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The Cascade of Global Norms:
An Integral and Mimetic Analysis of National and Civil Society
Leadership and Partnership in the Mine Ban Treaty

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in Conflict Studies

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Abstract

Purpose – This research sets out to examine the roles of leadership and partnership in the successful cascade of a new global norm in the field of security. Theories on the norm lifecycle and mimetism are brought together with the integral approach (IA) in order to create a tool with which to map the relationships and processes of the norm cascade process. The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) is the selected case study for both personal interests and for the simplicity of its process and its continuing success, 20 years after its endorsement by 122 nations in December 1997. The process was led by Canada. Four specific events during the 14-month period of the Ottawa Process are selected for analysis. The mapping tool allows for the understanding of both the individual and collective factors that validate a complex global cascade process. The selection of respondents—all of them Canadian members of the government–civil society coalition—affords some stimulating conclusions regarding leadership and partnerships, particularly in the form of exemplars, connectors, and co-leaders, necessary to the fostering of a successful normative change.

Design/methodology/approach – The method employed consisted of a qualitative analysis of primary material, consisting of official documents on the one hand, and interviews with some of the major actors on the other, as well as related secondary literature. A constructivist analysis of the four IA quadrants was performed, with a particular focus on mimetic aspects, with a view to identifying the key indicators around which to build a questionnaire and platform for analysis. This exploratory phase resulted in the identification of two complex dynamics of transformation leading to leadership and partnership in the cascade phase. The chosen approach unveiled the layering and collaborative interconnectivities of the norm leader and norm partnerships. This led to a more profound understanding of the complexity of the cascade phase, which improves the possibility of transposing it to other normative change and conflict resolution scenarios.

Findings – The two-part hypothesis was validated. The first part relates to how the mapping of the norm leader’s role allows for a richer understanding of the complexity of
the cascading of global norms. The second part relates to how the combination of the integral approach and mimetism theory has enabled the capture of the leadership and partnership qualities that lead to a successful cascade process. The qualities reside in three elements: 1) the role of the exemplars, 2) the role of the connectors, and 3) trust as demonstrated through co-leadership.

**Originality/value** – The originality of this dissertation lies in its amalgamation of the two theories of integral approach and mimetics to build an understanding of the cascading cycle of a global norm. Together these theories provide an expanded framework through which to understand the information surrounding the MBT. The deconstruction of the relations and processes leading to the successful execution of the cascade of the MBT allows for the identification of the dynamics of norm cascade, useful in any field of negotiations, such as at the national, provincial, municipal, or even organizational level.

**Keywords** – Global norm; normative change; integral approach; mimetic theory; leadership; partnership; government; civil society; cascade of norms; mine ban treaty; and conflict resolution.
Remerciement

My warmest thanks to Professor Vern Neufeld Redekop, who contributed advice, humour, and most importantly, an unfailing enthusiasm in the face of my many personal struggles. Thank you for your patience—it’s not easy for an engineer to become a philosopher.

I apologize to my interviewees. You shared so much and it was a difficult task to choose what to include in this particular study. You are truly an inspiration.

When the idea for this thesis topic came into being, it became clear that my career and my volunteer work had woven a web of knowledge and experience that enabled me to glean the lessons learned from this extraordinary Canadian initiative. The Mine Ban Treaty is still today a carrier of much hope for the future management of global common goods.

As a former deminer, I send my gratitude to all the Afghan mothers and children who crossed my path in refugee camps around Peshawar so many years ago. You were key to instigating my belief that more can be done to make the world a better place.

This project came to fruition as a result of my children, Nikolai and Katrina, each challenging me in their teenage years to do more for the world. This project sprung from my eternal love for you both, and, through you, for every child in the world.
Prologue

My experiences as an engineer, a civil servant, a candidate for the Green Party, a governmental consultant, a civil society activist, and a former military officer—eclectic experiences from domains with somewhat contradictory worldviews—have shaped the way I have chosen to investigate my topic. I functioned well in all these roles, although my age and interests have now limited my participation in all of them. I can attest that I don’t fit “only” inside a particular qualitative interpretive community. I know that I needed the full spectrum of my career to create my analytical tool and to dare to study the global context. My life experiences all informed my approach, leading me to deconstruct a tapestry of events in a manner that I hope will provide some guidance for future norm leaders.

As a former deminer, I taught children and women how to recognize anti-personnel (AP) mines in order to avoid them when fetching wood, water, or working in agricultural fields to feed their families. I was, and still am, very proud of Canada’s leadership role in the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), in achieving a ban on the production, stockpiling and use of AP mines. My attendance at World Social Forums had made it clear that the MBT was seen as a beacon of light in a world in much need of hope. So, the selection of the MBT as my case study was an easy decision. I chose to study the timeframe from October 1996 to December 1997, the period I identified as the cascade, in which a multitude of international, national, regional, and transnational leaders and partners, including governments and civil society organizations, cooperated to develop and approve a ban of the AP mine, a simple, inexpensive and deadly silent weapon. I’m always amazed that Canadians don’t know about this treaty while members of civil societies around the world keep studying it in the hopes of finding the key aspects and events that might lead to the cascading of new norms and the achievement of their aspirations. Finally, it is a positive story and I wanted to bring more hope into the study of conflicts.

I chose to look at the events leading up to the MBT through the lens of three theories. My first theory describes the lifecycle of norms. Norms—such as rules, principles, and behaviours—are an organizing and structural element in the life of individuals, organizations, and societies. They codify values, and ethical, moral, cultural,
and ritual practices. They can create conflict, but also act as the means or outcome of social mediation between two or more agents. A stable norm can concurrently be viewed as positive and negative—the former by those who wish to keep it and the latter by others working hard to change it. Once the stability of an old norm is challenged, the life process of a new norm begins.

As an engineer and project manager, I’m very familiar with lifecycle management, so finding Finnemore and Sikkink’s work on the lifecycle of norms felt auspicious (1998). Its simplicity was also part of the appeal. Finnemore and Sikkink define a lifecycle as follows: the emergence, followed by the cascade, followed by the operationalization. However, their description of the “tipping point”—the point during the cascade phase when there is “real” commitment to engage—left much to be desired. This lack of depth was the opportunity that I was looking for, and focusing on the tipping point proved to be as useful in finding hidden dynamics at play as I had hoped. It allowed for the opportunity to investigate both the relational and the procedural aspects of the actions of the norm leader, hence verifying my first hypothesis that the mapping of the norm leader’s role would allow for a richer understanding of the complexity of the cascading of norms.

Why choose to explore the cascading at the global level with its multiple variables? I must admit that containing my subject was a continual challenge. However, I have been concerned for some time about the structural violence at the top where national elite interests really “trump” the global agenda. As a strategist, I have observed that global institutions tend to be deficient when it comes to risk management and resilience, that they are vulnerable to the pressures of international corporations and lacking in the core skills needed to deal with pressing global issues. I wanted to contribute to making the global management of ordinary people’s interests more effective, transparent, and accountable.

My most exciting discovery was the essential role played by connectors: they are key in bridging different worldviews and opinions and carry the potential of a successful outcome on their shoulders. I also came to see and understand the work performed by the exemplars in a more profoundly heartfelt and hopeful manner. It allowed me to identify the exemplars in my own life and see how their values, morals, and actions have shaped
who I am today. Another important discovery was the invaluable importance of trust—the capacity of norm leaders to build it and the capacity of partners to sustain it. Evidence points to that the Achilles heel of the tipping point is trust.

I’m hopeful that this thesis will find its place in many fields of study. First, naturally, in the field of conflict studies where normative change needs to be recognized as a tool for conflict resolution both from a relational and transactional perspective. Second, in the field of leadership education where the self-transformation described in this thesis will not only enable individuals to reach a higher level of personal development, but will also enable them to effectively create hope and reach out to “the other” and in so doing to meaningfully build the trust necessary for effective and sustainable partnerships, and—ultimately—a better world.
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Chapter 1. Conflicts in the Global Context

We create the conflict in the various ways we make sense of it: the conflict “creates” us in challenging our ways of making sense of it.

Although the United Nations (UN) has instituted treaties, accords, and conventions to alleviate some of the global conflicts, numerous critics are calling for a new global governance to do a better job at managing those conflicts (Galtung, 2000; Benhabib, 2011; Roche, 1999; Collegium international and Goldman, 2012; Kissinger, 2014; Stiglitz, 2006: Massiah and Massiah, 2011). In the opening quote, McGuigan and Popp challenge our thoughts as a key part of conflict resolution, so I therefore ponder what if the major global challenge lies not in changing the structure of global governance, but in finding means to increase the level of accountability and transparency in the negotiation of global affairs and hence increasing the population’s ability to attend to the complex problems facing humanity as a whole? These questions lead to finding out how nations negotiate global affairs and how these are applicable to the present struggle to effectuate the UN Paris Agreement on Climate Change,\(^1\) the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,\(^2\) and the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons\(^3\) to name a few. One of the difficulties of tackling global conflicts is the size and the complexities created by the number of organizational variables (nations, competing issues, resources, etc.). However, this should not become an excuse to avoid

\(^1\) The details of the UN Paris Agreement on Climate Change can be viewed here: [http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php](http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php)


the complexity of the global conflicts and the possibility for achieving worldwide
improvements in the management of global affairs.4

When considering the challenge of global improvements as ongoing conflicts, one
can leverage the knowledge gained from conflict theorists. Conflicts can be viewed as an
“antagonistic relationship between two or more parties over intractable divergences
regarding what is mutually significant to the parties involved” (Rioux and Redekop, 2013, 2). I choose the definition of an antagonistic relationship for it describes a
relationship between parties, therefore implying a position within a social context with
intractable divergences that could involve tacit, implied or prescribed terms of
engagement, agreement or norms. Rioux and Redekop share the sources of conflicts as
differences of views over many things, including interests, need, identity, desires, values,
and rights (Ibid., 4–8). This basic categorization of intractable divergences supports the
understanding of congruence or divergence to identify potential points of pressure or
opportunities for creativity as proposed in *The Opposable Mind – Winning through
Integrative Thinking* (Martin, 2009).

Conflicts are always both philosophical and political, or relational and
procedural—and are present as a dormant risk in every type of relationship. The risk of
conflict can be further exacerbated when fear is involved and when the issue of
contention becomes a matter of life and death. Violent conflicts that threaten people’s
lives and livelihoods are particularly terrifying. Where international conflicts are

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4 The global level is challenging with a number of variables that I chose not to define. However, I
acknowledge that this exercise could be of value as I appreciated knowing from the Foundation
Paraguay that there are 200 variables of poverty defining the “complexities” in its multi-
dimensional resolution approach (Watkins and Wilber, 2015, 29).
concerned, solutions to such conflicts are entangled with the concept of sovereignty and national interests, making them both a legal and an emotional issue.

As defined by Wallace and Wolf in *Contemporary Sociological Theory* (1995), conflict theory can be divided into two quite different traditions.⁵ Although not identified by the authors as such, I view them as the subjective and objective schools.⁶ The first subjective group of theorists can be identified by their belief that resolving society’s conflicts is a moral obligation of social scientists. Moral value cannot be separated from judgement. Analyzing social and economic inequalities is a moral act and a moral necessity. They identified groups and individuals considered to be in this first group include Marxists and neo-Marxists, the Frankfurt School, and Jürgen Habermas (1929–), C. Wright Mills (1916–1962), and Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), influenced mostly by Karl Marx. They include in the second group of conflict theorists Ralf Dahrendorf (1929–

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⁵ Wallace and Wolf demonstrate the links between sociological theories and “the way in which we all deal with and try to understand our world” (1995, x). They review the structure of sociological theories and “their practical importance as a way of analyzing and understanding how human societies work” (Ibid., xi). They offer a review of the important underlying assumptions concerning human nature by contrasting the major trends of contemporary sociological theories of functionalism, conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, rational choice and few more alternate perspectives. Because the field of study for this thesis is conflict theory, the particularities with functionalism were of more interest since the latter has acted as the leading theoretical position from which other sociological theories emerged. Wallace and Wolf propose that conflict and rational choice theories emphasize the behaviour of individuals and groups, while functionalism is interested on the role played in events by the values and norms of the same individuals and groups. Therefore, the former theories “emphasize ‘interest’ which they often treat as self-evident but which include being free from subjugation, being in a position of power, and possessing more rather than less wealth and status” (Ibid., 9), while the latter theories study the internalization of social values. While both approaches aim at describing the event, conflict theorists are more concerned with its explanation. Conflict theory has a less unified perspective than functionalism. The latter sees interdependence and unity in society and the former see “an arena in which groups fight for power, and the ‘control’ of conflict simply means that one group is able, temporarily, to suppress its rivals” (Ibid., 76). However, the authors conclude that recent trends confirm that major theoretical perspectives can offer “different and often complementary insights” (emphasis in text) (Ibid., 409).

⁶ It seems that the first group looks at the left quadrants of Wiber’s Integral Approach (IA) and the second concentrates on the right side. In integral theory one would say that both are needed. The IA theory is discussed in detail throughout this thesis as a foundational tool for this analysis.
2009), Lewis Coser (1913–2003), and Randall Collins (1941–), also influenced by Karl Marx plus major continuities with Max Weber (Ibid., 77–78).

While members of the first group believe that a society where social conflict can be reduced to where it would no longer be a major component of the analysis could exist, the second group of theorists believes that conflict is inevitable and that social science doesn’t need to be value-based, but can be as objective as the natural sciences.

Wallace and Wolf contend that general conflict theory used by both schools of thought incorporates three basic tenets (Ibid., 76–77). The first tenet assumes that people have a number of basic or “self”-interests—things they want or need to acquire that are common to all people within society. These self-interests can include basics necessities, such as food and shelter, but can also include safety, health care, and education. These items are often identified as elements of contention in social justice theories. The second assumption revolves around power as a central focus of social relationships. Power is scarce, unequal, and often coercive, which tends to lead to conflict over access to finite resources. The analysis of power is central to all conflict theories, but they differ in identifying the core source of power. Another assumption shared by all conflict theorists is that ideas and values can be used as weapons by different groups to achieve their own goals at the expense of others.

Within the first school with a focus on morals, the dimensions of conflict are mostly discussed at the level of the individual within a society in terms of ethnicity, and

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7 Maslow’s basic hierarchy of needs in *A Theory of Human Motivation* (2013).
8 For example, for issues of Ethnicity, Culture and Identity-Formation see Spencer, *Race and Ethnicity: Culture, Identity and Representation* (2014); for issues of Nationalism and Ethnicity see Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (2002); for issues of Politics and Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict see Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict* (2000); for issues of Resolution of Ethnic
religion, morals, and social justice. However, in the second objective school, conflicts can be discussed by using indexes of conflicts to instead register criteria such as the state of economy, education level, and the state of the law. With criteria ranging from internal domestic violence to the economics of violence, and hence following the realist school of thought on conflict, Vision for Humanity shares for example, that “the

Conflicts see Oberschall, Conflict and peacebuilding in divided societies: Responses to ethnic violence (2007).


10 For example, for issues of Sources of Morals see Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (1990); for issues of Collaboration or Resistance see La Boétie, De la servitude volontaire. (1576–2001) and Klemperer, L.T.I. La langue du IIIe Reich (1996); for issues of Reflections on Conflicts see Améry, Par delà le crime et le châtiment. Essai pour surmonter l’insurmontable (2005); for issues of Morals and Political see Held, How Terrorism is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence (2008).

11 For example, for issues of Principles of Social Justice see Miller, Principles of Social Justice (1999); Sen, The Idea of Justice (2009) and Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983); for issues of Self see Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, (1992); for issues of Access see Fraser, Qu’est-ce que la justice sociale? Reconnaissance et Redistribution (2005); for issues of Capabilities see Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach (2011).

12 Examples of global indexes include: 1) Barometer – Heidelberg Institute of International conflict research - a political conflict is a perceived incompatibility of intentions between individuals or social groups. Actors, measures, and issues are the constitutive attributes of political conflict; 2) Global Conflict Risk Index – Based on 5 axes – political, conflict prevalence, social cohesion and public security, geography and environment and economy – total of 26 targets evaluated; 3) Global Conflict tracker – Council on Foreign Relations – civil war, criminal violence, interstate, political instability, sectarian, territorial dispute, transnational terrorism and unconventional; 4) Crisis Watch – International Crisis Group – provide on-time data on the sources of the conflicts; 5) The Global conflicts to Watch in 2015 – The Atlantic - survey of 2,200 US government officials, academics and experts; and 6) Global Risks Landscape 2016 – World Economic Forum – Evaluation of some 28 conflicts in terms of impact and likelihood.
2017 World Peace Index finds that [...] over the last decade [the world] has become significantly less peaceful.\textsuperscript{13}

The two traditional schools allow for a wider perspective on conflict theories however as seen previously, entangled issues of sovereignty and international interests appear to be located at the edge of both schools, for they are not inclusive enough to cater to the field of global conflicts. Another aspect of concern with the two traditional schools is their restricted ability to span the different levels of participation on the global scene to include simultaneously the micro level of the role of the individual to the macro level of the mandate of their organization or their collective of organizations. Finally, the three tenets of conflict theories of self-interest, power, and values affect global negotiations to varying degrees depending on the proposed new norm. In the field of security, the pressures are emphasized by the military national approach, its range of weapons, and its ideologies of power.

Such aspects of international and contentious global conflict were evident in the usage of the antipersonnel mines (APMs). APMs were weapons for military engineers around the world. They were used strategically to protect troops or to deny access to camps and withdrawal routes during violent conflicts. However, long after the conflicts were resolved, they continued to claim the lives of civilians now living in peace (Wisotzki, 2013, 84; Tutu, 2008, ix).

While anti-personnel mines were not the cause of violent conflicts they were to become in early 1990s the source of a conflict between a number of transnational networks and the military and political wills of many nations because of the mounting

\textsuperscript{13} Vision for Humanity is a “guide to peace and development for people who wants to see change take place” and is provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The index can be viewed here: \url{http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/}
evidence of their catastrophic impacts on innocent people. This conflict was situated at the moral level: between the right to use them for protection during a conflict and the choice to ban them in order to prevent post-conflict deaths and minimize the expensive, difficult and dangerous post-conflict clean-up they necessitate. The antagonistic views between those espousing the right to national security and those more concerned with the right to human security are not exclusive to the issue of APMs, but are in fact common to other essential security dilemmas. The priority of these security dilemmas creates other global and national challenges and conflicts by divesting funds and resources from other issues such as social justice and international development.\textsuperscript{14}

The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT)\textsuperscript{15} to primarily abolish the production and usage of APMs stands as a landmark norm and the amount of written material on it make it a particularly promising case study.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, the MBT has been viewed by civil society

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[14] Military spending by country is collated by the Stockholm International Peace Research institute. Details can be found here: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
\item[16] I chose the MBT for my case study for five main reasons. As somewhat of a politician with two brief attempts to represent the Green Party of Canada, I realized that Canada was quite constrained with its commercial and military allegiances. I discovered the realities of realism as ideologies not only limiting the abilities of nations but also limiting the nations’ potentials, capabilities, and willingness to act. As a global activist, I chose to defy my colleagues that our efforts are more efficient at the community level because of the finite level of resources afforded by the CSOs. My position is that while one must work at the community level, one must also bring focus to areas for improvement at the global level. As a retired deminer with time spent teaching mine awareness in Afghan refugee camps around Peshawar, Pakistan, I saw first hand the ravages of APMs. I contend that there are now more alternatives to armament than ever before. I wish to encourage all nations to let go of their fears and embrace these opportunities. As a Canadian, I stand proud of my country’s contributions in the world. Canada was truly an exemplar with the Ottawa Process. Even though the dynamics of one nation’s place in the world was destabilized with 9/11, I believe that informed national political choices within moral partnerships are required to face the complex global problems facing 2018 and beyond. I content that the MBT must remain a case study beyond the field of political international relations.
\end{enumerate}
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organizations as a “beacon of light” (Kmentt, 2008, 24) because it was approved at the
global level, in the “sovereign” field of disarmament in the shortest recorded period of
negotiations. In spite of the fact that the treaty has yet to be signed by three of the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council, it is operational in a large part of the
world. Its successful decision-making process relied heavily on representatives of
national and transnational civil societies. Most importantly, MBT as a global normative
change has succeeded over the last twenty years in reducing loss of life and limb.

The role of norms and normative approaches provides an understanding of
conflict dynamics. Norms can be approached empirically when they can be inferred from
observable actions or reflectively when they can be derived from statements of intention
and links to cultural, religious, and political values as understood within cultures. The
empirical dimension of the issue of the national use of APMs suggests that over a period
of decades more and more landmines were used; this usage then pointed to the fact that
the use of landmines was a normative tactic that contributed to strategic goals. The extra-
conflictual impact of landmines led to calling into question the norms associated with the
use of landmines. A strategic view of the situation further steered to the question of who
and how one is to deal with pervasive conflictual practices that have a broad negative
impact, going beyond the primary parties involved in the conflict.

With the unfolding of the MBT, theories on security were challenged by the
emerging concept of “human security,” and this has highlighted the political theoretical

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17 Indeed, both Jody Williams and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a major
transnational organization, received the Nobel Peace prize in October 1997. See details at this
differences between realism, constructivism, liberalism, and globalism in international relations. It is my view that international security conflicts carry high potential for the emergence of improved rules and behaviours, for new normative changes, that not only lead to the resolution of the particular extant conflict and the reconciliation of the parties\textsuperscript{18} in question, but that can have a civilizing effect on society at large.

The maintenance of normative status quo can sometimes aggravate complex problems whereas an understanding of the process of norm creation, and particularly the approval process, or negotiations, of a new norm as it becomes widely accepted, has the potential to equip global institutions with better tools with which to face today’s evolving complex changes and enduring conflicts. When a conflict arises, it creates an opportunity to find the cause, and then to address it by making adjustments. In fact, continual adjustments can be made to the terms of the relationship to ensure social cohesion. However, failure to seek the cause, and to resolve it, will continue to threaten social cohesion.

How was the MBT approved? How were the pressures of national interest, power and the value of human security managed? How were the political parties engaged? Who were all the players? Who were the leaders? Can the lessons learned be transposed to other global conflicts? These questions are addressed throughout this thesis with the hope that the answers carry seeds of creativity through norm dynamics for future global conflict resolution.

This chapter therefore begins by first reviewing the context of security conflicts at the global level with a focus on its major actors. The next section introduces the theories

\textsuperscript{18} I loosely define this term as the recognized moral agent, which can be either a group or a single representative, authorized to negotiate on behalf of one of the factions.
selected to analyze and deconstruct the case study as a means to understand global normative change. Finally, the chapter concludes with the outline of the thesis.

1.1. Security Conflicts at the Global Level

This thesis studies global partners involved in the process of negotiations in order to suggest concrete approaches towards achieving the successful conclusion for the planning and delivering of other moral-based global norms. I propose to use the concept of the cascade of the norm that I consider similar to decision-making and negotiation processes. The selection of the norm lifecycle theory with a focus on the cascade process and its tipping point was based on the expectations that it would support the discovery of dynamics at the relational and procedural levels. Finnemore and Sikkin’s deconstrivist model provides the required rigour to navigate these two levels (1998). In addition, the choice of the norm lifecycle model was coherent with the study of the Ottawa Process, the negotiations period of the MBT; a period that boundaries fit rather well with the theoretical cascade phase.

Since negotiations usually take place between a minimum of two parties of different opinion it could be reasonable to consider that global negotiations be conducted between parties representing the various opinions of people worldwide. I chose these two partners as the UN and the people as represented by their social collectives. However, I note that anarchic structure of the global environment is a quasi-political structure, since its main body, the UN, functions by negotiations through national representatives designated by the elected representatives of each nation.¹⁹

¹⁹ For example, Article 27 of the UN charter stipulates that each member of the Security Council shall have the right to vote. http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/voting.shtml
In its 70 years of existence, the UN has equipped itself with different bodies and agencies to fulfill its mandate. However, other international ad hoc collectives have been formed to take important decisions outside of the UN. Organizations such as the G7 and G20, through national designated representatives, have given themselves mandates to negotiate political and economic matters in exclusive forums. Other organizations, such as Davos, invite national designated representatives, often of the highest rank, to discuss mandates related to global affairs to influence economic and military alliances in the confidential circumstances afforded by their agreed-upon organizational norms.²⁰

In comparison, citizens and civil society organizations²¹ (CSOs) and their academic partners have had little to no access and therefore influence over global decisions. Social change is a key driver for civic membership in CSOs and social movement. One of the dynamics of globalization is the convergence of fight²² by CSOs (Brandy and Smith, 2005). A number of authors agree that efficient pressures for social

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²⁰ Information on the membership of the G20 can be found here: [http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/](http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/)
²¹ Beck and Sikkink define a transnational advocacy network as “relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (1998, 2), and choose to not use the term ‘civil society’ to “evoke the structured and structuring dimension in the action of these complex agents, who not only participate in new areas of politics but also shape them [...] in the increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms” (ibid., p.4). However, I choose to use the term ‘civil society’ to represent these same agents as the term is used in the historical documents referring to the Mine Ban Treaty. I define civil society as “a utopia carried by a set of heterogeneous social actors as a counterpart to the State, working in the fields of culture, environment, social justice, common goods and values, who wish to build a better world, emancipated neoliberalism, imperialism, patriarchy and all forms of oppression with a positive vision of diversity.” This definition has been inspired in part by Dubet (1993, 61), Sholte (2006, 273, in footnote), James (2009, 208), and Massicotte (2010, 22).
²² A convergence of fight is realized when CSOs with different original mandates partner with other organizations to support a common goal for a short or long time. An example is the rallying of Canadian CSOs to the organization Mines Action Canada (MAC) for the purpose of banning anti-personnel mines. These mines were affecting opportunities for effective agriculture and economic prospects by producing loss of limbs and life. A convergence of fight allows for the converging of resources with a resulting greater ability to create public and political awareness, provide education, and, ultimately, move toward the achievement of the common goal.
changes at the global level can only be mounted through civil society organizations and their members because the economic actors and their allied governments use their resources and power to keep the status quo of the existing systems (Massiah, 2011; Perlas; 2003; Beck, 2003; Cavanagh and Mander, 2005) and block half of the world’s population from accessing resources and building wealth (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009). This desire for social change is the main motivator for civic power expressed through membership in civil society organizations and social movements.23

The history of social movements is traditionally divided into three successive waves: first, there was the syndicalist movement as carried by the working class, then, the new social movements related to identity and various interests (feminist and environmental movements), and then, the movements called alterglobalist with a view to modifying the hegemonic neoliberal system (Massiah 2011; Couvrat, 2006). This categorization of social movements allows the distinction of means to deconstruct social conflict, modes of action, and scope of social transformation.

For Dubet, the continued relevance and success of the phenomenon of social movements resides in their expansion beyond the social and political mobilization of the workers’ movement and its demands related to production and economy, into the field of culture and values, in the process advancing the forms of conflict management and giving political representation to new actors (1993, 61). The resilience of social movements rests with their capacity to create hope in their selected fields of interests.

Three theories intersect to provide a perspective on the organizational aspect of social movements. First, there is the theory of resource mobilization, which aims to

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23 The study of social movements builds an understanding of the evolution of the CSOs in terms of their increased fields of interest and their growing power in the global context.
associate the success of social movements with their capacity to obtain the human and logistical resources required for the achievement of their objectives (McCarthy and Zald, 2001). The theory of political structural opportunity, based on the capacity for identity and value construction, associates the success and efficiency of a movement with the ability to recruit and mobilize new members, maximizing the chances of the hoped-for outcome (Tarrow, 2011). Finally, there is the theory of the frame and dynamics of action, promoting the requirement for the interpretation of cognitive framing as a necessary condition to the participation of organizations in social movement (Snow et al., 1986).

This last theory is favoured by Golshorkhi et al. as they suggest that the elaboration of shared stories and cognitive framing is a key decisive condition for the mobilization of agents of change (2011, 83).

This research is not focused on social movements per se, but it is helpful to appreciate the development, progression, and evolution of the role CSOs have played in the global scene and particularly as expressed in the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

The UN has many departmental territorialities and is not an efficient organization, but it is the sole political body with a capacity to create a space of global or multinational dialogue, recommendation, and decision-making. The UN system is dependent on its sponsors, their priorities, and their funding. Therefore, there is constant competition over agenda setting and limited resources. Not all issues carry the same weight in terms of their impact on the ground or in terms of the interests of sponsoring nations.

The work related to social programs appears easier to manage than that related to the field of security. While both are undertaken within the same asymmetric power bases, there is a difference with regard to their perceived risks: specifically, in the potential for
immediate physical violence and loss of life. Security is also linked to sovereignty and therefore to physical territories and resources. Security is an element in the social contract of nations and their citizens.\textsuperscript{24} The social contract basically stipulates that in return for the citizens’ payment of taxes and supporting the national political leader’s decisions, the leader provides the structure of management for social programs and security. This security is provided through laws, judicial systems, police, and military forces with little or no input from the population on their scope and priorities. The level of expenses for these last services is dependent on the prioritization of needs as established by the elected political representatives, the historical positioning of the country, the opportunity for funding, the expectations of military alliances, and the real or perceived threats from neighbouring countries to the country in question and its allies. Security has always been a complex and sensitive issue as the security establishment acts as a demonstration of

\textsuperscript{24} Hobbes (1588–1679) ([1651], 1957) is the first to link the social contract to the obligation of individuals to a sovereign, the ultimate authority who determines right from wrong. Knowing their own conflict-prone nature, but seeking peace for survival in a community, individuals willingly choose to give over their right to self-determination and instead obey a sovereign in return for their protection and security. Hobbes’s critics draw attention to his failure to acknowledge the aspect of compassion, in contradiction with a warrior ideology, and the moral right of individuals to rebel against a tyrannical sovereign. Locke (1632–1704) ([1689], 1952), on the other hand, proposes a social contract in which trust is identified as the basis of political authority. Just as with Hobbes, government plays a key role in Locke’s philosophy. The legitimacy of government is based on the citizens’ “natural” right to life, liberty, and property in return for their political obligation to respect the political authority identified as their government. The dual nature of this social contract requires consent from individuals and assurance from the political authority that their natural rights, including those of property, will not be violated. When governments begin to abuse the rights of their citizens, trust is broken, raising moral issues. Rousseau (1712–1778) ([1762], 1957) proposes the concept of popular sovereignty—a social contract in which the decision-making authority is taken away from a political authority and given directly to the citizens. According to him, the right of liberty can be enjoyed only if the citizens can rule themselves with mutual consent. This consent would require the development of the general will of the citizens, which would have to be followed by a political obligation to act to fulfill the general will. The general will would then be confirmed through a voting process, the mechanisms and frequency of which would no doubt be a challenge. Determining the general will is a complex process since it is subject to many factors such as the evolving economic and security environments of a society.
national power and therefore carries the potential of threats to potential enemies while being the answer to insecurities real or perceived by the national citizens, in terms of fear of reprisals or following unwise decisions with serious repercussions for all.

Challenges in the field of global security are not new. Regional meetings have been held to discuss issues of contention. As cities and villages came together to create larger societies and eventually countries, these assemblies became larger. Westphalia is one such example. In 1648, European states came together to agree to stop the Thirty Years War and agree on their respective territorial integrity,\textsuperscript{25} thereby setting the stage for norms on sovereignty and self-interests that affect global affairs to this day.

A more recent example of a global norm is the establishment of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to provide a “set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare” (ICRC, 2004). Two other security agreements of relevance for this research is the Chemical Weapons Convention\textsuperscript{26} and the establishment of peacekeeping forces in 1948.\textsuperscript{27} Canada was the instigator of the latter and an engaged participant in the former. Canada is also remembered for acting as a leading nation in the case of the ban on anti-personnel (AP) mines.

\textsuperscript{25} Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648–1948 (1948)
\textsuperscript{26} Details of the Chemical Weapons Convention can be found here: \url{www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/}
\textsuperscript{27} The United Nations Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East. Details on the history of UN peacekeeping can be found here: \url{http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history}
The MBT became an international treaty in 1997, despite the fact that the United States, Russia, and China (three of the five permanent members of the Security Council) have yet to sign it. There are 162 states, parties and one signatory that have yet to ratify the treaty and while casualties from AP mines are still being recorded, stockpiles of some 49 million mines have been destroyed and a land area the equivalent of 200km² around the world has been cleared of mines as of 2014 (Landmine Monitor, 2015). Civil society views the Mine Ban Treaty process as a “Beacon of Light” because it was created under an innovative diplomatic process (Kmentt, 2008, 24) mainly known through official discourses.

The MBT is recognized as a successful collaboration between the realms of government and civil society. The process leading to its approval was seen as contrary to international protocol where secrecy is normally the order of the day. Diplomacy at the international level had followed a protocol continuously improved since Westphalia by the diplomatic corps of each nation. This discipline was further structured through the inception of international institutions with different organizations and rules for different objectives. Pressures were increasing from civil society to unblock and speed up the international process. Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy’s challenge in October 1996 was to be the catalyst for this change, but it was not accomplished unilaterally, and in order for the analysis of the cascading of this new norm to be of any relevance to the study of the cascade processes for future new norms, the surrounding events and their actors need to be investigated.

Interviews of the two groups of actors involved in the Ottawa Process, the representatives of the state and those of civil society, were carried out following the
successful closure of the Ottawa Convention, as recorded in To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (1998). That information has also been included here. However, there has been no previous analysis, from either a subjective or objective perspective, of the essential steps, actions, and agreements of the process, or of the key elements required for it to succeed. The goal of the interviews of this research is to fill in this gap, in order to better equip future partnerships.

1.2. Theories to Deconstruct a Successful Global Normative Change

The focus of this research is therefore on unconventional leadership and partnerships in the security area of global governance. As previously mentioned, one of the challenges of security global challenges lies in finding the necessary conditions for the potential success of solutions, in terms of both political and humanitarian objectives. Therefore, I expect that analysing the success story that is the MBT will provide some insight into the dimensions of both leadership and partnership in negotiating normative change in the field of security. As such, normative change can be a path to conflict resolution.

An agreement on norms is a mutual understanding of the rules in place. Norms have a lifecycle, making of interest the study of their various phases, such as emergence, cascade, and internationalization or operationalization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Although norms help structure our daily lives, there is little available information on how they cascade.

I anticipated that the integral approach (IA) and mimetic theories would prove fruitful in the analysis of important aspects of the lifecycle of norms, especially leadership, partnership, and the dynamics of successful norm negotiations.
The two parts of my hypothesis are that: 1) the mapping of the norm leader’s role will allow for a richer understanding of the complexity of the cascade process of global norms; and 2) the integral approach and mimetic theory will, in a combined framework, enable the capture of the leadership and partnership qualities that lead to a successful cascade process.

Once we map the relational dynamics that take us from the state of established structural violence in the field of global security towards a change of norms, we can map these same dynamics in any field of negotiations, at the national, provincial, municipal, or organizational level.

1.3. Presentation of the Research

The second chapter introduces the theoretical frameworks and the mapping tool. The three theoretical frameworks used to build this new integrated mapping tool are Finnemore and Sikkink’s lifecycle model of norms, Wilber’s integral approach as used by McGuigan and Popp, and Girard’s mimetism as defined by Palaver and Duyndam. Note that these are at the level of abstract theory and could be applied to many phenomena. As I did my research, leadership and partnerships emerged as practical phenomena that were important. Hence it was important to look at practical theories on these themes; this research is presented in chapter four.

The decision to support a norm is in itself complex. The presentation of the norm, including its advantages and disadvantages, its perceived benefits, and its national and international supporters, influences its approval and lifecycle. The socio-political context of the lifecycle of global norms is situated at both the national and international levels. Nations must first decide on their position when a proposal for new international rules or
behaviours is presented. National elected representatives often participate in meetings to collect information prior to signing and ratifying a decision of support. Input from civil society organizations (CSOs) may also influence the national position. While this input may originate at the national level, it can, critically, also be coordinated transnationally.

The framing of a norm is influenced by the views of all involved parties, including the initiators, the internal and external supporters, and the deciders. Their worldview, moral codes, and other sociological and cultural filters influence them all.

To describe the emergence stage of the norm lifecycle, Finnemore and Sikkink introduce the concept of norm entrepreneurship; it is the task of a norm entrepreneur to frame the norm in such a way that the support of like-minded individuals, organizations, or nations can be rallied. At the cascade stage, they associate the actor with a state or organization. At the final internationalization stage, the actor is defined as “law, professions and bureaucracy” (1998, 898). This description does not, however, take into account the fact that nations and organizations require individual representatives at the global level to question, discuss, negotiate, and reach decisions on behalf of their nations and organizations.

The leadership and partnerships of the designated representatives are, however, important relational and procedural elements. Consequently, I shall review various approaches to international relations, namely realism, liberal pluralism, and globalism, prior to introducing the typologies of the norm entrepreneurs and their roles and responsibilities.

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28 The “initiators” are the norm entrepreneurs; the “internal supporters” are the citizens or CSOs; the “external supporters” are member of the global community or global organizations, and the “deciders” are the elected representatives mandated to represent the political party in power, during the signing and ratification ceremonies.
The second theoretical framework is based on Wilber’s integral approach as developed by McGuigan and Popp in their *Integral Conflict* (2016). The integral approach allows for the combination of subjective and objective, or interior and exterior, fields of research with those of the individual and the collective and as such provides for four quadrants of locational agency. These quadrants permit the systematic capture and analysis of data in a way that deconstructs the complexity of a given situation. For McGuigan and Popp, this deconstruction enabled the better understanding of the sociological interconnections of cultural and behavioural contexts involved in a conflict resolution process. Cascading a new norm has a great deal in common with conflict resolution however, so McGuigan and Popp’s framework offers the opportunity to study the cascade process of a norm by viewing it as an opportunity for conciliation, negotiation, and common decision-making.

From here, the integral approach requires an understanding of the actors and organizations involved, enabling the mapping of their thoughts and actions. Once identified and mapped, this historical information can be used by future norm leaders in the cascading and operationalization of future global norm. However, because of the richness of material in understanding the interactions of conflicting individual and teams, additional information on McGuigan and Popp’s use of the four quadrants in *Integral Conflict* can be found at Annex C. Although McGuigan and Popp’s *Integral Conflict* framework is rich in many respects, it does not hold enough detail for the purpose of this enquiry. Since the emphasis of this research is on the leadership and the partnership of my selection of actors, the Integral Approach has to be complemented with mimetic theory.
The final theoretical framework employed is hence Girard’s mimetic theory, as defined by Palaver including Duyndam’s concept of “exemplar.” Mimetic theory includes the triangle of desire and scapegoat practices. The dynamics of these vary according to the sociological contexts. Because they often occur at the subconscious level, the actor is not always aware that mimetism is happening. It could therefore easily be omitted in the analysis of historical events, thereby missing an element of complexity. However, since this research includes dynamics at the level of the individual, there is an opportunity to identify the influential elements, personalities, and events that all contribute to the picture of what happens during the tipping point sequence of a norm’s approval stage.

The third chapter introduces the case study through a literature review, with the objective to provide a concise account of the processes and relations behind the successful cascade process of the MBT. The case study is explored through five sections defining, in turn, the historical context, the Ottawa Process, the vision and goals, the actors, and their leadership and partnerships.

The cascading phase of the Ottawa Process begins, in my view, with Axworthy’s challenge in October 1996 and comes to an end with the signatures of 122 countries in December 1997. It consists roughly of four major events that all contribute to highlighting the key objectives and challenges, namely the 1996 Ottawa conference, the Austrian drafting of the convention, the preliminary negotiations in Oslo, and the 1997 Ottawa conference. The processes and relations that arose during and as a result of these four events are key to understanding the cascade process.

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29 Mimetic phenomena can include mimetic desire, mimetic rivalry, mimetic doubling, mimetic influence, inverse mimetic desire, creative mimesis, etc.
The fourth chapter presents the research methods by first describing these approaches and constructing an integrated mapping tool. This map uses the three theoretical frameworks of the norm lifecycle model, relating it to the cascade process, mimetic dynamics, and the foundational quadrants of the Integrated Approach, as used in McGuigan and Popp’s *Integral Conflict* (2017). Selected key indicators in each of the four quadrants formed the basis for the review of documents and the development of the questionnaire to test the research hypothesis. The particular aspects of leadership and partnership are then introduced with the objective of identifying the characteristics of the leader and the process elements that enable efficient partnerships and successful outcomes.

The research of the Ottawa Process could then be undertaken with the selected key indicators and pointers for leadership and partnerships. The document review and the development of the questionnaire are shared along with the selection of the interviewees and the research outreach plan. Finally, the chapter examines the preliminary analysis with a review of the research’s expectations and risks prior to identifying two major trends.

Chapter five explores these two major thematic findings: the personal and collective transformation of norm entrepreneurs and norm partnerships. The first section looks at the dynamics of the transformation of self into a norm entrepreneur. The transformation of self-identity and the construction of a collective identity is examined by considering the nature and role of emotions, the dynamics of transformation of the norm entrepreneur, and the norm entrepreneur’s rallying of followers. The second main dynamic to have emerged during the interviews is the building of relations between
organizations to create and sustain norm partnership. This second section presents a literature review to capture the dynamics of relation and process in different types of partnership to better situate the unusual multilevel national and CSO partnerships of the Ottawa Process. The review includes the process arrangement of the Project Management Institute (PMI), followed by the relational aspects of business mergers, conflictual partnerships, and the concept of co-leadership with its critical requirement of trust. The characteristics of trust are examined through the example of the unusual partnership between Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) and CSOs with a view to generalize the specific aspects of that relationship. I selected some of these characteristics to evaluate the complexities of the contributing variables in the success of the Ottawa Process.

These complexities are discussed in the three chapters that follow, starting with an analysis of the leadership, followed by an evaluation of the partnerships, and, finally, of the cascade phase itself. The objective of these chapters is to provide a contextual understanding of the events and actions generated by norm leaders surrounding the cascade of a global norm, in this case the 14-month process leading up to the signing of the treaty. The layout of these three chapters is intended to be similar, because each seeks to present the cascade’s complexity through the lenses of both integral and mimetic analysis. A similar sequence is introduced, reviewing the aspects of processes and adding specific insights and limitations. It provides a good opportunity to analyze the material provided by both the government and the CSOs’ representatives, and to evaluate the degree of alignment between the two.
Just as each quadrant of the IA theory, although studied independently, requires some sort of percolation across the quadrants for a fuller understanding of the phenomenon under study, I have chosen to review these two elements of partnership and leadership as independent variables for the sake of clarity, as there is leadership in every partnership, and a need for some sort of partnership in order for leadership to be shown.

The thesis concludes by addressing the two-part hypothesis and proposing future topics of enquiry. Complex problems require complex tools, particularly when the problems are situated in the field of global governance, where no fewer than 196 nations, as well as numerous transnational actors, both governmental and non-governmental, must communicate and work together. The complexity of the web of interactions compels research for theories such as integral approach and mimetic theories that can span the field while allowing for concurrent foci. The heuristic use of the integral approach and mimetic theories to create a new mapping tool has met the challenge of making sense of conflict but also generated significant insights into several important aspects of cascading norms—not least the aspects of leadership and partnership required to propel a norm from concept to binding agreement.
Chapter 2. Theoretical Frameworks—Integral Approach and Mimetic Theories in Norm Cascading

If we are ever to make progress in coming to terms with what seem like overwhelming problems, we need theoretical complexity to match the complexity of the human dynamics and issues involved.

Vern Neufeld Redekop
Foreword – Integral Conflict, 2016, vxi.

The unknown and hidden rules structuring the functioning of societies have long been a personal fascination of mine. An engineer appreciates the combination of foundations, building blocks and load columns, electricity, plumbing and communications devices in a building. In a way, I view norms in a similar manner: as a constitutive part of societies, with some norms acting in more strategic areas.

This chapter will first review the lifecycle model of norms, with a view to situate the cascade phase and the role of a “norm leader.” The second theory reviewed is the “integral approach,” aiming in particular to capture its foundational structure and its potential to capture the complexity of human conflicts. The third theory is that of mimetic dynamics and their impact on groups’ behaviours. Finally, the mapping tool, its indicators, and the processes of data collection will be presented.

I will begin this chapter with a look at norms, as the main impetus of the research is to arrive at a deeper and broader understanding of the process of norm building.

2.1. Norms

Norms are embedded in life, at individual, family, and societal levels. Some are transmitted tacitly and some are taught. Some are codified legally while others are not. At the family level they are transferred by parents and other elders. At the national level,
they underpin the machinery of governments and their laws. At the international level, they provide for a code of morals\textsuperscript{30} and behaviours. The field of norms is extensive, covering generality and particularities; I am choosing to address four succinct aspects. The review starts with the definitions of norms, followed by the explication of norm formation, the designation and role of their agents, and lastly, by giving a few contextual examples of their operationalization.

2.1.1. Definition of a Norm

The first section addresses the question of the definitions of norms in international relations (IR).\textsuperscript{31} Dufault suggests that the theories provide for three specific definitions: a rule (such as the respecting of an agreement); a principle (such as sovereignty); or a behavioural expectation (such as the respecting of human rights) (2008, 288–289). Axelrod defines a norm as existing “in a given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way” (1986, 1097).

For the purpose of this research the definitions of rules and actions as a set of behaviours are of particular interest because the question of leadership is investigated as an essential element in the life of global norms. Krasner was the first to define the world order as an “international regime” in terms of rules described as procedures and tools agreed on by the actors working within an international context (1983). Finnemore, on

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{30} Defining ‘morals’ has proven to be a challenge. Where not related to a specific political ideology, I have opted to follow Muller’s suggestion of a working definition: “[f]ollowing Habermas, we use the term morals for value-based demands, assessments, or norms with a claim to universal validity; ethics for such demands, assessments, or norms that are founded on particularistic systems of values” (2013, 16, note 1).
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{31} Unless made specific, the expression ‘international relations’ will include the three constituent elements of IR as defined by Halliday: the inter-state, the transnational, and the systemic (1994, 8).
\end{footnote}
the other hand, focused on the behavioural expectations of the actors (1996, 22), and on the embodied quality of “oughtness” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 892). Florini similarly defines what she terms a “sense of obligation” thus “[n]orms, by my definition, are a subset of memes having to do with accepted standards of behavior, and international norms as a sub-subset having to do with the behaviors of states” (Ibid., 372).

It’s fascinating to consider norms as constitutive of every relation between subject and subject, and subject and object, taking the form of social norms or psychological norms depending on the context. Norms are also a constitutive element of important societal and organizational theories that apply to generic systems, dynamic systems, and complex adaptive organizations. Therefore, the study of conflicts can be seen as an extension of the analysis of the evolution and lifecycle of norms within a context of agents and their environment.

2.1.2. Lifecycle of a Norm

The second aspect of concern to this research regards the formation of a norm. Wunderlich defines two waves in the study of norms; the first considers norms in a structuralist context where they are seen as stable and constant, the second focuses on an evolutionary model (2013, 24–25).

32 These theories were first devised for research in the natural sciences to explain change, uncertainty, and non-linearity. Ricigliano, in Making Peace Last, looks at what the factors of systemic change are with the notion of applying them to a peacebuilding context, and his review includes the following concepts and theories: “[Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s] General system theory has spawned many related concepts, such as systems dynamics (Jay Forrester), complexity theory (Murray Gell-Mann), cybernetics (Norbert Winer), dynamical systems theory (Peter Coleman), soft systems methodology (Peter Checkland), and even multitrack diplomacy (Louise Diamond and John MacDonald). It is not necessary to explore the technical aspects of these disciplines to grasp the essence of systems thinking and the basic tools it offers to help people see and understand wholeness” (2016, 21–22). I suggest that Ricigliano’s factors of systemic change can be applied to leadership and partnership (defined as the interaction or relationships among parts and interconnectedness of parts), and potentially to IA and mimetism (feedback and dynamic, as opposed to linear, causality, and patterns, or holism).
In order to understand how norms function, Finnemore and Sikkink have suggested a norm “lifecycle model”, shown in figure 2.1., to describe the evolution of norms in terms of three stages: an emergence, a cascade process, and an internalization or operationalization as integrated behaviour or a set of rules (1998, 895–896).

**Figure 2.1. Finnemore and Sikkink Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norm emergence</th>
<th>“Norm cascade”</th>
<th>Internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>Tipping point</td>
<td>Stage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stage 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The concept of the evolutionary process was first used by Florini who compared norms with genes that as such “are in competition with other norms or genes that carry incompatible instructions—and some are reproduced at much higher rates than their competitors” (1996, 364). Axelrod, on the other hand, was interested in the evolutionary approach in the interests of promoting cooperation in international settings—“to help explain three things: how norms arise, how norms are maintained, and how norms displaces another” (1986, 1096).

The “positive feedback loop” (PFL) has been used to offer another take on the evolutionary model. The PFL is composed of three elements: the initial conditions, the rules, and the relationships as represented in figure 2.2. The dynamics of this loop

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33 “Positive feedback loop” refers to an outcome characterized by an increase in the magnitude of the change. If there is a decrease in the magnitude of the change, it is called a “negative feedback loop.” Negative feedback loops are important as correctives to a given dynamic. Both types of feedback loop can be observed during the cascade of a new norm. However, to move to the third phase, that of operationalization, there is a requirement for a higher magnitude of change to create the tipping point, so the focus of this thesis is on the “positive feedback loop.”
represent a continuous interaction among these elements to provide for reinforced behaviours and resistance to change. A more complex context, as for example the conflict situation in Syria since 2011, has the potential to cause a paralysis even under strenuous challenges and willingness by other nations to end the sufferings of civilians. One of these three elements must be affected for change to take place. When the goal is to change a rule (extended here to mean “norm”), one of the other two elements or a combination of both must also change in consequence.

The positive loop provides an understanding of the influence of norms or rules in the creation of context, habit, and behaviour. The arrows demonstrate the constant evolution and its reinforcing process. Without changes to its elements, the loop strengthens the “legitimacy” of a behaviour over time and space, making it more challenging to deconstruct or replace. The loop also highlights the constitutive elements required for a cascade process, in which the norm or rule is to become the subject of a proposed change. The evolution within the cascade, in turn affects the initial conditions or relationships. The questions become: How can one affect the initial conditions? How

Figure 2.2. - Schematics of a positive feedback loop
to choose which conditions and which relationships? And where are the best leverage points within each of these aspects, at which to achieve a collective decision? While these questions may generate an overwhelming amount of information when studying a global context, this research seeks to apply them to a simpler context.

Finnemore and Sikkink’s lifecycle model is simple and allows the researcher to concentrate their efforts on the cascade phase, thus offering an opportunity for the understanding of processes and relations of decision-making and approval dynamics that affect important societal changes. Without the success of that process, a norm is a good idea that stalled, died, or was replaced by another priority.

Because the cascade process represents the intermediate stage in the lifecycle model, authors dedicating their research to the role of norm leaders in the other stages—of emergence and internalization—will be referenced during the analysis of the data, to better frame the results of the research as considerations for outputs or inputs in the norm lifecycle.

Having decided to first focus on the cascade process, the next section introduces the actors.

2.1.3. Norm Entrepreneur

This third section addresses the question of who gets to be involved in the life of a norm. Faulker proposed that “[m]oral entrepreneurship may be described as the organization, management, risk assessment and promotion of principles of right action, and conduct, within a given issue area” (2007, 2). Finnemore and Sikkink write that “norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them”
They list different actors for each of their three phases where the actors of the norm cascade are states, international organizations, and networks. They add that, “[t]he characteristics mechanism of the first stage, norm emergence, is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. […] The second stage is characterized more by a dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers” (Ibid., 895). However, how the “imitation” works is left out of their concept.

As Muller writes: “[i]n each phase, norms do not change automatically. The factors just discussed do not work like forces in physics, such as impulse, pressure, or gravity. They need human agency to gain social meaning and take effect” (2013,13). However, human agency is always located within a specific context. Wunderlich stipulates that “intrinsic and extrinsic factors…provide windows of opportunity” (2013, 30).

This research seeks to define the dynamics of the cascade process by answering the following questions: Who are the “antagonists” that destabilize existing norms? What creates the required circumstances to destabilize an existing norm and potentially replace it with another? What motivates norm entrepreneurs to take on the required leadership and accept the label of ‘non-conformist’? What is required to motivate a “quantity” of potential agents to join the movement of change? These questions link the leader of a potential new norm—their motivations, their perceived needs for change, and their efforts to create a movement to rally others—to this rule or behaviour. These queries will be addressed in what follows.

Muller provides interesting typologies of who those state actors acting as “norm entrepreneurs” are; these typologies are useful for studying the leaderships of nations and
organizations. His thesis centers on the realist notion of self-interest, and his categories, which are useful in researching how nations’ and international organizations’ premises may affect the cascade process of a new global norm, reflect this approach. He defines three types of states as agents. First, there are the great nations whose interests are those of preservation and freedom of action in order to fulfill their responsibilities (perceived or real) to the world, and are therefore close to the classic notion of national interest. Then there are the “good international citizen” states, who are seen as beacons of moral righteousness, but support policies that are primarily conducive to their own security. And finally, there are the non-aligned states, who focus on sovereignty as protection against further colonialism and on the development of their economy. These three types of state actors, hence, represent conflicting worldviews at play.

So how can they possibly come together to affect a change? Finnemore and Sikkink describe the beginnings of the norm cascade as the stage when the new norm is accepted by a “critical mass” of actors and the “tipping point” is reached (1998, 892). However, they fail to mention that leadership must be mobilized at multiple levels in order for a norm to move from emergence to cascade and beyond. Nations, international organizations, and networks must mandate their representatives to protect and defend their interests. Likely these designated officials need to feel empowered to act as leaders and convince their many colleagues to build whatever is considered the critical mass and the tipping point. Finnemore and Sikkink left out the complexity of this essential stage, which precedes the successful internalization of a norm.

So, how can we explain the reasons behind a collective decision to accept and operate a global norm change? Social norms grow out of social values and as such serve
to guide human social behaviour. The reality is that we are always immersed in a universe of norms, at various stages of emergence, cascade, or operationalization. Some of these rules are enacted within enclosed contexts such as a family, but others are embedded in larger contexts such as a cultural tradition. In the contest between incompatible norms, prioritization processes are permanently ongoing. Muller shares:

If norm contestation is a permanent feature of any normative system (Wiener 2008) and serves as a powerful engine to drive the process of norm dynamics… then justice claims are a particularly salient type of contestation. They lead to two different, but equally explosive, conflicts over norms: first, whether the status quo, or change thereof, satisfies an agreed standard of justice and second, what valid justice standard should be applied. The first is a type of “practical judgment” about which people might disagree. Subsuming a particular case under a more general normative standard is all but self-executing… The second conflict is a moral-philosophical dispute; positions are connected to broader worldviews and ethical beliefs. As the international realm is populated by actors from all cultures, ideologies, and theories, we must not be surprised when we see clashes over justice claims in diplomacy where the protagonists disagree profoundly on what justice means in the first place (Cohen 1997). (Muller, 2013, 7)

The contestation of norms is therefore a constitutive element of an evolving society. Any given evolution may be considered positive or negative depending on each state’s worldviews. These worldviews are constantly challenged in our world of instant communications. Real, perceived, or disguised national interests can become issues of justice, of right or wrong, for nations sharing borders or wider ecosystems. Muller’s research concludes that the “perceived” differences between justice and interest can be quite “subtle” (2013, 360–362). Watkins and Wilber are less subtle when they share that, “[e]ach stakeholder group therefore sees the problem differently; they have different motives, opinions and objectives and will invariably stand behind a version of the ‘truth’ that suits their purpose, while simultaneously dismissing all others” (2015, 29–30).

Consequently, the negotiations may not be as transparent or honest as some could, or
would, expect. This lack of transparency could explain in part the reason for the reluctance to regularly review a norm for its usefulness in today’s fast evolving world.

Change is hard and it is human nature to want to be comfortable. Kegan and Laskow Lahey in *Immunity to Change*, argue that “[it] is not change that causes anxiety; it is the feeling that we are without defenses in the presence of what we can see as danger that causes anxiety” (2009, 49).

Since societies are constituted with an amalgamation of low and high priority norms, it is understandable that the level of effort to modify a norm would be incrementally higher with a high-priority norm or what I choose to call a strategic norm. If this is the case, then we would have to include the “complexity of the case under study” within the cascade process for strategic norms. The social cohesion of a society does not equate necessarily with the level of homogeneity of its citizens’ wants and needs. The basic principle of democracy, applied with some small variations only across nations, rests on the majority trumping the wishes of the minority. The societal norms become a reflection of the wishes of this majority and the needs of those in power within their governments. The possibilities for a modification of new norms are affected by the openness of that society and the rigidity of its organizational systems. Could it be that the capacity to negotiate new norms is reflective of the degree of consciousness or maturity of a society? 

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34 The capacity to negotiate could be perceived as a double-edged sword because changes can be “good” or “bad.” Therefore, it could be agreed that not all norms are up for negotiation and the decision to cascade a norm is either a personal, institutional, or national choice depending on the context of its application. However, as previously mentioned, this thesis has a positive vision and from this perspective, I would suggest that enhancing social justice and strengthening human security could be two criteria for consideration in choosing norms for potential negotiations in IR.
Wertsch, Del Rio, and Alvarez suggest that the means of social mediation “provide the link or bridge between the concrete actions carried out by individuals and groups, on the one hand, and cultural, institutional, and historical settings, on the other” (1995, 21). These means include, for example, language, technologies, social norms, and cultural assumptions. Porras, on the other hand, lists social norms as constitutive of organizing arrangements that in turn compose one of the four streams of operation for organizations. These organizing arrangements include goals and strategies, formal structure, policies, and administrative systems. The other three streams include social factors, (iii) technologies, and (iv) physical settings (1987, 51). In this context, the cascade process becomes a structural aspect of social mediation whereas successful mediation implies a successful cascade phase. Similarly, successful organizations are constituted of flexible norms adaptive to evolving needs and requirements.\footnote{Flexibility and adaptability are characteristics of successful organizations. Where they are lacking, there is a risk of stagnation as researched by Kegan and Lahey in *Immunity to Change: How to Overcome It and Unlock the Potential in Your Self and Your Organization* (2009). Here, adaptability and flexibility are taken as tenets of a developmental approach. As previously mentioned, however, not all norms are up for negotiation and, as will be further discussed in Chapter 3, there was no flexibility in the agreed shared intent for the MBT, which was clearly defined as a total ban, nothing less. There was, however, a great deal of adaptability and flexibility shown by individual nations in self-designating as pro-ban allies and concerning the means by which the MBT was advanced.} I contend that social norms can not only provide the means of social mediation but, as in the case under study, can produce a newly agreed-upon legal norm, i.e. the expected outcome of organizations or a global community.

Adaptive systems would make possible the healthy and effective norm contestation necessary in today’s complex environments, but they would still need to contend with the primacy of political ideologies.
2.1.4. Political Context of a Norm in International Relations

The final constituent of this review of norm theory relates to the impact of various contexts on the norms. Norms have been studied under the spectrum of political realism, constructivism, liberalism, and globalism.\footnote{Gagnon and Mascotto (citing Kristol, 2004) share that neo-conservatism is neither a constitutive nor an explanatory political theory. Neo-conservatism is more an ideology or a persuasion. They argue that neo-conservatism takes a realist approach to stability, believing it to be best achieved through a demonstration of military power, while it promotes liberty and human rights from a liberalism point of view (2010, 177–193). In Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy? Medina defines conservatives as “those political theorists who basically defend the status quo and hence are skeptical or refuse to accept any changes in political society, since for them traditions and the preservation of order are important political values” (1990, 155). He further adds that neo-conservatives are prone to the promulgation of American values for the stability of the world order, and generally think in terms of there being good and bad states. I excluded neo-conservatism because it was irrelevant to the cascade process of the MBT.}

Dufault affirms that theories following in the tradition of realism and neo-realism do not include the concept of norms as a constitutive element affecting the behaviour of actors in the international system (2008, 289). She adds that realism and neo-realism are rooted in the analysis of power, therefore the focus is on the “great nations” and on their struggles to preserve or increase their level of power in the world (Ibid., 358–359). Realism cannot be mentioned without citing Morgenthau’s warning that the “real” issues in IR are not what the idealists would like them to be (1993). This statement is worth remembering when faced with today’s global economic and conflict contexts. On the other hand, the tenets of realism failed to forecast the end of the Cold War, e.g., or the place given to transnational organizations in the cascade phase of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).\footnote{The integral perspective on the other hand combines the perspectives of realism and idealism in analyzing events.}

Constructivism is another IR theory, which, although it was already popular in 1960, was only adopted in the field of IR in the 1990s. Masson defines the focus of the
constructivist approach as the understandings and representations shared by social agents. As such, identity and interests are the outcome of a process of social interaction making it an endogenous process compared to the exogenous focus of the realists (2008, 45–47). This theory is very much aligned with McGuigan and Popp’s assessment of the self-construction of conflicts and the self-challenges necessary to resolve them.³⁸

Liberalism represents another facet of IR theory, one which is fundamentally pre-occupied with the individual, and his or her legal, administrative, and economic freedoms. Robichaud proposes that under liberalism, while sharing the same epistemology as the realism family of theories, the relation between the state and societies is granted more importance than the capacity and power of the state alone. She defines three principal variations of liberalism: republican, commercial, and sociological. Both republican and sociological liberal ideologies focus on the democratic state, and the quest within it for equality and social justice, which can create the transnational relationships leading to social cohesion (2008, 247–249). A sub-order of liberalism is neoliberal institutionalism, which focuses on the role of institutions as operating agents that facilitate international cooperation, including the internal state of cooperation to support and sustain that national perspective (Crowley, 2008, 228–230). Another sub-order is liberal pluralism, which suggests that “non-state actors are independently viable as major influences on the world stage, and therefore should be observed as such” (Faulkner, 2007, 17).

The fourth and final IR theory is globalism. Cantin and Spronk write that the concept of globalism is often used to describe a variety of transformational processes in

³⁸ Kegan writes, “Conflict is a challenge to our pretense of completeness” (1982).
the global economy of today’s societies (2008, 264–268). They suggest three principal variations of the concept. The first variation contends that the existing global political market has eroded the ability of nation-states to manage their economies and societies. The second builds on the first and adds the emergence of new forms of transitional public authority that affect global governance. The last variation theorizes the internationalization of production and the formalization of a global civil society\textsuperscript{39} to reorganize the internal and external dimensions of the relationship of states and civil society. These variations have all been developed in the context of global capitalism and the discovery of its negative effects on populations, such as socio-economical inequalities and social divisions. Each variation of globalism describes a different level of cooperation (or partnership) between the parties of the state and civil societies.

These four IR theories provide lenses through which the context and importance of the role of norms can be better understood. It is reasonable to assume that the norm leader, working in an IR context, would be working with colleagues with different contextual and political ideologies, affecting their participation in the cascade process.

2.1.5. UN Treaties as Norms in International Relations

I contend that the complexity of the cascade process at the global level must be embraced in order to make possible the adoption of new norms should willingness and readiness be present on the part of at least some of the agents, be they government or civil society representatives.

One interesting point about the concept of the social contract, as a constitutive element of our lives in societies and a basis for our relations, is that it is usually

\textsuperscript{39} Van Tuijl proposes different ways to identify the role of civil society in public life. He shares that, “[it] can be categorized in three groupings: as a set of nonstate actors; as a public sphere or arena of interactions; or as a set of norms and values, promoting good society” (2016, 3).
understood in terms of rights and obligations. A debated concept as seen in section 1.2.,
the social contract nevertheless remains a useful tool in devising a view of global
 governance that includes values such as moral and social justice. Two points are
important for this discussion. The first point acknowledges that social contracts are in fact
 built either on a tacit or legal agreement on norms within a collective. The second is that
the social contract is rarely a written agreement, except in cases of individuals getting
married, adopting children, or changing nationality, individuals and collectives involved
in transfer of ownership, and between nations for alliances, trade, and UN agreements
(such as treaties, conventions, and accords).

However, if a norm is defined very broadly, as a rule or a behaviour, would UN
treaties, conventions, and accords be considered normative processes in IR? States are
coming together under very different social constructs.40 Chayes and Chayes support the
relation between norm and treaty since the latter “is an agreement among states and is an
undertaking by them as to their future conduct. The object of the agreement is to affect
state behavior” (1995, 193). Sills concurs by stipulating that “there is one, universal
organization in the world today than can set globally accepted standards and norms of
behavior. That is the United Nations” (2002, 1).

Williams and colleagues share in the context of the landmine ban treaty,

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40 For example, while regulations around work environment differ only a little from state to state, something like child labour can be strictly forbidden in some states and allowed in others, yet be encompassed by the global market regime framed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO). In a similar manner, the national environmental regulations offer a wide range of restrictions on certain products, while others have reached a global consensus under UN Conventions such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (a protocol to the Vienna Convention of the Protection of the Ozone Layer) designed to phase out the production of numerous substances deemed responsible for ozone depletion. The two ozone treaties have been ratified by 197 parties and stand as the first universally ratified treaties in UN history. UNEP, Ozone Secretariat, The Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/en/treaties-and-decisions/montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer
The term “norm” is taken in a sociological sense to mean a rule that is socially enforced, be it through law (including international treaties) or through social opprobrium. It is argued that the formation of a “social norm” banning antipersonnel mines preceded the establishment of the “legal norm” by legislation and treaty, and that this process is relevant to other weapons fields… The adoption of legal norms may codify the change in social norms that has already occurred. But without the evolution of the social norm, adoption of the legal norm would be unlikely. (2008, 200, 203)

Therefore, I am choosing to consider UN treaties norms with the following justifications. First, I believe it is useful to keep the nomenclature of “norm” for the full duration of the cascade process for a global norm. Second, I argue that the cascade phase, as the period during which nations come together to discuss new rules and behaviours under a participatory type of governance is integral to the study of the lifecycle of norms.

2.1.6 The Particularities of Security Related Norms

The realm of international security resonates with the ever-present risk of violence and potential alienation. Are the norms that support arms control and disarmament more important than the norms that support human rights or the environment? Indeed, are there other considerations worth mentioning before the analysis

41 I hesitate to define the official signing or ratification of a UN agreement as the marker of the beginning of the operationalization stage because some agreements like the COP21’s final accord appears as a diluted version of what is required to make a difference (UN Paris Agreement on Climate Change at http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php). I would also argue that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, while adopted on 13 September 2007, is still in its operational infancy, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf

42 Some argue that the Security Council with the P5 functions more dictatorially than collaboratively because of the impact of their veto rights on peace and social justice in the world. An example is the UN Human Rights chief who has been critical of their role in the Syrian conflict (OrientNet, 4 October 2016).

43 I adopt Thakur and Maley’s definitions of arms control and disarmament: “Arms control measures are means of trying to constrain reciprocal threats by regulating the acquisition, testing, numbers, ratios, location, deployment, spread, or use of current or prospective armaments; disarmament entails the actual reduction or elimination of armaments. The former seeks to institutionalize and regulate arms buildups; the latter aims to halt, reverse, or even preempt them” (1999, 274).
can be undertaken? I view norms related to security unique. They are causally linked to human lives, to the protection and survival of collectives, and to the primary mandate of the UN. They are also embedded in situations where power and fear hold sway.\textsuperscript{44}

I contend that norms dealing with arms control and disarmament are “strategic norms,” which carry the burden of a higher risk of failure.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, any challenge to the existing strategic norms will be seen as an act of betrayal from the members and signatories of these previous norms. This sense of betrayal can also be extended to other external agents, such as civil societies, which are often the primary entrepreneurs of emergent global norms. The high level of risk involved in the emergence of strategic norms in particular makes it even more interesting to concentrate this research on the leadership and partnerships required to bring into action a proposed change.

Particularly since the security context is described as foundational to national social contracts.\textsuperscript{46} Muller shares,

\begin{quote}
Cooperative security regimes are thus normative governance systems of a primarily prescriptive and prohibitive character, that is, located in the realm of regulative norms. But they have, over time, two constitutive effects domestically and internationally. Domestically, once a state has become party to a regime and has transformed its obligation duly into domestic rules and concomitant habits, attitudes, and routines of procedure, complying becomes part of what is appropriate to do for the actors (politicians, diplomats, officials, businesspeople, etc.). As these actors represent the state, complying becomes part of the state’s identity; the norms have constitutive effect on what the collective actor believes it is all about… Internationally, a cooperative security norm, if close to universality, can become the defining standard for how a good international citizen should behave. (2013, 4)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{44} Norms related to the environment, to the availability of water, to food, etc. are also linked to lives, survival, and UN mandates, however as a crisis these preceding norms often become taggled with security concerns.

\textsuperscript{45} There are of course also degrees of risk and failure within the category of strategic norms. Some weapons, e.g., carry a higher level of fear and/or protection than others, making AP mines less contentious to ban than nuclear weapons; as shared by one interviewee.

\textsuperscript{46} As seen previously in section 1.2.
Security is a basic human need, attached to the emotion of fear (Redekop, 2002, 54). Therefore, any issue related to the loss, real or perceived, of any degree of security is highly charged and easy to exploit by resourceful political or military parties. In the global context, the needs for security have been met in part by military arsenals and alliances. Any challenges to the military domain must be prepared with great care, even where a lesser weapon such as a landmine is concerned, as I will describe in the next chapter. However, as cited by Muller above, compliance with a particular norm in the field of security is also linked to self-identity. Self-identity is an issue of recognition, another human need which Redekop pairs with the emotion of shame (Ibid., 54). These human needs, and their related emotions, are raised to establish the challenges associated with sociologically and psychologically cascading a new norm domestically.

In conclusion, it is definitely worth trying to understand the complexity of the cascade stage partly by expanding the IR view of norms. No theory provides other than a limited and discipline-centric knowledge map, which is why it is important that theories from outside the traditional purview of IR studies, such as those on consciousness development, be included in the analysis on norm building and norm evolution—as individuals and cultures evolve, norms change.

The definitions and roles of norms are multifarious, but in the IR context of this research they feature as both rules and behaviours, constructed and approved along a lifecycle model where the cascade stage involves a multitude of leaders designated by their nations and organizations. These leaders work within different political cultures and ideologies, which affect the spectrum of their mandate, including their possible effectiveness and, hence, the success of the overall process.
Since the level of information about the cascade process is minimal, this research concentrates on the role and actions of designated officials to support and influence the process of global norm approval through their leadership and partnership discourse and actions. In order to discover the answers to these questions related to the complexity of the cascade process, I use Wilber’s integral meta-theory as applied, by McGuigan and Popp, to the conflict resolution field.

2.2. Integral Meta-Theory

In *A Theory of Everything* Ken Wilber shared his attempt to write a book provisionally titled “System, Self and Structure,” arising from his frustration at feeling stuck with what he considered deconstructive impacts of post-modernism and the academic proscription against the four words “development, hierarchy, transcendental, [or] universal” (2001, 37). He was searching for a world philosophy that could support his pluralist views: not a system of particularities but one of “orienting generalizations” (Ibid., 38). His main challenge lay in finding a concept of hierarchies that could be embraced by everybody, rather than the existing hierarchies (including post-modernists, ecologists, and feminists, to name but a few), which each comprised its own value system, something which had proven to create division rather than unity. His book, in which he first proposed his integral approach, was finally published under the title *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality* (2000).

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47 Of particular interest to Wilber are the problems of fragmentation and dichotomizing, which limits thinking to an either/or model that in itself gives rise to antagonisms.

48 Wilber moved through 5 iterations of interal theory – the most recent is AQAL.
2.2.1. Ken Wilber’s Integral Approach Process

In *A Theory of Everything* (2001), Wilber proposes different contextual applications, including business, science, human and public relations, and politics. As applied to politics, the integral approach allows for going deeper than the mere objective surface (Abbott’s notion of flatland)—the verticality—and wider—the horizontality—than the understanding produced by exposure only to the media or selected political statements. Needless to say, the major critics of Wilber’s integral approach are those opposed to an integration of theories into one universal theory. His holistic approach is about allowing the juxtaposition of concepts such as individuality and collectivity to allow the understanding of the social relationship between the two. While accepting that some theories could be better linked, Potter (2013) argues that Wilber’s integration is oversimplified, that there is too much focus on individual ideology and that some links are underestimated or neglected, such as the setting of capitalism in responding to climate change issues. To this critic I would respond that the choice of theoretical emphasis must be pertinent to the context chosen for the study.

Wilber’s approach can be illustrated by four interrelated conceptual quadrants: the interior–individual, the exterior–individual, the interior–collective and the exterior–

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49 *Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions* is a satirical novel in which Abbott deconstructs the rigid hierarchical Victorian culture by presenting it as a simple two-dimensional world ([1884], 1992).

50 Especially post-modern theorists who are highly resistant to ideas of evolution and hierarchies. For example, Foucault’s genealogy “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’” (1977, 141) while Vattimo views the end of universal history “as a unitary process […] rapidly dissolving” (1988, 6).

51 Potter criticises the AQAL model for failing to anticipate the expansion and depth of analytic perspectives of the world we live in. In reviewing the articles submitted for *Integral Theory in Action: Applied, Theoretical, and Constructive Perspectives on the AQAL Model* (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010) he points to failures of the authors to be inclusive in their choice of the AQAL’s indicators, such as their avoidance of analysing the fundamental impact of capitalism on climate change. He therefore judges the theory to be oversimplified.
collective – integrating quantitative and qualitative paradigms. The model (or frame) acknowledges the juxtaposition of these four elements in a map composed of four quadrants as in Figure 2.3.

**Figure 2.3. The Basic Structure of Wilber’s Integral Approach**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Interior</th>
<th>Exterior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Left (UL)</td>
<td>Upper Right (UR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interior – Individual (Intentional)</td>
<td>Exterior – Individual (Behavioural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>Lower Left (LL)</td>
<td>Lower Right (LR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interior – Collective (Cultural)</td>
<td>Exterior – Collective (Social)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The elements of the integral approach framework include the quadrants, levels, lines, states, and types. The levels refer to the vertical development inside each quadrant. Watkins and Wilber share that “these levels have been extensively studied by developmental psychology and sociology in extraordinary detail, and virtually all of the various schools—although often focusing on different quadrants—are almost always in general agreement as to the overall nature of these levels themselves” (2015, 74). The lines define the multiple streams of cognitive development along with the lines of the development of other types of intelligence, including musical intelligence, self-intelligence, and spiritual intelligence, to name a few. The states are a categorization used for the purpose of identification, comparison, and creation with a view to understanding human possibilities. For example, the states of consciousness could be described as “1) waking state, 2) dream state, 3) deep dreamless state, 4) pure witnessing or pure awareness state, and 5) non-duality state” (Ibid., 96). Finally, the types provide for the identification of typologies in order to raise awareness of similarities or differences. For
example, and as seen in section 2.1, there are different types of political ideologies, types of governments, and types of values and motivations involved in the MBT.

A definition of each quadrant, showing how each pertains to the issue of norms and norm change, thereby providing a deeper comprehension of the heuristic potential of this meta-theory, could read as follows:

• Upper Left (UL). Interior and individual/ subjective and qualitative. This quadrant includes values and attitudes, as well as personal experience. Examples of this could be the government representatives understanding of national interests and CSO representatives understanding international common goods.

• Upper Right (UR). Exterior and individual/ objective and quantitative. This quadrant comprises points of analysis such as behaviour. Examples would be how one fits into the hierarchy, follows organizational rules, and meets expectations, and how this is expressed in observable actions or outcomes, such as promotion, e.g.

• Lower Left (LL). Interior and collective/ subjective and qualitative. This quadrant covers things such as culture, worldview, myths and legends, shared morals and values about the organizational culture and shared sense of justice and fairness.

• Lower Right (LR). Exterior and collective/ objective and quantitative. This quadrant encompasses systems of politics, economics and governance, laws, and security allegiances; each system with their individual norms.

2.2.2. McGuigan and Popp’s AQAL for Conflict Studies

Since AQAL is context free it can be applied to various contexts. McGuigan and Popp have applied AQAL to the field of conflict resolution in *Integral Conflict – The*
New Science of Conflict (2016).\textsuperscript{52} Their innovative approach is built using Wilber’s quadrants, incorporating the many individual, collective, subjective, and objective aspects addressed by the theories and empirical studies in the field of conflict and conflict resolution. They chose the relevant aspects carefully through lengthy analysis and experimentation, and were finally in a position to put together communication material, and to offer facilitation and training to support the prospect of a more cohesive resolution of conflict, which would ensure the participants of respect and opportunities.

McGuigan and Popp’s application of Wilber’s AQAL method to the field of conflict resolution provides an interesting model for the mapping of the decision-making process for global norms, as it provides an example of chosen theories and experiences, and an implementation process for the collection of valuable information and the healing of protracted conflicts.

The large amount of work done by McGuigan and Popp has been essential to the synthesizing of my proposed tool. Their application of Wilber’s AQAL integral approach to the understanding and resolution of conflicts is the cornerstone of my approach. Unlike their goal of finding approaches and solutions to existing conflicts, mine is to capture the thoughts and actions of leaders working towards the approval and implementation of a

\textsuperscript{52} Wilber wrote 35 books over a period of 45 years. His primary focus was on the integration of a multitude of fields of knowledge. His first books centred on the consciousness and the impacts of religions in an attempt to collate the process of personal transformation and to challenge the limits of postmodernism. Later, in A Theory of Everything (2001), Wilber melds knowledge from the spheres of business, politics, science, and spirituality with psychological theories of developmental consciousness. McGuigan had worked directly with Wilber and together with Popp he applied Wilber’s AQAL frameworks in the specific context of conflicts between worldviews. In his foreword to Integral Conflict (2016), Wilber gives credit to McGuigan and Popp’s application. In the preface of Wicked & Wise: How to Solve the World’s Toughest Problems, Wilber writes, “when applying my ‘work’, there is a fair amount of ‘kosher’ material that—unless you’re introducing a new idea—has to be followed ‘correctly’ if it has my name on it” (2015, xiv).
solution to conflict. This includes the search for the various elements, factors, and behaviours that support the cascade effect of a collective decision with a view to changing the accepted values and behaviours that detrimentally affect large parts of the global population.

My usage of their “integral conflict” approach accepts McGuigan and Popp’s definition of the quadrants, as well as the quadrants’ authors and levels as described by Wilber. McGuigan and Popp acknowledge conflict as having a positive side: that of resolving real issues of unfairness. However, because, as they themselves acknowledge, “context does matter” (Ibid., 219), some important differences in my proposed approach must be underlined.

Although they critiqued Wilber regarding his failure to sufficiently integrate the cultural dimension, and particularly the indigenous knowledge base, this latter element is not included in my research either. While I acknowledge that the populations at risk from anti-personnel mines include indigenous peoples, a specifically indigenous perspective on the issue is not the focus of my study.

Since the proposed interviews with influential key actors involved with the MBT are of a limited duration, the extent of the investigation could not hope to match the sum of knowledge and validation that have been accumulated from the 11 years of interactions spent building the “integral approach to conflict.” There is a requirement to

53 Annex A has been developed to provide additional information on their definition of the quadrant.
54 In alignment with Bush and Folger (2005), they concur that conflict may support the moral and ethical growth of the disputants.
55 The full quote includes this line: “Every conflict is located within a structural context; every conflict, at every scale, has structural forces in motion, silently directing its choreography. Social conflict is about systems and structures, and part of our work as interveners is to analyze the role that these forces have in a conflict.”
restrict the volume of gathered information. As that is the case, the levels of consciousness of the interviewees has not been captured, 56 although information has been collected on their level of education and expertise. The importance of the culture 57 of respondents would offer a wealth of information, however, the focus lies solely on the sub-field of the meaning of culture as it relates to the goal to be achieved, i.e. the approval of the ban. Most importantly, since the focus is not on the process of the resolution of a conflict but on the dynamics of the process of collective decision-making, the quadrants are being used to collect data on that activity.

Lastly, in order to capture more of the inherent complexity resident in the quadrants dealing with interiority, I will incorporate Girard’s mimetic theory into the framework. 58

2.3. Mimetic Theory

While translating classic literature, Girard stumbled on a process appearing to link protagonists with the development of their life stories. In his first book, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure (1966), he writes that he discovered a linkage during his literary comparisons between desire, which appeared as a source of negative emotions, and the drastic actions, sometimes including violence, that it led to. While primary sources of information are always to be preferred, in the case of Girard,

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56 However, it must be emphasized that ‘levels of consciousness’ [as defined by Kegan] are a key variable in understanding norm entrepreneurs and their actions.
57 Culture is an important aspect in Integral Conflict as defined in terms of the specific, determinate, shared culture (national, ethnic, religious, generational, class-based, and gender-based) rather than a personal cultural conglomerate.
58 McGuigan and Popp mentioned mimetism on page 68, but there are no details on its incorporation in their tool for resolution in Integral Conflict.
one would have to review some 47 years of writing.\textsuperscript{59} I chose to read Palaver’s \textit{René Girard’s Mimetic Theory} to get a grasp of the main concepts of mimetism, and to investigate the new research on creative mimesis, with the aim to apply it to the understanding of the cascade process of a norm.\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{2.3.1. Mimetic Processes}

Palaver describes the mimetic cycle as consisting of three components, including the crisis brought about by mimetic rivalry, the collective violence of the scapegoat mechanism, which transforms the chaos into a new social order, and the religious veiling of the scapegoat mechanism\textsuperscript{61} (Ibid., viii). He researches the causes of rivalry in a Girardian manner by reviewing classical literature and works of philosophy and notes the human propensity for: idolatry (Ibid., 37); the three objects of desire, namely nourishment, territory, and sexual partners (Ibid., 44); and a quest for exceptional uniqueness (Ibid., 69). These propensities lead in parallel to a loss of brotherhood (Ibid., 109), a loss of prestige (Ibid., 125), and to the mimetic model of desire—the obstacle where what one desires is also what one is denied (Ibid., 130).

He defines the scapegoat mechanism as the “mimetic snowballing of all against one in order to resolve a crisis brought about by the social consequences of mimetic desire, which creates within the group a war of all against all” (Ibid., 9). Mimetic desire is

\textsuperscript{59} Although I recommend to the curious reader two additional books from Girard: \textit{Violence and the Sacred} (1979) and \textit{The Girard Reader} (1996).

\textsuperscript{60} Mimetic theory has become bigger than Girard, a point agreed upon by an international body of scholars who are part of the Colloquium on Violence and Religion, based originally on Girard’s work. His books were written over a period of 50 years during which his insights accumulated gradually. He started by analysing literature, and later branched out to anthropology and psychology. Palaver has been a respected Girardian scholar since 1990 and has been acknowledged as a solid political theologian. He applies mimetism to the study of human society whereas Girard worked almost exclusively with texts.

\textsuperscript{61} This last element is not a focus of this research.
simply defined as the fact that “human beings base their own desires on the desires of others” (Ibid., 8). Palaver views Girard’s theory as one of conflict, with the dormant potential to deconstruct violence in human society.

Contagion was introduced by Girard to describe the emergence of scapegoating. Positive contagion uses the same idea of a widespread and mutually reinforcing mimetic phenomenon, but sees it as leading to a positive outcome for all (Redekop and Ryba, 2004, 25).

In Palaver’s view, Girard’s theory offers the potential for more meaningful relationships to support the resolution of contemporary manifestations of crisis, in that Girard’s rejection of the thesis that war and political hostilities represent eternal human institutions, opens up significant ethical perspectives for the future. This rejection undermines all theories that define warfare and xenophobia as inexorable elements of human nature. His argument that these institutions are based on the scapegoat mechanism shows, namely, that all forms of interpersonal violence and hostility begin in the most elementary human relationships (Ibid., 295).

2.3.2. Creative Mime

While Girard premises his groundbreaking vision of the triangle of desire on the need for a scapegoat, in order to reduce the violence in a conflict, many of his followers have developed concepts identifying the tenets of creative mimesis, by aiming for an ultimate outcome that promises more than the mere restriction of violence. Redekop and Ryba, as editors of René Girard and Creative Mimesis, introduce a spectrum of possible applications of mimesis as a catalyst of creativity. They write:

As humanity became conscious of creativity as something that could be distinguished as a phenomenon, the creative person became the Model to be
emulated. Artists, scientists, philosophers and leaders each took on their specific Models to mimetically live up to or even surpass. Creativity itself, with all that attended it, became an object of mimetic desire. Ontologically this was transformed with a passion to be creative and for the hypermimetic individual to be recognized for it. Mimetic desire drives the impulse to excel at creativity. (2014, 23)

Creativity is required at many levels for the emergence of a new norm, the first being the individual level. An individual agent must use creativity from the earliest stage of developing an idea, convincing themselves of its value, researching the facts around the contextual issue, understanding the positive and negative challenges. Then, they need to develop the various stages of implementation, detailing the required resources, and reframing the issue and the context under the impact of their proposed new norm, before sharing with other agents.

Creativity is also required at the collective level, as each new agent introduced to the idea of the new norm brings their personal identity, cultural knowledge, values, and personal interests to bear on the process of negotiation.

Since there can be no emergence or change without creativity, I contend that it is at play also during the cascade period. In fact, the requirement for imagination and flexibility may even be higher during this phase, because of the full range of global identities, cultural knowledge, values, national interests, and pre-existing alliances, that form part of the context for negotiation.

Norm entrepreneurs have to achieve a high level of knowledge and interpersonal skills in national and international diplomacy to create the required conditions for the cascade to succeed. Leadership would be part of their intentional expression in creating these conditions and adapting them in the new relation. Their willingness for collaboration and the creation of partnership would be part of their position of readiness
to enter into the new agreement for a new rule or behaviour. Redekop and Ryba view
Girard’s mimetism as “an insight into who we are as human beings and how we
function…[our] motivation, passion, and the driver of culture” (2014, 3). I contend that
mimetism should, as an important feature in human relationships, be identified and
recognized so that we, as citizens, can understand how it can act as a catalyst in troubled
times, and inspire hope.

Even more inspiring are authors Oughourlian and Merrill’s observations in
*Psychopolitics*, that “mimetic rivalry obeys the same laws on both the individual and
national levels” (2012, ix).

2.3.2.1 Exemplar

In *René Girard and Creative Mimesis*, Duyndam proposes a definition of the
inspiration behind a relationship with a model called an “exemplar.” He suggests that,

[i]nspiration depends on what the exemplar represents to a certain inspired moral
agent: courage, perseverance, justice, generosity, or just a particular skill. I use
the general word “value” to denote what the exemplar represents, what the model
embodies, and what at the same time triggers me, challenges me, activates me,
or—in brief—inspires me as a moral agent. (2014, 251)

However, Duyndam is careful to emphasize that imitation of the “exemplar” falls
short of the more complete mimesis’ hermeneutical application, which involves the
integration and demonstration of a creative process in action, including the incorporation
of the exemplar’s values into the life of the moral agent. He writes further, “there is no
other way of understanding the exemplar’s narrative than the translating and applying
done by the moral agent” (Ibid., 255). Only when the moral values of a model become an
integral part, a “hermeneutics-by-doing” (Ibid., 250), of an agent can the model be called
an “exemplar.” I contend that this concept of an “exemplar” is worthy of investigation in
the context of the cascading process of a new norm at the global level, which is easy to do once we understand that the study of mimesis can be integrated within the integral approach.

An exemplar must show courage, perseverance, justice, and generosity not only in their discourse but most importantly in their actions.\textsuperscript{62} Ricoeur has expressed that morals can only be demonstrated through actions,\textsuperscript{63} in which case an exemplar can only be recognized through demonstrations of moral actions. To be recognized as an exemplar in a norm-building context would entail others speaking of the exemplar’s specific leadership qualities and actions to establish and maintain partnerships. These same actions would have to be identified as catalysts for another agent’s action in support of the cascade process, thereby affecting a change, or evolution of a normative process.

\section*{2.3.2.2 The Dynamics of Evolution}

McGuigan and Popp not only applied the integral approach in devising their integral conflict tool, but they also provide a link between the integral perspective and the theory of mimesis. They propose that even though Girard’s “mimetic theory became a linchpin in understanding human behavior, destiny, and the causes of violence and conflict” (2014, 68), the \textit{Integral Theory} of Wilber allows moving it to its fuller potential along a transdisciplinary and evolutionary trajectory. They observe that “[i]ntegral theory coordinates, locates, and uses the different knowledge domains of psychology.

\begin{footnotesize}
62 Here it might be relevant to distinguish between a positive exemplar and a negative exemplar, although Duyndam did not make this distinction. A negative exemplar could be a person whose discourse or behaviour is actively rejected by an agent. However, the focus of this thesis is on positive exemplars.
63 Ricoeur defines morals as the field of norms with the principle of what is allowed or not, in which where the sense of obligation is the subjective side in the relation of an agent dealing with norms (1996, 689).
\end{footnotesize}
anthropology, determinism, and sociology (to mention a few) in an evolutionary model of mimesis” (Ibid., 69).

The four quadrants mentioned earlier become “four different dimensions of, and perspectives on, mimesis” (Ibid., 76). These dimensions allow not only for the capture and observation of the Girardian notions of desire, rivalry, violence and scapegoating, but also for positive demonstrations of mimesis through elements of creativity and reconciliation. McGuigan and Popp described these latter elements as the evolutionary dance between groups of people in the process of ongoing and increasingly complex sets of interactions, in which the dance transforms the people, who in turn collectively transform the dance. In a similar manner, Scharmer and Kaufer argue that the process must start with self, “that responding from the emerging future requires us to shift the inner place from which we operate. It requires us to suspend our judgments, redirect our attention, let go of the past, lean into the future that wants to emerge through us, and let it come” (2013, 3). I suggest that the collective decision-making process that results in the establishment of a global norm transforms the people involved, who then transform the old rules and behaviours.

McGuigan and Popp postulate that mimesis can therefore be studied in its manifestations in every aspect of all four quadrants: in the observable behaviours and systems of the right quadrants as well as in the qualitative and experiential aspects of the left quadrants, thereby allowing for the exploration of the meaning and value in the whole spectrum of actions of those that are active and willing participants in the “dance” of norm cascading.
Wilber’s AQAL structure allows for a progressive line of development, an evolutionary path, within each quadrant. These levels of development show that each individual or organization is on an evolutionary path of their own. Some fascinating questions related to the case study are held within the left dimension quadrants, the “how and why people care so much about obtaining the Object and why they fight so vehemently over it” (Ibid., 78). The evolution of norms can therefore be seen as an element in an individual’s development or level of consciousness. McGuigan and Popp contend that,

the complexity of a person’s (or a group’s) consciousness is a critical and fundamental variable within the triad of mimetic desire and violence and is equally critical in the possibility and process of reconciliation […]. An evolutionary perspective shows us that as the complexity of my consciousness grows, so does my awareness of those opportunities for different choices and my capacity to make those choices. (Ibid., 79-80)

Thus, a positive outcome is never guaranteed, as it depends on the social contexts that encourage, dampen or deter it. Although the mimetic process can remain at the unconscious level, mimetism may offer the possibility for nations and organizations to engage with one another in a manner that promotes collaboration and solidarity, making new norms as they do, which in turn can help encourage individual societies towards increased social justice and peace. Mimetic indicators\(^6\) have been included in the proposed mapping tool as I anticipate that the conflict of national self-interests (not always apparent) on the one hand and the common goods interests on the other, will be more easily identified within the triangle of desire through individual interviews. Critics have argued that the sources of desire cannot be solely attributed to mimetic dynamics,

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\(^6\) The Merriam-Webster dictionary define indicator as “a sign that shows the condition or existence of something.” Mimetic indicators therefore reflect the presence of mimesis either at the subjective or objective level within an integral perspective.
that there could be more than one mediator in a relationship e.g., or that there are situations where someone is the first to desire a new object and therefore isn’t mimicking anyone (Pommier, 2010, 18). Others confirm that this is entirely consistent with mimetic theory; a unique combination of models is one approach to creative mimesis (Redekop and Ryba, 2014). I venture that one way of determining this is by asking the respondents directly about their “biggest inspiration” in the category of leadership, which is just what I did in my research.

The above review has allowed for the identification of overlooked elements in the existing literature and for the presentation of an idea on how to fill these lacunae through the building of a new tool that allows for the apprehension of the complexity entailed in the adoption of a new norm, along with a focus on the leadership and partnership required among the norm leaders.

2.4. The Mapping Tool – A Combined Framework of the Integral Approach and Mimetic Theory

The Integral Approach (IA) is a useful theory to take into account all composite parts of the relation for an individual or a collective embedded in a PFL. Without the full scope offered by the IA theory, any evaluation would be entrenched in other normative lenses, which could restrict results. In his book, *Organizational Transformation for Sustainability*, Mark Edwards shares:

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65 Redekop and Ryba add: “While the initial insight was focused on a desire for an object that was patterned after the desire of the Model, Girard came to see that it was not really about the object. Rather, what drove mimetic desire was the sense of satisfaction or well-being of the Model. It was the meaning and satisfaction that the Model derived from the object what was the source of appeal. Hence the focus of desire was to be like the Model, and at the extreme, to be the Model” (2004, 4).
The impact of social theory on our lives is rarely acknowledged. While we marvel at, or are dismayed by, the power of technology to influence our public and private lives, the influence of all manner of social meta/theories is hardly noticed. At its best, the widespread assumption of certain worldviews creates a stability that enables society to function in an efficient way. At its worst, the unconsciousness appropriation of meta/theory institutionalizes maladaptive systems of economics, education and organization. Ideologies are reductive forms of meta/theories that are so imbedded [sic] in the exchanges of political and social life that we no longer see them, and we are unconscious of their power to resist change even when social change is desperately needed. (2010, 11)

Edwards advocates for the use of integral metatheory particularly in the field of social and organizational transformation. He emphasizes that “theoretical pluralism is characteristic of all social sciences” (Ibid., 15). He offers that social and organizational theories will remain relevant as long as their sense-making frameworks are flexible and adaptive to our evolving global environments, and move away from the narrowness of traditional theory building towards integrative research. Whereas Edwards’ focus is on sustainability, I contend that integral metatheory is equally applicable to the field of security and disarmament.

In a similar manner, mimetic theory offers insights into the impetus behind a desire to modify one’s behaviour and rules (at the individual level) and to openly advocate for or adopt new norms (at the collective level). How is the mimetic dynamic expressed? Mimesis is one possible reaction for an individual faced with new information that leads to a sensation of desire, likely created by a cocktail of emotions resulting from the various scenarios played out in their imagination.

The mimetic process is built upon interactions with another agent, involving emotions and knowledge, and with various objectives in mind, such as gathering or
sharing of information, convincing, negotiating, or obtaining support.\textsuperscript{66} Combinations of all these objectives are likely involved during the evolution of the cascade process when the agents are willing to listen and tune in to each other.\textsuperscript{67} These interactions are unlikely to take a simple linear trajectory, but rather to require a gradual unfolding of positions, arguments, counter-arguments in a dynamic which can be understood through McGuigan and Popp’s “dance” between two individuals to reach the point of mutual understanding (2014, 81). The dance itself becomes the process by which a shared intent is created to solve a problem, in this case to ban AP mines. But while the process of mutual understanding unfolds at the global level, one of the uncertainties of the process comes in the form of other agents, representing other nations, who are in a position to either join in or undermine and disrupt the collective dance.

\textsuperscript{66} I have pointed out a criticism of Integral Approach theory that it is not relational. It is also not diachronic in that it does not deal with relational interactions through time. Mimetic theory is all about relationships and dynamic diachronic interactions, responses, reactions, etc. The chosen integral and mimetic theories complement one another in this way. It harks to Ricoeur’s dialectic of idem and ipse—IT is idem and mimetic theory is ipse. In \textit{Oneself as Another}, Ricoeur underlines his theory of idem-ipse. Idem is qualified as well-developed qualities; sameness; basis of comparative, and synchronic. In turn Ipse is defined as always changing; diachronic; looking back (history); and looking ahead to future horizon (2008).

\textsuperscript{67} Effective or active listening also implies the need to internalize what the “other” has to share. U theory called this phenomenon “generative listening,” or the ability to actively care about others’ statements and emotions (Scharmer and Kaufer, 2013, 147). It implies that the dialogue is not a debate and that both agents are in a conversation together. Being listened to is a basic psychological need. The effective toolbox of a facilitator is outside the scope of this project, however, the simple list of the following can speak of the need for willingness from both parties in all meaningful discussions to include: active listening, paraphrasing, summarizing, “I” statements, open questions and reframing as encouraged by the Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (\url{http://www.cicr-cicrc.ca/en/}). The Presencing Institute outlines that “Theory U proposes that the quality of the results that we create in any kind of social system is a function of the quality of awareness, attention, or consciousness that the participants in the system operate from. Since it emerged around 2006, Theory U has come to be understood in three primary ways: first as a framework; second, as a method for leading profound change; and third, as a way of being — connecting to the more authentic of higher aspects of our self.” \url{https://www.presencing.com/theoryu}
The cascading required to reach Finnemore and Sikkink’s “tipping point” is in fact a dynamic of change created by mimetic phenomena among a number of individuals large enough to “tip” the remainder of the collective to adopt the new norm. It is doubtful that this tipping point remains stable throughout the cascading process. Just as with other evolving processes, there is the possibility of retrogression, disengagement from agents, reversal of priorities, or transformation of the original goals. Maybe another perspective would be to consider the point of legitimacy as a required element for nations to complete the cascade process. Therefore, the essential goal of the required leadership and partnership is to render the new norm as a global legitimate requirement. The tipping point phenomenon is illustrated in figures 2.4.

Figure 2.4.a. Demonstration of a Tipping Point Process in which X is in a Position of Power

Figure 2.4.b. Demonstration of a Tipping Point Process in which X and Y are in equilibrium
Figures 2.4. demonstrate three different situations that for a tipping point to occur, Y is expected to be numerically higher than X. However, unlike the situation of a pure weight balance in which Y requires only a bit more mass than X for the scale to tip, in IR negotiations, where both X and Y may represent an individual norm entrepreneur in the emergence period or an individual state in the cascade process, the “critical mass” required may be substantially larger.

In a similar dynamic, an organization requires a mimetic phenomenon to occur among like-minded organizations in a number large enough to tip the collective of organizations for a new norm to be adopted. This phenomenon becomes more complex with a higher volume of transnational organizations. Similarly, the cascading process involving nations working towards reaching e.g. a UN agreement entails a multitude of mimetic phenomena and cascading events.

The level of complexities increases with the levels of interactions, which is why research on the dynamics of social interactions at the global level requires complex theories. Edwards is critical of Wilber’s AQAL representation of relationships while providing a glimpse of the level of complexities and their inherent participation in a cascading process.

He states that,
AQAL’s individual–collective lens is a reduced form of the ecological holarchy\(^{68}\) lens. A more complete description of this lens within organisational settings might involve the holarchical levels of individuals, dyad, triad, group, department, organisation, community, society, nation and global community. A minimal representation of this holarchy should include at least three or four levels—individual (microlevel), group (mesolevel), organisation (macrolevel) and environment (macro-macrolevel). Problems arise in lens relationships when the ecological holarchy is reduced to the two levels of individual and collective... In using the reduced version of this multi-level holarchy, the individual–collective lens is mistakenly represented as a bipolar lens that can be applied to one holon when it should always refer to a holarchy. One implication of this confusion is that AQAL never shows holons in relationship. Consequently, interactive lenses such as mediation and decentring play small roles in AQAL analyses of social phenomena. (2010, 218–219)

Therefore, Edwards proposes the following table (figure 2.5.) to “provide for a non-reductive application of these lenses to organizational levels” (Ibid., 219).

![Figure 2.5. Edwards’ Metatheoretical Framework](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ecological levels</th>
<th>1st person perspective (&quot;I/Me&quot;)</th>
<th>2nd person perspective (&quot;You&quot;)</th>
<th>3rd person perspective (&quot;He/She/It/They&quot;)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microlevel (individual)</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses personal data about &quot;I/Me&quot;</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses interpersonal data about &quot;You&quot;</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses impersonal data about &quot;He/She/It&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meso-level (group)</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses intra-group data about &quot;Us/We&quot;</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses inter-group data about &quot;You&quot;</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses group data about &quot;Them&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-level (organisation)</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses intra-organisational data about &quot;Us/We&quot;</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses inter-organisational data about &quot;You&quot;</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses organisational data about &quot;Them&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-macrolevel (environment)</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses macro-environmental data about &quot;Us/We&quot;</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses macro-environmental data about &quot;You&quot;</td>
<td>Inte, ext. Discloses macro-environmental data about &quot;Them&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{68}\) Wilber defines an holon as “a whole that is part of other wholes. For example, a whole atom is part of a whole molecule; a whole molecule is part of a whole cell; a whole cell is part of a whole organism. […] Reality is composed of neither wholes nor parts, but of wholes/parts, or holons. […] This is also why, as Arthur Koestler pointed out, a growth hierarchey is actually a holarchy, since it is composed of holons.” (2000, 40)
The goal of this research is to partially map the level of relationships and the essential partnerships as seen and shared by the selected Canadian interviewees. It is in other words beyond the scope of this research to map all the relations involved in the cascade process of all the nations involved in the MBT, however, the objective is to represent the complexities of relationships in a global environment, and by proposing a framework for an in-depth analysis of required relations debunks the myth of the “perfect storm” when considering the replication of a cascade process.

The combining of IA and mimetic theories into a new map positions the possibility of understanding the dynamics of “mini-cascades within a mimetic phenomenon” inside each IA quadrant. In summary, the theoretical frameworks informing the building of the integrated mapping tool include:

- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s “norm lifecycle model,” in which the life cycle is described as having three stages: presentation, cascading, and operationalization.

- Ken Wilber’s integral model as applied by Richard McGuigan and Nancy Popp in their conflict resolution approach. The integral approach allows for the amalgamation of the individual and collective contexts and characters, and hence the successful apprehension of their role in influencing the negotiations leading to the approval of a new norm. The indicators for each quadrant have been chosen to take the context of the MBT into consideration as well as to capture the mimetism mechanisms.

- René Girard’s mimetic theory, as developed by Wolfgang Palaver, to investigate how parties negotiate through a process of mimetism, but are
challenged by the scapegoat effect, in combination with Duyndam’s positive concept of the “exemplar” to capture the leadership and partnership aspects. I seek the indicators of the process of mimetism to act as a tool with which to better understand the actions of the norm leader both in meeting their own mandate and in encouraging other designated leaders to arrive at an agreement within their nations and organizations to approve a new norm.

Therefore, this research is a qualitative investigation into the applicability of the integrated mapping tool to collect and study the leadership and partnership elements required to cascade a global norm, and for capturing the complexity of the process.

Theories work at different levels and have different scopes. Some theories are wholly abstract while others relate to specific empirical observations. Theories on leadership are more empirically based and not as broad as the more abstract theories of IA and mimetism. Some practical theories of leadership and partnership are important to review and will be introduced in Chapter 4.

Prior to presenting the development of the integrated mapping tool and the research methodology, the next chapter will introduce the case study.
Chapter 3. The Mine Ban Treaty

It is a story of an extraordinary alliance—derided by some as a ‘coalition of angels’—of diplomats, generals, legislators, mine survivors, medical doctors, committed activists, and ordinary citizens who helped heal the physical, emotional, psychological, and social pain by creating a landmark in international humanitarian law: the ban of AP mines.


In this chapter, the emergence and cascade phases of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) are introduced and reviewed. The main goal of this review is to provide a contextual understanding of the events and of the actions by designated agents surrounding the 14-month decision-making process of the MBT.

The first part of this chapter describes the events, challenges, and actions of the norm entrepreneurs, and those of their opponents, in the emergence phase of the MBT, while the second section introduces the four major events of the Ottawa Process—the 1996 Ottawa conference, the Austrian drafting of the convention, the preliminary negotiations in Oslo and the 1997 Ottawa conference—to chronicle the key objectives and challenges of the cascading phase. The last section of the chapter presents a synopsis of the actions of the norm entrepreneurs, comparing them to those of their opponents, and reviews the main challenges to a complete ban as identified during the emergence phase to support the understanding of the measures necessary for a successful cascade process.

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69 As a point of clarification, the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) became a norm when it was ratified at the UN. However, the same expression, “MBT”, was used during the Ottawa Process. Therefore, unless otherwise stipulated in this text, MBT is the expression of the norm in development and not the norm itself.

70 A case study can be “whatever bounded system is of interest.” (Stake, 1983, 283.)
3.1. The Emergence

This first section aims to situate the emergence of the MBT historically. The intent is to trace the various issues, challenges, and their mitigations, and thereby identify the key actions and events that led to the Ottawa Process, in other words to highlight those steps of the emergence process that acted as the foundations of—and challenges to—the subsequent cascade phase. There were numerous major events that led to the emergence of the idea of a global ban. A brief chronology of the complete lifecycle of the treaty has been provided (in Annex A) to highlight some of the crucial historical moments along with a list of acronyms pertaining to it (in Annex B).

Price proposes that the end of the Cold War was conducive to shifting the attention from the spectre of nuclear weapons to the actual wars on the ground, and the conventional weapons used to fight them (1998b, 619). It appears that although landmines were already an issue prior to the Cold War, it was partially overlooked at that time as a result of the lack of global collaboration in the bipolar relations and by the cloak of state sovereignty hiding “the human cost of landmines and other threats to individual security” (Axworthy, 1998, 448). Cameron labels the period from the end of the Cold War to the 1995–1996 review the “Consciousness-Raising” period (1998, 430). It was a period when civil society organizations took the lead in informing governments and the public about the use of anti-personnel (AP) mines, most particularly their long-lasting effects well past the point at which the conflict was deemed over.

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71 Macleod and al. share that “polarity” is a concept borrowed from electricity to designate the poles of power in an international system, as particularly seen as the neorealists, such as Waltz (1979). The concept allows for the sub-categories of unipolar to define one hegemonic power, multipolar as a shared power structure and bipolar where the power is shared by two nations. The first two categories are seen as unstable structures while bipolar offers the best scenario for stability (2008, 31 and 326). The Cold War era is typically defined as a bipolar global context.
In what follows, the primary focus will be on identifying the agents behind the success and those behind the challenges of the emergence phase.

3.1.1. International Norm Entrepreneur

Finnemore and Sikkink define a norm entrepreneur as an individual actor at the emergence stage but in the case of a global norm the actors are “states, international organizations and networks” (1998, 898).

The devastating impact of landmines became headlines as a result of the work of high-profile campaigners such as Princess Diana\textsuperscript{72} and Pope John Paul II, former US president Jimmy Carter, and Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General. The first government official to take action was Patrick Leahy, a US Democratic senator from Vermont, whose initiative placed the United States in the lead as the first country to enact domestic legislation on landmines in 1992. This step by a major country provided a “tremendous impetus to the ban movement internationally” (Wareham, 1998, 214).

Williams and Goose view this step as having a significant psychological and development impact:

\begin{quote}
[the] simple fact that the US had just stopped the export of a legal weapon galvanized the imagination of the international community. Politicians, in particular, began to believe that if the US could take this step, perhaps significant movement against AP mines was possible. (1998, 26)
\end{quote}

Although world leaders were becoming important spokespersons for the need to ban landmines, the norm entrepreneurs carrying the heavy load of education, dissemination, outreach, and advocacy were civil society organizations.

The \textit{Landmine Monitor 2015} reported that civil society organizations had become the witnesses, in the field, on the impact of the AP mines on the civilian populations in

\textsuperscript{72} Princess Diana was an Ambassador to UNHCR. The issue of the impacts of AP mines was one of her most publicized appeals for public support.
post-conflict areas. Their practical experiences provided for sets of perspectives—from human rights, to children’s rights, to victims’ rights; to development issues, refugees’ issues, and medical, reconstruction and humanitarian relief—that were different from those of the military forces. They raised awareness about the sources of these many problems and about their consequences on society. They became empowered through their capacity to collect detailed and precise data and their willingness to create a network of concerned organizations ready to combine their efforts, sometimes away from their prime organizational objective, to the one goal of an all-inclusive ban (2015, iv).

Neufeld specifies that civil society organizations provided the technical and medical expertise and experience that lent legitimacy to state-level actors in expressing empathy with human suffering in lieu of the more usual support of the goals and methods of the military establishment (2005, 21). Perez substantiates this claim of legitimacy on the part of the non-government actors in that: “[m]uch of research and statistics on mine types, the production of mines, the location of mines, demining efforts, risk education, and civilian relief and rehabilitation have been produced by NGOs” (2010, 36).

Civil society organizations (CSOs) such as the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) became norm entrepreneurs. They raised public awareness on the impacts of AP mines through information sessions and by acting as advocacy groups to influence national governments. Other nations followed suit to the USA and in March 1995, the government of Belgium became the first, to be followed by Norway in June 1995, “to ban the use, production, trade, and stockpiling of AP mines” (Williams and Goose, 1998, 27).
Regional initiatives such as the institution of “mine-free zones” came about (Thakur and Manley, 1999, 284), and on the global level the UN got involved.

Working from outside the official process to which they had no access, civil society organizations moved the emergence process forward under a reframed label of human security, but first they got organized to support their vision. In what appears to be an organic process, organizations started to conglomerate under the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The ICBL was launched in October 1992; it comprised six NGOs,73 who agreed to initiate an international campaign to issue a “Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines.” They hosted the first NGO-sponsored international landmine conference in May 1993. The steering committee was coordinated by Jody Williams. Soon the ICBL was “composed of over 1,000 NGOs from over 60 countries. It is a good example of what has been dubbed ‘global civil society’—a network of social groups and organizations that transcends national boundaries” (Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin, 1998, 5). Under the leadership of Jody Williams, ICBL’s transnational campaign plan was initialized and executed. Mobilization and education of the public became key to getting the attention of national governments. Finding and disseminating factual information were two critical components of this activity.

ICBL’s single goal, or solution to the humanitarian impact of AP mines, was known as “a ban of AP mines.” ICBL was running a campaign plan that could be compared with military equivalents. Issues of momentum, monitoring, and equilibrium of resources, time, and opportunities were always at the forefront of their attention. Planning was done for both short-term and long-term activities, juggling the availability of

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73 These organizations included: Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (US), Medico International (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (UK), Physicians for Human Rights (US), and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (US).
volunteers and logistics and communications requires time management and the maintenance of data and credibility. While it is clear that the main coordinator, or chief of staff, was Jody Williams, it is unclear who the commander was. Perhaps a diffused and participative leadership was an important key to the success of the enterprise? Nevertheless, an international campaign was maintained along with national campaigns under the leadership of national organizations.

Since our focus is Canadian, it is imperative to also introduce Mines Action Canada (MAC) and their pivotal role in the partnership leading to the Ottawa Process.

3.1.2. Canadian Norm Entrepreneur

MAC was launched in March 1995, following the lead of ICBL, around formal objectives and mandate, by a group of organizations whose mandates covered issues of “development, social justice, faith, health, peace, disabled people’s and disarmament” (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998, 49). Their focus was on providing information to the Canadian Government, the media, and the public. Their first major roadblock appeared to be the government’s position that issues of AP mines were to be addressed exclusively as part of the existing negotiations within the review process instituted by the Convention.

There are particularly four issues with communications that are worth mentioning. First, there was the expertise and credibility of the data collected on the impact of the AP mines. Then, there was the issue of timely distribution of that data and the information on the various national and international campaigns. Third, there was the requirement to take advantage of windows of opportunities. Finally, there was the capacity of “[c]reative campaigners [that] proved tremendously skillful in distilling often seemingly complicated issues into simple slogans that allowed no doubt as to the positions of the ICBL” (Williams and Goose, 1998, 44).

There is a lot to learn from the media events organized by civil society organizations throughout the cascade process, and although it is considered as an important element, the wealth of information of immediate actions in the decision-making processes preclude the addition of details for this aspect. Warmington and Tuttle recognize that “the existence of an informed and concerned public was most vital…[including] simple avenues for public participation, to promote the positive results of public action, and to give Canadians a sense of ownership in the campaign to ban landmines” (1998, 58).
of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). This negotiation framework kept the issue inside the division of Arms Control and Disarmament of the departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence, instead of the Human Security Division.

MAC’s first strategy was to link the issue of AP mines with international humanitarian law (IHL), emphasizing their use as indiscriminate and illegal with inherent responsibility for their long-term humanitarian cost. In addition, and under the leadership of the ICRC, the idea of proportionality was introduced. Warmington and Tuttle describe it as “a tenet of IHL that demands that the weapons and means used to accomplish military objectives not to be so out of proportion that they inflict massive destruction on civilians and societies at large” (1998, 52).

It also appeared that a significant element of MAC’s campaign was the growing awareness in government that consultation with civil society organizations was “becoming an increasingly important and substantive element of the policy development process” (Ibid., 1998, 49).

On 17 January 1996, the Canadian government announced a moratorium on the production, transfer, and operational use of AP mines. Tomlin suggests that Canada had no choice in joining the moratorium movement because the UN made a mistake in placing it on a published list of countries with export moratoria, thus creating a strong if accidental catalyst for a change of policy (1998, 193). In March 1996, an ICRC study, Georghiades provides a detailed legal foundation of the context of the Land Mine Treaty where states chose willingly to be bound by it, and that of the of IHL which prescribed the conduct of military operations and must be observed by all states. The issue of compliance is therefore a critical element for treaty but so is the legitimacy of the weapon to conduct the military operations (1998). Perez also contributes to the understanding of the use of IHL in debating the legitimacy of the AP mines (2010, 19–38). Although Price suggests that the idea of “intention” was a factor in setting the AP mines apart, since for most other weapons “human users bear the moral responsibility [which] simply does not resonate with any plausibility for a device that operates without immediate human intentionality” (1998, 628).
Friend or Foe?, suggested a lack of sound analysis in the military arguments to use AP mines, which affected the government’s position (ICRC, 1996, 2). Another significant moment in the partnership between MAC and the government of Canada was an invitation by the government to MAC to assign a representative to the official Canadian delegation to the final CCW negotiating session in April–May 1996. That invitation represented MAC with a dilemma. By accepting it, MAC could be seen as endorsing the government’s decision, and by declining it, MAC could lose the opportunity to be directly influential. In the end, as Warmington and Tuttle write, “the potential for MAC to bring a humanitarian perspective to the discussions outweighed other concerns and considerations” (1998, 55).

Norm entrepreneurs need a platform for their actions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 896). At the global level, these structures must expand vertically across all levels of governments and horizontally across the international semi-political environment. As a result, their actions are expected to align with the principles of UN institutions and forums.

3.1.3. The UN Platform

The UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, was an outspoken proponent for the Mine Ban Treaty as were various UN agencies such as the Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

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77 Human Rights Watch shares similar critical conclusion by the U.S. Army on the harmful impact of AP mines in Combat (1997, 10).

78 As shared during the interview, it was in preparation for attending that negotiating session that Valerie Warmington took Third Party Neutral training at CICR. When she returned she reported that she found it very helpful.

79 He made a vital link on the obstacles created by the AP mines in the reconstruction and peace-building in post-conflict situations (1994, 8–13).

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was created by the UN General Assembly’s first Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 as a single global negotiating forum for the discussion of arms control. It reached an important milestone in 1993 with the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, though favoured by the United States, Perez suggests that the CD became “split on the issue [of the main focus of anti-vehicles or AP mines] and preoccupied with other priorities” (2010, 32).

The 1980 Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)\footnote{The formal title is the ‘Convention on Prohibitions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects’.}, entered into force in 1983, was the first treaty that attempted to control the use of AP mines. The CCW includes 10 articles and three protocols on explicit limits\footnote{There are many questions such as: What kind of limits? Numbers of these in use? Tonnage? Explosive power? Where they can be used? In what kinds of situations? However, I excluded them from this research to focus on the relationships of the Ottawa Process.} imposed on certain weapons; the limits on AP mines are included in Protocol II. Perez attributes its lack of effectiveness partly to the vague definitions created to increase flexibility on recruitment, and partly to the perception that Protocol I was easier to annex, as well as to the lack of focus on a specific weapon, which provided loopholes for overall compliance (2010, 30).
1993 was a landmark year in the CCW process since any signatory state could call for a review conference. The request to hold that meeting was made by French President Mitterand following pressures by Handicap International (Price, 1998b, 620). This 1993 conference was held in Geneva and was co-hosted by UNICEF and ICBL. It is interesting to note that UNICEF “provided all the logistical support, space, and support staff for the conference” (Williams and Goose, 1998, 28). In addition, it is worth noting that while UNICEF pushed other UN organizations towards formal support for a ban and initiated a partnership with civil society organizations, it actually had no mandate in the field of arms control (Ibid., 28). Four governmental sessions were subsequently held in Geneva in 1994 and early 1995 for the review of the CCW landmine protocol. The UN secretary-general was first to invite ICRC to attend the preparations for the 1995 Review Conference, in which ICRC were allowed to participate fully, which meant they were “allowed to speak, submit proposals, distribute documentation, and [were] asked to prepare two working papers” (Ibid., 624). This access therefore recognizes ICRC in their role of experts, which may have paved the way for other authorities to extend similar privileges to other NGOs.  

These sessions were followed by two additional rounds in January 1996 to deal with technical issues, and in April–May 1996 there was an attempt to conclude the negotiations.

Neufeld suggests that the ineffectiveness of the CCW process was a key catalyst for the Ottawa Process, but she does not address the causes of the ineffectiveness (2005, 25). Many would, however, attest that the effectiveness and the pace of decision were

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83 I suggest that the ICRC is not exactly an NGO, given its formal links to governments. It is in a class by itself, given its commitment to neutrality. However, this neutrality status was destabilized by their active engagement in the MBT.
limited by the need to take decisions by consensus.\textsuperscript{84} Price reports that the NGOs were excluded from full participation in the CCW review conference since issues of disarmament were considered to lie within the sphere of national security, and therefore to be the exclusive purview of those in political power with high security clearance (1998b, 624). However, certain countries remained loyal to the CD process when the Ottawa Process was running in parallel because they appeared to have concerns over the possibility of its dissolution and the lack of other UN forums to replace it.

It could be argued that it was structural limitations that kept some supporters from endorsing the ban. The supporters of the CD process were not necessarily against a ban on AP mines. Some countries were arguing in favour of exceptions for certain territories or about the technicalities around combinations of usage with other system of weapons or time-lapsing potentialities. Other challengers may have hidden behind an existing norm of allowing the usage of AP mines with the hope that no one would dare contest its legitimacy. However, in light of the unexpected contestation, the challengers found themselves having to defend their claims publicly.

3.1.4. The Challengers

I propose that there were two main categories of challengers to the emergence of the Land Mine Ban. The first challenger was the military-industrial complex, and its responsibility for defense operations. Another category of challenge was levelled by the major powers, as a result of their concerns about sovereignty and national security in general. Although the objections from the military-industrial complex and the political

\textsuperscript{84} Thakur and Maley describe the CD process as a “perennially Cumbersome and Deadlocked forum that takes months even to agree on an agenda” (1999, 286). Some contended that these structural procedural constraints could be viewed as structural violence as defined by Galtung (1967).
leadership of major states might seem similar, it is worthwhile considering them separately to identify other factors leading to their reluctance to embrace the Ottawa Process.

3.1.4.1. The Military-Industrial Complex

This next section will introduce the actor we shall call “the military” as one of the challengers to the emergence of a ban on AP mines. I broadly defined the term as the military agenda, as represented through an amalgam of actors in the fields of military, political and economic interests. The influence of this actor could be directly and indirectly detected through the blockages affecting the progression of the CCW procedures. The direct impact was transparent in the discourses of nationally elected officials and their senior representatives, both civilian and military, citing doctrinal needs for military operations. However, there was also an indirect power through the national and transnational corporations often identified as the “military-industrial complex.” Who they are and how they influence the discourse is unknown. It is easy to trace the armament companies, search for the military associations, and in some countries even find the donations to political parties and the meetings between armament lobbyists with political representatives, however the content of these discussions are still surrounded by secrecy in all democracies. The extent of their political influence is the biggest question as it can be seen as unduly powerful even with the highest office in democracies.85

85 A warning about the unduly power of the military-industrial complex was issued in 1961, by American President Eisenhower on his retirement. He warned the Americans and the world about the “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist”. Consult for more details the following link: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp.
Nevertheless, the answers to these important questions fall outside the scope of this research as its goal is to study the success of building partnerships to approve a change. 86

Beier and Crosby suggest that the Ottawa Process was “a conduit through which broader military, political, and economic forces could find new ways to realize old interests” (1998, 269). They contend that the role of “the military” was to deflect the Ottawa Process from potentially affecting the military’s power-oriented worldview. The use of military resources conserves the existing hierarchies of power, hence inequalities and insecurities world-wide. Beier and Crosby further feel that the Ottawa Process failed to produce the opportunity to block and even transform that worldview into a “pursuit of human security [...] a demilitarized pursuit” (Ibid., 271). They recognize that “those transformative initiatives will [have to] emerge from within civil society” (Ibid., 271).

Beier and Crosby discuss the challenges of transformative actions by first analyzing the power struggles in opposition to the transformative initiatives and then introducing the compromises often made along the way. They suggest that the Cold War created “the conditions within major industrialized states for the development of a matrix of government, military, and economic relationships, each with its own particular interests in sustaining the ideas and practices that rooted security in military means” (Ibid., 273). This confluence has the resources to control the ideologies, the technologies, and the economic and political processes to maintain their basis of strength and even “produce and/or exacerbate insecurities and conflicts for many of the world’s peoples” (Ibid., 274). They argue that the UN should have transferred the responsibility for the

86 I note that the blockages create resistance and their understading would therefore provide a level of significance of how they could be overcome
implementation of the Ottawa Convention to either its development or humanitarian agencies, instead of the Peacekeeping Operations.\textsuperscript{87}

Similarly, Price submits that “states seek to monopolize their internal control over significant means of destruction vis-à-vis society, and powerful states seek to maintain their technological advantage over weaker states by denying the legitimacy of low-cost equalizers” (1998c, 344). However, in this case the proposed ban was to affect everyone in the same manner. The forces of transition, here represented by the norm entrepreneurs with a ban project, had powerful and resourceful actors to displace. These entrepreneurs had to make the decisions that were right for them, and negotiate their way to vital and constructive compromises.

Beier and Crosby also present some evidence that ICRC was supportive of the military means of security. According to them, both ICBL and ICRC failed by not being critical of it, by choosing to participate in the continued legitimization of the military ethos and the actions of industrialized states. However, they also admit that if these civil society organizations had tackled the subject of legitimization, the Ottawa Process “likely would not have come to pass” (Ibid., 278). But as a result, the concept of “human security” was drained of substantive content and no radical proposition was offered to pave the way to further global critical security issues (Ibid., 286–287).

On the other hand, it must be noted that ICRC was very successful in reaching out to retired military members of all ranks to question the legitimacy of AP mines in their roles in offensive deep strike, force multiplier, and defensive actions. This alliance proved to be successful in raising doubts about the legitimacy of AP mines as weapons of war.

\textsuperscript{87} I would also like to argue that the daunting task of reporting and monitoring over the last 20 years could have been undertaken by an existing agency of the UN, instead of the sponsoring parties behind the \textit{Landmine Monitor}. 
choice. The role of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation in particular, but also military retirees in other national organizations were, in my view, essential during the emergence stage.

Next, we shall look at the role of the security hegemons, or the P5 of the UN Security Council.

3.1.4.2. The Major Powers

Although, the P5 have not been subject to criticism as a group in the CCW or the Ottawa Process\textsuperscript{88} some authors such as Hajnoczi, Desch and Chatsis have mentioned that “it was the lack of goodwill by states that kept the international community from achieving a total ban rather than the supposedly complicated nature of the issue” (1998, 293). On the other hand, Price states that the negative effects of the lack of hegemonic leadership were compensated through the web of multilateralism\textsuperscript{89} created to anchor the new norm to ban AP mines (1998a, 106). This seems to suggest that the states behind the ban campaign were traditional followers rather than global leaders.

To this day, three out of five of these leaders have yet to sign the treaty including the US, China, and Russia. France signed on 3 December 1997 following an electoral promise made by the new incoming government. Japan also signed on 3 December 1997, after the Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to norm entrepreneurs in the cause of a complete ban on the use of AP mines.

Although President Clinton was among the first political leaders to denounce the AP mines and the US was the first country to propose an export moratorium, Clinton did not sign the treaty in 1997 under pressures from the Pentagon to allow for research and

\textsuperscript{88} At least to my knowledge at the time of submission.
\textsuperscript{89} Ruggie suggests that the principles of multilateralism include both an agreement of principles of conduct and the rule of law instead of the rule of power (1993).
development to find alternatives in their zones of contention. The role of the US continues to be a conflicted one on this issue: while it continues to be one of the larger contributors to mine action, donating $85 million in 2008 (*Landmine Monitor*, 2009, 68), and while their support for the 1996 UN Resolution 51/45S and their agreement to participate in the Oslo conference allowed other participating countries to support the cause, they were also the most outspoken on the need for special clauses for acceptance of smart mines, and, specifically, for their continued use in Korea. Another unsavoury and complicating matter is that it has also been noted how the business of clearing minefields and providing support to the affected populations have “benefitted” American agencies and companies (Beier and Crosby, 1998).

However, in September 2014, President Obama declared that the USA “would abide by key requirements of the 1999 accord everywhere except on the Korean Peninsula”. 90

Sadly, Russia is, in 2017, in the midst of internal and external conflicts where the issue of AP mines is not seen as a priority. As for China, Neufeld reports that they stopped producing AP mines without a self-destructive mechanism in 1997. They are also said to be moving “toward a more humane mine” (2005, 43).

3.1.5. The Main Challenges to the Emergence Process

Although there were a series of challenges to the emergence of the MBT, I contend that the five main challenges can be listed as 1) the legitimacy of the use of the AP mines, 2) the access to the decision process, 3) the terms of the treaty 4) the time imperatives, and 5) the leadership requirement. These challenges were creating concerns

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90 As reported by Alexander (2014).
for the decision-making process, for a concise and coherent treaty and for an expedient process.

First, there was a conflict over the legitimacy of the use of AP Mines. The lines of conflict were drawn between the national and military’s will for the right to use them and civil society’s demand for a ban in defence of the right to human security. The concept of human security was developed to defend a total ban of AP mines. Human security was perceived by some as a challenge to the principle of sovereignty, and by others as a challenge specifically to military defence protocols. The effectiveness for the minefield between the two Koreas was used to illustrate the need for the continued use of AP mines, albeit maybe with some restrictions. The suggested changes in the rules and behaviours surrounding the use of AP mines were opposed by national military powers, which viewed them as tools in all stages of battle—in defence, offence, and withdrawal situations. Their low cost of production and ease of transport and use made the idea of a ban particularly provoking for the military.

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91 The definition of the “decision making process” for this research is “the process of a consensus built through persuasion and diffusion achieved through bargaining and coalition-building” making it a combination of tools used for policy and political streams as defined by Tomlin (1998, 189).

92 I make mine Axworthy’s definition of human security as “security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights, and encompasses ‘the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity’” (1997, 185).

93 Early in 1998, the army published information on the operationalization of the new norm on APMs by providing the internationally context as “the international community considered the humanitarian cost so unproportionately high that it demanded a ban on the use of the anti-personnel mine” (1998, 10). Then, by providing legal information affecting all soldiers in mentioning that “Canada was the first nation to ratify the Convention. Concurrently, the federal government passed legislation (Bill C-22 - The Anti-Personnel Mines Implementation Act) making it illegal for any Canadian to: Place an anti-personnel mine under, on or near the ground or other surface area with the intent to cause the explosion of the anti-personnel mine by the presence, proximity or contact of a person; or Develop, produce or otherwise acquire, possess or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, an anti-personnel mine, or stockpile anti-personnel mines. The maximum penalty for a violation of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act is a $500,000 fine and/or five years imprisonment. The Anti-Personnel
In Canada, the respective ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs were seen to advocate different approaches to the resolution of the issue and it is likely that similar situations occur at other national levels. Proposing a ban was perceived as risky, “even as a symbolic gesture [that] would significantly damage Canada’s reputation within the international arms control communities” (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998, 53). However, Minister Collellette of the Defence Department and Minister Ouellet of Foreign Affairs were not aligned in their statements on AP mines in the fall of 1995 (Tomlin, 1998, 185). This misalignment was noticed and leveraged by MAC in their outreach to public and government alike. André Ouellet resigned from his post in January 1997 and Lloyd Axworthy became the new minister of Foreign Affairs.

Lloyd Axworthy was a veteran politician with extensive experience in a large portfolio of affairs, but he was also “a former professor of political science [so he] was a minister genuinely interested in policy innovation, who saw politics as a way to advance policy goals” (Tomlin, 1998, 194). Axworthy has shared that “working at the grassroots was the essence of politics” (2003, 35) and “the real advantages of the Canadian parliamentary system…helps make our development of foreign policy more consultative and its execution more firmly based on public acceptance” (Ibid., 36). His role as a critic in foreign affairs for Jean Chrétien’s 1993 election is of particular interest as he witnessed

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Mines Convention Implementation Act is applicable to anyone in Canada, including foreign citizens. The Act is also applicable to Canadian Forces personnel serving anywhere in the world. Any Canadian Forces member serving with the Canadian Forces, on international staff, exchange postings or liaison postings who violate the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act is liable to prosecution under section 130 of the National Defence Act” (Ibid., 10). Finally, the legal implications of the MBT on operations were defined for each of the following categories: combined operations, rules of engagement, right to self-defence, operational plans, command and control, Operations on previously mined terrains, clearing minefields, training, and transit of the anti-personnel convention (Ibid., 11–12).
consultations on the future of the UN for the party electoral platform. After that election, he was appointed the minister of Human Resources and, in that capacity, he attended the 1995 UN Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, at which he was first exposed to an extended notion of human security and the requirement for more international cooperation to achieve it (Ibid., 41–42).

Second, there was the question of access and influence by civil society organizations on the decision-makers at the global level. The designated national representatives were the acknowledged decision-makers; however their range of actions are usually proscribed by the mandate given them by the office of the minister in charge of the UN relationships, usually the minister of Foreign Affairs, who in turn might have been given a constrained range of actions from the prime minister. Citizens are rarely asked directly for an opinion on global norms, but they can compel governments to take action when they speak from a critical mass as they did through petitions, marches and personal letters, and e-mails to their elected member of parliament. However, there is some level of influence waged by civil society groups, which can be translated politically by elected officials, particularly in the run-up to national elections in which international affairs have been known to be used to sway some voters, as was the case for both France and England (Price, 1998b, 634).

Third, there was a question of the actual content of the proposed norm, not only regarding usage but also regarding stockpiling, clearing of existing minefields, and meaningful support to victims. Lessons were learned from the ban on chemical weapons.\footnote{Price contends that the existence of a viable chemical weapon taboo helped the international society in comparing similar humanitarian and legal assessments and in associating the AP mines} One such lesson was to use simple and concise language to keep the terms of
the treaty clear with little room, or none if possible, for loopholes. The issue of potential exceptions was problematic as it had the potential to dilute the effectiveness of a complete ban. Compliance with a future treaty was at the forefront of discussions and negotiations. Indeed, successful compliance was necessary to ensure the long-term operationalization of the new norm, not least because of the extent of minefield clearance necessary to make a real difference. The possibility of complete compliance was seen as “enhanced […] by the lack of wriggle room in the Convention: you either have mines or you do not, and this makes compliance much more straightforward than arms control agreements with more complicated rules for deploying certain types of weapons” (Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, 1998, 11). For that reason, the ICBL felt the future treaty had to cover a total ban, whereas nations like the USA continued to hold on to the notion of exceptions well into the Ottawa Process.

Fourth, there were questions of timing. Every new year saw an increase in victims, and while data was collected and shared on the number of deaths, loss of limbs, and acreage under minefields affecting agriculture and economy of villages and countries from organizations such as Human Rights Watch and ICRC, there were no solutions in sight. Aside from the general and constantly increasing urgency of the situation, there was also the issue of momentum to be considered. There was a constant worry on the part of civil society organizations about the attention span of the public and that of the decision-makers in international institutions, who were seen as being burdened with multiple foci. ICBL worked steadily to gather and distribute information to its membership. Sometimes reframing of data was required to counteract arguments within the same category of weapons, and therefore in setting the stage for a positive position towards a ban of AP mines (1998b, 629).
presented by proponents of arms control and military might. Errors in judgement or factual correctness could have easily and detrimentally damaged the credibility acquired over the period of 1992 to 1996.

Fifth, there was no global leader to change the rules of the use of the AP mines or to ban them entirely. CCW negotiations were perceived to have failed as a result of the fact that “the rituals and nuances of traditional international diplomacy proved to be only too effective in blocking substantive process” (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998, 55). Civil society organizations had to find a way to break the power hold by major states in the management of this file and to seize and maintain the support of citizens and volunteers across the globe. ICBL and MAC recognized the requirement for a leader nation to provide a catalyst to avoid expected future blockages inside the CCW. A core group of pro-ban partners was formed to include Austria, Belgium, Canada, and Norway. They worked together, and closely with the ICBL and ICRC, toward the common goal of expanding the circle of like-minded countries and civil society organizations.

It is interesting to note that any faux pas from MAC at the CCW meeting in April 1996 could have had the potential to shut down the coalition, wherefore Warmington as MAC’s representative was shouldering a great responsibility throughout this process. Her early and ongoing credibility was key to the process of increasing civil society organizations’ participation and responsibilities.

At the closure of CCW negotiations in April 1996, Williams and Goose report:

A decision that turned out to be of pivotal importance in the next stage of the ban movement was made to put a priority on getting avowedly pro-ban governments to self-identify and work together as a bloc to move beyond the CCW impasse…to work together on moving the issue forward….As a clear symbol of the growing NGO/government partnership, on the last day of the CCW conference in May 1996 the ICBL held a joint press conference with the UN department of
Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, and the government of Canada. For each the message was the same—only a ban will do. (Ibid., 32–33)

The events leading to the April statement started in March 1996 with a draft “Action Plan to reduce the Global Use of Landmines.” Tomlin shares:

The plan proposed movement on two tracks. The first was continued Canadian participation in the CCW review Conference, scheduled to meet in Geneva in April, which the Canadians were convinced would remain deadlocked. The second track consisted of an unremarkable proposal that contained the seeds of the Ottawa Process: IDA\(^{95}\) proposed that Canada host a small international meeting of officials and NGOs to develop an action plan on landmines. (1998, 195)

This opportunity to host the next international meeting was warmly welcomed by senior bureaucrats within the Department of Foreign Affairs, mainly Lawson,\(^{96}\) Sinclair,\(^{97}\) Lysyshyn,\(^{98}\) and Pearson\(^{99}\) (in hierarchical order from the bottom up). Tomlin reports that the numbers of countries that wanted to attend the Ottawa meeting was growing, but so was the concern that “opponents might attend the session simply to sabotage it” (1998, 195). He also shares the fact that the concerns about access and participation was key to the new alliance between IDA and ICBL (Ibid., 197–198). Mark Gwozdecky of the IDA section proposed a new innovative process of self-selection by letting each state determine their attendance.\(^{100}\) In addition, IDA proposed, as a way of including the formerly excluded civil society organizations, that “the session would have open and

\(^{95}\) IDA was the Non-proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Division, inside the department of Foreign Affairs. Note that DFAIT’s initialism doesn’t fit with the name of the government department or initiative mentioned.

\(^{96}\) Manager in IDA.

\(^{97}\) Director of IDA.

\(^{98}\) Director-General of International Security.

\(^{99}\) Axworthy’s senior policy adviser.

\(^{100}\) The basis of “self-selection” allowed states to self-determine their participation in this process outside the confines of the UN, without nations having to officially decline a formal invite by another nation.
closed meetings, the former including NGOs and the latter for governments only” (Ibid., 198).

By September 1996, the upcoming meeting finally caught the attention of the Foreign Affairs minister’s office, where staff became nervous about the potential risks and outcome for their minister and the government as a result of “this small planning session” (Ibid., 200). Lysyshyn reassured everyone but also ensured the development tools to mitigate the risk of derailment by, among other things, developing a “Chairman’s Agenda for Action” that would not require endorsement by attendees and by working at keeping a low profile for the meeting.

Meanwhile there was still a debate between Foreign Affairs and Defence on the issue of the two-track approach, as Defence and some within Foreign Affairs still favoured alignment with the CCW process. A proposal to destroy the AP mines stock as an act of good faith prior to the 1996 Ottawa meeting renewed the debate. The decision had to be brought to the prime minister who in the end decided to destroy one third of the stock then and the remainder following successful negotiations. Both parties were left unsatisfied with this compromise, putting their relations at risk for future events.101

Awareness of these five major challenges bring an appreciation of the steps, actions, and relations built to overcome them. Canada became the leader of leaders who did just that, and how this came to pass, through the Ottawa Process, is the focus of the next section.

101 Defence Minister Collenette resigned after this decision (Tomlin, 1998, 199).
3.2. The Cascading Phase—The Ottawa Express

The cascading phase of the Ottawa Process, lasted in my view from Axworthy’s challenge in October 1996 to the signatures of 122 countries in December 1997. It consists roughly of four major events that all contribute to highlight the key objectives and challenges, namely the 1996 Ottawa conference, the Austrian drafting of the convention, the preliminary negotiations in Oslo, and the 1997 Ottawa conference.

The conference in Ottawa in October 1996 was the key opening event of the cascade. Lysyshyn chaired the event. As such, he was responsible for the smooth proceedings and the development of the “Chairman’s Agenda for Action” to outline the actions required to reach a ban rapidly. The proceedings focused on the various concerns of the participants. Advocates of the CCW process were expected to present their case, but it was unknown who would speak first and how, or if, those “like-minded” would handle the matter adequately. The first opportunity came from the head of the French delegation, Michel Duclos, in an open forum when he expressed reservations about a total ban. Jody Williams made a declaration to assert the contradiction of his statement, and her intervention was supported by a majority of the attendees. Tomlin shares that this interaction, confirmed IDA hopes that any rats who decided to attend would face intense scrutiny in a forum intolerant of equivocation, it also confirmed the worst fear of the US, and other doubters, that the session would create a bandwagon effect and inexorable pressure to support a ban. It was what Foreign Minister Axworthy

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102 Thakur and Manley, 1999, 297.
103 The meeting was held over the period of 3–5 October 1996.
104 Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin noticed that the Ottawa Process was an unthinkable possibility before as “a coalition of NATO members and non-aligned states on security issues would have been all but impossible during the Cold War” (1998, 11).
105 Tomlin shares that “to its essence, the French position boiled down to this: France was prepared to ban landmines, until it needed them” (1998, 201).
called the mobilization of the shame, and it was deliberately intended to move countries in the direction of a ban. (1998, 201)

It was also a moment confirming support for the alliance with civil society organizations and in accepting Williams’s leadership in the subject of the ban related to AP mines. Tomlin further reports,

Lysynshyn surveyed his counterparts around the table, international security bureaucrats like himself from the 50 countries formally attending the meeting. He realized that, of the 50, probably 25 or 30 were simply there to ensure that their governments were represented in the meeting; they neither knew nor cared a great deal about the AP mines issue, nor did they believe particularly in the need for a ban. As a result, they could be expected to follow the lead of the major powers and direct the issue to the CD, where it would be buried. If this was a problem, then Lysyshyn could also see an opportunity unfolding… he could see for the first time how broad the international coalition was on this issue, and he was impressed by the presence of very senior UN officials, there to lend their support to the initiative. (1998, 202–203)

Lysynshyn was an experienced bureaucrat with a strong background in multi-level dialogues gained through another Canadian political leadership global file with the Open Skies negotiations in 1989. As the chair of the 1996 October meeting, he could more easily evaluate the potential risks of Canadian leadership in reference to a MBT. He contacted his boss Assistant Deputy Minister Paul Heinbecker to share that the issue of a ban was ripe but could easily derail and therefore recommended that Canada be the host for follow-up negotiations to conclude an international ban treaty before the end of 1997, but that resources in the order of $2 million would be required for the management of the project. This move was daring, requiring a balance of secrecy, informed support by key civil society organizations, and the approval of the minister of Foreign Affairs. Axworthy approved the suggestion, the budget was confirmed, and both ICRC and ICBL were kept abreast of the intent to close the meeting. The risks were mapped out in terms

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of the anger of major allied nations and “of [Canada’s] grandstanding, failing to consult, and playing outside the rules; and there was a danger that the initiative would fail” (Ibid., 205). Axworthy took the risk. He said, “I have one final point to add to your action plan. That point is to see a treaty signed no later than the end of 1997.” ¹⁰⁷

Cameron suggests that “the extent to which Axworthy was out on a limb should not be underestimated: in effect, his core coalition at that time consisted of NGOs and a handful of states” (1998, 438). The process of negotiation was modified. Neufeld shares that the Ottawa Process changed the consensus requirements used in multilateral negotiations to a “principle of two-thirds majority vote, sacrificed participation in order to keep the content of the treaty intact” (Ibid., 30). In addition, abstaining countries did not have the capacity to block the outcome, and were given the option to sign the treaty at a later date.

In the end, there was no doubt that the 1996 Ottawa conference was competing with the CCW process. Authors such as Dolan and Hunt called it “inexplicable in the context of conventional international relations” (1998, 393). In their view, the Ottawa Process manifested a series of “broken rules” including the radical alliance of state and civil society organizations in which the latter were viewed as integral actors in the negotiations, and a generally inclusive, egalitarian, and participatory democratic process in which “each depended on the other in propagating the ban message” (Ibid., 399). Further, the lowest common denominator approach, a standing operating procedure in international relations (IR) negotiations, was rejected from the inception and was replaced by a set of core positions, based on moral and ethical perspectives that brooked

no compromises. And a middle country rather than a major power was taking the lead. Finally, as momentum had been identified as a determining factor, a period of no more than 14 months was fixed for the process leading to signatures. It seemed as if all the old rules of diplomacy had been overthrown in a single meeting (Ibid., 392–396). The negotiations for this global norm were even held outside the normal channels of the UN institutions. However, the chairman’s action plan did seek a UN General Assembly resolution promoting an international agreement to ban landmines, and on 10 December 1996, UN Resolution 51/45S was passed in the General Assembly by a vote of 156–0, with 10 abstentions.108

Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy gave Austria the task of elaborating a first draft of a ban convention, which according to the standing operating procedures had been previously negotiated between the two nations. Therefore, the second major event is Austria’s leadership in the elaboration of the first draft of a ban convention. The Austrians had noted during previous negotiations that both content and process were of primary order. They were therefore aiming to achieve a simpler and more concise formulation than those of previous disarmament conventions. They knew that the “easiest,” albeit not guaranteed, route to acceptance of a treaty would be to draft for a comprehensive ban. As for the process, they decided that the focus would be “on norm-building by a co-ordinated group of like-minded states rather than on an attempt to reconcile humanitarian and military considerations in a forum that included major mine-users or mine-producers, such as the CCW Review Conference or the […] CD” (Hajnoczi, Desch and Chatsis, 1998, 292).

108 The abstentions included China, Cuba, Israel, Belarus, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Syria, Russia, and Turkey.
However, there was again the concern about derailment by the nations not in favour of the proposed full and inclusive ban and about how best to pre-empt their actions. It was imperative that the right conditions for the decision-making process be created. Hence, the Austrian treaty writing team identified two main issues: “how to get states to comment on the text and incorporate their suggestions without putting the integrity of the draft treaty at risk” (Ibid., 293). They therefore chose to circulate the draft and present it as their own, although it was recognized that “approximately 70 states…had submitted comments, as well as the UN, ICRC and ICBL” (Ibid., 295). On 13 May 1997, they presented a total ban treaty that was a collaborative work, both at a bilateral and multilateral level.\textsuperscript{109} This draft treaty contained 20 articles within 10 pages of text—to be compared with the treaty of the Chemical Weapons Convention which was 172 pages long.\textsuperscript{110}

Halfway through the Ottawa Process, in June 1997, the Belgium conference was held, during which the process of identifying like-minded states and the monitoring of risks carried on. There were more than 130 civil society organizations from 40 countries present.\textsuperscript{111} I view the Belgium conference as an interim step to better position the negotiations in Oslo.

The third major event of the cascading process was the conference in Oslo, in September 1997, during which the final negotiation of the treaty to ban AP mines, or what was then formally called the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,

\textsuperscript{109} The draft had first been negotiated ahead of the conference, on a one-on-one basis between Austria and nations desiring to participate in the elaboration of its content. In itself, the elaboration of this document required mini-cascade at a bilateral level and larger cascade when discussions would require consensus between larger groups on conflicting proposals.

\textsuperscript{110} The Ottawa Convention in \textit{To Walk Without Fear} has 22 articles. Details of the Chemical Weapons Convention can be found here: www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/

\textsuperscript{111} As reported by Williams and Goose, 1998, 41.
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,” was to take place. Once again, the overriding concern over derailing the Ottawa Process directed the planning efforts; securing the presence of the US delegates was seen as a particular challenge. However, despite not having signed the declaration in Brussels, their involvement was confirmed on 18 August 1997.

A total of 85 countries met to transform the draft Austrian treaty into a legally binding convention. The meeting’s opening coincided with the death of Diana, Princess of Wales; a tragic event that nevertheless, thanks to her prior involvement in drawing attention to the problem of land mines, brought the one good with it – ensuring increased media attention to the unfolding process, which in turn created new windows of opportunity for civil society organizations to feed the increased public interest.

A new rule of participation was put in place: it was agreed on the first day that ICBL would have equal status as an observer government; they would have no voting privileges, nor could they present proposals for treaty language, but they would be able to make informal proposals regarding amendments to the language. Williams and Goose believe “that this is the first occasion on which NGOs were given official status in international negotiations of a disarmament/arms control or humanitarian law treaty” (1998, 43).

A major fear was confirmed when the US sought derogation to include some exceptions.$^{112}$ Canada was caught in a position where it looked as if bargaining had become necessary. Yet, ICBL would not shift. There were concerns that a rift would

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$^{112}$ The heads of the US delegation told other diplomats that their package of conditions was in essence non-negotiable and included “a geographic exception for Korea, a change in definition to exempt certain US ‘smart mines’, and a nine-year delay in the effective date of the treaty” (Williams and Goose, 1998, 44).
form, not only between ICBL and the United States, but also internally in the membership of ICBL. However, Canada remained on the non-compromise track mainly due to the fact that the US would not break their package of conditions. President Clinton announced that the US would stop using AP mines in 2006 following the closing of the Oslo conference\(^{113}\) in what Dolan and Hunt called an attempt “to save face” (1998, 415).

Once again, the Ottawa Process recorded a historic first in the way that small and medium powers had come together in Oslo to work in close cooperation with civil society organizations for the common goal of removing an active weapon. In the aftermath of the conference, on 10 October, the Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize jointly to the ICBL and its co-ordinator, Jody Williams. This was another positive step leading to the 1997 Ottawa December conference.

The final milestone event of the Ottawa Process was the December 1997 conference in Ottawa when 122 states signed the Ottawa MBT. The Land Mine Ban Treaty includes 22 articles disposed as follows: article 1 includes general obligations; article 2 provides definitions; articles 3 to 5 are the compliance actions by state parties; articles 6 to 12 are technical responsibilities and guidelines procedures for the execution of compliance actions, and; the remaining articles are procedural specificities of the treaty. The treaty became binding international law on 1 March 1999\(^{114}\) (ICBL, 2012).

\(^{113}\) This presidential promise was never fulfilled.

3.3. Synopsis

The international and local norm entrepreneurs from civil society organizations provided education, dissemination, outreach, and advocacy. They collated facts from different fields of expertise ranging from development, medicine, social justice, faith, peace, refugees and disarmament. They steadily built their legitimacy as experts. They canvassed to increase their numbers and their span of influence, first partnering with other national civil society organizations and then by forming a transnational organization focused on the issues of AP mines. They collectively agreed to focus on the primary goal of a total ban without letting go of all the required activities to sustain their campaign.

The opponents of a complete ban had built their cases and held their ground to control the potential outcome of a ban through numerous meetings held under the leadership of the CCW process and rules. The main issues were over territory and technicalities to make the mines “smarter” or “more humane.” However, military doctrine on security was never absent from the discussions on the control over the ideologies, the technologies, and the economic and political processes. The military-industrial complex and its political agents put up a strong front, and they were in a good position to do so since their interests were represented throughout government departments, such as Defence and Foreign Affairs, in every participating nation. The ideology of military security was at odds with that of human security. This internal battle had to be conquered by every country prior to their support to a proposed treaty.

Five main challenges to a complete ban were identified during the emergence phase, and these were: the perceived legitimacy of the use of AP mines, access to the
negotiations, the content of the treaty, the timing, and the leadership. The identification of each challenge helped to prepare the mitigations measures necessary for a successful cascade process.

The norm entrepreneurs developed a process for reframing the issue of the use of AP mines. It changed from being a military issue to becoming a humanitarian one. While some still clung to the idea that it was a military issue, the reframing helped cast doubts on questions of successful technical replacements and on the cheap costing of lives. The notion of the legitimacy of the use of AP mines shifted during the emergence phase.

Access was a problem in two parts. The first consisted of the restrictions imposed by the CCW process and rules. After years of slow operation with little hope of arriving at an agreement, and in light of the sustained level of injuries suffered by, mainly, civilians in post-conflict zones, a new process was required. It had to be built from outside the UN institutions without alienating them. It is unclear who suggested a parallel process. However, a parallel process was put in place by Canada by first suggesting the “Chairman Agenda’s for Action” in the October 1996 meeting. There was an understanding from the start that there was to be no leverage for abstaining countries to block the outcomes. Participating countries were encouraged to select their representatives themselves rather than default to the usual government officials. The new process rejected the path of consensus and implemented the principle of a two-thirds majority vote to keep the content of the ban intact. It also rejected the lowest denominator model. There was an early regrouping of like-minded countries from the first October meeting. There were other initiatives throughout the Ottawa Process such as the collaborative work in developing the content of the treaty.
The second access struggle consisted in the securing of the participation of civil society representatives in the decision-making processes. The UN appeared as the lead innovator in bringing the expertise of civil society organizations to bear in the removal of the blockages affecting the institution of new rules on AP mines. Canada was next to invite MAC to participate in a CCW meeting in April 1996. There were risks on both sides of the partnership. Both parties analyzed these risks and in the end, the foundations were laid for innovative and evolving attendance by civil society in the cascade phase.

The civil society organizations never stopped their public outreach and therefore were also supporting the political appeal for the complete ban of AP mines. They continuously refreshed and reframed their message to maintain that appeal globally and inclusively by adapting their message to local environments and by following the progress of the campaign.

The third challenge was posed by the content of the treaty. Since only a complete ban would do, there was an understanding that the treaty needed to include a set of core positions framed in a simple and concise document, but there was concern over compliance with such a document. Stopping the “Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines” was essential in stopping the growth of minefields. The issue of due care to victims of mines was a main focus of humanitarian action. As was already mentioned, the process for the drafting of the treaty and the negotiations had to be framed to protect the content. Compromises were introduced at the last hour in Oslo, putting like-minded countries at odds with each other and at odds with their collaborators from civil society. The compromises were not needed in the end, the rifts were healed and the content of the treaty was absolute, as they had intended from the start.
Timing was always at the forefront of concerns. AP mines around the world continued to take their toll, and experts knew that even with a ban in place, it would take decades to clear the existing minefields. A deadline had to be imposed. So it was proposed that the development of a treaty ready for signatures should take no more than 14 months.

Lastly, we have the issue of leadership, which lies at the centre of this research. It is clear that the initial leadership on this issue came from civil society organizations. However, they were very unlikely to ever stand a chance of achieving a cascading of a global norm on their own. It required the leadership of a nation state, and it was Canada that was to play this leadership role throughout the full cascade phase, and has remained a pivotal partner since albeit at a different level.\footnote{As a matter of fact, Canada took a specific lead in mobilising the global community. Once Canada had publicly declared its support of the Ottawa Process, other nations also came forward to share in the work of leadership. These nations were both from the North and the South. First, at a primary level, it was Canada’s official policy to support the MBT. Second, there was leadership invoking a Whole of Government approach that included a global diplomatic push for the Treaty and military leadership in finding alternatives to make it viable. Third was leadership in building partnerships with civil society, becoming a collective exemplar in how this could be done.} One particularly important Canadian in this context was Lloyd Axworthy, who in 1996 was the minister of foreign affairs under the leadership of then Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. At the 1996 Montreal conference, Lloyd Axworthy dared the world to sign the treaty within a year (Williams and Goose, 1998, 34) and responding to his challenge, the 1997 Ottawa Convention brought together 122 countries to officially accept the treaty (Faulkner, 2007, xxiii).
The MBT appears as a rare case of idealism trouncing realism, but one could of course argue that there must by definition be an element of realism in the idealism since the treaty has been in force for the past twenty years.\textsuperscript{116}

The events and processes of the emergence and cascading phases have been summarized in order to provide a context for what follows, namely a quest for the requisite elements of leadership and partnership among the agents of government and civil society. Therefore, the next chapter will introduce the methodology and literature in the fields of leadership and partnership in order to identify the elements of pertinence in the analysis of the anticipated emergence of dynamics leading to a cascade of a norm.

\textsuperscript{116} Although Redekop has argued during the conduct of this research that, “perhaps it would be better to see it as the integration of idealism and realism. Realism is not realistic without acknowledging the role of ideas, values, and ideals that underly action and idealism is not idealistic without acknowledging the kinds of actions that make ideas come to life, including the complex array of factors that contribute to and detract from the goal.”
Chapter 4. Research Methods

In spite of the expected complexity, hidden dynamics, distracting elements, and a wealth of data, I have ensured that the research has stayed focused within the selected theoretical frameworks, while allowing for the emergence of the elements identified as constitutive of the successful completion of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). I began the research process by aiming to validate the research hypothesis, by complementing the three foundational theories of the norm lifecycle process, the integral approach (IA), and mimetic theory, and by recording the evolution of relations and processes observed during the Ottawa Process, in order to provide a model for the replication of cascading where other global security norms are concerned. My objectives were, hence, inductive and exploratory. The two parts of my hypothesis are that: 1) the mapping of the norm leader’s role will allow for a richer understanding of the complexity of the cascade process of global norms; and 2) the integral approach and mimetic theory will, in a combined framework, enable the capture of the leadership and partnership qualities that lead to a successful cascade process.

This chapter provides a systematic and sequential reconstruction of the research process. First, it reviews the methodology, followed by a review of the literature in the fields of leadership and partnership in order to identify the elements of pertinence to the Ottawa Process. A brief review is presented of the qualitative research of available primary sources and in the development of the questionnaire and its outreach plans in support of the interviews. Finally, I provide a preliminary analysis of the anticipated emergence of an understanding of the dynamics involved in the norm change necessary for the approval of the MBT.
4.1 Methodology

The research consists of a qualitative investigation into the applicability of the integrated mapping tool, for identifying the leadership and partnership elements required to cascade a global norm, and for capturing the complexity of the process. The analysis of the case study takes a constructivist approach, relying as it does on personal perceptions of reality or, as Searle words it, the premise of the construction of social reality (1995). The case study aims both to contribute to an intrinsic understanding of the MBT and to use it instrumentally to provide insight into the processes and relations between individuals, representing different interests, perspectives, and levels of influence and power.

The primary goal of this qualitative research is to identify and understand the particulars of leadership and partnership that contributed to the success of the process. In order to understand the complexity of the decision-making process in the most complete way possible, I used two methods of data collection: the review and analysis of texts as well as interviews. The material was gathered with the underlying motive of attempting to answer the critical questions of “who,” “what,” “when,” and “why” as they apply to the procedural and relational facts at hand.

The literature review was limited to Canadian and UN documents, articles and books covering the emergence and the cascading period of the MBT. The events leading to the emergence of the treaty were mapped in order to fully comprehend along what axis the conflict was situated, what the overall context was, and who the major proponents leading the establishment of this new norm were. The focus was the four major moments: 1) the announcement of the Ottawa Process challenge; 2) the development of a draft
treaty; 3) the negotiations on the treaty; and 4) the signatures confirming the legitimacy of the treaty. The research primarily isolated some Canadian actors of those key events to examine their roles, challenges, leadership opportunities and involvement in a number of partnerships’ dynamics.

Since a framing process or a relational approach could result in missing the synergy of a combined approach, I selected the combination of the integral approach (IA) theory and mimetic theory to provide a better prospect for the identification of key elements. The flexibility of these two main theories allows for the inclusion of concepts of relational and process dynamics often otherwise seen as incompatible by various schools of thought, which have traditionally focused on e.g. individualistic or collective aspects, subjective or objective perspectives. The IA framework provides a way of anchoring various theories within four specific dimensions to include the interior–individual, the exterior–individual, the interior–collective and the exterior–collective. These dimensions, called quadrants, support the mapping of the complexity of an event, conflict or, in this case, the role and actions of agents, or norm entrepreneurs, during the approval process of a new set of rules and behaviours, while mimetism theory seeks a deeper understanding of the dynamics of relationships.

The quadrants encouraged containment, through the enforced choice of a limited number of indicators. This containment was essential to avoid digressions caused by the overwhelming amount of data on the MBT. The next section introduces the construction of an integrated mapping tool.
4.1.1. Integrated Map

I built an integrated mapping tool using the three theoretical frameworks of the norm lifecycle model as it related to the cascade process, mimetic dynamics, and the foundational quadrants of the integrated approach as used in the Integral Conflict. The goal of the tool was to collect the information on the leadership and actions of designated norm leaders to trace the complexities of the cascade phase. In order to validate said tool, I used it to analyze the data gleaned both from literature in the field and from individual in-depth structured interviews in order to draw conclusions about the processes that led to the instigation and adoption of the MBT. The constructed map supported the validation of the research’s selected two-part hypothesis: 1) the mapping of the Norm Leader’s role allows for a richer understanding of the complexity of the cascading of global norms; and 2) the integral approach and mimetism under a combined framework will enable the capture of the leadership and partnership qualities leading to a successful cascade process.

4.1.2. Indicators

The crux of the integrated mapping tool is the selection of indicators to map each quadrant leading to the choice of questions to test the research hypothesis. These indicators are meant to support the understanding of the relevant actions and thoughts of the norm leaders during the cascade process, i.e. during the convincing of other nations to approve and sign a global treaty.

My selected indicators were all exploratory in nature. However, they were also contained within the structure of the IA framework, each to a quadrant related to individual, collective, interior, and/or exterior aspects of leadership behaviour and the
potential for relationships in terms of the partnerships under review in this research. The indicators were also limited by the choice of theories; elements related to the cascade and mimetic processes were identified in each quadrant. The framing of the research through individual indicators enabled the study of a complex global issue such as the decision-making process among nations. The placing of my indicators within quadrants provided meaning through positioning in addition to identifying their potential as contributors to the dynamics of norm cascade.

The IA framework can support the inclusion of other theories to take on the same issue of leadership and partnership, or use the same theories to concentrate on more detailed aspects, such as, for example, the impact of the contemporary French and British elections during the Ottawa Process or the correlation between the availability of participant funding and the ability to bring the project to its conclusion.

The indicators identified in Figure 4.1 are sourced from the three theories presented in Chapter 2.

**Figure 4.1 – The Proposed Indicators for the Mapping Tool**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Upper Left</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual and Interior</strong></td>
<td><strong>Individual and Exterior</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIND</strong></td>
<td>–Individual social interactions, mediation, and behavioural interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I – Being</strong></td>
<td><strong>IT – Doing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of the cascade process:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- issues of morals;</td>
<td>- issues of mandate and actions;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- issues of challenges, limitations;</td>
<td>- issues of success and regrets; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>perceived keys to personal success; and</td>
<td>- issues of legacy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- issues of perceived success and regrets.</td>
<td>Mimetic Dynamics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mimetic Dynamics</strong></td>
<td>- Potential for McGuidan and Popp’s “dance of conflict resolution”</td>
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<tr>
<td>- potential for ‘Exemplar’; and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- mimetic competition for leadership</td>
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<td>Lower Left</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Collective and Interior</strong>&lt;br&gt;TEAM LEVEL: worldview, culture and social justice&lt;br&gt;<strong>WE – Subjectively relating</strong></td>
<td><strong>Collective and Exterior</strong>&lt;br&gt;TEAM LEVEL: social structures and collective social interactions&lt;br&gt;<strong>WE – Objectively interacting</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complexities of the cascade process:<br>- issues of collective internal team work (culture).<br><br>Mimetism Dynamics<br>- issue(s) of “object of desire”;<br>- issues of exclusion or differentiation;<br>- mimetic appropriation of values; and<br>- passions for the cause<br>- issues of conflicts or perceived conflicts and conflict resolution;<br>- issues of alliances, requests and compromises;<br>- collective strategies;<br>- issues of external teams (friends and opponents); and<br>- and strategies for success.<br><br>Mimetism Dynamics<br>- issue(s) of “objects of desire” and rivalry;<br>- issues of exclusion or differentiation; and<br>- evidence of mimetic creativity a positive contagion

These key indicators formed the basis for the review of all selected written documents and the final development of the questionnaire. The vast majority of the information related to the collective quadrants was gathered through publicly available documents. The information related to the individual quadrants, on the other hand, was collected through interviews. As the informants/interviewees were known actors easily identifiable, a level of sensitivity and confidentiality has been used in this publishing. I will further the development of the quadrants in chapter 5.

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117 There were many levels of team or collectivity: the Government team, the civil society team, the interaction among teams from different countries, and the multi-lateral collective at various gatherings and at the UN.
4.2. Literature Review on Leadership and Partnership

In order to properly capture and analyze the dynamics of leadership and partnership, I have selected a number of books and articles, by scholars as well as other authors, including writers of popular business books in order to identify emerging trends. Even though the Ottawa Process was completed 20 years ago, many interviewees used qualifiers proper to the present-day understanding of leadership and partnership so it seemed apt to include recent publications. This literature review was done in part to help develop the questionnaire, but it was only finalized following the interviews as some elements, such as trust, were mentioned frequently, while other organizational dynamics, such as silos, turned out to never be mentioned.

4.2.1. Leadership

The study of leadership has been evolving from the times of Plato and Socrates when the focus was mainly on military or political fields. Leadership was at that time defined in terms of the top position for individuals. Today thousands of books in the field of leadership can be found that include premises involving people within family, collectives, organizations, and nations. The contexts have also expanded to include commerce, sciences, arts, and others. The variables in the field of leadership are so many that it creates confusion and the word ‘leadership’ appears to lack the power it once implied. One positive aspect from my perspective is that there has been a drastic change in the tenets of leadership from the earliest Western notion of leadership as power over someone to power with someone, where the leader’s strength is a source of inspiration. This shift in perception has created a different work environment for followers who also appear to have evolved from being considered automatons to contributors, and even
intentional leaders. Whether self-empowered or empowered through directions, the intent to lead a norm change is a remarkable quality, as it will be described here. Canada became such an intentional leader. In an act of transformation, first through the collective reflections by small groups independently on the possibilities of leading, and then by coming together as part of the Canadian coalition, Canada emerged as the first intentional national leader. A few definitions will first define the field of the intentional leader that I have here renamed the norm leader.

The Canadian military has defined ten key points of leadership. However, in my twenty years as an officer, the main characteristic was to “lead by example.” This particular attribute led me to explore whether the definition of the exemplar as proposed under the mimetic theory was indeed a key to understanding the dynamics of this relationship often defined in an asymmetric power environment. This question is addressed throughout this chapter.

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118 I borrowed this expression from Franklin Holtforster, president of Colliers Project Leaders, a project management firm in Ottawa. Holtforster developed a course for Canadian public servants aimed at helping managers at all levels to feel empowered by the trust embedded in their position. The objectives were, first, to learn to trust their skills and knowledge to take on the ownership of issues at hand and, then, to step forward in situations where there is a lack of hierarchical leadership and a pressing need for decisions.


120 I am a retired army lieutenant-colonel in the Canadian Military Engineers and therefore have had substantial training and education in leadership unlike that of any other Canadian institution. I subsequently became an executive member of the public service in the Government of Canada, holding various financial and managerial positions. Since then, I’ve worked as a senior project leader for the private sector. I was a Green Party candidate in the federal elections of 2008 and 2011. I have been a volunteer in the sectors of environment and peace throughout my career. I’m presently (in 2018) a senior advisor to the Canadian government. I choose to work both with government and civil society because I have belonged to both, on and off, often concurrently. I only once had to choose between my job and my values and I left. I have never found a conflict of interest to arise as a result of my involvement with the government and civil society. I find, to the contrary, that there is opportunity for more mutual connection and contribution.
Since the 80s, styles of leadership have included autocratic, participative, and adaptive leadership. The type of leadership could affect the different stages of the cascade process, such as knowing when and how to lead and when to coach, challenge, and co-create; when to stand firm and when to fade into the background letting others shine. Since the field of leadership is continuously evolving to understand the successes and failures of individuals and organizations, emerging trends were reviewed to better qualify my observations. I reviewed these new trends so that my own military, bureaucratic, and political filters would not bias my analysis. To this end, I selected the following literature.

As described in Chapter 2, the advent of the MBT was not simply a case of a weapon having outrun its ethical time. The scope of the treaty (including the production, stockpiling, etc. of the mines) and its complexity required a search for an equally complex solution and required not only an innovative approach but also outstanding norm leaders. Thus, this chapter on leadership focuses on the particular triggers for the emergence and growth of these norm leadership characteristics.

*Wicked & Wise: How to Solve the World’s Toughest Problems* by Watkins and Wilber (2015) analyses today’s complex problems as well as possible solutions by using Wilber’s Integral Approach (IA). The difficult problems of the 21st century are analyzed as being complex according to six key properties: “they are multi-dimensional, they have multiple stakeholders, multiple causes, multiple symptoms, multiple solutions, and they are constantly evolving” (2015, 16). The authors write, “at the epicenter of every wicked problem are human relationships and social interactions. And unfortunately human beings are usually not very good at either” (Ibid., 59). Thus, the four quadrants of IA
allow for the capture of the essential elements for resolution. Although the MBT was not technically a “wicked problem,”\textsuperscript{121} using the concept helps to identify the stakeholders and the constant evolution. Indeed, the 14-month cascade process saw the evolution of the extent and content of the treaty and the difficulty agreeing on the basis concept of the definition of an AP mine until the end of the Oslo conference, barely three months before the signature of the treaty in December 1997.

Also contributing to the understanding of the concept of the norm leader is Watkins and Wilber’s review of the level of development of the human and organizational agency, in which the highest levels (7 & 8) demonstrate heightened levels of meaning and the “emergence of second tier value systems [that offer] hope that we can overcome the current global ‘Culture Wars’” (2015, 88). Since participants in a project or a cascade process all operate from different levels of consciousness, affecting their sense of meaning around issues of culture, it is essential that the norm leaders be in a position to know and work with the human needs of all involved. These leaders need to operate from these highest levels. The capacity for adaptability is hence a necessary trait for a norm leader.

In \textit{Immunity to Change: How to Overcome It and Unlock the Potential in Your Self and Your Organization} (2009), Kegan and Lahey define the markers and triggers that act as impediments to bringing about required changes in order to overcome them to achieve success.\textsuperscript{122} They argue that leaders must find the means to grow into our future.

\textsuperscript{121} Whereas a wicked problem with multiple causes is a global concern, such as the end of poverty or the resolution of climate change, I would argue that there was only the one cause of AP mines in the MBT.

\textsuperscript{122} Kegan had previously conducted detailed research on the development of consciousness levels in \textit{In Over Our Head} and \textit{The Evolving Self} (1994), as it pertains to the demands of modern life and the problems and processes of human development.
possibilities because “human capability will be the critical variable in the new century” (2009, 11). Using the plateaus in adult mental development\textsuperscript{123} they define the self-transforming mind as one with the ability for self-reflection on personal limits, the possibilities of contradictions and opposites, and the capacity to hold multiple systems of thought. They share that people with transforming minds “are seeking information that may lead them or their team to enhance, refine, or alter the original design or make it more inclusive. Information sending is not just on behalf of driving it; it is also to remake the map or reset the direction” (2009, 20). The ability for transformation is an indicator retained for the evaluation of a norm leader.

In \textit{Leading from the Emerging Future: From Ego-System to Eco-System Economies} (2013), Scharmer and Kaufer introduce the Theory of U, for the evolution of individuals and organizations, returning to a premise of the well-being of the whole, thereby creating a more resilient, inclusive, and aware agent. They describe symptoms of systemic disconnect. Although their focus is on the economic system I consider many of the symptoms to be equally applicable to the field of global security: disconnect between the security system and the real needs, disconnect between the infinite growth imperative and the finite resources, disconnect between Haves and Have Nots, disconnect between institutional leadership and people, disconnect between weapon arsenals and well-being, disconnect between governance and the voiceless in our systems, and disconnect between technology and real societal needs.\textsuperscript{124} They write: “bridging the gap between eco-system

\textsuperscript{123} In an attempt to define levels of consciousness similar to that used in the IA theory of Wilber. 
\textsuperscript{124} The authors’ original disconnects are: disconnect between the financial and the real economy, disconnect between the infinite growth imperative and the finite resources, disconnect between Haves and Have Nots, disconnect between institutional leadership and people, disconnect between gross domestic product (GDP) and well-being, disconnect between governance and the
reality and ego-system awareness is the main challenge of leadership today… The goal must be to co-sense, co-inspire, and co-create an emerging future for their system that values the well-being of all rather than just a few” (2013, 12). These last abilities are equally valid criteria for norm leaders’ abilities and roles.

*Primal Leadership: Unleashing the Power of Emotional Intelligence* (2013) by Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee, argues that “the fundamental task of leaders…is to prime good feeling in those they lead. That occurs when a leader creates *resonance*—a reservoir of positivity that frees the best in people. At its roots, then, the primal job of leadership is emotional” (2013, xiii). They propose that an emotionally intelligent leader will “inspire, arouse passion and enthusiasm, and keep people motivated and committed” (Ibid., xiv). They question “how do leaders create an emotional climate that fosters creative innovations, all-out performance, or warm and lasting customer relationships?” (Ibid., xv). Their research provides insights for agents in a distributed leadership environment. These indicators and insights have also guided my analysis.\(^{125}\)

*Co-active Leadership: Five Ways to Lead* (2015) by Karen and Henry Kimsey-House, provides concepts with which to define the field of shared leadership, which has been mentioned as key to the success of the Canadian coalition. While the book is about voiceless in our systems, disconnect between actual ownership forms and best societal use of property, and disconnect between technology and real societal needs (2013, 6).\(^{125}\) In particular Appendix B on Emotional Intelligence and Leadership Competencies: self-awareness (emotional self-awareness, accurate self-awareness, and self-confidence), self-management (self-control, transparency, adaptability, achievement, initiative, and optimism), social awareness (empathy, organizational awareness, and service), and relationship management (inspiration, influence, developing others, change catalyst, conflict management, and teamwork and collaboration). While not all these indicators have been retained in the research, those in resonance with the thoughts shared by interviewees were retained.
leadership, in my view it is even more about partnership and will be referred to here and in the following two chapters.

Lencioni’s organizational books *The Five Dysfunctions of a Team: A Leadership Fable* and *Silos, Politics and Turf Wars: A Leadership Fable about Destroying the Barriers that Turn Colleagues into Competitors* (2006) provide indicators of successful teams and their leaders. I have used the indicators related to teams in my chapter on partnership and the indicators of leadership in the final three chapters of this thesis.

*René Girard and Creative Mimesis* (Redekop and Ryba, 2014) offers insights into human development, originality, and competition, as well as philosophical and scientific perspectives on the mimetic dynamics that support the role of the norm leader. The concept of Exemplar was defined in Chapter 3 in a way to help select indicators for success. Opportunities for creativity are key to finding solutions at a higher level of consciousness than was present when the issue first came about.\textsuperscript{126} Imagination is retrained to identify these opportunities. Girard’s theory is based on the dynamic that desire is always modeled on the desires of another, making it always a demonstration of mimesis. Leadership, in its basic definition of influence, is to entrain others to willingly accept the vision of the leader. The object of desire is the attainment of this vision when credit can be given to the followers or the co-leader for their contribution to that end. Emotions are strong indicators of the dynamics of mimesis.

\textsuperscript{126} Einstein is cited for saying “No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.” Or, as apparently more appropriately quoted to Einstein, “our situation is not comparable to anything in the past. It is impossible, therefore, to apply methods or measures which at an earlier age might have been sufficient. We must revolutionize our thinking, revolutionize our actions, and must have the courage to revolutionize relations among nations of the world. Cliches of yesterday will not longer do today, and will, no doubt, be hopelessly out of date tomorrow” (Green, 2003, 52).
However, it is above all O’Dea’s book, *The Conscious Activist* (2014), that has retained my attention with its definitions of the indicators of norm leadership, as it provides for a more integrated understanding of transformation and the challenges of self in the context of important societal changes reaching beyond the borders of a specific nation. His focus is on activism, and I contend that the mandate of the Canadian coalition was very much an activist challenge that can be compared to practical transformations such as the end of slavery and the advent of feminism.\(^{127}\) In addition, I argue that the norm leader in a global context is a high-consciousness leader, as he or she must learn to navigate constantly evolving levels of complexity. O’Dea shares:

> Our moral development is linked to our belief about the world—it is a journey from exclusive self-interest to inclusivity and serving the *common* interest. Along the way we are invited to re-define *self* and other until we learn to treat other as self. To reach this degree of mature development requires a high level of integration. (2014, 138)

In a similar manner, Watkins and Wilber share that,

> the cultivation of wisdom in this sense refers to a means of personal transformation, an expansion of our individual and collective consciousness, more constructive and positive relationships, and a more complete understanding of the way we relate to our world. In essence, there are three dimensions to wisdom; subjective (‘I’), interpersonal (‘WE’), and objective (‘IT’). (2015, 58)

From these books on leadership, especially *The Conscious Activist*, I have chosen to retain the following seven indicators to be further developed in the chapter on leadership: imagination; courage and audacity; authenticity through emotional leadership;\(^{127}\)

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\(^{127}\) While books on partnerships on global norm changes such as *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* often focus on civil society organizations’ (CSO’s) contributions, it is clear that the historical societal norm changes that precipitated the end of slavery and the advent of feminism required a partnership between government and CSO to cascade and, hence, to succeed.
adaptability; ability to connect and share; credibility through knowledge, skills, and expertise; and, finally, strength, dedication, and passion.

Since leadership is essential, but not on its own sufficient, to cascade a new norm, the next section will explore the impact of partnership on the cascade process.

4.2.2. Partnership

Partnerships are formed at all levels of society for different reasons and are akin to social contracts between political partners. In order to identify the characteristics of an organizational partnership and the keys for successful norm partnerships, the next three sections look at the relational and process dynamics for successful project management, business mergers, and conflicting partnerships.

4.2.2.1. Dynamics of Project Management

The Project Management Institute (PMI) is the world’s leading project management organization with over 450,000 global members and over 280 local chapters internationally. In their Project Management Professional Handbook, they describe the eight certifications required to manage successful planning and execution of project and program management. Their focus is on equipping interdisciplinary teams, with members with different roles, toward a shared intent. The PMI’s standards are in use in North America. The Canadian government regularly seeks the qualification of Project Management Professional (PMP) in the consultants it hires for its real estate projects.

A typical project under the framework of PMI would usually have one designated leader. PMPs are familiar with the project management framework and therefore

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128 PMI’s web site is [www.pmi.org](http://www.pmi.org)
130 An additional qualification of a PMP is risk management, which has been retained as a characteristic in norm leadership and will be discussed in chapter 6.
understand their roles. They are members of a multidisciplinary team and experience has taught everyone where and when their contribution is required. The project goal is made clear and is agreed upon by signature of all parties through a project charter. The client is also a signatory of this charter to ensure that the goal is well defined, that the risks are accepted in advance and will be managed by all in good faith. The members share the same contextual language. The planning and execution phases have defined and detailed tasks associated with them. Process tools include a charter, a project schedule, a project risk matrix, and a communications plan that provides for detailed internal and external information and anticipated communications products.

In the Canadian government, if the project is unusual, complex, and/or highly “political,” the team will be under the stewardship of a Governance Committee and terms of reference will clearly identify their oversight roles and responsibilities.

The project management process supports the understanding of key organizational components to lead a project to completion once the partners have agreed to a project charter. The project charter clearly stipulates the intent, the organizational structure, the roles and responsibilities, and the expectations regarding time, schedule, and scope. The PMI’s project elements prove to be useful and valuable process requirements also for norm partnership to succeed. The nine elements of project management according to the PMI process include the management of the project integration, scope, time, cost, risk, quality, procurement, HR, and communications.

Since the PMI’s process does not put specific focus on the essentials of the relationship between members, other than the management of human resource components, other organizational partnerships will have to be evaluated to have a better
model for comparison with the dynamics of partnerships observed during the Ottawa Process. The dynamics of business mergers are reviewed next, since the construction of a norm partnership is usually formed between existing organizations. The dynamics of the ramping up of a business merger are of interest in discovering organizational catalysts to the cascade process.\textsuperscript{131}

4.2.2.2. Dynamics of Business Mergers

Studying the dynamics of mergers in business partnerships helps to identify keys to its success beyond great leadership. Doing so is straightforward as there is no shortage of organizational business literature. Two books were particularly helpful from a reversed engineering perspective because they focused on dysfunctions rather than successes and therefore emphasized the “unseen.” These books are Lencioni’s \textit{The Five Dysfunctions of a Team} (2002) and \textit{Silos, Politics and Turf Wars: A Leadership Tale about Destroying the Barriers that Turn Colleagues Into Competitors} (2006).

First, Lencioni proposes five dysfunctions of trust in the model of an interrelating pyramid where the first dysfunction rests at the bottom and the last one sits at the top. He defines the first dysfunction at the bottom of the pyramid as an \textit{absence of trust} among team members, essentially stemming from their unwillingness to be vulnerable within the group. The \textit{failure to build trust} in the team creates the second dysfunction, as \textit{fear of conflict} makes team members incapable of engaging in unfiltered and passionate debates about ideas. A lack of healthy conflict then causes the third dysfunction, namely a \textit{lack of commitment} as team members withdraw from sharing and arguing their opinions openly and feigning agreement where none exists. This lack of real commitment creates the

\textsuperscript{131} Even though it is noted that unlike successful business mergers, norm partnerships are often disestablished once the goal has been achieved.
conditions for the development of an *avoidance of accountability* with regard to shared goals and actions. The failure of accountability leads to the fifth dysfunction, the *inattention to results*, where the common goal is lost to self-interest. Any one of these dysfunctions will affect the whole.\(^\text{132}\)

In his second book, Lencioni tells the story of a fictitious dysfunctional merger. In his fable, the merger was a surprise and there was no immediate plan of action in terms of how the jobs would be allocated, except that everyone was to continue doing his or her job until otherwise advised. However, dysfunctions appeared rather quickly, not least as a result of the silos—the “departmental politics and territoriality within organizations”\(^\text{133}\) (2006, vii)—that soon appeared. He shares that the “turf wars” between the silos generate organizational dysfunctions; they “waste resources, kill productivity and jeopardize the achievement of goals” (Ibid., viii) while at the same time causing individual “frustration, stress, and disillusionment by forcing employees to fight bloody, unwinnable battles with people who should be their teammates” (Ibid., ix). His solution to bring about alignment and sanity, and move away from avoidance and denial as a best course of action, is to break down the walls and regularly create thematic goals with fixed timelines, clear objectives, and standard operating objectives with metrics.

In describing attuned organizations working in unity, he cites the example of a hospital emergency operating room: calmness, speed, decisiveness, responsiveness from the staff, a known and followed process for making decisions, required actions and an

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\(^{132}\) According to Lencioni, members of a positive and truly cohesive team: 1) trust one another, 2) engage in unfiltered conflicts around ideas, 3) commit to decisions and plans of action, 4) hold one another accountable for delivering against those plans, and 5) focus on the achievement of collective results (2002, 189–190).

\(^{133}\) Lencioni also extends his definition of silos to include “infighting or lack of divisional cooperation” (2006, 43). This aspect of his definition was not retained here.
emphasis on the immediate correction of errors, and an overall “bizarre and beautiful mix of chaos, coordination, and communication” (Ibid., 90). He lays the responsibility for the continued existence of silos with the corporate leadership. In his search for the resolution of the problem of silos and the creation of more organizational unity, Lencioni finds that crises are triggers that either break silos apart or, at the extreme end, break the entire organization apart by creating thicker silos. Therefore, it would seem that to successfully break silos in newly formed partnerships, management should deal with issues in a crisis mode.

Finally, Lencioni mentions the notion of satisfiers—the idea of sharing in the bonuses among teams in one organization (2006, 70 and 109), leading one to wonder about the satisfiers in the Ottawa Process partnership.

While some of the dynamics of a business merger can be said to have been applicable to the Ottawa Process partnership, the parties of the Canadian coalition had the potential for a more conflictual relationship than two businesses with similar or complementary commercial objectives looking to merge would be expected to have. Indeed, the Canadian coalition was constructed of two organizations with different worldviews (and different organizational structures) where one, the Civil Society Organization (CSO), was created to criticize the other, i.e. the government. Therefore, their usual dynamic of interaction would have been closer to one of conflict than one would expect of the parties in a business merger.

It would be interesting to extrapolate the notion of accountability and responsibility of “global silos” as part of a future research project on the dynamics of global normative change.
4.2.2.3. Dynamics of Conflicting Partnerships

In Chapter 2, I presented McGuigan and Popp’s concept of the “dance of conflict resolution.” This process of two conflicting parties coming together to resolve their issues creates a space for the emergence of reconciliation that allows for a normative change to occur. They called the process a “dance” to provide us an image of the work required for two worldviews to come together. Their project—bringing parties to resolve a conflict over fishing quotas—took 11 years of training, education, research, and one-on-one and collective sessions. Over time, the worldviews and the cultural ideologies were shared in a space that felt secure enough for all parties to trust that they would be respected and to allow creativity to flourish. McGuigan and McMechan were hired to act as facilitators as the members of the conflicting parties were unable to designate any of their own members to fulfill this role.

Indeed, the members of the parties had had little to no opportunity of getting to know “the others.” Although they were involved in the same issues of access to and confirmation of fishing rights, their cultural bias had resulted in their viewing each other as “enemies.” Each party was doing what it could to stop the other from enjoying the right to fish. They were mutually involved in actions and crises that built ever stronger resentment. The positive feedback loop had reinforced the animosity between the parties and the ongoing mimetic dynamics were generating new degrees of negative emotions and reasons to perpetuate the division.

This dance process is in itself a mini-cascade as it may encourage another to step forward. Here, following the conflict scenario drawn up by McGuigan and McMechan, the work of the facilitator acts as catalyst or reinforcement in a process of change.
Emotions such as hope and passion might also, when expressed, influence the engagement process. The dance comes together organically when a shared intent has formed the basis of the partnership; when the conflicting parties at first have opposing intentions, it is necessary to construct a dynamic with rules of agreements and rules of engagement (ROEs).

Watkins and Wilber share that “each stakeholder group therefore views the problem differently; they have different motives, opinions, and objectives and will invariably stand behind a version of the ‘truth’ that suits their purpose, while simultaneously dismissing all others” (2015, 29–30). The secret of a great relationship, according to Watkins and Wilber, is the ability to perceive “the second person perspective,” the “You” (2015, 33). It is the ability to temporarily step outside the first person perspective—to disregard what the “I” thinks, wants, or demands—and exchange one’s own personal rationale for an objective (third-person) perspective. When different groups are unwilling to meet in the middle, they are stuck in a shallow dialogue of “parallel monologues” (Ibid., 33). They need to set aside the “I” and look for the shared and the mutual.

Understanding the dynamics of relations and process in building partnerships—through the lenses of PMI, business mergers, and conflictual partnerships—supports the identification of process elements. I selected the following five main requirements for norm partnership: 1) the selection and maintenance of a shared intent; 2) the maintenance of trust; 3) shared leadership; 4) shared risk; and 5) the selection of ROEs. With the chosen characteristics for leadership and partnership, indicators were developed for each
quadrants of the mapping tool to act as building blocks for the development of the questionnaire, and later, in the analysis of documents and interviews.

4.3. Researching the Ottawa Process

The investigation started with a literature review followed by an interview process. The literature was limited to Canadian and UN documents, articles, and books covering the emergence and cascading period of the MBT. The focus was on the four major moments of the announcement of the Ottawa Process challenge; the development of a draft treaty; the negotiations on the treaty; and the signatures confirming the legitimacy of the treaty. The research primarily isolated some Canadian actors of those key events to examine their roles, challenges, leadership opportunities, and involvement in a number of partnership dynamics. In the following, I focus on the lead-up to the construction of the questionnaire, as well the preliminary selection of interviewees.

4.3.1. Ottawa Process Literature Review

The case study is defined in Chapter 2. The MBT has been the source of numerous studies over the years. The book *Walk Without Fear* (Cameron et al 1998) provided a series of articles on the Canadian perspective from government, civil societies, and academia, recording personal experiences and lessons. In a similar fashion, *Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security* (Williams et al 2008) provided a timely discourse of the achievements of the MBT and its continued promises in the field of AP mines and its potential to affect other disarmament files.

*Moral Entrepreneurs and the Campaign to Ban Landmines* (2007) is Faulkner’s analysis of the inter-disciplinary dialogue to securely create a space for cross-disciplinary insights and perspectives of contributors at all levels. His moral entrepreneurs face a
multitude of challenges, and the strength of their passion and willingness for partnership provides the right chemistry to affect the global system. His in-depth review of theoretical political theories for IR, and those theoretical aspects affecting the debate on the use of AP mines, support the understanding of how members of the grassroots movements were for the first time brought to the negotiation table not just as informants but as colleagues.

*Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control – Interests, Conflicts, and Justice*, (Müller, 2013) provides a series of articles on norm conflicts, norm dynamics, and external drivers of norm dynamics, and concludes with an article on the centrality of agency. As first seen in Chapter 2, norm changes start with an entrepreneur and his or her relations.

Even though lessons of leadership and partnership percolate through these texts, these elements have not been specifically assessed. It might have been difficult at the time to assess the level of individual and societal transformation required to achieve the success of the MBT as it is known today.

The knowledge of change dynamics and of the roles of leadership and partnership are better developed now than they were twenty years ago. However, only those

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135 He emphasizes the aspect of fear generated by AP mines.
136 Faulkner’s analysis gives more credit to ICBL than I do. I decided to focus on the coalition between the Canadian government and Mine Action Canada (MAC). However, one of my interviewees also gives credit to International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL): “in my view the land mines treaty would not have happened without the ICBL.”
137 Wisotzky’s article “Humanitarian Arms Control: The Anti-Personnel Mine-Ban Treaty, the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions” is critical of the MBT’s lack of universality. However, she acknowledges that norm conflicts did not stop its operationalization and that norm dynamics allow for a continuous execution and monitoring (2008, 89).
participating in the process can share deep insightful information of these dynamics in action.

### 4.3.2. Interview Process

So, what took place during that exceptional year to accelerate the process of approval of the MBT? Who were the actors and what were the actions that resulted in the successful worldwide implementation of an agenda driven by Canadian politicians? Who were the actors challenging the Ottawa Process? What were their arguments and what were the perceived impacts on the process? How did the pro-treaty actors counterbalance these arguments? How did the pro-treaty actors increase their numbers throughout the process to reach the tipping point required to move into the next phase of the norm lifecycle, that of operationalization?

In order to collect answers to the above questions, I considered members holding senior positions within the national political, bureaucratic and civil society contexts and mapped their mandates, their actions, and their thinking both individually and collectively during the Ottawa Process.

Muller’s typologies of state actors provide for different political worldviews that include not only national interest, moral righteousness, and sovereignty, but also security perspectives on colonialist behaviour and economic injustices. Muller shows how issues of fear and shame arise from particular security dilemmas, affecting the choices of nations, such as the prioritization of alliances and the decision to accept and operationalize new norms (2013).

It could be argued that it is the *raison d’être* of civil society to be a challenger of norms. Other agents of change are political parties seeking to gain and hold power and
represent the people. In choosing to interview representatives from both government and civil society, I hoped to locate the emergent catalyst powerful enough to create the multi-leveled cascading sub-groups within nations that in turn propel the dynamics of cascade internationally.

The interviews were key to investigating the motivations and considerations of the actors involved in the events. They brought to light the individual challenges, mitigation measures, and plans that arose on the path toward the approval of the new norm. The interviews uncovered the oft mysterious dynamics of mimesis.

A semi-structured questionnaire was used for the open-ended interview. All the selected interviewees were directly involved in the cascading process of the MBT as nominated representatives of their respective collectives (either government or civil society). Hence, the interviewees were comprised of former politicians and bureaucrats as well as representatives from civil societies. Over thirty candidates were approached to participate in the research and twelve agreed to participate as listed in Annex D.

4.3.2.1. Questionnaire

The questionnaire was built to consider each indicator with a view to potentially address the many questions of the dynamics of negotiations involved in the cascade period, such as: Is the individual important in the formation of a global norm, or are they simply an actor with a designated mandate? What of the meaning-making or the cultural-shaping process underlined by McGuigan and Popp (2016) when representing a nation or an organization?

The enclosed questionnaire consists of a list of open-ended questions developed to explore the dynamics of leadership and partnership, as located in each quadrant of the
IA mapping tool, with a view to capture the dynamics of the cascade and mimetism processes. Although the questions are designed to address the characteristics located within specific quadrants, it was expected that some of the answers provided by the interviewees would, and indeed did, stray into the territories of other quadrants. A brief summary of the meaning of the quadrants is offered in Figure 4.2.

**Figure 4.2. – Meaning of the IA Quadrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UL – Culture, mind, and social justice</td>
<td>Qualitative interpretation, meaning-making and values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR – Behaviour</td>
<td>How individuals interact with each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL – Individual social interactions within groups, mediation and corporate cultures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR – Social structures and collective social interactions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaire featured four main sections—opening questions of a personal nature, questions on leadership, questions on partnerships, and closing questions. All mentions of the quadrants were avoided in the questionnaire provided to the interviewees. The questions follow:

1. **Personal role**

1.1. What was your title, mandate and key objective(s) with regard to the project of the MBT? (UR Quadrant)

1.2. What did you find significant about your role? (UR Quadrant)

1.3. What type of training did you have as a mediator, facilitator or negotiator prior to your involvement in this process? If so, please provide details (UR Quadrant)

1.4. Who were the negotiators working for you, how many people and what were their main areas of responsibility? (LR quadrant)

1.5. What were your one or two personal biggest keys to success? (UR Quadrant)

1.6. What sort of regrets if any, could you could share? (UL quadrant)

1.7. What sort of personal conflicts on the process, if any, could you share? (UR Quadrant)
1.8. Were there, for you personally, important issues of social justice and/or morals? (LL quadrant)

1.9. Were there personal changes in your identity, culture or values during the period of the Ottawa Process? (LL quadrant)

2. Leadership

2.1. What do you feel you and your team were able to accomplish with regard to the project of the Landmine Treaty? (UL quadrant)

2.2. The MBT stands as a “Beacon of Light” in global norms for its rapidity and its effectiveness even without the alignment of all major powers – can you speak of the Leadership required to achieve this success? (LR Quadrant)

2.3 As an actor in the Ottawa Process, what were your leadership style and personal challenges? (UL quadrant)

2.4. Can you speak of your biggest inspiration? (UL quadrant)

3. Partnership

3.1. Who were your most significant allies nationally and internationally? (LR Quadrant)

3.2. Could you share your personal experience of the partnership between the politicians, bureaucrats and representatives from the civil societies? (UL quadrant)

3.3. How would you define this relationship over the period of October 1996 to December 1997? (LR Quadrant)

3.4. As a collective, how were the meetings among peers and within partnerships to discuss the project? (LR Quadrant)

3.5. What sort of strategies were available to influence and rally other states to the project? (LR Quadrant)

3.6. To date three major countries have yet to sign the treaty. In 1996, what sort of conflict resolution strategies were developed to rally them? (LR Quadrant)

4. Closing questions

4.1. What sort of recommendations do you have for additional contacts with former colleague(s) as part of this research?
4.2. What questions or requests do you have for the next steps of this research?

4.3. Do you have any overall reflections on how and why “norm cascading” worked as effectively as it did in this case? What for you are transferable lessons learned that could be applied to other cases? Is there anything that could have been done to get the major powers, which did not sign the Treaty, on board?

4.4. What else would you wish to share at this stage?

4.5. [For Minister Loyd Axworthy] Why set a deadline for approval?

These questions were presented to the interviewees at least 48 hours prior to each interview. The full questionnaire is enclosed as Annex E for ease of reference.

4.3.2.2. Interviewees

I chose to interview both government and CSO representatives, as both groups claimed the MBT as their achievement and I was anticipating both groups to feel equally responsible for its achievement. I wanted to speak with a minimum of five government respondents and five civil society representatives. I selected the participants based on their leadership role in the cascading process of the MBT, as recorded in the documents. Gender was therefore not a factor in the selection of the participants. All participants were Anglophones so there was no requirement for translation of their statements.

To ensure as profitable a list of participants as possible, I shared for input the names of a short list of former politicians and bureaucrats with Lloyd Axworthy, former minister of foreign affairs, Canada. The list of representatives of civil society was shared with Valerie Warmington, co-founder of Mine Action Canada. Mr. Axworthy and Mrs. Warmington allowed me to mention their names as supporters and participants of the research project. The preliminary list of potential interviewees included eight government representatives and nine CSOs representatives. In the end, to meet the timing
of my schedule, I reached out to thirty candidates, of which eleven agreed to a full
interview and one CSO representative agreed to answer some questions via e-mails.

To meet the ethical requirements, each participant was made aware that they
could withdraw from the process at any time, with the understanding that should they
choose to do so, their information would not be included in the analysis. Upon their
confirmation of their participation, a consent form and the questionnaire were forwarded
to them ahead of the interview. Questions were withdrawn, on their request or when the
length of the period for the interview became a concern.

I was not in a position of authority vis-à-vis the participants. Although I
personally knew two individuals on the preliminary list, I reached only one. However,
another governmental representative was suggested by a previous participant and I
discovered that I knew him, but had been unaware of his participation in the process.

Participants were asked to review their own personal statements. Transcripts from
other participants were not shared, even anonymously as they are still well-known in their
circles and could be identified by their colleagues. Since the data was collected using the
Integral Approach, the information related to the individual quadrants were mostly
gathered through interviews and as a consequence, a level of confidentiality has been
applied in the reporting of the final analysis as most quotations are unattributed.

Although the MBT is viewed as a success story in both political and social terms,
I didn't underestimate the possibility of both positive and negative emotions coming up
in the interviews. I believe that my experience as a former military officer, public servant,
Green Party candidate, and civil society activist allowed me to connect with my
interviewees in a meaningful manner. I was provided with a generous amount of detailed
information. I felt trusted to convey the lessons learned by way of the MBT in order to encourage its replication.

4.4. Preliminary Analysis

The nature of this research was primarily exploratory. Due to the complexity of the variables in the negotiations among nations and, in particular, in the cascading of global norms, the subjects under study—leadership and partnership—required delimiting. The research took into consideration expectations, risk management, and the understanding that exploratory findings might require complementary investigation prior to a final analysis.

4.4.1. Expectations

My expectations of the contributions of this research were aligned along three main lines. First, the new mapping tool would develop more complex understanding of the chosen theoretical frameworks to support the identification of the complexity of the cascade’s dynamics through the designated leaders in the approval process for global norms. It would therefore expand the applicability of the theory of integral approach in mapping out the lifecycle of a norm during the cascade stage, leading, perhaps, to future similarly-framed research of the norm’s emergence and internationalization phases. Lastly, it would provide additional information on the particularities of the dynamics of mimetic theory and its promise for more authentic relationships at both an international and human levels.

Second, the mapping of the complexity of the cascade’s dynamics of norms would provide insights into the factors affecting the progress of global norms for critical
security issues that are presently stuck and appear to be stuck on perpetual “stand-by” status with little impetus to reach the “tipping point.”

Third, the completed map would act as a record of history of the cascade of the MBT, with the potential to become a model for transparency and accountability at various levels of government. Such a record of existing global norms could support national elected officials in their policies and dialogues with citizens, national civil societies and transnational organizations. It could provide for more effective global governance through the UN.

Lastly, it could become a systemic tool for conflict resolution at the global, regional and local levels in matters of global common goods management.

These expectations influenced the overall research process and construction of indicators and questionnaires.

4.4.2. Risks

Although this examination consisted essentially of literary reviews and interviews, there were potential emotional risks involved in meeting strangers to investigate historical events. However, the research was on the process of a global norm that has had a positive impact on many populations and regions of the globe. Therefore, the risks were considered low for the interaction between the interviewees and me, as the researcher.

I considered three major risks to the implementation of the project. First was the risk of not gaining access to the interviewees. As a mitigation measure, I employed well-connected personal contacts as go-betweens. Second was the quality of the interviewees’ recollection of events (the effect of time; the difference and potential conflict of perception related to the same question). I had planned to conduct follow-up interviews,
and where this was not possible, to note that. Third was my potential bias in the building of the mapping tool and, in particular, the selection of indicators in mapping the actions and thoughts of the interviewees. In order to counteract my potential bias\(^ {138}\) in selecting indicators during the building of the tool, I validated them with my thesis director at regular intervals during the collection of the data. I had planned to change them if I discovered any one of them to be of limited value during the early stages of the research, but as they continued to fulfil their purpose of guiding my analysis I ended up keeping them all.

However, there was another unanticipated risk, which was discovered after the presentation of the thesis proposal together with the first few interviews, namely that of becoming sidetracked, thereby missing the opportunity to identify the pertinent emerging trends, as a result of the sheer wealth of information collected and not previously identified in the literature review.

### 4.4.3. Trends

I made the decision to not code the results of the interviews, but instead review them with different perspectives.\(^ {139}\) The first reading aimed at capturing the elements of leadership only; the second reading targeted the identification of the characteristics of

\(^{138}\) Personal bias mainly from my experiences working in uniform and as a public servant.

\(^{139}\) As part of the research for my master’s degree I coded over 50 short interviews using the software NVivo and found that the tool limited my exploration. I was concerned that a similarly linear review would jeopardize the complexities I was expecting to discover in this thesis. Because of my bias for strong structure, I was particularly careful to avoid “rigid” lenses for this analysis. I used the “multi-pass” review process when reviewing government documents. When examining government documents for senior management, I first ensured a clear semantic understanding, then I evaluated them a second time to ensure the issues were well “translated” from a scientific vision to a political perspective and, lastly, I reviewed them to ensure that the priorities were harmonized with those of the department. This “multi-pass” process, which I used in reviewing the interviews, requires a salutary resetting of lenses.
partnership only; the third reading focussed on the innovations made to accommodate the build-up for the campaign process; and the fourth and final reading was to pick up on everything relational.

The information collected from the interviews could be grouped in four main categories. First, there was the corroboration of events as presented in the literature.

Second, there were additional details provided on known events. Third, there were new discoveries—of tools and processes—providing valuable input to the complexity of the cascade process. Finally, there was the discovery of two main relational dynamics that lead to a transformation process.

The two main dynamics, presented as thematic findings requiring complementary study, are the transformation of the self and the creation of organizational partnerships as essential catalysts for the cascading of a global norm. Both dynamics represent an ongoing movement across the four quadrants of the Integral Approach mapping tool, requiring a mimetic process between two persons, a norm entrepreneur and a follower, for their creation and sustention.

The norm leader’s transformation of self manifests itself in a more compassionate leadership and in more integrity in the process itself. Similarly, the creation and sustention of effective multi-level organizational partnerships built to achieve a shared

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140 As already mentioned, some of these discoveries include: double-track negotiations; access to CSOs in discussions; letting the victims in, thereby supporting them in becoming co-creators in the process; finding alternatives to landmines in defending contested national boundaries; reframing the discourses on human security and non-invasive military options; and allowing nations to self-determine their level of participation. Examples of this last are Austria taking sole responsibility for the drafting of the treaty and the development and implementation of regional meetings like the successful Maputo meeting in Africa. Other examples of innovative measures taken were the introduction of a full plan of the way forward, which lead to a successful operationalization phase, and the empowerment of CSOs as monitors of this phase.
goal appears as key to recruit and convince potential followers to support the proposed norm. These two dynamics were unanticipated results of the creative process of the research.

This chapter presented the qualitative methods used to identify the elements required to cascade a global norm. It introduced an integrated mapping tool, constructed for the identification of the leadership and partnership elements, using the case study of the Ottawa Process. The integrated mapping tool incorporated three theories: the norm lifecycle model (targeting the cascade phase), the IA framework (allowing a research across four quadrants of transformation of self and collective identities), and the mimetic theory (to identify the dynamics at play in the art of convincing followers to adopt a new norm).

Through reviewing the literature on leadership, I identified seven leadership characteristics: 1) imagination; 2) courage and audacity; 3) authenticity through emotional leadership; 4) adaptability; 5) ability to connect and share; 6) credibility through knowledge, skills, and expertise; and, finally, 7) strength, dedication, and passion. These are some of the very characteristics a norm entrepreneur needs in order to succeed in convincing others and they will be looked into further in the chapter on leadership.

Following a review of the literature on partnerships, I selected five main characteristics of norm partnership: 1) the selection and maintenance of a shared intent; 2) the maintenance of trust; 3) shared leadership; 4) shared risk; and 5) the selection of ROEs. These partnership characteristics are emblematic of the organizational goals required to reach the tipping point and complete the cascade process.
Indicators were developed for each quadrant of the mapping tool to act as building blocks for the development of the questionnaire and, later, for the analysis of documents and interviews. The indicators became the filters through which I compared the data collected on the MBT with the literature, seeking similarities or confirming non-alignment with a view to identifying potential key elements for the success of future norm cascades.

The information collected from the interviews corroborated events as presented in the literature, provided additional details of known events, allowed for new discoveries relating to the cascade process—of tools and processes—as well as the discovery of the two main relational dynamics that lead to the emergence process. These two main dynamics—of the transformation of the self and the creation of organizational partnerships—will be explored in the next chapter.
Chapter 5. Thematic Findings

Things change. Evolution is always at work. So no matter how perfect the fit between problem and structural solution at the time, the resolving of one problem inevitably opens the door to other problems—because things change.

As mentioned by authors McGuigan and Popp, there is always a process of evolution at work. I agree that there is a need for movement forward for a cascade process to occur. What could these elements of motion, these dynamics, required to cascade the process to a successful outcome, be? The preliminary analysis of the interviews disclosed the emergence of two relational dynamics, requiring complementary reading prior to the completion of the analysis. If these dynamics contribute to the cascading of a new global norm then I anticipate that further theoretical discussion, and additional theoretical findings might provide for a more structured approach to the relational and transactional aspects of subsequent analyses.

This chapter will therefore be a review of the literature on the two thematic findings of 1. a norm leader’s transformation of self, and 2. the building of relations between organizations for successful partnership. This review better positions the final analysis of leadership and partnership in the cascade process.

5.1. Transformation of Self as Norm Entrepreneur

What motivates the agent to become an entrepreneur in the emergence phase? What motivates a state to become the entrepreneur in the cascade phase? Not unlike a business entrepreneur, the norm entrepreneur is willing to risk a lot for the advancement, the planning, and the implementation of his or her idea or dream, even if labeled as utopian by their closest colleagues and friends. However, there is a huge difference
between an idea and its execution. This passage to action is loaded with uncertainty and the risk of failure or loss of credibility. Failure can be detrimental to one’s career and therefore considering a normative change in one’s environment can be increasingly challenging given one’s higher position of credibility and legitimacy. However, individuals in positions of authority and with respect gained from their contributions can act as norm leaders for their institutions and other potential followers.

The intent to lead is the catalyst to engage the “self” in a new project. To lead is to expose oneself to criticism, cynicism, and rejection. Without creative leadership, every society has the potential to become stagnant. On the other hand, with leadership, passion is exposed and creativity offers new means for planning and execution of new normative changes. In business, norm entrepreneurs are often perceived as the risk takers or the innovators, which do not always carry positive connotations. The evaluation of the contribution of the norm entrepreneur often depends on the ethics of his or her proposed idea.

Watkins and Wilber share that “You can’t solve an interior problem (feeling unsafe and insecure) by employing an exterior solution (gates, guards, and guns)” (2015, 21). Self-transformation is a complex process of awareness and the Integral Approach (IA) provides a satisfactory structure to capture the complexity of some of the required thought process. The IA theory supports the understanding of the “self” as it is confronted by the pressure of the outside world and therefore the self must choose either stagnation or change in some or all relational quadrants. Here the quadrant under observation is the upper left—that of the individual and interior.
5.1.1. The Self: Individual and Interior (UL)

The upper left (UL) quadrant is the quadrant of the “I” and the mind, the quadrant situating culture, social justice, qualitative interpretation, meaning-making, and values of self. The expectations for the analysis were for indicators of mimetic dynamics, such as the potential for “exemplars” and mimetic competition for leadership. There was also a search for indicators of the complexities of the cascade process, such as moral issues, challenges, limitations; perceived keys to personal success; and successes and regrets. These expectations were used in the selection of the questions forming the questionnaire as described in chapter 4.

5.1.2. The Transformation Process

Murphy stipulates that in order to participate in the deployment of the universe,\textsuperscript{141} we must first realize that we have the possibility to do so (2001, 119). Everyone is entitled to authenticate for himself and herself that emotions are first and foremost experienced in the self, through the bias of our mental and emotional filters created through our history and through our relationship to the people in our circle of influence. He proposes that one of the major barriers to social change is located inside us and that we simply don’t have the willingness, the determination, and the faith to fight efficiently against greed and violence (2001, 33).

Goodwin et al. (2001) suggest that the key to self-transformation is the release from a destabilizing context acting as a catalyst of change of the self-amorphous state. Citing Ringmar, they further propose that actions, such as those taken by newly established groups, rather than being based on personal interest (such as promotion or

\textsuperscript{141} Our participation in the deployment of the universe rests in our willingness and readiness to engage in the evolution of its affairs.
increase in wages for example) appear when there are social, economic, or political changes afoot that destabilize past identities and it is in those moments of potential alteration that an individual or a nation can act in order to transform or reaffirm who they are. But Murphy suggests that the acquisition of new knowledge is necessary for such a sociocultural paradigm shift to take place and that this new paradigm not only permits an adaptation of new data, but a new representation of reality and its potential, ultimately allowing a redefinition of self and world (2001, 180). The combinations of these concepts allow an understanding that if one has not been exposed to misery, then this reality is non-existent in one’s conscience, however, the discovery of misery allows a choice in deciding to ignore this new discovery, or to integrate it into a new reality.

The concept of wanting to be transformed is incorporated in Roelvink’s theory of affect, which she defines as a relation to augment or diminish the capacity of a collective to act. This is similar to Bloch’s concept of “Not Yet” (1986, 224–249). Roelvink uses Friere’s theory that social changes result from sources of new means of knowing or “being in the world” (2009, 4). She emphasizes the classical philosophical distinction between “be” and “should be,” which through a genuine education allows for opinions and visions for the transformation of knowledge. She suggests that a key element in this process of transformation is the power of testimonies affecting the cognitive and affective levels. The importance of testimonies is also emphasized by Jasper, who in citing Nussbaum shares, “emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object salience’s or importance; in that sense, they always involve appraisal or evaluation” (2011, 14.5). Roelvink completes her theory of affect by citing Foucault and his “culture of self” which she expands into the process of transformation of identity.
when an individual becomes an integral part of a collective, when the “care of self” leads to new ways of being in the world (2009).

Androti and Dowling (2004) support this approach to self-improvement by presenting the notion of “unfinishedness,” and by citing Friere’s self-liberation through self-reflection they foster an openness to the possibility of an invalid piece of self-knowledge, acceptance of unlearning and, hence, becoming open to the possibility of change. They then define empowerment as the individual capacity to negotiate one’s own subjectivity to go beyond self-determined limitations. I capture this dynamic of being willing to relearn and embrace possibilities as a first step towards self-leadership with the intent and capacity to grow.\footnote{Kegan would qualify this capacity to grow as growth of consciousness and O’Dea would suggest it is spiritual growth.}

5.1.3. UL Connecting to the Other Quadrants

Although the other three quadrants all consist of relational components and could be included in the section on building partnership, I have chosen to include their analysis here in the section on the transformation of self. This provides a more fluid mapping of the transformation of “self” in contact with external pressures, as expressed through opportunities for leadership and adherence to a new or changing collective identity. Watkins and Wilber share their view that in order to solve “wicked problems” we need to work concurrently with the four quadrants of the IA theory. They emphasize that “nothing gets done, because the change requires that human beings change their hearts and minds – in the ‘I’ and ‘WE’ spaces. The multi-dimensionality of the problem – the fact that it exits in several different dimensions – means that all of the significant dimensions need to be addressed simultaneously” (2015, 23).
The quadrant of the upper right (UR) is that of the individual and exterior, such as individual social interactions, mediation, and behavioural interactions. It is still the space of the mind, but now expressed in how individuals interact with each other. The expectations for indicators were in understanding mimetic dynamics expressed as McGuigan and Popp’s “dance” and in the complexities of the cascade process in terms of the issues of mandate and actions, successes, regrets, and legacy.

5.1.3.1. The Collectives

The lower left (LL) quadrant is the space of the collective and the interior. This is the state level, where worldviews are formed and held, with another level of expression for culture and social justice. There is the space of state-level worldview, and expressions of culture and social justice. The expectations for indicators were for mimetic dynamics of the issues of “objects of desire,” exclusion or differentiation, and mimetic appropriation of values and passions for the cause. The indicators for the complexities of the cascade process were expected to be found through issues of collective internal teamwork (culture).

The last quadrant of the lower left (LR) is that of the collective and exterior, where inter-state-level social structures and collective social interactions are expressed. The expectations of the indicators in mimetic dynamics were of the order of issues of “objects of desire” and rivalry, of exclusion or differentiation with evidence of mimetic creativity as a positive contagion. The complexities of the cascade process were anticipated in terms of issues of conflicts or perceived conflicts and conflict resolution, of alliances, requests and compromises, of collective strategies and of external teams (friends and opponents) and strategies for success.
The questionnaire was built to address the indicators of each of these three quadrants.

5.1.3.2. UL and UR: Collective Identities—Worldviews of Social Collectives

As seen through the three major theories of social movements,\textsuperscript{143} the building of cognitive framing allows for a connection between the mission’s need for recognition and the main objective of the social movement on the one hand, and the need to belong as expressed by the individual joining in its mobilization on the other. This approach allows a link both with the utilitarian theory of Fireman and Gamson (1979), which focuses on the analysis of an actor’s intent, and the structuralist theory of Lin (2001), which concentrates on the deterministic view of various structures, such as those of the framing and its opportunities. This process of turning an actor’s engagement into a social transformation project, or into normative change, can be related to the concept of collective identity built around the sharing of values, which renders an actor more sensitive to new knowledge arising from a cause or a campaign, and generates emotions necessary for support or engagement (Camilleri, 1990; Calhoum, 1994).

Poletta and Jasper provide a definition for collective identities as an “individual’s cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice and institution” (2001, 285). They define the phase of collecting the needs of their community as the most important phase in the process of construction of identities, because this is a step encouraging participation through indicators of solidarity, allowing

\textsuperscript{143} I linked the emergence of new civil society organizations, such as ICBL, to new social movements to capture the understanding of the construction of collective identities and their campaign to defend a cause beyond the political fora.
the opportunity of getting together to make a claim. Change in the individual identity is often the first goal of social movements because the identity discourse not only serves to construct solidarity, but also to instill a change in self and the relation of self with the other in a horizon that includes the social movement while offering more opportunity beyond the movement (2001, 296). Goodwin and Jasper (2004) in *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning and Emotion*, insist on the cultural dimension in the cognitive and emotional processes in the construction of the collective identity. Identity construction is an important step in the life of a social movement because it not only acts as a distinct element of the organizational self, but it serves as an emotional asset to recruit, attract, and transform the individual engaged in the realization of their social aspirations.

5.1.3.3. Emotions

To better understand emotion in a social context, Heurtin proposes that emotions are not only the result of interior states of mind and consciousness, which on their own motivate actions, but are an emergent effect of an activity, the unrolling of which is integrated in the conditions of an unfolding situation, and therefore what can best characterize an emotion is its intentionality (2009, 104). Heurtin notes that it is the relation between agents that influences emotions, and therefore emotions are one outcome of a coordination process. This is supported by Lefranc and Sommier (2009) as they suggest that emotions be analyzed as effects and not causes of mobilization since their qualification results from the coordination between two or more people. Murphy supports the importance of relationships but specifies that it is not necessarily the

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144 The four stages of protest are: 1) collection of collective demands, 2) recruiting for the movement, 3) tactical and strategic decision-making processes, and 4) the outcomes expected by the movement.
relationship between two agents but more a continuous personal manifestation, which can be variable and psychosomatic of the relation, that we entertain with our physical and social environment (2001, 80). It appears that emotions are both cause and effect in the cascade of “self” and perhaps this phenomenon should not be excluded \textit{a priori} for the understanding of mobilization in a social movement or a collective.

Jasper insists on the fact that emotions are fundamental elements in the construction of a collective identity, as supported by Tarrow (2011), Della Porta and Diani (2006). Rodgers supports this analysis by underlining that the central factor for recruiting, motivation, and retention in social movements rest on emotions (2010). Jasper, in citing Jang, specifies that the construction of a collective identity is in fact a sign of emotional skill because it requires a solid construction encouraging long-term participation through emotional mechanisms such as collective solidarity, rituals of interaction, and other group dynamics (2011, 14.9). He proposes that the strength of the emotion generated is in direct relationship to enthusiasm and the maintenance of participation levels. Traïni and Siméant support this argument by noting that it is in building and celebrating a common memory based on a history of anger, and a group history, that participation is maintained (2009, 25). Woods et al. (2012) propose instead the metaphor of a “scale of emotions,” including amongst others anger, frustration, and despair to better capture the nuances and evolution of action in the different phases of mobilization of social movements.

An interesting analogy with the creation of the Ottawa Process is the process of the World Social Forum (WSF) defined by de Sousa Santos as a space that affects an epistemological operation whose goal is “to identify and enlarge the signs of possible
future experiences under the disguise of tendencies and latencies that are actively ignored by hegemonic rationality and knowledge” (2006, 29–33). The WSF is seen as an environment in which to foster new dynamics of perception through its potential to create hope and provide an experience for the participants of having replaced the temptation of destruction with an affective desire to make a personal contribution towards the creation of another possibility. Hope is created out of the “fields of expectations” that create alternative options in a short period of time.

Whitaker, the co-founder of the WSF, accepts the idea of a space for re-education within the WSF. Therefore, the WSF can be seen as an experimental field for new practices and a place of incubation of new initiatives, but he insists that in 2002 WSF saw the emergence of two dynamics of struggle, namely the transformation of the structures and the transformation of self (2006, 112). The importance of the WSF in the personal transformation of its participants is well documented (Santos, 2006, Osterweil, 2009, Canet, 2006, and Massicotte, 2010).

In my experience of the WSF, in 2013, 2014, and 2016, there are many similarities between it and the Ottawa Process, as spaces for idea creation and incubation, in the latter case as provided first by Canada and then as built progressively by the pro-ban nations.

5.1.3.4. Type and Nature of Emotions in Social Movement

Goodwin et al. share the historically low level of interest in the analysis of emotions in the understanding of social movements (2004). It is only during the second phase of social movements, with the development of thematic fields of action such as those supporting the rights of women and homosexuals, that researchers found other
emotions than anger to explain activists’ engagement. Goodwin et al. underline the importance of the comprehension of elements of culture and fondness as factors in the construction of the collective identity of organizations. They found two other types of emotions as catalysts to social change, either related to reciprocity in terms of the link between two individuals engaged in the same cause, or related to sharing such as indignation for those “without.” Concerns are framed in such a way as to achieve a resonance with the members of the organization, as concerns are not actionable without emotional involvement.

Jasper contributes to the understanding of the role of emotions in the context of social movements by proposing a categorization with a focus on moral emotions, which he defines as “feelings of approval and disapproval based on moral intuitions and principles, as well as the satisfactions we feel when we do the right (or wrong) thing, but also when we feel the right (or wrong) thing such as compassion for the unfortunate or indignation over injustice” (2001, 14.3). He suggests that the framing of identities can be done using moral issues with a range of emotions. This later concept is defined as a combination of chosen emotions that are neither too positive nor too negative to encourage action. One such set of emotions\(^{145}\) is the combination of hope in a better future with anxiety regarding the present suffering, relying on this contrast to act as a motivator for action. I understand the tempering of fear with hope as essential in the process of individual and social transformation because if there is too much fear and too little hope, it may impede the participants from taking action, and if the problem is presented as being almost over the participants may perceive their involvement as

\(^{145}\) I include in my use of the word ‘emotion’ both the physiological component (UR) and the connection with interpretations that are linked with it (UL).
unimportant. The right balance of positive and negative emotions therefore becomes an exercise of judgement for organizations. Emotions improperly understood or handled can become a double-edged sword.

Goodwin et al. identify compassion and indignation as moral emotions suitable for strategic use in the recruitment to social movements (2004). Indignation is proposed as a first approach. Indignation is defined by Pierron as a “un sentiment fort d’un ‘choisi la vie’ face au mal qui la caricature […] une dénonciation du mal qui nourrit la nécessité de l’engagement […] une réplique éthique et politique” (2012, 58).

Jasper proposes that the routines of protest movements offer different kinds of satisfaction for participants, such as the pleasures of conversation, enthusiasm for actions, the empowerment of moral intuitions, a feeling of creating a new path that keeps participants interested independent of the probability of the hoped-for outcomes (2011, 14.13).

In conclusion to the theoretical reflections on emotions and their instrumentalization as mobilizing tools for social movements, I share the remarks of Broqua and Filleule:

146 A strong feeling of a chosen life even with the wrongs that characterize it and with a denunciation of the wrongs which created the necessary engagement as an ethical and political answer - My translation.
147 If we are not interested in the source of emotions but instead in the manner of their expression at the interface of a situation or an experience, we still have to gather proper instruments to think through the individual effects of the emotional mobilization on the plan of learning and of
The dynamics of emotions can therefore be perceived as an element of the
inspiration and propagation of moral emotions, e.g. transforming feelings of shame and
inequality into indignation or anger. These dynamics can support the understanding of
this anticipation of structural conditions to facilitate these objectives, such as the decision
to transmit certain types of information knowing that they have the potential to create
strong emotions and therefore some reaction from participants. The WSF creates a space
that allows for the sharing of “war secrets” from different struggles, the promotion of
hope between organizations and between individuals, and engages and generates a level
of energy that helps maintain motivation. Similarly, the Ottawa Process can be seen as an
incubator of hope on many fronts, through the provision of access to civil society
organizations, in changing what had been seen as a national military issue to a global
issue of human security, removal of at least one military weapon and the willingness to
minimize or eradicate one type of violence, as well as the acceptance of leadership from
middle power nations.

5.1.3.5. Passage to Act Towards the Common Goal

In defining triggers to engagement, Fillieule shares that,

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Fillieu chooses the analogy of the evolution of a career and its trajectory, in the objective and subjective dimensions, to understand the steps and conditioning factors which bring two parties, the agent and its social movement, to a social contract. In developing paths of analysis, he shares that the story of life guides the conduct of individuals and frames the patterns that produce rules of the game to understand and integrate (2001). This underlines the importance of the construction of a cognitive frame to adequately formulate the context and the expected benefits of social movements in their mode of recruiting.

Traïni and Siméant describe the trigger process—a recruiting tool that they call an “angle of sensitization”—that leads to engagement in social movements. They stipulate that it is the capacity “à émouvoir” (to emotionally move) that becomes a catalyst for social transformation by encouraging the breakdown of habits and triggering engagement in victories which *a priori* appear improbable (2009, 34). This concept of sensitization has two objectives: to make previously invisible problems visible and to sensitize individuals who are receptive to be moved to action. The construction of the cognitive framing appears to successfully cause the expected emotional reaction.

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148 All research has the same common point of departure, namely a deficiency of knowledge about the conditions for and forms of action. We don’t know under which modality a condition of “being disposed to” do something translates into an *effective action* or inaction. No collective behavioral theory which holds to predetermination of the action, no school of mobilization of resources, blocked by the actor’s rationality metaphor, no structuralist approach has succeeded in building a convincing model of the individual engagement and its evolution in the course of the action, which would implicate an analysis of a variable phenomenon in terms of intensity and duration, which evolves in function of contextual and situational variables, be it that of an individual or a social order - My translation. Emphasis in the text.
Bassy proposes categorizing the level of engagement to situate it as a complex process with different goals, starting with the lowest participation level where the agents are involved through signatures or donations. The next level sees a more active agent in the organization towards a level where activists are fully engaged, participating in mobilization and political struggle on a more frequent basis (1998). Therefore, social movements and civil society organizations would require different messages to attract and mobilize different actors.

Emotions are relational because they are the emergent effect of an activity or relation with another as a consequence of new knowledge perturbing or touching both physical and social environment. The new knowledge comes in two stages: first, the knowledge sought by the participants themselves to satisfy their preliminary curiosity, and then, the knowledge proposed or imposed by organizations. Jasper insists that emotions are fundamental to capturing the interest of potential recruits for a cause (2001).

When an intentional leader, a norm leader, is ready to act and lead a normative change, thenceforth the process of building relations and norm partnerships can start. This mini-cascade of transformation must be embraced by all of those becoming advocates for the cause. At some point, one organization starts embracing the intent and itself becomes a norm entrepreneur through its representatives. At later point, nations can turn into norm leaders, too. This is the moment when the cascade process has reached the global level.

5.2. Building Relations Between Organizations

The Integral Approach (IA) theory provides details on the dynamics of self as it reaches out to consider joining a collective through a process of transformation caused by
the emotions and the information related to a given issue. Exterior pressures combined with subjective and objective reflections may lead the self either to stagnation or to action. The latter scenario is the focus of this research. In this section, the objective is to understand how organizations arrive at the decision to work together with a view to creating a normative change. I have called this category of organizational partnership “norm partnership.” I focus in particular on the dynamics of the “dance,” analysing it using the mimetic and IA theories proposed by McGuigan and Popp.

In the “River Conflict” they describe, there were no exemplars to shift the negative energy until the government decided to step in and take ownership of the problem. As the members of the conflicting parties were unable to designate any of their own members “assigned facilitators” McGuigan and McMechan became the connectors between the parties in conflict. They first had to demonstrate their curiosity in knowing the facts and their interests in resolving the conflict and working equally with both groups. They took the time to understand each group’s worldview generally, as well as specifically as it pertained to the issue of contention. They had to demonstrate generative listening and emotional capacity. They developed questionnaires and exercises in order to deepen their understanding. This process of “being allowed” into the worldview spheres of others is not something that can be precipitated and it cannot be built through the glasses from other contexts. Each context is as different as each member is different. The relationship aspect of working towards normative change has to be handled respectfully.

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149 The terms “glasses” could be replaced by frameworks or action plan done for other conflicts without a true understanding of the specifics of each context.
When a facilitator or mediator is designated as a connector between parties they become a constructive element of a normative change. They are key to the relational aspect of the resolution, from the emergence to the operationalization phase. The success of their involvement is based on the quality of their interpersonal skills, their experience, and the parties’ willingness and readiness for their presence.

From my analysis of the Ottawa Process, it emerges that the dance of the cascade started when an exemplar took a stand and connectors emerged on both sides of the negotiating table. Their desire to form a partnership, to move closer and discuss the issues with the other parties, started the process of the dance. By initiating contact, they made themselves vulnerable to opposition, but also opened up possibilities of imagination beyond their known organizational culture.

The Ottawa Process was a different type of dance than the one observed by McGuigan and Popp. In McGuigan and Popp’s example, conflicting parties come together, through facilitators designated by government, to find a resolution. The dance is that of coming together to engage in dialogue and to seek out an agreed-upon solution. The Canadian coalition, however, was already “dancing” during the emergence process, allowing the partnership to come together with an agreement around a common goal and a willingness to engage in a dance of trust\textsuperscript{150} to plan and implement a campaign of action from the start of the Ottawa Process.

\textsuperscript{150} The Merriam Webster dictionary defines trust as “an assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something; one in which confidence is placed; dependence on something future or contingent; hope.” However, the theme of trust has been problematized and nuanced in the literature since the definition is unclear to most people. Mayer et al. propose a definition of trustworthiness that breaks it down into three components: ability, integrity, and predictability (1995). A structuralist viewpoint would include a transactional aspect that deals with questions of economic, political and military security. A relational perspective would include an understanding of an individual’s personal life story, in terms of wounds, judgements.
The dance can, in other words, be initiated at two different stages, first for building ROEs in order to gain the trust necessary to agree upon a shared intent, and second, when an agreed-upon shared intent to build the ROEs to achieve their objectives has already been established. In the MBT, the dance was set in motion to achieve a ban, the desirability of which had already been agreed upon, and therefore the dance metaphor will be used to describe the dynamics of the cascade process as it relates to the planning and execution of the campaign.

5.2.1. Dynamics of Co-Leadership

The concept of co-leadership implies a willingness and readiness to share in the decision-making and execution of a project. Karen and Henry Kimsey-House, in their *Co-Active Leadership: Five Ways to Lead* (2015) offer that “At its most basic, Co-Active means simply being in action […] together. Or perhaps it might be more appropriate to say being together […] in action.” (2015, 4). Therefore, this concept is useful in understanding the various partnerships created during the development of the Ottawa Process.

They write:

More inclusive understanding of leadership fosters connection and allows people to live and work together with shared ownership of whatever is being generated […] everyone is a leader regardless of role or title by choosing any one of the five different ways to lead: Leader Within, Leader in Front, Leader Behind, Leader Beside, and Leader in the Field. (Ibid., ix)

and other potential triggers in terms of both positive and negative experiences related to trust issues. I have chosen to focus on the creation and sustainment of the qualifiers of trust between organizations by reviewing recent studies of relationships between representatives of governmental and civilian organizations with different worldviews to get a better understanding of the role mutual trust played in the Ottawa Process.
The five typologies of leadership construct a multidimensional model of leadership in which members of the group have the opportunity and choice to offer their knowledge and experience to lead in some capacity. The notion of choice is important; it echoes Ricoeur’s autonomy or willingness to own and self-author a chosen action. The authors propose that the concept of responsibility “becomes generative and nourishing rather than weighty and burdensome […] we immediately have more freedom and creativity […] to shift from being a passenger with things happening to us and instead be open to the challenges of our lives and allow them to shape and grow us” (Ibid., 6–7).

The concept of collaboration takes new forms under the five typologies of co-active leadership. Karen and Henry Kimsey-House suggest that “collaborative solutions emerge that would not have been available from one-dimensional, hierarchical leadership structures in which important considerations are often overlooked” (Ibid., 11). It appears that there is more space for the emergence of creativity when willing members of a group are offered the opportunity to co-lead the planning and execution of a project, with the freedom to choose when and how to provide information, support, advice, or direction. While they acknowledge that “stepping into the unknown takes great courage” (Ibid., 40), they contend that “the gift of Co-Active Leadership is that it fosters a dynamic rather than static relationships between a leader and his or her world” (Ibid., 42). Leadership as shared ownership is an organic relational process where and when intentional leadership can be expressed by a volunteer leader aware of their capacity at that moment in time.
Their five typologies of co-active leadership are defined as follows:

- **Co-Active Leaders Within** take responsibility for their world by accepting themselves fully (co) and living their lives with integrity in accordance with their personal values (active).

- **Co-Active Leaders in Front** foster connection with the people who are following them (co) and stand firmly for a clear direction and purpose (active).

- **Co-Active Leaders Behind** are committed to empowering and calling forth the brilliance of other people by believing in them and coaching them through deep listening, powerful questions, and acknowledgment.

- **Co-Active Leaders Beside** take responsibility for their world by consciously designing their partnership around a shared vision and intention (co) and leveraging each other’s strengths so that a remarkable synergy occurs with the whole being that is greater than the sum of the parts (active). (Kimsey-House, 2015, 13–16)

- **Co-Active Leaders in the Field** slow down and expand their sensory awareness so that they can access their imagination, intuition, and insight (co), and have the courage and commitment to act on what they sense in a way that is innovative and new (active). (Kimsey-House, 2015, 13–16)

The concepts of shared ownership of whatever is being generated, choice, collaboration, emergence of creativity and organic structure are retained in my analysis of the Ottawa Process as indicators for the demonstration of co-leadership.

**5.2.2. Primacy of Trust**

Since a majority of my interviewees mentioned trust as a key to successful partnerships, and in particular to the Canadian coalition between government and MAC
(as the collective of Canadian civil society organizations), I have looked into the concept of trust as it pertains to collaborations between government organizations and civil society organizations to better understand its nuances and relevance to the Ottawa Process. Ironically, the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) has recently mandated studies to understand trust in the context of efficiency when working in partnership with local organizations to meet their mandate. Although the context of their study is one of collaboration in a post-conflict situation, the Ottawa Process can be identified as a context of post-post-conflict not involving direct military participation on the ground but nevertheless relating to the military as an essential partner at the national and global levels.

Another contextual difference is that of the respective cultures of Foreign Affairs and DND. However, even DND’s mandate can be one of collaboration in the case of humanitarian affairs, and since human security and the premises of IHL were basic conceptual frameworks for the MBT, I argue that DND lessons learned from their partnership with civil society organizations are in this case contextually similar to those studied here. It is also interesting to note that the civil society organizations involved with DND are often composed of Canadian civilians and locals with different cultures and values, as was also the case with the MBT.

In the article “Collaboration between the Canadian Forces and the Public in Operations,” authors Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown and Flear of Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto for DND, examine the core issues supporting or hindering collaboration between Canadian forces members and non-governmental organizations.

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151 It is ironic since the MBT has been seen as a fight against the military.
NGOs) through semi-structured feedback discussions with selected respondents with experience of DND in the field operations of post-conflict Afghanistan. Their research focuses on five core themes that had emerged from previous studies, including: negotiation (a critical activity of collaboration); power; identity; stereotypes/prejudice and trust (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Flear, & Brown, 2011, and Thomson et al., 2010). To better understand the role of trust in the Ottawa Process, I have chosen to examine four trust-related elements as they apply to the process: dynamics of partnership, interpersonal skills, the experiences of the members, and the issue of trust violation.

The first category is the dynamics of the partnership. Thomson et al. posit that “trust is commonly argued to be a positive contributor to collaborative efforts” (2011, 35). They share:

Respondents noted that issues such as shared power and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, mutual respect, and mutual trust all impacted their collaborative efforts with other personnel within the JIMP\(^{152}\) environment. Differences in communicating, negotiating, planning and decision making were also highlighted as potential barriers to effective civil-military collaboration. (2011, 1)

They mention the differences in language as an issue in the building of a relationship. They note that the military uses a style of language that is direct and to the point\(^{153}\) and can be seen as aggressive (Ibid., 12). The style of, and approach to, negotiations are other aspects noted to influence the potential success of the relationship. Advice was collected on different styles and approaches for effective collaboration (Ibid., 15).

Thomson et al. maintain that the type of mission affects the contribution required and sought by each party. Partners may feel more or less empowered to contribute, and

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\(^{152}\) JIMP is an abbreviation for Joint, Inter-Agency, Multinational and Public.  
\(^{153}\) In addition, the military has a propensity for the use of acronyms.
over time, if a feeling of empowerment fails to materialize for some members, dynamics of mistrust may evolve.

The second category is interpersonal skills; this includes the predisposition to be a willing member in a successful partnership. The authors determined that positive and negative stereotyping played an important role in determining the possibility and efficiency of collaboration. One interesting component was the need to downplay the “army guy” persona “in order to gain traction with civilian counterparts” (Ibid., iv). However, they note “stereotypes also seemed to be reduced as a product of contact with one another and of learning about another organization’s values, intentions, and operational objectives and goals” (Ibid., iv). In examining the correlation between the conditions of collaboration and its successful outcomes, respondents suggest, the importance of having the right person with the right skill sets working with individuals who represent diverse organizations. Indeed, almost every participant said that collaboration in the field came down to “personality.” Asked what characteristics an individual should possess in order to operate effectively in a JIMP context, they identified openness, flexibility, empathy (i.e., the ability to understand different points of view), good judgement, being a good listener, diplomacy, being strong willed, patience, perseverance, good health, social skills, and having a sense of humour. (Ibid., 52)

Third, Thomson and al. touch on the members’ experiences as determinants for building trust. They share that foundational elements of trust were achieved “by demonstrating competence, sharing risks and experiences, and maintaining professional integrity” (Ibid., iv). One element contributing to the emergence of trust is common experience. In this instance, the shared experience of working with soldiers in the field enhanced camaraderie.

The onus is on each member of the partnership to establish and maintain trust (Ibid., 42). While “trust at part”, where the onus of trust is shared equally among the
members of a collective, appears obvious for a successful relationship, this element
reinforces the concept of the stability of the coalition.

Finally, they point out those violations of trust, which had occurred during
operations, were a strong detriment to maintaining trust and, worse, could even eliminate
any previously built trust. They share that “Afghan nationals provided examples of CF\textsuperscript{154} trust violations that may have turned the local population against them” (Ibid., iv).

The indicators I selected to relate the impacts of leadership and partnership on
trust building are: collaborative efforts, shared power and clearly defined roles and
responsibilities, mutual respect and mutual trust, language, type of missions, positive and
negative aspects of stereotyping, personality, common experiences, and professional
integrity. I have chosen to retain them all for the evaluation of the Canadian coalition
partnership, as well as for the proposed identification of the general characteristics of
norm partnerships.

In “Discovering Effective Civil-Military Cooperation Insights from the NGO-CF Relationship,” another article on trust, Ball and Febbraro research the nature of the
military’s relationship with NGOs over the last two decades. They examine the
organizational structure and culture, as well as stereotypes, of both groups to foster
collaboration and make recommendations on mutual training and education. Their
starting point was Winslow (2002) who first identified the following five primary sources
of tensions in the NGO–military relationship: 1) organizational structure and culture; 2)
tasks and ways of accomplishing them; 3) definitions of success and time frames; 4)
abilities to exert influence and control information; and 5) control of resources (2011,

\textsuperscript{154} CF is defined as Canadian Forces.
Many findings are in alignment with Thomson et al.’s study. However, Ball and Febbraro provide additional observations useful in the deconstruction of the dynamics of the partnership in the Ottawa Process. One such reflection is on the differences in structural organizations and processes, another is on the specific stereotyping of each group, and a third is on the gender and age differences of the respective organizations.

Ball and Febbraro share:

Militaries tend to consist mostly of young men, typically between the ages of 19 and 22 (Winslow, 2002). In addition, their peace operations units are usually uniracial. In contrast to this, NGO and UN field staff members tend to be women, typically ranging in age from their 20s to their 40s, and who typically have diverse ethnic backgrounds (Miller, 1999; Williams, 1998; Winslow, 2002). These “demographic differences may help to perpetuate a distance between the two populations” (Miller, 1999, 192). (2011, 30)

Ball and Febbraro also, however, point to a great deal in common between the NGOs and the military that offer another arena for reflection:

They both tend to have a hardworking “can-do” attitude, they both often work in dangerous and austere conditions, and they both share a willingness to work among the suffering, the dying, and the dead (Winslow, 2002). These similarities may provide a common ground for building communication, coordination, or even cooperation; they may help NGOs and the military view each other more positively; and they may even encourage friendship ties that can be critical for successful intergroup relations (see also Pettigrew, 1998). (2011, 34)

This second article’s indicators of the differences in structural organization and in gender and age, as well as the common “can-do” attitude, will be useful in the evaluation of the characteristics of the Canadian coalition partnership.

In a third article on trust, “The Role of Trust in Whole of Government Missions,” Thompson and Gill explore the role and importance of trust in collaborative tasks in complex, uncertain, and high-risk environments. They propose that “as trust is always a
judgment based on incomplete information, it represents both a probability estimate (Gambetta, 2000) and, ultimately, ‘a leap of faith’ (Boon & Holmes, 1991; Holmes, 1991)” (2010, 5). Their theoretical framework is based on a compressive approach, which is broadly defined as “an alignment of purpose among national (and/or international) agencies (Leslie et al., 2008; Simms, 2008)” (2010, 2). They provide a list of institutional, structural, and resource challenges to effective Whole of Government (WoG) missions (Ibid., 3). Their research confirms that effective collaboration in WoG missions is unusual with few ad hoc successes. They argue, “one way in which to augment situational strength within any given alliance is through pre-existing organizational links” (Ibid., 6).

An interesting discovery was a correlation with what I identified as connectors. Indeed, Thompson and Gill explore the role of “boundary spanners,” whom they defined as, those individuals whose organizational role (and so in this sense could also be termed an organizational structure) provides them with the opportunity to have contact with or to seek out their counterparts in another organization (Zaheer et al.1998; see also Katz & Kahn, 1978; Friedman & Podolny, 1992)[…] Several formulations have been applied to understanding this crucial role (e.g., Challis, 1988; Engel, 1994; Friend, Power, & Yewlett, 1974; Trist, 1983; Webb, 1991; as cited in Williams, 2002); however, some clear themes of particular relevance to the current issues have emerged. Among these are the common key attributes associated with excelling in the role of boundary spanner. These attributes include the abilities to cultivate “interpersonal relationships, effective communication skills, an interest in an appreciation of the interdependencies” (Williams, p. 109) among the players, sufficient knowledge of organizational structures to facilitate linkages and problem resolution, a recognition and value of differences, the capacity to invite and entertain the perspectives of others, and the ability to use social engagement and influence to achieve a common good rather than an over-reliance on formal organizational structures and power dynamics. In fact, some researchers (e.g., Beresford & Trevillion, 1995; Faitlough, 1994, cited in Williams, 2002) summarized the requisite personal attributes associated with

155 This comment emphasized the richness of the lessons of the MBT as a successful joint endeavour.
successful boundary-spanners as involving “diplomacy, tact, dispassionate analysis, sincerity, honesty, commitment and reliability”—notably all attributes associated with trustworthy individuals. In summary then, the current relevant organizational literature strongly suggests that boundary spanning roles and the individuals who fill them play a crucial role in inter-organizational trust and effectiveness (Williams, 2002). (2010, 9)

A second salutary element for building trust is an organizational culture that supports the venture. Thompson and Gill share that,

having the right key people in the right key places will be of great benefit. Note, however, that relying only on selected personal relationships in the absence of an organizational culture that supports and promotes interagency collaboration will always place additional heavy burdens on the people placed in boundary spanning roles. (2010,10)

From this article, I have retained the following indicators: complex, uncertain, and high-risk environments and pre-existing organizational links, boundary spanners, and the notion of organizational culture supporting the venture for my evaluation of the Canadian coalition partnership.

Lastly, from this review of the role of trust in building organizational partnerships, I retain lessons from The Trust Factor: The Science of Creating High-Performance Companies (2017). The author, Paul Zak, is a neuroscientist who has spent decades making and refining field experiments in various business, governmental and civil society organizations to study high engagement and its impact on the social brain. His hypothesis is that trust and goal setting have been given priority in successful relationships that result in a high level of productivity. Therefore, his goal is to establish organizational structures with high engagement levels, making them successful. Zak takes blood tests from the participants before, and after experiments or new projects in their organizations. He then follows up with questionnaires, to be filled out at different intervals, in order to validate his premise of the importance of trust and goal setting in the
achievement of high levels of productivity as well as a correlation with the heightened levels of various chemicals in the blood that are markers for motivation. He shares:

My neuroscience experiments, and those of many other labs, show that groups of individuals with a clear sense of purpose form strong bonds and perform at high levels [...] trust and purpose synergistically improve organizational performance. It turns out that both trust and purpose activate regions of the brain that motivate cooperation with others, reinforcing behaviors essential to meeting organizational goals. It also means that trust and purpose need to be nurtured by consciously designing living cultures around them. (2017, 10)

From this last study, I shall retain the correlation between high engagement and level of productivity as an indicator for my evaluation of the Canadian coalition partnership. All the above indicators of successful partnerships will be tested against my case study of the Canadian coalition and other multilateral partnerships in order to verify what the main characteristics of successful norm partnership during the cascade phase of the MBT negotiations were.

This chapter provided a review of the literature on the two thematic findings that arose out of the analysis of the interviews. The first of these findings related to the dynamics of a norm leader’s transformation of self—located to the individual and interior quadrant of the integrative mapping tool—and to the construction a new collective identity—mapped over the remaining three quadrants. Emotions were identified as a key element behind a decision by the self to act, or not.

The second dynamic entailed the building of relations between organizations for successful partnership. The objective was to understand how organizations arrive at the decision to work together with a view to creating a normative change. I focused on the dynamics of the “dance,” analysing it using the mimetic and IA theories devised by McGuigan and Popp. I identified that the dance can be initiated at two different stages:
first, when building ROEs in order to gain the trust necessary to agree upon a shared intent, and second, when an agreed-upon shared intent to build the ROEs to achieve the objectives has already been established. In the case of the MBT, the dance was set in motion to achieve a ban, the desirability of which had already been agreed upon.

The concept of co-active leadership, as defined by Karen and Henry Kimsey-House, was reviewed as a concept contributing to successful norm cascading. I identified that there is more space for the emergence of creativity when willing members of a group are offered the opportunity to co-lead.

Finally, I reviewed the primacy of trust in any leadership or partnership scenario, to better position my findings regarding its role in the cascade process.

Deepening the understanding of both the dynamics for the transformation of self towards intentional leadership and the dynamics for relation-building between organizations helps to identify and highlight the lessons learned from the MBT that can, in turn, help to dissect and analyze other, future, cascade processes as well. How do these dynamics unfold at the leadership, partnership, and cascade levels? What are some of the characteristics of these dynamics? Are the results from the interviews in alignment with the literature review or not? What are some of the ways in which norm entrepreneurs can wield influence? These questions will be addressed in the next three chapters.
Chapter 6. Analysis of the Ottawa Process Leadership

The Ottawa Process was hung [on a slender thread]: leadership was provided by a small group of core countries, and within each only a handful of individuals did the work and promoted the cause. The same was true for the NGOs: although there was a large coalition of organizations active on the issue, the process was driven by a very small group of people.


I wish to disagree with the statement that “the process was driven by a very small group of people.” On the contrary, I have in the course of this research observed and analyzed the full extent of multiple levels of leadership. This chapter clarifies that leadership was central to the Ottawa Process, during every step of the planning and execution of the vision of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). However, I also want to acknowledge the extraordinary work of the norm leaders, as I came to recognize them within the organizations forming the Canadian coalition.

This chapter will build on the knowledge gained from the literature on leadership and norm leaders, expanding the definition of norm leaders to include the role of organizations during the cascade phase. This is followed by an investigation of the characteristics of the Ottawa Process norm leaders, as well as their primary challenges, as identified by the interviewees.

6.1. Organizations as Norm Leaders

Finnemore and Sikkink share little about the skills of organizations acting as norm leaders in the cascade phase. Do organizations behave like individuals in their self-transformation? Do emotions and outside pressures influence their behaviours as detailed in the section about the self? If so, are they the same emotions? Are the outside pressures the same for all organizations? These questions are answered through the Canadian
perspectives of the interviewees in describing leadership, inspirations, and the success of the MBT.

The process of transformation of organizations appears similar to that of individuals. It was outside pressure that caused the question of the unfairness of the impact of AP mines on the lives of innocent victims to be raised. A range of emotions, from disbelief to outrage, encouraged numerous organizations to raise the issue of seeking a required change. Chapter 2 takes a short look at the various organizations acting as norm entrepreneurs during the emergence stage (such as International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), and International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)). These three actors remained engaged throughout the cascade and operationalization stages. Even the governmental representatives were engaged at the emergence stage since the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) process had already started. The emotions were strong on the part of many societal actors, although it could be said that the civil society organizations were in the front line for dealing with outside pressure. Society was asking for an end to the misery created by the AP mines. What, then, was different from organizations that weren’t norm leaders in terms of behaviours for organizational norm leaders during the cascade phase?

The relational capacities of leadership are developed within the self, first. However, when considering the process of transformation of an organization, there is a requirement to bring in the notion of “process” to capture the specific dynamics to be considered. Three characteristics have been identified as foundational for the success of organizational norm leaders: they are backed by strong political leaders; they have the
ability to keep the momentum going during the first emergence phase, and they have the ability to manage risk.

6.1.1. Political Leadership

The national political leadership was a complex web of interacting agencies and social contexts where a designated leader became the hub in a wheel of interpersonal connections.

Two governmental representatives share their thoughts on the importance of political leadership:

Ours [military decision related to the use of Anti-personnel mines(APM)] was in the context of NATO and in the context of our relationship with the Americans. How did we ensure that our Canadian forces’ position wouldn’t be prejudicial to their ability to do their military job? We always had to be cognizant particularly for the United States. I’d go back to them; I remember they’d have discussions saying “Guys, you know, we need to maintain this capability.” We had those discussions in NATO. It wasn’t in specific terms of “this agenda is moving forward,” it was, we’re all in these discussions without governance. What’s your position? We’re going to hold the line; we’re all holding the line. But the political movement was such that, well I mean Belgium was way ahead of us in terms of the military already having been co-opted into giving it up. Our play in the allies’ discussion, was that we were all cognizant of it, it’s a capability that is part of a military doctrine, and we need to understand that if it disappears how do we back it up? And, do we want to? What are the risks? And one of the things about the military is, that we’re responsive to the politicians, and at the end of the day, if the prime minister says jump, you say “how high?”

This statement emphasizes the requirement for a political decision to convey intent and directions to the Department of National Defence (DND) prior to the military senior management being willing and ready to modify their position on the issues of APM. Hence, the lack of a political decision de facto validates the maintenance of the status quo within DND, expressed in their dealings both with other federal departments and within international security alliances.
I think the biggest key to success was political leadership. Because this was, this was audacious from the beginning. Knowing you had political leadership, and a minister that had your back and then quickly we had a prime minister that had your back, and was willing to put some skin in the game and take some risk. It’s massively empowering, right? It’s massively empowering. And the other thing was, not only did you have your back kind of covered and that cascaded, and it was an extraordinary time for the Department of Foreign Affairs [DFAIT], right? Because it cascaded down to the ADM [Associate Deputy Minister] and the DG [Director General], there was nobody who was a bureaucrat at that point. They all had guts and they all cared, okay? I’m not contrasting it to the current day. The other thing was, and it flows from that, I was given the freedom to get on with it. Nobody micromanaged me. We just did it. We did it. We came up with the stuff. And some of it will be totally outrageous in retrospect, and we just did it. Because we didn’t think we couldn’t, and there was nobody there that we thought we should say “should we?” We just did it.

Political leadership was conveyed as the catalyst to the start of the process of the cascade of the MBT. It was also interpreted as giving permission to do what was required in order to succeed. The sense of empowerment this actor felt is traced directly to the sense of security that arose from knowing that the system as a whole and its leadership in particular was protecting and supporting the evolving process.

Their observations underline the necessity for national governance to lead and thereby empower departments and individuals alike in pursuing an approved plan of action. This empowerment, coupled with the required resources, provided the institutional platforms and therefore the foundations where the rest of the process could rest.

The political leadership, which catalyzed the Ottawa Process, belongs to Axworthy, then minister of foreign affairs. I was curious to find out what had given him the courage to stand out in the midst of the UN CCW process that was becoming unpopular with pro-ban nations, and to empower his staff, Canada as a nation, and eventually the whole world to implement a new global norm banning the APMs. In my
interview with Axworthy I began by focussing on the support he had gathered, including from then prime minister Chrétien and other political colleagues, prior to proceeding with the announcement of the Ottawa Process in October 1996 and the expectations he expressed to his team.

I give Prime Minister Chrétien a lot of credit. First he had approved to take on this issue. Secondly, even though we were at the time on a very restrained budget, he got the minister of finance to allocate a hundred million dollars to me, so that we could actually provide direct support for setting [the campaign] up, and bringing smaller countries together, to have a major political campaign of going around the world and embassies. And we recruited senators and MPs and universities.

In other words, the moral and financial support to launch the campaign spanned many levels of government and society.

By that time, I was a very veteran minister. I was a long-time Liberal, I had 4–5 portfolios, I had served under a couple of prime ministers so I knew my way around and I could also be pretty tough on things. I wasn’t on a learning curve on the political side, but I was able to put those skills to work and I think have some respect at that time, both in the party, in the government, and in the country, that I wasn’t crazy, that I wasn’t blissfully chasing rainbows, but actually had a pretty good track record of getting things done.

Here we find the elements of trust and respect. Axworthy knew that he had gained the respect of his peers through his political track record. As a result he was able to project this knowingness and provide reassurance when required that this new idea that was the Ottawa Process was not merely a utopian fantasy, but a viable plan, and actually the only acceptable action.

You have to realize, that was a fairly gutsy move for a country like Canada. There were a lot of friends, a lot of middle powers, like the Norwegians, the Dutch, and the Austrians, as well as some from the South, the Chileans, the Mozambiquans, and others. So we do the candidacy, kind of spoke to the UN secretary general and said, ”What do you think?” and he goes “Okay.” Then we spoke to the Prime Minister’s Office and they were ok with it. The rest is history. I got up and said “Okay, right now with the present system, we’re going nowhere so what I want to do is invite any and all countries that would be interested in working with us to come back to Ottawa a year hence [to sign a treaty].”
Axworthy also had the support of the chief administrative officer of the UN and of the ICBL and ICRC leaderships to launch the Ottawa Process. He also harboured the expectation that like-minded nations would step in to support the initiative, but had at that time not yet consulted these nations.

[The campaign] really began by having different stages: getting commitment from the institutions and the people I was working with. It began with Foreign Affairs. They were already committed to the idea [of Canada leading the campaign for the ban of AP mines]. I’m not so sure they were committed in that they knew that, when a politician, a minister, came along that identified with that, I think that they were pleasantly surprised. It became a creative exercise as well, it wasn’t hierarchical.

Once the announcement was made in October 1996, Axworthy continued the work, through his various internal and external networks, of convincing others to commit to the initiative. He also ensured that the members of the departmental team, the office of Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Division (IDA), reporting to the DFAIT International Security Bureau (IDD), were fully on board with forming the required relationships and otherwise contributing to the process.

I think the leadership style was to be fairly forthright and aggressive and prepared to take some risks. With that, I go back to my earlier comment: I probably wouldn’t have been quite so secure in that [position] ten years earlier.

In emphasizing his perception of his personal style of leadership, Axworthy shows his understanding that the announcement of the Ottawa Process was risky, but also worth implementing.

I always thought that the idea of political leadership, of taking a stand and having an agenda, a blueprint, I guess that would be the most important, I would think the most important thing. I think there are far too many people who go into politics without a roadmap in front of them: what they want to do, one or two things they think are important to do, with a certain set of values so they become transactional. [...] I wouldn’t use the word ideals and I think that’s part of it, but I think, but I always knew that if I was going to succeed, I had to have a framework
to work in. It wasn’t just ad hoc existentialism. I think that’s one of the strengths I was able to bring.

Axworthy’s statement about the importance of a “roadmap,” a structured plan of action, based on morals and ideals, was a key piece of information in the quest to understand the type of political leadership required for normative change to take place,

Axworthy’s statements helped me reach a better understanding of the conditions necessary for the successful expression of his political leadership: first, he had the support of others, namely of the prime minister and other political colleagues, of like-minded nations, and of the departmental team assigned the project; second, his personal style of leadership was such that it both fostered the creativity necessary to instigate change and was assertive enough to convince others; and thirdly he was operating according to a “roadmap,” which was based on his experience and on the firm personal conviction that banning APMs was a normative change for which it was worth risking his personal credibility, and that of his country and its citizens.

6.1.2. Momentum

Another prerequisite of success for organizations campaigning in the capacity of norm leaders for a normative change is momentum. The concept of a cascade speaks of a movement, a momentum to affect a change. There was already a huge momentum built during the emergence stage, as identified in Chapter 2. Impediments to the existing momentum could have diminished the possibility of a cascade or, worse, have stopped progress altogether in its tracks. Therefore, the ability for organizations to pursue their work, continue to grow, and develop a preparedness for quick reactions appear as essential in fostering cascade dynamics.
This momentum was expressed during the MBT process in two fashions. First, there was clear recognition of the urgency of a treaty, shown through the imposition of a deadline and the encouragement given for organizations to grow to pick up the speed and the volume of work required.

Axworthy considers the designation of a deadline:

You know something? I guess it was just a bit of symbolism. “Yeah, come back here in a year.” We knew it was going to take a lot of time just to kind of put the pieces together and get them to stick. It just seemed appropriate because the meeting that we held in 1996 was in the old railway convention centre. It just seemed appropriate: “Let’s pick a date.” “Well, come back next December!” There was no big strategy other than knowing that we at least need that amount of time and we’re going to get things underway. I wish maybe I had been a little bit more strategic […] No, actually I think it worked out fine. I think the value of saying “Okay, come back here in a year’s time” just had a nice simple straightforward message that you weren’t going to be getting involved in a bunch of messy complicated things. Just come back here and we’ll buy you a cup of coffee.

When reviewing the history of global norms surrounding the issues of non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, it is surprising to note that the process of global normative changes take decades and that some, such as the potential ban of the use of nuclear weapons, are still far from cascading after 70 years of discussions.\textsuperscript{156} Therefore, the reason for imposing a reconvention date was key. Axworthy admits to having taken this step intuitively rather than as part of a conscious strategy. This intuition, based on his political experience and moral grounding, was key to completing the cascade in fourteen months.

\textsuperscript{156} This link provides more information on the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards their Total Elimination: https://www.un.org/disarmament/ptnw/
A Mine Action Canada’s (MAC’s) representative expresses their reaction to the confirmation of a deadline, which they had not been informed of even though they were a local civil society organization that was pressing the Canadian government to action:

When Minister Axworthy said Canada was going to take the lead I felt, like my first reaction was that I had a huge weight come off my shoulders, like we did it! We convinced the government that they needed to do this and be the leader. I felt like a weight came off, but almost instantly it came right back on even more because I thought: “Oh my god, this is a once in a lifetime opportunity, we have to make it work.”

The weight of a deadline was felt also by MAC. At the time, in October 1996, the organization consisted of a few dedicated volunteers. The implications for them of the public announcement of a 14-month deadline were enormous. The willingness and readiness of MAC to take on the pressure of the unilaterally imposed deadline shows their strong desire to achieve the aim of a ban.

The momentum for growth was essential for MAC to keep up with the requirements to act as a central hub within the ICBL organization and as a key partner in the Canadian outreach to all potential signatory nations to the anticipated ban treaty.

A member of a CSO shares:

Celina [Tuttle] had been in contact between many international campaigns on landmine stuff, and was getting active. So we kind of had something in common in that regard. As a result we hosted a meeting, bringing together organizations that had experience in landmines impacting their work. We realized very quickly that it was a much bigger problem, affecting Canadians, aid workers, and aid agencies, than we had first realized. It was from there that the core group kind of came together and we officially formed Mines Action Canada. I believe it was very early in 1995. Maybe January 1995. But we had been active for quite a long time before that period… We were mainly just reaching out to different organizations. People sort of emerged as the right person to talk to within that organization, and generally because landmines kind of weren’t a separate division within each organization… Because it was probably such an unusual topic really and the fact that it was commonly impacting people’s work.
The success of MAC in growing their organization is one to be applauded. DFAIT had access to funding and departmental processes in hiring additional personnel to support their evolving mission; MAC on the other hand had to convince engaged volunteers already working for other organizations to reprioritize their activities. Fortunately, MAC had already equipped itself with enough information about how APMs in the fields were impacting people and therefore was in a position to link other CSO’s volunteering work to support the shared intent of a comprehensive ban. MAC had become a very effective, persuasive, and credible organizational norm leader.

Ken Epps, Director of Project Ploughshares during the Ottawa Process, shares his experience,

[Ploughshares’] mandate has always included arms control and disarmament and we certainly saw the potential for a landmines treaty within the disarmament part of that work. The original interest came when the ICBL announced that they had started a campaign. We obviously were aware that landmines were a problem prior to that, but it was really the announcement that the campaign was underway, which I think was in 1992, that got our interest. Then we became one of the first NGOs in Canada to draw attention to the campaign, and the fact that it was worthwhile. So, I guess, our objective in the formal sense, would be that we supported the campaign and the idea of a ban on landmines. But it started from a very preliminary basis, where we had to first educate ourselves on the issue. […] then Ploughshares did contribute to the process of engagement by bringing various actors together. […] Ploughshares as a whole has earned a certain respect, certainly within civil society, but even beyond that, that allowed us to have the credibility to bring together people who might be skeptical for example: one of the things that is forgotten is that the Canadian government didn’t always support the idea of a ban on landmines. And there was the process of convincing the government that a landmines ban was an opportunity and something that Canada should be taking seriously. So, I think we were part of that process as well, of just spending time with Canadian officials and politicians to convince them this was an important issue and that Canada should get on board. And I think the other aspect of our role, and I say “our” because although I was the point man for the landmines treaty, it was more than just me within Ploughshares that was doing this work. […] we brought some of the Canadian details to the table, that otherwise might have been overlooked or lost. In an international campaign this can be a challenge […] on the one hand, you want to make sure that people are
aware that this is a global issue and shared universally, but on the other hand, often for the issue to be brought home to people, there has to be a local or national connection that people can feel some empathy or some connection to.

Ploughshares, an early founding member of MAC, supported the efforts to inform and educate the government on the issue of APMs during the emergence phase, and also to inform and educate the general public throughout both the emergence and cascade phases. As a recognized and respected organization, it was able to use its existing national and international networks as platforms to create the potentials for forming new and diverse partnerships.

This momentum had to be matched by the Canadian governmental machinery, which also had to act as a central hub for all Canadian ambassadors, all alliances involving Canada, and all government departments, most importantly DND because of the security aspect of AP mines. Which brings us to the third element necessary for successful organizational norm leadership, namely the management of risk.

6.1.3. Risk Management

Organizational norm entrepreneurs must carry all the initial risks until a larger community is built to share them. The risks involved include loss of political legitimacy, political credibility, and resources both at a national and international level. However, the governmental representatives have all shared that the advent of Canada as an intentional leader in the MBT was a clear case of managed risk.

One interviewee mentions the completion of a risk assessment sent as a briefing note to Axworthy:

We wrote a memo to the minister…we called it the 100 states strategy, and you know at times people would look at us and say, “Are you crazy?” Like this is not going to work, there were so many reasons why it may not work. The conflict on disarmament, there were lots of people that were like “Well, why would you go
outside the United Nations, you’re Canada, you’re supposed to be supporting the United Nations.” So there were a lot of people who said “Let’s do it through the CD [Conference on Disarmament].” I guess one way of wrapping up one of those keys to success was the entrepreneurial people involved and the intelligent risking that they took, and the coalition, and the discourse of shift.

I, for one, would be curious to read this initial assessment in light of the fact that their organizational positioning of the campaign was less than ideal at the announcement of the Ottawa Process, and one important member of the future Canadian coalition had yet to be informed. However, one important element was already in place: members of IDA were ready and willing to make informed recommendations of all aspects of the campaign to their minister.

A second government representative shares that transparency and the identification of risks were on the table during the first briefing to Axworthy prior to his engagement:

I remember sitting in the briefing, I’m a relatively junior person, Ralph is a director general, Jill’s a director, and Minister Axworthy, and briefing him. Ralph was the principal briefer, saying we have the opportunity to lead a process that would lead to a convention and here are all the risks. The United States will be very unhappy, the Russians, the Chinese, and many of our NATO partners will be unhappy, because Canada will seem like it’s stealing the show and trying to avoid well established institutions. He went through, and I’m sitting there, thinking “Ralph, are you trying to convince the minister or are you trying to dissuade the minister?” But it was very effective. He put out all of the worst possible consequences right on the table and there were many. He said “Minister, there are very few countries that will be supportive of us in the beginning. But hopefully with time they will come on board.” It was a soft sell approach, but Axworthy needed to see the potential here.

This statement provides two additional pieces of information. First, it shows the expediency of sharing all risks as understood by the staff members even though the acknowledgement of these risks could create a fear of failure that could offset the willingness of the minister to become the intentional norm leader. Second, it reinforces
the understanding that Axworthy had the opportunity to use the self same risks as an excuse not to engage himself further or accept the political leadership of the APM issue. With these first-person descriptions of the conditions of political leadership, the creation and maintenance of momentum and the establishment of a risk assessment as tools for successful organizational norm entrepreneurship in mind, we now turn to the Ottawa Process to confirm the presence of these characteristics, which lead to the norm leader role in partnerships and the cascade process.

6.2. Characteristics of Norm Leadership in the MBT Process

“Shaping culture is one of the leader’s most important jobs.”
Wicked & Wise: How to Solve the World’s Toughest Problems

There are a multitude of books on leadership and partnership, however none has focused on leading an approval process of a specific global norm like the MBT. The leaders in the MBT were too many to name. Some came in the emergence stage and others at the important signature stage. This research is primarily interested in the leaders present in the heat of the cascade process, in those that stepped forward to claim the space of influence and action. This section will review what was said about these leaders in order to collect indicators on the types of personal motivators, and internal and external actions, that could line up the delicate balance of leadership characteristics required for future global normative endeavours. What follows is therefore divided into six sub-sections, starting with one on the imagination, the instigating characteristic for norm entrepreneurship. It is followed by sections on courage, authenticity, adaptability, the ability to connect and share, credibility, and passion.
6.2.1. Imagination

The ability to “shape culture” is a matter of creativity. Without imagination, we can remain trapped within the conditions that have created a particular problem. As already mentioned, Einstein encouraged all to find and create new potentials for ourselves. It is the imagination that allows a smaller group to withstand and counter the critics of larger groups or to keep a public interested, for any period to time, in a particular subject, when challenged by the complexities of the world. It is imagination that sustains hope in the face of atrocities or the overwhelming pressures of endless life challenges. It is imagination that at first can deconstruct the foundations of outdated institutions or rules. O’Dea shares:

The loss of imagination kills that sense of possibility that we can really transform moral decay in ourselves or in the social order. The bog land of guilt, numbness and indifference steals the vital energy needed to imagine change. But when imagination and conscience combine, we begin to unleash those archetypal energies that are at the root of human progress and evolution… But conscience comes with a warning label: side effects can lead to self-righteousness and arrogance if not grounded in true humility. (2014, 32)

Without imagination our solutions are cosmetic and shallow. (Ibid., 222)

Imagination is the door to possibilities that lie beyond façade, showmanship, and sham compliance.\(^ {157} \) The transformation work of each member of the team led to the collective courage to propose that Canada take the lead. This “sense of opportunity” was at the heart of the recommendation provided by the internal disarmament team to Axworthy prior to October 1996, and at the heart of the minister’s recommendation to prime minister Chrétien.

\(^ {157} \) In *Humanitarian Intervention and the Failure to Protect: Sham Compliance and the Limitations of Norm Life-Cycle Model*, Vanayan argues that although non-conformance to a global norm is not a frequent occurrence, in her analysis of her case studies, there were instances in which compliance was marginally achieved (2008).
I submit that in order for norm leadership to emerge, the following four major indicators related to imagination must be present: the demonstration of intentional leadership, the creation of partnerships, the instituting of shared leadership, and the encouragement of innovations.

6.2.1.1. Imagination and Intentional Leadership

To be an intentional leader you first have to conceive of yourself as a leader. An emerging trend in the MBT was the rise of the middle power as a recognized leader. Canada was the first to assume this new leadership role. Pro-ban nations followed and soon other intentional leaders arose in each nation, with very few exceptions. Even though some nations, such as the US, ended up not signing the ban treaty, members of the public, CSO, and even departmental officials could nevertheless be found working to influence their elected officials and others in positions of power to consider joining the coalition of pro-nations.

Regional leaders emerged. Victims came forward as leaders. In each instance, a first person or a first organization was needed to act as a catalyst for the emergence process to occur. These emergences were numerous inside the cascade of the Ottawa process, which demonstrates the complexity of the lifecycle of norm dynamics.

One interviewee mentions a contagious process not unlike, in my opinion, the dynamics of Girard’s scapegoat phenomena:

Suddenly, we had most of the Western European countries on board. We had a growing number of non-aligned countries who were motivated in part because they were the ones that were mine-affected; they were the casualties; they wanted an international solution to their problem, but I think it didn’t hurt that we were doing something that was kind of a renegade process. The fact that the United States wasn’t on board I think kind of helped us with a lot of contrivances. Because they immediately saw that this is not something the super powers are trying to implement, that they could own it, right? …I think they took a lot of
pride in a process that they had real influence over as opposed to something the big boys cooked up.

The demonstration of intentional leadership on the part of some nations could be seen as an instance of providential mimesis, a mimetic structure of blessing, given that the result was to improve human well-being. Some nations were doing it not out of concern for the well-being of their own populations; for example, landmines were not a threat to the people of Western Europe.

6.2.1.2. Imagination and Partnership

O’Dea shares that “many of our contemporary politicians still act as if dialogue is a betrayal of their beliefs. But they and all who seek to change the world must learn to serve the power of sharing ideas and not seek to make ideas serve their personal power” (2014, 33). During the emergence phase, it was the usual case of limited trust and respect between government and NGOs in every nation. NGOs were informing their members of the impacts of the AP mines. Governments were staying inside the confines of the CCW.

NGOs were aware that representatives of governments were feeling the demands from the public. Warmington and Tuttle share their concerns about the first invitation for access:

Within weeks of the announced moratorium, MAC was invited to appoint a representative to the official Canadian delegation to the final CCW negotiating session. Although this opportunity was welcomed, the invitation created a dilemma for the coalition. MAC did not want to be perceived as endorsing the ‘legitimate use’ of landmines by becoming a full participant in the CCW negotiations, nor did members wish to forgo the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of and contribute directly to these otherwise closed-door discussions. In the end, it was decided the potential for MAC to bring a humanitarian perspective to the discussions outweighed other concerns and considerations. The CCW Review Conference reconvened in April 1996 with Mines Action Canada represented as a member of the Canadian delegation. (1998, 55)
Chapters 4 and 5 on partnership provided a series of indicators, characteristics, and challenges for taking this first step— that of announcing oneself available for partnership, as the members of MAC had done —to its fruition in meeting the vision and mandates.

6.2.1.3. Imagination and Shared Leadership

At first, the coalition was a hard sell. Some members on each side of the Canadian government and the CSO had to become brokers of trust. The CSOs were being trusted with information by being trained by an expert on mines, being trusted with access by being invited to a UN meeting in Geneva, being trusted as a partner by the acknowledgement of the data they’d collected to inform all levels of government. The government was in turn being trusted with the viability and sustained maintenance or focus of the partnership.

Trust is an essential element of a successful “dance.” Two extracts from interviews provide insight into some of the cascading elements in partnerships during the Ottawa Process:

It was really important to identify campaigns within campaigns that could use support. Or, other sectors of the non-governmental community that could use support and build up their profile, for example, disabilities and landmines survivors and the landmine survivors network. Building those up and working with them, not just telling them what to say but hearing their stories and their perspectives.

The level of support is undefined in this statement, however, just listening to the perspectives of others provides a sense of empowerment for all, and simultaneously contributes to the positive reputation and profile of organization, and of the campaign to ultimately improving its chance of being successful.

South Africa was fascinating because here you had a transition from apartheid. The bloom had not gone off the rose for the ANC [African National Congress] yet, you still had the Mandela years. We had Graca Machel, who […] became
Mandela's wife who was an activist in Mozambique. So, I got to work with and met her. I was on a panel with her on armed conflict and children in the United Nations with her. And yet the officials on the South African side were White guys… We had this South African struggling to understand how Whites were going to work with Blacks when Blacks were in position of power. Jacob Selebi is a force of nature, he’s incredibly confident… he was in jungles… and he becomes a diplomat and he goes on to be their foreign minister at one point. And he, you know, he delivers most of Africa for us [by rallying the support of African nations].

The empowerment of Africa in choosing to stand as a pro-ban continent, despite the non-alignment of the major powers, was accomplished through the leadership of Jacob Selebi. Selebi was in turn entrusted to chair the negotiations in Oslo, thereby bringing attention to the co-leadership of Africa. This was just one of several ways in which the notion of shared leadership was expressed throughout the Ottawa Process.

6.2.1.4. Imagination and Innovations

Innovations were required to fill the organizational vacuum created by the departure from the CCW process and the creation of the Ottawa Process. However, it was essential that these were the right innovations in order for the new process to create and sustain credibility through the demonstration of successful steps, a forward momentum, without destabilizing the tacit rules of global engagement. For Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, these right innovations included:

Three innovations came together: (1) a partnership was built between states and NGOs, allowing ‘two-track diplomacy’ in which both states and NGOs participated in the development of the Convention; (2) small and medium-sized states worked together in a coalition of the like-minded; and (3) negotiations were held outside normal channels and mechanisms in order to place AP mines on a diplomatic path to extinction. (1998, 5)

Additional information on the importance of innovations came up during the interview process. One governmental representative shares the following regarding the impetus to innovate:
Jill was a huge entrepreneur as well [like Minister Axworthy]. It was almost a weird ideal combination of people... she would always ask the tough questions: “Why can’t we do this?” “Why don’t we do things differently?” Jill is an amazing diplomat. She is one of the most outstanding diplomats I think of her generation. She knew how everything worked, how the United Nations worked, how bilateral relations worked, and how things worked in Geneva. She was extremely well informed.

This statement acknowledges the important role of individuals in innovation. Jill is an exemplar who broke down barriers to progress and provided the impetus to finding solutions.

Three innovations are retained here as they were emphasized by the interviewees, namely the creation of a new space, the creation of new discourses, and the creation of new ways of doing business. They all together contribute to the construction of a new collective identity and its ability to work together effectively to fulfill the shared vision and mandate.

*New Space*

The Canadian government bent the rules and created the space for collaboration. They worked horizontally, which was not a common practice 20 years ago. They eschewed hierarchy and treated all participants of the process as equals (to a degree). However, in my view their most audacious move was to take the process outside the UN.

In the MBT, it appears that it was informed imagination that led to a near utopian outcome. Everyone could imagine a world without APM but overcoming the locked position at the CCW Disarmament Negotiations table required imagination. This

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158 Since Thomas More wrote *Utopia* (1516) in which a traveller describes his discovery of a foreign country where people live peacefully side by side, achieving success through collaboration and common interests, there have been many attempts to create a new and better world, as if on new, blank canvas. However, political realism has remained a force to contend with for over 70 years since Morgenthau first defined political realism in his book *Politics Among Nations* with a first edition in 1948; his quest was to bring order to the realm of foreign affairs and not to develop a theory of international relations.
obdurate position could have been changed through a rule change, from the requirement of complete consensus to a requirement of a qualified majority in favour. But there is no UN systemic process to change this procedural aspect when a UN board is mandated and a consensus vote would obviously continue to be a sticking point.

One solution was to take the process outside the UN system. This had been done before,\textsuperscript{159} when the G6 was formed in 1975, to become the G7 with the inclusion of Canada in 1976. Therefore, there was a precedent for conducting disarmament discussions outside the UN. The real ingenuity was to have a middle power taking the lead this time, breaking down the tenets of realism and its “might is right” philosophy and turning it into “right is might.” It required the support, the understanding, and the pledge of the public to mitigate the political risk, and in the case of the MBT, to accept the “moral legitimacy” of the cause itself.

The situation required a form of participatory democracy not seen before\textsuperscript{160} and not even imagined by contemporary social and political theorists. What was required was a relational approach that created a new form of connection yet used the diplomatic and international networks already in place to communicate and organize. This was achieved as a result of an interpersonal rather than a procedural practice.

\textsuperscript{159} The creation of the G6/G7 is interesting because it was created independently of the realm of national politics and yet was basically uncontested.  
\textsuperscript{160} In \textit{Navigating a New World}, Axworthy shares: “The land-mine experience also showcased the potential for partnership between governments, NGOs and international humanitarian organizations, where the whole became greater than the parts. The NGOs in particular lost their scepticism about government intentions when they saw that we were prepared to stick out our neck. From our part, it would have been impossible for governments to mobilize opinion and pressure the way the coalition did. The international organizations such as the Red Cross and UNICEF, usually reluctant to get into what is seen as political activity, were essential players in lending their credibility, knowledge and worldwide networks.” (2003, 153)
The required change came about as a result of the experience of other international norms changes. One such norm was the Open Sky project.\footnote{The Treaty on Open Skies entered into force on January 1, 2002, and currently has 34 states parties. It provides a foundation of mutual trust based on a shared intent of establishing “a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its participants.” US Department of State – Open Skies Treaty. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/123551.htm.} One government representative shares the following:

Ralph was involved with a process where Canada was the host of a negotiating process that lead to a treaty. But that previous process sat there in our minds. Suddenly meetings were going on, and more and more countries were standing up saying, “we want a ban, we want a ban.” We’re thinking, well, we’re going to end our conference, everybody is going to have said their piece, expressed their desire and then what? So it really was Ralph who came up with the idea to avoid the conference on disarmament, avoid the hassle of negotiating something over two decades and maybe never ever getting to our destination.\footnote{Ralph Lysyshyn whose actions and decisions are explained in part in Chapter 2.}

The creation of a space by a middle power and a non-member of the veto right at the UN Security Council, outside the premises of the approved CCW process, was revolutionary in the field of global security. This new space could be conceived as a dangerous distractor. However, it was required to include the other elements of innovation required for a successful campaign. One such element was the reframing of the APM issue.

\begin{quote}
New Discourses
\end{quote}

Imagination is required to transform awareness of a known issue that requires resolution. The impacts of AP mines on soldiers had been known since their first use on the battlefield, and on civilians in the aftermath of battle. The possibility for change had been discussed in an endless series of negotiations already. In order to affect this change, new discursive frames of reference needed to be introduced. The construction of collective identities, as introduced in section 5.1.2.1., needed reframing.
reframing were required to arrive at the successful cascade of the Ottawa Process. All
new and existing collectives were to be habituated to transparency and accountability in
their planning and execution of the campaign to ban the AP mines. The reframing was
adjusted to fit the needs of each institution and government, as each norm leader went
about their business of connection and influence. However, two new discourses were
given priority: human security and the military discourse.

Discourse #1: Human security emerged as a new normative term

Entirely new organizations, such as ICBL and MAC, were created to deal with
this issue. There was also some tweaking to incorporate this issue into the mandates of
many existing transitional organizations such as ICRC and VVC. These particular
reframings centred on the privileging of the issue of human security over the needs of
national security.

The discourse on human security became key to contesting the legitimacy of the
AP mines with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as seen in Chapter 2. Here three
government representatives share their thoughts on the importance of this change in
discourse:

The fact that we had a broader framework called human security was enormously
important in attracting the attention of other countries and other institutions.
Again, this is not just a one-off ad hoc kind of initiative. It was seen as being part
of a kind of rebuild, a bit of international system around the protection of people.
I know that when we ran for the Security Council we used that really as our
campaign motif. I think we got the highest number of votes that anybody had ever
had because I think other people said, “Look, this isn’t some kind of ego thing,
it’s not Canada thrusting its way.” They really do believe that this is a building
block towards a different way of thinking about security and looking at the world
in a somewhat different way and breaking away from the kind of realpolitik of
“might makes right.”
The change in discourse of the APM—from a national security imperative to a human security imperative—instigated a global discussion on national obligations among victims as well as the more general citizenry and a new international legal interpretation of human security. The fact that Canada, a country known for its international mediation skills, was among the leader of the discourse provided legitimacy for the reframing.

When you take all the files on the CCW, it is a security issue: landmines are weapons of war. It’s a security issue. But pivot the discourse to a humanitarian issue and that enables all sorts of other coalition partnerships, other ways of looking at the problem—the stigmatization of the weapon as a devilish power war. You know soldiers are honourable; they don’t use weapons that kill civilians. There was the impact on women and children, the developing world, so the shift from security to humanitarian was essential.

The reframing of the discourse surrounding the APM from that of a nation’s right of usage during conflict to that of a citizen’s human right “to walk without fear” proved to be an easy rallying call.

Allen [Crawford] played an extraordinary role in this [...]. We had a verification research unit where we did amazing work to try and facilitate the negotiations on arms control treaties by actually dealing with the verification issues. We’re talking about “no one wants to give up anything unless they know what the other guys are doing” and all of that stuff, so we did a lot of ground breaking work that helped thinking on the comprehensive test ban treaty and the chemical weapons convention and the biological weapons convention. We were doing work on this area on CCW. Allen was there and it was Allen who was part of this very small team who provided a lot of intellectual input and I have to say, it was Allen who first said, “You know what, we got to reset the issue, we got to reset the issue not as doing away with the weapon system, but changing the way.”

The introduction of the concept of human security was such a way; it moved the discourse from the “right of usage” of the weapon to the right to live without being harmed after a conflict is over. The discussion of APMs was rendered simpler, less contentious, since the topic of a possible ban of APMs was delinked from the issue of national and territorial sovereignty. The negotiation was moved from a politico-military
context to a humanitarian context. These three statements provide an understanding of the legal, political, and humanitarian aspects of the human security discourse.

**Discourse #2: Military alternatives emerged to support the normative change**

There was also a requirement for many nations to change their *military discourse*. Whereas ICBL became the transnational repository of the campaign for human security, the Canadian coalition carried the military discourse, including the question of the possibility of replacing AP mines. The success of the cascade process of the MBT was dependent on the realization of the continued need for some nations to protect their boundaries so a solution was required. The Canadian coalition brought in the expertise and the solution, working hard at building the sub-partnerships.

Robert Lawson, working as a civilian in the disarmament section at DFAIT, shares:

> When you do the research and you realize this is just ridiculous how many weapons we left there all over the world. I knew that our military treated them with respect, and our de-miners knew how to lift them after these exercises and all these things. I knew we weren’t a part of the problem, but at an emotional level this is not how soldiers operate. Our job is not to kill civilians, and our military has to provide leadership around the world. So, if we’re working for peace support operations, if we’re working with militaries of the developing world, you want to transfer those values and uphold those values. Because this was a self-inflicted injury, military used them without any mapping, civilian groups used them, guerrilla groups used them, I mean it was just crazy.

Being able to understand the veterans’ and serving military members’ position in reference to the use of APMs was essential. The norm leader had to be in a position to listen to the military knowledge and suggestions on how to reposition the discourse.
The senior military officer assigned to the Canadian coalition, then army engineer Colonel Fitch, shares:

[commenting on progress of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban treaty and why Canada felt it was necessary to involve uniformed military officers:] Soon after the start of the drive towards an Anti-Personnel Mine Ban treaty, perhaps 79 [nations] immediately understood that this was the right thing to do so they were “in.” We assessed that there was a small group of states that would never be “in.” In the middle group that was left, our target group, many were former soviet countries and dictatorships, where you would say the military had inordinate power. These were not, technically speaking, democracies. […] The diplomats had carried the message as far as they could and had brought like-minded people together quite quickly. But in that middle group of countries, they needed a soldier they could send to speak eye-to-eye with their top-level soldiers.

The human connection was another component in the military discourse on alternatives to the use of APMs as defensive weapons. This agent needed the credibility of rank and national support to convey the importance of the message being shared.

While the discourses were important, there was one more building block to the creation of a new relational infrastructure—new ways of doing business were required.  

*New Ways of Doing Business*

The Ottawa Process was a daring proposal from its inception to its conclusion. The creation of the new space offered the required flexibility, but I contend that the challenges of the ongoing legitimate CCW forced the Canadian coalition and the pro-ban nations to contribute new and imaginative ways of doing business to the delicate diplomatic questions of access and contribution to the process. Two aspects of the new relational infrastructure have been given priority in this analysis: the self-selection for participation and a higher level of responsibility and accountability for the leading nations in the planning and execution of the four major events reviewed in Chapter 2.
On the process of self-selection, Williams and Goose write:

A decision that turned out to be of pivotal importance in the next stage of the ban movement was made to put a priority on getting avowedly pro-ban governments to self-identify and work together as a bloc to move beyond the CCW impasse. […] to work together on moving the issue forward. (1998, 32)

Tomlin adds to the understanding of this new selection process:

Although the number of countries wanting to attend the Ottawa meeting was growing, there was still substantial opposition to the movement to ban mines, and officials in IDA were concerned that opponents might attend the session simply to sabotage it. The problem centred on the invitation list. […] A solution to this dilemma was proposed by Mark Gwozdecky to the IDA group in June 1996, and it was deceptive in its simplicity. The meeting would, in principle, be open to all states but each would determine for itself whether it should attend. (1998, 196)

Hajnoczi, Desh, and Chatsis identify some particulars of the level of responsibility and accountability for Austria in the development of the draft treaty. Indeed they share that,

to a certain extent, the statement of the Austrian chair that the text was provided only for the purpose of discussion (and would not bind any delegation) helped to build confidence. […] When the new Austrian draft was circulated worldwide on 13 May 1997, it represented a collective effort not only of Austria and the core group but also, to a certain extent, of the approximately 70 states that had submitted comments, as well as the UN, ICRC and ICBL. Nevertheless, the paper was attributable solely to Austria. This approach made it possible to view this paper as the result of extensive bilateral and multilateral negotiations while leaving Austria and the core group the discretion to take up only those proposals that were consistent with the objective—a total ban of AP mines. (1998, 294–295)

These new ways of doing business—through self-selection and consultation for products and decisions—are essential innovations of the Ottawa Process. In my view, these were necessary innovations to ensure the participation and privacy of players reluctant to leave the CCW process, but maybe hopeful of arriving at a real solution to the APM issue.
This section has reviewed the trait of imagination—as seen in the creation of a new space, the creation of new discourses, and the creation of new ways of doing business.

However, organizational norm leaders had to bring more than imagination to the fora of global negotiations to sustain the immense amount of effort required to cascade a global norm that is still qualified today as “the right thing to do.”\(^{163}\) The decision to act also, as with the steps toward self-transformation, requires courage.

### 6.2.2. Courage

O’Dea proposes that “no matter how complex things get, it is through courage that we define our moral choices and speak truth to power. It is courage that transforms moral platitudes into game-changing visionary imperatives” (2014, 95). I would define courage demonstrated in the face of challenges and risks as a combination of self-trust, strength of will, and an expression of self-leadership, prior to it being expressed in the relational collective quadrants. There is no question that the Ottawa Process was “speaking truth to power,” not only in defying the agreed-upon ongoing process of the CCW, but in assigning an outcome to a ban, and racing forward to formulate its content within a tightly designated timeframe (in a manner rather more aggressive than is usual in the field of disarmament).

A couple of other interviewees share their views on courage and audacity:

> ICRC, I think the big deal, first, this is the first time they stepped out of their neutrality. But I don’t think so, because if you say an objective assessment of this weapon is that the humanitarian impact is primary over the military utility, that can be an objective assessment, and then you say, therefore they should be banned, that is still objective and based on objectivity. It is still an activist

\(^{163}\) The reminder of the immense amount of effort and resources needed to cascade the treaty for a ban of a simple weapon acts as a useful indication of the difficulty of the task at hand in cascading global norms presently “stuck” in the UN system.
position. I don’t think it’s out of hand. So the ICRC’s credibility is to me a very large factor here. And also governments and military listen to their book *Friend or Foe?* So that was a big deal, I think. I think you’ll have to ask governments: “Did *Friend or Foe?* have an impact on you?”

This statement highlights the significance of the role of ICRC. The leadership of this organization took a risk to their neutrality and their credibility when self-identifying as a pro-ban organization working on behalf of the victims to achieve a total ban.

So the Red Cross has got its own culture. I mean they’re humanitarian neutral. But then you have Cornelio Sommaruga, who is the head of the ICRC, who was also quite unique. Usually the Red Cross is not outspoken.

The significance of ICRC is emphasized by another interviewee. Sommaruga’s leadership in supporting the book *Friend or Foe?* proved essential in destabilizing the military position on the usage of the APMs. This destabilization allowed for a change of discourse and a new contextual environment for dialogue.

The Mexicans! They were part of our core group. Mexicans have this incredibly rich history of independent thinking in foreign policy and in disarmament affairs. They’ve been antinuclear from the very beginning so. So, they’re fine, they’re great allies.

It took a number of nations to take a courageous stand in order to achieve a successful cascade towards a total ban.

It’s courage. It’s courage [that is required to achieve the success of the Ottawa Process]. You know when we go through our day-to-day lives, we’re often rewarded for not taking risks. The systems around us reinforce the comfort zone. We often follow the patterns, follow the norm, follow the world the way it is. Courageous people really think outside the box, and Jill is one of those people. […] When you have a courageous leader that says, “Yes, you can do these things, try these things, take these risks to advance the world,” that created a sort of ethos in the department that led to the child soldiers work and work on blood diamonds…it sort of empowers you to think that you can take these risks and convince people that these can be done and you can get allies and get things moving.

Courage can, as we see in the above excerpts, take many forms. One demonstration of courage is to be among the first to support a new initiative, another is to
risk one’s credibility for a higher cause, a third is being willing to take informed risks in organizations in which the culture is otherwise averse to doing so.

One expression of courage and audacity in the MBT was the weaving of surprise into the process. Many nations viewed Axworthy’s surprise announcement of the Ottawa Process as a sign of betrayal by Canada.\textsuperscript{164} One interviewee shares that it took a few months even for the pro-ban nations to rally behind the process. Surprise thus has the potential to produce confusion. However, surprise is a well-known element of military campaigns\textsuperscript{165} as it creates destabilization and a resulting opportunity to leverage one’s advantage.

As seen in Chapter 2, Axworthy did share his intent with a few select people at the UN, ICBL, and ICRC before making his surprise announcement. My evaluation is that this decision was made for strategic reasons, to pre-empt naysayers from killing the “project” before it was given the opportunity to blossom. In addition, I suspect that in alignment with the requirements for social transformation, the emotions of indignation and disheartenment from the CCW process needed time and space to shift to allow for the emergence of hope.

Some additional thoughts on the subject are shared in this interview extract:

\begin{quote}
The surprise factor was massive, right. [Axworthy’s challenge] Not even that, the audacity of what we did and how we did it. Don’t forget, this is the first time, and I think for me, when I reflect, “Okay, is this replicable?” One of the big reasons
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{164} I acknowledge that not everyone has the power to make a bold surprising decision. With the backing of the PM and with the financial resources already committed, Axworthy was in a good position to take this bold and surprising step.

\textsuperscript{165} The \textit{Canadian Military Doctrine} summarizes surprise to “[have] an effective and powerful influence in war and its effect on morale is immeasurable. Every effort must be made to surprise the enemy and to guard against being surprised. Surprise can produce results out of all proportion to the effort expended and, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be achieved strategically, operationally, or tactically. The elements of surprise are: secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity, and speed.” (2009, 2.5)
why I think it will be difficult is because we had a surprise tactic. Right? We actually didn’t know what we were doing, which was great, so we didn’t know we couldn’t do it. Then we did it, but in retrospect people are good to this. And you hear countries saying, “Oh my gosh, they might do an Ottawa Process and take it outside this negotiation forum.” So, we had the benefit of surprise on our side, because it hadn’t been done before.

Courage, audacity, and the element of surprise carry risks for individuals and organizations, therefore risk management is a necessary element in norm leadership. As noted where self-transformation is concerned, both an objective and reflective analysis of self, the other, and the working environment are required in the risk analysis. It is critical to be able to situate emotions and their level of intensity.

6.2.3. Authenticity

O’Dea muses on the possibility of authenticity, “Do we have the courage and humility to reveal who it is we truly are?” (2014, 223). In addition, Watkins and Wilber suggest that,

leaders will often be unable to access their best, most creative thinking, or get the most out of others, if they don’t first develop some degree of emotional coherence. More advanced levels of emotional coherence facilitate more constructive and powerful working relationships and more refined cognitive intelligence. (2015, 110)

Coherence must be present so that support promised by a norm leader is delivered as per the terms of the original agreement. This coherence can only be achieved when the leader is self-aware with regard to a given issue, both subjectively (regarding their state of internal emotions) and objectively (regarding their alignment with known codes of morals and ethics). Therefore, the leader must be “vulnerable” enough to allow themselves to be exposed to outside pressures, with a corresponding expression of emotions. This vulnerability is rarely attributed to the notion of leadership; however,
disconnect or a lack of emotions can be perceived, by observers in sensitive files such as the MBT, as a lack of care or as dishonesty.

6.2.4. Adaptability

Adaptable leadership is a tall order, but I propose that adaptability was a characteristic essential to norm leaders in 1996, and that it is so even more today. Adaptability is required when a person with a particular worldview ventures to meet someone with another worldview. There must be a level of humility that enables the recognition that the other has something valuable to share, as well as a true capability for listening. O’Dea proposes that “those who have mastered higher levels are able to help us stabilize our consciousness at the next level it is capable of reaching” (2014, 69). It appears that higher consciousness helps dissolve the barriers of polarity.

Thus, authenticity must not only be expressed in the alignment of self with the norm leader, but also in the alignment of worldview with worldviews. While there is likely to be divergence in terms of priorities of issues, and the means to achieve success, between any two individuals or organizations, there must be coherence in an agreement to work together when forming a partnership. Often, this unity of purpose is built around a commonality of morals or ethics. Ethics and morals often appear as antipodal to political realism and for many political thinkers, morals should never trump national

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166 “Knowledge doubling every 12 months, soon to be every 12 hours” (Schilling, 2013), Industry Tap, [http://www.industrytap.com/knowledge-doubling-every-12-months-soon-to-be-every-12-hours/3950](http://www.industrytap.com/knowledge-doubling-every-12-months-soon-to-be-every-12-hours/3950)

167 Aron, a contemporary of Morgenthau, suggests that politics and morals must be complementary companions. In *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations*, he shares “Que la morale devienne plus politique et la politique plus morale, l’une et l’autre reconnaissant que les jugements sur la conduite des États doivent se référer à la nature et aux buts de ces personnalités collectives” (1968, 577). My translation: So that morals become more politically oriented and
security interests. As noted in Chapter 2, national interests can, however, be disguised under a superficial layer of ethics and morals, which would render the latter less than authentic.

For a successful cascade, individual norm leaders within each organization have to find the means to own the issue contested and also allow themselves to be vulnerable in reaching out to potential allies.

When asked to describe his leadership style, Axworthy shares:

I still believe that the role I had to play was to get the cabinet to agree to what we were doing, to get the caucus to agree, to get Canadians to agree, and then to get other countries to agree. We spent a lot of time jawboning in meetings and I was becoming the perpetual nag about landmines, but it was very much personal in a lot of ways. First of all, personal contact with other foreign ministers or with other prime ministers and very direct contact with people like Cornelius Sommaruga of the Red Cross, and I just spent a lot of time doing what I had been doing for a long time, and it was just using the power of, well, academics are always kind of scornful of my use of softpower as the power of persuasion.

An experienced political leader has access to personal networks through which they can reach out in the name of a cause. However, I contend that for a cascade process to be effective, the relationship must be beyond a mere transaction, becoming first and foremost an experience of shared moral aspirations.

Two characteristics were brought to light for norm entrepreneurs in the Ottawa Process: the ability to connect with emotions and the capacity for equipoise.

The MBT was an emotional adventure. The horrors caused by AP mines to military and civilian alike, provoked emotions and reactions in everyone. The frequency of the deaths and injuries caused by them in some of the poorest places in the world were unknown at first, but through the diligent work of ICRC and VVAF, data started to be

politics become more moral-based, so that one and the other recognize that the judgments on the conduct of states must refer to the nature and goals of these complementary personalities.
collected. As a result of the distribution of this information to other organizations and the general public, the level of indignation rose. When ICRC published *Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?*, for some the indignation turned into anger. The concept of “proportionality,” raised by the IHL, became a starting point from which to raise the issue of human security. The anger and indignation increased with the wider distribution of information, but until the Ottawa Process was announced there was no sense of hope with which to balance the tide of negative emotion.

The members of the Canadian coalition raised awareness and money by tempering the negative (the reality of the impacts on human lives) with the positive (reports of what could be achieved with the funds collected to resolve the situation in part or entirely). At first, the emotions were only of despair, injustice, and indignation. Gradually, however, there also arose emotions related to hope, empowerment, and a possibility to affect a positive change. Each interviewee had their personal source of inspiration, but many also relied on each other for continuous acknowledgment that hope was present.

However, it is interesting to note that there was little to no room for mentioning emotions within the political context. Political decorum did not allow for the demonstration of emotions in the conduct of political affairs. This lack of demonstration of emotions may be worth further evaluation, because it is likely that it is also the expected behaviour within the Security Council of the UN. However, it is clear that emotions were given more room for expressions in the MBT.
O’Dea writes:

You need vision that is responsive and alive, a generative sense of hope and possibility, a state of equipoise and positively charged instinct for spontaneous creativity. (2014, 102)

Equipoise is defined as a state of equilibrium.\(^{168}\) I associate this definition with the ability of staying core—centered on the ability to connect with emotions while remaining calm and in control of self as well as others in the situation at hand.

One representative of CSO shares:

We were full of this kind of optimism. I think that has tempered over time. But no, my belief in the potential for middle powers working together to create change is still there as a result of this exercise.

I see the sense of permission to express positive emotions among partners in a relationship as an expression of trust and authenticity and as a catalyst for the emergence of the same emotions in others.

O’Dea shares:

Like tightrope walkers, activists also need to acquire equipoise not so that they can tamp down their instinct for peace and justice but so that they can stay on the edge. This quality allows them to be bold and daring, while also being balanced. Courage is daring but not reckless. Passion becomes ranting if it isn’t matched with convincing argument. Moral indignation loses its power if it has no self-reflection. And fear paralyzes if it becomes a dominant emotion. Gaining equipoise requires inner mastery. (2014, 104)

The capacity to adapt while reaching out to others when combined with O’Dea’s situational equipoise would allow one to remain true to one’s moral convictions while negotiating and considering solutions for the benefit of the partnership.

This study will not address the full breadth of the concept of self-mastery. However, the mimetic dynamics of the exemplar suggest a level of consciousness that can in itself become an “object of desire” in the triangle of the relationship. In a similar

\(^{168}\) Merriam Webster Dictionary at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/equipoise
fashion to how the “intent to act” is key for the self to move in the various collective settings illustrated in the two collective quadrants, the “passage to connect” is crucial for norm leaders, both from a relational and process perspective.

6.2.5. Ability to Connect and Share

The norm leader must be habituated to reach out to others in order to influence them to contribute to the cascading of a new norm. The ability to reach out to create partnerships is essential to anyone wanting to achieve norm change. This ability is built upon knowledge of self and “the all” as described below.

Self and the Inner Knowing

O’Dea identifies the ability to have a vision that is built upon more than the sum of one’s particular experiences and expertise. He ventures:

Vision unfolds to the level of our knowledge. It is the forward edge of our knowing. By knowledge I do not mean the repository of collected data or the sum total of conditioned perspectives. It is a little more nuanced than that. What we are referring to here is a form of knowledge that is accessed through our being. The degree to which our being has been expanded, developed and refined opens us to higher and more comprehensive forms of knowing… The activist is now called to be the embodiment of a non-polarizing vision. Getting there is at the heart of conscious activism (2014, 46). When instinct is joined by conviction and subtle intuition, they provoke not just passionate intensity but the kind of passion that can transform others and turn the tide. (2014, 103)

The ability to attain this form and level of knowledge is aligned with the ability expected from an adaptable leader. The tools of the IA theory and the dynamics of mimetism allow such a leader to navigate the evolving levels of relationships and contexts constitutive of their environment. Their subjective and objective awareness
support the intention to lead a norm change, to follow one, or to remain uncommitted and wait.\textsuperscript{169}

One government representative shares:

I was representing the views of the NGOs more than I was representing the views of the department probably. I was starting to become their spokesperson, but it was also because intellectually I figured out this was going to work, if we did the right thing.

The capacity to connect is possible solely through a willingness and ability to be open to the views of others and therefore vulnerable in accepting of the possibility of having to modify one’s own version of reality. The ability to reach out and connect with others is key to all normative changes. It requires particular interpersonal skills. I argue that it is this ability that distinguishes a successful norm leader, irrespective of their leadership style and personality shortcomings. In part, this ability is expressed through the building of trust and the contribution to the dance of partnership, which will both be addressed in the next chapter.

Three interviewees offer their personal perspectives on this ability.

Jill always respected Ploughshares, always respected the disarmament team, because that was her community in some ways, she was a disarmament person in government, but she knew that they had views that had to be respected and they were very important in their own communities in terms of the research that Ploughshares did, the contributions on public policy.

The kind of relationship one can rely on for mutual support can take many years to build. If this relationship is nurtured, even tacitly, it can be key in proving able to meet a shared goal, even one with an aggressive schedule of implementation.

\textsuperscript{169} The theory of the balance of power is key for the neutralists. Macleod, citing Waltz (1979, 117), shares that in order to survive, states may use two strategies: bandwagoning or balancing. The expression “to join the bandwagon” is linked to the undecided and their “tendency to join a state, or a group of states, appearing as the more powerful or threatening” (2010, 95).
You don’t want to end up coopted. But I felt that, I certainly felt that I had a voice, and that I was listened to. I think there were many sympathetic people and our discussion was not whether or not it was the right thing, so much as how do we get there. Bob Lawson for example, he was such a presence for Mines Action Canada, because well, he’s a bureaucrat and understood why the government didn’t want a ban, but he also could see the other side, as would Minister Axworthy. It was more or less a matter of convincing them of why this is a good thing, to do it, but it was more a matter of helping them creatively on how they could do it.

There is more stress on the partners when the relationship has to be built during the campaigning. In this situation, connectors bringing knowledge, experience, and a sincere willingness to listen can minimize the level of stress and establish foundations of trust more quickly.

[MAC] had never seen a mine! You know, they knew it was a terrible thing, but they never had seen one! How does it work? So I think that was good for building partnership with them. They saw we could share. They probably thought worse of us than we thought of them probably.

Connectors willing to share as equals can encourage a realization on all sides that when joined (and equal) the parties are in a better position to pool resources for the empowerment of all.

The ability to connect with self and share with others are natural concepts when analysing elements of leadership, however the connection “to all” is more a surprise. My pragmatic sense almost avoided its inclusion. However, in the end I decided to include this field of connection because of the repeated mention of thoughts of “perfect storm,” “perfect team,” “alchemy,” and “synchronicity” by a majority of the interviewees when talking about the success of the Ottawa Process.

*The All*

O’Dea proposes that “it is the conjunction of the inner and the outer, the immanent and transcendent, that ignites the alchemy of transformation” (2014, 121).
Quantum theory allows for the understanding of entanglements in morphogenetic fields of identified conscience. However, to simplify this concept and apply it to the understanding of a successful team changing the destiny of the world with an envelope of new rules packaged under the MBT, the following from O’Dea has helped me to realize the untapped potential of higher consciousness in a leader. O’Dea proposes that,

the Great Mystery does not operate a train schedule. It catalyzes wave upon wave of synchronicity and connection. When we experience these synchronicities, the universe seems to be an ocean of flow that we can tap into to perceive incredible layers of connectivity. When this occurs, one doesn’t need to seek the miraculous: miracles abound. The more one is able to step into this flow, the more one experiences grace and guidance. (2014, 80)

A leader, and I would argue a norm leader in particular, must have the humility to surrender to that guidance. The idea of the creation of synchronicity is interesting since it allows the examination of the potentials and conditions for synchronicity.

I identified two synchronous phenomena at play during the Ottawa Process: the creation and expansion of a web of connections, and the deconstruction of existing relations and processes. The connections in question will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter 7. However, the deconstruction of existing relations and processes has not been identified in the articles or by the interviewees collected for this study. The deconstruction process is similar to the idea of breaking down layers of old for new to emerge. It requires that the norm leader has the ability to believe in the possibility of change and not let known and unknown obstacles get in the way. Instead they must choose to create the possibility of deconstruction knowing, as a structural engineer would, which foundational elements to keep and which to discard. For example, in the development of new discourses there were old ones to “win over.” In the creation of a new space for a coalition to take form, there were relations, legitimacy, power structures
and other logistical processes “under trials” with the CCW. Each deconstruction carries its own cascade of changes.

There is more to develop on synchronicity in relation to the cascade process. Peat proposes that synchronicities “give us a glimpse beyond our conventional notions of time and causality into the immense patterns of nature, the underlying dance which connects all things and the mirror which is suspended between inner and outer universes.” (1987, 2). In understanding this complex and somewhat “mysterious” change dynamics, O’Dea shares that “when we switch from ego to witness we become so much more receptive to the creative agency of the universe ready to help us transform, and it is in that state of receptivity that epiphanies occur and synchronicities abound” (2014, 172).

The ability to connect and share is based on a state of receptivity to three concurrent levels: that of “self,” the other, and the “all.”

One interviewee shares on this phenomenon:

I’m a massive believer, and I have been since that day. You don’t need lots of people. You need, and I always say this: “You need three of the right people.” You can literally change the world, you know as long as you have some political cover too. So that was it…But the core team was this *troika*, in Canada… There wasn’t a lot of science about this, it was alchemy.

The ability to connect is expressed differently by various actors depending on their ease with others, their access to resources, and their ability to listen to their intuitions to recognize and leverage synchronicity. The credibility of the norm leader—a function of—has been found to be directly linked to their knowledge, skills, and expertise.
6.2.6. Credibility

According to Lencioni, the characteristics of a successful organizational consultant are the “three Rs: his reputation, the relationships he had with executives, and the rapport he developed” (2006, 21) (italics mine). These three elements are of interest as they span the boundaries of the four quadrants of the IA theory. Lencioni also places a special emphasis on the attention and respect inspired by the leaders of an organization in looking for the resolution of organizational conflicts (Ibid., 51) where they “assume a very real sense of accountability and responsibility for achieving [the objectives] (Ibid., 183). He encourages leaders to create among their employees “a sense of unity and commitment to each other” (Ibid., 68); otherwise they will look for it somewhere else, which could create more division and potentially work against the corporate objectives, mainly because “their confusion turns into disappointment, which eventually becomes resentment—even hostility—toward their supposed teammates. And the worst thing possible happens—they actually start working against those colleagues on purpose!” (Ibid., 176) (emphasis mine). The desired unity and commitment can only be achieved by a constructed ideology and identity shared through mimetic dynamics.

Shared responsibility and accountability, exemplified through the leadership, is in a state of constant flux. The “dance” needs a highly attuned sense of awareness and timing.

Members of the Canadian coalition all respected the high level of engagement demonstrated and the level of expertise and interpersonal skills in evidence. There was an acknowledgement and leveraging of the expertise and experience of both partners in the Canadian coalition. The government reached out to the MAC officially and publicly,
however, there had been awareness of the AP mines issue on both sides prior to their formal collaboration. The members of the disarmament section of DFAIT were well aware of the issue of the AP mines and MAC had worked to connect with the Canadian government to demand action and to seek Canadian leadership for a faster resolution.

The Canadian government brought diplomatic skills, military knowledge and *accompagnement*, and organizational outreach networks and resources to the coalition. The CSO brought their knowledge of the public’s sensibilities, the impacts of the mines in the developing countries affected by minefields, real data, the ability to present these impacts just as they were, i.e. not “sugar coated” by political or national self-interests, and direct connections with the victims and numerous networks.

In the Canadian coalition, each norm leader had credibility within their respective organizations, making it possible for them to “label” the ban in the terms most likely to reassure and get the necessary internal support for it. They could navigate the “waters” of their own organizations. For example, Minister Axworthy had international, and national experience. He had prior experience of the concept of human security, which was such a pivotal element in the justification of the MBT. He had previous experience with NGOs and knew they could be trusted. In the incubation phase, norm leaders were truly intentional leaders. For example, Tuttle nominated herself as the repository of knowledge on the impacts of the mines; she built her role herself and it was never contested. Warmington agreed to become MAC’s governmental point of contact, another act of self-nomination that was not challenged internally.

These elements of credibility, knowledge, skills, and expertise were important threads in the tapestry (the integrative and organic method) of the Ottawa Process.
Many interviewees commented on the primacy of these elements.

So Bob was our main contact person… And Bob had a military background, too, so you know he was useful and informed. He had a good idea. He was very much a pro-NGO guy. At the same time, he had a role to play—he was government you know […] Generally it was a positive relationship, you know, Bob would sort of lay down the law now and then, but […] he was so positive.

So Robert Lawson as a connector brought an eclectic knowledge—of the military, of diplomacy and of reaching out to the public on social issues as a federal candidate for the New Democratic Party (NDP)—to the Canadian coalition.

I was really well prepared. I knew the issues; I did all my reading… I could be persuasive without being bullying or seeming to know it all […] There was so little time, so few resources. When we were strategizing […] they just kept this thing going, and let’s build up. I could decide what I wanted to do within reason. I wasn’t going to issue press releases although I would write them, and people would sign off on them. I wouldn’t send them out without somebody’s okay, not often anyway. I always thought when I was strategizing about the ripple, if I do this one activity, of all the things that I can do, what can I do that’s going to have a ripple, make a ripple down the road you know. So that’s always an image in my head. What can I do now that’s going to help with other things later?

This connector from MAC researched the APMs and developed a knowledge base in order to provide links to other NGOs. The ability to link the APM issue to the core activities of other NGOs facilitated the rapid building of the partnerships inside MAC.

Credibility in all its aspects is essential for the self to be able to reach out to others in seeking collaboration. However, norm leaders also need to be self-powered to a great extent to face the multiple challenges associated with normative change, most particularly at the global level.

6.2.7. Power, Dedication, and Passion

The sustainment of the momentum of the Ottawa Process campaign, the tight deadline, and the requirement to rapidly grow in size, each partner organization in the
Canadian coalition required particular features. In my analysis three characteristics stand out as foundational elements for success: passion, dedication, and power.

O’Dea identifies the motivators for a life as a Conscious Activist as follows:

What gets you to move into the territory of social transformation is the quality of your original motivation and intention. The deeper and more rooted your intention when you set out to address a problem, the greater will be the chances of sustained impact. Maturing activists have to continually refine the flame of moral passion that ignited the desire to act in the first place. (2014, 44)

Passion is a fuel that can be used to transform others, to incite belief in what eventually becomes a shared vision. The more the passion is shared, the stronger it gets, much like the effect of a burst of wind in a fire, making the flames reach higher.

Most interviewees shared a commitment level that I name “dedication to a point of exhaustion.” In many cases, this level of commitment affected their quality of life at home. For a core group, this commitment had already started in the emergence phase and carried on for years into the operationalization phase of the treaty. Is this level of commitment essential to bring to term all global norm changes? It appears that a core group has to provide for a high level of commitment based on some of the norm leaders of the Canadian coalition interviewed with this research.

This section on the indicators of norm leadership allows for an acknowledgement of an assemblage of characteristics that are somewhat integrated but can also be viewed independently. In other words, adaptable leaders need many, but not necessarily all, tools to be efficient. In their quest for partnerships, some skills and knowledge might be sought to improve the opportunities for success.

The leadership characteristics mapped here for the Ottawa Process would, in my opinion, be incomplete without the inclusion of power. Although never mentioned in the
articles or interviews, I consider power of presence and of character as essential indicators of a successful norm leader. This element is in alignment with Hawkins’s *Power vs. Force: The Hidden Determinants of Human Behavior*, which emphasizes power over force. Hawkins proposes a system of social distribution of consciousness levels in which he suggests that enlightened people using power and not force can support a rise in mass consciousness. He mentions that “truth is whatever is subjectively convincing at one’s current level of perception” (2013, 275 and 284). A norm leader must have enough power, built on integrity, to shift the discourse of the masses.

Here are some interview extracts on these leadership traits:

It's our kind of quiet, you know, self-effacing, Lloyd Axworthy. He was great, because he believed, in his very quiet way. He was so passionate, you couldn’t work for a minister like that and not be inspired and not want to give and deliver everything you possibly could to him. I mean working with Lloyd was extraordinary. I consider myself very lucky to have worked with him… And people ask “well, how can he be an inspiration?” But he was, because he’s a politician, right and he ran a lot of risks, including with his prime minister and with his colleagues globally. And he just said, “Go for it.” So, it was extraordinary to work with him.

Passion can be expressed in many ways. Here our interviewee underlines the quiet passion of the political leader, the catalyzing actor of the Ottawa Process.

Another quote on leadership is shared here:

We were inspired; we were really inspired by the energy of the ICBL. The passion. Like you, once you see the victims, these poor innocent people, you can’t help but be moved by it. Jill personally is an extraordinary individual, you know that, having met her. She was an inspiration to me. So I didn’t find it difficult to support this. If anything I was too personally engaged in it. Sometimes to the point of extreme exhaustion.

The passion of the ICBL propelled the creation of national networks reaching to CSOs across borders and became a source of inspiration for individuals to give their best to the cause.
I think what was significant about the role was the passion of those who were concerned about the issue, right? The minute you got into the issue, here you were sitting in Geneva with a bunch of boring national delegates, and then you’re talking to the ICRC, and you’re talking to the NGOs, and you’re talking to the victims, it was that visceral contact with reality, with human reality, what this theoretical, diplomatic negotiation made for, meant for real people.

Here, raw passion is channelled into networking, informing and supporting the new contacts.

We were so consumed by what we were doing, and the excitement of it. It is hard to describe or to capture, just how exhilarating it was, to be working with so many great people, on such an important issue. And to think/know, because I don’t think we ever thought we were going to fail, but to know that you could deliver this [...] We were in a fight, and that intensity is something you just don’t get. We were very lucky to not have it on a battlefield. We were lucky to have it on a different sort of field.

Finally, passion for the cause also manifested itself in a feeling of exhilaration at belonging to a community and in doing the right thing for the good of humanity.

The last six sub-sections offered outstanding characteristics of norm leadership, reviewed here in the context of the MBT, and suggested a new understanding of the norm leaders. They also highlight two important leadership roles, namely that of the exemplar and that of a role I label the “connector.” These roles will be looked at in more detail in the next two chapters.

6.3. Challenges to Norm Leadership

Challenges abound in any new project and the MBT had its share, even though millions of participants across the world showed an amazing willingness and readiness to contribute. There are also many uncertainties that participants must contend with.

One such uncertainty was the reason why Canada got involved as a leader in the first place. On deconstructing the Ottawa Process in terms of a comprehensive rational
policy-making process,\textsuperscript{170} Tomlin provides details around a UN mistake that could have
been part of the precipitating position of Canada. He writes:

The UN mistake in placing Canada on a published list of countries with export
moratoria in place provided a powerful argument for a change in Canadian policy,
and the US request that Canada co-sponsor a UN resolution calling for an export
moratorium provided the impetus for change. The alternative, to announce to the
world that there had been an error, that Canada did not have such a moratorium in
place, was unthinkable, and Defence Minister Collenette, and his officials could
not maintain their resistance to the export moratorium alternative. Their
intransigence provoked Ouellet to act unilaterally, however, so that by the time
DND finally gave in and agreed to an export moratorium, the policy window had
opened and the mines issue was firmly entrenched on the governmental agenda.
Policy entrepreneurs, inside and outside government, would seize the opportunity
to begin moving Canada, and the world, in the direction of a complete ban. In the
words of one official, ‘Ouellet’s statement broke the logjam and gave DFAIT the
opening it needed.’ (1998, 193)\textsuperscript{171}

It appears that this UN mistake prompted Canada into unanticipated internal
actions. The initial conditions were changed externally, so the feedback loop forced an
adjustment to rules and relations. Canada had a choice to disclaim the UN list or to
respect the export moratorium. The choice of the latter was one important initial trigger
towards the cascade of the MBT.

Projects always carry the “we don’t know what we don’t know” so it is good
practice to gather lessons learned from previous projects, such as reviewing their
mitigation measures and evaluating their success rates, in order to prepare project
managers for future challenges.

\textsuperscript{170} By applying Kingdon’s policy process model of the three separate streams of problem
identification or recognition, policy alternatives generation, and politics, Tomlin suggests that the
coupling of these streams create windows of opportunities for social change. He further shares
that “when problem, policy, and politics were aligned in Ottawa on 4 October 1996, Lysyshyn
played a critically important entrepreneurial role and was savvy enough to present a beau risque
to a minister not afraid to take one” (1998, 207).

\textsuperscript{171} My research has not uncovered the details of this “mistake.” However, the logjam can be
recognized as emergent creativity that opened up adjacent possibilities.
In my analysis of the Ottawa Process, the most challenging factors were the elements that related to the norm leaders themselves, which in turn had the potential to affect the new collective identity that was being created to provide a viable solution to the MBT issue. Emotional leadership, availability, credibility, and strength are all subject to the willingness of the norm leader to know “self” prior to engagement. Training and in-situ experiences are both ways to foster the necessary personal growth. The availability of institutional leaders and exemplars encourages the possibility and speed of acquisition of these skills even in the most stressful or challenging of environments. Stories abound of such leaders in war zones, humanitarian relief operations, American ghettos and minority environments.

However, I have found two major challenges as they relate to the MBT cascade process and the continuous engagement of the norm leaders. What could be issues that would cause the norm leaders to withdraw from their cause or create barriers to success? As first described in section 5.1.2., challenges to the construction of collective identities include blurred identities and emotions of fear and confusion, for example. Indeed, blurred identities affect the human need for meaning, connectedness, security, and recognition. In fact, all negative emotions affect human needs. Redekop suggests that anger affects the sense of meaning, fear that of security, shame that of recognition, sadness that of connectedness, and depression the willingness to act (2002, 54). Here follow some insights shared by interviewees on these aspects.

*Blurring of Identities*

I went through a crisis. I didn’t know what my role was anymore. Was I working with the government? Or was I continuing to advance the non-political objectives that happened to be dependent on politics? I really struggled with that, because everybody was really happy and “oh, let’s celebrate the government!” And I did.
was really happy, but I wanted to make sure that our goals didn’t get lost, that our objectives weren’t lost in money and prestige, and just those warm and fuzzy feelings.

The decision to remain a partner in a new collective can be debated at different times by different partners in a relationship. Individuals react differently when triggers challenge the collective identity. Here, the challenge is faced as a crisis and the struggle resolved with the realization that the organizational goals are being implemented.

**Negative Emotions**

So Axworthy makes his statement [in October 1996]. Again, I felt very emotionally charged at that moment in time, here we were launching something into the unknown. We would have to start with a grand total of one country… as much as it was euphoria for officials […] we realized that now we’ve got 14 months to overcome all of this resentment and anger against us […]. I will remember to the day I die, that the Irish had their delegation, came to us and said “Canada, only in the New World would this have been possible.” And he didn’t explain himself but what I understood him to mean was that it’s only in the New World that we are crazy enough to reject convention, well understood conventions and the accepted institutional approach to things, and instead to break away from these norms, and I will always be proud of that comment. Because indeed we were doing something that really broke tradition. But there was a lot more anger than there were compliments at that time.

The cascade process can be an emotional ride for norm leaders. In the case of the Ottawa Process, there was at the announcement a fear of resentment and anger from other nations. It was accompanied by the fear of being considered outsiders (to agreed-upon norms), and of being rejected or abandoned. These emotions were slowly replaced by pride as more nations joined in the process, and the fear was replaced by hope that the goal of a total ban could be achieved. Norm leadership is not for the faint-hearted.

My passion is to get things done, it's not to talk about getting things done, or write about getting things done […] I thought nothing about what damage I might be doing to my career by being the kind of guy that I was, I didn’t think about that, I was just thinking about the issue, and getting this issue and being successful. And that I reached this point of terror, and I haven’t told many people this, but
terror that I would screw something up because it became so big. You felt like you were just riding this train with no control over it.

One interviewee shares the terror of realizing the potential impact of the wrong choice of priorities or actions with little or no control to modify its course because of the sheer size of the campaign.

I have no control over these people, so it just became so big and so important and so consequential, and you get so close, and then you arrive in Oslo and you are negotiating it. Lady Diana passes away before the meeting. It started blowing your mind, so after a while you start shutting down emotionally because you can’t get that excited, you have to keep it really calm, because you had confidence it was going to happen, but you couldn’t let yourself believe it was going to work. And then we get the 24-hour extension in Oslo. I thought “this is exactly how it falls apart, you know” people who don’t know what’s going on on the ground decided to play with the politics of it all. The Americans ask for an extension, the NGOs start criticizing Canada, and I start to think “Oh my god!” And 24 hours later it’s done! And we’re celebrating. It was just an emotional roller coaster of epic proportions.¹⁷²

This last statement shows the many and intense emotions experienced by one interviewee during the Oslo conference. It describes clearly the fear of the potential collapse of the Ottawa Process, during the 24-hour extension, succeeded by the joy of celebrations.

To summarize this chapter, a norm leader as seen through mimetic and IA theories, is shown to be attuned both to self and to those others ready to commit to partnerships and thereby share in leadership. It has been identified that the expressions of leadership are mimetic dynamics at play. The successful exemplar can set the tone for the vision (the object of desire) while providing resources for a successful execution. They need to ensure that the human needs of the participants, as previously mentioned with Redekop’s emotional assignation, are met within the organization. If possible, the exemplar should identify why outliers are not getting on board with the proposed norm.

¹⁷² The implications of this extension are discussed in Section 7.3.
change, either because of a conflicting discourse or a stagnation in the shift to the newly proposed rules and behaviours. The exemplar also needs to control the field of emotions by first being attuned to his feelings. In the case of the Ottawa Process, the emotions ranged from indignation to anger, but they never reached the level of violence\footnote{This comment applies to the behaviours of participants in the Ottawa Process and not the level of violence created by the AP mines.} as described by Girard in writing about mimetic dynamics. The norm leaders of the MBT were capable of containing the emotions so that the public, the organizations and nations were kept positively engaged and involved throughout the operationalization phase.

The IA theory supports the dynamics of self-transformation towards engagement with a cause. Various indicators of successful interactions in the two collective quadrants meet the challenges of the construction and maintenance of collective identities. The indicators of self’s readiness and willingness for intentional leadership are those associated with the capacity to connect to inner knowing, adaptability, and the capacity for a higher level of consciousness. The force behind the first stage of the cascade, when many elements are still in the emergence phase, depends on the norm leader’s possession of attributes such as courage, audacity, adaptability, dedication, and passion. Authenticity and the ability to provide emotional leadership is also imperative, as is credibility, skills, expertise, and strength. However, the single most important characteristic would appear to be the capacity to connect with others, making meaningful partnerships, strong enough to sustain the challenges of blurring identities and negative emotions, possible. This will be explored further in the chapter on partnerships.
Chapter 7. Analysis of the Ottawa Process Partnership

It is a story of an extraordinary alliance—derided by some as a ‘coalition of angels’—of diplomats, generals, legislators, mine survivors, medical doctors, committed activists, and ordinary citizens who helped heal the physical, emotional, psychological, and social pain by creating a landmark in international humanitarian law: the ban of AP mines.


In the evolution of global governance, partnerships evolved to bring together organizations and eventually nations in thematic alliances around defence and commerce, from the suggestion of the creation of the League of Nations to the various sponsored bodies of the UN today. This research centers on global norms and includes the process of approval between nations.\(^{174}\) It is a political process, with the representatives of states nominating UN delegates to negotiate in the national interest. However, as there is no global government or global political organization to “host” the public space\(^{175}\) for the presentation, discussion, and decision-making of global norms, the process cannot be said to be wholly political, but rather “quasi-political.”

As described in the previous chapters, leadership is key to normative change and I contend that norm partnership is equally essential for the success of the cascade phase. Indeed, as touched on in the citation above from Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, the MBT is a story of an extraordinary alliance and even if these authors focused on the “coalition of angels,” this research has found that in fact it was partnerships, not “angels,” that brought the normative change to fruition. There were a multitude of partnerships,

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\(^{174}\) The term “nation” is used in lieu of the sovereign states, members of the UN.

\(^{175}\) The “public space,” first defined by Habermas, proposes two ways of looking at the relations of the world: one defined by science and technology in a cognitive and instrumentalist relation and the other defined by interaction between agents based on the need for communication, including its moral, legal, ethical, and political cognitive aspects as experienced within a public space.
both horizontal and vertical, required to achieve the “tipping point” of the cascade process. Once parties agree to form partnerships, dynamics of process planning and implementation follow in order to sustain the logistical demands and the ongoing relational requirements to achieve the vision and mandate.

Therefore, this chapter will build upon the knowledge gained from the literature review on the construction of partnerships. The first section will take a look at the Canadian coalition by considering the partners as independent variables prior to the creation of the partnership. The second section examines the multi-layered global partnerships. The third section concentrates on the Oslo conference, as a key moment of trust violation in the Ottawa Process, to hone in on the particular circumstances and the appurtenant struggles to see what lessons can be learned. The next section proposes a series of characteristics of norm partnerships as identified by the interviewees and the literature review during the Ottawa Process. The chapter concludes by outlining the main challenges for norm partnership, as viewed by the interviewees.

7.1. The Canadian Coalition Partnership in the Ottawa Process

A successful partnership is based on complementarity. The strengths of parties should be maximised through the partnership in order to create a collective equipped to fulfill its mandate. First, the new partners need to see themselves as a new entity by transforming themselves through the evolutionary stages of forming, storming, normalisation, and performance. Concurrent with this evolution, a collective understanding of the roles and responsibilities that each party is willing to accept and accomplish is constructed.
As reviewed in the first chapter, the history of social movements is traditionally divided into three succeeding waves. There has been an expanding worldwide network of NGOs, assuming roles ranging from acting as service providers to taking on policy-shaping roles at every level of governance. Their platform for action has the potential for wider and broader impact if they choose to rally support on a transnational level and partner with other organizations with similar mindsets and goals. Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin argue that the “emergence of global civil society holds the promise of making existing international institutions more democratic, transforming them through innovation and experimentation, and anchoring them in the world opinion” (1998, 13). In a similar manner, the Nobel Committee noted, in their nomination of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) for the Peace Prize in 1997, the development of “a new model of diplomacy that could, hopefully, be applied to other issues of global humanitarian concern” (Williams and Goose, 1998, 47).

However, it must be noted that the CSO’s success in becoming part of the decision-making structure was entirely dependent on the willingness of the government officials to provide access and share their power base. As Thakur and Maley suggest, “the relationship of NGOs to governments ranges from adversarial to complementary and subservient/co-optive” (1999, 282).

Maybe the goal of the relationship has a lot to do with the quality of the partnership? This next section reviews the two main partners in the Canadian coalition that lead the campaign of the Ottawa Process.

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176 According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 130 international groups organized the Union of International Associations in 1910. In the 21st century, more than 2,000 NGOs are fully accredited with consultative status at the UN with automatic right to participate in UN-sponsored conferences. [www.britannica.com/topic/nongovernmental-organization](http://www.britannica.com/topic/nongovernmental-organization).
7.1.1. Mines Action Canada

Throughout the Ottawa Process, civil society organizations were ready to take on responsibilities for the follow-up actions required for the operationalization of the norm. As such, they challenged the notion that “rights, obligations, and identity are most appropriately bound up with the nation-state” (Dolan and Hunt, 1998, 395).

As described in Chapter 3, Mine Action Canada (MAC) became the coalition of CSOs in Canada. From its humble beginnings, it grew to rally some 60 CSOs by December 1997. Some were small local initiatives and some had international outreach. Each had to forego its own goal for a while to contribute support, time, and resources to the collective goal of achieving a ban on AP mines. MAC worked to keep each of its member groups well informed so that their members could in turn rally support through education and fundraising within Canada and support the ICBL’s larger campaign internationally. Some of the constituting CSOs had transnational outreach. As a result, a series of networks were built. The growth of MAC was fueled by incoming and updated information and activities. The extent of the level of support, while not quantified officially, could be better appreciated if a study on funds raised could be undertaken. It takes resources to cascade a global norm, even, and maybe especially, for the nations willing to lead the pack.

During the Ottawa Process, MAC had no funding, therefore the CSOs were operating, at least in their own minds, at arm’s length from government. As an example, there arose at one point a legal issue related to the charitable status of civil society organizations. Warmington and Tuttle share the details on that contextual element:

It was recognized from the outset that effective action in response to the landmine crisis would require a significant amount of political advocacy on an issue that
could be viewed as having more to do with disarmament than with development. However, Canadian NGOs were traditionally somewhat cautious with respect to undertakings that could lead them to exceed the proportion of funds legally allowed to be devoted to lobbying government—exceeding this proportion could jeopardize an organization’s charitable status. In the past this constraint had steered some NGOs away from direct involvement in disarmament issues, despite the obvious links between disarmament and development and humanitarian issues. (1998, 48)

Following the legal edicts that allowed them to maintain the charitable status which, in turn, kept the necessary funding in place, was just one aspect of remaining a viable CSO. In order to keep the engagement of members, other more subtle but equally important attitudes, such as how far one could trust the government in considering new initiatives, were also key.

7.1.2. Canadian Government

The Canadian government has multiple levels of national partnerships. Through the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the political, trade and development personnel of its embassies and consulates, it has wide international reach. Embassies and consulates are internally called “missions.” In support of the Ottawa Process, the full network of Canadian missions abroad was put to work to “influence the sell” of the Canadian initiative.

This was no small job, as each individual involved in the process first had to be informed about the impacts of the AP mines. They had to understand the barriers of the proposed ban as worked through the years under the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) process. In addition, they had to feel comfortable enough to be the local Canadian expert in exercising pressure on the host nation to join the pro-ban side.

The senior point of contact at a mission is the ambassador. Matters of national political interest and pertinent local news items are continuously communicated between
the missions and the Department of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa. During the Ottawa Process, the mine ban bureau became the focal coordinating point at Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), sending information to the missions, horizontally across the various bureaus and vertically to senior management, to the minister’s office and through him to other federal departments and to the Prime Minister’s Office. Those relationships are embedded into a well-established chain of command and information protocol.177

In my analysis, the high level of professionalism of Canadian diplomats combined with the strength of a solid bureaucracy with an efficient global network offered a strong platform for the norm to take hold and grow. However, at the start of the Ottawa Process, the question of how far to engage with Canadian CSOs was now necessarily a priority question.

7.1.3. Canadian Coalition

Once the Ottawa Process was launched, DFAIT’s Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Division (IDA) within the Department’s International Security Bureau (IDD) had to quickly grow from a small staff to more than one hundred personnel. Concurrently, MAC was growing, from just a few volunteers in the initial member organizations to a network of some 60 CSOs. Roles were reassigned, resources allocated, and space, people, computers and other tools found and made operational. These last tasks were accomplished within each organization with no consultations with other partners.

177 This organizational culture has been shared in part by a government representative in an interview and tallies with my personal experience of working within the department.
This capacity to quickly grow, continually readjust and reprioritize based on the requirements of external factors is a question of adaptability. It includes flexibility under pressure and the capability to insist to the point of “fighting” for the resources needed to succeed. It also embraces the need for a dedicated initial core group, commonly defined as a “committed group,” to trust each other. While little has been published on this level of commitment, my interviews have allowed for a clearer image of the essential elements of both main organizations’ core groups. Participants in the research interviews have spoken of exhaustion, broken personal relationships, and missed family opportunities in order to continuously commit to the Ottawa Process. However, many of my interviewees were already involved 18 months prior to the start of the Ottawa Process and many CSO representatives remained in the internalization phase well beyond five years.

The Canadian coalition members were so convinced of the righteousness of the project, that they more often than not succeeded in removing barriers and doubts, and, therefore, in aligning the energy of the collective towards the achievement of the goal. The confidence they expressed and projected helped other nations, CSOs, and partnered organizations to overcome their fears and perceived barriers and seek “the possible” for the partnership and its goal.

The interviewees in both groups confirmed without exception that they needed each other to bring the Ottawa Process to its successful fruition. They were complimentary of each other’s contributions in terms of expertise, demonstrated willingness, and commitment to the project.

The many levels of communication needed constant attention. Dedicated personnel were assigned to ensure clear means of access to information (including on the
status of international and organisational support), documentation, and professional
training (particularly on AP mines).

There is little published information available on the extent of support provided by Canada to other countries. Some elements uncovered during the interviews, however, constituted support given to regional conferences: providing people, communications material and funding; transportation and accommodations for the delegations of the smaller countries to enable them to attend events, and education and training on the signature and ratification of treaties for their officials. One implied element of leadership is that one cannot hide or run away from the file. Not only was continuous support required throughout the Ottawa Process, but it became clear than Canada had to position the Ottawa Process as a winning strategy with a detailed plan prior to its handover to the UN.

Here are four interview extracts from MAC representatives on their thoughts on working in collaboration with the Canadian government:

You will hear this from other NGOs and civil society people, which is: there was a perception that we got away by talking with government rather than protesting government in the street. You did not conduct mass demonstrations on issues as you did in the past, in the 80s, because personally, I felt, you know, I’m not going to have a mass demonstration on landmines, I’d rather sit down with them at these consultations that they’re paying for and making available. The point to make is to what extent is this government, a progressive government with goals in mind, wanting to have a backup with civil society, and therefore paying for these consultations. That they got stuff out of, you know, there is expertise in NGOs that government doesn’t have. And especially when government changes and all the bureaucrats move out. They go: “they know nothing about the summit, they know absolutely nothing!” So you got to train them, you know, so they need us for the expertise. To a certain extent, I mean. At the time of Axworthy and my gang, these guys knew a lot of stuff, these guys were really up to date with everything. I mean we still provided, but compared to what came afterwards, they were brilliant.
Co-option is a concern for CSOs, because it is precisely in their distance from government that their effectiveness in advocacy or in supplementing governmental policies and programs is ensured. I can understand that being invited to sit down to work through issues jointly but in an asymmetrical power environment can be overwhelming and create trust issues. However, once a partnership is established, sharing can be expanded.

Governments are elected and that’s democracy, but they are not permanent. NGOs are not elected, these are people, many of us are volunteers, right? And so, we don’t have the public saying “we want you to be there.” We are there because we are committed, but it doesn’t mean that we have democratic authority, you know? So, NGOs can be there, not forever, but for a long time through governments coming and going, so that’s the big difference. And then you have the things like the ICRC [International Committee of The Red Cross] that are there forever and that’s why they are so important. Because NGOs come and go, too.

Government officials carry the legitimacy of being elected, while CSOs, on the other hand, are unelected, so to the extent they represent the citizenry it is an unofficial representation. This difference is always part of what must be negotiated when forming a coalition between these two parties.

Our key objectives were clear: we wanted a ban on landmines, absolutely, and we really wanted to work with our government towards the ban. We felt right from the beginning that in Canada we had the capacity to really convince our government to take different actions than those they had been taking.

The establishment of the objective of a ban of APMs was the foundation for MAC. Organizations and volunteers engaged in MAC’s activities to pursue this single goal.

Over the course of the project I developed an enormous amount of pride in the Canadians. I was never not proud to be a Canadian, but I had never actively felt this sense that, you know, “I’m a Canadian, and aren’t we great?” But I had huge pride in our government; I had renewed my hope in democratic process, and in the functioning of our political system, all of those things. You know, really, we
are strengthened as a result of this process. You know, to some extent I was quite jaded when we started this process. It was like it’s important and we are going to do it. Do I hold out much hope that we will be successful? Well, who knows? Maybe not really. But by the time I finished I really felt that the Canadian government functioned the way government is supposed to. It listened. It listened to its constituents and acted accordingly. And I know that was in large part due to an individual. You know Axworthy really did take it on. But he felt it was right at the moment, because thousands of Canadians wrote and told him so. I felt that that was great. Political system working well. I don’t know if I’d do the same thing now, but it felt that way then.

Once the fear of co-option was diminished, sharing expanded, and trust was established, the Canadian coalition became an example of participatory democracy. This statement speaks of pride in belonging to the coalition, its goal, and the work performed. Twenty years later, this interviewee speaks highly of the quality of leadership and shares hope for more demonstrations of this type of partnerships in the future.

One of the reasons this coalition was successful was because it was capable of reaching outside of Canada.

7.2. Global Multi-Layered Partnerships

The Canadian coalition was the first intentional leader of the cascade process, but it needed many levels of partnerships around the world for the Ottawa Process to be successful. This section reviews those partnerships that supported the process to capture their contribution and to map the complexity of normative change at the global level. Eight partnerships are presented here, in no specific order.\(^\text{178}\)

7.2.1. The Victims

The discourse on the need to ban AP mines became one of human security because of their impact on an unacceptable number of civilians in a post-conflict context,
with the fighting parties gone but the destruction of lives continuing unabated. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation (VVAF) had been the voices of the victims for a number of years before the victims became the focus of the effort behind the Ottawa Process. Although this research is not focused specifically on who the victims were, it is important to acknowledge that a large number of those whose lives had been affected were allowed to speak on behalf of their fellow survivors of their post-injury struggles. This community became the motivator for the pursuit of the MBT outside of the CCW process.

One CSO representative says the following about this essential partnership:

I think that it created a more level playing field. Often in the past when delegates were going into a negotiation session, the only impact that the international campaign could have, for example, was maybe we had young amputees standing outside handing roses to the delegates to remind them of who they are negotiating for here. So that’s one way. That’s the typical way that civil society engaged in the diplomatic scene because we’re excluded from it. It did level the playing field. And it gave civil society an avenue for direct impact, [...] within the context of negotiation. Not blocking them in the hall, but actually having a conversation they are not trying to escape from.

Creating the ability to connect with victims and giving them a voice takes a lot of political courage from norm leaders, as in part it creates the perception that governments accept accountability both in terms of for the alleged abuse and corrective actions.

Building partnerships with victims is therefore in my eyes an act of courage.

7.2.2. The Canadian Public: Citizen as Leader First

Another large but “unstructured” partnership, is between the collective of citizens and their government, the former encouraging the latter to become a signatory to the MBT. The Canadian public was behind every step taken by the Canadian government, MAC, and therefore the Canadian coalition. If the Canadian public had stopped its
financial and moral support during the cascade process, I believe that that would have affected its success, particularly if it had happened early on.

One CSO representative talks about the essential support of the public:

Certainly, it was Canadians standing up and shouting about it that got the Canadian government to even get engaged. Had Canadians not stood up, the impetus for Canada to engage with the international campaign wouldn’t have really been there. It was critical that Canadians worked with their own government. Because obviously Mr. Axworthy isn’t going to care so much about what people elsewhere think. He is really considering what Canadians, his constituency think. So, I think Mines Action Canada’s role of just bringing Canadians along with this was essential. Had Canadians not stood up, Canada would not have gone the route that it did. There just wouldn’t have been enough pressure on the Canadian government to take that risk.

This statement credits engaged Canadians for motivating the Canadian coalition. However, it must be noted that one of MAC’s major activities was the educational and fundraising outreach to Canadians throughout the Ottawa Process. This feedback loop between Canadian Citizens and the Canadian coalition was ongoing for the entire cascade phase.

7.2.3. The Canadian Political Coalition

As mentioned in Chapter 3, it took political courage to break the international stalemate that held a possible ban on AP mines hostage to the agendas of major countries. But one minister of Foreign Affairs wouldn’t have been able to make such a public statement as Lloyd Axworthy did on October 1996 without the support of a political coalition. This coalition was possible only with the support of the full machinery of government in power in 1996. The decision first had to be approved by the Prime

179 The 35th Canadian election in 1993 concluded with a Liberal majority government.
Minister Jean Chrétien. It also had to be endorsed by the members of parliament so that Canada be strong with one voice on the issue of the ban.\footnote{I excluded the views of the opposition parties from this research.}

7.2.4. The Like-minded Coalition of Nations

Dolan and Hunt (1998) posit that “the tension [at multiple levels between the major powers and the pro-ban states] was as much about who were appropriate and legitimate actors in the international system as it was about the legitimate venue for internal issues to be discussed” (405).

How was this initial pro-ban nation coalition formed? Jill Sinclair’s director of Non-proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Division, inside the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (IDA), confirmed that she used her personal contacts within like-minded countries as a the starting point to launch the campaign. There was a level of trust and respect between a core group of people who were key in rallying support from their own governments for the process.

This coalition of like-minded nations was necessary to build confidence in the Ottawa Process and its goal. It is unlikely that one country alone, let alone a medium-sized one like Canada, would have been able to build up sufficient national momentum to also tip the international community, outside the purview of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the UN. The four events chosen to define the Ottawa Process, the Ottawa October 1996’s announcement, the Austrian drafting of the treaty, the negotiations of the treaty in Oslo in September 1997, and the Ottawa December 1997’s meeting of the signatories provide for an understanding of the sharing of the load as was noted in Chapter 2.
7.2.5. The Transnational Organizations

As mentioned in Chapter 2, both ICBL and ICRC played fundamental roles during the emergence phase of the norm. Williams and Goose share that the first time the UN held a joint press conference with ICBL was in May 1996 at the CCW conference (1998, 33). ICBL exercised a huge amount of influence and worked tirelessly during the cascade phase. They received recognition for their involvement with the announcement of the 1997 Peace Nobel prize. It is difficult to assess the impact of ICBL during the Ottawa Process.\footnote{The volume of information first produced by ICBL or by MAC is not known. However, it is clear that ICBL had the largest transnational outreach of all the CSOs involved in the Ottawa Process. How much information was received nationally by ICBL, how much was produced by MAC for internal and external use, and how much information the Canadian officials shared through the Canadian missions is also unknown.}

Although ICBL is headquartered in the US, during the Ottawa Process it acted as a transnational organization sending requests for support for pro-ban organizations in other countries to all involved national organizations. MAC was working as a fully integrated unit of ICBL, but they were also independent in their national campaign within Canada. The communication between ICBL and MAC was two-way, as each sent demands, shared information, and acted on requests.

There were also other transnational organizations that had already established their international outreach and were using their networks for political and public awareness and education, fundraising, and political national pressure. For example, various church groups were working across nations and borders to support a mine ban as a humanitarian goal.
7.2.6. The Owners of AP Mines

Unlike the relatively small group of nations who possess nuclear weapons, the nations that were producing and using APM made up a large group. These nations were put under pressure by their citizens and/or civil society organizations as they were challenged to evaluate their moral obligations. Many of these APM nations were first to stop production and to eliminate their stockpiles during the emergence phase of the MBT.

One CSO representative talked about the importance of the notion of “proprietorship”:

There are coalitions of the willing, so to speak, that have cropped up more and more in terms of building norms. Sometimes they’re misguided like for example there is a movement now called the ban, “the nuclear ban movement.” They think they can borrow from the Ottawa Process and negotiate a ban on nuclear weapons without any of the nuclear weapon-possessing countries at the table. I think they’re misguided, the reason we could do this for landmines was that virtually every country in the world had a stockpile of landmines. So everybody had something they could contribute. We could say we’re not using the mines; we’re going to destroy our mines. It’s different with the nuclear context where what’s the point of having 170 countries who don’t have nuclear weapons ban them.

Proprietorship goes hand in hand with accountability, both with regard to the harm done and the obligation to end it.

7.2.7. The Military Coalition

Little has been written about the military coordination among nations, but there was a defensive requirement to provide an alternative to existing minefields to protect the borders of some nations, as was discussed in section 3.1. It was a delicate situation, but the military coordination also served as a diplomatic tool. One of the Canadian military’s missions became the finding of a workable and affordable option for replacement of the

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APM. This option had to be equally efficient as a deterrent, but safer. The clock was ticking toward the anticipated December 1997 treaty deadline. The Canadian military looked at options and found an acceptable solution, which was then introduced with quiet decorum to militaries of other countries.\(^\text{183}\)

As one of the military advisors during the Ottawa Process explained:

The two functions that mines and anti-personnel landmines produce when used as a military weapon are to provide you with an early warning of an intruder but at the same time it causes casualties amongst the intruders. But the mine doesn’t know who’s stepping on it; it can’t differentiate between a military target and non-military target because the human has been taken out of the loop. The kill decision is made by a machine. So that’s not acceptable by the world so far. If you think of a mine as a little robot, and we don’t accept non-humans deciding to kill humans. We found out that if you separate the functions, there are many other means of detecting intruders, radar and other kinds of sensory, there’s observation, and today 20 years later, much more equipment is available. So that detection of the intruder then gets passed through the human who then makes that critical decision, is that a military target: yes or no; and then we apply lethal force, if that’s what was appropriate […]. We found technology that probably sounds quite archaic today, but there was a firm just outside of Ottawa, that had a coax cable, very low voltage, you could bury it anywhere. And it would detect motion across, so there is slight current which creates a flux, and when the flux is disturbed, you know something is there. They have the ability to differentiate between small animal, large animal, small vehicle or large vehicle… So we worked this out, and we separated the functions, when we were able to show ways the functions could be performed by treaty-compliant devices.

The institution of the military is imbued with a code of honour that has been codified both in international law and in national doctrine, and reinforced through the rules of its various branches, e.g. the rules of the military engineers with reference to the recording, usage, and removal of APMs. Therefore, the written and unwritten rules must be modified when a given political order affects a military capacity. The above statement provides a glimpse of the work done in terms of finding an alternative that would allow the military to continue to defend national borders, and the national leaders to save face.

\(^{183}\) In a similar manner that other organizations like churches and schools have collected funding for the campaign.
7.2.8. The Emerging Coalition of Signatories

An important partnership was the collective of nations that began to form and grow during the cascade phase of the process. This partnership had a different role than that of the original pro-ban nations, who shared leadership during the Ottawa Process. The Canadian planners were working with the goal of having 100 nations on side by December 1997. The evolution of the ever-growing coalition of signatories is an illustration of the snowball effect. The growth of nations joining the pro-ban coalition could have become one of the deciding factors for others to join the alliance. On the other hand, no growth in a collective of nations over a period of time has the potential to affect the withdrawal of early-designated participants.

This analysis of the Ottawa Process describes the allocation of a short time frame for decision-making process for a crisis situation that can be easily understood by the parties involved. The reframing of the APM from an evil but necessary weapon to a deficient and inhumane device for defensive and offensive operations, was a way to legitimize the Ottawa Process as a rightful normative process of seeking and implementing a resolution to what amounted to a humanitarian world crisis.

The transition phase is fragile, exposed as it is to both internal and external pressures. The act of joining a voluntary alliance, outside an approved UN forum, is not necessarily an easy decision, and must be arrived at by each nation as a result of a contemplation of its place in the world, the importance and position of its multi-level alliances and the particular challenges to its security, as well as its economic, social, and environmental prospects.
7.3. Trust Violation—The Biggest Challenge to the Canadian Coalition Partnership

Oslo was really important for us because we had three weeks to negotiate something that would normally take three decades.

Excerpt from the interview with a government representative

The conference in Oslo in September 1997 was an event where the potential for dissent was drastically increased. Lloyd Axworthy made a decision to extend the discussions with the US by 24 hours even though the negotiations had proceeded so fast that there were in fact a few days left to the end of the conference. However, according to the participants, since the goal of the conference was met, the request to pause was seen as a critical decision.

According to Hampson and Hart, for Lloyd Axworthy, the conference was an opportunity to search for a bridging compromise that would get the US onside while ensuring the essence of the treaty (1995, 40). For other government representatives, it was a diplomatic occasion that re-prioritized political and national imperatives, over pleasing the CSOs in the coalition. For most of the government representatives, the 24-hour extension requested by Axworthy was a decision over which they had had no control but which they needed to be seen as endorsing because of the unwritten rules of conduct for diplomatic delegations. They were able to understand the possibilities not only for the future of the Ottawa Process, but also for the general diplomatic ties between Canada and the US, as well as other international files.

ICBL was profoundly affected and decided to openly criticize Canada for their decision to give the US another 24 hours to sign the treaty. Some members of MAC were more disturbed than others. Some were angry. It was after all nine months since the start
of the Ottawa Process. So much work had already been done and the finishing line was in sight.

For the Canadian CSOs in the Canadian coalition, it was a reminder that politics may outplay and even destabilize ongoing work to a point of non-resolution. Cameron writes:

MAC sought assurances from Canadian Officials that they would not accept any exemptions, and its members would surely have walked away from the negotiations had an exemption been given. The leadership of the ICBL, however, particularly the members of the US campaign, might well have accepted such an exemption. With the ICBL divided, the core group of states seeking a ban could have collapsed. (1998, 439)

Thus, loyalties and synchronicity were challenged in Oslo. Here, the exemplar, Lloyd Axworthy, was out of step with the Canadian coalition. However, his request for an extension resulted in an official decision on the part of the Canadian government to regroup to properly consider the inclusion of the US, an important international player and major power. In the interviews, the government representatives shared that the requirements of diplomacy meant offering the US another opportunity to demonstrate leadership in the project. At first, the civil society representatives could not believe that their “government friends” had offered an extension to the US.

In hindsight, one can see that the delay did not cause the cascade process to go backward, eroding gained support, but instead was more like a pause. What might some of the elements supporting the eventual continued cascade have been? I suggest addressing five questions to get a sense of the complexity of trust violation and the context in which trust was challenged in Oslo.

The first question is: what if the requested extension had been longer than 24 hours or, worse, extended beyond the period allocated for the conference? The extension
of time was of short duration and contained within the timeframe of the conference. Should a longer period have been negotiated, this “vacuum of space and time” could have potentially resulted in an increased level of anxiety, and in bargaining on the part of the US for the support of other nations (following the maxim of “you are either with us or against us”) to name but two additional pressures to wrestle with.

The second question is: what if the US had been more flexible and had broken down their package of requests? The US package in its entirety did not succeed in making a “breach” or gaining an “edge” in the negotiations. If the US demands had been limited, however, say to the inclusion of the “smart AP mine” as an exception to the treaty, one interviewee shared that even ICBL could have been divided. So the intransigence of the US helped the cascade move forward.

The third question is: what if the request had been made by another pro-ban nation, i.e. not by the exemplar? Axworthy used his professional integrity to manage the situation he created. His personal relations with norm leaders inside ICBL, ICRC, the UN and ministers of foreign affairs in the pro-ban nations were solid at the time of Oslo. Other leaders could not claim the same. There were no written rules around official requests that we know of, in spite of the risk of their unfavourable impact on the campaign momentum. One interviewee mentioned the notion of predictability. When seen outside the context of the Ottawa Process, Canada’s request for a 24-hour extension to listen in to the possibility of having the US become a signatory to the treaty, even with the conditionality of some level of compromise, was quite coherent with Canada’s reputation as an ethical and honest broker in global affairs. So predictability could have
been an element to explain part of the dynamics of “acceptance” of the exemplar’s trust violation.

The fourth question is: what if the trust violation had happened during another time in the cascade process? If the special attention to the US exclusivity had appeared early in the process, it would have been detrimental to the nurturing of the partnerships of the Canadian coalition, potentially sowing doubt in the civil society contingent (as they might have wondered when and under what conditions the US would “get their way”). Maybe there is a correlation with the timing of the tipping point that would be interesting to investigate through future research.

The last question is: what if the request for extension had not been from a P5\textsuperscript{184} nation? It would appear that the US had become the “enemy,” the resisting party. More than one interviewee mentioned the possibility that the MBT was perceived as going against the will of the US (during the cascade phase) and that this situation had encouraged other nations to join the pro-ban alliance as a sign of rebellion. If that was indeed the case, there could have been grounds to investigate the possibility of scapegoating, as identified in mimetic theory, but this research’s focus is primarily on the Canadian coalition and not enough information has been collected to validate the potential impact of scapegoating on the cascade process. However, the document review showed a mounting sense of the righteousness of stopping the use of AP mines as a likely priority factor for nations to join in.

It is difficult to imagine the world without the MBT in 2018, but these questions are good reminders that there is always the possibility for division among norm

\textsuperscript{184} P5 refers to the UN Security Council’s five permanent members; namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
entrepreneurs during the cascade phase. The Canadian representatives of both groups were able to get back together because the end game was the ban. They were together, along with all the other partnerships, to complete the race.

Here is an excerpt from the interview with Valerie, one of the connectors, as she remembers facing the challenge of the collective identity of the Canadian coalition in Oslo:

I was in the negotiations [in Oslo] and some of my colleagues were out on the streets, with signs protesting. The international campaign really went after Axworthy and Canada at that time because Canada was trying to broker some kind of a compromise. It was thought that this would weaken the whole treaty. The international campaign rose up, even though Canada and Axworthy had been such good allies the Campaign wasn’t afraid to call Axworthy out, because they thought he was backtracking. I remember, that time was hard, walking through the hallway and kind of gearing myself up because I’m Canadian and I’m on the delegation even though I’m also part of the Campaign. It’s just how it works. I’m on the delegation, I’m part of that negotiation and so in that instance, in that role, I have to take the criticism and do my best to make things better.

This offers a glimpse of the challenge of loyalties experienced by a MAC member; she could have decided to put pressure on her allies in the Canadian coalition but opted not to apply pressure from within the relationship during times of negotiations. This dilemma showed her affiliations to be complex and in some ways contradictory and blurring the lines of identities. Living with the paradoxes involved, indicates a capacity of consciousness to deal with complexity. However, once confirmed, this loyalty to the Canadian coalition meant that this member was ready and willing to stand the storm.

Here are two interview excerpts on trust and emotional pressure:

This request [for a 24-hour extension in Oslo] provoked this terrible reaction from the NGOs and reaction from the Norwegian government. Remember that we had persuaded the Norwegian government to take on the hosting responsibility. It was expensive, it was a huge amount of effort and then in the last moment when they are about to see a final treaty, gathered in, Canada says “no, no, hold it!” Well,
you can imagine it would be upsetting. But it was well motivated on Axworthy’s part [...] they felt like we were going to negotiate, and let the United States negotiate loopholes in the treaty, which we weren’t prepared to do, but nevertheless there was that fear.

This member of the Canadian coalition on the other hand, clearly stood by the political exemplar and his reasons. This interviewee didn’t mention that he was aware of his exemplar’s motive during the interview.

The only tense moment was the 24 hours in Oslo. So, that was an interesting moment, because that’s when reality clashed up against the aspirations. That’s when being an NGO and being in the government, there was a different role to be played […] the NGO should have understood that a little bit more. You know governments are governments […]. It was a test zone.

This statement suggests that even though a coalition can be established there will always be outside pressures that will require each member to understand the non-negotiable positions of their partners. If these non-negotiable positions were known in advance, it could help to alleviate perceptions of trust violation. Although this pre-knowledge could merely exacerbate the difficulties as each instance of it confirms the preconception for partners not invested in their role of connector or exemplar.

Oslo was seen by most as just a “pause,” but for others it was too emotional to qualify it so simply.\(^{185}\) It would appear that the Canadian coalition had built “core” during a period of some 12 months, during the Ottawa Process. “Core” is the ability to stay strong and confident in the partnership even under substantial outside pressure to abandon one’s goal or one’s full vision.

\(^{185}\) One interviewee even suggested that Axworthy was excluded from the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize because of his request of an extension in Oslo.
The leadership and partnership were indeed tested and one appears to have reinforced the other.\textsuperscript{186} It also exposed the roles of the exemplar and the connectors, and the challenges presented by fear and a lack of conflict management. The five questions address, in part, the fact that there are many unknown risks in a cascade process, but as facts about the process and its risks are used and collected, norm leaders and norm partnerships have a better foundation on which to bring forth future global norms.

7.4. Characteristics of Norm Partnership

The following section reviews the characteristics of norm partnership as seen through the Canadian coalition partnership, with the indicators selected in section 4.2 for building relations between organizations.

I propose the following five main requirements defined in chapter 4 for norm partnership: 1) the selection and maintenance of a shared intent; 2) the maintenance of trust; 3) shared leadership; 4) shared risk; and 5) the selection of ROEs. These five requisites are looked at in more detail in the section below in the hope of providing a more in-depth understanding of the complexity of the cascade phase.

7.4.1. Selection and Maintenance of Shared Intent

Achieving a Mine Ban Treaty to be signed within 14 months was the shared goal and mandate of the partnerships of the Ottawa Process. Those not in favour of signing were not aligned with this intent.

As previously reviewed, Lencioni provides recommendations on how to deal with the dysfunctions created by silos in the context of business merger. His suggestion is to

\textsuperscript{186} Strong and solid leadership anchored a resilient partnership that in turn strengthened the leadership.
break down the walls of the silos, partly by dealing with issues in a crisis mode.\textsuperscript{187} The Canadian coalition treated the Ottawa Process as a crisis. It could be seen as a case of “survival through repositioning” (Lencioni, 2006, 127) where everyone bought into the rallying cry and timeframe of “a treaty by December 1997.”\textsuperscript{188}

Dolan and Hunt propose that it is the emphasis on idealism and ethical principles in the Ottawa Process that best left little room for compromise in the negotiations (1998, 398). As such, the most credible representatives of these moral aspects were the victims, their families, and those who had worked to minimize their sufferings, such as ICRC and the VVAF. Similarly, Cameron suggests that:

Triangulation between policy-makers, NGOs, and the mass public contributed to the success of Canada’s foreign policy initiative to ban landmines because it tapped into a deep current of idealism and Pearsonian internationalism that had long been neglected by the pragmatism espoused by the foreign policy establishment. (1998, 443)

Axworthy concurs that the Mine Ban Treaty was a just cause and acknowledges the need to “circumvent the traditional diplomatic process and chart a new path” (2012, 1). The Ottawa Process was risky but “the landmines crisis was a case in point: traditional disarmament approaches did not permit the international community to address effectively the aggression against civilians that was part of the very nature of this weapon” (Axworthy and Taylor, 1998, 192). He also mentions that:

Rising public engagement in the previously closed and élite world of foreign affairs, new connections based on the shared power of information, new partnerships within and between societies and states, and the influence of soft power all point the way to differing but continuing successes for human security and humanitarian values. (1998, 459)

\textsuperscript{187} Lencioni also mentioned concepts of time, bottom line, peer accountabilities and ROEs in support of breaking down corporate silos.

\textsuperscript{188} In the case of the Ottawa Process, my understanding of the repositioning is the reframe of the issue of the APMs from a military tool to a human security issue.
The partnerships under the Ottawa Process were unlike a business merger because the issue was political and did not have profit as its bottom line. There was no executive order to force the CSO into joining a Canadian coalition or a pro-ban coalition. One main challenge of the proposed ban was to move nations beyond their self-interest and the perceived usefulness of AP mines for protection to thinking about the issue in the context of human security. Usually, collective interests are hard to define because they appear at a distance from the individual. If the distance from the individual is perceived as great, then the attention of this individual might be directed to a case or situation closer to a personal community or national interest instead of the global level. In addition, there is then more of a risk of division or the construction of silos.

There was no mention by any of the interviewees of a particular orientation program for new employees that would have specifically spelled out the shared intent of the partnership, leading to a hypothesis on my part that the leaders must instead have been doing a good job as exemplars. The leaders provided a “compelling context for working together” (Lencioni, 2006, 176) and the new team members knew the priorities.

One interviewee shares his thoughts on the working environment:

That power of a single idea to motivate so much because people saw the beauty of an outcome. We were going to get an outcome. And that galvanized everybody. It’s not like so many things in this life. You’re fighting terrorism, you’re fighting drugs, you’re fighting all kinds of things but are you ever going to get to an outcome or you’re not sure. In this process, we knew we were going to come to an outcome and that was, I think, the single most empowering thing about this process. Whether you were with us or against us. If you were against us, you knew there was a big thing happening in Ottawa, right? In December, did you want to be outside the tent, you’d think really hard about that.

The idea of a ban on APMs and the knowledge that there would be an outcome appear as powerful motivators for this interviewee’s engagement and as moral
imperatives for belonging to the pro-ban nations. The strength of this combination—of a moral and achievable purpose—makes it a good foundation on which to build trust.

7.4.2. Maintenance of Trust

As previously mentioned, CSOs in general have made it one of their roles to tell governments what they are doing wrong. Most of the CSO participants interviewed confirmed their lack of trust at the start of the Canadian coalition partnership. Trust was built over time, with the continuous sharing of information and continuous and regular connections. Requests were made and wishes were executed. Access to professional training and resources proved to be necessary as more demands for support were being made. The Canadian government representatives were reaching out to MAC and ICBL and were supporting both entities. Over time the working relationship became a partnership. The notion of trust was mentioned as a key element in the partnership by most interviewees although there was no prompting about this subject in the questionnaire.

In previous chapters, trust was selected as an essential element for successful partnerships, in the next two sub-sections, similarities and differences in terms of alignment and non-alignment with the literature review are introduced to better define the role of trust in a cascade process.

Alignment

While issues of stereotyping were noted in the Ottawa Process, the connectors were able to find common ground with the members of the other group forming the partnership. There was clearly one government connector who had experiences in common with the CSOs across a wide spectrum of agencies, including experience as a
political candidate with strong social concerns. His allusion to his community outreach programs confirmed his concern for well-being and social justice and his compassion for others. I noted this inclination to provide required resources as his “can-do attitude.” MAC reflected the same pro-active helpful attitude by providing information to other organizations about the impacts of AP mines and by tailoring information to link these impacts to the CSO’s interests, for example, by connecting the impacts of minefields to the inability to farm and the economic loss that entails. Other members of MAC made themselves available to participate in Canadian delegation meetings and set up full-blown organizational networks and logistic for regional meetings such as what was put in place by Lisa Bernstein in Maputo (Williams and Goose, 1998, 37).

I view professional integrity as important, both as a trait for an exemplar and as an element in partnerships. Professional integrity is maintained first at the individual level and within one’s own organization and then in the partnership in which that collective is engaged.

Maybe the high integrity and stamina of all team members during the Ottawa Process and of the majority of those interviewed could in part have been fuelled by the idea of the ban and the ongoing and building up of the trust? Lencioni provides a series of indicators of dysfunction where trust is concerned, including absence of trust, failure to build trust, lack of commitment, avoidance of accountability, and inattention to the collective results (2002). However, there were no

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189 A few interviewees mentioned the Maputo conference as a key regional conference that won the heart of Africa, a continent plagued by the APMs, in supporting the Ottawa Process.

190 It is worth noting that the original core group of the Canadian coalition maintained this high level of stamina into the internationalization phase.
indications of any of these posing a challenge within the Canadian coalition during the Ottawa Process.

**Non-Alignment**

There was no pre-existing organizational culture supporting the venture in the Ottawa Process since MAC was a newly created organization. However, with the announcement of the Ottawa Process, Axworthy in fact created a “new space” where the rules would be different from those of the CCW conferences. The understanding of this was tacit until the presentation of the action plan at the October 1996 meeting when it became explicit.

There was no project charter and no agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the various parties. This was the first project between DFAIT and MAC. In addition, neither of these two partners had had any previous contact with IDA, except that Jill Sinclair had developed contacts with the Canadian disarmament community over the years.

One government representative spoke about the confirmation of his assignment in the coalition:

> I started to go to meetings with DFAIT, quite frankly I wasn’t sure if it was the right thing to do at first. Who were all these strange people? And they didn’t know the difference between anti-personnel landmines and anti-tank mines.

Joining a coalition to ban APMs in which members lacked basic knowledge of the mine itself was a shock for this interviewee. Discrepancies in the levels of knowledge between partners can affect the building of trust.

CSO and government representatives expressed their concerns about trust:

> How do you as a leader get to know people, “can I trust this person?” If I bring this person into my trust will they betray me? Will they keep the confidence? We
knew we were doing some new things, exchanging information freely between systems. I told Jill [Sinclair] that I was keeping them in the loop, you know transparency, but every now and then you wonder was this a good move? Was this going to come back to get me? Was it going to come back to get them? Because sometimes when the NGOs get too close to government, the NGOs will nibble at them, and sometimes the government gets too close to NGOs and the government will eat you. Because you are creating an interesting unique space where you are completely trusting each other. But also, to treat that transparency with respect. And I think that’s a little bit about what you learn about being a leader.

The ability to trust depends to some extent on experience. Even though this interviewee appears comfortable with the requirement to build trust in a new space with new partners, there is a sense of plaguing uncertainty. However, this uncertainty is mitigated by the knowledge that a leader must be willing to take risks while respecting the new partners in a relationship.

[Re: Oslo] We thought we had built such a relationship of trust. And we had to trust them, too. It takes two to tango. And I do think that, you know, NGOs thought it was all about them trusting us. But the risk that we managed in working this intimately, as we did with the NGOs, was massive, absolutely massive. And I don’t think to this day, that they have any appreciation for that.

The parties in a relationship might not necessarily be aware of one another’s internal organizational difficulties related to the maintenance of the partnership.

You don’t necessarily like all the people you work with when you do these things. I’d like to think that for the most part, we were mature enough to put those things aside for the greater interest of what we were trying to achieve and I would say that that was largely the case.

Trust is not about liking others. Trust is, however, being willing to work together for the achievement of a higher purpose.

One CSO representative shares his thoughts on the process of building trust:

Politically, it changed me I think in many ways. I came from an ultra-leftist position, but putting that aside, I was always antagonistic towards government. It didn’t matter what they did, their ulterior motives, they were always bad, you know, sort of approach. Ultra-left. And what I learned was, there was a
relationship possible between civil society and governments for mutual objectives. And yeah, there were corrupt people in government. You know, they only went so far, but there are corrupt people in NGOs too. There were people who were doing it for their ego and not for the cause; it's obvious that people are people.

The burden of trust, the ability to sustain trust under pressure, is an individual challenge. It may appear light to some and quite heavy to others. However, there is of course also a collective aspect to trust sharing and one person's inability to feel or create a sense of trust can affect an entire organization. Therefore, organizational components to support the building and maintenance of trust are here under study to support partnerships and increase the potential for an effective cascade phase.

7.4.3. Shared Leadership

No interviewees mentioned any discussions on the need to share the leadership of the Canadian coalition, yet it was tacitly understood. Other national and transnational collaborators were, in their different ways, working towards the same goal of banning APMs with its many other objectives. As mentioned previously, even Canadian military officers were clearly identified as leaders in their field of expertise. In addition, a civil society representative was often included in the Canadian official delegation and was therefore seen a leader in recruiting and informing other CSOs and other national officials alike

Canada could not have planned and hosted the major and regional events alone, so it was necessary to also share the leadership with other nations. It was truly a combined and sustained effort. Belgium, Austria, Norway, South Africa, and Mexico stand among the top leaders during the Ottawa Process. In addition, it is worth noting that the UN was
actually supporting the side-tracking of its own CCW process. Everyone took risks and, in a sense, could be said to have co-lead the process with Canada.

New rules and procedures can need to be created in order for power to be shared. In this case, opportunities for real dialogue required the creation of a new space outside of the UN system and universal access to the negotiation table, based on the recognition of the skills, expertise, and knowledge of all parties. Although the issue of representation was not mentioned directly, there were indirect remarks about the evolving rights of CSO’s representatives in the planning and execution of the campaign and in their attendance during the official governmental conferences. The concept of representation is a sensitive political issue as it enables access as well as confers rights and obligations. In the Ottawa Process, the issue of representation appears to have been built in organically without challenges to the partnership.

Here are some thoughts from government and CSO representatives on the benefits of access:

I wasn’t necessarily always appreciated. But I was certainly at meetings where there were groups who didn’t care about that. And working with other governments. The most important thing there was the opportunity to talk about specific wording or specific issues with the treaty or with the landmines issue. Often in a one-on-one in a social environment. This is one thing where you are in the UN and you are doing the negotiations and you are fighting for the wording that you are after, but then there’s always these events, there in hallway conversations, having coffee with people, having a drink at one of the receptions or whatever that gave you an opportunity to just talk to people. It’s amazing how people’s minds can change when they have the opportunity to be exposed to a different perspective. I felt that in terms of having an influence on other political representatives that was the most important piece. Just having that opportunity.

Being granted access includes more than a seat at the negotiation table. It also involves being given the opportunity of one-on-one discussions as equals. Nevertheless, it must be noted that access to the negotiation table remained the prerogative of
governments. There were instances where the CSOs were informed of rules of engagement stipulating observation role only in selected discussions.

Some ways we were working together even though often they, you know, the government representatives, might take a stance that MAC didn’t like. Then we kind of had a heated discussion, and sometimes there would be some outcry from the public. We would send out an action alert and let the whole network know what had happened, why they were doing something that we didn’t think was right. Then, they just got a lot of pushback and usually they would come back having discussed things and found results. You know, while I worry about “sleeping with the enemy” so to speak, well I also am a firm believer that without dialogue you don’t make progress.

Access here is defined as the opportunity to dialogue, with a view to presenting one’s proposal or position. Another degree of access is the prospect of joint problem solving.

[Re: the type of leadership required] I think that you have to walk the talk in the sense that we built this process on the idea of shared partnership. Civil society with countries, so internally I felt that was the recipe we had to have inside of the government. We worked hard to try to build that sense of partnership in my own team, gave people lots of opportunity to work independently and to have real roles, meaningful roles. We gave our ambassadors at our missions lots of opportunity to advocate in their own special ways. We really tried to promote partnerships at all levels. That sounds trite, but listen, Canada and any other small–medium country doesn’t get anything done alone. So it’s the most important rule it seems to me, even the United States doesn’t get anything done alone. Nobody gets anything done alone. So we had to really practice what we preached.

True partnership is thus defined by the availability of meaningful opportunities for all parties to contribute to the shared goal. The level of contribution is not defined, but since the statement was made in response to a question about the type of leadership required, I infer that successful partnerships require shared leadership, which in turn require rules around the management of risks.
7.4.4. Shared Risks

There were risks for both governmental and non-governmental factions during the Ottawa Process. First, there was the risk to their organizational credibility. CSO’s representatives were afraid of being coopted. The government was afraid of being criticized by their CSOs once the process was announced. There was no social contract or project charter between the parties, which could, maybe, have provided a level of security for the parties as they took the risks necessary to fully support the enterprise. There was from the start of the cascade period to the end, a very organic understanding of the intent of a mine ban. There was no agreement on its definition, scope, implementation, or even on the plan to get through the fourteen-month period leading up to December 1997. It was a total leap of faith for all involved.

Each group risked internal dissension. The Department of Foreign Affairs is a well-established federal department supporting a number of missions in the world. Should the internal messages have been only slightly misaligned, the full enterprise could have suffered greatly. A successful cascade required a clear and sustained message from the minister, and from the whole government, that this project was a priority in order to sustain the required level of effort. For MAC the process was more organic since they were building all their organizational processes as they were developing into a larger and more complex organization. However, they did have a core group that managed their activities. Some of their personnel were more involved with DFAIT than others. MAC’s decision-making procedures were also more organic and they succeeded in growing to meet the increasing demands made on their resources and their planning capacity.
In the Ottawa Process, peer accountability worked differently for the two organizations because of their differing respective long-term goals. Should the shared goal not have been arrived at, the government representatives would have been directed towards other priority objectives or portfolios. As for the CSO’s representatives, they all had their own mandates and would have resumed their respective missions. It is conceivable that some of the partner organizations of MAC would have maintained MAC’s objectives, had these objectives only slowly erode over time or been dismantled with members joining other interest groups.

The interviewees were all in agreement that the major “satisfier” would be to obtain their shared goal of banning APM. However, other satisfiers were also mentioned, including the joy of working with true professionals, the opportunity to make new friends, the opportunity to affect the world beyond Canada, and a job well-done.

One governmental representative spoke on the evolving dynamics of sharing risks:

I am very non-hierarchical, I’m very non-traditional, and I’m very inclusive, and if that’s a leadership style […]. I really believe in just looking at the best in people and letting them do stuff. I couldn’t care less what their levels are. In fact, the best ideas come from the ground. It's the bottom–up. It's making sure that those whose support you need, you can give them the confidence they need to give you that support. It's all symbiotic. It's totally symbiotic, and it’s total, total team. It’s total team, and making sure that everybody can share in the glow, and share in the risks, and share in the challenge, delivering; that’s what it is.

The ability to share risks with new partners is not necessarily a characteristic of all leaders or of all work environments. There are personal, organizational, and cultural elements affecting this ability. However, this aptitude is, as this interviewee mentions, a trigger for the creation of a highly effective and performing team.
Risk-sharing did take place within the Canadian coalition during the Ottawa Process, although the degree of risk might not have been the same for all members. Since this aspect of co-leadership was initiated early enough in the partnership, it might explain why there were few written rules on how to work together.

7.4.5. Rules of Engagement (ROEs)

The Ottawa Process created the conditions under which a fully legitimized representation of civil society organizations, outside the political and IR élite, became empowered to affect a change of rules and behaviour. These conditions adapted to the unfolding decision-making process, but some “standard” diplomatic rules of behaviour were never broken, such as the voting power and the non-attendance of CSOs in designated “closed meetings.”

In previous chapters, ROEs were selected as an element for successful partnerships, in the next two sub-sections, similarities and differences in terms of alignment and non-alignment with the literature review are introduced to better characterize ROEs’ role in a cascade process.

Alignment

While there was no mention of a concern over a common language in the Ottawa Process, there was a requirement for all members of the Canadian coalition to build common knowledge. Ambassadors and other government and CSO representatives had to acquire an understanding of the working of APMs, their usage and their impact on lives. As a result, each member was able to speak with more assurance about the APM’s impact on development and human rights, use the appropriate discourse to influence decision-making, and encourage others to join the emerging coalition of signatories.
The CSO representatives’ approach to negotiations mainly remained the same throughout the process. The same could not be said of the government representatives. The first exception to their usual style of negotiation was the inclusion of MAC as part of the Canadian delegation, thereby pushing aside the sanctity of secret, which normally kept diplomatic negotiations away from public scrutiny. The second was the daring move of creating a separate process, when the CCW already had a mandate to deal with the issue of AP mines and their impacts.

In analysing the differences in gender and age between the two parties of the Canadian coalition, I note that DFAIT in 1996 had far more women serving in leadership and command positions than the CF had in uniform working in the field. In DFAIT, the contacts in the field, from the ambassadors to the responsible portfolio managers, could be quite junior because of the rapid growth of the team during the Ottawa Process. In the core group of government representatives, Jill Sinclair was in a minority as a woman, while among the CSOs’ representatives, women were in a majority. One government interviewee acknowledged that it was thanks to women that the Ottawa Process was a success. Ethnicity, on the other hand, was not mentioned as a factor in the Ottawa Process, although it is always present as an issue in diplomatic contexts.

No interviewees mentioned discussions on the requirement to confirm the boundaries between the two groups. However, they were all complimentary about their peers’ abilities to do their jobs well. Comments were made by CSOs on the capacity of diplomacy to deliver, and the compliments were repaid by the government officials.

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191 This observation is based on my own experience as an Army engineer in 1996 and my subsequent work as a consultant at DFAIT since my retirement from the CF.
192 The aspects of ethnicity and women in peacebuilding efforts lie outside the scope of this project, but they are nevertheless elements of consideration in the cascade of global norms.
regarding the CSOs’ capacity to deliver on public awareness and education on the impacts of APM on the lives of civilians in a professional and emotionally respectful fashion.

In analysing the type of mission the MBT was, one can note that a war and a humanitarian mission require different types of expertise and leadership, where in the former the military is at the forefront and in the latter there exists the possibility of sharing power. The MBT had a humanitarian goal with a wide appeal, in spite of which it took an incredible amount of time and effort for the global society to agree to abolish a small mine worth a few dollars.

The readiness and willingness to contribute to a partnership appear greater when one’s contribution is given an equal status to that of another partner. This was certainly the case with the Ottawa Process, where interviewees speak of collaborative power having been established in record time. There was no mention of people or organizations “not pulling their weight” or not contributing to the full extent of their capacity or experience in the Ottawa Process.\(^{193}\)

**Non-alignment**

At the start of the Ottawa Process, no ROEs existed between the Canadian government and the CSOs. It was assumed that the partnership would remain in place for a fixed period of 14 months, up to the signing of the treaty. Even without ROEs, the executive leadership across the two organizations turned out to be well-aligned. There was momentum, clarity, a sense of a shared purpose for the good of the partnership, good morale, and a sustained level of care towards citizens and members of CSOs alike. These

\(^{193}\) Although I note that some innovative processes, such as self-selection, have been attributed to either government or civil society organizations depending on the author of the articles.
elements were built organically, gradually and spontaneously. ROEs were selected as an element for successful partnerships, however there were no written rules in the Ottawa Process, clearly in non-alignment with the literature review.

Were there conflicts? Yes, there were. Were they hidden? Some were. However, it appears that everyone was aware of the boundaries and of what was appropriate and what was not. It appears that some conflicts could be resolved together in the partnership while others were kept within the initial core organization.

What were the types of conflicts? There were certain personality conflicts within the initial core organization, although none were mentioned between the connectors or exemplars. As stated in the section on leadership, they were aware of the needs of the other members and able to meet them, even in difficult situations (such as the Oslo conference and the ongoing need to keep the public informed).

Warmington and Tuttle suggest that “although Mines Action Canada was represented on Canadian delegations throughout the Ottawa Process, this did not preclude substantive disagreement with the government on specific issues, the proposed US exception for the use of AP mines in Korea being a case in point” (1998, 57). They add that “it was during such times that the existence of an informed and concerned public was most vital” (Ibid., 57).

Were there politics? As seen in the case of business mergers, inside politics often create silos that foster divisions and a loss of corporate unity. In the case of the Ottawa Process, politics permeated everything. However, it was a case of positive politics built on a shared agreement.
Trust was the sole foundation for the onward evolution of the cascade process, during and after Oslo, since there was no formal conflict management or mediation mechanism in place to deal with a challenge the like of which could have had a significant impact on the project as a whole.\textsuperscript{194} There were no risk matrices or risk mitigation measures in place prior to the launch of the cascade process. However, there were clearly signs of risks shared transnationally as resources were distributed and priorities were assigned organically throughout the process. Would a risk matrix have caused too much of a delay? Probably, as they often require an agreement being reached between parties prior to any action taking place, for any risks that can be anticipated in advance.\textsuperscript{195}

None of the interviewees mentioned an agreement on roles and responsibilities for the Ottawa Process being treated as a priority for the partnership. This is interesting as it is usually a first step in relationship building. Organizations such as the PMI have created a project charter to record the mandate, roles, and responsibilities of each party in the planning and execution stages, to ensure success. Eschewing this, the initial groups involved in the Ottawa Process had, however, given themselves a mandate that remained valid once the partnership was created. Therefore, there were no requirements to modify or compromise them. Their roles and responsibilities simply remained the same while they reached out to new partners. This proved the simplest and most efficacious strategy given the pressures of the rapidly growing partnership.

There were time constraints because of the designated timelines of the four events discussed in Chapter 2 and choices therefore had to be made regarding what issues or

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{194} Valerie Warmington took Third Party Neutral training which enabled her to be more effective as a member of the Canadian official delegation.
  \item \textsuperscript{195} The full extent of this question is, however, outside the scope of this research.
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content to include. In a business setting, time is a relevant parameter for the calculation of annual returns or quarterly profits, or as a target date for the delivery of a new initiative or product. In the Ottawa Process, by setting a relatively tight deadline, time was used to create a crisis situation and became an incentive to work all available resources in as many meaningful directions as possible, all at once. Knowing the available time in which one must complete a task creates a sense of the momentum required to succeed. O’Dea shares that “if you really tried to obtain a comprehensive analysis of every problem before you decided to act, you would end up being paralyzed” (2014, 44). When a target date is given by a respected and accountable leader or, in our case, an exemplar, then time can become an essential key to success in the cascade process. O’Dea suggests that a sense of immediacy sparks creativity and altruism in a human rights activist while acting on behalf of another human being and therefore has the ability “to catalyze will as an instrument of powerful transformational action” (2014, 87).

One temporal element, required in the Ottawa Process, was a sustained tempo. There were 14 months. There was a common cause built on months of CCW processes, but there were hardly any definitions or scopes set, and therefore there was no backbone for a treaty. Tempo was therefore an important element for the continuous and growing support. There were some discussions with the pro-ban nations on issues such as whether or not to include cluster munitions and verification teams, but these two subjects and others were quickly analysed and put aside to maintain the tempo required to meet the treaty date of December 1997.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{196} This exclusion has been one major criticism of the MBT and the subject of a subsequent global norm – the Convention on Cluster Munitions (www.un.org/disarmament/ccm/).
Here follow some interview excerpts related to the coalition’s organizational process:

We didn’t feel those divisions. We played into the space usually played into by NGOs we played in space that governments usually played into. We strategized and shared, I think, in a fairly unique way. So it was very, very, very good. Bob [Lawson] was key to managing all that [...] When I say those boundaries were totally, almost totally, erased I would say during the process. Because Bob was invited to their [MAC] strategy sessions and all sorts of stuff that you just normally would not have government there, and as government you would never send somebody to something like that. But we really blurred the line. I think some of the blurriness is what made it so difficult in those 24 hours in Oslo. Because we had blurred the lines, and everyone kind of forgot who they were and what their accountabilities were at the end of the day. And then it [the tacit partnership] came crashing.

The lack of boundaries around organizational rules, or ROEs, provided a level of freedom to share information and resources, build trust, and share the risks of managing the campaign of solicitation to join the pro-ban nations. However, as seen previously, blurring lines around organizational accountabilities can also pose a challenge when real or perceived trust violation occurs.

The challenge, of course, was to hear the other side of the argument and to try to maintain your own position while responding to the concerns from the other side, as with any negotiation I guess. I do seem to have an ability to do that. I’m not one of these campaigners that become so closed-minded, I don’t shut down conversation in that way. I haven’t seen enough, and it’s not because I have worked in a diplomatic field I think it’s because I naturally tend to be that way, that I keep the conversation open [...]. [on the other hand if there is the need to] call you on your bullshit, I will not let you get away with that. And, in a way, it kind of shuts down conversation and at the same time makes the point that has to be made. That’s one thing. And then there’s another way when you know and you hear that something is wrong, but you don’t call it out right at that moment because you’re looking for an opportunity to convince them otherwise and in some ways a good campaign needs both of those approaches. You have to keep the lines of communication open and yet, at the same time, you have to be able to push back really hard when you need to.

Out of all the organizational rules, those around keeping the lines of communication open are most essential. As seen with Lencioni (2002), in Chapter 4, one
element of team dysfunction is a lack of commitment caused by the withdrawal of team members from sharing and, when and as required, arguing their opinions openly.

However, this statement brings home that the decision to fully participate remains an individual’s choice, at all times.

I think it’s a huge combination of different pieces, the leadership of the campaign. Because you need that person that’s going to get out there and get on the soapbox, and get people rolled up and get them angry. Get them pushing, and you also need the people that can get back from that, and have the conversation that allows them to inch people forward to a new perspective as well… it’s really hard to create any positive movement if you’re just butting heads and you are just insulting the other side and they don’t want to do anything with you anymore. There is a need for balance. There is a balance. And maybe it does need to be a different role. Maybe there are different roles to be played within the organization to accomplish all the goals.

The connectors were flexible enough to work with the information and the mix of emotions to rally the public, under a global Canadian leadership, to the cause of banning APMs. It was essential that Canada, as the exemplar nation, look united. At the same time, the coalition had to remain positive, professional, and focused in order to deal with the challenges of implementing a campaign, sharing with pro-ban nations, and drawing potential followers. Adaptable norm leaders could manage the dosage of this gymnastic of communication.

I actually think, I mean the treaty was extraordinarily important, I think the “Ottawa Process” was our biggest accomplishment. The Ottawa Process was a massive accomplishment because for me that’s where, even if you can’t replicate the process, there are techniques in this that you have to use, right? How do you work with those that are affected by the problem? How do you work with people outside your usual kind of sphere of contact, so it’s civil society? How do you empower, engage, and integrate them as a matter of course, not in a consultative way? That’s why I hate the comprehensive approach, because it’s a method, it’s not an integrated experience. It’s about coordination. And to me coordination is failure. The process has to be integrated, coherent, and embedded throughout. It’s embedding it for the purpose of inputting it into the process, challenging your own thinking, changing all our thinking. It’s this iterative process. […] people like Bob Lawson who was just right out there with the NGO community, with
...the sort of governmental team, of my sort of eight players globally which included South Africa, Austria, Norway, and Mexico, and Germany, New Zealand, who were in the core group, which I worked as a family [...]

I do think that the accomplishment was really ‘the how, not the what.’ And it was the different way that we did it in this total partnership. And it was in the cleverness of our campaign plan. You know, we didn’t use that term, I didn’t know that term, but Bob did, so we had a campaign plan. We strategized, there was not a moment, an opportunity, a political engagement, a significant day, nothing that we left unturned. We were absolutely relentless in exploiting every single opportunity, and so [...] and that, I think, opened all sorts of opportunities, because the fact that we were going to exploit somebody else’s election, which we did [...]. We interfered shamelessly.

The techniques consist, in part, of tacit organizational ROEs within and among partnerships, in part of human codes of behaviours among partners working for the achievement of a great cause; a cause worthy to move beyond our self-rules to become an added value to a “total partnership.”

It wasn’t crystal clear how everything worked. But maybe that was one thing I was able to do, sort of allow that to happen. Try to keep it, looking like, we were totally on top of everything, we knew what was going on and who was doing what, and what were the financial and legal obligations.

The ability to allow the dynamics of partnership to be what they are, was part of the flexibility observed in the connectors. This ability was part of the “dance.” The dynamics of partnership in the Ottawa Process were a dance of trust and hope—some might say a coping mechanism—under extreme internal and external pressures. It was a dance allowing the possibility of devising new rules and other innovations to create the conditions necessary for success.

The five main characteristics for successful norm partnership—maintenance of a shared intent, maintenance of trust, shared leadership, the agreement to share risks, and the selection of ROEs—have proven to have been in place during the Ottawa Process. The indicators of time, tempo, project charter, roles and responsibilities, conflict...
management, and organizational culture complete in part the list of the factors not fully aligned with the dynamics of building relations. The analysis of the Ottawa Process allows for an understanding of the contextual factors of norm partnerships therefore allow a degree of generalization regarding the identification of the main challenges of norm partnership.

7.5 Challenges to Norm Partnership

As seen in this chapter, there are numerous characteristics affecting the forming and well-being of partnerships. However, the lessons learned from the Ottawa Process suggest the conditions may not in all respects be in alignment with the frameworks of business or project management, in spite of which success is possible as long as the partners have agreed on a shared intent and leaders are willing and empowered to act towards that objective. As with the challenges of norm leadership presented in Chapters 4 and 6, I suggest the most challenging factors are the elements with the potential to affect the cascade process. I have chosen to look more closely at three such elements: blurring of the collective entity, blurring of the ROEs, and management of emotions.

7.5.1. Blurring of the Collective Identity within the Canadian Coalition

Each organization remained stable within itself through the growth of the coalition by continuing to abide by its own standard roles and responsibilities. Hence, the internal equilibrium of individual organizations was not affected by the growth of the coalition.\textsuperscript{197} The Canadian organization that suffered the largest impact was the military, which, on the order of the Canadian prime minister, changed their doctrine and

\textsuperscript{197} This evaluation is based from my observations of their continuous success during the operationalization phase of the MBT.
eliminated the use of the APMs. Being built on loyalty and on following hierarchical orders, however, once the decision to proceed was given, the military ensured its full support. Thus, resources were dedicated to finding alternatives to the use of AP mines, and to providing technical expertise during the Ottawa Process.

Why was the maintenance of the collective identity of the “Canadian coalition” so important? I observed that the coalition’s identity was an expression of a collective agreement to speak as if with one voice and to leave little to no room for the possibility of anyone attempting to “divide and conquer.” However, the collective identity did not erase the original, individual identities of the home base organization, or initial core group prior to the formation of the coalition.

Here are some thoughts from CSO’s representatives and the military advisor shares his thoughts on the strength of the collective identity when he faced his home base organization:

But that is where my crisis was, like, am I with them or [...] . I was really confused of my identity there. What is my role? We were non-governmental organizations and the governments were governments, it’s not that we wouldn’t always agree, but there were times that we would not agree and our tactics would diverge. We had to accept that, and I think if there were any conflicts between me and anybody else it was on that specific issue.

The collective identity crisis can be an irrevocable decision from the start partnership for some members and for others it could be an ongoing existential question.

Another thing that we were trying to do was to keep people paid, because the government wasn’t giving us money to pay staff.

I wonder if the fact that MAC was financially independent from the government during the Ottawa Process, may have in part enabled them to sustain their advocacy, education, and fundraising roles with the public. These roles would have kept MAC
focused on representing the public and the victims in the dialogue with the other partners of the Canadian coalition. I also wonder if their financial independence may have brought a balance of power to the partnership. There was certainly a noticeable sense of pride in the interviewee when discussing the financial independence of MAC.

The senior military officer assigned to the Canadian coalition, then army engineer Colonel Fitch, shares:

One place that I didn’t feel very comfortable was within NDHQ. The political order had come down to say, “get on with this” [the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban treaty] but there was no effort to bring the rest of the Army and the HQ along. I remember meeting Navy guys, who were asking “We’re not going to have any more sea mines?” “What? Who told you that?” “Well, there’s this mine ban thing, and there’s going to be no sea mines.” “The treaty only deals with Antipersonnel mines.” “Anti what?” There was a lot of ignorance, so I had to take some time and do some training around NDHQ

Taking on a new collective identity when one already belongs to another organization may prove challenging in more ways than one. In this case, that seems to particularly have been the case for those who were involved in the Canadian coalition for a set period of time. However, loyalty to the new collective identity may take many forms and it’s for the member to choose how they will respond in accepting, avoiding, or mitigating the pressures if contradictions arise between two or more self identities.

Any blurring of the collective identity caused by pressure, such as a significant trust violation, can slow down or stop the cascade process in its track. The collective identity needs nurturing by norm leaders within norm partnerships.

7.5.2. Blurring of the Rules of Engagement

The participation of civil society organizations in closed-door government negotiating sessions was uneven during the Ottawa Process, according to Price. He notes

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that “the number of states making such accommodations dropped from over a dozen at Ottawa in 1996 to only six at Brussels and Oslo” (1998b, 639). The factors for the reduction during the process are unknown and have not been mentioned by the interviewees.

As mentioned, no ROEs were formed for the Canadian coalition. There was, simply, the primary goal and a series of action plans. However there were tacit understandings of what was acceptable. Maybe the lack of ROES allowed for the maintenance of the tempo of the campaign and the keeping of its deadline? Then again, maybe a joint project management office would have provided the required support to include and maintain the essential elements of project management in the cascade process? The blurring of the ROEs, or their vagueness, became an issue after the perceived violation of trust in Oslo. Since there was no mechanism for conflict management, the trust deficit occasioned by the accommodation of the US at the Oslo conference was managed purely through the integrity and overall demeanour of the exemplar and the connectors.

The blurring of ROEs was demonstrated also between MAC and ICBL. One CSO representative shares the following on working with ICBL:

But there were times when, and I really noticed this at the first mines conference in ’96, they [ICBL] just excluded the people who had been in Canada working on the ground all the time, and it was just like “Geez, I’ve got better things to do than deal with this bullshit.” […] ICBL did provide resources and stuff, they did, and we raised a lot of money. Canadians contributed a lot of money towards the international campaign through Mines Action Canada and other stuff as well.

The unexpressed expectations between CSO partners can create resentment, which in turn can affect the level of trust and lead to dysfunctions. The same dynamics can affect governmental partnerships and hybrid relationships such a coalitions between
government and CSOs. The early establishment of ROEs could alleviate some of these risks.

Without necessarily considering extensive project charters or legal documents prior to forming norm partnerships, it might be interesting for the sake of the cascade process to discuss concepts such as expectations, constraints, and conflict management early between the norm leaders of participating organizations.

7.5.3. The Management of Negative Emotions

While the management of emotions during the Ottawa Process has not been the subject of discussion, it was in evidence throughout the process at every level of every organization. For example, CSOs did not shy away from using an emotional approach to persuading the public to contribute funds. They also used emotions to recruit new members and to engage existing members to dedicate their time and resources towards action in support of the campaign plan. The management of emotions played a part also within the various political parties, the civil service and parliament. The governmental representatives all demonstrated poise as well as knowledge, and acted with transparency, based on informed decision. Similarly, the Canadian coalition was managing emotions of fear and hope within the collective of the pro-nation countries.

The norm leaders faced a constant management of emotions, in negotiating with each other, with their own organizations, with the various parties of the Canadian coalition, and with all of the collectives involved in putting the plan into action. So, although there was no single party in charge of the management of emotions, it appears that the quality of the exemplars and connectors had resulted in the establishment of a level of trust, which over time had created sufficient stability to “absorb” events such as
what happened at the Oslo conference. In spite of this, one wonders if trust and the
negotiation of emotions would have been less of an issue if there had been a set of
agreed-upon rules for all the participants. It is impossible to know this of course. What
we do know is that, for the Ottawa Process, a strong, shared intent was a sufficient
catalyst for the process to cascade.

One CSO representative shares their thoughts on the strength of a collective
identity:

There was a camaraderie that comes from working towards something that one
views as important. Ten years in the making. You become friends. You become
good friends in many ways. You share a lot, including fears of what’s going to
happen as well as the joys of what does happen.

I suggest that when individuals within a partnership become friends, this
friendship can be seen as the end result of a successful dance.

In conclusion, this chapter provides an analysis of the roles of the norm partnerships in
the Ottawa Process through the lenses of mimetic and IA theories for a better
understanding of what makes partners willing to work together for the sake of achieving a
common goal. The major finding regarding the relationships between government and
civil society actors, in the context of the cascading of a global norm, is that they are of
both a relational and transactional nature. On the relational front, I observed a willingness
and readiness on the part of the representatives to act as connectors to the other group,
through self-transformation and the establishing of the trust required to build a
partnership. On the transactional front, the partnerships were supported by good
organizational platforms, an inclusive decision-making process, and adequate resources
to develop and execute the campaign and sustain the momentum throughout the
operationalization phase.
It was also identified that the type of dance, or interplay, was important in establishing the mimetic and IA dynamics at play, as were the tools supporting the building and maintaining of the partnership throughout the whole cascade phase. While McGuigan and Popp’ context was that of conflicting parties coming together through facilitators, in a dance of dialogue to seek a common solution, the Canadian coalition was already “dancing” during the emergence process, having from the very start of the Ottawa Process an agreement around a common goal and the necessary degree of trust to plan and implement a campaign of action. The dance creates the opportunity for the formation of a collective identity in which the building, maintenance, and pressures become expressions of mimetic and IA dynamics both at individual and collective levels within the norm partnership.

Key elements must be available to sustain and build trust throughout the cascade phase. Such elements have been defined as indicators in business partnerships and project management partnerships, as well as in conflictual partnerships. Five of these are pertinent also for norm partnerships: the selection and maintenance of the shared intent is the goal to be achieved by the cascade process; the maintenance of the dance of trust grounds the sustainment of the main collective identity of parties ready to implement the new norm; and the last three characteristics—of shared leadership, shared risks, and supportive ROEs—reinforce trust and potentially mitigate the pressures caused by the blurring lines of collective identity, unknown or confusing ROEs, and emotions such as fear when faced with trust violation.

The capacity for a connector to connect, or for an exemplar to perform, to the best of their abilities in a norm partnership can be restrained by the quality of any of these five
characteristics. In addition, the element of shared leadership is distinctive of the Ottawa Process. The concepts of connector, exemplar, and shared leadership will be further defined in the next chapter, with a view to contributing to a better understanding of the cascade process of a global norm.
Chapter 8. Analysis of the Cascade of the MBT

The characteristic mechanism of the first stage, norm emergence, is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new forms. The second stage is characterized more by a *dynamic of imitation*\(^\text{199}\) as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers. The exact motivation for this second stage where the norm “cascades” through the rest of the population (in this case, of states) may vary, but we argue that a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem facilitate norm cascades. At the end of the norm cascade, norm internalization occurs; norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate.


Mimetic theory is well suited to analyzing the dynamic of imitation when deconstructing the cascade phase, while the integral approach (IA) theory helps us understand how norm leaders socialize others to entertain the proposed change. The hypotheses underlying this research are that the mapping of the norm leader’s role allows for a richer understanding of the complexity of the cascade process of global norms, and that the combined analytical framework of IA and mimetism enable the capture of the leadership and partnership qualities that lead to a successful cascading process. These premises have in part already been confirmed.

However, this chapter, proposes to expand the knowledge gained by first reviewing the context of the Ottawa Process with a view to then analyzing its lessons learned from norm leaders and characteristics of leadership and partnership. This positioning further allows enlarging on Finnemore and Sikkink’s lifecycle norm model to reflect some of the complexities of the Ottawa Process.

\(^{199}\) My emphasis.
8.1. Context of the Ottawa Process

The cascade is the means by which a decision-making process proceeds and leads to its conclusion. The Ottawa Process was a program of actions built to inform and convince nations not already part of the pro-ban partnership to undergo their own internal decision-making process. The cascade phase entailed a multitude of projects undertaken by the leading countries. I have chosen to review four major events: the announcement of the Ottawa Process challenge; the development of a draft treaty; the negotiations on the treaty; and the signatures confirming the legitimacy of the treaty. Similarly, the emergence phase was constituted by a program of projects which included among other tasks: the gathering and selection of information; the development of International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL); the reframing of land mines from a required weapon to a human security threat; and the development of a media campaign.

Finnemore and Sikkink share that “two elements seem common in the successful creation of most new norms: norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms from which entrepreneurs act” (1998, 896). The Ottawa Process was being run concurrently on three platforms. First, there was a Canadian national outreach program. The purpose of this program was to manage the campaign within Canada, ensuring that all federal departments as well as the Canadian public were aligned with the goal of a signed mine ban treaty by December 1997. The national outreach program had its own resources and communication plans to ensure the education of both Canadian public servants and citizens.

The second platform consisted of the international outreach program. This was dedicated to reaching out to 100 nations as an initial target for the number of signatories
for December 1997. This program had a series of individual plans, each one integrated and synchronized within the overall campaign of the Canadian coalition. Each plan was resourced to meet the evolving demands of the campaign. One plan entailed the core group located within the disarmament unit of IDA\textsuperscript{200} managing the government campaign to reach out to potential national allies. Another plan entailed the military developing tactically viable alternatives to the use of AP mines as well as a new discourse about the use of these other protection measures, and then sharing these with other militaries through assigned military officers within the disarmament unit of IDA. A third plan consisted of Mine Action Canada (MAC)’s outreach in response to requests for support from other national CSOs. There were, in other words, two international outreach approaches: one led by the Canadian government and the other led by MAC. The international plans included the development and support of other national and regional campaigns to reach out to existing alliances and international platforms such as l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie to get as many signatories for the treaty as possible.

The third and final platform consisted of the structure for the international development of the treaty, coordinated mainly by the pro-ban nations. They developed their own sub-plan for the logistics and management of numerous events. Among them, conferences required the determination of chairmanship, rules on attendance (in terms of inclusion and exclusion), and resource and communication plans. Pro-ban nations kept each other apprised of the unfolding writing of action plans and the evolution of the drafts of the treaty. The collaboration in terms of shared leadership will be reviewed in

\textsuperscript{200} IDA is the name given to the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Division in DFAIT department.
more detail in section 8.3.1. This platform also ensured the concurrent development of action plans for the operationalization phase of the new norm and in so doing provided a level of assurance that the Ottawa Process would be more than a convention.

This next section will focus on verifying the two-part hypothesis by reviewing the contributions of the mimetic and IA theories to the understanding of the role of the norm leader.

8.2. Norm Leaders in the Cascade – Lessons

The ability to understand or connect and sympathize with the worldviews of others, while not necessarily compromising one’s own, is a basic requirement for norm leaders.\(^{201}\) The norm leaders encourage a leap of faith in potential allies, thereby laying the foundation for trust. They support the abatement of fear, and maybe even instil hope, during the uncertain days of alliance building. This period of uncertainty could develop in one of three directions: 1) it could develop opportunities to grow into the relationship; 2) it could develop barriers that result in a retraction from the potential; and 3) it could result in a degree of fear too strong for trust to emerge.

The role of the norm leaders is to apply pressure to conform, to entice the desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem. The mimetic dynamics required for the cascade of new norms are evident as the object of desire for other state leaders then becomes a personal, and potentially national, allegiance to the pro-ban group, or being a founder of a new international legitimation initiative, or to improve self-recognition. Although the focus of this research is not on the validation of Finnemore and Sikkink’s argument on the methods for cascading a new

\(^{201}\) Here the expression “norm leader” is used for the representative of a national government or national CSO.
norm, I suggest that the cascade of a global norm is always about a new international legitimacy for the new norm, as dreamed and developed by a norm leader and the cascade’s starting point rests in the ability of the norm leader to identify and connect with potential norm followers. I labelled this norm leader a connector.

8.2.1. Connectors

Connectors are required to provide sustainable links to others, for example, through existing communication platforms inside organizations or institutions of national governance. The type of leadership of the connector must be congruent with the organizational norms, structures, and processes and must therefore be credible, that is, accepted within the core group. The connector’s demonstration of morals must also align with the values and codes of the institutions in question. Insiders should have no doubt that the connector has their personal interests at heart, holds the purpose of the institution in the highest esteem, and won’t be a threat to the organization. There might be reputational risks, but these would be evaluated beforehand.

Each member of the government IDA team and of the executive team at MAC was a connector. They became the enablers and translators. They facilitated the execution of requests on behalf of each other as best they could. They were capable of understanding requests and concerns and of representing them according to the worldviews, both of the parties making them and of the Canadian coalition. There were connectors inside each quadrant and across quadrants. They had the ability to sense opportunities in their connection “to all” and were often in positions to react quickly to opportunities that arose. They were successful at respecting what was of value for the others while remaining focused on the shared goal.
8.2.1.1. Two Types of Connectors

I identify two types of connectors and have labeled them “peripheral” and “deep connectors.” The difference between the two lies in the physical and emotional/mental distance between the connector and the other’s worldview. The physical distance is measured through the frequency of contacts and transactions, in terms of transfer of resources and knowledge, with the other’s organization. The emotional/mental distance is evaluated through the quality of the established relation in terms of the personal investment that the connector is willing to bring to the relationship.

Peripheral connectors support the process aspect of the relationship. They establish the foundation for communication, but not its quality, nor depth. They enable the sharing of resources and knowledge, critical for the development of the relation, as there is a level of anticipated sharing when building a partnership. Every partner is understood to have something to bring to and something to gain from the partnership.

Deep connecting is linked to the relational quality. How is the connector willing to adapt to the other’s worldview? How much is the connector ready to share of themself, how vulnerable are they prepared to be? Deep connecting also speaks of the quality of the connector’s alignment with the shared goal. I contend that the quality of the listening and the level of caring are two means by which to demonstrate this willingness to come together, to be affected by the other. This openness is the ticket to togetherness for the sake of the shared goal. The connector must therefore be convinced of the importance of that goal.

The connectors live in the space between institutions. Their focus is to build and then maintain trust and their goal is the planning and execution of the shared intent. The
connector has to be adaptable. The task requires a willingness to adjust one’s way of thinking to align with the achievement of the goal. The capacity for quick reaction\textsuperscript{202} is also important as opportunities to connect may be few and far between and delay can jeopardize both the relationship and the attainment of the shared goal.

As mentioned, there are different types of connectors. First, there are those who reside in the peripheral space between organizations, and then, there are those who do their work deeper inside the organizations, where every move, word, and action is under observation, where their moral convictions will be revealed at every contact. These connectors must not be afraid of failing or apologizing. The poise they show in the face of difficulty will act as a catalyst for mimetic demonstrations.

Not all connectors are willing or capable to go deep. Some choose to stay at the periphery—for fear of cooption into the other’s worldview, or as a statement of loyalty with their institution. The capacity to go deep without being coopted requires other skills that this research was not able to easily identify.\textsuperscript{203}

The quality of the connection achieved is determined by the personal investment of the connector in their institution, their capacity to meet the demands of the proposed new partner, and the equal willingness and readiness of the latter to get involved in the proposed partnership. Such connectors are the enablers of the cascade process. My analysis identifies connectors to have at least two distinct roles. First, as connector-resources they have the role of conveyors of information, equipment, tools, funding, and

\textsuperscript{202} I view the capacity for quick reaction as possible only after a serious reflection affirming the level of commitment towards the partnership.

\textsuperscript{203} The answer would require more in-depth tools to evaluate the connectors’ levels of consciousness, and any inner wounds (psychological trauma) evaluated as part of the certification as Third Party Neutral offered through the Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution. This is a certification I received in 2017.
personnel to support the planning and implementation of actions. This role can be carried out either in a comprehensive or targeted arrangement depending of the level and volume of needs expressed by the parties. In the case of the Ottawa Process some nations had never ratified a norm and needed to have support in understanding the process so they could in turn explain the steps of the process to their national colleagues.

Second, as connector-recruiters they have the role of finders of national norm entrepreneurs from within each nation, either from the government or from a civil society group, or better, as in the case of the Ottawa Process, from both sides. Each connector becomes a recruiter dedicated to starting the intra-national cascades required for a global norm to actualize. Some nations do not have much by way of a civil society in those cases the connector-recruiter could only work with the government officials either through the nation’s leader and their circle of influence\textsuperscript{204} or through the Department of Foreign Affairs or the Department of Defence. In some cases, small civil society groups were formed specifically in response to the Ottawa Process, and worked directly with the connector-recruiter, either on their own initiative or through international organizations’, —such as ICBL’s or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s—suggestion and/or recommendation.

In my view, the differences between the two types of connector and their capacity to fulfill the two roles rest with the norm entrepreneur’s capacity for emotional support required to entice and support a potential norm follower or to support a partner into a new partnership. As such a norm entrepreneur with a low threshold of trust with government representatives may carry more fear of being co-opted than someone else with a higher

\textsuperscript{204} In the case of the Ottawa Process, the spouse of the Jordanian king, Queen Rania, was mentioned as a national norm entrepreneur by one of my interviewees.
level of trust. As I discovered the dynamics of connectors, I realized that these roles have been normalized as part of international politics since societies first negotiated treaties between themselves, although the term “diplomat” didn’t make its first appearance until 1813.\textsuperscript{205}

\textit{8.2.1.2. Diplomats}

There are at least two types of diplomats. First, there are political nominations of well-known and successful people. Second, there are public servants serving within the Department of Foreign Affairs. When describing the source of the ability to connect as a successful Canadian diplomat of the latter category,\textsuperscript{206} clearly understanding the task of bringing to bear the objectives, the intent, and the challenges of Canada and to fully realize that one needs others in order to achieve the objectives were mentioned. The following characteristics were used to describe the desirable qualities of the diplomats: curiosity towards the other, humility, cultural sensitivity, and, as an added bonus, linguistic capability. The diplomatic role was defined as one of facilitator, problem-solver, project manager, leader, and “the eyes and ears” of government.

The role of diplomat aligns with the concept of “connector” as both require the incumbent to be interested in the other’s views, to listen to their perspectives and to be somewhat in a position to translate their concerns, conditions, and constraints, in short

\textsuperscript{205} Merriam-Webster dictionary at www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomat.
\textsuperscript{206} Ad hoc conversation while discussing the role of diplomats with Mrs. Sandelle Scrimshaw on October 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2017. From 2000 to 2003, Mrs. Scrimshaw served as High Commissioner to Barbados, from 2003 to 2006 as High Commissioner to South Africa, and from 2006 to 2010 as Minister Plenipotentiary at the Canadian Embassy in Paris and Consul General to Monaco. She is currently President of the Retired Heads of Mission Association (RHOMA) and a member of the Board of the Canadian International Council – National Capital Branch.
their perspective, into frames of reference that are consonant with Canadian values.\(^{207}\) The role of the diplomat can indeed be compared to that of a two-way interpreter since they not only translate the interest of other nations to their Canadian colleagues, but also convey the Canadian position or interests in a way that will be understood by their non-Canadian diplomatic colleagues. Canadian diplomats act as advocates, representatives, negotiators, and convenors of these interests. Experienced Canadian diplomats know how to modify strategy to achieve common ground for successful negotiations. They have, over the years, developed a series of networks allowing them to reach out to colleagues efficiently. They bring perspectives and define ways by which this common ground can be built and maintained. They also bring a knowledge of how to build consensus. These networks, the first grounding blocks for national partnership, are built one by one, by one individual reaching out to another. Over time, these individual partnerships allow for the creation of a wider partnership of “like-minded nations” with links often through multiple files.

The intent to connect is quite interesting because I have come to realize that while evident among Foreign Affairs diplomats, it is not necessarily in evidence among Canadians public servants in other departments, with the possible exception of some Canadian military officers who have the opportunity to act as connectors when deployed overseas as part of a NATO or UN posting or when acting as exchange officers in other countries. These diplomats support and represent the Canadian government’s objectives

\(^{207}\) While it is understood that Canadian values can be a vague concept for the Canadian citizen, these values are usually defined in terms of objectives to be attained through federal programs. Global Affairs’ Report on Plans and Priorities for 2016-2017 identifies that “guided by Canadian values and a focus on results, our priority is re-energizing Canada’s leadership and constructive engagement on key international issues and in multilateral institutions. (2017, 3) - http://international.gc.ca/gac-amc/assets/pdfs/publications/plans/rpp/RPP_2016_2017_ENG.pdf
and overall Canadian values in projecting and cascading them in IR. As such, diplomats are both conveyors of national interest and connectors, but not necessarily exemplars.

Mimetic dynamics are always at play in a relationship. If the self wishes to achieve its vision of potential capacities, then a choice can be made for an exemplar on either a short and long-term basis. This choice would be a very private endeavour and could even be done on a very subjective basis without the awareness of the dynamics of mimetism. However, when a public campaign for a new global norm is activated, it offers the opportunity to observe the mimetic dynamics leading to personal and national transformation that, I contend, will always include the choosing of exemplars.

8.2.2. Exemplars

As noted in Chapter 2, Duyndam (2014) defines an exemplar as someone who demonstrates their morals through their actions, and through them proves inspirational to others. In the context of a normative change, where the connector becomes the *porteur* of the project, they are an exemplar. It is not for the connector to choose to set themselves up as an exemplar, but rather it is a role they may come to assume in the eyes of their fellow partnership members as a result of their actions. These partners may mimic their actions or their overall moral approach. The quality of alignment in terms of the bearing of the exemplar facing the challenges of the proposal will provide both confidence and assurance to the insiders of the institution. It may provide the seed for others to cascade the idea.
This analysis confirms that the exemplars in the Ottawa Process were the inspiration behind several actions. First, they became the official sponsors of the shared intent with a designated timeline of December 1997. Second, they nurtured a series of innovations required in terms of process and relations. Third, they became co-creators in an action-based program within which everyone was an actor. Finally, they provided a sense of hope regarding the development and implementation of the campaign and the attainment of the ultimate objective.

I observed the exemplars as setting the tone or being the conductors. Although every member of the orchestra is playing a different part, there must be a willingness and readiness to keep the tempo and to synchronize one’s part with the collective effort. The shared intent registers as the collective output of the symphony. Unlike an orchestra, the Ottawa Process was a collective of collectives without a music sheet. However, very much like a jamming session with experienced musicians, the various parties attuned themselves to the needs of the moment with some players ending up with a larger role to play.

Interestingly, without exception, the interviewees viewed someone other than themselves as exemplar. A majority of them described Minister Axworthy as an exemplar. When I shared that they were themselves exemplars to others, they all appeared sincerely surprised and humbled.

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208 I view all the interviewees as exemplars in the Ottawa Process, as former colleagues recommended them all. Some, such as Lloyd Axworthy, had more public exposure, while others had more diplomatic, military or CSO exposure.

209 These exemplars were also connectors. I acknowledge that there are likely more differences between the connector and the exemplar than the notion that the exemplar is chosen by the observer, however, it would require a more detailed questionnaire to ascertain this.
While Axworthy’s *Navigating a New World* (2003) is a good self-portrayal of an exemplar, I propose to evaluate him further, using the four quadrants of the IA theory, focusing on leadership and partnership, in order to present a perspective that can serve as a guide to future national political exemplars of normative change.

### 8.2.2.1. A Succinct IA Mapping of Axworthy During the Ottawa Process

*Navigating a New World* (2003) is the basis for my deconstruction of Axworthy’s exemplar’s values as they relate to his role in the Ottawa Process.\(^{210}\) The purpose of this mapping is to identify the key characteristics of Lloyd Axworthy as an exemplar. The characteristics are not prioritized in any order.

As previously reviewed, the integral approach allows for the combination of subjective and objective, or interior and exterior, fields of research with those of the individual and the collective and as such provides for four quadrants of locational agency. Since these quadrants permit the systematic capture and analysis of data in a way that deconstructs the complexity of a given situation, each quadrant will now be reviewed with a closer look at our selected exemplar.

*Interior and Individual – Who Is Lloyd Axworthy?*

In writing about his life as the newly appointed minister of Foreign Affairs, Axworthy provides an understanding of international relations as a political ideology of realism within a more collaborative global governance.\(^{211}\) His ideal of compromise was

\(^{210}\) I acknowledge that it takes a lifetime to know someone and to map their values and motivators to their choices and actions, and even then, that this process is done through self-perception, with all its known and unknown analytical filters. I contend, however, that even with these shortcomings the following section is of value. By exploring the opportunities offered by the IA theory, I hope my findings will encourage political leaders to take a stand to advance participative governance at all levels of political activities.

\(^{211}\) I refer here to an informal structure of global governance and not to the UN as an institution of global governance.
in need of an imaginative and informed process. Axworthy mentioned that there are three ways to deal with the clash between the global network of terror and “the world’s most powerful state”212 and its connections: the ways of the fanatic, of the warrior, or of the navigator. He preferred the ways of the navigator, defining it as “seeking out a secure, safe course for the passengers on board mindful of their welfare, skirting the shoals and reefs, working in a team with others making the same voyage” (2003, 407).

His thoughts are in part summarized in what follows,

The strong hold of beliefs in national sovereignty, and anti-internationalist feelings, meant that many governments resisted multilateral cooperative ventures. The philosophy of go-it-alone was alive and well even in the face of a shared risk. Traditional notions of national interest were stoutly defended even while they simply didn’t match the tempo of interdependence that was under way […] now the Bush administration is not just a reluctant signatory but also a ferocious opponent of any agreement that does not directly serve specific ambitions of the U.S.—hardly a promising atmosphere in which to construct a new global architecture […] By the time I became foreign affairs minister a realistic and imaginative look was needed to make sense of these conflicting and confusing trends […] During my time at Foreign Affairs a number of international challenges, from Zaire to Haiti and from Cuba to Kosovo, suggested the need for a new approach that would emphasize the human and humanitarian dimension and also promote Canada as an innovative player. The concept of human security emerged as the lens through which to view the international scene. (Ibid., 3–4)

His emphasis on the need for both a realistic approach and for imagination is worth reflection. His humanitarian approach within the context of security was translated into the concept of human security. His key values and overall attitude in coming up with the challenge for the Ottawa Process, can perhaps be summed up in the following excerpt: “My own resolve was certainly strengthened by the sign of public support, and enhanced by the experience of trying to answer my young son’s question as we toured the mine exhibit: Why would anyone use such weapons to kill children?” (Ibid., 136).

212 Axworthy doesn’t state clearly the US as the most powerful state. However a reference is made to Richard Falk, *The Great Terror War*, in which the competing networks are identified as the US and the network of terror (2003).
His need to be both realistic and innovative in his decision-making on behalf of Canada appears as a prime objective. He is willing to take on a risk, but it has to be an informed one.\textsuperscript{213} He is not clear about the reason why he is willing to take on the risk, but it could be as a result of the Canadian parliamentary system, in which politicians are directly responsible to the citizens, unlike the political system of the US where they are more responsible to Congress.

Informed decision-making has two advantages: first, it makes it possible to provide the citizenry with proper information and to address whatever questions they may have; second, it allows for grounding or slowing the decision-making process in order to take carefully considered actions on behalf of the country and its citizens.\textsuperscript{214} This positioning of information backed by a collection of facts investigated by CSOs and verified by bureaucrats appears as a priority in his chosen path for action. Axworthy’s attitude with regard to the creation and sharing of information is highlighted in these two quotes from his book:

Another form of outreach to enlist civilian involvement and intervention was called the Canadian Peace-building Initiative. It was the result of several months of effort in 1996 to give expression to the human security idea, and involved officials and ministerial staff from both Foreign Affairs and CIDA—an attempt at shared policy-making and coordinated delivery that was unusual, one might say groundbreaking. (Ibid., 59)

Once again it became clear that a lack of investment in good analysis and ideas handicaps Canadian policy-makers; given today’s complex issues, good

\textsuperscript{213} I forego the usual expression of “calculated risk” since in my view, his evaluation of risk involved an approach centred less on numbers and more on the human aspect.
\textsuperscript{214} In general, there is no information on the money raised for public awareness and education, for reaching out to other nations, to develop and distribute documentation in support of the cascade process. However since then the Landmine Monitor has reported on the financing for the internalization process of the MBT. There were no mentions of negative publicity to counter attack the new proposed norm unlike today with for example anti-scientist articles refuting the impacts of climate change.
scholarship translated into good advice is essential. Without it, all is improvisation. (Ibid., 109)

While at the Department of Foreign Affairs he contributed greatly not only to this department, but to Canada and the global community at large. When receiving UNAC’s 2017 Pearson Peace Medal “which honours outstanding Canadian achievements in the field of international service and understanding,”215 on the 24th of May 2017, Axworthy shared that he had tried—and failed—to join the department as a young man, but was glad he had found a way to finally do so as its political minister.216 He was well aware, however, of the department’s shortcomings in terms of its excessive risk aversion, as his “major criticism would be that the nature of foreign service leads it to overcaution, a tendency too often to look for a settled solution” (Ibid., 49).

Axworthy’s understanding of and previous experiences with social justice, human security, and in working collaboratively with CSOs appear to have stood him in good stead as he started his new position in Foreign Affairs. He reflects on this:

One turning point for me in extending this notion of human security into the wider international arena was the UN Summit on Social Development, held in Copenhagen in 1995. It brought together more than 117 heads of state and a large gathering of NGOs, and its themes were the eradication of poverty, the need for full employment and the need to build secure, stable societies. At its core was a sense of disquiet about the social dislocation caused by global economic forces and the increasing inequality created by the uneven distribution of the benefits of the emerging global economy. I was struck by how much the underlying issues were the same internationally as they were domestically. I was beginning to realize the global interconnectedness of employment and security. (Ibid., 41–42)

In his career as a politician and government actor in Canada and the world, Axworthy decided to focus on two things: positioning Canada as a player while respecting basic humanitarian values and finding the ideology that could best create this collaboration.

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215 UNAC’s media release, provided as a personal copy from Ms. Joan Broughton.
216 I attended the function.
There appear to have been two strong political inspirations for his career. The first was Lester P. Pearson and his concept of Canada as a bridge-builder. Axworthy writes:

[Lester B. Pearson’s] concept of Canada as a bridge-builder, based on our history of working through compromise to establish and preserve our nationhood, was compelling […] it also made me understand that we can play such a role only by fostering liberal-minded, specially responsible, unity-oriented policies and attitudes at home. It is our values that define us, and our politics that can give those values tangible expression. (Ibid., 31–32)

A second political influence, coherent with the first, was Pierre Trudeau and his ideology of a national multiculturalism and a focused and active internationalism on the part of Canada. Axworthy adopted similar ideas to guide his political decisions and choice of actions. He emphasizes Trudeau’s outstanding and daring actions:

[In] his launching of a peace mission in 1984 to encourage world leaders to restart a dialogue on nuclear disarmament […] Trudeau [the father] added a further element to the foreign affairs legacy established by Pearson. This wasn’t just Canada as a renowned honest broker and fond of fresh ideas—the classic middle-power stance. It was Canada as an independent voice—a voice that doesn’t simply echo the interest of the powerful and the privileged but speaks for those without international clout who are in need of representation. This was defining a leading role for Canada in establishing norms of global behaviour and rules of law, and advocating inclusive decision making on issues that affect all humankind. (Ibid., 38)

Regarding his own view of Canada in the world, Axworthy writes,

Canada is only one community amongst many. We have no pretension about wielding a big military stick, nor do we have any whiff of manifest destiny. But we can offer ideas, skills, resources, a political commitment to working with others to find practical, peaceful solutions, and a sense of quiet optimism about the future. We can hold hope for many around the world. We can mark the road towards a horizon where justice, security and fairness beckon. We can set a beacon to guide both Emmas [Axworthy’s granddaughter and a Ugandan child warrior] as they define their own pathway into this new century. (Ibid., 422)

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217 By collective, I refer to the political culture of Canada; and to understand how Axworthy views this particular culture, I looked at how he has defined it through various prime ministers.
This is a worldview far from Morgenthau’s realism and his emphasis on relations between states as fundamentally conflictual.\footnote{Morgenthau sought to bring order to the conducting of foreign politics. He was the first to define political realism in his book \textit{Politics Among Nations} with a first edition in 1948. He viewed nation states as extensions of human nature in an anarchic system. The context of anarchy justified his conception of the relations between states as being fundamentally conflictual. Relations between nations are therefore seen in light of a choice between security and the uncertainties of cooperation. Morgenthau’s epistemology is consequently marked by pessimism, skepticism and mistrust between states. In his view, states are continuously preparing for, or recovering from, violence organised under the auspices of war. Conflicts and the use of force are seen as normal and legitimate activities. National interest, defined as the maintenance and the expansion of its power, is what motivates a state to act. The relations between states are primarily established through power, and principally through military power (1993).} Instead, Axworthy’s worldview is of a community working collegially in all fields of global affairs:

I have sought to map out a distinctive course for Canada. The three most important coordinates are: (1) to retain our rights to make choices that reflect our own values and interests; (2) to navigate using human security as a lodestar, seeking an international rules-based system that respects and protects the rights of the individual in contrast to a world dominated by military force and naked self-interest; and (3) to build partnerships between governments, business and civil society to tackle the problems we face in common as global citizens. (Ibid., 403)

This course of action is value-based and offers the flexibility to focus on global partnerships that will be mutually empowering. In terms of what defines Canada, Axworthy takes a line of “positive nationalism” and writes: “the values we express internationally help define who we are when other distinctions are being erased. Equally, our welfare is closely tied to international rules and practices” (2003, 1). The concept of distinction is an important one, because it addresses the notion of cultural boundaries as well as political or physical ones. Specifically, it seeks to delineate the boundary between Canada and the United States. He offers that Quebec’s search of an identity within Canada was a valuable lesson and great motivator in finding Canada’s place in the world.

Our efforts also demonstrated how an activist, internationalist policy can help shape our identity and promote unity in the country. International
accomplishments reinforce our basic values and enhance our pride as a people. The extent to which Canadians see their country playing a useful, effective role abroad adds to the sense of cohesion, confidence and pride that is an indispensable part of our national makeup. (Ibid., 59)

Axworthy’s values and morals appear to be derived from an idea of a fair and inclusive social system that can account for the choices of a politician within a nation as expressed globally through actions to support effective systems of collaboration.

**Exterior and Individual – How Did Lloyd Axworthy Act?**

In Chapter 3, some of the choices made by Lloyd Axworthy during the four selected events were discussed. During the first Ottawa meeting held in October 1996, Axworthy dares the world to accept four major conditions: 1) Canadian leadership; 2) a separate process outside the UN CCW; 3) an aggressively expedited timeline of 14 months\(^{219}\); and 4) a treaty, yet to be defined. Other expressions of his choices and actions are analyzed in what follows.

He was a well-seasoned politician in October 1996. He was well-versed on the issue prior to making the decision to challenge the rest of the world to ban the AP mines on behalf of Canada. He knew about the disabilities caused by the AP mines and was aware of the inability of third-world countries to counteract the impact of displaced refugees, to clear the existing minefields, or to support the victims. He was knowledgeable about the concept of human security. There was coherence between his thoughts, values, and actions—except in one instance. It is customary in diplomatic circles to not be the bearer of any surprises, but Axworthy chose to share his decision to

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\(^{219}\) I choose the term “aggressively expedited” in lieu of “limited” to emphasize the fact that this timeframe had never been achieved before with other disarmament issues. Case in point is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 3 September 1992 after 12 years of negotiations.

open up a new process under Canadian leadership with only a few. He informed the Secretary-General of the Security Council and selected CSOs, but not the US or the pro-ban nations. Could it be said that there was a lack of transparency? Or was it just a decision to stop potential pre-emptive counter proposals? It was certainly daring in more than one way.

During the other phases of the Ottawa Process, Axworthy supported new innovative diplomatic processes. He advocated the sharing of responsibility with pro-ban nations to prepare the draft treaty, to host regional negotiation meetings, and to host the negotiations of the treaty. He worked to maintain the support for the ban inside the political and parliamentary systems. He remained available to his departmental staff and to the international organizations of the ICRC and ICBL. He was the core of the project throughout. We find coherence in values, choices, and actions—but then we come to the Oslo incident.

At that moment, he chose to step in and ask for a 24-hour intercession to consult with the US regarding their concerns. Why take this risk? He shares that he really believed then that the US could change their position and that it was hence a risk worth taking. I contend that this decision was the mark of an astute politician. He completed his graduate studies in the US in 1961. While there, he was immersed in civil rights demonstrations, anti-war protests and other morally grounded issues. He was therefore more aware perhaps than most Canadians of the potential of the US to decide to support of the ban.\footnote{Axworthy attended Princeton University (Ibid., 32).} The US had been a prime leader in the late stages of the emergence of the treaty, through Senator Leahy, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), the ICBL, and through its president, Bill Clinton. Some recognition was due for that
courageous first step. In addition, Canada is intimately connected to the economic, military, and social networks of the US. There were current and future affairs to be negotiated, both during and after the negotiations of the Ottawa Process. In that reality of ongoing and numerous bonds with the US, an offer of reaching out makes sense for Axworthy, for Canada, and for the global community.

**Exterior and Collective – How Lloyd Axworthy Defines the IR Context**

Defining international relationships with a focus on human security helps to identify the elements that formed Axworthy’s imagination and choice of actions. The concept of human security changes the priorities, from those of self-interest to those of common interest. Supporting and becoming a spokesperson for the concept of human security is politically daring as it also exchanges a realist perspective for one of collaboration. It creates a new form of governance in IR social systems by openly creating the space to criticize the notion of defining global security solely in military terms. Axworthy shares:

> While simple in concept, in some ways [human security] was revolutionary, since it set the notion of human rights against deeply held precepts of national rights [...] a way of seeing the world and tackling global issues that derived from serving individual human needs, not just those of nation-state or powerful private economic interests. This is not through some form of all-powerful, centralized world government. Rather, it is a form of global governance that operates under global rules, works through global institutions and will require a form of global democratic politics to make decisions. It seeks to transcend particular interests for a common good. This new outlook has to date mostly been applied to achieving security from violence. (Ibid., 5)

Although there are other innovative elements in Axworthy’s unusual willingness and ability to put into practice the concept of global collaboration, I find his stance on participative democracy especially interesting, since it promises to expand the potential of other partnerships and the various processes that support them. He shares that his
understanding of shared power was learned during his time studying in the US. He remembers:

At times the [anti-Vietnam] protest movements were truly anarchic, but they also began to rewrite the ground rules of democracy, since they stood for the ideal that democracy could be enhanced through the sharing of power. Participatory democracy was more than a slogan; it was a model of how ordinary citizens could be directly involved in decisions that affect them. (Ibid., 32)

Taking this concept of participative democracy to the global level requires additional motivators and processes. Axworthy reflects on this question:

We have inherent strengths as a people of wealth and talent who have forged a community of interests, express a humane set of values, know the struggle to assert and maintain a sense of independence and understand the benefits of working in collegial fashion […] I believed Canada was the ‘value-added nation’ in the international system—Canadians can help carve out a global system of security based on protecting individual, social, political and economic rights. (Ibid., 5–6)

From the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe to the present-day veto-wielding Security Council, the great powers have always occupied a place of privilege in international affairs. In the case of land mines, the one instrument we [although not clearly identified, the “we” could be the middle countries] had on hand to execute a ban—the UN Conference on Disarmament—also happened to be the campaign’s most stubborn barrier. The only way to move beyond the “lowest common denominator” approach was to walk a different path […] That walk began with citizens’ groups. They were the ones who eventually yanked politicians and officials out of their comfortable chairs and forced them into stride. Focusing on the humanitarian impact of what had hitherto been strictly seen as a disarmament issue helped give the campaign the emotional force that it needed. And this was done by the power of people working in a global network. (Ibid., 155)

In other words, emotional force can counteract military might. Is this the clue to the success of this exemplar in leading the way in the Ottawa Process? I believe it is a necessary part of it, but not a sufficient one. The mapping of the four quadrants allows for the identification of a coherence between values and morals, political ideologies, the search for facts and actions as expressions of these values and morals. I venture that
Axworthy’s identification of internationalism as part of Canada’s heritage and identity, following in the footsteps of Pearson and Trudeau, was also strongly influential within the Canadian House of Commons and Senate. Unquestionably, the events in Uganda and meeting the children affected by AP mines were also critical in prompting his actions. With his strong reputation as a solid politician, Axworthy was in a position to express his values and morals through his actions throughout the Ottawa Process.

This reflection also leads to the question of what kept the pro-ban nations together. If Pearson was an inspiration for Axworthy, then the path of the former’s thoughts and actions through the peacekeeping approach might be worth further study. After all, peacekeeping was laid down and adopted as a global norm in the field of security during the Cold War as a collaborative alternative to the exclusive protection of national social, political, and economic rights. This approach was an alternative to viewing wars as being only of local and limited concern. The two major powers of the time, the US and the Soviet Union, favoured non-intervention, but other nations felt that an end to wars had to be negotiated.221

This mapping across the quadrants of the IA theory allows the situating of morals, ideologies, worldviews, and actions to address, in part, the complexity of the cascade process for an exemplar. It may also provide the basis for action in future cascade phases of global norms.

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221 While the focus of this research is not on peacekeeping, it is however worth mentioning that the pro-ban nations were also strong peacekeeping nations.
8.2.3. Dynamics of Norm Leaders in the Cascade Phase

There is a difference between being a bureaucrat and being a public servant. Being a public servant means that you’re looking out for the public good, and have the best possible public policy. A bureaucrat means that you’re processing pieces of paper. I was lucky to live through a special period.

Excerpt from an interview with a government representative

The cascade phase starts with self. The self is situated in the internal and individual quadrant of the IA theory. This quadrant allows for the understanding of the transformation of self. I view the dynamics of change to become a follower of a norm in a sequence. First, I have to trust myself. I have to find the alignment between my values and this new idea presented to me as the right thing to do. I need to accept hearing or reading about this proposed idea. I need to investigate the impacts of this new idea and maybe even explore what my positive or negative emotions with regard to it may be. If the idea sits well with my own framework, I can trust myself to move forward, including sharing my decision or alignment with my collective

In the exterior and individual, I might be the one to bring the new idea to my group for endorsement. If I have this role, my involvement in the cascade process is more cumbersome than if my group had already endorsed the idea and was waiting for my alignment and maybe my participation. If I’m the norm entrepreneur, I’m the founder of the emergence process for my group. My role is to present the idea in such a way as to achieve an endorsement of it. I might need to reframe the issue in such a way that the impact of the idea will be seen to support the collective identity and objectives. My success will depend on presenting the right level of information, the right level of credibility, the right level of informed risk, and the right level of emotion—these will all influence the positioning of the new idea among the ideas already sanctioned or those in
competition for endorsement. The level of trust the collective has in me might influence the speed at which the idea introduced by me will be accepted.

A cascade scenario would, for me as norm leader, begin by my convincing myself to become a spokesperson for the proposed norm. Then, I would aim at creating relationships and founding a partnership. The collective quadrants show what would be the construction of trust between me and my collective, trust between “you” and me, and trust between my collective and “yours.”

Each agent can be seen as a point of entry or node in the web. Each node carries the potential to create a relation to another person. Each new person brought into a relation can choose to mimic the connector, becoming one themselves. Instead of being a finite point in the web, a new node creates new outreach opportunities. Each node is an incubator for a sub-cascade process, as illustrated in Figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1 demonstrates in part some of the sub-cascade phenomenon observed during the Ottawa Process. For example, in the figure above country Y could represent
South Africa, which became a strong supporter of the ban and through, in part, the leadership of Jacob Selebi, South Africa’s Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, convinced the rest of Africa to join the ban movement.

The emergence of an exemplar and connectors would hopefully build the reciprocal trust needed to achieve the shared intent. A lack of trust would mean that potential support of a norm leader or partnership would not materialize, nor would the potential self-transformation the process could result in. It would instead lead to stagnation (as represented in figure 8.2.a) or regression (as shown in figure 8.2.b.).

However, a lack of trust is not the only factor that can create stagnation and regression; personal fear, a blurring of identities, and a blurring of ROEs within the partnership could create the same phenomenon, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Stagnation and regression could also be caused by one party being suspected of using the new norm as leverage for personal gain, the divulging of a non-desired status (such as of a non-aligned nation), or demonstrating the priority of another alliance (such as being a P5 or a NATO member).

![Figure 8.2.a – Stagnation Movement in the Cascade Process](image-url)
During the Ottawa Process, Russia, China, and Cuba never moved from the position characterized by figure 8.2.a. However, no nation that officially endorsed the ban retracted their support, as seen in figure 8.2.b.

Each connector becomes a node in the web of connectors and I suggest that each node should also be viewed as a space for dialogue to understand the dynamics of a movement towards the completion of the cascade process. Each space nurtures the potential for relationships and the achievement of a shared intent. Each space is created to ensure a safe environment where the future partner defines safety, by implicitly agreeing to participate. Whether a space feels secure depends on the quality of the communication, the listening abilities, and the emotional environment. For example, in the space created by the Canadian coalition, consisting of the Canadian government and MAC, the actors each brought something, information or action, that was needed by the partnering side.

A potential partner is subjected to many pressures for compliance with a new norm, as presented by figure 8.3. The pressure points create a zone of discomfort that can result either in status quo or a change towards compliance. The pressure can be exerted
by designated groups of citizens, national and transnational organizations, and political representatives or by other countries. However, there is also the possibility of an internal mimetic process in which the national leader can decide to act, in imitation of other national leaders, notwithstanding the volume of external pressures.

The complexities of the cascade process are considered next, by looking more closely at the leadership and partnership lessons of the Ottawa Process.

8.3. Leadership and Partnership in the Cascade – Lessons

The need for the building and maintenance of trust for successful norm partnership has, as discussed in Chapter 4, been recognized as essential. Shared leadership appears to be one of the building blocks to trust. Karen and Henry Kimsey-House define five different types of leader: Leader Within, Leader in Front, Leader Behind, Leader Beside, and Leader in the Field. They emphasize the need for collaboration, adding the prefix “co-active” in front of each type of leader. Their typology is used in the following section as an analytic framework through which to
evaluate shared leadership as a cascade element within the IA and mimetic theories and within the Ottawa Process.

8.3.1. Co-Active Leadership under the IA and Mimetic Analysis

How is shared leadership defined? It could be defined as partners combining their various skills, experience, tools, and materials to complement one another. However, my observation of the organic evolution of the partnership of the Canadian coalition and the partnership of the pro-ban nations suggests a dynamic process, a synergy, beyond this simplistic definition.

Part of the effectiveness of the less visible aspects of the five typologies of co-leadership is the mimetic modeling in which the object of desire is a supra ordinate goal. The consistancy of maintaining this as an object, rather than the prestige of narrow self-interest has an impact as others mimetically desire the same object which is achieved by everyone at the same time. By supporting others, mimetically others will eventually support you.

Therefore, the various typologies of co-active leadership are worth further analysis by means of the IA and mimetic theories.

8.3.1.1. Co-Active Leadership and the IA Theory

These typologies are thought provoking when identified with the quadrants of the IA theory. In my understanding, they would be mapped as in figure 8.4.
In the Upper Left (UL) quadrant, signifying the individual and interior aspect, I have placed *Co-Active Leaders Within*. It signifies reflection, subjectivity, and is where a leader seeks alignment with new concepts and proposals. In defining the typology, Kimsey-House share that by being within, “we are able to claim authorship of our own life and live with integrity according to our own internal compass, guided by our purpose and values. This self-acceptance and self-authority are the co and active in the Co-Active Leaders Within” (2015, 21). It is the field where a leader is able to renew or revisit their
integrity when faced with new internal and external challenges. It is where norm entrepreneurship begins.

I locate the *Co-Active Leader in the Field* in the Upper Right (UR) quadrant, which signified the individual and exterior. This is a field of connection between the individual and the outside world, involving a sense of awareness of one’s surroundings and interactions. It is a field where the impact of one’s action in a relationship is validated.

In the exterior quadrants of the Upper Right (UR) and Lower Right (LR), I situate the *Co-Active Leaders in Front* since these are the fields of social interactions and social structures. While many of the actions of the Ottawa Process were represented mainly through elected representatives or other established leaders, some individuals like Jody Williams in ICBL and Cornelio Sommaruga in IRCR successfully claimed that space. Within the Canadian coalition, Valérie Warmington, Celina Tuttle, and Ken Epps can also be considered co-active leaders in front.

I situate both *Co-Active Leaders Beside* and *Co-Active Leaders Behind* in the collective fields of the LL and LR because these fields can act as a space for dialogue. Kimsey-House propose that:

> Co-Active Leaders Behind are both the glue that holds everyone together (co) and the ones who provide the resources needed for things to go well (active). Co-Active Leaders Behind give themselves fully to the joy of participation and love, nourishing the brilliance in others because they know this adds to the goodness and the wholeness for all [...] they generate an inspirational sense of everyone working together [...] Co-Active Leaders Behind also take responsibility for whom they are following and why. They do not follow blindly. Instead, they are willing to face the risks of challenging and asking questions to keep Leaders in Front in touch with and in tune with the vision. (2010, 45–47)

When the two people step fully into Co-Active Leader Beside, they model a relationship that is human and authentic. This creates permission for others to do
the same, fostering an environment of connection and aliveness rather than one of isolation and fear. We also discovered that this dimension of Co-Active Leader Beside creates a deep sense of belonging for all […] In Co-Active Leader Beside, it’s important that both people remain grounded in Leader Within. Otherwise there is a risk of codependency or becoming so blended with the other person that we lose our sense of self and our own authentic voice. (Ibid., 62)

The authors define the relationship under *Co-Active Leadership Beside* in terms of a “designed alliance” (Ibid., 63). It is a close-knit relationship, based on a shared vision of outcome, where the roles and responsibilities are clearly arranged. I contend that it is the model for the norm partnerships developed during the Ottawa Process.

The IA theory allows for a deconstructed understanding of the dynamics of shared leadership. It acknowledges a continuous movement between the quadrants and as such provides an insight into the development of the cascade phase, which is far from being static as any one action has the ability to create either stagnation, regression or a step forward.

8.3.1.2. *Co-Active Leadership and Mimetic Theory*

The typologies are also interesting when deconstructed under the premises of mimesis and the concept of the exemplar. The exemplar could be aligned with the Co-Active Leader in Front. Kimsey-House shares:

Great Co-Active Leaders in Front engage others in a way that is exciting and inspiring and act for the betterment and development of the people they are leading […] The *co* of Co-Active Leaders in Front is about connection, engagement, and inclusion. […] people will be able to engage and trust if they have been able to contribute through conversation and disagreement. The best way for a Co-Active Leader in Front to generate connection and engagement is through dynamic and generative conversation. (2015, 32–33)

The essential activities of the connectors are indeed connection, engagement, and inclusion. As connectors encourage the construction of partnerships, they also build the foundations for trust. Through their example of active listening and contributing
information and resources, they help establish a partnership based on good faith. If these contributions are in alignment with the expressed needs of the new partners, discussion of the organizational needs and the required action plan can start. The desired end is confirmed as shared and the partnership starts forming.

Co-leadership styles are successful because they are based on relational rather than transactional processes. A co-leader in any of the mentioned typologies can entice and encourage the members’ teams and partners to move forward even in the face of opposition. In a context of co-leadership, the partnership becomes successful through its ability to allow the expertise and resources of the most able and willing partner to be brought forward in a timely manner to support the implementation of the required activities for the achievement of the shared goal.

The objects of mimetic desire for these leaders are: first, the mine ban, a superordinate goal and, second, the enhanced capacity of other actors in the network of partnerships. In so far as they are willing to share or altogether forswear credit for what is accomplished, thereby avoiding making recognition and credit the basis of rivalries, they renounce acquisitive mimetic desire.222 However, this positioning has not been identified by the interviewees and even with a more in-depth questionnaire, it is doubtful that this mimetic dynamic could be known by the individual; albeit an emotional norm leader with a higher consciousness may intuitively know the negative effects of rivalry and therefore choose to avoid them in a new partnership.

Redekop shares that “mimetic structures of violence each have their own mythos. They develop over time just like the plot of a story. Not only are the structures imitative of one another, the people caught up in these structures are mimetic of one another, as René Girard used the term. They are mimetic in relation to desires, satisfiers of identity needs, and other dimensions of interiority. They also imitate each other’s violent attitudes, rhetoric, and behavior” (2002, 161). However, Axworthy as the exemplar in the Ottawa Process focused on a team approach transforming the mimetic structure of rivalry to a partnership.
8.3.2. Co-Active Leadership and the Ottawa Process

During the Ottawa Process, these five typologies were, at different times and places, represented by all its parties. Individuals and nations were using different styles of co-leadership for different events and projects. It is interesting to note that Canada also chose a different style of leadership during the four selected events of the Ottawa Process.

Canada\textsuperscript{223} was very much a \textit{Co-Active Leader in Front} on the global level during the announcement of the challenge in Ottawa in October 1996. However, first Canada had to be \textit{Co-Active Leaders Within} because it had first to clarify its willingness to be represented by a coalition of government and civil society representatives.\textsuperscript{224} In this case, each of these two groups had to evaluate its values and alignment to the objective of the potential Ottawa Process.\textsuperscript{225} Once that step had been confirmed and the risks evaluated, Canada was ready to provide the vision and the co-leadership required to spark the imagination and provide the initial resources for the cascade phase. Canada was not a domineering leader, a characteristic still associated today with great leadership in business and political endeavours. Instead, Canada set about constructing a partnership, a campaign and its support networks.

Canada was also a \textit{Co-Active Leader in the Field}. This type of leadership is not often mentioned in business or management literature, as it requires an element of inner knowledge.

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\textsuperscript{223} The term “Canada” is used here as the perceived and official position of this nation as represented by the official members of the Canadian coalition.

\textsuperscript{224} I view that each individual member of the Canadian team was a \textit{Co-Active Leader Within} and as such I’m translating what is a subjective, intra-individual level to an intra-national (treating the nation as an individual).

\textsuperscript{225} Although it has to be noted that Axworthy did not consult with MAC about the announcement in October 1996.
Kimsey-House share:

The *active of Co-Active Leader in the Field is about taking actions based on the insight that our intuition offers us without the security of evidentiary proof or agreement from the external world. Letting go of the security of what is commonly understood requires a big leap of faith and willingness to fall. We must have faith that there is something valuable in what our instinct and our intuition offer us beyond what we can define or explain. When we choose the dimension of Co-Active Leader in the Field, our actions are innovative and fresh because they are not bound by past information or evidence. (2015, 80)

Indeed, without the security of the external world, and even as an open challenge to the ongoing CCW process, Minister Axworthy announced the start of the Ottawa Process. It was an informed decision taken in full awareness of the risks involved, as identified by the staff of the IDA section. It was a decision for which essential agreements had been obtained from the Canadian prime minister, from Jody Williams of ICBL, and from Cornelio Sommaruga of ICRC. It can still be considered a giant leap of faith, in light of and despite the IR context, but proved to be fruitful for the innovation necessary to cascade the new norm. The Ottawa Process introduced a number of innovations, including the provision of a negotiating space outside of the UN, the concept of self-identification for participants to the development of the treaty and in the inclusion of CSOs as participants, in providing information and acting as observers to the negotiations.

For the second selected event of the Ottawa Process, the development of the draft treaty, Austria acted in the role of the *Co-Active Leader in Front*, while Canada’s role moved into that of *Co-Active Leader Behind, Co-Active Leader Beside* and *Co-Active Leader in the Field*. After the announcement of the Ottawa Process challenge, Canada was the first nation to establish a governmental campaign, using its network of ambassadors and its membership of various economic, military, and social alliances. In
so doing, Canada was designing a deployment campaign that could be repeated by other nations once they self-designated as pro-ban nations. Canada can therefore be said to have been in a **Co-Active Leader Beside** role in relationship to this hypothetical new pro-ban nation. As Kimsey-House share:

> Co-Active Leader Beside is a true partnership, with both people being fully responsible for every part of the initiative. Co-Active Leaders Behind take responsibility for their world by creating their partnership around a shared vision and intention and supporting each other’s strength to generate a powerful synergy in which the whole is much greater than the sum of the parts. Co-Active Leader Behind is like a masterful dance with both parties in 100 percent and each very sensitive to the direction of the other. (2015, 60)

Canada was also a **Co-Active Leader Behind** in supporting the co-leadership of Austria during the development of the treaty. This role is not to be treated lightly as leaders need followers and in this case, Austria needed the initial leader to stand firmly behind them, as a demonstration of trust and legitimacy. This was a knowing and deliberate move by Canada. Canada had, prior to the Ottawa Process, chosen to participate in the pro-ban coalition during the CCW convention in Geneva\(^2\) and knew that it did not have the resources or the power base to lead the entire cascade process. As Canada dedicated its resources to the building of the campaign, it chose to rely on Austria for the treaty development phase. Kimsey-House propose that,

> Co-Active Leaders Behind are both the glue that holds everyone together (co) and the ones who provide the resources needed for things to go well (active). Co-Active Leaders Behind give themselves fully to the joy of participation and love, nourishing the brilliance in others because they know this adds to the goodness and the wholeness for all. (2015, 46–47)

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\(^2\) Lawson et al. share: “The origins of the core group could be traced to the small group of countries that agreed to meet with the ICBL and ICRC to muse about a ban on the margins of the CCW process in early 1996 – Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland.” (1998, 166)
In the third event of the cascade process, the negotiation of the final treaty, Norway hosted the negotiations while Jacob Seleni from South Africa was the individual lead for the process, so both can be identified as *Co-Active Leaders in Front*. However, for the duration of the extended 24 hours, Canada was again the *Co-Active Leader in Front*. The treaty had been negotiated in record time and there was time to spare, so Lloyd Axworthy decided to request a stand-still in order to open negotiations with the USA. When the 24 hours were up, Canada moved aside again and let Norway conclude the proceedings. In the periods both leading to and following this event, Canada continued to co-lead, alternately adopting the leading styles of *Co-Active Leader Behind*, *Co-Active Leader Beside* and *Co-Active Leader in the Field*.

Lastly, as the host for the signatures confirming the legitimacy of the Ottawa Process in December 1997, Canada was again a *Co-Active Leader in Front*. Canada was active in offering guidance and transport to signatory nations, and generally in providing for the logistics of the conference. Wanting to take advantage of the momentum created by the Ottawa Process to have the treaty rapidly accepted under the auspices of the UN and to have it start demonstrating its success in the field, Canada also developed an action plan to operationalize the norm.

Two government representatives shared their thoughts on Canada’s leadership:

What made us so massively successful was so classically Canadian. And we were very self-effacing. Canada drove this process, we created the process, we funded the process, and we did the whole thing. If any other country had done this, you would have known it. But we were so wonderfully focused on the outcome, and so, I mean there was no ego in it; there was no profile in it. We had a minister that wasn’t seeking that ego.

[The MBT] was almost made for Canada. Because once you took the big powers out […] Who’s next? And that’s an environment where Canada really shines.
We’re seen as non-partisan amongst the nations and straight talkers, highly ethical and diplomatic. I can see now, it was irresistible.

The interviews confirmed that the core group coordinated the agreements of the leader in the Front with the other pro-ban nations willing to actively participate in the main activities of the Ottawa Process. However, the agreements around the types of co-leadership were not formulated pragmatically, but were observed as part of the deconstruction of the concept of shared leadership. The five typologies of co-leadership offer a good framework with which to analyse the shared leadership undertaken by the pro-ban nations during the four selected key events of the Ottawa Process, and contribute to the understanding of elements of the cascade process.

8.3.3. Dynamics of Leadership and Partnership in the Cascade Phase

The characteristics of norm leaders in supporting their mission of rallying nations and CSOs towards a proposed norm were explored in Chapter 3. The selected characteristics are a combination of competences including, to name a few, imagination, courage, emotional availability, adaptability, and credibility. All these competences would likely not be required to cascade all organizational norms, therefore I would recommend they be considered a tool bag for norm leaders, particularly for global norms affecting national economic and military interests.

The five main characteristics of norm partnership — of shared goal, trust, shared leadership, shared risks, and ROEs—were reviewed in Chapter 7. Two different types of contexts set a very different process in the approval of a new norm. There are partnerships formed on an upfront agreed-upon shared and known goal or on a directed intent to terminate a conflict with a view to bring the conflicting parties to collaborate on the development of win-win options. However, both scenarios require the work of
connectors and exemplars to cascade the norm. The main difference lies in the volume of work required to accept, develop, and fulfill a shared win-win vision.

Possible dilemmas for both norm leadership and norm partnership include the blurring of identities, the emotion of fear, and the blurring of the ROEs, which as seen in figure 8.1. can lead to stagnation or to a backward movement in the cascade process.

8.4. Additions to Finnemore and Sikkink’s Norm Lifecycle Process

The multi-level cascading sub-groups were analyzed to find the seeds of catalyst in the elements of leadership and partnership, in both national and civil society representatives, that support the propulsion of the cascade internationally.

Finnemore and Sikkink argue that “changes at each stage […] is characterized by different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence” (1998, 895). However, the analysis of the Ottawa Process has identified some level of new emergence of agents and ideas within the cascade process and some cascade process to support the entrepreneur at the emergence level. The process is less linear and more complicated than first presented and could best be described as overlapping, as illustrated in figure 8.5.
Figure 8.5 shows a cascade process with different starts for the individuals or nations involved. Each nation had first to go through the emergence process. For some nations, such as the pro-ban nations in the Ottawa Process, the cascade process had started before Axworthy’s October 1996 declaration, while for other nations, their cascade process may not have begun until the development of the treaty, or the Oslo conference, or even mere days before the December 1997 deadline. Having set a time limit (from October 1996 to December 1997) for the cascade period studied can be an additional challenge to understanding the process properly.

A factor in the cascade process is the constitutive elements of the proposed norm. In the Ottawa Process, the proposed treaty included a series of constitutive elements such as the production, stockpiling, use, and clearance of land mines, and support to victims. Each of these elements required its own cascade process. Each nation had to agree to each element prior to signing the treaty in December 1997. However, it must be noted that definitions were still being negotiated in September 1997, including the description...
of a landmine. Whereas some pro-nations never vacillated in their support, other nations struggled with one or more constitutive elements, thereby increasing the complexity of the decision-making process.

Figure 8.6 allows reflection on the impact of each constitutive element as a sub-cascade of the larger phase. For example, the US led a process of emergence by passing domestic legislation declaring a one-year moratorium on the export of AP mines in 1992. This action by a major nation created a sense of possibility and optimism. France sought a review conference of the CCW in 1993. The government of Sweden voted for a total ban in 1994 and pressured CCW for an amendment to the AP protocol. In the US, VVAF supported the creation of the ICBL movement and sponsored the leadership position held by Jody Williams. Axworthy didn’t consult the US on the eve of the October ’96 announcement and the launching of the Ottawa Process. The US participated as an observer at all the meetings of the Ottawa Process. However, the US did not agree to the content of the treaty as proposed in Oslo. While the first sub-action by the US may have
propelled others to action, it was not sufficient in the end for the US to become a pro-ban supporter.

The concept of the positive loop helps us understand the virtuous cycle of the CCW, whereas it is easier to understand that some initial conditions such as the consensus-based rule supported a context of status quo. A failed cascade attempt as a positive loop with no changes during the cascade phase for a norm is demonstrated in figure 8.7.

![Figure 8.7 – Failed Cascade](image)

Upon review of the initial conditions of partnership during the CCW conference, one notes that the magnitude of serious injuries and lost lives caused by AP mines created difficulty towards achieving either a consensus or the flexibility required to respond to the human emergency. Figure 8.7 illustrates the lack of changes in the initial conditions, rules and relations in relation to the purpose of the CCW conference lead to a lack of movement. This situation is in contrast with the important innovations of the initial conditions of the Ottawa Process.

Major actions were required to cascade the MBT. Analysing them one at a time allows for the identification of distinct objectives that were essential in the success of the Ottawa Process. They represented sub-cascades within the main cascade process that established foundational priorities while building on early success to encourage a
movement forward. Major activities of the cascade of the Ottawa Process are illustrated in figure 8.8.

In conclusion, this chapter was set to expand the knowledge gained from the Ottawa Process and its lessons learned from norm leaders and characteristics of leadership and partnership to enlarge on Finnemore and Sikkink’s lifecycle norm model, mainly the cascade and its tipping point. The latter turned out to be more complex than it would seem at face value; this is illustrated by the following excerpt from an interview with a government representative:

If you were to then deconstruct what were the tipping points at a national level, and some countries, say the UK, it had nothing to do with the norm, it had to do with winning an election.
The tipping point of the cascade phase remains a key element to a successful unfolding of the cascading of a norm. However, defining the requirements of a tipping point is as complex as the variables that make up the issue, the parties, the length of time and strength of the feedback loop, the creation of a safe space for dialogue, and the emergence of exemplars. My observations have led me to consider the December 1997 event as the confirmed tipping point and the start point of the operationalization of the norm.

Norm leaders socialize nations, national and transnational organizations, and colleagues to become followers and/or leaders of their proposed norm. The Ottawa Process has allowed for the identification of two roles for the norm leaders that are essential to a successful cascade: as connectors and as exemplars. Each norm leader is a node in a mini-cascade process. The volume of mini-cascades—of nations joining the pro-ban partnership—creates the tipping point that moves the proposed norm into the operationalization phase. However, there are other mini-cascades of relations and processes, such as those related to various campaign activities and those related to the constitutive elements of the new norm that must also follow.

Co-active leadership makes these mini-cascades more likely as it contributes to the establishment of trust, making more likely the successful joint planning and implementation of the various activities of the campaign as well as the agreement on the content of the norm.

The deconstruction of the roles of the norm leaders within a context of leadership and partnership has provided for some level of understanding of the complexities of the cascade process. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that this analysis of four specific
events in one case study can only offer a limited insight into the intricate challenges of a successful cascade.
Chapter 9. Conclusion

Resolution is not about political compromise, it’s about going to the very heart of any given conflict and looking for transformation rather than accommodation. Resolution of any conflict calls for the ability to be deeply receptive to the other party. [...] It requires deep training in non-polarized thinking so that respect and understanding are never compromised by strong differences of opinion. Resolution, on this higher level, is charged with imaginative engagement.


As this last chapter surveys the major lessons learned and validates the research hypothesis, it also supports the essence of O’Dea’s process of resolution, as its primary focus is on the transformation of the norm leader and their willingness to connect with another party to reach a shared goal. O’Dea, an activist and former director of the Washington DC office of Amnesty International, shares above that resolution is an accommodation process requiring a deep reception of the other, something which requires training in non-polarized thinking and an imaginative engagement. The landmines crisis was an issue requiring imagination since the traditional UN disarmament approaches had proved ineffective in addressing the ongoing loss of limbs and lives of non-combatants long after the armed conflicts were concluded. Instead, the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) was working on a compromise, which was creating barriers to the possibility of a complete ban.

The idea of a complete ban first arose during the emergence phase of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were the first to insist on a full and complete ban and were, therefore, the MBT’s first norm entrepreneurs. On Axworthy’s announcement of the launch of the Ottawa Process, the MBT moved into the cascade phase of its lifecycle.
The two parts of my hypothesis are that: 1) the mapping of the norm leader’s role will allow for a richer understanding of the complexity of the cascade process of global norms; and that 2) the integral approach and mimetic theory will, in a combined framework, enable the capture of the leadership and partnership qualities that lead to a successful cascade process.

This conclusion reviews information on the complexities of self-transformation, the conditions in which the type of leadership capable of generating partnerships and imaginative and supporting imaginative processes can flourish, which, in turn, can generate series of mini-cascades. The review of the progressive accumulation of such independent cascades leads to an understanding of the complexity involved in the successful cascading of a global normative change.

The chapter closes by reviewing other applications of the research methodology and by offering recommendations for its improvement.

9.1. Summary of Observations

Chapter 1 considered the complexity of conflict resolution in global affairs, particularly in the field of security and investigated the dynamics behind a normative change. The research’s emphasis is principally on the leadership and partnership aspects of the negotiation process between nations and civil society organizations (CSOs). Its prime focus is on the initiator, the norm leader, proposing a new way of being and behaving towards one another. Theories on the norm lifecycle and mimetism were brought together with the integral approach (IA) in order to create a tool with which to map the relationships and processes of the norm cascade process. This integrated mapping tool turned out to be as useful as hoped to target the cascade phase allowing a
research across four quadrants of transformation of self and collective identities to identify the dynamics at play in the art of convincing followers to adopt a new norm.

In first addressing the second hypothesis, the research starts with the review of the selected theoretical frameworks to identify their advantages, shortcomings and complementarities to support the building of the exploratory integrated mapping tool. Therefore, chapter 2 introduced the theoretical frameworks and the mapping tool. The three theoretical frameworks used to build this new integrated mapping tool were Finnemore and Sikkink’s lifecycle model of norms, Wilber’s integral approach as used by McGuigan and Popp, and Girard’s mimetic theory as defined by Palaver and Duyndam. The norm lifecycle theory is composed of three sequential phases: emergence, cascade, and operationalization. This thesis focused on the cascade phase, which included the process of negotiations between nations. A cascade happens as a result of a tipping point being reached, creating the first catalyst for success.

The Integral Approach (IA) allowed for the combination of subjective and objective, or interior and exterior, fields of research with those of the individual and the collective, and as such provided four quadrants of locational agency. These quadrants permitted the systematic capture and analysis of data in a way that deconstructed the complexity of the situation. The IA theory provided ways to understand the actors and organizations involved while enabling the mapping of their thoughts and actions. Although rich in many respects, the IA framework needed to be complemented with mimetic theory to provide more depth of insight into the dynamics of leadership and partnership of the norm entrepreneurs.
The mimetic theory is based on Girard’s observation that individuals imitate the desires of each other, and through the triangle of desire, this imitation leads to rivalries and violent conflicts. Mimesis can also be a catalyst for a positive replication as expressed through Duyndam’s concept of “exemplar.”

The objective of the integrated mapping tool was to identify the key elements that contributed to the tipping point sequence of a norm’s approval stage. The Mine Ban Treaty was chosen as a case study to analyze with this mapping tool. This was done through a documentation of the sequence of events and a qualitative interview process of the key Canadian actors with an open-ended questions that were based on the mapping tool.

The case study is meant to illustrate and validate the whole enquiry, namely what was the nature of the emergence and cascade phases of a global norm change. This particularly case study was chosen because of the level of transparency of the thoughts and actions of selected norm leaders of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

In Chapter 3, an exposé of the historical context of the MBT helped define the elements that led to its emergence as a global norm, and identified the challenges of some foundational constraints as the norm moved into its cascade phase. These major constraints were identified in order to provide an appreciation of the steps taken to overcome them, including the establishment of new relationships. The key issues, challenges, and proposed solutions were examined through the actions of its norm entrepreneurs and the relationships among them. The major actors, representatives of the Canadian government (political, military and diplomatic) and of Canadian civil society,
were introduced to show the layering and interconnectivity of their respective and collaborative roles, thoughts, and actions.

The cascading phase of the Ottawa Process began, in my view, with Axworthy’s challenge in October 1996 and came to an end with the signatures of 122 countries in December 1997. I chose four major events during the process that highlighted the key objectives and challenges, namely the 1996 Ottawa conference, the drafting of the convention by Austria, the preliminary negotiations in Oslo, and the 1997 Ottawa conference. Capturing the processes and relations that arose during and as a result of these four events was key to forming an idea of the essential leadership and partnership dynamics of the cascade process.

The methodology was careful constructed to validate my hypothesis. Chapter 4 presented the research methods, which were inductive and exploratory and structured around selected indicators to ensure its containment. Key indicators selected from the four IA quadrants formed the basis for the review of documents and the development of the questionnaire. The identified leadership characteristics and the process elements enabling efficient partnerships and successful outcomes were presented. Each question thus addressed the indicators while exploring the hidden dynamics of mimetism, expressed through leadership and partnership actions, and uncovering the elements of the cascade dynamics. The twelve interviews that followed provided a wealth of information, including the identification of two dynamics that warranted additional study.

The emerging trends of the research were captured in a literature review that focused on the qualities of leadership and partnership. The dynamics of self-transformation and of partnership building were deconstructed to capture the
Chapter 5 explored these two major thematic findings, namely the personal and collective transformation of norm entrepreneurs and the building of norm partnerships. The transformation of self-identity and the construction of a collective identity were examined by considering the nature and role of emotions in the dynamics of transformation of the norm entrepreneur, and the norm entrepreneur’s rallying of followers. The building of relations between the various organizations creating and sustaining norm partnership was reviewed, including the concept of co-leadership and its critical requirement of trust. Trust, where present, helped form the necessary condition to ground and sustain a given relation. The elements of trust were evaluated in the contexts of selected partnerships.

Chapter 6 introduced the integral and mimetic analysis of the cascade of the MBT leadership with a focus on the unfolding process of leadership. The chapter first reviewed the characteristics of organizational leadership. Three characteristics have been identified as foundational for the success of organizational norm leaders; they are strong political leadership, the ability to keep the momentum going during the first emergence phase, and the ability to manage risk.

The indicators of leadership supporting the maintenance of momentum of the Ottawa Process and, hence, the cascading of the new norm were reviewed. The Ottawa Process included many new imaginative engagements as demonstrated through intentional leadership, reaching out to new partnerships, sharing leadership, innovating new space outside of the UN disarmament forum, reframing discourse, and developing new ways of doing business. The indicators of the self’s readiness and willingness for intentional leadership were analyzed and found to be those associated with the capacity
for inner knowing, adaptability, and a higher level of consciousness. The drive behind the first stage of the cascade, when many elements were still in the emergence phase, was a norm leader in possession of attributes such as courage, audacity, power, dedication, and passion. Authenticity and the ability to provide emotional leadership were also found to be imperative, as were credibility, skills, expertise, and strength. However, the single most important characteristic proved to be the capacity to connect and share with others.

Chapter 7 presented the integral and mimetic analysis of the cascade of the MBT partnership and analysed the Canadian coalition’s many multi-layered partnerships. The partnerships were analysed with a view to distinguish the similarities and differences of the complexities and worldviews of each party, and to evaluate their respective challenges throughout the cascade phase. The issue of trust was assessed against the background of what happened at the Oslo conference—a request by Canada to pause the negotiations for 24 hours—that put key relationships to the test. Major characteristics for successful norm partnership were identified, as were the challenges to norm partnership—the blurring of the collective identity, the blurring of the rules of engagement, and the management of emotions. The concept of co-leadership and its role in the dynamics of the cascade process was also examined.

These leadership and partnership characteristics, collated and applied to the Ottawa Process, were used to verify alignment with the dynamics of self-transformation and partnership building.

And now we turn to the first part of my hypothesis—on the inevitable complexity of a norm cascade process. Major findings on cascading were traced in Chapter 8, having arisen from the analysis of the norm leader’s norms and partnerships. The roles of the
exemplar and the connectors and the concept of co-leadership were reviewed to better appreciate roles and responsibilities, self-assigned or directed, throughout the period of the cascade phase. Additions to Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm lifecycle model were provided, in the form of eight additional sketches. These eight graphics identified: 1) the dynamics of sub-cascade phenomena; 2) stagnation and backward movement in the cascade process; 3) the pressures of compliance; 4) a map of the five co-active leadership typologies within the IA quadrants; 5) the overlap of phases of norm lifecycle during the Ottawa Process; 6) the various cascades of constitutive elements in the Ottawa Process; 7) a failed cascade process; and, finally, 8) the cascade of major activities of the Ottawa Process.

9.2. Hypothesis under Study

Once more, the hypotheses under study were that: 1) the mapping of the norm leader’s role will allow for a richer understanding of the complexity of the cascade process of global norms; and 2) the integral approach and mimetic theory will, in a combined framework, enable the capture of the leadership and partnership qualities that lead to a successful cascade process.

I anticipated that building on the integral approach and mimetic theories would allow for the capture of important variables that would expand the understanding of leadership and partnership, and how these affected the mutual acceptance of a new norm.

The research validated that the mapping of the norm leader’s role, as connector or exemplar, providing a richer understanding of the complexity of the cascading process of global norms. The first IA quadrant—representing the interior and the individual—was analyzed with a view to understanding how the self is predisposed to consider a
normative change. The transition to an emotional engagement was emphasized to identify the role of emotions in actions, including that of intentional leadership. The focus on emotions centered on questioning the self, and the mini-cascade of the self that results in the readiness and willingness required for action. Then, the three remaining IA quadrants were reviewed to capture the dynamics of collectives in the launching, support, and maintenance of a normative change through the construction of collective identity, once more with a particular focus on the role of emotions.

Connectors must first hold legitimacy inside their organizations if they are to act as sustainable links to others. The type of leadership and the demonstration of morals of the connector must be congruent with the organizational norms, values, codes, structures, and processes.

I have identified two types of connectors and have labeled them “peripheral” and “deep” connectors. I determined the difference between the two to lie in the physical and emotional/mental distance between the connector and the other. Whereas the physical distance is measured through the frequency of contacts and transactions, in terms of transfer of resources and knowledge, with the other’s organization, the emotional/mental distance is evaluated through the quality of the established relation in terms of the personal investment that the connector is willing to bring to the relationship.

Peripheral connectors support the process aspect of the relation, establish the foundation for communication, and enable the sharing of resources and knowledge, critical for the development of the relationship. However, they do not necessarily invest in the quality or depth of the relationship. Deep connecting on the other hand is linked to the relational quality, through the quality of the listening and the level of caring as
demonstrated by the willingness to come together, to be affected by the other. This openness is the key to moving together towards the shared goal. The quality of the connection achieved is determined by the personal investment of the connector in their institution, their capacity to meet the demands of the potential new partner, and the equal willingness and readiness of the latter to get involved in the proposed partnership. Such connectors are the enablers of the cascade process.

My analysis identified two distinct roles for the norm entrepreneur acting as a connector: connector-resources and connector-recruiters. The connector-resources convey information, equipment, tools, funding, and personnel to support the planning and implementation of actions. The connector-recruiters have the role of finding national norm entrepreneurs from within each nation, either from the government or from a civil society group, or better, as in the case of the Ottawa Process, from both sides. Each connector becomes a recruiter dedicated to starting the intra-national cascades required for a global norm to actualize. In my view, the difference between the two types of connector lies in their respective capacity for feeling and showing the emotional support required to entice and support a potential norm follower or to support a partner into a new partnership. A norm entrepreneur with a low threshold of trust may carry more fear of being co-opted than someone with a higher level of trust.

Duyndam (2014) defines an exemplar as someone who demonstrates their morals through their actions, and through it proves inspirational to others. In the context of a normative change, where the connectors becomes the *porteurs* of the project, they are exemplars. This research further defines the exemplar as a moral agent with courage, perseverance, a sense of justice, and/or generosity. An exemplar must show these traits
not only in their discourse but, most importantly, in their actions. An exemplar can only be recognized through demonstrations of moral actions. In a norm-building context, this requirement would entail others speaking of the exemplar’s specific leadership qualities and actions in order to establish and maintain partnerships. These same actions would have to be identified as catalysts for another agent’s action in support of the cascade process, thereby affecting a change or the evolution of a normative process.

This research confirms that the exemplars in the Ottawa Process were the inspiration for the interviewees to act as connectors by first becoming the official sponsors of the shared intent, by nurturing a series of innovations required in terms of process and relations, by becoming co-creators in an action-based program within which everyone was an actor, and finally by providing an overall sense of hope towards the attainment of the ultimate objective.

The leadership role of connectors and exemplars is essential in building and sustaining partnership. Each connection carries in itself the possibility of a mini-cascade. The overall cascade at the global level is based on the creation of hundreds, if not thousands, of mini-cascades to create the tipping point required for the cascade phase to be completed.

In addition, the analysis validates the second hypothesis, namely that the heuristic use of the integral approach and mimetic theories to create a new mapping tool has generated significant new insights into several important aspects of cascading norms—not least the aspects of leadership and partnership required to propel a norm from concept to binding agreement.
A review of the elements constituting a partnership, through comparative analysis with global and business partnerships, foregrounded the role of trust. Trust was deconstructed in the context of the relationship between the representatives of government and CSOs and in function of its impact on success. The maintenance of trust provided an essential feeling of security, but also acted as a demonstration of the interpersonal skills that would build foundations strong enough to counter both internal and external challenges to the identity of the newly formed collective.

The IA was in itself a partnership tool because it allowed an inclusive search of the multiple dimensions of individual, collective and objective and subjective fields through the joining of quadrants, i.e. for thinking in terms of unity versus division. In this research, this potential proved essential in understanding the role of norm entrepreneur as a connector.

McGuigan and Popp’s concept of dance (2016) is a good metaphor through which to understand the transformation of the negotiations. This concept supports the understanding of the cascade as an ongoing evolutionary “dance” between groups of people, in which the dance transforms the people, who in turn collectively transform the dance. The dance itself becomes the process by which a shared intent to solve a problem is created. As described in Chapter 5, the dance can be initiated either with the purpose of building rules of engagement (ROEs) in order to gain the trust necessary to agree upon a shared intent, or, when an agreed-upon shared intent already exists, to build the ROEs to achieve their objectives. In the MBT, the dance was set in motion to achieve a ban, the desirability of which had already been agreed upon at the start of the cascade.
Karen and Henry Kimsey-House’s (2010) typologies of co-active leadership supported the understanding of shared leadership within the context of shared intent. Their five different types of leader comprise: Leader Within, Leader in Front, Leader Behind, Leader Beside, and Leader in the Field. They emphasize the need for collaboration, adding the prefix “co-active” in front of each type of leader. Their typology was used as an analytic framework to evaluate elements of the shared leadership between the pro-ban nations. These co-leadership styles were indeed present during the Ottawa Process and that they proved successful primarily on relational processes, and secondarily on transactional processes. In a context of co-leadership, the partnership becomes successful through its ability to allow the expertise and resources of the most able and willing partner to be brought forward in a timely manner to support the implementation of the required activities for the achievement of the shared goal.

However, the Ottawa Process is only one of many global norm-building processes and the results of this research should not be generalized without further in-depth investigations. Numerous choices had to be made to contain the extent of the elements under study. Therefore, the findings of this research can only be viewed as a partial understanding of the dynamics at play in the cascade process of a global norm.

The combination of the three theoretical frameworks of the IA, mimetism, and norm lifecycle models has allowed for the construction of an integrated map providing the means to select indicators within a manageable field of research. The integral approach and mimetic analysis of the cascade phase of MBT has allowed the identification of triggers, actions, and innovation in processes as they related to the relational and procedural elements of leadership and partnership.
This research used simple dedicated questions, unlike the integral approach used in McGuigan and Popp’s *Integral Conflict* (2016). They chose to interview their participants with tools developed with the explicit purpose of gaining insight into their level of consciousness, their worldview, style of leadership, observed rules of behaviour, and positioning. My choice of questions arising from within each quadrant provided a certain limited amount of information on each individual participant’s perceptions of roles; more targeted investigation is recommended.

On the other hand, the elements of the mimetism, although subtle, were present everywhere, being implicated even in my ability to build trust during the interviews. The ability to build and sustain trust between partners is essential for the maintenance of a relationship. However, so is the ability to convince others. A certain degree of self-knowledge is necessary to acknowledge the role of mimetism in one’s interactions; otherwise it necessitates a knowledgeable observer to identify its constitutive elements. This observation suggests opportunities for future research with the aim of improving the identified shortcomings.

9.3. Recommendations for Future Research

This research opens a small window of understanding of the leadership and partnership of selected Canadian norm leaders involved in the Ottawa Process. However, many questions on the success elements of the overall lifecycle of the MBT remain. Why was so much global effort required to achieve something that today seems so self-evidently good? Are other integral and mimetic analyses possible for understanding the cascades of other global norms? The questions lead in part to the following five thematic proposals for future applications of this type of normative analysis.
9.3.1. The Integrated Mapping Tool

I anticipate that similar applications of the integrated mapping tool would identify both enhancers of and barriers to the progression of other cascade processes on the individual level, including the quality of an individual’s leadership and the type of partnerships entered into. The first quadrant helps us to evaluate the starting point of exemplars and connectors, and assess their capacity to foster trust and provide emotional leadership.

Although this research was looking at the positive elements of leadership and partnership in the norm leader to support the positive cascade of a new norm, the integrated map can also aid in the understanding of the thoughts and actions of an opposition leader or opposition collective, and analyze their impacts on the process. The two collective quadrants of the integrated map could contribute to the understanding of group dynamics, equally when searching for enhancers or barriers to the pursuit of a shared intent.

While this research focuses on the field of global governance with an emphasis on security issues, the integrated mapping tool offers the possibility of capturing the same dynamics of leadership and partnership in private or public governance, and the resolution of political, organizational, moral, ethical, and philosophical issues affecting any two or more organizations in conflict.

9.3.2. The MBT as a Case Study

I contend that further study of the MBT could deepen the understanding of the dynamics of global negotiations. The MBT exemplifies a successful and rather quick global normative change in the security field. Therefore, one could argue that it avoided
issues of systemic barriers. However, although this research focuses on the positive aspects of the leadership and partnership of the Ottawa Process, there was nonetheless an undercurrent of opposition during the emergence and cascading phases. One proof of this conflict is the volume of effort and substantial cost still required in 2018 to continue the work of demining alone. The MBT is a good case study to research the positive aspects of leadership and partnerships; however, it can also offer the possibility to investigate the undercurrents that blocked the CCW proceedings.

This thesis centered on the Canadian norm leaders involved in bringing the MBT to a successful conclusion. It would be interesting to compare their actions with those of norm entrepreneurs in other pro-ban nations, to identify similarities and exceptions, particularly cultural identifiers if any. There were numerous events not mentioned in this research such as the regional meeting organized in Maputo, which would likely offer a series of clues on regional partnerships and successful campaign management in diverse cultural environments.

Much also remains to be learned about the emergence process. For example, Lawson (2002) focused on the essential need to reframe the landmine issue as an issue of human security rather than military security. As a result of this change of discourse, emergence norm leaders were able to reach out to a larger public across national divisions. This reframing was one of the catalysts of the cascade phase. Various dynamics of transformation and collective identity were likely at play and could be further investigated.

Similarly, much can be learned from the operationalization phase, as defined by Rostek (2010). In the case of the Ottawa Process, this final phase of the norm lifecycle
started prior to the signing of the treaty as many of the norm entrepreneurs were developing an action plan prior to the December 1997 signatory conference. Various dynamics must take place in national governance in order for the norm to be firmly established; this presents opportunities for further research into better pre-positioning the success of the three phases in the norm lifecycle.

Other aspects surrounding the MBT that could be considered for additional research are the impacts of the landmines, including a detailed enquiry into who the perpetrators and victims were, and the reasoning behind and consequence of identifying a landmine ban as a social and humanitarian cause.

Finally, the constitutive components of the creation of a new space for dialogue where reframing of the issue was possible, and the series of innovative processes can be investigated and compared with those of existing and evolving global norms in order to improve their chances of successful operationalization.

9.3.3. The Cascade Process

Some dynamics of cascade have been uncovered, although incomplete; a refined questionnaire around leadership and partnership could explore them in more depth. Various social fields have room for contribution. On the level of the individual, one could be asked to review life situations where the same outcomes kept repeating. For example, a series of failed personal relationships could lead to the recognition of attracting emotionally non-available partners and to the acknowledgement for inner work to create new personal possibilities. Similarly, this recognition can support all partnerships in terms of understanding personal fear to connections, reaching out to others and the deeper wounds affecting the individual’s capacity to foster trust. As a result, educational
programs could be designed to better cater to the empowerment of connectors as a field of self-development.

Chapter 8 opens with a quote from Finnemore and Sikkink on the three pragmatic reasons to agree to a new proposed norm: the pressure for conformity, the desire for international legitimation, and state leaders’ self-esteem. It would be interesting to identify other reasons, or look at how these same three reasons can potentially also be considered as deterrents for some nations, such as Russia, China, and the US, all three nations that have yet to ratify the MBT convention.

The lenses chosen to investigate the leadership and partnership of the Ottawa Process have coherently favoured the positive dynamics. However, one must remain aware of the barriers to the evolution and progress of the cascade process. I identified the military industrial complex as a counterforce to contend with, without giving it much space in this research. Other research projects could examine the extent of opposition to the MBT and support for the maintenance of the status quo regarding landmines. In a similar fashion, the lessons from this potential research could lead to greater understanding of the extent of influence the mining industry has on global norms, as the effect this has on indigenous rights e.g., and in the conflict between transnational corporations and environmental organizations. The idea would not be to identify these forces as “enemies” because that would just sow further division. As we saw in the analysis of the connectors for the Ottawa Process, it is easier to achieve results by creating common ground and developing a shared intent among all players if possible.
Finally, it could yield a better definition of the tipping point, and as such it could be a useful tool for investigating the dynamics of cascade once a goal is perceived as being close at hand.

9.3.4. Connectors and Exemplars

It would be interesting to discover if the same dynamics—of the transformation of self in the norm entrepreneur, and of the co-leadership in building partnerships—were present in other pro-ban nations. The evaluation of the leadership and partnership-building skills of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize recipient Jody Williams could aid in the identification of the particulars of the partnerships dynamics required for a transnational organization to successfully construct and sustain a shared intent.

Any research to understand the strength of character of the political exemplar would be useful in at least two ways. First, CSOs in the field of political advocacy could start using this information to mobilize support from the nation’s population leading up to elections to better equip their nation to work in collaboration. Second, it could act as a training manual for individuals aspiring to bring positive changes in global affairs.

These proposed research initiatives can all be executed at different levels for the identification of the cascade process of public or organisational policies and projects. Researching the dynamics of individual characteristics, of trust, and of the expression of emotional leadership in the participants involved in the adoption process of a new norm can inform a dialogue for its operationalization.²²⁷

²²⁷ It is often a surprise to participants to find out that their personal behaviour is what is stopping the success of their organizations. In Immunity to Change (2009) the stories are all about personal behaviours acting as barriers. In a similar fashion, barriers to trust and emotional leadership to reach out to “new” partners should support public, private, social, and business organizations alike.
9.3.5. Building Relationships

This research on the Ottawa Process identified an evolution of various partnerships\textsuperscript{228}, however, in-depth research into the dynamics behind this evolution was not embarked upon. I would suggest the following two angles for further investigation: first, the exploration of the type of context that encourages the emergence of partnerships, and second, the identification of the types, severity, and number of obstacles impeding the construction or sustainment of these partnerships.

The challenges to successful partnerships were identified in this thesis as the blurring of the collective identity, the blurring of the rules of engagement, and the management of negative emotions. Additional research in these sub-fields would allow for a deeper understanding of other potential dynamics or tools. One possible conclusion could be the essential of reframing collective identities as part of the shared intent over and beyond national interests.

These proposed research topics would all add to the understanding of the successes and pitfalls of cascade processes, and hopefully, in their applied extension, to the successful negotiation of future global norms in the hope that these would make the world a better place for all.

9.4. Final Notes

In the quote at the beginning of this thesis, McGuigan and Popp challenge us to find the source of conflict by searching within. My research similarly finds that normative change can be traced to the thoughts and actions of the norm leader. The

\textsuperscript{228} I wish to emphasize the fact once more that many of these partnerships were in themselves a significant and ground breaking emergence as it was a first for many nations to have members of CSOs working in close partnership with government leaders and bureaucrats.
leadership and partnerships initiated by the government and CSO norm leaders proved useful foci in understanding the cascade process of global norms. The cascade process is all about conflict resolution. There is no resolution of conflict without norm leadership – bold, imaginative, and self-aware. There can be no norm partnership without passionate (emotionally) conscious leadership, a shared desire to resolve the conflict, and a sense of a shared identity.

Could the Ottawa Process be repeated in 2018? Leadership and partnership are essential for the cascade effect, but conflicting ideologies and resources are mighty forces. The events of 9/11 have affected the state of global security. Communications and social media tools are considered better than in 1997 now that one has instant and free access to a number of news platforms online and can therefore more easily form an opinion based on a variety of sources than one could earlier. However, the media remains polarized according to the political ideology of their owners and unbiased factual commentaries are often lacking in the mainstream media. The wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine have destabilized world security and have forced a division among the nations of the UN Security Council. The climate change challenge puts added pressure on the relation between the North and South, creating other divisions. In addition, there has been an erosion of the credibility of “experts” making factual information an amenity that the public is now wary of. A divided global civil society with limited resources and national support can only do so much.

The possibilities of partnerships between government agencies and CSOs are seen with guarded optimism; they could create an alignment with a potential to broker a power balance between the major and developing countries and between the transnational
corporations whose interests are often different than those of the national citizens. The complexity of the cascade of global norms has identified the requirement for the establishment of relation-building processes that would support, as a primary key to success, the unity of purpose towards a shared intent under the leadership of a political exemplar and connectors from both national and CSO organizations.

To situate this in relation to a realist position, which reduces everything to self-interest and power, I show that key aspects of the human condition involve trust and collaboration. If these truly are part of reality, it is more “realistic” to include them than to pretend they are not real. Just as the MBT leaders needed to be “idealistic” in bringing an ethical vision with which to challenge the prevailing realist outlook of many agents, I needed to espouse an ethical vision and an idealistic attitude in everything from my choice of case study to my choice of theories in order to be able to focus on the possibilities of change, or growth, and to show how a much-needed sense of hope can be reintegrated into IR. The integral approach allowed me to deliberately focus on the interior aspects of human experience, where these aspects are found. An examination of how some people took daring risks for the sake of unknown third parties, is better explained through a framework that validates the commitment to norms, which emphasize human well-being and harm reduction, than one that reduces everything to Darwinian, or political realism’s, self-interest.

I close on an optimistic note by referring to O’Dea’s aspiration for an imaginative engagement of both national and civil society organizations in setting goals for the management of global affairs, with a priority given to humanity and its security. In doing so, intentional leaders, future political exemplars and connectors, in their role as global
norm leaders could find means to co-share the platform of negotiations in inspiring shared intents. I remain hopeful that in the future emotional leadership of the players on the world scene will one day soon be up to the task of managing the complexity of the global problems. Citizens can use their political agency to choose these future game changers, and also use their private resources to fund the CSOs so that these are able to work towards fulfilling their aspirations for the world. According to Worldometer, the world stood at 7,595,107,555 people at 2h15pm in Ottawa on January 15, 2018, and once these billions become empowered to think globally, they will hopefully influence and equip the global governance systems and through the choice of its norms to become more effective in agreeing and implementing a more sustainable and just world.

List of Annexes

Annex A: Chronology of Mines Ban Treaty
Annex B: Acronyms
Annex C: McGuigan and Popp’s Integral Conflict—Additional Information
Annex D: List of Interviewees
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http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/
Annex A: Chronology of Case Study—Mine Ban Treaty

Major Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sep 1991</td>
<td>Publication of “The Coward’s War: Landmines in Cambodia” by HRW and PHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nov 1991</td>
<td>VVAF, Medico International Frankfurt launch joint campaign for advocacy for NGOs to work towards a ban on APMs</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>May 1992</td>
<td>Handicap International, MAG and PHR launch campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oct 1992</td>
<td>The above organizations met in New York to coordinate campaign effort, and to co-sponsor first NGO Conference on Landmines in London, in 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dec 1992</td>
<td>EU Parliament passes resolution on APMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td>First NGO Conference on Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dec 1993</td>
<td>UN General Assembly adopts a resolution calling for a review of the 1980 CCW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>Second NGO Conference on Landmines in Geneva attended by 100 representatives from over 75 NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>Vatican Council for Justice and Peace calls for a ban on APMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sep 1994</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General submits his first report on mine clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sep 1994</td>
<td>President Clinton addresses the UN; calls for “eventual elimination” of APMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jan 1996</td>
<td>Canada announces a moratorium on production, use and trade in APMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Oct 1996</td>
<td>Ottawa Conference: 75 governments meet to discuss the fast-track process to eliminate APMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Feb 1997</td>
<td>Fourth NGO Conference on Landmines in Maputo, Mozambique, held with 450 participants from 60 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Oct 1997</td>
<td>Nobel Prize was awarded jointly to the ICBL and global coordinator, Jody Williams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dec 1997</td>
<td>122 states sign the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>June 1998</td>
<td>Landmine monitor established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mar 1999</td>
<td>Mine Ban Treaty Enters Into Force; deposited with the Secretary-General of the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Apr 1999</td>
<td>135 states signed the UN treaty; 72 ratified, 50 Entered Into Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>United States Government to undertake a review of its current non-participation in the Ottawa Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex B: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Anti-personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>Anti-personnel mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Anti-tank mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Integral Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Non-proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Division, inside the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDD</td>
<td>International Security Bureau, inside the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIMP</td>
<td>Joint, Inter-Agency, Multinational and Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHR</td>
<td>Physicians for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine Action Canada/Mine Action Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>Mine Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Permanent Members of UN Security Council with veto rights: US, Russia, China, France and England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>Positive Feedback Loop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMI</td>
<td>Project Management Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMP</td>
<td>Project Management Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROEs</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVAF</td>
<td>Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex C: McGuigan and Popp’s Integral Conflict—Additional Information

Here are some selected references providing McGuigan and Popp’s perspective of the role assigned to each quadrant from *Integral Conflict: The New Science of Conflict* (2016).

**Figure C1 – The Left and Right Quadrants of Interior and Exterior**

The two left-hand quadrants represent the *invisible interior, subjective*, qualitative dimensions of the experience of conflict. These aspects can be understood only through introspection and interpretation. Interior aspects of conflict include cultural values, myths, and beliefs. They also include each individual’s sense of identity and their understanding of conflict (p.63). The two left-hand quadrants also represent qualitative theories that focus on the data uncovered through introspection, such as phenomenology and introspection theory, hermeneutics and collaborative inquiry (p.66).

The two right-hand quadrants ... represent those aspects of experience that relate to the *exterior, objective* processes of conflict...These aspects of experience are observable and easily corroborated by others (p.63). The right-hand dimension of AQAL attends to the external observable behaviours and systems of the individual and the group (p.67).
Figure C3 – The Four Quadrants and Their Focus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Upper Left (UL)—Individual and Interior MIND</th>
<th>Upper Right (UR)—Individual and Exterior CULTURE—social interactions, mediation and behavioural interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the Upper-Left quadrant (UL) we use constructive developmental theory and phenomenology to guide us in understanding individuals’ internal experience and meaning-construction. (Ibid., 66)</td>
<td>In the Upper-Right quadrant we look for neurology, cognitive behavioural psychology, behaviourism, and game theory to shed light on individual behaviours. (Ibid., 66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Left (LL)—Collective and Interior STATE LEVEL—worldview</th>
<th>Lower Right (LR)—Collective and Exterior INTER- STATE LEVEL—social structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Lower-Left quadrant represents the intersubjective space or cultural space that unites two or more people as they share information (feelings, concerns, thoughts, values, ideas, etc.) through talking, in order to better understand one another’s inner experience. (Ibid., 66)</td>
<td>The Lower-Right quadrant shows the systems within which individuals act: the structure of their government; the laws of their society, and the rules of negotiation and engagement. (Ibid., 67) The Lower-Right quadrant attends to the systems and structures within which individuals and groups act and interact: the structure of governments; the laws of society, and the rules of negotiation and engagement. (Ibid., 201)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *individual* interior universe holds all the thoughts, feelings, ideas, images, memories, values, and meaning in the privacy of our own minds in every moment of our experience. In this interior universe our sense of self, our identity, is both felt and constructed (p.100).

The *collective* interior universe holds all the thoughts, feelings, ideas, images, memories, values, and meaning that we share in our collective mind in every moment of our collective experience. In this collective interior universe our sense as a people, our collective identity, our “we-ness”, is both felt and constructed. (p.100).
It is interesting to note that McGuigan and Popp share the following on the role of norms in society:

Formal rules and informal norms are the external expression (LR) of the beliefs and values (LL) that guide an organization’s operation. Every group creates its own norms, whether implicitly or explicitly, and norms can be dysfunctional as well as constructive. Norms are also ends in themselves—they become social standards or goals that we align our actions or behaviour to. They tell us how to behave as good members of our group. (Ibid., 213)

In addition, it must be noted that the quadrants presented under the integral conflict approach have been the fruit of development from previous works involving McGuigan such as we can read in McGuigan and McMechan’s *Integral Conflict Analysis: A Comprehensive Quadrant Analysis of an Organizational Conflict* (2005) and in McGuigan’s *Shadows, Conflict, and the Mediator* (2009).
Annex D: List of Interviewees

The list of Canadian official actors:

a. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

b. Jill Sinclair, IDA, Department of Foreign Affairs,

c. Mark Gwozdecky, IDA, Department of Foreign Affairs,

d. Robert Lawson, IDA, Department of Foreign Affairs,

e. Jean Boyle, Chief of the Defence Staff, and

f. Ed Fitch, Military Engineer.

The list of CSOs’ actors:

a. Valerie Warmington, Mine Action Canada,

b. Celina Tuttle, Mine Action Canada,

c. Robin Collins, United Nations Association of Canada,

d. Ken Epps, Project Ploughshares, Canada,

e. Debbie Grisdale, Physicians for Global Survival, Canada, and

f. Ben DeLong, Lawyers with Social Responsibility
Annex E: Questionnaire

**Interviewees**
Designated leaders acting on behalf of Canada and Civil society representatives acting on behalf of their organizations, during the period from the announcement made by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy that the treaty would be signed to the day of the signature, i.e. the year between the announcement at the Ottawa Conference in October 1996 to the signatures in December 1997.

**Expected duration of each interview:** 1.5 -2 hours

**Questions**

1. **Personal role**

1.1. What was your title, mandate and key objective(s) with regard to the project of the Landmine Ban Treaty? *(UR Quadrant)*

1.2. What did you find significant about your role? *(UR Quadrant)*

1.3. What type of training did you have as a mediator, facilitator or negotiator prior to your involvement in this process? If so, please provide details *(UR Quadrant)*

1.4. Who were the negotiators working for you, how many people and what were their main areas of responsibility? *(LR quadrant)*

1.5. What were your one or two personal biggest keys to success? *(UR Quadrant)*

1.6. What sort of regrets if any, could you share? *(UL quadrant)*

1.7. What sort of personal conflicts on the process, if any, could you share? *(UR Quadrant)*

1.8. Were there, for you personally, important issues of social justice and/or morals? *(LL quadrant)*

1.9. Were there personal changes in your identity, culture or values during the period of the Ottawa Process? *(LL quadrant)*

2. **Leadership**

2.1. What do you feel you and your team were able to accomplish with regard to the project of the Landmine Treaty? *(UL quadrant)*
2.2. The Mine Ban Treaty stands as a ‘Beacon of Light’ in global norms for its rapidity and its effectiveness even without the alignment of all major powers – can you speak of the Leadership required to achieve this success? (LR Quadrant)

2.3 As an actor in the Ottawa Process, what were your leadership style and personal challenges? (UL quadrant)

2.4. Can you speak of your biggest inspiration? (UL quadrant)

3. Partnership

3.1. Who were your most significant allies nationally and internationally? (LR Quadrant)

3.2. Could you share your personal experience of the partnership between the politicians, bureaucrats and representatives from the civil societies? (UL quadrant)

3.3. How would you define this relationship over the period of October 1996 to December 1997? (LR Quadrant)

3.4. As a collective, how were the meetings among peers and within partnerships to discuss the project? (LR Quadrant)

3.5. What sort of strategies were available to influence and rally other states to the project? (LR Quadrant)

3.6. To date three major countries have yet to sign the treaty. In 1996, what sort of conflict resolution strategies were developed to rally them? (LR Quadrant)

4. Closing questions

4.1. What sort of recommendations do you have for additional contacts with former colleague(s) as part of this research?

4.2. What questions or requests do you have for the next steps of this research?

4.3. Do you have any overall reflections on how and why “norm cascading” worked as effectively as it did in this case? What for you are transferable lessons learned that could be applied to other cases? Is there anything that could have been done to get the major powers, which did not sign the Treaty, on board?

4.4. What else would you wish to share at this stage?

4.5. [For Minister Loyd Axworthy] Why set a deadline for approval?
Notes:
1. Information in color is added to locate the quadrant. They were not provided to the interviewees.
2. Although the questions were presently located within a quadrant, some of answers overlapped into other dimensions and quadrants.

Quadrants

1. Individual and Interior – UL – Culture and social justice – Qualitative interpretation, meaning-making and values
2. Individual and Exterior – UR – Mind - How individual interact with each other
3. Collective and Interior – LL – Individual social interactions, mediation and behavioural interactions
4. Collective and Exterior – LR – Social structures and collective social interactions
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