Corruption and Women in Politics: Correlation, institutional context, or coincidence?

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Marie Dumont

Supervised by Dr. Stephen Baranyi

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Abstract

Since the turn of the millennium, studies have demonstrated a relationship between gender and corruption, finding that in countries where female political participation is higher, indicators of corruption are lower. This thesis approaches this debate in two ways, quantitatively and qualitatively. A multivariate regression analysis updates data for the year 2015 and incorporates underexplored institutional variables. Results show that the proportion of women in politics is positively and significantly correlated with reduced corruption, even when controlling for these institutional variables. The findings from this analysis are applied to a focused comparison of two countries, Rwanda and Haiti, which have very different female representation and corruption outcomes, despite the presence of a very similar institution, a 30 percent legislated gender quota. Using feminist institutionalism as a theoretical guide for the analysis, this thesis demonstrates that institutions such as democracy and auditing standards moderate the relationship between female representation and corruption outcomes. On that basis, it concludes that while increasing female participation in politics can modestly contribute to reducing corruption, linking female participation to strengthening democratic governance and institutionalizing accountability can further reduce corruption in some developing country contexts.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAIN</td>
<td>Global Anti-corruption Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRG</td>
<td>International Country Risk Guide</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Government Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Inter-Parliamentary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGTBQI+</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual, Queer, Intersex, Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MVRA</td>
<td>Multivariate Regression Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAHP</td>
<td>Observatoire Citoyen de l’Action des Pouvoirs Publics en Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Per Person Parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>QoG</td>
<td>Quality of Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<td>STV</td>
<td>Single Transferrable Vote</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Chapter 1. Introduction

“For me, a better democracy is a democracy where women do not only have the right to vote and to elect but to be elected” (as quoted in Lopez Torregrosa, 2012). This statement from Michelle Bachelet, former executive director of United Nations Women and the current President of Chile, reflects how active political participation from women is demonstrative of the strength of a country’s democracy. Since earning the right to vote to being actively involved in political processes, women certainly have made strides to shatter the political glass ceiling in a domain once reserved for men. More women are participating in politics than ever before, through voting, as elected members of parliaments, upper houses, or as heads of governments.

Part of this growth in female political participation is attributed to the United Nation’s fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 in Beijing. This conference produced a Platform for Action, regarded as “the strongest and most urgent international statement about women’s rights” until that time (Reichert, 1998, 371). At this conference, Hillary Clinton, first lady of the U.S. at the time, declared, “women’s rights are human rights”. This conference is said to have sparked a movement for countries to promote female leadership.

Contemporary media has certainly taken greater interest in female political participation, and indeed, with many women rising to the top echelons of power it is difficult to ignore. In Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made a decision to appoint a gender equal cabinet, the first time this has happened in the country. In responding to a reporter’s question as to why he decided to do this, he quipped, “Because it’s 2015”, a statement that summarizes how the principle of gender equality should be an obvious objective in this day and age. The Globe and Mail responded to his now famous reply with the launch of a new weekly column, Women in Politics (Taber, 2016). This column captures the unique challenges women face, and progress
that has been achieved by women joining this still largely male-dominated field. Despite Trudeau’s comment, his 50/50 cabinet hardly represents the gendered composition of the House of Commons in Canada, where women occupy only 26.3 percent of the seats (IPU, 2017). The United States lags even further behind, with women holding 19.3 per cent of the seats in the lower house (IPU, 2017). In this male-dominated domain, the first female presidential nominee in United States history to win the nomination of a major party was Hillary Clinton, who eventually was defeated in the 2016 election. Her political platform generated even greater interest in female political involvement. Indeed, one needs only to look at the headlines to believe that women in politics are gathering momentum as political representatives in North America.

Yet, this increased attention coincides with an increased scrutiny and augmented criticism of women leaders. Although Hillary Clinton had a place at the Presidential debates, her opponent, Donald Trump, is well remembered for uttering the words, “crooked Hillary” and “such a nasty woman” during the campaign. Her rise to prominence and eventual defeat unfolded in a global setting where other notable female political leaders were exposed for their involvement in corrupt behaviour. Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff was impeached and removed as President in August 2016 following a series of corruption scandals including a kickback scheme (Watts & Bowater, 2016). A few months later, South Korea’s Park Geun-Hye was impeached, removed from her presidency, and now sits as an inmate in Seoul Detention Centre for influence peddling, bribery, and collusion with Samsung and other large conglomerates (McCurry, 2017). Thus as the value of women in politics as a symbol of gender equality is becoming a mainstream belief, we are faced with anecdotal examples of female leaders (Sundström & Wängnerud, 2014, 355) who do not meet the moral expectations that are placed on all politicians, male or female.
Researchers in academia are also acknowledging the greater importance of women in politics, counteracting these case examples of mistrusted female politicians with evidence that having more women engaged in politics has societal benefits that extend beyond the normative value of gender equality. Studies from fields of criminology, sociology, psychology, business, political science, and the policy world reveal that while gender equality is an important value, there are measureable consequences if women continue to be excluded from positions of power. In particular, there is a growing body of literature that examines the relationship between female political participation and corruption (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001), demonstrating that in contrast to the narrative of crooked female leaders being impeached for their corrupt acts; having more women in politics generally fosters a less corrupt environment. Thus, there is an incentive to further examine these social utility benefits that women leaders can have on corruption, especially as women are gaining more political power.

This rise of women in politics is not only happening in developed nations; many developing nations are surpassing developed nations in female political representation. This is important, given that corruption is a more prevalent issue in developing nations (The World Bank, 2017, 2). In Rwanda and Bolivia, women are now at the forefront of political participation. These are the only two countries where women hold the majority of the seats in the lower houses. Although lower house participation is only one measure of participation, it is an important indicator of greater equality in the political sphere. Both of these countries have also achieved over 35 per cent female representation in their upper houses (IPU, 2016). The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) is an organization that monitors the proportions of female political representatives in lower and upper houses around the world. Their data tracks these rises in female political participation, with Rwanda leading all countries at 63.8 per cent female
representation in their lower house (2016). Many countries, including Rwanda and Bolivia, have implemented gender quotas, which, if supported by other institutions, are fast-tracking women to positions of political power (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005). Although statistics about presence in the parliament does not reflect how much influence the women have once in power, they are measurable indicators that reflect both voters’ willingness to elect women, and a supportive institutional environment for female entry into politics. These increases in women’s participation are a reflection of deliberate efforts of policy changes, the institutional contexts of the countries, and the women and men who influence these policies and participation.

Still, other countries have yet to achieve meaningful levels of female representation. In Haiti, even with efforts to boost female representation through a constitutionally mandated gender quota in 2012, in the most recent election in 2016 only 3 women were elected to the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, while only one female representative sits in their Senate (IPU, 2017). Haiti also ranks poorly in other measures of well-being in society, an indicator that a deficit of women in politics represents greater social ills. Countries like Haiti demonstrate how the rise in female political participation has not developed uniformly around the world. With mounting evidence that women in politics promote social utility benefits, this is no longer an issue of stark gender inequality alone. The continued exclusion of women from positions of power represents a loss of wider development potential.

Increasing the numbers of women in politics matters for several reasons. This thesis focuses on the impact of female political participation’s impact on corruption, yet research demonstrates a multitude of reasons why women’s involvement in politics is important. Paxton and Hughes (2017) frame the issue of gender proportion in politics by asking readers if they would be comfortable with having absolutely no men in national parliaments and legislatures (p.
As difficult as it is to imagine a political sphere consisting of only women, the reality is that men disproportionately dominate almost all political positions. The world average of female politicians in both lower and upper houses is 22.7 per cent (IPU, 2016). In other domains where women’s participation was previously far below that of men – such as labour force participation, educational attainment and other traditionally male occupations - women have advanced (Paxton & Hughes, 2017, 3). Politics remains a sector where women do not participate as actively as men; increasingly this deficit is viewed as a wider social problem that needs to be addressed.

Both gender equality and good governance are regarded as a priority for development, increasingly their relationship is emphasized in academic and policy research. The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000 addressed gender equality in goal three (promote gender equality and empower women), using the proportion of women in national parliaments as an indicator of its progress, but meanwhile anti-corruption initiatives were minimally mentioned. The more recent 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) expand on gender equality, and address issues of governance which is a notable shift from the MDGs. Using female participation not only in national parliaments, but in local governments and managerial positions as an indicator of progress, SDG 5 (gender equality) clearly acknowledges that representation in positions of power is a sign of greater gender equality. Goal number 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), includes targets for reducing corruption and bribery, recognizing the universal importance of accountable and transparent institutions (UN, 2016).

Nevertheless, the links between gender equality and good governance are not clearly established in the SDGs. Goetz and Jenkins (2016) document the efforts of two civil society organizations, the Women’s Major Group and the Post-2015 Women’s Coalition, to build a broad bridge between gender and good governance in the SDGs (128). They show how, despite
these efforts, inclusivity is noted as vital but is not clearly defined. Therefore women, all types of minorities, LGTBQI+, rural and urban peoples are not specifically mentioned within the goal, but their inclusion is implied (130). Still, the push for greater gender equality within goal five, and the inclusion of the potentially politically sensitive goal of good governance in goal 16 indicate of how these priorities can no longer be ignored in international development processes.

As President Bachelet noted, when women are elected it represents a strengthening of democracy. Until 1890, women were excluded from politics globally; in no country did they even have the right to vote (Paxton & Hughes, 2017, 1). Thus the increase in participation, however slow, must be commended. Nevertheless, when Prime Minister Trudeau implied with his comment that in the year 2015 we should not need to defend why we would create a gender-neutral cabinet, it masked the reality that in most countries, males continue to dominate politics. His comment did, however, prompt a discussion about the value of having women in politics and whether there should be policies and practices that promote gender equality in politics. As females comprise half of the population of Canada, if government is to represent the general population, to what extent should gender demographics be reflected at all levels of government?

This question can be answered by considering the meaning of representation. In academic discourse, two types of representation are generally recognized, descriptive and substantive (Pitkin, 1967). Descriptive representation focuses on the characteristics of an individual and implies that if there are shared characteristics between the representative and those represented, then the interests of the represented should be accounted for. Gender, ethnicity, class, and region are some of the characteristics that representatives and those represented can share in common. In creating a gender-neutral cabinet, Prime Minister Trudeau appealed to descriptive representation, aiming to create a cabinet that looks like the Canadian population. The other type
of representation, substantive, deals with the policy aspect of representation. If a group is substantively represented, their concerns are being addressed and change is happening for that group at a policy level (Celis et al., 2008). A definitive relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation is yet to be established by researchers. However, empirical evidence from the studies from Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. illustrate how increased descriptive representation of women is linked to a substantive effect, reduced corruption.

A basic definition of corruption is “the use of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 2017). Corruption is problematic because it limits economic development, reduces government capacity, and fosters an environment of distrust (Elliott, 1997). Whereas the World Bank formerly regarded corruption as a “cancer” (cited in Fukuyama, 2014, 81), there is a notable shift in language as to how it has framed corruption. In 2017, the World Bank states, “the first step in rethinking corruption is to recognize that corruption is not a social “malady” or “disease” to be eradicated, but rather a built-in feature of government interactions” (77). Such shifting discourse invites thoughtful analysis of how institutions shape government outcomes.

Organizations such as the United Nations are acknowledging that corruption impacts women differently than men, thus a gendered approach to anti-corruption policies is needed (UNDP, 2014, 18). In recognizing the impact of institutions on corruption, it is appropriate to frame corruption not only from an institutionalist lens, but a feminist institutionalist lens. Given that the majority, about 70 per cent, of the world’s poor are women, they are more vulnerable to the financial penalties imposed in a corrupt society (United Nations, as cited in Transparency International, 2014). This makes it difficult for women to pay the bribes necessary to get access to public services in their countries, and it may occur that women are obligated to offer payment through sexual favours (Transparency International, 2014). In interviews with women at Dzaleka
refugee camp in Malawi, sex was accepted as a means of payment from police officers, a method of accessing more food from food distribution agencies, and way to arrange an appointment from a staff member of the UNHCR (Ramier, 2016). In Haiti, a UNHCR report revealed that aid distribution was facilitated in exchange for sexual favours, and in another report made for the INGO GOAL, many women stated they did not realize that aid distributions were supposed to be free (cited in Davoren, 2012, 287). These examples demonstrate how corruption manifests itself differently for women. Towns (2015) pushes researchers to expand the definition of corruption to include sexual gain, as thus far, it has largely been ignored in literature on corruption. By expanding the definition of corruption to include sexual abuse of power, it is clear that corruption is a concern for many feminist and civil society groups and motivates policy makers to attempt to find ways of abating it (Rosthein, 2016).

The issue of corruption is multifaceted, secretive, and difficult to measure. Nevertheless, Transparency International addresses it by measuring perceptions of corruption through large-scale global surveys linked to an index of corruption perceptions. Although there is no simple solution, policy makers seek to reduce corruption knowing that economic and political stability is at stake. The research that links female political participation with reduced corruption is exciting for policy makers (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001). If having higher female political participation is regarded as part of the solution to corruption, then efforts to increase women’s participation could be considered as simultaneous efforts to reduce corruption. The positive externalities of having increased female political representation are enticing prospects for those desperate to tackle the complex issue of corruption, and warrant future research in the field. My research reexamines the question, updates the data, and incorporates institutional variables to bring feminist institutionalist theory into the analysis.
As stated earlier, corruption is a “feature of government interactions”, meaning that rules can be applied depending on who you are, even when systems are set up to be impersonal (World Bank, 2017). Thus, institutions largely dictate these government interactions. Institutions can be formal (laws, rules, constitutions, contracts, and guidelines), or informal (traditions, behaviours, customs, beliefs, expectations, and norms) (cited in Chappell & Waylen, 2013, 604-605), and recognizing how corruption is impacted by these institutional differences in each country helps us to recognize which policies could help to reduce corruption. Given that researchers have established a link between gender and corruption, it is important to take an institutionalist analysis further, and recognize the gendered impacts of institutions. By using a feminist institutional framework, my analysis revisits how representation of women in politics and institutional context, impacts corruption. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how particular institutions, such as gender quotas, shape female representation.

This analysis arrives at a pertinent time. Whereas women in politics are recognized to a greater extent in the media, notable female political actors have also been under intense scrutiny for corruption in their countries. The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in a corruption scandal in Brazil, Christina Fernández de Kirchner’s indictment on corruption charges for a public works scandal in Argentina, Park Geun-hye’s impeachment for bribery charges in South Korea, and even Chilean President Michelle Bachelet’s daughter-in-law accused of tax evasion, all contribute to a narrative that all politicians, whether female or male, are susceptible to corrupt actions. These cases reignite the debates on the links between gender and corruption, opening the door for future research.

As such, my research seeks to answer the following questions: What is the relationship between women’s political participation and good governance? More specifically, how strong is
the correlation between women’s representation in politics and the level of corruption in a country? How do institutional variables such as gender quotas, electoral systems, and auditing institutions influence the relationship between women’s representation in politics and anti-corruption efforts?

My first hypothesis (following Dollar et al. and Swamy et al.) is that in societies where women are more engaged in politics, there will be less corruption. Given the attention female leaders have received, my analysis will also include female heads of state or government as an indicator of female representation. My second and more original hypothesis is that electoral systems, gender quotas, audit mechanisms, and level of democracy impact the relationship between women’s political representation and corruption efforts. In other words, it is not only the descriptive representation of women in politics that influences corruption, but also key national institutions within the country that affect the possibilities of corruption. This second hypothesis goes beyond the findings of Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, (2001) and Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azfar (2001) by drawing on updated data from a wider range of countries. By including key institutions in the analysis, my approach harnesses feminist institutionalist theory to advance the debate.

To answer these research questions and explore these hypotheses, this thesis is organized as follows. The literature review in chapter 2 acknowledges the vast research on representation and mechanisms to increase female participation. It then sets up the current debates in the literature about gender and corruption, particularly since academics have responded to the initial studies of Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. That review will include an identification of gaps in the current literature, thereby positioning my contributions to filling this gap. In the third chapter, I will explain and justify my use of feminist institutionalism as a guiding theoretical framework; I will also explain the quantitative and qualitative aspects of my research methodology. The results
of the multivariate regression analysis will be discussed in the fourth chapter. In the fifth chapter, I will drill down into a focused comparison of two case countries (Rwanda and Haiti) to provide additional insight into how institutional context impacts the relationship between gender and corruption. The concluding chapter articulates how my research adds to the body of literature on this subject, and points to areas for further research.

**Chapter 2. Literature Review**

There is a growing body of literature that addresses gender, corruption, and institutions. This literature review first provides a summary of the literature that tackles the subject of representation. Following that, the concept of critical mass is introduced, with a summary of how the institutions of electoral systems and gender quotas impact higher female political representation. In the next section, key research that specifically looks at the relationship between gender and corruption is organized into three positions of a debate. The first position is micro-level experimental research that finds behavioural differences between men and women as they relate to corruption. The second position in the literature asks altogether a different question, that is, whether corruption prevents women from joining politics. The third position in the literature I identified is a group of macro-level studies that approach gender and corruption through quantitative analyses that incorporate various institutional variables as controls to explore this relationship. Lastly, this review identifies the gaps in the literature, positioning my analysis within this vast and growing body of work.
Gender and political representation

A large body of literature addresses the concept of representation, which was highlighted in the introduction. Literature tends to recognize the types of representation that are outlined in Hannah Pitkin’s (1967) work *The Concept of Representation*. Pitkin distinguishes between descriptive and substantive representation. With descriptive representation, representatives, by virtue of who they are, “stand for” the people they represent, as they share characteristics (Ibid., 61).

The proportion of women in politics, then, is categorized as descriptive representation. By looking at the percentages of women in politics in countries around the world, we are able to see numerically if women are being represented. Yet Pitkin argues that descriptive representation focuses less on what the representative is doing for the group he or she represents, and more on the characteristics of the representative (Ibid., 61). For example, a country that has a high number of female politicians may very well still have laws in place that infringe on women’s rights. The proportion of female politicians does not always reflect the situation for women living in the country. Thus, only looking at descriptive representation does not provide information about the policies that ensue if more women are involved in politics.

Therefore, researchers are also interested in substantive representation, the policy outcomes of representation. For a group to be substantively represented, policies are implemented that reflect the needs of that group, even if members of that group are not necessarily present in decision making positions (Celis et al., 2008). As an example, a country with low proportions of female politicians may have strong policies in place that benefit women, despite the low percentage of female political participation. Nevertheless, research suggests that an increase in descriptive representation of a particular group has effects that extend beyond the change characteristics of that government. As the proportion of a group increases through
descriptive representation, that group is more likely to be substantively represented (Dahlerup, 1988; Krook, 2015). As noted by President Batchelet, “One woman in politics changes the woman; but many women in politics changes politics” (as cited in Celis et al., 2008, p. 184). This statement captures the concept of “critical mass”.

**Critical mass, quotas, and electoral systems**

Critical mass is widely discussed in debates about the value of having more women in politics. The concept suggests that when a group that is represented has achieved about 30 per cent political participation, its increased representation will bring about changes for this group (Dahlerup, 1988; Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2015). Given that women have been excluded from politics for so long, in increasing numbers of female politicians, there is a hope that women’s issues would be better addressed in the political realm. Although the concept of critical mass has not been empirically proven (Dahlerup, 1988), the ideal it evokes has motivated a push for more women to join politics at all levels on the assumption that increased representation leads to transformative changes like greater gender equality and wider benefits to society.

Policy makers have operationalized the concept of critical mass through mechanisms to increase female participation. Electoral systems are at first glance, a gender-neutral institution, although it is recognized that countries with a proportional representation electoral system generally have higher levels of female political participation (Pitkin, 1967; Castles, 1981; Tremblay, 2006; Paxton et al., 2010). In such systems, women are more likely to be elected given that parties have greater control over who gets onto lists, often choosing to include higher proportions of women to appeal to specific groups of voters (Tremblay, 2006, 505). Proportional representation is an explanatory factor for the steady rise in female political participation in counties like Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands (Dahlerup & Freidenvall,
This gendered outcome of the electoral system on female political participation speaks to the importance of this institution’s inclusion in analyses.

While the link between electoral system and female representation is widely discussed, a body of work also examines how electoral systems impact corruption. Elections enable citizens to punish corruption politicians at the polls, but the type of electoral system determines if a voter votes directly for a candidate or only for the political party. Some researchers demonstrate that proportional systems are correlated with increased opportunities for corruption, in particular when voters choose political parties instead of candidates directly (Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Chang, 2005; Persson et al., 2003; Stroh, 2010). Whereas others find that corruption decreases as proportionality increases, given that having larger districts enable more competition and entry from honest candidates (Alfano et al., 2013). Therefore a causal link between electoral system and corruption is yet to be established. This indicates that electoral systems are a useful avenue for research into the impact of institutional design.

Another policy choice to boost female representation in politics is a gender quota, which many countries and political parties have implemented. Gender quotas can be distinguished into three types: reserved seats, legal candidate quotas, and voluntary political party quotas (Quota Project, 2015). According to the Quota Project, reserved seats ensure that a specific number of seats are allocated to women, while legal candidate quotas mandate that women occupy a minimum percentage of seats, through electoral or constitutional law. Voluntary quotas are implemented by political parties and are not adhered to by all parties in the country. A quota cannot guarantee an increase in female participation; its ability to increase female participation is contingent on other institutional factors, including electoral system and the strength of the quota itself. Nevertheless, a study by Tripp and Kang (2008) demonstrates that gender quotas are the
key explanatory factor in accounting for current rates of female parliamentary representation, particularly in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (p. 338). The varying outcomes of gender quotas serve as a reminder that policies do not exist in isolation, and institutional surroundings have strong gendered outcomes.

Nonetheless, the research acknowledging a relationship between gender quotas and corruption leads to unclear conclusions. On one hand, gender quotas can have the effect of improving the legitimacy of masculinized political parties that are perceived as corrupt, as they bring in new female politicians who, given their past exclusion from politics, are perceived by the public as “politically pure, untainted by partisan infighting and immune to corruption” (Baldez, 2006, 105). Furthermore, gender quotas shake up the process of candidate nomination, argued to be highly centralistic and undemocratic (Ibid., 106). Thus, there is an argument put forth that gender quotas can improve corruption. On the other hand, research also demonstrates that gender quotas are correlated with higher perceptions of corruption (Watson & Moreland, 2014), in particular when regimes considered illegitimate by their citizens shrewdly implement gender quotas under the assumption that this will improve their legitimacy (Bush, 2011). This argument suggests that gender quotas may be the outcome of political parties wanting to instrumentalise women in order to improve the party’s corruption issue. This limited and inconclusive debate opens an avenue for my research and points to the importance of including gender quotas as part of institutional context.

**Gender, representation, and corruption**

Current research indicates that gender quotas and electoral systems influence both the proportions of women in politics and corruption. Nevertheless, there remains a debate with regards to their impact on the latter. At the turn of the millennium, two pioneering studies
demonstrated a relationship between increased female participation and reduced corruption. Dollar, Fisman and Gatti’s (1999) working paper *Corruption and Women in Government*, and Swami, Knack, Lee and Azfar’s (2001) study *Gender and Corruption* effectively ignited a conversation about how women’s political participation may reduce corruption. Their findings were echoed in the World Bank’s pivotal *Engendering Development* report (2001). It offered evidence suggesting a strong correlation between increased female participation in politics and the labour force and improved governance. These findings motivated the authors of the report to suggest better governance as a motivation for encouraging more women to join political life. The following literature review presents their arguments, and then demonstrates how the scholarly reactions to their findings can be organized into three distinct positions within the debate.

Dollar et al.’s (2001) analysis found that “the presence of female parliamentarians apparently has a significant, negative effect on corruption” (Ibid., 427). To arrive at this result, they took a sample of over 100 countries, and used the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) corruption index as well as the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s *Women in Parliaments* survey for the years 1985, 1990, and 1995 (Ibid., 424-425). They controlled for variables and institutions that were believed to have an impact on that correlation. These variables were: GDP, political and civil freedom, population, average years of schooling, openness to trade, ethnic fractionalization, regional dummies, colonial dummies, and legal origin dummies (Ibid., 425). By including those control variables, their analysis was less vulnerable to criticism that could point to these explanatory variables as an alternative explanation for the correlation. Even taking into account those variables and excluding outlier countries, their study found that “at a country level, higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower rates of corruption” (Ibid., 427).
Those findings were echoed in Swamy et al. (2001), whose quantitative methodology used evidence from the World Values Surveys and a World Bank survey of corruption in Georgia, as well as cross-country data from 93 nations to establish a correlation between women’s political and workforce participation and corruption. Taken together, those levels of analysis led them to conclude “that there is indeed a gender differential in tolerance for corruption” (51). Their macro analysis uses Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Kaufmann graft index to assess corruption (38). For women’s participation, they used the following measures: the proportion of female participation in national legislatures, in high-level or ministerial positions, and the share of women in the labor force (39). Like Dollar et al., they control for the variables and strength of institutions by including per capita income and average years of education (40). They also control for proportion of Muslims and Catholics, British colonial past, ethnic divisions, and Freedom House’s political freedoms indicator (41). Taking into account these institutional variables, their findings identify “an empirical regularity, a stylized fact” (52) that higher female participation is correlated with lower corruption.

The conclusions of these two studies generated great interest from academia and policy makers. The World Bank report, Engendering Development, cited the work of Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. finding similar results, stating, “these findings lend additional support for having more women in the labor force and politics” (12-13). Based on this assumption, in Peru and Mexico policies have been implemented where women are specifically hired for positions traditionally held by men in the hope that they will be less corrupt (as cited in Swamy et al., 2001, 26; Goetz, 2007).

Thus the evidence presented by these studies has real world impacts. The findings suggest that a gender equal parliament is not only an ideal to be strived for based on the principle
of equality, but that there are also measurable social utility benefits of having more women engaged in politics. Therefore when a policy is implemented to encourage women to participate more in public life, it should benefit women as well as society as a whole. Indeed, in Engendering Development it was suggested, “policies promoting gender equality can help clean up governments and business” (World Bank, 2001, 74). This has consequences for larger development goals, since corruption is negatively correlated with economic growth and development, reducing corruption should be a goal for governments and organizations (92). Based on these findings, the World Bank’s 2001 Report pushed for policies encouraging female participation in politics and public life. The World Bank’s 2017 report, Governance and the Law, continues to present such arguments (211).

Since these influential studies, the contemporary literature on the relationship between women in politics and corruption can be categorized into three positions. Frank, Lambsdorff and Boehm (2011) have identified similar positions in their work (p. 60). The first position found in the literature approaches the issue of corruption from a behavioural level, suggesting that women are socially less corrupt, thus less likely to engage in corrupt practices. The second position, reverse or societal causality, reverses the correlation found in Dollar et al. and Swamy et al.’s hypotheses, suggesting that in societies that are less corrupt, there are more opportunities for women to join politics. The third position argues that while the correlation exists, it is factors other than women in politics and anti-corruption measures that contribute to the correlation. According to researchers who adopt this position, institutional factors within the country have a greater impact on reduced corruption than the proportion of women in politics. The following sections go into greater detail on the positions within that debate.
**Position 1: Women as less corrupt at a behavioural level**

This first position in the literature contributes in a similar manner to the behavioural studies provided by Swamy et al. in their micro-level analyses. These studies demonstrate that at a behavioural level, women tend to engage less frequently in corrupt actions than men. While this essentialist argument appears controversial, multiple levels of analysis back it up. Swamy et al. complemented their findings with a macro-level analysis and found similar results. Using the World Values Survey, the researchers compared responses from men and women finding that consistently for every country in the study, women responded, at a statistically significant higher level than men, that corrupt acts were never justifiable (28). Their other approach used survey results to demonstrate how firms in Georgia operated or owned by men, were significantly more likely to give bribes than female-ran firms (27). Further studies have built on this behavioural difference assumption.

The origin of the behavioural difference between men and women stems from criminology studies. Consistently women are shown to be less involved with serious crimes (Swamy et al., 2001; Torger & Valev, 2006). Although corruption is considered a crime in many countries, it is not always clear who the victim of the corrupt act is. Thus local laws and context matter in assessing how people regard corruption as a crime (Zimring & Johnson, 2005, p. 799). For eight Western European countries, Torgler and Valev (2006) used the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey to find that “[w]omen are significantly less likely to agree that corruption and cheating on taxes can be justified” (p. 22). In an experimental setting, other researchers have arrived at similar findings, in particular in a Western country setting.

Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal and Gangadharan (2009) conducted an experimental study using participants in Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore, finding that only in
Australia, women tended to have less favourable views on corruption than men. In India, Indonesia and Singapore, there was no significant gender difference in attitudes toward corruption (p. 663). This study has important implications for policy development. The authors recognized that the research of Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) had a large number of Western countries in the sample, even though their research is presented as a global analysis. Therefore Alatas et al.’s findings suggest that country context matters, an issue that is not addressed in large sample quantitative analyses such as those by Dollar et al. and Swamy et al.

The importance of country context is recognized further in the third position of this literature review. In a controlled experiment using hypothetical scenarios that gave participants acting as firms or public officials the opportunity to engage in a bribe, Rivas’ study (2013) confirmed evidence from other studies that women tended to be less corrupt (35). Her sample was from undergraduate students at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona in Spain (16). Therefore these findings apply again to a Western country case. Her study shows that at least in a Western university setting, the behavioural difference between men and women appears to exist. However, countries experiencing the most corruption are frequently developing countries (Jetter et al., 2015; Transparency International, 2016; Chaudhuri, 2012). Therefore, policy makers should be cautious to suggest that increasing the proportion of female representation, as a means to improve transparency, would be effective in all countries. (Alatas et al., 2009, 678).

Providing much needed empirical research on Sub-Saharan African countries, Alhassan-Alolo (2007) hypothesizes that there would be no significant gender difference in attitude toward corruption between men and women. Their experimental study conducted hypothetical scenarios with male and female members of the Ghanaian police and educational services (230). Participants were offered an opportunity to participate in a corrupt act, such as receiving a gift
for completing a task, obtaining additional income from clients, and influencing the visa obtaining process (231-232). Their experiment concludes that there are no statistically significant differences in responses from women or men. This conclusion validates the view that context matters enormously.

Chaudhuri (2012) provides an overview of the literature addressing women and corruption. His exhaustive description of empirical and experimental studies suggests that taken together, the results of all studies are inconclusive. Some studies indicate that women tend to engage less frequently in corrupt acts (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Abbink et al., 2002; Rivas, 2011), whereas others suggest there is no significant gender difference (Alhassan-Alolo, 2007; Alatas, et al., 2009). Yet he states, “[t]here are no studies that find men to be less corrupt [than women]” (13). Therefore, he is able to cautiously agree that increased female participation could lead to decreased corruption.

What follows from behavioural studies like these, is that if women tend to be less corrupt, then increasing their descriptive representation in politics will likely reduce corruption. Yet one cannot necessarily predict that based on the findings of these micro-level studies that this would be the case. That is because these assumptions are gathered from evidence that is self-reported or conducted in an experimental setting (Chaudhuri, 2012, 15). Furthermore, this data is collected at an individual level, and the behavior of one individual does not necessarily inform us about the behaviour of a group (Sung, 2003). Data that accounts for actual incidence of corruption, such as the Corruption Perception Index, is available only at a national level (Swamy et al. 2001, 27). We cannot assume that individual behaviours will necessarily be reflected in national statistics. Nevertheless, studies like these reinforce studies at a macro-level and represent a significant portion of the literature that approaches gender and corruption.
The risk of overly adhering to this position is that women are reduced to an “efficiency payoff” (Swamy, 2001, 27). By focusing only on the benefits that may accrue if more women are elected, we are ignoring that there is an inherent value in equality. Alhassan-Alolo (2007) argues, “integrating women into the public sector is a just cause in and of itself” (236). Therefore even if gender-based attitudes towards corruption are not apparent in all country contexts, we cannot reduce the value of having more women engaged in politics to the positive externalities that may occur with their increased participation.

Goetz (2007) also articulates this position by stating that “[w]omen are seen as instruments to achieve a broader development goal, not welcomed to public office as a matter of their democratic and employment rights” (88). She considers the idea that women are somehow less corrupt than men as “a myth in the making” (Ibid., 87). Her argument critiques the instrumentalist view that women should participate more in public life for any reason other than the principle of equality and fairness. In taking an instrumentalist approach, the value of having more women engaged in politics has been diminished to an “efficiency payoff” rather than “a matter of human rights and democratic justice” (87-88). If women are viewed as an instrument to achieve broader development goals, they become reduced to a monolithic group, thus undermining the individuality of each woman (88). Thus focusing only on individual differences between women and men without addressing broader causes of corruption and societal context is problematic, because it views women as a simple solution for the multi-faceted causes of corruption.

**Position 2: Reverse causality**

Given that women in parliaments and corruption are two independent variables, the nature of their relationship does not flow in an obvious causal direction. This is referred to as an
endogeneity problem. Some researchers propose that rather than higher percentages of women in politics leading to reduced corruption, less corrupt societies tend to encourage more female political participation. Even one of the authors of the Engendering Development Report, Andrew Mason, stated that he preferred to think, “a higher level of women’s participation signifies a country that is more open in general, with a more transparent government and a more democratic approach” (quoted in Sung, 2006, 142). Therefore when considering the relationship between women in politics, this body of literature reminds us that a correlation does not demonstrate causation.

Stockmeyer (2011) advances this idea in his study of Africa, arguing that “[h]igher containment of corruption fosters higher percentages of women in parliament” (693). His analysis looks at how democratization, corruption, electoral system, quota provisions, wealth, and political culture influence the proportion of female politicians. With regards to corruption, he finds, “[c]ountries that are more corrupt have fewer women deputies than less corrupt countries” (703). Rather than viewing corruption as the dependent variable, as other researchers (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001) have done, he views corruption as one of the many independent variables that influence the dependent variable of women’s political participation. Indeed, his research concludes that corruption impedes female representation.

In a study of local councils in 18 European countries, Sundström and Wängnerud (2014) follow a similar argument. They argue that corrupt countries favour those who are already in power because of ‘shadowy arrangements’ (Johnson et al., 2013, cited in Sundström & Wängnerud, 2014, 355) that benefit the privileged, most often men. Thus women face obstacles in corrupt societies that exclude them from access power, directly through candidate selection at a party level, and indirectly at a societal level whereby women feel less welcomed to join
politics. By confining their study to a European context, they were able to observe variances in corruption and female representation in the context of liberal democracies. Thus, they controlled for the variable of liberal democracy that Sung (2003) concluded was a richer explanatory variable. By controlling for national and regional-level variables (electoral systems, quotas, degree of democracy, location, and regional GDP per capita) they conclude, “the quality of regional governance exerts a substantial influence on women’s local political representation in European regions” (362). Thus, their analysis demonstrates that the variances in female participation outcomes at a regional level show that gender offers explanations that democracy alone cannot explain.

In recognizing this body of literature that regards women’s political participation as the dependent variable, the causal direction of most literature on the subject is opened to criticism. When discussing analyses that conclude women’s political participation as a means to promote good governance (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al, 2001), Bjarnegård (2013) finds these conclusions “problematic” because women are viewed as a simple solution to the far more complex, gendered issue of corruption (9). This criticism is justified, yet no study on either side of the causal direction dispute, can confidently dismiss other findings. For example, Sundström and Wängnerud (2014) “do not attempt to end the debate on causality between gender and corruption”, while specifying that for their study of regional governments, it would be difficult to attribute reduced corruption at a national level to local politicians (6). Therefore, there is room for research on both causal directions. This brings us to the third position in the literature.

**Position 3: Correlation exists, yet institutional variables affect the correlation**

The third position in the literature is distinguished from the others in that researchers focus on other variables, including institutions that may be influencing the correlation between women in
politics and corruption. The works in this body of literature are macro-level studies that analyze corruption and female political participation at a country level, similar to the macro analyses of Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. Though corruption is the dependent variable of their analysis, these researchers look at the institutional factors that affect this relationship. Some authors argue that after incorporating institutional variables, the correlation between women in and politics is much less significant (Sung, 2003; Goetz, 2007). Others note that the correlation exists, but provide a nuanced perspective as to which institutional variables influence the correlation (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013; Watson & Moreland, 2014; Stensöta, 2015; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, forthcoming; Agerberg et al., 2014).

Responding directly to Dollar et al. and Swamy et al., Sung (2003) questions the generalizability of the correlation between increased female political participation and decreased corruption. He argues that it is a “fairer system”, rather than female representation that accounts for lower corruption in countries with higher percentages of female politicians (703). He notes that even the authors of Engendering Development stated that the correlation “could be either causal or spurious” (2006, 141). Therefore to him and other researchers who adopt this position, an intervening variable may underlie the apparent causal link between women’s political participation and lower corruption. For Sung, liberal democracy is the institutional variable that tends to foster an environment that leads both to higher female political participation and reduced corruption. In his analysis, when liberal democracy (including rule of law and freedom of press) is appropriately controlled for, the significance of the relationship between women’s political participation and corruption declines, becoming “partially spurious” (718).

Goetz (2007) argues instead that gender does not affect ones reaction to corruption, but rather determines ones access and opportunity to engage in corrupt acts (88). In her interviews
with low-level government officials and field-workers of microfinance programmes in South Asian countries, she finds that women participate less in corrupt acts because they are excluded from the networks that create opportunities to earn income illegally (100). Ultimately, her analysis proposes that we attempt to understand the underlying reasons and alternative factors as to why women are perceived as less corrupt.

These critiques (Sung, 2003; Goetz, 2007) push for a greater understanding of the institutional environment in countries. Given that the relationship between women in politics and corruption depends on many factors, it is important that empirical research integrates institutional variables into research. Investigating these institutional variables pushes research away from an essentialist perspective as we gain greater insight into the institutional context needed for female representation to have substantive effects. The following researchers have contributed to this new and growing body of literature.

Esarey and Chirillo (2013) found, “democratic institutions activate the relationship between gender and corruption” (362). The institutional variables incorporated into their analysis are measures of democracy and autocracy using a Polity Score (370). Using the World Values Survey, they examine a gender difference for tolerance of bribes. They found that in autocracies, the gender difference in corruption was lower than in democracies. Their explanation was that in autocratic countries “corruption is a part of business as usual” (372), therefore both men and women are more likely to engage in corrupt acts. In contrast, democratic countries have institutional checks and balances that discourage corruption, and in such environments women tended to be less corrupt than men. The authors “attribute this difference to greater pressure on women to conform to the norms and imperatives of the political system” (374). This study
emphasizes the importance of institutional context when considering the relationship between women in politics and corruption.

Emphasizing the difference between descriptive and substantive representation of women, Watson and Moreland (2014) incorporate proportions of female representation, legally mandated gender quotas, and legislation that substantively improves women’s interests (using health expenditures and legal pregnancy protection from firing as indicators) as independent variables that influence their dependent variable of perceptions of corruption (402–403). In distinguishing between types of descriptive, formal, and substantive representation, the authors provide a unique analysis that incorporates indicators of substantive representation and of gender quotas. Their analysis finds that both descriptive and substantive representation is correlated with decreased perceptions of corruption. However, where legislated quotas are implemented, perceptions of corruption are higher (407). By distinguishing between types of representation, this analysis shows that different measures of representation can have varied influences on perceptions of corruption.

Stensöta, Wägnerud and Svensson’s (2015) article took a different approach, observing that many of the studies looking at women in politics and corruption looked at the political rather than the bureaucratic functions of government (476). They aimed to fill a gap in the literature by distinguishing between the legislative and administrative responsibilities of government as two distinct areas where women can have an impact on corruption, thus highlighting the importance of institutional variables. They note that feminist institutionalism is a “theory [that] builds on an interaction effect that emphasizes institutions as a mediating factor” (Ibid., 481). Their research demonstrates that the correlation between women in politics and corruption is weaker in the state administration than in the legislative arena, and that where bureaucratic principles are stronger,
the effect of gender is less impactful (475). The literature that considers the intermediate variables that influence the gender and corruption correlation is part of a growing body of work that uses feminist institutionalism as a theoretical lens.

In a recent piece, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017) propose a new theory for why the impact of women’s representation influences corruption in some countries, but not others: electoral accountability. They define electoral accountability by four measures: corruption as not a norm within society; freedom of press; parliamentary not presidential systems; and personalistic rather than party-centered electoral rules (3). The authors justify these measures as indicators of electoral accountability. In other words, where the electorate is better able to react against corruption at the ballot box, the link between women’s political participation and reduced corruption is strongest. Their findings also validate the importance of national institutions as intervening variables. For example, in countries where there is low freedom of press, the relationship between women in politics and corruption perceptions does not exist as it does in countries with a free press (22). They conclude, “[s]trong electoral accountability appears to be the mechanism by which higher levels of women’s representation relates to reduced corruption perception (26).

Following a similar trajectory, Agerberg, Sundström and Wängnerud (2014) look at country context when exploring the relationship between gender and corruption. This aims to answer, “how and under what conditions the gender balance of elites has an effect on corruption” (2). They distinguish between regime type: neo-patrimonial states; competitive particularism states; and good governance states; dividing countries into these clusters based on their characteristics. Their findings demonstrate that women have the strongest impact on corruption in well-governed states, whereas the association is less strong in neo-patrimonial states and in
states characterized by competitive particularism\(^1\) (15). Their distinction between regime types proves to be useful as it shows that for gender to have an impact on corruption, other elements in the country should be present (17). The authors call for increased research looking at country context and the institutional conditions that mediate the correlation between gender and corruption. Given that this feminist institutional lens is a relatively new perspective, there remain many unexplored gaps to research.

**Research Gaps**

It has now been fifteen years since the breakthrough studies from Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) that first demonstrated the correlation between increased female political participation and reduced corruption. Since then, research has evolved to incorporating more institutional variables into the analysis, emphasizing the importance of country context and institutional variables influencing that correlation. My analysis updates the evidence of this correlation by providing updated data from the year 2015; it also incorporates institutional variables that have not yet been explored in the literature.

As indicated in the literature review, many analyses have updated the correlation using a wide selection of measures. Yet, even the most current research (Watson & Moreland, 2014; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2017; Agerberg et al., 2014) uses data only up to the year 2011. Given there is data available for corruption perceptions up to 2017 and women in parliaments up to the most recent month; the first contribution of this thesis is that of updating the correlation using more current data. Many analyses in the literature review offer panel data, with evidence gathered from a series of years. My analysis looks at one specific time period, the year 2015. This offers a snapshot of a relevant time period, it happens to coincide with the end of the MDGs

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\(^1\) The authors consider “competitive particularism states” to be the majority of the world’s states, and are regarded as “fairly free, but usually not fair” (8).
and beginning of the SDGs. My analysis explores whether the relationship between women in politics and corruption has evolved since the original studies that explore this topic, and with the slow yet steady increase of female politicians worldwide.

Contemporary literature incorporates institutional variables into analyses by controlling for several variables, including certain aspects of institutional context. What is missing from the literature is an investigation that combines gender quotas, electoral systems, and strength of auditing and reporting mechanisms, to see how they influence this correlation. Although Watson and Moreland (2014) look at legislated quotas and how they impact corruption, they use a dummy variable to incorporate the quota for each year (402). The percentage mandated in the legislated quota and voluntary quotas are missing from their analysis. My analysis will incorporate voluntary quotas and delve into the strength of the quota regime by including their percentages. Gender quotas appear to be an explicit effort to increase female representation in politics, yet their ability to increase female participation is contingent on the institutional context (Kang, 2013, 94). Furthermore, evidence is building that quotas can impact the perceptions of corruption, with Watson and Moreland (2014) indicating that the presence of a legislated quota is actually correlated with higher perceptions of corruption. Incorporating both legislated and voluntary quotas into my analysis revisits how gender quotas relate to corruption.

Electoral systems, as part of the institutional setting, also have a strong effect on the level of female political participation in a country. Countries with a proportional representation (PR) system demonstrate higher levels of female political participation (Castles, 1981). This holds true even when controlling for the presence of a quota. As for their relationship with corruption, the literature demonstrates an inconsistency. Swamy et al. (2001) incorporate PR electoral systems as a dummy variable, and find that having a PR electoral system had a small but significant
correlation with increased corruption (48). In contrast, Dollar et al. (2001) did not find PR electoral systems to have an impact on the correlation between women in politics and corruption, thus they did not include it as a control variable in their analysis (425). By integrating PR electoral systems, this analysis revisits the question of the importance of electoral system when analyzing corruption.

A notable absence from the literature is the inclusion of auditing standards as a control variable when analyzing the correlation between women in politics and corruption perceptions. Gustavson and Sundström (2016) note the general absence of studies that focus on auditing as it relates to corruption (2). The results of their analysis show that high professionalism and independence of auditing institutions in countries are substantially and significantly correlated with lower corruption (15). Research from Mondo (2016) argues that corruption can be more objectively measured (rather than the subjective measure of perceptions) by looking at audit reports in Brazilian municipalities as a measure of corruption. Asiedu and Deffor (2017) examine the link between internal auditing firms and corruption, finding that by implementing an internal auditor, Ghana was able to reduce administrative corruption (94). Thus, the literature indicates there is a link between auditing standards and corruption. So far, this link has not been applied to research that analyzes women in politics and corruption, and research tends to be applied to country case studies. By incorporating a variable of auditing standards to my multi-country analysis, this analysis offers insight as to how auditing effects corruption on a global scale.

Despite the attention female presidents and prime ministers have received in recent years, in particular with regards to corruption, their inclusion as measures of female representation is another notable absence in the literature. My analysis addresses this by incorporating whether the head of government or head of state in the time period is female. Even though this is only
one individual, it is often the president or prime minister of a country who receives more attention at a global level, particularly if there is a corruption scandal. This gap in the literature is also covered in my analysis.

Another gap in the literature is a range of case studies that analyze corruption, women in politics and institutional setting as they relate to specific countries. Thus far, case country analyses focus on the effect of gender quotas on female representation (Kang, 2013; Buckley et al., 2014) how the electoral system affects female representation (Batto, 2014), or how both of these institutional variables affect female participation in a given country (Bauer & Burnet, 2013). Thus far, the case specific literature does not look at how these institutional variables affect the correlation between women in politics and corruption. By providing a focused comparison of these dynamics in Rwanda and Haiti, my research looks into how these institutions impact both female representation and corruption outcomes.

My analysis will add to the literature by looking at two case countries from a feminist institutional perspective. As the country with the highest percentage of female representation in the lower house (IPU, 2017), Rwanda was an obvious choice for a case study. Furthermore, compared to other countries in the geographical area, Rwanda has better rankings in the CPI (Transparency International, 2016). This case of Rwanda actually prompted my inquiry into the relationship between gender and corruption. This led me to the studies (Dollar et al. & Swamy et al.) that researched the link between female participation and corruption and propelled me to take the research further. Haiti was chosen as a case country because it shares a similar institution yet, country context leads to very different outcomes. Whereas Rwanda, which has the highest female political representation in their lower house, is well documented in the literature, an academic analysis of Haiti that targets the lack of women in politics is lacking. Both case studies
also demonstrate the importance of institutions in mediating relationships between gendered political participation and corruption.

Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Feminist Institutionalism

My analysis will follow the theoretical framework of feminist institutionalism. This framework is outlined by Mackay, Kenny and Chappell (2010) and Chappell and Waylen (2013), and posits that institutions, although appearing to be gender neutral, have gendered outcomes. Policies and institutions affect different genders in many ways. Despite this reality, there tends to be a sense of “gender blindness” in contemporary institutionalist research (Mackay et al., 2010, 580). Although laws may use gender-neutral terms such as “individual or citizen” what those words are describing in practice is “white men” (Pateman; Phillips; Young as cited in Paxton & Hughes, 2017, 4). As a result, seemingly inclusive research actually ignores large segments of the population. Feminist institutionalism aims to bring gender differences into the analysis, moving research towards examining the reciprocal relationships between institutions and gender.

In a similar vein, contemporary feminist research can be strengthened by approaching issues from a new institutionalist approach (Mackay et al., 2010). This applies directly to my chosen topic of gender and corruption. A country’s institutional environment has a direct impact on rates of descriptive and substantive female representation in politics. Recognizing these institutional opportunities and barriers guides a feminist analysis towards a more thorough overview of how country context impacts gendered outcomes. Since laws that excluded women from being elected into public office were changed, women who enter politics are disrupting an environment that for so many years was a completely male-dominated institution (Lovenduski,
While it is individual women who decide to run for politics, their institutional environment influences their desire and ability to run. Those institutions are most easily identified in formal rules, laws or policies. Research shows that the formal institutions of gender quotas and having a proportional representation electoral system increase the descriptive representation of women in parliaments (Tripp & Kang, 2007; Krook, 2009; Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Paxton et al., 2010). Informal institutions also impact female representation, these include expectations of how women should behave, and engrained stereotypes of jobs women are capable of doing (Chappell & Waylen, 2013, 606). Approaching women’s representation in politics from a feminist institutional perspective can help to explain why countries that have formalized institutions to boost female representation are still far away from achieving gender parity in politics.

Although the concept of critical mass suggests that having a higher number of women would influence policies affecting women, representation does not necessarily lead to responsiveness (Tremblay, 2006, 502). Rather, it is institutions and policies that influence the degree to which women are substantively represented, perhaps to a greater degree than the effect of having more women sitting in a parliament can have (Mackay, 2008). While there is no guarantee that having gender parity in politics will lead to institutional change (Chappell & Waylen, 2013, 601), my research intends to take a look at these institutions intended to boost female representation, and see their descriptive effect on female representation, and their substantive effect on corruption perceptions. Research shows us that corruption is an issue that impacts women differently than men, particularly in developing countries.

Given that institutions are largely defined as “the rules of the game – the rules, norms, and practices – that structure political, social and economic life” (Ibid., 599) they have an
influence on what is largely considered breaking these rules: corruption. While culture is often used as an explanation when discussing corruption (Fischer et al., 2014), this explanation is weak as it ignores the importance of institutions in affecting corruption outcomes. A country’s culture and history influence the institutional context, which determines to what extent there are opportunities for corruption. When political and economic institutions are incompetent, regarded as illegitimate by citizens, or undergoing transition, corruption is more likely to occur (Elliott, 1997, 184). This speaks to feminist institutionalism as an effective framework for analyzing corruption.

Institutional change is difficult, which explains why even in a context where institutional changes have occurred; the outcomes may be less significant than anticipated. Historical institutionalism emphasizes the continuity or ‘path dependence’ of institutions. Pierson (2004) stipulates that institutions limit the possibility of what can be achieved, whereas other scholars note that these institutions can serve as strategic resources for actors (as cited in Mackay et al., 2010, 575). In approaching feminist institutionalism, Chappel and Waylen (2013) stress the importance of including informal institutions in analysis, although they are “not only hard to identify but also particularly ‘sticky’ and resistant to change” (605). Acts of corruption such as paying a bribe for a public service may become so engrained in a society that they become part of the informal institutions. By applying this theoretical framework to my research, the limitations and opportunities of institutional context on female representation and corruption can be observed. The quantitative analysis portion of my study incorporates relevant institutions, demonstrating the degree of their effectiveness on women’s representation and corruption. The qualitative case study analyses bring in key actors who motivated institutional change, demonstrating how institutional changes through laws, quotas, and procedures are significant
steps to be achieved, but the outcomes of their implementation are also contingent on other factors. The case studies go into greater detail on these other factors that either maintain path dependency or activate institutional change.

This discussion of institutional constraints and strategic key actors reignites the structure and agency debate. Mackay et al. (2010) stipulate that while institutionalism tends to direct focus to structure, the framework does not ignore the importance of the agency of key actors. My analysis attempts to address both sides of this debate by including relevant institutions: gender quotas, electoral systems, and the strength of auditing and reporting standards, in the quantitative analysis, while also adding a variable of female head of state or government. Although a leader is not independently responsible for corruption perceptions in a country, the recent media attention brought to female leaders for allegations of corruption sheds light on how they receive extra attention due to their rarity. Thus, when female leaders are associated with corruption, it can influence peoples overall impressions of women and corruption. Yet political actors are constrained, guided and influenced by institutions, policies, rules and practices in their societies (Ibid., 573). Bringing in leaders to my institution-based analysis aims at bridging the divide between structure and agency.

The qualitative portion of my research will further bridge that divide, attempting to demonstrate “the co-constitutive nature of politics: the various ways in which actors bring about or resist change in institutions” (Ibid., 2010, 573) for the case studies of Rwanda and Haiti. These countries are important cases, as both countries’ constitutions enshrine the goal of 30 per cent female participation in the public sphere, yet their outcomes for female representation differ greatly (Quota Database, 2017). Their outcomes for corruption perceptions vary greatly as well (Transparency International, 2015), despite similar economic development reflected in their GDP.
per capita (CIA, 2017). These different outcomes highlight the importance of institutional context, time, key actors, and motivations behind policy implementations. Looking at these cases through a feminist institutional lens sheds light on how institutions do not operate in a vacuum.

**Design and Methodology**

In approaching the subject of gender, politics, and corruption, the amount of data available to researchers has grown considerably since the initial studies from Dollar et al. (2001), and Swamy et al. (2001). In completing a multivariate regression analysis (MVRA) using this updated data and different institutional variables, my aim is to demonstrate the correlation between women’s political representation and corruption as control variables are added to the regression analysis, and to explore other independent variables as they correlate with a corruption measure as the dependent variable. As noted in the literature review, some researchers approach such quantitative analyses with the reverse causal direction. My decision to have corruption as a dependent variable stems from wanting this analysis to provide potential policy insights for which measures help reduce corruption. Therefore, most of the independent variables can be viewed as potential policy measures that could serve in the repertoire of arsenal required to combat corruption.

Given that specific case studies about the relationship between gender and corruption are largely missing from the literature, my qualitative focused comparison of Rwanda and Haiti provides a contextual narrative that is missing from the MVRA alone. This analysis compiles document research, newspaper articles, secondary interviews with key actors, peer-reviewed literature, and statistical information to build a focused comparison of the countries. This analysis includes variables from the quantitative analysis, demonstrating how institutional context matters enormously for policy outcomes.
Key dependent variable

The dependent variable for my analysis is the level of corruption. Corruption remains a very difficult issue to measure, thus organizations tend to use perception measures to quantify largely secretive acts (Heywood & Rose, 2014). These measurement issues are addressed in the following paragraph. Nevertheless, the efforts by the organization Transparency International (TI) offers a promising point of departure. The indicators used for corruption in this analysis come from TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for the year 2016. The independent variables are from 2015, therefore having this time lag on the dependent variable assumes that for the independent variables to have an impact on the dependent variable, it will require a bit of time before this can occur. The CPI is the most recognized measure of corruption, and uses multiple sources from numerous surveys that draw on the perceptions of public sector corruption from senior managers and business leaders (Swamy et al., 2001; Watson & Moreland, 2014; Sung, 2003). The 2016 CPI was compiled using data from 13 different sources, including from the World Bank, Freedom House, the WEF, International Country Risk Guide, Varieties of Democracy Project and other regional sources (TI, 2015). It must be acknowledged that for the purposes of my analysis, the CPI is used as a proxy measure of corruption, but really it is a measure of the perceptions of corruption and not acts of corruption per se. In 2016, the index included 176 countries, and the score is a number between 1 and 100, with 1 representing the most corrupt, and 100 as least corrupt (TI, 2016). This variable is included in the equation as CORRUPT.

However, using the CPI as a measure for corruption is a limitation of this research. As noted above, the CPI is a perception-based indicator that combines survey data to produce the index. It has been criticized as a Western-centric tool that overemphasizes business interests,
resulting in a neo-colonial index that does not acknowledge cultural differences (de Maria, 2008). This is important to acknowledge, as there are repercussions for countries analyzed in the CPI. The CPI is a contributing factor for some countries to receive foreign aid, despite TI distancing itself from such policy measure (Galtung, 2006, 123). Furthermore, any errors made due to the perception-based nature of the CPI, affect academic interpretations of how we view the world (Heywood & Rose, 2014, 526), including in this analysis.

On the other hand, TI does not hide its limitations, stating that the CPI cannot tell the full story of corruption in a country; it can only capture the “extent of corruption in the public sector from the perspectives of business people and country experts” (2015, FAQs, 2). By being forthright and honest about these limitations, TI positions itself better than other measures (Galtung, 2006, 114). Despite the methodological deficiencies, the CPI is a highly publicized measure that, for the most part, captures a country’s situation of corruption. These limitations of the CPI and of quantitative analyses in general, bolster support for including the focused comparison after the quantitative portion of my research.

Another necessary caveat in using CPI data is that TI has explicitly stated that in indices before 2012 its methodology is “not designed to allow country scores to be compared over time” (as cited in Heywood & Rose, 2014, 6). In 2012 their methodology was updated, and CPI scores following that date can be compared over time (TI, 2015, FAQs). Whereas many MVRA studies use the CPI for longitudinal analyses, my analysis focuses on data only from 2015. Looking at the methodology of the CPI justifies this cross-sectional analysis. Treisman (2007) echoes these concerns of using the CPI in longitudinal studies (220).

As a robustness check, the CPI should be corroborated with another indicator of corruption to support the findings of the MVRA. Galtung (2006) argues that while the
International Country Risk Guide’s corruption assessment score has been used as a dependent measure for corruption, it includes indicators of military, bureaucracy, democracy, and law and order; therefore it should not be used as a measure of corruption (115). Furthermore, parts of the ICRG index, as well as measures from the WEF, are used to build the CPI. Thus, as a robustness check, the model is run using the World Bank Governance Indicator’s Control of Corruption index for the year 2016. Results of that analysis are provided in Appendix B.

Key independent variables

The primary independent variable this analysis explores is female political representation. The indicator for this measure is taken from the Inter-parliamentary Union’s (IPU) survey, *Women in Parliaments*, from the archived data from December 1st, 2014. The data from that year includes 190 countries. When a country has a bicameral system, the IPU provides the percentages of women in both lower and upper houses. The percentage of women in lower houses is identified as *FREPLOWER*, and *FREPUPPER* for upper houses. Most analyses require the average of both houses; therefore this variable is *FREPAVE*.

As another indicator of female representation, this analysis includes whether there is a female head of government or head of state as a control variable. For the year 2015, there are 20 female leaders, who are included in the analysis through a dummy variable, where 0 is the coefficient for a male leader, and 1 for a female leader. In cases where the female head of state is a monarch or representative of the monarch, the head of government will be used instead for that country. This control is included as it sheds light on how much influence a female leader has in affecting corruption perceptions. This is particularly interesting given that the media has heavily scrutinized some of these female leaders who have been accused and in some cases found guilty of corruption in their countries (see Watts & Bowater, 2016; Cohn, 2016; Holpuch, 2016; &
Bonnefoy, 2016). Therefore, including female leadership as a variable provides insight as to what impact female leaders have on overall corruption perceptions in a country. This inclusion also incorporates agency and actors into my largely structural analysis. This variable will be represented in the equation as $\text{HEAD}$.

As a quantifiable institutional variable, electoral systems will be controlled for in the analysis. Although the types of electoral system include plurality, majority, mixed, proportional representation (PR), and single-transferrable vote (STV), the main distinction in the systems lies between plurality/majority and PR/STV (King, 2000). Therefore, in the analysis, a dummy variable for PR and STV is included, and represented in the equation as $\text{ELECT}$. The Quota Database provides data on electoral system for most countries.

Incorporating institutions that have not been included in previous analyses of women in politics and corruption is an objective of my research. Gender quotas are institutional variables that are primarily intended to increase female political participation. There are, however, clues in the literature that suggest that gender quotas have a relationship with corruption, however there is not a conclusive causal direction that has been established (Baldez, 2006; Watson & Moreland, 2014; Bush, 2011). The data for gender quotas is available from the Quota Project, a joint initiative of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the IPU, and Stockholm University, in their Quota Database. This database includes gender quota information for 128 countries. Rather than being included as a dummy variable, gender quotas are added to my model by the percentages that the quota mandates. For voluntary quotas, it is political parties that implement the quotas. Therefore to find the percentage of gender quotas for those countries, the varying percentages of voluntary quotas are added together and divided by the total number of political parties in the parliament that have achieved over 5 percent
representation in the lower house. The labels for these variables are \textit{LEGQUOTA} and \textit{VOLQUOTA}. If a country has a gender quota of either type, the percentage of that quota will be incorporated into the analysis. For the purposes of this analysis, only quotas for the lower houses will be considered if the country has a bicameral system, however most quotas apply to both houses.

\textit{Control variables}

Other control variables are recognized within corruption literature to be necessary for such analyses. It is expected that a country’s level of economic development will have an impact on the relationship between women in politics and corruption. Research from Jetter, Agudela and Hassan (2015) indicates that controlling for income through GDP per capita is necessary for corruption analyses. Therefore, GDP per capita per person parity data from the World Bank for the year 2014 or more recent will be included as a control. When completing the linear regression analysis, GDP per capita PPP did not follow a linear distribution, therefore using a log transformation allowed the data to fall into a more linear pattern as it pulls in larger values, and spreads lower values (Zelterman, 2010, 134). So, this variable is represented by \textit{logGDPpercapita} in the equation, as the log transformation allowed the data to better fit my model.

Democracy has been recognized in the literature as an important institutional variable that influences the relationship between women in politics and corruption. Sung (2003) included measures of democracy in the analysis on gender and corruption, arguing that the effect of women in politics on corruption becomes much less significant if you control for democracy through rule of law, freedom of the press, and democratic elections (710). Thus, it is necessary to control for democratic institutions in this analysis. Freedom House provides a measure of
political rights for the year 2015 that is used in this analysis. The scale for this variable is from 1 to 7, with 1 being the best, and 7 being the worst. Given that this changes the direction of all other variables (where having a higher score means better), this variable is flipped for the analysis to ease interpretation. The label given to this variable is DEMOCRACY.

Given recent literature that demonstrates a link between good auditing processes and reduced corruption (Gustavson & Sunström, 2016), for the purposes of this analysis, I wanted to see if the relationship between female representation and corruption remains positive and significant if we control for auditing standards. The United Nations Development Programme recommends that anti-corruption initiatives include support to improve auditing procedures (GAIN, 2014, 31) therefore by controlling for this indicator, its effectiveness as an anti-corruption strategy is tested and the variable FREPAVE is controlled to a higher standard. Data for this variable is taken from the Quality of Government (QoG) Institute’s Expert Survey 2015, a survey that overall received 1294 responses from country experts found through public administration organizations, peer-reviewed article identified experts, and through professional networks of scholars at the QoG Institute. In the survey, there are 3 questions pertaining to auditing standards: independence from government, education and qualification of auditors, and if National Audit offices communicate their results. The indicator is a value between 0 and 7, with 7 representing the highest standards, and 0 the lowest, a composite score of these 3 questions was created for each country. This score is available for 107 countries (Dahlström et al., 2015). In the equation, this indicator is represented by AUDIT.

Before conducting the multivariate regression analysis, a summary of the variables is provided. The following table demonstrates the mean of the independent and dependent variables for all countries, the poorest quartile of countries, and the richest quartile of countries. A similar
Summary data table was provided in Dollar et al.’s (2001) analysis (425). The table illustrates that the richest quartile of countries perform better on the CPI, have slightly higher (4.5-6 percent) proportions of women in their lower and upper houses, tends to have more PR electoral system, have more heads of government or state that are female, and have better auditing and reporting standards than the poorest quartile of countries. This reaffirms the need to include GDP per capita as a control variable, and demonstrates how increased income in general is a strong explanatory variable.

Table 1: Summary of Data 2015 When N = 137 (Number of countries where all values available)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All countries</th>
<th>Poorest Quartile of Countries</th>
<th>Richest Quartile of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita (USD, mean)</strong></td>
<td>20,667.44</td>
<td>2,536.30</td>
<td>49,249.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CORRUPT (score, mean)</strong></td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>30.34</td>
<td>70.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREPLOWER (%) mean</strong></td>
<td>22.56</td>
<td>23.22</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREPUPPER (%) mean</strong></td>
<td>21.93</td>
<td>21.78</td>
<td>26.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEAD (number of)</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELECT (number of PR &amp; STV)</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEGQUOTA (number of)</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VOLQUOTA (number of)</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOCRACY (score, mean)</strong></td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 4. Results of quantitative analysis

The variables for this analysis have been tested for multicolinearity and robustness. Appendix A provides a full summary of that analysis.

Establishing a Correlation

The main correlation sought in this analysis is the impact of female political representation (an independent variable), on corruption (the dependent variable). Therefore before including the control variables, the quantitative analysis begins with an equation that looks at the relationship between the two main variables of the analysis (women in parliaments and the corruption perception index). This determines whether the descriptive representation of
women has an impact on corruption perceptions. In all the equations the variable $i$ represents the country, and the variable $y$ represents the year, which for this analysis is always 2015.

$$CORRUPT_{iy} = \alpha + \beta_1 \ast FREPAVE_{iy} + \varepsilon_{iy}$$

In running this correlation in SPSS, we find that indeed the percentage of women in politics is correlated with corruption perceptions. To interpret the data from SPSS from this and all analyses in this section, Andy Field’s (2013) text, Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics is used as a guiding tool. 136 countries are included in this correlation. This correlation analysis has an R-value of .290, indicating a weak positive relationship. The R-Square value is .084, which tells us that female representation can account for 8.4 percent of the variation in the CPI. To explain in other words, this means that women in politics explain approximately 8.4 percent of the CPI, meaning that other variables can explain the other 91.6 percent. This is a relatively low R-squared value, yet this makes sense given that there are many other variables that impact corruption perceptions. A scatterplot depicts this correlation below, demonstrating that there is a slight upward slope.
Corruption is a multifaceted issue, therefore it is a given that female representation would account for a small portion of the many institutional variables that impact the CPI. The next part of this analysis incorporates the other independent variables, to examine theoretically the impact of other variables, and to demonstrate if the relationship between women in politics and corruption remains positive and significant when we include control variables into the analysis.

**Multivariate Regression Analysis**

For quantitatively assessing the relationship between women in politics and corruption, a multivariate regression analysis controls for other variables that impact perceptions of corruption. This type of analysis allows us to summarize a lot of data without having to report at each variable individually (Zelterman, 2010, 90). In the simple correlation analysis above, the impact of women in politics on corruption perceptions was viewed at an individual level. The analysis showed that FREPAVE can explain 8.4 percent of CORRUPT, a small, yet significant (p=0.001) relationship. The following equation includes the independent variables that are also thought to have an influence on the dependent variable CORRUPT. The objective of conducting the multivariate regression analysis is to see if the independent variables are significantly correlated with the dependent variable.

**Equation**

The specifications of the model for this analysis are represented in this equation.

\[
CORRUPT_{iy} = \alpha + \beta_1 * FREPAVE_{iy} + \beta_2 * \log GDP_{per capita}_{iy} + \beta_3 * DEMOCRACY_{iy} + \beta_4 * HEAD_{iy} + \beta_5 \\
* ELECT_{iy} + \beta_6 * LEGQUOTA_{iy} + \beta_7 * VOLQUOTA_{iy} + \beta_8 * AUDIT_{iy} + \epsilon_{iy}
\]
Table 2: OLS Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FREPAVE</td>
<td>.428***</td>
<td>.275**</td>
<td>.276**</td>
<td>.370***</td>
<td>.373***</td>
<td>.290**</td>
<td>.275**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.094)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.094)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logGDPpercapita</td>
<td>11.139***</td>
<td>8.930***</td>
<td>8.925***</td>
<td>9.122***</td>
<td>8.288***</td>
<td>8.968***</td>
<td>8.147***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.896)</td>
<td>(.882)</td>
<td>(.885)</td>
<td>(.848)</td>
<td>(.888)</td>
<td>(.888)</td>
<td>(1.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.262***</td>
<td>3.228***</td>
<td>3.773***</td>
<td>3.493***</td>
<td>3.297***</td>
<td>1.477*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.549)</td>
<td>(.576)</td>
<td>(.546)</td>
<td>(.527)</td>
<td>(.556)</td>
<td>(.759)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.561 (2.841)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-9.283**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.059)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGQUOTA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.216***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOLQUOTA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.039 (0.084)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUDIT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.584***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant:</td>
<td>-68.193***</td>
<td>-59.836***</td>
<td>-59.731***</td>
<td>-62.495***</td>
<td>-54.297***</td>
<td>-60.403***</td>
<td>-70.697***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N:</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R Square</td>
<td>.568</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>.664</td>
<td>.684</td>
<td>.688</td>
<td>.654</td>
<td>.753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05   **p < .01   ***p < .001 Dependent Variable: CORRUPT (Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, Transparency International) Standard errors are in parentheses.

As the table demonstrates, Model 1 of the regression analysis explores the relationship between women in politics and corruption while controlling for a log of GDP per capita, demonstrating that while GDP per capita is highly correlated with an improved corruption score, female representation remains positively and significantly correlated. In Model 2, when controlling for democracy (political rights and freedoms), female representation continues to be positively and significantly correlated with improved corruption, and aligning with my first hypothesis. The table further demonstrates that female representation maintains a positive and significant relationship when institutional variables are added to the analysis, shown in models 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 on the table. Model 3 shows evidence that while the correlation between female head of government or head of state is positive, the relationship is not significant. Model 4 displays findings that proportional representation and single-transferrable voting systems are negatively correlated with the CPI to a significant level, echoing Swamy et al. (2001)’s findings.
that PR systems are correlated with increased corruption. Model 5 shows that legislated quotas are also negatively correlated with the CPI, a similar finding to that of Watson and Moreland (2014). Voluntary quotas in Model 6 are shown to not have a relevant relationship with the CPI. Model 7 incorporates the composite audit score as an additional control variable. This model has fewer (107) cases than the other models. When this variable is included as an additional control, the correlation between women in politics and lower corruption perceptions remains positive and significant.

**Theoretical explanations of results**

This multivariate regression analysis demonstrates that in updating the data to 2015, the relationship between the proportion of women in politics (in lower and upper houses) and corruption perceptions is positively correlated and significant, even when we apply a more rigorous control of auditing and reporting standards. These findings are consistent with most of the literature that promotes the social utility of including more women in politics, and cautiously demonstrates that by having more women in politics, there are additional benefits that extend beyond greater gender equality. Whereas Sung (2003) demonstrated that controlling for democracy reduced the significance of the correlation between women in politics and corruption, this analysis shows that the relationship is positive and significant even when applying controls for GDP per capita, democracy and auditing. The other variables of female head of state, PR/STV electoral systems, and gender quotas were included in this analysis to explore their impact on corruption. This section analyzes these variables in further detail.

To my knowledge, female head of state or government had not been included in previous quantitative analyses about gender and corruption. When incorporated in the analysis, the results showed little significance, highlighting the need to not place the onus of a country’s corruption
level on one individual alone. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while conducting my research over the past couple of years, I observed that female leaders accused of corruption have dominated the conversation about women in politics and corruption, particularly in the media. As examples, the Brazilian corruption scandal implicated hundreds of government officials, yet “[t]he scandal’s most visible victim was Dilma Rousseff” (Pahnke, 2017, 43); in South Korea, Park Geun Hye was the first female president in a country where female political participation remains low, thus her impeachment and arrest “does not bode well for the future of female political leadership in the country” (Cohn, 2016). Despite my results that female leadership at the head of state or head of government level is not correlated with overall perceptions of corruption, these scandals involving a high-profile woman in a corruption case have the potential to tarnish the perceptions of women in politics more generally.

By incorporating PR electoral systems as a variable to explore theoretically, my results demonstrate that PR systems are correlated with increased corruption. Several researchers have put forth arguments as to why this is the case. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argue that, in PR systems, party leadership is better able to concentrate corrupt opportunities and there is less ability to monitor rent seekers. Chang (2005) argues that the uncertainty incumbents face in open-list PR systems when approaching reelection encourages increased political corruption before their term is up. Along a similar vein, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) argue that because plurality systems allow voters to more directly punish corrupt incumbents at the ballot box, PR systems may offer more opportunities for incumbents to extract rents. The empirical findings in my analysis bolster the arguments put forth by these researchers.

In incorporating the percentage of legislated gender quotas in my analysis, my results demonstrated that legislated quotas are correlated with increased corruption. An explanation for
this finding is that many countries with legislated gender quotas are part of what Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) refer to as “fast track” – countries that have low female representation and have implemented gender quotas to rapidly increase representation. Many of these countries are developing nations where corruption tends to be higher. Therefore, it is likely that many legislated gender quotas have been implemented in countries where corruption has been more of an issue. On the other hand, voluntary party quotas were not demonstrated to have a significant relationship with corruption perceptions. This finding is unsurprising given that only some political parties implement voluntary quotas, thus, many citizens may even be unaware of such policies. Furthermore, when coding for voluntary quotas, the percentage of the gender quota often resulted in a small percentage overall as the percentage of the quota is divided amongst parties in the parliament that have met the five percent threshold. Given that voluntary quotas are mostly found in “incremental track” countries, where quotas were implemented to help gain momentum of female representation when women leaders were already gaining traction, for example the Scandinavian countries, corruption is likely less of an issue for those countries (Ibid.). These findings demonstrate these institutions (PR/STV electoral systems and gender quotas) that are recognized in the literature to increase female representation, are not mechanisms that, by extension, improve corruption perceptions.

The inclusion of the QoG auditing score as an additional control variable demonstrated a strong correlation between the audit score and improved corruption perceptions. This reinforces the findings of Gustavson and Sundström (2016), that there is a positive and significant relationship between the two variables. The impact of women in politics on improved corruption scores remained positive and significant when this variable was added as a control. This finding speaks to the importance of solid auditing practices as a means to reduce corrupt behaviour.
Thus this analysis demonstrates that having more women in politics is not a singular prescriptive measure that is guaranteed to reduce corruption. The relationship identified is mostly positive and significant, yet other variables such as GDP per capita, auditing standards, and democracy are far stronger predictors of corruption than the proportion of women in politics. Even when controlling to a more rigorous standard than previous analyses, women in politics and corruption continued to have a positive and significant relationship, demonstrating the strength of the impact of women in politics on corruption. Nevertheless, this type of analysis cannot make causal claims about this relationship. As feminist groups around the world push for increased representation and the SDGs push for gender equality through political representation, my findings hint that gender equality impacts other indicators of wellbeing. This analysis updates the findings of other studies (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001) that prompted this analysis. The next chapter provides a focused comparison of two case countries taking a look at the institutional variables that were incorporated in the quantitative analysis.

Chapter 5. Focused Comparison of Rwanda and Haiti

Thus far, my analysis has focused on quantitative measures. Female political representation, institutional variables, and corruption perceptions have been quantified, and inferences have been made about their correlations, based on findings from the regression analysis. Some researchers may not agree with such inferences, particularly about extrapolating causation from correlations. As Roberts et al. (2013) argue, “the relationship between institutions and representation is conditional on a country’s social structure and configuration of gender ideologies. In other words, there is no good reason to believe that a single, universal, causal effect of institutional change exists that could be statistically estimated” (1558-1559). Whereas my quantitative analysis attempted to demonstrate such a relationship, it is important to take a
closer look at how these institutions work together to influence outcomes in different countries. The following focused comparison aims to provide context analysis to complement the quantitative analysis.

My focused comparison looks at two cases, Rwanda and Haiti, paying particular attention to the formal and informal institutions that mediate the relationship between female representation and corruption. These are two very different countries in terms of female representation and corruption; yet have striking similarities in other respects. Rwanda is a country of 11.9 million people has a GDP per capita PPP per capita of 1,913 current international dollars annually; Haiti’s population is 10.8 million where GDP per capita PPP is 1,784 current international dollars per year (The World Bank, 2017). The countries have roughly the same geographical area, their economies are dominated by agriculture, and their political systems both include a President, Prime Minister, and lower and upper houses of parliament (OACPH, 2016). More importantly, these countries share an institutional similarity, the presence of a constitutionally mandated 30 per cent gender quota (Quota Database, 2017). This gender quota serves as a starting point to propel this analysis. Using a feminist institutional theoretical framework as a guiding tool, this focused comparison attempts to address why the outcomes of this quota for each country are so divergent. Concepts from the various strains of institutionalism (historical, rational choice, organization, and constructivist) are used to analyze the gender quota, and other key institutions in both countries. This focused comparison begins with a brief individual overview of each country, before delving into the feminist institutional analysis.

Country overview: Rwanda

Looking at the visual map of the Corruption Perceptions Index some years ago, I noticed that in the swatch of African countries painted in dark red (the color used to depict the most
corrupt countries) a small nation, Rwanda, stood out in orange, indicating that perceptions of corruption were lower there. Rwanda’s ranking on the CPI has improved from the 102nd most corrupt in 2008, to the 50th in 2016, placing it far above neighboring countries like Burundi which ranks 159th and Kenya at 145th (TI, 2016). Knowing that Rwanda also has the highest percentage of female political participation in the lower house, a critical mass of women represented in the senate (IPU, 2017) and ranks fifth best overall in the 2016 Gender Gap report (WEF, 2017), it is an interesting case study to analyze the link between gender and corruption.

These positive transformations in the country may come as a surprise to many, given that in recent history Rwanda is probably best remembered for the 1994 genocide that took the lives of between 500,000 to 1.1 million people (Burnet, 2008; Reyntjens, 2004). Although the genocide remains an unforgettable part of Rwanda’s past, institutional changes have helped to shift the rhetoric surrounding Rwanda, drawing attention to more positive developments. Much of this progress in Rwanda is attributed to President Paul Kagame, whose party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, is credited with ending the genocide (The Economist, 2003). In the post-genocide period, a new constitution was developed and adopted in 2003. It codified bold measures to promote gender equality, including a gender quota that reserves 30 percent of parliament seats for women (Rwanda Constitution, Article 76, Number 2). Institutions that monitor corruption have also been established and the country’s CPI has significantly improved.

Yet Rwanda’s progress is contrasted with growing authoritarianism in the government. The same constitution that enshrined institutions that promote gender equality is also critiqued for “restrictions on freedom of speech around issues of ethnicity” (Powley, 2005, 155). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index scores Rwanda 3.07 out of ten, signaling an authoritarian regime (Economist, 2017). The Press Freedom Status from Freedom House for the
country in 2016 was “not free”. These concerns are complemented by the fact that President Kagame is unwilling to step down and transfer his power to someone else (McVeigh, 2015). He clings to power despite the constitutional provision (Article 101) that the President is able to renew the seven-year term-limit only once (Rwanda Constitution, 2003). A referendum was held in late 2015, where apparently 98 per cent of the voters were in favour of amending the constitution to allow President Kagame to keep running for office until 2034 (Carter, 2016, 37). The President plans on running again in the next elections. Thus, the case of Rwanda is not so straightforward; there is a paradox of gender equality and good governance in an increasingly authoritarian setting.

**Country Overview: Haiti**

There is a Kreyol phrase, “poto mitan”, that states women are the pillar of society in Haiti (as cited in Rendón & Nicholas, 2012; Rames et al., 2016, 25; OCAPH, 2016). In informally asking Haitian peoples about “poto mitan”, many begin singing the well-known song that accompanies the phrase, knowledgeable about its meaning about women’s significance in society. The nongovernment business entrepreneurial organization, Women of Milot, builds upon this, characterizing women as “the backbone of the Haitian economy” (Women of Milot, 2013). Given this rhetoric surrounding the role of women in Haitian society, it would appear that women are recognized as important contributors to Haitian society. In some respects, women are advancing in terms of legal rights. In the 2012 amended constitution, article 17.1 specifically addresses women’s representation in decision-making bodies through a 30 per cent gender quota for all levels of national life, specifically in public service (IDEA Haiti Programme, 2014). Yet other indicators of gender equality in Haiti relay a very different story.
While Haiti is not included in the Global Gender Gap Report from the WEF, the Government of Haiti’s, *Politique d’égalité femmes hommes 2014-2034* provides an overview of the situation of women in Haiti, highlighting the feminization of poverty, and the deep inequalities women face (13). With regards to education, women have two fewer years of schooling than men, and women’s illiteracy rates are higher (World Bank, 2014). Economic statistics demonstrate that women are 20 percent more likely to be unemployed, more likely to be employed in informal sectors, and their wages are 34 percent lower than men’s (World Bank, 2014). As for home ownership, 71 percent of Haitian women do not possess land or a home, and if they do, it is more likely to be shared than independently owned (Alterpresse, March 7, 2017).

In politics, women are vastly underrepresented. The IPU indicates that only 3 women sit in the 117 seats of the lower house, while the 20-seat upper house has a single female representative (2017). Thus, despite the narrative of women as pillars and backbones of society, women in Haiti are, by many statistical measures, much worse off than men.

High levels of corruption compound the issue of gender inequality in Haiti. A telling example of this is the 2010 earthquake and its aftermath. Poor building practices brought about from lack of regulatory oversight in the construction industry allowed for the construction of buildings that are unable to withstand seismic activity, thus the death toll was so high in comparison to similar scale earthquakes in less corrupt and wealthier societies (Ambraseys & Bilham, 2011). It is estimated that at least 250,000 people died, 300,000 were injured, and 1.5 million people became homeless (IMF as cited in Gros, 2011, 132). This had gendered consequences, notably earthquake aggravated gender-based violence, as people were moved to camps for internally displaced persons where women were particularly vulnerable to violence (Davoren, 2012). The earthquake also revealed how corruption had concentrated power in the
capital city. It became clear that years of political corruption had centralized resources in Port au Prince, where friends of the President and the “morally repugnant elite” had control of the assets (Gros, 2011, 143). When the power-laden capital city was destroyed, there were few resources left in other parts of Haiti, forcing an increased reliance on foreign donors (Ibid.). This reliance on INGOs to fulfill duties of the state leads to further issues of accountability. Haiti ranked 159th on the CPI in 2016, a telling sign that the institutions in place still allow for corruption to permeate society (TI, 2016). Padgett & Warnecke (2011) attribute “institutional rigidity”, or path dependence, to Haiti’s “recurring government failure”, where “lack of economic diversification and high poverty rates to the spread of HIV and the stagnation of economic growth” has prevented any form of progress with regards to economic development (530).

Both of these cases reveal a puzzle. In Rwanda, we see that an institutional environment that fosters gender equality and reduced corruption exists in tandem with growing authoritarianism. In Haiti introducing a similar gender quota has had little impact on female representation, and corruption continues to be a major issue. Approaching these contradictions from a feminist institutional perspective and gaining insights from contemporary literature provides some explanations to these contradictions. This analysis begins by comparing formal institutions in both cases beginning with the gender quota, then developing a comparative analysis of the different outcomes of the gender quota by taking into account other institutions, namely the electoral system. Then, corruption outcomes in each country will be compared by looking at auditing and ombudsman institutions, as well as corruption in relation to the substantive representation of women’s interests.
Institutions addressing women’s descriptive representation

Gender Quota

This section goes into great detail of the gender quota implementation as it demonstrates how various institutional elements affect the gender quota outcomes. Both the Rwandan and Haitian constitutions include a 30 percent gender quota. Although the specific wording is different in each, they embody the same principle. Yet, their outcomes are completely different: while Rwanda has 61.3 per cent female representation in their lower house and 38.5 in their senate, this is contrasted with Haiti’s 2.6 percent female representation in the lower house and 5 percent in the upper house (IPU, 2017). The most obvious explanation for these differences is that Rwanda has had the benefit of time, their gender quota (of 2003) was implemented nearly a decade before Haiti’s (in 2012). However, given Haiti’s female representation trajectory since the gender quota was implemented, it is unlikely that the gender quota over time will spur female representation as it has in Rwanda. The following table demonstrates female representation and the CPI in both countries over time, highlighting election years since 2000.

Table 3: Historical overview of countries’ % female representation and CPI

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda % female representation in lower house</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti % female representation in lower house</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda CPI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.1/10</td>
<td>5/10</td>
<td>53/100</td>
<td>53/100</td>
<td>54/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti CPI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2.2/10</td>
<td>1.5/10</td>
<td>1.8/10</td>
<td>1.8/10</td>
<td>19/100</td>
<td>19/100</td>
<td>20/100</td>
</tr>
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*The year of gender quota implementation is highlighted for both countries

Another plausible, yet inadequate, explanation is the gendered demographic imbalance in Rwanda: according to international sources, women and girls comprised up to 70 per cent of the
population following the genocide (Hogg, 2009, 39), while national sources put this number at 54.6 percent (General Population and Housing Census, as cited in Kanakuze, 2004, 96). However, these reasons are limited in their explanatory power. As the above table demonstrates, the gender quota’s implementation in Rwanda nearly doubled female representation in the lower house, whereas even after the 2016 election in Haiti following the gender quota, female representation has stagnated. Furthermore, Rwanda’s demographic imbalance is reported to have returned to a more equal level. By 2002, the Census reported that women and girls were 52.3 percent of the population (Ibid.). Therefore, he institutional literature on gender quotas provides other factors that can help explain these different outcomes.

The theory behind historical institutionalism is that there tends to be periods of relative stability known as path dependency, which explains the typical difficulty of making institutional change. When this stability is interrupted by a turbulent or formative moment, there is opportunity to ignite institutional change (Peters et al., 2005, 1276). Tajali (2013) argues that the rise in gender quotas in developing countries can be attributed to the windows of opportunity that exist in countries after domestic crises (262). In Rwanda and Haiti, Tajali’s argument holds.

In Rwanda, the end of the genocide brought President Kagame into power, initially for only a transitional period. This transitional political environment led to the writing of policy papers that had direct impacts on the 2003 Constitution. In the year 2000, the Rwandan government released *Vision 2020*, outlining the country’s priority areas and strategies for building a nation for the future. In the document, good governance and a capable state were stressed as the first pillar of the vision, while gender equality was the first crosscutting area (Vision 2020, 2000, 13). By placing these priorities first, it was clear that good governance and gender equality were of utmost importance to the government. In Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper of 2002, again, good governance and gender equality were highlighted as priority areas and crosscutting themes (PRSP, 2002). These documents, created during the reconstruction period, paved the way for the 2003 Constitution that included institutional change of a gender quota (Chirwa, 2015, 114).

In Haiti, the national crisis of the 2010 earthquake provided another window of opportunity. The post-earthquake period provided a political opening to make changes to the 1987 constitution. Policy makers borrowed ideas from post-conflict countries, and suggested that the reconstruction period that Haiti faced post-earthquake be considered of the same magnitude as in countries that had experienced the end of conflict (Kozul-Wright et al., 2012). Therefore, historical institutionalism helps to explain why a gender quota was adopted in particular conjunctures in each country.

More recent research disaggregates the type of national crisis as a determinant of both a gender quota’s implementation and effectiveness at increasing female descriptive representation. In a study of African countries, Hughes and Tripp (2015) argue that the end of a civil war, particularly in contexts of high-intensity violence is a specific structural condition that explains the rise in female representation. They not only demonstrate that such relationship is correlated, but push further to suggest there is a causal relationship (1514). Applying this argument to our cases, one can understand why Rwanda, having experienced a civil war, has certainly achieved higher female representation. In contrast, Haiti’s situation propelled policy makers to view the post-earthquake as a time to implement similar policy reforms as in a post-conflict setting (Crane et al., 2010, 54), but the institutional changes have not had the same effect on female representation. It appears that specifically the effect of civil war can help to explain part of the differentiated outcomes between these two countries. The end of conflict may “create new
opportunity structures - peace talks, constitution-making exercises, new electoral commissions, and truth-and-reconciliation processes” (Hughes & Tripp, 2015, 1531) that were simply not present in Haiti’s post-earthquake context, despite the international push (Crane et al., 2010; Fatton, 2011) for Haiti to take advantage of this opening as if it were in a post-conflict setting.

A further disaggregation of the type of crisis could help to further explain the variance in outcomes. Agerberg and Kreft (forthcoming), present an argument that in conflicts where sexual violence is highly prevalent, there is a further increased likelihood of quota adoption. Given that sexual violence has gendered implications, it follows that this specific type of violence pushes women to politically mobilize (3). In Rwanda it is well documented that leading up to and during the genocide, women were subjected to brutal acts of sexual violence where rape was used as a weapon of genocide (Human Rights Watch, 1996). In Haiti following the earthquake, it was reported that at camps for internally displaced peoples gender-based violence was widespread, a signal that humanitarian responses had inadequately considered the additional risks women face in times of crisis (Davoren, 2012, 283). In both case countries, sexual violence was a significant issue and gender quotas were adopted following the crises, aligning with Agerberg and Kreft’s argument. This argument demonstrates that sexual violence in particular appears to provide a greater incentive for institutional changes that benefit women.

These structural arguments from the literature are only part of the story that explains the distinct outcomes of these cases. Historical institutionalism acknowledges the role of events and political struggle in instigating institutional change (Mackay et al., 2010, 575). The cases of Rwanda and Haiti are demonstrative of a larger pattern identified in the literature where a national crisis and gender-based violence can provide a window of opportunity for gender quota implementation (Tajali, 2013; Agerberg & Kreft, forthcoming), with civil war in particular
having a structural impact on the quota’s effectiveness (Hughes & Tripp, 2015). Yet, it would be a mistake to consider only these arguments to explain the contrast between the implementation of the gender quota in these countries. Indeed, unfortunately civil war and gender-based violence has been a reality since conflict has been documented; yet it is only recently that women have been able to mobilize after such extreme hardship to implement institutions such as gender quotas following these crises (Dr. A. Alexander, comment at conference, April 25, 2017).

Therefore, there are other elements from historical institutionalism that can help explain why a gender quota became institutionalized in these case countries, including a temporal role of timing and sequence of events.

The implementation of constitutional gender quotas is a fairly recent phenomenon. Tripp (2015) notes that before 1986, gender quotas were not implemented following civil wars. Even when a window of opportunity was made possible in post-conflict situations, and key actors from women’s movements desired change, women’s issues were not considered a priority and institutional changes that benefit women did not get implemented. Although Uganda was the first post-conflict country to implement a gender quota in 1986, this practice gained momentum following the forth UN Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (196). At this conference, a Platform for Action was established as it was recognized that previous strategies from other UN conferences on women to address the inequalities between women and men were inadequate (Reichert, 1998, 374). The conference brought women’s issues to the forefront, and it became an “international norm” that women could demand that their needs be addressed (Tripp, 2015, 197). This global ‘formative moment’ paved the way for women’s groups in Rwanda and Haiti to mobilize in their post-crisis environments.
Thus far, this institutional analysis has focused on the historical developments that gave an opportunity for the gender quotas to be implemented in the case countries. A missing piece of the argument is the key actors who pushed for the gender quota’s implementation. Including these key actors in this analysis borrows from discursive institutionalism, whereby actors are not only acting in or for their own self-interests, but for a greater ideational cause (Mackay et al., 2010, 575). It is the efforts of these key actors from women’s groups in Rwanda and Haiti that allowed for the institutional changes to be included during these windows of opportunity for constitutional change. A key actor in Rwanda was Judith Kanakuze, the only female member of the commission drafting the new constitution. She is credited with promoting the idea of the gender quota in the consultation process (Bauer & Burnet, 2013, 107). Kanakuze herself gives credit to Rwanda’s civil society organizations and the women’s movement, which organized under Collectifs Pro-femmes Twese Hamwe and put pressure on decision makers to include gender provisions in the new constitution (2004, 96).

In Haiti, key actors also pushed for the gender quota’s inclusion when a new constitution was drafted in 2011. The Minister for Culture and Communication at that time, Marie-Laurence Lassègue (2012), detailed how at the time when the constitutional amendments were voted on, there were only four female deputies in the Haitian National Assembly. She supported them by being present in person at the assembly on the voting day for the constitutional amendment. She also credited the efforts of Haitian feminist movement groups for their support of the quota. The organization Fanm Yo La (Women are Present) arranged a press conference and meetings with the president at the time, Michel Martelly, to add a gender quota to the 1987 Constitution, which did not include gender provisions (Alterpresse, September 7, 2011). The gender quota implementation in both case countries was made possible by the efforts of these key actors, who
were supported by a shift in international norms surrounding the rights of women, and historical windows of opportunity caused by crises in their countries.

Organizational institutionalism places greater emphasis on how actors interact with institutions (Mackay et al., 2010, 575), and there is evidence that the type of organizations in both countries influence the outcomes of the gender quota. In Rwanda, women’s councils are noted to have complemented the gender quota, whereas INGOs in Haiti are documented to divert attention and talent away from feminist organisations (Côté, 2014). As another institutional explanation for the rise in female participation in Rwanda, the significant rise in female political participation in Rwanda is largely attributed to the institutionalization of National Women’s Councils, an elected body that liaises with the President and members of cabinet and parliament (Article 178, Number 3, Rwanda Constitution, 2003). In an interview with Ambassador Fatuma Ndazinga about female empowerment in Rwanda, she highlighted how these councils enabled women to build capacity, gain empowerment, and find their voice, allowing them to better compete electorally with men. She detailed how these experienced women would then forego their reserved quota seats and compete electorally for the non-quota seats, allowing other, less experienced women to take their place in the reserved seats (The Daily Beast, 2014). Burnet (2011) argues that these councils primarily engaged elite women, served as a means to disseminate the government’s messages, and were “symbols of inclusion” rather than substantive gains (368). Nevertheless, these councils help explain why female representation has greatly surpassed the minimum 30 percent quota requirements.

In contrast, Haiti is dominated by international non-government organizations – over 10,000 are reported to exist in the country. Thus, an institutional analysis would be incomplete without acknowledging the impact these groups have on the country. Despite their presence,
development issues are hardly improving, “they exacerbate Haiti’s manifold problems, as much as they help to alleviate them (Gros, 2011, 147). A clear example of this is with local feminist organizations. Horton (2012) found that “international NGOs pay higher salaries and draw qualified personnel away from local women’s organisations with less access to funding” (300). Gros (2011) highlights the self-interested nature of INGOs; they have their own mandates and fulfill their own missions even when they parallel the functions of local organizations or even the state (147). Côté (2014) echoes these concerns, arguing that INGOs cast a shadow on feminist movements by instrumentalizing Haitian women as victims to propel their agendas forward. By framing Haitian women as helpless victims, they are able to move their own agenda forward, be it to obtain funds for their project or promote their own organization. Meanwhile, the local women’s groups are ignored and forgotten (216). Furthermore, when emergencies occur, donor interests shift from long-term gender equality projects to immediate humanitarian assistance, diverting funds away from feminist causes (Horton, 2012, 300). These points illustrate why the heavy INGO presence in Haiti may be limiting female political involvement.

There is another dimension of institutionalism that can help explain the implementation of gender quotas in these two countries. Rational choice institutionalism pushes this analysis to analyze other key actors who, for strategic reasons, would benefit from a gender quota’s implementation. In Rwanda, President Kagame’s party, formerly the RPF, now called the “Government of National Unity” (GNU), was finally responsible for implementing the gender quota and other women-friendly institutions. The President has received international recognition for this, including winning the 2007 African Gender Award as well as accolades from other African leaders, including the first female president on the continent, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (as cited in Burnet, 2008, 369; 371). Chirwa (2015) asks if this signal of gender equality is genuine,
or whether this government would implement such a quota for superficial reasons, or perhaps to attract foreign aid (120). A preliminary study from Carillo, Chiariello, and De Siano (2016) tests the validity of this ‘women’s participation instrumentalized as a tool for receiving foreign aid’ argument. Their results demonstrate that for African countries, when there is a higher share of females in parliaments, the country attracts more foreign aid (3). Whereas this study can be interpreted as an additional motivator for increasing female representation, Reyntjens (2004) argues that the women who have been elected are sympathizers of Kagame’s party (186), an indication that the quota could be reinforcing the power of the president.

In Haiti, the gender quota has had very little impact in affecting female representation in parliaments, indicating that while the government implemented the quota, it was a low-cost institution to implement. Political sociologist, Julien Sainvil, views the quota as an instrumentalization of the women’s movement, a small achievement that actually weakens the capacity of women’s groups to demand more substantive gains (Alterpresse, May 22, 2012). Nevertheless, despite the low number of female parliamentarians, when choosing cabinet ministers, President Martelly selected 7 female ministers out of the 22 positions, meeting the 30 percent quota. In response, sociologist and member of feminist group Kay Fanm, Danièle Magloire, argued that the quota is “a minimum, not a ceiling” (Ibid). Following the 2016 elections that brought Jovenel Moïse to power, again female representation is low, prompting women’s groups and the State University of Haiti to organize an inquiry that addressed the obstacles women faced, before, during, and after the election campaign (Alterpresse, January 23, 2017). As such, in Rwanda there are concerns that those in power attempt to appeal to the international community by using gender quotas as a tool. In Haiti, the concern is that by implementing a gender quota, it will appease women’s groups by providing them with a rather
ineffective institutional gain. Rational choice institutionalism buttresses these concerns, demonstrating how institutions can be used as means to temporarily satisfy the groups who are lobbying for changes without addressing the crux of the issue.

The gender quota does not address civil society, nor does it ensure substantive representation of women. In Rwanda, many of the women leaders who were integral in advocating for the gender quota in the 2003 Constitution are now members of government. Indeed, a study from Bauer and Okpotor (2013) analyzed the proportion of female cabinet ministers in African countries, and in Rwanda 31.6 percent of cabinet ministers were female (83), demonstrating that at the very least, a critical mass of women have joined the highest ranks of decision making in Rwanda. Yet Burnet (2008) argues that with the implementation of the quota, “as [women’s] participation has increased, [their] ability to influence policy making has decreased” (363). She found that their shift from civil society to government left a void in women’s organizations, whose lobbying efforts were integral to the pro-women policies being implemented. Their replacements lacked the experience to lobby for more policies, and the women in government became focused on other responsibilities, in particular towards supporting Kagame’s regime (379). Therefore according to Burnet, if legislative gains are to be made that benefit women, what is needed is a strong civil society lobbying for increased women’s rights and a responsive government.

In Haiti, concerns about the gender quota are echoed. Social worker and “militant feminist” Michaëlle Desrosiers, describes the gender quota as “a reformist tool, which does not bring about significant changes in the living conditions of the beneficiaries. It certainly contributes to reducing inequalities, but its main role is to bail out the ranks of the elites. The fundamental contradictions, producing these inequalities [between women and men], are
untouched by quotas” (Alterpresse, May 22, 2012). Sharing similar concerns, sociologist Danièle Magloire, asks whether women will continue to face discrimination once in office, highlighting the importance of quotas being accompanied by additional policies (Ibid.). All of these concerns speak to the fact that a gender quota alone cannot improve the situation for women in any country. In contexts like that of Haiti today, it may not even be able to increase female representation when it is implemented. The differences in outcomes of representation can be explained further by other institutional dynamics, notably in electoral systems.

Electoral System

The electoral systems in Rwanda and Haiti contribute to the differing levels of female political representation in the countries. Whereas an electoral system may appear to be gender-neutral at face value, research demonstrates that proportional representation (PR) systems typically foster higher levels of female political participation (Pitkin, 1967; Castles, 1981; Tremblay, 2006; Paxton et al., 2010). Rwanda’s gender quota is designed to work within the list-PR system, Article 77 of their constitution states that deputies “shall be elected by direct universal suffrage through a secret ballot from a final list of names using the system of proportional representation” (Rwanda Constitution, 2003). The gender quota ensures that a specific proportion of women are put onto those lists, effectively assuring that women will be elected to the parliament. Although the electoral system in Rwanda complements the gender quota, Tripp (2015) argues that the electoral system is a less important institutional variable for determining female representation. Her analysis in African countries shows that the above-mentioned factors, gender quota and post-conflict environment, are far better predictors of female representation (210). Stroh (2010) makes an argument that the PR system in Rwanda is fostering undemocratic outcomes by maintaining
authoritarian power of the president. Nevertheless, having a PR electoral system appears to be supporting the gender quota’s effectiveness at increasing female representation.

On the other hand, Haiti’s electoral system is an absolute majoritarian electoral system, where candidates must receive at least 50 percent of the vote in the first or second voting rounds (Political Database of the Americas, 2011). Though there is limited academic literature that attributes Haiti’s electoral system with its low female representation, requiring a candidate to win 50 percent of the vote, is an added barrier to prevent women from being elected. Sainvil argues that women need to strategize to find a means to reform the electoral system, given that the gender quota has been institutionalized (quoted in Alterpresse, January 23, 2017).

Norris (2000) summarizes the influence of the electoral system on representation by stating: “by itself, the electoral system is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to guarantee women’s representation. Nevertheless, the electoral system functions as a facilitating mechanism, which expedites implementation measures within parties – affirmative action, for example – for female candidates” (350). Comparing the electoral systems of Rwanda and Haiti demonstrates the facilitation role this institution has on influencing descriptive female representation.

Institutions that monitor corruption

Auditing and ombudsman institutions

The quantitative analysis demonstrated a strong correlation between the strength of auditing and reporting standards in a country and corruption perceptions. Looking at these institutions in Rwanda and Haiti can provide insights to explain corruption outcomes. Rwanda’s 2003 Constitution formally created the Office of the Auditor General of State Finances, responsible for auditing state finances and property (Article 183, 2003 Rwanda Constitution). Evelyn Kamagaju
Rutagwenda, a woman who was one of only 20 qualified accountants living in Rwanda at the time, was appointed as Auditor General in 2004. In 2009, she received the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants’ Global Achievement Award for Africa and the Middle East (Ngunjiri, 2009). In interviews with nine employees of the office of the auditor general and other government employees, Isaksson and Bigsten (2012) found that the office “is met with positive attitudes and that there is political will for reform and to work against corruption” (1875). However, their interviews also demonstrated that the auditor’s office is faced with capacity constraints that limit its ability to be independent, and furthermore, there are no rules to prevent the auditor general from being fired by the executive, potentially infringing on her independence (Ibid.). Nonetheless, the 2015 Global Competitiveness Report gives Rwanda a score of 5.1 out of 7 for auditing and reporting standards, relatively high compared to neighboring countries Burundi (3.6) and Kenya (4.5) (WEF, 2015). Therefore Rwanda’s auditor’s office appears to be a fairly effective institution to manage financial oversight.

The office of the ombudsman is another accountability institution that addresses corruption by dealing with poor government administration. In Rwanda, the Ombudsman office was created in 2004. The female in charge, Justice Cyanzayire Aloysie, spoke with reporter Baffour Ankomah in 2013 about her office’s role in reducing corruption in Rwanda. She explained how the office is able to investigate any public officials for corruption. They gather evidence from audits, but also have set up tools for citizens to report acts of corruption anonymously if they encounter it. Rwanda’s Leadership Code of Conduct (2008) outlines the responsibilities that public officials have to demonstrate to the ombudsman, including providing asset information on an annual basis. Although the powers of the ombudsman’s office to investigate extend as far as the ability to investigate the President’s wife, the President himself is
immune from prosecution (Ankomah, 2013). So while important institutional changes have been implemented and have served to improve governance, limits to accountability endure at the highest level of the political system.

In Haiti, auditing and reporting standards receive a lower grade of 3.6 out of 7 in the 2015 Global Competitiveness Report (WEF). O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, and Ilcan (2014) provide an analysis of how “a culture of audit is being embedded in Haiti” as international donors are increasingly taking over functions of the state (310). They argue that when international organizations mandate audits, they are not imposing a neutral institution, but a means of “shap[ing] conduct [through] relationships, practices, and habits” (313). A pre-earthquake analysis from Vannier (2010) echoes these arguments, demonstrating that international non-government organizations are very aware of auditing requirements, therefore they tend to avoid partnering with more political local organizations, “often resulting in an unintended depoliticization of community organizing” (283). He links the growing emphasis on audit institutions with an international push for a limited neoliberal government in Haiti. Indeed, in the post-earthquake setting where the international community pushed to ‘build back better’, “as an auditable development goal, the IMF has called for reductions in the number of state employees through the privatization of social services” (O’Connor et al., 2014). Many feminists critique such neoliberal reforms that reduce the public spending of governments, because they impact men and women in different ways, often undermining women by increasing their unpaid work burdens (Helleiner, 2003, 692). Therefore although my quantitative analysis demonstrated a strong link between auditing standards and reductions in corruption, it would be overly simplistic to assume that improving auditing in Haiti could both improve corruption and address the greater development issues and the needs of women in the country.
Another accountability office in Haiti is the ombudsman, called the *Office de la Protection du Citoyen et des Citoyennes*, enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. As is the case in Rwanda, a woman, Florence Elie, is at the helm of this organization (OPC, 2017). The organization allows citizens to report corruption online and protects individuals against government abuses. The office declared the year 2016 as *année de la femme*, the year of women (Ibid). In March 2016, a delegation from Haiti’s UN Women office came to visit the ombudsman office. Their meeting highlighted the need for these institutions to work together. The director of the protection of human rights for the ombudsman’s office took this meeting as an opportunity to state that budgetary constraints limit the overall effectiveness of this institution. Thus, these oversight organizations are recognizing the importance of women’s involvement in ensuring strong audit procedures. Whereas auditing and oversight institutions are highly correlated with measures of good governance, these case studies demonstrate that these institutions are faced with budgetary constraints and are not immune from potential corruptibility.

**Substantive representation or continued corruption?**

The Rwandan government has framed good governance as a measure of substantive representation of women. Powley (2005) writes, “Rwanda has actively promoted and emphasized women’s participation as a component of good governance” (14). Furthermore, given that women are so heavily involved in politics, they are actively engaged in the implementation of anti-corruption measures. Female politicians in Rwanda have contributed to good governance by pushing for increased decentralization, improved reconciliation efforts, consultative meetings where the constitution was drafted, partnerships between civil society and executive and legislative bodies, and forming the first cross-party caucus in parliament (Powley, 2005, 3). Kanakuze (2004) emphasizes that good governance “gives rise to the political will to
achieve gender equity and equality” (98). Yet it is important to remember that these advances have occurred in a climate of growing authoritarianism.

While the Rwandan government has framed good governance as an indicator of the substantive representation of women, the situation for all women has not improved in the country. Burnet (2011) argues, “urban, elite women have reaped the greatest benefits from these changes, thanks to increased access to salaried jobs, including lucrative positions in the national legislature and ministries, and greater purchasing power (for items like automobiles, clothing, and domestic servants), whereas rural peasant women in elected positions in local government have seen their workload increase and their economic security undermined” (305). Furthermore, researchers point to how increasing authoritarianism contradicts the improvements that have been made in the country. The organization Human Rights Watch has criticized the government for shutting down opposition parties and free speech (McVeigh, 2015). Mo Ibrahim, whose organization offers a large financial reward to African leaders committed to good governance, also notes the contradiction of Rwanda’s progress. He called it a “pity” that President Kagame is reported to seeking a third term, however emphasized that this cling to power should not be viewed as a reversal of all the gains that have been made in the country (as cited in Ibid., 2015). Thus it is difficult to objectively assess actual good governance in Rwanda, and the actual effect it has on different categories of women.

In Haiti, women’s descriptive representation in parliament remains low, but there are competing narratives that describe how this parliament is addressing the substantive representation of women. On one hand, the speaker of the chamber of deputies, Cholzer Chancy stated that despite the male dominance, he was prepared to give his word that the chamber would represent the interests of women « heureux de pouvoir prendre solennellement la parole et pour
dire aux femmes que la chambre des députés est à leur côté» (Alterpresse, March 11, 2016). In practice, however, the notion that men in parliament would represent the interests of women is yet to be demonstrated. Feminist leader of the organization Solidarite fanm ayisyèn, Lise-Marie Dejan, notes that in practice, politics is unfolding « au masculin » (Alterpresse, March 9, 2017). Moreover, the ruling political party, Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale, has been accused of perpetuating corruption (Haiti Sentinel, November 22, 2015) and of worsening the economic situation of women due to the party’s pro-business development model (Alterpresse, May 22, 2012; March 8, 2017).

*Focused comparison*

This focused comparison illustrates the complexity of the link between gender and corruption, and demonstrates how feminist institutionalism can deepen our understanding of that nuanced relationship. The analysis demonstrates how the implementation of one norm, the constitutional gender quota of 30 percent, can have very different outcomes depending on the institutional context of the country. In Rwanda the gender quota worked in tandem with proportional representation and ruling party interests to propel female representation to the highest level on earth. Institutions to address corruption have also been legitimized and by many indicators are working. Yet, some see the country’s increasing authoritarianism as a binding constraint on development.

In contrast, the electoral system and other institutional arrangements in Haiti do not clearly support the gender quota. As a result, only a few women have been elected in the national assembly since its implementation. This year, above the crowds at the annual Carnival festival in Port-au-Prince, the women’s organization Réseau des femmes candidats pour gagner hung a banner that had written, *Atik 17.1 konstitisyon amande a egzije kota 30% fanm nan tout espas*
pouvwa yo. Sonje!!! Translated to English this states, “article 17.1 of the amended constitution requires 30 percent women in all spaces of power. Remember!!!” This poster reminds us that despite the constraints on female political representation in Haiti, women’s organizations are still campaigning to boost awareness of this quota. Indeed, although the inclusion of the gender quota in the reformed constitution is a legislative gain, to quote Minister Lassègue (2012), the gender quota is only a “first step” to building an institutional environment in Haiti that supports women’s representation and improves good governance.

Whereas in Haiti, the goals of this gender quota have yet to be realized, in Rwanda they have surpassed expectations to make gender parity a reality in parliament. Nevertheless, both of these cases demonstrate that there are more efforts to be made to improve women’s substantive representation, good governance, and positive synergies between those major development goals.

Chapter 6. Conclusions and Further Research

Women have largely been excluded from politics since the inception of representative government. Despite the progress, women worldwide have yet to achieve a critical mass of political representation and men continue to hold more than three quarters of the seats in parliaments and upper houses (IPU, 2017). Gaining access to politics for any minority group tends to be incremental, from obtaining the vote to becoming members of parliament and the heads of government. After centuries of exclusion, women are slowly achieving political gains. The very characteristics that once served as arguments against women joining politics, such as compassion and risk-averse behaviour, are now viewed as characteristics that can enhance politics, making it more transparent and inclusive (Goetz, 2007, 90). Whereas philosophers Plato and Rousseau argued that women were unable to grasp ethical reasoning, women are now
associated with higher moral values than men (Ibid.). Thus, as more women join politics, great attention is being paid to the larger impact this can have on society. As having more women in politics is viewed as an indicator of greater gender equality, researchers are also able to explore whether there are increased societal benefits to increased levels of female inclusion in politics. Improved governance through reduced corruption is one such social utility benefit that is being researched.

This thesis approached the relationship between gender and corruption in two ways. The quantitative analysis demonstrated that the positive correlation between women in politics and corruption perceptions is small, yet significant. This demonstrates that increasing female representation in politics can have a modest effect in reducing corruption. The focused comparison of Rwanda and Haiti demonstrated how a similar institutional change, the implementation of a gender quota, has resulted in different outcomes in the countries based on their institutional contexts. Both approaches highlight the importance of institutions in determining female representation and corruption outcomes.

In the quantitative analysis, data from previous studies was updated; incorporating previously unexplored variables including female head of state or government and the percentages of legislated and voluntary quotas. An audit score from the QoG Expert Survey was added as an additional control variable. Results of this analysis showed that even with the additional control of the audit score, the relationship between women in politics and corruption remains positive and significant. In line with findings in the literature, PR/STV electoral systems and legislated gender quotas were correlated with increased corruption perceptions. Therefore policies associated with increased female representation do not necessarily correlate with
reduced corruption, highlighting how singular institutional changes are insufficient in addressing the many dimensions needed to improve gender inequality and reduce corruption.

Nevertheless, legislated gender quotas are being implemented in many developing countries, positioning them as interesting points of analysis for research. The 30 percent constitutional gender quota was implemented in both Rwanda and Haiti, yet we see very different female representation outcomes. By comparing these countries through a feminist institutional lens, the role of various institutions helped to demonstrate why both countries have achieved such different outcomes in female representation and corruption. Rwanda is a country where increased female representation has been coupled with improved corruption perceptions; nevertheless, these general improvements are occurring in an increasingly authoritarian environment. Haiti, in contrast, has not been able to increase female representation with the implementation of the gender quota; the country’s institutional environment helps to explain why female representation remains so low, and provides explanations as to why corruption remains so pervasive.

This focused comparison aligns with the findings from the quantitative analysis. Thus, these two approaches to the relationship between women in politics and corruption lead me to cautiously conclude that having more women elected in politics can indeed have a small impact in helping to improve perceptions of corruption. However, institutional context matters. Societies with strong auditing and reporting standards, strong democratic institutions, and high incomes are more strongly correlated with reduced corruption perceptions.

Of course, this analysis does not delve into all relevant dynamics. The thesis provided little information on intersectional feminism, focusing more on women as a monolithic group for the quantitative analysis. Despite calls for inclusivity and diversity in representation, the fact
remains that most political representatives tend to be elites. This analysis did not take racial, sexual, socioeconomic, or other types of diversity into account when using the proportion of women in parliaments as an indicator of female representation. An improvement in disaggregated data would make it possible to account for the diverse women who join politics in a quantifiable way. On the other hand it is elites who tend to benefit most from systematic corruption (The World Bank, 2017, 203). Therefore, in building upon evidence that recognizes that including more women in politics is correlated with less corruption, this analysis demonstrates that whether elite or not, women, having been excluded from politics for centuries, are contributing to an anti-corruption effect on existing power structures. Future analysis that incorporates the intersectional attributes of women would strengthen research on gender and corruption. This could be achieved through interviews with women in marginalized groups, or by pushing for availability of intersectional data at national and sub-national levels.

Further, this analysis did not provide a conclusive answer to the reverse causality issue—whether more women causes less corruption, or if less corrupt societies foster greater female political participation. Since correlation does not equal causation, this analysis does not attempt to prove otherwise. By having the time delay of one year on the dependent variable, I attempted methodologically to ensure that if the independent variables have an impact on corruption, it would take time before they were to have an effect. Therefore, by framing this relationship the way I did, the results suggest that encouraging more women to join politics is not only a push towards greater gender equality, but also a sound policy choice. However, the caveat is that my analysis demonstrated that policies designed to increase female representation, gender quotas and more broadly proportional representation electoral systems, do not clearly serve as a mechanisms to reduce corruption.
Further research on the substantive representation of women would benefit scholarly
discourse. In this analysis, substantive representation was limited to the issue of corruption,
which, as stated earlier, does impact women in unique ways. More analyses that articulate the
impact that descriptive female representation has on women’s substantive representation would
provide greater insight into the amount of power those women have once they reach political
office. Dahlerup (2006) calls for increased empirical-based research that builds upon the concept
of critical mass. Increased examination of how women represent the interests of women once
they are in office would be another useful avenue of research. An avenue for this research could
be looking at feminist laws or policies that have been implemented since an increase in female
descriptive representation or interviews with women’s organizations in the country to see if their
objectives have been recognized by the parliaments in their countries.

The quantitative analysis reinforced the importance of strong auditing institutions,
showing they are positively and significantly correlated with improved corruption perceptions.
The focused comparison approached audit and ombudsman institutions from a feminist
perspective, finding that female leadership was a feature of these institutions in Rwanda and
Haiti. This finding pushes for further research that could investigate whether gender balance of
other institutions has other social utility benefits. In particular, the role of female auditors general
or leaders of ombudsman offices could provide an interesting perspective on the link between
gender and corruption.

As women join positions of power from which they were excluded in previous times, it is
important to research the effect this has on society at large. This type of research demonstrates
that improving gender equality is not only a principle that should be achieved for equality’s sake,
but a sound policy choice. Whereas this approach is open to the criticism that it instrumentalizes
women, my opinion is that when women continue to face barriers to power, formal or informal, research that bolsters the normative concept of gender equality with evidence of positive externalities only further promotes the need for greater gender equality.
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Appendix A: Diagnostic Testing of Model

Diagnostic testing of the model used for my analysis will demonstrate the validity of this model. Andy Field (2013) provided the statistical guidance to accurately report the data. This testing shows that my statistical model demonstrates the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and is an appropriate statistical model.

Outliers

In the model, the first test is to determine if there are outliers that should be removed from the analysis. An analysis of standard residuals was carried out to determine any outliers in the data. The results demonstrate there are no outliers given that the residuals lie between 3.29 and -3.29, the numbers that indicate if there are outliers (Standard Residual Min. = -2.096, Standard Residual Max. = 2.467) (Dart, 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residuals Statistics³</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
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</thead>
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<td>80.27</td>
<td>47.80</td>
<td>17.163</td>
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<tr>
<td>Std. Predicted Value</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Std. Residual</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>107</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

³a. Dependent Variable: CORRUPT2016

Collinearity

An analysis of collinearity was conducted to ensure that two of my independent variables were not also highly correlated. To interpret the following table, the two columns on the far right must be considered (under the larger collinearity column). The tolerance value should be above 0.1, and the VIF value should be below 10 so there is not multicollinearity occurring (Dart, 2013). Therefore, the tests to see if the data met the assumption of collinearity indicated that
collinearity was not a concern (FREPAVE tolerance=.685, VIF=1.460; HEAD tolerance=.868, VIF=1.151; ELECT tolerance=.766, VIF=1.305; LEGQUOTA tolerance=.834, VIF=1.199; VOLQUOTA tolerance=.771, VIF=1.297; logGDPpercapita tolerance=.467, VIF=2.139; AUDIT tolerance=.446, VIF=2.243; DEMOCRACY tolerance=.439, VIF=2.280). The following table details these findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREPAVE</td>
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<tr>
<td>logGDPpercapita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRACY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QoGAudit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOL QUOTA percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOL QUOTA PERCENTAGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: CORRUPT2016

Independent Errors

Another test to determine the goodness of the model is the Durbin-Watson test. This test looks “for serial correlations between errors in regression models. Specifically, it tests whether adjacent residuals are correlated, which is useful in assessing the assumption of independent errors. The test statistic can vary between 0 and 4, with a value of 2 meaning that the residuals are uncorrelated” (Field, 2013, 874). The following table demonstrates that the Durbin-Watson test met the assumption of errors, given the value is 1.854, a value close to 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Summary b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), VOL QUOTA PERCENTAGE, QoGAudit, ELECT, LEG QUOTA percent, HEAD, FREPAVE, logGDPpercapita, DEMOCRACY
b. Dependent Variable: CORRUPT2016
Random Normally Distributed Errors, Homoscedasticity and Linearity

Histogram

In plotting the histogram, it is determined that my data falls under a normal, bell-shaped curve distribution. This indicates that my data is meeting the assumption of normally distributed residuals (Dart, 2013).
**P-P Plot**

These results are echoed by a P-P plot of regression standardized residuals. The aim for such plot is to have the variables (circles) matched as closely as possible to the line, indicating that there are few outliers. As one can see in the following plot, most of the circles are touching, or are very close to the slope, indicating normal distribution.
Scatterplot

The following scatterplot of residuals demonstrates a continued pattern of normally distributed errors. The aim for scatterplots is to have most of the data points around the centre of the plot, without skewedness towards one side. Although not all points are congregated around the centre, there is no discernable pattern that would indicate heteroscedasticity or non-linearity. Therefore, this scatterplot of standardized residuals demonstrates that my model meets the assumptions of homogeneity of variance and linearity (Dart, 2013).
Appendix B: Robustness Check

This robustness check analyzes the model using a different measure for corruption, the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index for the year 2016. Adding this additional measure of corruption assures the reader that my analysis is not just applicable to the CPI, but to other measures. The scoring for this measure is similar to the CPI, this index is from 0-100 where the absence of corruption would be scored as 100.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<td>.309**</td>
<td>.311**</td>
<td>.429**</td>
<td>.406**</td>
<td>.360*</td>
<td>.261*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.141)</td>
<td>(.132)</td>
<td>(.132)</td>
<td>(.134)</td>
<td>(.135)</td>
<td>(.140)</td>
<td>(.133)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1.343)</td>
<td>(1.319)</td>
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<td>(1.285)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.829)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>8.090***</td>
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</table>

*p < .06   **p < .01   ***p < .001 Dependent Variable: Control of Corruption World Bank (2016, World Bank)