unpredictable and potentially even conflict-promoting effects.” (p.506). Further, Millar suggests that while hybridity can be planned, to some extent, at the institutional and practical levels, it is unpredictable at the ritual and conceptual levels.

Disaggregated hybridization theory presents themes to be conscious of when considering the actions of both local and international actors. While institutional and practical hybridization may be evaluated when examining relations between both sets of groups, researchers should also be aware of internalized hybridities when examining the actions of both local and international actors.

Millar’s observations contributed to an emerging debate in the peacebuilding literature around whether hybrid outcomes are predictable or desirable. Contributions by Donais (2012),
Mac Ginty (2011) and Richmond (2011) posit that such approaches are desirable and should be pursued to create the transformative agency described by Donais, through which local actors are viewed as “agents of transformation rather than as objects to be transformed” (2012, p.17). However, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016) recently reassessed the predictability and desirability of hybrid approaches concluding that hybridity is not a condition that can be crafted, nor are its results able to be predetermined. They argue that “Attempts to instrumentalize hybridity seem to have a scant understanding of local agency and the ability of the interaction between local and international actors to produce unexpected outcomes” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 220).

Authors who discuss civil society’s roles in hybridized peacebuilding also suggest that the outcomes of hybridized peacebuilding processes are often different in practice than what was anticipated. Verkoren and van Leeuwen indicate that, during the implementation of external programs, diverse stakeholders with their own agendas and perspectives re-appropriate and transform liberal models to fit them to their agendas and objectives (2013, p. 159).

Recent additions to the literature on hybridized peacebuilding have also been critical of the binaries created through the identification of the local and the international and the traditional and the liberal (Nadarajah & Rampton, 2015; Hirblinger & Simons, 2015; Paffenholz, 2014). Nadarajah and Rampton suggest that these binaries also extend to modernity and tradition, peace and conflict, coercion and resistance (2015, p. 57). Hirblinger and Simons (2015) conclude that despite the efforts of hybridity theory to dispel accusations of essentialism, because the local maintains “its relevance mainly in terms of its alterity or similarity to distinctly ‘liberal’ peacebuilding, the use of hybridity reproduces an essentializing ‘ontology of otherness’” (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015, p. 424). This tension reflects the lack of conceptual clarity resulting from the failure to present clear definitions of who the local are and where they reside. However,
the ambiguity of this term may suggest a need to consider the differences between the local and
the international and the traditional and the liberal along an intersecting grid to begin to
demonstrate the diversity in approaches. Such an approach might better capture the diversity of
experiences and lived realities that exist in conflict-affected contexts and could compliment
context specific explanations of peacebuilding actors and approaches, although this would fall
short of capturing the fluidity of the approaches.

These conceptual challenges have led post-liberal peacebuilding to remain primarily as a
critique rather than a site for the development of new and innovative peacebuilding practices
capable of challenging dominant power structures. This conclusion is consistent with the
findings of Mac Ginty and Richmond who indicate that hybridity offers insights into the
conditions for legitimacy as well as the mediation of power. For them, hybrid forms of peace are
connected to both emancipation from pre-determined liberal models as well as the defence of
existing customs and power structures, depending on the context (2016, p. 233). In an earlier
publication, Richmond writes that emancipatory peace can be thought of as “an everyday form of
peace, offering care, respecting but also mediating culture and identity, institutions and custom,
providing for needs and assisting the most marginalised in their local state, regional and
international context” (Richmond, 2011).

Examining local civil society peacebuilding organisations offers a starting point to
understand the roles of intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding because closely linked to both
the local at the community and household level as well as to the international through financing
and other support. This focus also provides the opportunity to explore how such actors resist
conflict-oriented activities and support peace-oriented ones undertaken by both provincial and
national state actors.
There are many gaps in the conceptualization of hybridity including how hybridized approaches interface with macro-causes of conflict, such as political cleavages and the proliferation of armed groups. Another gap relates to how hybridized approaches to peace influence actors at all levels (local, national and international). For authors interested in local approaches to peacebuilding and hybridization, the actors being examined should be those that have the agency to engage in peacebuilding practice at the local level. However, identifying those local actors remains elusive for post-liberal authors still struggling to answer the questions of who and where the local are situated.

Actors with the agency to represent the needs of their communities in peacebuilding processes will necessarily vary between conflicts and locations. Actors with this capacity could include churches, customary or traditional authorities, schools, agricultural cooperatives, CSOs and other associations. In struggling to identify local actors engaging with peacebuilding processes, both liberal and post-liberal authors have considered the role of local civil society as being the site of potential agency to fulfil this role. However, civil society has been used as a term of convenience to capture a broad range of actors in both literatures despite lacking conceptual clarity. The following section will examine how civil society has been constructed in the liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding literature and consider how they represent a variety of local voices and needs.

**Civil Society and Peacebuilding**

Civil society is a contested concept. Purdue notes that civil society has a complex genealogy with meanings shifting according to rhetorical needs (2007, p. 1). Many authors note that the concept initially came into prominence in the late eighteenth century with the emergence of capitalism and was originally understood as the ability of individuals to deal with strangers.
without using force, particularly in urban centres (2007, p. 1). The concept has since been developed by de Tocqueville, Marx, Gramsci and Hegel in divergent ways which make it accessible to a variety of theoretical approaches.

Civil society re-emerged in the literature after the Cold War. In this context, Edwards (2009) and Pischikova and Izzi (2011) suggest that there are three contemporary approaches to civil society. The first approach, which is dominant, is the associational life approach (Edwards, 2009, p. 108), which, Pischikova and Izzi (2011) suggest is an analytical perspective that endeavours to identify the core characteristics that define civil society. The second approach understands civil society as good society (Edwards, 2009, p.108) which is a normative approach which implies that civil society either directly or indirectly upholds certain values in society (Pischikova, & Izzi 2011). Finally, it can be understood as the public sphere (Edwards, 2009, p.108) which Pischikova and Izzi define as “the relational” in which civil society is understood as a space where rational dialogue on common concerns takes place between citizens (2011).

Although the practical involvement and scholarly discussion of the role of civil society in peacebuilding emerged in the 1990s, van Leeuwen notes that in the “context of the global war on terror focus shifted again from peacebuilding to military intervention, from local civil society to the role of the state and its institutions in reforming governance and promoting development” (2009, p. 50). This re-emergence of civil society in academic literature occurred in part, through the work of the Global Partnership on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, which was picked up by the World Bank and re-published by Paffenholz in 2010.

Theoretically, literature addressing the role of civil society in peacebuilding is situated both within liberal and critical traditions and considers a broad range of actors and themes. In the context of peacebuilding, Paris indicates that promoting the development of independent CSOs
was part of the typical formula for liberal peacebuilding along with the promotion of civil and political rights and marketization (2004, p. 19). From a post-colonial perspective, Richmond agrees that an important aspect of the liberal peace is the argument that conflict cannot be resolved unless the concerns of civil society are met or in their absence (Richmond, 2010, p. 23).

The discussion of civil society participation in peacebuilding within the liberal tradition, tends to focus on the inclusion of CSOs in peace negotiations, as well as their advocacy function in relation to the state. For example, Nilsson (2012) concludes based on a quantitative study, that peace negotiations that included at least some civil society participation were more likely to be sustainable. However, her thesis and others including work by Zanker (2014), who conducted research in Kenya and Liberia examining how the inclusion of civil society actors contribute to the perceived legitimacy of peace negotiations, fails to differentiate between local, provincial, national and international civil society.

Such approaches also assume the existence of a Weberian state, with democratic institutions and a market economy which civil society can strengthen. Authors such as Paffenholz (2010) (2014) present models of civil society engagement in peacebuilding which also assume their existence within a liberal state. This is problematic for a number for reasons. First, such generalized approaches fail to recognize the diversity in the type of organisations and the ways in which they emerged (Lewis, 2002). Second, such approaches do not recognize the existence of vibrant civil societies and their unique roles in failed, receding or fragile states. They also tend to ignore the construction of CSOs by external actors to promote development and peacebuilding objectives, failing to recognize that other CSOs already exist and are constructed by local actors in some contexts (Wickramasignhe, 2005). As such, they downplay the extent to which the external construction of locally-based CSOs can undermine the effective
representation of conflict-affected populations by prioritizing the implementation of liberal models of peace and governance.

In contrast, the post-liberal literature typically considers CSOs as a potential set of actors who may or may not represent the local in peacebuilding processes. Initially many authors in this tradition were wary of the involvement of civil society in peacebuilding processes. Richmond indicates that because civil society “has been so externalized in post-conflict states, and dependent on donors’ rather limited support, that civil society in practice has often become an engineered artifice that floats above and substitutes for the local and for context” (2011a, p. 28). Further, Chandler (2010) argues the civil society discourse enables a much more interventionist policy paradigm reinforcing and re-institutionalizing international hierarchies of power and evading responsibility for policy outcomes. However, more recent contributions to this tradition have been more open to the inclusion of CSOs among a broad range of local actors. Christie indicates that “Critical scholarship has long-viewed civil society and social movements as the space for resistance against universalism” (2013, p. 201). Donais (2012) argues that if the local ownership debate is about the extent to which the inhabitants of post-conflict societies are active agents rather than passive victims, then civil society represents vehicle through which such agency can be expressed. Finding ways to effectively support domestic civil society efforts to nurture peace remains an important element of the broader puzzle (2012, p. 60). Richmond, who was initially skeptical of the role of civil society in local approaches to peacebuilding, includes the space for local CSOs among a range of possible actors in the concept of peace formation in a book written with Pogodda (2016). However, the reflection that this type of action arises through subaltern power/agency in sectors of society where non-violent peaceful change is sought
(Richmond & Pogoda, 2016) signals a specific type of civil society group which is peace seeking and that challenges existing power dynamics.

This uncertainty about the role of civil society in representing local needs reflect two trends in the literature on peacebuilding and civil society. First, it may reflect the binary which was created using the terms local and international, liberal and traditional. Because civil society was often construed as being a central component of liberal democratic states and therefore supported through international development and peacekeeping interventions, they were viewed as being easily corrupted by liberal ideology. The increase of comfort with the inclusion of civil society as constituting local actors has emerged in parallel with continued efforts to refine the definition of the term local. Second, the definition of civil society presented in much of the literature on peacebuilding, in both the liberal and post-liberal traditions, has unwaveringly reflected the liberal definition of civil society which is actor-focused and concentrates on the relationship between civil society groups and the state. Such approaches fail to consider the diversity that exists among civil society actors, at a range of levels between the village, province, nation and region in addition to the implication of state fragility.

One of the most prevalent definitions of civil society is the functional approach suggested by Paffenholz and Spurk in 2010. It identifies seven key functions of civil society in peacebuilding contexts including: protection, monitoring, advocacy and public communication, in-group socialization, social cohesion, intermediation and facilitation and service delivery (T. Paffenholz, 2010, p. 65). This represents a liberal definition of civil society. A more recent book by Cortright, Greenberg and Stone attempts to further develop this approach by including a consideration of power relations. In the collection van Tuijl indicates that this functional approach fails to adequately center civil society’s role as challenging a state’s power and
proposes an alternative definition of the role of civil society in peacebuilding. He describes it as “the un-coerced association between the individual and the state in which people undertake collective, non-violent and gender sensitive action for normative and substantive purposes relatively independently of the government and the market” (p.3-4) with an emphasis on the ability of civil society advocacy to challenge existing power relations (p.5). While this definition is a useful starting point for critical scholars examining the role of civil society in local peacebuilding processes, other areas of the civil society literature and the post-liberal peacebuilding literature identify additional themes that can be considered in the construction of a more robust post-liberal definition of civil society rooted in both post-colonial and post-modern approaches. These will be discussed below with a view towards informing the definition of civil society presented in the theoretical framework.

First, it is important to note the existence of other theoretical interpretations of the term civil society which extend beyond the actor-focused approach advanced in much of the peacebuilding literature. For example, Wickramasinghe indicates that Hegel and Marx understood civil society as being part of bourgeois society and pose the possibility of a non-liberal or non-pluralist civil society (2005, p. 406). Such approaches present an opportunity to analyse the class relations at the heart of civil society and may be relevant in understanding their activities as local peacebuilding actors. Gramsci takes this further by acknowledging that power dynamics within civil society could be determined by pre-existing power relations with the potential to maintain the position of dominant groups, particularly when the state is controlled by dominant classes (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 264-5). These contributions create the space to explore the complex terrain of class, regional and other struggles. More recently, Richmond presented an alternative construction of civil society which may be useful for post-liberal analysis. He
suggests that a locally situated civil society can constitute a “post-colonial civil society [which] indicates a legitimacy that transcends the state and the market, liberalism and cosmopolitanism, though it also includes and modifies them.” (2011, p. 433). While this definition provides a foundation for moving forward it is also complicated by the ambiguity of the term local described above. These definitional issues are considered throughout this thesis.

Beyond its weak definition, the literature on civil society in peacebuilding also fails to engage with other themes related to identity and civil society, which may be important to consider when examining its roles in peacebuilding. For example, there has been little engagement in both the liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding literature about the challenges of applying western models of civil society in Southern and particularly to African contexts. As explored below, this has been an important topic within the political science, human geography and anthropology literatures.

Mahmood Mamdani (1995) raised the question of whether the concept of civil society was applicable in the African context, particularly in states with powerful non-democratic governments. Since then, a significant body of literature has emerged addressing this question and has generally concluded that broad definitions of civil society can be adapted and applied in the African contexts. Lewis emphasizes the importance of applying an approach which is adaptive that takes on local meanings and recognizing the impact of colonial legacies on patterns of domination and resistance (2002, p. 575). He concludes that “By examining the range of local meanings being created around the concept in certain Africa contexts, it becomes clear that civil society refers to increasingly universal negotiations between citizens, states and market (Lewis, 2002, p. 582). Lewis (2002) and Wickramasinghe (2005) conclude that these variations and histories of resistance make it essential to adapt conceptions of civil society to African and other
Southern contexts. Edwards adds that efforts to define civil society in the African context continue and need to better “reinterpret and recombine the relationships between associations based on primordial attachments of tribe and clan and those based around cross-cutting ties and affiliations, which have grown steadily over the last fifty years” (Edwards, 2009, p. 35). An additional challenge to applying the concept of civil society in the Congolese context is the absence of a liberal state to which civil society can advocate. Given that the Congolese state is best captured within a framework of predatory fragility it will be important to consider how CSOs undertake and direct advocacy activities.

Cubitt argues that in post-conflict contexts, indigenous and autonomous forms of local association are more legitimate and appropriate for broader citizen representations than a bourgeois civil society constructed from outside (2013b, p. 92). However, local CSOs can play different roles in conflict settings. Marchetti and Tocci highlight that while civil society can help to achieve peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation, it can also act within the conflict dynamic fuelling discord or entrenching the status quo (2011, p. 1). van Tuijl elaborates that civil society can be a site of intolerance, sectarianism, female oppression or other violent ideologies (2016, p. 3). Vogel highlights that “It is vital to attempt to understand how local civil societies’ alternative modes of operation challenge the existing power imbalances and rethink civil society conceptually, in order to open the possibilities for local voices to relocate from the periphery to the centre of their societies and peace discourses” (Vogel, 2016, p. 4). This is particularly relevant in South Kivu where Brabant provides evidence that frustrated, university educated, young men, will join armed groups to try to contribute to their own visions of peace and development. Having been blocked from finding jobs with more established organisations, she indicates that, through their involvement with armed groups, these young men will form their
own CSOs to support development in the territories that they control (Brabant, 2016, p. 228). These findings are consistent with informal remarks made by some of the participants in this thesis who referred to small organisations that represented a broader range of interests, whose activities did not necessarily promote security, development or negative or positive peace.

Furthermore, the majority of the literature on civil society in peacebuilding also fails to consider the way gender is represented within and by CSOs. This reflects a broader trend towards de-gendering civil society and a limited consideration of gender equality within the civil society literature. Eto (2012) highlighted that CSOs and studies tend to remain gender-neutral in an effort to avoid discrimination based on sex but that individual studies of associational life fail to adequately capture the blurred realities for women between private and public life. She emphasizes that women’s specific contributions in these realms have been largely undocumented as a result. Adding to this discussion, Chaney argues that the extent to which women’s needs are well represented depends on whether policies and programs are defined at the grassroots level or by program staff and managers (2016, p. 213).

While these and other contributions highlight the need to include women in peace operations, they fail to consider the different experiences of men and women in peace, conflict and civil society and what might block their full participation in these processes. This thesis also challenges readers to expand their understanding of civil society organisation beyond being a homogenous group of actors, examining the intersection of ethnicity, class, religion, age and gender. Examining gender dynamics within CSOs in their capacity of representatives of local needs in peacebuilding contexts characterized by high rates of gender inequality and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), where women navigate the divide between being treated as victims and as active participants in markets, politics, conflict and peace.
Finally, the post-liberal peacebuilding literature also offers some suggestions for how to advance the understanding of the role of civil society in peacebuilding. As previously stated, post-liberal peacebuilding theorists encourage the examination of local actors in peacebuilding processes with an emphasis on power relations. This invites an examination of civil society actors at the local level, as opposed to the national, regional or international level. In doing so the emphasis on power relations and local knowledge invites an examination of the dynamics within locally situated CSOs as well as the relationship between civil society groups and household and individual interests. An examination of hybridity could include a discussion of where the activities of CSOs are situated in relation to individual or private, national or international actors. These considerations are revisited in the theoretical framework.

An increasing number of studies are emerging which specifically examine the role of civil society actors in peacebuilding. These case studies add some nuance to the understanding of the range of civil society actors and their activities but rarely go beyond this to examine identity and power dynamics within and between organisations. At the local level, van Leeuwen (2008) considers the discourse and practice of local civil-society peacebuilding and its international support, from three angles: policies and images of civil-society peacebuilding; organising practices of peacebuilding and; framing conflict and the assumptions of informing peacebuilding. He concludes that peacebuilding, and peacebuilding actors, are politicised. He identifies implications for practitioners including recognizing the everyday politics of peacebuilding and observing and connecting with local agendas. Christie discusses state-civil society relations in peacebuilding and problematizes the role of national NGOs as actors representing local needs in relation to peace. He concludes that civil society is not able to challenge or confront the state in a profound way and adds that “favouring civil society over the state does not inherently resolve
conflict within societies but … creates new forms at the same time as others are supposedly addressed” (Christie, 2013, p. 202). He suggests that civil society groups, beyond NGOs, should also be examined in relation to their role in local approaches to peacebuilding. Finally, at the international level Smith and Verdeja indicate that peace scholarship should move beyond elite transnational expertise and “resituate social movements and civil society at the center of debates about durable and just peace.” (2013, p. 10). Although these studies give agency to CSOs, sometimes at the local level, they do not document and cite the voices of these groups, nor do they critically consider the power dynamics that influence the internal and external relations of these organisations.

Thus, there is significant opportunity for further examination of the role of civil society in peacebuilding. At the local level, civil society could be examined to determine who the dominant actors are in relation to peacebuilding, and how they interact with, address and represent the needs of their communities in relation to peacebuilding. The relationship between local CSOs and international intervening actors might also be further considered when trying to better understand the local context in relation to hybridized peace.

**Local Needs, Hybridization, Civil Society and Peacebuilding in the DRC**

Given the focus on context and local knowledge in the post-liberal peacebuilding literature, many case studies have been published considering hybridized and locally driven peace. Common countries of focus include Bosnia and Kosovo (Donais, 2012), Haiti (Donais and Burt, 2015; Baranyi and Herns Marcellin, 2012), Sierra Leone (Millar, 2014b; Cubitt, 2013) and Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands (Richmond, 2011). There are also an increasing number of publications which examine the DRC. This is likely related to the publication of *The Trouble with the Congo* by Severine Autesserre. In her book Autesserre argues that the dominant
international peacebuilding culture shaped the intervention in the Congo in a way that precluded action on localized violence such as individual land conflicts, ultimately dooming externally-led efforts. The book illuminates how this peacebuilding culture operated on the ground and influenced the interveners’ understanding of the causes of violence and eventually led to the failure of peacebuilding efforts to prevent continued large-scale violence in the Eastern part of the country. She argues that “the eastern part of the Congo remained so violent during the transition not only because of regional and national tensions, but also because of the presence of distinctively local problems. These included conflicts over land, mineral resources, traditional power, local taxes and relative social status of specific groups and individuals.” (2010, p. 176). It is relevant to note that Autesserre’s work was published six years after a book edited by Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers which, using a livelihood model, argued that efforts to end the war in the Eastern DRC should be grounded in the causes of conflict that lie below the international and regional level. They wrote that the “Congolese conflict can only be fully understood with reference to the ways in which conflict, together with a legacy of colonial and state policy that preceded and informed it has created a situation in which the rational pursuit of individual livelihood ends up reproducing the collectively irrational phenomenon of war” (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004, p. 290). The findings in Autesserre’s book supports the theory presented in Vlassenroot and Raeymaeker’s work. However, discussion of the two pieces rarely overlaps because the former is situated in the international relations literature while the latter is located in the livelihoods literature.

A great deal of the literature on the DRC remains concerned with the history of and the regional and national causes of the conflict (Prunier, 2009; Stearns, 2011, 2014) Although this literature does not advance the participation of local actors in peacebuilding and peace formation
processes, it provides historical context for both local peacebuilding efforts and it helps to situate local efforts in relation to the state. For example, Raeymaekers highlights that as of 2013 the Congolese state still enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy despite being powerless in an administrative and in a coercive sense (2013, p. 600). He adds that, in the void of the state, mutinying soldiers and militias “consciously instrumentalize their forced occupation of the government’s blank spots to claim legitimate rule over expanding territories and populations with detrimental consequences for human security, impunity and legal justice” (p. 605). Thus, he concludes that that “political legitimacy remains rooted in a tight association of political protection, military coercion and economic capital between violent elite networks” as opposed to popular embeddedness or alternative justice (p. 614). In addition, Trefon outlines the structural, political and historical causes of statebuilding failures in the DRC resulting in the powerlessness of local, national and international stakeholders to influence Congo’s unmanageable political landscape (2011, p. 122).

Given that the role of civil society is often constructed in relation to actors’ engagement with the state, such observations are integral to understanding the role of Congolese CSOs in peacebuilding processes for two reasons. First, national governments are often key stakeholders and are relied upon by international and domestic actors to play a central role in peacebuilding and statebuilding activities particularly where strategies include the development of liberal institutions. In the DRC, these activities are increasingly being taken up by both provincial and national state actors, facilitated by a gradual process of decentralization which saw the transfer of jurisdiction over education, health care, agriculture and rural development to provincial governments (Englebert & Mungongo, 2016, p. 7). Yet, both the provincial and national governments have shown limited ability or will to consolidate peace in the Eastern part of the
country leading to significant service and protection deficits, undermining the state’s accountability to its citizens. Second, because of these gaps, Congolese CSOs struggle to advocate for, and fulfil the accountability holding functions, with the government as imagined in the liberal civil society and peacebuilding literature. This has led to the emergence of new activities and relationships between CSOs and other actors that would not be anticipated under the liberal model.

Some of the more recent literature on the DRC addresses the themes discussed above, including local approaches to peacebuilding, hybridity and civil society. Stearns (2014) questions the validity of addressing local causes of conflict such as land and ethnic disputes rather than national causes of conflict including political cleavages and military elites, which he indicates are broadly perceived by experts on the conflict as the main sources of conflict. However, Matagne (2011) and Seay (2011) seek to further nuance Autesserre’s understanding of the local. Matagne’s contribution acknowledges the diversity of needs and dynamics that influence local approaches to peacebuilding. With a population of over 65 million people including multiple ethnic-groups, addressing ethnic and land-conflict in the DRC would present significant challenges. Further, Seay (2011) questions Autesserre’s failure to address the work of local peacebuilders in the DRC. Although this may have been outside the scope of Autesserre’s work, this critique raises an important point, that much of the literature on the DRC fails to acknowledge the work of local actors to contribute peace.

Further, a small amount of locally published literature exists written by Congolese authors on the local causes of conflict and community level conflict resolution and peace agreements in the Eastern DRC. The first was published by a researcher at one of the organisations considered in this research and includes details on the local causes of conflict as
well as traditional conflict resolution mechanisms which exist at the level of “les chefferies”\(^5\) which was published in 2003.\(^6\) It documents how traditional leaders, known as mwamis, used to intervene in contexts of organised conflicts in some communities, thus suggesting the existence of parallel conflict resolution structures between municipal and provincial governments and traditional leaders. The second was recently published by Ka Mana of the Pole Institute in North Kivu and examines the local causes of conflict across the Eastern DRC and considers local engagement with the potential to contribute to a peaceful future (2016, p. 21). Such locally produced publications are deeply rooted in context analysis conducted across diverse groups of local actors which are less easily accessed by foreign researchers, yet they are referenced infrequently in the Western-dominated academic literature. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that such works are also embedded in local power and conflict dynamics.

Additional articles have also emerged echoing Autesserre’s call for greater involvement of local voices in externalized peacebuilding processes. Hellmuller unpacks the idea of accessing local voices by addressing two ambiguities in the concept of local ownership, in the DRC case. First, she indicates that the concept of local ownership still lacks a clear definition and its “practice often remains different in that projects seldom involve local communities, the so-called beneficiaries, in the definition of what peace is or should be” (2012, p. 237). Second, she indicates that if local ownership is to become a genuine objective of peacebuilding programs, it first needs to be understood in view of a specific conflict context (p. 249). This highlights that

\(^5\) Les chefferies along with les secteurs represent the socio-political organisation of rural communities and their leadership are responsible for governance and development. There are 476 secteurs and 261 chefferies in the DRC and 70% of the population live in these spaces. The core difference between the two is that secteurs are governed in accordance with the laws of the state whereas chefferies are governed through customs and by traditional leaders (Maneno, 2014, pp. 177-8).

\(^6\) Please note that the name of the author and publication details is being withheld to preserve the anonymity of the participant and their organisation. However, the book’s title and year of publication are listed in the bibliography.
the understanding of what constitutes the local extends beyond the theoretical literature into the analysis of specific cases as well.

There has also been a recent increase in the publication of case studies examining the involvement of local actors in peacebuilding, reconciliation and transitional justice processes. Following several international civil society publications documenting local involvement in peacebuilding, Clark documented the rise and fall of the Barza Inter-Communautaire, which sought to resolve localized conflicts at the village level through committees comprised of local elders (Clark, 2008). Although these conflict resolution groups never took hold in South Kivu and disintegrated in North Kivu as a result of political cooptation and ethnic conflict within the groups, their activities and composition closely reflect those of the community-based structures in South Kivu which will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. Another example of such studies is the doctoral thesis of Laura Seay which outlines the differences in approach taken by protestant and catholic churches in peacebuilding processes (2009). Santoso indicates that it is important to remember that civil society in North and South Kivu “has developed separately from its European and North America counterparts as a hybrid of deeply entrenched patrimonial associations, transnationally-controlled NGOs and small local associations” (2010, p. 36). This observation reflects the discussion of culturally and historically situated definitions of civil society as well as the differentiation of the roles of local civil society actors play in peace and conflict. Verkoren and van Leeuwen (2013) discuss which actors should be considered part of local civil society in the DRC. Hellmuller (2012 and 2013) begins to identify who local actors are and describe the nature of their interactions with external actors. In her 2012 article, she addresses the ways in which international actors have attempted to foster local ownership in the implementation phase of peacebuilding initiatives and suggests that they prefer to work with
national elites as opposed to local actors because the national elites are more accustomed to working with them. In her 2013 article, she considers how local actors negotiate local and international priorities in peacebuilding processes. Although she indicates that international priorities continue to dominate, Hellmuller concludes that “local peacebuilding organisations are important actors in the negotiation of this space between international priorities and local experiences” (2013, p. 230).

There have also been several recent articles examining the participation and resistance of local actors in transitional justice processes. Arnould’s case study of transitional justice actors in the DRC finds that “both domestic and international actors both promotes and resists transitional justice, underscoring how deeply intertwined transitional justice and peacebuilding are in practice” (2016, p. 323). Indeed, this observation will prove to be valuable in understanding the promotion of local conflict resolution and mediation groups supported by the CSOs examined in this thesis. Further, Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud found that because transitional justice mechanisms have “have oversimplified the political, economic and sociocultural context of the eastern provinces, the current mechanisms of transitional justice have not brought peace and accountability to the DRC” (2013, p. 75).

This final observation coupled with the last quote from Hellmuller (2013) above represents the point of departure for this thesis. While a great deal is known about the role the international community plays in peacebuilding in the DRC, only a small amount is known about how peacebuilding priorities are negotiated between local and international actors. Furthermore, limited consideration of how local civil society actors interact with each other or their communities. The primary exception to this finding was an article examining local peace committees in the North-Eastern DRC, which includes details of individual organisations as well
as some general observations about these actors more broadly. van Tongeren indicated that most local peace committees (LPCs) were established because the community felt threatened, violence increased, justice and development failed; the tasks are mainly related to goals such as opening a dialogue in a divided community, solving community conflicts etc.; members of LPCs are generally volunteers and are not paid (2013, p. 52).

Further, none of the authors described above have attempted to give voice to the local actors and identify what their peacebuilding priorities are. This gap makes it difficult to sustain the claim that that local priorities are not being addressed through international peacebuilding processes. It also limits the potential for the changes, in peacebuilding policy and practice, which the post-liberal peacebuilding literature seek. Without knowing what local needs are, it is difficult to assert that they are not being met and therefore it is difficult to design peacebuilding interventions that address those needs.

More work also needs to be undertaken to understand the nature and design of CSOs in the literature on the DRC as well as highlighting their contributions to peacebuilding. Although an earlier thesis conducted by Rugusha argues that the contribution of civil society is limited by the absence of an effective state and the failure to address the structural causes of state failure (2005, p. 198), only a small amount of literature exists discussing how Congolese civil society functions within the context of a fragile state. There is also no existing literature which outlines the dynamics within these organisations in addition to whose interests they represent and how. Further, there is limited information on how these organisations engage with national and international partners, nor is there any literature on how they interact with grassroots structures with whom they have formal and informal relationships.
Conclusion

It can be difficult to connect the literature reviewed above, to the realities of CSOs in South Kivu. Preliminary observations from the field are therefore integrated into the conclusions, below, to help ground the broad themes discussed in the literature, in the everyday realities of the organisations examined.

The question of what constitutes the local is pervasive throughout the literature, and this is further complicated within the hybridity literature, which underscores that the local has long been subject to external influences. The ambiguity of the definition of the local has led to the use of the terms local and international, traditional and liberal, as binaries, ignoring the diversity of actors and the roles that they play. In addition to challenges in identifying what groups and individuals constitute the local, these gaps also make it difficult to define what constitutes local knowledge and how it can be accessed. Such macro-level questions limit the ability of the literature to engage with the micro-dynamics which persist among community, municipal and provincial level actors which may support or undermine peacebuilding. It also slows the ability to implement locally-informed peacebuilding practices in conflict-affected contexts.

In the context of the research design for this thesis, the lack of clarity around the definition of the local initially made it difficult to identify an appropriate group of actors to engage and was complicated by the reticence and ambiguities of some post-liberal peacebuilding authors towards civil society. Upon completing the fieldwork, it became clear that CSOs were not simply situated at the local, the national or the international level. CSOs in Bukavu focused on peacebuilding varied significantly in size, thematic focus, age and capacity. Some were based in the provincial capital, but worked across districts and villages, while others were situated at
the district or village level. These preliminary observations demanded a broader, yet more fine-grained understanding of what local actors and traditions might constitute.

By working with local CSOs and the members of their community-based structures, it became clear that the local level offers a diversity of understandings of peace, as well as what local needs are, in relation to peacebuilding and development. These differences are present across identities based on gender, age, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status and physical location. They also suggest that local CSOs might be better understood as intermediaries in peacebuilding with access to local knowledge who represent the needs of their staff, participants and beneficiaries.

Indeed, it would stand to reason that local actors with the agency to contribute to peacebuilding efforts would have access to localized perspectives on their communities. This points to yet another gap in the literature which fails to deliver a nuanced theoretical or empirical understanding of the dynamics that influence the way these organisations interact both with their own communities as well as with the external actors who might seek localized knowledge. These may include culture, power, finances, politics, ethnicity and gender.

For example, gender would seem to be of importance in cases such as the DRC, which have included high rates of SGBV. However, its discussion is limited across all three bodies of literature considered above. In each case, it is considered as a subset of the literature. For example, there is an emerging subset which examines women’s capacity to contribute to war and peace (Davis, 2013) and Reilly and Warren (2014). However, these contributions are considered through the lens of women’s organisations and not through the lenses of community, professional, associational or government life. In addition, the consideration of gender is absent from much of the post-liberal peacebuilding literature, although there is a subset of the broader
peacebuilding literature focused on women, peace and security. Nor are these contributions well integrated into either liberal or post-liberal literature. Finally, as already mentioned gender has largely been excluded from the study of civil society reflecting the blurred realities of women between public and private realms (Eto, 2012). These gaps also apply to political affiliation and ethnic identity, and to a lesser extent to the division between religious groups.

The uncritical application of a liberal definition of civil society has also proved to be problematic in the fieldwork for this thesis. It limited the range of possible actors who might be considered as constituting civil society. Further, the relationship between civil society and the state assumed by liberal constructions of civil society and applied in the post-liberal peacebuilding literature also did not seem to apply in South Kivu. Although civil society actors try to interact with provincial and national state actors, the weaknesses and absence of formal state institutions and patchy national infrastructure for peace has meant that local CSOs have had to find other channels through which to conduct their advocacy.

Finally, given that most of the existing research on the conflict in the DRC examines dynamics at the national and international level, there is very little information available on powerful actors at the territorial and provincial levels who drive the continuation of violent conflict. As Autesserre (2010) suggests, national actors and causes of conflict seem to have little overlap with dynamics at the provincial level and below. This complicates the understanding of the power, peace and conflict dynamics between complex networks of ethnic and religious groups at the local level. There is also a dearth of information about which local actors have the capacity to identify and address the local causes of conflict as well as the needs of their communities. This is complicated by a complete failure in the literature on the DRC to critically
examine the meaning of civil society within a fragile state and an absence of discussion of differences between peace-oriented civil society and conflict-oriented civil society.
Chapter 3: Case Study and Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the theoretical framework rooted in post-colonialism and an emerging post-liberal peacebuilding theory\(^7\) which informs the research and analysis of this thesis. The framework presented emphasizes the intersection of material and discursive power and agency within local civil society organisations in an effort to situate them as intermediary actors within hybridized peacebuilding spaces. Reflecting its grounding in post-colonial theory, this chapter begins by providing background information on peace and conflict in South Kivu. By doing so, it remains grounded in the post-colonial tradition by respecting the knowledge and practices that inform the context and avoiding the imposition of a top-down theoretical model. The chapter then provides an overview of the post-colonial underpinnings of the theoretical approach and defining core concepts applied in the theoretical framework. It concludes by revealing the theoretical framework and research questions that I use to examine this case.

Case Background

Mould indicates that despite the existence of the extensive literature on state failure and violence in the DRC, that there is very little emphasis placed on the positive contributions of the local population to peace and justice (2012, p. 71). Examining the contribution of local CSOs to peacebuilding recognizes the agency of local actors to contribute to sustainable peace. It also addresses a gap in the literature on the DRC which is often devoid of the inclusion of local voices complicating efforts to identify local agency and needs.

---

\(^7\) Note that while post-liberal peacebuilding is not as well established or broadly reaching as postcolonial theory, it should be considered as an emerging theory. Different authors use different theoretical approaches to explore post-liberal approaches. For example, Duffield uses a strong post-colonial approach and Mac Ginty and Richmond take a moderate post-colonial approach while Baranyi and Donais use a critical approach. In contrast, Paffenholz uses a problem solving approach rooted in liberal peacebuilding to explore it. These contributions suggest that there is conflict within the broader literature which seeks to refine a more nuanced post-liberal peacebuilding theory.
Between 1998 and 2003 both North and South Kivu were controlled by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) which was supported by the Rwandan military (Stearns, 2011, p. 251). Watuta indicates that the RCD installed several governors and other leaders in South Kivu during their occupation which maintained the power of dominant ethnic groups (the Shi and the Legas) while forcing the acknowledgement and participation of the marginalized Banyamulenge and Bafuliru ethnic groups (2007, pp. 170-2). These authorities were responsible for carrying out the RCD’s goals while they were in power. This included creating chefferies designated for the Banyamulenge in Itombwe. These shifts reflected ongoing tensions between ethnic groups as well as territorial occupation patterns which persist in the region today.

Stearns also notes that the RCD rebels and their political representatives created local militias known as “Local Defense Forces, to impose rebel control at the local level” in both provinces. Rather than improving security, he suggests that these groups exacerbated the suffering of the population: “in South Kivu, half of the dozen most important customary chiefs were killed or fled. In some areas, new customary chiefs were created or named by the RCD, usurping positions that had been held for centuries by other families” (2011, p.251). Such accounts highlight the ways in which the conflict has affected the social fabric which existed before the war.

The Sun City Peace Accord was negotiated by President Joseph Kabila, replacing his father, Laurent, who was assassinated in late 2001, and which saw an end to the formal involvement of international actors in the hostilities (Mould, 2012). Under the accord, the RCD withdrew and were replaced by provincial leaders appointed in South Kivu between 2003 and 2006 (Watuta, 2007). Provincial and national elections were held in 2006 and 2011 as part of the
reconstruction process and Joseph Kabila was elected as president in both cases. He remained the head of the Congolese government at the time of writing, despite having exceeded his constitutionally mandated term, with elections being scheduled for December 2018.

Despite the realization of the Sun City Peace Accord in 2002 and over $5 billion a year in various forms of foreign aid, the Eastern part of the country remains plagued by violence perpetrated by armed groups, government forces and private actors (Stearns, 2014, p.160). It was estimated that up to five million people had been killed as a result of the conflict by 2007 (International Rescue Committee, 2007). Turner (2013) notes these numbers are contested, yet lower estimates which suggest that mortality rates were closer to 2.5 million, are still unacceptably high. He also underscores the prevalence of SGBV, with an estimated 400,000 women having been sexually assaulted before 2010. He indicates that mass rape has often been used as collective punishment or ethnic cleansing in the DRC: the driving out of unwanted people. Some cases of rape are also carried out acts of revenge directed against the woman, her husband or her family (Turner, 2013, p. 131). High mortality rates and instances of SGBV persist alongside other forms of violence such a forced displacement, torture and assault – making this an archetype of Kaldor’s ‘New Wars’.

Rebel groups continue to operate in the East – the most high-profile of which included the Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and later the M23 which formed in 2012 to replace the CNDP (Reilly & Warren, 2014). Despite the defeat of the M23 armed groups including the FDLR/ Interhamwe, the Mai Mai, Raia Mutomboki and members of the FARDC continue to perpetrate violent attacks against the civilian population in South Kivu and beyond (Deibert, 2013).
Turner observes that, more than twenty years of trauma on the Congolese population has reinforced a political ideology of entitlement and violence, thus perpetuating trauma. He suggests that “Because members of the traumatized group cannot successfully complete certain psychological tasks (mourning, healing, rebuilding), they transmit these tasks to the children of subsequent generations along with the conscious and unconscious shared wish that these descendants will resolve them” (Turner, 2013, p. 135). Violence has also traumatized the members of the CSOs examined in this thesis, in their work as well as in their private lives. For example, many of the participants had experienced displacement and had witnessed violent attacks during the war. Some of the participants in this thesis had also experienced violence through their peace and human rights related work. The regional history and individual experiences of violence which are pervasive in this context require a trauma sensitive approach outlined in the research methods chapter and implemented thereafter.

Local vs. National Causes of Conflict

As previously noted, Autesserre (2010) indicated that the MONUSCO peacekeeping intervention and extensive foreign aid to the DRC failed to yield sustainable long-term peace because they did not address the local causes of conflict including land and ethnically motivated disputes. Her claims, which reflect the earlier accounts of Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004), have led to an increase in attention to local conflict dynamics and peacebuilding efforts by academics and practitioners. However, the bulk of international efforts and research remain concentrated at the national level and the divide between the local and national causes of conflict remains contentious. Two of the national causes of conflict highlighted by Stearns include the continued presence, activity and power of armed groups, particularly in the East as well as a lack of national political leadership resulting from a system that “rewards ruthless behaviour and
marginalizes scrupulous leaders. It privileges loyalty over competence, wealth and power over moral character” (Stearns, 2011, p. 331). Other macro causes of conflict frequently cited in the literature include regional relations and access to resources between the DRC and its neighbouring countries: Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (Prunier, 2009).

This thesis accepts that local, national and regional causes of conflict need to be addressed to end the persistent violence in the Eastern DRC. It recognizes that locally situated actors are more likely to have the resources and power to influence the local, rather than national or regional, causes of conflict. However, given the inter-connectedness of local, national and regional dynamics, it recognizes that efforts to influence one set of dynamics is likely to impact the others, reflecting the diversity of needs cited by Matagne (2011).

The Predatory Fragility of the Congolese State

The Congolese state is complex and can be characterized in several ways. The peacebuilding and security literatures often construct the Congolese state as fragile or failed (Treforn, 2013) (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004) (Autesserre, 2010). This reflects the fact that it does not maintain a monopoly on coercive force, relies heavily on MONUSCO to maintain any semblance of stability in the East and continues to fail to quell armed attacks, incursions and massacres across the country. The lack of accountability of the Congolese state, reinforced by its inability to collect taxes, provide public services, its failure to uphold the rule of law, the absence of a strong security sector, and the country’s recent turn away from democratic elections, contribute to what Turner describes as a culture of its impunity. At its core, this culture is carried out by state and non-state actors, and, is characterized by “behavior that reflects a well-founded belief that they will not be held accountable for their actions. Such a lack of accountability is a
key element in the widespread theft, killing and sexual violence in the DRC” (Turner, 2013, p.132).

Yet, such accounts do not consider that state institutions do exist at the national, provincial and municipal level even if after “decades of state collapse, Congo’s public service sector is unable to cope with even minimal service provision and even less with contributing to or managing reform” (Treforn, 2011, p. 87). Titeca and de Herdt point out that non-state actors often fill the gaps left in state service provision, offering the intervention of churches and CSOs to provide educational services where the government has failed (Titeca & De Herdt, 2011). While, this presents a strong argument that governance is not absent from the DRC, the argument is somewhat less compelling in relation to other areas of service provision including health care and security. The characterization of the Congolese state as fragile or failed also fails to capture the nature of the state outside of the Kivus, and now Kasai, where Tull suggests more “mundane political struggles are unfolding… [and] state central authorities, local communities and donors vie for influence to shape the country’s reconstruction project” (Tull, 2010, p. 656).

Thus, if the state does exist but is unable to provide basic services and is in a constant struggle with non-state actors to negotiate its power and authority, the question should be raised as to whose interests the Congolese state serves. An examination of the decentralization process offers a potential answer. Decentralization was negotiated into the DRC’s new constitution in 2005 which required “the decentralisation of government expenditure and revenue-raising authority to sub-national government” (Tull, 2010, p. 653). However, the outcome of the 2006 and subsequent elections in the DRC granted more power to Kabila “who sought to prevent decentralisation reform that would deprive the central state of significant revenues” (Tull, 2010). Indeed, the state did not commence the formal decentralisation process until 2015, when the
eleven existing provinces were broken down into twenty-six and were granted access to up to 40% of tax revenues and broader control and service delivery within their territories (Englebert & Mungongo, 2016). Engelbert and Mungongo highlight that this process added a new layer of rent-seeking actors to the context and concluded that the process “did not automatically produce accountable behavior or checks and balances between local and central authority. It did however multiply opportunities for predation, especially after laws conferred upon provinces the right to raise taxes independently of Kinshasa” (Englebert & Mungongo, 2016, p. 25).

Characterizing the state as predatory in the context of ongoing violent conflict and challenges to state authority parallels well with the idea of the political instrumentalization of disorder in which political elites seek to profit from conditions such as those described throughout this thesis. This also reflects the unwillingness of the state to meaningfully adopt statebuilding and peacebuilding reforms because as Chabal and Daloz suggest “where disorder has become a resource there is no incentive to work for a more institutionalized ordering of society” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Yet, this conclusion still does not change the reality that, predatory or otherwise, both provincial and national institutions in the DRC are fragile and risk collapse at the hand of non-state actors including armed groups, political actors and even civil society who challenge their authority. Thus, the state should be understood as being both predatory and fragile, or existing in a situation of predatory fragility.

There are several implications of framing the state in this way as well as the above discussion more broadly. First, state agents may be present in a territory even though they are not delivering services, which is complicated by the fact that they often play multiple roles in society to ensure their economic survival. Second, there are often competing interests between provincial and national governments which may influence state behaviour in relation to peacebuilding and
other activities. Third, where there are gaps in service delivery non-state actors, including the CSOs examined in this thesis may fill in the gaps. Finally, because of the complexity of the Congolese state, it is difficult to frame the role that either provincial or national state authorities play in peacebuilding processes, although the results below show that they are at least present at these processes, if not playing a meaningful role.

*The Emergence of Congolese Civil Society in Response to Predatory Fragility*

While there is a significant amount of literature outlining the causes and outcomes of the conflict, painting a bleak picture of the quality of life and prospects for peace and development in the DRC, there is a dearth of research on how Congolese actors challenge these conditions through their participation in civil society and social movements and through other channels. Bakajika indicates that the current civil society movement began to emerge in the Kivus in the 1970s and consisted of well-educated young professionals who were blocked from joining the public service by Mobutuist policies. He indicates that as the Mobutu regime began to transition towards democracy because of international pressure, opportunities for civil society participation expanded to the rest of the country (Bakajika, 2004, pp. 178-9).

Seay (2009) notes that CSOs have been particularly active in South Kivu, contributing to peace negotiations and opening radio stations to promote development and peace. Barrios notes that today civil society has been institutionalized in the DRC through the use of accreditations, representatives and presidents for each province (2016, p. 8). These broader descriptions are complimented by the accounts of Hellmuller (2013) van Leeuwen (2008) and van Tongeren (2013) described in the literature review and reflect on the diversity of actors who make up civil society in the province.
There is also some limited information available that specifically explores local CSOs in South Kivu. Rugusha documented the strategies that they deployed which included lobbying, investment in human capital and participatory action research. However, he concluded that while CSOs were highly skilled at developing new approaches in the face of difficult circumstances, they were unable to fulfill functions related to the state ascribed under liberal definitions of civil society, in which these organisations conduct advocacy and offer checks and balances directed towards the state (Rugusha, 2005, pp. 197-8). A more recent chapter published in 2016 provides a brief overview of one local NGO in Bukavu which helps to promote reconciliation through inter-ethnic dialogue in the province. It notes that this organisation and two others have developed community-dialogue platforms called Cadres de Concertations Intercommunautaires which “provide a space for community leaders to report issues and resolve problems before they escalate into violence or deteriorate into further violence” (Bussy & Gallo, 2016, p. 316). These groups are among the community-based structures that will be discussed later in this thesis.

Some analysis also exists which considers the nature of Congolese CSOs and their members. Treforn indicates that civil society developed because “people have no alternative but to invest in new social and economic survival strategies, indicating that these networks help to replace the state in many areas of public life” (Treforn, 2011, p. 178). Similarly, Mould notes that in the regions of the country farthest from the Kinshasa, CSOs are “leading efforts to bring peace and reconciliation to local communities. Such groups have unique access to local population and through persistent grassroots efforts have built solid reputations and firm relationships within the communities” (Mould, 2012, p. 71). She concludes that in Eastern DRC, in the context of the “failure of the state in its reconciliatory involvement,” community members
understood the involvement of domestic CSOs in reconciliation processes as being fundamental to their success (2012, p.70).

Despite the growing strength of these organisations, they also face major challenges including bullying by the ruling political class, the failure to fully integrate women into civil society forums, limited access to funding and the inability to collaborate effectively with the government (Treforn, 2013, p.126-7). These challenges and others were notably present among the organisations examined in this thesis.

To understand the role that these organisations play in peacebuilding in South Kivu, this thesis considers the dynamics within and between the organisations being examined as well as the material conditions they operate in. The following section outlines the core concepts, including power, knowledge and agency that will be used to develop the theoretical framework.

**Post-Colonial Theory**

Post-colonialism is used as the broad theoretical lens in this thesis and informs its research methodology. It can be understood as a field of theories examining the “many meanings of colonialism, decolonization and forms of neo-colonialism in the post-colonial world. Underpinning this field is a normative commitment to decolonization in the broader sense of disrupting hegemonic power in all forms” (Liden, 2011, p. 57). The thematic focus underlying post-colonialism can generally be understood as concentrating on discourse, knowledge and the perceptions of key actors in post-colonial contexts (Richmond, 2011, p. 230). Bhabha indicates that post-colonial approaches “intervene in those ideological discourses of modernity that attempt to give a hegemonic normality to the uneven development and the differential, often disadvantaged histories of nations, races, communities, peoples” (2004, pp. 245-6). More explicitly, this approach rejects the assumption of neo-colonial continuity by challenging
unhelpful binaries between the local and the international by acknowledging the heterogeneity of actors in peacebuilding spaces in South Kivu. To do so it examines the positionality of local civil society organisations across four themes grounded in postcolonial theory: knowledge, location, identity and power. Both discursive and material power are considered as part of this analysis.

There is a large range of approaches to post-colonialism both in general and in relation to peacebuilding. Some post-colonial authors such as Duffield view peacebuilding as a form of neocolonialism or ‘biopolitical control’, perpetrated in weak states by what he describes as a humanitarian empire (2007, p. 8). Such an approach frames peacebuilding interventions as neocolonial where powerful, wealthy states impose Western state models and economic policies on weaker ones. Such a lens also suggests that external intervention in peacebuilding processes generally reproduces conflict, and may lead to the argument that external actors should avoid action or intervention in cases of violent conflict. However, drawing on Donais, Richmond, Hellmuller and others, this thesis takes a more moderate approach which accepts the potential positive contribution of external actors, while considering power relations and examining the dynamics between the liberal and the traditional and the international and the local more similar to that described by Liden (2011, p. 57). Adopting this approach creates the space for studying hybridized peacebuilding processes, acknowledging the negotiated interactions and power imbalances that shape those processes.

There are certain assumptions rooted in post-colonialism that it accepts and others which it seeks to challenge. It accepts the analytical assertion of the post-colonial literature that liberal peacebuilding interventions navigate hegemonic power structures between liberal and illiberal, and developed and developing states. It also accepts the normative assumption that local

---

8 This does not exclude the consideration of other contributions of Duffield, it is intended to acknowledge the authors acknowledgement of the continued presence of international actors in the case being examined.
populations should articulate their own visions for peace and that addressing micro-dynamics of conflict may contribute to macro-level stability and long-term peace.

This thesis challenges how local actors are constructed in the post-liberal peacebuilding literature and raises questions about who articulates the needs of local communities, by examining which actors have the agency to communicate local peacebuilding needs and goals to external actors as well as what factors may influence the way in which such communication is carried out. To this extent, it will build on Linden’s assertion that global should not be associated with domination and local with resistance (2011, p. 65), as there are many levels of power dynamics left to be explored between and within these groups of actors.

This thesis also questions post-colonial assumptions about the formation and role of civil society in peacebuilding contexts. With some exceptions (Richmond, 2011), post-liberal peacebuilding scholars generally present civil society as an un-problematized group. The civil society literature on peacebuilding discusses these actors in a more nuanced way that acknowledges how cultural and structural differences may lead to different constructions of civil society. This issue will be discussed in greater detail below.

An important debate has emerged in postcolonial theory, which warrants examination in this thesis. Some authors (Ashcroft, et al., 2000) have noted the failure among early postcolonial approaches to consider how material sources of power intersect with the discursive sources of power which traditionally constitutes the focus of the theory. For example, Kapoor stresses that some post-colonial approaches fail to adequately address the material conditions which give rise to power imbalances both within and between states. Citing Parry (1996) he indicates that what is missing from these approaches is “an analysis of the relationship between materiality and agency and the limits material inequality imposes on subaltern ‘negotiation’” (Kapoor, 2008).
Such an approach invites attention to how international funders might influence the approaches and contributions of local civil society as well as the material contexts in which they operate. While this debate is still emerging in the post-liberal peacebuilding literature, this thesis attempts to strike a balance between recognizing the discursive sources of power as described in the accounts of post-colonialism while still considering the historical and current material relations of power which shape outcomes in hybridized peacebuilding interventions. The balance sought through this approach reflects the contributions of Young noted by Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (2000, p. 156). This focus is not only essential to understanding the challenges of accessing local voice and knowledge, but also helps to examine some of the material factors that might influence the relationships between local CSOs and their external partners.

Gender

This thesis also integrates a gender lens into its post-colonial approach. Bjokdhal and Mannergren Selimovic indicate that a gender perspective raises critical questions on the study of peace and peacebuilding including: whose peace? And how do men and women experience peace differently? They indicate that such questions emphasize a focus on the everyday activities of men and women which may contribute to peace and conflict and help to broaden the concept of peace (2016, p. 181). Of course, other aspects of identity including age, ethnicity, religion, education and class intersect with gender in a way that influences the positionality within organisations and the peace and conflict experiences of both men and women. McLeod suggests that a feminist perspective on peace, security and development offers a textured understanding of the power relations between local and international agents in peacebuilding contexts and that such an approach opens the way for deeper understanding of the concepts underpinning hybrid peacebuilding processes (2015, pp. 61-2) including those explored below.
Key Concepts

Peace

The negative and positive constructions of peace presented by Galtung (1969) will serve as the foundation for the understanding of peace in this thesis. Negative peace exists in context where there is an absence of violence, fear and direct threats whereas positive peace exists in a context where there is social justice including access to adequate social and economic resources.

Yet, the thesis also recognizes the diverse understandings of the term peace which may exist in peacebuilding contexts. Odendaal indicates that for local communities, peace invariably means more than the settlement of national issues and that it is “inextricably linked to the absence of violence, economic survival, the healing of family and community, the settlement of local disputes and the reliability of government institutions.” (2013, p. 9). This highlights the potential for the existence of multiple understandings of peace within one peacebuilding context and creates space to acknowledge the perceptions of local actors. The importance of this was illustrated in South Kivu, where expatriates would frequently suggest that there was no war in the DRC based on their experiences in other conflict affected contexts, whereas many Congolese participants in this thesis would highlight the ongoing nature of violent conflict and insecurity. Such contradictory perceptions could undermine the compatibility of localized and internationalized peacebuilding efforts, and influence funding decisions of external actors.

In recognition of the diversity of experiences of war and peace, this thesis seeks to apply a gendered understanding of peace that makes it “visible in the everyday and built from below. It brings to the fore equality, social welfare and equity, and by being emancipatory, it also provides for shifts in existing power and gender relations” (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2016, p. 182). Recognizing the importance of aligning interventions implemented by both local and
international actors with local definitions of peace and the conditions for peace, this thesis acknowledges the diverse understandings of peace expressed by participants, which are influenced by identity and experience, including gender.

_Peacebuilding_

This thesis accepts the broad definition of peacebuilding presented by Lederach as “a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (1997, p. 20). The approach presented by Lederach integrates a broad range of activities undertaken by numerous groups of actors and is used to examine the broad range of influences on hybridized peacebuilding processes.

_Liberal Peacebuilding_

Paris identifies efforts to promote liberal democratic governance systems and market-oriented economic growth as core components of the liberal peacebuilding model (2010, p. 337). He also highlights that this approach was implemented by the UN following the end of the Cold War in several post-conflict contexts (p.341). As previously noted, Baranyi (2008) and Richmond (2010) identify liberal peacebuilding as second-generation peace operations, responding to the emergence of new wars characterized by internal armed conflict. This thesis accepts the promotion of liberal democratic governance and market-oriented economic growth as defining features of liberal peacebuilding, which were generally imposed by the United Nations and other international actors. It also acknowledges that, as suggested by Richmond (2010) and Baranyi (2008) that it represents a generation, or a particular point in the evolution of peacebuilding, as opposed to a universal approach.
Post-Liberal Peacebuilding

Despite early enthusiasm for liberal peace building Paris indicates that “Rather than creating conditions for stable and lasting peace, efforts to hold a quick set of elections and economic reforms did little to address the drivers of conflict and in some cases produced perversely destabilising results” (Paris, 2010, p. 341). Post-liberal peacebuilding emerged in academic response to such shortcomings. In early contributions authors defined the concept of post-liberal peacebuilding as what the liberal peace is not: emancipatory and bottom-up. Indeed, Richmond indicates that “the notion of the post-liberal peace merely indicates a purposive transcendence of the rhetoric associated with the liberal peace in order to create contextualized hybridity” (2011, p. 188). Later acknowledgement of diverse forms of hybridity (from emancipatory to conservative) added nuance to this initial view of post-liberal as always being emancipatory. Such accounts may explain some of the lack of conceptual clarity in the approach, which responds to perceived gaps in existing literature rather than framing a post-liberal agenda for peace.

Despite the shortcomings described in the literature review, post-liberal peacebuilding remains useful in a variety of ways. It identifies a number of core concepts to be considered in the approach including agency, emancipation and power among others discussed below. It also emphasizes the engagement of actors who are geographically situated within the borders of conflict in peacebuilding processes and demands their participation in the identification of needs in relation to peacebuilding and the shaping of interventions. Baranyi (2008) and Richmond (2010) also frame post-liberal peacebuilding as subsequent generations emerging after liberal peacebuilding. Equally importantly, the peace that emerges out of these processes are not always liberal or democratic in nature. Authors including Belloni (2012), Baranyi (2008) and Paris
(2010) explore the ways in which locally informed peacebuilding processes can result in illiberal peace characterized by hybrid or non-democratic governance. Hybrid governance emerges where democratically elected governments share control over some spaces with non-elected groups including armed groups or customary leaders, as is the case in much of the Eastern DRC.

Acknowledging it as a different generation of peacebuilding emerging out of liberalism alleviates some of the need to frame post-liberal peacebuilding as entirely distinct from previous generations, including the liberal model. Thus, this thesis understands post-liberal peacebuilding as an emancipatory and bottom-up approach to peacebuilding which emphasizes the participation of conflict-affected populations in identifying their own needs and designing and implementing peacebuilding interventions. Such a definition does not preclude the inclusion of similar activities to those implemented by liberal actors (supporting democratic principles, livelihoods and primary education) but demands the cooperation and inclusion of conflict-affected populations in these processes.

(The) Local

As described in the literature review above, the definition of the term local in the post-liberal peacebuilding literature remains contentious. This literature frequently cautions against romanticising the term, however, in the absence of a strong definition it can be used to justify the engagement of actors ranging from the household level to national elites. Thus, in the context of peacebuilding, this thesis defines the local as including individuals or groups who have been directly impacted by an ongoing violent conflict in a fixed geographical location whose experiences of war are shaped by their identity, and who may have a long-term interest in conflict or potential peace. As previously stated, this definition draws on Randazzo (2016) and
actors whom may or may not share an interest in peace including: militia and military members, politicians, government officials and civil society.

This thesis sought specifically to engage with peace-oriented actors to better understand their potential capacity to contribute to peace. Thus, this thesis examines civil society peacebuilding organisations located in South Kivu founded and staffed by individuals with direct experiences related to the violent conflict which has existed there intermittently since the mid 1990’s. It also examines their engagement with actors outside of their organisations whose interests may promote either conflict or peace including other CSOs, state and customary authorities, churches, the FARDC and other armed actors, and international actors.

In an effort to better understand who influences the organisations being examined and their peacebuilding efforts this thesis also considers the identities of their staff and beneficiaries. The components of identity relevant for this thesis include gender, age, class, education, religion and ethnicity.

Local Knowledge

Local knowledge, as it is presented in the post-liberal peacebuilding literature, is understood to be context-specific knowledge of conflict which is owned by populations who are impacted by conflict-related violence in their daily lives. However, this notion of local knowledge is complicated by authors such as Liden (2011) and Millar (2014b) who argue that local knowledge and experiences are influenced or hybridized through interactions with external entities. In a context such as the DRC, the question of whose knowledge is local and which aspects of that knowledge are prioritized is complicated by migration patterns, inter and intra group dynamics such as gender, ethnicity or political affiliation, and how that knowledge is represented. In order to examine the dynamics that lead to the construction of local knowledge
this thesis strives to include the voices of a diverse range of actors both as civil society actors and beneficiaries, and to situate the emergent narrative within the context of hybridization.

**Representation**

Representation is another core concept in this thesis, given the focus on civil society as intermediaries of local knowledge. Examining the process of representation is essential to understanding how local needs are presented to external actors and why. This thesis will examine the ways that local CSOs represent the needs of their communities to external actors and considers the possible impacts for down-stream peacebuilding outcomes.

**Hybridity and Translation**

The term hybridity was originally explored in the biological sciences when examining the cross between two species of plants or animals (Kuortti & Nyman, 2007, p. 4). The term has more recently been used in the anthropology, sociology, literature and cultural studies. Kuortti and Nyman emphasize that there are two different constructions of hybridity which can be applied in different ways. The first is organic hybridity, presented as a natural process in which one language or culture absorbs elements from the other through the course of interaction. This approach is frequently discussed in cultural studies Bhabha (2004). The second is hybrid shock where a new language or cultural practice is introduced or implemented to “change, challenge, revitalise or disrupt through deliberate intended fusion and in so doing create an ironic double consciousness” (Kuortti & Nyman, 2007, p. 8). Mac Ginty and Richmond indicate that hybrid shock is advanced in post-colonial approaches to peacebuilding to highlight “how the weak become compliant with hegemonic power in various, often abrasive ways, implying in post-colonial terms, trusteeship and native administration” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 221). Rubby and Alsagoff indicate that this approach challenges essentialism through its examination
of power relations between actors and resonates well with postcolonial and postmodern skepticism about essentialist understandings of culture (2014, p. 8).

Both the organic and shock approaches to hybridity will be integrated into the understanding of hybridity presented in this thesis. It acknowledges the implementation of the shock approach through peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC, where the international community has often attempted to implement liberal peacebuilding norms. At the same time, it also acknowledges that internal actors to the conflict as well as external intervenors are exposed to each other’s approaches and knowledge through communications as part of the peacebuilding process, which they at times adopt into their own efforts in an organic way.

For example, the staff at the organisations being examined are exposed to a variety of understandings of peace and peacebuilding interventions through their work with both beneficiaries and local, national and international external actors. Indeed, in the concluding chapter hybridization is reframed as a translation, which responds to the shock of having external approaches at times imposed upon them as well as the organic adoption of a variety of approaches characterized by the creative dynamism in their interventions documented in the results chapters.

Rather than understanding hybridity as a process where knowledge is either imposed by external actors or passively adopted in an organic way, this thesis suggests that when confronted with new knowledge and interests actors in hybrid peacebuilding settings engage in a process of translation. They do this by choosing whether to adopt, defer or resist the knowledge and interests they are confronted with in the process of exercising agency. CSOs and their representatives are shown to navigate and negotiate between local needs, knowledge and approaches advanced by their participants and beneficiaries, and liberal and international
approaches advocated for by their donors and international and national partners. This also reflects the post-colonial sentiment that all cultures are hybrid (Bhabha, 2004, p. 31),

Adoption can be understood as the process of addressing the interests and needs of internal and external actors to conflict as well as reproducing the knowledge or information that they share. Deference would occur when the organisation or actors with in it choose to transfer the responsibility for addressing specific interests or reproducing knowledge to another actor or group of actors. Finally, resistance can be understood as the process of failing to respond to interests and reproduce knowledge either actively or inactively.

Approaching hybridity as translation moves away from the creation of a binary between the local-traditional and the international-liberal actors, acknowledging that actors can act along both spectrums in a fluid way. This approach is consistent with Donais who suggests that hybridity emphasizes a focus on the dynamic and fluid interplay of agency across the international-local divide, the broader argument developed here has much in common with the emerging strand of peacebuilding literature that privileges hybridity as a central concept (2012, p. 141).

Agency

Agency is a core concept within the post-liberal peacebuilding literature. Bleiker suggests that in post-liberal peacebuilding, the term has been used to demonstrate how local populations actively challenge and resist both conflict and liberal peacebuilding (2012, p. 309). In this thesis, agency is used as one of the qualifying criteria for potential actors who in-part represent the local. This thesis adopts the definition of peacebuilding agency advanced by Kappler who indicates that “‘peacebuilding agency’ refers to transformative processes aiming to improve the social conditions of everyday life” (2015, p. 867). Presenting agency in this way will invite an
examination of how local civil society actors actively define and contribute to peacebuilding and how power, legitimacy and material factors influence their ability to do so. It also examines how the local CSOs exercise agency in relation to their relationships and collaboration with partners, particularly how they translate knowledge from members of their community-based structures into projects and how they carry out their work in relation to available funding. Finally, it also explores the exercise of agency in the ways that actors within the organisations translate between internal and external actors to peacebuilding through the processes of adoption, deference and resistance described in chapters 5 to 8.

Legitimacy

The perceived legitimacy of local CSOs with both external actors and the communities that they serve also impacts their ability to obtain funding and successfully deliver interventions. Kappler (2015) details how intermediary actors shift their identities between the local and international-tied elites in order to gain the legitimacy necessary to exercise their agency. For the purpose of this thesis, legitimacy will be understood as the historical and continued perception of the effective and reliable delivery of peacebuilding activities by external actors coupled with the willingness of outside actors to engage in such activities.

Power

This thesis adopts the definition of power presented by van Tuijl who defines it as “the ability to direct or prevent the current or future actions of other groups and individuals” (2016, p. 6). He elaborates that in the context of peacebuilding, civil society should be understood as having “soft power which is constituted in the compelling nature of norms and cultures, the importance of the reciprocity.” (2016, p. 7).
Power within beneficiary communities, local CSOs and external actors influences how local knowledge is articulated, understood and presented. Further, power, both within and between groups of beneficiaries and civil society actors, influences how local knowledge and needs are represented to external actors. Finally, power also influences the way in which both local CSOs and external actors respond to local knowledge and needs in relation to peacebuilding, ultimately shaping peacebuilding outcomes. This thesis will also examine some of the sources of power which contribute to these dynamics. These may include identity related to ethnicity, political affiliation, class and gender which are discussed substantially in the literature as sources of identity-based conflict. Special attention will be paid to the intersection of gender and power within this thesis as the construction of gender identity and roles including masculinities may influence the dynamics both within CSOs and between them and their beneficiaries. This thesis also considers the exercise of both discursive and material power by the CSOs and their external partners; discursive power in the determination of how peacebuilding needs are addressed and represented, and material power in the determination of the financial and material capability of the organisations to intervene.

Discursive power can broadly be understood as the ability to control intersubjective understanding and therefore creating or maintaining the ability to direct or prevent current or future actions of other groups or individuals. Hopf observes that one of the most significant aspects of discursive power is “the capacity to reproduce order and predictability in understandings and expectations. In this respect, identities are a congealed reputation, that is, the closest one can get in social life to being able to confidently expect the same actions from another actor time after time” (1998, p. 190). This links easily to van Tuijl’s definition of the soft power exercised by civil society who can frame compelling norms and use culture to translate
local knowledge into international language and introduce international norms into local context in a consistent way. Material power can be understood as having access to the material resources, including financing necessary to influence the ability to direct or prevent the current or future actions of other groups and individuals.

**Key Actors**

The post-liberal peacebuilding literature often presents a binary representation of actors in hybridized peacebuilding processes which is represented by the international and the local. This thesis problematizes that binary by identifying these actors as potential intermediaries for translating or presenting local and context specific knowledge to external actors. It focuses on local CSOs to try to better understand their role in representing the knowledge and needs of their communities in hybridized peacebuilding processes. It also examines the beneficiaries and external partners of civil society organisations to understand how the dynamics within and between these three groups of actors impact the ability of local CSOs to both address and represent the needs of their communities in relation to peacebuilding. This includes a focus on the material power relationships prescribed by the postcolonial approach described above.

**Civil Society**

Post-colonialism and post-liberalism explore power as part of their broader analytical frameworks. These approaches suggest themes that are explored in relation to civil society including: the cultural applicability of the concept, power dynamics within CSOs and their embedded nature in local conflict dynamics.

By examining CSOs, this thesis implicitly applies a focus on civil society as associational life, which invites a consideration of the activities of each organisation in relation to peacebuilding as well as the internal dynamics between their staff. It also applies an approach
focused on “good society” in that it focuses on peace-oriented organisations attempting to make positive contributions to their societies. It accepts the core functions of civil society in peacebuilding contexts outlined by Paffenholz including: protection, monitoring, advocacy and public communication, in-group socialization, social cohesion, intermediation and facilitation and service delivery (2010, p. 403). Further it acknowledges the advocacy undertaken by CSOs to address problematic power structures in the contexts in which they work.

This thesis applies a post-colonial approach to civil society in its analysis of CSOs in several ways. First, it adopts a broad definition of what constitutes a civil society organisation and its core functions in a way that recognizes cultural differences in governance and the absence of a strong central state in the DRC. It attempts to understand the contributions of CSOs within historical context. It also examines the relationships between actors within the CSOs as well as the relationships between the organisation as other actors to understand their relationships with and contributions to prevailing power dynamics as they relate to peace and conflict. As previously stated, civil society actors will be presented as playing an intermediary role, translating local needs to external actors while simultaneously diffusing international norms in their communities.

This thesis addresses two sets of actors within CSOs. First, it examines the program staff who are responsible for implementing peacebuilding related programs. Second it considers the leadership of the organisations including directors, deputy directors and to a lesser extent, financial administrators, due their position of power within the organisation and their influence over the approaches taken in their programming.
Community-Based Structures and Beneficiaries

In the research design phase of this thesis it was assumed that the local CSOs based in the provincial capital of South Kivu would directly deliver peacebuilding programming to beneficiaries in the capital and beyond. This reflects difficulties in adequately identifying local actors engaged in peacebuilding processes because of the lack of clarity around the definition of the term “local” and a lack of information on other actors engaged in peacebuilding in South Kivu. However, upon arrival in the field it became clear that the civil society organisations examined through this research were in many cases not delivering interventions or assistance directly to beneficiaries. Instead, they had established networks of smaller organisations at the community and village level that were structured to provide mutual support to the organisations.

The community-based structures documented in this thesis reflect the composition and activities described by Clark (2008). He indicated that the Barza were made up of community leaders at the village level with the primary purpose to “prevent resolve and heal wounds after conflict. This require[d] what its leaders call[ed] negative values in the community… before they led to conflict” (Clark, 2008, p. 6). A core difference between the Barza and the structures documented below is that the Barza were co-opted by rebel and government actors in the Kivus who tried to implement them as semi-formal conflict resolution institutions. However, general mistrust of the government in the South meant that they never took hold and led to their eventual collapse in North Kivu (p.9). Indeed, these structures could be understood as a re-imagining of the Barza by local CSOs, avoiding the problematic linkage to the government and armed groups.

Some of these community-based structures also reflect the “local peace committees” described by van Tongeren (2013 ) and Odendaal. Odendaal defines a local peace committee as “an inclusive forum operating at the subnational level that provides a platform for the collective
local leadership to accept joint responsibility for building peace in that provides a platform for the collective local leadership to accept joint responsibility for building peace in that community” (2013, p. 6). Many of the structures discussed below adhere to this definition, however, other types of structures were also established by the CSOs to fulfil the purpose including: agricultural and worker cooperatives; identity based-groups such as women’s services and; peace clubs for children and youth. I have chosen to use the term community-based structures to reflect the diversity among these groups as well as the term used by my Congolese informants “les structures à la base”.

While members of the community-based structures do benefit from the support provided to the CSOs, there were also two groups of beneficiaries that did not participate in these structures. The first group of beneficiaries benefited directly through services provided by the organisations such as participating in a literacy group, receiving legal services or using a market built by an organisation. The members of the second group of beneficiaries benefited from an organisation’s activities indirectly. For example, individuals may have benefited from broader support of dialogue, reconciliation and a culture of peace promoted by these organisations but never directly interacted with them. Like members of the community-based structures, beneficiaries were consistently present in the observed spaces that the organisations worked in and provided invaluable information through informal dialogue.

External Partners

The external partners of the local CSOs examined through this thesis included the funders, collaborators and drivers of some of the peacebuilding projects and processes undertaken by local CSOs. They are not only significant because of the amount of power they exercised over local actors but also because of the dominant liberal model that they were
purported to apply to the peacebuilding processes. As previously stated, the liberal model is thought to be at odds with local visions of and needs in relation to peace. The external partners of the organisations examined in South Kivu included local, national and international governmental and non-governmental organisations, churches, the UN and other bodies.

*Exploring the Role of Local Civil Society in Hybridized Peacebuilding Processes*

Given the macro-lens, based on post-colonial theory, adopted in this thesis, this research did not examine a specific hypothesis but instead presented a provisional statement on the role of local civil society in hybridized peacebuilding processes, reflecting the theory’s rejection of natural science epistemology.

At the time of the proposal, the research sought to examine three sets of complex relationships to answer the research questions identified below and contribute to a better understanding of the role that local CSOs play as intermediaries of local knowledge in hybridized peacebuilding processes. This section identifies the starting point for examining these relationships based on an extensive review of the literature.

The first set of relationships was between CSOs and their beneficiaries. The post-liberal peacebuilding literature suggests that local CSOs not only understand the needs of the communities that they serve, but they address them in peacebuilding processes. This is a one-dimensional approach to both local communities and actors and the CSOs that represent them. It assumes that the communities that are represented by the CSOs are relatively homogenous and have similar needs that they can easily represent and that can be understood by their external partners. It also assumes that this is the primary motivation for the work of local CSOs. Instead, CSOs are viewed in this thesis as representing specific identity communities (political, ethnic, or gender) or thematic priorities (conflict minerals, justice, community dialogue). Further, it is
understood that the thematic focus or group represented would influence the ways in which they interact with other local CSOs and represent the needs of their communities to external actors. The motivations of the employees and leadership of these organisations were understood as being diverse and may include factors such as status or access to resources, in addition to addressing the needs of their communities.

The second set of relationships that were examined were those between the local CSOs and external actors or partners. The research sought to examine the ways in which local CSOs represented the needs of their communities. This representation of local needs was initially understood as being influenced not only by the goals of the organisations and their communities but also by the perceived preference of the external actors which might impact access to both human and financial resources for the organisations to carry out their work. Further, it considered the possibility that there were disconnects between the way that local CSOs understood the needs of the communities they represent and how they presented those needs to external actors. It was hypothesized that this may have been influenced by a variety of factors including human and financial resource needs and inter and intra group relationships within the local CSOs. Finally, the original understanding of these relationships suggested that there was a range of context-specific knowledge that exists within partner organisations that may extend beyond the information reported to them by their local partners. Such information was thought to influence the ways in which external organisations respond to the local knowledge and needs articulated by local CSOs.

The third set of relationships examined were the relationships between individuals within the CSOs themselves. Examining these relationships sought to understand who had the power to influence decision making on behalf of the organisations. It also sought to understand the
relationships between the staff and leadership of these organisations. The original understanding of these relationships asserted that the leaders of the organisations would have a disproportionate influence over the goals and approaches of the organisations.

Although this is still the general framework explored in this thesis, the relationships were more complex and messier than presented in this original statement. First, the relationship between the organisations and their beneficiaries was adapted to examine the relationship between the organisations and the community-based structures. Further, not all the external partners identified and addressed were liberal or internationally based. It became apparent during the research that there are several other groups of actors with the potential to act as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding processes in South Kivu including churches, INGOs with local headquarters and staff and the UN. Other groups may also include provincial and national government officials and members of armed groups. The fluid identity of these intermediaries was also evident as they might present themselves as being more local or more liberal depending on the context in which they found themselves.

Figure 1 illustrates the links between the three local CSOs and other actors operating in peacebuilding spaces in South Kivu. In these relationships, material resources can generally be understood as flowing down from the top of the chart to the bottom, whereas knowledge is fluid through all of the levels. Further, non-material collaboration can generally be understood as occurring between actors on the same horizontal plane, one plane above or below.
Figure 1: Relationships Between Civil Society and Other Peacebuilding Actors in South Kivu

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundations for this thesis are post-liberal peacebuilding rooted in the foundations of moderate post-colonialism. Drawing on post-liberal peacebuilding, it includes conflict-affected populations in identifying their own needs and designing and implementing peacebuilding interventions in a bottom-up and emancipatory manner. This lens guides the identification of civil society actors as potential sources of local agency and knowledge in complex, hybrid spaces. It encourages the examination of the relationships of these organisations with other actors including international financing and implementing partners, the national and
provincial government, other provincial actors as well as individuals, households, community groups and local governments active in peacebuilding across the province. It recognizes that local civil society organizations can present the needs of their members and other individuals, households and communities to more powerful actors including the provincial and national governments and international financing and implementing partners. It also recognizes that these organizations exercise their agency, which is influenced by more powerful actors and context, to design and deliver locally informed peacebuilding interventions.

This thesis adopts post-liberal peacebuilding theory through its acknowledgement of a diversity of post-conflict peacebuilding arrangements. First, it acknowledges the existence of diverse understandings and definitions of peace. Some of these definitions captured in this study include both negative and positive understandings of peace, which may be supported by liberal or other institutional arrangements. It also acknowledges that the peace being created or sustained through the organisations examined is not necessarily liberal in nature. At times they reinforce illiberal customary and elected governments to promote peace and replace some service provision functions normally undertaken by a state, reproducing hybrid state authority.

This thesis is post-colonial because it rejects a simplistic view of neo-colonial continuity reproduced by the local-international and liberal-traditional binaries discussed by many liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding authors. Kapoor (2002) suggests the use of such binaries, even in counter-hegemonic ways only serves to recreate the power of the dominant group, in this case external peacebuilding actors. Therefore it “seeks to preserve heterogeneity and to criticize its disparagement or transcendence by any master discourse” (Kapoor, 2002, p. 652). To do this it uses an analysis of discursive and material power relations between different peacebuilding actors within a given context, South Kivu, to demonstrate the heterogeneity of actors that exist
outside of the confines of local, international, traditional and liberal labels. It goes further than this by considering how identity influences the different sets of actors within these spaces, and the ways they translate between internal and external interests in hybridized peacebuilding processes. However, this variant of postcolonialism is moderate because it accepts that external actors can make positive contributions to local peacebuilding.

It also applies a post-colonial theoretical framework through its examination of discursive and material power. It examines discursive power through its consideration of which local actors’ needs are reflected and represented through the interventions designed and implemented by the local civil society organisations. It also considers the representation of local needs and liberal values by the organisations to other actors within the peacebuilding context, with a particular emphasis on communication strategies and tools including publications, websites and events. It examines material power by considering how the organizations operationalize their peacebuilding efforts and how they access the resources to do so. Further, it considers the intersection of discursive and material power by considering how the local CSOs use their discursive power to gain access to the material resources necessary to operationalize their peacebuilding interventions. Yet, at the same time it acknowledges the ultimate power of financing partners, and to a lesser extent implementing partners, to determine which priorities and needs identified by the organizations are implemented.

Further, this thesis also seeks to examine power within the organisations. Examining the relationship between different identity groups among their staff, it seeks to understand who and what influences the peacebuilding interventions that the organisations design and implement. To do this it considers the exercise and influence of both discursive and material power in formal and informal decision-making processes within the organisations. In relation to discursive power
it considers how different knowledge or interests are prioritized within each of the organisations examined to determine who ultimately influences intersubjective understanding within the organisations which shapes the knowledge they share with external actors, seeking to meet the peacebuilding. Material power is explored within the organisations to understand how access to resources influences which peacebuilding activities are undertaken and as an ultimate determinant on the organisations’ abilities to exercise discursive power.

The consideration of both discursive and material power within the organisations and in relation to other actors also ultimately links back to the post-liberal element of this framework. Access to material resources are seen as potentially influencing the ability of the organisations and their staff to exercise agency both internally and externally. It also influences whether interventions are ultimately bottom up or top down in nature. Discursive and material power both understood as influencing the emancipatory potential of the interventions undertaken by the organisations for their staff, the members of their community-based structures and beneficiaries.

Ultimately, the tensions that emerge between material and discursive power dynamics and the exercise of agency in the delivery of peacebuilding interventions by local civil society organisations necessitate a reconsideration of the binary construction of local/traditional-international/liberal hybridity. The expression of agency and influence mediated by discursive and material power explored in the results chapters suggests that there is nothing essentially local about traditional approaches or liberal about international approaches. As described in greater detail below, a space- or place-based understanding of locality (or internationality) also raises questions about the broad application of the terms local and international. This may especially true where some potentially local actors, such as those working for the local civil society organisations represent the needs of others living in the same geographical locations and execute
interventions in those places. It may also be the case where international actors relocate to the spaces where they intervene for long durations, becoming, in part, part of “the local”. This space- and time-based understanding of hybridity is part of what leads to framing this approach as moderate post-colonialism. It also lends itself to a more fluid understanding of hybridity through which discursive power is not understood as being imposed by external actors, but knowledge is shared and transferred by intermediaries in a process of translation. This approach moves away from the shock model of hybridity or liberal peacebuilding used by post-colonially informed post-liberal peacebuilding authors including Richmond (2011) and Duffield (2007) and described by Richmond and Mac Ginty (2016, p. 221). The following paragraphs begin to construct an alternative model for understanding these relationships. It is important to note that the model remains limited by the language used in the existing literature on post-liberal peacebuilding, as it still situates a set group of actors in relation to the existing binaries of the local and international.

This theoretical framework helps situate local CSOs as one set of possible intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding processes, in South Kivu. It does this by examining the way that external intervenors and internal actors transfer knowledge and material resources to the intermediaries in a way that influences their contributions to peacebuilding efforts. In this framework, knowledge and interests are understood to be transferred between CSOs and community-based actors, as well as between CSOs and external intervenors. By determining what knowledge and interests are prioritized in their own peacebuilding efforts, the CSOs are shown to exercise some discursive power. It is in this context that the staff and leaders at the CSOs are able to determine whether they adopt, defer or resist the knowledge and interests of both the internal actors and external intervenors. However, this process of translation is mitigated by the material power exercised by the external actors. This arises out of the inability of the
CSOs to access material resources locally or independently, forcing them to often rely on internationally-based actors. In this role they are understood as translating knowledge, resources and interventions between their beneficiaries and members of their community-based structures, and external partners at the provincial, national and international levels.

**Research Questions**

The research questions noted below, explore the relationships between the actors and the concepts described in this theoretical framework.

This thesis examines four central research questions:

1. How do local civil society organisations seek to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?
2. Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions and how?
3. Are local civil society organisations able to address either the local or national causes of conflict?
4. What are the implications of local civil society organisations working as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding for post-liberal peacebuilding, in theory and practice?

In addition, there are several related secondary research questions that were identified to guide the development of the research methods. Although, they will not be considered independently in the analytical section, they were identified in the early development of this thesis and are reflected in the research methods implemented. These questions help to explore the core concepts of power, agency and identity as well as the relationship between different groups of actors. They were divided between CSOs, beneficiaries and external partner, and can be reviewed in *Annex 1.*


**Application of Research Questions and Theoretical Framework**

The first three research questions described above are explored in the results chapters that are divided by organisation. Exploring the results in this way invites an examination of the different types of knowledge that the organisations are exposed to, ranging from locally expressed needs to liberal institutions by a variety of actors. Further, these chapters explore how discursive and material power influence the ways in which the organisations exercise agency by adopting, deferring or resisting the knowledge and interests shared with the organisation by other actors. Finally, it considers the interests and identities of the staff and leaders of the organisations to address how organisational dynamics influence that process.

Chapter 8, the analysis and conclusion chapter, brings together these findings in an effort to offer modest insight on the fourth research question. It begins by presenting a summary of the findings in order to explore broader trends in power dynamics, agency and identity across the organisations. The chapter also situates these trends within the literature on civil society’s role in peacebuilding in fragile and conflict affected states. The chapter then goes on to explore the potential role of local CSOs in South Kivu as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding. It suggests this role emerges out of its ability to control norms and narratives by influencing how knowledge about peace, conflict and human rights are communicated and applied to both internal and external actors in the peacebuilding context in South Kivu as well as through their ability to determine how material resources are used to address locally expressed needs. Understanding the role of the local CSOs as one set of potential intermediaries in these processes suggests that they act as translators in hybridized peacebuilding process. The final chapter builds on the idea of intermediaries acting as translators and presents the idea of hybridity as a process of translation,
thereby challenging the binary vision of hybrid peacebuilding presented in much of the post-
liberal peacebuilding literature.
Chapter 4: Research Methodology

The research methods for this thesis were designed to explore the process of translation undertaken by local CSOs as intermediary structures through their efforts to contribute to peace and conflict resolution in South Kivu. The emphasis in the research design, on the intersection of different sources of knowledge on peace and conflict and the way the organisations exercise agency, draws on the post-liberal peacebuilding literature addressed above. This is further applied by exploring the organisation’s relationships and partnerships with a broad range of actors beyond liberal state and international actors to achieve their objectives and thus moving beyond the liberal paradigm. In addition, the emphasis on examining the contributions of a fixed set of actors bound by time and place through and ethnographic lens is rooted in the moderate post-colonial approach adopted in this thesis as it rejects uniform neo-colonial continuity. This approach is reinforced by the exploration of identity and power dynamics both within the organisations and in their external relations. To undertake this level of analysis the research methods were influenced by ethnography and sought to examine the micro-dynamics between three local CSOs in the DRC through: in-depth, semi-structured, interviews; participant observation and; content analysis of communications materials. These methods will be described in detail below.

Research Design

Ethnography

The research methods selected to undertake this thesis, were influenced by the ethnographic tradition. Ethnography is an approach in anthropology and other social sciences that examines a complex set of largely concealed individual, community and institutional systems that coexist as hidden transcripts alongside official or other public transcripts (Mosse &
Lewis, 2006, p. 16). More broadly ethnographic inquiry requires the researcher “to engage substantively with local beneficiaries and the context in which they live, spending enough time in the local settings to begin to understand the way that challenges and hardships affect local lives and the worldviews and lifeways” (Millar, 2014a, p. 159). Van Donge (2006) identifies distinctive contributions of ethnographic research methods. He indicates that they tend to rely on observation; imply an open approach and avoid framing a research situation beforehand, for example through formulating detailed questions; they use the case study method, focusing on situations in depth and make no claims to be statistically representative; and they try to understand society from the inside.

In the context of peacebuilding, Millar argues that an ethnographic approach is essential to understanding “local people’s perceptions and experiences of conflict, justice, security, development, empowerment, dignity, opportunity and peace itself as the starting point for any further international action that might hope to facilitate local voice, agency or emancipatory peace.” (2014a, p. 25). Beyond simply developing a more thorough context-specific understanding of conflict dynamics, this approach is rooted in empathy, emancipation and the everyday which Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) describe as being central components of post-liberal peacebuilding. The emphasis on context specific understandings of conflict dynamics also builds on the post-colonial approach adopted in this thesis. In relation to emancipation, Richards highlights that “one of anthropology’s tasks… is to keep emphasizing the local potential for spontaneous peace. It amounts to arguing for more radical options than conflict resolution” (2005, p. 19). Further, van Donge (2006) links the ethnographic approach to better understanding the everyday, stating that “ethnographic research methods attempt to thesis social life as it unfolds in the practices of day-to-day life” (2006, p. 180).
Ethnographically Informed Methods

This thesis adopted two methods in order to access the deep contextual understanding prescribed by the ethnographic approach. First, it adopted the ethnographic method of participant observation. Van Donge indicates that observation is a primary component of ethnography which can be used to correct preconceived ideas of researchers (p.183) and is also an essential component of understanding a society from the inside (p.185). The information gathered through this process serves to correct preconceived ideas about the organisations and their memberships acquired through the interview process and may also provide insight on the dynamics that influence the daily interactions within and between local CSOs and other actors. Finnstrom indicates that ethnography is “about painstakingly investigating and analyzing the common, general, mainstream and even taken-for-granted thesis of everyday life in a particular context” (2008, p. 10). In the context of the current thesis this meant sitting with participants through their daily routines at the organisations they worked for, observing their idle time, their time spent writing reports as well as their direct work with communities and special events. This helped to develop a clear picture of the everyday experiences of local actors in relation to peacebuilding.

Second, this thesis also used in-depth, semi-structured, interviews in order to explore how participants understood local peace and conflict dynamics and how they identified their primary contributions to peacebuilding. Bornéus (2011) indicates that in-depth interviews can be used in peace-research to “gain deeper understanding of processes of war and peacebuilding both among elites and among different groups of the population” (p.130). The use of semi-structured interviews reflected this open approach identified by van Donge (2006) as a defining component of ethnography which avoids “framing a research situation beforehand” (p.183). Interview
questions were developed to help to guide conversations around the micro-dynamics of local CSOs contributing to peacebuilding but will leave space to explore themes and experiences not anticipated by the researcher. They were also designed to reflect the primary and secondary research questions outlined above.

To develop this deep contextual understanding, the research design sought to include all of the actors occupying civil society spaces through observation and interviews. This included organisational leaders, staff, beneficiaries, participants and external partners to the organisations.

*Gender and Ethnic Considerations*

Gender and ethnic considerations were an important component to this research design given that both sets of identities have factored significantly into the conflict dynamics in South Kivu and impact individual and communal lived experiences of war and peace.

The conflict in the DRC has been characterized by the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war and thousands of men, women and children have been raped over the last two decades (Human Rights Watch, 2014). SGBV has subsequently become a major area of focus for external actors engaged in the peacebuilding process in the DRC (Hartviksen & Tiessen, 2017). De Zwaan and Freks, indicate that these acts should be situated within the history of patriarchy which has characterized gender relations in the DRC and is related to culture, religious preferences and past experiences of conflict. They conclude that it is not only important to address sexual and gender-based violence in the DRC but also the feelings of disempowerment among men related to their own experiences of conflict and SGBV (2011, p. 19).

These dynamics have two implications which were considered in the research design. First, experiences of SGBV as well as historically rooted gender relations may influence how both men and women articulate their needs in relation to peacebuilding interventions. As a result,
the gender of participants was recorded during interviews. Second, the emphasis of external intervention on SGBV may influence the way that local CSOs represent the needs of their communities to external actors as they try to position themselves for access to resources and power. Subsequently, this thesis considers the different ways in which groups of men and women express their needs in relation to peacebuilding and the extent to which these differences are reflected in the way that local CSOs both address and represent the overall needs of their communities. Women were invited to participate in interviews at a rate that reflected their representation within each organisation and were equally represented among beneficiaries interviewed as part of this thesis.

The examination of gender and gender equality through observation was also an important component of the post-colonial approach adopted in this thesis. Given the lack of equality which persists in the current context in South Kivu, gender-equality may be understood as an externally imposed policy framework. Observing the ways in which staff at the organisations adopted, deferred and resisted its implementation and how that manifested in the peacebuilding activities undertaken by the organisations helps to explore the process of translation described above.

Further, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004) and Autesserre (2010) stressed the importance of ethnic identity as a factor perpetuating the local causes of conflict in the DRC. While this topic has been less broadly explored in comparison with gender, in relation to participation in peacebuilding processes, this research sought to include a diversity of voices of different ethnic groups among both the staff and beneficiaries of the organisations being examined. This was measured by noting the familial language of the participants being
interviewed to develop a broad sense of the representation of different groups between the organisations.

Exploring the identity of the staff of the organisations invited a consideration of both discursive and material dynamics within the organisations and in their relations with external actors. Within the organizations it was used to consider how different identities helped to establish the dominant narrative that informed the approach of the organisations. It also invited an examination of who exercised material power within the organisations by determining how resources should be distributed. Examining the role of the identity of the CSOs in their external relations also facilitated an exploration of how the organisations were able to exercise agency in different spaces, why and where. These explorations help to integrate post-liberal and post-colonial theories into the interpretation of empirical observations.

Trauma-Informed Approach

While the ethics of working with a traumatized population were considered in the original ethics proposal, the extent to which trauma was interwoven into individual experiences of both conflict and peacebuilding were difficult to imagine before my arrival in the field. Most of my research participants experienced internal displacement at least once since 1996 and some had witnessed violent attacks or worse. In addition to this expected exposure to trauma, nearly all of the participants in this research were exposed to vicarious trauma during the course of their work with conflict-affected populations. In addition, many were also at risk of exposure to organised violence perpetrated by the state or other groups due to the nature of their work. While I emphasized the choice of participants to share information during interviews and to stop if they became uncomfortable it was often clear from formal interviews and informal conversations that many of the actors representing these organisations were struggling with multiple layers of long-
term trauma, with minimal access to psycho-social support. Only one of the three organisations observed offered counselling services to their staff. This situation points to clear steps that external partners can take in supporting the local organisations that they are working with.

**Ethics and Risk**

Given the prevalence of trauma within the organisations and conflict experiences of their beneficiaries and participants, ethical considerations were an essential component of the research design. This section outlines the ethics process for this thesis as well as the risk mitigation component which was applied due to the insecurity in South Kivu. This section also considers my positionality as a researcher in relation to the research methods, ethics and risk. This form of self-reflexivity is an important part of post-colonial and ethnographic research.

**Ethical Considerations**

Ethics approval was obtained for this research through the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board in December 2015. The ethics certificate provided by the board was also renewed and modified in March 2017 to reflect changes to the research methods described above.

As indicated above, the Eastern DRC has experienced conflict for more than two decades, these conditions are exacerbated by state fragility and extreme poverty which affects most of the country. The methods for this thesis were designed to reflect that research participants at the local level may be vulnerable because of both conflict related trauma and a lack of access to human and financial capital. Boas, Jennings and Shaw indicate that the basic rule for doing research in conflict situations is to do no harm (2006, p. 75). Three themes were considered as part of the ethical considerations for the research including: risks and benefits to the participants, protection privacy, and informed consent. Given that this research was undertaken in a conflict-affected context and focuses on peacebuilding there was the potential for
participants to experience discomfort while answering some of the interview questions. To prevent possible re-traumatization, participants were given the options to refuse to answer any question that might give rise to discomfort or to end their interview altogether. As required by the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board a list of medical services was made available for participants, although medical care and counselling services are not free in South Kivu. The possible benefits of participating in this research included contribution to practical conclusions about how local actors can work more effectively with external actors to achieve better peacebuilding outcomes.

Protection of privacy was another significant concern for this research because of its examination of interpersonal dynamics within and between organisations and involved the collection of sensitive data. In order to facilitate privacy interviews with all participants were held in a secure and private location which was mutually convenient for the participant and the researcher. Holgund and Oberg indicate that in peace research the following measures can be taken to protect participants privacy in data collection: the use of pseudonyms, storing respondents’ answers separate from identifying information; and finding a situation where respondents feel safe and comfortable (2011, p. 186). All of the above measures were adopted. A further level of protection privacy was created by using a pseudonym to identify the organisations themselves. Data collected as part of this thesis was stored on a password protected computer and a password protected Dropbox. The need for anonymity and for the safe storage of data was particularly high in cases where participants described persecution they had faced at the hands of the state, and particularly the Agence Nationale de Renseignement (ANR), the Congolese intelligence agency. When additional protection was necessary because of the content of a particular data sample, the recording was removed from my laptop and stored on an
encrypted USB key. When I crossed the border exiting the country at crossing Ruzizi 1, I deleted all of the data from my laptop transferring it to Dropbox and the encrypted USB key.

Finally, informed consent was sought from all interview participants and from the directors of the organisations where observation took place. Consent forms were developed for each of the five groups of participants described below through which interview participants were informed of the purpose, risks and benefits of the research through a consent form which was signed or consented to orally with a witness present. Participants who completed interviews via skype were asked to submit a scanned and signed consent form prior to participating in their interview. At the request of the Research Ethics Board, the directors of the organisations who were sent follow-up questionnaires also received an implied consent form.

*Risk Management*

In my thesis proposal, personal risk was considered under the ethics heading. However, after being directed to consult with the Office of Risk Management by the Research Ethics Board, risk management became a separate consideration. I arrived at the office with the expectation that if I strongly supported my work during my first in-person meeting with the risk analyst, that I would be permitted to go. Unfortunately, it was clear upon arrival that the office had already decided that I should not be allowed to proceed because of the pre-existing travel advisories issued by the Global Affairs Canada related to ongoing conflict in the region. I was informed that I could launch an appeal that would involve the submission of letters of support for my research and a detailed risk mitigation strategy. I also asked for permission to present my case to the risk management committee at the university, who would decide whether I could complete my research. This was allowed on an exceptional basis.
A committee was then convened to hear my case. I submitted five letters of support for my work from a variety of professional contacts. I developed a risk-mitigation strategy based on advice from the director of a Canadian civil society organisation with extensive experience in the Eastern DRC and based on my case knowledge of the DRC. A copy of this risk-mitigation strategy can be found in Annex 2. After meeting in late November 2015, the committee accepted my proposed research with several conditions including that I purchase an extended special-risk insurance policy and that I agree to not travel outside of the city of Bukavu during my fieldwork.

Ultimately once the committee decided to allow my research to proceed, they became a source of support. The committee provided funding to cover the cost of the insurance they required me to have and helped to connect me to a group of global risk consultants. One individual from the committee also provided their private phone number in case of after-hours emergencies. This level of support was unexpected and contributed to the overall success of my project. Once in the field I discovered that most of the other graduate students conducting research in the region had faced similar challenges from their institutions.

Upon arriving in the field, it also became clear that the risks that were identified through this process did not necessarily reflect those that existed on the ground. Other significant security challenges emerged in the field, particularly in the context to my time spent away from the organisations. While it was relatively easy to remain secure while engaging with well-established organisations, risks presented themselves after hours in relation to both transportation and individuals in my general vicinity. The cost of reliable, ongoing, secure transportation had not been factored into my project budget and I often found myself deciding between my security and the amount of money I had available. Further, I also struggled with making decisions about what activities being led by the local CSOs were safe to observe. On a trip to Bukavu’s central prison
a police officer aggressively harassed my research participant and I for a bribe. Further, while two of my three trips outside of Bukavu⁹ went smoothly the third did not, and I felt like I did not have enough information to make informed decisions about such trips. Knowing that I was having difficulty following the parameters set out by the Office of Risk Management also increased the challenge of arranging such trips.

Sluka (2008) concludes that risks involving fieldwork in dangerous areas can be mitigated through foresight, planning and skilful manoeuvre (p.260). Designing a risk-mitigation strategy in advance of my trip contributed to the overall success of my research, despite its inability to accurately identify all risks.

Positionality of the Researcher

One morning, late in my fieldwork, members of one of the organisations that I worked with were discussing the possibility that delaying or cancelling the national elections scheduled for November of that year, could lead to renewed war. I listened with concern as my participants discussed the dangers presented by the emerging political crisis, which must have registered on my face because one of my research participants turned and exclaimed “Do not be afraid, it’s simply that you have never experienced war before, it will be fine.” I was of course not worried about myself, I knew that I would be returning home to safety within a number of days but that this was not an option for any of the other people in the room. This was one of many instances during my fieldwork that the gulf-between my reality as a Canadian doctoral candidate and the lived realities of my research participants was painfully clear.

---

⁹ Although I had agreed with the Office of Risk Management not to make such trips, an inability to leave the capital city was overly restrictive and would have significantly limited my research results. When I did leave the city I made the decision to do so in consultation with my research participants and representatives with INGOs in the region, and informed my supervisor in Ottawa of my departure.
Finnstrom suggests that this level of privilege, being able to return home to Canada, or in his case Sweden, while our participants remained bound to their violent realities, suggests the need to adopt an approach focused on inter-experience. Drawing from Jackson, Finnstrom indicates that inter-experience and inter-subjectivity “are the ways in which selfhood emerges and is negotiated in a field of interpersonal relations as a mode of being in the World” (2008, p.17). He presents this model in contrast to a common approach to ethnography that emphasizes the sharing or blending of experiences.

To this extent I recognize the unique independent experiences of each of my research participants as well as my own and how our interactions with each other within the context that existed in Bukavu between February 2016 and May 2016 contributed to an inter-experience of certain events which may have shaped and influenced us in different ways. The way I understand the events which I observed in this period is related to my identity as a white, young, bilingual, female, Ph.D. Candidate, from a developed country with an airplane ticket home and access to resources which support my work and well-being. One example of how this may contribute to differences in understanding and knowing can be explained through a single event that took place while I was in Bukavu. In mid-April, a grenade was thrown into a moving Sports Utility Vehicle killing its occupants. I learned about this incident first through my special-hire driver who told me is understanding of the events, including that the perpetrator was an angry neighbour of the occupants of the vehicle. Nearly every person I spoke to, understood the event differently and provided different explanations for why the event had occurred, until there was a declaration that it was an act of witchcraft which most of my Congolese counterparts were ready to accept. However, since I do not believe in witchcraft because of my cultural and religious upbringing, and because I try not to rely on informal sources of information such as rumours, this
explanation was difficult for me to accept. In the process of acknowledging inter-experience I have attempted to describe understandings that differ from my own in the words of my participants and by acknowledging the tensions that arise between our understandings whenever possible. A frequent example of where this occurs in my research is in relation to gender where the expectations and understandings expressed by my participants often varied greatly from my own.\textsuperscript{10} This approach reflects that of Finnstrom who emphasizes that it is crucial to recognize that it “was not the stories that were fictitious but rather any conclusion that I as an anthropologist shared the experiences and biographies these stories mediated. My job as an anthropologist is not to absorb the stories of my informants as mine or to impose uncritically my stories upon them. It is about their familiarity with the world, not mine” (p.22).

My identity also influenced the ways in which my research participants shared and interacted with me. As a young, foreign, researcher, many of my participants were eager to show me, or tell me about how they and their organisations contributed to peace, and about the violence and trauma which had affected their communities. In relation to this element of my identity, they also sought to be welcoming, helpful and supportive and to help me integrate into the city. As a feminist woman, I was frequently reproached by male staff members who sought to convince me that men and women were not equal, often citing the Bible as proof. As a Canadian some participants would ask for money or information about immigrating to Canada. My status as a researcher was also at times viewed with suspicion, at one point I was accused by a local administrator of being a spy. Further, a representative from an international organisation sought to prevent me from uncovering a financial crisis spurred by mismanagement of funds by at least

\textsuperscript{10} Treforn emphasizes that informal information sharing reflects a lack of print media sources and lack of access to radio stations in the area, which necessitates the verbal transmission of news (p.181).
one of their local partners, despite this being well outside of the scope of my research. These factors influenced what I was invited to observe and who I was able to interview.

**Case Study**

Traditional international relations theory would invite a comparison of CSOs between states. However, given that this thesis examines post-liberal peacebuilding theory with an influence from post-colonialism it focuses on the local, local knowledge and the everyday. As a result, I chose to examine three CSOs within one context as opposed to comparing CSOs between different contexts. This approach invites an exploration of the power dynamics within the organisations and their relations with other actors. It also explores the differences between local organisations and their staff in a given space and context and demonstrate the diversity of approaches and actors that comprise the local.

**Context**

The Eastern portion of the DRC is generally considered to be the part of the country most affected by the violent conflicts which have persisted for more than twenty years and has endured the brunt of the humanitarian impact described earlier in this thesis.\(^{11}\) Prior to the division of the DRC’s eleven provinces into 26 in 2015, the Eastern provinces included North and South Kivu, Maniema and Orientale. South Kivu was selected for the site of this research for two reasons. First, because among the conflict affected provinces in the East, far less information was available on local engagement in peacebuilding provinces in South Kivu when compared with the Ituri and North Kivu. Second, it was also selected because of the relatively higher level of security compared with other parts of the East.

\(^{11}\) Note that within the last year a new rebel group has emerged in Kasai province which is currently destabilizing the previously calm region and has led to the discovery of hundreds of mass graves.
Bukavu is the capital city of the Province of South Kivu. The province’s total population was estimated in 2014 as 4,614,768 on a provincial website (Province du Sud Kivu, 2014). In the absence of another reliable source of data on the population of Bukavu, Wikipedia estimates the population at 870,954 as of 2016 (Wikipedia, 2016). It is made up of a number of peninsulas reaching out into Lake Kivu and is surrounded by lush, green, hills. The daily temperature does not vary significantly from twenty-five degrees. The natural beauty of the region creates a strange contrast with the security and development situation in the area which have remained consistently poor as indicated across annual human development and state fragility reports. In 1994 many people fled the Rwandan genocide arriving in Bukavu. In the following years armed conflict would result in further displacement of the population. Basic utilities including water and electricity are available but unreliable and critical infrastructure is low and deteriorating. Access to reliable and affordable medical care is limited, despite the presence of the Panzi Hospital which treats victims of SGBV. The DRC, as a whole, remains one of the only countries in the World not to provide universal primary education. Out of work adults and out of school children can be found idling in the streets during most parts of the day throughout the city. Security threats do arise in the city but are primarily related to criminality. At the time of research Bukavu was largely unaffected by the acts of communal violence perpetrated elsewhere in the province, but my research participants others in my general surroundings worried that it could return.

There are many peacekeeping and peacebuilding actors in South Kivu. MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission for the DRC is present throughout the province where it works with the FARDC to try to enforce security and stability. Stabilisation efforts are also supported by the program StaRec, with the engagement of the national government, the provincial governments of
North and South Kivu and the United Nations Development Program. There are also a number of international NGOs and other UN agencies based in Bukavu with projects throughout the province that contribute to both humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts. There is a rich civil society in South Kivu comprised of many organisations addressing themes including peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, human rights, natural resources governance and gender equality, many of which also have projects outside of the provincial capital. There are a number of different bodies that attempt to coordinate and govern civil society organisations in South Kivu, some of which conflict with each other. Other actors including bureaucrats, churches, customary and community leaders also undertake actions that address peace and conflict dynamics. The Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs attempts to coordinate some humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts thematically across these actors, though its thematic clusters.

Case Selection

The case study for this thesis examines three CSOs in Bukavu, South Kivu, using the definition of civil society described above. The three organisations selected for the thesis correspond to the local causes of conflict identified by Autesserre, because this thesis focuses on the impact of local peacebuilding actors on the local causes of conflict. Thus, the first organisation selected focused on human rights. The second organisation addressed land conflict. Finally, the third had a thematic focus on identity politics, focussing on the ethnic sources of conflict. Ultimately, there was some overlap in approaches taken between these organisations, reflecting the interconnection of the local causes of conflict as well as justice and human rights.

All three of the organisations selected for this thesis were selected based on their ability to undertake advocacy activities underlining their capacity to act as agents in hybridized
peacebuilding processes. They were also selected based on their engagement in one of the other
civil society functions described by Paffenholz (2010) including: protection, monitoring, in-
group socialization, social cohesion, intermediation and facilitation and service delivery.
Ultimately, each of the organisations undertook all of the above listed functions and others.

The organisations that participated in this thesis were identified with the assistance of
other actors familiar with South Kivu based on the parameters provided above. Advice was
sought from two Canadian NGOs. One of the two organisations directly recommended and,
provided a formal introduction to, the justice and reconciliation organisation that participated in
this thesis. The other two organisations that participated in this research, which focused on land
and ethnic conflict, were identified through a local contact of the second organisation. Following
the protocol of the Research Ethics Board after receiving a formal introduction via e-mail,
representatives of the organisations were invited to contact me privately to express their interest
in participating in this thesis. Upon arrival in Bukavu I arranged to meet with these organisations
in person in order to assess their suitability for and seek their consent to conduct the research.
Having a formal introduction to all three organisations was helpful in securing their participation.
Upon arriving in Bukavu I confirmed with the first organization that they were not obligated to
participate in the research and they confirmed their ongoing interest. Ultimately, having a more
direct connection with this organisation seemed to help me to gain the trust of their staff faster
than with the other two.

Organisational Overview

After these initial stages were completed, I implemented the two research methods
described above. I conducted participant observation in each and completed semi-structured
interviews with their leadership, staff, beneficiaries and external partners about their work. While
the methods implemented at the organisations were the same, the different structures, thematic focus and financing of each of the organisations impacted the way in which they were carried out and so they will be described separately for each organisation.

Organisation 1 was a human rights and justice organisation established in 1991. It was led by a single coordinator, who had recently been appointed, and had twenty-one staff members, including three women. It had four active projects and an annual budget of $300,000 provided by a range of international donors. This organisation was loosely affiliated with the Église du Christ au Congo (ECC), which is the dominant protestant church in the region (Organisation 1, 2016). Although the organisation had no official political affiliation, they were highly critical of the government and the organisation’s coordinator was a former Member of Parliament for an opposition party. Internally, this organisation encouraged open discussion and debate around local events as well as theoretical approaches to their work. Power structures were relatively horizontal within this organisation and employees collaborated with one another to accomplish tasks.

Organisation 2 was established in 1997 with a focus on resolving community-based conflicts, supporting good governance and socio-economic development. It was led by a coordinator and two managers and had forty-four staff members and two interns including thirteen women, however several members were on technical leave at the time of research due to a funding shortfall. Its estimated $800,000 funding for the year was project based (Organisation 2, 2016). This organisation had no official religious or political affiliation, however observation showed that they had strong ties with many government officials.

Organisation 3 was broadly focused on promoting a culture for peace and was deeply engaged in conflict research and analysis. It was run by a coordinator and a deputy coordinator
and had 31 staff members and two interns including nine women. Its annual budget was approximately $1,025,000 which it received from a wide range of international funders. This organisation was the peacebuilding arm of the ECC, the organisation of the protestant church in South Kivu. It had no official political affiliation and appeared to be outwardly tied to but inwardly critical of the government (Organisation 3, 2016).

Fieldwork

Observing Everyday Engagement with Peacebuilding

While more systematic and replicable data was collected through the interview process, observation facilitated access to a broader range of participants and helped to contextualize the data collected through interviews. Finnstrom indicates that the sharing of experiences “works as a tool of intersubjectivity12 in the endeavor to represent and demystify the other, the unknown” (2008, p. 19). My daily presence at the offices of these organisations helped me to develop trust with the participants and gain access to information which also informed my interviews. It also encouraged informal storytelling and opinion sharing which also informs my research.

I committed to conducting observation at each of the organisations one and a half days per-week, ensuring that an equal period of time was allocated for each organisation. I used the extra half-day to complete fieldnotes or attend special events. I made an effort to attend special events or project activities organised by the organisations so that I could watch them carry out their objectives. I also made an effort to visit participants in their homes and churches when I

---

12 Drawing on Jackson (1998) Finnstrom indicates that divergence in experience and understanding of a phenomenon understanding can give rise to a shared and intercultural understanding of the phenomenon understanding (Finnstrom, 2008, p. 17). As suggested by Finnstrom, sharing stories informally with my research participants helped to inform my understanding of complex events related to war and peace as well as the context that they operated in.
was invited to do so, which helped to develop stronger connections and learn more about their private lives.

As noted above I had very different experiences across these three organisations, related to their structures and the level of access I was granted by their staff and leaders. In addition to observation of the dynamics within these organisations, I also observed the dynamics between representatives of the CSOs and their beneficiaries and their external partners. These processes will be discussed below.

Organisation 1

Education and public engagement on human rights issues was an important component of the approach adopted by Organisation 1. As such, it was not surprising that their staff were eager to welcome me into their office and teach me about what they did. I was included in morning staff meetings during which the staff discussed human rights abuses in the region as well as their own work and prayed together. I would spend much of the day in an open-concept office where staff would stop to talk with me and I could observe interactions between staff and between staff and their beneficiaries. After doing this for approximately a month I started to be invited to accompany staff on project specific activities in the community including visiting the provincial jail where staff lawyers were engaged in public defense work and to the Panzi hospital where the women’s program accompanied women affected by SGBV. I was also invited to the homes and churches of several of the employees and I participated in two field visits with this organisation to two different parts of the province. The first was to Bideka in the Walungu territory where a representative of an external partner organisation was given a tour of local service providers and then met with beneficiaries of some of the financing provided by his organisation to support victims of SGBV through legal and psycho-social support. The second trip was to Sange in Uvira
territory where we met with members of some of the organisation’s community-based structures. The organisation’s culture, which encouraged open discussion and intentional efforts on the part of the staff to invite me to observe their work, granted me a high level of access to information at their organisation. This openness might also reflect the fact that I was formally introduced to this organisation by a Canadian partner organisation. 13

*Organisation 2*

While the second organisation was also eager to share their work with me, tensions within the organisation due to funding shortfalls and internal power-struggles impacted the level of access I had to the organisation’s activities and the rapport I developed with some of the staff. This organisation held staff meetings on Mondays and I was asked not to attend the organisation on those days. When special staff meetings were held other days of the week when I was present, that often concerned program evaluations, I was encouraged to attend. It became clear early in my observation, that while project implementation was going smoothly, the organisation had experienced a significant funding shortfall and was facing a rift in the relationship with one of their funders. This led to several employees being put on technical leave because the organisation could no longer afford to employ them. To this extent it was clear that the organisation and its staff were not trying to conceal their financial crisis.

When I first began to visit the office, I would sit at a large meeting table at the centre of the meeting room but was soon asked to sit at a desk in a smaller office where I was less visible. As a result, I had to make an effort to engage people during breaks and over lunch to develop a rapport with them. The coordinator of this organisation began to encourage me to visit their field sites outside of Bukavu early in my fieldwork, which represented a dilemma due to the tension in


---

13 Out of respect for the privacy of this organisation and their partner I negotiated consent with this organisation privately with an assurance that I would not communicate what I observed to the organisation
the office environment and because of security concerns. Having pulled out of one trip which would have taken me to Mwenga by a MONUSCO operated helicopter, I agreed to participate in a second trip to the Ruzizi Plain in the middle of my fieldwork. During the trip, the coordinator absconded on more than one occasion to hold private meetings with local political officials. It remains unclear what these meetings were about.

I also made an effort to accept offers to visit the homes of the staff of this organisation when invited to do so and attended a Catholic Mass with some of the staff members for Easter. These visits helped me to better understand some of the differences between the protestant and Catholic traditions in the region, which was important given that the first and third organisations were affiliated with the protestant church.

*Organisation 3*

This organisation had a formalized workspace and a hierarchical structure. There were few common work areas and with signs on the walls demanding silence it was clear that informal discussion was not encouraged. During the first month of observation, a senior researcher was assigned to accompany me through the office and introduce me to staff. This researcher also introduced me to members of one of the organisation’s community-based structures based in Bukavu, who invited me to participate in their bi-weekly meetings. This presented a unique opportunity to investigate the dynamics within the community-based structure, which was part of a broader set of structures supported by all three organisations.

I was unable to meet with the organisation’s coordinator until after the first month of my research. After our meeting other members of the staff became more at ease with me and were more willing to share their experiences formally and informally. I was also invited to attend special meetings including an evaluation meeting and a participatory research training.
This organisation had the highest budget and largest number of external partners of the three organisations that I examined. At a time when the other organisations were struggling to pay their staff, this organisation moved into a new building constructed and financed by one of its funders and changed its name. When the organisation moved, the number of shared workspaces decreased even further. It was even more difficult to have informal discussion in this space which did not seem to invite them. I also did not travel to the field with this organisation although this was partially offset by my participation in their community-based structure which allowed me to better understand the implementation of the organisation’s projects. I was also able to visit one of their community-based structures in Kalehe during a subsequent trip to the province.

Overall my level of access to informal information within this organisation was limited because of the hierarchy maintained by the organisation’s management. Instead I relied on interview results and formal documentation provided by the organisation which were less easily verified through observation.

Observation of Organisational Staff with Participants and Beneficiaries

Beyond interviewing members of community-based structures supported by the organisations, field and site-visits presented the best opportunity to observe and interact with their participants and beneficiaries. These included site visits both within and outside of Bukavu. I participated in several of these visits with Organisations 1 and 2, while they were more limited with Organisation 3. The sites visited in Bukavu included the provincial jail, the Panzi Hospital, the community radio station, soccer games for peace and special events at the community level. Travelling with Organisation 1 and 2 to their field sites in Bideka and the Ruzizi Plains demonstrated how their efforts extended beyond the borders of comparably secure Bukavu.
Further, these excursions demonstrated the large range of stakeholders, participants and beneficiaries in their programs. These included children, who were not a group that was anticipated to be in peacebuilding spaces. All three organisations included an emphasis on peace education in their programming and youth engagement. There was a range of adults included in organisational programming such as the victims of SGBV to members of the provincial and territorial governments.

During my initial fieldwork, gaining access to the field sites was dependent on invitations on the part of the organisations being observed. Although this resulted in the pre-selection of sites that I visited and my association with those organisations in those spaces, relying on invitations allowed me to maintain the consent of the organisations that I was working with. It also helped to identify what components of their work staff and leaders felt it was most important to observe. These visits were generally undertaken with two to forty-eight hours of notice and with several staff members present. We would travel to the field sites in the organisation’s vehicle.

Observation of Organisations and Their External Partners and Funders

I also had several opportunities to observe interactions between the CSOs and their funding and operational partners. I observed the presence of funding partners at all three of the organisations, where they were likely to arrive to complete evaluations or conduct site visits. These visits would last between a day and a week, and often involved a financial audit component. In addition, an international staff advisor had been provided to the third organisation by their dominant funding partner on an ongoing basis. This individual was responsible for providing both technical and financial advice to the organisation and reporting to the funder that sent them.
In addition to observing their relationships with funders, I also had the opportunity to observe the collaboration between the CSOs and locally based operational partners. Each of the organisations examined in this research engaged in formal paid, and informal and unpaid collaboration with other organisations to achieve their objectives. This was undertaken in three ways. First, at times organisations would work together with other local organisations on projects managed by one funder. These types of collaborations were often linked to the geographical presence of each organisation in South Kivu. For example, one organisation implementing a broad project across a large area might collaborate with another organisation with extensive connections in specific parts of that area. Second, members of these organisations participated in community and international networks and groups focused on coordinating civil society activities. For example, all three of the organisations examined were members of the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) thematic clusters. Third, it was also possible to view this collaboration at special events hosted by the organisations. For example, the second organisation invited a local gender equality expert to present at a special event that they hosted because of a lack of in-house expertise on the topic.

Additional Field Visit and Additional Observations

In August 2017 I returned to the Eastern DRC as the methodological lead of a review of humanitarian assistance requested by OCHA. As part of this mission I was responsible for supervising research undertaken by local enumerators recruited from other local CSOs. I also conducted interviews with public health officials, local leaders and civil society members in: Komanda and Bunia in the province of Ituri; Masisi, Kitchanga and Goma in North Kivu and; Bunyakiri, Kalehe and Bukavu in South Kivu.
While the interviews conducted as part of this position did not pertain to my thesis, they did inform my broader understanding of the humanitarian context in those provinces. Further, it provided me with an opportunity to observe the ways that local CSOs collaborate with international and other actors in the context of both humanitarian and peace related programming. These observations also inform this thesis.

*Exploring Agency through In-Depth, Semi-Structured, Interviews*

Overall, I conducted fifty-four in-depth, semi-structured interviews across forty-eight participants as part of this research during my original fieldwork. I conducted interviews with seven staff members, six community-based structure participants, two external partners and the coordinators of all three organisations. Four distinct interviews were designed for each group of participants. All interviews were held in private and followed the informed consent process described in the Ethics section above. A copy of all interview materials can be found in *Annex 3.*

*Leadership Interviews*

Interviews were conducted with the directors and deputy-directors of organisations to examine the ways in which these leaders influence the efforts undertaken by their organisations to contribute to peacebuilding as well as their unique roles within the organisation. In order to achieve this goal, these organisational leaders participated in three one-hour interviews. The first collected biographical information about each of the leaders by focussing on each of their personal experiences with war and their motivations for engaging in peacebuilding activities. The second explored the approach adopted by the organisation to peacebuilding, their main activities and the role of each of the leaders within their organisations. The third sought to understand the relationships between the organisation and external partners.

---

14 A fifty-fifth interview was conducted with a member of a community-based structure upon my return to South Kivu in September 2017.
A total of four individuals participated in these interviews including three directors and one deputy director. In addition to these full interviews, selected questions from these interviews were applied into the staff interviews with senior financial or project managers to gain a broader understanding of individuals with control of financial resources and power within each of the organisations.

Staff Interviews

Staff interviews were targeted towards program and project staff and were approximately an hour long. They sought to understand participants’ personal understanding of, and experience with, peace and conflict in South Kivu; their relationships with participants and beneficiaries and; their collaboration with external actors. Further, participants from each of the organizations’ active projects were sought to participate along with senior financial and project managers.

Twenty-one staff members from selected organisations participated in these interviews.

Beneficiary and Participant Interviews

These interviews were designed to explore the needs of the beneficiaries in relation to peace as well as how they engaged with the organisations being examined. However, they were modified once I reached Bukavu for a number of reasons. First, they were adapted to reflect the presence of members of community-based structures identified upon my arrival who had a different relationship with the organisations than their beneficiaries. Members of community-based structures were easier to incorporate into the research in terms of access and minimized ethical risk to the participant.15

Second, after completing the first series of interviews it became clear that an initial question, aimed at understanding participants’ needs in relation to peace and peacebuilding, was

15 Note that beneficiaries in the more traditional sense were included in this research through the observation process.
too complex. As a result, I broke the question down into four sub-questions which explored participants’ needs in relation to development, security, justice and reconciliation, reflecting the definition of positive peace presented by Galtung (1969).

Seventeen participants completed these interviews during the original fieldwork. In cases where a participant did not speak French, a translator worked with me to conduct interviews in the participant’s language of choice. The translator was identified through a recommendation from another interviewer and was asked to sign a confidentiality agreement. These interviews lasted for less than an hour.

Participants from the first organisation were identified during a meeting between program staff and members of two community-based structures in Sange, a town on the Ruzizi Plains. During this visit, three male and two female members participated in private interviews with me. In addition, a sixth member of a different community-based structure participated in an interview in Bukavu. The first five participants were interviewed using the original transcript and the sixth was interviewed using the revised version.

Participants from the second organisation were identified during a field visit along the Ruzizi Plain in Bagira, Sange and Uvira with the help of the organisation being examined. These participants were members of community-based structures in each of these locations and were interviewed in private with assistance from the translator using the revised version of the interview transcript. Three women and two men participated in these interviews.

Participants from the third organisation were identified through my engagement with their Bukavu community-based structures. Two women and three men were included from these groups. Further, a participant in a training session in Bukavu, who was a member of a community-based structure in Uvira, also participated in an interview. One male and one female
participant were interviewed using the original transcript and the remaining four were interviewed using the revised transcript. A seventh beneficiary from Organisation 3 was recruited to participate in an interview when I returned to South Kivu in September 2017. In addition to completing the interview he also showed me his community-based structure’s office and explained their membership structure and core activities to me.

External Partner Interviews

Finally, interviews were also conducted with representatives of external partner organisations to the organisations being examined in this research. The leaders of each of the organisations were invited to identify three partner organisations to be approached for these interviews and of the three I individually selected two. For each of the organisations one of the representatives from the two organisations needed to be physically located in Bukavu while the second needed to be located outside of the city. Interviews with Bukavu-based partners were conducted in person while interviews with remotely located participant were conducted via skype. These interviews examined the relationship between the organisations and their partners and how their partners understood each organisation’s approach and contributions to peacebuilding.

Follow-Up Questionnaires and Interviews

During this research, it became clear that local engagement in peacebuilding occurs at many levels. In South Kivu, this includes at the communal, territorial, municipal and provincial levels, as well as through churches, businesses and local, international CSOs and locally-based UN staff. Like the CSOs, other actors among these groups were identified as potential intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding.
In response to these preliminary findings a new interview was developed to consult with these actors electronically. These interviews explored many of the same themes investigated through the initial interviews with the staff of CSOs. Participants were identified based on their historical presence in Bukavu and their engagement with peacebuilding activities. The interviews were held via Skype and lasted between sixty and ninety minutes. In addition, one intermediary also participated in this interview in Masisi North Kivu. Although his work was being undertaken in a different province it demonstrated the breadth of the types of contributions that individuals and groups can make in peacebuilding processes. These interviews are considered in the analysis and conclusion chapters.

In addition, after reviewing preliminary findings from the local civil society organisation, the importance of their relationships with their community-based structures and other locally-situated actors emerged. As a result, a new questionnaire was developed to further explore the relationships between these organisations and other actors in South Kivu. I also invited the organisations to provide an update on project activities and their financial situation towards a more longitudinal understanding of each organisations’ activities.

Copies of these additional research materials can be found in Annex 4.

**Strengths and Weaknesses**

This research project originally sought to repeat the above described research methods in Goma in order to compare the experiences of local civil society peacebuilding organisations. Unfortunately, a number of factors combined to make a second field visit impossible. These included both structural and personal issues. The financial and security conditions documented in the section on risk management should be taken into consideration when reviewing both the strengths and weaknesses of this thesis and its overall results.
Strengths

An early strength in this research was the extensive networks with Canadian NGOs working in the Eastern DRC that I had established prior to commencing my research. My relationship with these organisations helped me to share knowledge and develop a strong research plan. They also helped me to identify potential research participants in South Kivu and establish contact with these groups which is particularly important to establishing trust in the Congolese context.

As previously stated, once on the ground this trust, in addition to trust developed through my consistent presence in their offices, helped me to establish strong relationships with the staff and leadership of each of the organisations being examined. This access allowed me to observe a broad range of project activities and a level of discussion of financing that was unexpected. Further, it encouraged the sharing of personal stories which contributed to my understanding of the context, the organisations’ work and the personal lives of the participants.

This high level of access, in addition to an openness on the part of research participants to share their experiences, helped me to collect a high volume of data in a short period of time, including approximately 35,000 words of fieldnotes. This data helps to paint a strong picture of civil society engagement with peacebuilding in the DRC that has the potential to make contributions to the literature on the DRC and post-liberal peacebuilding. These outcomes were also facilitated by the decision to adopt a mixed-methods approach based on both interviews and observation.

Weaknesses

There were two major challenges in the research design process which ultimately influenced the outcome of the research. The first was a lack of conceptual clarity around key
terms adopted from the post-liberal peacebuilding literature. The absence of a clear definition or a methodological discourse of the local, including who was part of it and where it could be found made case and actor selection difficult. Had the range of possible peacebuilding actors been clearer from the outset, the project might have been designed to look at a more diverse range of actors beyond local CSOs, and community-based structures might have been more adequately integrated into the research design. Ambiguity in the construction of the term civil society in the literature also posed challenge in identifying what type of organisation to engage with.

Second, a lack of foresight in the research design phase related to personal security and financing while in the field significantly impacted the outcome of this research. Expenses related to insurance, visas and local transportation as well as a relatively high local cost of living left little flexibility once in the field to address unexpected costs of doing research including paying an interpreter during field visits. Further, security risks that presented themselves outside of working hours were not adequately anticipated or addressed.

As noted above, these factors influenced my ability to return to do additional fieldwork. The decision not to return led to a significantly lower period of time spent in the field observing the work of the local CSOs, impacting the ability to claim that this research is truly ethnographic in nature. Indeed, this experience has demonstrated some of the challenges in collecting ethnographic and anthropological data in conflict affected contexts.

Finally, an additional methodological weakness in relation to this thesis was the late identification of the relationship between CSOs and their community-based structures. This research was designed with the assumption that the CSOs would be working directly with beneficiaries at the household and community level. While this is sometimes the case, more often they work with beneficiaries with and through their community-based structures. Had the
importance of this set of relationships been known prior to the commencement of the research, I would have designed the methodology in a way that would have allowed for more independent communication with these groups rather than relying on the CSOs. However, this does present a strong opportunity for future research, as described in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 5: Organisation 1

Organisational Overview

Organisation 1 was a human rights organisation. It was the oldest of the organisations examined in this thesis and was established in 1991. Its mission was to promote and defend human rights (Organisation 1, 2016). During my fieldwork in 2016 the human rights situation in South Kivu and throughout the DRC remained very poor. The 2017 Human Rights Watch Global Report indicated that in the midst of a growing political crisis, that Congolese security forces “systematically sought to silence, repress, and intimidate the growing coalition of voices calling for credible, timely elections” (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The same report indicates that government officials “banned opposition demonstrations, fired teargas and live bullets at peaceful protesters, shut media outlets, and prevented opposition leaders from moving freely” (Human Rights Watch, 2017). In this context, organisation 1’s mission and program were focused on the promotion and protection of civil and political rights through public education and facilitating access to justice for individuals whose rights have been violated.

Access to justice is an essential component of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In 2013 Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud observed that a comprehensive plan for ensuring justice and fostering reconciliation had “yet to be envisioned in the DRC. Concerned primarily with peacebuilding, policy makers… treated transitional justice almost as an after thought” (Klosterboer & Hartmann-Mahmud, 2013, p. 68). This was reiterated in the 2014 Universal Periodic Review of the DRC, where the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “expressed deep concern at the state of the justice system, characterized by a severe shortage of judges, a lack of adequate resources, political and military interference and high levels of corruption” (Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, 2017, p.
8). This has created a context in which the population has limited access to justice. Organisation 1 seeks to address the lacuna by offering mediation and legal services.

This organisation was selected to participate in this research because of its focus on justice and reconciliation. The Secretary General indicated that Organisation 1 “works towards peace through education and training. We do not create change for the population, instead we support them in their ability to create change for themselves” (Leadership1A, 2016). The organisation carries out its work in six territories of the province of South Kivu including Bukavu, Kalehe, Fizi, Mwenga, Uvira and Walungu and reported its annual budget as $300,000 USD in 2016 (Organisation 1, 2016). The organisation was also officially affiliated with the ECC, however, their relations with the church had recently cooled.

**How do local civil society organisations seek to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?**

**Programming**

This organisation has four program areas: women and children; campaigns and communications; organisational capacity building and; legal, protection and research (Organisation 1, 2016). At the time of writing it had seven projects divided across its four program areas. All of the projects were funded by international partners and designed in consultation with their beneficiaries and members of their community-based structures (Organisation 1, 2017) demonstrating that material power was concentrated outside of the organisation.

A significant portion of their project funding was allocated specifically for work related to SGBV. These projects were focused on the protection and promotion of women’s and children’s rights, emergency relief for the victims of SGBV and a women’s legal clinic. They
also received funding to support the monitoring of human rights abuses; human rights education as well as a business and human rights project focused on indigenous rights (Organisation 1, 2017). These funding allocations created financial shortfalls for some of the organisation’s programs. In response, the struggling programs expanded their activities to engage with the projects that were receiving funding, which allowed some of the staff to be paid and to maintain minimal operations of their existing programs. For example, the legal, protection and research program would offer the services provided for under the women’s legal clinic project. The four programs and their projects are described in detail below.

**Women and Children**

The manager of this programme, Eunice, indicated the program’s objective was to promote the rights of women and children (EC, 2016). This program had three active projects. The first was a campaign against their mistreatment and conducted monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses including sexual violence and child labour. It also included a component on women’s economic empowerment. The second project focused on providing legal and medical support to the victims of SGBV and worked with a local partner, the Panzi Hospital.\(^{16}\) The third project sought to build local capacity on addressing SGBV among the organisation’s women’s structures referred to as “les paillotes de paix” (Organisation 1, 2017).

Historically, this program managed peace clubs with youth and other youth-oriented activities, however, at the time of research its efforts to engage women were most visible. The program’s manager indicated that “I do everything to ensure that both men and women understand women’s rights, because we can’t get anywhere without the men knowing that the law and the constitution prohibit SGBV” (EC, 2016). Her colleague, Annie, emphasized the

\(^{16}\) The Panzi Hospital is based in Bukavu and is best known for its reproductive health services and its efforts to treat and support victims of SGBV (Panzi Foundation, 2017).
program’s service provision. She indicated that she and Eunice were responsible for counselling victims of SGBV and accompanying them to the Panzi Hospital. She also discussed her role in supporting “les paillotes de paix” as building their capacity to promote women’s rights (AN, 2016).

Interventions in cases of SGBV were an important element of this program’s work. Women and sometimes children arrived at the organisation on a regular basis to receive assistance from the program. For example, on one occasion three women who had been suffering from serious physical and mental health problems resulting from war-related rape, which had occurred up to ten years earlier, arrived at Organisation 1’s office with a member of a women’s structure from Kalehe. All three of the women had lost or been alienated from their spouses and children because of their attacks and limited means to support themselves. When the women arrived, Annie accompanied the women to the Panzi hospital after completing an intake process. Once they were admitted the member of the paillote de paix who had accompanied the women from Kalehe explained that she had also been a victim of SGBV and that she had joined the group to support other survivors.

The program continued to provided support to women who had experienced SGBV after they returned to their communities. During a visit to Bideka in Walungu territory with one of the organisation’s external partners, members of the local “paillotte de paix” were invited to meet with the international partner at a Pentecostal church. Many of the women who participated were survivors of SGBV. They described their experiences openly in front of the group and explained how the community-based structure had helped them in their recovery. The support included access to medical, social and legal services and peer-to-peer counselling. Women were
encouraged by the organisation to speak publicly about their experiences with SGBV to de-
stigmatize survivors and to demonstrate the prevalence of such violence.

Other women arrived at the organisation’s office in Bukavu for legal support on an
ongoing basis. Their cases often involved inheritance rights or the imprisonment of family
members. The manager of the program also often received calls to attend to children in the field
who had experienced SGBV but was limited in her capacity to travel long distances to reach
them because of budgetary shortfalls.

Although the need for this program was clear, and well documented in the literature on
the DRC, it was primarily externally driven. Some members of the staff at this organisation
openly expressed skepticism about gender equality. Further, individuals from outside of the
organisation expressed resentment towards the support received by female survivors of SGBV,
noting that victims of other forms of violence and traumatic experiences were not afforded the
same level of care. Thus, this program can be understood as an exercise of both discursive and
material power by the external partners funding it, who have consistently insisted on addressing
SGBV and gender equality at this organisation and more broadly across the context. The
organisation chose to adopt the knowledge and accept the material resources of their external
partners, reflecting the acceptance of some members of the staff of the need to promote gender
equality, leaving dissenting staff members to vocalize their resistance informally.

Legal, Protection and Research

The legal, protection and research program had one active project that focused on the
promotion of the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights. This project did not
start until after my fieldwork and as a result there is limited information available on its
implementation. Staff from this program offered legal assistance to victims of SGBV project that is managed by the Women and Children’s program.

However, the objective of this program was to focus on promoting mediation and access to justice in South Kivu. One of the lawyers who worked with the program, Emmanuel, indicated that, when people came with problems that they tried to help resolve them in accordance with their “knowledge of the law and by listening to each party involved and mediating between them” (EM, 2016). For example, during my research I observed two of the lawyers mediating a case between a landowner and a vendor who was illegally selling cellphone credits from his property. Emmanuel also indicated that part of his work involved training members of their community-based structures on mediation which created the capacity to undertake conflict resolution at the community and village levels.

This program also referred clients to other legal services and processes. It offered a public defense service to individuals who had been detained and cannot afford a lawyer. On one occasion I visited the Bukavu prison with one of the lawyers who was there to represent several beneficiaries in court who had been arrested but could not afford lawyers. The prison was well over capacity, over 1400 inmates were being held in a space intended for a maximum of 350 and conditions were very poor. After waiting for two hours in the open area of the prison where three judges sat facing defendants under a tin roof all but one of the lawyer’s nine cases were deferred to another day because of the high volume of cases.

The administrator for the organisation indicated that this program had lost most of its funding several years earlier after the funder indicated that the organisation should start asking clients to pay for services. However, the lawyer that I observed at the prison indicated that most of the local population did not have enough money to pay for legal services and, as a result, they
provided most of their services for free. Often these staff members went unpaid, resulting in high rates of absenteeism as they sought out other income opportunities undermining the reliability of the organisation’s services. These observations suggest that this program was driven by a combination of locally expressed needs and the interests of the staff at the organisation. The continued presence of beneficiaries at the organisation seeking conflict resolution services strongly suggests that there was a need for this programming. The lawyers at the organisation applied their knowledge of the context to the program, refusing to request payment, while continuing to adopt funding. In this way they can be understood as resisting the material power exercised by their international financing partners when they cut back their funding and also as adopting locally expressed interest in non-violent conflict resolution

**Capacity Building**

The capacity building program’s manager indicated that it was generally oriented towards organising training sessions with other CSOs as well as building the capacity of the organisation’s staff and the members of their community-based structures (EA, 2016). The program also had one active project that focused on building the capacity of the local population to monitor and advocate for human rights. This project worked with other local CSOs and supported the organisations community-based structures. Although the manager of this program was usually at the office, he was often working on other projects for outside organisations, such as designing a course for a local university. As a result, it was difficult to observe his work or assess what influenced its activities or outcomes. On one occasion, I observed a group of students arrive at the office to receive a tour of the organisation and he asked them to come back the following day when he would have more time, choosing to defer their interaction and expressed interests to another occasion, although it was unclear why.
Campaigns and Communication

The campaigns and communications program was responsible for the advocacy component of this organisation’s work. This was the only organisation examined in this thesis that engaged in direct public advocacy work, in contrast with the other two organisations which sought to engage powerful actors through events or informally. This program had one funded project at the time of my fieldwork, which supported the development of a report on the overall human rights situation in the province in 2015.

The program used two communication mediums for its advocacy activities, which focused on the promotion of international human rights standards in South Kivu. The first was a print periodical, produced on an ongoing basis, to denounce “flagrant human rights violations based on field research” (RT, 2016). These documents were printed and made available in the organisation’s office and are distributed via e-mail to external partners. These reports documented cases of human rights abuses and outlined the organisation’s position on the abuse including calls for action. For example, a report released during my fieldwork on February 16, 2016 described the context in which a province wide “journée de la ville mort” was held in Bukavu to promote the realization of planned elections during which citizens are encouraged to stay home. The document outlined the political context in which the protest was held and observed that the population of Bukavu actively participated in the action. It concluded by calling on Joseph Kabila to respect the presidential term limit set out in the constitution.

The second medium was a weekly radio show produced through Radio Maendeleo. The program manager, Robert, described the show as another medium through which the organisation denounces human rights violations. For example, in March 2016, Robert produced a

---

17 Radio Maendeleo is Swahili for “Development Radio” and is the second largest radio broadcaster in South Kivu. It is run by a coalition of 16 civil society organisations.
show that discussed “rien sans les femmes” the campaign associated with the 2016 International Women’s Day marches across the country, which sought equal representation between women and men in the workforce by 2030. Robert hosted a woman involved with a local socio-economic development organisation on the show and they discussed the march and its aims.

This program was also responsible for producing periodic and annual reports documenting the human rights situation in the province. Robert indicated that he felt that his work had a high degree of impact. He reflected that, “when we identify insecurity, the authorities often act to address the issue and its causes within their communities” (RT, 2016). These reports are based on information obtained through their legal clinic as well as their community-based structures.

This is a very interesting program in the context of hybrid translation. It advocates for internationally articulated, liberal human rights norms in a locally applicable way. Radio is a particularly important communications medium in the DRC due to high rates of illiteracy and low levels of access to internet. The radio show also offers communication of human rights advocacy in local language that reflect context specific priorities. At the same time, it challenges other domestic interests reflected in the historic governance pattern in the country that persists today. This program continued to run despite budgetary shortfalls and threats against the organisation’s staff demonstrating their resistance to capitulating to intimidation.

Conclusions

Overall, these findings suggest that international knowledge about human rights make up the foundation for the organisation’s interventions. The organisation then uses knowledge about

---

18 This reflection points to one of several examples of a complex relationship between the organisation and state authorities. While the organisation has historically experienced tensions with the state as a result of their criticisms of its actions, this points to a potential avenue of collaboration with state officials. These relationships are explored in greater detail throughout the chapter.
the local context in relation to the internationally defined framework to respond to locally expressed needs and apply the internationally informed framework in a context specific way, therefore translating international human rights norms into the local context.

**External Relations**

**Working with Community-Based Structures**

When delivering the projects and programs described above Organisation 1 worked with thirty-three community-based structures situated within their zones of intervention across the province. There were two types of community-based structures engaged by the organisation.19

The first group was called *les Comités de médiation et des défendeurs des droits humains* (CMDs). These structures include both men and women of a variety of ages. A participant in Sange indicated that CMDs offer mediation to individuals and groups within their geographical community (Beneficiary3A, 2016). A second participant indicated that there were also sub-groups of CMDs in Sange that provided reports to the larger more established CMDs about conflict and human rights violations (Beneficiary2A, 2016). The organisation’s legal, protection and research program and the capacity-building program supported these groups by providing them with human rights training, and by helping to mediate and resolve difficult cases. Members of the CMDs were in frequent telephone contact with the staff of Organisation 1 to inform them of human rights abuses taking place in their communities. Depending on the type of violation, the organisation might choose to intervene in a variety of ways including offering mediation or legal support through their staff lawyers and conducting local and international advocacy around systemic issues through their publications, demonstrating their responsiveness to local

---

19 Historically this organisation also engaged peace clubs for both parents and students at the community level, however, this program ended more than five years ago.
knowledge that fit within the parameters of their mission. Organisation 1 supported twenty-two CMDs.

The second group of community-based structures were called *les paillotes de la paix*. The members of these groups were women who worked to support the realization and protection of women’s rights at the community level. Members would alert the staff at the organisation to the violation of women’s rights (Leadership1C, 2016). They also helped to identify victims of SGBV and bring them to Bukavu to receive treatment at the Panzi Hospital. Organisation 1 supported 11 pailottes de la paix. They offered the groups training to support these activities through the funding provided by their external partners. Indeed, the material power exercised by the external partners in this case seemed to help the members of the organisation respond to this set of interests.

In response to the follow-up questionnaire sent to the organisation in March 2017, the organisation indicated that they worked with community-based structures so that the organisation could accompany victims of human rights violations and promote intra-community peace. The members of their community-based structures included local representatives from church groups, educators, health centres, women’s groups and church groups. The organisation specifically sought out men and women who were able to read and write in French and Swahili and who had a good standing in their community, to join their structures. When members joined one of the community-based structures they were expected to accept the official protocol of the organisation (Organisation 1, 2017).

A reciprocal relationship existed between Organisation 1 and their community-based structures. The organisation sought to address needs of individuals and communities expressed by and through the community-based structures while also supporting their work to promote
human rights and peace. In return, the members of the community-based structures provided community-level information to the organisation, which it used as a foundation for its projects and interventions. Members of these structures from Sange and Bukavu tended to describe how the organisation’s efforts supported them in two ways.

First, many of the members of community-based structures identified human rights education as one of this organisation’s primary impacts on their personal lives. One of the beneficiaries indicated that “above all the organisation informs people about their rights, if I know anything about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it’s because of them” (Beneficiary4A, 2016). These observations also applied to an increased knowledge of women’s rights. In addition to helping to break the silence of victims of SGBV (Beneficiary2A, 2016), members of the pailottes de la paix in Sange indicated that they learned “the importance of going to the hospital “above all within the first 72 hours after an attack” (Beneficiary1A, 2016). This is an example of how the organisation translated international liberal knowledge into the local context in a relevant way.

Second, the members of community-based structures described how Organisation 1 supported their ability to resolve conflicts within their communities. The beneficiary quoted above also noted that the organisation had trained her community-based structure on how to mediate different kinds of conflicts including land conflict (Beneficiary1A, 2016). In cases where mediation was not an option, a male member noted that the organisation conducted advocacy, which helped to end arbitrary arrests in his village near Sange (Beneficiary6A, 2017). These interventions responded to locally articulated knowledge about conflict and helped to empower individuals to exercise peacebuilding agency in their daily lives. The organisation supported this capacity through providing training (Beneficiary6A, 2017) and at times material
resources to support their work. A member of a sub-CMD in Sange indicated that “they provided us with our office, they sometimes cover our transport costs and they have even sent us rain jackets to stay dry during the rainy season” (Beneficiary5A, 2016).

Staff at the organisation demonstrated a high degree of commitment to working with members of community-based structures. The Secretary General indicated that he believed that the ongoing contributions to peace and human rights by the organisation’s community-based structures were one of the organisation’s core successes (Leadership1A, 2016). Further, the capacity-building project manager confirmed that staff at the organisation received daily updates by phone or in person that they are able to integrate into their advocacy and capacity building work because of their community-based structures (EA, 2016).

These observations suggest that Organisation 1 relied on strong relationships with its community-based structures to support their efforts related to conflict resolution and human rights monitoring and reporting in its territories of intervention.

Working with External Partners

Organisation 1 also relied on both local and international partners when contributing to peacebuilding processes. Its staff collaborated formally and informally with several other local CSOs. Some examples of formal collaborations with other actors included participating in forums, distributing reports to partner organisation, joining advocacy campaigns and through meetings (EC, 2016). Organisation 1 also collaborated with local partners through its membership in the office of the coordination of civil society in South Kivu, which held weekly meetings to review and coordinate efforts undertaken by local CSOs (RT, 2016). Participating in such forums offered an opportunity for the organisations to exchange information, avoid duplication of efforts and to identify opportunities to combine their efforts.
Organisation 1 also worked bilaterally with partners in Bukavu on project specific activities. For example, they worked with a legal program that provides support to victims of SGBV that offered support to the women who receive treatment at the Panzi hospital. Their partner indicated the two organisations collaborated across several activities related to defending human rights including lobbying and a campaign against SGBV. She also indicated that, “when we encounter cases of serious human rights violations, we consult with Organisation 1 to assess the situation and determine what the options are. At times we also refer people to the organisation for further assistance.” (ExternalPartner1A, 2016).

The Secretary General also indicated that they “collaborate with almost all of the other organisations working in the same villages as our organisation, including those that focus on peacebuilding, human rights and governance” (Leadership1C, 2016). He added that this also included collaboration between community-based structures and representatives from other organisations or other community-based structures in their villages (Leadership1C, 2016).

Working with other local partners in this way provided an opportunity to defer activities that the organisation either did not have an interest in or those that the organisation did have an interest in but did not have the knowledge, capacity or resources to undertake.

In addition to working with local partners at the municipal, village and community levels, the organisation engaged in limited cooperation with the provincial and national governments. Organisation 1 indicated in their follow-up questionnaire, that they provide information on human rights to officials in writing or in person to try to influence decision makers engaged in peacebuilding processes at the provincial level. For example, during a meeting with one of their external partners and the minister of health, social services and gender, the secretary general, manager of the women and children’s program and an international partner discussed efforts to
curb high rates of SGBV in the province. The organisation reported that state officials also participated in trainings and workshops on peace, human rights and democracy offered by the organisation, however I did not observe such participation during the course of my research. In addition, one of the projects on SGBV being undertaken by the organisation was funded by the Fonds Social de la République Démocratique du Congo, a nationally administered fund directed towards peacebuilding, humanitarian and development interventions.

Despite this collaboration, Organisation 1 historically had a difficult relationship with the state, with several of their staff members being targeted for arrest by the ANR when they had openly advocated against state policy or actions (Organisation 1, 2017). Interestingly, in late October 2017, one of the longest serving members on the organisation’s staff was appointed to a high-ranking administrative position in the newly elected provincial government. The Secretary General indicated in an informal discussion that he hoped that the appointment would foster a stronger relationship with the provincial government.

Organisation 1 also had five formal international funding partners and others who supported their human rights campaigns. In the relationships with funders the organisation operated as an implementing partner for projects funded by international donors, which included the World Bank and international NGOs. The availability of funding was a key determinant of success for the organisation’s programs as other sources of income were largely unavailable to the organisation. Eunice also indicated that “having international partners allows our advocacy to be taken to a higher level” (EC, 2016). Other staff also indicated that having international partners protected them from human rights abuses because of their powerful influence as donors. Finally, this organisation also engaged with OCHA clusters. Their participation included

---

20 The “Fonds Social” is a national government project which seeks to promote stabilisation through the improvement of quality of life in conflict-affected parts of the country and the provision of livelihood alternatives.
attendance of monthly meetings of the protection cluster. The Secretary General also indicated that “in January 2016 we were included in a four-hour meeting with the Special Envoy from the UN which discussed the prospects for peace with CSOs” (Leadership1C, 2016). This is part of what he sees as a broader trend of engagement with UN processes.

Conclusions

This section demonstrates a tendency on the part of Organisation 1 to prioritise the interests of its beneficiaries and members of its community-based structures. The organisation adopts, defers or resists the interests of other actors that they collaborate with based on their abilities to address their interests. Where the organisation lacks support to address those interests from international financing partners they collaborate with or defer beneficiaries to local implementing partners. Through its coercion the state plays a significant role in resisting the implementation of international knowledge of human rights to the organisation.

Communications and Representation

As described above, advocacy was an important component of this organisation’s approach. Advocacy was conducted across two principal mediums, radio programs and print documents, which outlined human rights abuses and local conflicts based on field research and direct accounts, as discussed above.

The organisation also has a website, that provides an overview of its history, mission, programs and campaigns. Interestingly, although the English capabilities of most of the staff members are minimal, some of the pages on the website are in both English and French, reaching a broader audience. It is relevant to note the absence of any pictures of beneficiaries on the website or other print documents, which might compromise their security.
Informally, the organisation also represented the needs of its beneficiaries across the various forums and through its collaborations with local, provincial, national and international partners. The effective representation of these needs necessarily influenced the ways in which the organisation works with its partners. The organisation was recognized for its contributions by other local and international actors.

It is relevant to note that neither of the external partners interviewed had a clear sense of the organisation’s stated mission. For example, their local partner indicated that they understood the organisation’s vision as the need to “work with other partners to improve the security in the insecure locations that the organisation works in” (ExternalPartner1A, 2016). In contrast, their international partner indicated that they were not sure what the organisation’s mission was but suggested that “it might be to improve security at the community level and that the communities participate more in politics, tries to avoid political oppression.” (ExternalPartner1B, 2016). The weaknesses in these explanations suggest that the organisation could be communicating their missions and work more effectively to their international partners. Without a basic understanding of the organisation’s mission it could be difficult for partner organisations to understand how local needs align with Organisation 1’s efforts.

Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions and how?

Beneficiaries and Members of Community-Based Structures

Organisation 1’s staff were eager to discuss and demonstrate their commitment to designing and delivering programming based on the needs expressed by their beneficiaries, members of their community-based structures and the broader population of South Kivu. The Secretary General indicated that the organisation’s funding partners required the organisation to
demonstrate that they developed and delivered programing based on the expressed needs of their beneficiaries (Leadership1B, 2016). The models for service delivery implemented by the organisation also facilitated the exchange of information about local needs from beneficiaries and members of the community-based structures. Beneficiaries who arrived at the organisation to receive assistance resolving conflicts and through the women and children’s program exposed staff to local needs daily. Members of community-based structures who had been trained on conflict resolution also shared information pertinent to peace and conflict with the organisation regularly.

Through our interviews21, members of community-based structures expressed needs that were related to both negative and positive peace. Almost all of the participants indicated that there remained a need for dialogue and reconciliation. Two different male members of CMDs from Sange expressed a desire for the organisation of “groups to unite everyone” (Beneficiary6A, 2017) and to “end discrimination” (Beneficiary5A, 2016). Further, a participant from a women’s structure in Sange indicated that what was missing to achieve peace was unity between ethnic groups (Beneficiary2A, 2016). The president of the CMD in Bukavu also identified the need for more dialogue but she conceded that she was not certain that it would help because it seemed like they engaged in dialogue every day (Beneficiary3A, 2016).

Participants also indicated that an increased access to goods and services would contribute to their personal sense of peace. Two of the participants indicated the need to engage and educate children and youth. Education remains a determinant of livelihood opportunities in

21 Most of the members of the community-based structures who participated in interviews in this study, were interviewed using the original beneficiary interview. During the process of interviewing this group of participants, it became clear that asking participants to reflect on their peacebuilding needs was vague and needed to be disaggregated into questions examining the elements of positive peace (the absence of war, access to basic goods and services, the presence of justice) which it was for future interviews. As a result, the foundation for understanding of peacebuilding needs is less well developed among these participants except for Beneficiary 3 who participated under the amended interview.
the country and their absence was perceived as contributing to youth engagement in armed groups. A male member of a CMD in Sange indicated that he thought that addressing youth unemployment would prevent young people from joining armed groups or engaging in other criminal activity (Beneficiary4A, 2016). Further, the president of the CMD in Bukavu advocated for more access to free education because of the “many street children who are not in school” (Beneficiary3A, 2016). Finally, the same participants also indicated a need for a greater involvement of the government in promoting security. The member of the CMD from Sange indicated that there was a need for responsible government that would “take charge, a government that would support the population, a government that would fulfil its obligation to protect the population” (Beneficiary4A, 2016). The president of the CMD in Bukavu added that “there needs to be greater protection of women against SGBV” (Beneficiary3A, 2016).

The assistance sought by beneficiaries who arrived at Organisation also suggested some additional sets of interests and needs. Individuals seeking assistance from the legal, protection and research program often sought mediation for familial, land and inheritance conflicts. These requests suggested a greater need for conflict resolution and at times law enforcement. In addition, the women who arrived to seek support through the Women’s and Children’s program further highlighted the continued need for access to medical, psycho-social, legal and economic support and for greater efforts to prevent and address SGBV.

Staff members who participated in interviews were asked to reflect on how they understood the needs of their beneficiaries. In general, the information they provided was consistent with the needs described by the members of community-based structures above. Eunice described the needs that she observed among the organisation’s beneficiaries and members of their community-based structures in detail. They included access to adequate food,
education and health care in addition to the absence of fighting. She concluded that it was the government’s responsibility “to ensure that the population has an adequate standard of living and that they respect the rights of the population” (EC, 2016). Robert, the manager of the communications program indicated that “the population needs security. People who have been displaced want to return home” (RT, 2016). It is however interesting to note that none of the staff identified the need for more dialogue and reconciliation, which was a priority for almost all of the participants from Sange.

The frequent interactions between staff and beneficiaries in their offices likely reflect the emphasis on their interests and knowledge over those expressed by the members of their community-based structures. Overall this discussion suggests that the staff was well aware of the needs expressed by beneficiaries and that they tried to address those interests that are related to the mandate of the organisation.

In the follow-up questionnaire, the organisation indicated that their projects were designed through formal collaboration with beneficiaries. It indicated that they evaluated needs through field visits, trainings and meetings and through the review of documents sent by community-based structures (Organisation 1, 2017). The manager of the communications program also indicated that he planed his weekly radio show in collaboration with the guests that he invites to speak. For example, he said that striking public servants were encouraged to denounce the government’s failure to pay their employees (RT, 2016).

This formal approach is complemented by informal interactions with beneficiaries and members of community-based structures, which offered them an opportunity to express their needs directly to staff. Annie indicated that when she was with beneficiaries that “they would often provide recommendations about the government, the authorities or even the organisation.”
The project officer from the legal, protection and research program indicated that he learned about local needs through the clients that came in to receive legal services every day (EM, 2016).

Although none of the staff recognized reconciliation as an ongoing need expressed by beneficiaries, it is addressed across the organisation’s projects. The legal, protection and research project offers mediation and conflict resolution in a peaceful way, between conflicting parties. Further, members of the organisation’s community-based structures receive conflict resolution training, which they use to peacefully resolve conflicts in their communities. The community-based structures also offered spaces where community members can work together and develop a shared understanding of peace and conflict and undertake reconciliation. An important distinction is also apparent through this analysis. While they were able to intervene in certain areas, some of the needs expressed by participants should have been the responsibility of the government and were too systemic to be addressed by a small organisation.

These findings demonstrate the many channels through which the organisation’s beneficiaries and members of their community-based structures were able to communicate their knowledge, interests and needs to staff at the organisation. It also demonstrates that the staff were broadly aware of them presenting them with an opportunity to adopt, defer and resist.

External Partners

Organisation 1 had a broad range of local, national and international implementing partners with whom they exchanged knowledge and shared interests. They worked most closely with other local actors, particularly members of the local civil society coordination. Their collaboration and competition with Organisation 1 impacted the organisation’s ability to complete its mission. The organisation also worked in collaboration with a small number of
international actors who shared knowledge and interests through supporting their advocacy campaigns and who exercised material power through their distribution of material resources. Finally, the organisation also conducted some limited work with national and provincial authorities who also influenced their ability to realize their peacebuilding objectives.

There were limited opportunities to observe organisation 1 collaborating directly with other local actors and when this did occur it was generally in a service provision context. For example, when the staff from the Women and Children’s program helped beneficiaries access services at the Panzi hospital. These collaborations demonstrated how the organisation was able to defer the interests beneficiaries to other organisations when they did not have the internal capacity themselves.

The staff from Organisation 1 were invited to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of working with other local partners. The Secretary General indicated that the majority of the organisation’s local partners were also members of the office of the coordination of civil society and that they shared “the same ideal, which is to relieve the population’s suffering” (Leadership1C, 2016). This suggests that this form of collaboration offered an opportunity for knowledge exchange. He added that the organisation did not only rely on contributions from local communities to develop their projects and programming but that they would also consult with reports prepared by other organisations in the province (Leadership1C, 2016). Incorporating information from the reports of other organisations may have ensured that a broader range of the population’s needs were considered in project development (Leadership1C, 2016).

Other organisations working in Bukavu also helped Organisation 1 to implement its programs and objectives. For example, Eunice indicated that local CSOs would form coalitions to advocate for peace to government forces (EC, 2016). Such collaborations created a stronger
voice for the organisation’s advocacy campaigns. Further, participating in the coordination meetings held by the provincial coordination of civil society allowed the organisation to plan and implement programs in a way that did not duplicate the work of other actors.

While most of the staff members interviewed for this thesis reflected positively about working with other CSOs in the community, Annie suggested that some organisations acted as if they were superior to others. She said that they needed “everyone to know that it was us who initiated this activity, it was us, it was us. All this despite the fact that the organisation was working in synergy with others” (AN, 2016). This response reflects the competition between organisations for financing and other resources. This organisation had historically engaged in activities, which were similar to those of others in this thesis including the establishment and support of peace clubs for youth, which had been cancelled due to funding shortfalls. Ultimately, international financing partners appeared to decide between comparable organisations when allocating funding which had a dramatic impact on the outcomes of organisations’ efforts. These dynamics created tensions in the relationships between organisations and presented challenges to successful collaboration.

In recent years, the available funding for the organisation had decreased precipitously. At the time of observation, many of the organisation’s staff had not been paid for several months, it was facing challenges supporting some of its community-based structures and it was unable to cover many of its operating costs including paying their rent and electricity bills. Their funding had declined over time with international financial crises and donor fatigue. For example, the financial administrator observed that one of the organisation’s primary funders had recently encountered financial difficulties and merged with another organisation which had been funding Organisation 3. After the two organisations merged, the new organisation decided to exclusively
fund Organisation 3 (OC, 2016), even though there was little overlap in the organisations’ thematic foci. This demonstrates that international funding partners had a significant influence over which organisations exercised agency in relation to peacebuilding and which approaches were implemented.

Projects that did receive funding from international financing partners generally seemed to be of mutual interest to both the funder and Organisation 1. A participant representing one of the organisation’s international partners indicated that their approach was consistent with the organisation’s goals and values. He indicated that his organisation’s priority was to ensure that projects that they collaborated on with Organisation 1 were in line with community needs. He added that local needs were identified through a research project, and then confirmed in a plenary session before the project that they funded was carried out (ExternalPartner1B, 2016). However, this may not have been the case when Organisation 1 collaborated with larger international organisations such as Bretton Woods Institutions who apply their own frameworks and specifications to projects (Harrison, 2012).

Cultural differences also created some tensions between the organisation and its funders and demonstrate the imposition of Western knowledge on the organisation. The Secretary General described how culture and context had impacted the collaboration between his organisation and their international external partners. He indicated that the working culture was quite different in South Kivu in comparison with where their partners worked. He indicated that this was partially linked to access to technology and cited that it was not always possible to access receipts for expenses incurred during their work. He also mentioned the difficulty of evaluating the impact of the types of projects undertaken by the organisation because they focused on behavioural change at the collective level. These may have been complicating factors
in the relationships between local CSOs in South Kivu as they struggled to navigate the divide between local working practices and adapting to meet the needs of international and limited access to funding from international partners where such adaptations are impossible or falter.

Both the provincial and national governments also influenced the objectives and interventions of Organisation 1, as implementing partners as well as part of the broader social and political context. In its follow-up questionnaire completed in March of 2017, Organisation 1 indicated that it provided information about conflict and recommendations to support peace to the provincial government. At the national level, it indicated that government officials participated in meetings and training sessions held by their organisation. They were also working on a project that is funded by UNDP and delivered by le Fond Social RDC (Organisation 1, 2017).

The responses to the follow-up questionnaire identified some general opportunities and challenges of working with the government. They indicated that involving government officials could create credibility for the organisation’s activities and provide opportunities for the population to engage directly with politicians. However, the questionnaire also indicate that government representatives were generally unavailable or unwilling to participate in such activities and that they often asked for the organisation to pay for their transportation and other fees (Organisation 1, 2017).

This section demonstrates how the exchange of knowledge with and the exercise of discursive and material power by Organisation 1’s partners influenced their ability to exercise peacebuilding agency. It suggests that while local partners may help the organisation to implement their peacebuilding efforts when they share interests, that competition to maintain control over peace and conflict narratives and to access resources may have undermined these
collaborations. Further, it demonstrates that at times international funding partners imposed their
own knowledge or practices on the organisation which is enforced by their material power,
limiting the staff’s ability to adopt, defer or resist their interests. It also suggests more broadly
that funding decisions undertaken by these partners had significant influence on the ways in
which the organisation exercised peacebuilding agency, responded to local knowledge and
exercised its discursive power. Finally, state actors are shown to resist the knowledge and
priorities of the organisation which undermined the interventions undertaken by the organisation
either passively, by not responding or participating, or actively, through coercive measures.

Staff: Leadership, Identities and Group Dynamics

Leadership

The Secretary General was a charismatic leader. He was a charming and effective
communicator. His long history of working across the organisation’s programs also positioned
him to guide and represent the activities of the organisation. However, his recent appointment as
leader may have sparked some tensions among the staff. Before arriving in South Kivu, during
an informal conversation, one of the organisation’s external partners indicated that another staff
member had been acting as the Interim Secretary General, after the previous Secretary General
had to seek long-term medical treatment outside of the country. The external partner indicated
that he had anticipated that the Interim Secretary General would have remained in his role and he
was surprised that the organisation’s board had selected a different candidate. After the decision
was made, the interim Secretary General resumed his role as manager of the capacity building
program. There was very limited open discussion of this situation in the office. The only two
staff members to engage the matter directly with me were the Secretary General and the
organisation’s financial administrator who both suggested that the decision was made based on
his extensive experience within the organisation. Yet, while the staff were generally open with each other and the Secretary General they appeared somewhat more reticent around him and were less likely to seek his support over that of the organisation’s financial administrator. These trends suggest that the Secretary General would need to work to maintain relationships with the organisation’s funders and authority among the staff in his transition period.

In our personal history interview, the Secretary General intricately weaved his work with the organisation into his autobiography. He indicated that he was trained as a teacher before he “received training on peace education for children and later human rights” (Leadership1A, 2016). He said that, “Fourteen years ago I joined a CMD, a community-based structure, in Uvira where I worked as the secretary, and later I became a program officer responsible for monitoring all of the projects taking place across the region” (Leadership1A, 2016). During the early stages of the war in 1996, the Secretary General was working as school principal in addition to his role with the CMD. During the height of violence in his community, he helped to shelter families in the school during the night and to protect the school from attacks. He later became the manager of the capacity-building program before he left the organisation to enter politics where he worked as an opposition Member of Parliament of behalf of South Kivu’s civil society in 2007. He said, “I entered politics as a bit of an experiment. As an organisation, we always advocated for what the government should do, and I wanted to know if it was possible for the government to actually do it.” After this detour, the Secretary General returned to the organisation as a program officer under the Campaign and Communications program before he was appointed to his current position (Leadership1A, 2016).

The Secretary General was deeply affected by the assassination of his friend, one of the former Secretary Generals of the organisation in 2005. While this will be explored in greater
detail in the security section of this chapter, it is important to note the sadness that the Secretary
General still expresses over the event and the visible trauma which it has caused him and other
members of the staff. The experience seemed to have contributed to his overall sense of the risk
associated with the organisation’s work. Yet, this and other threats that he has faced do not seem
to have deterred him from deeply engaging in the organisation’s work. In August of 2017 he was
injured during a protest in Bukavu when soldiers threw grenades at a group of peaceful protesters
calling for the President’s resignation in accordance with the end of his constitutionally
mandated term. He said afterward that the event would not deter his efforts with the organisation.

The Secretary General indicated that he was also influenced and inspired by his wife. He
often reflected about her during our conversations, describing how she had started her own
business selling used clothing so that she could work together with him to support their family.
This may be reflected in his stated commitment to promoting women’s rights and the prevention
of SGBV (Leadership1A, 2016).

Given his recent appointment to the position it is difficult to assess the impact of the
Secretary General’s history and approach on the organisation. There was strong indication
through both discussion and observation that he continued to feel a strong sense of connection
with community-based structures and would prioritize their needs. Further, his familiarity with
the organisation’s programs in historical context also positioned him well to make informed
decisions about programing. Finally, when he was at the office it appeared that staff were ready
to follow the protocol he had laid out for the office, in an environment that supported debate and
creativity, which may have helped the organisation to define new approaches into the future.
Staff

As previously stated, this organisation is comprised of twenty-one staff members three of whom were women. All of the members of the organisation were members of protestant churches, most of which were affiliated with the ECC. Ethnicity was only recorded for individuals participating in interviews; however, this can be taken as a representative sample because more than one third of the staff members participated in the interview process. Overall, five of the seven staff members were Bashi, the dominant ethnic group in South Kivu. One staff member was from the Lega ethnic group and the Secretary General was notably Bafuliru. Overall, this presents a fairly homogenized staff which is predominantly male, protestant and from the Bashi ethnic group. It is also interesting to note that most of the staff at this organisation were formally trained as teachers or lawyers before they joined the organisation. This likely influenced their emphasis on formal conflict resolution and public education about human rights and peace and which internal and external interests they chose to address.

One risk associated with this homogenization of their staff was that members of the team might lack the language skills to communicate effectively with beneficiaries and members from the community-based structures of other ethnic groups. However, staff at the organisation generally communicated to each other in French and Swahili and sought members for their community-based structures who fit the same language profile. This may suggest that access to education is a barrier to participation in the organisation’s activities because many children only acquire Swahili language skills in elementary school and French language skills in secondary school.

The organisation was directly affiliated with the ECC, and religion and protestant beliefs were deeply integrated into the organisation’s daily activities. Most mornings the organisation
held prayers and an exchange of information. Many of the members of the organisation’s community-based structures were also protestant and the organisation worked closely with ECC affiliated churches outside of Bukavu. However, the formal relations between the ECC’s administration and the organisation had reportedly cooled, and the church exercised less influence over the organisation’s activities (OC, 2016). Further, the organisation consciously chose to extend its services to other faith-based groups recognizing that “human rights do not only apply to protestants” (Leadership1B, 2016).

The Secretary General noted that the organisation’s beneficiaries included members of all faith groups. While he identified one case where a member of a Catholic Church was referred to their services, most of the organisation’s beneficiaries continued to belong to the protestant church. Further, some of the staff members openly expressed worries that the increasing Muslim population in the province might lead to terrorist activities. These observations suggest that staff may have been reticent to assist or collaborate with members of some other religious groups. Some of the organisation’s funding comes from international actors affiliated with protestant churches. Further, there was no evidence that the organisation collaborated at all with the Peace and Justice missions of the Catholic Church which have a major influence on national political and conflict dynamics. Overall, these observations and statements suggested that the organisation’s historical link with the ECC continued to influence both their internal culture and the populations which it served, and that members of the staff were resistant to working with members of other faiths.

Women’s participation also represented a challenge for this organisation. Only three of the organisation’s staff were women and two of the three women worked with the Women and Children’s program and the third was the office cleaner. As a result, women’s voices,
participation and needs were not well integrated across its programming. There also appeared to be a lack of consensus among staff members about gender equality. During morning briefings, members would sometimes debate about whether polygamy was justified or whether women and men were equal. Such discussions made it clear that there were a variety of beliefs among the staff members which were not guided by official organisational policies. On one occasion after a staff member loudly proclaimed that the Bible declared that men were superior to women, a second male staff member lamented to me privately that he did not understand how some of his colleagues were able to maintain such opinions. When confronting these views Eunice would often banter back and forth with her male colleagues and take other opportunities to demonstrate her status within the organisation. In contrast, Annie would attempt to ignore such exchanges. These dynamics were inconsistent with the organisation’s stated commitment to gender equality and their programming which sought to protect women’s rights and demonstrates how individual staff members chose to resist what they perceived as externally imposed interests.

When asked about how the organisation ensured that women had an opportunity to engage in peacebuilding processes, the director chose to provide a general answer about inequalities between women and men in the DRC and indicated that his organisation primarily worked with marginalized women. However, he added that ‘The women we work with also understand that in our culture they are not always listened to in public forums, so they also share their message within their homes and families. Women do make an effort but unfortunately, they aren’t well represented in decision making spaces’ (Leadership1B, 2016).

Despite the power dynamics between male and female employees, when clients came into the office women and men were given equal priority and appeared to be given equal respect.

---

22 On another occasion she loudly demanded a younger male colleague come to see her in the crowded office, instructing him to go and buy her bread.
Both male and female staff members treated female clients with a high degree of sensitivity. Women also had the opportunity to participate in CMDs as well as pailottes de paix, which provided them with opportunities to contribute to peacebuilding at the local level. Thus, the organisation appeared to be empowering women to participate in peacebuilding processes even when they were not encouraged to do so as formal members of the organisation.

These observations suggest that the organisation’s services were most available to members of the protestant church who spoke Swahili, French or one of the other languages spoken by staff members. It also highlights that while the organisation encouraged the participation of women in a voluntary capacity at the community level, that it was not necessarily creating space for women to take on leadership roles within the organisation. While there were other organisations that served different ethnic groups, religions and women, their services were not necessarily the same and so these factors may have limited the proportion of the population that have access to the services provided by the organisation. Overall, this organisation had formal structures in place for project and program planning, monitoring and evaluation that were well defined and corresponded to donors’ needs. The Secretary General explained that the organisation had two levels of evaluations. The first was an annual review of the organisation’s projects and activities based on feedback from staff and members of community-based structures. The organisation also used five-year strategic plans to guide their work and funding (Leadership1B, 2016). Such processes helped to guide the organisation’s work and most of the organisation’s staff seemed to be aware of and engaged with those processes.

The power relations within this organisation were relatively horizontal. The staff worked together in close quarters and the sound of laughter often filled the office when they were not busy working with beneficiaries. Despite having differences in formal titles, the staff members
shared similar work responsibilities within their programs. For example, the program officer of the Women’s and Children’s Program, suggested during our interview that she did nearly the same thing as her manager (AN, 2016). This kind of an open and supportive environment appeared to foster discussion and debate. During the staff’s morning meetings, they would exchange human rights related news and staff members would discuss facts about the cases or different ways to approach them.

However, there were also some indications of discord within the organisation. There was little accountability of the staff if they were late to the office or missed work. Further, the financial administrator also noted that staff increasingly refused to conduct internal skill-building workshops which would re-enforce cohesion and offer capacity building opportunities to younger staff. These trends likely reflected the financial strain on the organisation and highlighted the vulnerability caused to organisations by inconsistent funding.

The Secretary General and Financial Administrator maintained material power over the organisation, acting as the final decision makers about how financial resources were spent and who could access the organisation’s one vehicle.

*Material Conditions*

In early 2016 this organisation reported an annual budget of $300,000 USD. This was the lowest budget of the three organisations considered in this research (Organisation 1, 2016). The organisation’s small staff and challenging work environment reflected this limited budget. In early 2017 the organisation reported an increase in their annual budget of more than $160,000 with the arrival of new project funding (Organisation 1, 2017).

Material conditions and access to funding played a significant role in their ability to achieve their peacebuilding goals. Organisation 1 was located in a one-storey building on one of
the main roads in the Ibanda commune in Bukavu. The building consisted of three large communal offices, three small individual offices, a storage area, and a reception area. While the legal, protection and research project had its own private office to hear cases, the women and children’s office did not. As a result, when women arrived to seek support after having experienced SGBV, their intake was completed in a storage area between offices, where other staff members would periodically enter to move between rooms. This presented significant challenges to maintaining the confidentiality of cases. This positioning may have reflected a broader consensus within the organisation about the value of their conflict resolution services which did not apply to their formal gender equality work.

The washroom consisted of one single toilet in a room with no light or sink. This sanitation situation affected both clients and staff and necessitated that the staff stay home if they were unwell. I never observed either of the female program staff use the washroom while they were at work.

Funding shortfalls led Organisation 1 to have difficulty meeting its operating costs. Half way through my fieldwork Annie complained to me one morning that she was unable to work because there had been no power or internet for over a month. Closer to the end of my visit, the Secretary General admitted that the organisation had been unable to pay its rent for more than a month due to a lack of funds. The funding provided by international partners was often project based and did not include the costs of maintaining an office or vehicles. As a result, they were reliant on individual donations from members of the community which are limited by the overall financial situation and are not predictably available (Leadership1C, 2016). The absence of funds for utilities made it difficult for staff to complete their duties and meet project expectations.
The availability of funds also affected Organisation 1’s ability to implement its peacebuilding and justice related interventions. Emmanuel indicated during our interview that the legal, protection and research program had previously been able to provide notarization to beneficiaries of their project for free, but that with funding shortfalls this was no longer the case (EM, 2016). Several of the staff members who participated in interviews also indicated that they no longer had the funds to travel significant distances to intervene in specific cases. Eunice indicated that she had recently been unable to travel to Shabunda to assist an eleven-year-old girl who had been the victim of a sexual assault, despite repeated requests from the organisation’s community-based structure in the area (EC, 2016). The transportation situation of the staff was also complicated by the road conditions, which are dangerous during the dry season and impassable during the wet season.

The Secretary General also noted that the organisation had previously engaged with more community-based structures but had to abandon them because of difficulties accessing them, which was compounded by the transportation and financial difficulties described above (Leadership1B, 2016). Members of this organisation’s community-based structures identified this as one of the primary challenges of working together during their interviews. A member of a CMD from Sange noted that the organisation was no longer able to cover the transportation costs from his structure which hindered his ability to hold meetings or meet with participants to conflicts (Beneficiary4A, 2016). The president of the CMD in Bukavu discussed how the organisation had previously paid for their office space and working materials but that the support had recently dried up. She said, “for the moment most of us are continuing to work as we always do but some of our members are reluctant to work on a voluntary basis” (Beneficiary3A, 2016). Such shortfalls affected the ability of the community-based structures both to collect information
and to intervene to resolve community-level conflicts. This would certainly influence the reliability of the information that they provide to Organisation 1 about the needs in their communities.

Security

Insecurity has had a major impact on the way that this organisation designed and implemented its peacebuilding interventions. One day the Secretary General reflected glibly that he believed that he would die in his position. This was because armed men assassinated his friend, and former Secretary General. This event is well documented both by human rights organisation and in locally focussed literature on the DRC. The following Secretary General left his position to seek out of country medical treatment. At the end of the conversation, he leaned in close to me and said, “but I’m not afraid, are you?”

The death of the organisation’s former Secretary General weighed heavily on the staff and members of their community-based structures. His photograph was posted on the edge of the receptionist’s desk in the front entrance of the office demanding justice for him and his family. According the current Secretary General, he had been visiting with the former Secretary General shortly before his death. He said that after he arrived at home, he heard gunshots in the distance and learned shortly afterward that his friend and colleague had been killed. Witnesses indicated that he had been shot by several armed men when he responded to a disturbance at the front of his property. Robert, the communications and campaigns manager indicated that the former Secretary General had been threatened after publishing a report denouncing the involvement of a prominent army general in corruption around mine sites in Mwenga in South Kivu (RT, 2016).

Many of the current staff were already working with the organisation at that time. The event remains unsettling for many of them because formal justice had never been sought for the
case and because they felt that they may also be at risk of experiencing such violence. The case was often discussed publicly for advocacy purposes and updates, and privately between staff members who remembered him fondly. Several of the organisation’s staff disclosed to me privately that they no longer felt comfortable going out at night and that they feared for their safety as a result of his death.

Other staff members had also experienced direct threats related to their work. The manager of the communications and campaign program said that he could not say whatever he wanted to during his radio shows. He reflected, “I remember in 2004 when I was arrested… I had produced a radio show during the night and the next day the ANR sent two officers to arrest me. I spent 24 hours in custody” (RT, 2016). Members of the organisation’s community-based structures had also been targeted as a result of their efforts. A member of a CMD from Sange observed that there were people in his community who were very resistant to their work. He said that “they realize that their crimes have already been recognized, they search out who identified them, and they target them in order to intimidate them into keeping their secrets” (Beneficiary4A, 2016). Another CMD member from Sange recalled an incident where a member of his structure had taken a photo of a soldier committing a crime and the soldier confiscated the member’s camera and arrested him (Beneficiary6A, 2017).

Out of the three organisations examined in this thesis, Organisation 1 was the only one that faced direct threats from a variety of sources in relation to their work. This is likely related to the direct advocacy component of their work which was absent from the approaches adopted by the other two organisations. Other members of the staff also remarked on how the overall security context influenced their ability to implement peacebuilding and human rights interventions. Ernest highlighted that the struggle for security and democracy in the DRC are...
both a challenge and an opportunity. While the security situation makes it difficult for the organisation to carry out its task it also presents an opportunity to improve governance and democracy (EA, 2016).

**Conclusions**

This chapter has demonstrated that Organisation 1 sought to contribute to peacebuilding efforts by advocating for the protection and promotion of human rights, access to justice and peaceful conflict resolution across four programs. The Women’s and Children’s Program sought to protect and promote women’s rights with a focus on access to care for the victims of SGBV. The legal, protection and research program offered conflict resolution and mediation services to residents of South Kivu and contributes to access to justice. The capacity-building program facilitated the ability of members of community-based structures, the organisation’s staff and other groups to understand their basic human rights and engage in peaceful conflict resolution and advocacy. Finally, the campaigns and justice programs mobilized local and international actors to advocate for human rights and promoted a positive peace. These programs are defined and implemented in collaboration with community-based structures. They are supported by local and international partners.

While these programs primarily focused on “local” causes of conflict specific to South Kivu and the communities where the organisation works, some also extended to national causes of conflict. At the community level, the organisation’s protection, legal and research program helped residents to resolve conflicts in a peaceful way, which avoided them escalating and involving more people. Further, elements of the organisation’s programming oriented towards informing community members of their rights may also have served to resolve conflicts by providing additional analytical tools for analyzing conflicts. They also created awareness of
services available to victims of human rights violations potentially creating a sense of positive peace. The organisation’s efforts may also have addressed the national causes of conflict in two ways. First, the organisation’s campaigns and communications program specifically addressed national human rights violations, including the refusal of the current government to hold national elections which has become a major source of conflict in the country. Although Organisation 1 played a micro role in this macro issue, the knowledge which it shared through its advocacy campaign also informed actions taken by its external partners, offering it a broader reach. Second, by educating community members about their human rights, it made them less likely to be manipulated by powerful territorial, provincial and national actors who seek to engage them in broader armed conflicts.

*Discursive Power*

This chapter has demonstrated that Organisation 1 received information about local knowledge interests and needs in two ways. First, staff received information through members of its community-based structures who had been trained and mobilized by the organisation and who were directly engaged in helping it to achieve its mission. Second, it also absorbed this information through the daily interaction between staff and beneficiaries who received services from the organisation. The descriptions of the needs of their beneficiaries provided by staff suggested that they were more familiar with the needs expressed by their beneficiaries, likely arising out of the frequencies within their interactions.

Organisation 1 transferred knowledge provided by its beneficiaries and community-based structures to its external partners through a number of channels. It shared knowledge with its local implementing partners through its radio broadcasts, publications and participation in meetings and events, particularly those facilitated by the local civil society coordination. It
communicated its knowledge to its international financing partners more formally through publications, reports, meetings and evaluations. This information largely concerned human rights violations occurring in the province and the organisation’s calls to action.

The international implementing partners communicated their knowledge, interests and expectations with the organisations through their formal funding arrangements, publications and meetings. The organisation was exposed to knowledge and interests of other local implementing partners and the government through many of the same avenues that they shared this information.

Finally, Organisation 1 communicated human rights knowledge supported by its external partners and staff to its beneficiaries and community-based structures in a variety of ways. It did so by providing services to beneficiaries in their Bukavu office or referring them elsewhere if the organisation could not address their needs internally. Further, it offered human rights and peace education to members of its community-based structures who described sharing this information within their broader networks.

An examination of the organisation’s collaboration with community-based structures suggests that their members directly influenced the organisation’s projects and priorities through sharing information and that they played an important role in conflict resolution. The organisation’s external partners were able to support their interventions in a number of ways but had a disproportionate impact on their ability to implement projects by forcing them to compete for funding at the local level and by making decisions about who received funding and for what projects. This suggests that while members of community-based structures had more influence over project design, international partners exercised a disproportionate amount of power through funding allocation.
Despite financing and security challenges, Organisation 1 maintained control over the narrative it presented on human rights in South Kivu. The power of its narrative was reinforced by coercive efforts on the part of the state to silence the organisation’s members through violence, arrest and threats. Ultimately, these efforts and other security risks arising from the conflict in South Kivu also restricted the way in which the organisation and its staff were able to communicate their knowledge and objectives and contribute to peacebuilding.

**Material Resources**

The discursive power exercised by Organisation 1 was mediated by its material conditions and the material power exercised by its external partners. It was entirely dependent on material resources provided by international financing partners. The financing that the organisation received allowed it to undertake some of its programs and maintain its office. However, funding shortfalls meant that it could not fully realize its mission and presented many challenges to staff in their work. Material resources were distributed to the organisation’s staff through service provision and members of community-based structures recalled that the organisation had provided financing for their activities in the past when they had better financing. Limited access to financial resources also posed challenges to the organisation’s ability to exchange knowledge and support with other local implementing partners with whom they competed for limited funding.

**The Influence of Identity and Internal Dynamics**

Examining the dynamics within the organisation also demonstrates the ways in which individual actors and group dynamics within the organisation influenced its contributed to peace. The organisation’s beneficiaries predominantly included Bashi, Bafuliru and Barega speaking protestant church members from South Kivu, reflecting the composition of the staff. Further, the
insistence on gender equality by the organisation’s secretary general and external partners contributed to its strong women’s and children’s programming but was met by resistance from some staff member. The resistance of some staff to gender equality moderated the influence of women over organisational decision making. It may also have contributed towards a framing of women primarily as victims while men were framed as powerful conflict actors.

One of the more positive impacts of the identities of the staff members on the organisation was their professional training as lawyers and teachers. These backgrounds positioned them well to understand both national and international guarantees of human rights and their ability to engage in public education on those topics. The staff members also sought to influence peace outside of the organisation, working through their churches and in some cases by establishing their own community-based structures (AN, 2016).

The organisation’s horizontal power dynamics created a space in which information was openly shared. It also allowed staff members to individually determine how they would adopt, defer and resist the knowledge and interests of actors outside the organisation.

*Translating Hybridity*

The process of translation at Organisation 1 was undertaken informally, reflecting the horizontal structure of the organisations. Staff members discussed and debated contentious topics which helped to shape the organisation’s ultimate approach to address them. Both the organisation’s leadership and program staff would decide how to respond to these debates through their work. This case provided a number of examples of translated hybridity. These include gender equality, service provision and financing.

As previously discussed, gender equality and services for the survivors of SGBV were priorities expressed by both the external partners of the organisation and some of its
beneficiaries. With the financial incentive of their international financing partners, Organisation 1 developed and implemented the Women’s and Children’s program. In general, the staff of this program adopted the gender-equality model by providing support to the victims of abuse and by delivering educational programs on women’s rights. When the needs of their beneficiaries extended beyond their capacity, the program would refer them to the Panzi Hospital which provided medical and psycho-social support. Gender equality was also the subject of resistance on the part of some staff members who would vocalize their dissent for the concept. In general, these members would defer activities related to gender equality to other staff members. For example, only the manager of the women’s and children’s program marched in the International Women’s Day event.

Service provision more broadly presented another example of how the organisation adopted, deferred and resisted locally expressed interests and needs. The organisation adopted locally expressed needs in relation to conflict resolution into its programming by offering mediation and public defense services. It also advocated to the government in relation to governance and other human rights issues identified by its beneficiaries. The staff at the organisation would defer interests of beneficiaries whose needs exceeded the capacity or material resources of the organisation who would often be redirected to other service providers. The organisation demonstrated resistance by not trying to address all of the needs expressed. This was particularly evident in the interview with one member of the organisation’s community-based structures who repeated her request for an internet café several times of the course of our interview (Beneficiary2A, 2016).

Finally, staff at the organisation also demonstrated their ability to adopt, defer or resist in relation to the financing they received. Beyond determining how they used funds, the staff
generally tried to adopt the financial management style required by their donors. The
organisation deferred their financing situation by only paying their bills and rent when the money
was available to do so as well as deferring programming until financing could be secured. Staff
at the organisation resisted funding shortfalls by continuing to work on projects that they valued
such as the legal, research and protection project, without being paid, or despite not having
access to electricity or the internet.

Indeed, this demonstrates how the individual and group decisions made at the
organisation can translate between the expressed knowledge and needs expressed by external and
internal actors and the material resources provided by international financing partners.
Chapter 6: Organisation 2

Organisational Overview

Organisation 2 was selected to participate in this research because of their efforts to address land conflict in South Kivu. Vlassenroot explains that land disputes which had historically existed because of the heterogeneous nature of the population in the Eastern DRC and the presence of autochthonous and migrant groups became heightened in the 1990’s when the Mobutu regime encouraged groups to mobilize along ethnic lines. This led to increasingly violent conflict between ethnic communities (Vlassenroot, 2004). However, a more recent article published by Mathys and Vlassenroot highlights that other sources of land conflict have become more prominent in recent years “including community-level conflicts between farmers and large-scale concessionaires, between rural communities and mining companies, between pastoralists and farmers, and between national parks and surrounding populations” (Mathys & Vlassenroot, 2016, p. 2). Refugee flows stemming from other regional conflicts including the Rwandan Genocide (Boas, 2012, p. 98) and by returning Congolese refugees whose land has been taken over by other families, also contribute to land conflict (de Heredia, 2012, p. 85). Finally, Gaynor indicates that such disputes are further complicated by “the continued failure to address the ambiguous and easily manipulated land tenure laws” (Gaynor, 2016, p. 272).

Organisation 2’s efforts addressed land conflict across a number of thematic areas. The organisation sought to resolve land conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists in the regions that they work in, including Bukavu, Mwenga, Fizi and Uvira as well as with provincial authorities in both North and South Kivu (Organisation 2, 2016). These efforts also extended to address some elements of ethnic and other inter-community conflicts in relation to historical land use patterns of different groups. The organisation also worked with refugees from neighbouring
countries and returning Congolese refugees. Further, part of their work focused on livelihoods which specifically offered alternatives such as masonry that are not land intensive.

The organisation’s efforts also extended beyond addressing land conflict. An important element of their work was an equal engagement across ethnic groups through a formal policy adopted by the organisation. They also worked in Minembwe, an autonomous territory for the Banyamulenge of Mwenga, Fizi and Uvira created under the RCD while it controlled the province during the second phase of the war (Turner, 2013).

Organisation 2 was established in 1997 by its current coordinator in collaboration with two others who remained engaged with the organisation through its board of directors. The coordinator explained that he and his colleagues established the organisation because of their personal experiences of violence and conflict. He indicated that the organisation was created to bring the community together and sustain long-term peace when there were no other social or military structures seeking to do so. He describes the period as one marked by “polarization between ethnic groups, stigmatization and inter-community violence (Leadership2A, 2016). The coordinator described the organisation’s vision as seeking to create the conditions in which “the entire Congolese community can live in harmony, in perfect cohesion where the rights and responsibilities are respected. Our vision is to accompany the population through peacebuilding efforts and to support good governance in order to ensure a long term, sustainable peace” (Leadership2A, 2016). This organisation has no formal affiliation with a religious or political group.
How do local civil society organisations seek to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?

Programming

This organisation had three thematic areas of focus. First, it emphasized community conflict transformation. Under this theme the organisation conducted conflict analysis; offered conflict mediation; conducted advocacy and; supported local partners in their conflict resolution efforts. Second, it supported good governance, including citizen participation in all levels of government and decentralisation. Activities undertaken by the organisation related to this theme included research and analysis, civic education and capacity-building of local authorities. Third, the organisation focused on socio-economic development. Their activities in this area included food security; water health and sanitation; shelter; disaster risk reduction; HIV prevention; and gender equality (Organisation 2, 2016).

The organisation’s activities included projects related to the broad themes undertaken in collaboration with international funding partners. At the time of research, the organisation had two active projects. The first was a regional peacebuilding project funded by a large international non-governmental organisation (INGO) and the second was a peace education program funded by UNICEF. The organisation also continued to support a project that had recently lost its funding that focused on supporting community-based structures, which also engaged other local CSOs discussed below (Organisation 2, 2016).

Regional Peacebuilding Project

The regional peacebuilding project engaged community members, as well as local and provincial authorities from South and North Kivu. The evaluation manager for this project indicated that it was being implemented in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC on behalf of the
funding partner, with the objective of improving intercommunity relations within the Great Lakes Region. The project had three phases. The first involved a community-level conflict analysis which took place across the regions involved in the project. The second was to develop a roadmap for peace, which was being drafted in consultation with local actors, including local authorities, youth, women and civil society members. The final phase was to hold roundtables on the road map for peace in Goma and Kigali “where principal political and international actors and decision makers would be asked to ensure that the road map was implemented and realized” (SJ, 2016).

During my fieldwork, this project was in its second phase and a round table on the development and implementation of a road map for peace was held in Bukavu in early April 2016. Participants at the event included representatives from the UN, the provincial government, partner organisation and the members of some of Organisation 2’s community-based structures who they introduced as “Artisans of Peace”. Provincial ministers had also been invited but were unable attend because of a cabinet shuffle the night before. The meeting was held in a large meeting room housed at Organisation 3, with whom Organisation 2 maintained strong professional relations. In the meeting room there were two arches of tables and chairs around the event hall with high ranking UN and government officials sitting in the inner arch and members of civil society and community-based structures sitting in an outer arch. This layout visually separated elite actors from others attending the meeting, signaling the organisation’s emphasis on working with local and international elites.

The event was hosted by Organisation 2’s coordinator and it offered a forum for local and international actors to identify sources of conflict and the measures that they as local, national and international actors were taking to address them. At the beginning of the event a
representative from the INGO that was funding the project provided an overview of the results of
the first phase of the project which sought to identify factors influencing conflict in the Great
Lakes Region. They included: unequal management of natural resources; the inability or
unwillingness of local authorities to protect the rights and security of citizens; economic
stagnation; manipulation and exploitation of ethnic, national and political identities; and
recruitment of youth into armed groups. During the event, the artisans of peace, local CSOs,
INGOs, UN representatives and StaRec\(^{23}\) were invited to present on how they were contributing
to peace. A representative from a local women’s organisation was also invited to present on
Resolution 1325 and the integration of women and girls into peacebuilding processes. At the end
of the event participants were asked to form groups and identify commitments that they could
make to establishing peace together. However, the activity was rushed, and several participants
had already left the event. As a result, many of the groups failed to identify concrete steps to
implement a road map for peace. At the end of the second day of the event the organisation
agreed to circulate information on the road map for peace to relevant stakeholders and the
broader group expressed a commitment creating youth empowerment centers to divert young
people from joining armed groups.

Organisation 2’s coordinator suggested that this event was a concrete success for the
organisation. He said that the INGO that had financed the roundtable “appreciated our capacity
to mobilise people, our capacity to bring forward important questions and to bring the
government to the table… We even received messages of support from armed groups to
encourage our efforts” (Leadership2B, 2016).

---

\(^{23}\) StaRec is a program designed by the Congolese government to restore state authority and improve infrastructure
in conflict affected regions of the DRC including North and South Kivu. It also includes a reconciliation component.
It is supported by MONUSCO and UNDP (STAREC, 2018)
This event was particularly interesting from the perspective of this thesis. It was an opportunity to observe a forum in which different sets of community-based, provincial, national and international actors communicated their knowledge about peace and conflict in South Kivu. It underscored the differences in the frames of reference between groups ranging from inter-community violence and livelihood needs to reconstruction and the reinforcement of the security sector. It also provided an example of where the organisation had chosen to defer certain discussions, including gender equality that it lacked the internal capacity for, to other actors. Finally, the final activity could be understood as an attempt to translate the outcomes of the proceedings into action in the provincial and national political context despite their difficulty mobilizing this process.

In addition to financing the major components of the project above, the INGO also sponsored additional activities led by Organisation 2 that corresponded to the factors that influenced sources of conflict identified in the first phase of the road map for peace project. First, the organisation organized a training for one group of its community-based structures called “Workshop on the Manipulation of Identities and Stereotypes” in Bukavu. During the second day’s proceedings participants were asked to identify powerful actors who might participate in the manipulation of ethnic identities in their communities. The participants identified a range of actors including: armed groups, community leaders, religious leaders and CSOs among others. In the afternoon, participants were separated into groups based on their geographical communities and were asked to identify two concrete actions that they wished to take to address identity-based conflict in their communities. There was a great deal of disagreement on what approach to take between members of each of the groups which was not moderated by the facilitators. None of the
groups were able to finish the task within the designated two hours. Their presentations were postponed until the next day.

A second activity that responded directly to the factors identified during the Road Map for Peace project was a livelihoods activity which sought to present youth with training on income generating activities as an alternative to joining armed groups. The activities were undertaken in the Uvira territory of South Kivu. They included the construction of two markets where members of agricultural cooperatives could sell their milk and produce. In addition, more than thirty youth received training to become seamstresses, barbers and masons.

The activities undertaken as part of this project were clearly aligned with this organisation’s interests and objectives. The organisation’s coordinator was closely involved with its activities and went to significant lengths to support them, frequently travelling to participate in events related to the road map for peace.

**Peace Education Project**

The peace education project hosted at this organisation was funded by UNICEF. Both the project manager and a field supervisor for this project described themselves as being passionate about children and children’s rights. Stephane, the project manager explained, “When I was offered the job I knew that I would be in my element and that I would be able to contribute, to give something to the children, to communicate something to them about the importance of peace… and I am so happy to see the gradual changes brought about by our work” (SN, 2016). Stephane’s colleague, Alison, the field supervisor added that “I have a real passion for children, in Gisenyi, where I live with my children, I started a ministry within my church to help them. I was inspired by my work here. When I interviewed children for the project, I discovered that they have really been impacted by the situation here. It really causes them to suffer” (AS, 2016).
Stephane indicated that their project’s primary focus was peace education and the promotion of engaged citizenship among youth (SN, 2016). Alison highlighted that this was primarily carried out through the organisation of peace clubs including “soccer clubs, video forums, participatory theatre, dances and cultural activities” (AS, 2016). Stephane added that “We work with children in their schools and neighbourhoods in order to help them grow up valuing peace and tolerance, that’s what we are trying to achieve through the peace clubs” (SN, 2016).

Two soccer games under this program were observed as part of this study. The first was held in Kadutu, the most densely populated and poorest area of Bukavu. When we arrived, the game was already nearing its conclusion. Neighbourhood children and some adults observed the game which was being played mostly by teenaged boys, although one of the facilitators was careful to point out the “one strong girl” who was also playing. The teams were composed of players from different ethnic groups and that every game started with a lesson about tolerance and peace. At the end of the game when one of the teams scored the winning goal their friends rushed the soccer pitch to congratulate their friend.

The second game that I attended was in Mbobero, to the North-West of Bukavu. When we arrived at the soccer field, throngs of children between the ages of four and twelve arrived to greet us having left school for the day. Despite the age of the crowd the teams consisted of young men in their late teens and early twenties. Stephane launched the game, announcing that they were there to promote peace and understanding between different ethnic communities. During the game some of the facilitators spoke with the younger children who had gathered to watch the game, discussing what peace meant to them and promoting a culture of peace.
This project appeared to be more externally driven. Although its principles broadly aligned with the mission of the organisation, the staff who managed it had been newly hired, there was little additional engagement of youth through the programming and the coordinator and the administrators did not appear to be as involved with this program. UNICEF had also engaged at least one additional local CSO in the delivery of this program, confirming that it was their project.

Unfunded Projects

At the time of research, this organisation had come to the end of its funding cycle for several of its projects. Much of the staff was working on new funding proposals in early 2016, however the organisation reported in a follow-up questionnaire that it had not received any new funding for the projects described below (Organisation 2, 2017). This section explores the projects that were terminated but reflect the organisation’s priorities and approach to peacebuilding.

The first project worked with community-based structures. The organisation’s program administrator Etienne described the project as focussing on “conflict between agriculturalists, pastoralists and customary leaders” (EE, 2016). The project brought members of different ethnic communities as well as agricultural practices together in groups to resolve conflicts. Organisation 2 was among three local CSOs receiving funding through this project. Organisation 3 was also part of the project which had its funding halted due to reporting inconsistencies among the organisations involved in the project. The circumstances under which this project lost its funding will be explored in greater detail below. While Organisation 3 remained engaged with the members of their community-based structures when the funding ran out, Organisation 2 did not appear to be in contact with their participants. This suggests again that this project was not
well aligned with the Organisation’s mandate which seemed to be somewhat disconnected from the organisation’s emphasis on land conflict and livelihoods.

Etienne also described two other projects that had come to the end of their funding cycles. The first worked to assist refugees and internally displaced people (EE, 2016). David the project manager described part of this project as focussing on the ways in which refugees arriving from Burundi were impacting conflict dynamics in the region (DD, 2016). The final project was focussed on reducing tensions between pastoralists and agriculturalists and focused on bringing them together around common interests to reduce identity conflict. One of the most interesting aspects of this project was the provision of cattle to agriculturalists so that they could better understand the challenges faced by their pastoralist interlocutors (EE, 2016). The organisation appeared to be continuing to engage in some of these efforts beyond the end of their fighting, particularly those that related to conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists. The coordinator was quite excited by the latter project and discussed it at great length in our interviews and our private conversations.

Published Book

During my fieldwork, one of the staff members at Organisation 3 shared a book that he had co-authored while working at Organisation 2. It examined traditional approaches to conflict resolution among the Babembe, the Bafuliru and the Bahavu in South Kivu, and was locally published in 2003. It identifies thirteen local sources of conflict including: the mistreatment of women, rape, conflict over inheritance, pastoralists, the trade of illicit goods, land conflict, hunting reserve violations, land conflict over territories, arson, homicide, inter-tribal fighting and ethnic discrimination.
The book examined whether traditional approaches could be applied to existing conflicts within and between the communities. It outlined the hierarchical nature of each of the three tribal groups. Authority is ascribed in a patrilineal manner, with the grandfather at the head of the family. Each group is led by a Mwami who plays the role of maintaining tradition and resolving conflict within communes. Conflict resolution in each of these groups occurs at the familial level, the clan level and the tribal level. Depending on the type of conflict, it might be resolved by family members, community members, the Mwami or the Mwami’s authority. The book also outlined that at the community level, justice systems tended to avoid imprisonment or the death penalty and instead promoted the restoration and reparation for victims, and re-education and reintegration for offenders.

It concludes that using traditional justice mechanisms would help communities to: seek truth and forgiveness; reconcile; reconstruct social fabric; build their own peace; regulate the consequences for violent acts such as massacres, rape and pillage and; prevent subsequent drama. Indicating that the national justice system can be easily manipulated by international and national actors, it implores the Congolese state to formalize traditional justice mechanisms citing other African examples such as Rwanda and Ethiopia.

The research contained in this book demonstrates local, historically rooted, capacity for conflict research and analysis which could benefit all levels of peacebuilding engagement and activities. Through its content it also highlights local capacity for conflict resolution and identifies a potential foundation for a traditional or hyper-local approach.

These projects suggest that the organisation was responding both to internal and external knowledge in relation to peacebuilding. It was most engaged with challenges addressed by its

---

24 Although they maintain the death penalty as a last resort.
participants related to land-conflict which was directly linked to the organisation’s mission while being open to implementing youth peacebuilding initiatives that reflected external knowledge related to building a culture of peace.

*External Relations*

**Working with Community-Based Structures**

This organisation has established and supported a wide range of community-based structures which participate in their activities and shared information with them. At the time of research, staff indicated that they were actively working with three sets of community-based structures. The regional peace project worked with agricultural cooperatives that were supported by the project’s development efforts, and artisans of peace who were identified to represent their communities in the development of the road map for peace. The peace education program also engaged peace clubs that bring together children and youth up to the age of twenty-one for community-building activities including soccer, basketball, theatre and others. All of these activities emphasized peaceful cohabitation.

In addition, Organisation 2 had also been working with four other sets of community-based structures through projects that were terminated in early 2016. First, they worked with Cadre de consultation inter-communautaires (CCI’s) which acted as a community resource for conflict-resolution. These structures were led by community leaders from diverse ethnic backgrounds; they conducted conflict analysis, alerting Organisation 2 to cases that required additional resources or external intervention. Second, they worked with CMs (Comités mixtes) that were made up of pastoralists and agriculturalists who were tasked to intervene in cases of land use disputes. Third, they also supported CNs (Comités des négociateurs) who were tasked with encouraging members of armed groups to “leave the forest... when members do leave, the
committee helps to ensure that they are able to reintegrate into the community” (EE, 2016).

Finally, they also worked with refugee committees that assisted returning refugees to resettle, including accessing land, shelter and goods (EE, 2016). The organisation was unable to maintain relationships with these groups after their funding was terminated.

In the follow-up questionnaire administered, the organisation indicated that they supported community-based structures by building their members’ capacity in conflict transformation, organising, and through financial management. The questionnaire added that they also provided financial support to cover transportation fees, to support small peace initiatives and to cover the cost of office space (Organisation 2, 2017). David, the manager of the community-based structure project, indicated that the organisation also worked with these groups by engaging them in conflict analysis rooted in a participatory action research model and through project activities. He indicated that he felt that “by working with community-based structures we are empowering community members to resolve their own conflicts which will contribute to long term sustainable peace” (DD, 2016).

The members of community-based structures supported by Organisation 2 who participated in interviews highlighted two ways in which the organisation contributed to peace. The first related to their engagement with them through community-based structures and the second was through the distribution of material goods. A male beneficiary from Luberizi indicated that Organisation 2 had created a CM in his community, which had worked to promote reconciliation between agriculturalists and pastoralists. He added that the organisation had also installed signs guiding the pastoralists in order to avoid road accidents (Beneficiary4B, 2016). A female cooperative member from Sange explained that “There are many ethnic groups here. Organisation 2 invited us to attend a workshop through which they explained how to build peace
and live together” (Beneficiary2B, 2016). In addition, a female member of a community-based structure from Uvira highlighted how Organisation 2 tried to bring members of different ethnic groups together. She said that “They have tried to establish spaces such as markets where all of the groups can come and work together. When you work together, eat and drink together you make friends and even create peace” (Beneficiary3B, 2016). Finally, a beneficiary from Bagira reflected on the importance of being engaged through community-based structures as a woman, “Working together with the other women has meant that I can even give advice to my husband. When he expresses ethno-centrist ideologies, I feel comfortable to disagree” (Beneficiary1B, 2016). These examples demonstrate the organisation’s commitment to reducing identity-based conflict through the promotion of peaceful cohabitation and dialogue.

Members of the organisation’s community-based structures also emphasized the importance of their delivery of material goods. Two female members identified the provision of grains and seeds as being a key contribution of the organisation. The first member from Bagira indicated that “They brought grains, beans and corn. It’s an organisation that really wants to support your independence” (Beneficiary1B, 2016). The second member of the community-based structure indicated that she would also benefit from the market that was being constructed in Sange (Beneficiary2B, 2016). This demonstrates the connection between socio-economic development and peace in the region.

In contrast with Organisation 1, the staff from Organisation 2 put less of an emphasis on their engagement with members of their community-based structures during interviews and engaged with them over the phone and in their office less frequently. Further, at events that were held that involved local authorities and elites, as well as members of community-based

---

25 Locally this town was referred to as Bagira, however on maps the city appears as Kakamba and is located South of Kaminola in the Ruzizi Plains. There is a second town named Bagira to the North West of Bukavu.
structures, the interests of local authorities were given priority. For example, at the market opening in Sange community leaders, politicians and representatives from other CSOs were seated on one side of the property under a tent, while members of the women’s cooperatives, who were the intended beneficiaries, were forced to sit on the other side with no tent, under the midday sun, waiting for the arrival of the provincial Minister of Planning for more than four hours. Organisational staff made little effort to interact with the women during this time. Lower levels of engagement were also evident through the responses of members of community-based structures who described what the organisation had done for them as opposed to how they had been engaged in contributing to peace or justice through the organisation. This could reflect cultural norms which privileged people in elite positions or those of authority, and it could also reflect an organisational emphasis on engaging groups with political and economic power at the provincial and national level. These findings suggest that while this organisation had comparable access to members of their community-based structures, they were perhaps less engaged with their interests.

**Working with External Partners**

Organisation 2 relied on financing from international partners to develop and implement projects. At the time of research, the funding the organisation received was limited to the two projects described above. They were also cooperating with a third international funder who was investigating financial mismanagement within its community-based structure project. In their follow-up questionnaire, the organisation confirmed that it had not found new funding and that as a result their operating capacity was limited (Organisation 2, 2017).

Outside of working formally with funding organisations, Organisation 2 worked collaboratively with other peacebuilding actors in South Kivu. For example, a representative
from another local peacebuilding organisation, not considered in this thesis, indicated that they had been working with Organisation since 2010. The organisation’s representative indicated that, working in different territories, they collaborated “together to complete project evaluations and context analyses… We also work together outside of this project attending each others’ trainings and participating in research activities” (ExternalPartner2A, 2016).

Two of the staff members at Organisation 2 also described the importance of working in collaboration with other local organisations. Nathan highlighted that working together with other organisations was important because “each area has its own reality, for example if you have spent a significant amount of time in an area you will have a better idea of how to carry out peacebuilding efforts” (ND, 2016).

Further, the manager of the peace education project, Stephane, highlighted that because education fell under government authority that the peace education project worked both with the ministry of education and other local organisations in the field (SN, 2016).

Working with Local Elites

In addition to collaborating with community-based structures and external partners, Organisation 2 made a strong effort to engage local political elites both through formal and informal processes. This included representatives from the provincial government, territorial administrators, customary leaders and other actors who played a role in shaping local conflict dynamics. The coordinator indicated that they tried to target actors who could have either a positive or negative influence on peace and to bring them together. He said that is why they chose officials who were responsible for specific areas “the ones who manage the population and who have the responsibility to ensure peace. We also try to choose individuals who respect rights and fulfil their obligations” (Leadership2B, 2016). The organisation’s program manager also
described how certain efforts were specifically geared towards local officials. He said that “we are working with the authorities to place placards that identify areas for cultivation and for cattle grazing. There are also good governance initiatives that seek to support lawful taxation processes” (DD, 2016). Indeed, when travelling along the main road in the Ruzizi Plains there were visible signs identifying cattle grazing routes with the organisation’s name on them. This project responds to conflict between pastoralists and cultivators stemming from a perception that cattle herding has historically been practiced by non-indigenous groups in the territory to the disadvantage of indigenous ones.

The organisation’s engagement with local authorities was highly visible in the Uvira territory. The coordinator and one of the project managers had planned the trip to officially open market buildings that the organisation had constructed through the regional peacebuilding project. On the way to the town of Uvira, the organisation stopped in Sange to meet with the town’s mayor and to extend an invitation to attend the opening of the market, located just outside of the centre of the town the following day. During the meeting the coordinator revealed that some of the members of the cooperative had complained that the market was too far away from the centre of town and he asked for the mayor’s support to ensure that the opening was well attended, and the market space used. Once we reached Uvira town, the organisation also met with the territorial administrator to formally invite him to the series of market openings. The following day the provincial minister of planning as well as the territorial administrator attended the market openings. After the last market opened, the organisation’s coordinator departed with several of the local officials in the organisation’s vehicle without providing an explanation of where they were going. Support from local officials is viewed by some Congolese actors as essential to being able to access the communities that they work in. I learned during my second
trip to the Eastern DRC that local officials sometimes ask for compensation from local organisations in order for them to gain access to their communities. It is unclear whether the coordinator’s brief departure was intended to facilitate such an exchange.

Organisation 2 also worked with local authorities through events in Bukavu such as the round table on the road map for peace described above.

Conclusions

The programming described above demonstrated a willingness on the part of the organisation to adopt both local and international knowledge, particularly when it related to the organisation’s interests. Yet, the above discussion suggests a preference on the part of the organisation’s leadership to represent their own interests and priorities in their relationships. This reflected its more cautious approach to working with community-based structures and perhaps its inability to acquire long-term funding for the projects that it had identified should that have reflected a resistance to adopting an approach or focus more oriented towards those of the donors. Instead, the coordinator at Organisation 2 sought to work with provincial and national power holders who he felt could ensure the realization of their objectives.

Communications and Events

Organisation 2 did not produce formal publications related to their work. Instead, they communicated the organisation’s mission, vision, conflict analysis and results formally through meetings and events, and informally through verbal and written communications.

Formal events held by the organisation, such as those described above provide the organisation with an opportunity to formally showcase their work to a variety of actors. During these events, senior members of the organisation communicated the organisation’s vision and commitment to peace as well as demonstrating that they have done at the community or
provincial level. These events also provided an opportunity for the organisation to connect members of their community-based structures directly with their external partners and the local elites that they work with. Such efforts helped to inform other actors about the needs of the organisation’s members and beneficiaries.

Outside of formal meetings and events representatives of the organisation communicated on behalf of the organisation informally. The coordinator highlighted that they often communicated their achievements and goals through correspondence with their external partners. “If we complete a report or a research project, we share it with our partners. We also post context analyses on our website, even though it’s not much” (Leadership2C, 2016). The organisation’s website included information about their vision and mission, history, active projects and partners, although some of the information is out of date. The organisation’s program administrator Etienne highlighted that the organisation also communicated its activities and vision through its participation in local coordination meetings held by the office of the coordination of the provincial civil society of the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (EE, 2016).

One of the younger staff members, Nathan, lamented the difficulties that they faced in publishing the results of their conflict and context analyses undertaken by the organisation. He indicated that “we don’t have the necessary resources to publish on our own and rely on international organisation who… need to include their own point of view before the results can be published. In effect we do all the research and they publish it but never acknowledge that we did the original work” (ND, 2016). Although there is little evidence of the extent to which this does occur, it was clear across all three organisations that local CSOs conduct a fairly high
amount of primary research which could benefit both academic and practitioner communities if there was a greater opportunity for it to be published.

It is relevant to note that both of Organisation 2’s external partners who participated in interviews for this research were unable to capture its mission during our interviews (ExternalPartner2A, 2016) (ExternalPartner2B, 2016). This was comparable to the findings from Organisation 1 which highlights that breaks in communications between the organisations and their partners which might reflect challenges related to clarity of communication and the contextualization of local knowledge in other contexts.

Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions, and how?

Beneficiaries and Members of Community Based Structures

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Organisation 2 engaged with a large number of community-based structures which it established and supported. Observation and contributions made by members of the organisation suggests that the staff and leadership approach these relationships cautiously and that while they do seek out information from these actors, that their knowledge is not the sole or primary basis for the development of projects. A review of responses of staff to the question “How often do you work directly with beneficiaries?” offers some insight. Almost none of the respondents provided a clear answer to this question although one noted that the field staff of the Regional Peace Project interacted with beneficiaries on a more regular basis (SJ, 2016). Alison, a manager for the peace education project indicated that it was the peace club organisers who worked with the youth members daily and that she would meet with them when invited. She said that if “I had to estimate it would be one or two times per month” (AS, 2016). In contrast the other seven staff members interviewed from this organisation
consistently implied that it was someone else’s responsibility to exchange with these groups or that they lacked the resources to do so.

In the follow-up questionnaire completed by the organisation, staff indicated that some of the strengths of working with members of community-based structures included knowledge of local conflict dynamics and members of their communities; their legitimacy; their engagement and their willingness to contribute to peace (Organisation 2, 2017). During our second interview Organisation 2’s Coordinator indicated that members of the organisation’s community-based structures were responsible for collecting community-level information and conducting conflict analysis with the broader population. He continued by noting that “once we have collected this data, we discuss it with the communities through focus groups and interviews and we complete official documentation” (Leadership2B, 2016). The organisation’s program administrator Etienne indicated that “Even before starting a project we always start with a baseline study or bring the targeted community together to discuss any crises and propose solutions” (EE, 2016).

In general project staff reflected positively about the idea of working with beneficiaries and community-based structures, but often without providing concrete examples. David said that “I feel that a bottom-up approach is always preferable to a top-down one” (DD, 2016). Nathan reflected that the organisation was moving away from the term beneficiaries and towards a more participatory frame of reference. He said that such an approach signifies that “we also need them, we are really trying to collaborate with them as equals” (ND, 2016).

The follow-up questionnaire completed by the organisation also highlighted some of the challenges to working with members of community-based structures included that they “were not always available and that some of them were of limited capacity and had difficulty participating in formal trainings” (Organisation 2, 2017). During an interview the coordinator reflected that “It
can be difficult to organise and support the rural poor’s independence. That is why we created cooperatives and community-based structures to promote their self-reliance” (Leadership2B, 2016). Stephane indicated that additional challenges included that “they don’t have the means to realise their objectives. The community-based structures are voluntary… without resources they are fragile” (SN, 2016).

Further, little communication was observed between members of community-based structures and the staff at the organisation. Members of community-based structures and beneficiaries were rarely present at Organisation 2’s Bukavu office. Staff rarely received phone calls from the field in my presence nor did they refer to extended networks in the field. When staff met with members in the field their exchanges were formal and concerned only the projects that they were working on. These observations, in combination with an absence of concrete examples of how the organisation integrated feedback or knowledge from the community-based structures into the planning and implementing of its projects, suggests that they had little influence on how Organisation 2 developed its goals and programming.

**Community-level needs**

Four out of five of the participants who completed beneficiary interviews were members of community-based structures. Three were women and two were men. Two were Bafuliru, two were Banyamulenge and one was from the Babembe ethnic group, demonstrating the organisation’s emphasis on bringing together members of different identity-groups. There was a great deal of repetition in the needs expressed by these participants, including free primary education, employment, good governance and reconciliation.

A male and female participant from Bagira and a female participant from Sange all highlighted the need for free primary education. All three indicated that parents are responsible
for paying for their children to go to school which is a heavy burden. The female participant from Sange reflected that paying for her children’s school fees was a difficult burden to bare (Beneficiary2B, 2016). The male participant from Bagira remarked that “There’s a law that says that education is free, but the government hasn’t followed through” (Beneficiary4B, 2016). Further, the female participant from Bagira added that there was also a “high rate of illiteracy among parents, it would be nice to for them to have access to free classes” (Beneficiary1B, 2016).

The male and female participants from Bagira, in addition to the female participant from Uvira also emphasized the need for better employment and income generating activities. The female participant from Uvira indicated that she felt that broader “employment could really contribute to security. Even jobs from NGOs could encourage members of armed groups to leave the forest” (Beneficiary3B, 2016). The female participant from Bagira added that the government could “create businesses to occupy youth and prevent them from joining armed groups” (Beneficiary1B, 2016). Finally, the male participant reflected that many people in his community relied on farming as their livelihood but had nowhere to sell their produce. He felt that “if there was a market where they could sell their produce it could ensure the survival of families. The prices at our existing markets are too low” (Beneficiary4B, 2016).

The same three participants also reflected on their desire for a more responsible government. The female participant from Bagira felt that the government needed to take more responsibility through centralised authority, revenues from natural resources, education and, military discipline and training (Beneficiary1B, 2016). The male beneficiary from Bagira indicated that the government needed to “play a stronger role in maintaining security including improving the capacity of the military and police to protect civilian population” (Beneficiary4B,
The female beneficiary from Uvira commented that the justice system also needed to be reinforced (Beneficiary3B, 2016).

Finally, the female participant from Uvira and a male beneficiary from Luberizi stressed the continued need for reconciliation between ethnic communities. The female participant from Uvira indicated that “there is still persistent discrimination. We need Organisation 2 and their colleagues to continue their efforts to eliminate it” (Beneficiary3B, 2016). The male participant from Luberizi suggested that there was a need to “continue to reach out to members of armed groups and to bring the community back together. They should also start more cooperatives” (Beneficiary5B, 2016).

Staff Understanding of Local Needs and Project Relevance

Organisation 2’s coordinator indicated that they identified the needs of their beneficiaries through evaluations and consultations run by members of their community-based structures, specifically the Artisans of Peace identified as community focal points by the organisation (Leadership2B, 2016). All but one of the staff members interviewed were able to identify some of the peacebuilding needs communicated by the beneficiaries or members of community-based structures from the projects they worked with. The financial administrator conceded that he had never participated in a field visit with the organisation and that he had only read reports provided by the staff and so he was unable to identify specific needs of beneficiaries. He said “the financial situation at the organisation right now is not strong enough for me to go to the field” (LE, 2016).

Nearly all the observations made by the organisation’s staff related to the needs expressed by their beneficiaries and the members of their community-based structures. Alison noted that “the population suffers a lot, there is a lot of misery and poverty” (AS, 2016). She,
Serge and Nathan noted the need for more employment opportunities for youth in order to encourage them not to join armed groups (AS, 2016) (ND, 2016) (SJ, 2016). David also discussed the needs of the population in relation to armed groups observing that it was often difficult to convince members of these groups to demobilise. He said “they have many needs. Sometimes they say that in order for there to be peace you need to construct markets. For there to be peace schools need to be constructed that are either for specific ethnic communities or that are interethnic.” (DD, 2016). He highlighted that the often-shifting nature of these demands made them difficult to address.

The program administrator Etienne connected these needs to a broader desire for peace and security in the region. He said, “In order to live their lives, to put their children through schools and to do business they need to live in peace” (EE, 2016). Serge observed that many of these needs should be the responsibility of the government specifically those related to creating livelihood alternatives (SJ, 2016). Stephane reflected that because “the Congolese state lacks authority and demonstrates its inability to intervene it feels like you are always responsible for resolving problems, supporting negotiations and no one is looking at the needs of the communities at all” (SN, 2016).

These observations suggest that despite the absence of strong relations between the organisation and members of community-based structures, the staff interviewed did have a strong understanding of the broad needs of the population. There was also a strong link between the needs expressed by the beneficiaries and the projects being undertaken by the organisation. The Regional Peace Project’s focus on providing livelihood alternatives in part addressed some of the socio-economic needs presented by interview participants. They offered a small number of youth economic opportunities through participation in cooperatives and learning a trade which
could improve their socioeconomic situations and reduce the chance that they would join armed groups. Increased access to financial resources would also increase the likelihood that their children could go to school.

Further, the organisation’s engagement with local, provincial and national political elites presented an opportunity to promote greater engagement and responsibility on the part of the state in peace and security measures. While this engagement appears to address the needs expressed by their beneficiaries, the outcomes of such efforts are determined by the ability and willingness of state officials to act upon the information and efforts undertaken by the organisation that they were engaged in.

Finally, the peace clubs project and the three projects which had recently lost their funding, were focused on promoting dialogue between different identity groups including ethnic communities. These efforts directly respond to the needs expressed by participants and beneficiaries in the need for ongoing reconciliation and represent the most concrete and broad potential impact of the organisation’s efforts.

To conclude, these findings suggest that while members of community-based structures did not have a strong influence over the organisation’s goals and projects, staff integrated their contextual understanding into relevant programming which effectively addressed local needs identified by participants.

External Partners

A story which unfolded at this organisation during my research illustrates the amount of influence that both international and local partner organisations can have on the outcomes of efforts undertaken by local civil society peacebuilding organisations. As previously stated, Organisation 2 and Organisation 3 were part of the same project which focused on engaging
community-based structures along with another local CSO. The project brought members of different communities together to conduct conflict analysis. The groups were also trained in conflict resolution and were empowered to intervene when they had the capacity to do so. While staff at Organisation 3 disclosed very little about the project and how it unfolded, it was more openly discussed at Organisation 2 and so it is being discussed in this chapter. In contrast I had greater access to the community-based structures affiliated with Organisation 3 and so they will be discussed in Chapter 7 in more detail.

In mid-February 2016, the Executive Director of the international funding partner of the community-based structure project arrived at Organisation 2’s office in Bukavu for a meeting. After a brief exchange in which Organisation 2’s staff pleaded for the partner to restart the project’s funding the Executive Director of the partner responded indicating that negotiations were not going well with their funders from the UK and Sweden, and that there would need to be greater accountability within the program in the future. She then requested to meet privately with the organisation’s coordinator and the project’s team.

By early April, the international partner was conducting audits at both Organisation 2 and 3. The locally-based manager for the international partner often appeared stressed when working at the organisations and declined to participate in an interview as the partner of Organisation 2. An additional source from within the international partner confirmed that the audits were taking place at all of the organisations participating in the project as a result of suspected nepotism and mismanagement of funds. The same source later confirmed that while not all of the organisations had been found to be involved in financial mismanagement, the project’s funding had not been renewed. As a result, Organisation 2 reported that they were unable to continue supporting the community-based structures created through this project.
This case demonstrates the risks that exist for both international and local actors when working together. In this instance, inconsistencies in approach to accountability and reporting between the local CSOs and their external partners negatively influenced their long-term potential contributions to peacebuilding efforts. As discussed in Chapter 7, this also has a profound impact on the participants involved in the community-based structures supported by this project. It also demonstrates the intricacies of the dynamics between local CSOs and external partners.

**International External Partners**

The coordinator observed that Organisation 2 sought out funding partners with approaches that reflected the priorities of the local population. He stated that “the needs of the population need to be a focus for our partners and addressing those needs must be our objective as well. We get to know our partner organisations before entering into contracts with them” (Leadership2C, 2016). During interviews the staff tended to differentiate between their experience with actors from the UN system and INGOs.

The staff expressed more optimism about their work with UN affiliated structures. Stephane indicated that UN actors offered the only real “opportunity for financing and resources. They have really helped us a lot” (SN, 2016). David highlighted how a partnership with MONUSCO facilitated the organisation’s ability to access communities that were not connected to Bukavu by road by transporting them on their helicopters (DD, 2016). Staff at the organisation would not have otherwise been able to reach these communities. The coordinator also highlighted the organisation’s participation in humanitarian clusters organised by OCHA as a strength (Leadership2C, 2016).
Despite this optimism, the Organisation did face some challenges when collaborating with partners from the UN system. During an OCHA protection cluster meeting which the organisation participated in most of the discussion was directed by OCHA officials who would interrupt local civil society members when they tried to provide additional details to situational analysis or identify other areas of possible concern. The contributions of the local civil society members were limited to the last fifteen minutes of the ninety-minute meeting when they were given an opportunity to discuss their ongoing activities. Based on my observation of other OCHA meetings the reasons for limiting discussions in this way often related to structural limitations to engagement arising from financing and policy or due to the rigidity of a framework being applied by international staff. Other shortcomings identified by staff to working with UN agencies included an imposition of their own work models (AS, 2016) and priorities (DD, 2016). These situations reflect structural challenges in the relationship between local CSOs and UN agencies in the DRC, which these actors are likely willing to accept in exchange for the material support and legitimacy that they gain by working together.

Almost all of the staff acknowledged that Organisation 2 relied on INGOs for financing, but the majority of respondents were reticent about their work together, likely as a result of the recent loss of funding historically provided by these groups. Their comments reflect that international external partners had a disproportionate influence on whether and how a project is implemented. The financial administrator highlighted that while INGOs received long term funding, the funding that they provide to local civil society peacebuilding organisations was

26 For example, I observed a meeting for a health cluster in Bukavu where an international project leader suggested that OCHA and other humanitarian actors should stop treating cholera outbreaks in order to ensure that residents of cholera affected neighbourhoods purchased chlorine tablets for their water tanks instead of using their money for other purposes such as purchasing airtime for their cellphones. The official appeared unreceptive when local civil society agents pointed out that the role of humanitarian actors was to save lives.
short term making it difficult for the local actors to plan their interventions (LE, 2016). Nathan reflected that local and international organisations have their own approaches and philosophies but when Organisation 2 relies on funding from external partners “suddenly we’re not doing what we want to but what the money tells us we should be doing” (ND, 2016).

These observations demonstrate the strong influence that international funding partners exercise over the organisation. It is unclear why relations with the organisation’s international partners had recently cooled except in the case of the community-based structures project.

**Local External Partners**

The influence of other local civil society peacebuilding organisations on Organisation 2 was limited because of a lack of strong collaboration with those groups. The coordinator reflected that Organisation 2 primarily collaborated with other organisations working on projects funded by the same external partner and through forums such as the OCHA clusters. He also indicated that they sometimes invited representatives from other organisations to participate in their activities (Leadership2C, 2016). These claims were echoed by Alison who added that the staff from the peace education project collaborated with another organisation on the same project every day and that they worked well together (AS, 2016). However, there was no evidence that the organisation relied on support or collaboration from other civil society actors to achieve their goals or that they changed their approach based on the needs of other actors in the field.

**State Authorities**

Finally, Organisation 2 also engaged directly and consistently with state authorities. The Coordinator highlighted that the national government did not contribute to their efforts financially although they offered moral support (Leadership2C, 2016). The follow-up questionnaire completed by the organisation indicates that local authorities often accept
invitations to participate in meetings, dialogues and conflict transformation sessions. Further, their participation in these events was as observers, facilitators or moderators (Organisation 2, 2017). In the same questionnaire the organisation highlighted the importance of engaging with state officials. The response says that “when you work with them it becomes clear on how to yield results. If they are convinced by your efforts, they can make a major contribution to peace because they have the power and resources to push for state-led change” (Organisation 2, 2017). This observation may explain Organisation 2’s decision to prioritise engagement with state officials over other groups.

However, there are also disadvantages to engaging with state actors. On two occasions I observed that the delay in arrival or absence of state officials had a significant impact on the delivery of certain activities. For example, when I attended a series of market openings held by the organisation in the Ruzizi Plains the Minister of Planning did not arrive until four hours after the planned start time causing all of the subsequent events to be rushed because the organisation insisted on waiting for the minister’s presence before officially opening the market. Further, during the event to design a road map for peace in Bukavu, the absence of provincial ministers contributed to an avoidance of a commitment by the state to a substantial contribution to peacebuilding efforts. Even the responder to the questionnaire admits that state actors are “the primary manipulators of the population, if they don’t agree with your approach, they can block your actions and undermine peace” (Organisation 2, 2017).

Beyond the ability of these state actors to influence the outcomes of specific projects and activities, there is also a question related to the perception created by their engagement with the organisation. While acceptance of activities by local authorities is often understood as a necessary step in order to engage the population, there is also a risk that Organisation 2 may not
appear to challenge the actions taken by the state that contribute to conflict, the ongoing economic conditions and human rights violations. Such a perception may influence which actors are willing to collaborate with the organisation locally and how members of community-based structures interact with the organisation.

Conclusions

This section has demonstrated that Organisation 2 engaged with external partners in a limited way that allowed them to maintain control over the narrative that they applied to justify their development and peacebuilding interventions. Their collaboration with other local peacebuilding actors was primarily limited to delivery of projects funded by the same international partners. Little knowledge or support was exchanged. The organisation also appeared to engage with its international financing partners in a limited way that ensured that they maintained control over the projects and their management. This tendency may have been at the heart of their struggle over the community-based structures project.

The organisation’s excitement to work with authorities at all levels of government stands in stark contrast to the other external partners considered in this chapter. This reflects the clearly stated belief of the coordinator that it was these officials who could ensure that their peacebuilding efforts were undertaken in a meaningful and sustained way. These findings suggest that the staff at the organisation attempted to resist the interests and power of other actors, instead preferring to represent their own interests and maintain their own vision of peace.

Staff and Leadership

Leadership

The coordinator was one of three original founders of the organisation. He holds an undergraduate degree in economics and management from a university in Kigali and partially
completed a master’s degree in leadership (Leadership2A, 2016). He is a strong figure who serves as the public representative of the organisation and its central decision maker, his staff generally defer to his decision making and provincial, territorial and community leaders appeared eager to engage with him.

The coordinator’s approach was significantly shaped by his experience with identity-based conflict. His family is Banyamulenge and originally from Fizi where their ethnic community has historically experienced violent conflict with other groups. He reflected that these conflicts were originally economic in nature, evolved into political conflicts. He and his family were forced to flee the country into Rwanda due to violence on three separate occasions in 1996, 2000 and 2004 (Leadership2A, 2016).

Before the war began in 1996 the coordinator was working with an INGO as a security advisor. As part of his work the Coordinator travelled across Eastern DRC. He indicated that what inspired him most was “meeting victims of the conflict and realizing that there were no means or fora through which they (the population of the Kivus) could help one another” (Leadership2A, 2016). This experience prompted him to reconnect with a Babembe friend to address the situation. Together they started to “consult with the population and then we started to organise meetings and then established the organisation” (Leadership2A, 2016). Through consultation and community engagement they also identified a member of the Buhavu community to join the leadership team for their organisation (Leadership2A, 2016). Although the organisation formally listed a broad range of thematic areas of focus, the coordinator spoke most passionately about their efforts to reconcile land and identity-based conflict in South Kivu.

The coordinator described his role within the organisation by stating that he was ultimately responsible for all of the organisation’s activities including technical and financial
administration, policy, human resources, managing relationships partners and maintaining the organisation’s vision (Leadership2A, 2016). Situating his work in relation to his experience with identity-based conflict he said that “I need to be sure that things are improving… My community is one with many problems, but they also have something to contribute… That’s why I’m so focused on organising inter-group meetings” (Leadership2A, 2016).

The relationship between the coordinator and staff was hierarchical in the respect that he was the head of his organisation and clearly communicated to his staff that he expected them to adhere to his policies and goals. Yet, many of the staff expressed more commitment to their projects as opposed to the organisation. While they complied with his rules in his presence, the staff would often debate his decisions privately.

These observations suggest that while the coordinator formally determined the goals and directions of the organisation, and represented them to external actors, that the staff influenced the organisation’s operations and outcomes by resisting the coordinator’s guidance and by choosing how to engage with the organisation and their projects.

**Staff**

At the time of research, the organisation reported having forty-four staff members across five projects and the organisation’s administration. However, fourteen members of the staff were reported as being on technical leave when the Organisational Ethnography was originally completed and at least two more were put on leave during my research because of funding shortfalls. The organisation was also hosting two unpaid interns at the time of observation (Organisation 2, 2016).

Organisation 2 had an official hiring policy that sought to promote diversity among its staff, reflecting the organisation’s commitment to address identity-based conflict. This included
ensuring equal representation of staff from different ethnic communities in the territories where the organisation worked, including the Banyamulenge, the Babembe and the Bashi. The organisation also encouraged applicants from different religious groups and it is the only organisation considered in this thesis with Catholic staff members, including the organisation’s coordinator. Further, the coordinator reported that they sought to ensure that women made up fifty percent of their staff but lamented that “while this is the official policy, we have only achieved thirty-five percent representation” (Leadership2B, 2016). In their follow-up questionnaire Organisation 2 also highlighted the rigorous hiring process used to fill positions which included the submission and review of CVs of potential candidates, the completion of written tests and interviews (Organisation 2, 2017).

Examining the eight staff members that I interviewed, including the coordinator, the organisation appeared to be meeting some of its hiring goals. Two participants did not report their ethnic community but among the remaining six, there were two members of the Banyamulenge community, one representative each from the Bashi, Batembo and Babembe communities, as well as a Kinyarwanda speaker from North Kivu. Further, there was an equal representation of Catholics and Protestants between interview participants, who ranged in age from 30 to 54. Women were not as well represented on the staff as men with only thirteen women among organisation’s forty-four staff members. However, there were only two women who were working within the projects who were not on leave at the time of research and only one agreed to participate in an interview, thus the remaining seven interview participants were men. Women were better represented among financial and administrative staff.

Despite the organisation’s stringent hiring standards, at least one of the organisation’s staff members was a direct relative of the coordinator. There was no indication of how her
qualifications compared to the other members of the staff, however she was more deferential to his decisions.

Although the organisation’s sought to ensure a diverse staff, their local external partner suggested that they had at times experienced difficulties with certain customary leaders because of their perceived identity. The external partner indicated that “there was even a time that they were asked to leave a territory and cease the project that they were working on for ethnic reasons” (ExternalPartner2A, 2016). However, it was unclear from the discussion whether this expulsion occurred because of the perceived ethnic group of the staff or because their approach threatened the traditional authority of such leaders within their territories. Ultimately, the hiring process of Organisation 2 and its commitment to ending identity conflict, including the manipulation of identities, challenged existing power structures and offered an alternative to organisations that only work within their own ethnic communities which may represent both a strength and a weakness of the organisation.

Intra-Organisational Relations

Staff at this organisation were assigned offices based on their projects and only for meetings limiting the exchange of information. During meetings and in the project offices, debate appeared to be encouraged. Staff would sometimes politely offer advice to the Coordinator and the Coordinator would intervene in discussions when they appeared to be off track. Members of the staff would also often debate both work-related and other topics. However, differences expressed during these discussions appeared to have a negative impact on the personal relationships between staff members. On one occasion I observed a younger member of the staff sternly reprimand an older member of the staff who held the same title that he did. On a separate occasion one of the organisation’s interns reported that he was no longer
enjoying working with Organisation 2 because the same staff member would often yell at him while they were working together. He added that neither of the project staff that he was working with were helping him to develop new skills, which he understood to be a core component of his internship. Instead, they already expected him to work at their level. Such exchanges contributed to tension among the staff members and complicated their ability to work together to achieve project goals.

Gender

Despite Organisation 2’s reported commitment to equal representation of women on their staff, there was noticeable gender inequality in the office. This became evident early during my visits to the organisation when one of the staff members disclosed to me during a conversation that he felt that organisations only engaged in gender equality projects to access financial resources. He added that such projects took focus away from male victims of SGBV as well as the victims of other forms of violence and trauma. After this initial conversation, this staff member would visit me at my desk at least once per week to explain that men and women were not equal, and that definitive proof could be found in the Congolese Constitution.

While such overt behaviour was limited to the one participant, there was evidence of persistent gender-bias elsewhere within the organisation. As previously stated, women made up only thirty-five percent of the staff and they were poorly represented among project staff. Further, on one occasion a group of five staff members was discussing the possible contribution of women to peace. During the discussion four out of the five participants indicated that they felt that the only opportunity for women to contribute to peace was in the home and through influence over their families, which was especially discouraging given the presence of two women among the group. The fifth member of the discussion, an older man, vehemently opposed
this position and argued that there were many formal and informal opportunities to contribute to peace, however his colleagues appeared to disagree.

These observations contrast with the description of the organisation’s approach to gender equality described by the Coordinator. He indicated that the organisation was committed to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 to ensure that women played an active role in peacebuilding. He went on to describe how women had been integrated into many of their projects, boasting that seventy percent of their cooperative members were women. He concluded that “We have understood that women are the victims of the conflict but that they also have the capacity to contribute to peace” (Leadership2B, 2016). The views described above by the organisation’s staff demonstrate that this is not a broadly held belief within the organisation, nor is a commitment to gender equality being enforced.

Conclusions

These findings show that in addition to restricting influence from external actors over the organisation’s peacebuilding efforts, the coordinator also tried to carefully control his staff ranging from who was hired to limiting their informal social interactions. When debate occurred within the organisation, it was more related to human resources than defining the approach of the organisation or how to work together most effectively. Instead of adopting, deferring or resisting external interests, staff made this decision in relation to the coordinator’s approach.

It also demonstrates the mixed success of the organisation’s hiring strategy. While the organisation had been able to recruit staff across ethnic and religious identities, their work was still perceived as being aligned with migrant ethnic groups, limiting their capacity to intervene in certain areas. This dynamic highlights a trend that should be considered across CSOs operating
in South Kivu. Further, while the organisation had a gender equal hiring policy, this had not been achieved and represented a broader challenge for the organisation.

The staff’s resistance to gender equality was no exception to this. Rather than directly raising their concerns with the coordinator, they raised concerns more privately with their colleagues. Despite his insistence that the organisation was a strong promoter of UNSCR 1325, the coordinator’s decision to have an outside party discuss the resolution at their road map for peace event suggests that he may have been aware of this internal dissent and chose to defer the subject rather than confronting the larger problem.

*Material Conditions*

This organisation was located in a two-storey building, with offices and meeting rooms on each floor, that sits on top of a hill overlooking the Ruzizi 1 border crossing between Bukavu, South Kivu and Cyangugu Rwanda. This was an appropriate location for the organisation given its commitment to ending inter-community violence between Rwandophones and other groups in the province. The organisation had a generator for when the power was cut but not running water. The staff complained about the condition of the building and at times expressed concern about what would happen if there was an earthquake. When it rained the building smelled of mildew.

At the beginning of my research the organisation presented an estimated budget of $800,000 USD which was based on expected funding, much of which did not come through (Organisation 2, 2016). In their follow-up questionnaire the organisation indicated that in addition to the unfunded projects above, that the regional peacebuilding project had also ended due to a lack of available funding from their partners (Organisation 2, 2017).
Some of the staff reflected that, in addition to the availability of project funding, the organisation had difficulty meeting the needs expressed by their beneficiaries and the members of their community-based structures because of a lack of flexibility in the use of project funds (ExternalPartner2B, 2016). For example, David described how the organisation had communicated to a funding partner that they wanted to organise community-based workshops on peaceful cohabitation and conflict transformation but were told that they could only have one. He said that they were forced to invite one person per community but that the local leaders would invite two or three more to participate, putting them well over budget. He concluded that “We work in a volatile context. It’s the context that dictates the results. You might advance a little bit, but the context can upend all of your efforts” (DD, 2016).

Finally, budget shortfalls created tension between staff and undermined their capacity to work together. One week during my fieldwork, late in the afternoon the office had their weekly staff meeting which had been delayed from Monday. During the meeting attendees looked tense and spoke little. After a brief discussion of other projects, the coordinator announced that because of the uncertainty of the community-based structure project, that many of the 48 staff across the province would be put on “leave” in order to reduce costs. A debate then ensued about whether the staff should be given the opportunity to come in as volunteers. At the end of the meeting the program administrator who indicated that the cuts would affect the staff at the head office. One of the interns reflected that people working with local NGO’s expect this level of job insecurity.

Security

In contrast with Organisation 1, the staff at Organisation 2 faced limited security risks across their daily activities. This reflected a number of factors including that their work did not
directly challenge the power of local political and economic elites and because the majority of
their community-level work occurred outside of Bukavu. When the organisation worked in the
field, they were exposed to general risks including poor road conditions and armed violence
which is a common experience across the three organisations. In addition, David noted that the
staff were sometimes exposed to risks related to their work. On one occasion he reported being
detained by an armed group. On another occasion he reported receiving a phone call where the
caller asked for him by name and instructed him to “turn around. Do you see the person in blue
behind you? You need to give him phone credits. How could this person know who I was? You
see sometimes we feel threatened” (DD, 2016). However, there was no evidence that these
security incidents had a significant impact on the way that the organisation delivered its
programming.

Conclusions

To conclude, Organisation 2 contributed to peace across three thematic areas including:
conflict transformation; governance and; socio-economic development. It designed and
implemented projects that broadly related to these themes and that were funded by international
financing partners. The vision that underlies these areas of intervention sought to reduce land-
based conflict in South Kivu and to create the conditions for sustainable long-term peace. The
organisation engaged a broad range of actors in its projects in an effort to gain support for their
vision and mission. While it engaged with members of community-based structures, individuals
and other local civil society actors, and it sought funding from international sources, its focus
was centred on engaging local power holders who have the capacity to create and sustain
structural change.
This organisation’s peacebuilding interventions primarily addressed the local causes of conflict, but sought to engage provincial, national and regional authorities in peacebuilding actors in a way that differs from Organisation 1. As previously stated most of the organisation’s interventions directly addressed land-based conflict at the community level. Some of these interventions directly related to land use patterns including interventions that target conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists in the territory of Uvira and the organisation’s historical work with returning refugees to the same region. Further, the organisation’s broader programming also reflected its commitment to addressing land conflict. For example, the program which constructed markets and provided vocational training in Uvira offered youth and other residents livelihood alternatives that could avoid future land conflict. The vocational training avoided occupations that were land intensive and instead offered options such as masonry and hair styling. Projects oriented towards the manipulation of ethnic-identity, including the youth peace clubs, also had the potential to influence land conflict patterns as they reduced the likelihood that individual land disputes would escalate into inter-community levels based on the identities of conflicting parties. As observed in the previous chapter, such interventions might also represent an indirect way of addressing national causes of conflict because they reduce the influence of powerful actors who might try to manipulate the population based on identity.

While this organisation’s contributions to peacebuilding did not seek to address national causes of conflict or power structures, they did engage provincial and national authorities, inviting them to contribute to peacebuilding in South Kivu through events and other formal and informal activities. At the national level, the most concrete example of this was the Road Map for Peace meeting organised in Kinshasa following the event that I attended in Bukavu, to which
several national politicians and other authorities were invited. The organisation also showed a consistent effort to engage authorities at the municipal, territorial, provincial, national and international levels. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, this engagement is culturally significant in the DRC and the presence of such officials is understood as being essential to identify concrete actions for peace. However, the approach failed to challenge existing power dynamics which contribute to conflict and risks legitimizing predatory actors who seek to take advantage of the state’s power vacuum. Despite these risks, this approach complements those of Organisations 1 and 3 which challenge existing power structures but struggle to achieve support for broader implementation by powerful state and customary actors.

*Discursive Power*

This organisation maintained discursive power through its resistance to interests of external actors and its deference of the interests of its beneficiaries. The evidence in this chapter has demonstrated that the organisation was only willing to collaborate with external actors to the extent to which it facilitated their access to material resources, such as through their peace clubs project. While their projects did reflect local knowledge and responded to some of the needs listed by their participants and beneficiaries, this process was heavily mediated by the interests of the organisation. One incident where this became clear was when the coordinator insisted that the Mayor of Sange ensure that the women from the organisation’s cooperative attend their market opening despite the fact they had expressed safety concerns because of the distance between its location and the town. Indeed, the site was surrounded by fields and relatively close to the site where a massacre occurred in 2014.

The primary context through which the organisation communicated its objectives and interventions to other local peacebuilding actors was through events that it held where the staff
could closely control the narrative related to peace and development. They did this by determining who could speak, when and for how long.

**Material Resources**

Although the organisation did not prioritize relationships with other local actors, both local and international external partners ultimately had a significant impact on Organisation 2’s ability to realize its mission and objectives. The termination of financing by three of the organisation’s five funding partners resulted in the organisation being unable to continue the work being undertaken through those efforts. It became even more difficult for the organisation to continue its work in the absence of this funding because of a lack of local collaborators who were also engaged in the organisation’s mission and who might have been able to help the organisation to continue its work or connect them with additional resources. These observations highlight the importance of strong external partnerships and access to reliable long-term funding to the sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs engaged in peacebuilding activities.

**The Influence of Identity and Internal Dynamics**

The identity of the staff at this organisation was a defining feature of this organisation. As described above, the organisation sought to be representative of ethnic groups, religions and gender, which reflected their mission and mandate. While equal representation had been achieved across ethnic and religious backgrounds, the organisation’s perceived identity was also shown to limit its access to certain communities. Recall, that the local external partner of the organisation had described how the organisation was blocked from working in certain geographical areas because of the perception that they were affiliated with the Banyamulenge (ExternalPartner2A, 2016). This case demonstrates the important influence that ethnicity has on the ability of local CSOs to undertake their influence efforts.
The actor with the greatest influence over the organisation’s mission, objectives and project implementation was the coordinator. Having played a significant role in establishing Organisation 2, he remained the primary decision maker for project development and implementation, staffing and informal engagement with other actors, including representing the organisation at public events. He also ensured that the focus on equal representation and inter-community dialogue remained at the heart of the organisation’s efforts. Staff were primarily responsible for implementing projects as they were designed and appeared to play a limited role in decision making processes.

_Translating Hybridity_

This organisation translated hybridity in a very different way from Organisation 1. While the organisation undoubtedly was exposed to and had access to knowledge from the community-level to the international level, the organisation’s coordinator maintained strict control over its narrative as well as whose interests were addressed. In doing so the organisation can largely be understood as deferring or resisting external interests that did not align with their mission.

However, one exception may be the way that the organisation engaged with customary and state authorities. Organisation 1 resisted these authorities when they contradicted the organisation’s approach to human rights and, as will be revealed in the following chapter, Organisation 3 worked around them in a way that deferred to their influence. In contrast, Organisation 2 consistently engaged with them as other actors engaged in local peace and conflict dynamics. By doing so, Organisation 2 recognized their legitimacy in peacebuilding processes and in some way adopting their interests and knowledge.

By engaging with state and customary authorities, the organisation was able to collect knowledge on their engagement in peacebuilding and help to sustain their engagement in these
processes with a diverse range of actors, even if in a superficial way. Such engagement also may have helped to reinforce the authority of these actors in some ways by publicly reinforcing their roles in these processes.

These sustained efforts to engage state authorities have important implications for the understanding of local agency in the post-liberal model. This engagement was not limited to democratic state actors: by recognizing the legitimacy of other authorities the organisation indirectly supported the model of hybrid governance which is a defining feature of the current state. Further, continued efforts by this and other organisations to engage these actors demonstrate a “local” commitment to recognizing human rights and sustaining peace both on the part of the authorities and the organisation, which help to avoid claims that these conditions are being externally imposed. Finally, these findings identify provincial and national authorities as additional sets of intermediary actors in peacebuilding, although their roles, levels and sources of material and discursive power, and legitimacy in those processes were different.
Chapter 7: Organisation 3

Organisational Overview

Organisation 3 is the official peacebuilding branch of the ECC in South Kivu. Its objective is to “promote the evolution of a culture of peace”. (Organisation 3, 2016). The organisation was established by two men in 2003, one of whom is the current coordinator of the organisation (Organisation 3, 2016). This organisation also has a deputy coordinator, who was the only woman observed holding a leadership position across the three organisations. It was selected to participate in this thesis because of its focus on addressing identity-based conflict including ethnically-rooted conflicts.

In South Kivu, ethnic conflict is often framed as occurring between so-called indigenous and non-indigenous populations. In general, the Bashi, the Barega, the Babembe, the Bafuliru and the Bavira are considered to be among the indigenous groups and the Banyamulenge and the Barundi are considered to be migrants to the province (Turner, 2013). Although there has been significant migration of Kinyarwandan speaking populations to the Kivus and other neighbouring countries, beginning in pre-colonial times (Boas, 2012, p. 97), Deibert notes that during the 1930’s the Belgians began to transport rwandophones into “the Kivus and Katanga. These immigrants would become known as… the Banyamulenge in South Kivu” (Deibert, 2013, p. 18). Bakajika observes that during the Colonial period “the Banyamulenge and the Barundi were never forced to give up pastoralism because they were confined to escarpments where they didn’t necessarily interact with other groups” (Bakajika, 2004, p. 217). He concluded that conflicts began to arise after independence when the groups had to live together for the first time (Bakajika, 2004). Vlassenroot argues that this, in addition to the absence of a modern elite, helps to explain why the Banyamulenge never participated in local political life. He concludes that, “The history of the Banyamulenge community could be read as an expression of an incomplete
emancipation process” (Vlassenroot, 2004, p. 514). After independence the citizenship status of the Banyamulenge in Zaire changed several times in accordance with the political interests of the Mobutu regime, which further complicated their relationship with the other ethnic groups in their province (Boas, 2012). Inter-group conflict peaked in 1996 when Mobutu accused Rwanda of arming 3000 Banyamulenge to lead an insurgency against his government, and Rwanda used the protection of the group and other Tutsi living in the Kivus as a justification to invade the country (Turner, 2013).

Organisation 3 worked in Bukavu, Uvira, and Fizi in South Kivu as well as in North Kivu, Rwanda and Burundi with cooperation from partner organisations headquartered in each of those regions (Organisation 3, 2016). The coordinator indicated that in South Kivu, the organisation worked with a range of ethnic communities including “the Banyamulenge, the Babembe, the Bafuliro, the Bavira and to a lesser extent the Barega” (Leadership1C, 2016). He added that the organisation also worked with protestant communities among whom he said there was also significant conflict because “there is a lack of coordination between protestant churches all of which are independent and that causes quite a lot of conflict” (Leadership1C, 2016).

**How do local civil society organisations seek to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?**

**Programming**

Organisation 3 took a different approach in comparison with the other two organisations examined above. Rather than setting out a strong mission, with specific areas of expertise, the organisation has positioned itself as a local consultant on peacebuilding. As a result, rather than seeking projects that fit within existing thematic areas of focus, it had an evolving structure, based around projects of a similar nature. For example, several of the projects listed below are
child and youth oriented and they were managed by the same team of employees. Similarly, the projects that worked with community-based structures were managed by another team. This structure has implications for how the organisations adopted, deferred or resisted the knowledge and interests of both internal and external actors to the conflict. Positioning itself as a consultant for local peacebuilding efforts required the organisation to adopt local knowledge while selectively adopting, deferring and resisting the knowledge of external intervenors. This model also caused them to adopt the interests of their financing partners, which sometimes resulted in the deferral of the needs of their beneficiaries. The organisation engaged beneficiaries and members of their community-based structures when such an approach was consistent with the interests of their funding partners.

During one of our interviews, the coordinator identified what he felt were Organisation 3’s key successes. They included establishing an early warning system for emerging conflicts, building the capacity of local populations to resolve conflict through mediation and advocacy and helping to establish a provincial peacebuilding committee in South Kivu, although he mentioned that this was currently being blocked by the governor (Leadership3B, 2016). Curiously, the Coordinator also suggested that “If today the Banyamulenge and the Babembe can live together, we played a major part” (Leadership3B, 2016). This claim was interesting given that Organisation 2 had identified the same success (Leadership2B, 2016). 27 This is one example of the overlap between the two organisations, which will become apparent in this chapter and explored in Chapter 8.

---

27 This is particularly interesting because it suggests duplication in projects and outcomes between organisations but actually reflects the focus of each of the organisations on specific ethnic communities and geographical areas which will be discussed further later.
Below is an overview of active projects sponsored by international partners at the time of research in 2016. This section groups projects which are thematically linked. A great deal of the information in this section was obtained through my observation of an organisational review meeting where each of the project managers presented reports about the projects that they were managing. In the follow-up questionnaire, the organisation indicated that there had been no change to its programs as of March 2017, although both the community-based structure project and the gender and mining project had come to an end (Organisation 3, 2017).

Promoting a Culture of Peace through: Education, Dialogue, De-traumatization and Good Governance

This project’s objective was to contribute to a culture of peace while supporting the wounded. It was financed by an international religious partner and engaged nineteen staff members. Some of the project related activities included training programs, facilitating dialogue between religious leaders and communities, conflict transformation, research on trauma, offering psycho-social support and supporting women’s leadership within the organisation’s community-based structures.

The staff members leading the different elements of this project, communicated their deep commitment to it during our interviews. The organisation’s human resources manager had been assigned to work on the de-traumatization aspect of the project which he said had “three core components. The first was focused on peaceful cohabitation. The second encouraged peace-from within linked to trauma-recovery efforts. The third sought to improve local governance to prevent future trauma” (IM, 2016).

Another staff member, Ursula, described the evolution of the women’s literacy project that she had been working on for several years. She indicated that “at the beginning we solely
focused on teaching participants to read and write… but later we integrated other themes including peacebuilding into our lessons… I started to show the instructors how they could promote peace through their classes” (UZ, 2016). She also discussed the role of literacy circles in empowering women, who made up most of their participants. She said that, in addition to helping them learn to read, they also encouraged them to speak publicly in a context where this was traditionally not permitted. She said that among participants there were “occasionally success stories including some previously illiterate women who became leaders in regional development initiatives… who have become counsellors, who have even been responsible for maintaining security in their churches” (UZ, 2016).

This project responded directly to the needs not only described by the staff and beneficiaries of this project but also those from the other project as well, particularly education and trauma recovery. Beyond responding directly to those needs, it also sought to promote good governance in a way that could prevent the future traumatization of the population. These efforts also corresponded to international interests and knowledge documented by Autesserre and Stearns related to building strong institutions.

**Regional Peace Project (Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and North and South Kivu)**

This project was funded by an international peacebuilding NGO. Its objectives included contributing to increased peace in the region and positive relationships between decision makers and governments. There were a broad range of participants in this project including community members, CSOs and regional institutions. In addition to working with their international partner, it also engaged with several other local civil society peacebuilding organisations across the geographical region covered under the project. The project employs one coordinator, three researchers, two financial managers and one driver.
The project activities broadly included workshops that discussed research results, the manipulation of identities in the lead up to the scheduled national election, as well as a cross border meeting organised by youth. One of the researchers from this project participated in an interview. Eloi indicated that while it engaged the population in many ways that “in reality we are primarily focused on supporting community-based structures called les ‘groupes de dialogue permanent’” (EK, 2016).

While the need for community-based conflict resolution and analysis was clearly situated in local knowledge, the regional framework for this project was externally designed and imposed by the external partner. There was little discussion of a need for dialogue with communities from neighbouring communities by beneficiaries and even within the organisation the importance of these relations was often only reflected on by members the leaders of the organisations.

**Community-Based Structure Project**

This project was described in Chapter 6, as it engaged both Organisation 2 and 3. Organisation 3’s engagement in this project, which focused on establishing and supporting CCIs, took place in Fizi and Uvira. Some of the results the project manager listed included the structures that they managed being considered as a reference point by local communities and leaders, improved relations between agriculturalists and pastoralists, increased discussion about good governance and helping to reintegrate members of armed groups in community. The project manager indicated that it had engaged 5271 men and 2570 women. Further they indicated that project challenges included insecurity and financing.

During my fieldwork I had the opportunity to observe and participate in meetings held by the Bukavu chapter of the community-based structure which was part of this research which will be explored in detail in the next section.
As previously noted, this project appeared to prioritise community-based knowledge about conflict and draw on local conflict resolution traditions. However, it also reflected the interests of the external partner who ran the project, an INGO with a long history of community-level engagement in the Kivus.

**Student Engagement Project: Promoting the Spirit of Entrepreneurship and Creativity**

This was one of two projects managed by the organisation targeting children and youth. It was arguably one of the least visible and least discussed projects. Its stated objective was to cultivate a sense of self-sufficiency among University-level students and support them through employment counselling and internships. The activities under this project included training sessions and debates on the manipulation of identities. It is relevant to note that the staff at the organisation included several former interns who had participated in this program.

**Education, Conflict Transformation, Organisational Development and Good Governance**

This was the second youth-oriented project sponsored by one of the organisation’s international faith-based partners. Its goal was to reinforce social cohesion and fight against a culture of violence by engaging youth members of the organisation’s peace clubs. There were a broad range of activities undertaken as part of this project including workshops on developing peace clubs, peaceful cohabitation, peace education and the manipulation of identities of youth and women in the Ruzizi plains. It also provided support to peace clubs, organised International Peace Day demonstration and sought to train journalists on civics. Ensuring that youth from a range of backgrounds participated in the clubs was a central concern for this project.

The project manager was enthusiastic about his work. He indicated that he felt that the efforts undertaken through their peace clubs were able to bring different ethnic communities together. He provided an example from a youth festival in Fizi. He said that:
There was one young man whose entire family was killed when someone from the Banyamulenge community set fire to their home… He had developed such hatred in his heart as a result that he swore that he would kill a Banyamulenge if he had the chance. Those were his words. He didn’t consider them to be people. However, when we organised the festival members from all of the ethnic communities were invited to play together over three days. Despite his initial reticence, by the end of the festival he actually became friends with a Banyamulenge boy from a neighbouring village (II, 2016).

This was one of many examples provided by staff from the organisation of how their work brought people from different ethnic groups together.

There was also a fair amount of creative planning involved in this project. Its staff had produced their own tools to engage youth in peace. One example of this was a home-made version of snakes and ladders which was thematically linked to local peacebuilding processes in Bukavu.

Like at Organisation 2, this work did not seem to be a priority for the organisation’s leadership. However, reflecting the organisation’s commitment to engaging their participants and beneficiaries, youth were often at their office, participating in activities and helping to lead their clubs. In this way, the knowledge of the youths did seem to be integrated into the organisation’s programming.

Women and Artisanal Mining

This project sought to create awareness activities in and around artisanal mining sites, to identify barriers to the inclusion of women in artisanal mining projects and contribute to the development of a policy on gender equality and representation in mining. The project was primarily a research project that was funded by a Canadian NGO.28

---

28 I was unaware that Organisation 3 hosted this project, which is somewhat outside of its scope until this meeting. This project represented a conflict of interest for me because of my extensive work history with the Canadian partner organisation. I identified the conflict of interest to Organisation 3’s leadership and committed to not engaging with it further. As a result no interviews were completed in relation to this project nor were any of its activities observed.
Stabilisation and Infrastructure Reconstruction in the Eastern DRC

This project was part of a broader effort undertaken by the Fond Sociale and StaRec in the DRC. Its objective was to contribute to social cohesion in the Fizi, Uvira and Walungu in territories. Its activities included mapping and analyzing conflicts, forming or reinvigorating and supporting community-based structures.

Interestingly, during the meeting the project manager provided an overview of several major shortcomings related to working in partnership with the government. They included the poor execution of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration efforts, the absence of the state in certain places, a limited budget and poor coordination by provincial government officials. On a more positive note, one of the researchers affiliated with this project shared in a private discussion that he was encouraged by the fact that the government was actively seeking to have communities define their own needs for social assistance through the project and that Organisation 3 was playing a major role in facilitating that.

Examining the specific contributions of Organisation 3 to this project, there again appears to be an emphasis on local knowledge of conflict through the process of mapping and analysis, underscoring the organisation’s adoption of local knowledge to meet national and international interests.

Context Analysis

Context analysis was a central feature to much of this organisation’s peacebuilding efforts. During one of our interviews the coordinator said that, “We put a major emphasis on context analysis through our work. It is through context analysis that we identify local needs and we limit ourselves to what we can do as an organisation” (Leadership3B, 2016). He went on to indicate that context analysis took place on a regular basis in Bukavu and other territories. He
said that they also relied on exchanges with other local organisations to help inform their analysis (Leadership3B, 2016). Indeed, one of Organisation 3’s international external partners identified this conflict analysis as one of its strengths. She said that “local partners have a network in the communities that they work in and they have legitimacy and knowledge of local dynamics. This is a level of knowledge that we and other international organisations could never have” (ExternalPartner3B, 2016). However, it is important to note that this conflict analysis took place at the level of the organisation. Rather than relying on analysis conducted by the members of the organisation’s community-based structures, the data they collected was internally analyzed by staff, giving them epistemological priority.

Despite the organisation’s claims that context analysis meetings were held on a regular basis, no meetings were held during my three months of fieldwork. However, there was a training session held which focussed on participatory approaches to research which included members of the staff and the organisation’s community-based structures. During the second day of the meeting which I attended, the coordinator provided a basic overview of qualitative methods including interviews, surveys and observation. Further, the questions that were raised in relation to conducting interviews including what to do if a participant asked for money, or if participants in a follow-up review of results tried to undermine someone else’s contributions. They also raised questions regarding and how and when to cite other sources in written reports raised serious questions about the organisation’s capacity to conduct reliable research and representative conflict analysis. Although relations with beneficiaries and members of community-based structure were at times strained there was no additional evidence collected as part of this research suggesting that citation or plagiarism was a systemic problem within the organisation. At the end of the meeting the international technical consultant shared with me that
there had been more of a discussion of participatory approaches on the previous day during which the participants had been able to show their strengths.

Conclusions

These findings suggest that a combination of internal and external knowledge informed the program design and implementation at this organisation. They also suggest that the projects that were undertaken were framed by the interests of their external partners and that the knowledge provided by the members of the community-based structures were used to help ensure that they were locally appropriate. This is well situated within the organisation’s efforts to act as a consultant to international actors on the local peacebuilding context.

External Relations

Working with Community-Based Structures

This organisation had integrated community-based structures across its projects. Many of the community-based structures that they engaged were like those created and supported by Organisations 1 and 2 including CCIs, peace clubs, CMDs, CNs, and CMs. In addition, this organisation also supported women’s groups called “coalition wa maman amkemi”, literacy circles, “groupes de dialogue permanent” (GDPs) and “les pools d’intérêts économiques” (PIEs) (Organisation 3, 2016). According to the coordinator, the organisation identified members for their community-based structures through community focal points who are situated in the city, community or territory that the community-based structure is serving. Those individuals are instructed to select a representative number of men, women and children (Leadership3B, 2016).

Members of community-based structures were often present and engaged at Organisation 3. Members of the peace clubs and other youth groups were often at the office after school working on homework or activities related to their peace clubs; peace club events were also held
at the office over weekends. Further, the Bukavu-based CCI affiliated with the organisation held bi-weekly meetings there. However, members of these structures stopped arriving at the office after the organisation moved to its newly constructed offices near the Rwandan border. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

According to the Organisational Ethnography completed by Organisation 3, their community-based structures engaged over 27,000 people in South Kivu (Organisation 3, 2016). This was the only organisation that provided an estimate of individuals engaged through their community-based structures. However, if Organisation 1 and 2 were engaging with a comparable number of people, accommodating for differences in financial and human resources, these organisations could be interfacing with a significant portion of the population.29

In addition to examining the ways in which this organisation supported its community-based structures, this section will also provide a discussion of how two of the organisation’s CCIs operated and sought to contribute to peace.

In the follow-up questionnaire completed by the organisation indicated that their community-based structures were designed to encourage members of the population to become more self-reliant. It indicated that the community-based structures were inclusive and included different “ethnic communities… as well as women and youth whose voices are often not taken into consideration. We support them by providing them with materials and small financial donations to support their conflict transformation activities that they undertake in their communities.” (Organisation 3, 2017).

29 Although no census has been completed in the DRC in recent decades, the population of South Kivu is estimated at 5.8 million. If each of the organisations’ community-based structures engaged 27,000 people that would suggest that they directly engage approximately 1.4% of the population, which is significant given the size and resources of these groups.
All of the staff members consulted, including administrators and the two coordinators, worked directly with members of community-based structures. The organisation’s human resources manager explained during his interview that all of the administrative staff were assigned to a project which provides them with opportunities to visit the communities that they work with and have an understanding of local needs (IM, 2016). For example, the deputy coordinator was closely involved with the women’s groups and indicated that she was “often in contact with the women who organise for peace at least every other month” (EO, 2016). This approach was different from the other organisations examined in the research, which did not have adequate resources to send members of their administrative teams to the field.

Several participants provided information on how Organisation 3 worked with its community-based structures. Eloi, the project manager for the Regional Peace project, described the different ways that project staff worked with GDPs. They included “regular meetings in the communities… encouraging dialogue around specific themes… and keeping in regular contact with members over the phone and in person” (EK, 2016).

Two members of peace clubs from Bukavu discussed Organisation 3’s work in relation to their activities. It is significant to note that both members expressed a sense of pride in working on behalf of Organisation 3 through their leadership roles within their respective peace clubs (Beneficiary1C, 2016) (Beneficiary2C, 2016). The female peace club leader indicated that “when we are organising a conference or whatever else, they review our work and offer us feedback and do anything that they can to support our efforts. They provide both financing and suggestions” (Beneficiary1C, 2016). She added that Organisation 3 also organises activities in which the peace clubs participate, such as a games festival and a celebration for international peace day where they can meet members of other peace clubs (Beneficiary1C, 2016).
A leader of a “coalition wa maman amkemi” from Baracka indicated that Organisation had created the group that she worked with which gave women an opportunity to take on a leadership role (Beneficiary5C, 2016). These structures also helped to promote peaceful cohabitation and acceptance between ethnic communities (Beneficiary5C, 2016).

Three male members and one female member of CCIs affiliated with Organisation 3 participated in interviews as part of this research. Two of the men and the woman were from Bukavu while the third male was from Kalehe. The first male participant from Bukavu indicated that Organisation had brought together members of different ethnic communities through the creation of CCIs which promoted tolerance between these groups. He added that the organisation supported his CCI’s activities financially and by ensuring their participants had their transportation paid for (Beneficiary3C, 2016). The female participant from Bukavu indicated that the organisation also supported them institutionally “by giving us an office with paper, maps and cellphone credits. They provided us with the conditions that we need to succeed at our mission” (Beneficiary6C, 2016). The second male CCI member from Bukavu indicated that the CCI’s relationship with Organisation 3 was reciprocal because “we are supposed to be resources for Organisation 3, as they rely on us for information” (Beneficiary4C, 2016). He added that this helped the organisation because of their strong networks of CCIs across the province, which could provide them with context specific information (Beneficiary4C, 2016). Finally, the president of the CCI in Kalehe described how Organisation 3 had sought him out when they were planning to establish the community-based structure in the town. It was not clear why this man had been selected for the position, however he worked in the community as a veterinarian, spoke several languages and had attended university which positioned him well to take on the role. When asked about how the organisation supported his CCI’s efforts the president said “they
trained us on how to maintain peace. They provided information on how to peacefully coexist. They also offer training sessions for members of community-based structures so that they can support their communities to live in harmony” (Beneficiary7C, 2017).

During my fieldwork, I observed the meetings of Organisation 3’s CCI in Bukavu on a bi-weekly basis. This section provides an overview of some of their work both in Bukavu and in Kalehe.

As discussed above, I interviewed two male and one female members of the CCI in Bukavu. During their interviews they described how their community-based structure sought to contribute to peace. The second male member of the CCI indicated that in Bukavu they were responsible for “information sessions to support peace and to create rapport between participants. The CCI also conducted advocacy on behalf of CCIs elsewhere in the province towards Organisation 3 and the government” (Beneficiary4C, 2016). The female participant who was also the group’s president, indicated that the group’s efforts were not confined by Bukavu’s borders: “we are involved throughout the province because as members of CCI Bukavu we stand with members of other CCIs in other places… When they bring problems to our attention, we inform the relevant authorities and we work with them to try to find a resolution” (Beneficiary6C, 2016). Finally, the first male participant from the CCI discussed the importance of their work in bringing members of different ethnic communities together. He said “what I do in the CCI is organise reconciliation meetings and retreats as well. The retreats last for three days and engage members of different ethnic communities and religious groups including Catholics” (Beneficiary3C, 2016).

The CCI had their own room at Organisation 3’s original office. During their meetings they would often review current political and societal events. After identifying the most pressing
issues they would select an action to undertake together to address those issues. For example, one week the group that had convened identified two local causes of conflict. The first was that employees from government offices were on strike because they had not been paid which was leading to service disruptions. The group resolved to conduct advocacy with relevant powerholders in order to insist that the public servants receive their salary. Second, they also discussed efforts by a local Pentecostal church to interfere with the democratic process in one of the territories. In order to respond they decided to visit the mayor’s office and ask him to mediate the conflict with the church. Other issues that the CCI addressed were related to national elections, gender equality and violence in other parts of the province.

The first week that I met with this CCI in late February approximately ten people arrived to participate in the meeting. There was a combination of older and younger adults and an even representation of men and women. Many of the older members held government and other leadership positions in the community while the younger members appeared to have lower ranking positions and had travelled from farther away. Some of the younger people in the group were unable to follow the discussion in French so they continued in Swahili providing occasional translation or comment into French for my benefit. The president of the CCI was an older woman and the secretary was an older man, with an extensive career as a bureaucrat. This demonstrates the potential for the informal participation of state officials through local CSOs and their community-based structures.

Over the subsequent four weeks the number of participants in the meetings decreased to five. During the third meeting that I attended, at the end of March, members of the CCI revealed that they were no longer receiving money to cover the cost of their transport to meetings which were prohibitive for some of their members. This was connected with the suspension of funding
for the project by the international external partner described in the previous chapter. At the end of the meeting I asked whether we would still meet two weeks later because of the organisation’s scheduled move to its new location. When we arrived for the subsequent meeting the group was locked out of the original office in the pouring rain. The group was allowed to enter and use the still empty space by a benevolent security guard.

The following meeting was held at Organisation 3’s new office. When the organisation’s deputy director learned that the group had not found a new place to meet, she made an exception by providing them with a room to hold their meeting in for free. There was a strong turnout for the meeting including someone who had not attended previous meetings. During the meeting it came up that members of the CCI were longer receiving travel reimbursements and so this member called on the group to suspend their activities until the funding started up again despite the protests and advice of the structure’s president. They then went and spoke to the deputy coordinator about this plan. Upon their return, the Director of the CCI said that she and some of the more active members would likely continue to meet, despite the absence of ongoing financial support. As part of this discussion, she also explained that men were not used to working for free which may have influenced the new member’s reaction. This statement may offer some insight as to why women play more prominent roles within community-based structures.

Upon my return to the Eastern DRC in August and September 2017, I also encountered a CCI that had been set up by Organisation 3 in the town of Kalehe, the capital of the Kalehe territory. Although the community-based structure had stopped receiving funding from Organisation 3 in 2015, the president was still actively engaged in supporting peace in his community. He ran the structure in a small office which sat on a property shared by a local NGO. The walls were covered in chart paper outlining the CCI’s membership and included several high
ranking municipal and territorial officials. The sheets on the wall also noted some of their results including that the CCI had successfully demobilized thirteen members of armed groups with the help of local authorities. In an informal discussion the president outlined some other activities undertaken by his CCI including mediation of land and marital conflicts, negotiation, conflict analysis and advocacy. He concluded that one of the most significant ways that Organisation 3 had supported his CCI was that it helped them “to be accepted by the community and to know how to introduce a message of peace within it” (Beneficiary7C, 2017). This contribution suggests that being associated with Organisation 3 supported his CCI’s visibility and legitimacy, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. He also concluded that in the absence of ongoing support from Organisation 3 that they were seeking out funding from another INGO.

These observations highlight that community-based structures and their members can play an integral role in promoting the organisations’ peacebuilding efforts. They do this in two ways. First by working with their founding organisations they helped with the implementation of their mission, objectives and projects while providing context-specific information back to them. Second, members of these structures often also extend their efforts beyond what was mandated by the organisations, making collective decisions about where and how to intervene. This is particularly evident in cases where members of these structures have continued to meet despite a cessation of funding. It is also clear that many members receive personal benefits from participating groups including more exposure to members from different communities and increased leadership opportunities, particularly for women.
Working with External Partners

Organisation 3 also relied heavily on external partners to meet its objectives and goals and deliver its projects. Its external partners included other local CSOs, international partners as well as local and international religious groups, including the ECC.

The deputy coordinator indicated that “it’s our policy not to work alone. We try to develop projects in collaboration with others. We have worked together with other local organisations including Organisation 2” (EO, 2016). For example, the project manager for the literacy element of the project ‘Promoting a Culture of Peace’ indicated that a meeting was held for all of the literacy organisations working in South Kivu twice per year to discuss “how we are contributing to peace, what our impacts are and how to find solutions to our collective problems” (UZ, 2016). This organisation was also working with Organisation 2 on the community-based structure project and worked with several other local organisations in South Kivu, North Kivu, Rwanda and Burundi.

In addition to collaborating with other organisations on project specific activities, the organisation also worked with other local actors in different ways. Like Organisation 2, Organisation 3 also participated in OCHA’s protection cluster meetings which Leonard indicated provides them with opportunities to “communicate our activities with other organisations” (EL, 2016). The coordinator also explained that Organisation 3 took efforts to include members of other organisations in their context analyses (Leadership3C, 2016).

Although the organisation was officially affiliated with the ECC, this connection was rarely visible. I never observed members of the clergy at the organisation for meetings or other purposes. The most visible displays of this connection were on International Women’s Day when members of the organisation were invited to stand on the main stage as opposed to in the crowds
in the Place Lumumba with the other organisations and through the participation of the organisation’s staff in weekly sermons at a local Pentecostal church.

Organisation 3 also collaborated at times with the government. One of the organisation’s projects supported the national government’s stabilisation and reconstruction program described above. Beyond direct collaboration of this kind, both national and provincial state representatives cooperated with Organisation 3’s efforts in various ways. For example, when the organisation held civic education workshops the Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI) “offers a session in which they provide instructions on electoral processes since they are experts in that field. Thus, they give us the information that we need” (II, 2016). The follow-up questionnaire completed by the organisation indicated that they also provided recommendations to state authorities within the scope of their work (Organisation 3, 2017).

The organisation’s international external partner who participated in an interview for this research indicated that they collaborated with the organisation on program design and supported them institutionally through capacity building and financial assistance. The external partner suggested that her organisation “has a philosophy of partnership with their implementing partners of being on equal levels, which they try to achieve across their programs” (ExternalPartner3B, 2016). The Coordinator indicated that the organisation also worked with other international actors by providing them with context analysis. For example, he noted that in 2005 the Organisation “was invited by external actors to explain the causes of conflict in the DRC to representatives from more than fifty countries because local politicians had presented another interpretation” (Leadership3C, 2016). He added that representatives from the organisation were also at times invited to visit partner organisations in Europe to provide overviews of their efforts (Leadership3C, 2016).
Embedded External Partner

This was also the only case where a foreign staff person was embedded within the organisation. The technical advisor was sent from one of the Organisation’s international religious partners. Her presence at the organisation has been captured both in observation and through interviews. The woman, a pastor from Europe, explained that her contract indicated that her role was to work with the organisation’s youth and women’s programs but that her role was also consultative. She said that she worked with several of the programs and would provide advice on the strengths and weaknesses of activities and technical advice to the coordinators and members of the staff (ExternalPartner3A, 2016).

During an interview, the technical advisor described how her home organisation worked with Organisation 3. She said that their goals in working together were “capacity building on peacebuilding contributions and social cohesion” (ExternalPartner3A, 2016). She added that her organisation maintained close contact with Organisation 3 which facilitated the provision of financing based on their needs and helped her home organisation to better understand the context in Bukavu for advocacy purposes (ExternalPartner3A, 2016).

It is also interesting to note that this partner merged with a former partner of Organisation 1 and decided to continue its support to Organisation 3 rather than Organisation 1 in its transition.

Conclusions

This section demonstrates a commitment to collecting and analyzing local knowledge to conflict undertaken by the organisation. Information was collected through its community-based structures and the organisation also sought to collect additional data through its relationships with other local peacebuilding actors, even when such efforts were not successful. Having access
to the breadth of knowledge supported by its large number of community-based structures supported the organisation’s claim to be a strong consultant on the local context and attracted several financing partners, who provided funding to support their interests. The organisation then leveraged its relationship with its community-based structures to help implement these projects, falling short of directly responding to the needs and interests expressed by their members.

**Communications and Events**

Organisation 3 did not have a formal communications project or program. The organisation also did not maintain an active website. However, some of Organisation 3’s projects included the production of communications materials. For example, the regional peacebuilding project helped to produce a video featuring local voices discussing peace in the Great Lakes Region as part of a team of organisations from across the Great Lakes Region, supported by an international funder. The organisation did not host any events during the time of observation, however it did report having previously organised events around International Peace Day as well as other community-oriented activities.

Given the organisation’s focus on context analysis it was somewhat surprising that they did not produce formal hard or electronic copies of their reports and research. The human resources manager reflected that “We have not successfully reached a point of recognition where we are in a position to publish… we do not have the resources necessary to publish, if we want to publish in hard copy we must do so through our partners in Europe” (IM, 2016).

Outside of these formal efforts, the technical advisor observed that the organisation’s culture was more oriented towards informal verbal communication. She said that above all Organisation 3 communicated with her organisation “verbally but also sometimes via the internet” (ExternalPartner3A, 2016). This closely reflects the relationship with external partners.
described by the Coordinator. He suggested that “We have management committee meetings including myself with funders, to exchange about the needs of the communities we work with in person, online and by e-mail. We exchange with them and hold formal meetings to ensure that they understand local needs and to conduct evaluations” (Leadership3C, 2016).

Both the technical consultant and the other external partner who participated in this research had a strong understanding of the organisation’s mission and objectives. Further they both indicated that their organisations understood the context that they worked in well and sought out like-minded partners. The external partner from the international NGO said that they “looked for local partners whose goals and objectives were aligned with those of our organisation which was initially a source of tensions with the coordinator. We now interact by phone on a regular basis which gives them an opportunity to elaborate on their objectives and goals” (ExternalPartner3B, 2016). It is relevant to note that there were limited visible tensions between Organisation 3 and its external partners, which may be a product of the highly formalized work environment maintained by the organisation’s coordinators as opposed to an actual absence of concerns.

**Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions and how?**

*Beneficiaries and Members of Community-Based Structures*

Staff at Organisation 3 made fewer claims that they deeply engaged beneficiaries and members of their community-based structures in their planning and programming development. Two factors may have influenced this. First, the organisation engaged with and relied heavily on context analysis for most of its activities. The way staff at the organisation described this process included input from members of community-based structures but also other sources of
information such as other local CSOs. The context analysis was then conducted internally by staff who would draw conclusions from the information that they received. The second factor that may have contributed to a weaker emphasis on the participation by members of the community-based structures in program design was the hierarchy within the organisation which placed the coordinator and deputy coordinator as the central decision makers, working in collaboration with their external financing partners.

Instead, the organisation treated members of its community-based structures as implementing partners and beneficiaries. For example, Ismael, one of the researchers at the organisation, indicated that members of community-based structures were selected by the general assemblies within their communities to work with and lead CCIs. He said that once these individuals were in place that the organisation was able to extend its reach into places like Fizi, despite its distance from Bukavu. He went on to say that “Organisation 3 helps them to resolve conflicts in their communities, with our experts in peacebuilding. We train the CCIs and give them advice but ultimately it is the CCIs that work in their communities” (IS, 2016). Further, Leonard, the program manager who also worked closely with the CCIs, indicated that Organisation 3 collaborated with their community-based structures to “understand the roots of conflict together and gain insight and then we engage the affected community and provide them with concrete recommendations. So, it is on that basis that we work together with the hope that they will do what is necessary to support peace” (EL, 2016). This suggests that while the members of these community-based structures did not have significant influence over planning that they do play an important part in this organisation’s implementation of its projects, vision and mission, suggesting that they do influence the outcomes of the organisation’s efforts.
Although the organisation did not strongly engage the members of its community-based structures and beneficiaries in the planning process, it is still relevant to consider how effectively their interventions were addressing their needs in relation to peacebuilding.

**Members’ Needs**

Two of the members of community-based structures who participated in this research responded to the original beneficiary interview in which the question examining individual needs in relation to peacebuilding had not been disaggregated (Beneficiaries 1 and 2). While their responses were comparable to the others conducted with participants from this organisation, they were somewhat less detailed.

Governance emerged as an area of concern across responses from members of community-based structures who participated in this research. The president of the Bukavu peace club indicated that “There needs to be good governance, there must be community sensitization about the importance of peace and there needs to be more action taken against conflict” (Beneficiary1C, 2016). A male member of a Bukavu peace club added that if there was good governance “and the population’s needs were met, there would be an equal distribution of resources and more employment” (Beneficiary2C, 2016). Further, the CCI president from Kalehe suggested that the state should play a more significant role in ensuring security. He indicated that politicians played a key role in conflict by “orchestrating armed groups… the government should be open and sincere about its intentions” (Beneficiary7C, 2017).

Beyond good governance, participants also expressed the need for improved access to services. A male member of the CCI in Bukavu indicated that “We don’t have a government. Our government hasn’t changed anything. We need clean drinking water and electricity, everything” (Beneficiary4C, 2016). The director of the CCI in Kalehe called for greater access
to “education and the construction of schools, roads, and improved agricultural production” (Beneficiary7C, 2017). One of the male CCI members from Bukavu also identified the need for clean drinking water and electricity. He added that there was a “great demand for the provision of free health care” (Beneficiary3C, 2016). Having echoed the other participants in relation to the need for services, the president of the CCI in Bukavu identified her desire for more transparency and reform within the judicial system because parties to conflict “often find that they have to pay the judges to hear their cases. And where does that get you? Cases take years and years to be heard” (Beneficiary6C, 2016).

**Staff Understanding of the Needs of Beneficiaries and Implementation in Programming**

Many of the staff members who participated in interviews for this thesis discussed how they perceived the needs of their beneficiaries and community-based structures at length. The researcher who wrote the book about traditional conflict resolution, discussed above, identified governance as the primary need of the population. He noted that an absence of state authority and a duality of national and customary laws perpetuated ongoing conflict in South Kivu. He said that “It always comes down to governance. Because there has been conflict for so long, we have developed a culture of killing and death which requires cultural change. There are some places where there are still no roads, that are completely inaccessible” (IS, 2016).

In addition, staff members also identified that their beneficiaries required improved security. Hélène indicated that “there is insecurity everywhere. They must start indicting those who torture others during the night and the armed forces could be reinforced as well” (HE, 2016). Leonard felt that security could be improved by providing better services to youth. He indicated that “Most of the population is under 20. They need education and employment to
prevent them from turning to drugs and alcohol which contributes to a culture of criminality” (EL, 2016).

As part of more formal efforts to support security, Derek highlighted the need to continue to support acceptance and peaceful cohabitation at the community level. He said that the members of the organisation’s community-based structures continued to need “dialogue between members of the populations, like the ones that we are organising now. There is also a need for inclusive activities which help different members of the community to better understand each other” (II, 2016).

The deputy coordinator of the organisation indicated that she was particularly moved by the needs of women, suggesting that their demands were most closely linked to the previous sets of security and peaceful cohabitation needs. However, she highlighted that historically women have not had the opportunity to advocate for their rights in public spaces and that as a result they are “not fully integrated into peacebuilding processes even at the village level” (EO, 2016). Thus, she identified the need for a greater inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes. Many women were playing leadership roles across the organisation’s community-based structures, which may be related to the coordination’s commitment to greater inclusion.

Finally, Ursula reflected on the need for poverty alleviation. She said that even “where there is security, things remain difficult socio-economically. They try to cultivate the land, but it can be difficult because of land conflict. When people need food, they try to get it at any cost and this can cause problems between neighbours” (UZ, 2016).

These comments reflect a broad understanding of the needs expressed by members of community-based structures by the staff, including socio-economic needs with an emphasis on security and governance. Staff acknowledged the need for government services like healthcare
and education less frequently, although the provision of such assistance was outside of their mandate. However, the Coordinator also identified a key challenge in the ability of the organisation to address these needs. He indicated that a slow response to context analyses produced by the organisation on the part of their financing partners had been problematic. He said that “while we wait for a response the participants develop new needs while our partners organise their calendars. There are a lot of needs that go unaddressed and that is a real problem for us” (Leadership3C, 2016).

Organisation 3’s partners also appeared to have a strong understanding of the needs of their beneficiaries and members of community-based structures. The technical advisor reflected on many of the same themes identified by the staff as well as education but noted that at times it was difficult to identify needs because people would express them in different ways at different times (ExternalPartner3B, 2016). Indeed, having an embedded staff member provided the religious international external partner of Organisation 3 with an opportunity to better understand the needs of the communities that they were supporting.

Some of the organisation’s programming appeared to respond well to the needs expressed by the population. For example, the work conducted by the organisation to support decentralisation, train journalists on election programming and promote participation in the democratic process addressed some of the concerns raised by members of community-based structures in relation to governance, particularly those related to accountability. Further, the organisation’s participation in the stabilisation and infrastructure project run by the government might also contribute to the government’s ability to ensure the security of its citizens. However, their efforts were unable to promote the provision of services by the government, nor did they address any of the service gaps identified by participants, except education. Still, such activities
could be understood to fall outside of the capacity or scope of the organisation. In contrast with the other service related needs listed by the members of the organisation’s community-based structures, this organisation did offer relatively strong education-related interventions. However, neither of their education-oriented interventions addressed broader structural problems related to education such as the absence of universal primary education. These findings suggest that while the organisation relied on local knowledge to develop its peacebuilding interventions, that the interests of its international financing partners took precedence over those of its beneficiaries.

External Partners

**International Partners**

Cooperation with international external partners was visible in the daily activities of Organisation 3. The organisation’s projects were all defined individually, in consultation with their funders. Further, the organisation cooperated with the audit conducted by the funder of the community-based structure project described in Chapter 6 although some staff privately expressed frustration with this process.

Staff indicated that their strengths of their international partners included knowledge exchange, capacity-building, financing and networking. The Deputy Coordinator indicated that working with their external partners allowed the organisation to “develop a broader vision by learning about other ways to respond to local needs. There are also opportunities to better understand the regional context and how international funders work in those spaces” (EO, 2016). Leonard recognized the efforts of international funders to financially support state and non-state actors to contribute to peace, particularly lauding MONUSCO efforts (EL, 2016). Derek reflected that their “international external partners offer us trainings, capacity-building, financing. They finance our field activities and give us a sense of pride in our work in
comparison with efforts undertaken by other organisations through their financial recognition” (II, 2016). Finally, Eloi reflected on one of their partner’s ability to connect the organisation with additional funders (EK, 2016).

The major weaknesses of the organisation’s international external partners related specifically to the distribution of funding. The Coordinator discussed challenges with the way the organisation’s funders distributed their funds. He said that:

A lack of flexibility with how the funds are used is a significant challenge. Another challenge is the banks. When our partners choose a bank for us it becomes complicated. For example, if they transfer their funds to a bank in Bukavu it takes seven days longer… Working on peacebuilding also demands a more flexible budget (Leadership3C, 2016).

Leonard indicated that there simply were not enough funds. He said that the “money available is not enough to address needs. When I compare the results they were expecting, to the funding available, to accomplish them it is clear that we need more.” (EL, 2016).

These reflections demonstrate that financial and knowledge exchanges influence the organisation’s capacity to contribute to peacebuilding.

Local Partners

Staff at Organisation 3 indicated the organisation was a leader among local civil society actors. For example, the Coordinator indicated that the organisation had been appointed as a mediator for conflicts between different local actors by the local civil society coordination office (Leadership3C, 2016). However, while it was clear that the organisation collaborated with other organisations on projects where they shared funding, there was no evidence of other forms of collaboration. As previously discussed, the technical advisor had worried that the organisation’s move to the more elegant office space and their rebranding had alienated them from other organisations. During one of our interviews the Coordinator had also reflected that they had
since been unable to convene context analysis meetings with other organisations. This suggests that local partners have a limited influence on the organisation’s peacebuilding efforts.

One positive observation that a staff member offered was that when they did work together with other local organisations it offered an opportunity to address problems that affected more diverse issues. Ursula added that they also “exchanged a bit on methodology and try to work together” (UZ, 2016).

However, staff at Organisation 3 expressed doubt about the utility of collaborating with other local CSOs. Eloi reflected that in working with other organisations in the Kivus, Rwanda and Burundi he found that there were “competing agendas between different places. At the beginning of the project there was a certain suspicion because we did not know if researchers from the three countries would be able to work together” (EK, 2016). Although, he did conclude that these tensions had eased over time. Further, Ursula suggested that a lack of experience and capacity made it difficult to collaborate with other local civil society actors. She said that “sometimes there are organisations that are amateur and unprofessional. One day they tell you that they are taking a certain approach and the next day they are doing something else. They are not very focussed” (UZ, 2016). Samuel extended this conversation to financial management by other organisations. He said that “There is a tendency towards corruption among local civil society actors. The managers of those organisations tend to undermine the sector” (IS, 2016). The Coordinator concluded that “We often find that we do not share the same vision as other local actors. We work, for example, with one organisation, but they have a very different approach and we have difficulty working collaboratively” (Leadership3C, 2016). These statements reflect the reluctance I observed among members of the organisation to collaborate with other local actors. This suggests that while some other local CSOs were reported to
contribute to the organisation’s context analysis that they did not otherwise influence the organisation in a significant way.

**Government**

As described above this organisation collaborates with state actors in certain contexts. The follow-up questionnaire completed by the organisation reflected the influence that the state exercises over their activities. It indicated that some of the organisation’s activities required authorisation from the state which was sought through meetings and correspondence. State officials also periodically visited the organisation’s projects. The questionnaire concluded that CSOs cannot succeed without some support or recognition by the state (Organisation 3, 2017).

Yet, overall engagement with the state was seen as having a negative influence on the organisation’s capacity to realise its peacebuilding objectives. The technical advisor reflected privately that because they worked on government funded projects, they were limited in their ability to speak out against government inefficiency and political strife. She suggested that this contradicted their advocacy for systemic change around conflict dynamics and governance, as a result she was not sure about the efficacy of their work. Further, evidence from one of my interviews with the coordinator suggested that their engagement with the state had a minimal impact. He reflected that the government had not followed up on promises that it has made during its participation in community dialogue processes and that the provincial government has been slow to respond to their context analyses, representing an obstacle to their ability to achieve their goals (Leadership3C, 2016).

As discussed by members of the other organisations examined in this project, state authorities were also partly responsible for creating or perpetuating the conditions which necessitated their peacebuilding interventions. In the follow-up questionnaire Organisation 3
acknowledged that “armed groups disturb the peace and Congolese authorities are not in a position to secure the population” (Organisation 3, 2017).

Affiliation with ECC

As previously stated, this organisation is considered to be the peacebuilding branch of the ECC, the organisation of protestant churches in the DRC. However, none of the staff or management of the organisation discussed their relationship with the church nor was their engagement visible during observation, beyond the staff’s weekly attendance of a church service on Monday mornings away from their office. While this affiliation must have influenced the organisation’s efforts, it is not clear how.

Conclusions

These findings show a strong tendency on the part of the organisation to adopt or meet the interests of its external financing partners. Staff members would individually show their resistance to these funders through complaints about funding and management. However, the tendency to adopt their management style and address their interest could be understood as a key to their financing success.

The organisation’s desire to maintain the favour of these international external partners may explain why they insisted on situating themselves as leaders among civil society actors. Their desire to hold context analysis meeting might also have reflected an attempt to maintain control over the local narratives related to peace and conflict confirming their leadership related to peacebuilding and their authority in relation to local knowledge on peace and conflict. However, this largely seemed to be resisted other peacebuilding actors.

Finally, while staff at the organisation vocalized concern over the role of state actors in conflict and security sector failures, the organisation generally seemed to defer engagement with
the state rather than directly resisting its actions like Organisation 1. At the same time when these actors do not cooperate with their efforts, they do not push to engage them (unlike Organisation 2).

Staff and Leadership

Leadership

Organisation 3 had both a Coordinator and a Deputy Coordinator. It was the most hierarchical of the three organisations, creating a sphere of influence around the two coordinators. In private discussions staff would often concede that the coordinators had ultimate decision-making authority within the organisation and there was very little debate about programming or situational analysis among staff or with the coordinators. In general, the staff worked more closely with the deputy coordinator who was responsible for financial administration and staff oversight. In contrast, the coordinator primarily engaged with the staff as a group providing guidance on conflict analysis or evaluation, often taking on the role of teacher. I rarely saw members of Organisation 3’s staff interacting directly with the coordinator, other than the deputy-coordinator and other administrative personnel.

The coordinator was one of two founding members of Organisation 3. He indicated that after the war, he and his colleague had decided to make the most of training they had received on development and peace and so they created the organisation as a training centre within ECC in 2003 (Leadership3A, 2016). Over time, the organisation grew to become a local resource for peacebuilding efforts. The coordinator said that his role within the organisation was to “supervise

---

30 While there was hierarchy between the staff and coordinator at Organisation 2, the power structure between staff was relatively horizontal and as noted staff tended to challenge the coordinator’s position. In contrast, there were several levels of hierarchy at this organisation based on the staff member’s position (in other words manager exercised power over their program staff rather than acting as equals). Further, while the staff at Organisation 2 privately challenged the authority of the coordinator, the staff at Organisation 3 rigorously adhered to the rules set out by their leaders.
the workers here and the organisation’s activities. I’m the person who represents Organisation 3 externally and the church granted me relative autonomy to do so, although I remain their point of contact” (Leadership3A, 2016).

The coordinator indicated that before being invited to work at Organisation 3 by the ECC, he had been working as a Professor at the University of Kisangani, having completed his graduate studies in Belgium (Leadership3A, 2016). He reflected that “Despite spending more time working with CSOs, I will always be a professor at heart” (Leadership3A, 2016). This element of the coordinator’s approach was very evident in his interactions with staff. For example, the two organisation-wide meetings that I observed were directed exclusively by the coordinator who lectured his staff on research methodology and program evaluation.

The Coordinator reflected that his interest in peace had developed at a much earlier age. He said that “I grew up in a big family and my father would often have guests from different communities over and I learned how to live with different people and how to accept others. My family life shaped my personality and so I was already a man of peace early on” (Leadership3C, 2016).

In 2016 the deputy coordinator had been working in her position for five years and was responsible for the organisation’s financial management. She explained that she had “started working there in the women and families’ program and moved on to work on an agricultural initiative. After that I joined the finance department where I started as a teller and then an accountant. After gaining all of that experience they nominated me to be the deputy coordinator” (EO, 2016). The deputy coordinator was a brave woman with an extended history of working with peace organisations. She explained that during the invasion of Bukavu by the RCD in 2000 that:
The day the fighting arrived in Bukavu, when I left for work, I discovered that many people had fled, but I just went to work. My concern was to save the organisation’s money. At the time the situation was evolving rapidly, and I was responsible for finances, I also knew there was money in the office, and cheques, and I said to myself, what am I going to do if they loot the office? And that just would not do. I had to go. So, I snuck to the office on foot. When I arrived at the office, I took all of the money and hid it and I took the cheque books with me and I left. My family and I left after that. When they arrived to loot, we lost nine vehicles and four motorcycles … but fortunately they were never able to open the vault where I had hidden the money (EO, 2016).

This was an important story for her to share because it both demonstrates the potential strength women can bring in the midst of armed conflict while also noting her own extensive history contributing to peacebuilding in the province.

Her capacity and influence also extended beyond Organisation 3. At the time of research, she was also the president of Organisation 2’s Board of Directors. She explained that she met the director of Organisation 2 when he was working with a long-term international peacebuilding partner that was providing her organisation with funding, prior to 2003. She said that “that’s why they approached me to participate in the board’s general assembly. When I went, they were looking for board members, so I stepped forward to become the president and I was elected!” (EO, 2016). She indicated that she did not feel that this position compromised her relationship with either organisation and that it had created opportunities for the two organisations to work together. She reflected that working in the “Sud-Sud” or the Southern most part of the province, “we have found that if we work with another strong actor we can bring together a lot more participants to address the question of peace” (EO, 2016).

Staff

The staff who participated in interviews all had extensive experience within the organisation. Many of the staff members were over the age of forty-five and had been working with the organisation for at least ten years. Further, several of the younger staff had completed
internships with the organisation before joining the team. Hélène who worked with the Education, Conflict Transformation, Organisational Development and Good Governance project said that before she was hired that “I did an internship here and participated in several training sessions. I decided to do my formal university internship here, because peace is important to me” (HE, 2016). This was also the case for the organisation’s librarian who had been hired after completing an internship and hoped that he would be able to transition into a project management position (NJ, 2016). Despite this clear trend towards hiring individuals who had previously gained experience working with the organisation, the follow-up questionnaire completed by the organisation indicated that the “identification and choice of staff at our organisation is based on the manual of administrative and financial procedures. They are recruited based on a test and when they are hired, they are formally trained by the organisation” (Organisation 3, 2017).

Overall, the organisation had thirty-one staff members and two interns at the time of research. Nine of the employees were women. There was some diversity in the ethnic backgrounds of the ten staff members interviewed from the organisation. Three were Bashi, two were Bafuliru, two were Babembe and one was Barega, two declined to indicate their ethnic heritage. It is significant to note that all the staff members interviewed were part of groups who considered themselves to be autochthonous to the Eastern DRC. Indeed, their partner from the International NGO indicated that it was “a challenge for RIO to access communities in Mwenga and Haut Plateau because of the presence of Banyamulenge and Barundi who are not well represented among the staff” (ExternalPartner3B, 2016). In addition, given the organisation’s affiliation with the ECC it is not surprising to note that all the staff interviewed attended protestant churches, although two members did not attend Pentecostal churches which are most
closely linked with the ECC, attending Baptist and Methodist churches instead. Like Organisation 1, the organisation insisted that they worked with members of other religious faiths. Indeed, there were Catholic members of the organisation’s community-based structures.

These findings are consistent with the findings of the review of the other two organisations which suggests that local CSOs primarily work with communities that reflect the ethnic and religious composition of their staff. This will be discussed further in Chapter 8. As in the other two organisations women were underrepresented on this organisation’s staff. Yet, it is relevant to note that no one within this organisation discussed the legitimacy to claims of gender equality in my presence. This certainly reflects the organisation’s commitment to gender equality but may be supported by a woman occupying a key leadership role. The deputy-coordinator confirmed that the organisation was committed to equality between women and men both in their programming and staffing, but they faced barriers when staffing. She revealed that “our policies require us always to give female candidates a chance. However, we often have positions where there are no female candidates. When we were recently trying to hire a videographer, the women that we approached told us that they did not have the skills, but our funder was pushing us to choose a female candidate” (EO, 2016). She went on to suggest that these challenges were related to low levels of access to education for women in South Kivu and the failure to complete university (EO, 2016).

Organisational Structure

As previously stated, this organisation was very hierarchical with much of the power and influence controlled by the coordinator and his deputy. At the project level, power was concentrated with the project managers, who took the responsibility for making decisions for their teams. Unlike the other two organisations examined in this thesis, the staff rarely
challenged each other or their superiors at Organisation 3, either on questions related to their work or on other topics such as gender, ethnicity or causes of conflict. This respectful but controlled environment was enforced through the use of signs demanding “silence!” on the walls of both of the organisations’ offices and the need to consult with the coordinators on work related decisions.

While this approach did leave less room for creative decision making, it also contributed to a more supportive environment for staff. For example, this was the only organisation that had a human resources manager who would help to resolve problems between the staff and offer capacity-building programs both within and outside of the organisation, (IM, 2016). Further, the coordinator took every opportunity to improve his staff’s capacity. For example, during the monitoring and evaluation session that I attended at the organisation, he provided clarification on how to quantitatively verify the number of men and women participating in a project while qualitatively assessing the extent of each group’s participation. This formal structuring and support had a visible impact on cohesion among staff members which helped them to work collaboratively on project development and implementation.

Conclusions

The structure at Organisation 3 also seems to reflect the desire of its leadership to be situated as an adviser or leader on local knowledge related to peace and conflict. Information flows within the organisation are tightly controlled by the coordinator and deputy coordinator, who themselves apply internationally informed standards for project and knowledge management. As part of this structure, staff and members of their community-based structures are invited to participate in the organisation’s operations only in relation to their projects by sharing information on and delivering their projects through a highly structured process.
The composition of the staff also supports this finding. The long history of many of the staff members of the organisation helps to maintain historical institutional knowledge at the organisation and perhaps claims about their competency. New staff are brought in having completed training at the organisation as students helping to ensure that staff continue to follow this rigorous structure.

*Material Conditions and Context*

Organisation 3 had a relative financial advantage in comparison with the other organisations considered in this research. The organisational ethnography indicated that they had an annual budget of $1,025,000 USD in (Organisation 3, 2016). Further they indicated that they had two sources of financing including international funders and funds recovered from consulting with other local organisations on behalf of Organisation 3 (Organisation 3, 2016). The deputy coordinator also suggested that the new building that the organisation moved into “could also be a source of revenue for the organisation because of their ability to rent out meeting spaces and their auditorium” (EO, 2016). Yet, despite these relative advantages the Coordinator still lamented that “Our resources up until now have facilitated what was necessary but not the maximum” (Leadership3B, 2016).

Like staff from the other organisations examined, the staff from Organisation 3 also recognized challenges presented by the context that they were working in to their efforts. The human resources manager noted that physical access to sites across South Kivu had an impact on his organisation’s ability to achieve their objectives. He said that “when we are planning something, the means to communicate our actions are not always available. Some of the roads to the sites that we work at can be completely impassable” (IM, 2016). Further the technical advisor observed that a lack of electricity, access to the internet and running water also influenced the
implementation of projects both on the part of the organisation and the participants. She added that “the road conditions, a lack of access to information and poverty also complicated things” (ExternalPartner3A, 2016).

Organisational Re-Branding and Relocation

A major factor influencing the work of Organisation 3 at the time of research was that the organisation was going through a re-branding and relocation process. This process had been funded by its international religious partner. It included changing the organisation’s name and logo, creating a new brand highlighting its status as a resource for peace in the region. As part of the process the partner had also paid for the construction of a new office, close to the Rwandan border.

The original office was a tired three storey building on the shores of lake Kivu. It had many open spaces where staff and community members could work together, as well as individual office spaces. In contrast, the new building was vibrant with two storeys and included a cafeteria and a large presentation hall. While more visually striking, it also offered less space for the staff and community to work in. The meeting rooms had to be booked in advance and priority was given to paying clients. The presentation hall could also be booked by other organisations and was intended to become a source of income for the organisation.

While the original location of the organisation was in the centre of town and reasonably accessible from all the corners of Bukavu, the new location was more remote and a much farther distance from Kadutu where most of the city’s population lives. Members of the CCI from Bukavu expressed concern over the increased travel time that it would take to get to the organisation.
The technical adviser also worried about the impact of the construction of the new building. In an informal conversation she reflected that she felt that such an elegant space seemed to contradict the message of the organisation. She also explained that the construction of this new office had also strained relations with other CSOs who could not afford such luxurious accommodations. The new building was constructed by this employee’s home organisation, which also sent the architect to work on the project.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, Organisation 3 also contributed to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu in close collaboration with international external partners and members of community-based structures. The organisation actively sought funding from international external partners for projects designed either by the organisation or by the funder related to local and regional peacebuilding, with an emphasis on the reduction of inter-community conflict. These projects were broad in scope and engaged a wide range of actors including: women, children and youth, community members, politicians, regional actors and members of state and non-state armed groups. The organisation trained the members of its extensive -community-based structures and facilitated their ability to implement their projects. The organisation’s activities included conducting research and context analysis, holding mediations to resolve conflicts, conducting advocacy and holding community-level events and dialogue. Members of community-based structures even reported assisting with disarmament related activities.

The organisation also engaged with key actors. For example, the civics education program engaged with journalists about how to ethically and democratically cover elections. The children and youth programs organised large events for members of peace clubs which brought groups together from across the province. Further, the regional peace program engaged with
political and religious leaders to reduce the manipulation of identities and helped to create a documentary depicting community-level engagement with peace processes.

Organisation 3’s efforts primarily addressed local causes of conflict related to inter-community conflict. Many of their projects sought to promote dialogue, reconciliation and healing related to historical conflicts between different groups in South Kivu. Further, their educational and youth programs helped to promote a culture of peace at the individual and household level. Even the organisation’s participation in the regional peacebuilding project which also engaged communities in North Kivu, Rwanda and Burundi, was directed towards the lived experiences of communities as opposed to greater coordination by governments within the region. While the organisation did seek to adhere to the cultural norm of engaging provincial and national governments in events and official activities, it did so in a symbolic way, and internally viewed these officials as an obstacle to their efforts rather than an active actor in them.

Further, this case also adds to the list of actors operating within the South Kivu peacebuilding context. It identifies international, national and provincial religious actors as potential sources of funding and collaboration in their peacebuilding efforts. Although the relationship between the ECC and the organisation were not well captured in this thesis, Seay (2009) documents the extensive contributions of both protestant and catholic churches to peacebuilding in the East. Further, a considerable amount of this organisation’s substantial funding came from international religious partners, as well as through church offerings collected locally. The international technical advisor also represented a set of intermediaries who developed strong technical knowledge through their extended placements in the country but who did not share the same cultural values, traditions of shared experience of war as other members of community-based structures.
Discursive Power

In relation to the other two organisations examined in this thesis, Organisation 3 enjoyed a stronger ability to exercise discursive power through maintaining a consistent narrative on local peace and conflict which it delivered through communications with international partners. These relationships with external partners ensured that the organisation had access to resources to meet the needs of their beneficiaries and community-based structures that aligned with the interests and priorities of those partners. It also meant that the organisation was less reliant on support from other local peacebuilding actors, but this also meant that they were largely excluded from the local development on narratives on peace and conflict.

Examining Organisation 3 can help to further nuance the understanding of CSOs as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding. Like Organisation 1, they enjoyed strong connections with their community-based structures, yet, these relationships were more materially-oriented rather than rooted on an exchange of knowledge and support. While Organisation 3 did exercise more material power relative to the other two organisations examined in this study, their international financing partners and other international actors maintained a monopoly on material power in their relationships and the broader context.

Organisation 3 provided its community-based structures with the resources and training that they needed to support dialogue, literacy, conflict resolution and other themes with the expectation that these structures would continue to engage in these activities in their communities beyond the cessation of formal support, as was the case with the CCI in Kalehe. Instead of informally collecting knowledge and data through ongoing communications with these groups the organisation trained its staff and community-based structures to formally collect data in a way that adhered more closely to Northern models. This approach likely stemmed in part
from the Coordinator’s graduate education in Belgium, which set him apart from the other leaders considered in this thesis. These formal data collection models were also influenced by the availability of financial resources. Several participants from this organisation described how a lack of financing hampered their ability to reach as many areas as they had hoped as well as the organisation’s ability to publish data that they had collected. Further, the elite position that the organisation had achieved through its extensive funding also limited its ability to collaborate and share knowledge with other organisations. However, at the very least these observations in combination with those from Organisation 1, demonstrate the capacity of local CSOs in Bukavu to formally and informally collect and manage data which can inform peacebuilding interventions.

Material Resources

This organisation demonstrated how increased access to financial resources and knowledge sharing can positively impact the outcomes of an organisation’s missions and objectives. For example, the organisation has been able to financially sustain paying for a generator which allows their staff to continue working when the power is out. Further, continued engagement with international funding partners has ensured that the staff at the organisation are paid and not put on leave maximizing their engagement with the organisation. Financial support from their international religious partner also allowed for the construction of the organisation’s new office which is also expected to be a source of income and may create a space where the organisation can build stronger relationships with other local actors.

The results from Organisation 3 in comparison with the findings from the other organisations raise important questions about how competition for access to financial resources and partnerships with international actors impact the broader context of local civil society
peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu. Organisation 3 has adopted a more conservative approach to peacebuilding which does not challenge political or cultural norms contributing to conflict and it engages primarily with the dominant ethnic groups in the region. This suggests that the limited funding available through international partners may not always be directed in a way that facilitates the capacity of local CSOs to collectively address and challenge existing conflict dynamics. Instead it may create a context of competition between the organisations which makes it difficult for them to collaborate, undermining their sustainability.

*The Influence of Identity and Internal Dynamics*

The impact of identity was less visible on this organisation, which was the peacebuilding arm of the ECC. While none of the research participants openly discussed whether they would work with members from other religious backgrounds, the members of their community-based structures did seem to reflect the ethnic and religious composition of the staff. This organisation also sought to exclusively hire individuals with university degrees.

There are two internal factors that have positively influenced this organisation’s ability to exercise discursive power and address some of the interests of its beneficiaries in a consistent way. First, the hierarchical structure within the organisation ensured that staff and volunteers at the organisation designed, implemented, and evaluated projects in a consistent way. It minimized debate and ensured the ultimate authority of the coordinator and deputy-coordinator. In return the coordinator and deputy-coordinator listened to and supported their staff, while presenting the organisation in a professional manner to external partners. Both of these individuals had a high degree of education and experience which supports their capacity to do this.

Second, its consistency and reliability enabled the organisation to attract an extensive list of international partners including both religious and civil society-oriented groups. These groups
provided generous funding and support to the organisation which helped it to gain access to the material means to complete their work and manage operations. This process reinforced the authority of the coordinators although this hierarchy might also have undermined the ability of the organisation to engage in the development of creative solutions as it minimized debate and problem solving. A strong and reliable network of community-based structures also helped to ensure that the organisation was able to implement its projects, although these relationships are undermined by inconsistent funding.

Translating Hybridity

Like Organisation 1, Organisation 3 translated the knowledge and interests of both local and international actors. While at Organisation 1 this process was undertaken informally through discussion and debate, at Organisation 3 it was undertaken through a formal process of context and conflict analysis which was directed by their leadership. While there were limited opportunities to directly observe these formalized processes during this study, the ultimate authority of the organisation’s coordinators over these processes were visible through their approach to comparable areas examined at the other two organisations.

In relation to gender, the organisation had successfully adopted gender equality into its programming and had a female deputy-coordinator. Yet, the organisation still did not have any women as managers for their projects, and despite their gender inclusive hiring policy the organisation had refused to hire a female videographer at the request of their external partner, demonstrating some resistance to its full implementation through hiring processes. Instead of adopting gender equality through formal processes, it was more likely to be adopted informally at the project level, for example through the programming at literacy clubs which attracted more female participants.
Governance provided an example of how the organisation deferred problematic interests. Many of the beneficiaries of the organisation reflected on a need for stronger governance, which was a call echoed by several members of the organisation’s staff. Yet, because of the potential risks associated with resisting state authorities, the leaders at the organisation opted not to directly resist or oppose them, instead working around them and deferring direct action to other organisations.

Finally, Organisation 3 eagerly adopted the financial management style required by its international funders and accommodated their interests. As a result, this meant that the organisation was not able to creatively defer or resist their influence and so when the funding arrived late, or the interests of the organisation changed, they had to defer the interests of their beneficiaries as was demonstrated by the case of the CCI in Bukavu.
Chapter 8: Analysis and Conclusions

Formal relationships between these organisations were primarily governed by external actors. As previously discussed, both Organisations 1 and 3 were affiliated with the ECC thereby linking the two, especially given that they were working towards similar goals, often in the same places. However, the presence of the church was not easily observable within either organisation beyond the membership of all of the staff at each of the organisations in protestant churches. To the same end, there was little evidence of formal or informal relationships between Organisations 1 and 3, they were rarely observed in the same spaces nor did any of the staff from either organisation refer to any form of professional or personal relationship to the other organisation in interviews. Further, through the discussion with the financial administrator at Organisation 1, it became clear that the organisations were in competition with each other for funding from common partners (OC, 2016). Recall that Organisation 1 lost funding to Organisation 3 after the amalgamation of the organisations’ international religious funders. This might have also been influenced by the fact that Organisation 3 was branded as the official arm of ECC while Organisation 1 was considered to be a faith-based organisation, loosely affiliated with the church (Jordhus-Lier, 2017) creating a hierarchy between the two.

Organisations 2 and 3 had a formal relationship through their collaboration on the community-based structures project. Again, there was little visible collaboration between the two organisations in the context of this project. However, the Coordinator at Organisation 3 did indicate that they met with the managers of Organisation 2 every couple of months (Leadership3C, 2016 ). The two organisations were also linked through the participation of Organisation 3’s deputy coordinator as the president of Organisation 2’s Board of Directors. Although she insisted during her interview that her dual roles did not create a conflict of interest
(EO, 2016), it is difficult to prove that she was effectively able to represent the financial interests of both organisations given her role as financial manager at Organisation 3.

Informally, Organisation 2 enjoyed stronger relationships with both Organisation 1 and 3, visibly collaborating with both on more than one occasion. For example, early during my fieldwork I was visiting Organisation 2 and observed a presentation of an evaluation of Organisation 2’s efforts to mark cattle grazing paths to reduce land conflict in the Uvira territory, that was led by a staff member from Organisation 1. Further, Organisation 2 held its road map for peace event in the event space at Organisation 3’s new office. Although both engagements likely involved the exchange of funds, these examples suggest the capacity for collaboration between local CSOs in the absence of the influence of international financing.

These findings suggest that relationships between these organisations were influenced by the competitive funding environment created by their external partners and the broader international community. Where organisational staff saw their activities as being in direct competition with those of one of the other organisations, they would make an effort to differentiate themselves from the other both in terms of attracting funders, as was the case between Organisations 1 and 3 and when they were collaborating on a project such as between Organisation 2 and 3. This would explain why relations between Organisations 2 and 3 appeared to be strong except in relation to their collaboration on the community-based structure project, where representatives from both organisations complained about their colleagues. Since the organisations relied on support from other local actors to implement their peacebuilding efforts during funding shortfalls, such a competitive climate caused by the material power exercised by funding partners may affect the long term sustainability of CSO efforts.
Examining this limited set of relationships between comparable intermediary actors begins to complicate the process of translation described above. Given that each organisation was engaged in the process of translation between different local and international actors and engaged in these processes in different ways touches on the complexity of the influence of these intermediary actors on broader narratives on peace and conflict in the region. While this thesis has documented the agency of local intermediary actors to contribute to peacebuilding efforts, it would be very complicated to map all of the flows of resources and knowledge which ultimately shape the broader peace and conflict context.

The previous chapters reviewed the ways in which three local CSOs sought to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu. They also explored the way that they exercise and maintain discursive power by exercising their agency to adopt, defer and resist the knowledge and interest of both internal and external actors in the peacebuilding processes, thereby translating hybridity. They suggested that while the interventions led by these organisations primarily focused on the causes of conflict specific to South Kivu, that they also interfaced with national causes of conflict and engaged national actors. Further, they highlight the importance of the relationships that each of the organisations created and sustained with community-based structures and external partners, underlining the influence of discursive and material power in these relationships. Yet, it is difficult to understand the significance of these contributions and relationships without situating them within the broader context of peacebuilding in South Kivu and in more theoretical terms.

This chapter seeks to more deeply explore these findings in relation to the theoretical framework outlined for this thesis. It begins by situating its findings within the literature on civil society peacebuilding efforts, presenting a hypothesis about the role that CSOs play in these
spaces. It goes on to explore the role of local CSOs in relation to other possible intermediaries in peacebuilding processes in South Kivu. Finally, the chapter concludes by exploring the findings within the broader context of post-liberal peacebuilding.

**Civil Society and Peacebuilding in South Kivu**

This thesis contributes to the civil society and peacebuilding literature in a number of ways. It sought to identify the contributions to peacebuilding efforts and interests of three civil society organisation operating in the context of a state characterized by predatory fragility. In doing so, it also contributes to the literature on peace and conflict in the Eastern DRC. Second, it also explores how discursive and material power influence the ways in which civil society functions in this context. Third, through both of these tasks it advances a potentially new understanding of CSOs in peacebuilding spaces which are neither purely local nor liberal in identity, knowledge or power.

**CSOs in South Kivu: Mapping the Interests and Functions of CSOs in a State of Predatory Fragility**

As explored in Chapter 2 liberal approaches define civil society based on its functions including: protection, monitoring, advocacy and public communication, in-group socialization, social cohesion, intermediation and facilitation and service delivery (Spurk, 2010, p. 65). In contrast, more critical approaches emphasize the role of civil society organisations in challenging the power of the state in a non-violent way (van Tuijl, 2016). Richmond highlights a post-colonial understanding of civil society is one with legitimacy that “transcends the state and the market, liberalism and cosmopolitanism, though it also includes and modifies them.” (2011, p. 433). Thus, this section explores how the CSOs explored in this study correspond to these
definitions, ultimately finding that the post-colonial definition presented by Richmond best captures the organisations described in this thesis.

The results described above demonstrate that the activities undertaken by the three organisations do align closely with the functions of civil society in relation to peacebuilding described by Paffenholz. Organisation 1 stood out in terms of its protection work through its efforts to both educate and protect the rights of its beneficiaries in South Kivu, including through helping to connect victims of SGBV to relevant medical and psycho-social support in Bukavu. All three organisations engaged in conflict and human rights monitoring in collaboration with the members of their community-based structures, which also supported in-group socialization and social cohesion. While Organisation 1 was the only organisation to conduct direct advocacy and public communications, Organisations 2 and 3 did undertake these functions through their events and in their communications with external partners. Facilitation was undertaken by the organisations both in relation to the trainings and education they offered to members of their community-based structures and members of the public and through the events they held to attempt to contribute to peace. All of the organisations also conducted service delivery across different themes. Organisation 1 provided conflict resolution and public defense services to the population. Organisation 2 provided materials ranging from seeds to markets, as well as training to support livelihoods and give members of rural communities alternatives to joining armed groups. Finally, Organisation 3 provided badly needed de-traumatization services as well as literacy support. Responding to van Tuijl’s critical definition of civil society the organisations also challenged state and other power holders in non-violent ways including through advocacy, direct engagement in peacebuilding efforts and passive resistance.
However, the applicability of these definitions was challenged by the absence of a strong and/or liberal state with which the organisations could interact, which arises out of the security and governance conditions that persist in South Kivu. These dynamics are at the heart of both the liberal and critical frameworks outlined for civil society above. The need for peacebuilding, reconciliation and justice in South Kivu and the rest of the Eastern DRC arose out of the recent history of, and ongoing, violent conflict in the region which have continued in part because of the predatory fragility which characterizes the Congolese state. Certain elements of the security situation in South Kivu impacted the organisations universally and others were specific to the individual organisations examined.

The security situation broadly impacted the activities of all three organisations in relation to daily risk. These elements were not well captured through interviews because participants understood them as being part of their daily routine, yet these factors would not have influenced organisations in other contexts. For example, road travel was limited outside of Bukavu to the times between dawn and dusk because of the risks of encountering armed groups after dark. When spending extended periods outside of the city, staff from the organisation risked being present in locations that are vulnerable to incursions by armed groups, which are a routine occurrence for members of their community-based structures. Inside Bukavu, movement and activities by members of the organisations were restricted during times of protest, when offices would be shut down for “journée de la ville mort” and other acts of civil disobedience. Criminality also posed a risk to the offices of the organisations. On one occasion when I was entering the compound of Organisation 2, two young men ran past me, apparently having been frightened away from stealing the organisation’s generator. Further, as discussed in Chapter 4, most of the staff members had been personally been affected by the conflict through
displacement or the loss of a family member and were also impacted by direct or secondary trauma which they experienced as part of their jobs with little support. In some cases, these experiences had visible impacts on their wellbeing and influenced their sense of risk in both their personal and professional lives. Security risks posed by powerful political and security actors in Bukavu as well as those in the field demonstrated the level of risk that all three organisations needed to navigate and that staff at all three organisations are deciding to accept these risks through their continued involvement with the organisations.

A lack of critical infrastructure and services including roads, electricity, clean drinking water, access to universal primary and secondary education, health care and justice services also emerged as a theme impacting the efforts of the organisations being examined. Beyond their immediate need for negative security these factors were among those most frequently identified by the beneficiaries who participated in this research as being necessary to realize peace. Further, the absence of adequate roads played a major role in the ability of the organisations to reach the communities that they worked with. The opening story of being stuck in the mud depicted the challenges faced by all of the organisations in trying to reach other parts of the province. Further, certain communities were not accessible by road at all, which led Organisation 2 to rely MONUSCO helicopters to access those places, leaving them without an exit strategy in the case of violence or emergency. Finally, a lack of access to universal primary education limited the number of candidates who were able to work with the organisations and the community-based structures to those whose parents were able to afford to pay for their education.

Governance was a theme that emerged as having both positive and negative impacts on the ability of the organisations to realize their peacebuilding objectives. The predatory fragility of state authorities in South Kivu has created the conditions in which all three organisations
operate and seek to address in South Kivu. Their inability or unwillingness to deliver basic services to the population including facilitating peacebuilding, justice and reconciliation processes left a significant gap which these organisations work to fill. This reflects Hellmuller’s experience in Ituri where she noted that communities quickly organised themselves in institutions and reproduced structures of authority to address power vacuums left by the state and other powerful actors. Citing Chopra and Hohe she reflects that “during armed conflicts ‘traditional structures evolve, social organization is redefined, and people continue to survive’” (Hellmuller, 2016, p. 94). Further, the state has made little effort to interfere with the activities that these organisations undertake, save when they challenge the power structures which facilitate the gluttony of powerful actors. Yet, it also plays a role in failing to control the armed groups which contribute to the pervasive insecurity described above.

These contextual challenges inform the applicability of the models of civil society presented by both Paffenholz and van Tuijl who assume the existence of a liberal or even a strong state in relation to which the organisations undertake their actions. Rugusha (2005) confirmed this observing that civil society organisations had not been able to fully undertake the functions ascribed to liberal civil society in the DRC because of the absence of a liberal state. Despite subsequent elections that have occurred since Rugusha’s book was published, state authorities have continued to struggle to establish a monopoly on coercive control over the entire territory no less establish a healthy democracy and robust economy and thereby failing to meet the criteria of a liberal state. As a result, the work of civil society organisations has had to confront several sets of power holders including state and customary authorities, armed groups and international actors including the United Nations, who jointly maintain authority over Congolese territory, institutions and the economy. These relationships are very different from the
ones imagined in the liberal and critical approaches. In other contexts, the negotiation of power, knowledge and interests with international actors and non-state armed groups would be undertaken by the state. The ability of the organisations to fulfil the functions described by Paffenholz while challenging the power of these actors situates their efforts in the post-colonial definition of civil society described by Richmond (2011).

In this way, the findings from this thesis also correspond to Mamdani’s (1994) emphasis on the ability of civil society to challenge power relations in non-democratic states. The findings of this thesis that demonstrated that the organisations tended to serve members of their own ethnic and religious communities confirmed Edwards’ (2009) emphasis on the importance of clan in African civil society. It is important to note that despite these tendencies that the identities represented across the civil society organisations across South Kivu allowed for the coverage of support to most identity-based communities, perhaps with the exception of the indigenous pigmy population.

*Relationships, Legitimacy and Agency*

In the context of complex power-sharing arrangements which characterizes the peacebuilding context in South Kivu, the CSOs examined in this thesis relied heavily on their relationships with other peacebuilding actors to undertake their peacebuilding efforts. They were supported through their relationships with both their external partners and their community-based structures. This section explores the ways in which these relationships facilitated their ability to exercise their agency in their peacebuilding efforts.

The discussion in the results chapters demonstrated the dependence of the CSOs on funding from external financing partners who were largely international based. This dependence is closely linked to a lack of domestic sources of funding either from the government or the
general population arising out of the extreme poverty that persists across the DRC. These conditions have resulted in a monopoly on material power exercised by international actors on the activities undertaken by the civil society organisations, although this does not take into consideration the potential willingness of the staff and other allies to work for free to achieve their interests. It also reflects the broader peacebuilding context in the DRC where very little capital is available to the government or armed forces for peacebuilding interventions which are heavily reinforced financially and in kind by international actors. As a result, the international community could be understood as replacing part of the role that a stronger, more financially stable, state plays in other contexts. It results in a need of the civil society organisations to shift some of their advocacy efforts towards international actors while continuing to challenge the power of the state. Because they are beholden to the international community’s financial power, these challenges come sometimes in the form of creative financial management on the part of the organisations and more often in staff continuing to work despite the absence of pay. These financial considerations are also important to understanding the position of society in fragile and conflict affected states.

Collaboration with other “local” organisations ensured that the organisations were able to deliver their programs both with or without funding. For example, Organisations 2 and 3 collaborated on their community-based structure project because each organisation had an existing recognized presence in different parts of the province which helped to facilitate their access to those spaces. Further, Organisation 1 relied on other local civil society actors to participate in their action campaigns and would also refer their beneficiaries to receive services from other organisations when they did not offer them themselves.
The community-based structures observed went beyond the peace committees described elsewhere in the literature on the DRC and included cooperatives, women’s groups and literacy circles. These structures played an important role both in helping to deliver the organisations’ programming and in sustaining their legitimacy. The CSOs supported community-based structures through trainings related to peace, conflict resolution and human rights, and that they work with these groups in the delivery of other programming, such as special events and at time also provide them with material goods. Further, these structures also provided community-level knowledge to the organisations which can be used for program development or advocacy purposes. For example, the coordinator of Organisation 3 indicated that these structures “analyse the local context and that the organisation is then able to turn around and provide institutional and technical support” (Leadership3B, 2016).

The local CSOs examined in this thesis were all headquartered in the provincial capital and staffed by individuals with university educations, who could withstand the financial risk of working with organisations with unstable sources of funding. These factors may contribute to the perception that they primarily represented elite needs rather than those of the broader community. However, the exchange of knowledge described above, when coupled with consistent formal and informal communications between the organisations and their community-based structures supports claims that they are able to effectively represent local needs (Van Houten, 2018). These exchanges of knowledge and services promoted the perception of legitimacy by international actors and other local actors. This was visible through the sustained engagement of all three organisations in peacebuilding over periods of between fifteen and twenty-seven years and their continued ability to secure at least some project funding. The

31 These relationships also support the legitimacy of community-based structures who benefit from exchanges of resources and visible proximity to other actors exercising a higher degree of discursive and material power.
international external partners for all three organisations indicated that they perceived their partners as legitimate because of their histories of service to their communities and their collaboration with other local actors (ExternalPartner1B, 2016) (ExternalPartner2B, 2016) (ExternalPartner3B, 2016)

As I have argued elsewhere, legitimacy is perceived in both the liberal and post-liberal literature as being a central component of sustainable peacebuilding (Van Houten, 2018). It is at the centre of post-liberal calls for the greater inclusion of local actors in peacebuilding processes. For example, Talentino (2007) argues that the perception of peacebuilding efforts as being locally driven increases the legitimacy of an intervention among beneficiaries. Richmond and Pogoda indicate that localised peace formation connects with more subtle forms of legitimacy and resistance to injustice (2016, p. 2). Examining both sets of relationships demonstrate how legitimacy arises out of ongoing collaboration with local and international/external actors.

The delivery of projects funded by international partners also increased the perceived legitimacy of the organisations by local partners and the members of community-based structures. This access to financial resources also promoted stronger relationships between the organisations and their community-based structures by helping the organisations to provide them with material support. These contributions included office space and transportation stipends. Yet, this support was also vulnerable to funding shortfalls as seen in the case of Organisation 1. The president of the CMD and Bukavu noted that historically, the organisation had helped to pay for her community-based structure’s office space but highlighted that, that this had changed as a result of funding shortfalls (Beneficiary6A, 2016). These findings show how the material power exercised by international external partners had the potential to influence the relationships between the organisations and their community-based structures. Sudden changes to funding
compromised these relationships, potentially impacting the reliability of knowledge shared by
the community-based structures by contributing to discord between the groups and because of
the importance of the material resources provided by the organisations to collecting information
at the local level. This suggests that the legitimacy of the organisations was intertwined with
their ability to maintain financial and professional relationships with both the members of their
community-based structures and their external partners.

These findings also contribute to the literature on civil society peacebuilding as they
explore the relationship between civil society actors and other actors in peacebuilding spaces
ranging from the community to the international level, which has not previously been explored in
the DRC. The relationships explored in this section reflect and are influenced by the discursive
and material power relations explored in the following section.

*Discursive and Material Power*

The power that these organisations and their staff exercised in relation to the broader
peacebuilding context and other local actors, tended to be primarily discursive, while national
and international actors maintained a monopoly on material power by controlling their access to
financial resources. These findings are consistent with those of van Tuijl, who reflected that
“Civil society power is grounded in the quality of information it articulates which is the
foundation of its legitimacy” (van Tuijl, 2016, p. 8). As demonstrated above, relationships with
community-based structures enabled the three organisations to collect community-level
knowledge and claim to represent the needs of a sizeable population from the geographical
locations that they worked in and served as a source of legitimacy. This knowledge was
communicated across various mediums including events, organisational websites and periodic
publications and was adapted for different audiences and contexts. The discursive power that
arose from these relationships provided enough legitimacy to gain funds from and collaborate with international actors whose authority entrenched their discursive power in relation to other actors.

The material resources provided by external financing partners also influenced the relative material power of the organisations. Organisation 3 was able to build its reputation and presence in peacebuilding spaces in South Kivu while the other two organisations were in decline. This allowed the organisation to implement a broader number of projects in pursuit of its mission and objectives, which reinforced some of its discursive power. Yet, in order to maintain discursive and material power, staff pushed for the organisation to maintain control over the peacebuilding narrative in South Kivu by situating themselves as leaders and hosting context analysis meetings. The result of its expansion and these efforts appeared to isolate it from other local peacebuilding actors.

It is important to observe that the additional reinforcement of discursive power of the local CSOs was directly linked to the ultimate material power of their financing partners. There are limited sources of income available to CSOs in South Kivu. While affiliation with churches or collaboration with government may bring in some financing, such relationships can also undermine the ability of organisations to challenge the roles that those actors play in conflict (ExternalPartner3B, 2016). Further, with the majority of the Congolese population living below the absolute poverty threshold, there is little prospect for fundraising or payment for services locally. This broader context provides limited opportunities for the organisations to establish a consistent foundation of core funding, leaving them reliant on the project funding that they can access through international partners.
As a result, when international donors ceased or decreased funding, the organisations were forced to rely on staff to work voluntarily and projects are often reduced or terminated. This reflects concerns of Pallas who indicated that in the absence of core funding organisations exist pay-cheque to pay-cheque and that in severe cases financing reduction on short notice may lead to organisational collapse (2016, p. 107). As described above, reduction in funding can also compromise the relationship of local CSOs with their community-based structures. With a reduction of participation, less knowledge is exchanged by the members of the community-based structures and therefore with the organisations, posing a double threat to their legitimacy, first by undermining their already limited material power and again by reducing their claims to represent local knowledge.

The ability of the CSOs examined in this thesis to communicate external knowledge related to human rights and peace to their beneficiaries while presenting community-based knowledge of conflicts and needs to external partners allowed them to exercise significant discursive power in framing the peacebuilding narrative in South Kivu. In contrast, material power was maintained by their financing partners who distribute material resources to the organisations. The organisations then used those material resources to address the peacebuilding needs of their beneficiaries reflected in their narratives. These processes were negotiated within the organisations in a way that reflected their internal power dynamics and management structures.

Despite the relatively different internal dynamics and management styles at each of the organisations, power tended to be situated with the organisations’ leaders and financial administrators. The organisations’ leaders tended to maintain a monopoly on discursive power within the organisations, representing the organisations, their staff, and their beneficiaries at
community meetings, to government representatives and to funders. In their interviews they described the objectives of their organisations as their own peacebuilding objectives, highlighting long-term commitments to the peace that they and their organisations sought to achieve. For example, the coordinator of Organisation 2 described how his personal experience as a Banyamulenge prompted him to seek partnership with a Babembe and a Bahavu friend to create his organisation, with a commitment to equal representation of their ethnic communities across the staff that persists today.

In contrast, material power was shared by each of the organisations’ leaders with a financial administrator or in the case of Organisation 3 the deputy coordinator who oversaw finance. While the leaders of the organisations maintained ultimate decision-making authority related to financing, financial administrators made daily decisions which impacted organisational activities. For example, on one occasion I observed the staff of the women’s program at Organisation 1 plead with the financial administrator for access to the organisation’s vehicle to conduct an intervention outside of Bukavu, but they were denied that access in favour of an activity being run by one of the other projects. Thus, it was clear that the financial administrator exercised material power in determining which project’s activities would be prioritized. Beyond formal leadership, other factors that influenced power relations within the organisations included rank and gender.

Translating Knowledge and Interests

The ability of these civil society organisations to translate hybridity by adopting, deferring and resisting the knowledge and interests of both internal and external actors was created and maintained by the discursive and relative material power of these organisations. As intermediaries who exchanged knowledge with both internal and external actors the
organisations could determine what knowledge they adopted, deferred or resisted when framing their narratives about peacebuilding. Receiving material resources helped the organisations to further exercise their discursive power by determining how they were spent to address their peacebuilding objectives within the context of their funding arrangements. It also facilitated their ability to exercise material power over their beneficiaries and community-based structures in this same process of determining how the funding is spent. This is explored through examples below. The material power of their international partners did, however, ultimately influence the process of translation within the organisations and their capacity to contribute to peacebuilding.

International interests in and knowledge related to gender equality emerged as the strongest example in this thesis of external knowledge which the CSOs translated. Chapter 5 discusses how gender equality was translated into local context through training on women’s rights and the provision of services to victims of SGBV by Organisation 1. The resistance expressed by certain members of the organisation’s staff was deferred by the Organisation’s director who communicated their approach to gender equality to actors outside of the organisation in collaboration with the staff from the Women’s and Children’s program. These dynamics played out differently at Organisation 2 where resistance from the staff and a lack of internal capacity resulted in a deference to other organisations by the coordinator, who invited a representative from a women’s organisation to present on UNSCR 1325 at their road map for peace event instead of someone from within the organisation. In contrast, gender equality was not actively discussed at Organisation 3 which translated these dynamics internally through resisting gender equal hiring procedures but integrating gender sensitive programming such as literacy circles. Indeed, the material power influenced by the international partners of these organisations likely influenced their stated commitments to gender equality, while their actions
reflected the negotiation of the collective translation of these processes by their staff and leaders. Formal adoption of this discourse did facilitate the peacebuilding efforts of Organisation 1 which was able to access funding for gender-related interventions which were not prioritized by the other two organisations.

Engagement with provincial and national governance is an example of the application localized knowledge about local authorities which was translated by the organisations to external actors, particularly international ones. Organisation 1 collected information about human rights abuses committed by government forces and other power holders and communicated it to its external partners, deferring knowledge that they often required support from government officials to undertake their activities. Organisation 2 deferred discussion of governance in its external communications choosing instead to adopt knowledge of the role of customary and elected officials to peace by engaging them in their activities. Organisation 3 also deferred sharing information about the government to its external partners, and also often deferred engaging directly with them reflecting their internal resistance to their administration. The differences in the approaches likely reflect a number of factors. First, the approach of all three organisations acknowledged the power exercised by customary and state authorities which is also an aspect of local knowledge. Second the internal negotiation towards translating this knowledge resulted in very different outcomes across the organisations reflecting the influence of other sources of knowledge and access to material resources.

All three organisations were broadly required to adopt the interests of their financing partners due to their material power. As a result, they generally adhered to their financial management and implementation requirements and when they did not, they lost their funding. However, this financial support did allow the organisations to determine how the allocated
funding through their projects permitting them to translate the interests of their beneficiaries and members of community-based structures. This was generally undertaken in a way that reflected the organisations’ discursive power as they sought to intervene in ways that responded to their framing of the context. For example, Organisation 1 produced a radio show and publications exploring reported human rights rebuses but resisted requests for assistance that fell outside of those areas. For example, one member of one of their community-based structures repeated a call several times for the creation of an internet café in Sange, which the organisation resisted and did not act upon.

The organisations also engaged in translation in response to the absence of funding. Most often they deferred needs or interests expressed by their beneficiaries that they could not afford to address to other organisations. However, they also, at times, adopted the interests of their beneficiaries and addressed them despite funding shortfalls. One example of this was when the deputy director at Organisation 3 granted a meeting space to the members of the CCIIs even though there was no remaining funding for them and that the meeting space was normally provided for a fee.

The ways in which translation occurred within the organisations was closely linked to their structure and their internal power dynamics. The horizontal structure at Organisation 1 allowed staff to discuss and debate contentious knowledge allowing its leadership and program staff to ultimately articulate their approach to addressing them including gender. In contrast, while the structure of Organisation 2 also promoted internal debate, staff were ultimately only able to influence human resources related considerations. Instead of translating external interests into their actions, the coordinator at Organisation 2 sought to achieve their own internally articulated mission by engaging with local, provincial and national authorities. The hierarchical
nature at Organisation 3 meant that this process was reserved for the coordinator and deputy-coordinator, perhaps in consultation with their project managers.

Conclusions

These results indicate that local civil society organisations occupied an intermediary space in which they translated interests and knowledge between internal and external actors to peace and conflict in South Kivu. Their role in that space in maintained through their discursive power and by the discursive power of their financing partners. The following section will explore their roles as intermediaries in more detail as well as what other factors help to maintain this position.

These findings have important implications both for the civil society literature and for the literature on the DRC. They demonstrate that the CSOs examined in South Kivu do meet the functions described in both the liberal and critical literature on civil society but do not completely conform to expectations because there is no strong or liberal state with which they can interact. Instead, the focus of their efforts is dispersed across a broader group of actors who jointly exercise a monopoly on coercive control in the context. This situates their activities within a post-colonial understanding of civil society.

Further, read in combination of other accounts of civil society contributions to peacebuilding in Ituri and North Kivu (Hellmuller, 2018) (Hellmuller, 2016) (van Tongeren, 2013) (Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2013) (Jordhus-Lier, 2017) (Seay, 2009), it demonstrates the potential agency of local civil society actors in peacebuilding processes in the Eastern DRC. It adds to these discussions by examining the relationships not only between these organisations and their international funders but also begins to understand their relationship with the communities that they serve, demonstrating the fluidity between all three sets of actors. Further,
it details how the internal dynamics within the organisations influence their activities and objectives situating sources of power and agency within those organisations.

**Local Civil Society Organisations as Intermediaries in Hybridized Peacebuilding**

**The Positionality of Local Civil Society Organisations**

These organisations represent three of many CSOs in South Kivu. Several of the participants in this research observed that the capacity of other organisations operating in the same space varied significantly (Leadership2C, 2016) (Leadership3C, 2016). As discussed in the methodology chapter, the organisations that participated in this research were initially identified with assistance from Canadian organisations, suggesting that they had already been recognized as being relatively competent and compliant with administrative criteria of donors. As a result, the findings are not necessarily representative of new or weaker organisations that might have had access to fewer resources and thereby a more limited scope and capacity in their work. The international external partner of Organisation 2 observed that there were three types of CSOs in South Kivu, those that collaborate with the government, independent organisations that serve the traditionally liberal functions of CSOs and a third group which is predatory and simply seeking money (ExternalPartner2B, 2016). Using this categorization, this thesis primarily focused on organisations in the second category, although Organisation 2 might be understood at being a hybrid between the first and second type.

The earlier discussion in this chapter exploring the process of translation of knowledge and interests begins to situate the three CSOs examined as intermediaries in peacebuilding. This section explores the positionality of the CSOs as intermediaries in peacebuilding by applying four of the core concepts from the theoretical framework and lays the foundation for presenting a non-binary definition of hybridity. They include knowledge, location, identity and power.
This thesis has already explored in detail that the ways in which the organisations had access to diverse sources of knowledge and information through their beneficiaries and their provincial, national and international external partners. Receiving information from these sources already situated them as intermediaries in the exchange of knowledge between different groups. However, their positions within the CSOs also granted the staff at the organisations access to other sources of community, territorial, provincial, national and international knowledge that could also influence these processes. For example, almost all of the staff who participated in interviews for the thesis were born in South Kivu. Many had experienced violence or displacement as a result of the conflict and their families remained spread across South Kivu. Therefore, they had access to contextual knowledge both based on their own experiences as well as the knowledge and stories shared by their families. Being situated in Bukavu, the staff at the organisations also had access to information shared by other civil society organisations at meetings and through the media. Further, their access to offices with electricity and internet helped them to access a broader range of materials on peacebuilding and human rights which they could incorporate into their peacebuilding efforts, including information on how to access funding. This aspect also applies to peacebuilding traditions. While staff at the organisations demonstrated that they had knowledge of the traditional approaches to conflict resolution, such as through the book published by Organisation 2, they were also influenced by peacebuilding and governance models promulgated by national and international actors. This could explain the tendency towards communicating a preference for a democratic governance while continuing to work with customary, democratic and undemocratic political officials. The results from this thesis present a strong argument for positioning these three CSOs as intermediaries in relation to peacebuilding knowledge.
The above paragraph has already described some of the ways in which being situated within the provincial capital may have contributed to the organisations’ position as intermediaries based on location in relation to their access to knowledge. More broadly, the geographical location of the organisations and their staff also positioned them as intermediaries between actors located in community, national and international spaces. As a provincial capital, Bukavu has much stronger infrastructure than rural communities including roads, electricity and access to markets and the internet. There was also greater access to national and international transportation networks as well as access to the provincial government. Yet, Bukavu is still located much closer to the realities of the rest of the provinces than Kinshasa or the headquarters of their international partners. Thus, being located in the provincial capital facilitated the access of the organisations to actors in national and international spaces while remaining close to the realities of both rural and urban communities within the province.

The third way in which these organisations could be understood as intermediaries is in relation to their identities. As previously discussed, the staff at these organisations were predominantly university-educated, protestant men with access to the personal financial resources necessary to withstand the financial risk associated with work with a CSO. Further the staff at Organisations 1 and 3 were almost exclusively from the dominant ethnic groups in South Kivu. All of these factors suggest that the staff at the organisations were made up of provincial elites whose interests and needs would differ greatly both from their beneficiaries but also from national elites and international actors. Their ability to translate between these groups as intermediaries was served by their knowledge, location and ultimately their power.

Together, the findings from this research suggest that civil society organisations may hold a significant amount of discursive power to shape international understandings of local
knowledge and needs and local understandings of liberal international knowledge and interests. Individually, however, this power is limited to influencing their own external partners and beneficiaries. In these contexts, all three organisations maintained discursive power which was established based on their identities, location and access to knowledge and reinforced through the narratives that they communicated through their interactions with both sets of actors. This discursive power was further limited by the material power of their external partners who could allocate resources in a way that determined the outcome of the organisations’ peacebuilding efforts. Examining the relative material power of the three organisations further nuances the positionality of each of these organisations. The financing shortfalls at Organisations 1 and 2 positioned them more closely to other local actors while at the time of research Organisation 3’s discursive and material power were positively influenced by their increased access to material resources. Overall, the quantity of and capacity to exercise power also situates these three local CSOs at an intermediate position between much more powerful actors operating in provincial, national and international spaces and much less powerful actors at the community or household level. This positionality and relative levels of power are ultimately influenced by individual and group identity as well.

In the last section of this chapter, this exploration of CSOs as intermediaries will be used to inform the presentation of a non-binary construction of hybridity. To this end location and identity can be understood as helping to situate actors along the local – international axis in the existing literature as they correspond to the questions of who and where are the local. In contrast power and knowledge can be understood as helping to situate actors along the traditional – liberal axis in the literature as they correspond to the question of what local knowledge is and
responds to an implicit assumption that international actors have the power to impose liberal approaches.

Other Intermediaries

The findings from this research suggest that local CSOs may not be the only intermediaries operating in South Kivu. If intermediaries can be understood as acting as translators of knowledge and interests between internal and external actors, it may be possible to identify several other groups of intermediaries in peacebuilding processes operating in South Kivu. These may include locally stationed staff of International Organisations and INGOs, state authorities, and territorial and customary authorities. Churches, as documented by Seay (2009) also may occupy these spaces.

Representatives from two INGOs participated in follow-up interviews designed for other intermediary actors contributing to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu. The first organisation had a number of focus areas including community-based trauma healing, food security, facilitating dialogue between hostile parties, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and; an exchange program linking young peacebuilders from within the DRC as well as international ones with conflict affected communities in the Eastern DRC (Intermediary1, 2017). She indicated that except for the exchange program, that her organisation did not have their own projects but instead focused on supporting local organisations in their projects and activities (Intermediary1, 2017). She concluded that “We rely on our local partner organisations and the needs assessments they conduct and submit with proposals for funding. We have a global peacebuilding coordinator…who reviews peacebuilding projects. Head office is receptive to project proposed by local partners.” (Intermediary1, 2017). These reflections suggest that the Bukavu office of this INGO played a similar role in the translation of knowledge and interests as
other local CSOs. Their local partners shared their needs and knowledge with the organisation and the organisation sent this information to their head office, who made decisions about what should be financed, returning funds to their local partners and beneficiaries via the Bukavu office.

In contrast, the second INGO examined in this follow-up research sought more of a balance between supporting initiatives presented by their local partners and realizing their own objectives. Their projects included: community empowerment and peaceful coexistence; the inclusion of women in decision making processes; support for small and medium enterprises; a stabilization project and; a youth peacebuilding project (Intermediary2, 2017). He reflected that “community members in the Ruzizi Plains asked for more support with socio-economic development… and that is when the organisation started to design projects that were more focused on supporting peace through socio-economic endeavours” (Intermediary2, 2017). He also noted that his organisation worked with community-based structures in the areas that they serve concluding by observing a tension between “communities who push the organisation to take on certain projects while funders also have priority areas which they want to advance” (Intermediary2, 2017). While the representative of this organisation described more of a balance between the interests of donors, the organisations and their beneficiaries, these findings also suggest that they are operating as intermediaries in their peacebuilding activities.

There are many possible examples from within the UN system which situates their departments and staff as intermediaries in peacebuilding processes. The easiest case to observe through this research was the cluster meetings organised by the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA organizes weekly meetings related to specific themes or clusters such as protection and public health which bring together local, provincial, national and
international actors who share their activities and receive situation briefings from its staff. During the meetings OCHA staff control what information is shared, who gets to speak and for how long, acting on its international mandate, again acting as an intermediary for local and international knowledge and international funding. Yet, this example also illustrates the need for further investigation of the inclusion of UN bodies as intermediaries. While this example shows OCHA can access local knowledge, it also suggests that its actions reflect its mandate and that it selects which local actors are given primacy. If it were to be characterized as an intermediary it might be understood as occupying a different space when compared with local CSOs.

Finally, an example of where provincial and state authorities may play an intermediary role is the StaRec project, which is supported by MONUSCO as well as the Congolese state. I observed a presentation of the project by provincial officials from North and South Kivu at Organisation 2’s event on conducting a roadmap for peace. The first phase of the project in South Kivu was described as including fifty-four projects which focused on economic development, humanitarian assistance and gender. Its main successes included the construction of six new garrisons for 14,000 FARDC members, the rehabilitation of roads, the construction of three new police posts and socio-economic development activities. Some of the weaknesses identified included insufficient funding and the failure to adequately integrate community-dialogue. StaRec was in the process of entering its second phase which was set to focus on five priority stabilization zones in North and South Kivu and address security, identity conflict, resource exploitation and regional dynamics. This phase of the project was also set to further engage representatives of the provincial government. Indeed, this project also shows the potential for collaboration between community, provincial, national and international actors and demonstrates financial exchanges originating at the international level.
contributions to peacebuilding of these actors were captured and will be described briefly below.

There were also other actors operating in these spaces who interacted with peacebuilding but whose efforts were not captured by this thesis. They included journalists, business owners, CSOs headquartered in South Kivu outside of the provincial capital and armed groups, particularly where they exercise territorial control. Territorial administrators and traditional leaders called Mwamis might also fit within these roles. Further, research should be conducted to understand the relationship of these actors in peacebuilding activities across the Eastern DRC.

These findings demonstrate that there are many groups of actors operating in South Kivu who may also act as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding. The ways in which these processes are carried out by these actors is influenced heavily by individuals operating within them situated within the context of knowledge, location, identity and power.

*The Role of Individual Decision Making*

In considering the translator potential of intermediaries in peacebuilding it is also essential to consider the influence of the individual actors who operate within them. Both within their organisations and in their role as individuals and community members staff at all three organisations demonstrated their individual capacities to adopt, defer and resist knowledge and interests that they were exposed to through their work.

As previously discussed, evidence from Organisations 1 and 2 demonstrated how in the absence of organisational hierarchies that staff were empowered to adopt, defer and resist knowledge and interests individually. This may also have occurred at Organisation 3 but was less visible beyond the coordinator and deputy-coordinator due to the discipline of the staff. There were two ways in which individuals within the CSOs were shown to adopt, defer or resist interest and knowledge that influenced the outcomes of peacebuilding efforts. The first was in
their decision making within their job-specific activities, such as deciding how to implement an internationally oriented project, and how to navigate funding shortfalls. The second way was when staff decided to engage in peacebuilding and justice activities beyond the scope of their work, such as organising peacebuilding groups in their own communities in a way that allowed them to exercise more autonomy.

The clearest example of staff determining how to adopt, defer or resist knowledge and interests in the course of their work occurred when staff chose to continue their work in the absence of pay. For example, at Organisation 1, the staff in the legal, protection and research program decided to continue offering conflict resolution to members of their communities despite the termination of funding to their project. The ongoing need for this support was visible through the ten to twelve people who arrived at the organisation’s waiting room every morning to seek their services. To try to provide some financial support to the staff who continued to fill these roles, some beneficiaries from the women and children’s program were transferred to the legal, protection and research program which facilitated the sharing of some funds between programs and kept the doors open. Further, at Organisation 2 I witnessed the impassioned pleas of one of the organisation’s staff members to allow their colleagues to work for free after the coordinator announced that many of them would be placed on technical leave due to funding shortfalls. The plea was entertained by the coordinator and at least some of his colleagues were granted the right to continue working at their will. Finally, after pleading with Organisation 3’s management, the CCI I observed in Bukavu was granted access to a meeting room at the organisation’s new office even though the meeting rooms were intended to be rented at cost. More broadly, projects were run in ways which attempted to respond to local context, despite at times taking on international or liberal themes such as the promotion of gender equality. These
examples demonstrate individual staff members acting to prioritize community level interests in the absence of international support.

Another way individuals chose to prioritize what they understood as community-level interests was through their activities outside of work. For example, several of the staff from the three organisations being examined had started their own organisations in their communities. Annie from Organisation 1 had created a women’s group in Panzi where she lived with her family. She explained that “I really like helping women a lot and I spend a lot of time thinking about them… After an organization that was helping marginalized women in Panzi moved out, I decided to continue on with their work.” Her organization sensitized women about their rights and engaged them in income generating activities (AN, 2016). Further, Alison who worked on the peace clubs project at Organisation 2 also took on a leadership role within her community, establishing a children and youth program at her church which provided educational and financial support to vulnerable youth (AS, 2016). These examples highlight the commitment of staff to peacebuilding beyond their organisation and the potential transfer of skills and knowledge that they obtained through these roles into their communities.

Beyond creating their own organisations, other staff members and individuals captured in this research took actions in the course of their work that went well beyond their official duties or roles stipulated by project funders. For example, a staff member at one of the CSOs described how he had decided to attend the scene of a massacre in 2014 to photo-document the incident. He went on to share those photographs with the coordination of local civil society at great personal risk. The photographs were used by the coordination of the local civil society to advocate for greater government accountability in the context of increasing intercommunity

---

32 Organisation, citation and pseudonym withheld due to the risk associated with sharing this story.
violence. Another participant in this research was a Catholic Priest based in rural North Kivu, although his account is unrelated to South Kivu it also demonstrates how individual choices can help to bring peacebuilding activities beyond the limits of international funding or institutional constraints. He indicated that he felt promoting peace was a core principle of the Catholic Church. As such, he made a personal decision to work towards disarming and demobilizing members of armed groups who operated in the forests around his parish. He would walk for up to three days at a time to reach the groups in the forest where he would meet with individuals to tell them about God and peace and invite them to disarm, all the while navigating the dangers of entering the forest alone. He had recently played a pivotal role in securing the demobilization of a high-ranked General which was documented in the international media. The Priest had also set up his own organisation to support his development and disarmament initiatives because “doing so as a representative of the church requires special authorization, this way I don’t need to seek approval” (JP, 2017).

These examples demonstrate how individual actors within each of the organisations circumnavigated the material power exercised by donors both inside and outside the boundaries of their formal employment. Within the context of their formal employment, individual employees made decisions about when and how to do their jobs in a way that were best adapted to the context specific conditions that they faced and the needs of their communities. Outside the boundaries of their formal work they would make decisions to apply principles and structures that they were exposed to through their work to independently address the needs that they felt were most pressing in their communities, without the constraints of the funders, supervisors or institutions. It is interesting to note that this agency was exercised in the pursuit of adoption of local interests as opposed to national or international ones. These actions may also be understood
as acts of resistance to the interests advanced by international actors through their exercise of material power.

Conclusions

This section identified four axes along which the local CSOs can be understood as acting as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding processes. They include knowledge, location, identity and power. By examining these four concepts it is possible to differentiate the position of local CSOs from other actors operating in the same spaces. Indeed, these actors may have access to similar knowledge and be located in the same spaces as the local CSOs in South Kivu, however their identities and power would differ greatly. In relation to identity, international staff of INGOs and the UN would have very different experiences, education and status to those of the staff in the local civil society organisations. Indeed, the identities of national staff of the INGOs and UN and national and provincial authorities would have more in common with those of the CSOs and influence where they could work and with whom. Further, all of these actors would have significantly more material power, arising out of their institutional homes. Further their discursive power would likely be augmented by their material power but have more influence at the location of their institutions, for example at the national or international level.

This thesis has shown that state authorities at the national and provincial level maintain an important role in peacebuilding by: remaining a powerful actor with the capacity to influence the outcomes of both peace and conflict; acting as figure heads invited to play a role in launching interventions led by local actors and; developing and implementing their own peace and statebuilding interventions, often with the support of other actors. Despite the significant challenges the state faces in terms of maintaining authority (Deibert, 2013) (Treforn, 2011), which has been aggravated by the failure of the state to hold scheduled elections and the
predatory nature of its institutions, many of the participants in this research indicated that they desired that the state play a more active role in maintaining and creating both negative and positive peace. Even the Coordinator of Organisation 3, who had otherwise been critical of the state conceded that his organisation was able to “resolve problems in Uvira, but the most powerful actors remained in Kinshasa” (Leadership3C, 2016).

In terms of their authority and access to financial resources, the potential impact of local CSOs in relation to these other actors may appear to be limited. However, being free from the constraints of bureaucratic systems, deeply engaged in conflict dynamics, and the need to consistently represent the needs and approaches of funders offers local CSOs more flexibility in relation to their ability to identify, address and represent the needs of the communities that they serve. Further, groups such as Organisation 1, engage community-level actors in peace and conflict resolution on a daily basis through the services that they provide, a model that would not be sustainable for the other actors considered above. Thus, while governments, the UN and to some extent INGOs can also play an important role in addressing the overall context, including war, violence, and poverty, local civil society actors help the population of South Kivu integrate peace into their everyday lives. This can be achieved through service provision and engagement in community-based structures which demand an ongoing commitment by and engagement from members.33

This section has also demonstrated the important role that individuals play in negotiating the outcomes of the efforts of local CSOs and extending their reach to overcome institutional barriers. Working within their organisations, staff determined how to interact with and support their community-based structures, how to deliver their programming and their overall

33 Other actors that may play this role include churches, INGO with local headquarters, municipal governments and customary leaders.
engagement with their organisations despite challenging contexts in a way that contributed to their success or failure. Finally, when staff and other actors identified needs that extended beyond the capacity or mandate of the organisations that they worked with, they often took actions to address those needs independently, their capacity to do so ultimately being influenced by their existing positions within churches and other organisations.

**Implications for Post-Liberal Peacebuilding Theory**

This thesis has shown that there is a diversity of actors contributing to peacebuilding processes below the national level in South Kivu with a range of power, resources and domains of intervention. These actors represent a range of approaches from traditional to liberal, often originating from one approach but being influenced by the other. For example, the staff at local CSOs are aware and have documented traditional approaches to conflict resolution in the communities that they work in but have also been exposed to liberal approaches through their education, at times in Western Universities, and by the partners that they collaborate with who may adopt liberal models. At a spatial and identity level, actors also work on a plane from more local to more international. Concrete examples of this range include Congolese nationals working with INGOs and the UN away from their traditional homes and international staff on long-term placement with INGOs, the UN and local CSOs in South Kivu. More than half of the staff at the organisations examined were born outside of Bukavu, contributing to the meeting of different traditions, even if they are more localized to South Kivu.

These findings have implications for post-liberal peacebuilding theory which has historically portrayed the local and the international as relatively homogenized wholes. This section explores how a more nuanced understanding of the range of local actors can contribute to the development of a non-binary of hybridity.
Finding the Local

During my fieldwork, Congolese authorities beckoned me towards them in Swahili while I was walking with my research participants on two occasions; first at the Bukavu jail and then crossing the Rwanda – DRC border at Kamaniola. In both instances my participants walked over to the officials and briefly engaged them in conversation. When they returned, I would inquire about what the official had wanted and in both cases I was told that they had asked for money but that each person had told them that I was Congolese and the authorities agreed that we were free to proceed. Had I become local?

The question of who is local has had major consequences for conflict and peace in the Eastern DRC. As discussed in earlier in this thesis, the perception of being indigenous or autochthonous as opposed to being a migrant, or an allogène, has been a source of identity conflict arising out of the post-colonial period and worsening in the aftermath of the invasion of Rwandan troops, purportedly on behalf of the Banyamulenge (Turner, 2013). Other conflict dynamics have also influenced what spaces people occupy, including Rwandan refugees who remain in North and South Kivu, and camps of internally displaced people which may be short or long term, formal or informal. For example, there is an informal IDP camp situated in the centre of the village which was not receiving any formal support from UNHCR or other groups that directly assist refugees. Such sites house long-term displaced people with distinct needs, different from those of historical residents of the communities that they occupy, further complicating a potential definition of the local.

Another relevant consideration is that while this thesis focused on ‘local CSOs’ based in Bukavu, who worked in collaboration with their community-based structures in rural and urban areas outside of the capital, I also found evidence of the existence of local CSOs situated in
urban centres outside of the provincial capitals. Their potential contributions to peacebuilding may further complicate the questions of who is local. These considerations capture both the concerns about presenting geographical (Mac Ginty, 2015) or identity-based (Randazzo, 2016) definitions of the local.

This thesis has shown the diversity of localized actors in relation to peacebuilding in South Kivu. Spaces where these actors were found included at the household, neighbourhood, municipal and provincial levels. “The local” included individuals, leaders from all levels of government including customary government, members of community-based structures and CSOs, members of armed groups including the FARDC, church congregations, bureaucrats and other government officials and international actors based in South Kivu on a long-term basis. This list of actors conforms to the expectation described in the theoretical framework that not all local actors may have a strong interest in peace. This thesis has provided many examples of how representatives from all of the groups listed above had acted in ways that both supported and undermined peace. This is especially true of state agents who threatened some of the participants in this research with arrest or worse, while others worked alongside programs contributing to security, stabilisation and reconstruction.

Examining the relationships between these actors demonstrated the complexity of navigating needs, agency, representation, resources and power within specific peacebuilding contexts. While actors could be parties to or affected by a specific conflict, they might work as peacebuilding actors in another. The most obvious example of this was the Congolese state, parts of which could contribute to peace through programs such as StaRec while other elements could remain active parties to conflict with armed groups, and others sought to leverage their positions for personal accumulation. Although these actors may have been internal in relation to conflict
between the population and the state over the scheduling of elections, they were definitively external to conflicts such as those between agriculturalists and pastoralists in the Ruzizi plains, moving from peacebuilding participants in the first case to interveners in the second.

Further, actors within local CSOs used a combination of traditional to liberal approaches, most often adapting liberal approaches and interventions to the local context, such as preparing election trainings for members of the local media which explain the importance of unbiased reporting. Further, the book written by the staff member from Organisation 2 also denoted some diversity in approaches to local conflict resolution in South Kivu, suggesting a diversity in terms of traditional approaches. Again, this problematizes a homogenized construction of the inclusion of traditional approaches to peacebuilding as part of the local.

Instead of defining concrete parameters to establish where, what and who are the local, the setting of a specific conflict or peacebuilding intervention should be used as the point of departure. Once the setting has been established, it becomes possible to identify the spaces affected by the conflict or peacebuilding intervention and the actors who articulate needs, exercise agency and power, and who may be subject to representation in those spaces. These actors can include individuals or groups who have been directly impacted by an ongoing violent conflict in a fixed geographical location whose experiences of war are shaped by their identity, and who may have a long-term interest in conflict or potential peace. Such an approach draws on the idea of peace formation as it invites the mobilisation of diverse actors across conflict settings and recognizes the exercise of “subaltern, critical agency through a range of local to internationally scaled networks” (Richmond & Pogoda, 2016, p. 9). Further, it acknowledges that claims that the identification of the local is always politically embedded and “strives towards awareness for the conflicting processes through which representations of the local are negotiated,
in order to unearth how the co-production of facts and values about the local intersects with political dynamics” (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015, p. 437). Such an approach recognizes the different spaces in which conflict can occur, the diversity of actors within those spaces and their shifting roles and the range of possible approaches which actors may adopt when resolving conflict.  

Framing the local in this way has implications for the definition and roles of intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding processes. Indeed, because intermediaries may fall within the above definition in some cases and not in others, particularly in spaces where they do not have a shared lived experience of conflict, intermediaries may shift from being local to external in different conflict settings. This recognizes the adaptation of formal, informal, local, traditional, national, international and liberal sources of knowledge and practices into peacebuilding interventions, which set local CSOs apart from other groups of actors in these spaces. It also recognizes differences in location, power and identity which may influence that knowledge or the agency that intermediaries exercise. Further, it differentiates intermediaries in relation to other actors in terms of their access to resources and their ability to exercise agency in relation to peacebuilding. Intermediaries should then be understood as groups of actors who may articulate needs or exercise agency in relation to conflict and peacebuilding efforts but who are not subject to representation in relation to those conflicts. Further, while they may hold historical contextual knowledge related to the setting, they do not share identical lived experiences related to the conflict, but they do share a long-term interest in peace.

---

34 This also has implications for international actors who should also be considered to be diverse and influenced by multiple actors and factors but who are not captured in this study.
Towards a Non-Binary Hybridity

If the observations in this thesis related to the role of intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding are consistent across South Kivu, their identification could have significant implications for post-liberal peacebuilding’s use of hybridity. Recall that some of the post-liberal peacebuilding literature applies a model of hybrid shock, highlighting “how the weak become compliant with hegemonic power in various, often abrasive ways, implying in post-colonial terms, trusteeship and native administration” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 221). This approach does not capture the diversity of actors and locations or variations in their knowledge, identities and power engaged in peacebuilding processes in South Kivu. Nor does it capture the role potential intermediary actors, including CSOs in translating the knowledge and interests of these diverse actors by adopting, deferring or resisting them in their peacebuilding efforts. Thus, with a more refined view of the actors participating in the peacebuilding process at the local level hybridity should be viewed as a translation, as opposed to a shock in peacebuilding contexts.

Through the identification of CSOs as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding begins to dismantle the binary between the local and the international by demonstrating the diversity of actors that exercise agency between households and UN headquarters. This is emphasized through the differentiation of intermediaries from other actors in terms of their locations and identities. It is through their position as intermediaries in these spaces that CSOs and other actors are able to translate hybridity by adopting, deferring and resisting internal and external interests related to peace and conflict. Through its exploration of knowledge and power, this thesis has also situated CSOs as being among a potential set of intermediary actors in relation to traditional and liberal approaches to peacebuilding. In the construction of hybridity liberal actors are assumed to have the power to impose their model in peacebuilding contexts. Instead, this thesis
has suggested that the CSOs examined exercise their own discursive and relative material power to translate and negotiate these international models into the local context. This thesis has also demonstrated the diversity of types and sources of knowledge available to these CSOs as intermediaries, challenging the idea that traditional and liberal knowledge are the only epistemologies present in the peacebuilding context in South Kivu. It should be noted that these processes are understood as being context specific and should be understood through a process of ethnographic study as opposed to through the application of a model.

Such an approach builds on the work of Donais, whose construction of hybridity is more rooted in the idea of the dynamic and fluid interplay of agency (2012, p. 141). It also has the potential to be applied using Millar’s four-part model of hybridity which recognizes that these processes occur at the institutional, practical, ritual and conceptual level (Millar, 2014b). Indeed, these forms of hybridity could apply to different groups of actors in different ways and create space at the individual, group and institutional levels.

Understanding hybridity as occurring between diverse groups of international and local actors, applying a combination of traditional and liberal approaches with intermediaries acting as translators in those processes, also addresses the critique that hybridity creates an unhelpful binary between the local and the international (Nadarajah & Rampton, 2015; Hirblinger & Simons, 2015; Paffenholz, 2014). The diagrams below attempt to capture the exchange of knowledge and interests between different groups of actors ranging from the international at the headquarters level and the local community level discussed in this thesis. Positioning the proposed intermediaries at the centre of the diagram reflects their position of discursive power which sustains their ability to translate between these actors. However, they do not capture the flow of material resources from international and national actors to the intermediaries and from
the intermediaries to the more local level which would better illustrated by one directional arrows pointing downwards. Further, it would be impossible to capture the complex ways in which identity, power, location and knowledge would influence the positionality of each individual actor.

By examining this process from the point of view of one intermediary actor it becomes possible to observe the process of negotiation and translation undertaken through peacebuilding processes, not only by the intermediaries, but by all of the actors involved Figure 2. This process is captured by considering the interactions of each of the organisations examined in this thesis with their external partners, members of their community-based structures and beneficiaries.

**Figure 2: Diverse International-Local Hybridity**

This contrasts with the shock model of hybridity currently advanced in some of the post-liberal peacebuilding literature where the actors, knowledge and approaches of a homogenized traditional local confront those of homogenized international actors as illustrated below.
Figure 2 does not capture that many international and local actors are likely to interface with more than one intermediary in relation to peacebuilding at the same time *Figure 4*. Thus, in hybridized peacebuilding, the process of translation is constant and ongoing and being undertaken by different sets of actors who may be translating them in different ways, which represents the foundation of hybridized peacebuilding. The simplest way to describe this is by examining the community-based structure project which engaged both Organisations 2 and 3 but was run by the same international external partner. In this instance, the organisation was delivering the approach laid out in collaboration with the international partner to different participants, in different community-based structures, in different geographical communities, in ways that were influenced by each of the organisations’ approaches and priorities. These processes would also have an impact on the type of knowledge collected and shared with the organisations by their community-based structures.
Building from post-colonial development literature (Escobar, 1994) (Ferguson, 1994), this model seeks to avoid the use of labels which limit the complexity of individual and group identities and their relationships with other actors. Instead, it invites readers who are seriously committed to the post-liberal peacebuilding agenda to return to its roots and examine discursive and material power relations and imbalances, agency and representation when designing and implementing peacebuilding interventions and research programs. It also invites careful contextual analysis of the relationships and peacebuilding processes in these spaces.

**Final conclusions**

To conclude, this thesis positions CSOs in South Kivu among a potential group of intermediary actors in hybridized peacebuilding who translate knowledge and interests between local and international, traditional and liberal approaches to peacebuilding. In this position, they also receive material resources from external actors which they distribute to more localized groups also applying the process of adoption, deference and resistance which characterized the
process of translation. These organisations creatively navigate these dynamics to develop and implement peacebuilding interventions which address the local, and sometimes national, causes of conflict in South Kivu. These findings suggest that in this context, the three organisations enjoy a relatively high degree of discursive power in being able to decide whose knowledge and interests are adopted, deferred or resisted. However, this power is mediated by the material power exercised by international actors.

Evidence from this thesis also reminds us that these three organisations operate in a broader field of intermediary actors including locally situated staff of INGOs and IO, churches, state authorities and others. If accurate, these actors would possess a similar level of discursive power who would help to shape the narrative on peace and conflict within the DRC, though some will have more material power than do their Congolese CSO counterparts. Their respective abilities to do so would also be shaped by their knowledge, location, identities and power.

This thesis also demonstrates the role of individuals within the organisations to negotiate in this process of translation. They do so by deciding what local needs are addressed and represented, while identifying which international norms are adopted and how. These findings easily draw upon the analogy from the opening paragraphs of this thesis about getting stuck in the mud on the highway to Sange. The efforts of the organisations to contribute to peacebuilding represent the organisation’s vehicle struggling to move forward in order to reach their beneficiaries and contribute to positive change. However, the organisations are stuck in the mud of a lack of financing, poor roads and other infrastructure, ongoing insecurity and war, a fragile government, and personal struggles with trauma. In order to advance along this muddy road towards their goals they need to negotiate with the truck drivers they encounter along the
highway who represent local and international partners, government authorities and other organisations who they can collaborate with to reach their ultimate destination of peace.

The findings and analysis of this thesis have directly answered the research questions identified at the beginning of the thesis. It answered the first research question of “how do local CSOs contribute to peacebuilding efforts in South Kivu?” by providing a detailed overview of the peacebuilding efforts undertaken by three local CSOs in Bukavu. This final chapter synthesizes and documents the common themes and approaches which arose across these organisations, suggesting some commonality between them, despite differences in organisational structure and theme.

This thesis also explored the second question of “Who and what influences local civil society’s peacebuilding goals, objectives and interventions and how?” across all three organisations. It demonstrated the overall authority of leaders within the organisations and how external financing partners exercised material power over the organisations. It also highlighted how contextual factors, such as security, governance and infrastructure also influenced the operations and outcomes of these organisations.

Further, this thesis demonstrated diversity between the three organisations related to how and whether “local civil society organisations are able to address local or national causes of conflict”. Although there was necessary thematic and practical overlap it showed that each of the organisations addressed different causes of conflict at the local level. Organisation 2 addressed land conflict while Organisation 3 addressed identity-based conflict. In contrast Organisation 1 addressed human rights concerns and supported conflict-resolution, filling a gap in formal conflict resolution mechanisms in the province. It also found that each organisation had a unique approach to engaging with the state, although all three addressed the manipulation of community
identities by powerful provincial and national political and religious actors. Recall that Organisation 1 interfaced with national power dynamics which contributed to conflict through some of its human rights campaigns. In contrast, Organisation 2 attempted to directly engage with state authorities through their activities, while Organisation 3 had little engagement with the state.

These results positioned local CSOs as being among potential intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding processes in South Kivu, amongst a range of intermediary actors. It also highlighted how individual decision making influenced the outcomes of these organisations. These findings suggested the existence of a diversity of locals and intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding processes, challenging existing constructions of the local in the post-liberal literature. The existence of intermediaries and diverse locals challenged binary constructions of hybridity and suggested that hybridity functions as a translation, rather than a shock, answering the final research question “What are the implications of local CSOs working as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding for post-liberal peacebuilding, in theory and practice?”

This research has made contributions to three different bodies of literature. First, it has added to a growing body of literature which examines the contributions of CSOs to peacebuilding in the DRC. Indeed, this thesis adds to the existing literature which focuses on civil society activities in Ituri (Hellmuller, 2018) (Hellmuller, 2016) (Verkoren & van Leeuwen, 2013) (van Tongeren, 2013) by expanding its view towards South Kivu where work has primarily focused on the role of the church (Seay, 2009) and faith based organisations (Jordhus-Lier, 2017). As a whole, these pieces including my own, demonstrate the agency of local actors in the DRC to contribute to peacebuilding processes in the region. More broadly, my thesis has also added contextual notes about different peacebuilding actors operating in Bukavu which help
to build a more comprehensive understanding of peace and conflict dynamics when read together with other works.

This thesis has also made a modest contribution to the literature on civil society. Its most substantial contribution was documenting the ways in which the CSOs examined in this thesis have established and supported community-based structures across South Kivu, with whom they share knowledge and resources to advance their peacebuilding missions. This has not been documented elsewhere in the literature. Further, it also contributes to emerging discussions in the civil society literature which examine how civil society functions in conflict contexts and in the absence of strong liberal institutions, which have historically been used as a point of reference for understanding associational life.

Finally, this thesis sought to make a significant contribution to the post-liberal peacebuilding literature. First, it recognizes the potential diversity of local actors who operate in relation to peacebuilding in a given conflict affected space. By selecting local civil society among the possible groups with agency at the local level, it has recognized the potential emancipatory impact on staff, members of community-based structures and beneficiaries through their actions. It has also recognized how those efforts are entrenched in everyday negotiations of conflict and peace. Further, it examined the discursive and material power relations within these organisations and between them and other actors in a way that helped to establish them as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding processes. Second, this thesis has identified a range of actors who may occupy intermediary spaces in hybridized peacebuilding processes in South Kivu, acknowledging the potential contributions of governments, churches and INGOs in these spaces which are not well captured in the literature. Third, it has helped to move the post-liberal
peacebuilding literature away from a binary construction of hybridity and towards a fluid definition which recognizes it as a form of ongoing translation as opposed to a shock.

*Areas for Future Research*

This research has helped to identify many potential areas for future investigation. It suggests that more research should be undertaken to understand the contributions of other potential intermediary and more localized actors in South Kivu. First, there is a significant opportunity to conduct further research on potential intermediary peacebuilding actors in South Kivu. Drawing on Autesserre’s work, the methodology from this thesis could be extended to examine the potential role of INGOs with offices in South Kivu and the UN as intermediaries in hybridized peacebuilding, with an additional emphasis on what sources of knowledge are privileged in these spaces. Such a study could also examine the dynamics between national and international staff working in these spaces to understand whose interests and knowledge takes primacy in designing and delivering programing. Further, additional research could be undertaken documenting the role of state actors at the territorial, provincial and national level in peacebuilding, potentially as intermediaries or under a broader framework of seeking to address the significant gap in the literature related to this topic. However, it should be noted that access may present a significant issue for extending research to this group of actors given that some of their activities might be covered by confidentiality requirements within the government, and because these actors often demand to be compensated for their time, which contravenes the guidelines for most university-based research ethics boards. Such dynamics might also compromise the reliability of data collected along with challenges to the ability to verify results through observation.
In relation to more localized actors, civil society peacebuilding in the Eastern DRC, it would be invaluable to conduct a survey of all of the community-based structures established across CSOs in South Kivu, in order to determine how many people, they engage, whom they engage and what benefits they offer their members. This information could be used to help measure the impact of local CSOs across the province and better understand who is included or excluded from their efforts. Further, it would help donors better target a more diverse range of groups across the province. The efforts of other more localized actors who contribute to peacebuilding could also be captured. It would be interesting to examine the interactions between customary and traditional leaders and elected officials at the municipal and secteur level with broader peacebuilding structure with a view towards how they influence conflict and peacebuilding outcomes. Such an emphasis on more localized actors could also be extended to examine the role of individual churches, CSOs headquartered outside of the provincial capitals and other groups. Combining both areas for additional research has the potential to develop a more holistic view of the peacebuilding landscape in South Kivu and advance the post-liberal peacebuilding agenda by potentially understanding the way that different localized and intermediary actors express and exercise their agency in relation to peacebuilding.

In addition, the present research and its methodology could also be extended to capture a larger number of peace oriented CSOs in South Kivu to better understand how local needs and knowledge are translated for external actors and how the intermediaries use resources and knowledge from those external actors to address local needs. This work could also be expanded to other provinces in the Eastern DRC including North Kivu, Maniema, Taganyika and Ituri in the Eastern DRC to develop a broader picture of civil society engagement in peacebuilding and to understand differences in civil society histories, practices and cultures across the region.
In relation to the civil society literature, this research could be extended to other fragile and conflict-affected states. Such research could be correlated to types of violence or war endings. For example, cases with low level violence could be compared with states facing acute or catastrophic violence such as Syria or South Sudan. Alternatively, the research could be applied to countries with different types of war-endings such as where there have been relatively successful UN peacebuilding interventions such as Sierra Leone and Haiti, but state and wider socio-economic fragility persists, and in contexts where war was addressed largely outside of the UN system such as Uganda and Afghanistan. Such studies would help to develop a more robust framework of how civil society contributes to peacebuilding in distinct fragile contexts.

Finally, the conclusions of this thesis have significant implications for hybrid peacebuilding in theory and in practice. Many post-liberal peacebuilding authors argue that liberal international peacebuilding actors perpetuate the hegemony of the powerful without adequately addressing local causes of conflict and needs. However, evidence in this thesis suggests that certain international actors can facilitate the exercise of discursive and emancipatory power by localized actors through the exercise of their material power and resources. It has also demonstrated that some local CSOs seek to promote liberal institutions such as democratic elections and governance. This invites future exploration of the ways in which international actors can leverage their power to promote the full engagement and inclusion of localized actors in peacebuilding processes. A strong starting point for such research would be to identify which groups of international actors are currently promoting local participation in peacebuilding and rigorously addressing local needs (plus how they are doing so and with what effect). It is important to undertake such research grounded in the recognition that local actors remain the main sources of knowledge about local needs and practice in relation to
peacebuilding. Indeed, further research that explores the relationship between local and international actors in hybridized peacebuilding actors could support a better understanding of the activities of both groups.
Annex 1: Secondary Research Questions
Local Civil Society Organisations:

a. What factors influence how organisations understand the needs of the communities that they represent in relation to peacebuilding and how do they seek to address them?

b. Which communities or interest groups does each local civil society organisation considered in this study represent?

c. What are the human and financial resources necessary for the local civil society organisations being studied to undertake their work? How are those resources accessed?

d. What are the factors that influence the way that local civil society actors communicate and collaborate with local and external actors?

e. Are the goals of each of the local civil society organisations ever adjusted to reflect external actors’ vision of peacebuilding?

f. What are the sources of power that influence the way that local civil society organisations both address and represent the needs of their beneficiaries in hybridized peacebuilding processes?

g. How do local civil society organisations address the different needs and experiences of men and women in relation to conflict and peacebuilding?

Beneficiaries:

h. How do the beneficiaries of the local civil society organisations studied understand their needs in relation to peacebuilding?

i. How do the beneficiaries of the local civil society organisations being studied engage with those organisations?
j. How adequately do the beneficiaries feel that the local civil society organisations being studied address their needs?

k. How do beneficiaries feel that the interventions from local civil society organisations differ from those of external actors? Is there value added?

External Actors:

l. How well do external actors understand the goals of their partner local civil society organisations and the needs of their beneficiaries?

m. What are the local needs communicated by local civil society organisations to external actors through communications materials such as websites or pamphlets, and through public interactions at meetings?

n. To what extent are external peacebuilding actors already aware of the way in which micro-dynamics within and between local civil society actors affect the way in which local needs are communicated to them?
Annex 2: Risk Mitigation Strategy

*Kirsten Van Houten Risk Mitigation Strategy for Proposed Research Trips to the Democratic Republic of the Congo*

**Ongoing Support**

The School of International Development and Global Studies accepted my proposed research as part of my admissions package. My supervisor Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Stephen Baranyi have provided extensive and ongoing support for my project and will continue to do so while I am abroad. I have established an extensive network of connections of Canadian Non-Governmental Organisations operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in advance of this research. I have received formal offers of logistical support from Partnership Africa Canada, KAIROS Canada and the Jane Goodall Institute. I have also established a relationship with staff at the Bilateral Relations Desk at Global Affairs Canada in the West and Central Africa Division. I am also receiving financial support from the University of Ottawa and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council based on my proposal to conduct field research in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Pre-Departure**

1. I consulted with and received immunizations from a travel doctor.

2. I continue to follow Congolese news updates which include a review of recent armed attacks, political activity and other relevant local information.

3. I joined expat groups on Facebook in both North Kivu and South Kivu through which I intend to identify a place to live before arriving in the DRC.

4. I have received a letter of support from COSOC-GL an environmental and justice organisation situated in Bukavu who have agreed to facilitate first research trip and will identify others before arriving.

5. I will acquire special-risk and war zone insurance.

6. I will register with the Canadian Embassy in the DRC.

7. I will identify a residence in a safe neighbourhood in Bukavu prior to arrival.

**Living on the Ground**

1. I will arrange to be met by a representative of COSOC-GL at the Rwandan/Congolese border at arrival and departure.

2. I will have contact with at least one organisation that I’m working with on a daily basis following a regular schedule.

3. My travel will be using passenger motorcycles (moto-karts) using my own helmet and with recommended drivers.
4. I will not travel unaccompanied after dark.

5. I will have access to bottled water and fresh food from local markets.

6. I will register with local immigration authorities and present myself and my research to municipal authorities upon arrival.

7. I will contact my supervisors on a weekly basis and after any high-risk meetings.

8. I will seek advice from local and foreign partners on the security situation and will consult with them about any travel plans outside of the cities on an ongoing basis.

**Adverse Events**

In the case of any adverse event which interrupts or prevents the successful completion of my research due to health or safety considerations either for myself or my research participants I will contact my supervisors, local and international partners, and the relevant local authorities and exit the country as soon as it is safe to do so. My exit strategy will be to exit the DRC through the border with Rwanda and get on the next available flight to Canada. In the event of a less serious adverse event such as an illness or a robbery I will consult with the relevant local authorities, seek medical attention and consult with my supervisors, local and international partners and local authorities in order to identify follow-up steps.

**Flexibility and Resilience**

Given that there remains a risk of armed violence in the Eastern DRC and development indicators remain low it will be essential for the research plan proposed to remain flexible in order to respond to adverse events that may arise. My risk mitigation strategy and extensive support network both lend themselves to resilience in responding to such events and I am open to input from the Office of Risk Management on how my strategy could be improved.
Annex 3: Original Research Materials

Ethnographie organisationnelle : profils des organisations, entrevues et observation participante

Avant que la recherche proposée commence, une première réunion aura lieu entre la chercheuse et l’ation pour expliquer la recherche aux employés des ations étudiées dans le cadre de cette recherche. Le profil ationnel permettra la chercheuse d’observer des activités ationnelles essentielles comme des réunions de personnel et des visites sur le terrain. En plus, la chercheuse demandera d’examiner les documents de communication pertinente à cette recherche.

**Profil organisationnel**

*Cette section sera complétée avec la coopération du directeur ou administrateur de chaque ation qui participera à cette recherche. Cette information sera recueillie lors de la première réunion. Le but de ce profil est de mieux comprendre les structures et l’administration de chaque ation d’une façon qui est cohérente et qui peut être comparée entre les organisations qui participent à cette recherche.*

Pseudonyme de l’organisation :

Emplacement :

Année d’établissement :

Fondateurs :

Objectifs :

Projets courants :

Nombre d’employés :

Nombre de bénévoles :

Nombre d’employés et des bénévoles qui sont des femmes :

Nombre de membres du conseil d’administration :

Nombre de membres du conseil d’administration qui ne sont pas Congolais :

Budget annuel (optionnel) :

Sources de financement (optionnel) :

Partenaires internationaux :

Partenaires locaux :

Affiliation politique :

Affiliation religieuse :

**Les questions d’entrevue avec les administrateurs/directeurs des organisations**

322
Les données seront recueillies auprès des administrateurs/directeurs des organisations de société civile locale dans le cadre de trois entrevues. Chaque entrevue durera une heure et aura lieu à un moment négocié entre la chercheuse et le participant. L’utilisation de plusieurs entrevues a été choisie pour adapter la méthodologie à la profondeur de l’information qui sera saisie par cette recherche et pour s’assurer d’avoir le temps nécessaire pour réfléchir aux données entre les entrevues.

Les entrevues adoptent une approche ethnographique selon laquelle les participants seront consultés à titre de commentateurs experts. L’adoption de cette approche respecte les expériences vécues des participants dans le cadre du contexte plus large des dynamiques au sein des organisations de la société civile et leurs relations avec d’autres acteurs. Les questions d’entrevue sont d’une nature ouverte, et pourraient être suivies par des questions additionnelles. Les questions additionnelles seront utilisées pour clarifier ou développer en détail les réponses des participants.

**Entrevue 1 : l’historique**

L’objectif de cette entrevue est d’examiner les trajectoires des individus à la tête des organisations de la société civile locale qui seront étudiées dans cette recherche. L’identification des intérêts personnels, des motivations et des sources de pouvoir de chaque directeur ou administrateur des organisorgisationnelles permettra une compréhension des facteurs qui influencent l’approche de chaque participant à leur travail.

**Partie Préliminaire** :

2. Colliger l’information démographique relative au genre, religion et langues parlées de chaque participant.

**Entrevue Questions**

3. Où avez-vous grandi?
4. Quel niveau d’éducation avez-vous atteint? À quelle institution?
5. Comment est-ce que vous et votre communauté avez été affectés par le conflit?
6. Que signifie la paix pour vous?
7. Quels facteurs restent à être adressés pour obtenir la paix?
8. Décrivez comment vous vous êtes engagé dans la consolidation de la paix pour la première fois. Qui d’après vous a eu la plus grande influence sur votre décision de travailler dans le domaine? Quels facteurs ont eu une influence sur cette décision?
9. Depuis combien de temps travaillez-vous avec (insérer le nom d’ation)?
10. Où est-ce que vous avez travaillé avant de joindre (insérer le nom d’ation)?
11. Décrivez votre rôle dans l’ation.
12. Est-ce que vous pensez que la vision de l’ation reflète votre compréhension de la paix et les facteurs qui doivent être adressés pour obtenir cette paix?

**Entrevue 2 : L’approche actionnelle à la consolidation de la paix.**
60 minutes

L’objectif de cette entrevue est d’examiner comment les organisations de société civile locale comprennent les besoins de leurs communautés et aussi les relations au sein de chaque ation. Cette entrevue abordera aussi sur l’influence des directeurs et administrateurs sur les dynamiques au sein des organisations.

1. Comment est-ce que votre ation contribue aux efforts de la consolidation de la paix? Comment contribue-t-elle à la justice et la réconciliation?
2. Quels communautés et groupes reçoivent de l’aide de votre ation? Pourquoi?
3. Décritez comment votre ation détermine et répond aux besoins des communautés desservies par votre ation en matière de consolidation de la paix.
4. Quels sont les obstacles qui compliquent les efforts de votre ation de répondre aux besoins de vos bénéficiaires? Par exemple le financement, l’insécurité ou d’autres facteurs.
5. Comment est-ce que votre ation se consacre aux besoins et aux intérêts de vos bénéficiaires?
6. Comment votre ation évalue t’elle les impacts de ses efforts dans les communautés ou elle travaille?
7. Décritez certains des succès importants de votre ation vis-à-vis la consolidation de la paix, la justice et la réconciliation.
8. Est-ce qu’il y a des dynamiques dans votre ation ou avec d’autres acteurs qui posent des problèmes pour votre ation dans l’atteinte de ses buts?
9. Est-ce que votre ation a participé à une mission de la consolidation de la paix internationale?
10. Quelles sont les contributions de votre ation à la paix dans votre communauté?

Entrevue 3 : Les contacts avec des partenaires externes.

60 minutes

Ces questions examinent les relations entre les organisations de société civile et leurs partenaires externes. Elles se penchent aussi sur les stratégies de communication utilisées par ces organisations.

1. Comment est-ce que votre ation accède aux ressources financières et humaines nécessaires pour réaliser sa mission et ses buts?
2. Est-ce que votre ation a des partenaires externes?
3. Comment est-ce que votre ation informe les partenaires externes des besoins de vos bénéficiaires?
4. Est-ce que vos partenaires externes partagent la même vision de la paix que votre ation?
5. Vos partenaires externes sont-ils réceptifs aux besoins identifiés par vos bénéficiaires?
6. Quels sont les défis de travailler avec ces partenaires externes?
7. Comment est-ce que votre action travaille avec d’autres organisations locales pour répondre aux besoins de votre communauté?
8. Décrivez les relations entre votre action et les autres organisations dans la communauté. Sont-elles positives et collaboratives? Où est-ce qu’elles sont négatives et tendues?
9. Comment est-ce que votre action gère les tensions entre des organisations dans la communauté?
10. Comment est-ce que votre action travaille avec d’autres organisations locales et internationales pour réaliser les objectifs de la consolidation de la paix locale?
Entrevues avec les employés et les bénévoles

60 minutes

Les entrevues adoptent une approche ethnographique selon laquelle les participants seront consultés à titre de commentateurs experts. Cette approche respecte les expériences vécues des participants dans le cadre plus large des dynamiques au sein des organisations de la société civile et leurs relations avec d’autres acteurs. Les questions d’entrevue sont d’une nature ouverte, et pourraient être suivies par des questions additionnelles, pour clarifier ou développer en détail les réponses des participants.

L’objectif de cette entrevue est d’examiner la trajectoire et les motifs des employés et des bénévoles qui travaillent avec les organisations de société civile locale. Les questions explorent comment les intérêts des employés et des bénévoles influencent leur travail au sein de l’ktion. En plus, cette entrevue examinera comment chaque ktion travaille avec ses bénéficiaires et partenaires externes.

S.v.p. notez que cette entrevue pourrait être divisée entre deux séances.

2. Colliger l’information démographique relative au genre, religion et langues parlées de chaque participant.
3. Décrivez votre poste dans l’ktion.
4. Comment est-ce que vous et votre communauté avez été affectés par le conflit?
5. Que signifie la paix pour vous?
6. Quels facteurs restent à être adressés pour obtenir la paix?
7. Comment réalisez-vous votre vision de la paix dans le cadre de votre travail avec (insérer le nom d’ktion)?
8. À quelle fréquence est-ce que vous travaillez directement avec les bénéficiaires?
9. Décrivez les besoins des communautés avec qui vous travaillez vis-à-vis la paix/consolidation de la paix.
10. Sentez-vous que vos efforts répondent aux besoins de ces communautés?
11. À quelle fréquence est-ce que vous travaillez avec des membres des autres organisations sur la consolidation de la paix?
12. Décrivez les opportunités et les défis qui sont associés au travail avec les acteurs de l’extérieur de votre ation.
Entrevues avec les bénéficiaires

60 minutes.

Les entrevues adoptent une approche ethnographique selon laquelle les participants seront consultés à titre de commentateurs experts. Cette approche respecte les expériences vécues des participants dans le cadre du contexte plus large des dynamiques au sein des organisations de la société civile et leurs relations avec d’autres acteurs. Les questions d’entrevue sont d’une nature ouverte, et pourraient être suivies par des questions additionnelles, utilisées pour clarifier ou développer en détail les réponses des participants.

Cette entrevue explorera les besoins des communautés et des bénéficiaires des organisations qui seront examinées par cette recherche. En plus, elle examinera l’approche que ces organisations adoptent pour répondre aux besoins identifiés par les bénéficiaires.

2. Colliger l’information démographique relative au genre, religion et langues parlées de chaque participant.
3. Comment est-ce que vous et votre communauté avez été affectés par le conflit?
4. Que signifie la paix pour vous? Quels facteurs restent à être adressés pour obtenir la paix?
5. Décrivez le travail de (insérer le nom d’ation) dans votre communauté.
6. Comment cette ation a-t-elle travaillé avec vous? Comment vous a-t-elle soutenu?
7. Comment le travail de (insérer le nom d’ation) contribue-t-il à obtenir la paix? Expliquez votre réponse.
8. Quelles sont les forces et les faiblesses des efforts de (insérer le nom d’ation)?
9. Est-ce que vous avez des besoins relatifs à la paix qui ne sont pas encore adressés? Décrivez-les.
10. Est-ce qu’il y’a d’autres organisations qui travaillent dans votre communauté? Comment est-ce que leurs travaux diffèrent du travail de (insérer le nom de l’ation)?
11. Comment est-ce que vous et votre communauté contribuez à la paix?
Entrevues avec les bénéficiaires (Réviser)

60 minutes.

Les entrevues adoptent une approche ethnographique selon laquelle les participants seront consultés à titre de commentateurs experts. Cette approche respecte les expériences vécues des participants dans le cadre du contexte plus large des dynamiques au sein des organisations de la société civile et leurs relations avec d’autres acteurs. Les questions d’entrevue sont d’une nature ouverte, et pourraient être suivies par des questions additionnelles, utilisées pour clarifier ou développer en détail les réponses des participants.

Cette entrevue explorera les besoins des communautés et des bénéficiaires des organisations qui seront examinées par cette recherche. En plus, elle examinera l’approche que ces organisations adoptent pour répondre aux besoins identifiés par les bénéficiaires.

2. Colliger l’information démographique relative au genre, âge, éducation, religion et langues parlées de chaque participant.
3. Comment est-ce que vous et votre communauté avez été affectés par le conflit et la guerre?
4. Que signifie la paix pour vous? Quels facteurs manquent pour obtenir la paix?
5. Décrivez le travail de (insérer le nom d’ation) dans votre communauté.
6. Comment cette ation a-t-elle travaillé avec vous? Comment vous a-t-elle soutenu?
7. Comment est-ce que le travail de (insérer le nom d’ation) contribue à la construction de la paix? Expliquez votre réponse.
8. Quelles sont les forces et les faiblesses des efforts de (insérer le nom d’ation)?
10. Comment est-ce que la sécurité peut être augmentée dans ta communauté?
11. Quels sont tes besoins dans le cadre du développement? Par exemple: les services de la santé, plus d’argent ou le travail ou des écoles gratuites.
12. Comment est-ce que la justice et la réconciliation peuvent être mieux soutenues?
13. Est-ce qu’il y’a d’autres organisations qui travaillent dans votre communauté? Comment est-ce que leurs travaux diffèrent du travail de (insérer le nom de l’ation)?
14. Comment est-ce que vous et votre communauté contribuez à la paix?
Entrevues avec les partenaires externes

60 minutes

Les entrevues adoptent une approche ethnographique selon laquelle les participants seront consultés à titre de commentateurs experts. Cette approche respecte les expériences vécues des participants dans le cadre du contexte plus large des dynamiques au sein des organisations de la société civile et leurs relations avec d’autres acteurs. Les questions d’entrevue sont d’une nature ouverte, et pourraient être suivies par des questions additionnelles, pour clarifier ou développer en détail les réponses des participants.

Cette entrevue considéra les relations entre les organisations de société civile locale et leurs partenaires externes. Elle étudiera comment les partenaires influencent les organisations locales. En plus, elle considérait comment le pouvoir et les dynamiques entre les organisations affectent les résultats des missions de la consolidation de la paix. Finalement, elle examinerait comment les besoins locaux sont communiqués par les organisations locales à leurs partenaires externes.

60-90 Minutes

1. Commencer par expliquer la recherche et présenter le processus de consentement. Demander au participant son consentement et répondre aux questions. Demander la permission pour enregistrer l’entrevue.
2. Comment est-ce que vous et votre ation collaborez avec (insérer le nom de l’ation) et les soutenez?
3. Depuis quand travaillez-vous avec (insérer le nom de l’ation)?
4. Quelles sont les défis et opportunités de travailler avec (insérer le nom de l’ation)?
5. Comment est-ce que les membres de (insérer le nom de l’ation) communiquent leur objectifs et buts à votre ation?
6. Comment (insérer le nom de l’ation) vous décrit-elle les besoins des bénéficiaires?
7. Comment est-ce que vous comprenez les besoins des communautés aidées par (insérer le nom de l’ation)? Décrivez les besoins.
8. Quelle est d’après vous la vision de la paix adoptée par (insérer le nom de l’ation)?
9. Est-ce que vous pensez qu’il y a des facteurs qui doivent encore être adressés pour obtenir la paix qui ne sont pas pris en compte par (insérer le nom de l’ation)? Expliquez.
10. Quels facteurs influencent la capacité de (insérer le nom de l’ation) à réaliser leurs objectifs et leur mission?
11. Quelles sont les dynamiques qui influencent la façon dont (insérer le nom de l’ation) communique les besoins de ses bénéficiaires à votre ation? Expliquez.
12. Est-ce qu’il y a des dynamiques locales qui influencent la perception et la communication des besoins de la communauté par (insérer le nom de l’ation)?
13. Comment est-ce que la participation des acteurs locaux influence les résultats de la consolidation de la paix?
Annex 4: Follow-Up Research Materials

Questionnaire supplémentaire pour les organisations de la société civile au Sud Kivu

L’objet de ce questionnaire est de clarifier certains thèmes principaux qui ont émergé comme partie de la recherche qui était complétée entre février et avril 2016 au Sud Kivu concernant les contributions des organisations de la société civile à la consolidation de la paix. Le questionnaire présente aussi une opportunité aux organisations de fournir une mise à jour de leurs projets, leurs activités et leurs financements.

1. Fournissez une mise à jour sur les activités, projets et financements de votre ation.
2. Quels facteurs ont influencé le succès de vos efforts dans le cadre de la consolidation de la paix pendant l’année passée?
3. Est-ce que vous avez commencé de travailler avec des nouveaux partenaires pendant ce temps? Si oui, qui sont les?
5. Comment est-ce que les gouvernements provinciaux et nationaux contribuent-ils aux consolidations de la paix au Sud Kivu?
6. Est-ce que votre ation travaille ensemble avec les représentatives du gouvernement provincial ou national? Si oui, décrivez comment vous collaborez.
7. Quelles sont les forces et les faiblesses de travailler ensemble avec les représentatives du gouvernement?
8. Comment est-ce que votre ation travaille avec les structures du bas? Comment est-ce que vous les soutenez?
9. Est-ce que vous connaissez bien les membres de vos structures du bas? Qui est invité de participer dans ces groupes?
10. Quelles sont les forces et les faiblesses de travailler ensemble avec les membres de vos structures du bas?
11. Décrivez comment vous identifiez et choisissez les candidats pour travailler chez votre ation. Quelles sont les qualifications que vous cherchez?
12. Décrivez le processus d’identifier et de développer les projets de votre ation. Qui influence ces processus?
13. Comment est-ce que tu évalues les efforts des autres acteurs dans le cadre de la consolidation de la paix au Sud Kivu? Qui sont les acteurs principaux?
14. Décrivez la contribution des organisations de la société civile au Sud Kivu à la consolidation de la paix. Comment est-ce que cette contribution est différente de la d'autres acteurs?
Entrevue avec les intermédiaires

1. Pendant combien de temps avez-vous travaillé dans le cadre de la consolidation de la paix en RDC?
2. Décrivez votre poste dans l’action. Que faites-vous pendant une journée typique?
3. Quels sont les buts et les objectifs de votre action dans le cadre de la consolidation de la paix?
4. Quels types des projets et activités implémentez-vous pour réaliser ces objectifs?
5. Qu’est-ce qui influence la capacité de votre action de réaliser leurs objectifs et buts?
6. Comment est-ce que votre action accède aux ressources financières et humaines qui sont nécessaires pour réaliser votre mission et vos buts?
7. Est-ce que vous travaillez ensemble avec les structures du bas dans le cadre de votre travail? Si oui, comment est-ce que vous travaillez ensemble avec eux? Comment est-ce que vous les soutenez?
8. Quels communautés et groupes reçoivent de l’aide par votre action? Pourquoi?
9. Décrivez comment votre action détermine et répond aux besoins des communautés lesquels sont servis par votre action relative à la consolidation de la paix.
10. Quels sont les besoins de vos membres/communautaires/bénéficiaires dans le cadre de la paix et le développement?
11. Qui sont vos partenaires locales et internationales?
12. Comment identifiez-vous vos partenaires externes?
13. Comment est-ce que votre action travaille ensemble avec vos partenaires externes pour obtenir la paix en RDC?
14. Travaillez-vous avec les représentatives du gouvernement provincial ou national en RDC afin de contribuer à la consolidation de la paix? Comment est-ce que vous travaillez ensemble?
15. Quels sont les opportunités et les défis de travailler avec vos partenaires externes?
16. Décrivez certains des succès significatifs de votre action vis-à-vis la consolidation de la paix, la justice et la réconciliation
17. Comment contribue la population locale à la paix?
18. Que signifie la paix pour vous?
19. Est-ce que la situation dans l’RDC aujourd’hui peut être caractériser comme une situation d’après-guerre?
20. Quels facteurs restent pour obtenir la paix au Sud Kivu?
Bibliography

AN, 2016. Interview with AN, Organisation 1, Bukavu [Interview] (19 April 2016).


Beneficiary1A, 2016. Interview with Beneficiary 1, Organisation 1, Female, Sange [Interview] (9 March 2016).

Beneficiary1B, 2016. Interview with Beneficiary 1, Organisation 2, Female, Begira [Interview] (19 March 2016).

Beneficiary1C, 2016. Interview with Beneficiary 1, Organisation 3, Female, Bukavu [Interview] (3 March 2016).

Beneficiary2A, 2016. Interview with Beneficiary 2, Organisation 1, Female, Sange [Interview] (9 March 2016).


Beneficiary3A, 2016. Interview with Beneficiary 3, Organisation 1, Female, Bukavu [Interview] (22 March 2016).


Beneficiary4A, 2016. *Interview With Beneficiary 4, Organisation 1, Male, Sange* [Interview] (9 March 2016).


Beneficiary4C, 2016. *Interview with Beneficiary 4, Organisation 3, Male, Bukavu* [Interview] (7 April 2016).

Beneficiary5A, 2016. *Interview with Beneficiary 5, Organisation 1, Male, Sange* [Interview] (9 March 2016).

Beneficiary5B, 2016. *Interview with Beneficiary 5, Organisation 2, Male, Luberizi* [Interview] (23 March 2016).

Beneficiary5C, 2016. *Interview with Beneficiary 5, Organisation 3, Male, Bukavu* [Interview] (12 April 2016).

Beneficiary6A, 2016. *Interview with Beneficiary 6, Organisation 1, Bukavu* [Interview] (22 March 2016).

Beneficiary6A, 2017. *Interview with Beneficiary 6, Organisation 1, Male, Sange* [Interview] (9 March 2017).

Beneficiary6C, 2016. *Interview with Beneficiary 6, Organisation C, Female, Bukavu* [Interview] (21 April 2016).


DD, 2016. *Interview with DD, Organisation 2, Bukavu* [Interview] (4 March 2016).


EA, 2016. *Interview with EA, Organisation 1, Bukavu [Interview]* (24 February 2016).

EC, 2016. *Interview with EC, Organisation 1, Bukavu [Interview]* (4 March 2016).


EE, 2016. *Interview with EE, Organisation 2, Bukavu [Interview]* (17 February 2016).


EK, 2016. *Interview with EK, Organisation 3, Bukavu [Interview]* (7 March 2016).

EL, 2016. *Interview with EL, Organisation 3, Bukavu [Interview]* (7 March 2016).

EM, 2016. *Interview with EM, Organisation 1, Bukavu [Interview]* (22 March 2016).


EO, 2016. *Interview with EO, Organisation 3, Bukavu [Interview]* (7 April 2016).


ExternalPartner1A, 2016. *Interview with External Partner 1, Organisation 1, Bukavu [Interview]* (20 April 2016).

ExternalPartner1B, 2016. *Interview with External Partner 2, Organisation 1, Via Skype [Interview]* (20 April 2016).


Intermediary1, 2017. Interview with Intermediary 1, Skype [Interview] (7 May 2017).

Intermediary2, 2017. Interview with Intermediary 2, INGO 2, Skype [Interview] (16 April 2017).


LE, 2016. *Interview with LE, Organisation 2, Bukavu* [Interview] (23 March 2016).

Leadership1A, 2016. *Leadership Interview 1, Organisation 1, Bukavu* [Interview] (10 March 2016).

Leadership1B, 2016. *Leadership Interview 2, Organisation 1, Bukavu* [Interview] (10 March 2016).


Leadership3C, 2016. *Interview 3 with Coordinator, Organisation 3, Bukavu* [Interview] (16 April 2016).


Mana, K., 2016. *Changer les imaginaires: Pour sortir de la guerre à l'est de la République Démocratique du Congo.* Miélan: IZUBA.


Mathys, G. & Vlassenroot, K., 2016. 'It's not all about the land': Land disputes and conflict in the eastern Congo. *Rift Valley Institute.*


Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/
[Accessed 25 June 2018].

Available at: https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/about
[ Accessed 25 June 2018].

Mosse, D. & Lewis, D., 2006. Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in

Mould, V., 2012. State failure and civil society potential: Reconciliation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In: M. Darweish & C. Rank, eds. Peacebuilding and Reconciliation:

Review of International Studies, Volume 41, pp. 49-72.

International Political Science Review., 34(3).

ND, 2016. Interview with ND, Organisation 2, Bukavu [ Interview] (10 February 2016).

Nilsson, D., 2012. Anchoring the Peace: civil society in peace accords in peace accords and


OC, 2016. Interview with OC, Organisation 1, Bukavu, South Kivu [Interview] (8 April 2016).


Organisation 1, 2016. Organisational Ethnography, Bukavu: s.n.

Organisation 1, 2017. Follow-up Questionnaire, Bukavu: s.n.


Organisation 2, 2017. Follow-Up Questionnaire, Bukavu: s.n.


RT, 2016. *Interview with RT, Organisation 1, Bukavu* [Interview] (26 February 2016).


SJ, 2016. *Interview with SJ, Organisation 2, Bukavu* [Interview] (27 April 2016).


SN, 2016. *Interview with SN, Organisation 2, Bukavu* [Interview] (24 February 2016).


UZ, 2016. *Interview with UZ, Organisation 3, Bukavu [Interview] (14 April 2016).*


