Am I My Brother’s Peacekeeper?:
Strategic Cultures and Change among Major Troop Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping

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List of Abbreviations

ANSF – Afghan National Security Force
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BJP - Baharatiya Janata Party
CAF – Canadian Armed Forces
CDS – Chief of Defence Staff
CDFS – Canada First Defence Strategy
CMC – Central Military Committee
CPC – Communist Party of China
DFS – Department of Field Support
DND – Department of National Defence
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo
FPU – Formed Police Unit
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
IFOR – Implementation Forces
ISAF – International Stabilization Assistance Force
LoC – Line of Control
LAC – Line of Actual Control
MEA – Ministry of External Affairs
MINUSMA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUC – United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MilObs – Military Observers
MoD – Indian Ministry of Defence
NAM – Non-Aligned Movement
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PFK – Indian Peace-Keeping Force
PKO – peacekeeping operation
PLA – People’s Liberation Army
PLN – People’s Liberation Navy
PRC – People’s Republic of China
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SHIRBRIG – Standby High Readiness Brigade
PSO – peace support operation
TCC – Troop Contributing Country
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNDOF – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF – United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP – UNISOM – United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNISOM II – United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNMIH – United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMISS – United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMOGIP - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UNTAC – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US – United States
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Abstract

With 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations currently deploying almost 100,000 troops, United Nations peacekeeping is the largest single source of multilateral military intervention in conflict zones. Because UN peacekeeping is entirely dependent on voluntary contributions from Member States, there a pressing need to better understand why nations contribute peacekeeping troops in the first place. Individual national rationales for peacekeeping contribution vary significantly, and incentives may include regional hegemonic aspirations, positive economic benefits from peacekeeping, desiring a seat at the Security Council, or a combination of any number of incentives. This has made it difficult to provide a generalized explanation about why states provide peacekeepers. This thesis proposes a model for understanding the peacekeeping contribution issue under the lens of strategic culture. The strategic culture approach focuses on elite beliefs about the objectives of the use of force, with national factors such as geography, history, domestic politics, and bureaucracy forming into cohesive and competing norms about the purpose of the military. Drawing on the fourth generation of strategic culture literature, this dissertation argues that strategic culture serves as an intermediary variable that can be measured by discourse analysis to help understand changes in specific strategic behaviour, such as military peacekeeping contributions. By understanding the dynamic way that a country views the use of force – in short, by understanding how a country views its military as being useful in achieving policy goals -- we work towards a better understanding of why a country may contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping.
Introduction: Why do States Peacekeep?

United Nations peacekeeping is currently the largest single source of multilateral intervention. With 15 current operations worldwide and almost 100,000 troops deployed under the UN flag, peacekeeping is one of the most prominent modern instances of the use of military force.¹ Yet the UN itself has no standing army, and relies entirely on the voluntary contributions of 127 Member States to maintain its operations. This approach to troop deployments – unique in the international system – has led to complex operational dynamics and a number of apparent contradictions in the field of peacekeeping.

For example, at 8,221 uniformed members, the largest current contributor of UN peacekeeping personnel is Ethiopia, a country with a relatively low GDP and the 41st largest military in the world (International Peace Institute, 2017). The largest financial contributor to the regular peacekeeping budget – the United States of America – provides only 48 military peacekeepers to UN missions.² And two of the largest and most consistent troop contributors to UN peacekeeping, India and Pakistan, are mutually hostile neighbours who have engaged in several open conflicts in past decades. Yet under the flag of the United Nations, these two countries have deployed officers and troops side-by-side in numerous peacekeeping operations.

Why do United Nations Member States voluntarily contribute military personnel to Blue Helmet peacekeeping operations? When and where do they choose to provide peacekeepers, if they choose to do so at all? Increasingly, these operations are complex, high-intensity, and often lethal undertakings in some of the most dangerous conflict zones in the world. Yet state military

¹ All troop contribution numbers are drawn from the International Peace Institute’s Providing for Peacekeeping Database, updated as of August 2017.
² While personnel contributions to peacekeeping are voluntary, financial support is mandatory and assessed as part of United Nations membership dues through a complex formula taking into account a country’s GDP, permanent membership in the Security Council, and other factors. According to the latest assessed contributions for the United Nations regular peacekeeping budget, the United States provided 28.47% of the 2016-17 peacekeeping budget (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2016).
contributions to peacekeeping operations are higher than at any point since the founding of the United Nations. Why do states peacekeep, and what factors influence the degree to which they peacekeep?

This dissertation investigates potential connections between the level of peacekeeping troop contributions among three different United Nations Member States and the perspectives on the use of military force that are found in key strategic documents and speeches between 1990 and 2015, a 15-year period from the immediate post-Cold War era to now. The thesis looks at changes in strategic narrative in Canada, China, and India over the last 25 years to see if these changes correlate with changes to the countries’ military peacekeeping contributions. In particular, by categorizing national discourses and statements according to historical strategic subculture, I aim to better understand the relationship between changes in national strategic culture and specific policy decisions involving the use of force – namely, the contribution of peacekeeping troops to UN operations. I define strategic culture here as:

“A distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective (usually a nation) and arise gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences” (Longhurst 2004, 17).

Ultimately, it is asserted that no single rationale can account for why a country contributes militarily to United Nations peacekeeping. Instead, I argue, we should look to a country’s strategic culture as an intermediate variable that helps us understand the multiple factors surrounding the societal view of the international use of force that influence peacekeeping decision-making. The primary contribution of my dissertation is the application of the strategic subculture approach to the understanding of UN peacekeeping. Such an
understanding of why states contribute to modern peacekeeping, at the peril of both the blood and treasure of their citizens.

As a result, the research question that drives this dissertation is as follows: **What is the relationship between long-term changes in national strategic culture and significant changes to the troop contribution levels of Member States to United Nations peacekeeping operations?**

In order to answer this question, 169 strategic documents were analyzed for their normative content across the three country case studies. This analysis focused on “strategic statements” as the core unit – that is, statements that contain national views about the international use of force found within official documents during the time period in question. This thesis will focus on the post-Cold War period of 1990 to 2015, so as to limit the scope of this research to modern, second generation peacekeeping. The distinction between first generation and second generation peacekeeping is important in answering the research question. Rival bloc dynamics between East and West incorporated a significant element of power politics in the calculus of who would provide peacekeepers during the Cold War, as well as influencing the norms that governed the use of force in peacekeeping (Higgins, 1995). The first generation peacekeeping operations generally (though not always) involved contingents of mostly unarmed peacekeepers monitoring pre-established ceasefire lines between two national forces. The second generation (i.e. post-Cold War) peacekeeping increasingly more robust interventions, mandated to use force to protect civilians and working in hostile environments with multiple state and non-state belligerent actors where there is often little peace to keep. This dissertation focuses on peacekeeping contributions after 1990 because post-Cold War peacekeeping represents a distinct type of international intervention and the use of force, separate from traditional, first generation peacekeeping.
Coding strategic statements found in official documents according to a model of strategic culture allowed for changes in these norms to be tracked over time. These were then compared with changes in national peacekeeping policy, as measured by patterns in troop contributions to the UN. Drawing on this analysis, I argue that the model of strategic culture helps us understand why a country might maintain or change a particular policy involving the international use of force over time. More specifically, I argue that national peacekeeping policy is linked to broader trends in how modern countries view their militaries, rather than to a particular incentive to peacekeep (or to not peacekeep). Specific policy decisions such as the decision to send soldiers to a particular UN peacekeeping mission are the product of a huge number of individual decisions and factors that are very difficult for researchers to trace. However, all of these factors and decisions take place in a normative environment that is informed by basic questions: why does our country have a military, and what is that military useful for?

In any country, there are multiple answers to these questions, informed by history, geography, social expectations, external events, among others. This is the context that informs the boundaries within which accepted decisions involving the use of force are made. There are no normatively “right” or “wrong” answers to the question “what is our military useful for?”. Rather, these answers represent different views on what the nation stands for internationally and what role it may play in the future. These views can be grouped into competing policy camps – the strategic subcultures whose ideas about the use of force compete with one another and fight for policy dominance. While these policy camps may line up with politically partisan boundaries, views about the role of force in the world tend to supersede and outlast party platforms.

Among the norms contained within a modern strategic subculture is a defined approach to United Nations peacekeeping. These norms of second generation peacekeeping have been
established by Security Council actions, evolving peacekeeping mandates, and the development of international law over the post-Cold War period. Whereas more isolationist subcultures tend to be antithetical to the peacekeeping approach, as do more expansionistic subcultures. While each national strategic landscape is unique, there is often a subculture whose approach to the international use of force meshes well with the tenets of UN peacekeeping, which I will later specify as the “peacekeeping sweet spot”. Over time, if a subculture that is favourably disposed towards peacekeeping becomes more dominant (i.e. if a subculture is mapped closer to the idealized “peacekeeping sweet spot” of norms), that country is more likely to become involved in peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, if a subculture that is more favourably disposed towards traditional warfare or isolationism becomes more dominant, a country’s troop contributions to UN peacekeeping are likely to decrease.

The primary take-away from the strategic culture approach, when applied to United Nations peacekeeping, is that an understanding of a country’s unique norms surrounding the use of force, rather than any single short-term incentive, is the best means for understanding a particular instance of the use of force such as peacekeeping. These strategic cultures are complex, interconnected, and constantly competing for policy dominance. But they are measurable and tend to persist over time. By applying a model that measures changes in strategic culture and by mapping that model to specific policy changes, the utility of a broad-based, cultural approach to understanding of why countries behave in certain ways becomes evident.

The structure of this dissertation mirrors the research puzzle described and evolved over the course of this dissertation. The initial driving question was: why do countries peacekeep, and why does their military commitment to peacekeeping change drastically over time? This introductory chapter will be devoted to exploring why the decision to contribute to peacekeeping
presents an interesting puzzle and why UN peacekeeping is a particularly interesting case in the use of force to study.

While some existing literature has previously investigated the incentives behind contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, those works have generally focused on individual country studies and specific individual incentives to peacekeep. These studies, however, tended to not be very suitable for cross-national comparison, and provided little insight into why countries, in general, have provided peacekeepers. During my investigation, strategic culture emerged as a broader understanding of incentives and decisions about the use of force which showed itself to be much more compelling in explaining peacekeeping than single-cause explanations. Chapter 2 thus conducts a literature review of two bodies of work; the literature on the incentives behind peacekeeping, and the literature on strategic culture theory.

Chapter 3 explores more recent attempts to operationalize the fourth generation of strategic culture and to adapt and apply the model of strategic culture to the specific case of United Nations methodologically. It also addresses the criteria that were used in the process of case study selection, and shows how the three case countries of Canada, the People’s Republic of China, and India were selected.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 – the three case studies – all follow a similar structure. After an overview of each country’s historical involvement in United Nations peacekeeping and the logistics of their unique policy decision-making process, the national strategic cultural landscape is mapped. Drawing on secondary literature by Comparative Politics experts, the four key strategic subcultures that make up the different approaches to the modern use of military force in each country are identified, and their respective views on UN peacekeeping highlighted. Then, the chronology of the countries’ key strategic documents from 1990 to 2015 is laid out. The
results of the analysis of strategic statements made within these documents are presented and compared to trends in national peacekeeping policy in the post-Cold War period.

The evolution of peacekeeping policy in all three case countries since 2015 is analyzed, with consideration to the possible future of peacekeeping in each of the case countries. The final chapter also explores the implications of this research for the study of peacekeeping, other forms of the use of force, and international relations more generally, suggesting fruitful avenues for further research.

Context

As of 2015, the United Nations was the second-largest deployer of international military force, surpassed only by the United States, and by far the largest international organization deploying force. As traditional interstate warfare has become less and less common, and with NATO on-the-ground footprint in operations such as Afghanistan shrinking to a token number of training staff, UN peace operations – that is, interventions authorized by the United Nations Security Council and operating under the UN flag -- have become the largest source of the international use of force. Indeed, the trend of intrastate conflict and sub-national belligerent actors – as well as increasing Western disillusion with the efficacy of coalition operations -- suggests that the demand for peacekeeping operations will only increase in the coming years. Questions of peacekeeping and why states involve themselves in such operations should therefore be of increasing interest to international relations theorists, who traditionally have been highly interested in questions of military power and state use of force.

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On the face of it, contributing military personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations seems to fly in the face of both national self-interest and traditional international relations theory. Most of the 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations are in regions that are generally considered to have little geopolitical significance – Mali, Haiti, Cyprus, the Central African Republic – yet currently over 100 countries provide almost 100,000 troops combined to
UN peace operations. Unlike the traditional peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era, which primarily consisted of small, unarmed contingents of observers monitoring pre-established ceasefire lines, post-Cold War UN peacekeeping often takes place amidst active conflict, where there is little or no “peace to keep”. As a consequence, the fatality rate among peacekeepers has been climbing steadily, with the annual casualty count in 2010-2016 averaging around 3,000 deaths, compared to around 500 annual deaths in the 1960s and 70s. While some have made the argument that involvement in peacekeeping flows from calculations of material self-interest, it is not readily apparent what might be the direct benefit to China of sending soldiers to Lebanon, or the relative gain to Canada of posting troops to monitor a 60-year-old frozen conflict in Cyprus. These operations are drawn-out, complex affairs that increasingly represent the only substantial overseas military deployments for many countries, yet our understanding of why and when UN Member States contribute men and women to peacekeeping missions remains limited.

From the standpoint of those in the United Nations, the question of motivation is important in the sense that the efficacy of UN operations is dependent in no small part on stable force generation (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 438). Modern peacekeeping operations are chronically stretched thin, with too few peacekeepers faced with demanding mandates and multiple belligerent parties. These peacekeeping operations face all the challenges of NATO-style or coalition enforcement operations, but with one critical difference: the system of voluntary troop contributions mean that at any point a contingent, battalion, or strategic resource could be recalled by their home capital. This critical issue was brought home in the case of Austria’s 2013 decision to abruptly withdrawal of all 380 of its troops because of increased


danger in the Golan Heights region. The loss of the Austrian contingent, which made up more than one third of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), almost derailed the entire operation until rapidly deployed Fijian peacekeepers arrived to fill in the gap (Gowan and Witney 2014). By gaining a better understanding of what motivates UN Member States to send their military men and women to peacekeeping in the first place—be it domestic politics, regional power dynamics, or some other consideration--officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations may be better able to anticipate sudden troop withdrawals and shortages.

From an analytical standpoint, the dynamics of peacekeeping operations make for an interesting case of the use of force by nation states, in large part because the United Nations is relatively transparent in its operations. Most examples of the international use of force, from nuclear defence to counter-terrorism operations to alliance operations, tend to be cloaked under a veil of policy secrecy and classification that is difficult for researchers to penetrate (Meyer 2006, 46). Research projects that are interested in knowing why and how states use force must often limit their insights to publicly available documents, and detailed information about UN peacekeeping is far more accessible than in the cases of other multinational coalitions, NATO operations, etc.

Logistically, the means by which the United Nations acquires troops from various Member States for peacekeeping operations has not changed significantly since the Cold War. While the regular budget for peacekeeping operations is drawn from the general dues of Member States paid to the United Nations as a requirement of membership, the contribution of armed

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6 The formula by which membership dues are calculate for each individual UN Member States is complex, factoring a variety of considerations such as populations size, GDP, and whether the countries are permanent members of the Security Council. The current top five contributors to peacekeeping budget are the United States (28.57%), China
military personnel, unarmed military observers (MilObs), police personnel, civilian staff, and equipment to peacekeeping operations is entirely voluntary. When the Security Council of the United Nations votes to launch a new peacekeeping operation or to expand the mandate of an existing operation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in coordination with the Department of Field Support, will request Member States to supply the troops, personnel, and strategic resources needed to carry out the mandate determined by Security Council. Requests may also be made to fulfill particular gaps that emerge in an existing operation. These requests may be general, and sent out to the delegations of all UN Member States, or they may be specific, asking a particular member to fulfill a particular operational need that the member has expertise in. Given the complexity of modern peacekeeping operations, these specific requests can be for anything from infantry battalions, engineering contingents, medical personnel, attack helicopters, landmine detection equipment, or – most recently – unarmed drone operators.

On the receiving end of these requests are the permanent delegations of each Member State to the United Nations Headquarters in New York. While the process by which each country responds to peacekeeping troops requests varies, these diplomatic delegations generally transmit troop requests – general or specific – to their home capitals, where an assessment is made by a state’s bureaucracy, military or political leadership (or a combination thereof) on whether their country can and should contribute to this operation. National peacekeeping contingents receive


The first unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) to be leased by the United Nations for use in a peacekeeping operations were deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo operation in December of 2013. While individual national contingents had previously brought UAVs into peacekeeping operations as part of their own equipment, this was the first time that the UN itself deployed a surveillance drone.
little by way of training, equipment or preparation from the United Nations prior to deployment, as this is expected to be provided by the Member State (Dorn and Libben 2016). In compensation, the UN provides a base remuneration of US$1,332 per month for each individual armed peacekeeper contributed. It is up to each Member State to determine whether remuneration is paid directly to the soldiers deployed to peacekeeping operation or whether those soldiers receive their usual national wages, with the Member State absorbing the resulting financial loss or gain.

In terms of what troop deployment actually looks like on the ground, in theatre, UN peacekeeping operations are unlike virtually any other military endeavour. While various national contingents are generally kept unified, there is, by necessity, a complex degree of interaction and coordination required between wildly different elements in all peacekeeping operations. Force commanders and staff officers, air support contingents, engineer groups, medical staff, and infantry members are often from widely different – and, in cases like major peacekeeping troop contributors India and Pakistan, mutually hostile – national military backgrounds (Aoi et al.). In addition, UN operations are increasingly “multidimensional’, integrating military components into a larger mission including civilian officials, diplomats, police contingents, and non-governmental organizations.

In the modern context, then, United Nations peacekeeping in many ways appears to be a contradiction of sorts. UN peacekeeping operations are one of the largest sources of the international use of military force, yet they depend entirely on the contributions of United Nations Member States for their finances, personnel, mandates, and leadership. Over 100 of these Member States are directly involved in military operations within UN peacekeeping forces, yet most of these countries have few strategic ties to the conflicts their troops are being sent to. It
is a concept dedicated to peace and conflict prevention, yet peacekeeping fatalities are on the rise. While UN peacekeeping operations are increasingly robust and kinetic, they are not surrounded by the walls secrecy and classification that typically characterize military matters. At all levels, including the chain of command, peacekeeping is an often conflicting mix of national sovereign power and international cooperation.

This introduction has sought to outline the puzzle of peacekeeping – to provide the context for why peacekeeping troop contributions present an interesting case for the study of international relations. Based on this overview of peacekeeping troop contribution dynamics, I will now turn a review of the existing literature on peacekeeping operations to explore prior attempts to explain the question of why Member States contribute armed forces to UN operations, despite these contradictions. This next chapter will also introduce the theory of strategic culture – a theory with its own extensive literature and internal debates – as a possible alternative avenue of explanation.
Chapter 1. Literature Review:

This chapter provides an overview of the literature that is most relevant to understanding peacekeeping troop contribution dynamics. Reviewing this literature allows us to begin to develop a more holistic model in order to understand why states contribute to peacekeeping. Through an overview of the existing research, a crucial element to understanding this puzzle emerges: the question of why Member State commitments to UN operations change over time, and why they change when they do. Previous explanations for why states peacekeep have struggled to address this issue of change, as Member States’ troop contributions have shifted drastically while material, political, and geostrategic variables appear to remain unchanged. Through a focus on change in peacekeeping, the utility of strategic culture theory emerges.

The literature review is divided into two parts. The first section looks at the state of the peacekeeping field in order to explore the contributions and limits of existing explanations of peacekeeping behaviour, suggesting avenues for the development of a new model for analyzing peacekeeping troop contributions. The second section presents strategic culture theory as a promising avenue for establishing such a theoretical model or framework. The strategic culture literature review maps the evolution of the approach over four generations of theorists, briefly examining the ontological and epistemological differences between the four generations. The chapter also discusses why the fourth generation of strategic culture theory provides the best basis for developing a probabilistic model of peacekeeping.
Peacekeeping Literature

*Our survey of the existing literature suggests that previous attempts to theorize why states provide UN peacekeepers are incapable of accounting for the wide variations in state behaviour*

- Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, *Providing Peacekeepers* (2013, p. 17)

In the field of international relations, studies of United Nations peacekeeping have largely focused on how peacekeeping developed, what role it plays in the international system, and whether it is an effective means of conflict resolution. Rather than applying a critical focus to the theoretical aspects of the peacekeeping project, the majority of the peacekeeping literature can be categorized as “problem-solving” (Pugh 2004). These problem-solving works tackle important issues, such as improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations (Gilligan 2003; Moore 1996; Lipson 2007), increasing the number of peacekeepers in the field (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Williams 2007; Holst 1990) or providing a post-mortem analysis of failed missions (Cristiani and Fabiani 2013; Tharoor 1995; Franck 2003). But these works tend to treat UN peacekeeping as an assumed “good” to be improved, and do not focus heavily on the different theoretical lenses that peacekeeping operations can be viewed through.

There are, nevertheless, a number of different schools of thought that see peacekeeping operations as “windows into the larger phenomena of international politics” (Paris 2000, 28). Though there have been some rationalist and neorealist forays into the topic, which focus primarily on the material incentives to peacekeep, the theoretical assumptions neorealists hold necessarily limit the degree to which they see a normative institution like UN peacekeeping as having an impact on the international system (Pugh 2003)). The bulk of the peacekeeping literature that has been written since the end of the Cold War has instead focused on the role of

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9 As an illustration of this, John Mearsheimer, the pillar of offensive realism, argued in 1994 that “Peacekeeping has no role to play in disputes between great powers…. Peacekeeping by the UN or by regional organizations…can enhance prospects for world peace only on the margins” (Mearsheimer 1994, 34–35).
normative incentives in driving countries to peacekeeping, deriving from theories of liberal internationalism, (Andersson 2000, 1-22; Diehl 1988, 485-507; Dorn 2005, 7-32), the constructivist/human security school (Findlay 2002; Tharoor 1995, 52-64; Hultman 2013, 59-73), or public goods theory (Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009, 827-852; Bove and Elia 2011, 699-714; Cornes 1996). Unlike strictly material explanations, these more normative-based approaches provide more room for the impact of institution and ideas to the calculus of state decision-making. Other theories resist clear categorization but fall somewhere between within the spectrum of materialist and normative-based explanations of policy (Bures 2007, 407-436; Paris 1997, 54-89; Lipson 2007, 5-34).

However, it is only recently that the specific dynamics of troop contributions – and more broadly the means by which peace operations are formulated, deployed, and maintained – have become the subject of sustained academic interest.

_Figure 2_

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<th>Power Politics</th>
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Since 2005, there has been an increase in the number of authors interested in troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping, in part due to the increase in UN-led peace operations in the field, as discussed to earlier. These works have tended to be individual case
studies about specific troop contributors, conducted by experts in the comparative politics of those countries. Yet the majority of these case studies contain underlying theoretical assumptions about why member states provide peacekeepers in the first place. The existing literature generally forms a spectrum ranging from those who hold that strict material incentives such as power dynamics, increased access to high-level military training and equipment or direct economic benefits constitute a state’s incentive to peacekeep, to those authors who argue that institutional incentives such as a greater reputation in the international system, public goods, or normative incentives are at the heart of the decision to contribute.

On the materialist end of the literature, Laura Neack provides a rare argument for understanding troop contributions to peacekeeping through a neorealist lens. Looking at the 18 peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1990, Neack argues that Cold War era UN Member States primarily contributed to peacekeeping out of self-interest – specifically, as a means of maintaining the international status quo. Countries such as the United States and Russia are seen as using peacekeeping as a mask for imperialist agendas, while middle powers use peacekeeping as a way of supporting the international systems, since “it is unrealistic to imagine completely revising the world system to better serve their interests” (Neack 1995, 184). A strictly materialist approach to understanding why Member States provide peacekeepers, however, faces significant challenges in explaining post-Cold War peacekeeping, as the East-West divide and the concept of “balancing” between communist and capitalist contributors is no longer a crucial consideration (Andersson 2000, 4). Additionally, a look at the current top contributors to United Nations peacekeeping shows than most of the major peacekeepers -- India, China, Ethiopia, Pakistan – cannot be categorized as powers with a vested interest in maintaining the global status quo.

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The economic answer to “why do countries peacekeep?” points to the fact that many modern peacekeeping contributors are developing world countries that can benefit materially from involvement in peacekeeping. For example, like Neack, Kgomotso Monnakgotla sees “naked self-interest” as the prime driver behind peacekeeping. However, while Monnakgotla cites the desire to maintain the international status quo, his argument also looks at the economic gains to peacekeeping countries. Noting that many of the countries that historically have contributed a large portion of peacekeepers have also been some of the world’s largest arms exporters, he draws on neorealist principles to argue that peacekeeping is simply another tool that countries use to support their own regional or economic power bases (Monnakgotla 1996, 59). Along with Monnakgotla, a number of authors have argued that the system of financial compensation for peacekeeping provides a key material incentive for countries to contribute troops. As was mentioned earlier, the US$1,332 per soldier per month rate\(^{11}\) that the United Nations provides to peacekeepers is given to the Member States, to disburse as they see fit. As a result, for countries that have low standard salaries for their armed forces (such as Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nigeria), the Member State can profit from its troop contribution by continuing to pay standard national salaries and absorbing the difference – a profit that can amount to thousands of dollars per peacekeeper per year (Gaibulloev et al. 2015)\(^{12}\). However, others have raised the issue of whether these compensations represent more than a drop in the economic bucket for many of the larger troop contributing countries – particularly when considering the

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\(^{11}\) This rate is the standard compensation provided for infantry, and specialist positions often receive additional compensation amounting to a few hundred dollars extra per month. Contingent Owned Equipment (COE), such as vehicles, radio equipment, and weapons technology, is also compensated by the United Nations.

\(^{12}\) Taking the example of Bangladesh: Gaibulloev et al. calculated spends $4,553 per year on an individual soldier’s salary, compared with the almost $16,000 per year UN compensation rate. Considering that Bangladesh has consistently contributed around 5,000 peacekeepers in recent years, this amounts to a net benefit of US$57,000,000 per year for Bangladesh from peacekeeping – keeping in mind Bangladesh’s annual GDP is US$245 billion.
often lengthy bureaucratic process that financial compensations must go through (Solomon 2007).\textsuperscript{13}

The institutionalist response to the question “why do countries peacekeep?” points to the more abstract gains in institutional leverage or international reputation that Member States get from significant troop contributions to peacekeeping. Like the economic answer, this perspective can be tied to the tenets of public goods theory, where the desire to achieve private gains ends up leading to collective benefit (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 14). In “Maintaining System Stability”, Bobrow and Boyer (1997) argue that post-Cold War peacekeeping is driven not by specific material gains such as financial compensation, but by the benefits of hegemonic stability and the so-called “peace dividend”. Other authors hold that the pursuit of a non-permanent United Nations Security Council seat, whose selection often is in part determined by candidates commitment to peacekeeping, is a strong determinant of troop contributions (Malone 2000).\textsuperscript{14}

Finally, there is a strong argument that troop contributing countries from Canada to India to China are motivated to peacekeep primarily by the more ephemeral goal of improving their international reputation, rather than for any specific institutional benefit (Wylie 2009; Wagner 2010; Zhongying 2005). However, while the institutionalist concepts of bandwagoning (playing the role of peacekeeper to gain the benefits of goodwill from stronger powers), impure public good (peace being a public good that benefits some states more than others), and issue linkage (supporting peacekeeping to gain political and diplomatic clout in other areas) help us understand why Member States might provide peacekeepers for indirect benefit, there is greater

\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, for many of the developed countries that contributed significantly to peacekeeping in the 1990s, high wages for their national militaries meant that those countries actually lost money, having to supplement the compensation rate out of their own budgets.

\textsuperscript{14} In the case of countries like India, Japan, or Brazil, attempts to revise the permanent structure of the Security Council have also been highlighted as the cause of those country’s peacekeeping contributions.
difficulty in understanding why similar states might contribute different amounts of peacekeepers (i.e. why some states free-ride and some don’t) (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 13).

At the normative end, Andreas Andersson (2000, 1-22), a democratic peace theorist, views UN peacekeeping operations as a public good that is primarily supported by those states that are beneficiaries in a broader sense, acting with “benevolent self-interest” in favour of institutional strength, expansion of democratic values, and systemic stability brought on by effective conflict resolution (19). Roland Paris (2003) looks at how the prevailing norms of global culture influence everything from Member States’ conceptions of sovereignty, to their willingness to provide personnel to overseas operations, down to the ways in which peacekeeping mandates are shaped to determine what peacekeepers can and cannot do. Peter Viggo Jakobsen (1996) points at the normative impact of the “CNN effect” on Western peacekeeping contributors in particular, arguing that the right combination of media factors can lead to sufficient domestic political pressure to influence contribution levels. Though focusing only on a specific subset of peacekeeping contributors, Jakobsen’s work highlights the fact that domestic considerations are often neglected in the larger peacekeeping literature.

There are also, importantly, increasingly gendered and critical post-colonial elements to the literature looking at contributions to peacekeeping operations. Speaking from the critical normative end of the peacekeeping literature spectrum, authors such as Sandra Whitworth (2004) Claire Duncanson (2009) and Sherene Razack (2004) argue that peacekeeping operations – and by extension, the decision to commit troops to those missions – are governed by the problematic myths involved in using military forces to “save” particular populations that are feminized or racialized as “the Other”. These myths can push a country either towards involvement in UN peacekeeping – as is the case of the “civilizing crusade” and “White Man’s Burden” norms that
suffuse peacekeeping operations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa or away from it, in cases where norms portray peacekeeping as a “wussy’, “unmanly’, or feminized version of traditional, masculine military operations.

The lack of both female peacekeepers and an appreciation of the role of gender in conflict in the culture of the UN has strong implications for troop contribution dynamics, which have only recently begun to be understood (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart 2005). Additionally, authors such as Sarah Elizabeth Mandelson (2005) have looked at how long-standing norms of military behaviour and masculine identity have led to UN personnel harming, trafficking, and exploiting the very civilians they are mandated to protect. Given the increased reporting of incidents of sexual exploitation, abuse, and misconduct by peacekeepers, further research into these elements of the use of force in peacekeeping operations and the types of personnel who are deployed to peace missions is particularly vital.

Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, in their book Providing Peacekeepers, provide one of the most comprehensive attempts to explain peacekeeping troop contribution dynamics. Ultimately, however, they dismiss the utility of any single theory or explanation for the patterns in UN contributions, asserting that

“(A) survey of the existing literature suggests that previous attempts to theorize why states provide UN peacekeepers are incapable of accounting for the wide variations in state behaviour” (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 17).

Instead, they adopt a hybrid approach that breaks down the possible rationales of individual major troop contributing countries into five categories: political rationales, economic rationales, institutional rationales, normative rationales and security rationales. As an example, Bangladesh (one of the top three peacekeeping contributors) is presented as having three key
reasons to contribute: fulfilment of international obligations, multinational exposure for their armed forces, and financial benefits to the Army (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 193).\footnote{Bellamy and Williams are not alone in describing these as Bangladesh’s core reasons for sending an inordinate number of peacekeepers to the UN, relative to the country’s size. Other examples can be found in Bobrow & Boyer (1997), Krishnasarny (2001), and Uz Zaman (2009).}

While their work provides detailed state-by-state analysis of current and historical conditions related to peacekeeping, this hybrid approach – as well as the other works along the spectrum identified above -- is hampered by a lack of systematic discussion about why contribution levels sometimes change abruptly, and what factors might influence the future course of a state’s peacekeeping troop contributions. Ultimately, it is the issue of change that proves to be most difficult for those trying to explain why nations decide to peacekeep. Returning to the example of Bangladesh, if the country has such strong incentives to contribute peacekeepers, why has it not always done so? Between 1999 and 2000, Bangladesh increased its troop commitment by almost 600% (International Peace Institute 2015).\footnote{From December 1999 to May 2001, Bangladesh’s peacekeeping contribution rose from 802 soldiers to 5,739 (International Peace Institute 2014).} Did the economic, institutional, or military rationales in Bangladesh change during this time? Did the prevailing norms in Bangladesh regarding the United Nations, the international system, or peace and security alter drastically? The incentive-based peacekeeping literature is largely silent on such periods of significant change.

The difficulty of accounting for significant changes in international politics under a rationalist perspective of strictly-defined material interest is already an established point of criticism in international relations (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994, 215-215). However, as Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, 391-416) have noted, other theories such as liberal institutionalism and even gendered analysis often suffer from a similar inability to account for abrupt changes in state behaviour. In order to address these difficulties in accounting for major
changes in peacekeeping contribution patterns, my approach applies the theoretical framework of strategic culture to the field of peacekeeping research. Across the spectrum of the literature each of the works identified above makes strong points about specific incentives that may influence particular Member States at particular points in time.

A strategic cultural model seeks to incorporate the range of materialist and normative arguments while providing a major addition by taking short-term changes in state behaviours into account. Strategic culture may appear to land closer to the normative incentive end of the spectrum of peacekeeping literature, because it has to do with how countries perceive the role of their militaries. However, as we shall see, strategic culture also incorporates important material elements of the troop contribution calculus. By bringing in variables of elite and societal perception that influence the use of force, strategic culture provides an explanation in those cases of peacekeeping change that cannot otherwise be accounted for.
Strategic Culture Literature

Tradition matters, because it is not given to societies to proceed through history as if they had no past, and as if every course of action were available to them. They may deviate from the previous trajectory only within a finite margin. The great statesmen act at the outer limit of that margin.


The origin of strategic culture theory is traditionally traced to Jack Snyder’s 1997 RAND report on the nature of Soviet nuclear thinking. Writing against the prevailing notion of the age that Soviet strategists used “culture-free, perception-free game theories”, Snyder theorized that socialized beliefs, attitudes and behaviours surrounding nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union were significantly different from those of the United States, something that American nuclear strategists had to take into account (Snyder 1977, 5).

However, the general argument that national culture influences military strategy has much deeper historical roots. The idea that culture has a defining impact on how a particular country goes to war can be found in sources from Sun Tzu to Thucydides to Weber to Clausewitz, right up to Russell Weigley’s *The American Way of Warfare* (Lantis 2009). This section focuses on how the different strands of strategic culture theory have incorporated different ideas of how culture influences behaviour, evolving into a distinct understanding of how and why states use force internationally.

*Culture as behaviour versus culture as symbols*

As a formal theory of international relations, strategic culture has gained prominence in both academic debate and, increasingly, in the realm of strategic policy itself.\(^{17}\) Not surprisingly

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\(^{17}\) The Canadian strategic policy document *The Future Security Environment: 2013-2040*, for example, strongly incorporates strategic culture into its predictive analysis; “While it cannot explain everything or offer certainty in looking to the future, the framework in which a country approaches questions of war and peace, but also more generally the usability of military power in the conduct of its relations with other international actors, nonetheless offers useful insights.” (89).
though, a number of different definitional debates permeate the strategic culture literature itself. As David Haglund (2004) notes, the term “culture” is already one of the most difficult words in the English language to define – and adding “strategic” to the concept does little to simplify things (482). Colin Gray (1986), for example, sees strategic culture as “referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms”. A key aspect of Gray’s version of strategic culture is that he sees behaviour as intimately connected with culture; for Gray, one cannot separate culture as an independent variable and behavior as a dependent variable. Decision-making processes are for him suffused with strategic culture, with culture and behaviour being mutually constitutive. By contrast, Alastair Iain Johnston (1995) sees strategic culture as:

An integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious. (46)

In this definition we can see the theoretical assumptions underlying Johnston’s approach to strategic culture. Far more than Gray, Johnston focuses on the “symbols” of culture and the causal role they play in shaping the perspectives of military force – especially the view that particular preferences are more rational than others. While these “symbols of culture” tend to be expressed linguistically, they are cognitive representations of a fundamental perspective of what role a country plays or ought to play in the world, specifically tied to the way that a country uses force. As a result, a strategic cultural symbol may be a norm (e.g. the non-use of nuclear weapons), a definition (e.g. what it means to be a “middle power”), a formal agreement (e.g. official neutrality), or an idealized future status (e.g. Manifest Destiny).
For Johnston, these symbols can be viewed causally alongside other possible incentives for the use of force, while for Gray these perspectives are so intertwined with behaviour that causality becomes meaningless in this context. The debate about the relationship between culture and behaviour is one that continues across multiple disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, and political science. “Culture” as a concept changes significantly depending on the context it is used, and can be seen to have any number of source. Strategic culture, however, is a more narrowly defined idea, focusing as it does on the national symbols and frameworks surrounding the use of military force. As a result, most strategic culture theorists agree that strategic culture has six major sources (Howlett 2005):

1. Historical and civilizational perspectives
2. Geography and natural resources
3. Political structure and political institutions
4. Myths and symbols that are a part of the national identity
5. Technological changes
6. Transnational norms and conventions

These primary sources are, of course, not fully distinct; they interact in dynamic ways to influence one another. Historical/civilizational perspectives can for example refer to the shared understandings about the birth and evolution of a nation state among its elites and population, such as defining battles of independence, or resistance, a colonial history, or – as Snyder alluded to in his work on Soviet nuclear thinking – the unique thresholds for things like an “unacceptable damage to the homeland” (Snyder 1977, 28). The impact of geography and resources on military thinking has been written on extensively, including from more structuralist perspectives (Gray 1999; Baum and Sorenson 2003; Woodward 2005). Approaches to military isolationism in Poland for example will undeniably have a different character than those of the United Kingdom, owing in large part to their respective geographies, historical experiences, past conflicts and resulting views of world affairs. Additionally, considerations of material capability – the ability
to actually use force in a given situation – may be considered under this second grouping.

Theories of democratic peace have pointed to the impact of political structure on strategic thinking, but more tactical-level variables such as the ways in which militaries and civil society interact can have an impact as well.

As referenced in Johnston’s definition, national myths and symbols that tap into a populations’ faith rather than its reason – take, for example, the “myth” that the American public will not tolerate high casualties (Lacquement 1997)-- can also have a determining impact on state behaviour and strategic thought. Differences in technology, both between countries and within a single country across time, have long been recognized by military personnel to have a guiding impact on preferred courses of action. Finally, transnational norms and conventions (norms governing international law, the use of force, what is and is not considered “warfare’, etc.) influence the strategic cultures of countries across the world and are filtered through national perspectives in a myriad ways.

*Strategic culture and theories of international relations*

In addition to definitional disagreements, there are also differing opinions on the relationship that strategic culture has with other prominent theories of international relations. Strategic culture theory can be seen as a means of filling the gaps in neorealism – explaining national foibles when states behave “irrationally” (Basrur 2001; Gilboy and Heginbotham 2012). Jack Snyder, who himself became uncomfortable with the way that strategic culture theory had evolved from his original report on Soviet nuclear thinking, argued that that strategic culture should be considered a “last resort”:

Cultural explanations tend to be vague in their logic, with causes that are quite distant in time and sequence from their purported consequences…Thus, culture, including strategic culture, is an explanation to be used only when all else fails (Snyder 1990, 4).
The motivational force of culture in decision making

Most strategic culture theorists, however, see the theory as an independent framework that rejects the ahistorical and acultural approach of neorealism and provides its own model for understanding state behaviour (Johnston 1995). These authors maintain that cost/benefit arguments and material calculation by strategic elites are important, but they stress that we must understand the cultural conditions that fundamentally shape how strategists perceive the material conditions that they are faced with (Howlett 2005). In other words, the unique historical and environmental elements that make up the national background are what give weight to “objective” strategic choices. Looking at how strategic decisions are actually made by elites, they note that:

Decisions on the use of force against perceived security threats are usually made in situations of urgency by a small group of elite decision-makers. They rarely allow for sober political cost-benefit analysis (Mirow 2016, 6).

It is in the high-stress environment that characterizes strategic decision-making that deeply-held cultural beliefs about the role of the military and the appropriate use of force come to the fore. Beyond a simple rejection of structural neorealism, many strategic cultural theorists seek to build upon the Copenhagen School of securitisation, which – though it highlights the role elites play in the decision-making processes of security policy – downplays the cultural context that strategists operate in. Specifically, strategic culture theory provides for an understanding of the actors’ “motivations”, clarifies the relationship between elites and the wider

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18 Many of the elements that led to the strategic cultural critique of neorealism also drove the push for a neo-classical realism. While most neo-classical realist authors give greater focus to the role that domestic politics and institutions play in strategic perceptions, they proceed with a materialist approach to these domestic elements, rather than a normative or cultural interpretation.

19 The Copenhagen School was a pioneering approach focusing on the social aspects of security, emphasizing how policy issues become ‘securitized’ in such a way that elevates them beyond the realm of regular politics through speech acts. Securitized threats are socially constructed in such a way as to legitimize extraordinary actions that would not normally be deemed legitimate in the course of ordinary politics (Buzan and Wæver 1998; Stritzel 2007; Buzan 2008).
national public audience, and provides cultural limits to the range of interpretations and actions available to actors in the face of threat (Rynning 2003; Mabee 2007; Mirow 2016). In line with these authors, the approach I take sees strategic culture as an independent theoretical framework that, more than acting as an explanation of last resort when other theories fail, has developed its own robust interpretation of why states act the way they do in the strategic field.20

The Three Generations of Strategic Culture

In his 1995 work “Thinking about Strategic Culture”, Alastair Iain Johnston identified three generations of strategic culture theory. “Generations” refers here to the fact that the sub-sections of the theory arrived in three sets, with the first generation becoming prominent in the mid-1980s and the third generation only developing in the 1990s (Toje 2009b, 6).21 In this section, I will lay out the key distinguishing feature of the three traditional generations before describing the still-emerging fourth generation which, I believe, addresses an important gap left by the previous models of strategic culture – the issue of behavioural change.

The first generation

The first generation of strategic culture is most often strongly associated with Colin S. Gray but was also taken up by other early strategic culturalists such as Jack Snyder (1977), David Jones (1990), and Carnes Lord (1985). These were primarily subject-area specialists who looked at particular country case-studies and saw strategic culture as pervading the full spectrum of strategic choices, from national strategy to tactics, to specific instances of the use of force. According to Gray (1999), what makes strategic culture so difficult to pin down

20 As will be discussed in the Key Terms section, strategic culture as a theory is set somewhat apart from general international relations theory by its focus on the use of force. There are analogous approaches to political culture more broadly, but strategic culture is a narrow approach in the sense that is strictly concerned with the international use of force.
21 Johnston, himself the pioneer of the third generation, tended to see the generations as a progression of a single theory being gradually improved upon (Haglund 2004, 491). However, the ongoing theoretical debates between the generations are such that they are best considering epistemologically distinct approaches to strategic culture.
methodologically is that it exists not only “out there”; strategic culture suffuses the institutions of government, the behaviour of elites, and the perspectives of those writing on international relations (53). Critics of the first generation contest that strategic culture seems to explain everything and thus explains nothing – as Johnston (1995) puts it, it is both under-determined, in the sense that it amalgamates a range of potentially competing variables in its fuzzy definition of culture, and over-determined in its deterministic way of seeing strategic culture as influencing behaviour (33). While the notion of culture acting as context is interesting, the first generation leaves unexplored how one might benefit from understanding this context (Twomey 2008).

The second generation

Like the first generation, the second generation begins with the core question: why don’t states follow the expectations of neorealism? For their answer, however, second generation theorists look to the cultural exchanges between elites that work to provide a common identity among security elites that transcends game theory. Second generation literature sees a significant difference between what strategic elites say and what they actually do; strategic culture is primarily seen as a tool by which violence and operational strategy can be legitimated in the eyes of the public (Johnston 1995, 39). The way in which violence and the use of force is seen as legitimate is determined by historical and cultural context, but the instrumental use of strategic culture to justify warfare by elites is the same across countries. There is thus a clear division between strategic culture and behaviour in the sense that there is a divide between “declaratory” and “uncommunicated” doctrines (Toje 2009a, 6). Unlike the first and third generations, these theories problematize the “natural” assumption of the state-sponsored use of military force, adding a more critical element to the strategic culture discussion (Lock 2010,

22 With some undertones of post-structuralism, Gray (1999) entirely owns up to the accusations of ‘fuzzy definition’ by asserting that “Strategic culture is the world of mind, feeling, and habit in behaviour” (58).
This has led the second generation to provide important insight into the deeper questions of why modern militaries are organized in the way they are, why some types of force are seen as legitimate in warfare while others are not, and why certain societies such as the United States and China spend such a large portion of their national income on defence despite the absence of a credible existential threat.

Johnston (1998) argues that a major element of the second generation incorporates neo-Gramscian ideas of strategic culture as a reflection of the hegemonist political order into its analysis (16). Indeed, to authors such as Bradley Klein (1988), the scope of analysis for strategic culture is not national security environments but rather the “cultural hegemony of organized state violence” that exists to different extents across political systems (136). The systematic categorization of “enemies” by states, the legitimization of military violence and the construction of artefacts that render alternative identities or narratives unavailable all connect the second-generation theory of strategic culture to interpretations of Antonio Gramsci’s work on cultural hegemony.

Though this Gramscian-inspired approach to international relations is clearly distinct from other theories of strategic culture, a number of methodological challenges has meant that the second generation has often been sidelined in favour of the Gray-Johnston debate. Critics of the second generation point out that there is a problem of specificity in this approach, as it is unclear how it would be operationalized so that particular case studies of the use of force could be understood (Neumann and Heikka 2005, 10). While it may be true that strategic elites share justifications for the use of force across national boundaries, why then do countries with similar

23 Some authors have in fact argued that the impact of the “second generation” was insufficient to warrant a separate classification (Desh, 1998). A number of alternative classifications for the sub-structure of strategic culture theory exist, though the fundamental disagreements about culture, behaviour, scope of analysis, and causality tend to persevere across the different systems.
elite structures have widely different approaches to warfare? Furthermore, while the first generation makes it clear that they expect elites to be socialized by strategic culture just as much (if not more) than the general public, it is less clear in the second generation whether elites genuinely believe the justifications for the use of force that they espouse to, or whether they simply use strategic culture as an instrument of power (Johnston 1995, 40). If it is the latter, is it truly “culture” that is being studied here, or simply propaganda?

The third generation

Having identified what he sees as the basic flaws in the first and second-generation theories, Johnston presents his case for organizational culture acting as an intervening variable in his third generation. He argues that “the dependent variable in the social sciences in general, and international relations theory specifically, is behaviour” (Johnston 1998, 171). Rather than seeing culture as context, the third generation attempts to bring strategic culture closer to the realm of strict causality by presenting it as one of many independent variables that can influence state strategic behaviour. As a result, some historical case studies will reveal a great deal of strategic cultural influence, while others will not – the theory thus being designed to be falsifiable (Lantis 2009, 15). Yet Johnston, who is in favour of greater methodological rigour and specificity in the theory, eschewed any attempt at prediction and viewed strategic culture primarily as a guide to the idealized grand-strategy preferences of a country. For example, in his analysis of strategic behaviour in Ming China, Johnston focuses on the persistence of an “idealized or symbolic discourse” in the decision-making process in Ming China that lines up with his expectations, even if the actual strategic behaviours were often influenced by extraneous factors.

Johnston’s aim of creating a falsifiable methodology for strategic culture theory led him into direct disagreement with Gray and other first generationalists, who believed that strategic
culture (and culture more generally) cannot be explained within the bounds of strictly positivistic causality (Howlett 2005). Johnston sees behaviour as something that can be studied entirely apart from culture, which a number of the critiques see as untenable (Neumann and Heikka 2005). At the heart of the Gray-Johnston debate, then, is the problem of “relating strategic culture to behavioral choice” (Johnston 1995, 46). This debate has now raged for almost two decades, with little result, and echoes many of the larger epistemological debates that characterize the study of human behaviour in social science which date back to Emile Durkheim and Max Weber (Haglund 2004, 489).

*Stability and change in strategic culture*

An underappreciated issue within all three of these generations of strategic culture is the challenge of accounting for medium- and short-term changes in state strategic behaviour – something that is essential to understanding a specific instance of the use of force such as peacekeeping. The issue of change also represents a potential way forward out of the context-causality standoff that has for so long characterized strategic culture literature. In all three generations of the literature discussed above, there is general agreement that, while the strategic environment and material variables may be constantly shifting, the influence of strategic culture is more or less stable.24 This view of the stability of culture makes sense on the surface; if strategic culture were easily altered by political winds, it would undermine assertions about the deep historical, geographic, and societal roots that strategic culture is said to have (Bloomfield 2012, 449). Yet the fact of the matter is that strategic behaviour shifts constantly; states can become more belligerent or passive over time, they can shift their strategic partnerships, and the role of their national military can fundamentally change. As Wilhelm Mirow put it:

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24 “If strategic culture itself changes, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in “objective” conditions. (Johnston 1995, 34).
Another largely unresolved issue regarding contemporary research on strategic culture concerns its nature of change over time… In other words, linking culture with behaviour remains the biggest challenge to researchers on strategic culture to this day (Mirow 2016, 5).

It is this dichotomy between a stable culture and fluctuating behaviour that is at the heart of so much of the debates between the three generations.

Johnston (1995) argues that the first generation of strategic culture leads to the “sweepingly simplified conclusion” that strategic thinking leads consistently to one type of strategic behaviour – e.g. that the United States is incapable of fighting and winning a nuclear war (37). As Neumann and Heikka (2005) point out, Bradley Klein and the second generation focused on long-term political shifts among the global elite (10). While their approach to strategic culture may be useful for macro-level studies of how trends in the use of force have developed over the centuries, such an approach is less appropriate on the micro level. Finally, although Johnston critiques the first generation’s assumption that strategic culture is unchangeable, his own third generation study faces similar challenges. In Johnston’s analysis of China, critics have pointed out that China’s behaviour under Mao and the Communist Party does not fit with the parabellum strategic culture that Johnston thinks characterizes Chinese history (Bloomfield 2012, 444–45).\(^{25}\) Similar issues have plagued other third-generation case studies, with significant strategic behaviour patterns that go against long-standing national cultures remaining unexplained.

Are strategic cultures truly immutable, or do they change over time? How can a model of strategic culture adapt to behavioural change without undermining the enduring influence of tradition?

\(^{25}\) As Bloomfield (2012) succinctly puts it, “Models predicated on assumptions of millennia-long strategic-cultural continuity struggle to deal with these sorts of mere-decades-long ebbs and flows of strategic policy” (438).
Table 1 Summary of the three generations of strategic culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation of Strategic Culture</th>
<th>Key Contributors</th>
<th>Relationship between Strategic Culture and Strategic Behaviour</th>
<th>Role of Elites</th>
<th>Methodological Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Generation</td>
<td>Gray (1971, 1999, 2007), Jones (1990), Lord (1985), Snyder (1977)</td>
<td>Strategic culture as the context that suffuses the decision-making process surrounding strategic behaviour</td>
<td>Elites are steeped in their national strategic culture throughout their careers</td>
<td>Broad Descriptive: Involves broadly historical analysis of patterns in the strategic behaviour of specific states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>Klein (1988), Legro (1996), Lock (2010), Luckham (1984)</td>
<td>Strategic culture as a mechanism by which hegemony and the use of force in strategic behaviour is justified</td>
<td>Elites forge transnational links of strategic culture to justify behaviour and maintain the status quo</td>
<td>Broad Descriptive: Involves broadly historical analysis of patterns in the strategic behaviour of specific states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Generation</td>
<td>Berger (1998), Duffield (1998), Johnston (1995), Kier (1995)</td>
<td>Strategic culture as an independent or intervening variable, as one influence among other possible factors affecting the dependent variable of strategic behaviour</td>
<td>Elites’ ranked strategic preferences are often influenced by strategic culture, as well as by material interests and other variables</td>
<td>Analytical School: Uses narrower definitions of culture and rigorous testing of strategic culture’s effects on specific classes of strategic behaviour</td>
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The Fourth Generation of Strategic Culture

Johnston’s primary aim in critiquing the first and second generations of strategic culture was not, I believe, to drive the theory towards absolute positivism. His goal was to make strategic culture theory operationalizable and falsifiable, above and beyond a debate about the role of causality in social science. Falsifiability and the requirements of methodological rigour, however, do not necessarily mean that strategic culture must be treated as an independent

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26 Absolute positivism is used here in the sense of placing an overall emphasis on strict causality, concretely measurable variables, and quantitative methodologies.
variable to the dependent variable of state behaviour. As Christopher Twomey (2008) notes, “rigor in discussing the ways in which culture is conveyed and changes across time is critical” for assessing strategic culture’s contribution to our understanding of policy (349).

What I call “fourth generation strategic culture” is differentiated from the above mentioned literature primarily by its use of strategic subcultures, which provides for the element of falsifiability without chaining the theory to strict causality. The notion of strategic subculture helps address the issue of national change, wherein past narratives are undermined and different views on the legitimate use of force become dominant (Pirani 2014, 1-2). In other words:

Most nations have a plethora of different national cultural themes that compete and interact throughout different elements of society. These are unlikely to coalesce on issues of national security. Rather, multiple voices will compete in identifying the “true” heritage of a national strategic culture, and leaders can choose among these to legitimate choices taken for other reasons. (Twomey 2008, 350)

In these fluid processes of domination and subordination the different attitudes or “repositories” of strategic culture (such as isolationism, regionalism, hegemonism, etc.) continue to impact strategic behaviour - though to different extents at different times. These processes are a reflection of the various ways in which history, geography, political structure, cultural symbols and technological change influence national strategic elites, with different views of what the role of a country’s military should be vying for influence. In his 1995 reassessment of the strategic culture debate, Johnston referred to the existence of dominant and subordinate subcultures.27 Johnston pointed to different “central strategic paradigms” and “grand strategic prescriptions” that could disagree with regards to the means that a country must take to become secure. However, Johnston never truly developed this concept of multiple strategic cultures coexisting and competing within a single national environment (Bajpai 2002, 246).

27 “It would be more logical to conclude that the diversity of a particular society’s geographical, political, cultural, and strategic experience will produce multiple strategic cultures, but this possibility is excluded by the narrow determinism of the first-generation literature” (Johnston 1995, 44).
By recognizing the existence of distinct, competing subcultures within a national strategic culture, fourth generation literature neatly sidesteps the behaviour-culture divide. It also addresses certain tendencies in the strategic culture approach – such as the tendency towards resorting to national stereotypes when explaining the actions of a particular state, or the difficulties inherent in operationalizing a concept such as a monolithic concept as “culture” – in a compelling way by adding much-needed nuance. Strategic subcultures were introduced along with the term “strategic culture” in Jack Snyder’s original 1977 work – Snyder saw it as a useful way to avoid oversimplification – but the use of subcultures in theoretical debates was limited until more recently. Neumann and Heikka (2005) may be considered early proponents of the fourth generation, though they do not identify themselves as such. Arguing that strategic culture needed to be disaggregated and moved beyond the positivist/post-positivist debate, they see strategic environments as more of an “unstable compromise of a contested process” than a homogenous evolution involving the use of force (Neumann and Heikka 2005, 17). Though Howlette (2005) refers to “narratives” – compelling national story lines – rather than subcultures when discussing change in strategic culture, he too can be considered part of the fourth generation because of his emphasis on developing models that focus on issues of continuity and change. Though they rarely self-identify as being part of a new generation of strategic culture, and indeed often disagree about the relationships that exist between different cultures, these subculture theories are increasingly prominent as a distinct approach to the study of strategic culture.

28 Patrick Porter (2007), for example, argues in “Good Anthropology, Bad History: the cultural turn in studying war” that, through its lack of methodological rigor and fuzzy approach to terms, strategic cultural approaches risk replacing strategy with cultural stereotypes – as when theorists treat Sun Tzu as culturally specific but Clausewitz as universal.

29 McDonough (2013), for example, writing on the Canadian case study, perceives strategic subcultures as forming more a spectrum (e.g. between American continentalism and independent internationalism).
More than almost any other, Alan Bloomfield has done much to formalize the use of subcultures in a distinctive manner. He notes that previous treatments of strategic culture tended to suffer by being *too coherent* – implying that “all aspects of the strategic behaviour of a state will always be consistent with its strategic culture”, and having no contradictory elements -- or that they displayed *too much continuity* --- asserting that strategic culture does not vary significantly over time, despite evidence of changes in state behaviour (Bloomfield 2012, 439).

His solution to this long-standing issue is the notion of subcultures. It allows for contradictory elements and changes in the strategic cultural environment without sacrificing the tradition and timelessness that is the hallmark of culture. Bloomfield draws from similar concepts of competing subculture that have already been developed in sociology and anthropology. Writing with another key innovator of strategic culture theory, Kim Richard Nossal, on the case studies of Canada and Australia, the authors used the subculture argument to understand how two countries with materially similar positions in the world and broadly similar histories underwent such different post-World War II policy shifts - pointing for example to competing conceptions such as who is defined as an “enemy” in the different subcultures (Bloomfield and Nossal 2007).

Drawing on Bloomfield and others, I argue that the fourth generation of strategic culture addresses what Johnston (1995) calls “frustrating level of vagueness about culture’s relationship to choice” (44). Competition between dominant and subordinate subculture over time leads to what Alexander Wendt would call a mutually constitutive relationship between strategic culture and state behaviour (Wendt 1998).30

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30 The notion of multiple different worlds existing simultaneously, and the implications that such possibilities have for social scientific research, also connect with Wendt’s more recent work on the “the quantum mind” (Wendt 2015).
Figure 4 is derived from Neumann and Heikka (2005), who also draw on Wendt when describing the relationship between grand strategy and doctrine, though the figure is altered to incorporate the subculture/behavior dynamic. Like discourse and practice in culture more generally, there is a feedback loop of strategic decision-making; “spilled blood and wasted treasure” will influence the dominance of particular subcultures, which in turn influence future strategy behavior (Twomey 2008, 351):

When both concepts (of culture and agency) are acknowledged for being essentially a structural and agential component, respectively, these can be seen as factors that each play an important role at different stages of a process leading to a particular instance of state action. (Mirow 2016, 10)
Fourth generation and peacekeeping contribution level

So how does the fourth generation of strategic culture theory help us better understand the practical puzzle of why peacekeeping troop contributions fluctuate over time? In this specific instance, the strategic subculture approach allows us to understand why particular military policies may become more or less popular among political elites in a relatively short amount of time. As has been argued above, while the first three generations of strategic culture may be useful for understanding broad evolutions in the use of force over centuries, the fourth generation is particularly useful for looking at specific instances of the use of force, owing to its ability to account for behavioural change. By introducing the notion of subcultures into strategic cultural theory, the fourth generation breaks down the monolith of one national perspective on the use of
force into multiple competing ideas about the military role of a country in the world. It is intuitive that culture of any kind changes only gradually, over the course of decades and centuries. In recognizing the existence of multiple subcultures, the fourth generation explains rapid policy change as a result of rising and falling dominance among subcultures rather than a change in culture per se. Theorists both within and outside of strategic culture have extensively criticized the theory’s inability to operationalize culture in a manner that allows measurement and comparison that would be relevant to policymakers – a glimpse into “tomorrow’s world”, as Twomey (2008) puts it (348). A fourth-generation approach to strategic culture that incorporates subcultures allows for a more probabilistic model of state behaviour.

Looking at the trends in troop contribution rates, we see a high degree of variation from year to year in the number of peacekeeping troops made available by individual Member States to United Nations peace operations. Macro-level variations represent a significant degree of change in peacekeeping policies among individual states across the years, with Member States increasing and decreasing their troop contributions drastically at different times. Rather than arguing that the national strategic culture of these states varies from year to year – a perspective that would limit the overall utility of the strategic cultural approach – the fourth-generation approach argues that the key strategic subcultures in a national environment remain relatively constant; it is their relative dominance that is constantly shifting. The fourth generation also provides the tools to identify when these shifts in dominance occur and in what direction they are moving. Drawing upon the notion of “strategic symbols” – cognitive frameworks that express a particular view about the role of a country in the world – the fourth generation suggests that the relative prevalence of symbols that support one national narrative over others can be measured as an indicator of change over time (Lee, 2008). By incorporating strategic change in this way, the
new view of strategic culture allows for the development of an empirical model that can test the impact of shifts in strategic culture on the use of force.

The fourth generation of strategic culture, with its unique approach to continuity and change, provides the best basis for a theoretical framework to understand the dynamics of peacekeeping troop contributions. Through an overview of the existing peacekeeping literature, this chapter explored the challenges of adapting and generalizing single-incentive explanations for why countries peacekeeping beyond a particular case study. Strategic culture, which takes a far broader approach to state behaviour and decision-making in the use of force, incorporates particular incentives for the decision of whether to peacekeep into the broader national normative context, which is informed by history, geography, institutions, external events, and many other factors. This normative context – known as strategic culture – is given greater nuance in the fourth generation of the theory, which identifies multiple, competing national strategic cultures that vie for dominance among the strategic elite and the public. By providing an operationalizable and analytically useful perspective on strategic culture, the fourth generation provides a strong basis to build a theoretical framework for understanding the national dynamics of UN peacekeeping.
Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework: A Strategic Cultural Model of Peacekeeping

*The real problem with the concept of strategic culture is not so much one of definition as one of empirical application*

- Christoph Meyer, “Convergence Toward a European Strategic Culture?” (529)

In elaborating the theoretical framework that will be applied to the case of United Nations peacekeeping in order to understand troop contribution dynamics, this chapter proceeds by outlining the core research question that the thesis seeks to answer, as well as defining some key terms in the context of this dissertation. Drawing on and developing a specific interpretation of strategic culture, this section outline the model that will be used to measure changes in strategic culture over the period of analysis. Methodological considerations are also outlined, including the corpus of documents that will be used as part of the discourse analysis, the ways in which discourse will be coded in the course of this analysis, and the methods of comparison within and across the different case studies that will be employed. Finally, the rationales for case country selection are laid out, with an explanation of the process that led to the ultimate selection of Canada, China, and India as the three case studies of this thesis.
**Research Question**

As was identified in the Introduction, the core research question guiding this dissertation is as follows:

*What is the connection between measurable changes in national strategic culture and significant changes to the troop contribution levels of major states involved in post-Cold War United Nations peacekeeping operations?*

This thesis argues that a model of strategic culture can significantly contribute to the general understanding of why Member States contribute troops to peacekeeping operations, and that there is a strong correlation between macro-level changes in strategic culture and changes in troop contribution policy among UN Members. Rather than focusing on one facet of the decision-making process - such as political, economic, or normative incentives - we must consider a country’s contribution level in the wider context of its strategic approach to military matters and the international use of force. In answering the research question, this thesis argues that whether or not a country decides to peacekeep is related to fundamental views about why a country has a military in the first place and what that military’s role in the world is perceived to be.
Key Terms

Before moving on to developing the framework for my model, it is important to clarify some of the terms mentioned in the research question above and define them in the ways they will be used throughout this thesis.

Strategic Culture

Beginning with strategic culture, I will use the term as defined by Kerry Longhurst (2004):

A distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective (usually a nation) and arise gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences (17).

This definition contains several key elements that differentiate it from other approaches to strategic culture, most crucially, the definition’s focus on the use of force which differentiates the term from political culture, grand strategy, and other terms. As Mirow notes (2016), “the use of force by the state is its ultimate, most drastic and more important means to achieve its traditionally most fundamental objectives of survival, security and order” (6). Treating strategic culture as purely concerned with the use of force allows us to analyze the most difficult decisions elites are faced with. Additionally, while this definition notes that strategic culture is generally ascribed to states, it leaves the door open for other key non-state actors such as NATO or sub-national groups to possess strategic culture. In line with the fourth generation literature on strategic culture, Longhurst’s definition allows for culture to be dynamic while acknowledging the long-term processes that shape different perspectives on the use of force Longhurst also sees

31 Numerous other definitions of strategic culture, including that used by Meyer (2006, 20), speak more generally of political, security, or defence goals, and lack the specificity to be theoretically and methodologically useful.
the referents of strategic culture as being the political-military elite of a country, with the national strategic community being the prime focus of strategic culture research (Longhurst 2004, 21).

Using Snyder’s original definition, strategic subcultures are “a subsection of the broader strategic community with reasonable distinct beliefs and attitudes on strategic issues, with a distinct and historically traceable analytical tradition” (Snyder 1977, 10). In order for subcultures to have a significant influence – rather than being fringe perspectives among a small group of elites – they must be both distinct and have a historical tradition within the national strategic environment. As Mirow (2016) puts it, “Strategic culture thus forms an ideational milieu which pervades in time beyond particular instances of security policy articulation and practice” (6). If the competition and differences among strategic subcultures may be termed “strategic thought”, then the dominant subculture at any given time may be considered the “grand strategy” of the moment (Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa 2014, 116–17).

**Peacekeeping**

It is also important to be clear about what specifically is meant by *peacekeeping* in this dissertation because the concept forms the core of this dissertation. Like “contingency operations”, “stability operations”, “enforcement”, “counter-terrorism” and a host of other terms that have emerged as “war” has become increasingly taboo, “peacekeeping operations” have been used to refer to actions across the spectrum of the use of force. In this text, I take a very narrow definition of the term. By peacekeeping, I refer only to those operations conducted, authorized and led by the United Nations. While discussion of the modern use of the term “peacekeeping” have centred on whether not there is really any “peace to keep” in today’s UN

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32 As Snyder saw it, because members of national subcultures are still members of the broader strategic culture, they are generally – but not always – likely to agree more with one another than with members of foreign strategic subcultures.
operations, to me the primary distinction of United Nations peacekeeping is that takes place under the authority of the UN flag. Unlike national military operations or “coalitions of the willing”, UN peacekeeping operations are truly multinational interventions with a particular command structure, authority stemming from the Security Council, and unique norms surrounding the use of force. This makes UN peacekeeping a distinctive subject worth studying.

In the past, a number of international military operations have been authorized by the Security Council under Chapters VI or VII of the UN Charter but led by a coalition of nations or a regional organization such as NATO (e.g. the First Gulf War). These missions have sometimes been dubbed “peacekeeping”, but for the purposes of this thesis, peacekeeping is applicable only to those multinational operations that fly under the United Nations flag and are mandated by the DPKO – missions known as colloquially “Blue Helmet” or “Blue Beret” missions. In the modern context, these UN missions include mandates that range from a limited use of force – with soldiers operating primarily as observers and mediators to a conflict, as per “traditional peacekeeping” – to highly intensive combat operations involving extensive fighting, forcible disarmament of combatants, and the active protection of civilians. This has led many to criticize “peacekeeping” as being no longer appropriate in many ongoing UN operations, since in operations like Mali there is currently “no peace to keep”.33

Post-Cold War United Nations peacekeeping

Finally, Post-Cold War United Nations peacekeeping refers to the time period of 1990 to 2015. This period is treated as distinct for a number of reasons. The 1990-2015 period can be seen to coincide with the rise of “complex peacekeeping” as opposed to traditional peacekeeping. Complex peacekeeping has been characterised by a high degree of unanimity among the

33 See, for example, Dennis Jett, “What Can Peacekeepers Do if there is No Peace to Keep?”, 2016, Middle East Policy, 23(4), pp. 149-158.
permanent members of the Security Council, deployment to areas where conflict is within rather than between states, where there is little or no “peace to keep”, and where the principles of consent of the host state, impartiality and the minimum use of force have become more difficult to adhere to (Choedon 2013, 208). From 1945 to 1990, the United Nations authorized 13 peacekeeping operations, whereas from 1990 to 2015 a total of 53 missions have been authorized. Lastly, the dynamics of Cold War-era peacekeeping troop contributions, which were dominated by the principle that peacekeeping missions must have a balance of Eastern and Western contributors (and that neither superpower must be directly involved), have evaporated. Clearly, then, post-Cold War United Nations peacekeeping is a distinct topic, and should be studied independently from traditional inter-state peacekeeping missions.

_Troop contributions_

Similarly, the term _troop contribution_ is narrowly defined in this thesis. Increasingly, United Nations peacekeeping operations are multidimensional endeavours that involve civilian experts, police personnel, aid and medical workers, as well as traditional military troops. Peacekeeping operations are much more than one-dimensional military actions. This dissertation’s focus on troop contributions is in no way meant to diminish the importance of the non-military aspects of these missions. As a study of state-centric decision-making and strategic culture, however, troop contributions are a useful starting point. Unlike civilian and police peacekeeping personnel, who often are voluntarily assigned, the decision to send peacekeeping troops is an example of

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35 There is also a more practical reason for restricting the period of analysis to 1990 and onwards. Prior to that period, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations did not systematically track peacekeeping troop contributions on a month-to-month basis. As a result, the International Peace Institute’s Providing for Peacekeeping Database – the source of this thesis’ troop contribution data – dates back only to January of 1990.

36 The largest ongoing peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, is made up of 3,840 civilians, 1,407 police members, and 478 unarmed observers, alongside 16,735 military troops (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2015).
centralized state behaviour. And because strategic culture is concerned primarily with the use of force, troop contributions make for an ideal case study.

**Major States**

*Major states* involved in peacekeeping refer to countries who have contributed at least 1,000 troops to UN peace operations at some point during the period in study. Out of the 193 Member States of the United Nations, 122 contribute at least some troops to peacekeeping. The majority of these contributors, however, may be considered “token contributors” – that is, their involvement in peacekeeping is not in any way a strategic or military priority. As Katharina Coleman puts it:

“It is therefore misleading to conceptualize state decision about whether to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations as a binary choice between participation and non-participation, without drawing distinctions between troop contribution size” (Coleman 2013, 47)

In order to capture the relationship between troop contributions and strategic culture during period of change, the contribution level must be significant enough to represent a degree of strategic importance to the Member State in question. By requiring that the case studies of this thesis reach the level of 1,000 troops at one point in the period of study, only those states are included that prioritized UN peace operations as part of their grand strategy.

**Significant variation**

In a similar vein, *significant variation* in peacekeeping troop contributions has been defined as an increase or decrease of at least 1,000 troops contributed to peacekeeping, sustained over the

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37 The cutoff point of 1,000 peacekeepers in defining a “major peacekeeping country” is, by necessity, a somewhat arbitrary line. However, the limit of 1,000 soldiers was chosen to ensure that the country in question was deploying more than a single peacekeeping battalion to a single UN operation. This definition tends to capture troop contributing countries that are deploying significant contingents to more than one peacekeeping mission, aiming to eliminate contributions single-battalion deployments that could be primarily explained by mission-specific incentives to contribute. Though the size of a battalion varies across different armed forces, they tend be under 1,000 soldiers.

38 Coleman (2015) defines token contributions as 40 or less peacekeeping troops taking part in a “significant” peacekeeping operation totally at least 300 total peacekeepers (48).
Defining variation in this way ensures that the changes that are studied in this dissertation represent true shifts in a country’s peacekeeping policy. For example, in August 2011 to August 2013, the United States more than doubled its peacekeeping troop contribution (International Peace Institute 2015). However, this only meant that number of American troops deployed to Blue Helmet operations went from 13 to 27 individuals. Particularly given the capacity of the United States military, such a case would hardly fit the criteria for the significant change this thesis is interested in. The requirement of variance of at least 2,000 troops over the period of study ensures therefore that cases are selected to fit the research question.

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39 At with the cutoff for what constitutes a “major state” in peacekeeping, the threshold of 1,000 peacekeepers is maintained to ensure it is a change greater than one battalion. The requirement of maintaining this change over the course of at least a year is meant to capture true policy changes, rather than changes primarily driven by logistical considerations.
Strategic Cultural Model of Peacekeeping

This section will focus on developing the fourth generation approach to strategic culture described in the previous chapter into a probabilistic model that can help us understand the ways in which peacekeeping troop contributions shift over time. The decision to increase or decrease the number of troops sent to the United Nations cannot be considered in a vacuum. Rather, it must be considered in the light of changes to how a country views its military and its international use of force. Christoph Meyer, whose use of scalable norms will feature prominently in this thesis, argues that changes in threat perception, the occurrence of crisis events and the emergence of new institutions are all clear changes that require national strategic cultures to develop learning mechanisms:

“Norms, ideas and practices are not isolated variables, but should rather be seen as interrelated elements of and derived from an overarching identity narrative of a given community in its relation to the outside world” (Meyer 2005, 529).

The approach to strategic culture taken here calls for a greater recognition of the importance of the work of comparativists and country experts than has traditionally been provided in international relations. In order to understand the international behaviour of a state, one must understand its cultural background, unique characteristics, and in-depth history. Drawing from anthropology and other fields, the strategic cultural approach seeks to operationalize these cultural views of the use of force, rejecting the notion that this is too complex or dynamic for use in international relations theory (Pirani 2014). Against the perspective of theories such as structural realism, change and systemic shocks are seen by this model not as once-in-a-lifetime events – represented in the view that the end of the Cold War or

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40 Cultural Theory, or CT, is a branch of comparative anthropology that uses analytic tools to identify different “ways of life” or worldviews (egalitarian, hierarchical, individualist, and fatalist) that can be compared across historical contexts to understand individual perception (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Like strategic culture, however, Cultural Theory can be prone to oversimplification, ethnocentrism and stereotyping – Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations is arguably a prime example of this (Lantis 2002, 88).
September 11, 2001 are random occurrences that are difficult or impossible for social science to account for. Instead, both periods of stability and periods of massive change are filtered through the lens of culture, as a continuous process that applies and reconstructs national narratives (Lantis 2002). Using the example of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York it could be said that, while experts could not have been expected to predict the details of the terrorist attack, those familiar with American strategic history, military institutions, and narratives surrounding the use of force would have seen that the post-9/11 response of American strategic elites would fall among a limited range of options. It would have been unthinkable, for example, for the United States not to respond with some element of force, or to have treated the events of 9/11 as a purely criminal/legal matter.41

In applying strategic culture to the understanding of national approaches to UN peacekeeping, I draw heavily from Christoph Meyer’s approach in studying European strategic culture, which made important strides in concretely operationalizing strategic culture theory.42 Rather than discussing the use of force in general terms, Meyer’s *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture* (Meyer 2006) breaks down strategic culture into four distinct norms, which he argues can be scaled and measured. These norms (or, more accurately, four macro-level categories of norms) are all interrelated, they may be shared across certain like-minded countries, and they are generally less resistant to change than previous approaches to strategic culture had assumed (Meyer 2005, 524). The norms are also scalable, in the sense that they are multidimensional approaches to a particular aspect of force that can be ranked from less

41 This is particularly true in this case because, unlike the defeat of Nazi Germany or the collapse of Imperial Japan, 9/11 did not result in a change in the foundational elements of American strategic culture. It only changed the relationship between existing dominant and subordinate strategic subcultures. The impact of September 11, 2001 on American strategic culture is explored further in Mahnken’s (2009) *U.S. Strategic and Organizational Subcultures.*

42 Meyer’s approach to the normative components of strategic culture in turn drew from Stein Heiselberg’s work *Pacifism and Activism* (2003), which located national strategic cultures according to different normative dimensions so as to avoid rigid dichotomies in the theory.
internationally activist to more internationally activist. A country that, across these different
norms, has a dominantly low level of activism is unlikely to use force of any kind outside of its
borders. A country that has consistently high normative levels of activism will readily use force
internationally to accomplish a range of policy goals. The four scalable norms of strategic culture
that Meyer identifies are:

1. The goal of the use of force
2. The way in which force is used
3. The preferred mode of cooperation
4. The threshold for domestic and international authorization for the use of force

As Meyer sees it, the first dimension, the goal of the use of force, can inform the other
three dimensions as it touches the heart of a nation’s military identity, determining to a large
degree “the structure, culture and capabilities of a community’s armed forces” (Meyer 2006, 22).
This first category identifies how useful a country believes the tool of the use of force to be, and
in which situations the country is likely to deploy armed force (as opposed to deploying tools of
a political, diplomatic, or economic nature). As mentioned above, the four norms Meyer
identifies are actually best considered as categories of norms – groupings of strategic norms that
can be broken down into questions about a country’s use of force. Questions that strategic elites
may ask themselves that are relevant to the goal of the use of force include: What are the defence
objectives of our country, and which objective is most important? Why do we have a military at
all? What is the relationship between the armed forces and civil society?

The way in which force is used touches on issues of restraint, casualty avoidance, and
calculations of risk. While various countries at different points in history have professed a
willingness to commit to “all-out war” with little concern for the lives of foreign citizens or their
own population, in reality issues of domestic impact and what is or is not considered a legitimate
war target always have an impact on strategic decisions. Even in the most authoritarian of
regimes, strategic elites must consider the impact of in-group casualties on stability and on the possibility to actually implement force, particularly in a nuclear age. Questions about the way in which force is used may include: What is the definition of threat? How are casualties and fatalities perceived? If we are attacked, what are the rules of a proportional response?

Whether or not a country prefers to use force in coordination with other international actors, i.e. its preferred mode of cooperation, is a major cultural component of strategy. Structural realism asserts that purely materialistic considerations captured in game theory can predict how a state is likely to align, but in practice elements of cultural affinity and long-term trust play a major role in determining whether a neighbour’s arms buildup is a source of reassurance or threat. The strategic cultural attachment to the ideal of neutrality in countries like Austria and Ireland, meanwhile, can strongly influence a country’s design not to enter into formal alliances, even where the material benefits seem clear. When understanding a country’s preferred mode of cooperation, the following questions are useful: Where does the country fit in the global network of alliances and collective security? What is the situation with regard to international law, and how does this affect the use of force? Who is our preferred partner?

Finally, the threshold for the use of force refers to the authorisations that a country’s strategic elite deems necessary to sanction the legal or legitimate use of military force. Such authorization may be technical in nature – for example, requiring Congress to authorize the deployment of military forces or requiring a United Nations Security Council resolution to be passed – or they may be vaguer – for example, the sense that a population broadly supports a particular action politically, or the assurance that the international powers will not interfere. Again, even in non-democratic authoritarian regimes, the assent of certain key groups (factional leaders, family members, regional warlords, or a superpower to which the state acts as a proxy)
is invariably required. To understand the ephemeral notion of a country’s threshold for the use of force, these questions can be helpful: What criteria must be met for the general population or the international community to see the use of force as “legitimate”, and which audience matters more? What are the norms of sovereignty and non-interference? What are the budget pressures and expenditure priorities that shape the country’s current military capabilities?

These norms are scaled in terms of national activism, with Meyer differentiating between countries that sees the goal of force as pure defence from immediate attack rather than extra-territorial expansion, for example, or between countries whose tolerance for casualties is low rather than high. Therefore, countries with a high degree of neutrality, such as Austria, might have a low scale of activism across the four norms, whereas countries with an aggressive and expansionist strategic culture, like North Korea, would be on the high scale of activism for all four norms.

Table 2 Strategic norms concerning the legitimate ends and means of defence policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Activism</th>
<th>Scalable Norm: Goal for the Use of Force</th>
<th>Scalable Norm: The Way in which Force is Used</th>
<th>Scalable Norm: Preferred Mode of Cooperation</th>
<th>Scalable Norm: Requirement for Domestic and International Assent to the Use of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Defence against immediate attack on home territory</td>
<td>Reactive, proportionate</td>
<td>Neutrality (non-interference)</td>
<td>High domestic threshold, high international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defending groups/nationals abroad against security threats</td>
<td>Activist, low in-group and low out-group casualties</td>
<td>Cooperation on the basis of laws, treaties, and rules</td>
<td>High domestic threshold, low international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Promoting values, beliefs or ideas abroad</td>
<td>Activist, low in-group and high out-group</td>
<td>Cooperation of choice among preferred</td>
<td>Low domestic threshold, high international</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, Meyer’s approach sees countries as having a single, characterizing strategic culture that is constant over time. In discussing the strategic culture literature, Meyer categorizes his model as following the first generation of strategic culture, which sees culture as having a largely causal, stable effect on state behaviour (Meyer 2006, 25). While he acknowledges that a national strategic culture may change as the result of major external pressures (such as the changes in post-World War II Germany or the fall of the Soviet Union), this is seen by Meyer as being as a rare occurrence. In general, he argues, we can expect the United States, Brazil, or Iran to act consistently in a certain way, owing to their elites’ strategic culture.

In contrast, I argue – drawing again from the fourth generation of strategic culture – that the strategic culture and strategic behaviour of a country can vary significantly over time, owing to the existence of multiple strategic subcultures. While the limits of this variance are set by long-standing national subcultures that have historical roots, state behaviour at a given time is influenced by the ways in which these subcultures vie for dominance among elites. Taking the example of the United States, we can see strong currents of unilateralism, extraterritoriality, and disregard for international authorization, which could be seen as one form of American strategic subculture (Lee 2008). However, students of American politics also recognize that there are, at the same time, strong tendencies towards isolationism, low casualty tolerance, and neutrality that come up from time to time in American strategic behaviour as well (Segal, Segal, and Eyre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extra-territorial expansion of political, economic, or cultural control</th>
<th>Aggressive, disproportionate towards in-group and out-group casualties</th>
<th>Unilateralism</th>
<th>Low domestic threshold, low international</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Thus, drawing on comparativist literature and works of American strategic history, a number national strategic subcultures can be identified in the United States. This allows for a range of strategic behaviour while at the same time delineating the boundaries of what is considered acceptable in the use of force within American society.

By combining Meyer’s use of scalable norms with the subculture approach of the fourth generation, a model emerges which is suitable for examining the strategic cultural implications of specific policy in a particular country – in the case of this dissertation, Canadian, Indian and Chinese troop contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Each of these three countries have multiple strategic subcultures unique to their national environment, and each of these subcultures interact with specific instances of the use of force (such as peacekeeping) in different ways.

Understanding strategic norms and change in this way also help avoid the fallacy of equating a particular strategic attitude with a specific political party. As Bajpai (2014, 113) notes, different strategic cultures can be found competing within all political parties, various branches of government, as well as in the media, academia, and in policy think-tanks. The example of the Republic Party illustrates how a single party, can put be isolationist, protectionism, and expansionist in its discourse.
Measuring Strategic Norms in Peacekeeping

United Nations peacekeeping is an unusual example of the international use of force (Wentges 1998). While modern armed peacekeeping operations are fundamentally still military exercises, they are in theory conducted to promote the broad values of international peace and security rather than strict national or material interest. They also tend to be casualty adverse for both in-group members (that is, peacekeepers and civilians) and out-group members (the belligerent forces of a particular conflict) (Bratt 1997). In their mandate, UN peacekeeping missions operate on the basis of host state consent, impartiality, and a number of other international laws, rules and norms (Rubinstein 2005). Finally, as operations authorized only by the United Nations Security Council, UN peacekeeping missions by their very nature depend on international authorization for the use of force.
Table 3: The Peacekeeping Sweet Spot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Activism</th>
<th>Norm: The Goal of the Use of Force</th>
<th>Norms: The Way in Which Force is Used</th>
<th>Norm: Preferred Mode of Cooperation</th>
<th>Norm: Threshold of Assent for the Use of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Defence against immediate attack on home territory</td>
<td>Reactive, proportionate</td>
<td>Neutrality (non-interference)</td>
<td>High domestic threshold, high international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defending groups/nationals abroad against security threats</td>
<td>Activist, low in-group and low out-group casualty tolerance</td>
<td>Cooperation on the basis of laws, treaties, and rules</td>
<td>High domestic threshold, low international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Promoting values, beliefs, or ideas abroad</td>
<td>Activist, low in-group and high out-group casualty tolerance</td>
<td>Cooperation of choice among preferred partners</td>
<td>Low domestic threshold, high international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Extra-territorial expansion of political, economic, or cultural control</td>
<td>Aggressive, disproportionate towards in-group and out-group casualty tolerance</td>
<td>Unilateralism</td>
<td>Low domestic threshold, low international</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on these core elements of how United Nations peacekeeping operations use force, the notion of a “peacekeeping sweet spot” can be formed from the scalable norms developed by Meyer. The principles behind the use of force in modern, post-Cold War peacekeeping were best enumerated in the 2000 Brahimi Report, the result of a UN Panel investigating the shortcomings of Blue Helmet peacekeeping in the wake of failures in Rwanda and Bosnia. Named after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Panel’s Chair, the report listed the conditions required for peacekeeping operations to be effective, including the ideal norms surrounding the use of force (Durch et al., 2003). Embedded in terms such as “impartiality” and “self-defence” can be found a normative structure that fits into Meyer’s typology of scalable norms. As Hikaru Yamashita (2008) noted, impartiality in the use of force by peacekeepers is interpreted in the Brahimi Report as “as loyalty to the mission mandate and to the Charter principles” – e.g. the promotion of certain
values, beliefs and ideas in operational settings (617). Self-defence and the use of force to protect civilians is emphasized to encourage few casualties, including belligerent combatants. Throughout the development of mission mandates and Rules of Engagement, deployment on the basis of international law is consistently the basis in peacekeeping. And finally, while theoretical neutrality is espoused in the Brahimi Report, the mandate of peacekeepers to counter “actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds” illustrate the primacy of international authority over domestic legitimacy in the sphere of modern peacekeeping (Yamashita, 2008, 618).

In a sense, this range could be considered to be the broad “strategic culture” of modern United Nations peacekeeping. This “sweet spot” represents the range of strategic cultural norms that are likely dominant in a high-level troop contributing country to UN peacekeeping. A country whose dominant strategic subculture sees the goal of the use of force as limited to defence against immediate attack on home territory is, of course, unlikely to be significantly involved in UN missions. Similarly, a country whose dominant strategic culture tends towards an aggressive use of force, with little regard for both in-group and out-group casualties, would have a difficult time reconciling this perspective with the way that peacekeeping operations are conducted. A state that sees the utility of force in promoting values abroad, that has a low casualty tolerance, that privileges cooperation on the basis of laws, treaties and rules, and that places a high value on the international authorization for the use of force, however, is a strong candidate for high-level involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

How can we test what national strategic subculture is, at any given time, more or less dominant in a particular case study, covering the post-Cold War time period of 1990 to 2015? If
a country has a number of key strategic subcultures, with only one favouring the use of force in peacekeeping operations, how can we identify that country’s current strategic orientation, relative to the “peacekeeping sweet spot”? Put simply, where can we find the “repositories” of a country’s strategic culture? Drawing on some of the methods that have been established in the operationalization of strategic culture studies, I argue that the use of strategic statements – that is, statements made or written by a national strategic elite that indicate attitudes towards the international use of force – are key. In the conduct of strategic policy, statements about the use of force represent the base unit of measurement. Simple statements pertaining to military force – statements like “like-minded allies”, “punching above our weight”, or even “mutually assured destruction” – contain complex normative meanings that can be tracked over time. When elites discuss how, why, and under which circumstances force is useful, they provide a glimpse into the different perspectives that are at play in a given decision-making process.

While historical documents – “classical” strategic texts such as Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, and Alfred Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* – can help us in understanding the strategic cultural environment that has given rise to particular subcultures, only contemporary statements about the use of force can indicate which subculture is dominant at a given point in time. As Bloomfield (2012) points out, an overreliance on historical text can feed into the excessive-continuity problem of strategic culture. Looking purely at Ming Dynasty-era texts to understand Chinese strategic culture leads to the conclusion that Chinese strategic culture has remained static for centuries, despite massive shifts such as the ascent of Communist China (443). Opinion polls, the alternative means of accessing perspectives on grand strategy, can be useful in identifying the public constraints and problems of
authorization that strategic elites face (Meyer 2006, 139).44 Mirow (2016), for example, uses polling data to track support for various uses of international force in a number of post-9/11 liberal democracies, including Canada.

In European Security Policy and Strategic Culture, Peter Schmidt and Benjamin Zyla provide three reasons why the use of elite discourse (as represented in strategic documents) is preferable to the other methods:

To start with, elite political cultures are easier to describe and measure than, for example, public opinion polls, which are usually too elaborative to reveal specific underlying cultural mindsets on security issues. Second, attitudinal structures held by elite policy makers are assumed to possess sophisticated political belief systems that are more coherent than those of ordinary individuals.45 Third, those elites hold primary responsibility for formulating the security policies of the organization in question, and thus have a great deal of influence in key decisions on values, beliefs, and norms in international security (Schmidt and Zyla 2011, 186).

Polls rarely capture the nuances and specifics in the implementation of force that differentiate one strategic subculture from another. Moreover, in many cases there exists a disconnect between the strategic views of the public and the perspectives of the strategic elites who must actually implement force, especially in countries where foreign policy issues are not a significant part of the domestic political discourse. Historical texts, though helpful for understanding the foundations of a strategic culture, do not provide the “snapshot picture in a specific given time” (Schmidt and Zyla 2011, 186). Ultimately, contemporary strategic

44 Meyer’s study on an emerging European strategic culture relies heavily on opinion polling, though he recognizes the limits of opinion polls in asking the right questions at the right time from a strategic cultural perspective. Meyer ultimately argues for a multidimensional approach: “Norms and culture are not easily deducible from the behaviour and policies of national governments; speeches, statements and documents may well be expressions of strategic culture, but they should be analysed systematically and ideally juxtaposed to other evidence such as public opinion polls, newspaper articles, oral evidence, or elite surveys” (Meyer 2006, 4).
45 I disagree with Schmidt and Zyla on the assertion that elite perspectives on strategy are necessarily more “sophisticated” than those of the general public. Instead, elites are simply more exposed, from an early point in their careers, to the elements that make up a country’s dominant strategic culture, and thus are more highly enmeshed in strategic culture, making their discourse more appropriate for analysis.
statements made by decision-makers, in a forum available to the public, are the best means of capturing the prevailing (and subordinate) norms surrounding force identified by Meyer.

Table 4: Breakdown of scalable strategic norms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scalable Norm</th>
<th>Strategic Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Goal of the Use of Force</td>
<td>The objective of defence policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>List of strategic objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The contribution that (Country A) can make in the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The nature of the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The role of the armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why does (Country A) have armed forces?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship between armed forces and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role of the armed forces in promotion ideology/values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Way in which Force is Used</td>
<td>Definition of threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-group casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Out-group casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportionality of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Table 4 above, I have broken down the four meta-norms of strategic culture identified by Meyer into 25 indicators of meta-norms involving various aspects of the use of force. These indicators illustrate the different facets of norms surrounding the use of force, and provide a guide for translating the strategic phrases into shifting norms. Strategic documents, speeches, and policy papers rarely make broad statements about “the threshold for the use of force” or “the goal of the use of force”. Instead, policy elites will discuss more specific elements of collective security, international law, or budget pressures. Key terms and phrases among these norms, such as the notion of “non-interference” by outside powers, that can be analyzed to understand elites’ larger perceptions about the use of force.

Such a categorization allows my model to match strategic statements made by national elites in various country-specific strategic subcultures identified in the literature, and allows us to
understand which subculture dominates the discourse of elites at a particular point. By using these statements to identify the prevailing ideas about the use of force in a country, and by comparing these sentiments with the ideals of the “sweet spot” of United Nations peacekeeping, a method can be found that allows us to identify whether a country’s strategic culture is amenable to involvement in UN peace operations.
Methodological Considerations

Part of the reason why works on strategic culture have generally dealt with empirical case studies in a very broad fashion is the widespread sentiment that:

It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove a causal link between a particular strategic culture, thought, or set of preferences and an actual action by state leaders (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2012, 35).

While the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate a mutually constitutive, rather than causal, link between the strategic culture and state behaviour (e.g. the decision to become involved in peacekeeping), the challenge remains. In developing this model’s framework, I argued that contemporary strategic statements are the best indicators of strategic cultural norms. In the course of this thesis research, 4,089 strategic statements were coded according to perspectives on the use of force – the national strategic subcultures – that they aligned with. These strategic statements were drawn from 179 strategic documents – White Papers, policy documents, military guidelines, and speeches – across three national case studies. This analysis was conducted to provide a more precise understanding of the dominant and subordinate subcultures at play in the different cases, to better understand the way that these subcultures relate to the peacekeeping policies of the time. This methodological section will clarify the means by which strategic subcultures are identified, which types of strategic documents were included for analysis, the type of discourse analysis that was conducted, and how specific strategic statements were matched with particular norms about the international use of force.

*Strategic subcultures*

In order to identify the primary strategic subcultures that exist in each national strategic landscape, this thesis draws heavily on the existing literature on national strategic culture done by comparative experts. Just as Jack Snyder’s original understanding of Soviet strategic culture
derived from his extensive research of Soviet history, military, and politics, existing literature on
the ways of war and the use of force in a particular environment has been conducted in a wide
variety of national contexts. Using Meyer’s framework of scalable norms and the breakdown of
normative indicators identified in Table 4 as a guide to this literature, I identify the four major
narrative groupings in how each case country views the utility of force. I then mapped the
national subcultures according to their respective views on the role of the military, international
cooperation, casualties, etc. and located each in relation to this peacekeeping sweet spot.

In many cases, this subculture classification is made explicit by authors, while other
authors who do not directly associate themselves with strategic culture theories make such
distinctions more implicitly. While disagreement among comparative experts as to the typology
of different strategic subculture certainly exists, I found that there was in general a high degree
of agreement about the broad narratives surrounding the use of force in the chosen case studies.
This allowed for the subcultures to be mapped more easily along Meyer’s spectrum of activism
in the international use of force.

Strategic documents

More and more, authors have turned to strategic documents – as opposed to “classical”
historical texts or opinion polls -- as the core indicators of dominant national culture.\footnote{Authors like Johnston (1998) and Gilboy & Henigbotham (2012) draw almost exclusively on classic texts like the Seven Military Classics or the Athrasustra do identify the strategic cultures of countries like China or India. As has been mentioned, though, a strategic cultural understanding of modern behaviour requires more than reading classical texts. Historical classical like Sun Tzu’s The Art of War may be emblematic of long-standing strategic subcultures that, in some form, persist to this day, but they alone are not the sources of strategic culture.} Strategic
documents are unique sources of policy because they speak at the same time to internal and
external audiences.\footnote{Of course, publicly available strategic documents do not contain all the information and planning that is at the disposal of a national military, and there will always be a high degree of secrecy and classification that factors into our understanding of elite perception in national security matter. As will be discussed in the case selection section, in some nations such secrecy makes accessing strategic cultural norms practically impossible. However, as Toje} A Defence White Paper is generally a keystone document that has been
formulated by a prevailing dominant strategic subculture. At the same time, it is also a document from which elites takes their cue in formulating day-to-day level policies relating to the use of force. Finally, such a White Paper is also used by public and international actors as a means by which to understand the current and future strategic direction of a country.

Other documents that authors have used to measure strategic culture include periodical strategic statements aimed at both domestic and international audiences, written tactical documents published by the armed forces, or speeches made by elites on the nature of the use of force. Benjamin Zyla, for example, argues that the attitudinal structures of a particular political elite are best expressed in strategic concept documents (Zyla 2011, 669). Lantis and Charlton (2011) focused on a case study of Australian strategic culture, and used that government’s Defence White Papers to track measurable changes in Australia’s defence policy.

*Speeches*

In addition to textual documents published by governments, militaries and strategic elites, speeches on the use of force may also be considered strategic documents. This is especially true when the speeches are given in environments such as the United Nations General Assembly where both domestic and international audiences can be expected to listen. In the case of Denmark, Rasmussen (2005), for example, used a database of a variety of speeches – including speeches made by the Prime Minister, the defence ministers, and other strategic elites – in conjunction with textual documents to examine the utility of force in the modern Danish context.

*Compatibility*

Methodologically speaking, my dissertation uses discourse analysis of elite strategic statements to evaluate whether changes in peacekeeping troop contributions match changes in

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(2009a) argues, most modern governments are expected to provide the general orientations of their strategy to citizens and the international system, even if tactical specifics are left out.
the strategic cultural discourses of three UN Member State case studies. For this study, the discourse of strategic elites – and specifically strategic statements as a base unit of measurement – if the key variable that is tracked over time in order to understand change. Because the strategic cultural environment of each case study is, by necessity, unique, this research engages in what could be described of as a “comparative checking” approach to discourse analysis (Engeli, Allison, and Allison 2014). When comparing strategic documents across different case studies, it is therefore vital to compare apples to apples – even if the strategic cultural environments themselves are wildly different. Textual discourse analysis offers a degree of comparability greater that is difficult to match through other methods, such as interviews with governmental officials.48

Particular types of documents will tend to emphasize particular aspects of strategic culture – for example, speeches made by political leaders at an international forum will generally tend to de-emphasize the use of force, whereas military tactical-level documents will generally tend to emphasize preparation for warfighting. While the strategic documentation of each country is different, every effort will be made to ensure that similar types of documents are faithfully compared across the case studies.

Sources and categories

In analyzing the post-Cold War strategic subcultures of major UN Member States involved in peacekeeping operations, I will draw on three primary levels of strategic documentation:

1. High-level Strategic Documents
2. Mid-level and Tactical Documents
3. Speeches by Strategic Elites

48 Additionally, whereas Canadian diplomats and governmental officials may be willing to provide extensive interview testimony, the same cannot necessarily be expected of Chinese or India officials. Furthermore, as in most cases involving defence and security policy, even the most forthcoming officials are unlikely to provide informations through interviews that cannot be accessed in publicly available documents.
Each of these categories of strategic discourse tend to illuminate different norms of strategic culture. High-level strategic documents, such as Defence White Papers and long-term grand strategies, help us understand the goal of the use of force in a broad manner. Mid-level documents, which tend to be published by a country’s defence department, and tactical-level documents, which tend to be issued by the militaries themselves, speak to the particular ways in which force is used. Speeches by strategic elites, especially when made before international fora, illustrate a country’s threshold for domestic and international authorization in the use of force, as well as that country’s preferred mode of cooperation. Of course, speeches made at the UN General Assembly can sometimes touch upon a country’s larger strategy, and Defence White Papers can include tactical details about the way force is used. By analyzing these three types of strategic document, the range of national strategic cultural norms of a country may be captured across time.

Strategic statements

What, then, should be considered as a “strategic statement” within these documents? Strategic statements are sentences or paragraphs that convey a particular norm about the international use of force. Generally, I use sentences as the dividers between one strategic statement and another, though a larger section may be considered part of a single statement if it expresses a single view on the use of force. When determining whether or not a statement can be considered a strategic statement, an important aspect to consider is whether the same statement could have been altered to fit different strategic subculture themes. Thus, “the role any

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49 Strategic statements, in this context, may also consist of indirect references to how force is used or oblique references to the non-use of force. For example, the phrase “Country X calls for settling disputes over territory through dialogue and negotiation” relates to the use of force in that it represents a low level of strategic cultural ‘activism’, to use Meyer’s approach.

50 Wherever possible, I have attempted to ensure comparability by sticking to a ‘one sentence, one statement’ guideline. In cases where succeeding sentences make essentially the same point – common in diplomatic documents – the two sentences are to be considered a single statement.
military is to defend its citizens” is too vague to qualify as a strategic statement, but “the primary role of the Canadian Forces is to protect Canadians from threats anywhere in the world” can be considered to be a strategic statement because it expresses a subjective view on the role of the country’s military.

Coding of Strategic Statements

In looking at the strategic documents, I extracted strategic culture statements that relate to the use of force and connected them to the norms listed above to understand their place in a particular national strategic environment. In identifying the unique national subcultures in every case study, particular nuances in each subcultures approach to the use of force are highlighted. These nuances fit broadly along the normative spectrum that Meyer identifies, but it is by drawing on the comparative literature mentioned earlier that particular key phrases, concepts, and indicators associated with these subcultures emerge. In the process of mapping each case studies strategic culture, their contending approaches to the goals of use of force, tolerance of casualties, preferred international partners, etc. (as well as more specific debates such as the utility of nuclear weapons or the legitimacy of international law) are drawn out from existing works on the national strategic culture. Using the norms identified in the literature in conjunction with the indicators identified in Table 4, specific statements can be coded as belonging to one subculture or another.

To provide an example of secondary literature to this coding process, I will take an example of a strategic statement from the American case:

The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.\footnote{This statement was part of President James Munroe’s 7th annual report to the United States Congress on December 2nd, 1823 (Gilderhus, 2006).}
A context-free strategic cultural analysis identifies this statement as relating to the issue of non-interference and the use of force to maintain independence and home defence, perhaps categorizing this as a more “isolationist” statement. However, by drawing on the extensive literature on the American way of war and American strategic culture, this strategic statement can be contextualized as not only being part of the Monroe Doctrine, having being repeated and rephrased throughout the history of the United States since 1823. Drawing on the secondary literature in this case allows us to further identify this statement as fitting not within a purely isolationist narrative, but rather as an important early justification for American intervention that legitimizes the use force in what is perceived by the United States as their sphere of influence (Gilderhus, 2006). This context allows for coding as strategic statement like this in a manner particular to the American strategic spectrum, whereas a similar statement made in a Venezuelan or Mexican context would take on a wholly different (perhaps more isolationist meaning).

While every effort is made to divide strategic statements into distinct ideas about the use of force, the identification and coding of truly “mixed” statements is also an important element of this analysis. A single statement may contain a mix of multiple strategic cultures (for example, the statement “we will not start a war, but if provoked we will use every option to win” suggests both elements of isolationism and activism). In such cases, statements are coded neither as belonging to one strategic subculture or another, but rather categorized in a separate ‘mixed’ classification. As we shall see in the case study analyses, the increase presence of mixed strategic statements appears to be a good indicator of an ongoing shift in the subcultural landscape. It appears that, during periods of change in national strategic cultures, policy elites often exhibit this transition for a time through mixed statements that combine both the formerly dominant subculture and the newly ascending subculture.
Tallying up these statements and categorizing them under different dominant and subordinate national subcultures while using the classification developed in Table 3, my method proceeds by classifying a document according to the degrees to which different subcultures appear dominant within it. For example, a given country’s White Paper, issued in the year 2000, may contain 50 strategic culture statements. Of these 30 may be classified under Strategic Subculture A, 10 under Strategic Subculture B, 5 under Strategic Subculture C, and 5 statements may be “mixed”. Therefore, we can say of this particular document that the dominant strategic subculture expressed in this paper is Subculture A (60%), with Subculture B (20%) and C (10%) playing subordinate roles, and a 10% mix of strategic sentiments. By comprehensively examining the range of strategic documents published by that country in the 1990-2015 timeframe, we can track the patterns of dominance and subordination among the national subcultures over time. This represents a first step in understanding how and why a particular strategic subculture becomes dominant at a particular point in time, and how such changes affect specific policies such as the decision to contribute to peacekeeping.

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52 A strategic statement that contains more than one strategic subculture in it is categorized as “mixed”. For example, the statement “Country A seeks peaceful harmony with its neighbours, but we will strike unrelentingly at anyone who attacks us” is a mix of contradictory views about the use of force. The number of mixed statements can indicate a transition period from one dominant strategic subculture to another.
Case Selection

Given the value that strategic culture has in terms of understanding the use of force across time, place and historical circumstances, cross-national comparisons will be vital to the future of strategic culture studies (Scobell 2005). An empirical test of the expectations of strategic culture theory that is limited to a single case study is vulnerable to the critique that the particular instance of state behaviour is unusual or “irrational”, or that the case falls outside the true realm of power politics and international relations – solidifying the view that strategic culture is primarily useful as a supplement to structural realism. Comparative checking of multiple case studies involving the same instances of the use of force (involvement in peacekeeping operations) is therefore needed to strengthen the argument for a strategic cultural understanding of state behaviour.

The case studies that were ultimately selected – Canada, China, and India – are extremely different national environments with diverse strategic cultures and very different peacekeeping behaviours. Nevertheless, as countries who, respectively, declined significantly in peacekeeping troop contributions, increased significantly from a base contribution point of zero, and maintained a high level of troop contributions, the three case countries offer a strong basis for comparing different patterns in peacekeeping behaviour. Furthermore, Canada, China and India each offer a similar corpus of official strategic documents that can be broadly compared to one another. Finally, while the scopes of their national militaries differ greatly – differences in scale mean that a Canadian contribution of 3,000 peacekeepers has a different implication than 3,000 peacekeepers from the massive Chinese People’s Liberation Army – this dissertation’s focus on changes in relative strategic peacekeeping behaviour over time means that comparisons can be made across militaries of vastly different sizes.
Criteria for case study selection:

- Contribution levels

As outlined in the “Key Terms” section, there are certain criteria that must be met by the case studies to appropriately answer this dissertation’s key research question. In order to be considered a “major state involved in post-Cold War peacekeeping”, the case country must have reached a troop contribution level of at least 1,000 peacekeepers after 1990.

Table 5: Member States with more than 1,000 peacekeeping troops, 1990-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Peace Institute, Providing for Peacekeeping Database, 2015

Such a filter reduces the number of eligible case studies from the 122 UN Member States who have been involved in peacekeeping since 1990 to 40 Member States, listed above in Table 5.

- Variations in contribution levels

The important role that change in state behaviour plays in our understanding of strategic cultural change led to a second criteria for case studies to fit the research question. In order to have experience “significant variation” in their troop contribution levels, an increase or decrease of at least 1,000 peacekeepers is needed.
Table 6: Member States with significant variation in troop contributions, 1990-2015

| Bangladesh | Jordan |
| Brazil     | Netherlands |
| China      | Nigeria |
| Canada     | Pakistan |
| Egypt      | Rwanda |
| Ethiopia   | Ukraine |
| France     | United Kingdom |
| India      | United States of America |
| Italy      | |

Source: International Peace Institute, Providing for Peacekeeping Database, 2015

Applying these two criteria, we are left with 17 Member States as possible candidate for this dissertation’s case studies.

- Available background literature

A more practical methodological consideration for the selection of my three case studies is the issue of existing comparative literature on the strategic culture of specific countries. The model of strategic culture used here draws from existing work by experts who have written on the norms, history, and politics of individual countries to develop an understanding the primary competing national subcultures that exist in each Member State. While major powers, long-standing nation states and traditionally Western countries have extensive strategic cultural and comparative literature available on the different facets of the national use of force, there are a number of countries listed in Table 6 that have not been the subject of sufficient or widely available academic studies from which one could derive a typology of the competing subcultures. On this basis, Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Nigeria, Rwanda, and the Ukraine would have been difficult candidates for further analysis.

- Different profiles of involvement
In the final step of choosing from Brazil, Canada, France, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the UK and the United States, I chose three case studies that represented three entirely different patterns of involvement in peacekeeping during the 1990 to 2015 period: Canada, the People’s Republic of China, and India. These three cases represent the three distinct peacekeeping profiles over the period in question. Of the nine Member State candidates, Canada exhibited the largest and most sustained decline from being a “major peacekeeper” to a “token peacekeeper”. The People’s Republic of China, meanwhile, shifted its long-term policy of complete non-contribution to Blue Helmet operations to now becoming the largest contributor among the permanent five members of the Security Council. Lastly, of all the Member States considered, India had the most stable level of troop contribution to UN peacekeeping, rarely providing less than a thousand armed peacekeepers over the 15-year period.

By choosing three countries with such vastly different peacekeeping profiles, these case studies may allow for a robust test of the strategic cultural model. While explaining the shift in contribution levels by applying the my approach to the “subculture model of strategic culture”, in the case of Canada, this model explains the decline by pointing to a distinct shift from a dominant pro-peacekeeping strategic subculture – a subculture that aligns strongly with the peacekeeping “sweet spot” identified earlier” – to a dominant anti-peacekeeping subculture that views the use of force differently. In the case of China, the model looks to a shift towards a more “pro-peacekeeping” strategic subculture in order to understand the country’s sudden engagement, with Chinese strategic elite increasingly viewing the use of force in a way that more closely aligns with the ideals of UN peacekeeping. Finally, in the case of India, the model would expect the relative stability of the country’s peacekeeping contributions to be a reflection of a
degree of strategic cultural stability, with the pro-peacekeeping subculture maintaining dominance throughout much of the period in question.

*Figure 6: Peacekeeping troop contribution patterns of Canada, China and India*

![Diagram showing troop contribution patterns of Canada, China, and India.](image)

*Source: International Peace Institute, Providing for Peacekeeping Database, 2015*

Thus, by applying the criteria of contribution level, variation in contribution levels, available literature and profiles of involvement the three countries of Canada, China and India present themselves as the best candidates for a more thorough investigation of why and how contribution levels change and how the changes can be predicted.

*Strategic documentation used*

In comparing the post-Cold War strategic subcultures of Canada, the People’s Republic of China, and India, I will focus on a number of different types of documentation, reflecting the similarities and differences in how the three countries justify their militaries and the way that they use force. These texts and speeches all fall into one of the three categories of strategic
documentation identified earlier; high-level strategic texts published by political governments, mid-level and tactical texts published by defence officials and militaries, and speeches made by strategic elites at international fora.

China and Canada both periodically publish comprehensive White Papers on Defence, which outline the core priorities of their respective militaries as well as provide key insights into the prevailing views on why, how, and when force is seen as legitimate. Though the Government of India does not publish White Papers, annual reports issued by the Department of Defence cover many of the same subject material as a traditional White Paper and perform largely the same function for policy elites and the Indian public at large as White Papers in other contexts.

In the Canadian case, I use the numerous tactical and mid-level strategic documents published by the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence (DND) on a semi-regular basis to track changing norms about casualty tolerance or the role of armed forces in civil society, for example. In the case of China, the inherently greater reliance on state secrecy means that such tactical-level documents are rarely made available to the public. Instead, I draw on the reports made to the Party Congress every five years by the paramount leader as a means of insight into the relationship between the People’s Liberation Army, other branches of the Chinese military, and the Chinese public. Within the Indian strategic environment, the unique venue of Independence Day speeches, given on August 15 of every year in front of a military parade, provides a sense of the prevailing norms about the use of force in that year.

Finally, in all three cases, I use the annual speeches made at the United Nations General Assembly’s General Debate to measure the changes in norms about collective security, preferred modes of cooperation, and views on the international authorization of the use of force in operations such as peacekeeping. These speeches, made every September at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York City, are usually made by the foreign ministers of their respective countries, though – as we shall see – the fact that these speeches are occasionally made by higher- or lower-ranking officials can be suggestive of the country’s current attitudes towards the United Nations.

Having developed the theoretical framework for this dissertation’s strategic cultural approach and establishing the baselines and boundaries of the scope of my research, the groundwork is set for the substantive analysis of the three case countries chosen. For a mix of both theoretical and methodological reasons, Canada, China, and India have been selected as the best cases to test the strategic cultural model put forth here. The following analysis will centre around the core research question: *What is the connection between measurable changes in national strategic culture and significant changes to the troop contribution levels of major states involved in post-Cold War United Nations peacekeeping operations?*
Case Studies

The following three chapters present the analysis of the three country studies selected for our examination of troop contributions to UN peacekeeping. Each case study will start by first laying the groundwork to defining the key national subcultures that exist in the unique cultural environment of each country. Canada, China and India all differ significantly in terms their historical and civilizational perspectives, geography and natural resources, political structure and political institutions, myths and symbols, technological attitudes, and norms and conventions.

By mapping out the strategic subcultures that have been dominant and subordinate at different stages in the history of each country, this thesis will conduct an analysis of the three case studies that allows for cross-country comparison while maintaining an appreciation of the significant differences in the historical experiences of each case. These case studies will also investigate how the different national strategic subcultures relate to the “peacekeeping sweet spot”, providing a basis to apply the strategic cultural model of peacekeeping.

Following this mapping of the national strategic cultural landscapes, the case studies then proceed with the analysis of the content of the three types of strategic documents that have been identified above. As mentioned in the previous chapter, coding strategic statements (that is, statements that reflect the use of force) according to different strategic subcultures and conducting a quantitative analysis allows us to track the ways in which the different subcultures rise and fall in all three countries, and can then link this variation to the variance in peacekeeping troop contributions.
Chapter 3. Canada: From Iconic Peacekeeper to Token Contributor

Some governments regard the use of force itself as the greatest evil. Others define "good" as the pursuit of human rights and will opt to employ force when human rights are violated. As the nineties drew to a close and the new millennium dawned with no sign of an end to these ugly little wars, it was as if each troubling conflict we were faced with had to pass the test of whether we could "care" about it or "identify" with the victims before we'd get involved.

Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, p. 517

Canada and UN Peacekeeping

All three case studies in this thesis focus on the element of change as a window into understanding the factors driving national peacekeeping policies. The Canadian case study illustrates one aspect of change in peacekeeping; namely, why might a major troop contributor to UN operations suddenly and drastically reduce its involvement in peacekeeping?

*Figure 7: Canadian Peacekeeping troop contributions 1990-2016*

*Source: International Peace Institute, Providing for Peacekeeping Database, 2015*
Figure 1, drawn from the International Peace Institute’s Providing for Peacekeeping Database, illustrates the puzzle of Canadian peacekeeping troop contributions. At the height of Canadian post-Cold War peacekeeping, more than 3,000 Canadian soldiers were deployed to Blue Helmet missions across the globe, second only to France among ranked contributors (Department of Peacekeeping Operations December 1992). By comparison, modern Canadian troop contributions have fallen to less than 1% of their previous level, hovering around 21 individual peacekeeping soldiers for the last decade. In 2015, this ranked Canada as the 76th highest UN contributor behind countries such as Zambia, Armenia, and Honduras (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2014).

Canadian identity has been – and to a certain extent still is -- wrapped up with the concept of UN peacekeeping, dating back to the period of Lester B. Pearson and the notion of Canadian ownership of the very idea of peacekeeping (Dorn 2005). Among the general public, peacekeeping consistently ranks among the top foreign policy priorities (Anker 2005), yet for more than a decade the Canadian government has, for all intents and purposes, withdrawn from United Nations peace operations. At the time of writing, Canada remains a token-level contributor to United Nations operations. The Liberal Government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has, as of August 2016, pledged to provide up to 600 Canadian Armed Forces members to the United Nations as part of a “reengagement” with peacekeeping. At the time of writing, however, Canadian troop contributions to peacekeeping remain at an all-time low.

**Peacekeeping Logistics**

In practical terms, the mechanism by which Canadian governments determine the level of peacekeeping troops they are willing to commit to a given operation is relatively transparent and
has changed little over time. As Sorenson and Wood (2014) note, while a number of bureaucratic and non-governmental actors may provide input and advice on the process, ultimately it is the ministers in cabinet – and, most of all, the prime minister – who determine how many peacekeepers from the Canadian Armed Forces\(^{53}\) will be used and where they will be deployed (168). Upon receiving a request for peacekeepers from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations, relayed through the permanent Canadian diplomatic delegation in New York, the Canadian foreign affairs and defence ministries conduct independent evaluations of whether the operation in question meets Canada’s current foreign policy priorities and defence capabilities (Fisher and Normandin 2014).\(^{54}\) Considerations taken into account in these evaluations include the complexity and risk level of the operation, other ongoing overseas Canadian military commitments, the views of the Chief of Defence Staff and other military chiefs, and the costs of the operation (Sorenson and Wood 2014, 169). The two ministers then present the results of these evaluations to Cabinet for a collective decision. Traditionally, involvement in peacekeeping operations has not been put to Parliament for a vote.

**Historical Background of Involvement**

From 1956 through to the end of the Cold War, Canada played a high-profile role in the evolution of UN peacekeeping. Following the establishment of traditional peacekeeping – and recognition by the Nobel Peace Prize Committee of Lester B. Pearson’s role in helping to

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\(^{53}\) Originally established as the “Canadian Armed Forces”, the term “Canadian Forces” was used increasingly to refer to the Canadian military in the 1980’s and 1990’s. As part of a rebranding effort that included re-establishing the ‘Royal’ titles of the Air Force and Navy, the Conservative Government of Stephen Harper re-established the “Canadian Armed Forces” naming convention in 2013. As we shall see, the inclusion or exclusion of the term ‘armed’ in referring to the military is linked to developments in strategic culture. For the sake of clarity, however, the modern term “Canadian Armed Forces” or CAF will be used throughout.

\(^{54}\) The process above describes the standard procedure for large-scale troop deployments. Token-level deployment decisions involving smaller contingents or individual commanding officers may be made at a lower decision-making level. Details of the peacekeeping decision-making process confirmed in an interview with Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade official Mateo Barney on August 19\(^{th}\), 2015 in Ottawa, Canada.
establish the concept of Blue Helmet operations. – Canada participated in operations in the Sinai Desert, the Congo, in Cyprus, and on the border between India and Pakistan, among many other locations. These missions were primarily – though not exclusively – non-combat observation operations, and Canada developed a particular niche in providing communications capabilities and signals technology to peacekeepers (Dorn 2005).

With the rapid expansion of UN missions following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Canadian government increased both the number of peacekeepers contributed and the scope of tasks that Canadian troops were expected to perform. With the evolution of “second generation peacekeeping”, Canadian peacekeepers became more robustly involved in enforcing ceasefires, rather than simply monitoring them. In the early 1990s, Canada provided five Force Commanders and helped to develop innovative mechanisms such as the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), creating an image as a leader in the field of peacekeeping. 1993 represented the high-water mark of Canadian troop contributions, with simultaneous deployments to UN operations in Cambodia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Sahara, and Syria.

**Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda**

If the zenith of Canadian involvement in peacekeeping was in places like Cambodia and Croatia, the country's peacekeeping low point followed quickly with the disastrous experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR in Bosnia faced many of the complications and issues that are now common in complex, modern peacekeeping operations; an unclear Security Council mandate (over 70 UN resolutions were passed regarding the conflict), multiple hostile parties, uncertain host nation consent, and direct threats to UN peacekeepers on the ground (Murray and McCoy 2010, 180). Overwhelmed by Bosnian Serb forces on the
ground, UNPROFOR required NATO air strike assistance and was eventually replaced by the Implementation Force (IFOR), a far more robust operation.

In 1993, members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM) beat Shidane Arone, a Somali teenager, to death. A subsequent inquiry revealed systematic behaviour of racism, unarmed shootings and torture in the regiment, and nine soldiers were criminally charged. The Somalia Affair had a strong impact on Canadian strategic culture at the time, both as a challenge on the country’s self-image as an open, liberal force for good in the world that is beyond the old-world problems of colonialism and racism, and as a brutal example of the problems facing modern peacekeeping. In *Dark Threats, White Knights*, Sherene Razack analyses Canadian military masculinity and racism in the Somalia Affair, and notes how the overwhelming reaction of Canadians in the wake of the Affair was to ignore the racism and torture of the events; preferring instead to see it as a betrayal of Canadian ideals. By blaming both “a few bad apples” in the Airborne Regiment and blaming the failure of UN peacekeeping more generally, Canadians could maintain the “national dream of innocence” of Canada as a “non-imperial power without ambitions of conquest” (Razack 2004, 119).

Finally, in 1994, forces deployed as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) stood by as more than 800,000 Rwandans were killed by the Hutu majority government. The peacekeepers, commanded by Canadian Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, were not mandated or equipped for military intervention, and requests made to New York for assistance and authorization to intervene in the face of genocide were ignored. As perhaps the biggest failure in peacekeeping history, the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath fed into growing

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55 The role of military masculinities in Canadian peacekeeping more generally is further explored by Sandra Whitworth (2004), noting the fundamental tension between the skills of war that deployed peacekeepers are trained in and the tasks required in peace operations. This tension is evident in Pearsonian strategic culture, with peacekeeping often derided by Canadian strategic elites as effeminate compared to more robust stability operations.
concerns in Canada about the efficacy of UN operations. The overall silence of Canadian leadership in the face of genocide and atrocities – in Rwanda, in Bosnia, and in Somalia – can be seen as early evidence of a narrowing of the “perimeter of concern” of Canada’s international affairs (Nossal 2004, 509).

Disillusion and Theories of Decline in Canadian Peacekeeping

Though these experiences played out in unique ways in the Canadian context, the late 1990s saw general disillusion with United Nations peacekeeping among Western countries. Beginning in 1997, the Canadian government began reducing its commitments to UN operations, with only a token number of troops being deployed since the turn of the millennium. Within Canada, UN peacekeeping had long been linked to the Liberal Party of Canada, owing to the enduring association with Liberal Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson. This association has led to several arguments tying the rise and fall of Canadian peacekeeping to changing domestic political circumstances, including electoral politics. Rioux and Hay (1998), for example, saw the post-Cold War deficit-focused drive away from peacekeeping as being championed by isolationist parties, including the Progressive Conservatives and the Reform Party. Fisher and Normandin (2014), in addition to linking the decline of Canadian peacekeeping to the after-effects of failures in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, noted that the Canadian domestic political context had not viewed peacekeeping as a priority since the ascent of the Conservative Party under Stephen Harper.

*Figure 8: Canadian federal elections and peacekeeping troop contributions 1990-2015*
Looking at the timeline of federal elections in Canada, however, it is clear that changes in governing parties alone does not explain Canada’s apparent declining commitment to peacekeeping in the mid- to late-1990s. Of course, foreign policy shifts do not necessarily occur immediately after an election, but even with that in mind the connection between electoral politics and significant variation in Canadian troop contributions is weak. Although the ascension of the Harper Government was shortly followed by Canadian peacekeeping troop contributions reaching their lowest levels up to that point (dropping from 158 peacekeepers to 15), the biggest drop in the number of Canadian Armed Forces provided to the UN came in the midst of a Liberal Party majority, under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. The premiership of Paul Martin maintained a low and stable troop contribution level, and Canada’s involvement in peacekeeping operations has been minimal ever since.
In 1995, a report by *Insight Canada Research* noted that 77% of Canadians polled believed the most important role of the Canadian Armed Forces was peacekeeping. 39% believed that peacekeeping was Canada’s main international contribution (Insight Canada 1995). This poll was conducted just after the height of Canadian peacekeeping. Yet subsequent polls taken in 2003 and 2005 – as Canada’s involvement in peacekeeping operations declined rapidly -- found similarly high or even higher levels of Canadian support for peacekeeping as a CAF role (Anker 2005). The most recent Nanos survey on the subject, conducted in October 2016, has similar results, with nearly 75% of Canadian responding that participating in UN peacekeeping missions is either a very good or good use of Canadian Armed Forces personnel and equipment (Nanos Research 2016).

The disconnect between partisan politics, public opinion and Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping operations has been noted by others. Roland Paris (2014) has written that, despite the longstanding association of peacekeeping with the Liberal Party of Canada, the most effective supporter of Canadian involvement in UN operations was Brian Mulroney, a Progressive Conservative (44). Allan Gotlieb (2005) highlighted the contradiction that the peacekeeping capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces were being drastically reduced at the same time as Lloyd Axworthy’s ambitious human security agenda was taking shape (23). Finally, Bloomfield and Nossal (2007) argue that, though the Canadian government continued to “encourage in Canadians the view that peacekeeping was Canada’s métier”, the truth was that, by the time of Paul Martin’s government, Canada had not been involved in traditional peacekeeping for quite some time (301). Finally, Sorenson and Wood (2014) make the argument that, rather than being the result of an ideological shift, peacekeeping in the late 1990s fell prey to fiscal conservatism and a desire to balance the budget – though, of course, the operation in
Afghanistan would lead to significant defence spending under both Liberal and Conservative governments.

The strategic cultural argument that will be presented here does not wholly discard the potential importance of domestic politics in Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping. It adds, however, that changes in strategic culture should be seen as incorporating various elements surrounding the perception of how Canada should use its military force and its peacekeepers. Rather than being the sole drivers of Canadian peacekeeping policy, party politics is seen to interact with and are shaped by the dominant strategic culture of the time. It will be argued that strategic culture may therefore be the best way of modelling and incorporating the various elements that add up to a change in how Canada – and in particular, elite Canadian policy-makers – fundamentally view the role of the Canadian Armed Forces and peacekeeping.
Mapping Canadian Strategic Culture

The history of Canadian strategic culture is relatively short, with full Canadian sovereign authority over foreign and military policy dating back less than a hundred years. A number of works on Canadian strategic culture have argued for the existence of several distinct, competing societal views of the Canadian use of force, and this case study draws extensively on this largely fourth generation strategic culture literature. Justin Massie (2009), for example, used the idea of competing subcultures in his study of Canadian strategic culture, as have Fortmann, et al. (2004). Christopher Twomey (2008), while not explicitly placing himself within the fourth generation camp, refers to the “multiple repositories of culture” as a useful means for explaining variations in state behaviour. These repositories represent the “plethora of different national cultural themes that compete and interact through different elements of society” to establish the “true” national strategic culture for a particular period in a state’s history (Twomey 2008, 350-351). Finally, Kim Richard Nossal, writing both by himself and with Alan Bloomfield, has applied the idea of strategic subcultures to the comparative cases of Canada and Australia, focusing on instances of shifting strategic behavior (Nossal 2004; Bloomfield and Nossal 2007). While they note that the subculture approach to strategic culture does not provide predictions in the strictly positivist sense, it does allow us to develop expectations about the future stability of a particular course of strategic behaviour -- a grasp of future behaviour that has been termed “explicative understanding” (Bloomfield and Nossal 2007, 288).

In his 2004 work, Nossal provides a history of Canadian defence policy since 1867 that divides Canadian strategic culture into distinct strategic attitudes based on prevailing definitions

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56 These authors refer to such competing norms as ‘countercultures’, to distinguish them from regional strategic subcultures (such as those at play between Quebec and Ontario), but the concept of countercultures is broadly similar to the notion emphasized by fourth generation strategic culture.
of what it meant to “defend the realm” – i.e. different perceptions about the use of force. Nossal (2004) identifies four distinct evolutions of the Canadian realm in the last 150 years:

1) 1867 to 1918 - An expansive definition of the realm that included the British Empire that Canada was a part of
2) 1919 to 1939 – A diminished definition of the realm and waning support for imperialism with strong isolationist policy tendencies
3) 1945 to 1991: A post-war internationalist activism that included a deep commitment to international institutions like the United Nations and NATO as well as active diplomatic engagement
4) 1991 to 2001: Following the end of the Cold War, a commitment to a human security agenda and a support for the expansion of NATO’s membership and mandate

Though he does not identify these different historical periods as defining strategic subcultures as such, he does see them as constituting distinct and competing visions of the purpose of the Canadian military and Canadian foreign policy. Nossal is careful to note that, during these time periods, not all Canadians agreed on these priorities. As he and others have noted, divisions between English-speaking and French-speaking populations on the strategic vision for Canada have often been particularly strident. Nevertheless, he argues that these were the dominant views held by policy-makers on who and what ought to be secured in the Canadian state. Viewed from the perspective of the fourth generation of strategic culture, these changing definitions can be understood not simply as an evolution of Canadian strategic thinking, but as distinct views of the role of Canada in the world that continue to resonate with different segments of the population. Just as the lessons of Vietnam resonate more strongly with a certain segment of American policy elites than others, many Canadian policy makers continue to display

57 Nossal’s notion of the Canadian realm, though explicitly couched in the literature of strategic culture, is somewhat broader than the approach suggested by Neumann and Heikka’s definition which is used here. Nossal’s realm refers to the political space extending beyond Canada which Canadians and policy-makers define themselves as being “inside” rather than “outside” (Nossal 2004, 505). By contrast, my understanding of strategic culture focuses solely on the use of military force for political ends, rather than larger dynamics of socially constructed belonging.

58 In a post-script, Nossal explores the emerging post-9/11 world that, though he admits at the time of his writing was too new to be sufficiently analyzed, gave indications of a more realist Canadian foreign policy. With the benefit of greater hindsight, one might argue that the 1991-1996 period represented simply a continuation of the post-war Canada internationalism in to different fields, with the more militarily robust foreign policy dominant today having its roots in the late 1990s.
the marks of being inculcated with the cultural values of isolationism or internationalist activism, though they are no longer dominant.

In Bloomfield and Nossal (2007), the authors develop these four key periods in Canadian history from a more explicitly strategic cultural perspective, adding an important temporal element to the discussion.59 They term the period of Canadian strategy up to 1919 as the “Imperial Period”, where identification with a larger British strategic vision of the world led to Canadian involvement in the Boer War and fomented significant divisions between the French-speaking and English-speaking populations. The interwar period, though brief, fundamentally transformed Canadian strategic culture, with an emergent focus on North American security and the 1931 transfer of foreign policy powers in the Statute of Westminster altering the role of Canada in the world in a major way. Bloomfield and Nossal describe the development of Cold War Canadian internationalism in a manner that largely mirrors Nossal’s (2004) discussion, emphasizing the importance of diplomatic activism and the international institutions to this subculture. Bloomfield and Nossal (2007) depict Canadian strategic culture after 2003 as increasingly distancing Canadian foreign policy from the American approach, with the post-Cold War world offering a “less restricting environment within which to make strategic policy” (300).

Other Canadian theorists have also developed their own categorizations and terms for the different strategic subcultures that have existed in Canadian history. Justin Massie (2009, 625-645), for example, divides the modern Canadian experience into three strategic cultures: continental soft-bandwagoning, defensive internationalism, and soft-balancing Atlanticism. “Soft-bandwagoning” is defined by Massie (2009) as a reassuring attitude by Canada that it is not a direct or indirect threat to the U.S., while retaining important aspects of sovereignty (632).

59 Bloomfield and Nossal (2007) use this typology of subcultures to argue that, because of different historical perspectives on the use of force, Canada and Australia have displayed strikingly different strategic behaviours since the end of the Second World War, despite their relatively similar material status.
Defensive internationalism is connected with Canada’s external identity for many years as a middle power, while soft-balancing Atlanticism is described by Massie as an emphasis on transatlantic solidarity through NATO structures and a Canadian identity as a relevant ally with contributions that place it outside the shadow of the United States. Finally, Mirow (2016) identifies two primary “nuances” of Canadian strategic culture, which he notes are shared to varying degrees by the main political forces in Canada:

“the traditional one which emphasises multilateralism, multiculturalism and a “middle power” role conception on the one hand, and the more “anglocentric” strand, which stresses the track record of mutual defence within first the Commonwealth and then the NATO alliance with the US” (200).

Building on Bloomfield and Nossal’s breakdown of different periods of strategic dominance, and the drawing from general agreement in the literature as to the broad currents that exist in Canadian strategic culture, I have divided the Canadian strategic cultural landscape into four competing views of what the role of Canada in the world should be; Canada as a Commonwealth Nation, Canada as an Isolationist, Canada as a Pearsonian Internationalist, and Canada as a Robust Ally.
The only major departure from Bloomfield and Nossal’s (2007) approach in this typology is found in the fourth strategic subculture – Canada as a Robust Western Ally. I argue that, rather than the post-1995 period being characterized by a drift in Canada-US or Canada-NATO relations, the strategic subculture that at time has been dominant throughout Canadian history sees the primary role for the Canadian Armed Forces as a capable, self-sufficient ally of “the West”, broadly defined. Bloomfield and Nossal largely included this approach within the Canadian internationalist approach, in part because their study focused on the range of Canada’s historical strategic culture, rather than on post-Cold War developments.

However, this distinctive narrative highlights role of Canada as a military force in its own right, with the discourse of this strategic subculture evident in the many references to Canada “punching above its weight” – engaging in robust military action above and beyond what would be expected of a “middle power”, whether it be during World War II, the Korean War, or in
Kandahar.\textsuperscript{60} Though this strategic subculture does not always translate in concordance with American strategic policy (as in the decision not to intervene in Iraq), it helps to explain Canadian involvement in military operations outside – and sometimes unauthorized by – the United Nations (Massie 2009). In this sense, it is closer to soft-balancing Atlanticism, with Canadian military support that works alongside not only the Americans but the British, French, and others as well.

These four strategic subcultures are each represented to different extents in contemporary Canadian strategic culture. However, they have their bases in Canadian history, and their impact on Canadian strategy extends back well beyond the post-Cold War period. Canada as a Commonwealth Nation of course has its roots in Canada’s colonial history, which continues to impact strategic thinking to this day. Canadian isolationism reached its zenith in the interwar period, but concerns about Canada extending itself beyond its sphere of immediate interest can be found in the Boer War period, and these ideas continue to remain relevant in a modern period of increasing populism worldwide. Though now tied to the name of Lester B. Pearson, Canadian internationalism has roots in the Canadian experience as part of the League of Nations and in the cosmopolitanism of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. And while Canada as a Robust Ally tends to be identified with certain periods of intense military operations, such as the Second World War and the Afghanistan mission, the broader view of Canada as a military power in its own right was

\textsuperscript{60} For examples of this narrative, see Ringsmose, Jens, and Berit Kaja Børgesen. "Shaping public attitudes towards the deployment of military power: NATO, Afghanistan and the use of strategic narratives." \textit{European Security} 20.4 (2011): 505-528. Matthew Fisher’s April 17 2015 National Post Article “Canada punching above its weight in fight against ISIL”, or the official Department of Foreign Affairs article on Canadian history, ““Punching Above Its Weight: 1939-68”.”
evident in the narratives surrounding Vimy and Passchendaele, in the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968, and in the BOMARC debate around nuclear weapons on Canadian soil.

All four subcultures have consistently had some influence on the Canadian strategic scene throughout the decades, and have been dominant and subordinate at different periods. The aim of this research is to understand with more precision the degree of influence the four subcultures have had in the 25-year period between 1990 and 2015, and the relationship between this influence and Canada’s troop contribution levels to United Nations peacekeeping in the same period.

1. Canada as a Commonwealth Nation

The first Canadian strategic subculture that has been identified is the one that has been most subordinate in the post-Cold War period that is the focus of this analysis. Owing to its history as a colony, dominion, and member of the British Commonwealth, the view of “Canada as a Commonwealth nation” is one that has had a lasting impact on Canadian strategic behaviour. As the Canadian understanding of what constitutes the “realm” has evolved over the years away from the former British Empire, the impact of this subculture has become more minor (Nossal, 2004). Nevertheless, the early years of Canadian strategy were dominated by this approach, and its legacy among Canadian elites remains.

In this subculture, the primary purpose of the use of force is to support the ideals of the “anglosphere” and the maintenance of “order” in the international system (Vucetic, 2011). In its initial form, the purpose of the use of force in this subculture was to support the ideals of the British Empire and maintain the norms of the societal order. Tied up with complex notions of “Anglo-Saxon” kinship, the preferred mode of cooperation here centred on the United Kingdom and on members of the Commonwealth, even after the formal structure of the British Empire had
been dismantled (Nossal 2004). As a liberal-democratic “zone of peace”, the Commonwealth is seen as mitigating the anarchy of the international system by bringing together countries with similar histories, cultures, and institutions (Srinivasan 2005). Furthermore, within Canada, this subculture incorporates contradictory elements of racial homogeneity, an uneasy relationship between French and English Canada on matters of military intervention, and the role (or lack thereof) of indigenous communities in influencing Canadian foreign policy, particularly in the Arctic.

Canada’s participation in the Boer War provides a good example of the norms at play in this subculture. Throughout its history, Canada has never truly had extraterritorial expansion as a goal in its use of force; rather, the Boer War involved defending subjects and assets of the British Empire abroad (Nossal 2004). By modern standards, tolerance for casualties (both Canadian and enemy combatant) was high during this period, and by those same standards, the threshold for domestic and international authorization of the use of force was much lower than in contemporary Canada. Overseas operations in particular were seen as a means of increasing national prestige and power, as illustrated by a historical “thirst for military expeditions” among Great Britain, the United States, Australia, and Canada (Haglund 2005a). As the 20th Century progressed, Canada’s identity as an increasingly multicultural, bilingual, and often North American-centric modern state has limited the continuing impact of this subculture in the post-Cold War era, owing to the subculture’s basis in a very specific ethnic, linguistic and geopolitical view of Canada.

Yet, as authors such as David Haglund and Justin Massie have argued, the impact of the Commonwealth legacy on modern Canadian behaviour should not be entirely discounted. While pointing to Canada’s refusal to participate in the 2003 Iraq War as one of the only instances
where Canadian foreign policy diverged from both the United States and the United Kingdom (as well as Australia), the authors note how common policy convergence is otherwise among these countries. Identifying it as an element of Canadian strategic culture, Haglund (2005b) examines how Canada’s modern participation in the “Anglosphere” interacts and conflicts with other aspects of Canadian strategic culture – notably the distinct attitudes towards the use of force in Quebec (194). As Massie (2008) notes, looking at strategic culture only on the national level can obscure important regional differences – such as the far more anglocentric perspectives held in regions such as Alberta.

In the modern context of declining American unipolarity, the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, and emerging fault lines between European allies, it is conceivable that, in the future, an anglocentric approach to Canadian foreign policy could re-emerge. In the 1990-2015 period, however – at the national level at least – the “Canada as a Commonwealth Nation” subculture was almost entirely subordinated by alternative visions for Canada in the world.

2. Canada as an Isolationist

The origin of this strategic subculture stems primarily from the Canadian experiences in the first World War and its immediate aftermath. The primary purpose of the use of force is to defend Canadian territory and prevent foreign entanglements. Involvement in overseas operations by Canadian Armed Forces is seen as undermining, rather than strengthening, the security of Canadians at home. This was this conviction that dominated the policy of “no commitments” under Prime Minister Mackenzie King in the late 1930s (Howell 1982).

During the brief but influential interwar period, the country’s level of activism was low on all fronts. The emphasis on North American defence and non-interference that followed the
high costs of Canadian involvement in World War I led to low levels of cooperation with most 
countries, the United States excepted (Bloomfield and Nossal 2007). Public sentiment, 
especially among Francophone voters in this period, resulted in high thresholds for the 
authorization of the use of force, both domestically and internationally. Due to the effect of 
World War I on civil society, Canadian security in this period was thought to be best served by 
non-involvement and protection of national sovereignty – a sentiment bolstered by Canada’s 
geographical distance from European concerns and stable relations with Canada’s only 
neighbour, the United States (Mirow 2016, 57). One of the key consequences of this isolationist 
perspective were the significant Canadian reservations about the League of Nations. Canadian 
opposition to “Article X” in the League of Nations Charter (which would have required members 
to assist victims of interstate aggression) was motivated by isolationism and a belief that Canada 
should not concern itself with events on the other side of the world (Waite 1983).

Yet is important to note that the Canadian brand of isolationism is in certain ways distinct 
from the isolationist tendencies that exist in the strategic cultures of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, or elsewhere. Even at the height of isolationist dominance, Canada was still a member 
of the League of Nations – unlike the U.S., Canada has always been involved to some degree in 
international diplomacy, even if superficially. Rather than being driven by a desire for policy 
independence or for protection of nationalist ideas from outside norms, Canadian isolationism 
has generally been driven by financial concerns. Both Kim Nossal and David Haglund reject the 
suitability of the term “isolationism” (at least in the sense as it is applied to the U.S.) for Canada. 
Nossal (1998) refers instead to a tendency towards “pinchpenny diplomacy”, referring to the 
unwillingness to spend on foreign and defence initiatives while remaining fundamentally
connected to the international system. Similarly, Haglund argues that, rather than isolationism, Canada has a tendency towards cheapness in foreign and defence policy:

“We spend so little on defence because we are cheap. And we are cheap because our strategic culture instructs us to be. There is little risk in being cheap because we live protected by an American neighbour that is at one and the same time constantly criticized but continually relied upon to be Canada's security provider of last resort” (Haglund 2002, 22).

As with the “Canada as a Commonwealth nation approach”, Canadian isolationism has been largely subordinate in the modern period. The arrival of the Second World War and the lasting impact of Canadian war-time involvement significantly sidelined the debate over a North American-centric approach to security. While “pinchpenny diplomacy” was evident during the fiscally-conscious late 1990s, it was manifested more as muted internationalism rather than as full-throated isolationism (Nossal, 1998). Nevertheless, in some elements of strategic behaviour – such as some of the immediate reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 – aspects of Canadian isolationism continue to have an impact (Haglund 2002). In particular, the continuing concern that involvement in operations in the Middle East can make Canadians abroad and at home a target resonates with past isolationism trends (Juneau 2015). Regionally, the debate over Canadian isolationism continues to be more prominent in certain subsections of Canadian society, such Francophone Canada (Massie 2008).

3. Canada as a Pearsonian Internationalist Power

As suggested by its name, the Pearsonian subculture emerged out of the post-war period of Canadian strategic policy, particularly during the dominant periods of Lester B. Pearson’s career. During this period of liberal, middle-power internationalism in diplomacy and among

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61 The association between Canadian Francophones, particularly those in Quebec, and isolationist sentiment has its basis primarily in the conscription crisis of the First World War – where opposition to conscription was most fervent in Quebec – and related concerns during the Second World War. However, as Massie points out, the evidence connecting Francophones with isolationism is far from conclusive, with support in Quebec for the UN-sanctioned First Gulf War being particularly strong (Massie, 2008, 40).
international institutions, the strategic cultural level of activism increased. The use of force was primarily seen as promoting values and beliefs of multilateralism, stability, and democracy, whether did so in the context of NATO or in United Nations peacekeeping operations (Fortmann, Larose, and Murphy 2004).

Tolerance for casualties, whether among in-groups or out-groups, is low among Pearsonian policy-makers and the public. While support for Canada’s international activism is such that the domestic threshold for the authorizing of the use of force is low, the preferred method of cooperating according to international law and norms leads to a high dependency on the international authorization – e.g. authorization by the United Nations Security Council – for the use of force to be seen as legitimate (Bloomfield and Nossal 2007, 299). Canadian security under Pearsonianism is viewed as being best served by a peaceful and economically stable world, with a cautious assessment of the relative impact that the deployment of Canadian military can have. The primary purpose of the use of force here is to enhance peace and to support international law, institutions, and norms – broad goods that filter down to benefit Canada in a number of ways (Mirow 2016, 59).

Yet Pearsonianism is skeptical that force – especially unilateral Canadian or Western military force -- can alone establish peace, and places a high value on the coordination of military, diplomatic, and economic tools to have a lasting impact internationally. A Pearsonian approach to defence expenditure emphasizes that defence spending should be realistically matched with the threats against Canada and the operational requirements of the Forces, often leading to a “do more with less” perception. Direct threats to Canadian security tend to be seen as marginal or limited, with Canadian interests in the peace of the international system – rather than simply its “stability” -- being the primary driver for the use of force (Massie 2009).
Yet within the notion of “Canada the Good” as an essential part of the Pearsonian worldview are a number of assumptions that are tied to a particular view of being Canadian; “that is, white, male, and Anglo (and implicitly straight and able-bodied), as well as those who can emulate such vaunted models” (Howell 1982, 63). Specifically, analysis of Canadian internationalism notes that circumstances in which the use of force is deemed to be legitimate is, in practice, highly elastic. The fact that the values being exported are framed in terms of international law and universal norms should not blind us to how this subculture still asserts that force is useful for the promotion of certain values, beliefs and ideas abroad:

“The storyline requires that the international be imagined as a space of a universal social contract. The UN oversees the contract and member states who do not respect the rules are disciplined by those that do…the power of the story of good and evil enacted globally, whether in peacekeeping trauma narratives or in President Bush’s speeches, should give us pause” (Razack 2004, 49)

Though the term “Pearsonian” is used as a cultural touchstone in Canada, the norms about the use of force and Canada’s role in the world that are represented in this strategic subculture extend well beyond the career of Lester B. Pearson or the influence of the Liberal Party. Brian Mulroney, the Conservative Prime Minister of Canada from 1984 to 1993, has been described as fundamentally Pearsonian in outlook (Paris 2014, 44). As Justin Massie noted, Pearsonian ideals permeated the debate about Canadian involvement in the American-led coalition in Iraq, with the issue of international authorization (rather than the use of force per se) being the primary sticking point that led to a temporary rift in Canada-US relations.

4. Canada as a Robust Western Ally

Finally, the subculture of “Canada as a Robust Ally” emerged in part from the Canadian experience in the Second World War as a major part of the Allied Nations’ fighting effort and the subsequent Western alliance (Mirow 2016, 52). Not being simply an alignment with
American foreign policy goals or a Canadian version of neo-conservatism, “Canada as a Robust Ally” sees Canada as contributing meaningfully, and often militarily, to Western security and priorities. As a result, it may involve alignment with NATO, the United Kingdom, the European Union, or others beyond the immediate sphere of North America. Key to this view is the idea that Canada is more than a middle (or middling) power, and that it is capable of “fighting above its weight” when need be (Government of Canada 2008).

This approach also tends to emphasize the development of Canadian interests, stability and order, and the core values of “the West” more than Pearsonian internationalism (Bloomfield and Nossal 2007). Seen from the angle of this strategic subculture, the primary purpose of the use of military force is the establishment of international stability and the furthering of Canadian national interests. Modes of cooperation in this subculture have tended to focus on Canada’s place within the “North Atlantic quadrangle”62, leading to policies that are at times in sync with American strategy and at times more distant from it, depending on the impact to Canadian interests (Massie 2009). The perception of threats to Canada are viewed as high under this framework, and the world generally is seen as a dangerous, unpredictable, and unstable place. As a result, this subculture subscribes to the doctrine of Forward Security:

“Forward Security involves the deployment of Canadian military forces overseas to ensure that violent international activity is kept as far away from North America as possible and that Canadian interests overseas are protected.”(Maloney 2002, 275–76)

Canadian deployment in Afghanistan, though initially largely framed in the narrative of international law, foreign aid, and a normative commitment to international peace and stability became – over time -- an example of the “robust” strategic culture, with Canada contributing to

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62 The North Atlantic quadrangle builds a concept introduced by Massie to reflect the impact of the United States, Great Britain, and France on Canadian strategic culture. It builds upon the notion of a North Atlantic triangle, first introduced by Canadian historian John Bartlet Brebner in 1945, by reflecting the importance of France in modern Canadian history, especially in Quebec.
counter-terrorism, Western security, and a policy of “punching above its weight” (Zyla 2013). Afghanistan represented a somewhat higher acceptance of out-group casualties, though the low threshold for in-group Canadian casualties undermined support for the mission as it progressed. Beyond a simple alignment with American foreign policy goals, “Canada as a Robust Ally” sees Canadian military involvement in missions like the NATO operation in Afghanistan or the first Gulf War as a means of giving Canada a seat at the decision-making table (Moens 2007).

**Canadian Strategic Culture and Peacekeeping**

Each of the four Canadian strategic subcultures represent competing views about Canada’s role in the world and how it should use force internationally. As a consequence, each Canadian subculture has different implications for Canadian military involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Rooted in a preference for working with specific allies and a higher casualty tolerance, the “Canada as a Commonwealth nation” perspective does not lend itself well to involvement in peacekeeping operations. Canadian isolationism, meanwhile, has a clear focus on home defence and non-involvement that precludes significant contribution to UN peacekeeping. The view of “Canada as a Robust Ally”, by contrast, supports a highly active role for Canada in the world; however, its focus on coalition operations and Canadian self-interest means that elites that hold this view are likely to take a dim view of United Nations peace operations.

Indeed, the only Canadian subculture whose norms match up with the “peacekeeping sweet spot” identified earlier is the “Pearsonian internationalist” perspective. This perspective contains the combination of international activism and strategic restraint in the use of force necessary for high-level involvement in peace operations. As a result, my model of strategic culture would expect that a period of high-level Canadian involvement in peacekeeping
operations would coincide with a dominant period for Pearsonian internationalism, while the nadir of Canadian commitments to the UN should correspond with a subordinate period of the Pearsonian strategic subculture.

**Canada’s Key Strategic Documents**

For the purposes of this analysis of Canadian post-Cold War strategic culture, Canada’s strategic documents from 1990-2015 have been divided into the following four categories:

1) Defence White Papers: Generally published once per prime ministerial administration, these macro-level documents outline the long-term defence priorities and perspectives of the Canadian Government. Though issued on an irregular basis, often not being published until a few years into a government’s mandate, these documents provide some of the clearest and most in-depth statements on the strategic culture of the day.

2) National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Policies: Published with greater regularity, the policy papers tend to deal with specific aspects of defence policy, and focus on shorter-term concerns. Canadian Armed Forces Policies tend to focus on the tactical level of the use of force, though they often implicitly contain broader strategic cultural themes as well.

3) United Nations General Assembly Speeches: Made at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City every September, this speech is made in front of world leaders from all 193 Member States, and is traditionally given by either the Prime Minister or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These documents, targeted at both an international and a domestic audience, rarely provide specific details of defence policy. Nevertheless, UNGA speeches provide insight into how the country views its role in the international sphere of peace and security.

4) Throne Speeches: Made by the Governor General at the opening of each session of the Canadian Parliament, outlining the government’s agenda for the session. While foreign and defence policy generally only makes up a small portion of any given speech, these documents are useful for tracking shifts in grand strategy and priorities from government to government.

*Defence White Papers*
During the period of analysis, three White Papers on Defence were published by the Government of Canada. As has become customary, these White Papers correspond roughly with the three changes in administration during this period; the ascendancy of Jean Chrétien in the early 1990s, the retirement of Chrétien and the leadership of Prime Minister Paul Martin in 2003, and the rise of the Stephen Harper Conservatives in 2006. In the immediate years following each of these prime ministers taking office, a Defence White Paper was issued outlining the strategic priorities of the Canadian military.

Douglas Bland (1989), while noting that Defence White Papers often represent a government’s ideal policies rather than a practical guide, nonetheless characterizes these documents “as fundamental government statements intended to direct the policy process towards its political and operational objectives”, and as a useful guide to studying continuity and change in the Canadian strategic environment (3). Writing on the sister publications that often accompany Canadian defence policy statements, William Hogg (2003) portrays foreign policy White Papers as “‘snapshots in time, a brief exposure of Canada’s tenuous position within an ever-changing and turbulent world” (522).

**Tactical-level Documents**

Far more plentiful, though irregular, are the strategic documents categorized as tactical or mid-level strategic documents. These include documents published by both the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces themselves, as well as reports by the Chief of Defence Staff that were made on a temporary basis between 1999 and 2004. The tactical nature

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63 Technically speaking, only the 1994 White Paper was termed as such, with the other two being termed ‘strategic documents’. However, the tradition of issuing White Papers as a tool of participatory democracy has an established history both in Canada and in Great Britain, and the 2005 and 2009 documents fit firmly within this tradition. The Library of Parliament catalogue categorizes these documents as White Papers as well, noting that “the term white paper is now more commonly applied to official documents presented by Ministers of the Crown which state and explain the government's policy on a certain issue.”
of these documents means that, by and large, they tend towards a greater focus on the “robust” aspect of the use of force, compared to documents and speeches with a more diplomatic focus. Nevertheless, by comparing these similar documents to each other over a 25-year time period, changes in thinking among the military and bureaucratic defence leadership can be monitored.

*Speeches from the Throne*

In the Canadian political system, each opening of a new session of Parliament is marked by a Speech from the Throne, given by the Governor General on behalf of the Queen to outline the government’s priorities in the forthcoming session. While these speeches generally cover the range of policy priorities and are primarily taken up with domestic considerations, they can also touch on grand strategic priorities as well. As Tim Nieguth and Tracey Raney (2017) argue, Throne Speeches are important opportunities to impart symbolic content to the Canadian public.

*UNGA General Debate Speeches*

Finally, the annual speeches made to the United Nations General Assembly provide perhaps the clearest view of the shift in rhetoric concerning the use of force by Canada between 1990 and 2015 and the way the speeches correspond to the Canadian commitment to peacekeeping operations. Analysis of UNGA speeches have been conducted in the past to study issues ranging from attitudes towards Middle Eastern peace initiatives (Suedfeld, et al. 1977) to broad analysis of attitudes towards international conflict at the UN (Donahue and Prosser 1997). In the same way that the military documents generally tended towards more “robust” views of the use of force, the international diplomatic nature of these speeches tended towards a more “internationalist tone”.
The period from 1990 to 1995, immediately following the end of the Cold War, saw the highest degree of dominance for Canadian Pearsonianism in the period studies for this case. These five years saw three Prime Ministers from two different parties in power: Brian Mulroney of the Conservative Party, Kim Campbell of the Conservative Party, and Jean Chrétien of the Liberal Party. Nevertheless, the relative dominance of Pearsonianism generally held across all four categories of strategic documentation. This corresponds well with the pattern of high-level peacekeeping troop contribution from 1990-95.

In the field of defence, the early 1990s in Canada also saw increased budget pressures to balance the budget to eliminate the national debt, with a particular focus on defence spending as the largest contributor to Canada’s ongoing deficit. These budget pressures were in part the result of the end of the Cold War, with policy makers and the Canadian public alike expecting a ‘peace dividend’ in the form of reduced defence spending. Between 1990 and 1995, the average yearly budget deficit was around $35 billion, and the Chrétien Government came into office on a pledge to balance the budget.64 Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, sectarian violence broke out in a number of former communist states, including the former Yugoslavia. Canadian Armed Forces were deployed through the UN to these hotspots, as well as through NATO to combat Iraqi forces in the First Gulf War. Consequently, towards the mid-90s there was increasing concern about the military’s capacity to sustain the tempo of operations in the wake of post-Cold War budget cuts.

Canada began the decade by providing more than 1,000 peacekeeping troops to UN operations. In 1995, the contribution number was over 2,000 – though, as we shall see, 1995

marked the beginning of a rapid decline in Canada’s peacekeeping involvement. This five-year period, incidentally, saw the zenith of Canada’s historical contribution to military peacekeeping, with a record 3,220 soldiers provided in January of 1993 (International Peace Institute 2015). The bulk of the troops were deployed to UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, but Canadian peacekeepers were a strong presence in peacekeeping missions in Cyprus, Cambodia, and the Sinai.

White Papers

The sole White Paper from the period -- the 1994 White Paper on Defence -- was the most heavily Pearsonian in character since the cornerstone defence document released in 1964 under the premiership of Lester B. Pearson himself. Of the 45 strategic cultural statements made in the 1994 paper, 20 statements (44%) can be categorized as Pearsonian. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat following the end of the Cold War, this paper also included a fairly high (for Canada) number of isolationist statements -- 6 statements, or 14% of the total. These sentiments were reflected in the early 1990s debate about the future of the Canadian military, with the perception of many being that, for the first time since the beginning of World War II, Canada was no longer under any existential or territorial threat. There was even discussion of disbanding the standing military as traditionally conceived, instead opting for a militia approach focused purely on national defence with any expeditionary capability (an arrangement currently in place in Iceland, Costa Rica, and a handful of other countries). 65 This discussion – understandably alarming to the leadership of the Forces – was directly addressed in the 1994 Paper:

65 Among the voices suggesting a more constabulary role for the Canadian Forces was T.C. Willet, a noted Canadian sociologist and criminologist who advocated for various non-military roles for the armed forces, including “planning, reconnaissance, and initial development of new community and town projects, particularly in the north and other as yet undeveloped parts of the country,” provision “of all air services for non-commercial public purposes” including “police work, ambulance, [and] rescue;” and the “provision and manning of social development teams to work with the native peoples all over Canada” (Shadwick 2013, 83).
In short, by opting for a constabulary force - that is, one not designed to make a genuine contribution in combat - we would be sending a very clear message about the depth of our commitment to our allies and our values, one that would betray our history and diminish our future...we must make the required investment in our armed forces if we are to play any kind of role in shaping our common future.\textsuperscript{66}

By the time the 1994 White Paper was published, elite perceptions seemed to have settled into a largely Pearsonian view of why Canada requires a standing military. This suggests that, in the context of a security environment that offered few direct threats to Canadian security, the tenets of Pearsonianism might have been seen by many, including military leaders, to offer a counter to the isolationist tendencies. The commitment to multilateralism and the use of force in a supporting role to diplomacy was interpreted by many as a clear mission for the CAF and a harbinger of isolationism. In reality, however, the 1994 White Paper depicted a clear, if constrained, role for the Canadian military internationally:

Given that the direct military threat to the continent is greatly diminished at present, Canada will reduce the level of resources devoted to traditional missions in North America. It will, however, remain actively engaged in the United Nations, NATO, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It will become more actively involved in security issues in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{67}

This is not to say that Robust Ally perceptions had disappeared entirely in 1994. 29\% of the statements made about the use of force in this White Paper continued to reflect the view that the Canadian military could and should be a strong force both in NATO and in the world at large. While the threat perception in this document is low, it highlights the need to maintain core combat capabilities to provide “the basis for the generation of larger forces should they ever be needed”.\textsuperscript{68} In defending the continuing utility of the Canadian Armed Forces, it outlines several non-traditional roles for the military, such as civil control, securing our borders, fisheries protection, disaster relief, and search and rescue and environmental surveillance. With the

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid. p. 27.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. p. 6.
reduced threat of global war, threat perception is also widened to include the global population burden, refugees, and failed states.

During this period, Canada’s relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was shifting as well. Alongside other NATO members, Canada debated the long-term role for the multinational alliance following the demise of communism, and this debate is reflected in the White Paper. While continued membership in NATO is endorsed as a matter of maintaining respect and influence abroad, the document expresses concern about NATO supplanting the UN as a deployer of internationally-sanctioned force:

The Alliance should resist the temptation to intrude on the provision of political and strategic direction for the mission; that responsibility must rest with the Security Council.69

Indeed, throughout the document the United Nations is set squarely in the middle of Canada’s strategic cultural vision for a post-Cold War international order:

Canada is strongly in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations, capable of upholding the political values and procedural means set out in its Charter, and believes that situations requiring international military action should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the Charter.70

The previous Defence White Paper of 1987 had, for the first time, allocated 2,000 CAF personnel for a peacekeeping standby and deployment force. The 1994 paper repealed this upper limit of 2,000 Canadian peacekeepers for a flexible contingency of up to 10,000 military personnel, in recognition of the significant growth of UN peace operations in the post-Cold War period. It notes the establishment of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, a training institution to provide Canadian and international peacekeepers with the tools need to deploy as Blue Helmets. While cautioning that Canada “cannot and will not participate in every multilateral operation”,

69 Ibid. p. 16.
70 Ibid. p. 16.
the potential scope that this document saw for Canadian involvement in peacekeeping far exceeded the number of soldiers that Canada would, in reality, deploy:

As a matter of general principle, the Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft... this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel.71

**DND and CAF Policy Documents**

Of the relatively few defence policy documents produced by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces during this period, the 1992 *Canada Defence Policy*, issued under Mulroney, stands out as an exceptionally Pearsonian document. Of the 38 strategic statements in this policy – which was intended to be but failed to become an annually updated document – 22 statements were categorized as Pearsonian. In a glow of post-Cold War optimism, the policy proclaimed that:“There is no external threat unique to Canada. Nevertheless, we cannot isolate ourselves from the world.”72

The document anticipated the greater role that Canada would be called upon to play in UN peacekeeping, as well as a greater role for the United Nations more generally, with the breakdown of superpower rivalry.

Yet documents such as 1994’s *The Future Land Force* -- a report commissioned by the Canadian Army under Jean Chrétien in anticipation of a Defence Review – hinted at the growing unease with Pearsonianism in some sectors, especially within the leadership of the Army. The document does state that, “abroad, in Cyprus, Kuwait, Croatia, Somalia, Cambodia and Bosnia, the army has made Canada and peacekeeping synonymous”.73 Yet in the same breath, the Army asserts that “there is little potential for Canada to contribute more land forces to United Nations

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efforts, and sustaining the present level of commitment is problematic”, blaming budget cuts and resources shortfalls.\textsuperscript{74} In defending investments in the Army, \textit{The Future Land Force} lent its voice to the growing chorus that asserted that the post-Cold War environment was not as peaceful as was generally assumed. Looking at the breakdown of strategic statements in this document – 20\% Pearsonian, 20\% Robust Ally, 20\% Isolationist, and 40\% mixed – underlines multiple bases for the emerging concerns about the post-Cold War implications of Pearsonianism. This breakdown further suggests that the strategic perspective of military elites tasked with developing documents such as \textit{The Future Land Force} broadly matched the mixed viewpoints of political and policy elites at the time.

\textit{Speeches from the Throne}

In the Throne Speeches and United Nations General Assembly speeches given by Canada between 1990-1995 – both of these documents, by their nature, being both more political and more broadly strategic – the theme of internationalism prevailed throughout. Pearsonian perceptions on the Canadian use of force were dominant in all of the three Throne Speeches\textsuperscript{75} and five UN speeches that took place during these years. The speech opening the second session of the 34\textsuperscript{th} Canadian Parliament declared that “Canadians are, by vocation, world citizens”, tying Canadian prosperity and stability with the international defence of human rights and development.\textsuperscript{76} It should be noted that the Throne Speeches of 1991 and 1994 were both unusually short documents with little discussion of international or defence affairs; this may have been a reflection of the rapid transitions of government during this period. The 1991 speech

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{75} The Throne Speech opening the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session of the 34\textsuperscript{th} Parliament was technically delivered in 1989. However, because it covered government priorities for the parliamentary session running through to 1991, it has been included in this analysis.

simply reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to international human rights, while the 1994 statement announced a comprehensive review of defence policy under the new Liberal government.

**UNGA Speeches**

Of all the documents analyzed in this period, the speeches made by Canada to the United Nations General Assembly were by far the most Pearsonian in character; not surprising, given the forum in which they were delivered. Nevertheless, the three speeches made under the Conservative Mulroney Government, and the 1993 speech delivered by Prime Minister Campbell herself, were among the most Pearsonian documents in the entire 1990-2015 period. The First Gulf War was depicted in these speeches as primarily a “litmus test” of the United Nations and of international law, emphasizing the importance of Security Council approval as a requirement for Canadian involvement. As the breakup of Yugoslavia evolved, the standby capacity of Canadian peacekeepers was readily promised by the Mulroney Government, which celebrated Canada’s pre-eminent status in UN peacekeeping:

> Of the 45,000 peacekeeping forces currently serving under the United Nations flag, close to 4,300, or almost 10 per cent, are Canadian. No other nation has made a greater commitment to United Nations peacekeeping than Canada.

Claiming peacekeeping as a Canadian invention, Kim Campbell declared that “this is our time, the United Nations moment”. In this early period of the decade, there was a strong sense of the wide possibilities of peacekeeping, from preventing conflict in Macedonia to the establishment of a standing peacekeeping force, spearheaded by Canadians. In the 1994 speech delivered by Minister of Foreign Affairs André Ouellet, at the beginning of the Chrétien administration, all 18 strategic statements made were Pearsonian in nature. Beyond expressing

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confidence in peacekeeping, the speech outlined a broader vision for post-Cold War relations that encompassed what became known as human security:

Let us recognize once and for all the need to expand the traditional concept of security, and to mobilize all components of the United Nations system to attack conflict at its very roots.79

This view of human security, which would have the United Nations and international law at its centre and which would be developed under Chrétien’s Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, drew on a host of Pearsonian norms about the nature of the use of force, the role of Canada in the world and in international organization, and the definitions of what constituted a threat to Canada following the Cold War. These norms, which were embraced by all three governments in power during this period, matched up well with the zenith of Canadian peacekeeping troop contributions at this time.

1996 – 2000

The latter half of the 1990’s in Canada was entirely dominated by the Liberal Government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. In Canada, as in much of the rest of the world, uncertainties about the initial post-Cold War optimism for durable peace began to set in. With these uncertainties – and with a number of high-profile failures during this period – came an increasing loss of confidence in United Nations peacekeeping. The failures of UN operations in the former Yugoslavia in 1995 gave way to a more robust NATO operation in Bosnia when the limited capabilities of the Blue Helmets became apparent. The full implications of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which more than 800,000 Rwandans were killed in a 100-day period, highlighted the dependence of peacekeeping on the political will of the Security Council. The experiences of Canadian Lt.-Gen. Roméo Dallaire as UNAMIR Force Commander – combined

with the Somalia Affairs and the inquiry into the killing of unarmed Somali youth by Canadian soldiers that concluded in 1997 -- had a major impact on Canadian views of peacekeeping in the years to follow.

Until 1997, Canada’s peacekeeping contribution levels had remained relatively high, hovering just under 1,000 troops (International Peace Institute 2015). However, following the conclusion of a training operation in Haiti (UNMIH) in November of 1997, Canadian participation in operations was limited to the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights – a traditional, unarmed mission.

In terms of Canadian strategic culture, Pearsonianism continued to characterize the majority of strategic documents analyzed in this period. This was the height of Canadian advocacy for the concepts of human security and the Responsibility to Protect, with the landmark Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention – the Ottawa Treaty – being signed in 1997. The five speeches given by Axworthy to the UN General Assembly in these years reflect the dominance of Canadian Pearsonianism at this time. Yet there is some evidence of changing security norms beginning to emerge over this period, particularly in the definition of what constituted a “threat” to Canada. No White Papers on Defence were published in these years, but documents from the Department of National Defence and the Force suggest that the dominance of Pearsonianism in Canadian strategic culture was beginning to wane, as were Canada’s contributions to peacekeeping.

**DND and CAF Policy Documents**

In many ways, the 1997 *Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces*, submitted as a report to Prime Minister Chretien by Minister of National Defence Douglas Young is the best example of the prevailing strategic culture of the mid-to-late 1990s. Conscious of Canadian concerns
about the use of force and the CAF, the tone of the document is a mix of pride in Canada’s past accomplishments, especially in the field of international peace and stability, and a “realistic” (i.e. more constrained) assessment of the contribution Canada can make militarily. Canada is depicted as facing essentially no direct threats, but the importance of military values and the role of force in contribution to international peace and security is underlined. In an 8-page document, peacekeeping is mentioned five times, and 62% of the strategic statements fall under the category of Pearsonian Internationalism. Likewise, Making a Difference at Home and Abroad, the defence performance and outlook report of the year 2000, defined the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in distinctly non-traditional military terms; “from peace enforcement, to disaster assistance, to the support provided to humanitarian aid operations”.

Some DND documents, such as A Strategy for 2020 (published in 1999), included a more mixed view on the appropriate use of force. Stressing the need for interoperability with NATO Allies and to defend Canada and Canadian interests, the document foresaw a far more uncertain threat environment emerging. Conceding that Canada faced no conventional military threats in the foreseeable future, the policy nevertheless anticipated a growing need for the use of force in a range of areas:

There remain direct and indirect threats to our national security for which a military response may be required, including drugs, organized crime, illegal immigration, terrorism, and the uncertainty caused by the growing proliferation of missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction.

Beginning in 1998 and running until 2004, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) produced an annual report on the state of the Canadian Armed Forces. Though they were only published for a limited number of years, these documents provided insight into the strategic thinking of the

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military’s highest level of leadership during this time. The initial CDS reports published in this period exhibited a fairly strong Pearsonian bent, with the 2000 document highlighting the Canadian Armed Forces’ role in contributing to “the safety, security and well-being of Canadian and communities throughout the world” through providing peace in the Balkans, assisting humanitarian relief in Turkey, and engaging in search and rescue.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{Speeches from the Throne}

The Chrétien Government’s Throne Speeches from this period included more strategic content than the speeches of the early 1990s, and almost all of that content reflected a Pearsonian point of view. In 1996, 1997, and 1999, the Governor General’s speeches reaffirmed the paramount importance of the United Nations to Canada as the key global forum. Marking Lester B. Pearson’s 100\textsuperscript{th} birthday in 1997, Canada was characterized as “a force for peace and understanding around the world” – importantly, for the notion of strategic culture, tying Canada’s international relevance to its work within the UN system.\textsuperscript{83}

While still emphasizing the soft power of the “global human security agenda”, the 1999 speech memorialized the more “robust” elements of Canadian military history, commemorating the times when Canada “answered the call” to fight as a strong ally in places like Vimy Ridge, Juno Beach, and Hill 355.\textsuperscript{84} Thus, even at a time when Pearsonian Internationalism continued to dominate Canadian strategic culture, we can see the enduring legacy of the vision of Canada as a Robust Ally that will not shrink from its duty to fight when needed.

\textit{UNGA Speeches}

\textsuperscript{83} Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Thirty-Sixth Canadian Parliament”, 1997.
\textsuperscript{84} Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session of the Thirty-Sixth Canadian Parliament”, 1999.
Every one of the speeches made in New York to the General Assembly in the 1996-2000 period was made by Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. An unusually active Foreign Minister, Axworthy was given considerable room by Jean Chrétien to formulate Canada’s approach to peace and conflict; the General Assembly in New York was a key forum for Axworthy’s formulation of Canada’s internationalist vision in these years (Donaghy 2003). The 1996 speech, for example, celebrated the 40th anniversary of the founding of UN peacekeeping:

We in 1996 must show ourselves capable of restoring the spirit of 1956 when, in the deepest freeze of the cold war climate, the United Nations gave birth to peacekeeping and changed international relations forever.85

Axworthy’s speech the following year was entirely Pearsonian in nature, following on the heels of the Ottawa Treaty’s ratification, which he saw as an indicator of the “changed character of world affairs” following the end of the Cold War.86 While peacekeeping was less directly referenced in later speeches in the period, Canada’s commitment to the UN Charter and to international law, particularly the Responsibility to Protect, were reaffirmed again and again in these documents. With the establishment of the International Criminal Court – a process in which Canada played an important part – Canadian strategic culture increasingly drew on legalistic bases for the country’s global agenda:

For Canada, the universal values set out in the Charter have acted as our moral compass in setting our global agenda…Enhancing human security also requires establishing legal instruments.87

An important exception to the otherwise uniform internationalism of these documents was the 1999 speech, which exhibited much less optimism than other Axworthy speeches. While still containing a major of Pearsonian strategic statements (11 out of 17 statements, or 65%), it noted that peacekeeping should not be seen as a panacea for the world problems:

There are legitimate questions about the purposes, limits and standards for Council engagement for humanitarian ends, which itself also present difficult contradictions with regard to the principle of non-interference.\textsuperscript{88}

In what little non-Pearsonian sentiment there was emerging towards the end of the 1990s, there was a notable trend in relation to UN peacekeeping. With the high-profile failures in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia, a number of speeches increasingly focused on the limits and conditions for peacekeeping:

Clear and consistent criteria are needed against which the necessity or otherwise of humanitarian intervention — including enforcement — can be judged and applied. These tests must be very demanding: the basis must be the existence of fundamental breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law.\textsuperscript{89}

These critiques of peacekeeping were often mitigated by an emphasis on constructively improving the overall efficacy of UN peacekeeping, feeding into the recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi Report that sought effective reform. Yet the frustrations of these failures – which could have conceivably fed into isolationist tendencies in Canada – occasionally led Canadian strategic elites to contemplate more robust, even unilateral action:

Prevention is the best sort of intervention. But when preventive measures fail - when the quiet diplomatic efforts; the targeted sanctions don't work; when the fact-finders find facts too horrendous to imagine, then there must be recourse to more robust action…In considering the daunting challenges ahead, any attempt to retreat, to shut out the world, to turn away from international engagement, would be to follow a dangerous path that is neither practical nor desirable.\textsuperscript{90}

The turn of the millennium included the convening of the United Nations millennium summit – the largest gathering of world leaders, with over 150 world leaders giving speeches to the General Assembly gathered in New York. Prime Minister Chrétien was among those leaders present, and gave a strong Pearsonian speech that affirmed that “the United Nations is the

\textsuperscript{88} United Nations, “Address by Mr. Lloyd Axworthy”, 54\textsuperscript{th} Session of the General Assembly, 1999.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
world’s indispensable institution, and Canada is unshakably committed to its common goals and shared vision.”

But while Chrétien proudly proclaimed that Canada “was one of the principal architects of peacekeeping” as well as “one of the most active participants in peacekeeping operations”, the troop contribution data for this period belie this latter statement. In September of 2000, during the Millennium Summit, Canada provided only 332 peacekeepers to UN operations, ranking as the 28th largest military contributor to peacekeeping. At the beginning of the 21st century, Canada had begun to rapidly draw down its UN peacekeeping operations. This process, and the strategic cultural shift from Pearsonian Internationalism to Robust Ally dominance, would be exacerbated by 9/11, the War on Terror, and the operation in Afghanistan, but the move away from Canadian peacekeeping had already begun.

2001 – 2005

Internationally, the five-year period from 2001 to 2005 saw the attacks of 9/11, the emergence of the Global War on Terror, the multinational war in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition. Domestically, Canadian politics continued to be dominated by the Liberal Party – albeit in a minority government following the 2004 elections -- with the succession of Paul Martin following Jean Chrétien’s retirement. More importantly for the strategic cultural context, the Canadian military saw its mission shift from the geopolitical firefighting of the immediate post-Cold War period to an active and prominent combat role in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

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92 Ibid.
Analysis of this period indicates that, at the beginning of the new millennium, the strategic culture of Canada as a Robust Ally began to increase its influence, with Pearsonian Internationalism beginning to wane as a result. There was also a marked increase in the number of “mixed” strategic cultural statements across all documents analyzed in this timeframe; as mentioned in the methodological chapter, the increase presence of mixed strategic statements appears to be a good indicator of an ongoing shift in the subcultural landscape. In this case, these mixed statements generally contained both Pearsonian and Robust Ally sentiments. As an example, this statement from the 2005 White Paper on Defence illustrates the tensions present regarding the mission of the military:

Our soldiers, sailors and air personnel must increasingly operate in environments where the lines between war and peace have blurred. These situations are volatile, and a humanitarian mission can swiftly turn into a combat operation, particularly when warlords, criminal gangs and other irregular combatants remain part of the equation.\(^9^4\)

The results of analyzing these strategic documents suggest that, rather being a partisan shift from Liberal to Conservative that only took hold when Stephen Harper became Prime Minister, Canada had already begun to move away from Pearsonianism under both the Chrétien and Martin premierships. This trend matches with the peacekeeping troop contribution dynamics over this period, which saw Canadian contributions drop to below 2% of the total number of peacekeepers and stay below that threshold. During these years, Western state involvement in UN operations declined generally, with countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Ethiopia emerging as the primary suppliers of peacekeeping troops.

A key question that emerges from this analysis is: was the shift towards a Robust Ally dominance simply a reaction to the events of September 11\(^{th}\), 2001 and the subsequent War in Afghanistan? This is difficult to answer in any conclusive way. Certainly, many of the

documents immediately following 9/11 make direct reference to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Yet as Meyer (2005) notes, external shocks such as a terrorist attack, invasion, or natural disasters can be interpreted in a number of strategically diverse ways in different national contexts. One can imagine the result of 9/11 being a reinforcement of Canadian isolationism, rather than Robust Ally thinking. Furthermore, documents from the late 90s suggest that a turn away from Pearsonian Internationalism may have been already underway, and that the emergence of a War on Terror fed in to an already emerging process in the Canadian use of force. This is not to downplay the impact of September 11th on the Canadian strategic landscape – it was by far the most formative single even in the post-Cold War period -- but rather to tie it to the broader dynamic of the perception of the use of force.

White Papers

The most significant strategic document in this period is 2005’s *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*. While technically styled an “international policy statement” rather than a White Paper, the document retains many of the same elements as the 1994 and 1989 White Papers on Defence. The format of the 2005 document is, however, unusual in that it was conceived as one half of a joint publication, with the other half – *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy* – being published by the Department of Foreign Affairs.95 The approach of seeing defence and diplomatic policy as two elements of the same policy is in and of itself suggestive of a Pearsonian perspective; however, as we shall see, the content of the publication was not as Pearsonian as the 1994 White Paper. The title of the document, meanwhile, can be considered more of a “mixed” strategic statement. While a “role of pride in

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95 The diplomatic counterpart to the 2005 defence statement was not included in this strategic document analysis because that document, as its preamble makes clear, is primarily interested in the “outward expression of our (Canadian) society”, rather than the elements of the use of force that make up strategic culture. Department of Foreign Affairs, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy – Canada’s International Policy Statement*, 2005, p. i.
the world” evokes the Robust Ally subculture, the notion that both Canadian defence and diplomacy can positively influence the world is in part a Pearsonian ideal.

36% of statements in this strategic documents were categorized as falling in the “Canada as a Robust Ally” subculture, 13% Pearsonian Internationalism, 9% Canadian Isolationism. The largest number of strategic statements – 42% -- were classified as “mixed”.96 Compared with the 1994 White Paper, the 2005 paper placed a far greater emphasis on partnership with the United States, North American defence, and addressing failed states internationally – not entirely surprisingly, given the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror. Yet the document suggests shifts in perspective about the Canadian military and the use of force that extend beyond the immediate threat perception of terrorism.

The 2005 White Paper reaffirmed the three primary roles for the Canadian Armed Forces: protecting Canadians, defending North America in cooperation with the United States, and contributing to international peace and security.97 Yet the combat-centric role of the Canadian military was highlighted far more than in previous policy statements:

The ability to respond to the challenge of failed and failing states will serve as a benchmark for the Canadian Forces...the task of restoring order to war zones will require Canada to maintain armed forces with substantial capabilities.98 To be sure, the Martin Government’s policy underlined the need to combine diplomatic, defence and development assets to rebuild failed states, yet at the same time stability and security are highlighted as preconditions to all other efforts.99 This approach contributes to the “mixed” tone of the document.

96 In terms of the absolute numbers, the breakdown for the 2005 Defence White Paper is as follows: 19 Mixed statements, 16 Robust Ally statements, 6 Pearsonian statements, and 4 Isolationist statements. 97 Department of National Defence, “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence – Canada’s International Policy Statement”, 2005, p. 2. 98 Ibid. p. 11. 99 Ibid. p. 26.
Importantly, United Nations issues are primarily relegated to the diplomatic part of the publication, with the UN being seen as mostly a matter of diplomacy and development rather than of military contribution. Additionally, the document voiced concern that UN operations bore little resemblance to traditional peacekeeping, primarily deploying in failed states where there is “little if any peace to keep” – a statement that has since become somewhat of a slogan for critics of modern peacekeeping in Canada. A Role of Pride and Influence in the World did highlight Canada’s 2004-2006 leadership of the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN peace operations (SHIRBRIG) through Brigadier-General Gregory Mitchell. However, while this was a prominent leadership position, General Mitchell’s brigade was primarily made up of contingents from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan – the leading contributors at the time. Lacking support from the developed world and the Security Council, SHIRBRIG would eventually fold in 2009 (Curran 2015).

In general, peace is a concept far less prominent in 2005 than it was in 1994. The terms “peace” and “peacekeeping” appeared 45 and 29 times in the 1994 White Paper, respectively. In the 2005 paper, peace is referenced 28 times, and peacekeeping only twice – even though the A Role of Pride and Influence was almost 50% longer.

DND and CAF Policy Documents

During the defence policy review process that led to the 2005 White Paper, a number of key strategic documents were issued on the status and future of Canadian military force, both by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. More than the White Paper, these tactical documents show a distinct increase in Robust Ally statements, particularly with regards to threat perception. Whereas the Pearsonian subculture generally downplayed the severity of direct threats to Canada itself when compared to global issues, Robust Ally
perceptions tend to view the world as uncertain and dangerous. In the 2001 to 2005 period, strategic elites increasingly portrayed the immediate threats to Canada as being as prevalent, if not more so, than during the Cold War.

2003’s *The Future Security Environment* is a strong example of this shift in culture. Issued by the Chrétien government, this document analyzed security trends leading up to 2040, with the aim of informing Canada’s strategic level long-term Force Deployment activities. Its core conclusion was that the Canadian military would, in coming decades, be called upon far more frequently than in the past to deploy in response to threats to stability.\(^\text{100}\) The authors state that threat perceptions had changed significantly from only a few years prior:

> The contrast could not be starker between the optimistic expectations of the immediate post-Cold War period and the pessimistic misgivings about the future that are routinely advances today.\(^\text{101}\)

While the document notes that more than just military power is needed to defeat foes such as Al-Qaeda, the majority of this foresight document (55%) affirms the core tenets of the Robust Ally framework: the importance of sustained high-level defence expenditures, the drawbacks of the UN-centric approach, and the need to work alongside American predominance.

A similarly forward-oriented document, *Future Force* (2003), was published by the Army in the same year. It also foresaw “somewhat greater emphasis on ‘hard power’ – military capabilities in particular- as a means of achieving foreign policy and security goals”.\(^\text{102}\) Particularly telling is the way in which the Army’s leaders viewed the use of force for Canada as compared to its allies:

> For the Americans, this (coalition operations) translated to the “creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and pre-eminent in any form of conflict”. It is no different for Canada.

\(^\text{101}\) Ibid. p. 21.
The view that the strategic considerations of strong allies like the United States are broadly the same as those Canada should consider is a key aspect of the Robust Ally framework.

Both *Future Force* and *The Future Security Environment* argue that, regarding preparation for the spectrum of operations, “a force trained for combat can perform all other missions with little difficulty. Yet, the opposite is not true”.\(^\text{103}\) Beginning in this period, this approach – that contingents trained for combat can “scale down” their approach to less kinetic missions, including UN peacekeeping operations – began to strongly influence the way in which Canadian officers were trained and educated at various institutions. A thorough review of Canadian Armed Forces training in 2015 shows that the Canadian military provided less than a quarter of the peacekeeping training activities it did in 2005, largely because of the assumption that combat training is sufficient for all contexts (Dorn and Libben 2016, 6).

Also published in the leadup to the White Paper was the 2004 national security policy *Securing an Open Society* and its 2005 follow-up document, titled *One Year Later*. As the name suggests, *Securing an Open Society* sought to achieve a balance between addressing external threats to Canadians such as terrorism and preserving “Canadian democratic values”. Developed by from the Privy Council Office rather than DND or the military, these documents included but were not limited to issues the use of force. The 2004 document was fairly balanced between Internationalism and Robust Ally thinking – 25% and 30% respectively, with 35% mixed strategic statements – and referred repeatedly to the need to bring both military and diplomatic/development assets to bear in addressing failed states.\(^\text{104}\)

By contrast, the 2005 sister document *Securing an Open Society: One Year Later* contained only Robust Ally and mixed statements, lacking any fully Pearsonian views. Of note is

\(^{103}\) Ibid. p. 157.
the significant increase in defence expenditure highlighted in this document, which is primarily justified through an expanded threat perception:

Budget 2005 provides Canada’s military with $7 billion in new budgetary funding over the next five years, which will support $12.8 billion in additional expenditures by the CF in that period—the largest increase in defence funding in the past 20 years.\footnote{Privy Council Office, \textit{Securing an Open Society: One Year Later}, 2015, p. 49.}

Across all documents, the need to “revitalize and renew” the Canadian military became more and more prominent, with the period of governance under the Liberal Party eventually being widely referred in Conservative circles to as the “lost decade” (Cohen 2011, 96). The Somalia Affair, in turn, was seen as loss of public confidence in the institution and its leadership. Without referencing the systematic issues of racism, torture, and violence that led to the Inquiry, these documents referred to the Affair primarily through a lens of defence spending cuts:

Throughout this period, the CF was forced to focus on survival and the implementation of personnel reductions and base closures, coupled with virtually constant attacks on its credibility.\footnote{Department of National Defence, \textit{A Time for Transformation: Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff 2002-2003}, 2003, p. 15.}

The view that Canadian defence spending should rank among the top tier of NATO allies – especially on major capital projects such as fighter jets, surface combatant vessels, and submarines – fits well within the Robust Ally framework, with Pearsonian Internationalist elites far more comfortable with a middling level of defence spending, in line with their relative threat perceptions.

Finally, four annual reports from the Chief of Defence Staff were published over this period. These documents are particularly useful in tracking the shift from Pearsonian Internationalist dominance to a more Robust Ally approach over these years. Whereas 47% of the strategic statements made in the 2001 report were Pearsonian, by 2004 only 15% of the statements could be categorized as Pearsonian, with 85% attributed to Canada as a Robust Ally.
Over this period, there was an important shift in these documents in the perceived goal of multinational operations such as Afghanistan or the deployments to the Balkans in the 1990s. Rather than portraying the role of the military as contributing to international peace and security generally, a much more direct link was made between the deployment of troops overseas and the safety of Canadian citizens:

The boundary between the home front and the international environment has vanished. By taking part in efforts to end instability and conflict overseas, the CF contributes to the safety and security of Canadians at home. Therefore, the CF must be able to respond, not only to terrorist attacks at home and abroad, but also to threats from the rogue states, failed states and organized crime groups that have made the world so very dangerous.\(^{107}\)

Increasingly, as the mission in Afghanistan became more combat-oriented, the operational side of the CAF became its raison d’être – rather than the humanitarian, disaster-prevention and peacekeeping aspects that were given prominence in the 1990s.\(^{108}\) In the 2001 annual report and in prior documents by the Chief of Defence Staff, the lack of a direct military threat to the Canadian mainland was repeatedly emphasized. After 9/11, the top military commander felt that “Our main function is to provide defence and security for Canadians”\(^{109}\) and that “we face new enemies. We face a new generation of threats. Relationships are changing. The nature of military operations is changing”.\(^{110}\) Unfortunately for the study of Canadian strategic culture, the Department of National Defence stopped publishing the Chief of Defence Staff’s annual reports in 2004; had the reports been published across the full 25-year period of analysis, it would have provided an even better insight into how the leaders of the Canadian military saw the use of force changing over time.

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\(^{108}\) Ibid. p. 4.


Speeches from the Throne

Four Speeches from the Throne were made in the 2001-2005 period, with the degree of focus on strategic issues varying from speech to speech as usual. The Chrétien Government’s 2001 speech to open the 37th Parliament was, in terms of strategic culture, virtually identical to the 1999 Throne Speech – incidentally, the speech was made in January of that year, before the terrorist attacks. Yet a speech made in 2002 under Chrétien also did not contain much in the way of Robust Ally statements; only five strategic statements in total were made in that speech.

The first speech under the Martin Government, made in 2004, contained the largest number of strategic statements. It was also the first Throne Speech to be dominated by Robust Ally sentiments since the Cold War, with the core military message being that “Canada can make a difference and we can more than carry our weight”. ¹¹¹ Yet the 2004 speech also illustrated the tensions inherent in the Martin Government’s approach to international affairs, with Canada portrayed as an independent power that nonetheless worked towards cooperation:

Canadians want their country to play a distinctive and independent role in making the world more secure, more peaceful, more co-operative, more open. They want to see Canada’s place of pride and influence in the world restored. ¹¹²

This uneasy mixture of Robust Ally and Pearsonian approaches to Canada’s role in the world would continue to characterize the Liberal government under Paul Martin, with Robust Ally thinking becoming more firmly embedded among strategic elites under the government of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

UNGA Speeches

Compared to the shift in subculture dominance exhibited in the DND and CAF documents analyzed, the change in strategic statements made at the UN General Assembly were

¹¹² Ibid.
more subtle. Pearsonian Internationalism was dominant in all five speeches made in New York during this period. Additionally, two of the speeches were made by the Prime Minister himself – one by Chrétien and one by Martin – suggesting a degree of importance placed on the United Nations as a forum. However, while Robust Ally thinking never prevailed in these speeches, as the years progressed the Pearsonian sentiments in Canada’s UNGA statements were increasingly diluted by statements that mixed praise for the UN with indications of frustration with the world body and, especially, the peacekeeping project.

The 2001 speech by foreign affairs minister John Manley was, exceptionally, given in November due to the terrorist attacks on New York City two months prior. This was the first speech in five years not to be given by Lloyd Axworthy, who had retired from politics and returned to academia. Perhaps partially because of this change, the speech contained a somewhat harsher tone towards the General Assembly, alongside the usual affirmations of Canadian support:

> There can be no more "business as usual." There is no more time, no more patience and no more resources for diplomatic gamesmanship and the stoking of dangerous self-interest.\(^{113}\)

Yet in the context of fighting terrorism, the Chrétien Government continued to emphasize the role of the UN, arguing that:

> While the campaign against terrorism will be conducted through coalitions of different state actors, alliances and organizations, this is where it must ultimately all come together in its political, diplomatic, legal, economic, humanitarian and security dimensions.\(^{114}\)

In 2002, there was a return to a heavily Pearsonian speech, with 81% of the statements categorized as Internationalist. This speech was made in against the backdrop of U.S. President

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\(^{114}\) Ibid.
George W. Bush’s attempt to gain Security Council approval for military action against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq:

Canada welcomes the powerful messages delivered here today by President Bush affirming his country’s commitment to work with the Security Council of the United Nations in resolving this serious threat to our collective peace and security.115

The Bush Administration would be unsuccessful, and a major rift would emerge in Canada-U.S. relations as the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 with Canada refusing to be a part of the “coalition of the willing”. In these documents at least, this appears to have led to a renewal of Canadian support for the UN as key norm-shaper for the use of force.

In the 2004 speech made by Paul Martin in his first year as Prime Minister, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect was mentioned for the first time in these documents. This maxim, which is based on the assumption that national sovereignty is contingent on a country’s ability and willingness to protect its citizenry, would be endorsed by all Member State at a 2005 summit, and was strongly backed by Canada (Bellamy 2005). Indeed, Canadian advocates such as Lloyd Axworthy and Michael Ignatieff had an important role to play in developing the concept through the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Yet even at this stage there were concerns which were voiced about the carte blanche authority for intervention associated with this maxim:

The primary responsibility for the protection of a state’s own population lies with the state itself, and we are not arguing for a unilateral right to intervene in one country whenever another country feels like it.116

The General Assembly debates at this time were conscious of the challenge that had been posed by the U.S. to the international norms through the war in Iraq; Minister Pierre Pettigrew noted in 2005 that “the situation with Iraq had not only divided the membership, but had left deep scars.

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within our institution”. Nevertheless, despite the slow increase in strategic statements that tempered Pearsonian arguments with concerns about the efficacy of international institutions when compared to allied action, at the 60th anniversary of the founding of the UN, these documents indicate the strong role that Internationalism still held in aspects of Canadian strategic culture.

**2006 – 2010**

In January 2006, in the 39th General Election, Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party of Canada was elected to a minority government, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Martin. The Harper Government would ultimately govern for almost 10 years, winning another minority mandate in 2008 and a majority government in 2011. During this period, the Robust Ally subculture would establish a dominant position in Canada’s strategic landscape – though the transition did not occur overnight with the Conservative victory, nor did Pearsonian Internationalism fade entirely.

2006-2010 were also the bloodiest years of the War in Afghanistan, with the Canadian Armed Forces tasked with countering a major Taliban offensive in the Kandahar region. Of the 159 soldiers who died on mission during the operation in Afghanistan, 150 were killed in this period. Additionally, one diplomat, a Canadian reporter, and two aid workers were killed during the war (Boucher 2010). Under the Chrétien and Martin Governments – and to some extent, under the early Harper Government -- the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, was initially largely in the narrative of international law, foreign aid, and a normative commitment to international peace and stability (Zyla 2013). Over time, it became an example of Canada contributing to anti-terrorism, Western security, and Canada punching above its weight:

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The Harper government continued to justify the mission – and the combat deaths it was producing – in largely the same terms that had been used by the Liberal government of Paul Martin in 2005: as a humanitarian mission designed to bring stability and the fruits of reconstruction and development to the people of Afghanistan, rather than, for example, as a Canadian contribution to a Western war against Islamist extremism or the US-led “Global War on Terror” (Bloomfield and Nossal 2007, 302)

Across almost all types of strategic documents between 2006 and 2010 – with some notable exceptions that will be examined in detail – the proportion of Robust Ally statements to Pearsonian statements was significantly higher than in past documents. Isolationist sentiments, while never dominant in the late 1990s and early 2000s, disappeared almost entirely in the documents during this period. This matches with the pattern of peacekeeping troop contributions made by Canada during these five years. While from 2001-2005, Canada fielded approximately 200 peacekeepers on a fairly steady basis, following 2006 Canadian contributions truly reached token levels.118

White Papers

The cornerstone document of defence policy under the Harper Government – the 2009 Canada First Defence Strategy (CDFS) – was a significantly more “Robust” document that the White Paper that preceded it. Of the 18 strategic statements in the 22-page document, there were 11 Robust statements, 5 “mixed” statements, and only one each of Pearsonian and Isolationist Statements.

In naming it Canada First, the document reflects the emphasis of strategic elites in protecting national interests and achieving Canadian strategic goals, rather than simply “influencing” international peace and security. Whereas the terms “peace” or “peacekeeping”

118 In her account of token peacekeeping, Katharina Coleman does not identify a specific threshold of troop contributions, under which a Member State qualifies as a ‘token contributor’. Instead, one of the definitions she offers for token peacekeeping is providing an operational force of peacekeepers too small to deploy independently, and which must therefore either deploy as part of a large continent from another contributing state, or as members of staff command only (Coleman 2013).
appeared in the 2005 White Paper 30 times – and 74 times in the 1994 White Paper – “peace” only was mentioned 3 times in 2009; peacekeeping was not referred to at all in the *Canada First* document.

The document sets an especially large mandate for the Forces in terms of domestic security:

“Delivering excellence at home requires the Forces to be aware of anything going on in or approaching our territory, deter threats to our security before they reach our shores, and respond to contingencies anywhere in the country.”

The international threat perception is similarly wide, asserting that “Canadians live in a world characterized by volatility and unpredictability”. Terrorism, drug trafficking, foreign encroachments on natural resources, and infectious outbreaks are listed as threats to Canada where the military has a prominent role to play. To fulfill these roles, the government pledged to increase the size of the Regular Forces to 70,000 and spend over $490 billion over 20 years to make up for previous budgets that were characterized as having “dramatically under-invested in the Canadian Armed Forces, leaving them seriously unprepared to deal effectively with this increasingly complex global environment.”

Nevertheless, the need for diplomatic and other tools for resolving conflict was recognized in the CFDS, in a lone concession to the arguments of Pearsonianism:

“Today’s deployments are far more dangerous, complex, and challenging than in the past, and they require more than a purely military solution… Only by drawing upon a wide range of governmental expertise and resources will Canada be successful in its efforts to confront today’s threats.”

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DND and CAF Policy Documents

With the loss of annual reports from the Chiefs of Defence Staff as an analytical resource, only four major tactical-level documents were released in this period – all of which were

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120 Ibid. p. 6.
121 Ibid. p. 6.
122 Ibid. p. 9.
published in 2009, when the defence review process that led to Canada First was completed. Interestingly, while the more political White Paper marked a clear break from its Pearsonian predecessors, the results of analyzing DND and CAF documents over this period were more mixed. Robust Ally thinking was in the majority in most of these documents, yet towards the end of this period, in a number of documents, the proportion of internationalist statements became gradually higher. As the War in Afghanistan dragged on and a military victory remained elusive, there was a greater recognition among the different services that diplomatic and developmental resources may be vital to a longer-term solution in the country. A 2008 journal article co-authored by Lieutenant-General (and future Liberal Party Member of Parliament) Andrew Leslie indicated this shift in operational approach:

“Canadian Forces (CF) acknowledgement of the need to practise a more coordinated and holistic approach to operations is ever more evident – and also pressing. Accordingly, DND leadership – both civilian and military – is increasingly calling for the adoption of a force that takes a “comprehensive approach” to operations. Such a force would employ diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources” (Leslie et al. 2008).

Like its 2003 predecessor, The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 seeks to analyze future security trends to assist in force preparedness. The 2008 document contained an even more pessimistic view of the security of the international system and envisioned a more robust role for the Canadian military in the coming years:

“Canada, in particular, faces a litany of security concerns… Consequently, the CF of the future must be a multi-role, combat capable force that can perform a broad range of tasks and operate in all engagement spaces (land, maritime, air, space, cyber, and cognitive).”

The document also took direct aim at the efficacy of UN in stability operations, arguing that after 60 years, the “rules that govern the structure and activities of the UN are not well-

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suited to dealing with the current, much less the future, security environment." This disdain for peacekeeping among CAF members who saw it as duty unfit for “real soldiers” had been longstanding, but intensified over this period (Arbuckle 2006). Canadian engagement in international bodies, which previously had been framed in the context of contributing to international peace and security, is linked more closely to national interest:

“Canada will have to maintain its contributions to international bodies, particularly the UN and NATO, since membership in these institutions continues to serve Canadian interests.”

Land Operations 2021, a similarly future-oriented 2009 document that focused on the role of the Army, took a somewhat more balanced approach to strategic culture – though it continued to be dominated by Robust Ally perspectives. Combat effectiveness is still the key metric by which the preparedness of the Canadian Armed Forces is measured, but the link between international peace and stability broadly speaking and the security of Canada is addressed in more Internationalist terms. There is also a greater recognition that “[i]n the future security environment, military power alone will not fully achieve national objectives”.

The 2009 Canada Military Doctrine was an attempt, in a single document, to lay out a comprehensive military doctrine for the Canadian Armed Forces alongside Canada First. Like Land Operations 2021, the result was a document with more mixed strategic culture than one might expect of such a force-centric document during a period of Robust Ally dominance. Once again, the need for a whole-of-government approach to solving intractable conflicts like Afghanistan was highlighted:

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124 Ibid. p. 75.
125 Ibid. p. 51.
127 Ibid., p. 25.
“Canada’s ability to continue to contribute to international peace and stability is dependent upon relationships with like-minded partners and the effectiveness of the Canadian Government in employing instruments of national power”.\textsuperscript{128}

At the same time, non-military tools such as diplomatic negotiation, economic policies and information collecting are described as “instruments of national power”.

In a reference to Canada’s lack of involvement in the Iraq War, coalition operations were defined in this document as “usually authorized by a mandate recognized under international law originating with the United Nations Security Council or a similarly authoritative body”.\textsuperscript{129} So while the importance of international law and the Security Council are recognized here, the qualifiers “usually” and “similarly authoritative body” illustrate the mix of strategic subcultures at play here.

Finally, the \textit{Integrated Capstone Concept} was the first tactical-level document in several years to contain more Pearsonian statements than Robust Ally statements. The goal of the document was to provide an over-arching institutional approach to future concepts shaping Canadian security– once again illustrating the military’s preoccupation with a future, post-Afghanistan environment in this period. 50\% Pearsonian, 44\% Robust Ally (with one mixed statement), this document provides insight into the impact that casualties – both Canadian and Afghani – had begun to have on strategic thinking in this period:

“Tolerance for collateral damage will continue to diminish – therefore, the requirement for greater precision which will place greater challenges on adaptability, comprehensiveness, and integration.”\textsuperscript{130}

The importance of understanding culture and motivation in modern conflict that “often have no precise beginning and no clear conclusion” is referenced in this document to a much greater extent than in similar documents published earlier in the Afghan conflict.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid. p. 6-6.
\textsuperscript{130} Department of National Defence, \textit{Integrated Capstone Concept}, October 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, p. 3.
in this document continue to be cast widely, and the mandate of the Canadian Armed Forces is likewise broadly interpreted. But in portraying international conflict as increasingly complex, the authors see a more important role for less “robust” actors than the military, including non-governmental organizations and development agencies.\footnote{Ibid. p. 41.}

*Speeches from the Throne*

Four Throne Speeches were made in this period, though one of the speeches – the 2009 speech opening the 2\textsuperscript{nd} session of the 40\textsuperscript{th} Parliament – contained no strategic statements whatsoever. All three other speeches were Robust Ally dominant, though they did not dwell extensively on matters regarding the use of force. In the first speech under the Harper Government, the language of “national interest” and “sovereignty” – which would be used throughout this period – was introduced:

> “Advancing our interests in a complex and sometimes dangerous world requires confidence and the independent capacity to defend our country’s sovereignty and the security of our citizens”.\footnote{Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Thirty-Ninth Canadian Parliament”, 2006.}

The following year, a renewed emphasis was placed on “Arctic sovereignty”, with procurements for Arctic patrol ships and aerial surveillance announced to “defend the North”.\footnote{Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Canadian Parliament”, 2007.} The growth of defence budgets was a prevalent theme throughout these speeches, with the context being the need for Canada to have “the capacity and willingness to stand for what is right, and to contribute to a better and safer world”.\footnote{Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Fortieth Canadian Parliament”, 2008.}

*UNGA Speeches*

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Ibid. p. 22.}
\item \footnote{Ibid. p. 41.}
\item \footnote{Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Thirty-Ninth Canadian Parliament”, 2006.}
\item \footnote{Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Canadian Parliament”, 2007.}
\item \footnote{Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Fortieth Canadian Parliament”, 2008.}
\end{itemize}
Whereas the documents published by DND and CAF in this period mostly only offer a snapshot of strategic culture in 2009 – and while the Throne Speeches only tangentially touch on strategic issues -- the speeches given by Canadian elites on an annual basis to the UN General Assembly provide a much better sense of the evolution of Canadian strategic culture over this period. The speeches made at the beginning of these period were particularly Robust, especially considering the forum in which they were given. Towards the end of the period, however, we begin to see a partial slide back to Internationalism that would begin to appear in other documents in 2011-2015. In 2008, as will be seen, there was also a remarkably Pearsonian speech that hints at a divide between the perceptions of different strategic elites in this period.

In his first speech to the UN in 2006, Prime Minister Harper struck a markedly different tone than that of the speeches by his Liberal predecessors. Focusing almost entirely on Afghanistan, characterized as “one particular and key area where global interest and higher purpose come directly together”, the speech highlighted Canada’s leadership role in the combat mission. Yet as Bloomfield and Nossal (2007, 302) note, like Martin and Chrétien at this point Harper continued to frame Afghanistan as a UN-centric mission:

“All our actions in Afghanistan -- civilian and military -- are being taken in accordance with the mandate of the United Nations Security Council”

In 2007, Foreign Minister Cannon’s speech returned to the theme of moral Canadian leadership in the international sphere:

“We are guided by unshakable principles…promoting them is not enough. They must be protected and defended, particularly when they are under assault in Afghanistan, in Burma, in Sudan, in Iran, and elsewhere.”

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137 Ibid.
He also affirmed a core element of the Robust Ally framework: “Security is the foundation on which everything lies”. In Afghanistan in particular, the Harper Government was firm in its conviction that without robust security being established by the coalition, reconstruction efforts would be fruitless.

2008 marked the first time that a Deputy Foreign Minister – not the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister or any other elected official – made the speech to the UNGA in the post-Cold War period. Leonard Edwards, the senior bureaucrat at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, was tasked with speaking at the opening of the 63rd General Assembly. Consequently, this was something of an outlier document in that it is much more heavily Pearsonian in sentiment. Unlike a speech from the Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs – whose statements are drafted and consulted upon by wide range of political and policy staff, with considerations as to the opinion of Cabinet, Parliament, and the media – the Deputy Minister had a relatively free hand to craft his speech, due to a high level of disinterest from the political leadership of the day. As a consequence of this, almost 80% of the statements made by Edwards were classified as Pearsonian Internationalist, with no Robust Ally statements included in the speech at all. Unlike previous speeches – even more so than speeches under the Liberal Governments – this speech placed the United Nations at the centre of all of Canada’s international efforts:

“For Canada, the United Nations remains indispensable for addressing the many global challenges that confront us today, be it the search for peace and security, the promotion of human rights, democracy and international development, combating terrorism or the protection of the environment.”

139 Ibid.
140 There were mitigating political circumstances for this decision as well. Canada was in the midst of a general election during this year and the value of sending a high-level political official to New York was questioned by the Conservative Party.
141 Former Deputy Minister Edwards continues to have a strong reputation as a Pearsonian Internationalist within Global Affairs Canada, and in retirement advocates for multilateralism and international institutions as a consultant.
Edwards’ speech also, for the first time in years, highlighted Canada’s role as a founding contributor to peacekeeping. Yet ultimately the presentation of the speech by a public servant, in a forum dominated by heads of government and state, sent a clear message about the relative importance of the United Nations to the Canadian Government at this time. Former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy voiced his concerns about what the decision meant for Canada’s 2010 candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, and Opposition Critic Bob Rae stated that he had “never seen as complete a contempt for international institutions and for Canada playing a lead role in the world”.  

2009 saw a return to form, both in protocol and substance; Foreign Minister Cannon delivered a strong Robust Ally speech to the Assembly. Afghanistan, which had been notably absent in the previous years’ speech, once again loomed large in 2009.

Finally, in 2010, Prime Minister Harper himself spoke at the UNGA, giving a much more Pearsonian statement. The speech emphasized Canada’s role as a “consistently reliable and responsible participant in UN initiatives around the world”144. He also highlighted Canadian financial support for the UN, including in peacekeeping-related initiatives:

“In particular, we have made a significant contribution to peace and security in Africa, including to peace initiatives, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in the Sudan, since taking office in January 2006.”145

Both the presence of the Prime Minister in 2010 and the more UN-friendly tone of the speech may be explained by Canada’s bid for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council that year, which Harper referred to in the speech. Ultimately, Canada would lose its bid for a seat on the Council to Portugal by a wide margin. Canada had won all of its previous bids for a seat

145 Ibid.
since 1946, and the loss was seen in the media as a major foreign policy embarrassment and a result of the Harper Government’s sidelining of the UN. As the delegation of the speech to a senior bureaucrat two years prior suggests, Canada did not make the UN Security Council bid a priority until shortly before the election date. As Denis Stairs argues, the Canadian Government failed to launch the type of campaign that had won elections in the late 1980s and late 1990s; the 2010 attempts were not helped by “a public, crudely transparent, and an unprecedentedly self-serving pitch in support of the Canadian cause” by the Prime Minister to the General Assembly at the eleventh hour (Stairs 2011, 9). Following the loss, Minister Baird characterized it as being the result of the Conservative Government’s unwillingness to compromise on strategic principles:

We will not back down from our principles that form the basis of our great country, and we will continue to pursue them on the international stage, some would even say that, because of our attachment to those values, we lost a seat on the council. If that's the case, then so be it.

2011 – 2015

Compared to the two five-year periods prior to this, 2011 to 2015 was relatively low-key time, both in terms of the international security environment and in the Canadian context. In 2011, NATO transitioned its presence in Afghanistan into a training mission, and Canadian combat troop were withdrawn by July of that year. By the 15th of March, 2014, the last of the training contingents had left from Afghanistan, marking the official end of a 12-year mission in Afghanistan – the longest military operation in Canadian history (Melnyk 2011). The Conservative Government of Stephen Harper won a majority government and a four-year mandate in the 2011 federal election, bringing stability to the Canadian political scene after four elections in seven years. During this period, the decision was also made to re-brand the Canadian Forces. Under the Chrétien Government in the early 90’s, the term “Armed” was quietly dropped
as a means of softening the military’s image. In 2011, the government reintroduced the “Royal” element to the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy, and in 2013 the Canadian Forces officially returned to the name “Canadian Armed Forces”. In the *National Defence Act*, the document governing the Canadian military, both names are used; the rebranding was seen at the time part of the Conservative Government’s broader effort to establish greater ties to Canada’s military history (Frenette 2014).

*Figure 10: Canadian peacekeeping troop contributions 2006-2015*

Canada’s peacekeeping contributions over this period was also static; from March 2006 onwards, Canada peacekeeping contributions to the UN were never more than 56 individual soldiers, and generally hovered around 20 troops. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre -- which had progressively lost support from the government and finally lost federal funding in 2011 – was shut down completely in 2013, leaving Canada as one of the few major countries without a dedicated peacekeeping training facility (Dorn and Libben 2016, 7). Finally, analysis of the strategic documents published in this period shows that this period of political stability
entrenched the dominance of the Robust Ally subculture – though with some signs of a possible re-emergence of Pearsonian thinking towards the end of the period. No White Papers on Defence were published, though a few DND and CAF reports were published to make up for the lack of a formal defence policy update.

DND and CAF Policy Documents

2011’s *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow* was dominated by Robust Ally statements. It interprets the *Canada First* strategy as:

intended to empower the Canadian Armed Forces to defend Canadian sovereignty, Canadians and Canadian strategic interests wherever it is necessary—at home, or abroad.

However, this was also a “mixed” document, with less emphasis on pure combat capability than previous documents, containing a recognition of combat and stability operations as fundamentally different roles. Rather than the traditional view of infantry training that held that combat training could be “scaled” appropriately to any operation, *Army of Tomorrow* outlines a continuum of operations that requires different tools and different preparation. Nevertheless, combat and stability missions – “the point on the continuum of operations that is the most complex and difficult” – continued to be the main focus of the Army’s concept designs.

*Advancing with Purpose*, a similar document published by the Army three years later, cast perhaps the widest range of possible threats facing Canada in its analysis. Terrorism, criminal organizations, cyber threats, space-based assets, and “adversaries on the moral plane”

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147 Ibid. 20.
148 Ibid. 45.
are listed among the dangers facing Canadians, with the Army playing an active role in
countering each. In light of Canada’s experiences in the 2011 Libyan Civil War, further
participation in “coalitions of the willing” with “like-minded” states is raised – with or without
UN involvement. Interestingly this document also raises the possibility of an emerging
multipolar world, with Canada and its allies needing to maintain a rules-based international order
during this transition.

In its third iteration, *The Future Security Environment 2013-2040* contained more Robust
Ally statements than its predecessors; 15 strategic statements were Robust Ally, 8 Pearsonian,
and 9 mixed. Once again, Canadian military operations under “less formal like-minded
c coalitions that are formed to address specific challenges” in the future is mentioned as a likely
possibility. Though Canada at this point had not contributed significantly to UN operations in
over a decade, the possibility that the Forces may be asked to support “some United Nations
Security Council Resolutions” through multilateral military options is raised – though Libya-
style intervention, rather than Blue Helmet operations, may have been in mind here. Though
international law is raised a number of times in this document, it is characterized as susceptible
to different interpretations; “the application of international law is often a function of perceptions
of a state’s power”. Consequently, while the Canadian use of force is said to be constrained by
the rule of law, broad-based support for international intervention is also considered acceptable
in this document.

Finally, as a side note, in this 2014 document, the concept of strategic culture is referred
to specifically by Canadian strategic elites for the first and only time in this analysis:

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150 Ibid. p. 4.
151 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
153 Ibid. p. 22
State power and, by extension, the behaviour of state governments, is also influenced by political and strategic culture, material resource availability, economics, and geography. Simply put, the power of a state, or its ability or capacity to do something, act in a particular way, or direct or influence the behaviour of others or the course of events, is influenced by many tangible and intangible factors.¹⁵⁴

*Speeches from the Throne*

In this final period of analysis, only two Throne Speeches were made by the Harper Government. 2011’s speech was generally similar to the previous statements made under Conservative leadership, with strong but broad assertions of sovereignty and national interest tied with military valour: “The Canadian Armed Forces play a crucial role in defending our sovereignty and national security”.¹⁵⁵

The 2013 speech, however, contained more strategic statements – and more Robust Ally statements – than any similar speech in the 25-year post-Cold War period. This Throne Speech is representative of many of the key elements of Robust Ally subculture, beginning with the assertion the Canada “cannot earn respect by projecting weakness. Serious countries have serious capabilities.”¹⁵⁶ Investments in defence spending are depicted as ensuring that “No longer does Canada have to hitch a ride with our allies”, and the claim is made that, soldier for soldier, “the Canadian Armed Forces are once again the best in the world”.¹⁵⁷ Though there clear parallels to the neo-conservatism that dominated American strategic culture from 2001 to 2008, the international use of force is interpreted and presented in this speech in a way that distinguishes the Robust Ally framework as a specifically Canadian subculture:

Consider this: we are honourable. People of peace, we use our military power sparingly; but when we do so we do so with full conviction, gathering our forces as men and women

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 25.
¹⁵⁷ Ibid.
who believe that the freedoms we enjoy cannot be taken from us. This clarity focuses our might in terrible times. And wherever and whenever we unleash that might, we raise our grateful voices and our prayers to honour those who have stood in harm's way for us.158

**UNGA Speeches**

Following the 2010 failure to win election to a non-permanent seat on the Security Council seat, this period saw a return to robustness in the annual speeches delivered in New York. The 2011 speech in particular adhered to the Robust Ally approach, with almost 70% of strategic statements falling in this category. This speech also contained a phrase that would, for many, encapsulate Canada’s approach to international affairs – and the UN in particular – at this time. Citing Canada’s opposition to communism during the Cold War, its opposition to apartheid in South Africa, its actions in Libya against Ghaddafi, and its support for Israel in a world body that had passed numerous resolutions condemning the country, Minister Baird stated:

> Canada does not just "go along" in order to "get along." We will "go along," only if we "go" in a direction that advances Canada's values...“This is the Canadian tradition. Standing for what is principled and just, regardless of whether it is popular, or convenient, or expedient.159

Comparing the War on Terror to the “great struggles of previous generations” against fascism and communism, the speech once again underlined Canada’s leadership and independence in the international sphere. Additionally, a clear point was made about the role that institutions like the UN play vis-à-vis sovereignty:

> State sovereignty is not created by multilateral institutions. Instead, multilateral institutions exist and derive legitimacy from the independent decisions of sovereign states.160

2012’s UNGA speech, also delivered by Baird, continued this critical approach towards the United Nations, decrying the lack of concrete steps made towards establishing stability and

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158 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
stressing that “this Organization is not a goal; it is merely the means to accomplish goals”. While traces of Pearsonianism appear through the statement’s call to improve international institutions – “the business (of the UN) is our common humanity, and our mandate is the strengthening of humanity’s bonds” – the conclusion of the speech falls squarely within the Robust Ally framework: “if the collective interest in our shared humanity does not motivate us to act, then the self-interest of our own security should”.

The final two speeches of 2013 and 2014 were more mixed in their strategic cultural content, though they too had a majority of Robust Ally statements. The address to the 67th session of the General Assembly was significantly longer than previous speeches given by John Baird, and “threats to peace” – including the crisis in Syria -- are given significant attention. Yet it asserts that Canada “doesn't seek to have our values or our principled foreign policy validated by elites who would rather "go along to get along". Internal debates within the UN about institutional reform – an issue of importance to Canada under the period of Pearsonian Internationalism -- are scorned:

The billions who are hungry, or lack access to clean water, or are displaced or cannot read and write do not care how many members sit on the Security Council.

On the evolving Syrian civil conflict, Canada affirmed its support for a political resolution; “But let us not confuse a peaceful, negotiated outcome with equivocation or moral uncertainty”.

Finally, in his last speech to the UN in 2014, Prime Minister Harper focused his statement overwhelmingly on the maternal health initiatives that was a cornerstone of his international policy. Referencing Canada’s support of the United Nations for over 70 years, the

162 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
Prime Minister stated that Canada has “always been ready and willing to join with other civilized peoples and to challenge affronts to the international order”\(^{166}\). Canada’s peacekeeping past is referenced obliquely – “Canadians have put their lives on the line to deter active conflict between peoples. It is a duty we accept and it is a record of which we are proud” – yet ultimately, in line with Robust Ally thinking, the international system is depicted as a threatening and instable place, with Canada taking part in a “common struggle against the savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world”.\(^{167}\)

\(^{167}\) Ibid.
Results

Figure 11: Canadian defence White Papers

Figure 4

The normative shift in the types of strategic statements issued in these three White Papers is significant. The 1994 document included a majority of Pearsonian strategic statements (e.g. “Canada's commitment to remain an active participate in multilateral efforts to promote collective security is a reflection of our values and interest”). By contrast, the 2005 White Paper had a large number of mixed statements that represented two or more strategic cultures in a single statement. For example: “While diplomacy remains the preferred tool in the pursuit of international peace and security, our country must possess the hard military assets necessary to
achieve our foreign policy goals. This includes using lethal force when necessary.”

The 2008 White Paper of the Harper Government, meanwhile, was dominated by strategic statements that highlighted the robust role of the Canadian military in tackling international threats; “In concert with its allies, Canada must be prepared to act and provide appropriate resources in support of national interests and international objectives”.169

**Tactical Documents**

![Figure 12: Canadian Armed Forces strategic documents](image)

Focusing specifically on these annual reports made by the top Canadian soldiers at the time, we can see an important shift towards greater “robustness” right around the period where

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Canadian peacekeeping troop contributions began to decline rapidly. As a brief example of the contrast, one can look at this statement made by the Chief of Defence Staff in 2000:

“Whether building or securing peace in the Balkans, providing humanitarian assistance after the earthquake in Turkey, spearheading Canada's search and rescue efforts, or helping to protect our borders against criminal activity, the Canadian Armed Forces continued to contribute to the safety, security and well-being of Canadians and communities throughout the world.”\textsuperscript{170}

When comparing such a statement to one made by the Chief of Defence Staff only three years later, the normative shift in the perspective about the utility of force seems clear:

“The CAF needs to be able to field mobile, lethal forces that are relatively easy to deploy, can operate in the most hostile and demanding operational theatres, and can be sustained.”\textsuperscript{171}

\textit{Throne Speeches}

\textbf{Figure 13: Speeches from the Throne, 1989-2013}

A total of eight Speeches from the Throne were delivered in the period of analysis. Only a part of each speech was devoted to defence and international affairs, and as a result the

strategic content of these documents was limited. Isolationist and Commonwealth discourses were absent from these documents, with only Pearsonianism, Robust Ally thinking, and a mix of the two in evidence. On average, about six strategic statements were identified per Throne Speech; these results should therefore be taken more skeptically than analysis of documents with more broad strategic content. Nevertheless, a broadly similar pattern can be seen in the shift from Pearsonian dominance in the early 1990s to a Robust Ally emphasis from mid-2005 onwards. The results also provide interesting insight into the periods where international issues were most prominent in the Canadian political scene; the Martin Government’s 2004 speech contained the greatest number of strategic statements, while the Harper Government’s 2009 Throne speech contained no strategic content whatsoever.

Figure 14: Canadian UNGA Speeches, 1990-2015

With some notable exceptions (such as the 2008 speech made by Deputy Minister Edwards), the progression from a dominance of Pearsonian statements to a focus on Canada as a
Robust Ally has been fairly steady in speeches to the UNGA as well. While speeches such as the 1993 Speech by Prime Minister Kim Campbell were evocative of Pearsonian internationalism (“The world is hungry for multilateral solutions to conflict and war. This is our time, the United Nations moment.”), a similar speech by Prime Minister Chrétien ten years later in 2003 was much more cautious in its approach (“We all recognize that, through the UN, we have met many global challenges successfully, but we recognize that on others we have failed.”).
Conclusion

What does this model and analysis say about Canadian troop contribution levels to United Nations peacekeeping? Strategic culture theory argues that the dominant culture affects the perceptions on the use of force of policy-makers by inculcating with certain norms and ideals, which then filter down into a variety of strategic policy decisions. The use of force in peacekeeping is appealing to strategic cultures with a low tolerance for in- and out-group casualties. Peacekeeping’s place within international law and the role of the Security Council in authorizing all peacekeeping operations also connect favourably with those states that emphasizes cooperation on the basis of treaties and international institutions, and those have a low domestic but high international threshold for the authorization of force. In the Canadian context, Pearsonian Internationalism as a subculture believes in the promotion of values and ideas abroad by Canada, supports cooperation on the basis of international treaties and norms, has a low casualty tolerance (both in-group and out-group), and believes the use of force should require sanction from international law. As a strategic culture, it thus provides conditions favourable to high-level Canadian contributions to peacekeeping operations.

The analysis of a range of Canadian strategic documents from 1990 to 2015 indicates that, in periods of higher peacekeeping troop contributions to the UN, Pearsonian Internationalism was indeed dominant in the discourses of strategic elites. As Canadian contributions to UN operations faltered at the turn of the millennium, and finally reached token status in the mid-2000s, Robust Ally statements became more prominent across the range of strategic documents analyzed. While exceptions to this general trend serve to remind us that non-dominant national subcultures continue to be influential among many strategic elites, the broad shift from Pearsonian Dominance to Robust Ally dominance appears clear. The results also
provide a means to contextualize future developments in Canadian strategic behaviour. As future Canadian governments release new strategic documentation, trends and comparisons to past documents can be analyzed to understand the plausibility of a return to high-level Canadian peacekeeping.

The conclusion that Pearsonian Internationalism is more amenable to participation in United Nations peacekeeping than other approaches to Canadian strategic policy is not in itself a surprising conclusion. However, this model suggests that variations in the troop contribution levels to UN peacekeeping for Canada (and other UN Member States) depend not on a single variable like domestic politics but rather on the breadth of factors that make up our societal perspective on how military force should be used – our strategic culture. Previous explanations of troop contribution dynamics have tended to see a single incentive as driving involvement in UN operations. The analysis above indicates that a number of factors were a part of the policy decisions surround peacekeeping troop contribution in post-Cold War Canada – low threat perception, a desire for recognition at the UN, a belief in the efficacy of peacekeeping, the need for a “mission” for the military following the collapse of communism. It also suggests that, in line with the expectations of the model of strategic culture, Canada’s peacekeeping decisions were linked to broader understandings of the place of Canada in the world and the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in the post-Cold War period.
Chapter 4. The People’s Republic of China: From Non-Engagement to Peacekeeping Prominence

Almost all empires were created by force, but none can be sustained by it. Universal rule, to last, needs to translate force into obligation. Otherwise, the energies of the rulers will be exhausted in maintaining their dominance at the expense of their ability to shape the future, which is the ultimate task of statesmanship.


China and UN Peacekeeping

The Canadian case study explored why a country might shift from being a major peacekeeping power to providing only a handful of military personnel to United Nations operations. The case of China explores the opposite scenario: a country that consistently provided no peacekeepers at all, only to gradually and significantly increase its UN troop contribution to the level of a major peacekeeping player.
Turning now to the second case study of this analysis, we can see from Figure 1 that China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations is virtually the reverse image of Canada’s peacekeeping experience. Prior to its membership in the United Nations – when the “China” seat was still occupied by Kuomintang’s Republic of China -- the People’s Republic of China was heavily opposed to UN peacekeeping for two primary reasons. First, on a theoretical level, the Maoist theory of just war saw peacekeeping as a pretext for hegemonic intervention in the affairs of others (Tieh 2003, 20). Second, China’s experience in the Korean War – a UN-sanctioned operation that eventually drew in Chinese forces – fed into China’s long-stand concern about the use of the Security Council Resolutions as a “trojan horse” for great power interventionist agenda (P. Wang 2015, 87).
Historical Background of Involvement

Following its accession to the United Nations in 1971, the PRC resolutely opposed the use of UN peacekeeping forces:

“Beijing continued to regard the use of UN forces as contradictory to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, as stipulated in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. This attitude guided Chinese voting behaviour in Security Council deliberations on a number of UNPKOs…In each and every case, Chinese representatives repeated Beijing’s stand on UN peacekeeping forces and chose not to participate in the voting on various resolutions.” (Yuan 1998, 277–78)

However, in deference to the Third World countries of the period who favoured peacekeeping intervention, China refrained from using its Security Council veto power from blocking the deployment of Cold War-era peace operations (Choedon 2013, 222). With the fall of the Soviet Union, China entrenched its global role as “guardian of state sovereignty in the post-Cold War era” (Yuan 1998, 291). Opposing both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the U.S.-led coalition that precipitated the First Gulf War, China abstained from the Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in the region. The peacekeeping missions that China did send observers to – missions in Iraq-Kuwait, Mozambique, and Liberia – were all traditional, first-generation peacekeeping missions (Yin 2007, 24). In 1997, for the first time in 25 years, China used its veto power in the Security Council, blocking the deployment of Blue Helmets to Guatemala and stating that “No country’s peace process should be at the expense of another country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Berman 1998, 4). This was in retaliation for the Guatamalan government’s close ties to and recognition of Taiwan, over China’s objections. The veto was withdrawn and the peacekeeping mission authorized once this point was made.

Two years later, China would again use its veto, this time to block the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia. As with Guatemala,
this decision was linked to Macedonian diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, rather than any specific issue with the operation, and China’s prematurely ended the experimental, pre-emptive form of peacekeeping (Zhongying 2005, 100). Writing in 1998 about the deep historical roots of Chinese concerns about peacekeeping and the linkage among Chinese leaders between UN operations and violations of sovereignty, experts predicted a continued ambivalence by China on peacekeeping operations in the 21st century (Yuan 1998).

However, beginning in late 2002, following ten years of complete Chinese non-involvement in peacekeeping, the People’s Republic of China began to steadily increase its contributions to the UN. What began as small peacekeeping unarmed contingents of Chinese personnel – with China’s very first peacekeeper being sent to Cambodia in 1992 -- has since evolved into a robust, combat-capable cadre of Chinese soldiers deployed to six operations across the world (Suzuki 2011). While Chinese infantry contingents have now been deployed to a number of missions, Chinese peacekeepers from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tend to be specialized assets that are particularly appreciated at United Nations Headquarters:

“China traditionally deploys hard-to-source enabler troops – the medical teams, engineers, and logisticians that provide the backbone to a peacekeeping mission, supporting all other troops to carry out the mandate. These high-value asserts are typically sparse in developing country military profiles and also cost more to maintain and train” (Fung 2016).

China first voted in favour of a “non-consensual” peacekeeping operation – that is, those mandated to take action against the host nation state – in Timor-Leste in 1999, having abstained from similar earlier votes on Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In the years that followed, China gradually increased its political, financial, and finally military support for UN peace operations. In 2015, President Xi Jinping committed 8,000 troops to a United Nations peacekeeping standby force, as well as $100 million to a African Union standby force and $1 billion for the UN Peace
and Development Trust Fund (Fung 2016). China is now among the top 15 Troop Contributing Countries to UN peacekeeping, and the largest contributor among the five permanent members of the Security Council. It is also the second-largest assessed contributor to the regular peacekeeping budget, after the United States (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2015).

**Peacekeeping Logistics**

Compared to a country like Canada, Chinese decision-making processes surrounding peacekeeping – and its strategic decision-making in general – is much more of a “black box”. Generally speaking, the main actors in the process are the Politburo Standing Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Committee (CMC), the People’s Liberation Army, with the Ministry of Defence and the Chinese delegation in New York acting as coordinators (Herman 2015). Following a request for participation forwarded from the UN by the permanent delegation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will make a recommendation on the level, length, and type of Chinese peacekeeping participation in an operation. The Chinese military, which is under the authority of the CMCs – state and party -- rather than the Ministry of Defence, provides the military expertise needed to make the decision. Ultimately, the State Council, in consultation with the CMC, decides on the recommendation and how the contingent will be composed. Analysts have argued that internal strategic decisions in China generally follow the Bureaucratic Politics Model, where decisions are the result of bargaining games between bureaucratic organizations with parochial interests:

The decision-making process on participation in peacekeeping is highly contentious, as it pits the diverging interests and competing priorities of the various agencies against one another (Herman 2015).
The decision-making process is also somewhat dependent on the style of the leader in power, with peacekeeping decisions (and policy decisions more generally) under Hu Jintao reportedly being far more consensus-based than under Xi Jinping, who prefers centralized leadership.

**Theories of China’s Pivot**

A number of theories have been posited in attempting to explain the sudden reversal of the long-standing Chinese ambivalence towards peacekeeping, again ranging from direct material incentives to normative aspirations. Karlsson (2011), for example, argues that “China’s behavior as a personnel contributor to multilateral peace operations is largely congruent with self-interested power-seeking behavior” (34). Others, taking an “investment model” approach to peacekeeping contributions, see the benefits to military modernization as incentive enough for the People’s Liberation Army:

Like other countries, China’s decision to deploy troops are motivated by its desire to protect national interests, gain operational experience, and secure a positive reputation and high status (Fung 2016, 1).

Incentive-based explanations can be found in the literature that focuses on China’s economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa, the site of the majority of UN peace operations. (van Dijk 2009; M. J.-Y. Wang 2007; Sprance 2008). Tull (2006), however, convincingly argues that the economic impact of Chinese involvement in Africa is, in the long term, marginal – both in terms of the impact on the continent and the relative emphasis that China places on African countries. Tull also notes that, with respect to Chinese peacekeeping, the government of China has at times seemed to play both sides of specific African conflicts. He points to the significant peacekeeping contributions China has made to Liberia while prior to 2003 having conducted considerable trade and investment with the government of Charles Taylor (Tull 2006, 475). Some of the operations
that have seen the largest contribution of Chinese peacekeepers – such as missions in Lebanon and Mali – are regions that contain little by way of Chinese economic interests.

On the more normative end of the explanatory spectrum, a number of authors have tied China’s involvement to peacekeeping to global hegemonic aspirations or the desire to be seen as a “responsible great power” (Lei 2011). This assumed that China’s engagement in UN peacekeeping has stemmed from an increasing flexibility as to its insistence on respecting sovereignty and the principle of non-interference as China has become more prominent (Hirono and Lanteigne 2011, 244). While its veto power in the UN only represents negative influence,

China’s role as a peacekeeping contributor helps it effectively participate in UN Security Council actions, finance debate, and policy circles; it has the authority and legitimacy to negotiate based on field experience (Fung 2016, 3).

The biggest challenge to explanations that rely on a single Chinese incentive is in explaining the timeline of events: why did China choose to start contributing in 2002? China has sought international recognition, field experiences for its troops, and protection for its overseas interests and citizens for quite some time (Tull 2006). Several authors argued that a mix of different incentives – strategic interest, normative support, material incentives -- gradually became more prominent over time as China’s global position strengthened in the 1990s (Fung 2016; Holland 2012; P. Wang 2015). Drawing on strategic culture theory, this chapter argues that, while none of these single variables can explain how and when China became engaged in UN peacekeeping, they all contribute in different way to a shift in how China has come to see the use of force.

Specifically, as we shall see, it is the increasingly Legalistic view of the international use of force, that most strongly supports China’s increased involvement in peacekeeping. Though China continues to have significant reservations about the peacekeeping project – and in
particular the potential for abuses of sovereignty and norms of non-intervention – Chinese elites see supporting peacekeeping as an important part of supporting the UN system of international order as a whole, which China can influence and reform from within. In considering the puzzle of Chinese peacekeeping contributions, it is important to keep in mind that while China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations signifies a major reversal in the attitude of the Chinese government towards peacekeeping, the current number of Chinese peacekeepers remains small when compared against the overall size of the People’s Liberation Army. Possessing the largest army in the world, China could easily double its current contributions and become the largest troop contributing country without straining its resources. Yet the People’s Republic has not done so, and in fact continues to express concerns about the direction of peacekeeping in various fora. The fact that China currently deploys many peacekeepers while maintaining certain reservations about UN peacekeeping suggests that China’s reasoning for providing troops stretches beyond the project of peacekeeping itself – a nuance that the strategic cultural approach to this case study captures.
Mapping Chinese Strategic Culture

As is the case in the Canadian case study, the existence of multiple strategic cultures competing with one another is well-established in an extensive literature. Unlike Canada, however, evidence of Chinese strategic culture stretches back almost 3,000 years, leading to a greater range of debate around the essential faces of the “Chinese way of war” (Feng 2009, 31). China has been the most popular case study for strategic cultural analysis, and there has been significant debate about historical and modern day context for this culture. Much of the disagreement in Chinese strategic culture literature is whether China’s culture is fundamentally non-violent and Confucianist or fundamentally aggressive and Maoist (Liu 2014; Johnston 1998; Booth and Trood 1999). This debate has taken on particular significance in the 21st century, as predictions of America’s strategic decline and the rise of China in a new bipolar, multipolar, or “G-zero” world have led to fears about what China’s influence will mean for the West. In these analyses, Western scholars have tended to place great value on the influence of certain classical Chinese texts – especially The Art of War by Sun Tzu – on Chinese strategic culture (Scobell 2005).

Historically-oriented studies of Chinese strategic culture that draw on these texts have depicted China as inherently and traditionally non-violent and non-interventionist – a surprising conclusion, given the important role that the use of force has had in Chinese history. Tiewa Liu, for example, argues that:

“China has a unique strategic culture, based on Confucianism, seeking non-violent solutions to problems of statecraft and interstate disputes, and is defensive-minded, favoring sturdy fortifications and peace over expansionism and war, exemplified by the thinking of sages such as Sun Zi and Confucius” (Liu 2014, 557).

Confucian principles of cooperation and harmony in particular have been seen as essential to Chinese strategic thinking, leading either to a basic pacifism or a reliance on defensive strategic
principles. Zhang (2002) argues that contemporary defensive realism in China is based on the tenets of Confucian moralism, which prizes restraint in the use of force and the importance of negotiation. In the modern context, this suggests that as China’s geopolitical influence rises, we can expect it to act as a “responsible great power” to promote peaceful non-intervention and uphold international institutions like the United Nations (Lee 2014, 207).

Yet analysis by Booth and Trood (1999) highlights how (as with all other ancient civilizations) an understanding of force and aggression is key to understanding historical Chinese culture; the period between the founding of the Western Zhou (1100 BC) to the demise of Imperial China in 1911 during which China experienced 3,790 domestic, foreign, and civil wars (29). Furthermore, they note that China alone has used force internationally no less than ten times – including a number of expeditionary and interventionist operations, belying the assertion that defensive-mindedness rules supreme in Chinese strategic culture (Booth and Trood 1999, 30). Indeed, some authors have argued that China scholars are self-consciously selective in asserting the non-military and Confucian nature of Chinese strategic culture as a means of promoting China’s “peaceful rise” narrative (Johnston 1998).  

The massive impacts of the “century of humiliation” between 1839 and 1949 that led to the rise of Chinese nationalism, as well as Mao Zedong and Chinese communist ideology, further complicate single-faceted attempts to explain Chinese strategic culture. The revolution that brought Mao to power has sometimes been treated as a complete break in terms of Chinese attitudes to the use of force, with more than two thousand years of Confucian tradition being replaced with the “purely pragmatic approach of the Maoist era” (Ondrejcsák, Husenicová, and Padrtová 2014, 123). Drawing on their conflict analysis, Booth and Trood (1999) argue that

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172 The term ‘peaceful rise’ -- *heping jequi* -- became China’s official national strategy in 2004, but its roots can be traced back to the Maoist period with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and even further back into traditional Chinese political philosophy (Dellios and Ferguson 2012, 3).
post-1948 China has been dominated by a strategic culture based in the teachings of Mao and the Communist ideology. Others, noting the numerous changes in strategic behaviour under the Communist Party of China – from Cold War standoffs to détente with the West and the Sino-Soviet split to the “peaceful rise” policy – are more skeptical about the influence of communist ideology (Ball 1993).

One of the most influential studies of Chinese strategic culture – and one of the most prominent strategic culture analyses in general – has been the research done by Alastair Iain Johnston. In Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (1998), Johnston conducted a textual analysis of Ming dynasty grand strategy from 1368 to 1644. Drawing on his understanding of strategic culture from The Seven Military Classics, Johnston introduces the parabellum paradigm (from the Latin “prepare for war”), arguing that throughout Chinese history parabellum strategic culture “is a prism through which changes in relative capability are interpreted” (Johnston, 1998, 264). Johnston argued that the cultural parabellum lens is needed to give “rational calculations” meaning to Chinese elites. In a more modern context, Johnston has argued that China maintained its commitment to realpolitik across the Maoist period, with Mao essentially continuing the approach to the use of force establish by his imperial forbearers (Johnston 1996). Likewise, Johnston (2003) has been skeptical that post-Cold War China’s “peaceful rise” heralds a fundamental change in the outlook of Chinese strategic elites. While Johnston, in order to differentiate his approach from a-cultural realism, emphasized that parabellum perspectives were culturally learned by Chinese elites and could therefore be challenged by other paradigms, in practice he saw realpolitik as dominant throughout Chinese history (T. Zhang 2002, 73)
Against Johnston, Feng (2009) argued that Chinese strategic culture can be best conceived on a binary spectrum, with Confucianism on one end and parabellum realism on the other. Feng focused on the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party as the variables in the system, with different leaders leading one way or another and influencing China’s ultimate strategic culture. Taking a game theory approach to Chinese strategic culture, Feng depicted one axis of culture being the cooperation/hostility dynamic, and the other the strong/weak control over military forces. In arguing for China’s peaceful rise, Feng argues that there has generally been a greater influence of Confucianism than parabellism on China’s defence policy:

Unlike Johnston, my reading of China’s history indicates that in over 2,000 years of feudal rule the feudal empires of China seldom displayed aggressive intentions towards other countries nor made any attempts at expansion despite the capability to do so (Feng 2007, 26).

As Feng notes, Johnston clearly recognizes the basic elements of Confucian culture in China’s history – “that war is inauspicious and to be avoided; the enemy is not necessarily demonized; violence is a last resort” – yet strongly denies Confucianism’s impact on modern strategic culture (Johnston 1998, 66).

In response to the Feng-Johnston debate, a number of alternative explanations emerged attempting to integrate different competing aspects of Chinese strategic culture literature. Scobell (2005) takes a utilitarian approach to strategic culture, arguing that China generally applies Confucianist\(^\text{173}\) strategic culture to support their international image, but may resort to parabellum frameworks from time to time as the need arises. Wang (2010), meanwhile, depicts three approaches to Chinese strategic choice: those that emphasize Confucianist pacifism, those in line with Johnston’s cultural realism, and the approach of structural (or defensive) realism.

\(^{173}\) The term ‘Confucianist’ is used to distinguish it from the Confucian philosophical/humanist religion, which eschews violence and the use of force.
Wang concludes that, in the modern era, defensive realism is the best guide to both historical and modern Chinese strategic action (Wang 2007, 208).

Though Johnston identifies the influence of the Legalist school of thought in the Seven Military Classics in China as a counterpoint to Confucian approaches, he folds the perspective of Legalism within the parabellum subculture. Wang (2007) argues that Legalism – which sought to strengthen state power through the rule of law – is not a separate culture but instead a type of practice of structural realism. Rosita Delios (1994), however, identifies a persistent and separate undercurrent of Legalism in Chinese strategic behaviour. She notes that this subsection of China has “always sought to underpin its morality with a foundation of decisive (if, at times, misdirected) strength”, and identifies the disproportionate reprisals in Tiananmen Square in 1989 with this strand of thinking (16).

By allowing for the simultaneous existence of multiple competing strategic culture perspectives, an increasing number of authors interested in the Chinese use of force use the fourth generation approach to sidestep the search for a single framework to explain all of China’s strategic behaviour (Ondrejcsák, Husenicová, and Padrtová 2014). By drawing on the subculture approach outlined in my theoretical framework, I also attempt to avoid the reductive tendency towards saying that “Chinese act like this because this is how the Chinese act” – something that Scobell (2005) identifies as a major issue in the existing literature that tries to assert a single unified national strategic culture (1). Using the subculture argument, both Johnston and Feng – as well as the numerous other authors identified above -- can be seen as partially right. Chinese strategic culture has, at different points, been both primarily motivated both by Confucianist and parabellum moral frameworks, as well as by alternative perspectives on the use of force. Drawing on a range of works that have uncovered different facets of Chinese strategic culture, I
divide the views of Chinese strategic elites into four key subcultures: Chinese Confucianism, anti-foreign isolationism, the parabellum paradigm, and Legalism.

Figure 16: Chinese strategic subcultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subculture</th>
<th>Chinese Confucianism</th>
<th>Anti-foreign isolationism</th>
<th>Parabellum Paradigm</th>
<th>Lawfare Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal of the Use of Force</td>
<td>Defence of homeland and nationals abroad</td>
<td>Defence of homeland</td>
<td>Defence of homeland and certain groups abroad</td>
<td>Promote values, beliefs or ideas abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Way in Which Force is Used</td>
<td>Low in-group and low out-group casualty tolerance</td>
<td>Low in-group, medium out-group casualty tolerance</td>
<td>High in-group, high out-group casualty tolerance</td>
<td>Low in-group, medium out-group casualty tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred Mode of Cooperation</td>
<td>Neutrality/Non-interference</td>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>Unilateralism</td>
<td>Cooperation on the basis of laws, treaties and rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold for the Use of Force</td>
<td>Domestic population willing to use force only in limited, “just war” circumstances</td>
<td>Domestic population highly unwilling to use force outside of defence matters</td>
<td>Domestic population highly willing to use force to achieve political goals</td>
<td>Domestic population willing to use force provided UNSC authorization is given</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the Canadian case study, these strategic subcultures represent fundamentally different views on the use of force and the global role of the military. Given the radically different geography, history, and relative power of the two countries, it is not surprising that the character of the subcultures is different as well; as we shall see, Chinese isolationism is distinct from Canadian isolationism, and while Pearsonianism and Confucianism share some characteristics, they are based on very different worldviews. The impacts of these different subcultures of China’s peacekeeping participation – the key strategic behaviour in question – play out in unique ways as well. Confucianism, though supportive of international cooperation, is
wary of expeditionary uses of force to the extent that it falls outside of the “peacekeeping sweet spot” identified in Chapter 2. Only the more activist approach of Legalism, which promotes the use of force in support of the international order, falls within peacekeeping’s scalable norms.

1. Confucianism

As we have already seen, a range of texts have attempted to describe the impact of Confucianism on Chinese strategic culture and the use of force. Though inherently linked to the philosophical-religious tradition that inspired it, Confucianist strategic culture must be considered in a distinct manner from the teachings of Confucius and the Hundred Schools of Thought. At its core, the Confucianist subculture holds that the use of force should be a last means of resort, only justified when protecting the interests and welfare of the Chinese state and people (T. Zhang 2002, 78). In keeping with a martial tradition that stretches back across millennia, a number of authors draw a direct connection between modern Chinese strategic culture and the instructions of Sun Tzu: “The preferred strategic goal is to win a war without fighting” (Feng 2007, 17). However, it is important to stress the difference between Confucianist subculture and pure pacifism. The Confucianist approach does not disavow the use of force, but rather has a high threshold for the justification of force. Generally speaking, direct force should be a last means of resort and is only justified as protecting the interests and welfare of the Chinese state and people. (T. Zhang 2002, 78)

There is therefore a strong connection between this view of Chinese Confucianism and the “just war” in the West, with an emphasis on defence of the homeland and a broad standard of non-interference (Scobell 2005). Though not dismissing military force outright, the concept of

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174 In *The Art of War* as well as in a number of other classical military texts, the notion of a just or righteous war – *yi zhan* – is referenced repeatedly, with war being justified primarily as a means to end further bloodshed or eradicate governmental evil (T. Zhang 2002, 76).
righteous war stresses that the use of force must follow principles of benevolence and justice (Wang 2010). The achievement of popular support (i.e. domestic authorization for the use of force) is also essential to just war. Yet even under the most ideal circumstances, the very application of force was seen under traditional Confucianism to undermines the authority and legitimacy of the whole imperial order (Fraser 2016). Consequently, force is to be avoided wherever possible.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence – mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence – that have defined the relationship between India and China is a strong example of the Confucianist subculture at work in a policy setting (Kurlantzick 2007). On the issue of international cooperation, Confucianist strategic culture tends to avoid strict alliances with any one single partner in favour of a web of relationships on principles of coexistence. This approach dates back to the strategy of Middle Kingdom in mitigating the threat of “barbarian neighbours” by playing them off one another; close neighbours should pay homage in return for protection, while periphery foes should be persuaded through processes of accommodation, cooption, and “Sinofication” (Dellios 1994). In this way, even when China was conquered in the past, the conversion of the invaders to Chinese ways of thinking meant that, ultimately, China’s culture prevailed. In concrete modern terms, this translates for a preference of open diplomatic dialogue, a support for regional organizations, and a strong preference for loose international associations rather than formal alliances.

In terms of threat perception, Confucianism tends to see peaceful yet mutually independent coexistence as the “long-term trend of history” (Kissinger 2012, 102). When

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175 Also known as the Panscheel Treaty, these principles emerged from negotiations between India and China on the Tibet region, and have been influential in the grand strategic thinking of both countries.
violence becomes unavoidable, the Confucianist subculture does allow for the “controlled calibration of violence to well-defined, limited political goals” (Johnston 1998, 65). An example of this can be found in the brief Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979, which was conducted to teach the Vietnamese a lesson so that, in the words of Deng Xiaoping, “they could not run about as much as they desired” (Segal 1985, 211). In line with these principles, budgets should be kept strictly to what is necessary for security, so as to devote more resources to order and prosperity domestically (T. Zhang 2002, 78). As a result, the military’s role is seen more broadly than pure defence and homeland security, with the development and welfare of the Chinese people part of the armed forces’ mandate.

2. Anti-foreign isolationism

Owing to unique historical and geographical factors, the nature of this subculture of isolationism differs from the isolationism that characterizes part of other countries’ strategic culture; most countries have some version of isolationism in their histories, but each has unique consequences for this use of force. Here, the purpose of the use of force is to protect China from the meddling, harmful, and subjugating actions of foreign powers. However, the tolerance and threshold for this use of force in defending the homeland is much higher than in the Canadian isolationist context (Thomas 2007). The experience of the two Opium Wars and the subsequent “century of humiliation” which saw the failure of traditional Confucian means of dealing with “barbarians”, had a lasting impact on the Chinese strategic cultural landscape that continues to have an influence in the form of anti-foreign isolationism (T. Zhang 2002, 81). This framework is in part derived from China’s historical experiences of victimization during the so-called “Century of Humiliation”, and its resistance to criticism of its ambition to govern “one-China” (including Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan). (Holland 2012, 41). The burning of the Summer Palace
in 1860 by the French and English during the Second Opium War – an event closely tied to the Century of Humiliation in the minds of most Chinese – continues to be an important touchstone for the modern Communist Party in China, with strong isolationist linkages (Weatherley and Rosen 2013).

Though the anti-foreign isolationist subculture has not been dominant for some time – with the century of humiliation having been deemed to have passed in 1949 and China’s reclusiveness on the world stage having declined since Nixon’s 1972 visit – aspects of this approach continue to be evident. Since the formal establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s foreign policy has often adhered to a “strong normative framework” centered on respecting sovereignty and non-intervention, most strongly evident in the “One-China” policy that treats Taiwan as an internal matter (Holland 2012, 41). The anti-foreign aspect of this subculture is not, as is often assumed, solely aimed towards the West. During the Cold War, opposition to any form of extraterritoriality led to Mao’s adamant opposition to the Soviet navy’s use of Chinese warm-water ports (Kissinger 2012). Most recently, China’s experience with British Hong Kong, ending only in 1997, continues to play a significant role in informing China’s view that a country’s force should only be based within its own borders.

In terms of threat definition, this subculture sees threats primarily in terms of Chinese sovereignty and outside meddling in internal affairs. Whereas Confucianism speaks of the need to respect “diversity and the right of countries to choose independent paths”, anti-foreign isolationism speaks of opposition to “interference in other country’s internal affairs by whatever means and under whatever pretext”.176

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3. Parabellum Paradigm

This paradigm, derived from the maxim *si pacem parabellum* (“if you want peace, prepare for war”), is the most activist of the four national subcultures. Alastair Iain Johnston, the foremost writer on the Chinese parabellum perspective, saw this particular strategic culture being based on the assumption that:

“Warfare and conflict are relatively constant features of interstate affairs, that conflict with an enemy tends towards zero-sum stakes, and consequently that violence is a highly efficacious means for dealing with conflict” (Johnston 1998, 61).

In short, Johnston identifies the parabellum paradigm closely with the tenets of zero-sum *realpolitik*. He notes that the maxims of resorting to the use of force only when it cannot be avoided – a maxim that appears regularly in traditional Confucian texts – is very different from asserting that the use of force will occur infrequently (Johnston 1998, 68–69). If one believes that international relations are characterized by violence and competitions, as *realpolitik* realists do, then the preparation and use of force may be dominant even if there is a desire to avoid it.

The purpose of the use of force in the parabellum subculture is to be ready for local or international warfare, which can break out at any time in an inherently dangerous and unpredictable world. Most importantly, the parabellum approach sees the use of force as a “continuation of politics by other means, with war being a political action” (Liu 2014). In other Chinese subcultures, such as Confucianism, the use of force is seen as appropriate only in clearly defined and very limited circumstances, under parabellum strategic culture there is a greater range of circumstances where military actors and force may be seen as useful. In terms of threat definition, in line with realpolitik thinking, this approach tends to see a constantly high level of threat to Chinese interests and territory, with little trust in the utility of alliances, institutions, or international laws. As Johnston put it, the parabellum worldview asserts
“[t]hat conflict is a constant feature of human affairs, that it is due largely to the rapacious or threatening nature of the adversary, and that in this zero-sum context the application of violence is highly efficacious for dealing with the enemy” (Johnston 1998, 249).

Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, the parabellum approach merged with Marxist-Leninist ideology to form an “anti-imperialist” dogma, with the Korean War signalling the emergent dominance of the parabellum paradigm under Mao (Tieh 2003). With expansionist internationalists notions of class struggle and the view that war and violence can play positive roles, if they serve class interests, “Communism with Chinese characteristics” was well-suited to the parabellum perspective on the use of force, at least under Mao. The “Preparation for Military Struggle” – a term which repeatedly appears in Chinese strategic documents to this day -- is a key element of this subculture. Struggle is a term with complex Marxist-Leninist connotations – and one that stands in direct opposition to the tenets of Confucianist strategic culture (Ji 2006).

With regards to China’s place in the world, this subculture sees itself as leading the Third World as an alternative to Western hegemonism and imperialism. The parabellum approach stresses unity with developing countries and “the Third World”, continuing to categorize China as a developing country. Also, like Confucianism, parabellum perspectives are wary of formal alliances and partnerships – though in this case because the anarchistic nature of global politics make such relationships untenable in the long-term.

The Korean War was a major event that signalled the emergent dominance of the parabellum paradigm under Mao. Under the Cold War manoeuvering of the USSR and United Stated, China emerged from the Korean conflict as a military power clearly willing to use force internationally to protect its interests. This willingness was demonstrated in the 1962 limited

\footnote{In On Protracted War, a collection of speeches made by Mao in 1938, he expanded his vision of the utility of the use of force, stating that “War is politics and war itself is a political action” (Mao 1966).}
China-India War, a war which had a lasting impact on Indian strategic culture but which was casually described by Mao as “extending the courtesy of response” to provocations by Jawaharlal Nehru (J. Chen 2010). In the modern context, parabellum characteristics may be seen in China’s apparent readiness, at times, to come to the bring of war over crises in the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea. The parabellum approach sees nothing particularly unique or unusual in the use of force to achieve political, strategic or even psychological goals.

4. Legalism

This subculture of the Chinese use of force draws from the domestic and internaitonal legitimacy of the armed forces in upholding order. More specifically, this perspective is rooted in the unique relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the military. Like Confucianism, Legalism (fǎ-jìā) has roots in traditional Chinese philosophy as one of the Hundred Schools of Thought, with Confucianism commonly being described as developing in response to the Legalism of the ruling class. Experts have argued that, in China’s recent history, Legalism represents more of a “living theory” that continues to influence the precepts of contemporary Chinese leaders (Kane 2001, 49). Former Australia Prime Minister Kevin Rudd wrote on the continuing influence of Legalism on Chinese thought:

“Whereas Confucianism and Daoism emphasize moral virtue as a precondition for the proper governance of the state, legalism, by contrast, argues that the well-being of the state would be best guaranteed by clear-cut rules rather than any reliance on private morality” (Rudd, 2014, 1).

178 The two schools of thought were seen to have combined in the Han Dynasty period through a type of synthesis: the Legalist victory, while seeming to destroy Confucianism, in reality created a stable society in which it could triumph. The Confucian victory, far from destroying legalism, made the Legalist empire all but indestructibly” (Fairbank and Reischauer 1960, 108).
Drawing on the classical writings of Shang Yang and other “pragmatic” Chinese philosophers, Legalism dismissed more abstract approaches to the use of force, arguing that centralized power of the armed forces is key, as is social order, technical expertise, and established rules of behaviour (Kane 2001). Under Legalism, engagement with foreigners and the outside world serves to strengthen, not diminish, China’s power.

Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party has placed importance on ensuring that the freedom of action of the military is tightly constrained by regulations and the rule of law, with the political supremacy of the Party over the military always well-established (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982). The emphasis of use of military force being legally circumscribed stems, in part, from the Chinese historical experience of the warlord period, where the lawless use of force undermined China’s standing, security and prosperity and extended the century of humiliation (Dellios 1994).

At times, this subculture has been called the Chinese lawfare approach (Vanhuilebusch and Shen 2016). This is in part drawn from a strategic document titled “Unrestricted Warfare”, which was written by two PLA colonels and which was widely circulated through the Chinese strategic environment, including Jiang Zemin (Qiao and Wang 2002). In this and other documents, “legal warfare” was defined as one of the three innovative ways of war; “Legal warfare refers to a struggle for legal superiority by mobilizing domestic and international laws to gain the political initiative and military victory” (Lee 2014, 201). While such an approach is certainly one element of Legalism, it is a primarily negative view. While Legalists may see international law as an opportunity for expanding Chinese power, they also see the international

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179 The document became notorious in the West, as it presaged elements of the September 11th 2001 attacks on the United States. Despite being billed as “China’s secret plan to destroy America”, however, the book is better understood as an exercise in strategic theory and scenario-building, which both the United States military and the PLA do extensively.
use of force as an important element for *upholding*, rather than undermining, international law. A purely negative focus on the effects of lawfare also ignores the importance of the domestic legal hierarchy of the armed forces in China.

In terms of threat definition, threats are defined more broadly as threats to the international order, stability, and “justice”. In particular, threats to the international status quo that could negatively affect China’s global standing are to be guarded against. Whereas Confucianism stresses international cooperation on the basis of trust and good neighbourliness, Legalism insists on the need for rules, regulations and laws for a stable international order. While the Legalistic approach sees the United Nations as occupying a special and irreplaceable position, it nonetheless allows for Chinese critiques of the UN system and international law, and seeks to reform the organization and the system in a Legalistic manner from within. While the Confucianist perspective tends to view Security Council reform in a cautiously optimistic manner – arguing that all Member States should have an equal right to speak on the question of UN reform – Legalism tends to guard China’s privileged role on the Council somewhat more jealously.

Most recently, Legalism was demonstrated in China’s opposition to the US-led war in Iraq and its insistence that the United Nations Security Council – on which China has a veto – authorize any international use of force (Yang 2013, 190). While the Legalism sees the United Nations as occupying a special and irreplaceable position, it nonetheless allows for Chinese critiques of the UN system and international law, and seeks to reform the organization and the system in a Legalistic manner, from within. There are also important connections between the growing emphasis on the rule of law and anti-corruption campaigns in domestic Chinese society and China’s views on international law and the use of force (Huang and Ding 2006). Xi Jinping,
who has spearheaded a number of anti-corruption efforts and has further developed the legal framework of the People’s Liberation Army, is reportedly well-versed in the Legalist classics (Schneider 2016).

**Chinese Strategic Culture and Peacekeeping**

As in the Canadian case study, each of these four Chinese strategic subcultures represent competing views about the use of force among Chinese elite decision-makers. And, as in the Canadian case, three of these subcultures do not lend themselves well to high-level Chinese involvement in peacekeeping operations. Anti-foreign isolationism in China, like other forms of isolationism, is ill-suited to involvement in peacekeeping operations due its inherent suspicion of foreign interventions and its focus on home defence. To understand the parabellum perspective on United Nations peacekeeping, we need look no further than the assessments of other, non-Chinese believers in *realpolitik* who tend to believe that “Peacekeeping has no role to play in disputes between great powers” (Mearsheimer 1994, 34). The parabellum paradigm places far too much focus on the virtues of unilateralism and strict national interest to be compatible with contemporary peacekeeping. As mentioned earlier, Mao’s parabellum policies saw peacekeeping operations and similar international interventions simply as capitalist (or Soviet) pretexts to interfere in the affairs of weaker states as a means of neocolonialism (Tieh 2003).

Confucianism has a complex relationship with the United Nations, international law, and UN peacekeeping. On the one hand, the fundamental principles governing the UN and its Charter (international cooperation, dialogue, peace, and consensus) closely mirror the core tenets of Confucianism. The cosmopolitan foundation of the United Nations generally meshes well with Tianxia (All-under-Heaven) flexibility of Confucianist thinking (Dellios and Ferguson 2012, 103). On the other hand, the proactive role of the UN in promoting human rights internationally,
the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, and the increasingly interventionist nature of contemporary peacekeeping operations are at odds with Confucianist non-interventionism:

In the Chinese context, the language of human rights, when it has been deployed to justify military intervention abroad, has been tainted by its misuses in the international arena (Bell 2009, 35).

As a result, while Confucianist strategic culture is highly amenable to the soft-power initiatives of the United Nations, it is more cautious in supporting peacekeeping or stability operations. This raises the broader question of whether UN peacekeeping fits the criteria of just war theory – a debate that extends well beyond the focus of this project.\(^\text{180}\) If Confucianist strategic culture sees the use of force as emblematic of a failure of governance, however, armed peacekeeping – which is based on the notion that the use of force is required before good governance and nation-building can take place – is problematic from a Confucianist standpoint. Furthermore, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – which stress non-interference in the internal affairs of others – are by their nature in conflict with the principles of the Responsibility to Protect that underlie Blue Helmet Operations (Feng 2007, 25). Thus, while Confucianism is not as antagonistic to the peacekeeping project as, say, the Robust Ally framework in the Canadian context, it is at best agnostic about the utility of peacekeeping for achieving Chinese policy goals.

Only the Legalistic approach to the use of force can be seen as fully supporting Chinese involvement in United Nations peacekeeping – not as a means to promote peace, per se, but rather as a means of supporting the international legal order with the United Nations Security Council (and, thus, China) at its core. As a result, this model of strategic culture would expect

\(^{180}\) The literature on this subject seems to agree that while traditional peacekeeping, involving unarmed observers monitoring ceasefire lines, is well within the bounds of just war, modern operations that do not require ongoing host state consent or that mandate the active use of force against terrorist or rebel groups fall under a gray area. For more, see Hehir (1992), Holliday (2003), and Williams & Caldwell (2006).
that the extended period prior to 2002 of Chinese non-involvement in peacekeeping operations would coincide with a dominant period of Confucianism, while the steady rise of Chinese troop commitments to the UN should correspond with a rise in Legalistic statements in China’s key strategic documents.
China’s Key Strategic Documents

Having mapped the Chinese strategic cultural landscape and having established the link between the various subcultures and the use of force in peacekeeping, this section will analyze the key strategic documents that were issued in the post-Cold War period by various Chinese strategic elites. In comparing these documents to the previous case study, we see a number of important similarities and differences. Despite their fundamentally different style of government – Canada being a constitutionally democratic monarchy and the People’s Republic being a single-party authoritarian regime – the types of strategic documents issued are comparable. White Papers on Defence are regularly issued by Beijing to clarify military priorities, with more tactical policy documents being issued on an ad hoc basis. Reports made to the Communist Party Congress every five years can be compared to Canadian Speeches from the Throne. And like Canada – like all 193 Member States – Chinese elites address the UN General Assembly each September to outline core aspects of views on global relations.

However, unlike Canadian strategic documents, which tend to have concrete statistics, numbers, policies and strategies, Chinese strategic documents tend to deal in the abstract. As a consequence, they have little by way of specifics, but are rife with strategic culture statements. Owing to the long-term, top-down and methodical nature of Communist Party bureaucratic governance, Chinese strategic documents were also issued with far more regularity than comparable Canadian texts. With the exception of the first five years, each sub-section of the 1990-2015 timeline followed a predictable pattern of rolling out key documents; every five year period contains three defence White Papers, a single Report to the 5 Year Party Congress, and five speeches to the UN General Assembly given by either the President or Foreign Minister of...
China. Such regularity has made such documents highly suitable for the study of strategic culture over time:

“By and large, the Chinese… use a highly structured terminology in their military affairs… (this) is especially useful in pointing to the changing nature of Chinese military thought” (Tan Eng Bok and Georges 1984, 3).

Beyond the academic world, governmental foreign policy experts have, for some time, placed great emphasis on the importance of such publications, which are targeted as much if not more to an international audience as to domestic Chinese readers. Both the U.S. Department of State and Congress regularly report on strategic policy papers, deeming them to be essential to understanding China’s military and geopolitical approach (Lee 2014, 199).

In line with this analysis, China’s strategic documents have been divided into three categories:

1) the White Papers on Defence that have been published every two years since 1998, as well as occasional White Papers on other matters relating to defence
2) Reports made by the paramount leader to the National Party Congress every five years
3) Speeches at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, made every September in New York City

1) Defence White Papers

Since 1998, the People’s Republic of China has published a Defence White Paper once every two years, with the intended audience being as much – if not more – foreign as domestic (Breslin 2013). These White Papers span the administrations of three of China’s paramount leaders – Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping – but unfortunately do not provide us with any pre-1995 perspective. Nevertheless:

“In general all the (biannual White Papers on Defence) have had comparable structure addressing the security environment in general, possible threats to China on national, regional and global level, state of development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its modernization and military expenditures.”(Ondrejcsák, Husenicová, and Padrtová 2014, 124)
Until recently, China’s Defence White Papers lacked specific details about things like defence spending, tending to deal mostly in broad statements about the objectives and direction of China’s armed forces (S. Wang 1996). The focus on broad strategy, combined with the fact that each White Paper has been translated into English by China’s government, makes it likely that these documents are written more with a mind to foreign audiences and geopolitical competitors than to the domestic Chinese population. The Ministry of National Defence has provided its own English-language overview of the key words and themes of all the White Papers on defence that have been issued since 1998.

2) Reports to 5 Year Party Congresses

Both more infrequent and broader in scope than the Defence White Papers, the Reports to the Five Year Party Congress cover the period from 1992 to 2012. As the highest-level meeting of the broad party-state that makes up the Chinese political system, the National Congress of the Communist Party of China – in concert with the National People’s Congress – is a highly choreographed event that aims to lay out China’s key priorities for the following five years (Wu 2015). The central event of the Congress is the paramount leader’s report, which in theory is submitted for approval but in reality is crafted long before and is rubber-stamped by the delegates.

Despite the formulaic nature of such speeches, they provide useful opportunities to identify core military themes that the People’s Republic of China will pursue for the period (Mulvenon 2013). They also provide external observers with rare insight into the leadership dynamics within the Communist Party, hinting at the existence of different factions and the emergence of successors (Scobell and Wortzel 2004).

3) UNGA Speeches
Finally, as in the Canadian case, the annual speeches made by the Chinese premier or Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Nations General Assembly in New York provide an insight into attitudes towards international cooperation and intervention. As expert China-watcher Evan Medeiros (2009) put it, “China’s behaviour at the UN is a leading indicator of its affinity for using multilateral organizations to advance its objectives” (170). As with other countries, China’s speeches made to the UN General Assembly, by their diplomatic nature, tend to stress themes of peace, international cooperation, and international law more than threat definition and homeland defence. As a result, Confucianist-style sentiments that have a strong presence throughout these documents are particularly likely to influence the discourse of these addresses.

**1990-1995**

In the immediate post-Cold War period, China’s global approach was characterized by trends of nationalism, regionalism and, above all, modernization (Zhao 1997). China entered the 1990s in crisis, following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown – after which a number of countries distanced themselves diplomatically from China – and the collapse of communist governments around the world. In response, China adopted Deng Xiaoping’s 24 Character Strategy, which sought to maximize China’s future global options by avoiding unnecessary provocations, limiting international burdens, and developing China’s long-term capabilities:

“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

Although he had technically resigned in 1989, the shadow of Deng’s legacy loomed large over his successor Jiang Zemin until Deng’s death in 1997, and his ideological influence on all

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181 As is so often the case with translations, care must be taken not to assume hidden idiomatic meaning without context; “hide our capacities and bide our time”, to English ears, is a sinister phrase that suggests deception. It might be better interpreted as keeping a low profile, or “to be self-effacing” (D. Chen and Wang 2011).
aspects of China, including strategic culture, would continue long after that. Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Communist Party and paramount leader in China throughout this period, represented the “third generation” of Party leaders. His leadership in the early 1990s was dominated by the introduction of the “socialist market economy” and the chaotic period of economic growth and corruption that followed.

In terms of strategic culture, strategic documents issued in the first half of the 1990s demonstrated a high degree of Confucianist influence on Chinese elite thinking. As we shall see, the influence of Confucianist strategic culture was relatively high and steady across the 1990-2015 period of analysis. Despite being the most influential of the four sub-strategic cultures, at no point was Confucianism entirely dominant; throughout the post-Cold War period, Chinese strategic documents contained a fluctuating mix of all four competing perspectives. These first five years, however, were arguably the height of Confucianist influence. Additionally, anti-foreign isolationism was much more prominent in these years than it would be in later periods (Young 1995). This led to Chinese opposition to a number of different forms of international intervention, including United Nations peacekeeping operations.

In 1992, with the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), China provided its first-ever major contribution to UN peace operations. However, it has been argued that the short-lived Chinese deployment to UNTAC was primarily the result of China’s wish to distance itself from prior support of the murderous Khmer Rouge regime, as well as a modest attempt to assuage post-Tiananmen isolation on the international stage (Deng and Wang 1999, 77). UNTAC did not represent a shift in China’s fundamental view of UN peace operations, and China continued to see it as at best a limited tool for dealing with
crises, abstaining from the numerous UNSC votes on intervention in places like the former Yugoslavia. Beijing would not deploy UN peacekeepers again for another 10 years.

Party Congress Report

The 1992 Report by Jiang Zemin at the 14th Party Congress – titled “Accelerating the Reform, the Opening to the Outside World and the Drive for Modernization, so as to Achieve Greater Successes in Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics”, in the fulsome manner common to such documents in the People’s Republic – was the first made by Jiang as paramount leader. According to analysis by the Hoover Institute, the report followed a nine-month process (initial personal drafting by Jiang, with subsequent drafts incorporating input from the Politburo, the Central Committee, regional Party leaders, and various other committees) that would be repeated for subsequent statements. Unlike later documents, however, this report was also reviewed and edited by Deng Xiaoping, despite his official retirement.

Accordingly, the document contained significant emphasis on the legacy of Deng Xiaoping, a denunciation of Rightism, and an homage to the ongoing influence of Mao Zedong. In strategic cultural terms, the document contained a true mix of perspectives that reinforces the sense of transition and economic change that marked this period of Chinese history. Of the 31 strategic statements made, 38% were Confucianist, 15% parabellum, 15% anti-foreign isolationism, and 13% Legalism. 19% of statements were classified as “mixed’. The core objectives of Chinese defence policy were defined, firstly, to safeguard China’s independence and sovereignty, and secondly, to promote world peace and development.182 While the statement reaffirmed the importance of the UN and the Charter, such sentiments emphasized the very limited conditions under which the use of force is justified, in line with Confucianist thinking.

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Indeed, a large portion of the report -- drawing justification from either Confucianist, parabellum, or isolationist rationales -- was dedicated to denouncing interventionism:

“Hegemonism and power politics – that is, the monopoly and manipulation of international affairs by a few countries – will not be tolerated... Any country that overreaches itself or rides roughshod over others will be denounced by the peoples of the world. A just cause enjoys abundant support, while an unjust cause finds little…. In the final analysis, the question of human rights is a matter within each country's sovereignty; China is resolutely opposed to the use of human rights to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.”\textsuperscript{183}

Such sentiments, which combine Mao-era defiance against Western imperialism, just war reasoning, and a stout adherence to supreme national sovereignty, were typical in the Communist Party’s defence in the aftermath of Tiananmen square (Young 1995).

\textit{White Paper}

China released its first White Paper on strategic issues in 1995. Prior to this, a number of White Papers had been published on domestic issues, including a number of statements on human rights following Tiananmen. Technically, the 1995 document was a White Paper on security rather than defence; as a result, its primary focus was on the topics of nuclear and conventional disarmament. Nevertheless, the document addressed broader defence issues as well, containing 29 strategic statements. More than half (55\%) of these statements were Confucianist, the most of any other white paper in the post-Cold War period. It reflected the fundamentally Confucianist worldview that:

“As peaceful international environment is necessary for China’s development and a prosperous and stable China, in turn, will increasingly benefit world peace. For this reason, China unwaveringly pursues a foreign policy of peace and independence.”\textsuperscript{184}

The White Paper also reflected the Confucianist approach to defence spending, assuring external audiences that as long as there was no serious threat to China’s sovereignty or security, China’s

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
defence spending would not increase.185 Those few statements that were not either wholly or partially Confucianist reflected continued isolationism by referring to the Century of Humiliation or reflected Legalism by asserting complete Party control over the armed forces.

**UNGA Speeches**

Finally, at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, all five speeches in this period were delivered by Qian Qichen, a career diplomat who served as China’s Foreign Minister from 1988 to 1998. A key member of Jiang Zemin’s inner circle, Qian worked to normalize relations with the West following Tiananmen Square, but his speeches to the UN in this period also reflect the higher influence of anti-foreign isolationism in this period, alongside Confucianism.

In the 1990 speech, China voiced its opposition to Iraq’s armed invasion of Kuwait that precipitated the First Gulf War, citing it as violation both of international law and “accepted norms governing international relations”.186 China backed the United Nations Security Council sanctions against Saddam Hussien’s regime, though this may be understood more as China’s attempt to restore the sanctity of Kuwaiti sovereignty against outside attack than as an endorsement of Western interventionism. This is reflected in China’s abstention from the resolution authorizing the US and allies to use force to repel Iraqi forces in Kuwait (Deng and Wang 1999, 79). China contextualized its condemnation of Iraq within its core principles of coexistence:

“Normal international relations can be ensured only when all countries observe the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.”187

185 Ibid. p. 5.
187 Ibid.
In China’s first UNGA speech following the collapse of the Soviet Union., the 1991 statement continued to contain undercurrents of anti-foreign isolationism. Qian warned against assuming that the end of the Cold War would bring an end to Big Power interventionism. Going beyond even the limited utility of force envisioned in Confucianism, the speech asserted no international role for force whatsoever: “In our view, force should not be used even as a last resort in the search of the settlement of a problem, however complicated it may be”. 188

Throughout this period, China also expressed uncertainty about the post-Cold War role of the United Nations. While supportive of a more peaceful international order, based on the UN Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China repeatedly opposed “the arbitrary use of military intervention by the UN” and the use of “mandatory measures” as counterproductive – a position well in line with the strong influence of Confucianism during this period. 189 As a consequence, the relative number of lawfare strategic statements had somewhat declined by 1995; at the same time, China had returned to a policy of non-involvement in UN peacekeeping. The 1993 speech also saw the first direct reference to peacekeeping, placing under severe condition that would be repeated verbatim by China in this forum:

“As the frequency and scope of United Nations peace-keeping operations is growing, we deem it important and relevant to stress such basic principles of the Charter as respect for the sovereignty of, and non-interference in, the internal affairs of Member States... We also believe that humanitarian missions must not be transformed into military operations and that a war cannot be stopped by expanding it”. 190

The status and role of the United Nations – “the most universal and authoritative intergovernmental organization of sovereign States today, is irreplaceable by any other international organization” – became a standard line in General Assembly Addresses. Amid the peace-laden rhetoric, however, were veiled threats that a failure by other states to adhere to the

principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the norms of non-intervention would lead to tension and even military conflict. While the principles of the UN and its Charter are repeatedly praised, the use of the UN as a forum for intervention is disparaged; assertions that “some countries should not be allowed to carry out military intervention in the name of the United Nations” can be interpreted both as a warning on the limits of peacekeeping, and as an explanation of why China itself did not contribute peacekeepers.  

1996-2000

In the latter half of the 1990s, China strengthened its remarkable drive towards economic growth and modernization. With the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, Jiang Zemin and the “third generation” of Chinese Communist leaders became firmly entrenched. Under this transition, the pattern of strategic policy publication became set, with the repetition of certain key phrases in documents and speeches becoming watchwords for established attitudes towards international affairs.

Confucist statements dominated in this period across the four different types of strategic document. Though the term would not become a core part of the Chinese governmental lexicon until the early 2000s under Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin – alongside Prime Minister Zhu Rongji – worked to realize the 24-character strategy of calmly maintaining a low international profile while pursuing aggressive economic modernization. Certain events – such as a series of crises involving the leadership of Taiwan and the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by American forces – would test this restraint and re-introduce elements of isolationism and parabellum thinking, but overall this period was the most dominated by Confucianist strategic culture in the post-Cold War period.

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Over the course of this five-year span, not a single Chinese peacekeeper was sent to UN operations. Despite a general tone of affability and cooperation on foreign affairs, Jiang consistently drew a line on peacekeeping of Chinese non-involvement. It was also during this period that China vetoed the establishment or renewal of UN operations in Guatemala and East Timor. As has already been touched upon, these vetoes were connected more to the question of diplomatic relations with Taiwan than with specific concerns about the peacekeeping mission. However, China’s willingness to push non-intervention with Taiwan at the expense of Security Council consensus suggests that, in this period, norms of non-interference were dominant over structural Chinese support for the international order (Deng and Wang 1999, 81).

**Party Congress Report**

In the 1997 Report to the 15th Party Congress, Jiang Zemin embraced an even more heavily Confucianist perspective than in his report five years prior. Perhaps not coincidentally, the 1997 report also had the lead amount of strategic content of the five documents analyzed in this category. Of 23 strategic statements, 11 were based in a Confucianist view of the use of force. The international system was depicted as generally peaceful and multipolar, and the role of the military in supporting economic development and the welfare of China’s people was highlighted. Threats to world stability are defined as formal military blocs (alliances) and as countries meddling in internal affairs, including through sanctions. With the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule that year, Jiang referred to the “century of humiliation” for China that British dominance brought, with not-so-subtle links being made to attempts to promote Taiwanese independence.192

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Importantly for the analysis of this period in which China’s peacekeeping troop contributions were non-existent, only a single statement could be placed in the Legalism category:

“Under the new historical conditions, the army must consistently uphold the absolute leadership by the Party, be in agreement with the Party Central Committee ideologically and politically, obey orders of the Party Central Committee in all actions and never forget its nature and purposes as the people’s army.”

The UN and its Charter are referred to only briefly in this document, in the context of the Five Principles, and peacekeeping itself is entirely absent. Even in reports made to later Party Congresses, when China’s peacekeeping troop contribution increased dramatically, UN peacekeeping missions would never be discussed directly in this forum.

White Papers

As the first official White Paper on Defence to be published, the document titled “China’s National Defence in 1998” is worth looking at in some detail; this document would set certain patterns of rhetoric that would be maintained or modified in the 10 documents that would succeed it. In line with the other documents of this period, half of the strategic statements in this document conformed to Confucianism. According to China’s Ministry of Defence overview of the document, the keyword for the White Paper – “cooperation” – reflects this strategic cultural influence.

A portion of the document (15%) fell under the parabellum paradigm, owing in large part to the increased international tensions over Taiwan that began at this point. One phrase in particular – that would reappear in later documents – represented the mix of Confucian non-interventionism with an underlying preparation for force: “We will not attack unless we are

193 Ibid.
194 Ministry of Defence, “Overview of All China’s White Papers on National Defence”.
attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack”. Refusing to “commit itself not to resort to force” in Taiwan in asserting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, Beijing blamed the continued existence of “hegemonism” in the international system for the continuance of military force as a means of self-defence.

Finally, this document contains early discourse on the notion of China as a “responsible power” – “Facts show that China is a responsible big country and a firm force safeguarding world peace and stability” – as well as a discussion of peacekeeping. The lawfare statements in this paper generally related to supporting United Nations action when it is in line with the Charter. However, there were some interesting linkages made between the modernization of China’s military and international law that suggest an increasingly Legalistic approach to the use of force by elites:

“While adhering to the principle of suiting military legislation to its national and military conditions, China also lays stress on bringing it into line with the international military-related treaties and agreements that China has acceded to, so as to make China’s military laws consistent in content with international legal norms and practices.”

Ultimately, though praising peacekeeping principles of neutrality and self-defence that had been effective in the past, China continued to take a cautious (and broadly Confucianist) approach to UN operations that put it at odds with the growing mandates of peace operations:

“Be practical and realistic. A peace-keeping operation should not be undertaken when conditions are not yet ripe, nor should a peace-keeping force become a party to a conflict, which would be a deviation from the fundamental purpose of peace-keeping operations.”

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196 Ibid. pp. 8-11.
197 Ibid. p. 2.
198 Ibid. p. 16.
199 Ibid. p. 33.
China’s National Defence in 2000, published at the turn of the millennium and written in the context of crisis in the Taiwan Straits, saw an increase in the number of parabellum and isolationist statements (21% and 13% of total strategic statements, respectively), though Confucianist sentiments continued to dominate at well (34%). This breakdown reflects the difficult task this report faced of trying to affirm China’s “peaceful rise” in international sphere while at the same time warning of serious military consequences if the West interfered in Taiwan. The actions of Taiwan’s leader Lee Tenghui, who “flagrantly dished out his two states theory”, were tied to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and American naval interference in the Strait. Parabellum and isolationist statements highlighted the dangers posed by “neointerventionism, neogunboat policy, and neoeconomic colonialism” to China and to the developing world more generally.

As the proportion of parabellum and anti-foreign isolationist statements increased, it is worth noting that the influence of the Legalism subculture declined. Fewer references were made to the primacy of the UN and the Charter, and alternative organizations like the Shanghai 5 – a multilateral organization of former Soviet and Central Asian states opposed to interventionism that would become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – were emphasized. On peacekeeping, an extensive list of criteria that UN operations must meet were developed, extending well beyond anything in the UN Charter:

“No UN peacekeeping operations should be launched without the prior consent of the countries concerned. All UN peacekeeping forces should strictly observe neutrality and

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200 In 2002, an article appeared in Foreign Affairs by Zheng Bijian, a former Vice Principal of the Central Party School who first used the term ‘peaceful rise’ in a speech in late 2003. Though not an official document of the Chinese government, the timing of this foreign affairs article and subsequent use of the term “peaceful rise” by China’s paramount leaders have led a number of authors to consider this document “quasi-official” (Kissinger 2012).
202 Ibid. p. 2.
203 Ibid. 22.
nonuse of force except for self-defence. Peaceful means, rather than coercive measures, should be sought to settle disputes, such as mediation, good offices and negotiation. Double standards and military interference under the name of the UN should be rejected. Any decision on launching UN peacekeeping operations must be based on practicability and capabilities, and no peacekeeping operation should be launched when conditions are not ripe. Peacekeeping forces should not become a party to a conflict, which would be a deviation from the basic purpose of peacekeeping operations”.

At various UN fora, China would repeatedly cite these seven requirements for “legitimate” peacekeeping – all of which are strongly based on a Confucian view of the use of force -- to limit the circumstances of “just” deployment. As we shall see, even as China began to become more involved in the provision of troops to peace operations, these criteria would continue to be referenced.

UNGA Speeches

Beginning the latter half of the 1990s, the venerable Chinese Foreign Minister Quen Qichen delivered his most heavily Confucianist speech (59% Confucian, 11% parabellum, 7% Legalism, 4% isolationist, and 19% “mixed’). In line with Confucian perspectives, threat perception in this speech was low, with social and economic development driving world peace. In this speech and in statements to the UN throughout this period, China’s rapid development in particular is portrayed as closely linked to peace:

“We pose no threat to anyone anywhere, but will only help to strengthen the cause of world peace, stability and development. On the other hand, if China fails to achieve economic development and its population of 1.2 billion is mired in poverty, that would indeed be ominous for world peace and stability.”

While Qian lamented the failure of a total post-Cold War peace and the endurance of “hegemonism and power politics”, he asserted the Confucian long-term view of history. Even on the issue of Hong Kong’s return to Chinese authority, the peaceful resolution of “issues left over from history” was applauded. One of the few less-than-peaceful statements derived,

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204 Ibid. 23.
unsurprisingly, from Taiwan: “No force on Earth can hold back China’s great cause of reunification”.  

1998’s speech was made by Tang Jiaxuan, Qian Qichen’s successor as Foreign Minister. Given the Communist Party’s established approach to leadership transition, this change of representative in and of itself likely had little impact on the content of China’s annual speeches in New York. Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1990’s and into the 21st century, these statements began to reflect a more Legalistic sentiment. In particular, questions of United Nations reform became of increasing interest to Beijing, “as they bear on enhancing the role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.” In reaction to nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, China pressed for a strong non-proliferation mechanism and began to represent itself as a “staunch force” for world peace and regional stability, rather than a developmental driver. Peacekeeping operations, though still a source of concern for China, had begun to become more acceptable, insofar as it represented the supremacy of the UN Security Council:

“It is essential to ensure and enhance the Security Council’s responsibility and political leadership in peacekeeping operations and to ensure the observance of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter”.

At the same time, China continued to oppose the interference in the internal affairs of others under the pretext of human rights. The delegation used the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade – which “naturally roused the utmost indignation of the entire Chinese people and the strong condemnation of the international community” – as a stage for criticizing

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206 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
NATO intervention in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{210} This denunciation incorporated elements of Confucian opposition to interventionism as well as a Legalistic defence of the sanctity of the UN Charter and the Security Council as the only body who could authorize the international use of force:

“A regional military organization, in the name of humanitarianism and human rights, bypassed the United Nations to take large-scale military actions against a sovereign State, thus creating an ominous precedent in international relations. This act was a violation of the United Nations Charter and other universally recognized norms governing international relations. It has eroded the leading role of the United Nations in safeguarding world peace and security and gravely undermined the authority of the United Nations Security Council”\textsuperscript{211}

President Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit reflected the continued influence of Confucianism on China’s view of military and foreign policy matters. Affirming China’s role as a leader among “poorer” nations and a supporter of peace and economic development, Jiang sought to allay fears about the threat of a rising China by stating that “China will never seek hegemony. This is a solemn commitment of the Chinese people to the world”.\textsuperscript{212} Overall, the Chinese President relayed an optimistic view of international affairs and called for a system of cooperation, gradual progress and respect for “internal affairs”.

\textbf{2001-2005}

The beginning of the new millennium represented a time of significant change, albeit measured and planned change in the style of the Chinese Communist Party. In what had become a well-planned and organized transition in leadership between generations of Chinese strategic elites, Hu Jintao became paramount leaders. The first Chinese leader without any “revolutionary credentials”, President Hu represented a far more technocratic governing class that ruled by bureaucratic consensus (Li 2012). More significantly, China had become by this point fully

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
integrated into the global economy as a modernized powerhouse. The People’s Republic’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001 symbolized China’s formal entrance onto the world stage (Ianchovichina and Martin 2004).

With this economic integration into the global system, China’s geopolitical and strategic role increased as well – despite Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character advice to “keep a low profile”. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, China took on a high-profile financial and political – though not military role – in post-Taliban Afghanistan. It involved itself in the Middle East peace process for the first time, sending envoys to Israel and Palestine (Zhongying 2005, 91). And in sub-Saharan Africa, massive Chinese investments were accompanied by far more external involvement in the affairs of countries far outside of China’s immediate neighbourhood.

However, conflicting tendencies emerged on China’s stance on the military and international use of force. China’s firm support for a peaceful solution in Iraq had little impact on events in that country, and concerns grew among China’s strategic elite that the United Nations Security Council may be losing its positions of legitimacy – with the Chinese veto in the UNSC subsequently losing relevance:

“Moreover, China had begun to stress the UN’s important role in safeguarding international peace and security. In particular, it repeatedly emphasized the dramatic changes in international relations which had served to justify China’s change of attitude toward about peacekeeping operations” (Liu 2014).

Beginning in 2000, China sent civilian police officers to East Timor for the first time (Deng and Wang 2005, 165). In 2002, the country broke its 10-year non-involvement in UN operations by sending a single armed peacekeeper to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC). In mid-2003, China’s MONUC contingent was 228 troops, and by the end of 2005 more than 500 Chinese peacekeepers were deployed to the United Nations Mission in Liberia as well (International Peace Institute 2015).
Party Congress Report

Jian Zemin’s 2002 Report at the 16th Party Congress, his last as paramount leader, contained significantly more Legalistic elements when compared to his 1997 report. It contained a greater emphasis on the legal control of the Party, both in defence issues and in Chinese society at large. Nevertheless, of 35 strategic statements found in this document, 14 of those statements fell under Confucianism. The rest were divided equally (seven statements each) among Legalism, anti-foreign isolationism, and parabellum thinking.

The highlight of this report was the introduction of the socio-political policy of “the Three Represents”, which was ratified by the Communist Party at the Congress. In short, the Three Represents codified China’s thinking on economic production, cultural advancement and political consensus:

“Our Party must always represent the requirements for developing China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. These are the inexorable requirements for maintaining and developing socialism, and the logical conclusion our Party has reached through hard exploration and great praxis.”

The implications of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, which worked to open up a more “democratic” form of Party governance and moved away from the notion of class enemies, reached every part of Chinese domestic and international policy. In the realm of military affairs and strategic culture, the Three Represents were interpreted through a major restructuring of the Chinese military based around codified rules and laws, with the subordination of the military to political leadership making up the essence of these reforms (Fewsmith 2003).

The Three Represents was based in large part on a stronger legal foundation for Communist Party rule, and this was reflected by the increased reference to lawfare sentiments in

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the report. On military reform, the adherence of the use of force with the law and absolute Party control over the armed forces were underlined as fundamentally linked:

“The army must be strict with itself and improve the system of military rules and regulations so as to raise the level of handling its affairs according to law….We must ensure that the army is forever loyal to the Party, socialism, the motherland and the people.”

The peaceful reintegration of Hong Kong and Macau with Chinese mainland rule were held up as example of the value of adherence to legal processes internationally. The “legitimate rights and interests” of the developing world were put into a more Legalistic framework, with China playing the role of advocate. Yet the continued dominance of Confucianist subculture should not be ignored: the statement “Ruling the country by law and ruling the country by virtue complement each other” – which would become a core part of the Central Committee’s Constitution in 2002 – indicates the mixture of Confucianist and Legalist perspectives than made up the core of the Three Represents policy (Hu 2007).

White Papers

China’s National Defence in 2002, like the Party Congress report, exhibited a significant increase in the influence of Legalism. 17 strategic statements in this document were categorized in the Legalistic framework, compared to only four statements in the 2000 White Paper; meanwhile, anti-foreign isolationist sentiments had all but disappeared. Confucian statements, which made up 32% of this White Papers strategic content, were particularly concentrated on regional issues; following a reduction in tensions in the Taiwan Strait, emphasis was placed on peaceful, economically beneficial relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region.

In the backdrop of 9/11 and the War on Terror, China expressed both concern with the threat posed by terrorism and with the interventionist license that such a vague global conflict

\[214\] Ibid.
\[215\] Ibid.
provided. On the one hand, the document expressed the Confucianist view that “terrorism should not be confused with a specific nation or religion, neither should dual standards be adopted in the fight against terrorism”. On the other hand, China appeared to make use of the terrorism context to crack down on secessionist and rebellious agents within China, using justifications in the Chinese Constitution:

“In the event of aggressions, China will resolutely resist in accordance with the Constitution and laws …Regarding maintenance of public order and social stability in accordance with the law as their important duty, the Chinese armed forces will strike hard at terrorist activities of any kind.”

In bridging this divide, Chinese elites turned to the framework of the United Nations Security Council and a Legalistic approach as a way of defining the scope for counter-terrorism. With notable similarities to the emerging Chinese approach to peacekeeping operations, the White Paper asserted that actions against terrorism require:

“conclusive evidence, clear targets and conformity with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter, and the universally acknowledged norms of international laws. In this regard, the leading role of the UN and its Security Council should be brought into full play”.

More broadly, military modernization in the early 2000s was focused on “winning local wars in high-tech conditions”. Initiatives to further the “fine style of work” of the Chinese military – shorthand for ensuring absolute Party command of the military – also made up a major portion of this document (Mulvenon 2013). As the White Papers progressed from early vague generalizations about the goals of Chinese defence policies, more details about the structure and regulation of China’s military branches emerged; the Central Military Committee was

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217 Ibid. pp.3-4.
219 Ibid. p. 4.
highlighted in its ability to formulate military statutes and laws relating to command and control of the Chinese armed forces and matters of defence spending.

Lastly, on the issue of peacekeeping itself, the 2002 White Paper marked the first substantive declaration of broad support for the peacekeeping project in years – matching China’s gradual move away from non-involvement in UN missions in this period. Unlike in 2000, this White Paper did not mention any of the criteria of sovereignty, non-interference, etc. for China to be involved in UN peacekeeping. Instead, China was stated as having an “active attitude” on measures of peacekeeping reform, in the hope that “efforts will be made to strengthen the role of the UN in peace-keeping operations”. 220

In the 2004 iteration of the Defence White Paper, the increased emphasis on legal principles and the United Nations framework continued, this time against the backdrop of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. By this point, China had also adopted a more cautious approach to the Global War on terror, and sought support for a more Legalistic, anti-crime approach for dealing with terrorism:

“China continued to strengthen its international counterterrorism cooperation. It supported the UN, particularly the Security Council in playing a leading role in this regard, and seriously implemented Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism issues, as was shown by its reports to the Council on the implementation of Resolution No. 1373.” 221

By 2004, the new Chinese reform to the military law system had been established, with the document asserting that “The PLA relies on laws and regulations to promote the innovation of political work”. 222 China’s support for United Nations supremacy was somewhat mitigated by a promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a more Confucanist organization

220 Ibid. p. 27.
222 Ibid. p. 11.
based on non-intervention. Even in praising the “relatively complete” organization structure of the SCO and its contribution to regional security, however, China focused on the “sound legal structure” that the multilateral body possessed, especially relating to security cooperation.\textsuperscript{223}

In reference to UN peacekeeping operations, this document stated that China has “consistently supported and actively participated in the peacekeeping operations that are consistent with the spirit of the UN Charter”, implying that China’s 10-year non-participation was a result of a failure of peacekeeping missions to adhere to “universally recognized rules and principles”.\textsuperscript{224} The White Paper once again laid out criteria needed for legitimate peacekeeping, though interestingly the pro forma list – the need for practicability, avoiding double standards, self-defence, etc. – was abandoned in favour of simply arguing that peacekeeping abide by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

The third and final White Paper of the period, \textit{China’s Peaceful Development Road}, was primarily an economic white paper, though with security and strategic aspects.\textsuperscript{225} At the transition point between Jiang Zemin and President Hu Jintao, the emphasis of this document was on China’s peaceful emergence, on respecting diversity in the international system and on the right of countries to decide their own systems and manage internal affairs (Narayanan 2007, 651). As a result, the document contained a number of Confucianist statements, and no parabellum sentiments. Yet the 2005 White Paper contained a number of Legalistic strategic statements as well. The “roots of terrorism” were raised as something that should be dealt with at the United Nations-level, as was Iraq:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{223} Ibid. p. 32.
\item\textsuperscript{224} Ibid. p. 33.
\item\textsuperscript{225} Whereas the term “peace” generally appeared around 40-50 times in China’s Defence White Papers, this 2005 document referenced the term 103 times.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
“China adheres to the purpose and principles of the UN Charter, (and) attaches great importance to the UN’s role in international affairs as the core of the international multilateral mechanism.”\textsuperscript{226}

As a part of its program of peaceful development, the 2005 White Paper highlighted China’s growing involvement in UN operations – “China is expanding its participation in UN peacekeeping efforts, having sent military personnel, police and civil officers on 14 UN peacekeeping missions”\textsuperscript{227} – and made a point of noting how knowledge about international humanitarian law had been disseminated within the People’s Liberation Army.\textsuperscript{228}

\textit{UNGA Speeches}

Compared to the 1996-2000 period, the speeches made by China to the General Assembly contained broadly the same relative content with respect to the Confucianist and Legalism subcultures. The most significant change was a decrease in the number of anti-foreign isolationist statements made in this period. While the issue of Taiwan – the largest source of isolationist sentiment in previous years – continued to crop up occasionally, the way in which China was increasingly interconnected to the rest of the world through economic ties undermined the feasibility of the more isolationist tendencies of the 1990s. In its stead, the competing trends of Confucianism and Legalism grew stronger.

As was mentioned in the Canadian case study, the 2001 opening of the UN General Assembly was postponed by more than a month due to the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks on the United States. In offering sympathy and solicitude to the United States following 9/11, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan took an assertive, interventionist stance:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{226} Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, \textit{China's Peaceful Development Road}, 2005, p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{227} Ibid. p. 16.
\item \textsuperscript{228} Ibid. p. 19.
\end{itemize}
“No matter when, where or in what form terrorism strikes, and no matter against whom it is directed, it should be met with condemnation and counter strikes by the international community taking a unified position thereon”.229

From the outset of the new Global War on Terror, however, China asserted the primary role of the UN and the Security Council in all responses to terrorism. In line with the tenets of Legalism, China stated that:

“All such (counterterrorism) actions should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognized norms of international law and should serve the long-term interests of peace in the region and the world at large”.230

In addition, reflecting Confucianist non-interventionism, China called for the assurance of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of a rebuilt Afghanistan. Indicative of the changes in Chinese international policy, China expressed its willingness to contribute to the political and financial assistance of Afghanistan, and called for a stronger UN role in the region.

In the 2002 UNGA speech, China’s foreign minister issued a number of statements that mixed Confucianist, Legalist and parabellum tendencies in China’s approach to the use of force. Peaceful development and non-violence characterized some sections of the speech, with other sections lauding the “heavy blows to the forces of terror around the world” -- and Legalistic terms such as “justice” and a “fair and equitable” world order peppered throughout.231 As tensions between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the United States escalated – and President Bush’s administration sought to convince the Security Council to intervene – China called on Iraq to faithfully implement Security Council resolutions on potential Weapons of Mass Destruction in order to “give full play to the role of this world body”.232

230 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
The 2003 speech, the first under the leadership of Hu Jintao, took a strongly Confucianist approach – both in general, and in relation to the situation in Iraq. Approaching the 50th anniversary of the development of the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence with India, China reaffirmed its approach of non-intervention and sovereign sanctity:

“Security should be maintained through cooperation, and disputes should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. The frequent use of force and the threat of its use should be avoided.”

In 2003, China hoped for a quick postwar reconstruction of Iraq and “the restoration of sovereignty to the Iraqi people at an early date.” However, as the conflict in Iraq continued and intensified, with no end to American occupation in sight, China began to see these developments as a threat to the United Nations and the Security Council system itself. Consequently, China’s speeches at the United Nations took on a more Legalist tone. Faced with ongoing military operations conducted by the strongest country in the world completely outside the framework of the UN, China sought to renew the monopoly of the Security Council on authorizing the use of force:

“The threats and challenges we face make it imperative to strengthen, rather than weaken, the role of the UN… It is the widespread call of the international community to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, take more collective actions, strengthen the role of the UN and safeguard its authority.”

At the same time, China’s threat perception – as expressed in these speeches – appeared to be increasing. China's desire for a “secure and stable” international environment – rather than a peaceful and cooperative one – was expressed, and discourse on the long-term trend in history towards peaceful coexistence was replaced with more alarmist rhetoric:

“Terrorist activities are raging, and such cross-boundary problems as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, transnational crimes and illegal

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234 Ibid.
immigration are erupting one after another. Uncertain, unstable and unpredictable factors are increasing.”

In 2005’s speech at the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly, a full 40% of strategic statements made by China were categorized under Legalism – the largest proportion to date. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s address was full of reference to the primacy of the Security Council and – not coincidentally – a focus on peacekeeping and stability in sub-Saharan Africa. China’s troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations – at this point having reached almost 1,000 peacekeepers – were couched in terms of China standing “side by side with their African brothers and sisters on this journey of historic significance (towards development)”.

But reinforcing the role of the Security Council was also tied to China’s involvement in peace operations:

“We support the efforts to sharpen the tools of the UN in peace-keeping operations, especially its capacity in fast-deployment and strategic preparedness, as well as its capacity to fully mobilize regional organizations and their resources under the leading role of the Security Council.”

China’s address supported a greater rules-base structure for peacekeeping, including a Peace-building Commission to coordinate UN efforts and helping the Security Council make judgements on “the merits of” crisis situations – again, using highly Legalistic terminology. Nevertheless, despite such statements of support for the peacekeeping project from the Chinese delegation, long-standing Confucianist concerns about “willful intervention on the grounds of rash conclusion that a nation is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens” remained prominent in these documents.
Having emerged from post-Tiananmen isolation in the 1990s and spurred on by rapid economic growth and modernization in the 2000s, many analysts now see the 2006-2010 period as the point at which China became a “true global power” (Goldstein 2005). Reinforced by the 2008 financial crisis that brought into question the Washington Consensus that had dominated for almost 20 years, China’s full ascendency to great power status was characterized by five trends (B. Zhang 2010):

1) A relationship with the United States on near-equal terms  
2) Strategic partnerships to soft-balance against the U.S.  
3) Reshaping regional orders, especially in Central and Southeast Asia  
4) A geopolitically-driver search for economic security  
5) A centrality of “soft-power” in Chinese international efforts

While all of these trends have implications for China’s strategic culture, it is the emphasis on “soft-power” that is most relevant to China peacekeeping troop contributions. As we have seen, Confucianism places great value on peaceful cooperation and development. However, the non-interventionist stance of this subculture limits its support for any extraterritorial action, at least where the use of the military is concerned. The current of Legalism, which is less constrained in its view of the use of force but values the use of military forces for non-aggressive means, would continue to vie with more establish Confucianist principles held by Chinese strategic elites throughout this period.

Under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, the fourth generation of Chinese elites sought to tackle internal problems of wealth disparity, corruption, and cronyism while defining a more assertive place for China in the world. Though broadly continuing to follow the 24-character policy set down by Deng Xiaoping, Chinese strategic documents increasingly cited core Chinese interests that were the “bottom line of national survival” and
non-negotiable. China’s defence spending would continue to grow during this period; despite assurances in a variety of documents that the budget increases were necessary to match China’s increasing economic growth, regional neighbours were especially concerned about the increased capabilities of the Chinese military. However, Chinese opposition to “Western interventionism” would continue to grow during this period as well, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continued unabated.

While the 2001-2005 period saw a gradual reversal of China’s non-involvement in peacekeeping, it was in this period that Chinese troop contributions to UN operations ramped up significantly, with China becoming one of the most prominent Member States in peacekeeping. During the 2006-2010 span, China almost doubled its troop contribution, from 1,000 peacekeepers to just under 2,000. Chinese contingents were deployed to operations in Liberia, South Sudan, and the Congo (International Peace Institute 2015). In addition, China provided UN operations with much-needed equipment, funding and – perhaps most importantly, at a time when most of the developed world had withdrawn from peacekeeping – international legitimacy (Bates and Huang 2013).

*Report to Party Congress*

In his first report to the Communist Party Congress in 2007, Hu Jintao would, like Jiang Zemin, focus significantly on issues of economic development and welfare. Hu used the event to introduce – in the familiar manner that “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” was introduced – the socio-political policy of the “Scientific Outlook on Development”, to be ratified by the Congress. This approach was seen as a successor to the Three Represents of Jiang Zemin, and aimed to create a harmonious society within China based on economic growth and egalitarian principles. A “scientific approach” to military matters was also evidenced in this report, with
both a Confucianist emphasis on a non-binding, independent foreign policy and a Legalistic approach towards establishing a rules-based approach to military affairs. Compared to the 2002 report, there was a notable absence of parabellum statements, with Hu asserting that:

“The international balance of power is changing in favour of the maintenance of world peace, and the overall international situation is stable”.

Likewise (with the standard exception of Taiwan) the 2007 report was devoid of isolationist strategic statements. Even on the matter of Taiwan, however, a far more conciliatory approach was taken than in previous documents, focusing on “peaceful reunification” rather than the threat of external interference. Overall, the document was primarily Confucian – lauding the reduction in the size of the People’s Liberation Army and opposing all forms of hegemonism – though with a heightened element of Legalism contained within.

In reaffirming the “fundamental principle of the Party in exercising absolute leadership over the armed forces”, Hu emphasized the need to operate the army in according with the law – both domestic and international – and to “strengthen scientific management” of the army, navy, and air force. The statement also heavily drew upon the concept of “win-win” solutions in international relations, using the term four times. In the context of strategic culture, “win-win” strongly reflects Confucian principles of peaceful cooperation by asserting that a rising tide of prosperity can raise all nations, without the zero-sum consequences feared by more parabellum perspectives.

Despite Chinese peacekeeping contributions reaching 1,500 soldiers in 2007, China’s peacekeeping policy was not important enough to the People’s Republic’s overall strategy to be included in this five-year report. Given that the PLA was reduced by 200,000 troops as part of a

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241 Ibid.
modest modernization effort at this time, this is likely a reflection of the relatively minor role peacekeeping still played in China’s grand strategy.

White Papers

Across the three Defence White Papers that were published in this period, the breakdown of strategic statements developed as follows: The Confucianist subculture continued to represent the largest number of statements, though Legalistic perspectives were strongly represented as well, with parabellum thinking waning over the course of the publications. A fifth to a quarter of strategic statements in these documents contained a mix of subcultures, most commonly a mixture of Confucianism and Legalism.

In China’s National Defence in 2006, as in Hu’s report to the Party Congress, defence spending increases are justified as proportional to China’s growing Gross Domestic Product (GDP):

“China has gradually increased its defence expenditure on the basis of its economic development. This increase, however, is compensatory in nature, and is designed to enhance the originally weak defence foundation.”

In its strategic content, the 2006 White Paper was broadly similar to that of 2004; a higher threat perception driven by terrorism, extremism and separatism is balanced by an assertion that China’s “overall security environment remains sounds”, the spectre of world wars being avoidable for the foreseeable future. While complaining of the propagation of unfounded fears about a “China threat” by hegemonists, the document goes to lengths to assure the continued defensive nature of China’s military power.

In listing the objectives of the military, the first objective of the armed forces is stated as “providing an important source of strength for consolidating the ruling position of the

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243 Ibid, p. 3.
Communist Party of China (CPC)”, followed by sustaining economic development, safeguarding national sovereignty, and promoting international peace and development. The continued implementation of a legal framework for the PLA and other military branches is highlighted in some detail in this White Paper, with reforms being made “in accordance with the Constitution, the National Defence Law, and other relevant laws”. The connection between new defence laws and China’s adherence to international law is made explicit:

“China has promulgated the Law on National Defence, the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and other relevant laws and regulations, and updated its border and coastal defence policies and regulations pursuant to international laws and practices”.

Yet outside lauding China’s participation in the UN, the White Paper makes no specific mention of UN peacekeeping operations, despite 2006 marking the beginning of even higher Chinese contributions to the UN.

*China’s National Defence in 2008* continued the by-now familiar formula of including broadly Confucian themes of peaceful development and non-intervention, mixed with competing undercurrents of preparation-for-war parabellum sentiments and Legalistic statements about the legal supremacy of the Communist Party over the armed forces and the analogic legal primacy of the United Nations Security Council and international law. A paragraph-long list of China’s defence objectives – ranging from “holding high the banner to peace and cooperation”, to “implementing the Scientific Outlook” integrating development and security, to “giving due consideration to traditional and non-traditional security issues”– is indicative of how

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245 Ibid. p. 5.
246 Ibid. p. 19.
interconnected China’s military affairs had become by this point, compared to the inward looking isolationist tendencies of the early 1990s.  

As Taiwanese separatism diminished in the island’s politics, China’s isolationist fears about foreign involvement in the Taiwan Strait continued to abate. In August 2007, as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Exercise, the PLA participated in its first major joint exercise outside of Chinese territory. Though American military presence across Asia raised concerns that “international military competition is becoming increasingly intense”, China’s response was to promote its “active and constructive role in multilateral affairs thus notably elevating its international position and influence” – as opposed to flexing its military muscle. Overall the strongest sentiment of the White Paper (that could be viewed from both the Confucianist or Legalist perspectives) is that:

“China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.”

With the diversification of roles for the armed forces, the lines between law enforcement and military force became increasingly blurred. Preparations for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing in particular required significant military involvement in security areas. Training for Chinese soldiers now included a major focus on various legal requirements, including the implications of international law on UN peacekeeping:

“Officers and men of units tasked with international peacekeeping missions and of naval ships making port calls have been organized to study the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, etc.”

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248 Ibid. p. 9.
249 Ibid. pp. 6-7.
250 Ibid. p. 3.
251 Ibid. p. 19.
As in 2006, no mention of the criteria for “legitimate peacekeeping” was included in this White Paper, unlike 2000, 2002, and 2004; discussion of peacekeeping in this document was limited to listing the number of personnel contributed and the location peace operations with Chinese contingents.

Though still not depicted as a major part of China’s military’s role, troop contributions to UN peacekeeping was mentioned as one of the roles performed by the PLA and increasingly referenced as a point of pride in the 2010 Defence White Paper:

As of December 2010, the PLA had 1,955 officers and men serving in nine UN mission areas. China has dispatched more peacekeeping personnel than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council.252

Compared to earlier White Papers, which had discussed China’s strategic priorities in a generalized manner, this document goes into great detail about the legal process by which the armed forces are governed by the State Council and the steps taken to authorize defence in the face of threats “in accordance with the law”.253 While 34% of the 77 strategic statements found in this document confirmed Confucianist principles, 29% were categorized as Legalistic. A higher threat perception regarding non-traditional and asymmetrical threats, rather than feeding only in to parabellum statements, drove a mix of responses from conflict preparations to heightened cooperation among developing countries to a support for a stronger UN Security Council.

UNGA Speeches

The annual speeches made to the UN General Assembly during this period generally followed the pattern set in the 2001-2005 period; Confucianism remained well-represented in these documents, while Legalism became increasingly prominent at the expense of isolationist

and parabellum sentiments. As with the Defence White Papers of this period, statements that mixed more than one strategic subculture tended to include both Confucianist and Legalist sentiments. Despite the increased presence of Chinese military personnel in UN operations, peacekeeping itself continued to play only a small part in speeches made by China’s representatives to the UNGA.

The 2006 address was the most heavily Confucian of the five speeches in this period, owing to its focus on development and development-related security themes. China’s partnerships with African nations were far more prominent in this statement than in previous years, emphasizing the cooperative “win-win” relationship with these states and reflecting China’s increased interest in the continent:

China will continue to demonstrate to the world that it is an important force for global peace and development and that the Chinese people will remain trustworthy friends and cooperation partners to the world’s peoples.254

China’s support for negotiation and conflict resolution mechanisms within the United Nations legal framework continued to reflect a desire to avoid non-UN interventionism, and China’s support for UN reform became more focused on enhancing the capabilities of the world body rather than critiquing its failures.

2007’s speech was given by a new Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, but generally followed the tone set by his predecessor. Hu Jintao’s concept of “win-win progress in a peaceful and cooperative manner” represented a continuance of Confucian, 24-character strategy thinking under the new presidency. Having been absent as a topic from the 2005 and 2006 speeches, Taiwan returned as a matter of contention, as attempts by Taiwan to gain UN membership were forcefully opposed by the PRC. In addition to the familiar statements of Taiwan’s inalienable

status as Chinese territory, China’s representative – for the first time in this forum – partially couched its position on Taiwan in international law:

We will not permit any challenge to the one-China principle and General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI)… any move that runs counter to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter or attempts to distort and deny General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) will not receive any support from the United Nations Member States and is doomed to failure.  

Resolution 2758, which passed in 1971 and recognized the People’s Republic of China as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” was thereby linked to the exhortation that “countries should honour their due international obligations” generally.

The 2008 speech to the General Assembly was notable in that it was delivered not by the Foreign Minister, as was custom, but by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. It was also a much shorter speech than generally given by China’s Foreign Ministers, but the strategic content fell in line with previous speeches in this period; 47% of statements were Confucianist, 18% Legalist, 18% mixed, and the remainder divided between isolationist and parabellum statements. This high-level appearance by Wen Jiabao would be topped in 2009, when President Hu Jintao was on hand to present his country’s address to the UNGA. Like Premier Wen, President Hu’s speech struck familiar balanced themes of opposing the “willful use or threat of force” and supporting the “purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. The challenges posed by the 2008 financial crisis and non-traditional threats were also referenced, though not in such a way that fundamentally altered the pattern of strategic culture that had been set in previous speeches. 2010’s speech was also made by Wen Jiabao, marking three consecutive years of high-level attendance to the opening of the General Assembly, with all three speeches containing a mix of dominant Confucianism and increased Legalism:

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256 Ibid.
We respect and protect human rights, uphold social equity and justice, and strive to achieve the free and all-round development for our people. This is the important hallmark of a democratic country under the rule of law. It is also a basic guarantee for a country’s lasting peace and stability.\footnote{United Nations, “Address by His Excellency Wen Jiabao”, 65th Session of the General Assembly, 2010.}

It is notable that in none of the high-level addresses made in 2008, 2009, and 2010 was United Nations peacekeeping mentioned even once. These speeches assured the world that “China will continue to firmly support the leading role of the United Nations in international affairs” especially in matter of the use of force. But as China’s troop contributions to UN peace operations neared 2,000 troops – with China becoming the 12th largest peacekeeping nation in the world – the lack of extensive discussion of peacekeeping in this document was notable (International Peace Institute 2015). Other major contributors used the United Nations General Assembly as a key forum to highlight their own involvement in UN missions as a core element of their international engagement. Chinese documents, while not altogether avoiding the subject, certainly appeared to downplay peacekeeping’s significance.

\textbf{2011-2015}

The final period of analysis, 2011-2015, was marked by a presidential transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping in 2012 and a continued strengthening of Legalistic norms in China’s strategic culture against the backdrop of greater Chinese involvement in global affairs. Against both the arguments that China was a purely status quo power or that China is a completely revisionist power, seeking to remodel the global order, other “China watchers” have argued that China in this period is best described as a “responsible reformer” that continues to try to keep a low profile while expressing dissatisfaction with some elements of the existing order (Weissmann 2015). This analysis is borne out by the subtle reformulation of Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character strategy, first under Hu Jintao and then continued under the presidency of Xi
Jinping. The reformulation, which was floated by Hu Jintao as early as 2009, altered the maxim from “keep a low profile and achieve something” (taoguang yanghui, yousu zuowei) to “uphold (jianchi) keeping a low profile and actively (jiji) achieve something (D. Chen and Wang 2011).

In the West in particular, Xi Jinping has been seen as a political “game-changer” in China’s international direction, as bringing a far more authoritarian and personality-centric style of leadership to the Chinese Communist Party compared to the “collective leadership” styles of Deng, Jiang, and Hu (Ferdinand 2016). Possessing a background in the military through time spent in the Central Military Commission, Xi is also seen to have a far greater interest in military issues and reform than his predecessors (Weissmann 2015). In terms of strategic culture, however, evidence suggests that Xi represents a continuation of longer-term processes tied to the emergence of China as a great, “responsible” power in the world.

A number of events tested China’s opposition to interventionism, both within and outside the United Nations framework. With the emergence of the Libyan civil war in 2011, China abstained from Security Council Resolution 1973, which was backed by Western Member States to impose a no-fly zone against the Gaddafi regime. However, China’s willingness to compromise with the West on Libya paved the way for extensive NATO operations against Gaddafi, culminating in the collapse of the regime and regional instability that continues to this day. The experience in Libya confirmed China’s fears about the use of coalition operations as a Trojan horse for wider Western interventionism (Y. Sun 2012). It likely also informed China’s decision to join Russia in vetoing a UN resolution authorizing international action against the Assad regime in Syria in 2012. Not wishing to see a repetition of the Libya experience, China endured international condemnation and maintained the status quo in the Middle East through its use of the veto in Syria.
On the peacekeeping front, this five-year period saw China maintain its peacekeeping contributions just below the level of 2,000 troops, deploying to peacekeeping missions across the globe. Towards the end of the period of analysis, China increased its involvement yet again by almost 1,000 peacekeepers, including combat contingents to Mali and South Sudan in 2013 and 2014 (International Peace Institute 2015). By this time, China’s military had become more accustomed to the operational environment of the UN operations, and has generally been lauded for their professionalism, training, and capabilities by host states (Bates and Huang 2013).

*Report to the Party Congress*

Hu Jintao’s final report at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 closely mirrored his speech five years earlier, though a return to more antagonistic language regarding the reunification of Taiwan saw parabellum statements return after an absence in 2007. Emphasis was placed on creating a “just and equitable” international system, with lawfully ruled China contributing to reform:

> The socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics has been established, and notable achievements have been made in building a socialist country based on the rule of law.\(^{259}\)

Beyond the military realm, the rule of law as “the basic way for running the country” under Hu Jintao suggests that this trend in Chinese policy-making had emerged well before the presidency of Xi Jinping.\(^{260}\) Yet even with the economic and geopolitical ascendancy of China in this period, the same Confucian themes that were present in the 1992 report issued by Jiang Zemin 20 years earlier remained constant:

\(^{259}\) Hu Jintao, “Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects”, Report to the 18th Party Congress, 2012.

\(^{260}\) Ibid.
“China opposes hegemonism and power politics in all their forms, does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion.”

Chinese involvement in UN operations or the issue of peacekeeping were not referenced directly, though China’s armed forces were lauded as having “always been a staunch force upholding world peace”. Regional and international military cooperation under a system of “mutual trust” was also highlighted in this document.

With eight Legalistic strategic statements in the 2012 report, the influence of Legalism as compared to the 1992 and 1997 Party Congress report (which had four and one Legalistic statements, respectively) clearly increased over the period of analysis. However, in the 2012 document – as with all other reports to the Party Congress analyzed as part of this project – there were more Confucianist strategic statements than any other strategic culture; most of the “mixed” strategic statements were partially Confucian as well.

White Papers

In this period, only one White Paper fully devoted to defence issues was published, along with China’s Peacekeeping Development Road 2011, a follow-up to the 2005 development White Paper. After 2011, China would break from the biannual China’s National Defence in XXXX formula that had been in place since 1998. Reflecting its focus on peace and development, the 2011 White Paper had a majority of Confucianist statements (57%), stressing non-interference in the affairs of others and a view of international democracy defined as every country’s right to participate. The 2011 document also highlighted the number of Chinese

\[261\] Ibid.
peacekeepers in the field, “the highest number among the permanent members of the UN Security Council”.  

The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, China’s 2013 Defence White Paper, represents a change in strategic content from previous similar documents, and was the first strategic document released under the administration of Xi Jinping. A shorter, more thematic document, this White Paper is apparently the first of a series that will, in the future, alternate between “comprehensive” and “subject-specific” documents every two years (Hsu, Murray, and Wild 2013). As the title of this White Paper would imply, this is a very “mixed” document, covering the full range of roles the Chinese military is expected to play. For the first time among White Papers analyzed, Confucianism was not the most well-represented strategic culture in this document, with only 13% of statements been classified as Confucianist; 28% were parabellum, 24% Legalist, and 2% isolationist, but the largest category of statements (33%) were mixed.

Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and supporting the country's peaceful development. This is the goal of China's efforts in strengthening its national defence and the sacred mission of its armed forces, as stipulated in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and other relevant laws.  

According to analysis by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the 2012 Defence White Paper includes somewhat stronger language on the U.S. than in the past, suggesting concern with the U.S. “rebalance” to Asia policy. Clearly referring to the U.S. but avoiding citing it by name, the document notes:

Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser.  

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[262] Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China’s Peaceful Development Road, 2011, p. 5.
[264] Ibid, p. 3.
The document also contained logistical details about the organization of Chinese armed forces that had not previously been included, and was hailed by Chinese elites for its transparency. However, in extensively detailing the armed forces’ preparation for warfare – especially “local wars under informationalized conditions” – the strategic document gave off a distinctly parabellum tone.265

More than any other White Paper before it, this document focused on UN peacekeeping generally and China’s contributions to the UN specifically. Whereas the texts of the White Papers in the 2006-2010 period referred the term “peacekeeping” 11 times, on average, *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces* mentioned peacekeeping 20 times. Explicit links were made between the legal framework for the Chinese armed forces and their deployment to UN operations:

Acting in accordance with laws, policies and disciplines. China's armed forces observe the country's Constitution and other relevant laws, comply with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and maintain their commitment to employing troops and taking actions according to law.266

Underlining the non-combat role of China’s peacekeepers, the document stated that “Chinese peacekeepers win the local trust of the people by following rules and regulations.”267 Also mentioned was the unprecedented role of the PLN in assisting counter-piracy and escort operations in the Gulf of Aden, which the document highlighted were operations in line with UN Security Council resolutions and conducted with the consent of the transitional Somalian government.

*UNGA Speeches*

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265 Ibid. p. 23.
266 Ibid. p. 4.
267 Ibid. p. 20.
Following high-level speech made by the Premier or President of China in 2008, 2009, and 2010, the 2011 address to the UN General Assembly was, once again, presented by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. The speech contained a by-now familiar mix of Confucianist dominance with a undercurrent of Legalist principles. Noting the continued uncertainty of the international political and economic environment, the speech repeated the need for stability and development to go hand in hand.\textsuperscript{268} On the United Nations itself, this mix was particularly evident.

In the current context, it is of particular and practical importance to adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to uphold the authority and role of the United Nations, to observe in good faith the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and to promote democracy in international relations.\textsuperscript{269}

The emerging civil war in Syria was also referenced in this speech, for the first time, and on this matter China issued a heavily Confucianist position, urging the international community to “respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria, and handle the Syrian issue in a prudent way so as to prevent further turbulence in Syria”.\textsuperscript{270}

As the crisis in Syria deepened in 2012, China’s speech to the UN that year – the last under Hu Jintao – relied more on the primacy of the Security Council than on norms of sovereignty to address the ongoing violence in the country:

We call on all relevant parties in Syria to put an immediate end to fighting and violence, implement the relevant Security Council resolutions.\textsuperscript{271}

This speech also contained a direct reference to Confucian philosophy, quoting that “the world will be a great place when all things thrive without hurting one another, and various endeavours are pursued in parallel without collision among them”.\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{268} United Nations, “Address by Mr. Yang Jiechi”. 66\textsuperscript{th} Session of the General Assembly, 2011.

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{270} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{271} United Nations, “Address by Mr. Yang Jiechi”. 67\textsuperscript{th} Session of the General Assembly, 2012.

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
Though this chapter has noted the high degree of continuity during periods of leadership transition from one paramount Chinese leader to another – with strategic cultural changes evolving gradually across leaders rather than shifting dramatically between administrations – the 2013 UNGA speech under Xi Jinping’s government is notable for two reasons. The first is that President Xi himself travelled to New York to deliver the speech, and the second is that it was the first such speech since 2005 to contain more Legalistic strategic statements than Confucianist ones:

The earlier generation of mankind pooled together their wisdom and adopted the Charter of the United Nations, laying the cornerstone of the contemporary international order, and establishing the fundamental principles of contemporary international relations. This was an achievement of profound impact.\(^{273}\)

This speech also saw the introduction of Xi Jinping’s China Dream policy, a social policy highlighting the role of the individual in Chinese society. On the international front, China Dream has been associated with a more activist Chinese foreign policy focused on sustainable development, soft-power self-promotion initiatives like the Beijing Olympics, and developing-world infrastructure projects such as the “One Belt One Road” policy – all of which require an international order with clear rules for China to work within (Ferdinand 2016):

We cannot realize the Chinese dream without a peaceful international environment, a stable international order and the understanding, support and help from the rest of the world.\(^{274}\)

In addition to denouncing the “law of the jungle” of zero-sum relations in favour of a justice-based approach and asking that the United Nations and the Security Council be given “full play” in all matters of peace and conflict, President Xi’s 2013 speech to the UN also announced the establishment of a $1 billion, 10-year China-UN peace and development fund to


\(^{274}\) Ibid.
contribute to world peace and development.\textsuperscript{275} This announcement was made in conjunction with Chinese support for a new UN Peacekeeping Readiness System, with a standby force of 8,000 Chinese peacekeepers – an unprecedented show of support for UN peacekeeping. Beyond the potential to massively increase China’s peacekeeping troop commitment, what is remarkable about this Readiness System is that it suggests that China is willing to be involved in any peacekeeping mission authorized by the Security Council, regardless of where that operation may take place (M. Sun 2017).

The 2014 speech to the UNGA – the last in this period of analysis – was made by new Foreign Minister Wang Yi and continued to contain more Legalist strategic content than any other subculture. In obliquely condemning Western interventionism in Iraq, the speech illustrated the interesting way in which legalism places attempts to assert the primacy of national sovereignty while still seeing international law as supreme:

Coercive action should have the authorization of the Security Council. If a country places its domestic law above international law and interferes in other countries’ internal affairs at will or even seeks regime change, the legitimacy of its action cannot but be questioned by the international community.\textsuperscript{276}

Results

How do the changes in dominant strategic culture – and especially the relative position of Legalism, the only Chinese strategic subculture identified as falling within the “peacekeeping sweet spot” – match with the dynamics of China’s peacekeeping troop contributions in the post-Cold War period? As the figures below illustrate, analysis of the three different types of strategic document over these years produces a view of the shift towards greater prominence for Legalism among Chinese strategic elites, at the expense of Confucianism, parabellism, and anti-foreign

\textsuperscript{275} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{276} United Nations, “Address by Mr. Wang Yi”, 69\textsuperscript{th} Session of the General Assembly, 2014.
isolationism. This shift, however, was not as stark as the change towards Robust Ally thinking identified in the Canadian case study. Possible explanations for why this is the case will be explored in the conclusion of this chapter.

*Reports to Party Congresses*

*Figure 17: Reports to five-year party congresses, 1992-2012*

Figure 17 suggests that, as the years passed, a more significant role for the Legalism approach evolved in the Reports to Five Year Congresses given by China’s paramount leader; though as a strategic subculture it remains clearly subordinate to the dominant Confucianist perspective. Interestingly, the Party Congress reports indicate a clear shift away from the anti-foreign isolationism that was present in the 1990s. Defiant statements such as those made in the 1992 Party Congress, “On questions involving our national interests and state sovereignty, we shall never yield to any outside pressure” -- were replaced with Confucianist statements (“We need to respect the diversity of the world, promote democracy in international relations and
strive for a peaceful international environment” in Jiang Zemin’s 2002 report\textsuperscript{277} and, increasingly, with statements emphasizing international legal norms (“To this end, all countries should uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, observe international law and universally recognized norms of international relations” in Hu Jintao’s 2007 report\textsuperscript{278}).

\textit{Defence White Papers}

\textbf{Figure 18: Chinese defence White Papers, 1995-2013}

Looking at Figure 18 we can see a small but stable increase in the number of “Legalistic” strategic statements after 2002, as China increased its involvement in peacekeeping operations. Quantitatively, we can also see a change in certain defence and military priorities that reflected

\textsuperscript{277} Jiang Zemin, “Build a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, Report at the 16\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress, 2002.

\textsuperscript{278} Hu Jintao, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects”, Report to the 17\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress, 2007.
greater support for the United Nations, the Security Council, and the international legal framework as a whole. Whereas the 1995 White Paper stated that China military forces “resolutely protects its national independence and sovereignty and opposes foreign interference” as its main goals, the documents from 2004 onwards placed an emphasis on the legal role of the People’s Liberation Army:

“The PLA implements the principle of governing the armed forces strictly and according to law, strengthens the building of the military legal system, raises the level of regularization, and enhances the combat capability of the armed forces”. (2004 Defence White Paper, p. 12)

Figure 19: Chinese UNGA Speeches, 1990-2014

As with Figures 17 and 18, Figure 19 indicates a gradual increasing of the prominence of Legalistic statements in China’s annual addresses to the United Nations General Assembly. However, as in the analysis of the other categories of strategic documentation, it is clear that for
the most part the Confucianist subculture remains dominant in the post-2002 period, with the Legalistic approach being secondary to it. Parabellum sentiments, which never had much place in the diplomatic setting of these speeches, continued to make the occasional appearance, especially in relation to events surrounding Taiwan. However, anti-foreign isolationism, which made up a sizable percentage of UNGA speeches made in the early 1990s, all but disappeared towards the end of the period of analysis. As the strategic subculture most antagonistic to the concept of United Nations peacekeeping – and as the most at odds with the evolution of a rising China, peaceful or otherwise -- it is not altogether surprising that these sentiments diminished as the 21st century progressed.

Conclusion

The strategic analysis above provides a context within which to consider the scope of China’s newfound support for peacekeeping. The People’s Republic, starting in the early 2000s, reversed its long-standing policy of non-intervention in United Nations peace operations to rapidly become one of the biggest contributors to peacekeeping, and the most heavily involved member of the p5. This development went against the expectations of a number of analysts closely familiar with Chinese strategic thinking, and has been sustained for more than a decade in such a way that explanations pointing to a single incentive are unconvincing. The model of strategic culture offers an alternative explanation of why the Chinese approach to the international use of force changed in some significant way over this period.

Having gone through the different sections of China’s post-Cold War period, the pervasive influence of Confucianism on modern Chinese strategic thinking is obvious. Throughout the different strategic documents looked at here, Confuanist statements were always a significant part of the picture, if not always dominant. As the post-Cold War period progressed
into the post-9/11 period, however, the dynamics of the other subcultures in the Chinese strategic cultural environment shifted. The undercurrents of anti-foreign isolationism and parabellum perspectives that were apparent under the earlier years of Jiang Zemin, were inherited from the influences of the Century of Humiliation and Mao Zedong, respectively. Legalism, which played a relatively small role in the documents of the early 1990s, grew in prominence as China’s growing economic and geopolitical status made the non-interventionism of Confucianism somewhat less feasible. While the concerns with international intervention as a Trojan horse persisted – and were reflected in Legalism’s aim to reform and reshape the United Nations from within to better suit Chinese interests – United Nations peacekeeping presented an opportunity for China.

The analysis suggests that China’s sudden participation in UN peacekeeping is less about a change in its view on international interventionism, and more about how China views the UN in maintaining the international status quo. Discourse throughout the strategic documents that have been analyzed confirm that China has not, as some have argued, become “increasingly flexible towards the Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and non intervention” (Yin 2007, 69). Instead, it seems more plausible that China “decided to participate in peacekeeping operations with the intention of making a difference through participation”, rather than be sidelined by other “use of force mechanisms”, such as NATO intervention (Choedon 2013, 222). China’s newfound involvement in UN peacekeeping operations stems primarily not from economic interests, nor even from a desire to see a more peaceful world, but from its interest in furthering the establishment of international law, as China interprets it. This goal of furthering the establishment of international law can also be seen in other, non-military realms of recent
Chinese foreign policy, such as the decision to reverse its reliance on coal fuels and joining the Paris Climate Change Agreement.

Yet in the scope of China’s massive military capabilities, it must be remembered that the peak of Chinese troop contributions thus far – 2,010 soldiers at the end of this period of analysis – represents but one aspect of China’s massive military capabilities. China has the largest army in the world, and the fact that it is not the largest overall contributor to peacekeeping is the reflection of a clear strategic choice by China, rather than the result of any limitations on the country’s capability or resources. Even at the height of China’s increases to its peacekeeping contributions, there was only brief mentions to it in the Defence White Papers – and no mention at all in the Reports to the Five Year Party Congress. Thus while the influence of Legalism certainly increased as China engaged with peacekeeping, the continuing influence of alternative strategic subcultures on China’s thinking should not be dismissed:

“Like other states, China’s position on the UN is not static – it is ever-evolving and shaped by various factors, including state interests and international norms” (Tieh 2003, 28)

As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Confucian strategic subculture is neither entirely antagonistic towards nor completely supportive of peacekeeping as a means to deploy force. While the tenets of Confucianism are often in line with the values of the United Nations and the Charter, modern peacekeeping introduces a degree of interventionism somewhat beyond the level of activism Confucianism represents. In the Canadian case study, the dominance of the Robust Ally subculture – an approach more directly at odds with UN peacekeeping – correlated with a decline in Canadian troop contributions. In the case of China, the dominance of Confucianism neither supports involvement in peacekeeping nor does it clash with the growing
Legalist undercurrent that sees a greater role for Chinese peacekeeping. So long as Confucianism remains the dominant subculture in China, peacekeeping is unlikely to become the major element in Chinese strategy. Nevertheless, under Confucianism’s dominance, the growth of Legalism in recent years has allowed for the gradual reversal of the policy of non-involvement in UN operations to the extent that China is now the 7th largest overall contributor to peacekeeping.

One final document of interest that illuminates China’s strategic mindset towards the end of this period is China’s position paper published on the 70th anniversary of the United Nations in September of 2015. Of the 20 strategic statements contained within, almost half (nine) were Legalistic statements, while four were Confucian, four mixed, one isolationist and one parabellum. Among these statements is a standard formula that would not have been out of place in 1990: “No attempt should be made, in the name of ‘rule of law’, to undermine other countries’ ‘rights and interests’”. Nevertheless, in highlighting the primary role of the Security Council in peace and security and asserting that that “universally applicable rules must be adopted to tell right from wrong”\textsuperscript{279}, the position paper also illustrates the tensions between the Legalist approach and the lines of Confucianism and non-interventionism that continue to characterize China’s perspective.

This results of this case study analysis suggest that, as the model of strategic culture would expect, the reversal of China’s long-standing non-involvement in peacekeeping operations and its decision to significantly contribute troops to the UN was correlated with a shift in the strategic cultural landscape in China. Though Confucianism – which is at best agnostic on the value of Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping – continues to be dominant, the influence of the Legalist strategic subculture has risen substantially since the early 2000s. Yet these results also suggest that, while peacekeeping is increasingly seen as a mechanism for maintaining the

stability of the international order, there continues to be disagreement and ambivalence of the ultimate utility of peacekeeping – perhaps explaining why peacekeeping remains a relatively small element of China’s overall military strategy.
Chapter 5. India: Consistent Peacekeeper in a Changing World

*Peace is not only an absolute necessity for us in India in order to progress and develop but also of paramount importance to the world. How can that peace be preserved? Not by surrendering to aggression, not by compromising with evil or injustice but also not by the talking and preparing for war! Aggression has to be met, for it endangers peace.*

- Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech at Columbia University (1949); published in *Speeches 1949 - 1953* p. 402

*India and UN Peacekeeping*

Both the Canadian and Chinese case studies examined the puzzle of peacekeeping through the lens of change. Canada abdicated its role as a major troop contributor to peacekeeping in the late 1990s, and maintained a token level of peacekeepers ever since. China, by contrast, emerged from a period of complete non-involvement in peacekeeping to gradually become a major source of UN military personnel. Yet change in state behaviour can also be usefully understood through cases of consistency; looking at a country which has maintained its peacekeeping policy may help us understand the phenomenon of change more broadly. India, third case study of this thesis, largely maintained a high level of involvement in military peacekeeping over the period of analysis, though with significant variation in the exact degree of that involvement.
The final case study looks at a UN Member State that, for most of the period of analysis, contributed a significant number of peacekeepers to United Nations operations. Canada presented a case of a major peacekeeping power that declined to become a token contributor. China gradually increased its participation in Blue Helmet operations from zero to almost 3,000 troops. India averaged a high number peacekeepers across the 25-year period, but with significant peaks and valleys in the level of contributions (International Peace Institute 2015). Consequently, this case study presents an opportunity to test the model of strategic culture in a country with significant changes in troop contribution, but a general baseline – with some exceptions, as shown in Figure 1 – of commitment to UN peacekeeping. The model developed
here would expect a strong presence of subcultures favourable to peacekeeping in the strategic documents analyzed, though with variation in competing perspectives about the use of force.

India’s stated commitment to “the principles of peace and justice as enshrined in the United Nations Charter” extend back to 1946, a year before India’s formal independence. (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 228). The Directive Principles of India’s Constitution also affirm India’s fundamental commitment, stating that India “shall promote international peace and security, maintain just and honourable relations between nations, foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another; and encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration”.

Though often overlooked when compared to the Western media coverage of the American and Chinese militaries, it is worth remembering that India has the third largest armed force, with 1.35 million active military personnel, and the largest volunteer army in the world (Wilkinson 2015). Shaped by four major conflicts with Pakistan, the Indian army, navy, and air force have traditionally been much more focused on its immediate regional environment – the Indian Subcontinent – than either the United States or China, especially during the Cold War era.

**Peacekeeping Logistics**

As with most other countries, requests for troop contributions to peacekeeping are submitted to the Indian Government by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York through the Indian Permanent Delegation to UN. India’s foreign ministry, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), advises the Cabinet Committee on Security on the feasibility of the request conjunction with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which provides expertise from a

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280 Article 51 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
military perspective (Banerjee 2013, 2). Following foreign policy clearance, the Ministry of Defence examines the proposal in four ways (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 238):

1) Political: does the mission fit India’s national interests or further them;
2) Force availability and commitment;
3) Ground reconnaissance and other aspects of participation;
4) Equipment: assessed against domestic requirements, with domestic needs always prevailing.

The Cabinet as a whole then makes a final decision on the deployment of Indian peacekeeping, with the External Affairs Minister often announcing approval in parliament when in session:

“Although the responsibility for sending and withdrawing Indian troops lies ultimately with the prime minister, in a vibrant democracy such as India he or she can be influenced by lively criticism from opposition parties, the national press, and particularly both serving and retired generals” (Bullion 2014, 197)

In this way, the peacekeeping decision-making process in India is broadly similar to the Canadian process, a reflection of the British parliamentary system that influenced both former colonies.

**Historical Background of Involvement**

India – and the Subcontinent in general, prior to independence – has a long history of providing expeditionary troops to imperial operations, including the massive troop contributions as part of the British Empire during the First and Second World Wars. As an independent state, India was involved at the very beginning of the peacekeeping project. India’s government under Jawaharlal Nehru voiced strong opposition to use of force in the Korean War, seeing the involvement of the United States as internationalizing the conflict (Bullion 1997). Nevertheless India contributed a Field ambulance and 300 soldiers to the operation in Korea, as well as the entire International Custodian Force in Korea from 1953-54 to implement the subsequent armistice (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 229–30). India was involved, providing observers to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez Crisis. The second-ever commander of
UNEF, Indian Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani, succeeded Canadian E.L.M Burns as Force Commander in 1959-1964. India would continue to play a pivotal role in UN peacekeeping operations throughout the Cold War period, in part because of its non-alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Given the principles of peacekeeping neutrality and the convention that neither superpower would be directly involved in UN missions, India used its peacekeeping role to further its image as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and a staunch supporter of the United Nations (Bullion 1997).  

In the modern era, India has continued to be one of the most stable troop contributing countries to post-Cold War peacekeeping, often ranking among the top three peacekeeping Member States (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2015). From 1991 onwards, India rarely contributed less than 1,000 peacekeepers. However, this does not mean that all peacekeeping operations automatically qualified for an Indian contingent. India avoided participation in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) out of fears of both inflaming tensions with Indonesia and concerns with its own separatist elements (Krishnasamy 2001). India contributed a small contingent and a Force Commander to UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1993, but took no part in the NATO-led bombings and operations that followed (Choedon 2005). Indeed, India has generally shied away from “coalition of the willing” or “lead-country” operations, including those primarily led by NATO, even if under United Nations authorization.

Despite its generally high level of involvement in UN peacekeeping, both during and after the Cold War, India has not hesitated to voice its concerns with the evolution of complex

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281 Despite its name the Indian Peace-Keeper Force deployed in Sri Lanka 1987-1990 was not a UN-mandated peace operations, but was instead a contingent sent to aid the Sri Lankan Military in the forced disarmament of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalist groups such as the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). The costly experience of this expedition was seen as further reinforcing Indian commitment to operations only under UN auspices (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007, 159).
peacekeeping operations, especially regarding the principles of consent, neutrality, and minimal use of force (Choedon 2005). Like Canada, the failure of peacekeeping in Somalia in 1995 – 12 Indian peacekeepers were killed during UNOSOM II – caused many within the Indian strategic establishment to re-evaluate UN peacekeeping (Bullion 1997). Unlike Canada, however, this period was followed by a significant re-engagement with peace operations, with India criticizing the U.S. resolve in Somalia and emphasizing the need to maintain peacekeeping norms in operations to ensure that mandates do not become too broad and all-encompassing (Bates and Huang 2013, 228). As Western countries withdrew their troops at the turn of the millennium, India increased its share of the peacekeeping burden, providing 16% of all UN soldiers in 1999 (International Peace Institute 2015).

Among modern peacekeepers, India has gained a reputation for being well-equipped, well-led and “trained specifically for the roles they are required to perform” (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 243). Since 1993, India has maintained a Standby Brigade Group for UN peacekeeping operations, made up of 4,056 troops, through a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN (Ku and Jacobson 2003). India has also recently begun to prioritize the role of women in peace and security, deploying the first all-female police contingent to Haiti in 2007. Most recently, India participated in the September 2015 World Leader’s Summit on Peacekeeping, pledging a further “850 troops, 3 FPU (formed police units) including women, critical enablers, technical personnel and training”.

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282 In contrast to the Canadian Somalia Affair, Indian peacekeepers were praised for their cultural sensitivity while operating in the country, gaining the respect both of Somalis and other international contingents (Bullion 1997, 104).
283 In an arrangement with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations that is unique in the world, an infantry battalion group is deployable in 30 days, with the rest of the brigade deployable within 8 weeks, subject to decision by the Prime Minister.
India, Pakistan, and Peacekeeping

As the biggest single driver of Indian military strategy since the 1947, the relationship with Pakistan continues to affect all aspects of the Indian strategic environment. Yet despite a number of full-scale conflicts over the last 70 years and continued antagonism, India and Pakistan share a common element; they are both consistently one of the top contributors to post-Cold War peacekeeping. The multinational nature of UN operations means that over the years, Indian and Pakistani soldiers have deployed side-by-side numerous times under the UN flag. Thus, despite a history as adversaries, elements of cooperation developed in the field of peacekeeping, such as Indo-Pakistani cooperation Somalia in 1994 – only five years before a limited conflict between the two countries in the “Kargil war”:

“Perhaps the greatest surprise for both the Indian and Pakistani armies was that, despite their mutual hostility towards each other in normal circumstances on the sub-continent, the two sides formed a surprising degree of camaraderie and goodwill in Somalia. There was a high degree of interaction and rapport between the two sides. and troops from each contingent were reportedly dining out together.” (Bullion 1997, 104)

In addition to being high-level peacekeepers, both countries play host to one of the oldest ongoing peacekeeping missions, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). A traditional observer operation in the disputed states of Jammu and Kashmir, UNMOGIP monitors a ceasefire between the two countries, with sporadic violence and gunfire continuing to this day.

One of the other major players in post-Cold War peacekeeping has been Bangladesh, who as of January 2015 contributed 9,436 police and military peacekeeper, meaning that the first, second and third top contributors of combined personnel to the UN at the end of the period of analysis were Bangladesh, Pakistan and India respectively. There is thus an element of
Subcontinental competition in peacekeeping contributions that a number of theorists have pointed to as an incentive for India to continue to peacekeep.

**Theories of India’s Commitment to Peacekeeping**

As India is one of the most consistent top contributors to peacekeeping, a number of incentive-based theories have put forth different arguments about what drives India’s troop deployment to UN missions. Incentive-based approaches argue that India’s future role in peacekeeping operations is contingent on variables ranging from India-Pakistani relations to financial reimbursement to the Global War on Terror to India’s campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. (Bullion 2014, 196–97). As mentioned, the high level of Pakistani and Bangladeshi peacekeeping contributions were thought to drive participation by all three countries, either through regional competition or as a means of easing tensions through cooperation in a shared endeavour (Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur 2007).

Choeden (2013) has argued that, “In the post-Cold War, peacekeeping has served as means for India to project itself as a great power and strengthen its claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council” (210). However, two things are worth noting in relation to this argument. First, permanent members of the UN Security Council traditionally do not have a sustained record of involvement in United Nations peacekeeping. Though France, Britain, and the U.S. have had brief engagements with peacekeeping troop contributions, the general preference is for non-permanent members to bear the majority of the peacekeeping burden. During the Cold War, there was a generally agreed-upon norm that the two superpowers would not directly contribute to peacekeeping in order maintain Blue Helmet neutrality. The second argument against seeing the prospect of a Security Council seat as incentive for Indian peacekeeping is simply this: India has been seeking a permanent seat for decades, yet despite
continued high-level peacekeeping involvement, the structural obstacles to Security Council reform have prevented any expansion of the membership (Malone 2000).

Others have pointed to the financial reimbursement that India received from the UN through the high number of peacekeepers it has deployed through the years (Solomon 2007). However, as Banerjee (2013, 3) has calculated, the reimbursement provided by the United Nations to India, estimated to be about US$250 million per year for equipment and personnel, does not cover India’s total deployment cost.\(^{285}\) There is some personal incentive for individual peacekeepers to deploy to UN missions, both in terms of financial compensation by the UN and the prestige of this form of employment. Bannerjee also notes that no core Indian national security interests are directly served by peacekeeping. Individual incentives for Indian soldiers to participate in peacekeeping due to UN compensation rates are a factor, but since compensation rates have remained fairly steady this influence is diminishing (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 241).\(^{286}\) Reimbursements, both for personnel and equipment, tend to be extremely delayed from the United Nations, further diminishing the economic incentive.

Banerjee (2013) himself argues that a mix of rationales compel India to contribute, noting that the initial impetus for peacekeeping was to hasten the pace of global decolonization, in which India had a vested stake. While the scale and consistency of India’s support for UN peacekeeping suggests that a single incentive to peacekeep is unlikely, as Figure 20 indicates India’s troop contribution levels vacillated significantly in the Cold War period. Politically, the provision of UN peacekeepers has never been a “contentious domestic issue”; domestic support

\(^{285}\) Member States may decide to pay soldiers deployed to UN missions at this rate – if it is higher than their usual military salary – or they may pay soldiers at their usual rate and keep the difference. In the case of India, soldiers in peacekeeping missions are paid over and above what they would normally make; thus peacekeeping opportunities are seen as a good opportunity by many Indian military personnel (Coleman, 2014).

\(^{286}\) Countries are reimbursed for contributing personnel to UN operations, at a rate of just over $1,332 per soldier per month. This rate was recently updated, but has generally not kept up with inflation.
for it has been steady, and it has never been made a major campaign issue by any political party (Bellamy and Williams 2013). Why, then, have India’s troop contribution levels fluctuated so wildly over the years, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of total peacekeepers deployed? A strategic culture approach, which incorporates the full range of strategic considerations that have pulled India in different directions since its independence, will hopefully shed more light on the issue.
Mapping Indian Strategic Culture

Indian strategic culture can be described, like China, as “civilizational”, in the sense that both countries largely contain venerable civilizations within their modern borders and developed a national mindset that predates the Westphalian nation-state system (Paranjpe 2013; Gilboy and Heginbotham 2012) However, unlike China – texts like Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* are known and studied worldwide – India does not have a large corpus of what might be considered classical military texts (Bajpai 2002, 250). Despite the influence of the *Arthashastra* – a text of political theory written at the end of the 4th century BCE by Kautilya and cited as an influence on the international relations theories of Max Weber and Hans Morgenthau – the text was only rediscovered by Indians in the early 1900s, having little influence on the development of overarching “Indian military values” until then (Sondhaus 2006).

The Indian military does hold an unusual place in civil society and is difficult to parallel with other cases. The Indian Army, at the beginning of the Republic, was significantly marginalized for three main reasons (Pant and Scott 2011, 16–17). First, the legacy of military disdain from national fathers Gandhi and Nehru placed the military at odds with the new civilian government. Secondly, the military was seen by many Indians as the last holdout of the British Raj. Lastly, following the separation with Pakistan, Indian emphasis on civilian control of defence was seen as an important distinction from the increasingly military-minded Pakistani government. The experience of the Indo-Chinese War in 1962 convinced the government that operational matters should be left to the military (Malik 2003). Yet in terms of policy direction and grand strategy, the Indian Government and the civilian Ministry of Defence continue to have significantly more control over the military than other peer nations. In the modern era, this has led to a somewhat disjointed approach to defence policymaking where the army carries out
defence, but has little input in its policy formulation (Dasgupta and Cohen 2011, 171). As a result, outside analysts of Indian military policy often find it difficult to identify one clear grand strategy approach in the world’s largest democracy, where politics and policy are notoriously complex even outside the defence realm.

The lack of a “classical military literature”, combined with the absence of a single national security document in the modern context, has led some prominent authors to argue that India is structurally unable to develop clear strategic thinking. George Tanham, after the end of the Cold War, wrote that:

“India has not had a tradition of strategic thinking; no great strategic thinker appears in Indian history and most modern strategies have been developed by leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, who usually couched their theories in general terms based on their own perceptions of the outer world and on their own predilections” (Tanham 1992, 129–30).

Others have concurred, arguing that the military has never been a central tool of Indian strategy (Pant and Scott 2011). These are remarkable assertions, given the fact that modern India has the world’s third largest military, has engaged in numerous armed conflicts in the years since its founding, and is one of the most active geopolitical players in the world. Tanham in particular has been accused of ethnocentric thinking, but it has not only been Western outsiders who have argued that India, in essence, lacks strategic culture. The statement that Indians “do not think strategically” has been made at times by Indians themselves, most notably including former Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh (Pant and Scott 2011, 15).

While Indian history does not have the same tradition of classical military philosophical texts that China does, as Kanti Bajpai (2002) notes, “since the country’s independence in 1947, it has had to deal with a number of security challenges, and the volume of writings on these issues

287 Basrur (2001) notes the unfortunate tendency among strategic culture approach – not limited to the case study of India – to make broad generalizations that lack methodological rigour and depend on national stereotypes rather than actual attitudes about the use of force.
is enormous” (246). Other have argued that a line of strategic continuity can be drawn through 2,000 years of Indian history, with a pattern of surface morality, regional hegemony, the use of force as a part of statecraft, and defensive strategy against extra-regional states (Prakash 2007; Scott 2008). Certainly, when compared to countries like Canada – which in 150 years of independence managed to develop numerous distinct strategic subcultures despite only gaining full control of foreign policy relatively recently – it is hard to see how India would have failed to develop its own unique traditions about the use of force.

By contrast, analysis by Jones (2006) suggests that those who see India as lacking strategic culture do so because they are looking for a single identifying approach, when in fact “India’s strategic culture is not monolithic, rather is mosaic-like” (3). In asserting that Indian elites have not generally been known for strategic thinking, arguments point to the strength of Indian society as compared to the relative weakness of the Indian State (Pant and Scott 2011). However, this seems to be an argument in favour of the influence of strategic culture on Indian strategic behaviour. Strategic culture theory expects that societal norms and historical standards influence the decision-making of policy elites in all countries, regardless of the strength or weakness of a state. Ahmed (2010), meanwhile, argues that there is strong evidence of a dynamic strategic culture existing in modern India, with the current trend being towards a parabellum-style offensive realism as a result of ongoing tensions with Pakistan, dominating the “higher order symbolic set” that sees India as one of many developing world countries rather than a global power. Finally, arguments dismissing the existence of an Indian strategic culture tend to rely on evidence that the Indian government tends towards pacifism, with the use of force playing a minimal role in Indian international policy. However, the disinclination to use force in many situations is, I argue, itself a type of strategic culture, and one which in India continues to
compete with other subcultures for dominance. As Bajpai (2014, 113) notes, India – like all countries – thinks and acts according to notions of “grand strategy”, even if they don’t use the term or express it in one single document.

In mapping the strategic cultural landscape of modern India, experts emphasize the need to look beyond a single source, such as the leadership of the military:

“The shapers of India’s strategic culture are primarily nationally recognized political party leaders, senior bureaucratic officials, and notables in the leading universities, think tanks and the press.” (Jones 2006, 28).

Jones himself defined the dominant Indian strategic culture as omniscient-patrician – a combination of perspectives about Indian sacredness, the hierarchical nature of the international system, and elements of regional isolation. However, in line with the fourth generation of strategic culture theory, he allowed for the existence of other strands of Indian strategic culture that challenge this approach.

One of the most prolific writers on the subject, Kanti Bajpai (2002), identified three core streams in Indian strategic culture vying for dominance; Nehruvianism, Neoliberalism, and Hyperrealism (251-253). Elsewhere, Bajpai adds three minor schools of thought – Gandhianism, Hindu nationalism, and Marxism – to these three major schools. He terms them “minor” schools because, according to him, “the proponents of these schools are not as prominent in the Indian strategic community…Their adherents in government and politics are far fewer” (Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa 2014, 114). Bajpai notes, while these three minor schools do not necessary have significant influence at the moment, historically they held sway in Indian strategic culture. However, the argument can be made that these minor schools are, in fact, elements of Indian society, and that they have influenced the implementation of the three major schools of thought in various ways over time.
Harsh V. Pant (2011) agreed with the depiction of India as having three main schools of thought; however, he is skeptical of the long-term influence of these schools, given the “absence of grand strategy” in Indian politics (20). Other recent authors have also broadly accepted the typology of three “main” competing strands of Indian strategic thought (Cohen 2004; Malik 2003; Sagar 2009). Bajpai notes that there are significant areas of basic agreement between the three subcultures; all three paradigms hold that power and violence are inherent to international relations, and all three see power mainly as economic and military capabilities – rather than, say, soft power capabilities (Bajpai 2002, 251). All three of the subcultures identified by Bajpai could also be categorized as what Meyer would call more “activist” subcultures. Nehruvianism is non-aligned, but has an international focus. Neoliberalism, too, is preoccupied with the international sphere. And where hyperrealists are often concerned with the actions of neighbouring Pakistan, their emphasis on realpolitik necessitates consideration of other powers such as China and the United States, etc.

India does not have a strong tradition of national isolationism, owing to a history and geography that placed it in the centre of invading outsiders, competing internal factions, and extensive trade relations. Yet as Tanham (1992) correctly noted, there is a persistent undercurrent of elite perspectives that tend to see security as focusing on the Indian subcontinent rather than external operations (135-136). This tradition is not fully reflected in Bajpai’s approach, whose analysis was admittedly focused on regional dynamics, although elements of subcontinental defence appear in all three of his subcultures. For the purposes of this analysis, I have supplemented Bajpai’s typology with a fourth subculture, which primarily seeks to defend

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288 Cohen (2004), for example, focused his analysis on India’s approach to China, and divided Indian strategic culture between Pragmatists who sought to engage China at a distance (Neoliberals), Hyperrealists who sought to contain and encircle China, and ‘Appeasers’ who support minimalist and non-provocative defence (Nehruvians). Sarang Shidore (2014) of the East-West centre wrote of “moralism, realism and neoliberalism in India strategic culture”.

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India’s interests in the Subcontinent, especially against the threat of Pakistan. This Subcontinental Defence approach, based on a sensitivity to external interference in South Asian affairs, has been identified as an important paradigm that dominated India’s political scene up to the government of Rajiv Gandhi (Babbage and Gordon, 8). Though it shares some elements with the isolationist subcultures identified in the Canadian and Chinese case studies, India’s unique historical experience led to an emphasis on regional, rather than national, self-determination.
### Indian Strategic Subcultures

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<tr>
<td><strong>The Way in Which Force is Used</strong></td>
<td>Low in-group, high out-group casualty tolerance</td>
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<td>Low in-group, low out-group casualty tolerance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Preferred Mode of Cooperation</strong></td>
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<td>Cooperation with preferred partners</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Threshold for the Use of Force</strong></td>
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<td>Low domestic, low international threshold</td>
<td>High domestic, high international threshold</td>
<td>Medium domestic, high international threshold</td>
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Returning to the notion of a peacekeeping “sweet spot”, previous case studies have already suggested that hyperrealism and sub-continental defence are ill-suited to India’s participation in United Nations operations. A focus on immediate national or regional interest is unlikely to spur high-level involvement in peacekeeping. Neoliberalism, while more closely aligned to the type of activism that encourages involvement with the UN, focuses on using force to protect primarily economic and national interests, rather than supporting the international
order more broadly. As a more detailed analysis of these subcultures suggest, Nehruvianism is the subculture most suited to supporting Indian troop contributions in Blue Helmet operations.

1. Nehruvianism

Five core elements of Nehruvianism can be identified: opposition to colonialism and imperialism; a policy of non-alignment; an active mediatory role for India; a support for disarmament; and a commitment to peaceful coexistence (Kalyanaraman 2014, 153–54). Jawaharlal Nehru believed that war is made in the minds of men, and must be eradicated by wise, cooperative policies made among states (Bajpai 2002, 252). Communication and contact between India and its adversaries will make India more secure. India must have enough force to defend itself, “but not so much that it makes others fearful” (253). The primary utility of force is to support an international system that can mitigate the anarchy that, in the meantime, necessitates force as a last-resort of national defence. Nehru believed that India could eventually live in peace with Pakistan, despite numerous challenges, and that above all India must be patient in international affairs in order to gradually change attitudes.

Even prior to Nehru and modern independence, significant elements of Indian strategic history were characterized by cooperation, an assimilative culture, and minimal use of force (Paranjpe 2013). Under British rule, Nehru articulated goals of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence as “polestars of Indian policy”, having been strongly influenced by the non-violent approach of Mahatma Gandhi (Hilali 2001, 738). As India’s first Prime Minister, he adhered to a refusal to permanently attach to any great power during the Cold War, identifying India as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and promoting cooperation on the basis of international law and multinational institutions rather than formal alliances. Strongly influenced by its
experience as a subjugated British colony, India saw non-alignment and independent decision-making as a sovereign and inalienable right.

It is important to distinguish Nehruvianism from pure pacifism:\(^{289}\):

“India challenged the British domination, but not on the military plane. India attached less importance to the military approach than to the peaceful approach... But this did not make the nation a pacifist” (Paranjpe 2013, 39)

In threat definition, Nehruvianism does not see the world as more or less threatening than, for example, hyperrealism. Instead, Nehruvians see different solutions – international institutions and non-binding cooperation, rather than military build-up – as effective in mitigating these threats. Like Chinese strategic Confucianists, a limited but entrenched military capability is seen as necessary to maintain national security.\(^{290}\) For example, on the issue of nuclear weapons, the Nehruvian approach supports the implementation of effective nuclear disarmament regimes, so long as they are applied to nuclear weapons states in a manner that India considers “equal” (Basrur 2001). However, as long as nuclear weapons cannot be abolished, Nehruvianism holds that India must maintain nuclear capability for its security.

Additionally, the non-alignment principles that make up the core of Nehruvianism should not be mistaken for isolationism: “Nonalignment was a strategy to stay away from the bloc conflicts, not global politics in its entirety” (Zaman 2006, 242). Essential to this concept of the use force was Nehru’s policy of “strategic restraint”, a doctrine with deep foundations in modern India which sees military force as a limited tool and generally opposes significant defence spending (Dasgupta and Cohen 2011). With the end of the Cold War, India was forced to adapt to

\(^{289}\) Unlike the other strategic subcultures identified by Bajpai, the Gandhian minor school did not accept that interest, power and violence are the core staples of international relations (Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa 2014, 117). Yet on the issue of Pakistan, even Gandhi, the apostle of nonviolence, was willing to have India resort to the use of force to protect her honor rather than be dishonoured (Zaman 2006, 240).

\(^{290}\) Indeed, Nehruvians see significant commonality between India and China, with war being far from inevitable between the two Asian powers. This commonality is evident in the Panchsheel Treaty, a Confucian-Nehruvian document in which the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence emerged.
the new international reality. However, a number of elements of India’s strategic restraint and non-alignment have remained unchanged since then. (Hilali 2001, 737)

2. Hyperrealism

Bajpai uses the term hyperrealism not as an outside moral judgment, but rather to indicate that this strategic subculture favours unilateralism and the utility of force more than traditional realism would suggest (Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa 2014, 120). In the pessimistic perspective of hyperrealism, international relations are governed by an unending cycle of threat and counterthreat, with the potential causes of war being numerous (Bajpai 2002, 253). Also referred to as “Indian realism”, this approach has been traced back to Kautilya, the author of the Arthashastra, whose conquest-focused Science of Policy advised Indian rulers on efforts to control the actions of its neighbors and restrict extra-regional influences on them (Zaman 2006). In the Arthashastra, relations between states are necessarily dictated by relative power, as illustrated by the six methods of foreign policy:

(i) Sandhi (peace): “Whoever is inferior to another shall make peace (with him).”
(ii) Vigraha (war): “Whoever is superior in power shall make war.”
(iii) Asana (neutrality): “Whoever thinks ‘No enemy can hurt me, or am I strong enough to destroy my enemy’ shall observe neutrality.”
(iv) Yana (march): “Whoever is possessed of necessary means shall march against his enemy.”
(v) Samshraya (seeking alliance or shelter): “Whoever is devoid of necessary strength to defend himself shall seek the protection of another.”
(vi) Dvaidhibhava (double policy): “Whoever thinks that help is necessary to work out an end shall make peace with one and wage war with another.”

291 Bharat Karnad argues that the hyperrealism of historical Indian factions led to them “exhausting themselves in endless intrigue, internecine rivalries and conflict with each other. The whole was, thereby, rendered vulnerable to the depredations by a string of invaders from Alexander of Macedon… and later the British venturing in from the sea” (Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa 2014, 207).
Under this framework, peace can be achieved through a variety of means, but such a peace will always be temporary, and should be part of a broader policy of lulling the enemy into complacency.

Hyperrealists see India as having no permanent allies, since only a balance of power can regulate relations. Force is indispensable to the future safety and security of India, especially where Pakistan is concerned. According to hyperrealists, the only language that Pakistan – or any other competitor for that matter -- understands is violence and power, and military supremacy over Pakistan must be maintained at all costs (McLaughlin 2003). Beyond Pakistan, China is viewed as the greatest military threat to India, both as a historical rival and as the other major “rising power” of the 21st century (Malik 2003). Both conventional and military power must be augmented to address Chinese expansionism. Though permanent alliances are illusory, hyperrealism tends to view U.S. support – especially as a dissuasion to Chinese influence – more favourably than Nehruvianism. Rather than being a fundamental approach to international relations, non-alignment was seen here as a policy pursued to ensure India’s security in a period where strategic inferiority, especially vis-à-vis China, made more active policies unfeasible (Zaman 2006, 242). Based on the notion of concentric circles of “friend” and “foe” neighbours found in the Arthashastra, short-term alliances bred of common interest are common within hyperrealism -- but always with the view to possible rivalries in the future (Uz Zaman 2009).

Hyperrealists assert that nuclear weapons will always be essential to Indian security, and reject both the non-proliferation regime and other institutional frameworks as attempts to limit the India’s geopolitical strength (Bajpai 2002, 265). More than any other subculture, hyperrealism sees Indian security concerns as extending beyond its neighbourhood and encompassing the globe, with a complex web of temporary arrangements needed to develop
India’s power. In terms of threat perception, challenges like terrorism are seen primarily through the lens of being armed, financed, and backed by governments or their agencies – most often Pakistan. Indira Gandhi, despite being Nehru’s daughter, and although she originally seemed to adhere to the principles of Nehruvianism, was moved by the defeat in the Indo-Chinese war of 1962 and domestic political turbulence to embrace the more hyperrealist approach to the use of force; she is thus the public figure most associated with hyperrealism in Indian politics (Chaulia 2002, 219).

3. Strategic Neoliberalism

In the strategic cultural context, neoliberalism sees a fundamental connection between defence/security issues and economic performance. Indian strategic neoliberals believe that independence and mutual gain from economic cooperation can mitigate the anarchy of the international system and that misunderstanding and miscalculation are the primary causes of interstate conflict (Bajpai 2002, 252). The utility of force is in supporting the economic well-being of the country, which supports national security in a broader sense. War itself is economically disruptive, and military spending and the use of force internationally actually causes India and the Indian people to have less security, partially because it takes away valuable resources from the domestic population. Neoliberalism became more influential in the post-Cold War period, where the demise of the bipolar system and the need for non-alignment were joined with the emergence of modern Indian capitalism:

“Economic growth became the national priority; it was to be achieved through liberalization, emphasis on trade, and foreign direct investment; hence economic diplomacy was emphasized” (Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa 2014, 181–82).

The Indian subculture of neoliberalism emphasizes the role of economic security over military security as the best means for India to secure both its home and its interests abroad. In
an interconnected world where capital is dominant, territorial expansion is counter-productive and would harm India’s long-term interests. On Pakistan, neoliberalism advocates appealing to the logic of cost-benefit among Pakistan’s leadership; military superiority over Pakistan is seen as helping India’s rival arrive at the conclusion that trade and cooperation is mutually beneficial. Neoliberals in India see the peaceful economic rise of China as something to emulate (Malik 2003).

The neoliberal paradigm is suspicious of both the role of formal international institutions – including the United Nations -- and balance of power politics. Instead, the best way to secure India’s future is seen to be the fostering of greater economic might.292 Rather than adhering to non-alignment or Indian realism – both of which limit trade relationships – neoliberals in this subculture see the role of other powers as one of potential security collaboration. Alignment with a greater power, most notably the U.S., can help to secure India: “neoliberalism challenged moralism’s discomfort with the global order and saw strategic autonomy as a secondary priority to a stake in the world system” (Shidore 2014, 2). The United States, as the major economic force in the world, is therefore an important pragmatic strategic relationship for India. Other interstate relationships – most notably economic and security collaborations with Israel, which would have been seen as a violation of non-alignment during the Cold War – have been recently cultivated by India with an eye towards increasing economic prosperity.

More than hyperrealists or Nehruvians, strategic neoliberals believe that India may pragmatically have to join a nuclear non-proliferation regime and reduce its nuclear stockpile with an eye to eventual disarmament. Neoliberalism in India also contains a strong element of regionalism, holding that South Asia must work together “to emerge as a major powerhouse of

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292 Neoliberals point to the decrease in instate warfare that has matched the pace of globalization since the end of the Second World War (Bajpai, 2002, 252).
economic creativity and enterprise” (Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa 2014, 184). Initiatives such as the development of a “blue water navy” are more connected to a growing economic needs for trade and access to energy resource, necessitating the protection of energy sea-lanes across deep waters, than as defence against threats or great power projection (Scott 2008, 5). Threat definition is thus more focused on dangers to international links and means of communication and trade, such as piracy.

4. Subcontinental Defence

India’s geography and history have meant that traditional isolationism as a strategic subculture has never really been able to gain much traction, the way it has at times been influential in Canada and China. The perception of having an “enemy” next door in Pakistan since 1947, as well as the security-centric relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, has necessitated that Indian security look outside its own borders at least to the extent of the Indian Subcontinent.293 The Subcontinental Defence approach, as a distinct Indian subculture, sees force as primarily useful in defending and securing the region, so that other parts of Indian political life can prosper. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, president of one of India’s top policy think-tanks, argued that this undercurrent can be seen throughout modern Indian history, noting that “almost all of India’s security policy, whether nuclear or conventional had been driven by a deeply defensive idea, formulated in the context of defending territory (Ahmed 2010, 4). In lamenting the lack of strategic thinking, authors have noted the “continental mindset” that privileges home defence over investments in things like the Indian Navy (Scott 2008, 128) – though again this represents a particular current of strategic culture, rather than a lack of strategy.

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293 Though not categorizing it as part of a separate subculture, Bajpai (2002) does note that India’s security perception fundamentally revolves around perceptions of the twin threat from China and Pakistan (31).
While sharing some elements with hyperrealism, such as the need for robust military spending to safeguard Indian citizens in a dangerous world, Subcontinental Defence is far more reactive than the offensive approach of the hyperrealists. Threats are defined more in relations to India’s immediate borders, whereas hyperrealism’s view of concentric circles of international relations sees potential threats emerging globally. Despite overgeneralizations in his analysis, George Tanham correctly notes the influence of geography on elements of India’s strategic elite:

“The mountains and seas have long been perceived as protective barriers and have given the Indians a sense of security, but they fully recognize that much of the time it has been a false sense of security, because invaders have poured through the northwestern passes and Europeans have invaded the subcontinent by sea” (Tanham 1992, 130).

The notion of “marginal war” in response to the constant threat of invasion strongly aligns with the Subcontinental Defence culture. Since India is unlikely to win a war against a major power – as illustrated by the disastrous Indo-Chinese war – it should optimally prepare for wars it can afford to fight. Bharat Karnad argues that this thinking still pervades the military attitude towards Pakistan, despite the fact that India has long been militarily superior to Pakistan (Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa 2014, 209). In this perspective, wars are common but generally minor – part of broader political manoeuvring – and armed forces assist in the maintenance of law and order within India itself. There is no larger strategic goal for India to become a hegemon in the future.

On nuclear weapons, there is the sense that India gets unduly singled out in areas such as nuclear proliferation or human rights, especially vis-à-vis Pakistan. International human rights activism and the criticisms of non-governmental organizations is seen as primarily protecting terrorism and undermining the safety of Indian nationals. Whereas hyperrealism sees terrorism as state-supported, basically as a proxy of Pakistan, the Subcontinental defence approach is more
willing to work alongside regional neighbours, including Pakistan, to undermine the common threat of terrorism that is faced by citizens in both countries.

**Indian Strategic Culture and Peacekeeping**

Of the four strategic cultures, Nehruvianism is most strongly in favour of UN peacekeeping, owing to its support of multilateral institutions and international law. Hyperrealism is the most activist of all the subcultures and most pessimistic in its view of the possibilities for peace and cooperation, more so than the Chinese parabellum perspective. Subcontinental defence’s emphasis on the immediate region limits its interest in multinational peacekeeping, making it mistrustful of external involvement beyond India’s backyard.

Strategic neoliberals are skeptical of peacekeeping -- and international institutions generally -- unless there is a clear economic benefit for the people of India. Peacekeeping may occasionally be instrumentally beneficial in protecting Indian interests, but high-level troop contributions to the UN are more likely to cost India than to benefit it. Yet neoliberalism is not as antagonistic towards peacekeeping as hyperrealism or Subcontinental Defence; we might expect an increase in neoliberalism to neither bolster nor significantly detract from India’s troop contributions, provided Nehruvianism was still prominent.

Nehruvianism, by seeing the use of force as limited, emphasizing cooperation and negotiation, yet still being relatively willing to use military force to achieve global ends, fits strongly within the peacekeeping sweet spot. Focused on peace but being neither pacifist nor isolationist, Nehruvianism is also concerned with India’s role in the world as a moral leader. In heading the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, Nehruvians saw early on the opportunity United Nations peacekeeping provided to raise India’s status, provide a concrete contribution to peace and stability, and move the focus of its military beyond the long-running
competition with Pakistan. In their chapter – analyzing the various incentives to India’s high level of peacekeeping contribution – Bellamy and Williams touch upon the connection between Nehru and peacekeeping:

“Why did India agree to take part in so many UN operations? The short answer is that India’s sense of being a great power in the making was a key factor: as India’s founding Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru put it, “We cannot shed the responsibilities that go with a great country…This conviction – that India’s contribution helped maintain regional peace and stability – was perhaps the dominant reason for participation in UN peacekeeping in the early years” (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 227).

How is it that Chinese Confucianism, which shares a number of characteristics with Indian Nehruvianism, is opposed to peacekeeping when Nehruvianism supports it? This distinction demonstrates the core insight of strategic culture – that national strategic subcultures are unique combinations that, while sharing elements of similarity with those of other countries, are a product of individual histories, circumstances, and philosophies. China’s strategic background meant that Confucianism saw the utility of force in far more limiting ways than Nehruvianism, which does not have such strict “just war” criteria. As a result, the same Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which Chinese Confucianism saw as safeguarding national sovereignty above all else, Nehruvians saw as being entirely compatible with the tenets of modern UN peacekeeping.
**India’s Key Strategic Documents**

As was mentioned earlier, modern India lacks a single clear strategic policy statement, such as a Defence White Paper, that can be pointed to as a source for the analysis of strategic culture over time. The lack of strategic documentation has been discussed at length by Indian analysts, with subsequent governments being pressured to provide a single statement of Indian strategy. However, perhaps as a reflection of the strong cross-tendencies at work within Indian strategic culture, such a document remains elusive. Instead, those attempting to identify trends in India’s military policy must rely on tactical-level documents from the Indian Ministry of Defence and speeches made by political elites.

In light of this, India’s available strategic documents can be divided into three categories:

1) Annual Reports by the Ministry of Defence;
2) Independence Day Speeches;
3) Speeches made to the United Nations General Assembly.

**Annual Reports by the Ministry of Defence**

From 2001 onwards, the India Ministry of Defence (MoD) made available its annual reports on the state of the Indian Armed Forces. Similar in content to the short-lived reports by the Chief of Defence Staff to the Canadian leadership, these documents provided an overview of the strategic environment of that year, noting India’s relations with major regional and international powers. Developments in threats to security, major new procurement initiatives, and elements of training and recruitment were included in all of these documents, which followed identical patterns.

Directly comparing these documents to the Defence White Papers published by the People’s Republic of China, John Garver (2002) identified these documents as essential resources for tracking the development of Indian security perspectives over time. A number of
other studies interested in India’s evolving regional and international relations have made use of these documents as well (Hilali 2001; Cohen 2004; Paranjpe 2013).

**Independence Day Speeches**

Marking the anniversary of India’s formal independence from the British Empire on August 15, 1947, the hoisting of the national flag in front of the Red Fort in Delhi, a military parade, and a subsequent speech by the Prime Minister of India have been tradition for 60 years now. Made following a military parade, the speeches generally have a military tone. They are used by India’s political leadership to lay out key governmental priorities and take stock of the accomplishments in the prior year. Coming as they do after a military parade, these speeches generally have a strong strategic element, though the focus tends to be on home defence and the immediate security situation surrounding India. The nature of the event tends to give a more general tone to these documents; specific military issues such as United Nations peacekeeping were never raised in the post-Cold War era of Independence Day speeches.

**Speeches to the United Nations General Assembly**

Finally, like Canada, China, and the rest of the United Nations membership, the Indian diplomatic delegation delivers a speech each September to the assembled audience of the United Nations General Assembly. More than Canada or China, India has a tradition of having the presiding Prime Minister deliver the UNGA speech at least once every few years. During his time in office, Jawaharlal Nehru placed a great deal of importance on such speeches, a fact which has continued with most of his successors (Rana 1970).

**1990 – 1995**

Unfortunately, due to the lack of available and/or translated strategic documentation in this period, the corpus that can be relied upon for analysis is limited to India’s speeches to the
UN General Assembly. In the period immediately following the collapse of the bipolar international system that India’s policy of nonalignment had centred on for so long, India was left uncertain of its place in the world. The ill-fated Indian Peace Keeping Force (unassociated with United Nations peacekeeping) was withdrawn following escalations in the conflict in Sri Lanka, leading to a soul-searching in the Indian military that led to a reaffirmation of Indian participation in UN-led operations (Bullion 1997). Domestically the 1990s began with India facing political turmoil as well. With four Prime Ministers in two and a half years, and still feeling the effects of the Indira Gandhi administration, P.V. Narasimha Rao took over leadership from 1991 to 1996. In 1991, a female suicide bomber influenced by Tamil extremist nationalism assassinated former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Armed insurgency in the Jammu and Kashmir regions, in part driven by electoral discontent, became prominent once again.

As the 1990s progressed, however, gradual economic liberalization and more stable politics emerged in India. From a brief period of non-involvement in UN operations – driven more by the operational requirements of the force in Sri Lanka than a change in Indian attitudes towards the UN – India rapidly re-engaged with Blue Helmet peacekeeping, sustaining more than 5,000 deployed peacekeeping troops for much of this period (International Peace Institute 2015).

UNGA Speeches

Speaking on behalf of the administration of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, a largely technocratic Prime Minister who served for less than a year, Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral gave a highly Nehruvian speech, with 53% of the strategic statements classified as such. In the face of ongoing tensions with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, the address emphasized negotiation:
“We are against the use or threat of force in the settlement of differences in inter-State relations. We firmly oppose aggression...Despite Pakistan's blatant violation, India has continued its quest to build a wholesome relationship of cordiality and friendship that I know the people of our two countries need and desire”.294

As we shall see, the majority of India’s UNGA speeches across different administrations are characterized by Nehruvian dominance. Alongside exhortations for peaceful negotiations, the address also accused Pakistan of funding terror activities to undermine the Indian state, a common refrain in hyperrealism. The 1990 speech also called for a “nuclear-weapons-free and non-violent world order”, despite India’s continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program.295

As India began to return to high-level UN peacekeeping involvement under Prime Minister Rao, the 1991 speech ramped up Nehruvian rhetoric, with 17 of 26 statements following this subculture. In responding to the Gulf Crisis of the period, India reaffirmed the Security Council’s role in mediation and the enforcement of peace. Citing India’s own experience as the target of economic sanctions and with Article 50 of the UN Charter296, the speech stressed the impact of interdependence on the global economics, in line with strategic neoliberalism.

The following year, Prime Minister Rao himself addressed the General Assembly at a world leadership summit, though the focus of his statement was far more on purely economic than strategic issues. In both this speech and the follow-on speech made by a top Indian diplomat, support for the UN system, non-proliferation, and a more conciliatory tone with Pakistan was expressed. The undercurrent of hyperrealism that appeared in earlier speeches appeared to ebb.

295 Ibid.
296 Article 50 States: If preventative or enforcement measure against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state...which finds itself confronted with the special economic problems arising from carrying out those measures (that state) shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems. UN Charter, Article 50, paragraph 1.
With the increasing liberalization of India’s economy under Prime Minister Rao, speeches in 1993 and 1994 saw an increased prominence of strategic neoliberalism, which was represented in 20% and 26% of strategic statements, respectively. The link between global security and development was made explicit and India’s assertive place in the world economy made clear.

More than previous speeches, the addresses of the latter part of the period increasingly raised the matter of peacekeeping, reflecting India’s greater stake in troop contributions. While Indian support for the UN and the peacekeeping project was repeatedly assured, concerns about the cost of peacekeeping, the burden on developing countries, and global inequality more broadly were also raised:

While “it is a matter of comfort because the United Nations at long last has started playing its Charter role in the area of peace and security”\textsuperscript{297}, “the resources for peacekeeping activities should not be at the expense of resources for development activities of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{298}

In the way that peacekeeping was raised as “at once a matter of comfort and concern”, the influence of neoliberalism may be seen to have somewhat limited greater Indian participation in UN operations over this period. India’s desire for a permanent seat on the Security Council was also expressed in this period, with a linkage to its contributions to peacekeeping:

“On the basis of any criteria – population, size of economy, contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to peace-keeping or future potential – India deserves to be a permanent member of the Security Council”.\textsuperscript{299}

At the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, the dynamic in these speeches between Nehruvian support for the international system and neoliberal skepticism about the ability of international institutions to mitigate war was well-established, with India’s Minister of

\textsuperscript{297} United Nations, “Address by Mr. Mukherjee”, 49\textsuperscript{th} Session of the General Assembly, 1994
\textsuperscript{298} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid.
External Affairs noting that “We set up the United Nations because we felt that all of us stood to gain from it”.

1996 – 2000

The corpus of documents available for analysis widened somewhat in the latter half of the 1990s, with the addition of Independence Day speeches made available under the political administration of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of the Baharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

A series of political corruption scandals that lead to the downfall of the Rao administration and the India Congress party, gave way to short reigns by Vajpayee, H.D. Deve Gowda and Inder Kumar Gujral as Prime Minister; none of these governments would last more than a year. Electoral and coalition struggles eventually gave majority control to the BJP under Vajpayee. Some analysts believed that the BJP, with a strong base among Hindu nationalists, would be more realist and less Nehruvian in international affairs (Bajpai 2002, 29; Chaulia 2002).

The conduct of a series of five nuclear tests in this period – including India’s first nuclear fusion bomb – as well as a limited armed conflict between India and Pakistan confirmed these expectations to some extent. A strong current of Nehruvianism was maintained in strategic documents available in this period, but towards the last years of the 20th century, a number of alternative subcultures – including hyperrealism – became more prominent as well.

After re-engaging in peacekeeping in the early part of the decade, India’s troop contributions to UN operations dropped off significantly again towards the late 1990s. Operational requirements in Sri Lanka as part of the non-UN Indian Peace-Keeping Force (PKF) – a force that was originally meant as a limited assistance to help the Sri Lankan government

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300 United Nations, “Address by Mr. Mukherjee”, 50th Session of the General Assembly, 1995
301 In May 1988, India conducted a series of nuclear tests, nicknamed Pokhran II, for the second time in its history.
disarm Tamil separatists – grew to the extent that many of the resources that were traditionally devoted to the UN became bogged down in the region. Following this disastrous experiment with non-UN peacekeeping, India’s military leadership renewed its support for Indian involvement in Blue Helmet missions, as the likelihood of a quagmire under UN auspices seemed significantly reduced (Bullion 1997).

*Independence Day Speeches*

In his first Independence Day speech as Prime Minister in 1998, Vajpayee’s address took a decidedly Nehruvian tone, in part perhaps to allay fears that India would take a more militaristic direction under BJP leadership:

“I wish to make it clear right now that India has always been an ardent advocate of peace and will always remain so”.

Compared to later speeches by the Prime Minister, the 1998 August 15 speech had relatively little strategic content; only 17 strategic statements, seven of which were Nehruvian, four Subcontinental Defence, two hyperrealist, one neoliberal and three mixed. Referring to problems with both China and Pakistan, the role of “friendly talks” was highlighted. Yet against the backdrop of the 1998 Chamba massacre, where 35 Hindus were killed as part of unrest in Jammu and Kashmir, threats such as terrorism were depicted in this document as a form of proxy war.

In 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests as part of the Pokhran-II project, the second series of tests in India’s history. The Prime Minister addressed these tests in his Independence Day speech, assuring both domestic and international audiences of India’s no-first-use policy and attempted to depict these tests in a defensive context:

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303 Ibid.
“We have to modernise our forces to enable them to face and danger and safeguard our independence and integrity. With only this aim, we conducted the nuclear tests on the 11th and 13th of May this year.”

This would be one of the few times that a Prime Minister would remark on India’s nuclear capabilities directly in these documents.

In 1999, in the immediate aftermath of the two-month Kargil War fought against Pakistan in which approximately 500 soldiers on each side were killed, Vajpayee’s address took on a more hyperrealist tone. Arguing that “a war was imposed on us”, and alluding to the approval of the international community of India’s “responsibility and restraint”, the Prime Minister nonetheless applauded the patriotic actions of the Indian armed forces against “the enemy”. In 1999, in the immediate aftermath of the two-month Kargil War fought against Pakistan in which approximately 500 soldiers on each side were killed, Vajpayee’s address took on a more hyperrealist tone. Arguing that “a war was imposed on us”, and alluding to the approval of the international community of India’s “responsibility and restraint”, the Prime Minister nonetheless applauded the patriotic actions of the Indian armed forces against “the enemy”. In 1999, in the immediate aftermath of the two-month Kargil War fought against Pakistan in which approximately 500 soldiers on each side were killed, Vajpayee’s address took on a more hyperrealist tone. Arguing that “a war was imposed on us”, and alluding to the approval of the international community of India’s “responsibility and restraint”, the Prime Minister nonetheless applauded the patriotic actions of the Indian armed forces against “the enemy”. In 1999, in the immediate aftermath of the two-month Kargil War fought against Pakistan in which approximately 500 soldiers on each side were killed, Vajpayee’s address took on a more hyperrealist tone. Arguing that “a war was imposed on us”, and alluding to the approval of the international community of India’s “responsibility and restraint”, the Prime Minister nonetheless applauded the patriotic actions of the Indian armed forces against “the enemy”.

In addition to an increased prominence of the hyperrealist subculture, strategic neoliberalism was also prominent in the 1999 address. Referring to the sanctions imposed on India by the U.S., Japan, and other following the Pokrhan-II tests, Vajpayee argued that sanctions have “lost their effect” and “become a thing of the past”.

In moving forward from the Kargil conflict, India hoped to focus more on economic development and interdependence: “the resources which ought to have been used for economic and social development were instead spent on war”.

This theme of strategic neoliberalism carried over in the 2000 Independence Day speech, which announced the “Decade of Development” by noting that “without security, there can be no development; without development our security is incomplete”. As Kargil receded, Nehruvianism once again became the dominant subculture in this document – accompanied by an increase in India’s peacekeeping troop contribution. Citing Mahatma Gandhi’s continued

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304 Ibid.
306 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
influence on India’s international approach, Vajpayee proclaimed an “age for resolving
differences, not for prolonging disputes”. Calling for the “salve of brotherhood” to be applied
to the region of Jammu and Kashmir, the Prime Minister at the same time warned Pakistan
against an “undeclared war” in the region fought through proxy terrorism. Looking forward into
the new millennium, the speech triumphed the ascendancy of India, with a strong focus on the
country’s economic might:

“There is no other country in the world, which is so ancient, so big, so populous, and so
rich in diversities; that has preserved its democracy, its unity, and its culture; and that is
fast emerging as a modern and prosperous nation”.

UNGA Speeches

If the few Independence Day speeches from this period suggest a move from more
hyperrealist/Subcontinental Defence sentiments to increasing Nehruvianism, the strategic
cultural analysis of India’s UNGA speeches from this time presents a muddier picture. A
general dominance of Nehruvian statements can be seen in most of these speeches, which generally
accounted for between 40% and 50% of statements. The exception to this was the 1998 speech,
which was also a low point in India’s UN peacekeeping troop contributions. Generally speaking,
a fair degree of consistency can be seen between the speeches under the Rao and Vajpayee
administrations; this would prove to again be the case when the Congress regained power in
2004 under Prime Minister Singh.

Despite the end of the Cold War years earlier, Indian External Affairs Minister Gujral
avowed India’s continued commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement as “an important plank in
our foreign policy” in this period, showcasing the ongoing importance of the Nehruvian initiative

309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
under the new United Front government. \(^{311}\) In line with this, the UN was hailed as “the foremost embodiment of multilateralism”, which provided an alternative to both isolationism and alliance. \(^{312}\) India justified its non-participation in non-proliferation and nuclear test-ban regimes as “partial and half-heated arms control measures” that were fundamentally flawed. \(^{313}\)

A year later, in 1997, returning as Prime Minister as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gujral marked the 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of India’s independence with a speech to the UN containing a large number of Nehruvian and neoliberal strategic statements:

“The core of our foreign policy is our keenness to pursue close ties and build confidence and cooperation with our neighbours, while recognizing fully that we are the largest country in the region, in terms not only of size and population but also of economic capabilities.” \(^{314}\)

Economic self-sufficiency and well-being was described as essential to international peace and stability, and the Prime Minister’s speech spoke of threat definition as centred more on economic challenges than traditional security threats to India. Once again, India’s participation in peacekeeping – though by this time having diminished drastically compared to 1993 and 1994 – was used as a justification of India’s qualification for a permanent place on the UN Security Council.

The 1998 address by the Indian delegation was notable for a number of reasons. It was the first given under the BJP government, and was given by Prime Minister Vajpayee himself. For the first time since 1990, Nehruvianism was not the most prominent strategic subculture on display; of only 17 strategic statements made, five were neoliberal, four Nehruvian, four mixed (primarily neoliberal-Nehruvian), three hyperrealist and one defensive realist. Considering the audience, the three hyperrealist statements were particularly notable. Vajpayee took on a more

\(^{312}\) Ibid.
\(^{313}\) Ibid.
forceful line than usual on what was depicted as “proxy terrorism”, seeing it as a threat to Indian regional and economic security:

“In India, we have had to cope with terrorism aided and abetted by a neighbouring country for nearly two decades. We have borne this with patience, but none should doubt the strength of our resolve to crush this challenge.”

The nuclear tests conducted that year were acknowledged as “ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent for India’s national security”. Notably, no mention was made of UN peacekeeping in this speech; at the time the address was given, India provided only 305 armed peacekeepers, ranking 14th among Member States (International Peace Institute 2015).

In 1999 and 2000, however, Prime Minister Vajpayee returned to the Nehruvian-led formula established by his predecessors at the United Nations. This included his speech made at the Millennium Summit, 40% of which had Nehruvian strategic content. Striking a theme of “responsibility and restraint”, Vajpayee sought to highlight the role of and downplay the recent nuclear tests and armed conflict in Kargil.

The maxim “one has to be strong to defend peace” could be interpreted to align well with growing Indian participation in peacekeeping. Yet alternative subcultures continued to be evident in these speeches as well. Aside from a mention by the Foreign Minister in 2000 about the importance of studying the Brahimi Report, none of these latter speeches addressed peacekeeping in any significant way. Speaking a year before 9/11, India was far more attentive to the threat of terrorism compared to other world leaders speaking in this forum:

“Of all threats to democracy, development and peace in our times, the most diabolic is international terrorism, with its links to religious extremism, drug trafficking and commerce in illicit arms.”

316 Ibid.  
318 Ibid.
pursuit of the mirage of military success. It also continues because of outside support, military and financial, to the Taliban.”

Compared to speeches that would be given in later periods – even following the terror attacks on New York and Washington and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan – hyperrealism was more evident in these documents, particularly concerning the threat of “state-sponsored terror”. These sentiments, mixed with declarations of support for the United Nations, the Security Council, and the primacy of the UN charter, contribute to the muddy strategic picture of this period.

2001 – 2005

This period covers the latter years of the Vajpayee premiership, which continued until 2004, and the first year under Congress Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. These were years of rapid economic development for India, as industrialization and poverty eradication initiatives began to pay dividends. This was also the first period of analysis where all three categories of strategic document were available.

This five-year period also presented challenges to India’s international approach. The conflict in regional neighbour Afghanistan and the threat of international terrorist networks were balanced by generally improving relations in Southeast Asia. Relations with Pakistan continued to be rocky, including a 2001 military standoff precipitated by a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. But the crisis was averted through diplomatic negotiation, and the relative liberalization of Pakistan’s political sphere under Pervez Musharraf widened the possibilities for future peaceful relations between India and Pakistan.

While India’s peacekeeping troop contribution levels fluctuated widely across these five years, it only briefly dipped below the status of a high-level contributor. As developed-world nations pulled out of peacekeeping in 2000, and focused increasingly on coalition operations

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after 2001, countries like India increasingly picked up the burden of providing military resources to the UN (Krishnasamy 2001).

MoD Annual Reports

Beginning in 2003, in the latter years of the administration of Prime Minister Vajpayee, the annual reports published by the Ministry of Defence became widely available, and were read almost as much by international audiences looking for hints of a grand strategy as by India’s domestic audience. From 2003 to 2015, spanning three political administrations, the MoD reports followed more or less the same formula, making them ideal for strategic cultural comparison. An overview of the current security environment is provided, with the core roles of the Indian Armed Forces outlined. Broad statements about India’s home defence, regional picture, and the international environment provide a wealth of strategic content. This is followed by chapters on the different branches of the armed forces, highlights of defence procurement, research and development, etc. As with similar documents in the Canadian case study, large portions of these documents are devoted to specifics of recruitment, training and equipment that have little strategic culture content.

In the first available annual report, covering the 2002-2003 period, the prominence of Nehruvian statements in such an explicitly tactical document is immediately apparent. Compared to similar documents in other national settings, India’s MoD annual reports place a far greater emphasis on peaceful negotiation, regional cooperation and India’s benign standing in the world. Of 48 strategic statements – an approximately average amount of strategic cultural content, compared to the reports that would follow – 31% were Nehruvian, 23% Subcontinental Defence, 19% hyperrealist and 4% neoliberal. Of the 23% of strategic statements that were categorized as mixed, most were a combination of Nehruvianism and Subcontinental Defence; “India remains
fully committed to maintaining peace with its neighbours and stability in the region through a combination of defence preparedness and unilateral restraint”. Yet elements of hyperrealism persisted, such as the bold statement that “Virtually every terrorist act anywhere in the world today has a Pakistani fingerprint somewhere”.

To give the peacekeeping context, at this point India was providing just over 2,000 soldiers to the United Nations. While this was a high level of contribution to be sure, in the coming years India would ramp up its peacekeeping involvement to a peak of 9,000 peacekeepers in UN missions, more than 10% of the global peacekeeping force (International Peace Institute 2015). Peacekeeping was mentioned a number of times in this document, referring to India’s contribution and the growing “relevance and importance” of peace operations in the world.

The following year’s annual report, 2003-2004, was somewhat of an aberration, in that Subcontinental Defence actually eclipsed Nehruvianism as the most prominent subculture – although just barely. The document focused on the history of regional aggression against India, including the “undeclared war at Kargil”. Terrorism, both depicted as state-sponsored and as an amorphous international threat, was the focus of much of the document, while the U.S. interventionism in Iraq was discussed in frank terms of balance of power:

“The US-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated US military power and willingness to use it unilaterally or in association with allies or coalition partners”.

Throughout these annual reports, there were always a large number of “mixed” strategic statements, usually with a true mix of all the different competing Indian subcultures. In this

321 Ibid. p. 3.
322 Ibid. p. 21.
324 Ibid. p. 13
report, however, almost all the mixed statements were in part oriented towards Subcontinental Defence. Interestingly, 2003 also saw a decline in India’s participation in peacekeeping relative to other UN Member States; in 2004, India provided more than 8% of all Blue Helmet peacekeepers, but in 2004 that proportion dropped to 5% (International Peace Institute 2015).

2004-2005 saw a return to the relative dominance of Nehruvianism. At the same time, India undertook a massive expansion of its peacekeeping troop contributions, adding more than 6,000 peacekeepers to the field in little over a year. The significance of peacekeeping to India’s armed forces was highlighted extensively in this document:

“Our contribution to UN peacekeeping operations since 1950 crossed the 70,000 troops mark, which is the highest by any country in the world… The professional élan of the Indian soldier is evident from the fact that for every new mission established by the UN, the first offer to contribute troops was made by the UN to India.” 325

The primary responsibility of the Indian armed forces continued to be the defence of borders and territory, in line with Subcontinental Defence norms. But the theme of this document may be said to be “effective diplomacy backed by military power”, a strongly – though not fully – Nehruvian concept.326 Positive developments in India’s two largest neighbours, Pakistan and China, towards liberalization and negotiation tampered down the threat definition in this period, allowing Nehruvianism to once again flourish.

Independence Day Speeches

Despite being made by two different Prime Ministers from two very different political parties – the BJP and the Indian National Congress – the August 15 speeches made in this period had a remarkable degree of continuity. Throughout the five-year period, Nehruvianism was the most prominent strategic subculture, though at no point did it represent the majority of statements. With the exception of the 2005 speech, Nehruvian sentiments accounted for between

326 Ibid. 15.
42% and 48% of the strategic statements made by both Prime Minister Vajpayee and Prime Minister Singh.

Of the addresses in this period, the 2001 speech (made a month before the terrorist attack of 9/11) contained the biggest element of hyperrealism. In the aftermath of failed talks with Pakistan and a standoff in Jammu and Kashmir between the two countries, Vajpayee expressed anger at what he saw as the insincerity of Pakistan’s negotiations:

“Let no one entertain any delusion that Pakistan can succeed in wresting Kashmir, through jehad and terrorism, what it has failed to get through wars.”

Interestingly, India’s peacekeeping contribution briefly dipped to 794 peacekeepers during the standoff between India and Pakistan (International Peace Institute 2015). However, Nehruvianism still accounted for 42% of this speech, suggesting that the relatively high number of hyperrealist statements reflected peacekeeping calculations in complex ways. Vajpayee also lamented the spending of limited resources by both countries on military resources when “we ought to be spending these scarce resources on the development of our two countries and to improve the lives of our peoples”.

This current of neoliberalism would grow slowly throughout the period.

The Independence Day speeches of 2002 and 2003 were more mixed and less hyperrealist than previous speeches made by Vajpayee. While no direct mention of the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001 were made in the addresses, the threat perception of global terrorism (as opposed to terrorism sponsored by Pakistan) drove Subcontinental Defence statements. Yet the overriding themes were ones of conciliation and negotiation, especially within the immediate region:

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328 Ibid.
“I am deeply saddened when I compare South Asia with other parts of the world. When Japan, which was devastated in the Second World War, today stands as one of the front-ranking nations; when the whole of Europe has united, forgetting all the old enmities; why can’t we resolve all our contentious issues through talks?”

Stating (in the context of Jammu and Kashmir) that “if any mistakes have occurred, we shall make amends”, Vajpayee lauded the general consensus among political parties on national security. This sentiment was borne out by Manmohan Singh’s first statement in front of the Red Fort, which largely followed the formula of speech established by his predecessor. The biggest difference in the 2004 speech was that defence issues, which had been placed up front in previous speeches, were relegated to later sections of the address. Hyperrealist sentiments, which had been declining sharply since 2001, were entirely absent from Singh’s inaugural address: 48% of strategic statements were Nehruvian, 19% neoliberal, 15% Subcontinental Defence, and the remainder mixed.

2005’s Independence Day speech saw a more prominent role for neoliberalism, at some expense to Nehruvian statements. It was in this speech that Singh established a narrative that would be repeated on later occasions; that of India as an “old civilization, but a Young Country” rapidly developing and expanding its economic strength. Discourse around Pakistan centred around opportunities for negotiation and “making our countries more prosperous”, reflecting this mix of Nehruvian and neoliberal perspectives. The threat of terrorism, previously defined primarily in terms of proxy warfare, is now primarily defined as a global threat to security and rooted in “economic backwardness”:

“Extremism is a challenge which requires a united response from all of us. However, it is also necessary to look at a political resolution of this problem…Often extremism has its roots in backwardness and lack of economic development”.

330 Ibid.
331 Manmohan Singh “Independence Day Address”, 2005, Prime Minister’s Office.
332 Ibid.
Finally, in terms of geopolitical relationships, the focus on forging closer ties with China, the United States, and Russia at the same time illustrates the daunting task faced by India and the relative pulls of Nehruvianism and neoliberalism

*UNGA Speeches*

The five UNGA speeches made in this period were far less uniform in their strategic content than other documents analyzed from 2001-2005. This is in part due to the varying quantity of strategic statements found in these speeches. While on average the speeches made by the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly tended to contain from 20 to 25 strategic statements, two speeches in this period – the 2001 speech under Vajpayee and the 2005 speech by Prime Minister Singh – had less than 10 strategic statements. The relative strategic cultural content of these speeches thus varied widely; perhaps of relevance is the fact that, for the first time, all five speeches were made by the Prime Minister in power that year.

India’s 2001 UNGA speech, like those made by Canada and China, was heavily influenced by the terrorist attacks in September 11th of that year. The war on terrorism, the eradication of poverty, and “our collective search for security” were all cited as defence objectives. Drawing from his country’s own experience in combatting the threat of terrorism, Vajpayee voiced his cautious support for the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan, although India would not actively participate in the coalition:

“We in India know from our own bitter experience that terrorists develop global networks driven by religious extremism…India supports the current campaign against the terrorist networks in Afghanistan. We hope that it reaches an early and successful conclusion.”

Of all the documents analyzed in India’s post-Cold War period, the 2002 UNGA speech made by Prime Minister Vajpayee was one of the most hyperrealist, with strong Subcontinental

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Defence Undertones. State-sponsored terrorism by Pakistan, which had receded as a topic in recent years, became prominent once more in 2002, with the added element of fears about nuclear weapons use:

“In our South Asian region, nuclear blackmail has emerged over the past few months as a new arrow in the quiver of State-sponsored terrorism… If Pakistan claims to be a crucial partner in the international coalition against terrorism, how can it continue to use terrorism as an instrument of State policy against India?”  

In both the 2001 and 2002 UNGA speeches, no mention whatsoever was made of peacekeeping, reflecting India’s brief status as a token contributor to peace operations in this period. Implicating Pakistan in electoral violence in Jammu and Kashmir and assuring the audience of India’s willingness to use “all means” to end terrorism, this speech contained some of the harshest rhetoric of any Indian strategic document. Yet, somewhat contradictorily, Nehruvian statements emerged as well; “no one in our country wants a war, conventional or otherwise”.  

Following an easing of tensions with Pakistan in 2003 and a return of India to high-level peacekeeping, the rhetoric of Vajpayee’s UNGA speech returned to a Nehruvian focus on the benefits of cooperation and the role of the United Nations. Like China, India lamented the lack of Security Council involvement in the U.S.-led war in Iraq:

“We saw the extraordinary inability of the five permanent members of the Security Council to agree on action in respect of Iraq, in spite of complete agreement on basic objectives…The reality is that an international institution like the United Nations can only be as effective as its Members allow it to be”.

In his first speech made at the UN, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took a strongly Nehruvian tone, especially focusing on diplomatic negotiation with Pakistan on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. 63% of the strategic statements in this speech were Nehruvian, with the remainder

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335 Ibid.
mostly neoliberal or a mix of the two subcultures. Indeed, the sources of Singh’s approach to international affairs were made explicit in this speech:

“We are inspired by the vision of internationalism bequeathed to us by India’s first Prime Minister, the great Jawaharlal Nehru — a vision of a world order whose pillars are peace, harmony, cooperation and development.”

The final speech of this period, made on the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, continued to reference Nehru’s continued influence on Indian life. In quoting Nehru, Singh reaffirmed the importance of the United Nations in creating a world order where “decisions are optimal”, the “use of force minimal”, and the absence of the United Nations unthinkable.

Though only eight strategic statements were made in this speech, half of them were Nehruvian – a reflection of the rapidly increasing involvement of India in the UN and UN peacekeeping at the end of this period.

2006 – 2010

This period contained a full range of strategic documents, with 15 speeches and annual reports available for this period. Politically, the domestic Indian environment was relatively stable during this period, with Manmohan Singh leading as Prime Minister through the late 2000s. In 2009, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance coalition secured a second mandate, increasing its representation in the Lok Sabha. Regionally and internationally, India continued to enjoy rapid economic growth and more stable relations with Pakistan that allowed it to gain significant international standing during this period. Sino-Indian relations were improved during this time as well, with the Nathula Pass between the two countries being opened up after four decades. In 2010, China became India’s second biggest trading partner, after the United Arab Emirates.

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In terms of India’s peacekeeping troop contributions, this period represents the highest sustained level of involvement in UN operations. As the number of peacekeeping operations continued to grow during this period, India’s contribution as a percentage of the total number of peacekeepers deployed did go down. However, sustaining around 8,000 peacekeepers in the field – and at time almost 9,000 troops – represents an impressive commitment by the Indian government to peacekeeping. Based on the model developed here and the map of Indian strategic culture, the expectation is that a high level of Nehruvianism would also be sustained in this period.

_MoD Annual Reports_

2005-2006 MoD Annual Report

The first Ministry of Defence Annual report of this period was strongly Nehruvian, with 41% of the 44 strategic statements contained within classified as such. In comparison to prior annual report, border relations with Pakistan were notably described as peaceful and tranquil:

“The ceasefire on the borders with Pakistan is continuing with a few minor aberrations. India is actively encouraging local level flag meetings to resolve differences and diffuse tensions along the border.”

The exception to this was in Jammu and Kashmir, where progress towards a comprehensive agreement had stalled. Yet the few hyperrealist statements in this document mostly concerned the need to continue a high level of readiness among the armed forces and concerns about defence cooperation between Pakistan and China. Compared to previous reports, both hyperrealism and Subcontinental Defence statements were quite limited.

The diffusion of tensions with Pakistan was correlated with an increased focus on the role of the Indian Armed Forces in UN peacekeeping, as at the time India was the single largest contributor to peace operations. Greater engagement with the UN more broadly was

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accompanied by increased involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Regional Forum, with elements of strategic neoliberalism intertwined.

Strategic neoliberalism continued to grow in influence in the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 MoD annual reports, representing 20% and 26% of the documents respectively. The armed forces were portrayed as “playing a pivotal role in creating stable conditions for the nation’s economic development”, a statement that doesn’t have parallels in either Canadian or Chinese post-Cold War documents. \(^{340}\) India’s stake in a “safe and secure world” was connected to its role as a driver of global prosperity. \(^{341}\)

As India’s economic status grew, the annual reports reflected security concerns “beyond the immediate neighbourhood”; only eight strategic statements in 2006-2007 were categorized as relating to Subcontinental Defence. In the wake of the 11 July 2006 Mumbai train bombings, references were made to terror modules “instigated, inspired and supported by elements across the border”. \(^{342}\) Whereas in the past, the linkage between Pakistan and terror was made explicit, in these latter annual reports the connection was only hinted at. Following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, India responded through initiatives to tie the two nations closer together:

“India wishes to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence, free from violence and terror, in our bilateral relations with Pakistan and is working on various confidence building measures with our close neighbour.”\(^{343}\)

In these documents, peacekeeping was identified as one the Indian Army’s primary roles. A joint venture between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, the Centre for UN

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Peacekeeping, was highlighted as a training institution for these specific deployments. In the 2007-2008 annual report, the term “peacekeeping” appeared 16 times, more than at any other point. In line with Nehruvian views about the utility of force and the military’s subservience to diplomacy, a range of new defence cooperation initiatives with a spectrum of partners, including the United States, Russia, and China, were announced.

In 2008, Mumbai was once again the target of terrorism, with a series of attacks lasting four days and leaving 164 people killed. The perpetrators were suspected to have come from Pakistan, raising tensions between the two countries yet again. The 2008-2009 annual report, which had 28% hyperrealist strategic statements, reflected this, stating that “the terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008 and the clear evidence that the attack was planned and launched by Pakistan have thereafter led to a pause in the process”.344 The document was an almost equal combination of Nehruvian, hyperrealist, defensive realist, and mixed statements.

Beyond the increased focus on the threat posed by Pakistan, a more hawkish tone was also taken with China in 2009:

“Similarly, its (China's) military assistance and cooperation with Pakistan and other countries in our neighbourhood, as well as the possibility of enhancing connectivity with Pakistan through the territory of Jammu & Kashmir, illegally occupied by China and Pakistan and with other countries will also have direct military implications for India”.345

Noting the role of deterrence in the regional security calculus, the report sought to balance more open and friendly relations with China with measures to “protect the national security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of India”.346 The relative decline of India’s peacekeeping contribution status – “India continues to be the third largest contributor” – was also raised.

345 Ibid. p. 6.
346 Ibid. p. 6.
As the ebb and flow of tensions with Pakistan continued, the 2009-2010 MoD report contained fewer hyperrealist statements and more neoliberal ones. “Strategic-economic factors” were identified as increasingly significant to India, with the determinants of national power in globalized era seen to be “knowledge-based strength coupled with economic wealth”. In the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis, links to the security environment and the work of the Ministry of Defence were highlighted. Threat perception was heightened in this later report, with India’s regional and international security challenges described as “formidable”, necessitating investment and modernization in the armed forces.

At 24% of the strategic statements, Nehruvianism never returned to the dominance it had in 2006, when it accounted for 41% of the annual report’s strategic content. At the same time, the 2010 document specifically addressed India’s reasoning for involvement in peacekeeping, tying it to its international reputation for responsibility and cooperation:

“India’s participation in these missions is driven by the commitment as a responsible member of the UN… The nation’s contribution during the crisis situations in all these Missions is a reflection for a quest for international peace”.

While it is true that India’s peacekeeping troop contributions were on a slight downward trend at the end of the 2000s, India was still regularly providing more than 7,000 peacekeepers to UN missions across the globe. This was more than double the peacekeepers provided by India in 2003, yet the relative strategic content of the 2003 report was more dominated by Nehruvianism than in 2010. This presents a challenge to the strategic cultural model tested here, and suggests that the model is better at capturing changes from token contributions to major contributions (or vice versa) than it is at capturing shifts in troop contributions when a country maintains its overall commitment to peacekeeping..

348 Ibid. p. 31.
Independence Day Speeches

The results from analyzing India’s Independence Day Speeches under Prime Minister Singh produce a stable picture, with strong trends towards growing Nehruvianism and neoliberalism. By 2006, the formula for Singh’s August 15th speeches was largely set in terms of structure, with the theme of India being at the same time an “old civilization” and a “young nation”. Speaking on the train terror attack in Mumbai that year, the Prime Minister’s response refrained from emphasizing state-sponsored terrorism, as earlier speeches might have done, and instead provided a response more along the lines of Subcontinental Defence and neoliberalism:

“India is facing two major threats to its internal security. Terrorism and Naxalism… Terrorists want to undermine our growing economic strength; destroy our unity; and provoke communal incidents”.

2007 marked the 60th anniversary of the Indian Republic’s independence. In a speech focused primarily on economic accomplishments and the challenges of poverty and illiteracy, there was significantly less strategic content. The strategic statements that were made were either Nehruvian or neoliberal in principle. In this anniversary speech, Prime Minister Singh struck a note of international cooperation that could have easily been attributed to Jawaharlal Nehru, praising:

“An India that has regained its due place in the comity of nations….the world wants us to do well. Our challenges lie at home”.

The absence of hyperrealist statements – which had made up a third of the strategic content in the 1999 Independence Day speech – continued for four of the next five speeches. Likewise, Nehruvianism continued to be prominent in speeches throughout these years, But the relative influence of neoliberalism and Subcontinental Defence varied greatly. In 2008’s speech, with the terror attacks on Mumbai in the minds of the audience, Singh’s speech included much

349 Manmohan Singh “Independence Day Address”, 2006, Prime Minister’s Office.
350 Manmohan Singh “Independence Day Address”, 2007, Prime Minister’s Office.
more strategic content focused on the threat posed by terror. However, while the annual report of that year focused on the role of Pakistan in these attacks with hyperrealist statements, the Independence Day speech took a more moderating tone:

“The terrorists and those who support them are enemies of the people of India and Pakistan, of friendship between the two countries and of peace in the region and the world”.

2009’s speech, following on the heels of Singh’s re-election, did not mention Pakistan by name at all, for the first time in speeches analyzed. Instead, themes of interdependence in the face of economic crisis, increased peace and prosperity in regions like Kashmir, and economic sources of extremism drove a mix of Nehruvian and neoliberal statements. The speech in 2010 continued this theme, promoting peaceful negotiation at home and in the immediate region, and economic strength abroad:

“Our country is viewed with respect all over the world. Our views command attention in international fora…whatever differences we have with our neighbouring countries, we want to resolve them through discussion”.

**UNGA Speeches**

Finally, the addresses made to the United Nations General Assembly during this period also suggest a trend in the strategic content of these documents, with a move towards greater neoliberalism in line with India’s growing economic status – and away from the hyperrealism that characterized previous confrontations with Pakistan. However, it is notable that, compared to earlier speeches, these documents contained relatively little strategic content. The speeches instead tended to focus on issues of trade, climate change, and economic interdependence.

After five consecutive speeches made by the Indian Prime Minister annually in New York, Prime Minister Singh would give only one of the speeches in this period, with the rest

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351 Manmohan Singh “Independence Day Address”, 2008, Prime Minister’s Office.
352 Manmohan Singh “Independence Day Address”, 2010, Prime Minister’s Office.
being presented by various ministers. Somewhat unusually, Minister of Defence Pranab Mukherjee presented the 2006 address. Despite India’s status as the largest contributor of personnel to United Nations peacekeeping at the time, however, no direct reference was made to UN peace operations in this speech. Of the 11 strategic statements made, 4 were Nehruvian (supporting the primacy of the United Nations), while other statements were divided equally among the subordinate subcultures (along with one mixed statement). The 2007 statement, also delivered by Minister Mukherjee, was heavily focused on trade and economic issues, as well as on climate change, with little focus on strategic statements.

In 2008, however, Prime Minister Singh was on hand to deliver the annual address. Referring to the liberalizing trends in Pakistan, Singh stated that:

“We welcome the return of democracy in Pakistan. We are committed to resolving all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, through peaceful dialogue”.353

Yet even in this Nehruvian/neoliberal speech, UN peacekeeping – or India’s role as a high-level contributor – was not referenced, and little detail about India’s approach to the international use of force was evident.

The 2009 speech, given by Minister for External Affairs S. M. Krishna, provided a better sense of the strategic perspectives of the time, with eight of the 16 strategic statements categorized as Nehruvian. Hyperrealism, which had been absent from the previous two speeches, continued to be completely subordinated: “Peace, security, stability and the welfare of our neighbourhood are vital for India”.354

Peacekeeping operations were once again part of the discussion, with India’s high level of troop contributions (as well as the high number of casualties suffered) fuelling a desire for greater representation in the UN structure:

“Over the past five decades, we have contributed more than 100,000 peacekeepers and have suffered a high number of casualties during this time. Strengthening the normative basis for peacekeeping operations and giving major troop-contributing countries a greater say will serve to make peacekeeping more effective”.

India’s UNGA speech in 2010 was notable, both in that neoliberalism’s influence appeared to wane, with only a single neoliberal statement, as well as the fact that the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir was referenced for the first time in several years. Citing “deep-rooted concerns about the growth and consolidation of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan”, Minister Krishna condemned Pakistan-sponsored activities in the contested region that threatened the peace and stability of the region. Despite these deviations from the establish speech formula, however, Nehruvianism was dominant in all speeches in this period containing significant strategic content.

2011 – 2015

India’s economic development, which had been growing rapidly in previous years, began to falter in 2012. Buffeted by a number of corruption scandals, the political stability of the Congress-led coalition under Prime Minister Singh came to an end with the election of Narendra Modi of the BJP as Prime Minister of India. The 2014 election was unusually centred on Modi himself, who was elected as a counter to the corruption that was seen to have gripped the Congress Party. Once again, a number of analysts expressed their feeling that a BJP-led government would take India down a more realist, more militaristic, and less Nehruvian path (Hall 2017). While only three strategic documents in the Modi era were included in this analysis,

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355 Ibid.
the initial indications have been that he has broadly continued the Nehruvian-neoliberal approach to military issues established by Prime Ministers Singh and Vajpayee before him, though with indications of a greater preference for hyperrealism.

Internationally, this period saw China become India’s single largest trading partner (Choedon 2013). On a number of fronts, including in defence cooperation, the Sino-Indian partnership expanded during these years, culminating in a state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2014. Relations with Pakistan improved as well, with India agreeing to resume talks on the condition that Pakistan would act against the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The relationship developed to the point that in 2012 India gained Most Favour Nation status with Pakistan, an unthinkable development only two decades prior (Taneja and Kalita 2011). In the combination of negotiations and regional economic integration that increasingly characterized the India-Pakistan relationship over this period, we can see the influence of both Nehruvianism and neoliberalism.

In terms of peacekeeping troop contributions, the 2011-2015 period has been the most stable period in India’s post-Cold War era. For the entire span, India’s UN contribution level was at or just under 7,000 peacekeepers. The largest continent of this was deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which was also the largest peacekeeping operation underway (International Peace Institute 2015).

MoD Annual Reports

In terms of annual reports, this period witnessed a remarkable degree of strategic continuity, including into the first year of the Modi administration. The 2010-2011 Annual Report by the Ministry of Defence continued to represent a melange of strategic subcultures, with the Subcontinental Defence, Nehruvian and “mixed” categories being represented about
equally. On the Nehruvian side, emphasis was placed in the positive developments in the Jammu and Kashmir regions, with ongoing peaceful dialogue being highlighted. Infiltrations across the Line of Control (LoC) in the region made up part of the Subcontinental Defence perspective; terrorist camps near the border were blamed more on the “continuing ambivalence of Pakistan” rather than the state-funded terrorism that hyperrealists would perceive.\(^{356}\) The relationship, in line with strategic neoliberalism, was also made clear in this report: “While geo-strategic imperatives play a defining role in our security paradigm, economic and social imperatives also shape our security concerns and objectives”.\(^{357}\)

For the first time, this report portrayed India’s involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa with a desire to develop South-South relations, a strong tenet of Nehruvianism:

“India has also been actively involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa under the UN mandate and seeks to consolidate its relations with many countries in the region with which we have historical linkages”.\(^{358}\)

The following year, in 2012, the MoD’s annual report saw a slight increase in the number of neoliberal statements. In the face of a number of challenges emerging from instability in the world economy and the upheavals of the Arab Spring, the Indian military leadership appeared to take a comprehensive approach, combining hard and soft power, economic and defensive. While hardening its approach to Pakistan – “Pakistan’s support to the ongoing proxy war continues unabated, the terror infrastructure” – a softer approach to China’s increased regional presence was taken:

“India always desires peaceful and cordial relations with all neighbours, including China. To this end, a policy of positive engagement and maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC (Line of Actual Control) is ensured”.\(^{359}\)


\(^{357}\) Ibid. p. 5.

\(^{358}\) Ibid. p. 5.

The role that India would play as a maritime power was given greater attention in this annual report, as the navy was seen in primarily neoliberal terms as a means of securing trade routes. Afghanistan, which for a time was seen as a possible economic opportunity for India, returned as a source of threat from terrorism, since fighting in the country continued following the withdrawal of NATO. Support to the United Nations system and United Nations peacekeeping specifically were clearly linked in this document:

“India has been an active contributor to all UN organs since its inception and is one of the largest military and police contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations”.

The 2012-2013 report was distinguished only by a somewhat increased discussion of the international system in terms of strategic competition and national self-interest, which slightly increased the number of hyperrealist statements in each year. Considering the relatively peaceful relations with Pakistan during this period and a stable situation around the border area – and consequently a lessened prominence of Subcontinental Defence narratives – this is an interesting trend.

The Asia-Pacific region, which was seen to be marked by “maritime disputes, new military postures and power rivalries” was a particular source of threat definition in these documents, though specific developments such as Chinese presence in the South China Sea were omitted. Furthermore, the principles of peaceful coexistence with China was affirmed, with new border cooperation mechanisms between the two countries being announced.

Beyond this, however, the 2013 report generally followed the trend set by earlier documents. Despite almost a decade and a half having passed since the end of the Cold War, non-alignment continued to be the guiding principle for India’s international relations:

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360 Ibid. p. 30.
“India has, in a manner consistent with its policy of strategic autonomy, strengthened its participation in multilateral institutions and deepened its strategic partnerships with various countries so as to effectively contribute, as a responsible stakeholder, to regional and global peace and security.” 362

Finally, the 2013-2014 MoD report provided a brief insight into India’s strategic direction under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi. To be sure, the trend towards increased discussion of strategic competition and balance of power dynamics increased, leading to a more hyperrealist tone throughout the document. Whether this can be attributed to Modi’s election or whether it is a continuation of a trend seen in the latter part of the Singh administration is difficult to say at this point. Broad Nehruvian statements about the nature of international force continued in this document:

“India’s view is that all countries must exercise restraint and resolve bilateral issues diplomatically, according to principles of international law and without recourse to the use or threat to use of force” 363

Liberalism, which until the middle of this period had been increasing in influence in these annual report, now accounted for only 11% of strategic statements. Especially where maritime security was concerned, the focus was less on the Indian Navy’s role in protecting trade route and exclusive economic zones, and more on the “growing presence of extra-regional power in the Indian Ocean, increasing the prospect of geo-strategic competition between them” 364

The shift from supporting Afghanistan as an economically stable partner to militarily supporting the country as a bulwark against terrorism and security challenges – more in line with Subcontinental Defence thinking – became more prominent in these later annual reports as well, with India supporting equipment and capability training for the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). Like the documents under Singh before him, Modi’s Ministry of Defence expressed

362 Ibid. p. 5.
364 Ibid. p. 6.
mixed attitudes – despite the fact that Chinese President Xi Jinping made a high-profile visit to New Delhi in 2014.

*Independence Day Speeches*

The four Independence Day speeches made during this period – three by Singh and one by Modi – generally had much less strategic content than previous statements from the Red Fort. This may be a reflection of the general decline in geopolitical threats to Indian security during these years; of the speeches in this period, only one hyperrealist statement was made. The trends in these speeches were mixed, with the 2012 address showcasing an unprecedented focus on Subcontinental Defence, while Prime Minister Modi’s inaugural Independence Day speech contained more Nehruvianism than any speech made by his Congress predecessors, ironically enough.

Prime Minister Singh’s 2011 speech was focused primarily on the issues of corruption that were threatening – and that would eventually topple – his administrations. As such, there was very little strategic content in this document, with no specific discussion of relations with other states and only a few statements on India’s commitment to peace and global tolerance.

The 2012 speech, meanwhile, subordinated Nehruvian sentiments of continuous, good-neighbourly improvements in regional relations with assurances of the military’s ability to deal with terrorism and a focus on border security threats:

“I would like to emphasise here that our armed forces and paramilitary forces have defended the security of our country both during war and peace with valour and honour”.

Out of 12 strategic statements made in this speech, five were categorized in the Subcontinental Defence category. This focus on home defence and counterterrorism, however, is better explained by specific concerns about an imminent threat to Indian citizens than by a

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365 Manmohan Singh “Independence Day Address”, 2012, Prime Minister’s Office.
persistent shift in the perspective on the use of force. Indeed, the 2013 speech was a return to form for Prime Minister Singh, with 38% of strategic statements being Nehruvian, only 9% hyperrealist, and the remainder equally divided among neoliberalism, defensive realism, and the “mixed” category (18% each).

Narendra Modi’s much-anticipated speech on August 15, 2014, was notable for its strongly Nehruvian tone, with a call to “renounce the path of violence and take the path of brotherhood”. Of the 14 strategic statements, more than half (eight) were Nehruvian, and hyperrealism was absent entirely from Modi’s speech. Neoliberalism was also represented by the military’s new “Make in India” procurement policy, which focused on home-grown defence solutions. The contrast to Singh’s 2012 speech, with its focus on counterterrorism and the defence of Indian borders, and this speech was stark:

“If somebody tells me that those who have taken guns on their shoulders and kill innocent people are maoists, are terrorists – but they are also somebody’s children.”

**UNGA Speeches**

Lastly, the speeches made by the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly – including Modi’s 2014 speech – generally continued the trend of partial dominance by Nehruvianism supplemented to varying degrees by neoliberal and Subcontinental statements. The exception to this was the 2011 UNGA speech, delivered by Prime Minister Singh, which presented a heavily neoliberal response to the challenges posed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Iniquitous job growth and lagging development in the Global South were identified as drivers of radicalization and extremism across the globe. Piracy in particular was identified as an emerging threat to India and the world:

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367 Ibid.
“At a time when the world needs more international commerce, the sea lanes of communication across the Indian Ocean are under siege. Acts of piracy are being carried out with impunity from lands that are beyond the writ of any functioning State or international accountability.”

In 2012, Nehruvianism – which had taken a backseat to strategic neoliberalism in Singh’s speech the year before – was once again dominant in India’s address to the United Nations, with a theme that “violence cannot lead to greater understanding”. In the context of sustained high-level Indian contributions to UN peacekeeping, the role of UN peace operations in supporting the world order was addressed directly:

“Peacekeeping and disarmament are among the unique pursuits of the United Nations, because they embody the promise and innate potential of the Organization to make the world a better place.”

Claiming Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India, the address nonetheless took a conciliatory approach to potential global rivalries, highlighting how the UN promotes the cause of peace in all regions.

Returning for the last time to the podium of the General Assembly hall in New York, Prime Minister Singh maintained this Nehruvian theme of dialogue and negotiation in security affairs. Addressing the growing civil war in Syria, he emphasized the role of the United Nations Security Council and dialogue in addressing the crisis:

“There is no military solution to that conflict (in Syria). We must intensify efforts to end the conflict and seek a political settlement… Multilateral efforts must guide our quest for peace and security, wherever they are threatened”.

Despite the political differences separating Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi, and despite concerns the Modi and the BJP would take a more militaristic path, the strategic content of Modi’s 2014 speech made to the UNGA was almost identical to the speech made by his

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predecessor a year before. Out of 21 strategic statements made in the 2014 speech, nine were categorized as Nehruvian – one more than in Singh’s speech. Noting that “India’s ancient wisdom sees the world as one family”, Modi stated that “India looks forward to a peaceful and stable environment for its development. Our future is linked to our neighbourhood”.  

Making clear his intention to continue supporting India’s role in UN peacekeeping, Modi stated that “the 69 United Nations peacekeeping missions have made the Blue Helmet a symbol of peace”. More than even his predecessor, Modi’s address saw a role for the UN in all matters of security, including in adopting a unified approach to countering terrorism:

“Our country, which has endured so many terrorist attacks, knows that, so long as the United Nations fails to take the initiative in that effort, and so long as we do not adopt a convention, we cannot be successful”.

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372 Ibid.
373 Ibid.
Results

MoD Reports

Figure 22: Indian Ministry of Defence annual reports, 2001-2014

Throughout the 2001-2014 period covered by available annual reports released by the Indian Ministry of Defence, a strong degree of strategic consistency can be seen. Across these reports, the Nehruvian strategic subculture generally was the most dominant of the four competing subcultures, especially relating to broad statements about India’s approach to military matters and international relations.
On more specific instances of the use of force, a hybrid of hyperrealism, Subcontinental Defence, and neoliberalism was present in most of the reports. As the years progressed, and as the Indian economic grew, the role of neoliberalism become somewhat more prominent. In the final two reports analyzed, however, increasing geostrategic competition encouraged more hyperrealist thinking among the leadership of India’s military. 2005, the year that saw the biggest proportion of Nehruvianism, also saw one of the largest increases in India’s contribution to United Nations peacekeeping, spiking from 2,000 troops to almost 9,000.

Independence Day Speeches

Figure 23: Indian Independence Day speeches, 1998-2014

Turning to the speeches made from the Red Fort annually from 1998 onwards, we see a similar tendency towards general Nehruvian influence balanced by a mix of the other three
strategic subcultures. As these documents date back further than available MoD annual reports, they suggest a higher tendency towards hyperrealism among Indian strategic elites in the 1990s, especially during the 1999 Kargil war. After 2001, neoliberalism and Subcontinental defence perspectives made up most of the non-Nehruvian balance.

**UNGA Speeches**

*Figure 24: Indian UNGA Speeches, 1990-2015*

Finally, analysis of India’s speeches to the United Nations General Assembly each year – expressed as a percentage of strategic statements in Figure 4 above -- indicates a strong dominance of Nehruvianism throughout the post-Cold War period in these documents. Once
again, 2004 and 2005 – the period immediately preceding India’s significant increase in troop contributions to UN peacekeeping – were one of the most Nehruvian speeches made across the period of analysis. However, the dynamics between the four Indian strategic subcultures fluctuated wildly in these speeches, and not always in keeping with the strategic culture model presented here. The high degree of Nehruvian sentiments in the 1990 and 1991 speeches – when India’s contribution to UN peacekeeping was it its lowest post-Cold War level – in particular presents a challenge for this model.
Conclusion

If the Canadian case study analysis provided the clearest picture of strategic cultural change, and the China case provided a somewhat less clear trend, the results of analyzing India’s post-Cold War strategic documentation is muddier still, though some conclusions can be made. In line with the expectations of most contemporary accounts of India’s peacekeeping policy, it seems unlikely that a massive decline in India’s support for peace operations is forthcoming, despite the election of Narendra Modi of the BJP. The strategic documents examined above suggest a surprising degree of strategic continuity in the post-Cold War period, despite there having been seven different Prime Ministers in power over this 25-year period. Though the impact of the BJP’s Prime Minister Modi on India’s military posture remains to be seen, all indicators thus far are that he intends to continue the policies laid down by his predecessors.

Looking back to the literature on India’s strategic cultural environment, it also seems that the perspective of hyperrealism is less significant than some authors have suggested. The addition of Subcontinental Defence as a subculture – which includes certain elements that others have folded into hyperrealism – may in part account for this. However, even when taken together, hyperrealism and Subcontinental Defence do not account for a major part of most strategic documents in this study.

With regards to the linkage between strategic cultural variation and peacekeeping troop contribution dynamics, however, the case study of India does not provide a very compelling conclusion. While Nehruvianism, the subculture identified most closely with the peacekeeping sweet spot, clearly has a strong influence on Indian strategic thinking, its representation in strategic documents did not ebb and flow with India’s varying level of involvement in peacekeeping. Despite only token contributions during the 1991-1992 and 1997-1998 period, the
available documents suggest an influence of Nehruvianism not significantly different from periods when India provided thousands of peacekeepers.

What does this mean for the model? It suggests, first of all, that the model may be better at explaining long-term, persistent changes in peacekeeping policy than more rapid variations in troop contribution. In the post-Cold War period, India experienced rapid changes in peacekeeping rates that were not reflected in the strategic documents; at the turn of the millennium, going from providing 2% of all peacekeepers to almost 16% and then back down to around 3% in the span of less than five years.

Secondly, the presence of a strategic subculture (neoliberalism) that was neither supportive of nor strongly antagonistic to India’s peacekeeping contribution was not apparent in the Canadian or Chinese case studies, and was not accounted for in the theoretical model. It was assumed that strategic subcultures either fell inside or outside the peacekeeping sweet spot. The influence of neoliberal perceptions – which are fairly agnostic to international institutions and peacekeeping specifically – on India’s military contributions to peacekeeping need to be looked at more closely.

Finally, this case study reinforces the need for a full and reliable corpus of strategic documents from which to draw from. Though gaps existed in the documentation of both China and Canada, by comparison the Indian case study had very few texts available from the 1990s. Furthermore, as various authors have noted, India lacks a single guiding strategic document in the category of Canada or China’s Defence White Papers. A greater reliance on speeches – which runs the risk of mirroring only the strategic perceptions of the speaker, rather than national elites as a whole – somewhat undermined the results of this analysis.
Nevertheless, the results of this analysis still provide insight into patterns of continuity and change in the Indian policy environment, further suggesting the utility of a strategic cultural model despite the limitations. While short-term changes away from peacekeeping participation did not correlate with the discourse analysis of India’s strategic culture, the broad long-term commitment of India to UN peacekeeping was captured by the model. This suggests that short-term changes in troop contributions – even changes amounting to thousands of soldiers – do not necessarily impact long-term norms to the extent that the decision to engage in or disengage in peacekeeping does. Though there were spikes and valley’s in India’s contribution to peacekeeping over this period, the overall commitment of India to peacekeeping was largely maintained, and this was reflected in the strategic discourse of the period.

Across different political administrations, geopolitical circumstances, and economic developments, India largely maintained a high-level commitment to UN peacekeeping. Likewise, a discursive commitment to Nehruvianism was present across the period of analysis, including during the BJP administrations. Both a commitment to peacekeeping and a Nehruvian mindset toward international relations appear to be well-entrenched among India’s strategic elite, suggesting that India’s status as one of the largest troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping will likely continue for the foreseeable future.
7. Conclusions

'Culture' is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance.


This thesis has focused on strategic cultural and peacekeeping policy changes from 1990 to 2015. It considered the research question of: “What is the connection between measurable changes in national strategic culture and significant changes to the troop contribution levels of major states involved in post-Cold War United Nations peacekeeping operations?” The broader question that initially drove this research was: “why do states peacekeep, and what factors influence the degree to which they peacekeep?” In answering these questions, I have portrayed strategic culture and national subcultures as the intermediate variables that exist between the myriad and shifting variables that influence norms of the use of force (e.g. institutional dynamics, bureaucratic approaches and domestic politics) and specific instances of strategic behaviour, in this case the level of troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. Using discourse analysis as an indicator of which strategic subcultures were most dominant in my case studies across different periods of time, and using a model of fourth generation strategic culture that maps different national subcultures in relation to the idealized “sweet spot” of norms best aligned with the core tenets of UN peacekeeping, I explore the connection between changes in strategic culture and peacekeeping behaviour, as measured in troop contributions. The results of this analysis indicate that strategic culture, as measured through discourse analysis of strategic documentation, is indeed a useful indicator of a country’s peacekeeping behaviour.
Though the timeframe for this research was constrained to the 25 years between 1990 and 2015 it is worth examining how these variables have progressed in the two and a half years since January 2015 as a way of understanding the implications of this research for the future of peacekeeping in the three case countries. Given the trends in national strategic subcultures identified in the research, and given the relationships between these subcultures and national peacekeeping policies that have been identified, certain patterns could be expected in the cases of Canada, the People’s Republic of China, and India. In each of these cases, the trends in both strategic culture and peacekeeping policy identified by this model’s analysis have continued.

Canada

In the case of Canada, the results of the discourse analysis suggest that, since the early 2000s, the Robust Ally strategic subculture has become steadily more dominant, largely at the expense of Pearsonian Internationalism in Canada. As a subculture that emphasizes the role that Canada can play in supporting NATO and the Western alliance in coalition operations – as more than simply a middle power – the Robust Ally framework is far less supportive of Canadian contributions to United Nations peacekeeping than Pearsonian Internationalism. Although the Robust Ally subculture reached its post-Cold War peak under the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the shift towards a more robust use of force began under Liberal Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin, indicating that this trend extends beyond a change in the ruling party from Liberal to Conservative. The decade-long Canadian combat mission in Afghanistan, where Canada engaged in the robust use of military force alongside NATO allies in the longest war in the nation’s history, further cemented the dominance of this perspective on Canada’s role in the world.
On October 19th, 2015 – 10 months after the end of this project’s research period – the Liberal Party of Canada, headed by Justin Trudeau, won a federal election and swept into power with a majority government. One of the key foreign policy pillars of the Liberal election campaign was to “renew Canada’s commitment to the United Nations” and contribute a substantial contingent of Canadian Armed Forces personnel to peacekeeping operations for the first time since the late 1990s. However, the model of Canadian strategic culture presented here would suggest that the build-up of Robust Ally strategic cultural dominance would continue to have significant momentum among policy elites and the general public, despite the change in government. A strategic cultural approach to this issue would expect that, while strategic subcultures compete with one another and are subject to ebbs and flows in dominance, these changes take place gradually and systematically. A governing power that sought to radically change the way in which a country uses its military in a short amount of time will face considerable resistance – even when that change is couched as a return to a Canadian legacy, as was the case with UN peacekeeping.

Indeed, despite a specific pledge to commit 600 Canadian peacekeeping troops (and 150 police personnel) to UN operations made in August 2016, the Trudeau Government has at the time of writing so far been unable to establish a clear peacekeeping policy or provide troops to UN operations. As of June 2017, Canada provides 20 peacekeeping troops in the field and is ranked 71st out of 121 UN Member States in terms of total peacekeeping contributions (International Peace Institute, 2015). The UN and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has made specific requests for Canadian involvement in a number of ongoing operations, including an opportunity to provide a Canadian Force Commander to lead the massive operation in Mali (MINUSMA). Although this position was held over into 2017 specifically to give
Canada sufficient time to devise a peacekeeping policy, the uncertainty continued and leadership of the Mali operation ultimately went to Major-General Jean-Paul Deconinc of Belgium.

One of the primary reasons that have been given for the delay in a cohesive Canadian peacekeeping policy is a concern for Canadian casualties in a peacekeeping operations such as Mali, as well as vocal concerns in the media and among opposition politicians over the lack of a “peace to keep” in such missions.\(^{374}\) The leadership of the CAF in has also expressed concerns over a lack of an appropriate “exit strategy” for a Canadian contribution to UN peacekeeping.\(^{375}\) And while Prime Minister Trudeau’s initial Mandate Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion mandated him to work with the Minister of National Defence to renew Canadian engagement in United Nations peace operations, the Mandate Letter to Minister Dion’s replacement Chrystia Freeland in February 2017 emphasized that any deployment of CAF personnel be aligned, first and foremost, with Canada’s national interest.\(^{376}\)

Canada has since readily committed to other military deployments. Operation REASSURANCE, a deployment of approximately 450 troops to Latvia as part of NATO’s deterrence measures in reaction to increased Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, is a complex deployment of indefinite length. More recently, a Canadian police contingent was authorized to advise and train Iraqi security forces in territories recently liberated from the so-called Islamic State, including Mosul. These deployments constitute a use of force that is both potentially


\(^{375}\) This military concern, clearly informed by the decade-long experiences in Afghanistan, is particularly interesting, given both the relatively small contingent of proposed Canadian peacekeepers and the built-in system of rotational deployments that UN peacekeeping has traditionally adhered to, wherein troop contributing countries deploy to one operation for a specified period and are then relieved by another troop contributing country.

\(^{376}\) Mandate Letters in the Canadian Government are the broad policy instructions given to each Cabinet Minister outlining their priorities and relationships with other departments. Under the Trudeau Government, these letters have been made public for the first time, and will prove to be an extremely valuable resource for future studies exploring the shifts in Canadian strategic culture over time. Prime Minister of Canada, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter”, February 1, 2017. Available at: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter
dangerous to CAF personnel and without a clear exit timeline. But the difference between these operations and the proposed Canadian reengagement with peacekeeping is that the former aligns well with the dominant Robust Ally strategic subculture. Supporting assurance operations in Latvia and aiding training and stability in Iraq connects well with the perceived role of the Canadian military as it has increasingly been defined over the last two decades.

The opposition to contributing troops to UN peacekeeping, within the media, the political opposition, and among strategic elites, has centred around questions of why Canada should participate, what the end goal of peacekeeping is, and whether UN operations are an appropriate place to spend. As with any instance of the international use of force, these are of course legitimate and important questions to ask when sending young women and men into conflict zones; their current prevalence, however, is a strong indicator of the continued dominance of Robust Ally thinking over Pearsonian Internationalism in the Canadian context.

**The People’s Republic of China**

The results of the China case study suggest that the rise in Legalism in the early- to mid-2000s in the Chinese strategic cultural landscape supported the policy reversal of the country’s long-standing non-engagement in peacekeeping. The analysis also suggests that the continued dominance of Confucianist perspectives among Chinese strategic elites will limit China’s dominance in UN operations (at least compared to what the country’s massive military capabilities would allow). President Xi Jinping in particular has been identified with the Legalist perspective as promoting a Chinese interpretation of the international world order and shaping that order from within. As President Xi’s leadership continues, the influence of Legalism both within China’s borders (through anti-corruption efforts and more stringent rules on the military) and internationally (through support for the UN Security Council, rules-based frameworks such
as the Paris Climate Accords, and greater involvement in sub-Saharan Africa) can be expected to continue.

Since 2015, China has steadily continued to increase its contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. As of June 2017, China provided 2,515 armed peacekeepers deployed across six different operations – making it the 12th largest contributing country overall (International Peace Institute 2015). In September 2015, at a United Nations Peacekeeping Summit, President Xi pledged 8,000 Chinese troops to help create a UN Standby Force and provided $100 million in peacekeeping funds for the African Union.377 While the details of this Standby Force are still being developed, this decision puts China in line to become one of the preeminent troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping. It has also been rumoured that China has expressed interest in heading the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, a section whose Undersecretary General has by tradition been a French national.

Most recently, the People’s Republic has opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, strategically placed in the Gulf of Aden. Analysis of this development has largely focused on the base as a means of expanding China’s economic power in Africa or as a sign that China’s status as an expansionist superpower has been cemented. When looked at through the lens of strategic culture, however, the establishment of an overseas base to support China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations may also be taken at face value.

Yet this increased support for peacekeeping operations does not mean that China has abandoned its criticism for peacekeeping operations that, from its perspective, do not adhere to the standards of neutrality, the non-use of force except in self-defence, and respect for host state sovereignty. China, alongside the Russian Federation, has been strongly critical of the United

377 For details of the announcement, see Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom, “China’s Xi says to commit 8,000 for U.N. peacekeeping force”, Reuters, September 28, 2015. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembleychina-idUSKCN0RS1Z120150929
Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and efforts to strengthen that force’s mandate. A UN inquiry in 2016 found that peacekeepers had failed to adequately protect civilians from violence and led to the dismissal of the Kenyan Force Commander – with the report also critiquing Chinese troops for abandoning their defensive positions. China rejected the inquiry’s conclusions and has warned against attempts to alter UNMISS’ mandate to allow greater use of force.

In other areas, China continues to display a Confucianist resistance to extraterritoriality, greater use of force, and major Chinese involvement in regions outside its immediate zone of interest. The country’s approach to tensions in the South China Sea continues to be heavily influenced by old-style parabellum behaviour, but outside the region China continues to be cautious about its expanded role in international affairs. The One Belt One Road initiative, despite its portrayal in some Western media as a threat to U.S. economic hegemony, largely follows the Confucianist template by emphasizing economic ties between developing-world countries with a broad respect for sovereignty (Lin and Wang, 2015). At a time when many are discussing the withdrawal of the United States and a potential vacuum in global leadership, China has focused on its support for free trade, development, and combatting climate change, rather than taking up the mantle as a global military force. Most significantly, China has continued to oppose any military effort to intervene in the five-year long Syrian civil war – including any suggestion of a UN-led intervention force.

In 2017, Xi Jinping will begin his second five-year term as President of China and paramount leader. While questions have already been raised as to whether he will continue on for a third term, tradition suggests that he will pass the reins of power to a successor in 2022. The strategic cultural analysis of China’s decision-making indicates that, however the succession

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378 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a World Bank alternative envisioned as part of the One Belt One Road initiative, is characterized by providing development funds with significantly fewer conditions and economic impositions attached.
plays out, the Chinese approach to the use of force will continue to develop smoothly and gradually. The results of this analysis suggest that Legalism was experiencing a slight recession in influence towards 2015. At the same time, the most recent Defence White Paper, published in May of 2015, contained strong statements of Legalism as well as Confucianism, and highlighted the Chinese government’s commitment to UN peacekeeping as one of its core aims in upholding global stability:

“China’s armed forces will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, strictly observe the mandates of the UN Security Council, maintain its commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, promote development and reconstruction, and safeguard regional peace and security”. 379

Confucianism, whether it continues to be the dominant subculture in coming years, will continue to influence Chinese strategic elites as the country shifts its focus to a more outward-looking approach. For those in the West closely watching the rise of China, the influence of Confucianism in tempering this shift will be important to follow in understanding why China will not behave like a “typical” major power. Even if the more expansionist Legalist approach becomes much more dominant in the coming decades, the subculture’s adherence to a rules-based use of force and its emphasis on changing the global order slowly, from within, will inform the way in which China’s influence grows. As a model of strategic culture argues, and as the results from the Chinese case study show, there is ultimately no such thing as “typical” behaviour in a major power.

India

The strategic cultural analysis of post-Cold War India strongly suggests that, for the foreseeable future, India will continue to be heavily involved in United Nations peacekeeping.

For over 15 years, India’s robust contribution to peacekeeping operations has survived numerous changes in government, the development of the Indian economy, and periods of high tension with neighbouring Pakistan. While the analysis cautions that brief periods of withdrawal from peacekeeping – such as in 1990-91 and 1997-98 – are possible due to individual variables that are difficult to foresee, the long-term dominance of Nehruvianism will likely support continued high-level involvement in peacekeeping.

India was the second-highest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in June 2017, with 5,730 troops – surpassed only by Ethiopia (International Peace Institute 2015). The country currently has uniformed peacekeepers in every UN operations – including the mission on the border between India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Alongside China, India pledged further support for the UN’s standby readiness capabilities in 2015, including training personnel, police units and force enablers. Despite fears of a more militaristic approach to international relations under the BJP government, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has largely followed the trajectory of his India Congress Party predecessors on matters of foreign policy (Basrur 2017). Modi has been a strong presence at the annual peacekeeping summits established since 2015, lauding the accomplishments of Indian peacekeepers and exhorting Western nations to re-engage with peace operations. While some have suggested that China’s increased involvement with the UN is driving India’s current level of contribution, other have noted that India’s support for peacekeeping far predates that of China, with Modi simply continuing a well-trodden policy path (Blah, 2017).

India’s desire for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council will continue to frustrate strategic policy elites, with periodic suggestions that India might pull out of peacekeeping if UNSC reform does not progress. However, India’s future troops contributions
are unlikely to be tied to the achievement of a permanent seat. True reform of the Security Council is no closer than it ever has been, and involvement in peacekeeping operations is too closely matched with India’s overall approach to international affairs and the use of force to be tied to a single factor. Indian peacekeeping personnel have been at the centre of a number of sexual abuse and exploitation allegations, and here it seems more likely that the UN will engage in substantive reform to address the endemic issue of abuse by peacekeepers. But unlike other troop contributing countries involved in these allegations, India has supported a collective approach to tackling Blue Helmet sexual abuse, and is unlikely to withdraw troops in response to action by the UN.

While a strategic cultural model has greater difficulty anticipating troop contribution trends within a country that is largely consistent in its support for peacekeeping – compared to cases like Canada or China – an understanding of the long-term influence of Nehruvianism on Indian strategic elites leads us to reasonably expect that India’s high-level contributions will continue for the foreseeable future. Contrary to expectations, Narendra Modi’s BJP government has largely continued India’s Nehruvian approach of measured conciliation with Pakistan, economic cooperation with China and other regional neighbours, and a general policy of non-alignment and support for the international system. Contributions to United Nations peacekeeping fits within this strategic cultural perspective, and are likely to be maintained.

**Implications for the Study of United Nations Peacekeeping**

What are the implications of these results for the broader study of peacekeeping beyond the three case countries of Canada, China, and India? This analysis tested the suitability of a strategic cultural model in these three cases, but the larger goal has been to develop a model that is useful for the understanding of peacekeeping trends more generally. As was mentioned in
Chapter 1 the literature on peacekeeping has thus far focused on individual incentives driving individual states’ peacekeeping contributions. The model of strategic culture put forth here could be applied to any UN Member State involved in peacekeeping, provided certain categories of information are available about that state.

First and foremost, this model depends heavily on the use of secondary comparative literature to understand the strategic cultural landscape and identify key national strategic subcultures. Secondly, information about the country’s peacekeeping policy and decision-making process during the period of analysis is required. And third, a corpus of strategic documents must be available to provide data for a discourse analysis of strategic statements. The significant amount of existing research into post-Cold War policies and strategies of Canada, China, and India made them strong case study candidates. Additionally, because they represented one case country that significantly declined in peacekeeping troop contributions, one that significantly increased, and one that largely maintained its peace operations involvement, these three cases provided a good test of the strategic cultural model. However, the same model could be applied to a number of other UN Member States to help understanding national patterns in peacekeeping contributions.

Further research could improve the model of strategic culture put forth here in a number of ways as well. Although it fell outside the scope of this particular project, a better understanding is needed of the ways in which the use of force in United Nations peacekeeping itself changes over time. The norms of the “peacekeeping sweet spot” identified in Table 3 are not necessarily static. During the Cold War, for example, Blue Helmet peacekeeping primarily involved unarmed observers maintaining an established cease-fire line between opposing national belligerents. As a result, the countries whose norms involving the use of force connected
well with Cold War-era peacekeeping may not fit the “peacekeeping sweet spot” of modern, more robust peacekeeping. United Nations operations continue to evolve in their use of force, and recent developments such as the use of unarmed drones and mission mandates allowing for the forcible removal of arms from belligerents – not to mention the ever-increasing scope of protection of civilians mandates – will develop and shape the norms of peacekeeping in the years to come. There have been some studies in the strategic cultures of supranational organizations such as the European Union and NATO, but a greater understanding of the use of force within the UN is still needed.380

More explicitly gendered elements could also be usefully incorporated into this model of strategic culture to inform future research. The intersection between UN peacekeeping and militarized masculinities is an increasingly important aspect of this field, especially are cases of sexual abuse and exploitation by United Nations personnel continue to come to light. On the strategic cultural side, the discourses found in national strategic documents invariably contain norms about manliness, femininity, and the role of the use of force in gender identities. Further work needs to be done in understanding how different gendered perceptions of warfare and the military match with different national strategic subcultures, as the connections between feminist critical theory and strategic culture theory are only beginning to be formed. Gendered discourse could be used as a strong indicator to track the rise and fall of different subcultures. Drawing on the work that has already been done on masculinized peacekeeping, such an approach could provide important insight into how these norms are tied to the type of military operations preferred by national strategic elites.381

380 For example of this research, see Cornish and Edwards (2005), Meyer (2006), and Zyla (2011).
381 For examples of research into the gendered aspects of peacekeeping, see Higate (2007), Patel and Tripod (2007), and Mäki-Rahkola and Myrttinen (2014).
Implications for the Study of the Use of Force

United Nations peacekeeping provided an interesting example of the use of force to be used in this model of strategic culture for a number of reasons. It is one of the only forms of military operation where specific details such as troop composition and deployment dates are publicly available. The use of force in UN peacekeeping is highly regulated through mandates, and the concept of peacekeeping often arises in national debates about the purpose of military force. And, unlike NATO operations or ad hoc coalition missions, UN peace missions are broad-based endeavours with numerous countries participating in conflicts across the globe.

Yet the theoretical framework presented here could be usefully applied to the study of the use of force beyond peacekeeping. Participation in Blue Helmet operations is generally not one of the core missions in a national military, and there is great interest in understanding the patterns and drivers of national decision-making in other areas of international power projection. Nuclear weapons, counter-terrorism operations, and NATO enforcement missions are three areas to which this model of strategic culture could be applied and adapted.

The concept of strategic culture has its roots in nuclear weapons, dating back to Jack Snyder’s introduction of concept in 1977 in relation to Soviet nuclear arms policy. A model of strategic culture drawing on the fourth generation approach of subcultures to understand the different conditions under which nuclear force is deemed “acceptable” could provide a better understanding of how nuclear weapons policy changes over time in a national setting. In the case studies of China and India, both nuclear powers, this thesis touched on the different ways that nuclear weapons were viewed among different subcultures. In China, the parabellum tradition, especially as expressed by Mao Zedong, included a willingness to use nuclear weapons – or to be seen as willing to use nuclear weapons – that far exceeded American or Soviet policies during
the Cold War. Both the Confucianist and Legalist traditions, by comparison, are more willing to consider non-proliferation and limited disarmament. In the Indian case, there is a clear distinction between hyperrealism’s stance that nuclear weapons are essential to India’s survival and Nehruvianism’s willingness to consider long-term abolition, provided an equal and effective international mechanism for disarmament is in place. Similar sub-cultural differences are no doubt present among the other nuclear powers, and a study of the ebb and flow of these competing perspectives over time would be highly informative.

Counter-terrorism operations in the 21st century are the most prominent instances of the international use of force by developed world nations. With the Global War on Terror stretching beyond its 15th year, it has become clear that different states take different approaches to combating terrorism, both domestically and internationally (Williamson 2016). What is and what is not an “appropriate” use of force in combatting terrorism is one of the key questions of our time, and the fourth generation approach of strategic culture can shed light on the different national perspectives that exist on this issue. Yet thus far there has been little by way of research focusing on the impact of strategic culture on counter-terrorism strategies. In part this may be due to the norms of classification and secrecy that surround modern-day approaches to terrorism. Unlike UN peacekeeping, where facts and figures are transparently available, the tactical details surrounding a given counter-terrorism operation are often unavailable to academic researchers. Furthermore, modern counter-terrorism operations by developed nations have only been a primary facet of military strategy for the last decade and a half, providing little historical background in many cases. Despite these challenges, there is considerable opportunity for future research into the interplay between strategic culture and counter-terrorism using the approach that this dissertation has laid out.
Lastly, as multinational missions with an integrated command structure and force mandates that extend beyond military objectives to norms such as “peace” and “stability”, NATO operations share significant similarities with UN peacekeeping. The mandates are more robust, the roster of troop contributing countries smaller, and there is less flexibility in deciding whether or not to contribute, but many of the supply-side considerations faced by NATO members mirror the decision-making processes explored in this project. As has been mentioned, a number of works have examined the relationship between NATO operations and strategic culture – including studies on the strategic culture of the trans-Atlantic alliance itself.\(^{382}\) Research into the sub-cultural perspectives of different members and their levels of involvement in NATO operations would significantly strengthen our understanding of the use of force in coalition missions. Like counter-terrorism missions, the scope of available information on the details of NATO forces in the field is significantly more restricted than in the case of UN peacekeeping. Additionally, such a research project would have to take into account variables beyond direct involvement in operations, since training exercises and the maintenance of defence spending are important parts of being a NATO member. The results of this study suggest that the theoretical framework used here could be of great use in developing research into these other instances of the international use of force.

**Implications of a Strategic Cultural Approach to International Relations**

What are the implications of the results of this fourth-generation strategic cultural approach to the study of international relations more generally? This approach argues for the value of a more culturalized understanding, not only of instances of the use of force but of how states make decisions more generally. Rather than focusing on specific incentives for state

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\(^{382}\) For further examples, see King (2014), Lindley-French (2015) and Becker and Malesky (2017).
action, as the more positivist approaches tend to do, the strategic cultural approach emphasizes that these incentives and calculations must be understood in the context of different normative perspectives. In a vacuum of potentially limitless policy choices to be made, perspectives make up the boundaries of what is societally accepted as “legitimate” at different points in time. Strategic elites may operate at the edge of these boundaries, but long-standing traditions as represented by strategic subcultures influence the long-term trajectory of a country’s international affairs in certain ways.

One of the major contributions of this strategic culture approach is that it inserts the importance of cultural norms into “rational” decision-making processes while at the same time providing clear categories of norms in a manner that is analytically useful. As mentioned in Chapter 1, acknowledging that there are multiple subcultures in any national setting helps avoid the tendency to stereotype that can plague strategic cultural analysis, e.g. Russia behaves a certain way because that is how Russians behave. The fourth generation approach also delimits the types of international behaviour that can broadly be expected from a country, avoiding the post-structural trap of a completely unfixed relationship between symbols, discourse, and behaviour. In the strategic cultural model put forth here, we may not be able to predict what Country X will do, but we can argue that it will likely take Path 1, 2, 3, or 4 on a given issue – and will be unlikely to pursue Path 5, because of a host of historical, geographical, institutional and other factors. Just as important, the strategic cultural approach gives us the tools to understand which of the four policy paths Country X may be most likely to take, owing to the dominant discourse at the time.

Another contribution of this approach to the study of international relations is the focus on change throughout this project. As theorists including Alexandre Wendt (1987) and KJ Holsti
(2016) have identified, change presents a unique problem for the study of international relations. Beyond simply comparing the foreign policies of different nations, international relations is also interested in understanding why policies change over time. In particular, changes in policy when broad material structures and incentives remain stable present a challenge to more rationalistic explanations of state behaviour. It is in periods of change – such as change in peacekeeping policy – that the underlying drivers of behaviour are best understood, and the strategic cultural approach provides a framework to understand these periods of change. Indeed, one of the challenges to strategic culture theory was to understand significant change in state behaviour while incorporating the enduring impacts of history, geography, institutions, and traditions. The concept of subcultures allows for an understanding of change and continuity that includes periods of instability and policy deviation while maintaining a longer-term perspective that captures a sense of persistent direction in a national setting. This understanding can be applied beyond strategic culture and the use of force, with implications for the study of political culture and decision-making more generally.

Within international relations, research on strategic culture – and especially work that could be loosely categorized as belonging to the fourth generation of strategic culture – has become increasingly prominent in the understanding of the use of force. The notion of competing national political sub-cultures has also been applied to areas of focus outside military strategy, including European state identity, generational dynamics in Russia, and American policy and politics under Donald Trump. Culturally-focused theoretical frameworks with a similar sub-cultural approach are being developed in the fields of psychology, sociology, linguistics, and, of course, anthropology.

383 For examples, see Denk and Christensen (2016), Solovyeva (2014), and Fisher (2016).
This project has sought to provide a contribution to knowledge by increasing our understanding of specific peacekeeping case studies, by operationalizing strategic culture through an analytical model that could be applied to other cases, and by further developing a cultural approach to state behaviour in international relations. There is significant opportunity for future research to refine and develop this model of strategic culture, applying it to further peacekeeping case studies as well as other instances of the use of force. The results of this analysis suggest that there is a strong connection between changes in peacekeeping troop contribution levels and national strategic cultural dynamics. It also suggests that discourse analysis of strategic documents is a useful means of accessing and understanding periods of change in strategic culture, wherein competing subcultures vie for dominance among strategic elites. With United Nations peacekeeping likely to continue and evolve as a prominent instance of the international use of force, understanding why, how, and when nations choose to peacekeep will continue to be of importance for researchers, international observers, national decision-makers UN officials, and the public.
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