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Canada
THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP OF MARCUS CICERO AND POMPEIUS MAGNUS

Lyman W. Gurney

This is an analysis of the impediments faced by Cicero, a novus homo, in his attempt to work with the nobles of Rome on an equal footing, and his consequent inability to meet Pompeius in true amicitia.

This thesis has been presented to the school of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the M.A. in Classical Studies.

Thesis adviser:
Professor S.M. Treggiari

December, 1981

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All dates are to be read as B.C. unless it is otherwise stated; clarity requires the expression "B.C." in a few instances.

Dates used in the correspondence of Cicero are taken from the edition of the letters by D.R. Shackleton Bailey, 1978.

The NEC spinwriter printer used for this work unaccountably prints an underlined capital Ω (Ω) with the appearance of an underlined capital Ω (Ω).
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Sources

Cicero: *Epistulae*: *Epistulae ad Atticum* = Cicero ad Att
           *Epistulae ad Familiarum* = Cicero ad Fam.
           *Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem* = Cicero ad Q.F.
Dio Cassius: *Roman History* = Dio Cassius.
Livy: *Ab Urbe Condita* = Livy A.U.C.
Sallust: *De Conjuratione Catilinae* = Sallust B.C.
          *Bellum Jugurthinum* = Sallust B.J.
Suetonius: *Divus Iulius* = Suetonius D.I.

Modern

Gruen, Erich: *Last Generation of the Roman Republic* = Gruen LGRR.
Hellegouarch, H. *Le Vocabulaire latin des Relations et de Partis Politiques sous la République* = Hellegouarch.
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

Cicero's effective political amicitia with Pompeius Magnus followed cycles of constant change and alteration which appear to have changed abruptly whenever Pompeius felt that needed assistance would not be forthcoming from within their alliance, and indeed, that Cicero would be an actual obstacle to its attainment. These alterations culminated in the abrupt, cynical and brutal use of Cicero by Pompeius at Luca in forcing Caesar to an agreement apparently most advantageous to Pompeius. Yet, with the onset of the Civil war, when Cicero was in despair about both Caesar and Pompeius, and knew that he should follow neither, he reluctantly followed Pompeius without being able to explain why.

This work will analyze these cycles and attempt to discover why and how Cicero enjoyed such power as to be able to work on apparent equality with Caesar and Pompeius when he was in agreement with their desires, yet was unable to defend himself against them when his purposes came into collision with theirs.

It appears from the evidence that Cicero, as a novus homo who lacked a large and powerful family network of amicitia, was always unable at the critical time to command such power as would compete directly with the brute force marshalled by politicians of the stamp of Clodius, Pompeius, Crassus or Caesar. There is a difference, both qualitative and quantitative, between the amicitia controlled by one who gained it in the courts, as did Cicero, and that gained by Crassus, with his network of clients bound to him by officium, or the immense resources of army commanders who had held one of the great special commands.
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

About one-third of the yearly magistrates apparently failed or refused to undertake pro-magistracies, as will be discussed in chapter II. It appears, therefore, that some risk or otherwise negative aspect of the task prevented many from following what had become almost imperative in the amassing of clientelae and financial resources for continuing in the cursus. Since those men who failed to take up promagistracies thereby lacked the essential power enjoyed by the successful proconsuls, they must have been at a permanent disadvantage in further political crises in Rome when they necessarily came into conflict with the interests of such men.

There appears to be a strong probability that success in the courts after a session as governor of a province was possible in general only to those who held the maximum strength in the networks of amicitia in the most noble families — to others the cost of necessary influence was impossible. Given these constraints upon the novus homo who had been successful in the cursus, new restrictions on freedom of action in matters of debt and agrarian reform will become clear.

All these problems for the consularis who lacked the background of ancient families united to modify his sphere of action when his aims were at cross purposes with those of a Caesar or Pompeius, and suggest reasons for decisions which are otherwise opaque. It was quite possibly this factor which operated upon Cicero whenever he came into conflict with the wishes of Caesar or Pompeius, and which both caused the problem and prevented him from finding a solution which could maintain his position relative to them.

The steps of the cursus might be described as a "Pilgrim's
Progress" wherein the rewards were great, but the path was so difficult at the upper reaches that only the most dedicated and fortunate survived to the consulship.

Cicero, as a novus homo, had a further difficulty to surmount: the consulate was guarded as a special preserve by the nobles, as has been well documented by Gelzer in his Roman Nobility, and despite his great influence gained in the courts, Cicero was constrained to attempt to create a personal alliance with Pompeius, a political amicitia, which would circumvent the actions of the nobles. That Cicero forged this alliance to his own purposes meant, however, that it could be broken at need by Pompeius since their powers were quantitatively different.

Following Pompeius' dismissal of his army after the Mithridatic War and his return to Rome, the pattern of alliances began to shift as his essential weakness politically became clear. A particular speech by Crassus appears to throw into sharp relief the problem of senatorial obstructionism facing Pompeius that led to the next crisis in Cicero's relations with him and ultimately to Cicero's expulsion into exile.

The reasons for Cicero's permanent attitude to both debt and agrarian reform lay in part in his aristocratic perception of values and people. Since this attitude had a sometimes disastrous affect upon his relations with Caesar and Pompeius, the general question of aristocratic stance should be analyzed.

Another reason for Cicero's basic attitude to land and debt reform lies in his fear of sudden catastrophic change initiated by basic modification in the political environment of Rome. It is easier to comprehend the intuitive understanding of such a political process if the
analogous physical phenomena "stable equilibrium" and "unstable equilibrium" are considered first. These concepts taken from physics are valid comparisons, for the almost uncontrolled infusions of wealth from praetorian and consular provinces constituted radical changes in the political environment. The result of these was a serious instability in the political process, which could then lie open to the designs of such adventurers as Caesar.

The deep political and economic convictions of Cicero led inevitably to the sequence of events culminating in his dismissal as a Roman consularius and expulsion into exile. His very great abilities constituted sufficient reason for his rehabilitation, however, and he was enabled by the efforts of Pompeius to re-enter the political arena. The political disabilities that flowed from the officium gained by Pompeius were nevertheless of paramount importance, as doubtless Pompeius had envisaged, and crippled Cicero's efforts at independent action until the end of Pompeius' life.

The paralyzing hold of Pompeius on Cicero's freedom of action after his return can best be understood by a sympathetic yet critical reading of the letters from exile. Cicero's initial position had been one of anger towards Pompeius for his failure to fulfill promises of aid and protection against Clodius. The gradual shift during his exile to a position of concentrating all his hopes on Pompeius demonstrates the probability that Cicero had actually placed himself unwittingly, or had been manoeuvred, into a subservient position with respect to any possible future amicitia because of his debt of officium.

Cicero's conception of suicide as the natural reply of a Roman
consularis to an intolerable and irreparable defeat enters the question of his relationship to Pompeius, since it was one more element which focussed his mind and his loyalties upon the one who had saved him, and had earned thereby almost limitless officium.

The twin paradoxes of Cicero's political life after his exile and the reinforcement of its lesson after Luca are equally puzzling: his agreement to defend his most hated enemy, Gabinius; and his reluctant trailing after Pompeius to Greece although he had found both Caesar and Pompeius to have become equally distasteful politically.

All the elements discussed up to this point were involved in these final decisions: from his initial attempt to be a Laelius to Pompeius' Africanus in 62 to his position of helpless subservience which is marked by his defence of Gabinius, an amicus of Pompeius. His final decision to follow Pompeius from Italy was probably not the gratuitous act he believed it to be, but was quite possibly foreordained by the entire cycle of events that had led to his restoration from exile and to the consequent reinforcement in his mind of Pompeius as his superior.
CURSUS AND CONSULSHIP: BARRIERS TO THE NOVUS HOMO

CHAPTER II
Cursus and Consulship: Barriers to a Novus Homo

In his final step in the cursus, Cicero attempted a barrier that would be at least several orders of magnitude greater than anything that he had attempted before. The aedileship was relatively easy to attain in Rome; even the praetorship was not a serious barrier to a novus homo of great gifts. The consulship, however, was a matter of honour to the nobiles and as such was defended by them bitterly and doggedly to the end of the effective existence of the Republic [1].

For most, even from within the nobility so-called, the leap between the praetorship and the consulship was virtually insuperable. No novus homo had attained the rank for 30 years before Cicero's successful attempt in 63, and the reasons lay in the perception held by the nobiles of their position in the state and of their natural prerogatives [2].

The interlocking relationships between the families that considered it their preserve were so effective that only accident of occasion or actual shortage of candidates could permit anyone to attain the rank from without the circle of the anointed [3]. When, for example, P. Cornelius Rufinus, both Patrician and noble, who had been twice consul and once dictator in the Samnite and Pyrrhic wars, was expelled from the Senate by his arch-enemy C. Fabricius for the ostensible reason of possession of more than the permitted ten pounds of silver plate, his family was reduced to praetorian status for generations without being able to break the cycle of impediments to superior status [4]. His great-grandson, Publius Sulla, was praetor in 186 but was unable to proceed further; not until the grand-son of that man, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, born in 138, was the cycle broken. And it can scarcely be claimed that the aristocracy had amicably opened ranks to that adventurer so as to facilitate his approach to the consulship.
Furthermore, his success was not such as to inspire hope for advancement in the novus homo Cicero.

Further examples of the stagnation of families at the praetorian level abound and can only have made even more determined Cicero's concentration on his objective. The Murenae, for example, were locked at that level; the Tremellae remained there for seven generations [5]. Cicero's determined courting of the moneyed and landed classes of Rome was forced by the need for allies who would perhaps accept adequate proof of determination to protect the status quo in questions of land in Italy (as with Rullus in 63). He had no great nexus of family relationships to provide virtually guaranteed entry to the consulship; he could only offer his own clientela which he had created in the courts. In place of the complex of relationships linking equites and nobiles, he had to seek a consensus between the orders: a concordia ordinum which would be his answer to the ready-made relationships of his competitors. His other hope was to enter the consulship in the hiatus before the return of Pompeius from the East in a few year's time, since Pompeius would probably wish the consulship for himself and for favourite lieutenants. Even so, his resources were few in comparison with those of any entering from the ranks of the nobiles: something further was necessary [6].

His card in reserve was the belief that he implanted in Rome that he was working closely with Pompeius in a relation of political amicitia. He had officium enough owing from Pompeius because of his assistance in the bill of Manilius on the war against Mithradates and perhaps from the defence of C. Cornelius in 65 [7]. This would probably ensure at least the benevolent neutrality of Pompeius. The influence that Atticus had with the
adherents of Pompeius was perhaps sufficient to ensure their support in
candidature and in the election itself. For it is quite clear from the
eyearly letters to Atticus that Cicero was depending upon the 'band-wagon'
effect to take him to success [8], and that there would be sufficient vocal
support to make his continued candidacy valid and believable.

Luck provided the extra support, for the fears of the landed and
moneyed were raised by the candidacy of Catiline to the point that the only
viable alternative to Catiline was Cicero.

More than mere nominal credit for the results must be given to Cicero
himself, of course, since he had quite clearly been first in the estimation
of the Roman people in the elections for the aedileship and the
praetorship, to the extent that he had each time headed the polls in the
latter election when counting was interrupted or disallowed [9], hence his
own contribution must not be unnecessarily downgraded in any analysis of
the results in the elections of 64. In this, he had followed his childhood
dream, "far to excell, out-topping the rest." [10] He himself had gained
considerable support in Rome for his work in the courts, and this support
rallied to him in the elections; but it was the fortunate element of chance
that provided the last critical aid: the dearth of creditable noble talent
in the elections. Otherwise, even the support provided by his work in the
courts would have melted away at the imperative of the hereditary nobiles
that the consulship be held by one of their own number [11].

Many of these men had perhaps never been reconciled to Cicero, even
from the days of his candidature for aedile (during the trial of Verres),
and much of his energy had been expended, not upon the affairs of Rome, but
upon maintaining his defences against their attacks. From the trial of
Sextus Roscius of Ameria in 80 to that of Verres in 70, Cicero had shown himself the champion of the Senate: not the senate of the pauci, who wished its senior posts to be their private reservation, but that part of the Senate that 'voted with its feet': the pedarii [12]. This was the part that was never called upon to speak but rather voted in the divisions and thus gave its mute verdict in any discussion, and without the secret ballot. In the earlier trial of 80, Cicero had spoken for all, even the pauci, for he was vindicating the rights of the Metelli, especially, to protect their clients and thereby their own position in Rome. In the trial of Verres, however, Cicero was emphasizing to the Senate that its own position would be in danger if the excesses of a few were not curtailed. Here he came into collision with the Metelli [13], but the disadvantages were minimal compared to the advantage of aiding Pompeius to reassert his influence in Sicily, first gained in civil war under Sulla [14]. Hence Cicero there alienated some of the nobles, the pauci as he was later wont to describe them [15]. Hortensius, Scipio Nasica, the Metelli and many others were expendable to a degree; indeed, were already lost before the case began. Hortensius was silenced by the brilliance of Cicero’s attack, and of the three Metelli, Q. Caecilius Metellus (Creticus) did hold his consulship together with Q. Hortensius in 69; but L. Caecilius Metellus died early in his term as consul in 68, and M. Caecilius Metellus did not reach beyond his praetorship of 69. Hence the benefits were immense and the debts minimal. The degree of his own popularity can be gauged by his signal success in the election for praetor shortly after, in which he topped the poll despite the efforts of the Metelli and Hortensius, and the large funding of his opposition by Verres, who had hoped that a chastened
Cicero would be unable to maintain his momentum in the prosecution.

Verres failed despite all the sympathy that his funding of the elections of two Metelli gave him, and this encouraged Cicero, who, armed with an indispensable praetor's warrant, had been able to employ all his great abilities in this prosecution in a manner which demonstrated all the qualities that several years later drove him to the consulship under much the same liability of antagonism from the leading optimates.

Cicero's strength now lay constantly with the moderates of the Senate. The aid of this group, and whatever machinations that made their backing so explicit at this time, made possible also the defence of C. Cornelius, tribune of 67 and author of bills that attacked bribery and blocked devices used by the Senate in rushing through bills when few members were present. Cornelius had forced a law requiring a quorum of 200 senators and in doing so had prevented a tribune's veto [16]; for this he was unsuccessfully attacked in 66, but after the Senate's success against Manilius, was attacked again. In this case, Cicero was once more able to draw upon even more support in his policy of detaching moderates from the ultra-conservatives of the Senate, the pauci.

In his progress through the cursus, Cicero had also the backing of one of the most influential of the hereditary aristocrats: Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, brother-in-law to Marcus Cato, and centre of a web of immense power in Rome. In July of 65, Cicero was forced to refuse to aid Caecilius, uncle of Atticus, since such aid would in turn have involved an attack on Aulus Caninius Satyrus, and consequently his patron Domitius, on whom Cicero's hopes for his candidature centered: in quo uno maxime ambitio nostra nititur [17].
Domitian was obviously a man to be handled very carefully, especially by a novus homo. In 50, Caelius Rufus was to describe Domitian's vindictiveness by: ... ut ne familiarern quidem suum quenquam tam odedit quam me ... (which Caelius was obviously quite capable of handling) [18]. Furthermore, Cicero had earlier referred to Lucius Domitian as "the perpetual enemy of his friends" [19].

It is well to remember, however, that all was not plain-sailing for anyone even of Cicero's gifts in plotting a passage between the diverse needs of the Senate, the equites, the tribunes and Pompey.

In the speech for Pompeius' imperium, Cicero had guaranteed assistance to Manilius if the latter were to be charged in the courts in retaliation for his moving a bill in Pompeius' favour [20]. When the guarantee of assistance was invoked by Manilius, conditions had changed. Pompeius had left and Cicero suddenly found that he was compelled to face a responsibility which, if he refused, would destroy the amicitia and its officium that he had so carefully built up in the year; yet which, if he did face it, would bring him into conflict with the nobles as a group. For Manilius had deeply antagonized the nobles by introduction of a bill for the re-distribution of freedmen in the tribes in a manner that would have diminished the voting control of the nobles. Cicero attempted to solve the problem by scheduling the case at the very end of the year, since Manilius would relinquish his tribunate on the tenth of December. In this way, Cicero would be able to act as praetor in charge of the trial and, if all went well, would utilize the same strategy that had been so signally successful in the quaestio de repetundis of C. Licinius Macer, in which Cicero's dispassionate attitude and impartial control had apparently won.
him great honour with the people [21].

Such was not to be the case with Manilius: the tribunes saw only that Cicero had left Manilius virtually no time to prepare a defence, and summoned him to a contio to explain such conduct to one favoured by the people. Cicero was forced to an agreement that he would personally defend Manilius in the following year, and with that, ran considerable risk of incurring more enmity amongst the nobles and their clients than he had amassed benevolentia amongst those devoted to Pompeius. Violence at his first trial, troubles in the state [22], and the final voluntary exile of Manilius allowed Cicero to escape this potentially dangerous defence. The point had been well made, however, that he was not to enjoy the political good-will of those of Pompeius' persuasion without having to live within the tenets of such persuasion - at least until the elections. It should also be noted that Cicero was obviously by default the one considered most suited to maintain the defence of those favoured by Pompeius, and was not to be allowed to detract at all from that position of duty and responsibility, with all its attendant benefits, without losing the favour himself of those well disposed to Pompeius.

His success in this election was accompanied by two main effects that would have continuing ramifications in his later career as consularis. First, he had called in his debt of officium from Pompeius in making his call to the electorate on the existence of a special relationship with the general, and he would be held accountable by Pompeius for the use that he had made of his name and any political disadvantages that might accrue to Pompeius from the association. Second, he had gained the contempt of many of the optimates who had tolerated him to the extent of perhaps granting
Cursus and consulship: Barriers to a novus homo

him their support in the elections, but only with the mental reservation that he was the least harmful of a bad lot. There was no groundswell of support on the side of the aristocrats: rather, he had suffered opprobrium and contempt for his having entered by accident a preserve for which he was simply not qualified by birth. He was an unworthy interloper who was permitted in only by an accident of law and occasion.

Quintus Cicero's Commentariolum Petitionis is quite explicit on the attitude of many: ... multorum adrogantia, multorum contumacia, multorum malevolentia, multorum superbia, ... perferenda est [23].

Sallust in his Bellum Jugurthinum makes clear an earlier attitude to the novus homo:

Novus nemo tam clarus neque tam egregius factis erat, quin dignus illo honore et is quasi pollutus haberetur. [24]

In his Bellum Catilinae, Sallust gives further discussion with reference to Cicero:


In the pro Plancio, Cicero makes clear the special privileges available to the nobiles, never available to the novus homo.

Quo quidem tempore, si id, Laterensis, facere voluisses aut si gravitatis esse putasses tuae, quod multi nobiles saepe fecerunt, ut, cum minus valuisserent suffragiis quam putasset, postea prolatis comitis prostermerent se et populo Romano fracto animo atque humili supplicarent, non dubito quin omnis ad te conversura fuerit multitudo. [26]
His entire speech consists of arguments designed to refute the prosecution's assumption that Plancius was unworthy of election as aedile because of his lowly birth. In essence, he attacks the concept of privilege defined in:

"...: hic familia consulari est, ille praetoria; reliquos video esse equestri loco: sunt omnes sine macula, sunt aequorum viri atque integri; sed servari necesse est gradus: cedat consulari generi praetorium, nec contendat cum praetorio nomine equester locus." Sublata sunt studia, extinctae suffragationes, nullae contentiones, nulla libertas populi in mandandis magistratibus, nulla expectatio suffragiorum:... [27]

A further example of this attitude can be found in the pro Murena: ... non arbitrabar, cum ex familia vetere et illustri consul designatus ab 'equitis Romani filii' consule defendetur, de generis novitate accusatores esse dicturos [28].

The attitude of noble contempt and condescension in which Cicero was compelled to work must have been obvious sufficiently often for it to have been a matter of trouble for Cicero's nerves. His constant preoccupation with the honours resulting from his consulship is probably evidence enough for this. How he handled it can perhaps be considered from the standpoint of stress faced and conquered in major athletic competitions of our present day; for in no other field of endeavour is the sense of competition so pervasive and the dedication required for success so total.

It is clear in a study of athletic records that standards have risen steadily over the years and that they can be expected to do so into the
indefinite future as records continue to be broken each year. The reason appears to be that athletes are not fighting to pass some final barrier that is a standard against which all must be measured, but are attempting to meet the present competition and win a medal or prize. Obviously a "... highly competitive situation brings out in the finest of athletes a level of performance of which even they are incapable under less challenging circumstances." [29] This was the situation in which Cicero found himself: he faced the challenge of winning the consulship against the combined indifference and prejudice of the hereditary nobility, and the lack of family and social ties that made such attainment relatively easy for the nobles. In doing so, however, he showed the concentrated drive and ability that had taken him to the premier place in earlier elections. He was, perhaps aided by the vagaries of chance in the lack both of believable competition and of danger from the competition, but, in the last analysis, he was an acceptable alternative only because he was prepared for and able to accept the challenge. The aid he received from Pompeius' name, and fear generated by the candidature of Catiline must not be permitted to obscure the great base he had prepared for himself and his campaign in the years leading up to the election. Only a man of the greatest gifts could have seized the opportunity when it became available. A 'hollow man' and empty braggart, as Carcopino [30] and others have claimed to find Cicero in later days, would not have been prepared to accept and defeat the challenge that he faced. Catiline could taunt Cicero with the word *inguinalis civis urbis Romae* [31] in the Senate, and there would probably have been a titter of amusement amongst the aristocrats at Cicero's discomfiture, but Cicero had earned the right to drive that scion of the nobility, Catiline, to such
jibes by his unremitting efforts in past years in the courts. He had been under the merciless eye of Romans whose judgements were honed to an intense degree by speeches of attack and defence in the law-courts where they were often a veritable extension of the political arena and were treated as such in partisan battles for the discomfiture or even political obliteration of political rivals. Cicero had endured an intense scrutiny for years in the courts and when the country faced the candidature of Catiline and the vague sense of danger that his conduct engendered [32], the legacy of Cicero's commitment in the courts was the deciding factor in the election, for the people knew their man and allowed his good fortune and Pompeius' name to guarantee his elevation to the responsibility.

In any evaluation, however, of Cicero's contribution to the continued political stability of Rome, it is ironic that the seeds of his eventual destruction as a plausible contender in affairs lay in the attributes that ensured his success in his advance to the consulship. In the face of vague and diffuse dangers that were radiating from Catiline's moves, the Romans naturally gravitated to any guarantor of the status quo, their natural reply to the new and unfamiliar. Cicero's immediate defence of the present status in anything pertaining to a reapportionment of land was known; it was a reflex on his part that could not be turned even by a later threatened defection by Pompeius or the antagonism of Caesar; it was a part of Cicero himself and brought him to both good and ill in the Republic. Cicero can be criticized for a lack of creative policy - for an indifference to the needs and suffering of the poor and oppressed. Yet his mind was in part a creation of the suffering created by the dynastic troubles of the previous half-century. The fluidity of property lines that
characterized the times of Marius and Sulla imbued him deeply with a horror of any change. Perhaps there was injustice and suffering in a failure to alleviate inequities, but there had been driven into his psyche a belief that such was nothing as compared to the suffering attendant upon any major re-appportionment of land; he was defending the most deeply seated and natural reactions of a perceptive and articulate human who saw the unpredictable results that flooded in after any slight breach in the concept of the inviolability of natural possessions. If this made him appear callous and indifferent to the needs of those who, unlike himself, had suffered from persecution and land re-distribution, it was because he was one of the lucky ones who had not suffered personally and was therefore satisfied that justice would be done if the re-distribution were not continued in the name of justice. His family had been on the winning side, and it is the winners who both make and write history.

The possible charge that he failed to use his paramount gifts of intelligence and ability to communicate and lead, in contrast perhaps to Caesar and the later Augustus, is a deeper matter that underlies the reasons for his successes and failures as consul and consularis. The reasons that give substance to this charge lie once again in his deliberate and reasoned refusal to take up provincial commands. When he remained immersed in Roman political life without the more free atmosphere of the provinces, he was always bounded by the checks and balances of political and legal strife. His entire training was directed from his earliest days in a narrow and straitened path; there were no broad vistas to make his attention wander; he saw no variant means of solution of problems. For the cursus in Rome directed a boy to accept utterly and completely the dicta of
success; this was character-training by reinforcement in the most dedicated and intensive of all arenas. The fact that he chose it when he could have walked the freer paths of provincial command is perhaps significant. The wider and less manipulated spirit of Julius Caesar rejoiced in the freedom of command. It was here that he discovered that solutions to new problems can be found if one is willing to attempt new techniques; but such learning requires both the innate ability, and teaching. This was true of Caesar, if not of Pompeius. It was a positive re-enforcement of exactly the same sort that had affected Cicero; the difference was perhaps that Caesar did not come from the winning side: he sprang from the family of Marius and had once even risked all for his defiance of the Dictator over his early marriage [33]. Since he had trained his spirit to seek new solutions for new problems, he was particularly suited for what we might call the 'Gordian Knot' solution.

For all its weaknesses, there is a basic element of value in the theory of Arnold Toynbee that every society is faced by a constant series of challenges to its continued existence and must reply to them. The groups, however, that are chosen for the replies are by their nature and success so deeply entrenched in control that the reaction time of the society to each new set of problems is gradually increased by the time required for each new group to gain control from the earlier. There finally comes a time when the delay in reaching power by the final group is so great that the society collapses through the very failure of this group to remove its predecessor in time for a solution to the latest crisis.

Since Cicero's refusal to accept a praetorship or proconsulship had serious effects upon his clientela, upon his finances and upon his very
attitude to Roman rule, some discussion of the reasons behind his refusal is necessary.

The ostensible and obvious reason, given in the pro Plancio in 55, was his intention henceforth to remain in the eyes of the voters of Rome after his almost unnoticed quaestorship in Lilybaeum in 75 [34].

The deeper and probably more important reason is that he had seen the conflicts between governors and Roman businessmen and knew that he lacked the network of amicitia necessary for survival in the almost inevitable legal attacks and challenges following a governorship. He knew how the publicani had destroyed the career of P. Rutilius Rufus since they could not reach the more severely defended Q. Mucius Scaevola [35].

He warned P. Cornelius Lentulus (cos. 57) in a letter of December 54 concerning similar dangers facing that man from his proconsulship in Cilicia:

Pelicitate quadam vellem consequate potuisse, ne eius ordinis, quem semper ornasti, rem aut voluntatem offenderes ...; sed nosti consuetudinem hominum. Scis quam graviter inimici ipsi illi Q. Scaevolae fuerint. [36]

The effect of this decision would be reinforced later when he saw the possibilities of revenge against himself while he was in exile. His enemies could attack him through Q. Cicero, praetor in 62 and governor from 61 to 58 in Asia. In May of 58, Appius Claudius Pulcher (to be consul in 54) would be praetor in the quaestio de repetundis and would have position and power to effect any penalty desired: ....; sane sum in meo infinito maerore sollicitus, et eo magis quod Appi quaestio est [37].
Cursus and Consulship: Barriers to a Novus Homo

In this correspondence, he must have had the recollection of his letter of early 59 to Quintus in which he had mentioned several times the publicani, negotiatores and equites in general. His comments about the Equites in that letter were very restrained, and Quintus was undoubtedly expected to read into them a much more dire warning than could be entrusted to the mail.

Atqui huic tuae voluntati ac diligentiae difficultatem magnum afferunt publicani; quibus si adversamur, ordinem de nobis optime meritum ...

[38]

This and the passage following it are warning enough of the risks connected with the hostility of those who constituted two-thirds of the judges in the courts.

Cicero visited Greece in 79, then Smyrna, where he spoke with P. Rutilius Rufus in about the fifteenth year of his exile. Their meeting probably came about from their amicitia held in common with Scaevola the Augur. Much later, in On the Republic, Cicero had Rutilius Rufus describe conversations with Scipio Aemilianus and his friends, conversations dealing with a saner age [39].

We cannot forget one other comment, however, which appears to represent something that was always in Cicero's mind: cum ... P. Rutilio damnato nemo tam innocens videretur ut non timeret illa [40].

The thread of understanding that comes from all these occurrences is that Cicero early understood that his lack of family connections and broadly-based amicitia amongst the nobiles would leave him naked and defenceless in any confrontation with the equites. It was his position as novus homo lacking deep support in the governing class that in part drove
him to an attempted creation of a *concordia ordinum*, to his defence of the *equites* and to his attempt to create a link of *amicitia* with Pompeius that would preserve the republic he knew, and simultaneously guarantee himself the support and protection that he lacked. We can gain the barest hint of the difficult path that he followed when we note that the father of Cn. Plancius, who protected him in Thessalonica in 58, was the somewhat violent leader of the *publicani* who requested and demanded a reduction in the contract for taxes in Asia in 61 [41].

The degree of suspicion and intolerance to which he must have been exposed can be discovered only indirectly, mainly from the letters of later years when he was *consularis*. The rapidity with which Metellus Celer forgot the *officium* granted him by Cicero in 63 over the governorship in Cisalpine Gaul bespeaks a reflex action that resulted when a man of Cicero’s social origins dared to reply forcefully to an attack made by a man from the family of Cornelius Nepos [42]. The criticism was that of ‘old money’ towards ‘new money’: Cicero was simply reminded that he lacked the saving grace of ancient lineage that would have made his defence credible to an aristocrat; anything he might say in his own defence was out of turn simply because he was of the wrong social order, and his mere accession to the consulship was of no consequence in such a consideration.

Another, even more blatant example, comes years later, but is applicable in the 60’s. The antagonism felt by Appius Claudius for Cicero during the days in Cilicia was almost palpable. Appius obviously was of the persuasion that a constant, sniping offence was the appropriate mode for dealing with an interloper; and although Cicero at that time was deeply concerned with placating Appius, he was still concerned to defend himself
so that Appius might not be victorious by default. The contempt and disdain held by this descendant of ancient nobility was obvious and brutal. In letter after letter [43] he attempts to keep Cicero on the defensive and on edge; it is the same basic technique used later by Pompeius, but the difference was that Cicero was not deeply in need of Appius' assistance, only of his neutrality. The one appearance of Appius on amicable terms seems clearly to be a demonstration of condescension on his part: for it came with the dedication to Cicero by Appius of a book on augury. Clearly the gift would have been scarcely noticed had there been the usual mood of antagonism between the two men; hence the improvement of relations appears to have been an expedient of Appius to permit him to vaunt himself as tutor in augury to Cicero [44], and to force Cicero to be dependent upon Appius' good will in obtaining a supplicatio for his military success in Cilicia [45].

Faced with the intransigent hauteur of this aristocrat in full cry, Cicero was at one point driven to the riposte, when hit once too often by a barb aimed at his non-aristocratic unworthiness: ... ullam Appietatem aut Lentulitatem valere apud me plus, quam ornamenta virtutis, existimas? [46] This affectation by nobles of their inherent superiority was perhaps made all the greater by Cicero's insistence upon his services to his country in the great year 63, claims that must have grated constantly upon the ears of men accustomed to honours from the earliest years, men such as Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus of whom Cicero said: ... qui tot annos, quot habet, designatus consul fuerit, ... [47]. But even then, we must note that his claims are made only for the consulship, not for any other service to the Roman state, and must be accounted, given the attitude of his aristocratic
competitors in face of his inferior birth, as the near-desperate attempts of a self-made man attempting to keep his deeds fresh in the minds of his fellow citizens when such deeds were all he had in the competition of reputations with full aristocrats whose very names granted the benefits that were Cicero's only by his own creation: he was nothing unless those exploits were constantly in the minds of all citizens and of the senators in particular. The criticisms aimed at his constant discussion of his exploits, even in defence of his friends, may well stem from the same general problem: his friends were attacked as a warning to others not to find themselves bound to this interloper in the byways and intricacies of Roman politics. He must have been compelled to identify the political successes of himself with those cases of attacks upon his friends so that the idea of warning his friends not to deal with him would miss fire [48].

It is a tribute to the enormous degree of popularity enjoyed by Cicero in Rome that he shared the respect of Caesar with Cato alone, Cato who held all the advantages of hereditary nobility and ancestry. This sense of respect drove Caesar first to attempt to have Cicero join in his unofficial 'triumvirate', and when that failed because of Cicero's allegiance to a different order of priorities, to acquiesce in driving Cicero into exile, as Cato was driven into a temporary quasi-exile of duty. Hence, it is a measure of Cicero's influence in the city that, apart from Cato, he was the only one 'whom Caesar consented to fear' [49].

It might be argued that the effective campaign orchestrated by Pompeius for the return of Cicero, once the consuls were favourable or neutral, was possible only because of the great groundswell of sympathy for Cicero in Rome and Italy [50]. This sympathy and favour must not and
cannot, of course, be ignored in any discussion, for it was Cicero's perception of this favour that gave him the confidence later to attempt to deal with Pompeius on terms of near equality and to attempt to separate the dynasts in efforts that were perhaps a major cause of the "conference of Luca" in 56. Reasons for the failure of that attempt must come later, but derive as much from the peculiarities of Pompeius' make-up as from any error of interpretation by Cicero in his position in the state.

In any discussion of Cicero's possible lack of vision in the future of Rome [51], too little critical attention has been paid to the fact that Cicero was virtually alone in his perception of realities of political life in Rome: the preeminence of Pompeius. Hence Cicero's attempts, usually nullified by the hereditary nobles and Caesar, to link Pompeius into the scheme of things of the Senate and bind this man of such immense influence into the way of thinking and approach of the Senate were an attempt to adapt politics to reality.

Further indication of Cicero's abiding influence in Rome, even after he had withdrawn from any position of influence, can be drawn from many occasions after 60 [52]. This position is clear from the attempt of Caesar to co-opt him into the so-called 'First Triumvirate'; from Caesar's attempt to retain Cicero in Gaul during the tribunate of Clodius; and from Pompeius' desire to effect his return from exile after guarantees had been given by Quintus from which he could not renege easily. The extent to which Cicero was responsible for the meeting at Luca, or at least the degree of responsibility that he shared for forcing Caesar to that meeting or allowing Pompeius to force Caesar to it is another indication [53]. Noticeable too is the facility with which he slipped once again into
opposition as the moral and political authority within the state without once having to reassert or to re-earn that authority.

It is quite clear from the letters and speeches of that period that the mantle of authority of Cicero was immanent in the man; he had no need to fight for it or to claim it: it was simply there. And when the forces of the great war-lords were scattered or neutralized, he stepped once more into the open and reassumed his old position without discussion or equivocation. Basic to this, perhaps, is the fact that the old line of nobles that had been opposed to him from the beginning had been wiped out in the civil war and the accession to power of Caesar. His success in his critical years had provided Cicero with a basis of strength that permitted him then to negotiate with the hereditary nobles on virtually a position of equality until once again his lack of a nexus of power permitted his destruction in the proscriptions of 43.
FOOTNOTES

1 T.R.S. Broughton, MRR, p. 52.
2 Cicero, pro Plancio 18, 19.
3 Plutarch, Marius 5,5-4; Cicero, pro Murena 68-72.
4 Plutarch, Sulla I; Broughton, MRR, 88 B.C.
5 Cicero, pro Murena 15f; Varro RR 2.4.2.
6 Cicero, pro Murena. 51.
7 ad Att I.10, May 67.
8 pro Lege Manilia 2.
10 ad Att. I.1, mid-July 65.
11 Erich Gruen, LGRR, p. 189ff.
12 L. Caecilius Metellus, Q. Caecilius Metellus & M. Caecilius Metellus; MRR, 70-69 B.C.
13 E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae, pp. 270-271.
14 Sallust Bellum Catilinae XX,7; XXX,4; XXXIX,1.
15 Broughton, MRR p. 144.
16 Cicero ad Att I.1,3-4, before July 17, 65.
17 Cicero ad Fam. VIII.14.1, Nov. 50. Note ad Q. E. III.1.16, Sept. 54.
18 D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero, p. 115, who unfortunately gives an incorrect bibliographic reference: "a letter of 54 B.C."
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22 Plutarch, Cicero 9; Q. Cicero (?) Comm Pet. 51.

23 Quintus Cicero (?), Comm. Pet. 54; cf. ad Att. III.9.2, Thessalonica, 13 June 58; ibid. IV.1.8, Rome, 10 September 57; ibid. IV.2.5, Rome, October, 57.

24 Sallust, BJ, LXIII,6; qv. also LXIV for further references to Marius.

25 Sallust, BJ, XXIII 5-6. See also Donald Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome, p. 50, for discussion and criticism.

26 Cicero, pro Cn. Plancio 50, 54 B.C. Note pro Cuentio: periculorum multituidinem.

27 ibid. 15.

28 Cicero, pro Murena 17, 64 B.C.


31 Sallust, Catiline 31.

32 "Marius Gratidianus met an especially unpleasant end by Sulla's orders; his executioner was Catiline."; D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero, p. 10.

33 Plutarch Caesar I; Suetonius Div. 1.

34 Cicero, pro Plancio 64-66; see also pro Murena 21, 63 B.C.

35 Broughton, MRR p. 78; Cicero ad Att. V.17.5; VI.1.15; pro Plancio 33; ad Fam I.9.26.

36 ad Fam I.9.26, Rome, December 54.

37 ad Att. III.17.1; note also III.17.3.

38 ad Q. F. I.1.32.

39 Elizabeth Rawson, Cicero, p. 25.
40 Ernst Badian, Lucius Sulla, The Deadly Reformer, p. 43, quoting Asconius 21c. Badian also notes that between 78 and 59, more than one half the consuls and praetors are not attested in provincial duties. Furthermore, since we have surely not lost the records of one half of the top politicians, then probably the worst governors were replacing those who would have been good.

41 Cicero pro Plancio 31-33; ad Fam I.17.9, 17 Dec 61; I.18.7, 20 Jan 60; Sallust BJ. LXXXV.4

42 ad Fam V.1.2, Jan-Feb 62; Sallust BJ. LXXXV.

43 ad Fam III.1 to III.13, Jan 52 to Aug 50; note III.7.2-5, 11 Feb 50.

44 ad Fam III.9.3, 20 Feb 50; III.4.1, June 50.

45 ad Att VI.7, July 50; ad Fam XV.10.1 (to Gaius Marcellus, Consul), end of 51 or beginning of 50; ad Fam XV.4.13 (to Cato), late Dec. 51.

46 ad Fam III.7.5, February 50

47 ad Att IV.8a, Nov 56.

48 Cicero, Pro Plancio 29, 68-69

49 R.E. Smith, Cicero the Statesman, p. 151.

50 ibid, p. 163.


52 ad Fam I.8.3 of 55 B.C., for example.

53 See Chapter VI, "Caesar, Pompeius and the Exile of Cicero", n. 30 and the text following.
CICERO, CRASSUS, and POMPEIUS.

CHAPTER III
Cicero, Crassus and Pompeius.

In the relationships of Cicero, Crassus and Pompeius there is one incident of considerable interest, that of a speech given early in 61 by Crassus in the Senate immediately following one given by Pompeius. In it, Crassus followed a line of different thrust, and quite to everyone's surprise, extolled an astonished Cicero without reservation [1].

This incident is of considerable importance in the study of the political relationship of Pompeius and Cicero since it shows in an indirect way the almost paranoid fear held by many in Rome of the consequences of any return of Pompeius with his army, and the probably concomitant belief of Cicero that any safety in the future lay in alignment with the wishes of Pompeius (whence his 'Laelius Letter'). It probably exemplifies also the immediate and hurried realignment of political forces and allegiances that arose when it became obvious that the conqueror of the East would not bring his army beyond the south of Italy. In this incident we perhaps see the obvious relief with which Roman politicians faced the future, and the subsequent petty attacks on Pompeius that heralded the much more serious obstruction that came with the senate's refusal to provide for his army or to accept his Eastern acta.

In his correspondence with Atticus on February 13 of 61, Cicero describes the reply of Pompeius, first to the question of Pufius on the selection of the jury-panel for the trial of Clodius on the charge of sacrilege, and next, the request by the consul Messalla for his opinion in the senate on the sacrilege and the bill proposed regarding it [2]. Cicero claims that Pompeius eulogized the measures of the Senate en bloc and then, in sitting down next to Cicero, stated that he had spoken adequately concerning "those affairs of yours": ..., ut addedit, dixit se putare satis
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ab se 'de istis rebus' esse responsum [3].

The result was an apparently unexpected thrust into the discussion by Crassus, who spoke in an unaccustomed way of Cicero and his office.

Crassus, posteaquam vidit illum excepsisse laudem ex eo, quod suspicarentur homines ei consulatum meum placere, surrexit ornatissimeque de meo consulatu locutus est, cum ita diceret, 'se quod esset senator, quod civis, quod liber, quod viveret, mihi acceptum referre; quotiens coniugem, quotiens domum, quotiens patriam videret, totiens se beneficium meum videre.' Quid multa? totum hunc locum, quem ego varie meis orationibus, quarum tu Aristarchus es, soleo pingere, de flame, de ferro (nosti illas \( \lambda_\text{v} \gamma_\text{v} \delta_\text{v} \gamma_\text{v} \chi_\text{v} \text{ } \)), valde graviter pertexuit [4].

Since Cicero was seated next to Pompeius, he noticed the effect that the speech of Crassus had upon him and, ostensibly at least, imputed the effect to the realization of Pompeius that he had neglected to gain for himself the credit of the people that was to be obtained from an espousal of Cicero's cause and from praise of his acts.

Proximus Pompeio sedebam. Intellexi hominem moveri, utrum Crassus inire eam gratiam, quam ipse praetemisisset, an esse tantas res nostras, quae tam libenti senatu laudarentur, ab eo praesertim, qui mihi laudem eo minus debearet, quod meis omnibus litteris in Pompeiana laude perstrictus esset. Hic dies me valde Crasso adiunxit, et tamen ab illo aperte tecte quicquid est datum, libenter accepi [5].

36
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Cicero's interpretation is obviously not the only plausible one, if only for the reason that he was an interested party, with a vested interest in believing in it. There are further possible interpretations that bear consideration which Cicero himself would never have put forward, even to himself, by reason of their danger to his position vis-à-vis his associates, Pompeius and Crassus.

The story is usually accepted at about face value by modern writers, if it is considered seriously at all. This, probably, was the surface sense desired by Crassus, but such a sense must not go unquestioned in its superficiality when it is given by a man of such subtlety as Cicero in an interpretation of dealings between men of immense power who fenced constantly in the political arena. After all, Absalom and Achitophel, with its ostensible setting in Biblical times far removed from its hidden reference to seventeenth century English politics, was not the first political satire [6].

Erich Gruen in his Last Generation of the Roman Republic accepts the story without discussion despite earlier consideration of the hostility, bitterness and competition between Crassus and Pompeius. He sees that "It was fitting irony that Pompeius eventually claimed responsibility for crushing the slave revolt by rounding up Spartacus' stragglers, thereby robbing the infuriated Crassus of well-earned credit. The bitterness between them had a long background." [7] Gruen gives many instances of the immense power wielded in the background by Crassus: "The extraordinary power wielded by Crassus is confirmed again and again by contemporary evidence." [8] Furthermore, "Crassus possessed a single-minded ambition: to exercise political power and to attain unchallenged political stature. His
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riches were a means to an end." [9] Gruen then quotes further to the same effect from Cicero's *De Officiis*, I.25 and from Velleius Paterculus, 2.46.2.

We have, therefore, a speech given by a man of immense power and influence in an assembly at which the man of consummate power in the Roman world had just spoken: a man with whom from the earliest days of political influence he had been in conflict, and who at that moment had only just shown how he would handle the devolution of power of his armies after years of undisputed primacy in the East.

We must first consider the problem of the obscure trip made by Crassus to the East shortly before. Gruen mentions that "Crassus had returned from his brief sojourn in Asia to swing the weight of his followers against Pompeius in 61." [10] There is no mention of the ostensible reason for the "brief sojourn"; there is no mention of the highly indicative act of following Pompeius' speech with one that extolled the acts of Cicero, of all people, since Cicero was not known to be any sort of political amicus of Crassus, and since Crassus had many things which he could have said to great effect had he felt them to be of greater importance. He obviously acted in a manner far different from that of Pompeius: the thrust of his speech was in a different direction, its stress was different; furthermore, the word was already out that Cicero had blundered and had been rebuffed for his volumen [11], a letter in which he personally extolled the achievements of his consulship and apparently failed to show a fitting reverence for the military sphere in comparison with the political. The loss of this letter has always been regretted but its results are known. Van Ooteghem, in his work *Pompée Le Grand, Bâtisseur*
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d'Empire, discusses the departure of Crassus to the East on the basis of
descriptions by Plutarch [12] and Cicero [13]. He argues that Crassus went
to Macedonia or Asia, not considering that this might place Crassus in just
the crisis that he wished to avoid. On page 270 he discusses the famous
'Laelius' letter of Cicero [14] and sees that considerable coolness existed
on the part of Pompeius, who was scarcely one to accept an associate under
any circumstances or at any time. In this letter, however, he was requested
by Cicero to accept an aide or associate, albeit at a lower level of status
than himself, merely to ensure his own position in Rome. Van Ooteghem fails
to see the one salient point that was obvious to Crassus from the moment of
Pompeius' return: that Pompeius had undermined his entire position by
relinquishing his army and trusting solely to the aura of command
engendered by years of success and unbridled authority; that in doing so he
had left himself open to the subterfuges and political devices of his
opponents who had realized before Pompeius did himself that Rome had
changed, that the political alignments had changed and that Pompeius was no
longer the omnipotent commander backed by an army. Van Ooteghem sees that
Crassus returned nine months after Pompeius had disbanded his legions [15],
but recognizes no possibility that there had been secret discussions
between the two. Yet Van Ooteghem is certainly a compendium of any ideas
that have been expressed by anyone on Pompeius up to his publication date.

Ward sees Crassus as attempting to build a countervailing
position to Pompeius, but, having failed, leaving for the East to have
discussions with Pompeius himself [16]. He then develops the concept with a
series of possibilities and ends with: "Apparently he was satisfied to this
effect (his safety) and soon returned to Rome." [17]
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Ward is as satisfied with his own mental constructions as he feels Crassus was with his efforts with Pompeius. What Ward does not envisage is the probability that the Crassus, who may perhaps (and that is not at all proven) have visited Pompeius before he returned and disbanded his legions, is not the same Crassus who spoke before the Senate and the people in the full strength of his position. He is not the same Crassus who spoke before a Pompeius who had not yet realized the "folly" of his actions in releasing his legions from service when he might still have persuaded them that he needed their protection as he had "needed" it when he was ordered home from Africa by Sulla; or when he failed to disband his men after the war with Lepidus. Any Roman noble could alter his links of political amicitia, and certainly Crassus could have done so after he saw the pit that Pompeius had dug for himself. Ward sees novos amicos and the ad Fam. V.7.1 as referring to "Caesar's behaviour since 5 December and Crassus' promises of good behaviour." [18] Supposition is based upon supposition; supposition is converted to certainty. On page 202, Ward sees Crassus aiding Cicero in the financing of his house; on pages 202-203, he sees Cicero as the recipient of praise so fulsome as to astonish even Cicero himself. He does not see that Crassus was already in full competition with Pompeius, although Crassus would have chosen his words carefully in the presence of the man who had but recently erased from the political and military horizons of Rome its most feared and most dangerous enemy. Crassus' ability as barrister and orator is everywhere attested as being one of his strongest points in gaining the amicitia that he possessed; it is wilful to ignore that at this point he was praising Cicero for deeds that were already publicly known to have been held beneath
Cicero, Crassus and Pompeius.

consideration by Pompeius when he was asked for personal political alliance. Crassus would have chosen his words for maximum effect: the furtherance of his own policies and the diminution of Pompeius'. He would have attacked his chief opponent in the way most possible and with the means most feasible; he would not have made a gratuitous attack upon a man whose political stature and influence appeared still to be at a peak and who had not yet suffered from the obstructionist tactics that would make obvious in the succeeding months how precarious was the base of Pompeius' power in Rome.

By page 211, Ward has developed a new thesis as if it were the result of events proved earlier: "Despite his trip to Asia in '62, ostensibly to assess the economic situation, ...." Crassus' trip to Pompeius (itself not proved) has now become one ostensibly devoted to tax contracts. He fails to see that Crassus had correctly assessed the situation and had realized that Pompeius was no longer the threat that he had once been, and could now be harassed with near impunity [19].

Beryl Rawson [20] sees more of the situation: "Crassus' elaborate praise of Cicero was surely intended to embarrass Pompeius, whose own speech in the senate had been rather obscure and vague. It seems also to have been something of a send-up of Cicero himself, though Cicero's reaction was only amusement and some gratification." [21]

In April of 62, Cicero had written concerning the mood in Rome brought about by Pompeius' promise of peace remaining upon his return: \textit{Sed hoc scito, tuos veteres hostis, novos amicos, vehementer litteris perculsos atque ex magna spe deturbatos iacere} [22]. If Crassus and Caesar are truly the \textit{veteres hostis}, Crassus' speech may mark the end of his
despondency [23].

What is not discussed in any of these works, however, is the reason for the use of Ciceró as subject and passive agent in the embarrassment of Pompeius. Plutarch indicates that the threats of Nepos had first worried Crassus into going into temporary absence from Rome [24]; that the threats sprang from the efforts of Caesar and Nepos to give Pompeius a legal excuse for returning to Italy with imperium: all to be done by means of a command from the Senate to return and eradicate the Catilinarian revolt.

It matters little that Pompeius would have been hard pressed to return in time to do anything, or that six weeks is considered to have been the normal time for communications to pass along the Mediterranean. Pompeius was a man who found means to transcend the normal; he needed and desired a legal reason for action; a legalistic justification if necessary, but legal. The grant of imperium would have been sufficient, and his supporters; Nepos and Caesar, knew that this was the thing for which they should press. Pompeius had used such manoeuvres against Sulla, against Lepidus, later against the Senate so as to attain the command against Sertorius, and finally in returning to Italy to eradicate the remnants of Spartacus' army. Pompeius Strabo had done the same on occasions that were undoubtedly examples to Pompeius [25]. Reasoned arguments, with discussions of the time required for trips across the Mediterranean, fall foul of another consideration: there is one speed for normal commercial transport; there is another for the personal transmissions of the commander-in-chief when he wants to know the political milieu into which he is about to return. All normal considerations of the speed of transport disappear in
Cicero, Crassus and Pompeius.

any discussion of the man who said in a season not normally used for navigation: *navigare necesse est, vivere non necessae* [26]. He could, of course, not create the white-heat of need such as had invested the second ship after the so-called "Mytilenean Debate" [27] in Athens in 428, but he could create a driving necessity that would ensure that his lines of communication would be more efficient by far than those available for normal transport. Moreover, Pompeius needed only an excuse for *imperium*; his henchmen such as Nepos would have left the result in his most capable hands to determine the use to which he would put their gift. The later events of 53, leading to the *Senatus Consultum Ultimum* of 52 show the chaos which he would tolerate, and indeed foster, if his interests were thereby to be strengthened.

These facets of Pompeius' character and career compel us to face the possibility, although proof will probably never be forthcoming, that Crassus was not only using Cicero to annoy Pompeius, but was actually in a semi-concealed political attack upon his old opponent. He was for once giving Cicero credit for his actions, since to withhold this would be to deny himself a chance of attacking Pompeius, albeit in a most circumspect fashion. Perhaps Crassus felt that Cicero's great success had been in acting so resolutely and speedily as to deny Pompeius his one great desire: a return to Italy with *imperium*. The grim and decisive execution of the conspirators had made superfluous and unnecessary the fielding of further armies; events continued without the necessity of Pompeius' presence. This alone would have provided joy to Crassus in whose heart still rankled the memory of Pompeius' return from Spain to "eradicate the remnants of the army of Spartacus" [28].

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Crassus may well have felt that Cicero had saved his family, his fortune and himself, for he had compelled Pompeius to return to Italy without the slightest right to imperium. Crassus knew Pompeius for the opportunist that he was; that Pompeius would not have failed to use the imperium in the most legal and absolute fashion. Pompeius would have extirpated the rebellion, but according to his own interpretation of rebellion and of conspirators. Even Crassus, described as a man with "horns on his horns" [29], could not have been safe from the overwhelming power arrayed on Pompeius' side; political amicitia in Rome would have counted for naught. It is impossible to gauge what the results would have been if this man who had been the adulescentulus carnufex [30] had returned with the full authority of the Senate and Roman People to extirpate the rebellion. "If only" is not a proper subject for history, but the thoughts that passed through Crassus' mind as he stood in the Senate house and described Cicero as the saviour of his people can and must be considered. Sufficient consideration must be given to the possibility that Crassus meant exactly what he said, no more and no less: that Cicero was the saviour of his country. But given that consideration, the discussion must arise as to how Cicero was the saviour. It was not from Catiline: Crassus was only too aware of the possibilities of that man's political and social movement, and the certainty of the return of Pompeius as scourge of Rome if Catiline were temporarily successful. Furthermore, Crassus probably had contacts on both sides of the Catilinarian affair who would have ensured his personal survival in any circumstances that did not involve the return of Pompeius with all that was implied in an imposed solution.

What we must consider is Crassus' attitude to the completely
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wide-open possibilities of a Pompeius returning with full powers to clean out all corruption and rebellion. Where would it all end? This was the problem that faced Crassus; for Pompeius had returned three times with armies that were most unwelcome to the ruling class: first from Africa under the nominal tutelage of Sulla; next from the war with Lepidus; finally from the war with Sertorius in which he had earlier made thinly-veiled threats that his army might return of its own volition were it not to be paid and supplied by the Senate [31]. But never before had there been raised the spectre of Pompeius in a return associated not only with a degree of power never before attained by a Roman general, but now with the possibility of the sanction of the Senate and People to eradicate all rebellion. This return would have been cataclysmic and no sort of foresight and planning could have prepared anyone for its results. Pompeius might have been trustworthy provided only that he be able to attain all his wants [32], but this was to trust Pompeius with not only the power but also the legal responsibility of ensuring that all vestiges of rebellion be extirpated. Hence the possibility remains that Crassus was genuinely thanking Cicero for depriving Pompeius of the excuse of a return as the scourge of Rome and its internal enemies - with duties to be interpreted by Pompeius alone.

Given this possibility, we must consider how Crassus could utter his thoughts without the words offering great and possibly dangerous offence to Pompeius. Probably all but the most obtuse followed the sense. Pompeius, however, would sit fuming amid the growing amusement of the senators as they slowly came to understand the hidden import of Crassus' words. We have nothing of the actions of Crassus nor of the subtle
interplay of hands, eyes and body that would have given a quite different interpretation to an audience than can the mere printed word. Pompeius, of course, could not afford to make the slightest move to take umbrage: to react to hidden meanings would betray a guilty conscience and could only increase the joke to his own discredit, discomfort and expense. Cicero, even were he aware of the import of the words, (since his self-confidence and belief in his own essential value were great enough for him to accept the surface meaning of Crassus' words for once without reading the hidden portion as he would certainly have done on any other occasion) could not afford any hint of understanding lest he bring down upon himself a cold and bitter enmity that could never be erased. The best path that both Pompeius and Cicero could follow would be to act exactly as they did: to join in political and personal friendship so as to give the lie to any hints of conflicting interests and acts.

The personal enmity between Pompeius and Crassus from the earliest times, and especially from the conclusion of the war with Spartacus [33], was such that only the quite remarkable diplomatic powers of Caesar brought the two together in any degree of cooperation, and even then unity was preserved only by the external compulsion of most powerful needs and dangers.

No independent proof of this theory can ever be developed; the affair would have had to be ignored by all concerned lest the concentrated hatred of a humiliated Pompeius descend upon the head of the offender, the hatred of a Pompeius who for years had never been forced to brook any opposition or criticism and who would therefore be all the more dangerous as one who had not learned to bear adversity in political situations, as
indeed he showed when he was finally compelled to provide the backing of
naked force for Caesar in 59. None the less, Crassus appears to have
enjoyed a tremendous joke and was probably the only man who could get away
with it. Cicero, from fear for his future, could not expatiate upon it, as
good as it was; Pompeius would resolutely ignore any hint of understanding,
and indeed demonstrate its falsity by agreeing resoundingly that Cicero had
done a superb job in saving Rome by his suppression of Catiline [34].

Once again, Cicero appeared to be the equal of the others in
political affairs, but it is subtly clear that he is again being used to
advance the affairs of others and is not accepted as equal. He is useful
for the moment, but is given full credit for his actions only when it is of
importance to those who manage the greatest influence.
Cicero, Crassus and Pompeius.

FOOTNOTES

1 ad Att I.14.3, February 13, 61.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 ibid.
6 John Dryden: 1861, attacking Monmouth and Shaftesbury.
7 Erich Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, p. 41.
8 ibid. p. 36.
9 ibid. p. 67.
10 ibid. p. 86.
11 Cicero, ad Fam V.7, April 62.
12 Plutarch, Pompeius 43.2
13 Cicero, pro Flacco 32; R. Seager, Pompeius, p. 70, notes 89-90.
14 Cicero, ad Fam V.7.3
15 Van Ooteghem, Pompeé le Grand, Batisseur d'Empire, p. 277.
16 Ward, Crassus, p. 184 and p. 196.
17 ibid. p. 198.
18 ibid. pp. 199-203; see note 22 below.
19 B.A. Marshall, Crassus: A Political Biography, pp. 81-84 and 93-94.
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22 ad Fam V.7.1.


24 Plutarch, Pompeius 43.2 (See note 12 above.)

25 As proconsul in 88 after his triumph on 25 December 89; probably in the death of his would-be-replacement, Pompeius Rufus; his ambivalent conduct in the civil war between Cinna and Marius in opposition to Octavius and the Optimates; his aid to Octavius, then hindrance; and finally, his secret negotiations with Cinna. See: Robin Seager, Pompeius, pp. 3-5, with full discussion of sources.

26 Plutarch, Pompeius 50.2; Van Ooteghem, Pompeé le Grand, p. 367, n.1.

27 Thucydides, History, 49-50.

28 Plutarch, Pompeius 21.

29 Plutarch, Crassus, 7.

30 Valerius Maximus, VI.2.8; V.3.5; Plutarch, Pompeius 10.4. Sources are given by Van Ooteghem on pp. 59-60.

31 Sallust, Epistulae CN. Pompei ad Senatum, 10; Plutarch, Pompeius 20.

32 Cicero, ad Q. F. III.8.4, Nov. 54; ad Att IV.9.1, 27 April 55; ad Fam. I.4.1; ad Q. F. II.2.3, January 56; Cassius Dio XXXVI.45; Plutarch, Pompeius 30.

33 B.A. Marshall, Crassus: A Political Biography, pp. 29-34 for the servile war; a full discussion of the "enmity" is given on pp. 34-41, with conclusions on pp. 40-41. An analysis of Cicero's attitude is included.

34 Cicero, ad Att I.16.1, July 61.
MODES OF PERCEPTION: ARISTOCRATS AND NON-ARISTOCRATS

CHAPTER IV
The trial of Verres has appeared to be a signal vindication of the rights of provincials to be free from the rapacious greed that had disfigured the actions of Roman governors as a matter of custom. Yet there followed immediately after it another action that displayed the considerable ability in persuasion that marked Cicero but that showed also that his attitudes and approach to provincial rights was sufficiently flexible to accommodate a much more disturbing indifference and contempt for provincials than would have been indicated in him had he ceased legal activity with the process in Verrem.

In the defence of M'. Fonteius, a different set of values was immediately introduced by Cicero the advocate. Here he defended the governor against the usual charge of repetundae, but with a significant difference: Fonteius was an amicus of Pompeius and had not disturbed the equites in their pursuits. These provincials, Galli of the South, were not the inheritors of Greek culture; there were no profaned and desecrated temples of Ceres [1]; there was no invidious comparison possible between Roman senator and Roman general as there had been between Verres and Marcus Marcellus, of whom Cicero could say that he had founded Syracuse in capturing it: ab illo qui cepit conditam [2]. In this later case the people were on their own; the governor was not defended solely by the pauci, for the senators and equites had drawn up a common front and had accepted with approval Cicero's unworthy claims that provincials qua provincials, were untrustworthy. This was no case in which the warning could be drawn that the senate would lose its absolute control of the courts unless it initiated reform, for, in the first place, the control had by now been lost (under the influence of Pompeius and Crassus), and second,
there was no division between the major orders that could inflame and complicate the case.

Cicero here demonstrated an indifference to the state and suffering of provincials when there was either no moral involvement in the future of the Roman senate or in which his integrity as governor was not implicated [3]. Such indifference was also to be seen in Caesar's treatment of the women, children and aged expelled from Alesia by Vercingetorix for the 'greater safety of the town'.

Mandubii, qui eos oppido receperant, cum liberis atque uxoribus exire coguntur. Hi, cum ad munitiones Romanorum accessissent, flentes omnibus precibus orabant, ut se in servitutem receptos cibo iuarent. At Caesar dispositis in vallo custodibus recepi prohibeat. [4]

So passed the non-combatants of Alesia for the furtherance of Caesar's dignitas and gloria. Perhaps the only comment that should be made is that, whenever we feel that Cicero's self-advertisement appears to be a little too much, we should note what a noble in full cry could consider as burnishing his family and personal image.

It was in a similar vein that Caesar perceived his justification for the imposition of Civil War upon Italy when he exhorted his troops:

Hortatur, cuius imperatoris ducta VIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda ferent, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant. [5]
MODES OF PERCEPTION: ARISTOCRATS AND NON-ARISTOCRATS

This will perhaps show Cicero as embedded within the mores of his aristocratic society and equipped with the conventional blinkers that prevented his developing anything of the more modern concept of compassion. That he was imbued with a degree of humanitas is clear from both his writings and from his conduct toward slaves and provincials placed under his direct care, although not for those captives whom he sold as unnecessary at mons Amanus [6]. But this straitened perception of lower classes prevented him not only from moderating his unsavory attack upon provincials in the pro Fonteio, but also, at a much deeper level, prevented his aiding in the amelioration of debts and the need for land that cursed the politics of Rome of his day and was to be implicated so deeply in the downfall of the Republic [7].

If we are to understand the underlying reasons for some of the positions that Cicero took politically, an analysis of his claims, pretensions and actions is now in order.

Chronologically, his letters from Cilicia are the latest works. Since, however, together with the first letter to Quintus in 59, they contain most of his speculation on what we may call his pragmatic ethics, or the duties of a governor, it seems best to consider their implications and go then to a consideration of certain forensic speeches that date from 69 to 54. These letters and speeches together give us a clue to the understanding of the public stance in which Cicero felt most comfortable socially and intellectually, and which permitted him to perceive some groups as resolved into individual persons but others as undifferentiated masses to be ignored as humans worthy of consideration and compassion.

Both Cicero's first letter to Quintus in early 59 and his letters to
Atticus from Cilicia in 51 and 50 demonstrate his personal code of ethics and the degree to which his desire for a good name and the pressure of political needs could sway him.

Ac si te ipse vehementius ad omnes partes bene audiendi excitarris, non ut cum aliis, sed ut tecum iam ipse certes, si omnem tuam mentem, curam, cogitationem ad excellentem omnibus in rebus laudis cupiditatem incitarris, mihi crede, unus annus additus labori tuo, multorum annorum laetitiam nobis, imo vero etiam posteris nostris afferet. [8]

Id autem erit eiusmodi, ut consulas omnibus, ut medeare incommodis hominum, provideas saluti, ut te parentem Asiae et dici et haberi velis. [9]

His ideas in this letter to Quintus go constantly to the belief that the governor must be incorruptible, must control his subordinates lest bribery enter unnoticed, and must control the sycophancy of the socii and recognize true friendship [10]. The essence of his code of values was briefly:

Quare sint haec fundamenta dignitatis tuae, tua primum integritas et continentia; deinde omnum, qui tecum sunt, pudor; delectus in familiaritatibus, et provincialium hominum et Graecorum, percautus et diligens; familiae gravis et constans disciplina. [11]

He saw the risks to the governor, whose position he described as: in tanto imperio, tam depravatis moribus, tam corruptrice provincia, .... These were the provinces: ubi nullum auxilium est, nulla conquestio, nullus senatus, nulla contio. [12]

Cicero first stated in public this need for incorruptible governors in his speech pro lege Manilia:
MODES OF PERCEPTION: ARISTOCRATS AND NON-ARISTOCRATS

Utrum plures arbitramini per hosce annos militum vestorum armis hostium urbes an hibernis sociorum civitates esse deletas? Neque enim potest exercitum is continere imperator, qui se ipse non continet, neque severus esse in iudicando, qui alios in se severos esse iudices non vult. [13]

He returns to the problem of ensuring that the governor practise self-control:

Itaque omnes nunc in iis locis Cn. Pompeium sicut aliquem non ex hac urbe missum, sed de caelo delapsum intuentur; nunc denique incipient credere fuisset homines Romanos hac quendam continentia, quod iam nationibus exteris incredibile ac falsa memoriae proditum videbatur; nunc imperii vestri splendor illis gentibus laetem adferre coepit; [14]

Ecquam putatis civitatem pacatam fuisset, quae locuples sit, ecquam esse locupletem, quae istis pacata esse videatur? [15]

This was Cicero's public posture, his stance. In his actual tenure of office in Cilicia, it was not quite so simple to follow his own tenets. The spectre of Brutus loomed constantly [16]. Furthermore, Cicero's problems of aiding the payment of debts in Cappadocia was exacerbated by the heavy drain on the state's resources caused by the mere payment of interest to Pompeius: *Ei tamen sic nunc solvitur: tricesimo quoque die talenta Attica XXXIII, et hoc ex tributis.... Alii neque solvit cuiquam nec potest solvere* [17];

Cicero's problem in his governorship in Cilicia at the end of the 50's lay in reconciling the conflicting aims of certain interested aristocrats,
the socii, the publicani & negotiatores, and his own personal code. Through all this, the demands of Atticus, muted but insistent, warned him of the consequences of a false step in handling his various obligations.

*sed plane te intellegere volui mihi non excidisse illud quod tu ad me quibusdam litteris scripsisses, si nihil aliud de hac provincia nisi illius benevolentiam deportasssem, mihi id satis esse.* [18]

This was the Brutus of whom Cicero had claimed that *libellum ipsius habeo, in quo est "Salamini pecuniam debent M. Scaptio et P. Matinio, familiaribus meis."* [19]

This Scaptius had been a praefectus under Appius Claudius Pulcher, and in the perversion of his duties had used cavalry to beset the Senators of Salamis:

*... et quidem habuerat turmas equitum, quibus inclusum in curia senatum Salamine obsederat, ut fame senatores quinque morerentur.* [20]

In this argument with Brutus, the essence was the attempt by Cicero to enforce his own edicts: to limit the rate of interest on loans and to prohibit official positions to negotiatores: *Id vero per te exceperamus, ne negotiatori; quod si cuium, huic tamén non;* [21]

Yet by April of 50, Atticus was apparently badgering Cicero to give the totally unworthy Scaptiús his cavalry: *Aussus es ... ut equites Scaptio ad pecuniam cogendam darem me rogare!* [22]

By early June, Cicero claims to have held fast to his scruples and edicts [23], but since no final reference is made to payment, we must presume that Cicero solved his dilemma by the time-honoured method of bureaucrats – by leaving it to his perhaps more accessible successor [24].
Modes of Perception: Aristocrats and Non-Aristocrats

Criticism of Cicero is easy but the pressure under which he acted was immense and the fate of Rutilius Rufus must ever have been in his mind. Furthermore, we should consider Ernst Badian's comment that "Equites were helpless unless they had help in powerful senatorial circles." If this was actually so, then Cicero had even more to fear of Brutus' enmity, since it might initiate collusion with angry equites in the _de repetundis_ court after Cicero's return from his pro-consulship [25].

On his arrival in his province, he had seen his future problems immediately.

Verum tamen decumani, quasi venisset cum imperio, Graeci quasi Ephesio praetori se alacres obtulerunt. Ex quo te intellegere certo scio multorum annorum ostentationes meas nunc in discrimen esse adductas. [26]

Cicero attempted to maintain his course from this point on, but some serious tacking was forced upon him [27].

He first discovered the abysmal state of affairs in his province after the depredations of Appius Claudius: ... _in perditam et plane eversam in perpetuum provinciam nos venisse scito_... a province which existed in the state because of a ... _monstra quaedam non hominis, sed ferae nescio cuius immemis_ [28].

He had not only Appius Claudius to contend with, but also a multitude of commissions sent to him by Brutus, partly through Atticus and partly directly from Brutus himself. He had obviously a great need to satisfy the demands of Brutus, something now beyond our discovery, and was compelled to stretch the interpretation of his edicts considerably [29].

His problems with Brutus were compounded by the fact that the Senate had been persuaded to pass two laws in 56 permitting Brutus to lend to
provincials, and to charge in excess of a governor's edicts or senatorial edicts [30].

The passage following that on edicts gives a further interesting description of the habits of the more unrestrained governors, for Cicero congratulated himself for not even quartering his troops on the local people. This practice was so burdensome that many cities were in the habit of making payments to the governor to prevent it [31].

Another, less pleasant, characteristic of Cicero comes, however, in the description of his sale of captives at Mons Amanus.

Hilare sane Saturnalia militibus quoque, quibus equis exceptis reliquam praedam concessimus. Mancipia veniant Saturnalibus tertii [32].

These captives were outside his perception of those to whom he owed duty both as proconsul and as human being. Their position was only relatively worse than those in the kingdom of Cappadocia, upon whom he felt comfortable in foisting businessmen as prefects: nec enim in provincia mea negotiabantur [33]. It was easier to put off Caelius about panthers for his games, for Caelius would not maintain an anger that could have serious consequences in the courts as could his other contacts in Rome [34].

Even Atticus had pressured him to provide cavalry to Scaptius for debt collection. If such were pushed by Atticus, the overall application of political influence and threats must have been almost insupportable for a novus homo with no great body of amici to back him in the court for de repetundis and with the fate of Rutilius ever in his mind [35].

Under this immense pressure, Cicero does what any rational human does in face of an unattainable goal, he slips into the aristocratic frame of reference and consults his own needs, ignoring the socii who now lie
outside his sphere of need and hence cannot hurt his sensibilities if he does not act to protect them as he had earlier intended.

Just as he himself had pressured Quintus in 59 to modify his decisions in order to accommodate some apparently quite unreasonable demands by a praetor-elect, L. Flavius, in an inheritance [36]; furthermore, just as Atticus pressured him to accommodate Brutus by assignment of cavalry, a most disreputable request, so we now see Cicero finding that his future is once again at risk if he dares to venture from the mode of action of an aristocrat working in an aristocratic environment: his mode of perception is forced upon him and he submits.

The serious breakdown in Cicero's code comes with the conflicting pressures of first his projected Triumph, next his desire to return to Rome in her agony, and finally his duty to his province and its inhabitants. His own needs bring him irresistibly to the mode of thought of the aristocrat heedless or those not in his sphere. Cicero pays lip-service to replacement by a qualified senator and mentions C. Coelius on a number of occasions [37]. He also gives all the arguments why it could be damaging to his reputation to quit his province but leave his own brother as replacement: *illud non utile nobis* [38]. He claims that the withdrawal of the Parthians permits him to pass over his brother safely, but the truth slips out with his admission that he wishes to apply for his triumph to the same magistrates as had agreed to his supplication: *sed plane volo his magistratibus, quorum voluntatem in supplicatione sum expertus* [39].
MODES OF PERCEPTION: ARISTOCRATS AND NON-ARISTOCRATS

This decision, which is actually based on thoroughly personal grounds, then permitted his relieved acceptance of Coelius as his replacement, a replacement for whom he had such contempt that: *quaestorem nemo dignum putat; etenim est "levis, libidinosus, tagax"* [40].

He had now walled in his world-view to enable him to accept an argument that consulted his personal interests only. The reason once again is clear from the last lines of the same letter:

> Amicorum litterae me ad triumphum vocant, rem a nobis, ut ego arbitror, propter hanc ἀπὸ τῆς ἀφορμής nostram non neglegendam. [41]

The symbolism in this final passage is significant: Cicero uses ἀπὸ τῆς ἀφορμής or "second-birth". Heavy political debts had been accepted by Quintus on behalf of Marcus for his return from exile in 57; guarantees of future conduct were explicit to Pompeius and Caesar. Now, in his return from a quasi second-exile, he had made comparable guarantees, but they had been converted to practical considerations by his political *amici* during this "exile". His safe return and freedom from concerted legal action were contingent upon them. Little did any of them realize that affairs would bypass Cicero and make him a pawn scarcely to be noticed in the coming conflict. Even his lictors, prepared for his projected triumph, would become an almost tedious encumbrance [42].

In April of 49, Cicero was to make a comment about the world-view of the dynasts:

> ... utrique semper patriae salus et dignitas posterior sua dominatione et domesticis commodis fuit. [43]

He was not a secret dynast, nor could he have become one, but he did suffer from the blinkers on his moral viewpoint that inclined him, in a
thoroughly human manner, to his own interests if the conflict with his responsibilities became too great.

In order to bring an acquittal in the proceedings represented by the pro Fonteio of 69, Cicero had to remove any sense of connection between the Roman jurors and the Gallic witnesses for charges under the Lex Cornelia de Repetundis. He quickly creates the distinction between Roman and Gaul by means of a bitter sarcasm in discussing the use of foreign witnesses.

*Quae est igitur ista accusatio, quae ...
... lubentius ignotis quam notis utatur, alienigenis quam domesticis testibus, planius se confirmare crimen lubidine barbarorum quam nostrorum hominum litteris arbitretur? [44]*

Since they did appear as witnesses, Cicero next equates them with those who had been compelled by force to provide cavalry, corn and money for the war against Sertorius in the years 80-72, or had been evicted from their farms by Pompeius for offering opposition to his move to Spain against Sertorius in 76.

... dicunt contra, quibus invitissimis imperatum est, dicunt, qui ex agris ex Cn. Pompei decreto decedere sunt coacti, dicunt, qui ex belli caede et fuga nunc primum audient contra M. Fonteium inermem consistere. [45]

He has now removed the witnesses from the set of persons recognizable to a Roman and can begin to demolish them as if they were an incoherent mob dedicated to the destruction of Rome.

*Etenim si, quia Galli dicunt, idcirco M. Fonteius nocens existimandus est, quid mihi opus est sapiente iudice quid aequo quaesitore, quid oratore non stulto? Dicunt enim Galli; negare non possimus. [46]*

*An, ..., in quod in teste profecto valere plurimum debet, non modo cum*
summis civitatis nostrae viris, sed cum infimo cive Romano quisquam amplissimus Galliae comparandus est? Scit Indutiumarius [47], quid sit testimonium dicere? [48].

Hae sunt nationes [49], quae quondam tam longe ab suis sedibus Delphos usque ad Apollinem Pythium atque ad oraculum orbis terrae vexandum ac spoliandum profectae sunt. Ab isdem gentibus sanctis et in testimonio religiosis obsessum Capitolium [50] est atque ille Iuppiter, cuius nomine maiores nostri vincent testimoniorum fidei esse voluerunt. [51]

Cicero's purpose has now been effected: the Gallic witnesses have been removed from the sphere of recognition and comprehension of a Roman; now their testimony can be relegated to an equivalent position. In doing this, however, Cicero displays himself even more clearly. He is embedded deeply into the mores of his own society; his position is one of delineating a stance, not of seeking truth. Truth to him could be recognized as of personal importance only if it derived from his personal set of values and from those persons who partook of personal individuality in his group.

It is this viewpoint of Cicero's which we must constantly keep in mind when we see his attitude to land reform or political conflict. His approach to Rullus' bill in 63 was typical, for he saw personal involvement in Rullus' failure, and had no feeling of sympathy or comprehension for those who might benefit from the effort. We may even see something of this characteristic after Luca, when the nobiles removed themselves from his perception of personal involvement by rebuff after rebuff, but the dynasts showed that they could aid him in his sphere, if he accepted their definition of personal involvement, as will be shown in a later chapter.
The *pro Flacco* follows ten years after the *pro Fonteio* but shares with it an unworthy use of racial prejudice as a means to success. In this case, the object of his calumny is the nation of Asiatic Greeks. Cicero's first letter to Quintus preceded this speech by a short space only, and hindered Cicero from taking complete freedom in attacking all Greeks, since he had had much to say of a complimentary nature of the Greeks in that letter [52].

Cicero grants the eminence of the Greeks in literature and the sciences, but gives them no credit for personal integrity: *testimoniorum religionem et fidem numquam ista natio coluit, totiusque huiusce rei quae sit vis, quae auctoritas, quod pondus, ignorant* [53].

Cicero follows a deliberately hurried and inconsequential description of a Greek as witness with the deliberate, sonorous and impressive description of a Roman in similar circumstances: *Qui autem dicit testimonium ex nostris hominibus, ut se ipse sustentat, ut omnia verba moderatur, ut tunet ne quid cupide ... dicat!* [54]

Once again Cicero has accepted the aristocratic limits of those whose existence is meaningful; all others may be treated in whatever fashion may be expedient.

Grimmer is Cicero's attack upon witnesses by categorizing them as the Asiatic Greeks who connived in the murder of some 80,000 Romans at the instigation of Mithridates.

*Mithridatem dominum, illum patrem, illum conservatorem Asiae, illum Euhium, Nysium, Bacchum, Liberum nominabant [55]. ... Liceat haec nobis, si oblivisci non possamus, at tacere, liceat mihi potius de levitate Graecorum queri quam de crudelitate. [56]*

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Cicero passes over any question of the reason of the hatred of the Greeks in Asia towards Romans; nowhere in his writings does he correlate his own admission of the duties of a governor with the brutal reaction of either slaves or subservient peoples if they are not treated humanely.

In hac igitur urbe se iactant quam oderunt, apud eos quos inviti vident, in ea re publica ad quam opprimendam non animus eis, sed vires defuerunt. [57]

The stance which Cicero then takes is interesting: he divides the Greek world so that those of mainland Greece and Massilia are removed from the mindless barbarism of the Asiatic killers of Romans, and instead brings them temporarily within the sphere of comprehension of Romans. The break is made even more striking by his use of the Gauls as a barrier and comparison.

Neque vero te, Massilia, praetereo .... cuius ego civitatis disciplinam atque gravitatem non solum Graeciae, sed haud scio - an cunctis gentibus anteponendam iure dicam; quae tam procul a Graecorum omnium regionibus, disciplinis linguaque divisa cum in ultimis terris cincta Gallorum gentibus barbariae fluctibus adluatur, sic optimatum consilio gubernatur ut omnes eius instituta laudare facilius possint quam aemulari. Hisce utitur laudatoribus Flaccus, his innocentiae testibus, ut Graecorum cupiditati Graecorum auxilio resistamus. [58]

It is a technically superb device that he has used. He has created contempt for Galli to differentiate between Western and Asiatic Greeks. He leaves only the Western Greeks with the appearance of human individuality—all the Asiatic Greeks are an incoherent jumble of hateful characteristics. He then demonstrates that the witnesses for the prosecution are of this undifferentiated breed of murderers and hence are unworthy of recognition.
Cicero's treatment in 55 of Calpurnius Piso [59], who was father-in-law to Gaius Julius Caesar and was consul in 58 and pro-consul in Macedonia in 57, is a quite stunning masterpiece of personal invective untrammelled by any law of libel or good taste [60].

The elements of interest in this discussion are those which betray the means by which Cicero knows he will bring down the contempt of other nobles upon Piso's head: constant reference to his non-Roman and non-Italic racial antecedents.

Cicero describes Piso as one qui colore ipso patriam aspernaris [61] and refers again to this non-Roman complexion which bears comparison only with smoke-stained relics: ... fumosarum imaginum, quarum simile habes nihil praeter colorem [62].

Furthermore, Piso is descended on the maternal side from a grandfather [63] who was not of good Roman orItalic extraction: Prius enim Gallus, dein Gallicanus extre mo Semiplacentinus haberi ... coeptus est, and was Mediolanensi praecune [64].

Cicero continues this unworthy ad hominem argument with further racial aspersions that place in even clearer relief the attitudes with which the aristocrat views all outside his sphere. Piso comes from unclean stock: lutulente Caesonine, his maternal grandfather [65], and has his relatives [66] in Gallia Narbonensis (Gallia Braccata) who are braccatae, cognationis. Furthermore, ubi galli cantum audivit avum suum revixisse putat [67].

Cicero makes his apparently obligatory obeisance to the group most dangerous to one of his position and links their sufferings under Piso with those under Gabinius: cum equites Romanos in provincia, cum publicanos
At a discreet distance from any mention of the "sufferings" of the equites under a governor comes this sobering reference to Rutilius:

non in eo cui facta est iniuria, sed in eis, qui fecerunt, sceleris et conscientiae poena permansit. [69]

Cicero makes one criticism of the desecration of native cults, but it is in terms of plague and pestilence visited as a judgement upon a Roman army, not in terms of injury inflicted upon a subject people.

A te Iovis Urrii fanum antiquissimum barbarorum sanctissimumque directum est, ... fana vexata hanc tantam efficerent vastitatem. [70]

In general, all Cicero's hatred that stemmed from Piso's actions leading to his own exile gives us another view of Cicero, one in which he personally would gain from obeying the injunctions of a closed group - a group that was of Italic or Roman extraction and was now of an aristocratic order in Rome - in denigrating and dealing contemptuously with someone from without the pale.

In the pro Scauro of 54, Marcus Cicero's approach to claims by the Sardinians concerning Scaurus's thefts is on a par with that which he used towards Gallic ancestry in his in Pisonem of the previous year.

To eliminate the effect of Sardinian witnesses for the prosecution, he used the usual technique of destroying the credibility of the entire people and of removing them from the set of peoples with whom Romans could have common bonds of understanding:
MODES OF PERCEPTION: ARISTOCRATS AND NON-ARISTOCRATS

postremo ipsa ratio, cuius tanta
vanitas est, ut libertatem a servitute
nulla re aliqua nisi mentiendo licentia
distinguendam putent. [71]

He admits, however, that if they come freely at some future time, sua sponte, and without having been bribed, they may be believed:

quaer si erunt, tamen sibi credi
gaudeant et mirantur; cum vero omnia
absint, tamen se non respicient, non
gentis suae famam perhorrescent? [72]

The pressure on Cicero in 54 to undertake the case must have been intense, considering that it was two years past Luca and P. Clodius Pulcher was actually a fellow advocate in the defence. We should note also that Appius Claudius Pulcher was consul and would soon go to Cilicia, where his actions would permit Cicero much self-satisfaction in comparison of their careers.

Nevertheless, the degree of racial intolerance which Cicero summons and displays can find little justification.

Fallacissimum genus esse Phoenicum
omnia monumenta vetustatis atque omnes
historiae nobis prodiderunt; ab his orti
Poeni ... nihil se degenerasse docuerunt:
a Poenis admixto Afrorum genere Sardi non
deducti in Sardiniam atque ibi
constituti, sed amandati et repudiati
cooni. Quae re cum integri nihil fuerit
in hac gente plena, quam valde eam
putamus tot transfusionibus
cocuisse? [73] ... magnam quidem esse
demum sine fide, sine societate et
coniunctione nominis nostri res ipsa
declarat. [74]

The character of his speech shows the degree to which his humanitas could be subverted and distorted when his personal interests were at stake; his veneer of civilization was thin and rarely hindered his desires. In the courts and provinces, he maintained a series of stances suited to his
position. The Sardinians were not his clients. They had no legal demand of protection to make of him, hence he could dismiss them from his attention—he had no perception of them as having human, individual personality, as had those of his own milieu.

He cannot be criticized for having a viewpoint that was truly not superseded until the Renaissance, but it does permit us to comprehend many of his more obscure actions and to understand his elemental stand on all thoughts of land reform and the amelioration of conditions for those who were not of the present governing class.
FOOTNOTES

2 ibid. 52.
3 For further instances of treatment of provincials that is devoid of honour, see the pro Scaurob (B.C. 54) 36; 38-41; 42-45 (especially) and notes 80 - 83 below.
4 Caesar, Bellum Gallicum, VII, 78.
5 Caesar, Bellum Civile, I, 7.
6 Cicero ad Att. V.20.5, 19 Dec 51.
7 See, however, discussion on this attitude in the chapter "Stable and Unstable Equilibrium."
8 ad Q. F I.1.3, early 50.
9 ad Q. F I.1.31.
10 ad Q. F I.1.8,13,16.
11 ad Q. F I.1.18.
12 ad Q. F I.1.19,22.
13 pro lege Manilia 38; note 5 in the chapter "Stable and Unstable Equilibrium."
14 ibid 41.
15 ibid 67.
17 ad Att. VI.1.3, 20 February 50.
18 ad Att. VI.1.7.
19 ad Att. VI.1.5, Laodicea, 20 February 50.
20 ad Att. V.1.6.
MODES OF PERCEPTION: ARISTOCRATS AND NON-ARISTOCRATS

21 ibid.

22 ad Att. VI.2.8, late April 50.

23 ad Att. VI.3, May - June 50.


25 Ernst Badian, Publicans and Sinners, p. 88.

26 ad Att. V.13.1, 26 July 51.


28 ad Att. V.16.2, 14 August (?) 50.

29 ad Att. V.18.4, 20 September 51.

30 ad Att. V.21.12, 13 February 50.

31 ad Att. V.21.5,7.

32 ad Att. V.20.3;5; 19 December 51.

33 ad Att. VI.1.4, 20 February 50.

34 ad Att. V.21.5, 13 February 50; VI.1.21, 20 February 50.

35 ad Att. VI.2.8, April 50; see note 31 above.


37 ad Att. VI.2.10, late April(?) 50; VI.4.1, mid (?) June 50.

38 ad Att. VI.6.3, 3 August 50.

39 ad Att. VI.7.2, Tarsus (?), July, 50; 9V.18.3, 20 September 51.)

40 ad Att. VI.3.1, on road to Tarsus, May/June 50.

41 ad Att. VI.6.4;

42 ad Att. VIII.3.5, 18-19 February 49; IX.7.3, 13 March 49.

43 ad Att. X.4.4, Cumae, 14 April 49.

44 Cicero, pro M. Fonteio 4.

45 ibid. 14.

70
ibid. 21.

Chieftain of the Allobroges.

pro M. Fonteio 27.

Brennus and his Galli, about 279; Livy, A.D.C. XXXVIII 16.

Sack of Rome in 390.

pro M. Fonteio 30.

ad Q. F I.1.27,28; note also the discussion of Greeks in I.1.16.

pro Flacco 9.

ibid. 12.

ibid. 60.

ibid. 61.

ibid. 61.

ibid. 63-64.


Cicero, in Pisonem 1,31,62, etc.

ibid. fragmentum 2.

ibid. fragmentum 1.

ibid. fragmentum 10.

ibid. 62.

ibid. 27.

ibid. 53.

ibid. 67.

ibid. 41.

ibid. 95.

ibid. 85.

Cicero, pro Scauro 38.
72 ibid. 41.
73 ibid. 42-43.
74 ibid. 44.
Stable and Unstable Equilibrium

CHAPTER V
Stable and Unstable Equilibrium

Every criticism of Cicero's inability to develop a concept of Roman government based upon more rational principles, something better than the concept of the dictator [1], must sooner or later face the fact that he was the Roman politician consummate who understood as did few the reality of Roman political life and alliances: the milieu of the possible. The knowledge, drive and influence that this gave to him is immanent in the affairs of the period: for this, witness Pompeius' espousal of his case for return from exile; witness Caesar's efforts to neutralize him (by a legateship in Gaul) yet retain him for more useful matters when Clodius should have passed; witness the great efforts of Caesar to enlist him upon his own side both before the revolution and after; and Caesar's treatment of him after Pharsalus. But notice always the means that Caesar and Pompeius were both compelled to take to ensure that he was effectively removed from Rome if he was found to be on a collision course with their desires: only violence of a most crude and direct type could bypass the influence that he both possessed and wielded.

If Cicero's creative powers were not sufficient, or perhaps appeared not to be sufficient, for a grand system that would correct and amend the condition of Rome, it was in part because he saw clearly that the course of events in Rome, given the immense power wielded by the pauci, could permit of no simple regression or adjustment into reasonable forms of government. He had experienced as perhaps more than a mere spectator the hideousness of the rampage of Sulla through the ranks of his opponents; he was in the direct centre of the collision of the cold and pitiless greed of Appius Claudius and Brutus in Cilicia where the populace had been entrusted to his own care by the Senate and the Roman People; hence he saw that the present
lines of power and the constantly accelerating demands of the nobles in their search for gloria would persistently prevent amelioration of conditions until the pauci could be isolated and balanced in their power by different alignments from those of the past. Herein lay the essence of his drive for a concordia; for no other isolation of the "few" was possible. He saw that to attempt otherwise was not merely to waste his own time, but was also to refuse Rome any hope of aid from a man of reasonably civilized tendencies who had reached the inner sanctum of power and who, with care, could use it in a manner calculated to maximize the probability of success. Anything else, to him, would be "tilting at windmills" at a time when the future required a cold calculation of the odds for the benefit of Rome. It was this consideration that led Cicero to conceive that Cato lived in his own world of unreality and not in the faex Romuli [2].

Plutarch, in his Life of Cicero, admitted that people could scarcely understand the reasons for the changes which Sulla had made in the constitution, but that they clung to these now since they did offer at least some degree of security and stability. Moreover, he ascribed the unrest in Rome to the unequal distribution of wealth: that the greatest families had destroyed their financial strength by the expenses of the cursus. He described the state at the time of Catiline as being rotten at the centre and being at the mercy of any man of ruthless decision [3]. It is this sense of the "razor's edge" (to use Stockton's translation of Plutarch) which is defined later in this chapter as "unstable equilibrium".

Cicero's concept of his concordia ordinum as an answer to the "razor's edge" must have had many facets: the chief would have been his desire to see an association develop between Senate and Equites that would preclude
the great special commands from creating men such as Sulla and Pompeius; deeper in his mind, and unstated, would be the hope that the concordia would control the greed of governors on one hand, and on the other, the vindictiveness of the Equites were they ever thwarted in a province by an honest governor. He hoped, furthermore, to prevent the attitude in the courts which permitted the exile of a Publius Rutilius Rufus, drove Cicero to warn Lentulus Spinther and his own brother Quintus Cicero in 59 of the risks inherent in alienating the Equites, and haunted his every action and thought in Cicilia in 51-50 which had an impact on the negotiatores. This problem of social disorganization or social disunity was ever present in Roman society, just as it had been in fifth and fourth century Athens, where it had been a constant preoccupation of Plato, who considered it to be the 'gravest danger to Greek society.' It was, indeed, as Gouldner describes it, 'a fact of Greek history [4].

Cicero saw that pride, desire for gloria and greed now dominated the politics of Rome and her relations with her pro-consular provinces. It will be one aim of the rest of this chapter to show the meaning of the accelerating change in goals that this denoted. Cicero's desire was to slow or stop the rush, for he saw that the penalty for inaction or failure would be the necessity of choosing between such men as Pompeius or Caesar [5].

Cicero was deeply the Roman politician, and yet was sufficiently apart from the hereditary nobility, because of his lack of familia, to be able to see, if the hereditary nobility did not, that the only probable way out of the impasse of politics in Rome was by the domination of one man: an army commander. Marius had shown the way; Sulla had perfected it; Carbo had shown its dangers; Sertorius had demonstrated its continuing danger to the
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state; the pirates and Mithridates had shown how power would devolve upon one man in the absence of a regular, coherent system for control of the provinces and of external wars. Even the problem of the corn supply would later show to Cicero that emergencies in the internal operations of the state could not be handled with ease and dispatch by the regular channels of command. To any perceptive Roman, and to Cicero perhaps most of all, it must have been clear that the nobiles were in an ever more crazed quest for gloria. He will have had an intuitive understanding of what modern engineering has termed the principle of "positive feedback", in that there was no naturally inhibiting process that would provide a brake upon the escalating moral, political and financial expense of the cursus. Cicero stated one part of the problem in 67:

Utrum plures arbitramini per hosce annos militum vestrorum armis hostium urbes an hibernis sociorum civitates esse deletas? Neque enim potest exercitum is continere imperator, qui se ipse non continet. [6]

Decreasing availability of financing and services in Rome would normally have provided the necessary "negative feedback" and its inherent natural control upon political life. Instead, there was the unnatural, and temporarily unlimited, source of funds and supplies available in the provinces to the suitably remorseless pro-consul or pro-praetor. The result was the onset of "positive feedback" in a normally more controlled atmosphere, and, since the degree of success of a participant depended upon his degree of callousness and greed, the normal checks and balances of the Roman political system broke down under an accession of wealth that appeared to be governed only by the rapacity and inhumanity of the participant. From the cases of Verres, Scaurus and Fonteius in their
provincial governorships, from the apparent need of three Metelli in a row who were in great financial need to finance three high offices in as many years [7] and who depended upon Verres to provide it, from the description given by Cicero of Appius Claudius and of Brutus in the East, and from the political efforts of Caesar, Pompeius and Crassus, we can see the depths to which governors could be reduced by the greed engendered through their need to shine in the political race in Rome. Given the number of great commands available, not merely the normal provincial governorships, it was clear to those who looked that there was an ever diminishing group upon whom the real power devolved, and that the great commands gave equally great armies suitable for another who could say: *Sulla potuit, ego non potero?* [8]

Cicero had often to hold his nose and turn aside from any formal admission of what he was compelled to do under the justification of following the 'politics of the possible' in Rome: he aided in attempting to re-negotiate the contracts held by the *Publicani* in 63, for as an alternative to *concordia* between the various forces in the state he saw an almost inconceivably worse situation [9]; he compromised with M. Brutus over the debt owed by *Salemis* [10]—in all probability because of the fear that he would undoubtedly have been politically annihilated by court action for *repemtundae* on his return to Rome in 50, as had been Rutilius Rufus some 42 years previously [11]; he saw the actions of Caesar in negotiations with the *Germani* and later at Alesia; he saw the *Pauci* at Dyrrachium prove his greatest fears in their fulminations and intended proscriptions against any opponents [12]; he foresaw in Rome of his own day almost certain probability of conditions of an almost inconceivable hideousness as had existed in his youth under Marius, Carbo and Sulla. Later poetry gives us
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only the slightest hint of the conditions suffered under Octavianus and Antony by opponents of the governing group. It gives, however, a sense of the ghastly reality of the proscriptions of which Romans were capable, given any disruption of the grave legalistic and stylized dance called by the Romans the cursus. What do we know of the sufferings of the descendants of the proscribed of Sulla? Caesar attempted to ameliorate their lot, but Cicero, a normally humane man, blocked the effort since he personally foresaw that any shifting of alliances at that moment could lead to incalculable results. So also came about his constant defence of property, worthy of the "Forsyte 'Change." Again, he knew that the Roman system was not a smoothly running physical organism that would react to imposed change with adjustment and automatic modification; he knew that it was in a state of "unstable equilibrium" and that slight perturbation would lead not to a gentle return to the status quo after a period of adjustment, but rather to violent upheaval and political anarchy as every repressed group in the country seized upon the moment of confusion to attempt to regain what it had lost, or to gain what others, more fortunate, had never lost. He saw that once an offer of conciliation to one part of the populace had been made and accepted, ostensibly on grounds of compassion and political fairness, then the rules would be swept aside and political life would become a madhouse of competitions to offer the most, and to rouse desires and hopes with which the state of Rome was not yet prepared to deal. This argument has been used, of course, in one form or another by every politician who has ever attempted to divert or entirely prevent change, yet we must consider the Gracchi and Saturninus, all beset in competition of the most extreme sort. Although Cicero might see danger in the technique of
repression of these reformers of the status quo, he would agree with the
result, at least while he was in the Senate. We today see the difficulty of
even our government in attempting to ameliorate the conditions of certain
particularly hard-pressed categories of society, and the nearly
uncontrollable reactions of the rest who wish to maintain their relative
positions, and who wish to gain whatever they can when the political mood
has suddenly become one of granting.

The early poetry of Augustan Rome, particularly the Georiges, should
tell us what Cicero believed he foresaw. He did not enter the intellectual
realm of the Greeks as a creative participant, perhaps partly from
inability and lack of essential interest, but perhaps also because he knew
where his responsibility lay: in the continued survival of Rome of his day.
He saw too, that any subtraction of his energy from that would serve only
to lessen his attention on Rome.

He knew that an army commander would probably surface as supreme
commander if his concordia should fail. Since the actions of Pompeius on
his return from the war against Sertorius gave hope, Cicero probably saw
that this was conceivably the way in which to deflect future crises of a
similar nature from Rome: to retain a man who had had his fill of power,
who wanted simply to maintain his position at the centre of universal
approbation and was perhaps amenable to reasonable advice from another who
had not the greed that stained many. Cicero, of course, would undoubtedly
have been the same and reasonable person; and those to be warded from
excessive power were the men who at the moment were "so thick at the trough
that no one else could get near." [13] This element of greed, as David A.
Stockton has indicated, should never be discounted or ignored in any
Stable and Unstable Equilibrium

analysis of the 'democratic process' [14].

There need have been no feelings of superiority in Cicero's mind about either Pompeius or himself: Pompeius was sated and needed only the continuance of his present preeminence; Cicero would be the first to vouch for himself, and would probably be justified in doing so. Their cooperation for even a few years might slow or even halt the wild acceleration of competition for gloria in Rome and the resulting evils so clearly delineated in the in Verrem. Sulla had seen the problem with clarity and had "solved" it, albeit temporarily, with ferocity. Cicero himself recoiled from such "solutions".

The student of history needs always to keep in mind two physical concepts: "stable equilibrium" and "unstable equilibrium."

An equilibrium position is classified as stable if a small disturbance of the system from equilibrium results only in a small bounded motion about the rest position. The equilibrium is unstable if an infinitesimal disturbance produces unbounded motion. A pendulum at rest is in stable equilibrium, but the egg standing on end is an obvious illustration of unstable equilibrium. If the potential energy of a system is at a minimum, then any slight change in the energy of a system will result in a return to the initial conditions. If the potential energy is at a maximum in the system, then any change will produce great conversions from potential to kinetic energy and velocities increase indefinitely, corresponding to unstable motion [15].

(An animal trapped in a deep pit, with minimum potential energy, a "potential well", illustrates that a change in energy - an unsuccessful
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leap upward - will result in a return to equilibrium. On the other hand, a person standing on one foot on the steeple of a building illustrates that potential energy is readily converted to kinetic energy, thus velocity, by any change in the system, and that there is no return to equilibrium after a slight oscillation.)

The student of history may consider that the Rome in which Cicero had been raised and formed intellectually, and in which he was now thinking and writing, was in a serious state of unstable equilibrium. As a result, all his thoughts were moulded in a way which the Greeks would perhaps not have recognized. He spent his life searching for a means of preventing that initial surge that would initiate the uncontrolled oscillation that would end forever all that he knew and valued. For him was not the solution of Sulla for the Samnites; nor the solution of Caesar for the women and children of Alesia. He saw the almost unbearable injustice of the treatment of the proscribed and their descendants, but feared that any amelioration of their appalling conditions might be that slight impulse that would set in motion the final uncontrolled oscillation. In time, he was proven right, if this was indeed his feeling, for there followed Antony, Octavianus and the metamorphosis into Augustus. In the poems of Horace and Virgil, we view the injustice of the proscriptions; but we note also the fear that any attempt to change the course of events would set off another uncontrolled oscillation. Perhaps the intuitive understanding of this, sometimes called "war weariness", by the inhabitants of Rome long after Cicero had developed his understanding of it, was what converted the Rome of Augustus into a conservative system of relatively stable equilibrium.
Stable and Unstable Equilibrium

To a statesman of foresight, walking the knife edge of action in an unstable society, every action is perhaps the harbinger of unutterable chaos; perhaps the Romans early saw that their institutions had developed from the beginning with an inherent element of instability; hence their conceptions of danger in all novae res. They perhaps saw intuitively that there was a basic flaw in their system and in their world view; and hence they were compelled to the intense conservatism that characterized their political ways of thought from earliest times. The statesman viewing this would hold his duty to be the preservation of the present; to future generations he would bequeath the responsibility for innovation and originality.

The modern historian who views Cicero from the position of one in a Western Democracy of relatively stable equilibrium must ever keep in mind the totally different perspective and the adjustment of political vocabulary required for any discussion of Cicero and the Romans. Witness the statement of an anonymous member of the U.S. Department of State in December of 1978 in reference to an attempted uprising against the Shah of Iran during religious festivals. He demanded anonymity in declaring that no contingency plans were being published concerning the possibility of the downfall of the Shah since many of the possibilities were so appalling to the West that their publication alone would cause too great fear in the United States. Such is the state of affairs during times of unrest in a political system of unstable equilibrium when it is in close political contact with others.

This will explain also why the late president Sandino of Nicaragua permitted closely related members of his family to bank funds in the United
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States and Switzerland, but as late as the end of 1978 still forbade all members of the police and National Guard to do likewise, so that their interests remained vested in the preservation and continuation of the existing state of unstable equilibrium in his fief.

Cicero's political life was an approach to the possible; he was prepared to accommodate for the present the greed of the equites and the cruelty that it entailed in the provinces, if a new generation might thereby develop with an understanding of new possibilities. In his attempt to introduce his concordia ordinum, which, with concession on both sides, might reduce the destructive competition of the Optimates and Equites, he was attempting to prevent the accession of another Sulla and to prevent these lines from being sung:

impious haec tam culta novalia miles habebit, barbarus has segetes: en quo discordia civis produxit miserios: his nos consevimus agros! [16]

Cicero was seeking that stability which would lead to the song:

hic illum vidi iuvenem, Meliboeae, quotannis bis senos cui nostra dies altaia fumant. hic mihi responsum primus dedit ille petenti: "pascite ut ante boves, pueri; submittite tauros." [17]
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FOOTNOTES

1 Cicero, de re publica, III

2 Cic. ad Att. II.1.8, June 60; Plutarch Phocion, 3.

3 Plutarch, Cicero 10; Stockton, Cicero, p. 100.


5 ad Att. VIII.3, 18-19 February 49, for this agonizing comparison of these equally objectionable men.

6 Cicero, de lege Manilia 38; note 22 in chapter "Modes of Perception".

7 Q. Caecilius Metellus (Creticus); M. Caecilius Metellus; L. Caecilius Metellus.

8 ad Att. IX.10.2, 18 March 49.

9 see note 3 above.

10 Cicero, ad Att. V.21.10-13. and ad Att. VI.1.5-6.

11 As legate to Q. Mucius Scaevola, he had drawn upon himself the frustrated ire actually held by the equites against the proconsul. Cicero, ad Fam. I.9.26. See MRR p. 8.

12 ad Att. XI.6.2, 27 Nov 48; "Tanta erat in illis crudelitas ... ut non nominatim sed generatim proscriptio esset inventa ...", written from Brundisium of Pompeius' army in Greece.

13 The comment of an unidentified observer at a recent provincial election in Canada.

14 Greider, William, "The Education of David Stockton", The Atlantic, vol. 248 #6, December 1981, pp. 27-54. "Do you realize the greed that came to the forefront?" Stockton asked in wonder, "The hogs were really feeding. The greed level, the level of opportunism, just got out of control." At this point, President Ronald Reagan's director of the Office of Management and Budget in 1981 is describing the virtual elimination of the corporation income tax. (page 51.)


16 Vergil, Eclogae I, 70-72.
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17 ibid. I, 42-45.
CHAPTER VI
Caesar, Pompeius and the Exile of Cicero

As Caesar's consulship came to a close and the plans of the Helvetii began to press upon him for a solution, certain problems had to be solved in Rome so that the plans of Caesar, Pompeius and Crassus should not go awry through something so minor as mere Senatorial obstructionism. The action of Caesar and Pompeius in admitting Clodius to the plebs was probably not for the purpose of initiating any precise course of events such as followed. Their intention was conceivably to force the voluntary removal of Cicero from his determined path by his physical removal from Rome, or by making him politically innocuous through promotion to a position dependent upon their good-will. In either case, they probably intended that he should, if possible, remain immediately available to them at any time that they had need of him, but that at no time would he have the opportunity of hindering their work. Were he to remain unleashed in Rome with free play for his admittedly great political gifts, he could too easily provoke more opposition from the senate than the three men were willing to tolerate. Cicero, of course, claimed to be taking the long view with respect to this opposition: Quid vero historiae de nobis ad annos DC praedicabunt? Quas quidem ego multo magis vereor quam eorum hominum, qui hodie vivunt, rumusculos [1].

Clodius did not remain long the obsequious underling that Caesar and Pompeius perhaps hoped to have when they permitted him his accession to the plebs. Cicero's letters are full of rumours of dis affection between the three War Lords and Clodius: that Clodius had threatened to repeal Caesar's acts; that Caesar had denied that he had had anything to do with the adoption. Cicero, indeed, came for a while to believe that the new position of Clodius might be of benefit to himself, and in a minor flight of joy
offered to go bail that the adoption had in fact been carried out:

Negent illi Publium plebeium factum esse? hoc vero regnum est et ferri nullo pacto potest. Mittat ad me Publius qui obsignent: iurabo Gnaeum nostrum, conlegam Balbi Ati, mihi narrasse (se) in auspicio fuisse. [2]

The actions of Clodius were undoubtedly his means of staking his claim to independence of action; and, in the result, his natural powers, his allies and his gangs persuaded Caesar and Pompeius, as nothing else could, that in the accomodation that must follow, Clodius would of necessity be treated as an equal power. They attempted to move Cicero out of harm's way by various offers, for he was a useful ally to have in reserve, and there was the danger that Cicero would be removed all too permanently from action before Clodius should have run his course. Caesar probably wanted Cicero safely out of the way in Gaul where his political abilities could be invoked at any time without the need of intercession by Pompeius; furthermore, there is the interesting suggestion that Caesar felt that he owed his very existence to Cicero from the time in 63 when he and Cornelius Nepos had angered the Senate. Caesar himself had apparently been in danger of his life but for the intercession of Cicero in the Senate house.[3]. Pompeius, on the other hand, probably wanted him safe in Rome where he could be a counterpoise with the Senate against Caesar if need be, and could aid against Cato. But Clodius soon settled the problem of Cato and the affair of Vettius muddied already roiled waters. In the letter in which Cicero described the charges of Vettius, and how the attempt was being made to rouse suspicion against Curio and others that Pompeius was the intended victim of assassination [4], Cicero goes on to describe the
assurances made to him by Pompeius that his way would lie in safety and that he would be protected from the machinations of Clodius:

Pompeius de Cladio iubet nos esse sine cura et summam in nos benevolentiam omni oratione significat. [5]

The repeated warnings had their effect however; (for who can be so utterly confident of his friends in such times, especially a man who knows well the benefits of duplicity) [6], and Pompeius retreated to the sanctuary of his house. But Caesar's offers of security had been refused; furthermore, the affair of Vettius had not only resulted in the estrangement of Pompeius from Cicero, but had also ended all hope of rapprochement of the former with the Römi [7].

Even at the worst of these times, Pompeius had probably retained some thought of utilizing Cicero again after the troubles that began in earnest with the entry of Clodius into the Tribunate in December of 59, but it was undoubtedly to be a Cicero under much better control than hitherto, and a Cicero to whom it was utterly clear where lay the seat of power. Indeed, Cicero was later to say of Pompeius that he was restituendi maiorum retinendi studiosior [8]. A warrior of the calibre of Pompeius Magnus is not easily crushed by the Sturm und Drang of Rome in 59 and 58.

Cicero was early offered a position on the agrarian commission, and later a legateship on Caesar's staff; his position in Roman and Italian political life was so striking that Caesar found it well worth his while to make one last effort to bind Cicero to his own future; for a beneficium of such size would have ensured Cicero's compliance to Caesar's wishes for the future and yet would not have compromised seriously Cicero's own position.
as a spokesman for the equites and Italians. Caesar made this last gesture of conciliation to Cicero, for he realized that Cicero's possible value was as great as the danger that he posed if he were left unmuzzled in Rome in Caesar's absence. When Cicero refused the post, however, he was dismissed from further consideration and abandoned to Clodius as an example to the city.

Clodius was left as guard for Caesar's acta but remained an independent agent. His initial legislation was designed to create a secure foundation for his future acts: modifications to the Leges Aelia et Fufia, to the collegia, and to the powers of the censors. He next imposed beneficia upon the consuls so as to ensure their compliance with his desires; and these beneficia were mixed irrevocably with the fate that he had designated for Cicero: Gabinius was for Syria; Piso for Macedonia and Achaea; but both pro-consulares were utterly dependent upon the dismissal of Cato to Crete and of Cicero to exile.

Cicero had again been apprised that his position as ally to the great was not as an equal; that without a major power base within Rome, he would always be relegated to obscurity in times of difficulty if he attempted a major effort as an independent.

A closer analysis of the time-span covered in the first part of this chapter indicates that Pompeius' popularity in the interval 61 to 56 shows a series of fluctuations. The low points preceding his heights almost invariably show a rapprochement with Cicero, probably to obtain access to Cicero's oratorical powers and his lines of communication with the Equites, since Pompeius alternated in his interests, using both Caesar and the Optimates as counterpoises to each other.
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The low point that came after Pompeius’ return from the East highlighted devastatingly his miscalculation in attempting to ally himself by marriage alliance with Cato, his most powerful and dangerous critic and opponent. His present wife, Mucia, had been a political choice by Sulla after Pompeius’ return from Africa and his triumph. Mucia was half-sister to Metellus Celer, consul in 60, and Metellus Nepos, to be consul in 57. If this marriage had linked him safely into the aristocracy of the 80’s, his divorce from her was to permit him access to one of the most powerful of his critics and opponents at the end of the 60’s — Marcus Cato.

His humiliation in the face of M. Cato’s refusal must have been one of the indicators that betrayed to Rome the essential weakness of Pompeius at this point: that he had nullified his great auctoritas by relinquishing his army, thus demonstrating publicly that he would use power legally and would not force himself on the state in its absence.

At this point, Pompeius moved in Cicero’s direction so as to gain access to the Senate and Equites that would result from his friendship. Cicero noted the advances, but recognized also the element of self-serving interest on Pompeius’ part:

Tuus autem ille amicus (scin quem dicam? de quo tu ad me scripsisti, postea quam non auderet reprehendere, laudare coepisse) nos, ut ostendit, admodum diliget amplexit amat, aperit laudat, oculte sed ita ut perspicuum sit invidit; nihil comae, nihil simplex, nihil evanescentiis politicos illustres, nihil honestum, nihil forte, nihil liberum. [9]

With the results of the Bona Dea case and the bitterness between Senate and Equites over the Asian tax case, Cicero on his part saw Pompeius as a necessary bulwark.
... erant quidam improbi qui contentionem fore aliquam mihi cum Pompeio ... arbitrarentur. Cum hoc ego me
tanta familiaritate coniunxi ut uterque nostrum in sua ratione munitor et in re
publica firmior hac conjunctione esse possit [10].

Metellus Celer was opposed, despite Pompeius' aid in his
candidature, Flavius had failed with his agrarian bill and Cato and
Lucullus were blocking all Pompeius' political aims. Cicero was the only
one to whom Pompeius could therefore turn at that time for aid.

Cicero at this point saw himself as standing fast and drawing
Pompeius to him, but not trusting entirely in the appearance that Pompeius
had assumed.

... et is, de quo scribis,
nihil habet amplum, nihil excelsum, nihil
non summissum atque populare. [11]

With the return of Caesar from Spain, events took a new course.
Marcus Cato blocked Caesar's efforts for a triumph and in the end forced
Caesar to look to Pompeius for the strength that he lacked in the present
Senate after his accession to the consulship for 59. As discussed earlier
in this chapter, both Caesar and Pompeius attempted to involve Cicero in
their plans, but to no avail. Cicero could have brought to the compact an
immense personal power, but since his personal beliefs prevented him, he
was neutralized. As he wrote to Atticus about the offer tendered by Caesar
through Cornelius Balbus:

Hic sunt haec: conjunctio mihi
summa cum Pompeio, si placet, etiam cum
Caesare, redivus in gratiam cum inimicis,
pax cum multitudine, senectutis
otium. [12]

This marked another high point in Pompeius' career and
demonstrated again that Cicero did not automatically maintain his position for his status still as novus homine weakened him and made him useful, but never essential as an associate in the plans of Pompeius.

By May of 59, the first and second agrarian bills had been passed, Ptolemy Auletes had been satisfied in his requests, the publicani had been satisfied over the Asian taxes and Pompeius' Eastern acta had been approved. Pompeius' popularity as a result, however, had reached another low and Cicero was reduced to watching from the sidelines and hoping that the second agrarian bill would fail in its purpose and that the dynasts would be seriously hindered by the resulting criticism and conflict with an aroused boni and plebs [13].

At this point, Cicero made a major miscalculation in his relationship with Pompeius. Vatinius had given Gaul to Caesar for five years [14], and Cicero was angered by the constant violence or threat of it in all legislation. In his defence of Antonius [15], he spoke forcefully and bitterly of the activities of the dynasts. Pompeius immediately agreed with Caesar, and probably Crassus, in the danger posed by Cicero in Caesar's absence, and acquiesced immediately in the admission of Clodius to the plebs as a mechanism to protect their acta. Cicero was now neutralized as an equal, but, as discussed earlier, Caesar and Pompeius both offered a legateship and libera legatio to Cicero so as to maintain him for future use.

Cicero's exclusion from Rome in exile denotes the completely amoral attitude of Pompeius to Roman amicitia: Cicero had been of use, but his refusal to guarantee the inviolability of the legislation of 59 meant that Pompeius' attitude to him would become one of indifference until a new
use appeared. It had again been demonstrated that a lack of a powerful body of associates and clients precluded him from dealing with Pompeius from a position of strength, and hence that Pompeius considered him only from a position of what he could give; no sense of reciprocity was involved in Pompeius' mind.

Pompeius now found himself too precariously balanced against the power of Clodius in the long term. Interference with Deiotarus, king of Galatia and client of Pompeius, and the freeing of the son of Tigranes from his position as hostage in Rome forced Pompeius to return to the position that Cicero could have future value in Pompeius' scheme of things.

The election of Lentulus Spinther, Sestius and Milo as consul and tribunes made matters easier in 57; even a slave planted with knife and ready confession failed to deter Pompeius for too long from plans to bring back Cicero, under certain conditions, as aide against Clodius and link to the Optimates. Quintus Cicero gave rigid guarantees; Sestius persuaded Caesar to withdraw his opposition to Cicero's return. The bills by Messius and Fabricius were faced by violence, but it was countered by Sestius and Milo. The deciding factor in the return of Cicero was the effort applied by Pompeius throughout Italy to gain support.

Pompeius' efforts were successful, and Cicero returned a hero. Unfortunately, however, the officium which he now owed to Pompeius was of critical importance: it was great enough to cripple Cicero's initiatives in the succeeding years if he failed to satisfy Pompeius' interests, and ensured a position of relative dependence upon Pompeius' initiatives.

Cicero's first effort in repayment was his support of the corn commission for Pompeius, in return for which Pompeius then named Cicero to
be first of the fifteen légates on the corn commission and to be his alter ego in all things [16]. This commission and the honour he gained in the return of Cicero from exile brought Pompeius to another temporary apex in popularity [17], one short lived in face of the efforts by Cato and other Optimates to end the agreement of the three Dynasts. Even Cicero felt it to be no act against Pompeius' interests to attempt to detach him from Caesar.

A shift in allegiances came with an attempt by P. Rutilius Rufus to annul the unpopular second agrarian bill of Caesar, the lex Campiana. Whether this was a move instigated by Pompeius in a shift towards the Optimates, and hence constituted an attack on the laws of Caesar alone, cannot be known [18]. Pompeius had little to lose by it, since his veterans had probably been satisfied in their needs by the first bill; Caesar had much to lose, since it could be the start of a campaign to annul other bills which would have a serious effect mainly on him.

The next critical period for relations between Cicero and Pompeius came with a return of Ptolemy Auletes to Rome for assistance in regaining the throne to which he had originally been returned by the efforts of Caesar and Pompeius in 59 [19]. Cicero was faced by the conflicting needs of accommodating two men who had aided in his return: Lentulus Spinther and Pompeius. The problem was baffling, for Pompeius spoke publicly in favour of Spinther [20], but had all his agents working for himself [21]. Cicero recounted the impossibility of dealing with this devious creature in one of his more revealing letters to Lentulus Spinther:

Nam cum in sermone cotidiano, tum in senatu palam sic egit causam tuam, ut neque eloquentia maior quisquam nec gravitate, nec studio, nec contentione agere potuerit, cum summa testificatione tuorum in se officiorum et amoris erga te sui. [22]
Yet in the same letter he could say:

Libonis et Hypsael non obscura
concurari et contentio omniumque Pompei
familiarium studium in eam opinionem rem
adduxerunt, ut Pompeius cupere videatur.

Religious impediments caused the question to be left in limbo until Gabinius solved it personally. Pompeius' popularity was now on the wane, however, and if he had seen no need to acquaint Cicero with his desires or to make him an honest confidant during the Egyptian question, he saw need to do so as Clodius and C. Cato mounted constant attacks against the background of senatorial obstruction [23]. Pompeius felt that Crassus was the initiator of his troubles and, in collecting large forces from Picenum and Gaul, was preparing for any eventuality: Sed magna manus ex Piceno et Gallia expectatur [24].

Cicero reports Pompeius' blunt statement in the Senate:

Respondit ei vehementer
Pompeius Crassumque descriptit dixitque
aperte se munitorem ad custodiendam
vitam suam fore, quam Africanus fuisset,
... [25]

Pompeius was now in serious difficulties in Rome. Cicero was disturbed, for he probably saw a similarity to conditions in 59 when Pompeius had been in difficulties so great that Cicero had written:

Quamquam nihil est iam quod
magis timendum nobis putem quam ne ille
noster Sampsiceramus, cum se omnium
serenibus gentibus vapulare et cum has
actiones c.î. x. rém m. rém. videbit,
ruere incipiat. [26]

In mid-February of 56 Marcus Cicero informed Quintus, who was acting on Pompeius' corn commission in Sardinia, that serious efforts were under way by Clodius and Pompeius both.
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Moreover, in private conversation, Pompeius now unburdened himself to Cicero about his position, as Cicero reports to his brother:

*Itaque magnae mihi res iam moveri videbantur. Nam Pompeius haec intellegit nobiscumque communicat, insidias vitae suae fieri, C. Catonem a Crasso sustentari, Clodio pecuniam suppeditari, ...; vehementer esse providendum ne opprimatur, contionario illo populo a se prope alienato, nobilitate inimica, non aequo senatu, iuventute improba; [27]*

At this point, Cicero, seeing what the return of Caesar forebode for the future, perceived again the possibility of separating Pompeius from Caesar (despite the continued marriage of Pompeius to Julia) and ending permanently the rule of the dynasts. As Cicero wrote to Lentulus Spinther in December of 54:

*Quin etiam Marcellino et Philippo consulibus Nonis Aprilibus mihi est senatus adsensus, ut de agro Campano frequenti senatu Idibus Maiis referretur. Num potui magis in arcem illius causae invadere aut magis oblivisci temporum meorum, meminisse actionum? [28]*

In his letter to Quintus on 11 April 56, Cicero described his following conversation with Pompeius in which Quintus was to be permitted to return:

*Cenatus in hortos ad Pompeium lectica latus sum .... Videre autem volebam, quod eram postridie Roma exiturus, et quod ille in Sardiniam iter habebat. Hominem conveni et ab eo petivi, ut quam primum te nobis reddeter. 'Statim' dixit. [29]*

Quintus was to return, but Cicero had no intimation that Crassus had informed Caesar at Ravenna of Cicero's action on the second agrarian
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bill, nor that Pompeius would meet Caesar at Luca, greatly strengthened by the threat which Cicero posed to Caesar. A letter to Lentulus Spinther in 54 gives a graphic description of a perhaps feigned anger on Pompeius' part and the command to desist, lest Quintus be compelled to repay his pledges given for Marcus' return from exile:

Quem cum in Sardinia Pompeius paucis post diebus quam Luca discesserat convenisset, 'te', inquit, 'ipsam cupio; nihil opportunius potuit accidere. Nisi cum Marco fratre diligenter egeris, dependendum tibi est, quod mihi pro illo spopondisti. [30]

Pompeius must have been in a grimly good humour as he criticized Cicero (questus est graviter), when he knew that, in reality, he owed his gratitude to Cicero for his assistance in compelling terms from Caesar. As it was, Cicero was silenced and once again Pompeius showed that he would use Cicero to his own advantage with a brutal callousness that indicated to Cicero his own position relative to physical power in the state.

Once before he had been abandoned by the man who had sworn to protect him. So, referring to 59:

... iecit quidam casus caput
meum quasi certaminis causa in median
contentionem dissensionemque civilem. [31]

In the present climax of Pompeius' power, Cicero was forced to compose a palinode in withdrawing his opposition and making the fact public:

Quin etiam (<iam> dudum
enim circumrodo quod devorandum est)
'subturpica mihi videbatur esse
c] / \ e . [32]

The palinode may have been either a letter or his speech de provinciis consularibus of mid-56 [33], but his usefulness to Pompeius was
past and he was compelled to protect the agents of the dynasts [34], men of the
class of Vatinius, in the courts so as to ensure that his
acceptability to them would be created again as he gained a new value:

Sed valeant recta vera honesta
consilia. Non est credibile quae sit
perfidia in istis principibus, ut volunt
esse et ut essent si quicquam haberent
fidei. Senseram noram inductus relictus
proiectus ab iis; ... [35]

Cicero had recognized that his political success during his years
to the consulship depended upon public recognition of a bond of amicitia
with Pompeius. In April of 62, in his "Laelius" letter, he attempted to
keep open these bonds of friendship: in re publica et in amicitia adiunctum
esse [36], but his fatal weakness continued to obtrude: he lacked the
political power that drew from a network of alliances that would have
prevented Pompeius from discarding him whenever their interests collided.
Had he controlled such a network, Pompeius would inevitably have been
compelled to sacrifice and to negotiate with Cicero rather than dictate to
him.

At his major times of need, Pompeius cooperated with Cicero:
first, in the frustrations after his return in 62; next in mid-59, when he
had reaped the benefits of the association with Caesar and Crassus but had
also discovered the debits in popularity and status; third, after his
deliberate humiliation by Clodius in the affairs of King Deiotaropus and the
son of Tigranes; and fourth, in February of 56 after the debates on Ptolemy
Auletes and the trial of Milo when: Pompeius nostro ... hercule, non est
idem [37].

Once he had regained his position, however, he simply went his
own way and left Cicero in abeyance for possible future rehabilitation, as he did in 58 with Cicero's exile, as will be discussed further in the chapter 'The Effect of Exile Upon Cicero'; or he cynically used Cicero as a pawn in bargaining, as he did at Luca with Caesar.

Cicero's efforts politically and his almost constant references to his services to the state did not protect him in political infighting with Pompeius, but left him always in a position of inferiority with only infrequent periods when he was bedazzled by Pompeius' offers when Pompeius was himself in need.
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FOOTNOTES

1 ad Att. II.5.1; early April 59.
2 ad Att. II.12.1, 19 April 59.
3 Plutarch, Caesar 8.
4 R. Seager, Pompeius, pp. 99f.
5 ad Att. II.24.5, August 59.
8 ibid, p. 531. Seager also quotes Cicero De domo sua, 66. This reference to section 66 must be a typographical error. cf. ad Att VII.3.3, Cales, 19 February 49; note especially: ad Att IX.19.2, Arpinum, 2 April 49; and X.7.1, Cumae, 22 April (?) 40
10 ad Att. I.19.7, 15 March 60.
11 ad Att. I.20.2; 12 May 60.
12 ad Att. II.3.4, late December 60.
13 ad Att. II.16.1, 1 May 59.
14 Plutarch, Caesar 14.
15 ad Att. I.1.1, January 61; Suetonius, D.I. 20.4; R. Seager, Pompeius, p. 90f.
16 ad Att. IV.1.7, 10 September 57.
17 ad Att. IV.1.6: Plutarch, Pompeius 49.
18 D. Stockton, Cicero, pp. 207f.
19 Suetonius, D.I. 54.3; cf. Gelzer, Caesar p. 76.
20 ad Fam I.1.2, 13 January 56; ad Fam I.2.3, 15 January 56.
21 ad Fam I.1.3, 13 January 56.
22 ibid. I.1.2, 3
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23 ad Q. F. II.3.4, mid-February 56.
24 ibid.
25 ad Q. F. II.3.3, 12-15 February 56.
26 ad Att. II.14.1, 26 April 59.
27 ad Q. F. II.3.4, mid February 56.
28 ad Fam I.9.8, December 54.
29 ad Q. F. II.6(5).3, 9 April 56.
30 ad Fam I.9.9-10, December 54.
31 ad Fam I.9.13, December 54.
32 ad Att. IV.5.1, June 56.
33 D. Stockton, Cicero, p. 211, n 36.
34 ad Fam I.9.19, December 54.
35 ad Att. IV.5.1, June 56.
36 ad Fam V.7.3, April 62.
37 ad Q. F. II.5.3, mid-March 56.
The Emotional Content of Cicero's Letters From Exile

Chapter VII
The Emotional Content of Cicero's Letters From Exile.

As he went into exile, Cicero felt the walls closing in about him. His letter to Atticus of April 3, 58 [1] is quite clear: in it he admits that he has changed his plans with what appears to be no reason. Yet he claims the best of motives: he has just received notice that he is to remain not less than 400 miles from Italy and hence cannot remain in Malta as he had wished. Yet he can scarcely bring himself to describe to Atticus the real hurt - that he had been forbidden Malta by C. Vergilius, governor of Sicily, who had hitherto been an ostensible friend of Cicero, but here had acted quite gratuitously against him since his refusal predated the edict concerning the 400 mile limit [2]. It was but one more example to Cicero of the cascading effect of disaffection of his friends: that erstwhile friends were deserting him in order to be in the lines of political amicitia with the new power in Rome. His feeling was now shame in defeat, for he had passed the opportunity for a glorious death and, rather than conquer in death, he would go down with a whimper when finally he met up with one of the old Catilinarians in Hellas. His moment had passed and he could scarcely foresee that the son of Tigranes would be perhaps the final straw in the rupture of relations between Clodius and Pompeius, and the consequent need by Pompeius for a Cicero now thoroughly chastened [3]. Nor could he possibly manage a cold-blooded analysis that would decide that Pompeius had quite deliberately brought about his humiliation so as to guarantee his malleability in the future, with the necessary implication that his return could be inevitable.

Cicero had reasonable grounds to believe that his exsilium was permanent. Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus went into exile in 100 when he refused to accept the provisions of a sanctio in the Lex Appuleia of Saturninus; furthermore, Marius opposed and Furius vetoed a bill of recall [4]. Publius
Rutilius Rufus appears never to have been recalled from his most unjust exile. Caesar inserted a sanctio into his agrarian legislation, requiring all Senators to abide permanently by its provisions. Metellus Celer, M. Cato and M. Fyontius finally signed, since they realized that refusal would end their careers as it had that of Metellus Numidicus in 100 and Rutilius Rufus in 99 [5]. Milo, as a later example, went into exile in 52 after conviction de vi, but was not recalled, even by Caesar. Caesar did recall many exiles, but can scarcely be used as evidence for Republican usage.

Nevertheless, three days later in April, Cicero was able to describe his powers of resilience with the statement ego enim idem sum. Inimici, mei mea mihi, non me ipsum ademerunt [6]. It is on April 29 that two critical letters come. In the first to Terentia [7] he writes in a highly emotional style; yet it appears to have been composed in a style that matches that of Terentia herself and is one that will communicate best with her [8]. He mentions to her his earlier desire of suicide and claims that he had been dissuaded only because his children wished life for him, not death. The arguments are good: he stresses the treachery of his friends and the necessity that Terentia remain in Rome and work for his return unless all hopes fail completely. Only if we accept the argument that Cicero was suffering from delusions of persecution on the part of friends can we fail to recognize the justifiable accusations that he levelled against them. In all, the style appears to mirror Terentia's and to be designed to silence her complaints and cries. It is in another letter [9] that he develops his theme, although not at all in the highly emotional form in which he wrote to Terentia. He stresses that Atticus was able to dissuade him from suicide, but could not prevent him from wishing it. He returns to the extreme danger from Autronius and others whence Athens was eliminated as a refuge. The theme is that
he might have met his fate with honour, but that he had let the moment pass and must now sink more and more into ineffective helplessness [10].

In this letter, it is the regret for opportunities lost that causes Cicero the most grief; from this point of view, his cries become more understandable and have no flavour of breakdown. A breakdown there may well have been, but a breakdown followed by re-synthesis and re-integration, not a final and permanent breakdown that could demonstrate a weakness investing his entire career. After all, Atticus had talked to Pompeius to no obvious avail; the news from Rome was bad; he was worried about Quintus and whether his enemies had decided to extirpate his entire line because of their hatred for him alone [11]. Yet what could be more devastating to a Roman consularis and nobilis than the annihilation of his entire family from the nobility instead of the passage of the fumosae imagines down through the depths of time? The treachery of his friends was still eating at his mind like a cancer, for he had too much time for introspective thought, and letters from Atticus had informed him that Quintus would be prosecuted: fore ut acrius postularetur [12]. Clodius was going from strength to strength to the point that he could match himself against Pompeius himself; and Cicero could be driven to say and admit that Tigrane enim neglecto sublata sunt omnia [13]. It was quite reasonable for him to say that grief made writing too much.

None the less, even if we grant all the errors that Cicero made in mistaking the mood and determination of Caesar, who delayed in Rome to the end of the affair even in face of the pressing challenge of the Helvetii, we must still admit that there is a level of understanding in the letters that explains much of Cicero's position — if only we will read it.

Amongst all the rhetorical insertions of Dio Cassius, there is perhaps
The Emotional Content of Cicero's Letters From Exile.

one element of truth: that Cicero was abandoned by the nobles because he had annoyed and exasperated them; that they wished to put him in his place [14]; furthermore, that Cicero was returned with their help when assistance to him would permit a similar humiliation to Clodius, who had replaced Cicero as the chief problem to the Roman state as the aristocrats saw it.

Cicero had in many places claimed that he would be able to handle Clodius on his own since he had backing of the people of Italy and his old band of supporters [15]. Yet, after the initial bill of Clodius, which did not name him personally, he gave up the fight in the Senate and displayed himself in the streets in mourning.

The first move by Clodius was to introduce a bill regarding any who put to death a Roman citizen without appeal to the People. There was immediately a volte-face by Cicero, who failed to defend himself as he had planned. Dio Cassius mentions later [16] that both Hortensius and Cato failed to back Cicero in his plans and advised him not to attempt a fight lest the violence get out of hand. This was not the backing which he had been led to expect, and ties in perfectly with the later complaints of Cicero that he had been betrayed [17]. What we can only surmise is the extent of the immense pressure that must have been applied by Clodius to bring about such a change in men who had promised their help and who were independent Roman senators of immense personal auctoritas. Moreover, the reasons that they later advanced for having refused to accede to Cicero's requests for help were probably not couched in any language that would bring out the truth; for a proud man who had been pressured by Clodius to abandon any attempt to aid Cicero would scarcely admit to such a reason for his defection: rather he would bring forward a reason such as that given by Clodius himself in introducing the bill. This interpretation of the
facts may account for the complete failure of Cicero to understand the true
opposition that he faced [18].

It is probably correct that he did not truly early understand the
determination of Caesar. For Caesar was hard pressed to meet the Helvetii in
time for their projected march, and was thereby made more determined to handle
Cicero quickly because of the otherwise long delay in Rome pending the outcome
d of Cicero's appeals against Clodius' laws.

The immense power of the forces arrayed against him must have daunted
and staggered Cicero at the moment of crisis. He had earlier believed that he
would be permitted to fight as a Roman consularis; it had scarcely occurred to
him that he would be completely disposed of in a brutal power-play that would
simply and cleanly remove him from the scene without real hope of redemption.
Critics of Cicero, in the security of the study, often fail to comprehend the
true moral crisis that can be initiated in a human by a set of events that
destroy everything that he has fought for, and that brutally and callously deny
him even the right to any effective action on his own behalf. Cicero was ruined,
and knew it. His preparations, his years leading to the consulship were erased;
his title pater patriae was flung in his teeth, and indeed, the acta that had
occasioned its use had themselves become the occasion of his downfall. In fine,
he knew that now he would never create the hearth and position of honour for his
descendants.

It was on June 13 that statements regarding the treachery of
Hortensius came [19]. We find in that letter the concept of a suicide at the
opportune time; now comes the idea that he may be compelled to suicide at the
wrong time since he had not been permitted to do it at the time most fitting for
his future reputation. He retains the proviso, however, that he will be
compelled to it only if all else fails. It is most moving to compare this letter to Atticus, a letter that must have been accorded great security in the post of Cicero were actually to name a man such as Hortensius, with his description in the pro Milone of 52 B.C.: vidi enim, vidi hunc ipsum Q. Hortensium, lumen et ornamentum rei publicae, paene interfici servorum manu, cum mihi adesset [20]. Such were the contortions forced upon Cicero in his return to the routes of power [21].

On June 13, there comes also the deeply emotional letter to Quintus which portrays Cicero as a most perceptive letter writer who quite correctly gauges his correspondent [22]. The letter is contrived with the skill of a barrister and is a fine example of emotional pleading aimed at one who responds to such an approach. Quintus had apparently, from the context of the letter itself, written in such a tone, and Cicero himself accepts that tone for his own. The rhetorical tone of Mi frater, mi frater, mi frater... indicates the approach chosen by Cicero and leads into a superior example of special pleading using antithesis in which the orator pleads the reverse, that is, asks rhetorically if he, in each case, is at fault [23].

The most critical point to be noticed is the difference between the tone of this letter and that of ad Att. III 9 discussed above. The letter to Quintus is deeply contrived to reach his brother on an emotional, not an intellectual, plane. That to Atticus, on the other hand, is quite dispassionate in explaining why Marcus was unable to see Quintus on his return. The difference in tone between the two letters indicates that Marcus Cicero manipulated his emotional ties with Terentia and Quintus so as best to communicate with them, but that he tried not to permit himself to succumb to those emotions, as is shown by letters of the same date to Atticus. It appears quite clear, as a
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result, that Cicero judged his reader carefully, just as he judged the jury in a law-court, and chose the mode of communication with precision. That he had reason for the deep sense of loss that permeates his letters is made abundantly clear if we go to the masters of description in Western literature for the meaning to a human of losing all.

Preeminent stands the Ὄις θαῦμα γενέσθαι ἃ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται of Homer with its now 3000 year old dream of a man fighting to return to his homeland [24].

Then we can see the sad descent into silence of Ovid and his pleas in the Epistulae ex Ponto and Tristia as he begs a return from exile for himself.

Adde loci faciem, nec fronde, nec arbore laeti,
Et quod iners hiemis continuatur hiemis.
Hic me pugnante cum frigore, cumque sagittis,
Cumque meo fato, quarta fatigat hiemis.
Fine carent lacrmarae, nisi cum stupor obstitit illis
Et similis morti pectora torpor habet. [25]

tristissima nocis imago,
Quae mihi supremum tempus in urbe fuit. [26]

Next, Cicero himself describes the prerogatives of success:

locus, auctoritas, domi splendor, apud exterar nationes nomen et gratia, toga praetexta, sella curulis, insignia, fasces, exercitus, imperia, provinciae. [27]

Finally Milton describes the permanent loss of everything:
Than to dwell here, driv'n out from bliss, condemn'd
In this abhorred deep to utter woe;

[28]

But his doom
Reserv'd him to more wrath; for now the thought
Both of lost happiness and lasting pain
Torment him;

[29]

; But O how fall'n! how chang'd
From him, who in the happy Realms of Light
Cloth'd with transcendent brightness didst outshine
Myriads though bright;

[30]

It is characteristic that a person gain a great part of his or
her strength from an association with others - the group [31]. It is clear
that Cicero was deprived of much of that strength, a fact made clear in ad
Att III.11.2, where he admits that he needs constant strength from Atticus
since he cannot supply it himself. So too on July 17, in ad Att III 12. In
section 3 especially of this letter he shows the problems of a man who has
been dependent upon intellectual communication and is now deprived of it.
This in itself will cause deep problems in the best of self-controlled and
inner-directed humans. The deprivation of stimuli will react seriously upon
anyone, most of all upon one so deeply integrated into the elements of the
inner group of a society devoted to spoken communication.

In his claims of treachery, he reminds Atticus in ad Att III 13
of August 5 that those who were jealous of him saw him wavering and
unnerved, and pushed all the harder to his downfall. In ad Q.F. I,4, he
expands upon the factors that impelled him to flight: the sudden defection
of Pompeius; the estrangement of the praetors and of the consuls Gabinius
and Piso; the timidity of the Publicani; the armed gangs. In a letter of
August 17, ad Att III 15, he exposes the difficulties the exile faced in
the problem of sheer existence. He describes in section 8 how he wishes to
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become somebody, aliquem, as opposed to surviving in the state of non-existence as he now did. This was the essence of the problem of an exile of a man of Cicero's stature and position: that he lacked not only the things and persons that were his, but also his very self: desidero . . . me ipsum [32]. This was the aspect of exile most corrosive to the mental equilibrium of a person of Cicero's makeup: the fact that the very raison-d'être of his existence, for which he had been trained from the earliest childhood, had been swept away from him and would apparently never return. This was not to be the weakness of M. Marcellus later, kept in exile by Caesar until the latter had relinquished his anger at the most earnest behest of the Senate. Marcellus had the makeup to enable him to convert all his deepest drives and needs for power in the state into true intellectual challenges so that he could, at least to all appearances, be so removed from the turmoil of efforts for his return as to appear to grant favour in his return rather than be granted favour in being permitted a return. Of course, it must be granted that Marcellus feared no such extirpation of his line as appeared to face Cicero, and so could bear what promised to be a temporary burden with at least superficial equanimity.

It is in the ad Att III.15 of August 17 that we see something of the alterations of alliances that beset Cicero at the moment of flight from Rome. Here he gives a belated thanks to Cato who had most of all attempted to act towards him without change or alteration under pressure. Cicero now regrets that the pretences of others counted more than did the good faith of Cato. He claims that he was held back after Pompeius' ungenerous response and could actually have either won triumphantly or have died; but that at least he would not have remained in this limbo in which he now
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found himself. He stresses in this passage that he would at least have made a definite decision and would not have faced a non-identity for the rest of his days. A charge that he is losing control of his courage could arise from his complaints against Atticus in *ad Att III 15.7*, yet here too, we see that so many had turned against him that it was reasonable for him to begin to believe that none had ever been that well disposed to him at any time.

A person who has been abandoned so suddenly by so many of his friends will have some reasonable grounds for supposing that many were luke-warm from the start. Hence it is quite reasonable, given the circumstances, that he should begin to give intimations of a lack of friendship on the part of Atticus, especially since Atticus had given the same advice as the others and they had been proven wanting. That Cicero was putting up a strong fight for continued control of his mind and emotions is clear from the letter that comes only two days later, *ad Att III 16* of August 19, wherein he asks Atticus not to use false optimism that always disappears under further reading; but rather to use only honesty in dealing with events at Rome. It is quite significant as a tribute to Cicero’s mental equilibrium that he mentions that Quintus fails him by being too optimistic all the time, whereas Atticus wisely alternates and varies so that he will not despair nor hope unwisely.

A true appreciation of the difficulties into which he has placed his family comes with the realization in *ad Att III 17* of September 4, where he sees that if Quintus were to be arraigned in the court on charges of *repetundae*, Appius Claudius would be the president. Once again he sees that his decision to live beyond his time has betrayed his family. We see
again why he felt compelled to remind Quintus that it was the tears of his family that prevented his suicide; for it appears imminent in the letters to Quintus that Quintus had asked, on one occasion at least, why he had not committed suicide at the obvious moment. It appears to have occurred to Quintus as much as to Marcus that the envy of the nobles could have been deflected from the family, and Marcus' honour preserved, had he ended the problem at the one moment granted him. The unstated expression in his letters to Terentia and Quintus appears to be that, since he could not state bluntly that it was their fault that he was still alive and causing trouble for them by his very continued existence, he was still contemplating it; that he had not saved himself from personal dishonour, only because he had listened to their tears and prayers that he consult their interests and remain living [33].

On September 15, he gives a clear, coherent and dispassionate discussion of possible suicide. There are no histrionics: he states merely that he will end all if the going becomes impossible [34]. He notes, moreover, as in the letter to Quintus, that it was his brother's miserae ac luctuosae preces, the hopes of his unhappy wife and the pleas of Tullia that had kept him alive. The emotionalism of his family and close friends had compelled him to forsake the obvious decision; it was not some pathetic and disgraceful fear that kept him mumbling about some idea of a suicide that could bring him into contempt from right-minded people, rather he had considered from the start and continued to consider that solution as the most Roman solution possible to a man of his class and position. He simply gave a calm and reasoned view that what is beyond redemption should not be maintained uselessly and at serious expense to his
friends and to his family. As usual, he thinks of Terentia and Quintus in giving priority in his decision: himself he considers beyond help or redemption.

The tone of high emotionalism, similar to that of the letter to Quintus, *ad Q.F. I.3* of June 13, comes in *ad Fam XIV.2* to Terentia on October 5. Once again it is a question of a letter that appears to match the tone of a letter from Terentia herself and that is gauged to meet her emotional needs. In it Cicero shows his doubts of both Pompeius and Crassus and goes on to develop with the proper amount of pathos the feelings that he has for the way in which Terentia has been treated. Terentia appears to have taken refuge with her half-sister Fabia, a Vestal Virgin, and was required to accompany tribunes on some financial matter to the Tabula Valeria: a *Vestae ad tabulam Valeriam ducta esset*. This is clearly the correct mood and tone in which to write to Terentia if she is to believe that he has the proper feeling for the way in which she has suffered; for he admits too that he cannot write to anyone save those who write to him, and those mentioned in Terentia's and Quintus' letters. (Unstated is the correspondence with Atticus and those mentioned in Atticus' letters.) The tone of these letters to Quintus and Terentia seems clearly to be one designed for people who see only a very narrow view of the problems faced, and who see these personally: who do not see, and are not given any view of problems in a greater context. Instead, Cicero appears deliberately to translate all problems into their own personal world, for it appears from his letters that they can comprehend only their own problems and thus see him as the instigator of all their troubles and responsible for their day-to-day suffering although he is in exile and suffers even more
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deeply [36].

The artificiality of these letters to Quintus and Terentia that is marked by this narrowness of viewpoint does not appear in the letters to Atticus, even when the letters come within a few days of each other. Hence it appears quite justifiable to claim that the pathetic and slightly contemptible tone of these intimate letters should call upon us to judge the recipient rather than the sender.

This tone that appears to be reserved for Quintus and Terentia comes out most markedly in two letters of November 25 [35]. In the former, to Terentia, his grief appears to be manufactured for her since the letter shows nothing of the cold and dispassionate discussion in the letter to Atticus of the very real dangers to be faced when L. Piso should leave for Macedonia and the protection of Plancus become insufficient. It is a discussion given without theatrics; yet in the letter to Terentia, he rehearses his theme of trusting some but not others (perhaps a reference to the legateship that he refused from Caesar.) The grief is quite obviously turned on and off at will in his letters to Terentia, for the post-script is one of detachment and composure. Perfectly composed, too, is the tone of the letter to Atticus, and it is in quite a mood of emotional detachment that he considers the probability that Lentulus Spinther is entirely under the thumb of Pompeius: *sum totum esse in illius potestate*, and that since he is friendly, Pompeius may be so. There is no touch whatsoever of the feeling of near hopeless grief that permeates the letter of the same day to Terentia. This contrast is heightened by the letter to Atticus of November 29 [37], in which the tone is one of total self-control, yet which is again matched by an effusive and highly charged letter of the same day to
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Terentia [38], which overflows with emotion and grief.

He speaks in it again of the jealousy of his enemies, perhaps a favourite topic of Terentia, yet shows himself coolly analytical when he explains that if the 'matter becomes stale, his future will be cut off': nam si inveteraris, actum est. Yet, even in this letter, the tone changes as soon as he has finished with what appears to be the obligatory expression of grief to satisfy Terentia, and he enters into an explanation that he has always defended Dyrrachium and hence will be safe there; but that later he will have to go to Epirus so as to flee Piso. There is no falsity of tone here; it is the recipient, again, whom we must judge.

The letters that follow show Cicero under great stress and in an agony of doubt concerning any hope of political or social redemption. His letter of 10 December 48 [39] starts on a very good note in an analytical discussion of the Tribunes and the consular provinces for the coming year; the good mental health of Cicero is exemplified in the last line: nam ista veritas, etiam si iucunda non est, mihi tamen grata est. The letter has also one of the few indications of the very great political power that Atticus must have wielded behind the scenes: the vestro consensu of the first line.

This influence which Atticus wielded comes to notice in an even more striking manner when, years later during the Civil War, Cicero describes what life had been in Pompeius' camp when morale was high and success still apparently inevitable. Atticus must have represented a most formidable influence which, from the standpoint of the optimates, he had taken over to Caesar, and for which he had drawn upon himself a concentrated hatred.
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iam omnium iudicio constitutum
esset omnium vestrum bona praedam esse
illius victoriae. "Vestrum" plane dico;
nunquam enim de te ipso nisi crudelissime
cogitatum sensi. [40]

A letter showing Cicero in the depths of despair comes in mid-December [41], in which he becomes querulous about even Atticus; yet he gained strength quickly and in a letter of mid-January [42], when the senate had passed a bill that was immediately vetoed by a tribune, he was calm enough to exclaim: potius vita quam patria carere. Then in early February, there comes the last of the letters to Atticus [43] until September of 57. In it he exclaimed that all hope was gone: funditus perisse. It was at this point that there began to sink into his consciousness the possibility that no power could cancel the street-violence of his opponents. This was also the time of the severe injuries of Sestius and of Quintus Cicero. Suicide once again probably became a viable alternative. In his desperation there was undoubtedly great reason: for nothing further was done in Rome, officially at any rate, until August of 57.

It is important to note in this period the efforts that Cicero could make on his own behalf in diplomatic initiatives: they are minor at best, but show that his mind was not seriously impaired by tribulation and that he could use such opportunities as presented themselves. Of signal interest is the letter to Metellus Nepos, consul of 57, in which Cicero pledges his services for the debt of officium granted by the consul in laying aside his family's vendetta against Cicero and preferring other goals; but the end of the letter is chilling in the warning that all alliances are mortal and that if he were to continue to aid in the
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annihilation of Cicero and his family, there might someday be no new alliance available for Metellus in his own need: ... vide ne, cum velis revocare tempus omnium servandorum, cum, qui servetur, non erit, non possis [44]. This point does not occur anywhere else in the correspondence or orations but it must have weighed heavily with many of the nobles: did they wish to continue in their efforts to humiliate Cicero and leave themselves alone in Rome with the likes of Clodius and his agents? Once the first flush of hilarity at Cicero's total discomfiture was over, many of the nobles must have considered what future alliances would be possible were Clodius' victory to be given a firm foundation, especially since Caesar loomed so darkly behind it.

The emotional strength hinted at in this letter is scarcely discernible in the few letters extant from the end of his exile. Chief demonstration of his recovery must come from the triumphant letters immediately subsequent upon his return, and from the speeches in which he endeavoured to recoup his financial losses [45]. The return was so triumphal that Cicero resumed his old outward ebullience without apparent loss of confidence or status. His description to Atticus of his return [46] is almost regal in tone and describes rather the Roman state returning to a recognition of his true position than an exile being re-accepted into the fold [47]. The tone is not unreasonable, however, for he shows that he is already deep in the accomodation to necessity that was required of anyone who dealt with Pompeius or with the Senate: negotiations were in progress to invest Pompeius with control of the grain supply but Cicerō was blocked from freedom of action by his own need to maintain good relations with the Pontiffs who were to decide upon the return of his house on the Palatine
which had been seized for ostensible religious purposes by Clodius[48].

His sense of confidence did not blind him, moreover, to his true position vis-à-vis the Optimates: *iam quidam qui nos absentis defenderunt incipient praesentibus occulte irasci, aperte invidere*[49]. He may not have appreciated the extent to which he was personally responsible for his dubious quality of many of his backers, but did at least comprehend that many had boarded the popular band-wagon for his return just as they had boarded it for his exile earlier, and for equally self-serving reasons. As he clearly described it:

*idem inquam illi (quos ne tu quidem ignoras) qui mihi pinnas inciderant nolunt easdem renasci; sed, ut spero, iam renascuntur [50]*

By November 11, his self-confidence has grown to the point that he can easily maintain himself against sudden violence by Clodius, and describe himself as 'tired of surgery:"

*cum Sacra via descendere, insecutus est me cum suis. Clamor lapides fistes gladii; et haec improvisa omnia. Discerri in vestibulum Tetti Damionis. Qui erant mecum facile operas aditu prohibuerunt; ipse occidi potuit, sed ego dieta curare incipio chirurgiae taedet [51].*

The cycle has run its course; positions are reversed and the defeats of 58 are erased for the time:

*Ad lata est enim nobis rogatio de pernicie mea; in qua quod correctum esse audieramus erat eius modi ut mihi ultra quingenta milia liceret esse, illuc pervenire non liceret*[52].

What remained now was the bond of *officium* which was to tie him so disastrously to Pompeius in the future.
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In conclusion, it is plainly incumbent upon the twentieth century reader not to permit modern views of suicide to affect any judgement upon Cicero. His constant references to suicide were to what was actually an acceptable, and probably imperative, Roman answer to unbearable tribulation. It is well understood that the focus of the life of a Roman noble was his virtus, and when he died, he had to pass on that abstract of character to his descendents. How could Cicero pass on anything if he were under not only sentence of exile, but also effective sentence of outlawry?

His riposte would naturally be to allow death to answer his accusers: then his personal honour would probably remain untarnished and his name and effects could pass to his inheritors. But not so once he had failed to act at the critical moment.

In retrospect, his failure to act at the moment demanded would be, to a Roman of his class, a catastrophic blunder and would damn his memory. It is only in wisdom after the event, (often called '20-20 hindsight'), that critics can term his talk of suicide a needless and posturing affectation. His was not the simple exile of a Milo; his was the political and moral destruction of a key person in the Roman state whose death had to match his status were it to leave untarnished his virtus and gloria [53]. Furthermore, the tone of grief adopted by Cicero was as stylized as was the habit of wearing clothes of mourning and of accosting citizens in request of aid. All judgements in a field as thoroughly Roman as emotions of grief and mourning must be made critically, but without the adversary approach that characterizes the work of many critics. 'To understand all is to forgive all' may not be the best creed for the historian, but it permits a tentative approach that permits other verdicts.
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to be considered than those that conform to the personal *mores* of the student. Furthermore, we must remember in an inspection of Cicero and his tribulations, that it was generally Pompeius who benefitted, especially in his perhaps deliberate decision to permit the exile of Cicero and consequent carefully controlled reinstatement, and again in his use of Cicero as a pawn at Luca to force Caesar's hand [54]. In any analysis of advantages and benefits accruing when Cicero was defeated in political conflicts in Rome, the old legal question *cui bono* usually points to Pompeius, who will once again be seen to have taken advantage of Cicero's lifelong attempt to make him a bastion of strength for himself.
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FOOTNOTES

1 ad Att. III.4; Vibo(?)- he will go to Brundisium.
2 Cicero, pro Plancio 96.
3 ad Att. III.8.3, 29 May 58; Q. F. II.3.3, Rome, 12 - 15 February 56; ad Fam I.5B.1, Rome, shortly after 9 February 56; Seager, Pompeius, p. 119: "C. Cato delivered a violent attack on Pompeius and with some subtlety followed it with copious praise of a reluctant Cicero . . . His hypocritical diatribe against Pompeius for betraying Cicero in 58 was received with attentive delight by his audience".
4 Dio Cassius XXXVIII.7.1; Broughton M.R.R. p. 2.
5 ibid XXXVIII.7.1-2.
6 ad Att. III.5, Thurii, 6 April 58.
7 ad Fam XIV.4, Brundisium, 29 April 58.
8 cf. Eric Wistrand, Caesar and Contemporary Roman Society, p. 40: "Cicero,... is a master of adapting the language of his letters with much tact and diplomatic skill to the views of his addressee, ...."
9 ad Att. III.7.2, Brundisium, 29 April 58.
10 ad Att. III.7.2, Brundisium, 29 April 58: Quius oppetendae tempus honestissimum praetermissum est; ad Q. F. I.3.6, Thessalonica, 13 June 58; ibid I.4.4, Thessalonica, 5 August 58.
11 ad Att. III.9, Thessalonica, 13 June 58; ad Att. III.13.2, Thessalonica, 5 August 58; ad Att. III.16.3, Thessalonica, 4 September 58.
12 ad Att. III.8.2, Thessalonica, 29 May 58.
13 Dio Cassius XXXVIII.30.2; Cicero, Post Reditum ad Quirites, 14; Cicero, de domo sua, 124; ad Att. III.8.3, Thessalonica, 29 May 58; Dio Cassius XXXVIII.30.3: Pompeius immediately began to act through the tribune L. Ninnius Quadratus; Broughton, M.R.R. p. 196.
14 Dio Cassius XXXVIII.12.5-7; ad Q. F. 4.4, Thessalonica, 5 August 58; cf. Note 17 below.
15 ad Att. II.19.1.4; Rome, 7-14 July 59: Videor mihi nostrum illum consularem exercitum bonorum omnium, etiam satis bonorum, habere firmissimum.
16 Dio Cassius XXXVIII.17.4.
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17 ad Att III.8.4, Thessalonica, 29 May 58; ad Q.F. I.4.4, Thessalonica, c. 5 August 58; ad Att III.15.4, Thessalonica, 17 August 58; cf. note 14 above.

18 Plutarch, Caesar 14(end). Plutarch claims that Caesar did not set out for his province until he had driven Cicero from Italy; Dio Cassius XXXVIII.17.6: Dio Cassius simply mentions that as soon as Cicero had departed, his previously most active supporters became supporters of the bill of Clodius.

19 Cicero ad Att III.9.2-3, Thessalonica, 13 June 58; ad Q.F. I.3.8, Thessalonica, 13 June 58; ad Att III.8.4 (implied only), Thessalonica, 29 May 58.

20 Cicero, Pro Milone 37.

21 cf. note 62 in 'Effects of Exile Upon Cicero' for further discussion of such contortions.

22 ad Q.F. I.3, Thessalonica, 13 June 58

23 cf. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero, pp. 67-69, for undercurrents of meaning in this letter, not all complimentary to Marcus Cicero.


27 Cicero, Pro Cluentio 154; 66 B.C.

28 Milton, Paradise Lost II.85-87.

29 Ibid I.53-56.


31 Anthony Starr, Human Aggression, pp. 25ff.

32 Ad Att III.15.2, Thessalonica, 17 August 58.

33 See note 23 above. Cf. also Shackleton Bailey, Cicero, Chapter 19, "Brothers' Quarrel" for further enlightenment of the relationships of these two men, especially concerning the hair-trigger temper of Quintus.

34 ad Att III.19, Thessalonica, 15 September 58.

35 See notes 22 & 23 above.

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36 ad Fam XIV.1 to Terentia; Dyrrachium, 25 November 58; ad Att III.22, Dyrrachium, 25 November 58.

37 ad Att III.23, Dyrrachium, 29 November 58.

38 ad Fam XIV.3, same.

39 ad Att III.24, Dyrrachium, 10 December 58.

40 ibid XI.6.2, Brundisium, 27 November 48.

41 ibid III.25, Dyrrachium, mid December 58.

42 ibid III.26, Dyrrachium(?), mid January 57.

43 ibid III.27, Dyrrachium(?), early February 57.

44 ad Fam V.4, Dyrrachium, mid January 57.

45 ad Att. IV.1.3, Rome, about 10 September 57.
See also the speeches: Post Reditum in Senatu, Post Reditum ad Quirites, and de Domo.

46 ibid. Section 5.

47 ibid. Sections 4-6.

48 ibid. Section 7.

49 ibid. Section 8.

50 ad Att. IV.2.5, Rome, beginning of October 57.

51 ad Att. IV.3.3, Rome, 23 November 57.

52 ad Att. III.4.1, Vibo(?), 3 April 57.


54 See the following chapter, "The Effect of Exile Upon Cicero" for a discussion of this point; Seager, Pompeius, pp. 121-122: "The second attraction that this proposal will have had for Pompeius was that it gave him a great opportunity to put pressure on Caesar. A short while ago he had been isolated, and he might then have seemed to be entirely dependent on maintaining his tie with Caesar. ... He could now point out to Caesar and Crassus that the way was again open for him to renounce the coalition ... while for Caesar it could spell total disaster ... . Whatever Cicero had intended, he had created a golden opportunity for Pompeius to recover the initiative when he seemed to have lost it completely."
THE EFFECT OF EXILE UPON CICERO

CHAPTER VIII
The Effect of Exile Upon Cicero

The effects of exile upon Cicero were different from those upon other Romans confronted with the same fate after (perhaps) peculation in a province, condemnation for vi in the progression through the cursus honorum or for any of the manifold means of elimination used by the intensely tribalistic associations of Roman nobiles in their bitter inter-necine feuds. Exile affected him differently from others concerning whom we have information [1], for he was in essence a different man. It is of no small import that he has come down to us as a man of the widest human sympathies and himself has provided the core of Roman philosophical and historical literature that defines today the Roman mind. But it is in the make-up of his own mind that there comes the characteristic that both made him the novus homo who reached the consulship, suo anno, without the backing of a major house of the Roman nobility, and in the doing, prevented him from utilizing the means that made the way secure for such men as the Metelli, Caesar and even Pompeius.

Cicero’s education had followed the narrow, clearly defined pattern that was postulated for any attempting the cursus honorum. The mental and social characteristics of a successful practitioner of the cursus, especially one not of a great house, were those of rigidity of mind and deep driving purpose. To a boy once on the route of preparation for the cursus, nothing else mattered: literature, poetry, music, conversation, friendship, property, wife and home were simply peripheral items that might have a beneficial effect upon the skills required for the cursus, but were worthy of little consideration in any other context.

certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, noctes atque dies niti praestante labore, ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. [2]
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Only where they permitted one to extend the bonds of political amicitia [3] or to improve techniques of pleading in the law-courts were they given even cursory notice. The only goals of a man or boy on the cursus were auctoritas, dignitas, gloria and virtus, which comprise, in essence, the actual definition of a Roman senator [4].

Cicero had recognized this goal early in his boyhood and had entered upon the cursus with the undeviating aim that characterized every other successful youth in the Roman governing class. His pursuit of the gloria that was the veritable essence of the goal is given best in the Pro Sestio: ... qui ingeniio ac virtute nobilitatem potestis consequi, ad eam rationem, in qua multi homines novi et honore et gloria floruerunt, cohortabor [5].

Lest this definition of gloria appear too biased in favour of Cicero and his own personal goals, Sallust, too, can be seen to view virtus as a functioning of a man's native ingeniium to the furtherance of exemplary deeds, thereby admitting to gloria [6].

In considering the nobility of Rome in the first century, we must remember to consider the protagonists from their own viewpoint: to view their aims, desires and goals from the point of view of a partaker of the political arts and to evaluate the goals from the vantage point of a Roman noble. Theirs was an absolute certainty as to the value of what they sought; there was no doubt in their minds that what they fought for was the greatest good that could befall them; and hence that their lives and all that they considered important were identical with their political life.

In this attempt to evaluate their aims from the point of view of
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the participants, it is of value to note the comments of Sir Kenneth Clark on those in another exclusive aristocracy: '... in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries great people were so sure of their status that they did not really mind what they were made to look like as individuals. In their portraits the later Medici look like criminal lunatics: they did not care - they were the Medici.' [7]

Thus all judgement of Cicero must be developed within this context of continual endeavour after a goal that was described by Cicero himself as being worth all that was ever demanded of a man: the locus, auctoritas, domi splendor, apud exterias nationes nomen et gratia, toga praetexta, sella curulis, insignia, fasces, exercitus, imperia, provincia [8].

He had, from the date of return from his first and only voluntary departure from Rome in 74, been steadfastly determined to remain in Rome and leave to others the gloria accruing from pro-consulships. His arguments were logical, but were almost obsessive in nature. The determination given in the pro Flancio [9], and amplified in the letters from Cilicia in 51-50, not only placed him in a position of inferiority vis-a-vis Pompeius and Caesar, but also showed in advance his inability to create a life for himself when he was compelled by an external process to absent himself from Rome: unlike Marcellus [10], he had no personal, inner resources, and no family and external resources upon which to draw when he was deprived of the resources of personal communication and strength that, to him, were available only in Rome [11].

It can be argued that Cicero was not the first Roman to go into exile, and that many men had left Rome, deprived of their possessions, and
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had still lived lives of interest in other regions, although not of delight, which for witness we may take Ovid. In reply, we can show Cicero's own almost irrational dislike of removing himself from the seat of power - of his near religious oath, taken after his return from Sicily, that he would always be visible thenceforth in Rome [12]. He said, of course, that he wished to remain visible, lest he be forgotten again; what he meant was that he did not want to lose his access to the corridors of power [13]. It was almost impossible psychologically for him to be absent from the home of his choice. In particular, he knew that in exile he faced the probability that he would meet his most bitter enemies beyond the frontiers of Italy, where their power would be overwhelming (as was that of Piso in Macedonia.) This fear was more than physical; it was the certainty that he would meet a miserable, contemptible death; that he would be adjudged in violation of the terms of interdictio aqua atque igni and be eliminated from existence as a felon or a hostis of the Roman People. It was this consideration that brought forth the poignant description of exile in his letters to Marcellus [14]. To a man who would later wonder what would be his reputation in future ages, this end was unthinkable [15]. Hence we must accept his cries against his friends and allies: these often appear lacking names and so have the appearance of blind cries of anger that attempt to create an appearance of truth without foundation [16]; yet we must remember that he was now a nonentity who dared anger no one - and the mail, for him especially, was not secure. Only once does he actually name Hortensius, and that must have been on an occasion of an exceptionally trustworthy courier [17].

It appears highly probable that Pompeius acquiesced in the exile
of Cicero with the direct aim of breaking the moral strength of a
difficult, brilliant and dangerous opponent.

That the decision was made under pressure from Caesar is
peripheral; what was critical to Pompeius was the demotion of Cicero, in
his own eyes, to a position of subservience to Pompeius' needs; the result
was an identity of view between Pompeius and Caesar and the political
neutralization of Cicero so that he could not defend himself against his
personal enemies. Pompeius had come up against Cicero's greater belief in
the transcendent importance of the status quo and had finally been
compelled to a means that would solve the problem of Cicero. If Cicero were
to be destroyed in the process, it was a risk to be accepted such as in any
war: for Cicero without re-orientation was a Cicero not to be tolerated
further. From first alliance with Sulla; from Africa and the return from
Spain with his army; from Sertorius and his threatened early return; from
the slave revolt; from the pirates and the East; and from the corn supply
and absentee-governorship in Spain, Pompeius' course was exceptionally
deeply egoistic. The Roman state itself, and Cicero in particular, could
work in alliance as their aims coincided with his; but alliance was on
Pompeius' terms and ended with his perception of the end of identity of
aim. Hence the ultimate check was to be applied to Cicero's ambitions; and
it was to be applied from without, so that Pompeius himself appeared to be
implicated only by failure or refusal to act: he was not to be implicated
by commission. The odium and hate were transferred to Clodius' shoulders
and once again Pompeius' desires were satisfied by another without the
obvious compliance of Pompeius himself.

So effectively was the affair managed that when in the following
year Pompeius was seen to strive with all his political might to effect the return of Cicero, there was no sense of political compromise on Pompeius' part; rather, he was seen as once again working in the best interests of the Roman state [18]. Hence all could conveniently be forgotten of the pattern of events whereby Cicero became too great an embarrassment to Pompeius and was silenced by the most brutal of all means. Cicero had drawn upon Pompeius' name in 64 and had drawn beyond any debt accruing to him from the defences of Cornelius [19] and others; he had not aided Pompeius in Flavius' bill [20] for the needs of Pompeius after the Eastern war, and since he now threatened Pompeius' last recourse - the accommodation with Caesar in 59 - his usefulness had ended, his identity of purpose with Pompeius had ended and he was to be neutralized. We should not forget that Pompeius had other means available for the enlightenment of Cicero; there was no absolute need for silencing in such a fashion. We may therefore conclude that Pompeius had maintained his policy of aloofness from the details of handling opponents and allies; once again disaster struck from the side when someone opposed Pompeius, but did not come obviously from Pompeius himself. The very indefinite nature of such results could only increase the mystery of Pompeius' direction in politics and would deter others who, too, would not know from what direction to defend themselves if they had occasion to anger or annoy the senior Roman of all. We are therefore permitted to conclude that Pompeius had decided upon the one final means of communication with Cicero that would overcome all further resistance to his commands [21]. Pompeius' aim was possibly to redirect all Cicero's political sympathies and to reorient them towards himself. To conclude that all was fortuitous or contingent upon Caesar's specific aims.
is to forget how Pompeius had handled Spain and later the Gabinian and Manilian laws. He had manipulated the tribunes to effect these laws and their great commands, and had probably done so through the maze of intersecting commands of Marcius Rex and Glabrio, when, under legislation brought forward by the tribune Aulus Gabinius, Cilicia was transferred to Quintus Marcius Rex in 68, and Bithynia, Pontus and the war with Mithridates to M. Acilius Glabrio in 67 [22].

Pompeius' probable view of the course of Clodius' activities was that of Clodius as a cleansing agent who would rend the fabric of Roman political life so that a major power and strength would be welcomed to end the time of troubles and permit a fresh start. The position in which Pompeius found himself in 55 through 52, mainly through his own activities, gives rise to this impression that he was prepared to be the only one who could then save the Republic from chaos. Certainly, in his impressive fight for the return of Cicero from exile, he shows the first step in the return to auctoritas of a genuinely popular personage who had immense political power outside the inherited, trammeled and convoluted lines dominated by the landed nobility. Furthermore, the controlled and subservient amicitia of Cicero towards Pompeius would be the key to an immense quantity of good-will on the part of people who would otherwise have had no links of political amicitia with Pompeius himself.

Thus the creation of Cicero that had come about through his great ingenium had been brought to naught: gone were his dignitas, his virtus, his auctoritas, his gloria. All had been wrenched from his grasp and its return was to depend, if ever he were to return, upon his acceptance of an immense beneficium from those whom he had hitherto considered, to his
present discomfiture, as equals; in particular, from one to whom he had at least hoped to be a Laelius to the other's Africanus [23]. One powerful argument that had dissuaded him perhaps from foreign assignments was that he had been thereby saved from the almost concomitant political trials that were used by the various political cliques to disable political rivals. Since he had no great family connections to grant him protection, it were better that he eschew any political conduct that could lead to such trials. Now he had suffered the effect of such a trial, if not for the normal reason: he had been politically disabled by his opponents. His acta which had been the means to his gloria were wiped out; his freedom was gone - for even a slave could reside in Rome.

When he departed into exile he lacked that comforting cushion of certainty that was the support of the hereditary nobles; his position had depended upon his own acta, and with the destruction of all that he had stood for and had created, so went all claim to a position independent of all political alliance. He could not feel that he was a noble in temporary retreat, as could a member of an old family; instead, his entire position collapsed with him like a pack of cards; there was no great nexus of family and political connections behind him in the upper reaches of political power, all prepared to foster his return; he was alone but for a few friends who counted for little in the great confrontation in which he felt like a pawn, but in which he had more truthfully been a massive and stupefying warning to all opponents of the new regime as to the risks faced by even the most powerful if they thoughtlessly disregarded the resolution of the three while these were ensuring the safety of their decisions. He had been casually sacrificed to an immediacy of purpose and had not even
the solace of M. Claudius Marcellus or Q. Ligarius that he had been defeated in honourable combat [24]: he had been swept aside as a nuisance. It is of small wonder that he lacked the fortitude to create in literature and philosophy during his exile; the humiliation was too crushing for such serenity of purpose and mind. What this exile did was to erase his self-confidence, a self-confidence that had had no being outside himself as did have later that of Marcellus, who had an entire family to safeguard his rights and status [25].

In essence, he had lost his Roman focus together with everything that it implied. Furthermore, he had the leisure to consider his failures of policy and of strategy in the days leading to the degree of exile; there was no reason for him to feel that there would be a change in the common front shown by Caesar and Pompeius in his regard; and there was every reason to expect the fate that he described to Marcellus in 46 [26].

That Cicero's despair in the face of his exile was real and almost total is clear: the letters replying to admonitions by Atticus that he cease bewailing and get to work, admit of as much [27]. The interpretation of them, however, is a matter of greater import.

In the first place, we must consider suicide, as it was described in an analysis of his letters in the preceding chapter, from the Roman point of view: not from that of the Judeo-Christian in the twentieth century. Lucretia, wife of Tarquinius Collatinus [28], after her violation by Sextus Tarquinius is accorded every degree of honour for suicide, but mainly because she held her decision in abeyance until she had informed her husband of the truth of the matter. So too is Servilia, wife of Marcus Lepidus, son of the one-time triumvir, ... quaе vivo igni devorato.
praematura morte immortalem nominis sui pensavit memoriam [29]. Velleius Paterculus places her in honour in equality with Calpurnia, wife of Antistius, who died in the third consulship of Carbo: Quantum huius gloriae famaeque accessit nunc virtute feminae [30]. Honour is accorded to Quintus Catulus and to Merula for their refusal to accept the fate decreed for them by Sulla, and hence the deliberate preparations made by them to ensure that they should control their own ends [31].

Even in the same historical period as that of Cicero's exile, we see that suicide has accorded the sanctity of martyrdom to Cato, evermore known as Uticensis. Nor is there anything said against Gaius Norbanus who, after the collapse of the Marian cause and the victory of Sulla, fled to Rhodes and suicide [32]. Then again, there is the fate that befell the son of Marius, and his decision for suicide which is accepted as inevitable and wise in face of the fall of Praeneste and his own imminent capture [33]. Moreover, the contempt of Sallust for Titus Turpilius Silanus, praefectus and sole survivor of the troops slaughtered by treachery at the orders of Jurgurtha in Vaga is striking: ..., quia illi in tanto malo turpis vita integra fama potior fuit, improbus intestabilisque videtur [34].

Sallust reports that, after the destruction of Vaga two days later, Metellus condemned Turpillius to scourging and death since he was a Latin citizen, not Roman [35]. Plutarch claims that Turpillius had been an innocent victim of the Vagans and Jurgurtha, but that Marius deliberately tricked Metellus into condemning a friend to death [36]. Sallust, however, dismisses the arguments as irrelevant to the disgrace of surviving his troops: Id misericordiane hospitis an pactione aut casu ita evenerit, parum
comperimus [37].

There is one unifying characteristic in all these examples: it is the style of death, the choice of the moment. There is only one proper moment for a suicide of protest or of acceptance of total defeat: to miss that moment through failure of nerve or of understanding is to convert the protest into something of pity and contempt. Lucretia showed that she did not die in an agony of horror and shame: she remained mistress of herself until she had informed her husband in true Roman tradition and then died in protest. Cato did not die at his last gasp after having been humiliated as a captive of Caesar; he died at the proper moment when his cause was finished and his duty to his beliefs was fulfilled: when he had nothing more to say. A day earlier and he would have been known a coward — one filled with fear and unable to face the critical battle. A day later, he would have been captive and a non-entity. His death said all.

In each case of suicide recorded in Roman history, the moment is critical. The actual historical truth is immaterial: the record counts. So it was with Cicero. He plainly felt that his position was impossible in Rome after his allies had succumbed to the immense pressures brought to bear by Caesar. If, in his own mind, his political career was finished, as indeed appeared probable, his proper moment for a suicide of protest was at the moment when his continued existence in Rome became impossible: *Scio fuisse et honestius moriendi tempus, et utilius... hanc non habius, multa alia praetermissi...* [38]. It appears quite clear, if we are to accept his own arguments, that he was dissuaded from that intention by Atticus and others on the grounds that he would jeopardize the safety of his family, in particular Quintus, if he were to remove himself from the fray too quickly.
What comes out clearly from the letters is that the thing for which he blamed his friends most of all was that they dissuaded him from action until the critical moment had passed; when, if he were then to act, he would but make himself an object of scorn. What would deepen his agony would be the realization that he alone had to accept the obloquy for an irrational desire to remain alive when he had had the moment for a hero's death. He could not commit suicide in Thessalonica and leave a memorandum that he had really wanted to do it in Rome but had been dissuaded by Atticus and others. To understand his position, we must consider what reputation Cato Uticensis would have inherited had he equivocated in Utica and had been suffered by Caesar to go into exile or had been executed after capture. For does any critic have anything but pity, rather than a feeling of respect, for the dog's death suffered by Pompeius when all his instincts warned him against going ashore in Egypt? [39] Why too does the record show that Caesar, in finding the odds too great, muffled his face and accepted his end, rather than drag out an impossible situation and appear to fear the death that faced him? Had he been armed, the death would have been different; but, like Cicero in 35, he was not armed: the fate that he faced was inexorable [40].

Suicide on Cicero's part would have been a thoroughly rational Roman answer to his position versus Clodius and the political solution of Caesar; it cannot be considered an irrational and degrading attempt to escape the consequences of his own acts.

The emotional upheaval engendered by so total and catastrophic a political reversal has been little studied. What does appear clear is that there is a close association between the emotional health of a human being
and physical health [41]. Striking examples from modern times are the serious case of phlebitis suffered by the ex-president of the United States, Mr. Richard Nixon, after his equally sudden and shattering removal from office, and the serious illness and subsequent death of the Shah of Iran after his exile. Some such illness had been foretold for Mr. Nixon by at least one prominent psychiatrist as a probable consequence of his intense emotional upheaval, and came exactly as foretold. In Cicero's case, there is no evidence of serious illness, but rather there was a degree of moral and emotional disintegration after his catastrophic fall from grace in Rome.

Adding strength to the arguments for a complex mind-body link is the discovery by doctors at Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston that of their sample of patients who had been revived after near fatal coronary attacks, more than 20% had suffered 'acute emotional perturbation' within the 24 hours previous to the attack [42]; there is, of course, no record for those who could not be revived.

The immediate effects of exile were the letters on suicide and on the treachery of his friends, and letters in which he attempted to reestablish lines of communication with the influential who were now unimaginably far above him in political and civic status [43].

The question of the morally and socially accepted case for suicide and the probability of the truth of the treachery of his friends is independent of the question of the impact upon Cicero of his downfall. His exile was a severe emotional shock: a coming apart at the seams. This was not an unrealistic answer to a defeat suffered in his political life: he had actually been destroyed politically, socially and morally. Any human |
being would go to pieces in the circumstances under which Cicero laboured; it is just that in his case his partial disintegration and consequent re-integration are given by himself in pitiless detail.

Cicero was a gifted, intense and inflexible person. The inflexibility of his character was one characteristic of any man capable of following the cursus to success; only a man devoted to a distant ideal and prepared to sacrifice much of the emotional side of life to his ideal could survive the weeding-out process. Indeed, it is quite possible that many of the names that disappear from the lists of the successful contenders in the cursus, and are so described by students of these lists as having 'perhaps died young', could quite easily have failed to maintain the intensity of purpose and, moving quietly to the sidelines, left their more dedicated companions to the insufferably rigid competition for the honours. The competition must have been unbearable for most of the Praetors, who could not possibly have found the resources for continued effort toward the consulship [44].

Cicero's grim concentration upon the political race thus left him in a more fragile and vulnerable position when his world crashed down about him; he had based his concept of what was important in life upon the competition for honours in Rome; when it was reft from him, he had no substitute. His defence mechanism failed; he regressed; he grovelled; his need for reassurance and aid became more childlike when he ceased to be the master of his fate. His belief in the 'treachery' of his friends is an element of paranoia; it is probably valid, for there was undoubtedly treachery on the part of some who had promised better, but it forced him to the position of doubting everyone - even Atticus at times [45], when it
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appeared that Atticus had not been gifted with enough foresight to solve in advance the problems that Cicero faced, or failed to bring to bear the power that Cicero demanded or expected.

Extreme inflexibility of character makes for considerable success in the right set of circumstances: it had brought Cicero, as a novus homo, to the consulship suo anno and had left him in the position of a senior consularis; where it betrayed him in exile was in the sense that he blamed others, not himself, for his defeat. He failed to see his own complicity in his downfall and to realize that he had ignored all warnings that had been made manifest to him as a critical point approached for Caesar and Pompeius. Furthermore, this rigidity and his consequent emotional investment on behalf of a single goal caused him to lose his broadmindedness and therefore his tensile ability to keep himself in balance, especially in adversity. Nonetheless, it was also, conversely, the characteristic that gave him the strength to handle his return and his later success. At the time of his downfall, however, it caused him to rationalize and to shift to others the blame that actually lay at his own door. A peripheral effect of his reaction to such adversity lay in his inability to sublimate his intense drive for political eminence into other fields, as did Cicero himself in his adversity of later years, and as did Marcellus in exile. The philosophical works of Cicero during the rule of Caesar were products of a different era and of a different man [46].

On the question of treachery, we should consider the extent to which a true noble, by hereditary standards, would feel revulsion for an eques who had surpassed him in an election. This attitude appears in the pro Plancio, section 6 especially, and may explain something of the
background of the affair in which Cicero's allies turned against him and withheld their help when he was attacked by Clodius and when his main support, Pompeius, had withdrawn in a unequivocal manner. Had they finally discovered an easy and passive means of silencing an upstart who had had the effrontery to surpass them at their hereditary game? [47]. His success in the cursus should not be confused with the regular means of bringing in new blood along with the scion of an old family [48]; the route of Cicero had been to bypass the aid of the nobles and to gain entry by means of his espousal of Pompeius' cause and name.

Inherent in the concept of exile was the denial of the justification for any withdrawal from political life on the part of a noble who had accepted his place as a political protagonist in Rome. It was in part this sense that created the bitter opposition to Epicureanism, whose tenets were the very antithesis to the concept of life of a noble, and explains in part the success of Stoicism in that ordo with its concept of duty and involvement.

The shock to the moral and political senses of Cicero must be considered in light, too, of psychological research upon persons suffering isolation from other human beings. Cicero's life had been directed upon a narrow, clearly defined goal to which all else had been sacrificed. He had been quite reluctant to leave Rome after his first official duties abroad, for he saw his presence there as being his only guarantee against political neutralization such as Pompeius tasted after his return from the East where he had lost touch with events and movements in Rome.

There is considerable doubt as to the veracity of much of the philosophic account of Cicero and Philiscus in Dio Cassius' account of the
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descent into exile of Cicero, but Dio's description of Cicero's departure is pertinent; 'Then at last he departed, against his will, and with the shame and ill-repute of having gone into exile voluntarily, as if conscience-stricken.' [49] Moreover, his own reputed description to Philiscus, even if it does not give more than a projected account of what he would have said, nonetheless has been composed by one who had enjoyed all the elements of auctoritas in Rome: "There seems to you, then, to be no great evil in disenfranchisement and exile and in not living at home or being with your friends, but, instead, being expelled with violence from your country, living in a foreign land, and wandering about with the name of exile, causing laughter to your enemies and disgrace to your friends?" [50]

With this enforced isolation from his fellows, the whole foundation of Cicero's being was swept away by the decision of the Roman People to deny him ignem atque aquam; and the effect upon himself was only exacerbated by the feeling that he had implicitly admitted culpability by his furtive flight from the city [51].

It is in the light of this set of circumstances that we can comprehend the effect upon his moral strength, and the possibility that any man who might save him from the depths of his degradation would seem emotionally a saviour. At this point Cicero had been emotionally broken; his perception of duty and friendship had been smashed free of all his earlier conditioning and training inculcated through boyhood and the years in the cursus; he had been drained of all emotional strength since the sources of all strength, Rome and the forum, were denied him. He was thrown alone into an alien world and had to seek some anchor in the chaos of his
mind. It is at this point that there comes into consideration the
sociological concept of 'identification with the aggressor' [52]. The sense
of this is that in any society, from wolf-pack to human political club,
from chicken-run to illegal society, there will be a constant testing of
individual strengths until the leaders emerge in what is often called the
traditional 'pecking-order'. Through this comes the sense of one who has
been defeated perhaps time and time again by another who is dominant, until
competition halts and the lesser member has learned by reinforcement a new
direction of allegiance and subservience [53].

This character of society is so deeply engrained in human nature
that when it has taken effect, even times of great danger and risk for the
leader will often not break the allegiance of the lesser members who might,
upon naïve reflection, consider such as heaven-sent opportunities for
rebellion and escape. This is a state of mind that is most deeply implanted
through conflict with a superior in periods of adversity and danger. It is
into this state that Cicero quite probably fell: he had been kept in a
state of suspense by Pompeius; Pompeius was then the one who made his exile
possible. It is immaterial that Caesar and his legions were the original
cause and that Clodius was the effective cause: Pompeius was one of the
'three' who had power enough to save whom he wished; he had stated that
clearly enough to Cicero when it suited his own purposes [54]. But it was
now Pompeius who had suddenly deserted Cicero and had left him defenceless
before his enemies. Yet it was upon Pompeius that Cicero had staked his
political fortunes, and upon Pompeius, and Pompeius alone, that Cicero's
resurrection to political life could be effectively based [55]. To effect
his return would doubtless require Caesar's acquiescence; but that would be
passive: the active part of the affair would come from Pompeius alone.

It was at this point, with the vision of Pompeius as being the only person capable of counteracting the efforts of Clodius, that Cicero was now re-programmed and re-conditioned, with Pompeius as the focus of his respect and sense of duty. The psychological effect upon Cicero of Pompeius' transcendent importance as being the sole effective force for his return created entirely new paths of duty and allegiance in Cicero so that in times of stress these, together with the profound Roman sense of officium for the immense beneficium granted by Pompeius' labours on his behalf, could overpower and overwhelm his powers of logic and common sense in times of great stress, when the man who had saved him was himself in a period of great travail and himself needed assistance.

The total control over Cicero gained by Caesar and Pompeius as a result of his permission and aid in returning from exile is well illustrated by the "palinode" (either a letter or the speech de Provinciis consularibus) extorted from him after he had been silenced on the Campanian law at Luca [56]. Similarly, his charge that Pompeius had done nothing to prevent his exile became, after his return:

Pompeius ... qui mihi
unus un Priavto amico eadem omnia
 dedit, quae universae rei publicae,
 salutem, otium, dignitatem.

Perhaps more truthful was his later statement:

Huic ego homini,
Quirites, tantum debo, quantum
hominem homini debere vix fas
est. [57]

This was truly spoken — for he had paid with his freedom of thought and action, although he as yet scarcely comprehended it. That he
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had paid irretreivably with his freedom was not clear to Cicero until he was forced by Pompeius into the perhaps most unbearable mental convulsions and convolutions of his life - the defence of Gabinius.

He described to his brother the scene in the Senate when Gabinius, tortured and in despair, termed Cicero *exsul*:

\[ \text{Homo undique } <\text{saucius}> \]
\[ \text{et, cum a me maxime vulneraretur,} \]
\[ \text{non tuli et me trementi voce} \]
\[ \text{exsulem appellavit.} \]

He explained that for several reasons he would refrain from acting as prosecutor of Gabinius - the chief being fear of annoying Pompeius, especially since the trial of Milo was approaching [58].

Cicero mentioned two weeks later that the trial for *maiestas* of Gabinius was being conducted by ineffective prosecutors (*acusatoribus frigidissimis utitur*) and that Pompeius was intervening (*Pompeius vehemens in iudicibus rogandus*) [59]. Three days later he described the acquittal of Gabinius and explained why the inevitable confrontation with Pompeius precluded any possibility of his having conducted the prosecution [60]. He then continued by describing the power which Pompeius could array against him:

\[ \text{tamen in republica me a} \]
\[ \text{se dissentientem non tuli (nihil} \]
\[ \text{dicam gravius), et minus potens eo} \]
\[ \text{tempore, quid in me florentem} \]
\[ \text{possit, ostendit. Nunc, ..., unus} \]
\[ \text{ille omnia possit, cum illo ipso} \]
\[ \text{contenderem? Sic enim faciendum} \]
\[ \text{fuisset [61].} \]

He then mentions that he had been advised to defend Gabinius on charges of *repetundae*, something that Pompeius had requested strongly: *et enim vehementer orabat* [62]. He admits moreover, that evidence which he
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gave for the prosecution was such that Gabinius actually expressed
gratitude for it. Cicero must have been writhing in making such an
admission, for he used all his advocate's skill to defend and excuse his
course of action.

Within the next two weeks he admitted that even his hatreds were
not free to be expressed, such were the pressures on him: meum non modo
animum, sed ne odio quidem esse liberum [63]. This heavy pressure on him
to defend Gabinius is exposed further when once again he explains that he
could not have defended that man since his alliances were based upon his
opposition to him.

Gabinium si, ..., 
defendisset, concidisset. Qui illum
oderunt (ii sunt toti ordines),
propter quem oderunt, me ipsum
odisse coepissent.

He then states his own desires:

et in omni summa, ut
mones, valde me ad otium pacemque
converto [64].

But the pressures must have continued relentlessly, for in
December he explained to Lentulus Spinther why he not only defended
Vatinius, but eulogized him. He had originally attacked Vatinius in the
Senate, but was then requested by Caesar to defend the man. He agreed. Why?
- don't ask.

cum quidem ego eius petitionem
gravissimis in senatu sententias
opponnavisse, ..., post autem Caesaris, ut
illium defenderem, mira contentio est
consecutae. Cur autem laudaris, peto a te,
ut id a me neve in hoc reo, neve in aliis
requiras, ... [65]

He had explained to the jury that certain persons of high rank
had intervened and had persuaded him to enter the action.

Sic petivi a iudicibus, ut,
quoniam quidam nobiles homines et de me
optime meriti nimis amarent inimicum
meum; ... darent mihi ipsi alium Publium,
.... [66]

A merciful silence covers the methods used to ensure his
compliance in the defence of Gabinius. One shudders at the technique of
Pompeius that reduced Cicero in the Pro C. Rabirio Postumo to claim that he
had cleared up his differences with Gabinius and had defended him out of
simple friendship; that Pompeius would never have requested any such action
were it against Cicero’s wishes, and that he himself could never have
consented in such circumstances.

Mihi, C. Memmi, causa defendendi
Gabinii fuit reconciliatio gratiae; neque me
vero paenitet mortalis inimicitias, sempi-
ternas amicitias habere; nam si me invitus
putas, ne Cn. Pompei animum offenderem, de-
fendisse causam, et illum et me vehementer
ignoras. Neque enim Pompeius me sua causa
quiquam facere voluisset invitus, neque
ego, cui omnium civium libertas carissima
fuisset, meam proieciessem. [67]

Cicero’s freedom as consularis was ended; the officum he owed to
Caesar and Pompeius for his return from exile could and would not be
cancelled by anything short of utter compliance with their wishes, by his
own death, or by their deaths. He knew that non-compliance would end in
another exile, or worse, from which there would be no return.

Thus Pompeius converted the hitherto independent Cicero into a
quasi-dependent who, when the lines were drawn for conflict, would be
compelled to accept Pompeius’ lot for his own [68]. Later this would be the
cause behind the letter to Atticus wherein Cicero describes pitiessly both
The Effect of Exile Upon Cicero

Caesar and Pompeius [69], yet in the end goes to Pompeius although he is unable to explain why [70].
1 Note the remarkable emotional strength shown by Marcus Claudius Marcellus in his exile. See ad Fam IV.8; IV.7; IV.9; IV.4; IV.11; IV.10; IV.12 and the discussion in: Stéphane Kresic, "Grandeur et Misère de L’Exil", Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa, Vol 40, Numéro 2, Avril - Juin 1964; see also Elaine Fantham, "Cicero, Varro and M. Claudius Marcellus", Phoenix, XXXI,3, 1977, pp 208-213. Note also that Milo in 52 could at least make a bitter jest about the quality of life in Massilia after his condemnation to aqua et igni interdictio under the lex pompeia de ambitu in 52. cf. Dio Cassius XL, 54, 3-4.

2 Lucretius, de rerum natura, 2.11-13.


5 Cicero, pro Sestio 56-57.

6 Sallust BJ LXXXV; Earle, Moral and Political Tradition of Rome, Chapter Two, for an analysis of Marius' speech in Sallust.


8 Cicero, pro Censorio 74; 66 B.C.

9 Cicero, pro Flacco 66: 54 B.C.


11 ad Att III.90.2, 9 June 58: Possum oblivisci qui fuerim, non sentire qui sim, quo carasam honore, qua gloria, quibus libris, quibus fortunis, quo fratre?

12 Cicero pro Flacco 64-66; ad Fam II.11.9, April 50; ad Fam II.92.2-3, 12(?)/June 50

13 In 54 Pompeius governed the two Spanis through legates so as to maintain his political attachments in Rome without impediment: Seager, Pompeius, pp. 50, 52 and n. 42 with references.
14 See references in note 9 above.
15 Cicero ad Att. II.5.9, early April 59.
16 ad Att. III.8.4, 29 May 58; ad Att. III.5.2, 5 August 58; ad Att. III.12.9, 5 Oct 58.
17 See the chapter "Emotional Content of Cicero's Letters from Exile", note 11; cf. ad Att. IV.9 for a mention of risks in the mail.
18 Cicero, Post Reditum in Senatu, 17,19,39; Post Reditum ad Quirites, 8.
19 Cicero, pro Cornelio, 65 B.C.
20 Cicero ad Att. I.11.4, 7 March 60.
21 R. Seager, Pompeius, pp. 902,904: "The calculation, though cynical, was sound. If he allowed Clodius to have his way, he could hope that in return the tribune would cause him no trouble, while in the fulness of time, when Clodius was out of office, he could work to secure Cicero's return and so lay claim to his gratitude for the future."; Stockton, Cicero, p. 211: "Pompeius artfully used an unsuspecting Cicero to send storm-warnings to Caesar."; cf. also Seager, Pompeius, pp. 921-922 (quoted in note 55 in "The Emotional Content of Cicero's Letters from Exile."); See note 9 also.
22 Cicero de leg. Manilio 18, Dio Cassius XXXVI, 7 & XXXVI,2,2. Note also Dio Cassius XXXVI,42-43.
23 ad Fam. V.7.3, April 62.
24 Cicero, pro Q. Ligario, late 45; Plutarch, Cicero 23; ad Fam. VI.5, August or September(?) 46; ad Fam. VI.6, November 46 both to Q. Ligarius.
25 See notes 9 and 24 above.
26 Cicero ad Fam. IV.9.4, September(?) 46.
27 Cicero ad Att. III.90: 9 June 58; III.7, 9 August 58;
28 Livy, I, LVIII.
29 Velleius Paterculus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, LXXXVIII, 4.
30 ibid. XXVI, 3.
31 Q. Lutatus Q.f. Catulus, Consul in 902; and L. Cornelius Merula, Consul Suffectus and Flamen Dialis in 87.
32 Consul 83, Proconsul: Velleius Paterculus II, XXVIII. (MRR p. 64.)
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33 Velleius Paterculus, II, XXVII.
34 Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, LXVII.
35 Sallust, B.J. LXIX.4.
36 Plutarch, Gaius Marius 8.
37 Sallust B.I. LVII.3.
38 *ad Q.E. I.3.6, Thessalonica, 5 June 58; ibid I.3.2; *ad Att. III.11, Thessalonica, 7 Sept 58; *ad Fam XIV 3.2, to Terentia; Dyrrachium, 21 November 58.
39 Plutarch, Pompeius 79-80

41 Research by Thomas H. Holmes, M.D., has shown that for people who have suffered a major life-change such as death of a spouse, divorce, separation or jail, there is an approximately 80% probability of serious physical illness within two years. Today's Health, February, 1167, Vol. 59 #2 (Published by the American Medical Association), 527 North Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., 60690.

42 Dr. Regis De Silva, in a speech delivered on May 5, 9109 to the New York Academy of Sciences and to be published later in 9109 in a paper by Dr. De Silva, Peter Reich, Bernard Lown and Benjamin Murawski in the Journal of the American Medical Association. See the Globe and Mail, Thursday, May 7, 1981.

43 *eg: *ad fam V.4, to Metellus Nepos in mid-January, 57.

44 It is instructive to note that of officials elected between 78 and 49: of 69 consuls, 54 (88.5%) were of consular families, 9 (Cicero), was a novus homo. Erich S. Cruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, Appendix I, p. 522, with details for Consuls, Praetors, Aediles, Tribunes and Pedrii.

45 *ad Att III. 7.4.7; 9 August 58

46 (de Re Publica 59;) Brutus; Orator, 46; Tusculanæ Disputationes; Hortensius; De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 45; etc.

47 For an opposing point of view see Earl, the Moral and Political Tradition of Rome, Chapter 2, 'The New Men', where he considers Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum 63, 64; and Bellum Civile 15, 6. He dismisses the concept of pollution by a novus homo with two rather flippant remarks, but does not recognize the apparently deep need felt by Cicero in the Pro Flancio to face the belief and attempt to nullify its prejudicial effects.
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49. Dio Cassius, XXXVIII, 18ff. According to Dio Cassius, Philiscus had originally met Cicero in Athens and then met him again in Macedonia, where this meeting is reputed to have taken place.


51. cf. Dio Cassius XXXVIII, 17.4: "Then at last he departed, against his will, and with the shame and ill-repute of having gone into exile voluntarily, as if conscience-stricken."

52. Johnson, R.N., *Aggression in Man and Animals*, Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1972, pp. 52ff. Reference is made to analytical studies of "peck order" in chickens in the following:
Guhl, A.M., "The Social Order of Chickens", *Scientific American*, 1956(194), pp. 42-46. Johnson also mentions that the "phenomenon was first described amongst hens and ducks in Norway by Schjelderup-Ebbe in 1922". See also:

53. Farber, I.E., Harlow, H.F. and West, L.J., "Brainwashing, Conditioning and DDD (debility, dependency and dread)", *Sociometry*, 1957(20), pp. 271-285. This group of psychologists analyzed the Chinese indoctrination technique of "szu-hsiang kai-tsao", "ideological remolding", "ideological reform", now called "thought reform". See also:
Lifton, R.J., *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*. New York: Norton, 1961, for particular examples of re-education and re-direction. See also:

54. ad Att. II.22.2, August (?) 59; ad Q.E. I.2.16, between 25 October and 10 December 59.

55. ad Att. III.14.1, Thessalonica 21 July 58; ibid III.13.1, Thessalonica, 5 August 58; ibid III.15.1, 17 August 58; ibid III.18.1, Thessalonica, c. 10 September 58; and in retrospect and scarcely to be trusted as representing his feelings during exile, pro C. Plancio 93: auctorem, ducem, defensorem salutis meae.

56. ad Att. IV.5.2, Antium, June(? 56; cf. Stockton, *Cicero*, p. 211, n 36 for amendments to the letter and discussion. Stockton believes the palinode probably to have been a letter, now lost; Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero, The Letters to Atticus*, p. 163, n 214 believes it to be the speech.
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57 Cicero, Post Reditum ad Quirites VII.16.
58 ad Q.F. III.2.2, October 54.
59 ibid III.3.3, 21 October 54.
60 ibid III.4.
61 ibid III.4.2, 24 October 54.
62 ibid III.4.3.
63 ad Q.F. III.5.4, Thessalonica, early November 54.
64 ibid III.5.5.
65 ad Fam I.9.19, Rome, December 54; cf. ad Q.F. I.3.8, Thessalonica, 13 June 58.
67 Cicero, pro C. Rabirio Postumo 33.
68 ad Att IX.7.4, Formiae, 13 March 49
69 ad Att X,4; Cumae, 14 April 49.

70 The following letters to Atticus, from 13 March to 2 April 49, illustrate the moral problems facing Cicero in his decision: IX.6.4,7, Formiae; IX.4.1,3; IX.10.2,6; IX.12.4; IX.13.3-4; IX.19.2, Arpinum.
CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this thesis has been to understand the relationship between M. Cicero and Pompeius Magnus that brought Cicero to follow to Pompeius' camp in Greece despite his own great reservations and despite the impassioned pleas of his friend Caelius Rufus not to jeopardize his safety and that of his family by precipitate and dangerous action [1].

His personal view of the two dynasts was bitter and direct:

... quid consecutus sim, quid praestiterim, qua in laude vixerim, his denique in malis quid intersit inter me et istos quos propter omnia amisimus. Hi sunt qui, nisi me civitate expulissent, obtinere se non putaverunt posse licentiam cupiditatum suarum. Quorum societatis et sceleratae consensionis fides quo eruperit vides. Alter ardet furore et scelere nec remittit aliquid sed in dies ingravescit; modo Italia expulit, nunc alia ex parte persequi, ex alia provincia exspoliare conatur nec iam recusat sed quodam modo postulat ut, quem ad modum est, sic etiam appeletur tyrannus. Alter, is qui nos sibi quondam ad pedes stratos ne sublevabat quidem, qui se nihil contra huius voluntatem facere posse, elapesus e socier manibus ac ferro bellum terra et mari comparat; non iniustum ille quidem sed cum pium tum etiam necessarium, suis tamen civibus exitiable nisi vicerit, calamitatem etiam si vicerit [2].

He was under no illusions of the basic danger that each of them constituted to his country and that they would consult their own interests first:

... quorum utrique semper patriae salus et dignitas posterior sua dominatione et domesticis commodis fuit [3].

It was quite clear to him what would be the outcome for everything that he knew and loved in his country:
Regnandi contentio est, in qua pulsus est modestior rex et probior et integer et is, qui nisi vincit, nomen populi Romani deleatur necesse est, sin autem vincit, Sullano more exemploque vincet. Ergo hac in contentione neutrum tibi palam sentiendum et tempori serviendum est. Mea causa autem alia est, quod beneficio victus ingratus esse non possum, nec tamen in acie <me> sed Melitae aut alio in loco simili <vel> oppidulo futurum puto [4].

The coils of officium owed are now locked about Cicero and he is unable to remember or to acknowledge within himself the advice given to him in 50 by his friend Cælius Rufus:

Illud te non arbitror fugere quin homines in dissensione domestica debeant, quam diu civiliter sine armis certetur, honestiorem sequi partem, ubi ad bellum et castra ventum sit, firmiorem et id melius statuere quod tutius sit. In hac discordia video Cn. Pompeium senatum quique res indicant secum habiturum, ad Caesarem omnis qui cum timore aut mala spe vivant accessuros; exercitum conferendum non esse. Omni satis spati est ad considerandas utriusque copias et eligendam partem [5].

His blunder in casting his lot and taking a definite stand became brutally clear to him as soon as he reached Epirus:

Ob eamque causam serius ad te scribo quod sero intellexi quid timendum esset. Te etiam atque etiam oro ut me totum tuendum suscipias, ut, si i i salvi erunt quibuscum sum, una cum iis possim incoluisse esse salutemque meam benevolentiae tuae acceptam referre [6].

On his return to Brundisium in April, however, he makes his last reference to the officium that bound him to Pompeius and made specious all
arguments that he had been a Roman *consularis* in full command of his independence: it is obvious from his letter to Atticus that his bonds to Pompeius were public and irremovable:

*dicebar debuisse cum Pompeio proficiscī; exitus illius minuit eīus officī praetemissī reprehensionem* [7].

The topic of this thesis has been a study of specific characteristics of the political relationship of M. Cicero and Pompeius Magnus. The "Introduction" gives the manner of approach, for many aspects of the history have been bypassed or minimized as not relating specifically to the topic: these would include close analysis of debt and agrarian legislation, the second and third consulships of Pompeius and the full history of the period as it is known. It has been found to be profitable to attempt a reassessment through modern topics such as equilibrium theory so that a new approach to the period can make possible an understanding of matters which have been omitted, suppressed or merely not comprehended as valuable in the documents of the period.
CONCLUSIONS

FOOTNOTES

1 ad Fam VIII.16, Caelius Rufus to Cicero; Liguria, c. 16 April 49
2 ad Att X.4.1-3, Cumae, 14 April 49.
3 ibid. X.4.4.
4 ad Att X.7.1, Cumae, 22 April 49.
5 ad Fam VIII.14.3; Caelius Rufus to Cicero; Rome, c. 8 August 50
6 ad Att XI.1.2, Epirus, mid(?) Jan 48.
7 ad Att XI.7.3, Brundisium, 17 December 48.
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