WAR
TIME LESSONS, PEACETIME ACTIONS:
HOW VETERANS LIKE MAJOR-GENERAL DAN SPRY
INFLUENCED CANADIAN SOCIETY AFTER 1945

By
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ABSTRACT

WARTIME LESSONS, PEACETIME ACTIONS:
HOW VETERANS LIKE MAJOR-GENERAL DAN SPRY INFLUENCED
CANADIAN SOCIETY AFTER 1945

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University of Ottawa, 2017

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This study examines some of the ways in which Second World War veterans helped
shape Canadian society in the years after 1945 by using the life experience of one of their
number, Major-General Daniel Charles Spry, as an interpretive model. Just over one million
Canadian men and women re-entered civil life after their wartime military service. Representing
approximately 35 per cent of Canada’s adult male population aged 25 to 49 in 1951, and found in
nearly every facet of Canadian life, Second World War veterans possessed social importance that
extended far beyond their experience of the Veterans Charter. Using Dan Spry’s documented
thoughts and actions in war and peace, this study argues that a number of these individuals
learned lessons regarding leadership, character, citizenship, and internationalism during their
wartime military service and – finding them useful – applied such lessons to various aspects of
their lives after the war’s end. In so doing, Second World War veterans helped to influence the
character of postwar Canada’s institutions, workplaces, and the lives of many Canadians by
providing societal leadership, moulding children’s character, developing future citizens, and
trying to build a better world. Appreciating their varied contributions provides new insight into
both veterans’ attitudes and the sort of place that Canada was after the guns fell silent in 1945.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This examination of the varied ways in which Second World War veterans like Major-General Daniel Charles Spry helped shape Canadian society in the years after 1945 has been produced with the assistance of many people. First and foremost of these is my dissertation advisor, Dr. Serge Durflinger. A talented scholar, Serge challenged me to question the evidence, listened patiently when I encountered problems, and he rejoiced with me when I made new discoveries. Serge encouraged me to develop my own thoughts, to which he offered well-founded and constructive criticism. I am a better historian for it.

Equally valuable has been the support of General Spry’s children, Margot and Toby, who permitted me to use their father’s papers that remain in their possession, such as letters, photos, and, most importantly, a binder containing nearly four dozen of their father’s postwar speeches. They also granted interviews which helped to fill in certain gaps in the documentary record. Had it not been their unfailing willingness to assist me in my scholarly endeavours, this dissertation would have been nearly impossible to write. Since our first meeting in October 2013 Toby has become a friend with whom I often meet. Toby and Margot, thank you for everything.

There were, of course, many others who have helped me along the way. Those who assisted in locating files and documents or granted access to archival sources include Ilene McKenna, at Library and Archives Canada; Captain Tim Robinson, the Regimental Adjutant of The Royal Canadian Regiment; Dan Smith, at the Royal Canadian Legion; Gord Kelly, curator of the Scouts Canada Museum; and Jacqueline Paschoud, the Senior Assistant, Information Services at the World Scout Bureau Global Support Centre in Geneva, Switzerland. Jim Buckland, an enthusiastic unofficial historian of Scouts Canada, provided me with valuable information from his collection. Dr. Steve Harris, the Director of History and Heritage in the
Department of National Defence, allowed me to use J.L. Granatstein’s interview notes from his work, *The Generals* (which were published in August 2016 under the title *The Weight of Command: Voices of Canada’s Second World War Generals and Those Who Knew Them*), as well as maps from the Canadian Army’s official history of the Second World War. Mark Zuehlke, who has published several books on Canada’s military history, provided me with letters and interview notes from various veterans. Fellow scholar Jamie Trepanier loaned an advance copy of his PhD study regarding the Boy Scouts’ role in the building of Canadian boyhoods. Several individuals also granted interviews. Prior to commencing my doctoral studies, I had the privilege to speak and correspond with Sheridan (“Sherry”) Atkinson, the late Tom Burdett, and the late John (“Spin”) Reid, all of whom served in The Royal Canadian Regiment with Dan Spry before and during the Second World War. They gave me valuable insights into the manner in which Spry conducted himself as a regimental officer. The late Colonel Ernest Côté, who worked closely with General Spry in the headquarters of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, shed light on how Spry ran large and complex military organizations in battle. From Colonel (retired) Joe Aitchison, I learned aspects of Spry’s honorary service as Colonel of The Royal Canadian Regiment. The University of Ottawa Office of Research Ethics and Integrity approved my conduct of interviews in support of this project after it was formally approved.

I must also acknowledge the late Richard Holt, a talented historian and author of the recently-published *Filling the Ranks: Manpower in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918*, a former military superior, and friend whose personal example in taking up graduate studies later in life inspired me to follow a similar path. Lastly, and most importantly, I owe my wife, Natasha, and our two daughters, Annemarie and Sara, a debt that I will never be able to fully repay. Without their loving encouragement and support, this study would not exist.
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<tr>
<td>administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General</td>
<td>AA &amp; QMG</td>
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<td>brigade</td>
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<td>BEF</td>
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<td>CASF</td>
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<td>CAPF</td>
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<td>CD</td>
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<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
<td>CIDA</td>
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<td>Canadian Military Headquarters</td>
<td>CMHQ</td>
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<td>Canadian Reinforcement Units</td>
<td>CRU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
<td>CDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
<td>CGS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire</td>
<td>CBE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander Royal Artillery</td>
<td>CRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
<td>CO</td>
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<tr>
<td>company</td>
<td>coy</td>
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<td>Co-operative Commonwealth Federation</td>
<td>CCF</td>
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<td>Distinguished Service Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>division</td>
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<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
<td>GOC</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship</td>
<td>HMCS</td>
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<td>infantry</td>
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Jamboree on the Air  JOTA
Lieutenant-Colonel  Lt.-Col.
Lieutenant-General  Lt.-Gen.
Major-General  Maj.-Gen.
National Defence Headquarters  NDHQ
non-commissioned officer  NCO
non-governmental organization  NGO
North American Air Defence Command  NORAD
North Atlantic Treaty Organization  NATO
operations  ops
Order of Military Merit  OMM
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief  OXFAM
Permanent Joint Board on Defence  PJBD
Princess Louise Fusiliers  PLF
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry  PPCLI
regiment  regt
repatriation  repat
Royal Air Force  RAF
Royal Canadian Regiment  RCR
Royal Military College  RMC
Sir Arthur Pearson Association of War Blinded  SAPA
training  trg
transport  tpt
United Nations  UN
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization  UNESCO
United States  U.S.
Vice Chief of the General Staff  VCGS
Young Men’s Christian Association  YMCA
1st Canadian Infantry Brigade  1 CIB
1st Canadian Infantry Division  1 CID
3rd Canadian Infantry Division  3 CID
7th Canadian Infantry Brigade  7 CIB
8th Canadian Infantry Brigade  8 CIB
9th Canadian Infantry Brigade  9 CIB
Major-General Daniel Charles Spry, CBE, DSO, CD in 1945
(Source: Toby Spry Collection)
INTRODUCTION

Every town, city, province, and this Dominion of ours, they were all made into better places by the influence of the veterans.

Anonymous Canadian veteran

Many scholars agree that the experience of war has helped to mould Canada. It has also profoundly affected the lives of those who have served in the nation’s armed forces. When their numbers have been sufficiently large, these people – veterans – have influenced the nature of Canadian society. Such was the case after the Second World War, when just over one million servicemen and women re-entered civil life. Although historians have generally overlooked their societal contributions, this study postulates that one cannot fully appreciate the nature of Canada in the years after 1945 without taking Second World War veterans into account. It does so by using the documented thoughts and actions of one of their number, Major-General (Maj.-Gen.) Daniel Charles Spry, as an interpretive model with which to examine how some veterans applied wartime lessons regarding leadership, character, citizenship, and internationalism to their civilian lives. In so doing, former soldiers like Spry helped to shape life in Canada after the war’s end.

Canada, as historian J.L. Granatstein has asserted, was profoundly changed as a result of the Second World War. On the one hand, economic mobilization in support of the country’s war effort lifted the country out of the Great Depression, during which a good many Canadians had faced unemployment and poverty, and furthered its transformation from a largely agrarian nation to an urbanized industrial one. This set the stage for a postwar economic boom that created

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1 Anonymous, quoted in Barry Broadfoot, The Veterans’ Years: Coming Home from the War (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1985), 8-9.
hundreds of thousands of jobs in new and expanded businesses, funded the modern welfare state, encouraged an explosion in both home-building and the country’s population through the so-called “baby boom” plus immigration, and promoted a sense of confidence in the future.\(^4\) The war also broadened Canadians’ horizons. Many of them had endorsed Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s foreign policy of “no commitments” during the 1930s, but Canada’s significant military and economic contributions to the Allied war effort convinced them that the country had the resources and the responsibility to help maintain world peace. As Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St-Laurent aptly observed in 1947, “If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization.”\(^5\) All of these aspects of Canadian life in the years after 1945 stemmed from the country’s experience of the Second World War.

The 1,037,409 men and women who returned to civil life after their military service were likewise affected.\(^6\) This was largely so because many of them were young and joining the armed forces was their first foray into the adult world. For most of the nearly 500,000 Canadians who served overseas, it was their first time outside of the continent of North America.\(^7\) People of all ethnic backgrounds, religions, and social classes served together in military units where they saw and did things that few would have imagined would be part of their life experience. Thousands of them risked their lives. Perhaps as many as 200,000 became officers or non-commissioned officers.

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\(^6\) This figure has been derived from the work of the Canadian Army’s official historian, C. P. Stacey, who recorded that 1,029,510 men and 49,941 women joined the armed forces. Of these, 42,042 lost their lives. C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), 66, 416, and 590. Walter S. Woods, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Veterans Affairs from 1944 to 1950, reported a slightly higher enlistment of 1,081,865 in all. Walter S. Woods, *Rehabilitation: A Combined Operation* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1953), 461.

\(^7\) C.P. Stacey, *The Half-Million: The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1946* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), xi. Of those who went overseas, 370,000 were in the Canadian Army, 93,844 belonged to the Royal Canadian Air Force, and 30,000 served with the Royal Canadian Navy.
officers (NCOs), and thereby bore the responsibility of planning operations and leading others into battle. Above all, veterans saw firsthand the horrors of war. Given all of this, it is little wonder that one former infantry officer, federal politician Barney Danson, wrote that “it was the war, more than any other event, that exposed me to the wider world and gave my life the shape it subsequently took, for better or worse.” Others felt much the same way. Infantryman Barry Broadfoot later credited his experience of war for “the ambition it gave me to do something with my life afterwards” (he became a journalist). Publisher Jack McClelland, who served in the Royal Canadian Navy, remarked that “I have no doubt at all that my involvement in the war had a major effect on the rest of my life.” A former airwoman named Margaret Fleming, when asked if the experience of war had influenced her life, immediately declared, “Oh, definitely.”

In the course of doing such things, veterans learned lessons that were not bound by social class or military rank, and were all the more meaningful because their lives were at stake. The military ethos reinforced values such as loyalty, discipline, and service – elements of character and citizenship that many had been taught by their families, schools, churches, and youth groups like the Boy Scouts. Many of those who survived combat developed a deeper sense of spiritual faith. Other lessons included teamwork and the sense of unity that came from having a common aim, which convinced some that Canadians ought to be able to work together in peacetime. In 1946, Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry called this “one of the big lessons I learned [from the war].”

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8 This estimate was derived by applying the percentage of leader positions in an infantry battalion (18.5 per cent) to the armed forces’ total intake of 1,079,451 people. The infantry battalion had neither the highest nor the lowest percentage in army units and such units were numerous in the army, itself the largest of the three services. 9 Barney Danson, with Curtis Fahey, Not Bad For a Sergeant: The Memoirs of Barney Danson (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2002), 10. For Broadfoot and McClelland’s views, see Bill McNeil, Voices of a War Remembered: An Oral History of Canadians in World War II (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1991), 230 and 282. Other veterans in this work expressed similar ideas. For Fleming, see Canadian War Museum (hereafter CWM) Archives, Oral History Project, Margaret Fleming, interview by Serge Durlinger, Ottawa, Ontario, 21 December 1999. 10 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Manuscript Group (hereafter MG) 28, Series I-73, Boy Scouts of Canada Fonds (hereafter Boy Scouts Fonds), Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 14 June 1946.
who went overseas developed a new appreciation of what it meant to be Canadian. Distance allowed them to see Canada as a whole, and many found that it compared favourably to what they saw while they were abroad. Their notions of national identity and teamwork were further strengthened by symbols like the “Canada” patch worn on their uniforms. For men in battle, belonging to a Canadian team was more important than those cleavages that might have divided them at home. The war also offered practical lessons. Military personnel of all ranks had to solve problems. Officers and NCOs learned how to build cohesive units, develop operational plans, communicate ideas, supervise others, and manage human and material resources. In this way, they learned how to succeed. Such were lessons that could be derived from active service.

Learning theory and common sense suggest that many ex-soldiers applied lessons such as these to aspects of their civilian lives. Learning theorists have postulated that human learning involves both the external interaction between the learner and the environment, and an internal psychological process whereby a person evaluates the learning content (i.e. knowledge, skills, attitudes, or values) against the incentive to learn (i.e., desire, interest, necessity, or compulsion). Through this process, people’s attitudes and beliefs are changed, and so are their views of subsequent social situations. Put another way, having learned something new, people see events in their lives through the lens of their new perspective – and act accordingly. This study argues that many Canadian Second World War veterans were transformed by their experience of war, and that wartime lessons framed their peacetime thinking and actions. Understanding this group of men and women can help us to appreciate the nature of Canada in the years after 1945.

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11 Vincent Massey saw this new appreciation of Canadian identity in military people that he encountered while he was Canada’s High Commissioner in Britain during the war. Vincent Massey, *On Being Canadian* (Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons [Canada] Limited, 1948), 6-7. Historians have also found that many veterans returned home with a stronger sense of national identity and unity. See John Maker, “A Home Away From Home: Citizenship and National Identity in the Canadian Army Overseas, 1939-1943” (PhD dissertation, University of Ottawa, 2010), 337.

The peacetime experience of Second World War veterans is historically relevant. Certainly, their number alone makes them an important group to study. It is worth noting that the armed forces were the second largest of 25 employment categories found in the Canadian workforce during the war. Only the agricultural sector, with 1,082,074 workers in 1941, was larger. Ex-servicemen and women outnumbered the individual populations of every province except Ontario and Quebec. By the war’s end, nearly one in twelve Canadians had undergone military service in the period 1939-1945. By 1951, census data indicated that 890,915 men and women then living in Canada had served during that conflict only, while 43,056 others had fought in both world wars, a total of 933,971 people. At least 95 per cent of this group (845,274) were men, and most of them were fairly young: by 1944, men between the ages of 18 and 42 years were eligible to join the armed forces. Recent war veterans thus accounted for 35 per cent of the 2,402,448 Canadian males aged 25 to 49 in 1951. They could also be found in every part of the country. As depicted at Appendix 4, a total of 232,430 of them were rural dwellers, while 701,541 others lived in urban centres of varying sizes. Some 92,328 veterans resided in the Maritimes and 145,544 more lived in the province of Quebec. Ontario, with 393,645 ex-military members, had the most, while a further 299,915 former servicemen and women lived in the four western Canadian provinces. Even the Yukon and Northwest Territories boasted 2,539 veterans between them.

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15 In 1941, census data indicated that Canada’s population was 11,506,655 men, women, and children. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *The Canada Year Book, 1945* (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1945), 93.

16 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Ninth Census of Canada, 1951, Volume 1, Population* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1953) (hereafter *1951 Census*), Table 19, Population by Five-Year Age Groups and Sex, for Provinces and Territories, 1901-1951, and Table 63, Population Reporting Service in World War I and World War II. This percentage is based on enlistment figures of 1,029,510 men out of a total of 1,079,451 Canadian men and women who served in Canada’s wartime armed forces. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 416 and 590.

Politicians and citizens alike realized that what veterans did with their lives after the war would greatly affect Canada’s future. Robert England, a senior civil servant in the Department of Veterans Affairs (created in 1944) and a First World War veteran, captured the mood of the day when he wrote that “Just as victory could not have been won without these men, so world peace and human rights everywhere and national solidarity at home are unobtainable without their aid and sympathy.” Ensuring that these people got off to a good start in civilian life, and thus would help build the postwar nation, was a major reason why the federal government put into place a comprehensive package of social benefits that included free post-secondary education and vocational training, financial assistance, and preferential hiring, collectively known as the Veterans Charter. In the years that followed, Second World War veterans were a factor in nearly every facet of Canadian life. Hundreds of thousands of them became parents during the baby boom that lasted from 1946 until the early 1960s, and they could be found in nearly every vocation – the working trades, the professions, politics, the civil service, education, science, churches, and the arts. Veterans also joined a myriad of social organizations. This study seeks to show that these men and women, sharing similar experiences within the context of economic prosperity and the emerging welfare state, were influential in the building of postwar Canada.

Dan Spry was one of these former soldiers. Like many Canadians who served from 1939 to 1945, Spry was born into an English-speaking, middle-class family and grew to adulthood during the Great Depression. Where his path differed from most during those years was that he joined the regular army (then called the Permanent Force) as an officer of The Royal Canadian Regiment. After the war broke out in September 1939, Spry, having just been promoted to the rank of captain, was one of the first Canadians to go overseas, arriving in Britain that December.

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While in Britain he was one of thousands who underwent leadership and other forms of military training. Front-line service followed. By September 1943 Spry had joined tens of thousands of Canadians fighting in Italy. By then a lieutenant-colonel, he was the Commanding Officer (CO) of The Royal Canadian Regiment. After a year of combat, during which time he led his battalion and, subsequently, the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, Spry was promoted to the rank of major-general and transferred to Northwest Europe to command the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. He spent seven months in this position, serving with 141,646 Canadians who belonged to First Canadian Army. In March 1945 he was transferred to Britain, where he spent the final weeks of the war as Commander of Canadian Reinforcement Units. Although Spry was exceptional in that he became a senior-level commander, he nonetheless shared certain things with other Canadian front-line soldiers. He underwent similar training, faced the same hazards to life and limb on the battlefield as did they, and he was young, just 31 years old when he became a general officer.

Despite his prominence, several aspects of General Spry’s life after the war also bore similarities to those of other veterans. Like the vast majority of them, he underwent the mental process of deciding what to do with his life after the war’s end – he differed by recording his thoughts at the time. In 1946, he took up a civilian job as the Chief Executive Commissioner of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association. By this time Spry was also the father of two children and, like thousands of other veterans who became parents or volunteered as leaders of youth groups, he tried to mould children’s character and teach them how to be good citizens. From 1953 to 1965, Spry was the Director of the Boy Scouts’ International Bureau (later called the World Bureau), the only Canadian yet to hold this position. He thus exemplified Canada’s greater

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21 The Boy Scouts believed that many of the 767 leaders it gained in 1946 were veterans. Scouts Canada Museum, *Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Canadian General Council of the Boy Scouts Association for the Year 1946*, 34. For Spry’s struggle to determine his postwar career trajectory, see Chapter 5.
involvement in international affairs during the 1950s and 1960s. After retiring from Scouting in 1965, Spry remained socially active. From 1965 to 1978 he served in an honorary capacity for The Royal Canadian Regiment and the Princess Louise Fusiliers, a Halifax-based Army Reserve unit. For part of this period he was also a deputy director with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), where he facilitated collaborative efforts between the federal government and non-governmental organizations regarding international development work. When he died at the age of 76 on 2 April 1989, Dan Spry’s legacy was one of lifelong service.

This mix of the extraordinary and the ordinary makes Dan Spry’s life experience an intriguing case study with which to analyze the part played by thousands of Second World War veterans in shaping Canadian society in the years after 1945. Such a project has not yet been undertaken in Canada, despite their pervasive societal presence. Scholars and other authors who have written about veterans have generally focused their attention on the Veterans Charter. This historiographical trend began in 1950 with Robert England’s Twenty Million World War Veterans, which favourably compared the Charter to Canada’s policies after the First World War and also to America’s G.I. Bill of Rights of 1945. Fellow civil servant and First World War veteran Walter S. Woods did the same in his Rehabilitation: A Combined Operation (1953), as did Frederick Lyon Barrow in A Post-War Era: A Study of the Veterans Legislation of Canada, 1950-1963, published in 1964. Historians mostly followed suit until the mid-1990s. This tendency may be seen in Joseph Schull’s Veneration for Valour: An Assessment of the Veterans Charter, Its Impact on Canadian Veterans and on Canada as a Whole (1973) and Shaun Brown’s 1995 PhD dissertation, “Re-establishment and Rehabilitation: Canadian Veteran Policy,

All of these authors applauded Canada’s efforts to reintegrate ex-servicemen and women into civil life. Interestingly, only Robert England suggested ways in which these people might help shape Canada’s future. In fact, they had already begun to do so.

Canada’s literature regarding veterans expanded in the 1980s to include topics related to the matter of postwar reconstruction. In 1985, oral historian Barry Broadfoot related individual stories about their successes and failures in adjusting to civilian life immediately after the war in his The Veterans’ Years: Coming Home From the War. Eleven years later, Dean F. Oliver’s PhD dissertation analyzed the policies, processes, and challenges of military demobilization. He concluded that, all in all, Canada’s demobilization plan had worked well. In 1998, historians Peter Neary and J.L. Granatstein published an edited volume, The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada, within which scholars examined subjects like demobilization, the impact that former servicemen and women had on universities after the war, how they were treated for war-related psychological, emotional, and physical disabilities, and their views regarding domesticity. These authors, writing with the benefit of hindsight, pointed out the Charter’s long-term effects on Canadian life, but did not, for the most part, address how veterans’ actions affected society. That same year, Mary Tremblay argued that several aspects of modern-day medical care can be directly traced to that which the Department of Veterans Affairs provided to disabled veterans, while in 2001 Richard Harris and Tricia Shulist asserted that one of the

25 Broadfoot, The Veterans’ Years.
Veterans’ Land Act’s great successes was its use as an urban housing program.28 Most recently, Peter Neary published On to Civvy Street: Canada’s Rehabilitation Program for Veterans of the Second World War (2011). Like some other works, this study covered many of the Charter’s immediate and long-term effects. Unlike most authors, however, Neary included examples of what former military people had done after the Veterans Charter. He observed that “lives that had been interrupted by military service flowed into different channels and found new meaning and purpose,” and opined that many of his readers would have similar stories.29 In this way, Neary suggested that veterans did influence the fabric of Canadian life in the years after the war.

Other than identifying veterans as beneficiaries of federal social programs, authors of all stripes have largely overlooked their participation in civil life in the years after 1945. This may be seen in well-known Canadian academic historical syntheses that have been published in the past several decades. Donald Creighton made no mention of Second World War veterans in his Canada’s First Century (1970), although six years later, in The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957, he said that they formed “a distinct and special group in the general social mixture” because “they represented, in an intensified fashion, the experience of the last generation which had lived through the Depression and the war.”30 Regrettably, he did not explore this theme further. More recent surveys have done little to inform readers that men and women with wartime service were present in postwar Canada. Such is the case with Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein’s Our Century: The Canadian Journey in the Twentieth Century (2000), J.L. Finlay and D.N. Sprague’s The Structure of Canadian History (also published in 2000), and R. Douglas

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Francis, Richard Jones and Donald B. Smith’s textbook, Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation (2004). Margaret Conrad and Alvin Finkel briefly mentioned the Veterans Charter in their History of the Canadian Peoples (2006) as part of an overview of reconstruction efforts after the war’s end. Veterans are also absent in textbooks examining the history of Quebec, such as Paul-André Linteau et al.’s Quebec Since 1930 (1991).

Many social historians have omitted any mention of veterans in postwar Canadian life. Neither John Porter’s The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (1965) nor Nancy Christie and Michael Gauvreau’s edited volume, Cultures of Citizenship in Postwar Canada, 1940-1955 (2003) included them, while George Woodcock merely noted that 1.1 million people had served in the armed forces in A Social History of Canada (1988).

Ninette Kelly and Michael J. Trebilcock’s The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy (1998) and Franca Iacovetta’s Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada (2006) have nothing on the subject. The possibility that military personnel who became parents after the war might have applied wartime lessons in the course of raising their children was overlooked in works about youth, such as Mary Louise Adams’s The Trouble with Normal: Postwar Youth and the Making of Heterosexuality (1997) or Mona Gleason’s


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Some scholars have briefly cited veterans’ activities immediately after the war. Alvin Finkel noted that they joined housing activists in demanding government action to rectify a severe housing shortage. Doug Owram described the part that veterans played in raising the

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baby boom generation in *Born at the Right Time* (1996), while Magda Fahrni dedicated a chapter to the social problems faced by soldiers and their families in Montreal during and after the war in *Household Politics: Montreal Families and Postwar Construction* (2005). Ray B. Blake and Jeffrey A. Keshen’s edited volume, *Social Fabric or Patchwork Quilt: The Development of Social Policy in Canada* (2006) included a chapter describing the Veterans Charter and some of the practical challenges associated with soldiers’ reintegration into civilian life, thereby placing the Charter in the larger context of the Canadian welfare state’s evolution. Tim Cook’s *Fight to the Finish: Canadians in the Second World War, 1944-1945* (2015) contained a similar chapter that focused on the soldiers’ perspective. A few scholars have described veterans’ actions in later decades, usually while examining broader topics. For example, church historian John Webster Grant described the part that they played in Canada’s post-1945 religious revival in *The Church in the Canadian Era* (1988). In 2006, José Igartua related the Royal Canadian Legion’s efforts to block Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson’s introduction of a distinctive Canadian flag as part of his study of the evolution of English-Canadian identities in the years after 1945. Bryan D. Palmer made even briefer mention of the Legion’s involvement in the 1964 flag debate – just one line – in *Canada’s 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (2009) as part of his examination of the social turmoil that characterized the 1960s.

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Most Canadian Second World War veterans have written little about their lives. Dan Spry, for one, did not produce memoirs. Those that did leave writings, and authors who have written about veterans, have often paid little attention to the years after 1945. Such was the case for many of the numerous memoirs and biographies that were read for this study. For example, Strome Galloway (a wartime major) recorded nothing about his postwar life. Neither did Captain Farley Mowat, Lieutenant Donald Pearce, Chaplain R.O. (“Rusty”) Wilkes, or Company Sergeant-Major Charles Martin. Some air force and naval veterans also avoided the issue, as seen in Murray Peden’s *A Thousand Shall Fall: The True Story of a Canadian Bomber Pilot in World War II* (1979) and Hal Lawrence’s *A Bloody War: One Man’s Memories of the Canadian Navy, 1939-45* (1990). So, too, did Lieutenant-General E.L.M. (“Tommy”) Burns in his memoirs, which were published in 1970. J.L. Granatstein’s collective biography, *The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (1993), only briefly described what some generals did after the war. Historian Douglas E. Delaney’s biography of Maj.-Gen. Bert Hoffmeister, *The Soldier’s General* (2005), contained just half a page on that officer’s post-military career. He used a similar approach in *Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45* (2011). Oral histories are also focused on the war.

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years, as seen in Bill McNeil’s *Voices of a War Remembered* (1991) and the Historica-Dominion Institute’s *We Were Freedom: Canadian Stories of the Second World War* (2010). The same can be said of the oral history collection compiled by Veterans Affairs Canada, available through the Internet. 58 Interviews in the Canadian War Museum’s Oral History Project are similar in nature, although they often included a brief mention of the war’s overall influence on the interviewees.

Exactly why Canadian scholars, popular authors, and ex-military personnel have mostly overlooked Second World War veterans in postwar society is not clear. It may have something to do with the fact that most of these people, while proud of their wartime service, did not generally advertise themselves as veterans. Then, too, veterans were fairly commonplace in Canada in the years after 1945. They blended quickly into the population, and became indistinguishable from people of like age without military service. Another possible explanation is that the war was the most important and most exciting event of veterans’ lives. Helping to win the war was worth writing about, whereas civilian life might have seemed ordinary or dull. When the war ended, one Canadian air force member recalled feeling that “something important and vital was missing from our lives.” 59 Whatever the reason, the experience of the war changed the outlook of most of its participants. In many instances, it determined how they approached peacetime civilian life.

Although one typically finds little mention of veterans’ participation in Canadian life after 1945, there are a few such works. Clifford H. Bowering led the way in 1960 with *Service: The Story of the Canadian Legion, 1925-1960*, within which he described the Legion’s internal development and, significantly, its multi-faceted involvement in community service after the war’s end. James Hale, writing 35 years later, updated the Legion’s story in *Branching Out: The


A few scholars have also taken an interest in veterans in postwar Canada. In the year 2000 Robert Innes wrote a Master’s thesis, “The Socio-Political Influence of the Second World War Saskatchewan Aboriginal Veterans, 1945-1960.” He noted that aboriginal veterans had learned much while they were in uniform – they had travelled far from their homes, and had been treated as equals in their military units – and that by the late-1950s some of them had become leading figures within their communities. In so doing, Innes concluded, these people became “active agents of social and political change.” More recently, historian Serge Durflinger described how the Sir Arthur Pearson Association of War Blinded swayed domestic policies and attitudes regarding the civilian and military blinded in *Veterans with a Vision: Canada’s War Blinded in War and Peace* (2010), thereby showing how veterans’ groups effected meaningful change for other Canadians. It was one of many ways in which such people influenced Canadian society in the years after 1945.

Some works written by or about veterans have described their activities after the war. Counted among the former are well-known national figures like Barney Danson, whose memoirs largely focused on his business and political careers; fellow federal politician Judy LaMarsh, mentioned earlier; and Paul Hellyer, who served as Canada’s Minister of National Defence from 1963 to 1967. Lesser-known individuals like Ernest Côté, who rose to the senior ranks of the public service after he left the armed forces, and Roly Armitage, who became a veterinarian and community leader in the Ottawa Valley, concentrated on the peacetime years in their written

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recollections. A few general officers, such as Maj.-Gen. Chris Vokes and Maj.-Gen. George Kitching, described their military activities in the years after 1945. Regarding biographies, historian John Swettenham dedicated the third volume of his study of General A.G.L. McNaughton (1969) to that officer’s post-military service to Canada. During the period from 1944 to 1962, McNaughton served in several important roles, including Minister of National Defence, Canadian representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations. Reginald H. Roy did much the same in his biography of Maj.-Gen. George Pearkes (1977), who was also a defence minister after the war and, later, the Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia. Dominick Graham’s *The Price of Command: A Biography of General Guy Simonds* (1993) covered Simonds’s contributions to Canadian military affairs from 1945 to the 1970s, perhaps most notably while he was the army’s Chief of the General Staff. Paul Dickson dedicated a chapter to General H.D.G. Crerar’s life after he retired from the Canadian Army in *A Thoroughly Canadian General* (2007). Crerar continued to serve Canadians in various ways, including carrying out minor diplomatic missions on behalf of the federal government, and serving as the Canadian Legion’s Grand President until his death in 1965. Works such as those cited above offer tantalizing clues on some of the ways in which Second World War veterans such as Dan Spry helped to change the nature of Canadian society, in the years that followed the war and for decades thereafter.

broadened veterans’ perspectives. She also argued that their status as parents of the baby boom generation contributed to their civic involvement, a trend that Doug Owram has asserted took place in Canada, too.74 Other American scholars have studied how race determined veterans’ postwar status and how military service affected women’s attitudes after 1945.75 Clearly, the American literature describes the portability of wartime experiences to peacetime life in a way that most of the Canadian literature to date has not. This study seeks to do just that.

Inspired by the works of Peter Neary, Serge Durflinger, and those of Michael Gambone and Suzanne Mettler, this dissertation breaks new ground by examining the thoughts and actions of Canadian Second World War veterans beyond their experience of the Veterans Charter. It argues that many of these people applied certain lessons that they learned during the war to their civilian lives, and that the ways in which they did so influenced and underpinned key elements of Canadian society. In addressing this central hypothesis, several interrelated questions will be explored. How did veterans’ upbringing during the 1920s and 1930s shape their early thinking about character and citizenship? In what ways did the war reinforce those beliefs? How did military service alter their perceptions of themselves, Canada, and the world, and how did those new perceptions drive the manner in which they approached their subsequent roles as parents, citizens, and, in several instances, as societal leaders? Did veterans influence the character of the country’s children and national institutions? How did their attitudes regarding citizenship and service to others affect the manner in which they approached their civilian lives? Why and how did they try to build a better postwar world? How did all of this fit within the context of the Cold


War? Examining such questions will deepen our understanding of Canada in the years after 1945 by revealing some of the contributions made by the country’s Second World War veterans.

The matters described above will be addressed by using the life experience of Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry as an interpretive model. This methodology thus combines elements of a few scholarly approaches. From the “life-course” analysis used by social scientists to study populations, it borrows the ideas that people’s behaviour is best understood by accounting for their earlier experiences, that individuals and generations are strongly influenced by historical context, and that the impact of prior experience and historical context on a person’s life course depends on their timing in the person’s life.76 Such ideas mesh well with the principles of learning theory. The present study also incorporates elements of microhistory and biography, in that Spry’s experience stands as testimony to the times in which he lived while simultaneously exploring the thoughts and actions of a significant microcosm of Canada’s population, namely veterans. From microhistory, which has typically been used by historians of Early Modern Europe like Italian historian Carlo Ginzberg, comes the idea of using an individual’s life as a vehicle through which one can examine larger societal issues.77 This enables an in-depth analysis, not only of how Canadian veterans learned certain life lessons during the Second World War, but also how some of them used those lessons to shape Canada’s institutions and influence the lives of their fellow Canadians in the years and decades that followed. From the field of biography, this study takes its chronological organization and its focus on a person’s life. Biography has long been used in intellectual history, within which a person’s story radiates outwards to illustrate broad


philosophical ideas.\textsuperscript{78} The biographical component also reveals the temporal linkages inherent to life’s experience. Familial and socially-accepted values framed soldiers’ early thinking, while lessons learned during wartime service forged their perspectives and actions in peacetime. So it was with Spry. Put together, this hybrid methodology provides a unique insight into some of the ways in which veterans helped make Canada the place it was after their return to civilian life.

Practicality also influenced this approach. It would be impossible to investigate the life experiences of thousands of individuals. Replicating Suzanne Mettler’s use of a survey and interviews would also have been unfeasible. Mettler did her research at a time when the youngest American Second World War veterans were in their mid-seventies. Today, their Canadian peers are fifteen years older, and many of them are in frail health. In March 2014, Veterans Affairs Canada estimated that 75,900 of these people were still alive, and that their average age was 91. At the time of writing, that number is surely less than 70,000.\textsuperscript{79} It is not known how many of them recorded specific details of how wartime service influenced their postwar thinking. Library and Archives Canada and the Canadian War Museum have few examples of such documents.

General Spry was selected as this study’s interpretive model for several reasons. To begin with, all of its major themes intersect with his life experience. Secondly, Spry was a well-known figure in war and peace, and his job-related activities were documented in contemporary official, public, and private records. Moreover, Spry laid out his philosophy on the topics that lie within this study’s scope in a series of unpublished speeches and published articles that he wrote while serving as a senior Boy Scout executive, of which nearly 50 have survived. Spry’s experience thus offers a verifiable means of generally examining Canadian veterans’ attitudes and societal

\textsuperscript{78} For biographies in intellectual history, see Daniel Horowitz, \textit{Betty Friedan and the Making of the Feminine Mystique: The American Left, the Cold War, and Modern Feminism} (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998) or Louis Menand, \textit{The Metaphysical Club} (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001).

influence, as well as the duality of military and civic service. Thirdly, as was described above, war tends to be an equalizing experience for its participants. For this reason, Dan Spry’s documented record, while that of an exceptional person, can speak for the many ordinary people whose actions in life went unrecorded and who left no personal papers. Fourthly, Spry’s life history shows how national institutions like the Canadian Army and the Boy Scouts contributed to certain middle-class English-Canadian ideals in the years after 1945. It also sheds valuable light on Spry’s accomplishments in war and peace, most of which are unknown today. Lastly, this approach accounts for the fact that veterans were individual human beings. Despite the commonalities of their collective experience, they interpreted their experience of war and peace through their own perspectives, and their actions after demobilization reflected that individuality. While many of these people helped shape postwar Canada in a positive manner, not all of them were honest, decent citizens, or good parents, as Jeffrey Keshen has pointed out. Any potential negative effects that such people had on society, however, are beyond this study’s scope.

The postwar contributions of the non-veteran component of Canada’s Second World War generation are not analyzed herein. While such people comprised the majority of the country’s population – 41.2 per cent of men aged 18 to 45 wore uniforms during the war; the female percentage was much lower – and no doubt helped make post-war Canada, their contribution awaits analysis. This dissertation is about Dan Spry standing in for a generation of veterans in Canadian society. As such, it is not a full-scale generational study like those written by American popular sociologists William Strauss and Neil Howe or American historian Robert Putnam.

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81 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 590.
A broad range of primary and secondary sources has been consulted in producing this work. Much of the former is archival material, and includes military reports and war diaries, the files of government departments and agencies, the Boy Scouts of Canada fonds and those of the World Scout Bureau, the Royal Canadian Legion’s papers, and the records of several other non-governmental organizations. Personal papers, memoirs, diaries, and interviews with some surviving veterans and Dan Spry’s family have been used to tease out his beliefs and thereby promote an understanding of other veterans’ attitudes. Many of these sources have never before been made public. Of these, General Spry’s collection of peacetime speeches, presently in his son’s custody, proved invaluable. Secondary sources include a wide variety of full-length scholarly and popular works, biographies, theses, and articles written by Canadian, American, and British authors regarding the wartime and peacetime experience of veterans, as well as books dealing with various aspects of Canada’s social history in the years after 1945. Academic studies of the Canadian and international Boy Scout organizations have likewise been consulted.

Definitions of key terms used throughout this dissertation are provided here to aid the reader’s understanding. In both the military and non-military contexts, leadership means “the process of directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one’s intent or a shared purpose,” while management entails “the authority-based process of planning, organizing, leading, and controlling the efforts of organizational members and the use of other organizational resources to achieve organizational goals.”83 Put together, the human aspects of leadership and the technical skills associated with management comprise the principle elements of the military function of command.84 The term character refers to human qualities and traits that are deemed to have social importance and

83 Canadian Forces, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations (Canada: Chief of the Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 131.
84 Ibid., 129. For a scholarly discussion regarding military command, see Delaney, The Soldier’s General, 3-8.
moral quality.\textsuperscript{85} Citizenship, within the context of this study, entails outwardly-directed ideals and duties that are considered to be desirable in a member of a democratic society.

Utilizing Dan Spry’s life experience as an interpretive vehicle, then, this dissertation explores the manner in which some Second World War veterans applied wartime lessons about leadership, character, citizenship, and internationalism to their civilian lives and thereby helped to fashion postwar Canada. Chapter 1 relates how values taught by families, schools, churches, youth groups, and the armed forces combined with the stark realities of the Great Depression to frame a generation’s pre-war attitudes. The second chapter addresses Spry’s military training in Britain, during which he and thousands of other Canadians learned about teamwork, leadership, citizenship, and service. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the experience of combat, and how it further shaped soldiers’ thinking. The remaining chapters focus on the years after 1945, and analyze the relationship between wartime lessons and veterans’ contributions to society. Chapter 5 describes the manner in which military personnel like Spry transitioned to civilian life, in some cases with an activist philosophy regarding their – and Canada’s – future. Chapters 6 to 8 show how Spry and other veterans applied lessons of war in their efforts to provide societal leadership, to mould children’s character, and to teach and practice democratic citizenship. Chapter 9 examines Spry’s work to build a better world as an international Scout executive, and argues that while his high-profile role was exceptional, his thinking reflected that of many other Canadian veterans. Lastly, the Conclusion describes how Spry and other ex-servicemen and women served others to the end of their days, and summarizes this study’s findings. All of this will contribute to the existing Canadian historiography by showing, through Dan Spry’s example, that thousands of Second World War veterans did indeed help in the making of Canada in the years after 1945.

CHAPTER 1

THE FOUNDATIONS OF UPBRINGING

*Everything depends on upbringing.*

Leo Tolstoy

The ex-servicemen and women who helped shape Canadian society in the years after the Second World War were not born with the philosophies that underlay their postwar actions. They had first been children and young adults, and their attitudes regarding leadership, character, citizenship, and service to others were initially shaped by the circumstances of their upbringing. Such was certainly the case with Dan Spry, and thus this study begins with an examination of his formative years, from his birth in 1913 to the outbreak of war in 1939. Through his individual example, one can see how values that were first taught by families, schools, school cadet corps, youth organizations like the Boy Scouts, and the armed forces, all of which were experienced in the context of the interwar years, helped turn thousands of young Canadians into citizens who would later play active and meaningful roles in Canadian society.

Most of those Canadians who underwent military service during the Second World War were born between the years 1902 and 1926. Daniel Charles Spry came into the world in the middle of this cohort, being born in Winnipeg on 4 February 1913.2 He was the third and youngest child of Daniel William Bigelow Spry and Ethelyn Alma Rich, both of whom were originally from Ontario; the family had moved to Winnipeg in 1910.3 In many respects, the Spry household was a typical example of solidly middle-class, English-Canadian life of the time. Spry

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Senior was employed as a newspaper editor. In his spare time, he was also an enthusiastic militia officer. Membership in the part-time Canadian Militia was popular in the years before the First World War. In 1913, for example, some 57,526 Canadian men underwent militia training. As historian James Wood and other scholars have noted, such activity reflected contemporary, mostly English-Canadian thinking about the utility of military values, such as discipline and service to country, in promoting contemporary ideals of democratic citizenship, and the notion that citizens volunteering to defend their homes were better fighters than professional soldiers.

At home, the Sprys were fairly representative of middle-class English Canada, too. D.W.B. Spry was a strict disciplinarian whom his son Daniel addressed as “Sir.” Ethelyn, like most mothers of the era, raised the children – Spry had two elder siblings, Graham (born in 1900) and Constance (born in 1902). Graham later described his mother as a “very loving and warm” person.

Dan Spry grew up in a family that was intensely proud of its roots in Canada and its long tradition of service to others. His paternal great-grandfather, Samuel Spry, was a British-born military engineer who having come to Canada in 1825 with Colonel John By, had helped to build the Rideau Canal. His grandfather, Daniel, had been a post office inspector in Toronto and in Barrie, as well as a militia officer and a past Grandmaster of the Ontario Lodge of the Masons. Through Marie Elizabeth Fortier, Spry’s paternal grandmother, the links to the past went back even further. The family believed that the first Fortier had arrived in Canada in 1633, and that a Fortier had fought under Sir Isaac Brock at Detroit during the War of 1812. Spry’s mother’s family were relative newcomers, having emigrated from Scotland in the mid-1800s. But they,

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6 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-10, “Roger Sunray,” and Potvin, *Passion and Conviction*, 8. “Roger Sunray” was Dan Spry’s start at his memoirs. It was incomplete at the time of his death in 1989.
too, greatly respected public service. Young Spry could hardly have failed to be influenced, at least to some degree, by familial stories of his ancestors’ lives and their achievements.

When the First World War broke out in August 1914 Spry’s father, like many militia members, volunteered for overseas service. By 3 October he was on his way to Britain. In 1915 Ethelyn and the children followed him, an uncommon step for most Canadian military families. They remained in Britain until the war’s end while Spry Senior served in several staff positions, there and in France. In October 1919 the Sprys returned to Canada, but not to Winnipeg. Having risen to the rank of lieutenant-colonel (Lt.-Col), D.W.B. Spry joined Canada’s small professional army, then known as the Permanent Force. His first posting was to Calgary, where he would be the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General (AA & QMG) for Military District No. 13.

Upon the family’s arrival in Calgary, six-year old Dan Spry was enrolled in the Earl Grey School. While he recorded little about his education, one can reasonably assume that, like many English-Canadian educators of the day, those in charge of the Earl Grey School sought to create functional citizens who, in the words of popular historian Daniel Francis, would “venerate Great Britain and its empire.” One way in which such beliefs were taught to children was through the school’s cadet corps, and it was in this setting that Spry was first exposed to military values. School cadet corps had been an important element of the militaristic fervour that had existed throughout much of Canada in the two decades before the First World War. While the nation’s painful experience of that conflict largely killed domestic militarism, educational authorities and families like the Sprys remained convinced that school cadet corps offered a good means of instilling in the country’s boys such conservative, socially desirable traits as loyalty, discipline,

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patriotism, and teamwork, and as such they could be found in many urban schools during the 1920s and 1930s. Membership in school cadet corps was usually compulsory for boys, but the military training they provided was amateurish at best. In both regards, the Earl Grey School cadet corps was no exception. Dan Spry later recalled that “We had no uniforms nor weaponry, not even broomsticks.” On the other hand, he added, the cadets were fortunate to have Mr. Gardner, a former lieutenant “not long returned from the Great War in France.” Among other things, he taught them how to advance in formation over the playground, with the school as their objective. Spry, who like other children before and since greatly disliked being cooped up in a classroom, thought the school building was “a very suitable target for destruction.”

Canada’s churches promoted conservative middle-class values, too. As church historian John Webster Grant has noted, such was the case for practically all of the country’s religious denominations, and in some instances this tendency had ethnic characteristics. The Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches, for example, saw their religious mission as mirroring that of Britain and its Empire. It is not known if Dan Spry and his family attended church during his youth, but they likely did. In 1921, just 0.4 per cent of Canadians had no religious affiliation, and church-going was part of the social convention of the times. Despite this, religion does not seem to have had much influence on Spry’s early thinking as he made no mention of it in his papers. Given his dislike of the classroom, one can easily imagine him being frustrated sitting in a church pew. Spiritual belief, however, would become important to him in his adult years.

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11 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, “Roger Sunray.”
12 Within this study, the collective term “conservative” is used to describe traditional values that societal pillars like schools, churches, governments, and the armed forces, and many families deemed worthwhile to preserve.
13 Grant, The Church in the Canadian Era, 93.
14 For religious statistics, see Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canada Year Book, 1922-1923 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1924), 163. Spry did not mention his family’s churchgoing in his draft memoirs, “Roger Sunray.”
If the cadets gave boys such as Spry a way to escape the tedium of school and church, the Boy Scouts offered an exciting way of spending their spare time. Scouting was still fairly new in the early 1920s, having been created in 1907 by Lord Robert Baden-Powell, a British general and a hero of the Boer War (1899-1902).\(^\text{15}\) Like other leading Britons of the day, Baden-Powell had noted that British troops who had fought in that conflict, many of whom came from poor urban families, seemed sickly and weak in comparison to those of Dominion contingents like the Canadians. Combined with their worries about crime, urban slums, and militant labour unions, these leaders feared that the British Empire’s future security would be imperilled by moral, physical, and military weakness.\(^\text{16}\) Such concerns were accompanied by a belief that some young people were getting too wild in their behaviour. Adult worries about juvenile delinquency were nothing new, and as will be seen later, Dan Spry faced them in his postwar career.\(^\text{17}\) In the early 1900s, such fears combined with concerns about the future to shape Baden-Powell’s thinking.

To Baden-Powell, the remedy for such societal ills was “truer education for the oncoming generation of citizens,” especially for boys (and for girls, after the Girl Guides were created in 1910), that promoted character (which he defined as “manliness, sense of honour, and balanced, broadminded outlook”), physical and mental health, and the ideals of British citizenship.\(^\text{18}\) Such were the philosophical foundations upon which the Boy Scout Movement was built. Baden-Powell laid out his ideas in *Scouting for Boys* (1908), which became a best-seller.\(^\text{19}\) The main

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\(^{15}\) Baden-Powell had led the successful defence of Mafeking, which was besieged by the Boers from October 1899 to May 1900. See Tim Jeal, *Baden-Powell* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 205-312.


components of the Scout program, especially those pertaining to character development and citizenship, will be examined in later chapters. For now, it is sufficient to note that the Boy Scouts sought to bolster familial, school, and church teachings on such matters through games and outdoor activities, with members getting together for a few hours about once a week. As one senior Boy Scout leader put it in 1926:

We use the boy’s natural tendency to gather together in gangs, whether for play or for mischief, and therefore the unit of the Movement is a Patrol, a little gang of six to eight boys under one of themselves as leader. And on that leader is put the responsibility for the conduct and the training of the boys in his Patrol...It is in effect a movement for boys, largely run by boys.

Scouting proved very popular, and it was almost immediately exported to other parts of the world. The first Canadian Scout troops were established in 1908. Strongly supported by the Governor General, Albert the 4th Earl Grey, they were soon to be found nation-wide. In 1910 a Dominion Council was created, with the Governor General serving as Canada’s Chief Scout. By 1921 – the year Dan Spry joined – the Canadian Boy Scouts comprised 4,000 Wolf Cubs (boys aged 8-11) and 28,000 Scouts (boys between the ages 12 and 17), roughly 3.5 per cent of Canadian boys within these age groups. By 1939 these numbers had grown to 41,000 Cubs and 50,100 Scouts, or 7.4 per cent of boys aged 8-17 years. Exactly how many individual boys joined Canada’s Boy Scouts during the period from 1921 to 1939 is not known. Given a high dropout rate of boys between the ages of 10 and 15 (described below) from the Movement, the figure must have been at least a few hundred thousand.

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Dan Spry was a member of the 2nd Calgary Wolf Cub Pack for two years. He never recorded why he joined, but his reason for doing so was probably the same as that of other boys: to have fun. His parents, whose permission he needed to become a Cub, likely had different motives. They probably discerned that the Boy Scouts’ focus on character, citizenship, and service to others matched their family’s values. The Scout Law (reproduced at Appendix 1), which Spry had to promise to obey to become a member, said that a Scout was to be loyal and obedient to the King, his country, his parents, his employers, and his comrades. A Scout’s honour was to be trusted; his duty was to help others. Scouts were to be cheerful, a friend to all, courteous, and “clean in thought, word, and deed.” Spry Senior would certainly have noted the similarities between these tenets and the military ethos that guided his own life. Boy Scout values would also reinforce those taught by Dan Spry’s school, church, and the cadets.

British historian John Springhall has said that British youth movements during the period 1883-1940 were generally created to reinforce social conformity. This characteristic, along with the Boy Scouts’ British origins and its initial espousal of imperial ideals, contributed to the Movement’s popularity among conservative-minded, middle-class families like the Sprys. Such families, and surely some politicians, would have found other aspects appealing, too. As the Boy Scouts were open to all those who wanted to join, it could help “Canadianize” new immigrants. Another positive, given the anti-war sentiment that prevailed in Canada after the First World War, Scouting came to Calgary in 1909. See Patricia Dirks, “Canada’s Boys – An Imperial or National Asset? Response to Baden-Powell’s Boy Scout Movement in Pre-war Canada,” in Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 115.


War, was that Scouting was not in any way affiliated with the armed forces, notwithstanding the debate about whether or not it was a creature of militarism.\textsuperscript{28} Baden-Powell himself disavowed such linkages. Although Boy Scouts wore uniforms and earned badges, and Scouting was originally intended to produce citizens capable of defending the Empire, he nonetheless insisted that the Boy Scout Movement could help to prevent conflict by promoting mutual goodwill and understanding, and after 1920 it sought to produce global citizens.\textsuperscript{29} Another desirable aspect of Scouting was that it was officially apolitical. Its leaders were barred from political activities while in a Scout uniform. Lastly, all Scouts were expected to observe a religion. In keeping with its open nature, however, the Scout Movement was not tied to a particular denomination.\textsuperscript{30}

Dan Spry’s comfortable life was interrupted from 1923 to 1925 when his mother took him and Constance to Britain to be near his elder brother Graham who was then attending Oxford. His father remained at his post in Calgary. Young Spry boarded at Ashford House, a preparatory school located in Middlesex. He later wrote that this time was as a lonely experience for him. Not only was he separated from his family, he was also a “colonial” with an American-sounding accent. Worse still, there was no nearby Scout troop to occupy his spare time.\textsuperscript{31} While this second British interlude gave him an early exposure to the world outside of Canada that he would long remember, Spry was surely happy to return to Calgary – and to Scouting.\textsuperscript{32}


\textsuperscript{29} Baden-Powell, \textit{Scouting and Youth Movements}, 26-29; Springhall, \textit{Youth, Empire, and Society}, 63; and Vallory, \textit{World Scouting}, 18 and 105-162.

\textsuperscript{30} The Boy Scout Association, \textit{The Scout Movement: What it Is – What it is Not} (Montreal: Quebec Provincial Headquarters, 1912), 4-5.

\textsuperscript{31} LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, “Roger Sunray.”

\textsuperscript{32} Major-General Daniel C. Spry Scout Record, \textit{The Scout Leader}, 23. Upon returning to Calgary in 1925, Dan Spry immediately joined the 2nd Calgary Scout Troop.
In 1927, Spry’s father was posted to Halifax. School still bored young Spry, a fact that he readily admitted and was reflected in his rather poor graduating marks from the Halifax County Academy in 1931.\footnote{LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, “Roger Sunray.” Dan Spry failed Algebra, Physics and Chemistry, and Latin. See Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-5, Common Examining Board for the Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland, Daniel Spry, Grade XI marks, (?) June 1931.} What did interest him was Scouting. By March 1928 he was a Patrol Leader, just five months after having joined the 9th Halifax Scout Troop. Responsible for six to eight of his peers, Spry learned to lead and motivate others by obtaining their consent, in accordance with the Boy Scouts’ methodology. By this time he was also a King’s Scout, a rare feat indeed.\footnote{A King’s Scout had to be a First Class Scout and have earned four of the following proficiency badges: Ambulance (compulsory), Pathfinder (compulsory), Cyclist, Marksmen, Signaller, Fireman, Rescuer, Interpreter, or Public Health Man. Canadian General Council of the Boy Scouts Association, Revised Handbook for Canada (Ottawa: The Boy Scouts Association, 1930), 24.} The following September, at age 15, he joined the 9th Halifax Rover Crew. This, too, was uncommon, as the minimum age for Rovers Scouts (created by Baden-Powell in 1919 for young men aged 18 to 21) was 17. Few younger boys were allowed to join. Spry quickly became a Senior Rover’s Mate and thus the senior rank in his Crew. He remained such until he left Halifax in 1932.\footnote{Major-General Daniel C. Spry Scout Record, The Scout Leader, 23.}

Dan Spry’s lengthy membership in the Boy Scout Movement was definitely not the norm. Statistics produced by the Canadian Boy Scouts Association in 1961 showed that the average drop-out rate rose sharply after a boy turned ten: by the time he reached 15, there was a 56 per cent chance he would quit before his 16th birthday. The Boy Scouts saw this attrition rate as a normal part of a boy’s developing maturity.\footnote{LAC, Seyward Papers, Volume 4, “Age and Membership in Canadian Scouting,” 10-12.} It was the same story in the 1930s, which leads one to wonder why Spry remained in Scouting for as long as he did. Part of the answer, surely, was that he thought Boy Scout activities were fun. However, he also stayed because his Scouting experience had profoundly influenced his outlook on life. As will be seen in later chapters, Spry internalized much of Scouting’s lessons on character, leadership, and citizenship.
In September 1931, Dan Spry began studies in History and Political Science at Dalhousie University in Halifax. Given his dislike of academia, his reasons for doing so are unclear. Surviving letters from his father and brother (by then an Oxford graduate) reveal strong familial encouragement, but Spry Senior warned his son that he would have to live at home and apply himself. Otherwise, Spry Senior could not afford the bill. Whatever Spry’s reasons, he became one of the few Canadians – just 3 per cent of those aged 20-24, hailing mostly from middle-class families – who attended post-secondary education in 1931. As historian Paul Axelrod has noted, going to university in those days had a certain contractual nature. The university’s role was to ensure that its graduates had the skills and values needed to lead professional, middle-class lives. In turn, graduates were to be “literate, respectful of tradition, organized, patriotic, inquisitive without being radical, and able to hold responsible positions in the community.” The values espoused by universities thus echoed those that Spry and his peers had been taught as children.

In April 1932, a 19-year old Dan Spry joined a Halifax militia unit, the Princess Louise Fusiliers (PLF), as a second lieutenant. Although he did so with his father’s blessing (Spry called it “parental pressure”), he found that he liked part-time soldiering. In his view, militia training was “vastly better than the Cadets” because the PLF, an infantry unit, conducted the sort of outdoor training he loved. He enjoyed being a leader, having been one as a Scout, and he liked the social life of the Officers’ Mess. Another positive factor was that the PLF was well led. The PLF’s CO, Lt.-Col. W.M. King, was a First World War veteran, and the unit was rated as “very

38 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-6, Graham Spry to Daniel Spry, 12 May 1931, and File 2-7, D.W.B. Spry to Daniel Spry, 1 August 1931.
39 Paul Axelrod, Making a Middle Class: Student Life in English Canada during the Thirties (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 21. Axelrod found that 27.1 per cent of the fathers of university students were professionals, 27.3 per cent were businessmen, 11.7 per cent had supervisory positions, and 10 per cent were white collar workers. See page 23. For the “contractual” nature of university attendance, see page 64.
well organized and administered” in its annual inspection report for 1932. On the other hand, like other militiamen across Canada (in 1931 there were 51,287 of them), Spry quickly saw the stark realities of military life in the interwar years. No unit had a full complement of personnel. In 1932 the PLF had 162 all ranks, about 25 per cent of its peacetime establishment. What little equipment the Militia possessed was left over from the First World War. The biggest problem was a severe lack of funding. In 1931-1932, Ottawa had allocated the Militia just $1.9 million, a funding level that reflected Canadians’ anti-war bias and the government’s priorities during the Depression. This deficiency severely limited the Militia’s ability to fill personnel establishments and conduct training. The only thing that militia units had in abundance was their members’ pride in themselves as citizen-soldiers and in their Regiment, and it was for this reason that Spry and his brother officers signed over their pay to the Regimental Fund. Getting paid was not the issue. What mattered were camaraderie and service to a country that might need them one day.

Dan Spry’s liking of military life deepened during the summer of 1932 when he went to Aldershot Camp, Nova Scotia, to train with “A” Company, The Royal Canadian Regiment (hereafter The RCR), a sub-unit of one of Canada’s three Permanent Force infantry units. During this time he was tremendously impressed by the professionalism displayed by “A” Company’s commander, Major H.T. Cock, and the company’s sergeants and warrant officers. Spry decided then and there that “should I become a regular officer, The RCR was the place for me.”

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44 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 160. For brief accounts by individual Canadians of life in a militia regiment during the 1930s, see Galloway, Bravely into Battle, 12-29, and Delaney, The Soldier’s General, 17-19.
45 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, “Roger Sunray.”
46 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry Record of Service, and “Roger Sunray.”
Spry remained with the PLF when he returned to Dalhousie in the fall of 1932. He also trained with the university’s Canadian Officer Training Corps (COTC) and served as the editor of the *Dalhousie Gazette*. The effect that these extracurricular activities had on his academic performance is not known, but that November Spry abruptly quit school. Years later, he wrote that he had used his editorial position to criticize the university’s decree that only rubber-soled shoes could be worn in the newly-built gym, which meant that the students could not use it for dances. When the local media picked up the story, Dalhousie’s president, Carleton Stanley, told Spry that “one of us has to go.” After obtaining a letter from Stanley stating that he was leaving Dalhousie for domestic reasons, Spry fled to Toronto to avoid confronting his father’s wrath.

There, he stayed with his brother, Graham, then a leading member of the leftist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and owner of the *Farmer’s Sun*, a weekly CCF newspaper.

In December 1932 Spry left Toronto to face his parents, then living in Ottawa. Spry Senior, now a colonel serving as Director of Organizations and Personnel Services in National Defence Headquarters, seemed sympathetic. He offered room and board, and – significantly – encouraged his son to think about joining the Permanent Force as an officer. Dan Spry had not previously considered this idea, and he weighed his options. He could not return to Dalhousie, and although he liked newspaper work the odds of finding a job were slim. By 1933 the Great Depression had reached its nadir, and roughly 713,000 Canadians were unemployed. The situation was particularly dire for young people. During the 1930s, as historian Cynthia

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50 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-7, D.W.B. Spry to Daniel Spry, 04 December 1932.
Comacchio has pointed out, the unemployment rate for male and female youth between the ages of 14 and 20 was greater than that of any other age group, partly because employers gave those with family responsibilities top priority in hiring.\textsuperscript{52} On the other hand, by joining the Permanent Force Spry would be doing something he enjoyed and be paid for doing it. Decision made, Spry submitted his application to the Permanent Force on 9 March 1933. In the meantime, he followed his father’s advice to “read every military book he or the library could provide.”\textsuperscript{53}

As military historian Stephen Harris has noted, most Permanent Force junior officers during the 1920s and 1930s were graduates of the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, or had come through the COTC programs that had been set up at civilian universities.\textsuperscript{54} Militia officers had a third means of achieving that end. This route involved being temporarily assigned to a Permanent Force unit, during which time the individual would undergo three months of training at RMC, called the “Long Course,” to be qualified as a second lieutenant.\textsuperscript{55} As an English-speaking infantry officer, Dan Spry could be posted to The RCR or the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). Given his earlier experience with The RCR, he hoped for the former. In May 1933, his application was approved. His father, as the army’s Director of Personnel, likely had something to do with this outcome. The fact that Major Cock of The RCR had written him a glowing recommendation – he described Spry as a “keen, energetic officer” – didn’t hurt, either.\textsuperscript{56} A week later, Spry was posted to “C” Company, The RCR, which was garrisoned at Wolseley Barracks in London, Ontario. He reported there on 10 June.\textsuperscript{57}

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\textsuperscript{52} Comacchio, \textit{The Dominion of Youth}, 9, 36.  
\textsuperscript{55} The real “long course” was the four-year program undertaken by the cadets attending the Royal Military College (hereafter RMC). Exactly why the Long Course was so named is not known.  
\textsuperscript{56} LAC, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry Personnel File, Assistant Director Personnel Services, to District Officer Commanding, Military District No. 6, 31 May 1933.  
\textsuperscript{57} LAC, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry Personnel File, Record of Service Prior to 1 September 1939.
Second Lieutenant Dan Spry had much to learn about the organization he sought to join. He soon found that conditions in the Permanent Force were little better than those in the Militia. On 31 March 1935 it numbered just 3,509 all ranks, distributed among its field units, supporting corps, and headquarters. Like the Militia, no unit was fully manned. The RCR’s situation was typical. In 1934, “C” Company had 5 officers and 72 other ranks; it ought to have had 175 in all. Three years later, The Regiment as a whole numbered 34 officers and 420 men, just 58 per cent of its established strength of 51 officers and 739 other ranks. Of these, 72 were serving in jobs outside of the unit. The equipment situation was slightly better than that of the Militia, but the gear was equally old. Money, too, was very scarce. The Permanent Force did conduct individual training courses during the 1930s, but field training at the battalion level and higher had virtually ceased. All of this had a negative effect on the Permanent Force’s war-fighting capabilities.

Spry had been a member of a regiment in Halifax, but it was when he became a full-time soldier that he came to appreciate what a regiment and the regimental system were all about. The importance of these concepts, in understanding his views and those of other Army veterans about certain aspects of their military service, cannot be overstated. Neither were Canadian inventions, as they were inherited from the British Army. On one level, a regiment can be understood as a type of military unit, but in this sense the term can mean different things. In the Canadian Army, an infantry regiment can consist of one or more battalions (a battalion usually numbers 750-850 all ranks); in the latter case, battalions are numbered, i.e. 1st Battalion, The RCR. On the other hand, battalion-sized armoured (cavalry, in the 1930s), artillery, engineer, and signals units.

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58 The Army’s strength rose to 4,169 all ranks by 1939. In 1935, the Royal Canadian Navy had 903 officers and ratings, while the Royal Canadian Air Force numbered 794 in all. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 4-5.
60 Harris, Canadian Brass, 197-198. Individual training covers skills needed by an individual soldier.
some of which are smaller than infantry battalions, are also called regiments. The concept of a regiment, however, takes on a broader meaning within a regimental system. As historian David Bercuson has noted, such a system uses “specific, unique regiments to recruit, train, and build cohesion inside an army that is not composed of regiments as units of manoeuvre but rather of battalions, brigades, divisions, and corps.”61 In the Canadian Army, each regiment has its own history and customs that sets it apart from the rest. Proponents of the regimental system believe that this uniqueness promotes the belief among a regiment’s members that they belong to a family bound together by shared values. Such a familial atmosphere tends to create strong bonds between soldiers. This is important, for soldiers do not fight for abstract reasons like King or country: they fight for their comrades in their regiment. Such is the basis of unit cohesion, which Bercuson has asserted is “the most important factor that prompts a soldier to endure battle.”62

Dan Spry’s new unit, The RCR, had a proud history as Canada’s senior regular infantry regiment. Originally known as “the Infantry School Corps,” it had been created on 21 December 1883 to provide a professional cadre of instructors for the Militia.63 The Regiment had performed well in battle during the Northwest Rebellion of 1885, the Boer War, and, most recently, the First World War. Upon returning to Canada in 1919, The RCR’s four rifle companies were dispersed to four locations in Eastern and Central Canada. “A” Company was housed at Wellington Barracks in Halifax. “B” Company occupied Stanley Barracks in Toronto, while Regimental Headquarters and “C” Company were in London at Wolseley Barracks, The Regiment’s “Home Station.” The fourth sub-unit, “D” Company, was based in St. Jean, Quebec. Such dispersion

63 In 1893 the name was changed to “The Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry,” and in 1899 to “The Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry.” In 1901 the title was shortened to “The Royal Canadian Regiment.” Bernd Horn, Establishing a Legacy: The History of The Royal Canadian Regiment, 1883-1953 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2008), 255-263.
allowed The RCR to train a large number of militia units, the Permanent Force’s main peacetime task, but it made command, control, and the conduct of unit-level training much more difficult.\textsuperscript{64}

As members of Canada’s small professional army, the officers and men of The RCR lived by a conservative set of values mirroring those that many thousands of young Canadians had been taught by their families, schools, cadet corps, churches, and youth movements like the Boy Scouts – and that Dan Spry had already internalized. Soldiers were expected to be loyal to their superiors, to obey orders, and to conduct themselves in a highly disciplined manner. For commissioned officers like Spry, the armed forces particularly stressed character values. This was another carry-over from Canada’s British heritage, within which officers, who historically came from the upper class, were expected to act like gentlemen. It was for this reason that the wording on Spry’s commissioning scroll, a document signed by the Governor General and the Deputy Minister of National Defence that was presented to all commissioned officers, stated that the individual’s appointment was based on the Crown’s “especial Trust and Confidence in your Loyalty, Courage, and good Conduct.”\textsuperscript{65} Standing Orders for The RCR published in 1925 amplified this requirement, admonishing RCR officers to “set an example of gentlemanly feeling and conduct.”\textsuperscript{66} Above all, the armed forces venerated the ethos of service. This meant service to Canada, the Canadian Army, and one’s unit, even at the cost of one’s life. As a leader, Spry was expected to put the interests of all these, as well as those of the troops serving under him, before his own. Most soldiers considered service to others an honourable way of life. As one RCR officer later put it, “We felt ourselves members of a dedicated order of chivalry.”\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} Toby Spry Collection, Daniel Charles Spry Commissioning Scroll, 20 June 1932.
\textsuperscript{67} Stevens, \textit{The Royal Canadian Regiment}, 4-5.
Believing in the value of their service was vital for professional soldiers during the interwar years. Canadians had come out of the First World War with little of their pre-war militarism, having seen 59,544 killed and 172,950 wounded out of 619,636 men who had served. Repulsed by the human cost of war, most people, English and French-Canadians alike, wished only for peace in the years after 1918. Such views did not mean that they were disrespectful of veterans – they were not – or that they did not believe in defending Canada. If it was necessary to do so, as it would be in 1939, Canadians would again fight for their country. However, the First World War was supposed to have been “the war to end all wars.” Perceiving no direct threat to Canada, few saw the need to spend precious government funds to maintain the armed forces. This was especially the case during the 1930s, when coping with the economic hardships of the Depression was widely seen as the country’s top priority. Professional soldiers sometimes drew the public’s scorn for “playing soldier” rather than working in a “real” job. The fact that they were housed and fed by the federal government using scarce tax dollars undoubtedly fostered further resentment on the part of many unemployed Canadians. Few civilians would have known that most soldiers, including Spry, were also tight for money. For their part, soldiers were well aware of what some civilians thought of them. This knowledge, combined with the bonds of the regimental family, led them to look to each other for support. Dan Spry, for one, forged friendships during the 1930s that lasted throughout his lifetime.


69 For example, Harry Foster, who was a Permanent Force cavalry officer during the interwar years, recalled that “Calgary’s citizens considered the army a collection of social parasites.” Tony Foster, *Meeting of Generals* (Toronto: Methuen, 1986), 62. In the 1930s the Militia also drew scorn, as may be seen in Farley Mowat, *The Regiment* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974), xv-xvii.

Spry knew that attached officers like himself would be under constant scrutiny and that he had to perform if he was to gain entry into the Permanent Force. His father, who regularly advised him on an officer’s proper conduct – the relationship between the two had improved since Spry’s decision to become a professional soldier – underlined that fact, saying “If you do not work and make good, there is not any chance of your getting your permanent appointment.”

Shortly after arriving in London, Dan Spry had a chance to show The RCR’s CO, Lt.-Col. R.J.S. Langford, what he was made of. At the time, labour unions were becoming increasingly militant as the economic effects of the Depression worsened. Governments at all levels worried about civil unrest. In late September 1933, the Province of Ontario requested troops to put down violence arising from a strike at several factories in the nearby city of Stratford. “B” and “C” Companies of The RCR, along with Regimental Headquarters, were called out to help restore order; they remained there until November. While in Stratford, Spry’s performance apparently impressed Langford. In a Special Report dated 5 December 1933, The RCR’s CO wrote that Spry’s behaviour “has been excellent,” and recommended that “this young officer, if successful at the next Long Course, be granted a commission in the Permanent Active Militia.”

From 24 February to 31 May 1934, Dan Spry attended the Long Course at RMC. The course director was Lt.-Col. Ken Stuart, whom Spry thought was “a most gifted teacher.” They would meet again during the war. Stuart drove his students hard. During the day, they attended classes and took part in field exercises. At night, they studied and prepared assignments. Upon

71 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, D.W.B. Spry to Daniel Spry, (?) 1933.
72 Bothwell and Granatstein, Our Century, 94-97. See also Desmond Morton, Working People, 139-165.
73 DHH, File 000.1(38), Desmond Morton, “Aid to the Civil Power: The Stratford Strike of 1933,” January 1970, and File 161.009(D56), Telegram from District Officer Commanding, Military District No. 1, to Adjutant-General, NDHQ, 6 November 1933.
74 LAC, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry Personnel File, Special Report, 2/Lt D.C. Spry, PLF, attached The RCR, 5 December 1933. The “Permanent Active Militia” was the official designation of the Permanent Force.
76 Ken Stuart was also the editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly for much of the interwar period. He sought to counter professional stagnation in the Permanent Force through education. Granatstein, The Generals, 219-221.
graduating, Spry was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Permanent Force and officially posted to “C” Company. He remained in London for the next two years.

Second Lieutenant Spry was initially employed as a platoon commander, a typical job for a new junior officer. During this time, an infantry platoon was supposed to have an officer, two sergeants, and 36 other ranks; most of those in The RCR actually numbered about 30 all ranks. Like other junior officers then and since, Spry’s superiors expected him to apply the leadership skills that he had been taught, and to learn from the mistakes that he would inevitably make. He was personally accountable for his platoon’s training and its administration, and for all tasks that his company commander might assign to it. He had to look after his men’s interests and get to know them as individuals, both being key aspects of military leadership. Another duty was inspecting the men’s barracks to ensure that their equipment and clothing were properly laid out. As Spry had less than one year of service, he was required to attend the daily Orderly Room Parade, where soldiers who had committed offences under military law would have their cases heard and judged. Lastly, Spry had to acquaint himself with the responsibilities of his company commander and the company’s second-in command should he ever have to stand in their place.

Dan Spry quickly found that a junior officer’s life in the Permanent Force during the interwar years was mostly a routine existence. There were frequent company parades, church parades, and CO’s inspections. A junior officer was required to be on duty each night, an onerous task that could be assigned in batches to those who had run afoul of a senior officer.

81 A military parade may involve assembling troops in a large rectangular area (called a “parade square”) for the purpose of formal inspections by a commander or to mark ceremonies such as a unit’s change of commanding officer. Another type of military parade involves assembling troops for varying types of activities. A church parade is one of these, whereby troops are marched to and from a church to attend religious services.
They were also assigned miscellaneous tasks, or “secondary duties.” Spry had three of these: Officer in Charge of Men’s Messing, Secretary of the Band Committee, and Editor of The Connecting File, The RCR’s newsletter. There was little to dispel the humdrum of garrison life. One pleasant diversion that “C” Company’s platoon commanders occasionally enjoyed involved taking their troops to the Cedar Springs Range, located near Chatham, Ontario, for weapons training. Spry liked such outings because they gave him a chance to run things away from the critical eyes of his superiors. Regimental field exercises were very rare events, although The RCR (less “A” Company) managed to conduct one in 1935 at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario.

One of “C” Company’s most important tasks was to provide instructors to help train the local militia units. In a way, it was a useful experience. As Spry later recalled, “We were spread all over the place and we were doing things far beyond our age and our rank. It was quite normal for a subaltern and four corporals to be training two or three Militia battalions.” Even privates had to serve as instructors. One such soldier, Tom Burdett, ran an anti-tank course for militia warrant officers and sergeants. Officers had to work several nights a week with militia units as well as carrying out their normal duties. Training part-time soldiers meant an increased workload and time away from garrison, which made it hard for young officers to get to know their men.

Almost immediately, Spry earned a solid reputation with his superiors and the troops, despite committing a few peccadilloes along the way. In 1934 and 1935, Lt.-Col. Langford and Lt.-Col. M.K. Greene (who replaced the former as The RCR’s CO on 15 May 1935) respectively

83 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, “Roger Sunray.”
84 Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 6.
85 Ibid., 5. A subaltern is a term used to describe an army officer below the rank of captain.
87 For example, when asked to deliver the Loyal Toast at a Regimental Dinner to honour Lt.-Col. Langford’s retirement, Spry – who had drunk too much during the meal – said, “Kintlemen and Jadies, the Lent” instead of “Ladies and Gentlemen, the King.” This social faux pas cost him a month of extra turns as Duty Officer at Wolesley Barracks. LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, “Roger Sunray.”
described him as “a good officer” and “an officer above the average of his rank.”

Equally important was how “C” Company’s lower ranks saw him. One former member, John C. Reid, remembered Spry as “a big gangling slim fellow” – he was 6’1” and weighed 150 lbs – who was “popular with the troops.” Tom Burdett had similar memories, describing him as “an excellent RCR type who by his manner deserved respect.”

Another soldier who joined The Regiment in 1939, Sheridan E. Atkinson, recalled that “Spry had a reputation as a good guy,” and that the troops “had a high opinion of him.” Such views are particularly significant when one considers that officers and private soldiers seldom had the opportunity to mix during the 1930s.

In 1936, Spry’s military career saw some big changes. During the period of 1 January to 15 March he was temporarily assigned to the headquarters of Military District No. 1, also in London, to serve as the District Intelligence Officer. This job exposed him to staff work, an experience he would later find very useful. After completing this task, Spry was posted to “A” Company in Halifax, where he would spend the next three years. On 1 June, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Two years later, in March 1938, he passed the Captain Qualifying examination. As he had done in London, Spry spent much of his time training local militia regiments, where his instructional skills, personality, and willingness to do voluntary work earned him high praise.

His only black mark, noted by his company commander, Major H.M. Logan, on 22 November 1938, was “a tactless manner in the acceptance of correction, and a frequent lack of precision in the execution of orders.” Little more is known about this fault, but it

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89 John C. Reid, telephone interview by author (hereafter Reid interview), 12 August 2010.
90 Thomas H. Burdett, letter to author, 5 October 2010.
92 LAC, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry Personnel File, Record of Service Prior to 1 September 1939, Appointments and Promotions.
93 Ibid., Remarks by Officer Commanding Halifax Station, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 22 November 1938.
was apparently quickly corrected. Within four months, Major Logan reported that Dan Spry could become “outstanding in his rank.”

By 1938, the state of Canada’s armed forces was starting to improve. Rearmament had begun two years earlier in response to the increasingly aggressive moves of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, fearing that the worsening international situation might lead to a war involving Britain that Canada could not avoid – and for which it was woefully unprepared – reluctantly approved greater defence spending. However, as several scholars have noted, rearmament would be based on a strict set of priorities, a tight budget, and domestic political considerations. In order of importance, King’s goals were to build defences on the Pacific coast to deal with possible Japanese actions, to develop the air force, and to expand the navy. King knew that few Canadians would object to bolstering home defence capabilities provided by the air force and the navy. He also knew that English Canadians would want a large expeditionary army, which raised the spectre of heavy casualties and English-Canadian demands for overseas conscription that would threaten Canadian unity, as had occurred in 1917. For these reasons, the army came dead last. By 1938 military expenditures were $36 million, more than double the $14 million that had been allocated in 1932-33, but still insufficient given the parlous state of the armed forces. The Permanent Force acquired some new weapons and vehicles, and in the summer of 1938 it was finally able to conduct limited all-arms training. Such exercises confirmed what everyone already knew. Canada’s armed forces were not ready for war.

94 Ibid., 22 November 1938 and 22 March 1939.
95 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume 2, 134-135. On 28 May 1935 the Chief of the General Staff, Maj.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, summarized the country’s military weakness in a memorandum entitled “The Defence of Canada.” He noted that Canada had no reserves of ammunition beyond that for rifles, no modern anti-aircraft guns, and no aerial bombs, but did have plenty of horse harness.
96 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 171; Stacey, Six Years of War, 13; and Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume 2, 134-153.
97 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 1-3.
98 DHH, File 324.009(D449), Report on PF Concentration at Camp Borden, 1938.
Dan Spry’s posting to Halifax also offered a chance to rekindle his relationship with Jessie Elizabeth (“Betty”) Forbes. He had met Betty, two years his junior, at the age of 17 at the Halifax Academy, and the two had kept in touch. They quickly became inseparable, and in 1938 Spry proposed. Betty recalled that this news upset Spry Senior, then a retired major-general, who thought that marriage would hurt his son’s career.\(^9^9\) His concern was likely based on a fear that the younger Spry’s income would be insufficient to fulfil family responsibilities, thereby leading to financial difficulty and disgrace for himself and the Spry family. In the 1930s a lieutenant in the Permanent Force earned $4.10 a day, seven days a week. This was more than the wage of a typical labourer in Halifax, who in 1937 received about $22.50 for a 45-hour work week, but officers were supposed to live like gentlemen and had to pay for mess dues, formal uniforms, tailoring, and if one was a cavalry officer, a horse. As a result, most junior officers often found themselves mired in debt.\(^1^0^0\) Spry usually listened to his father’s career advice, but this was one time that he did not. He and Betty were married in a military service held at St. Mark’s Church in Halifax on 23 March 1939.\(^1^0^1\) Furious at being ignored, Spry’s father did not attend the wedding. Instead, he sent his son a curt telegram that simply said “Best wishes, D.W.B. Spry.”\(^1^0^2\) These were among the last words between the two, for Spry Senior died on 13 July 1939.

After honeymooning in the United States, Lieutenant Spry and his bride left Halifax for a new posting to “D” Company at St. Jean, Quebec.\(^1^0^3\) By this time, it was clear to most Canadians that war in Europe was coming. The situation surrounding the Sudetenland Crisis in September

\(^1^0^0\) Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 162, and Foster, Meeting of Generals, 59-60. For a Halifax labourer’s pay and work week, see Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canada Year Book, 1938 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1938), 804.
\(^1^0^2\) DHH, Granatstein Notes, Betty Spry interview, 12 January 1992. Graham Spry wrote to his wife that “Father is furious, and tried to stop the [wedding]...” See Potvin, Passion and Conviction, 130.
1938 had been so tense that Britain, fearing an immediate outbreak of hostilities, had issued gas masks to its population. The agreement signed at Munich at the end of that month, whereby Adolf Hitler promised to make no further territorial demands, was rendered meaningless when Germany occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Britain responded by enacting conscription and declaring that it would fight if Hitler attacked Poland. Closer to home, Prime Minister King told Canadians on 30 March that while Canada would fight alongside Britain if war came, his government would not invoke overseas conscription. Throughout the spring and summer, the German-Polish crisis intensified. By the end of August, war was imminent.

The men and women who would serve in Canada’s armed forces from 1939 to 1945 thus found themselves on the threshold of a second world war. Each of them arrived at this point in their own way, their attitudes about life having been initially moulded by the circumstances of their upbringing and those of the times. Thousands of Canadians had grown up in middle-class families, had attended conservative-minded schools, had gone to church, and had been members of youth organizations like the Boy Scouts. These societal entities, working in combination with each other, tried to instil in these young people things that they considered to be important, such as character values, a belief in democratic citizenship, and the desire to serve to others. Some, as was the case for Spry, also learned the basics of leadership and teamwork through school cadet corps, the Boy Scouts, or through service in the armed forces as either a part-time or professional soldier. All were deeply affected by the hardships of the Great Depression. These youthful life lessons, all of which would be significantly reinforced by their experience of the forthcoming conflict as young adults, filled thousands of Canadians, including Dan Spry, with a desire to build a better future once their chance came.

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CHAPTER 2

TRAINING OVERSEAS: EARLY WARTIME LESSONS

*The object of all training is to turn a man into a soldier.*

Canadian Army Training Pamphlet

Roughly half of the nearly 1.1 million men and women who joined the Canadian forces during the Second World War spent at least part of their service in Britain. It was there that Canada’s overseas army trained its soldiers to fight as a cohesive team. For thousands of officers and NCOs, newly-appointed and those with pre-war experience alike, Britain was where they learned much about leadership and management. Such training readied Canadians for combat. Overseas service, however, also saw military personnel of all ranks develop new perspectives about national identity and unity that helped prepare them for postwar citizenship. All of these things may be seen through the experience of Dan Spry.

On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later. One week afterward, after having debated the matter in the House of Commons, Canada issued its own declaration of war on Germany. Military preparations for this long-dreaded conflict had already been initiated. On 25 August, all leave for the Permanent Force was cancelled. That night, 99 militia units across the country were ordered to place armed guards at vital points such as bridges and canals. Defences on both coasts were manned, and all three armed services deployed extra units to the Atlantic region to further guard that vital gate. Seven days later, on 1 September, an Order in Council created the Canadian Active Service Force (CASF), Canada’s army for wartime service. This legislative move set in motion Defence

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3. For a brief description of the parliamentary debate, see Granatstein, *Canada’s War*, 11-17.
Scheme No. 3, the army’s pre-war contingency plan that called for mobilizing an expeditionary force comprising two infantry divisions, a corps headquarters, and ancillary troops.4

For the army, mobilization sparked a flurry of activity across the country. Raising the CASF would require virtually all Permanent Force units and several more from the Militia, none of which were fully manned or equipped. This fact necessitated an urgent appeal for volunteers, in keeping with Prime Minister King’s oft-stated promise that his government would not invoke overseas conscription.5 By the end of September, 58,337 men (mostly English Canadians) had joined the CASF. Nearly half of them were or had been part-time or full-time soldiers. Another 1,252 men had foreign military experience, mainly with the British forces, while 4,206 others were First World War veterans.6 The experience of The RCR’s “D” Company, Dan Spry’s unit, was typical of most military organizations. It received orders to fill its war establishment of three officers and 97 men on 7 September. By the 10th the company had accepted 63 recruits; ten days later, it stopped recruiting.7 These were hectic days. Spry, who had been promoted to Captain on 1 September, immediately was sent to the 3rd Brigade as an instructor. By mid-November, he was back in St. Jean as “D” Company’s commander.8 Like other military leaders, Spry no doubt tried his best to cope with the difficulties of mobilization. Everything from boots to weapons was in short supply. Conducting effective training was practically impossible under such conditions.9

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4 For Canadian war planning, see Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 3-43. A Canadian corps was not actually created until 25 December 1940. Initially, it consisted of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions. The CASF was renamed “Canadian Army (Active)” the previous month. Ibid., 70-71 and 89. For army organizations, see Appendix 2.
6 Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 50-52.
8 LAC, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry Personnel File, Record of Service 1 September 1939 to Date, 14 June 1946; RG 24, Volume 15206, RCR War Diary, “D” Company, 5 September 1939; and Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Summary of Military Service.
9 Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 56-58. It was much the same story for the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force, both of which were initially much smaller than the CASF. By the end of 1939, the navy numbered 5,042 personnel and the air force had 8,287 all ranks. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 15-17.
On 19 September, King’s government announced that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID) would go to Britain. Its main components were three infantry brigades, which were organized along regional lines as depicted at Figure 2-1. The 1st Brigade was made up of Ontario regiments. Those of the 2nd Brigade hailed from the Western provinces, while the 3rd Brigade initially had two Quebec-based units and two from the Maritimes. As had been the case in the First World War, Canadians from all parts of the country would serve alongside each other.

Figure 2-1 1st Canadian Infantry Division Organization, 1939

On 10 November, The RCR was ordered to concentrate at Camp Valcartier near Quebec City. There, Major Vernon Hodson replaced Lt.-Col. K.M. Holloway as CO. Twenty-one days later, on 1 December, Dan Spry handed over “D” Company to Captain Ralph Crowe and became the unit’s Adjutant. He was ecstatic about his new appointment, writing to his mother some two weeks later that “It is without doubt the best job I could possibly get and I am doubly pleased at being permitted to serve in this capacity for Uncle Bill [Hodson] who is as you know my idea of a regimental officer (Officer Commanding cum laude).” As the Adjutant, Spry served as the CO’s personal staff officer, a task that included supervising the orderly room staff (the unit’s administrative cell) and producing battalion-level orders. Captains with years of experience were normally assigned the job of Adjutant as the role required a great deal of professional knowledge, good organizational and management abilities, and human skills. That Hodson chose Spry, who was a very junior officer, spoke volumes about his confidence in the latter’s abilities. Then again, Hodson knew him well, having been his company commander in Halifax from 1936 to 1938. Clearly, he trusted that his former subordinate could handle such an important role.

Spry’s first big job as Adjutant was to organize The RCR’s movement overseas. The battalion left Valcartier by train on 17 December and arrived in Halifax the next day. On the 22nd the troops boarded His Majesty’s Transport Almanzora, a vessel that joined the second of two convoys transporting 1 CID to Britain. Spry’s wife, Betty, watched them leave. He recalled that morale was high aboard ship, and that “the troops were all singing their heads off.” After a week-long voyage the Almanzora arrived at Gourock, Scotland. The RCR disembarked and

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12 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-8, Dan Spry to Mother, 12 December 1939.
15 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15206, RCR War Diary, 18 December 1939.
16 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Dan Spry to Mother, (?) February 1940.
proceeded by train to Aldershot, an old garrison town situated 70 kilometres southwest of London. There, on New Year’s Eve, the unit was quartered in Barrosa Barracks. Graham Spry, who had been working in Britain for an American oil company since 1937, met his brother at the Aldershot train station. Betty and a few other Canadian military wives arrived at about the same time, having made their own trans-Atlantic crossing. She moved into a nearby cottage. Aldershot would be The RCR’s – and the Sprys’ – home for the next six months.

Map 1  The Canadian Army’s Operational Area in Britain, 1940-1943

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17 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Graham Spry to Irene Spry, 2 January 1940. In February 1941, Graham became the personal assistant to Sir Stafford Cripps, a British cabinet minister. Potvin, Passion and Conviction, 118-153.
18 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Dan Spry to Mother, (?) February 1940. The Canadian Army could do relatively little to prevent spouses from following their husbands to Britain. Betty remained in Britain throughout the war. In so doing, Betty emulated the behaviour of Dan Spry’s mother, who had followed her husband to Britain during the First World War. See Chapter 1.
In January, the 1st Division began training for war. Knowing that half of his men were new recruits, Maj.-Gen. A.G.L. (“Andy”) McNaughton, the formation’s commander, initially focused on individual skills like first aid, navigation, weapons handling, and fieldcraft. Exercises at the battalion, brigade, and divisional levels followed in March and April. The manner in which these exercises were conducted came as a surprise. Despite Germany’s use of mechanized forces to rapidly conquer Poland, the British were still using First World War methods. Spry, who had learned about mobile warfare during the 1930s by reading works written by British theorists like Maj.-Gen. J.F.C. Fuller, found his unit practising trench warfare techniques. This, he recalled, “really shook us, and thank God we didn’t do any fighting under those circumstances.”

While training was 1 CID’s top priority during the winter of 1940, many of its leaders found getting used to the scale and scope of their new environment to be a significant challenge. Few of them, even those with pre-war experience such as Dan Spry, had ever seen a full-strength battalion in one place. Now, they were serving in units manned at their wartime establishment of 33 officers and 753 men, within an infantry division of 14,476 all ranks. There was many more weapons, vehicles, and other equipment, too. All of this meant a considerable administrative workload for the officers and NCOs. They also had to consider more details when planning and conducting operations. Some could not cope, and were relieved of their duties. The rest did their best. Spry found this time exhilarating and exhausting. In February 1940, he told his mother that “During the day it is just one mad rush.” On a more positive note, he added that, owing to rapid changes to the unit’s officer slate, he was The RCR’s senior captain and next in line for

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21 For example, the CO of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment was relieved on 30 January 1940. His replacement was Lt.-Col. H.L.N. Salmon, an RCR officer. Mowat, The Regiment, 18-19.
promotion to major. Given his young age – he was then 27 – and very brief service as a captain, it was a remarkable rate of progression. In peacetime, he would have had to serve for several years as a captain, and have completed staff training at a British staff college (the Canadian Army then lacked its own staff college), before being considered for such a promotion.

While the Canadians trained, the “phony war” that had existed since the fall of Poland in October 1939 came to an end. On 9 April 1940 the Germans invaded Norway and Denmark. One month later, on 10 May, they attacked Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. By 20 May they had broken through to the Channel coast, thereby cutting the Allied land forces in two. This dire situation led senior British officers to consider using 1 CID as part of a larger effort to reinforce the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and restore the situation. Twice during the period 23-26 May, the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 CIB), to which The RCR belonged, was warned that it was bound for France. Both operations were ultimately cancelled; The RCR’s war diarist called it “an awful letdown.”

For Dan Spry, who organized his unit’s move to Dover for embarkation, it had been a good test of his abilities. As Harry Foster, then 1 CIB’s brigade major, observed, “If three days ago anyone had said it was possible to move, embark, disembark, and move a brigade on verbal orders only I’d have said he was crazy. But we’ve done it…” By 29 May, with the situation in France having further deteriorated and the BEF about to be evacuated from the Channel port of Dunkirk, Britain’s Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, promised the French that he would send a new force to help them continue the fight. The 1st Canadian Infantry Division, one of only two combat-ready divisions then in Britain, was thus ordered to cross the Channel.

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22 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Dan Spry to Mother, (?) February 1940.
23 Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 266-270; LAC, RG 24, Volume 14063, 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade (hereafter 1 CIB) War Diary, 23 and 26 May 1940; and Volume 15206, RCR War Diary, 24 May 1940.
24 Foster, *Meeting of Generals*, 183. The brigade major was the senior operations officer in a brigade headquarters.
This time, 1 CIB made it to France. The RCR, after disembarking at the Brittany port of Brest on the morning of 14 June, boarded a train heading for an assembly area between Laval and Le Mans, about 350 kilometres to the east. They never got there. At 3:45 a.m. on the 15th, the train was stopped at Châteaubriant. George Kitching, then an officer serving in “B” Company, remembered seeing Captain Spry trying to find out what was going on. Spry quickly learned that the French Army was collapsing. Soon afterward, The RCR was ordered to return to Brest and embark for Britain. The battalion arrived at Plymouth on 17 June. That same day the French government, now led by Marshal Henri Pétain, requested an armistice. On 22 June, France surrendered. Spry had acquitted himself well throughout this ill-fated operation. One of his friends later told Spry’s brother, Graham, that he had last seen Dan “sitting on his tin hat on the pier at [Brest] smoking and joking with the CO.” 

With the fall of France, the siege of Britain began. The military situation was desperate, and most observers thought that Britain would have to surrender. That did not happen, as the British people, buoyed by Churchill’s example, were determined to keep fighting. Still, there were few ground forces with which to resist a cross-Channel invasion. One of these was Canada’s 1st Division, which was grouped with the 1st (British) Armoured Division and two New Zealand brigades on 21 July to form VII (British) Corps. Maj.-Gen. McNaughton was promoted to command the new formation as a lieutenant-general. He was replaced at 1 CID by George Pearkes, the 2nd Brigade’s former commander. Soon afterward the Canadians moved to Surrey, just south of London. The RCR went under canvas at Glover Wood, near Charlwood.

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26 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15206, RCR War Diary, Appendix 22, Report on Recent Operations in France – RCR (CASF), 21 June 1940, and Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 94.
27 Stacey, Six Years of War, 281.
28 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 21, Graham Spry Diary, entry for 18 June 1940.
29 Stacey, Six Years of War, 285-290.
30 Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 31.
Few of the 27,379 Canadian soldiers then in Britain were likely to forget the charged atmosphere that characterized the summer of 1940.\textsuperscript{31} The most important action was in the air, where the Royal Air Force (RAF) was battling the Luftwaffe for control of the skies, but ground units like The RCR were nonetheless liable to attack. Its bivouac was bombed on the night of 24/25 August; three soldiers were killed.\textsuperscript{32} Spry faced such dangers with his wife, Betty, who remained in Britain to support her husband. On 26 August, they and Lt.-Col. Hodson narrowly escaped injury when a bomb fell in front of the car in which they were travelling.\textsuperscript{33} Experiences like these, as historian C.P. Stacey has observed, were important. Sharing the dangers of aerial bombardment helped bring Canadian military personnel and British civilians closer together.\textsuperscript{34}

Dan Spry was promoted to Major in early July, but Lt.-Col. Hodson kept him in the Adjutant’s job. Given the possibility of a German invasion, he likely wanted a man with proven abilities in that crucial position. Two months later, Spry was given command of “B” Company, which consisted of a company headquarters and three rifle platoons of roughly 25-34 all ranks each, in all some 115 officers and men.\textsuperscript{35} Major Spry’s main job was planning and conducting company-level operations. To do so, he was assisted by six key players, three of which were in the company headquarters. The second-in-command, usually a captain or a lieutenant, oversaw administration. Discipline and training were the purview of the company sergeant-major, the company’s most senior NCO, while a quartermaster-sergeant handled supply and feeding. Three platoon commanders, all lieutenants, made up the rest of Spry’s command team.\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] Stacey, \textit{Six Years of War}, 200.
\item[32] LAC, RG 24, Volume 15206, RCR War Diary, 25 August 1940.
\item[33] LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Diary, entry for 26 August 1940. Neither Betty nor Dan Spry ever wrote about this incident in letters to their families that summer, no doubt to avoid causing them to worry about her safety.
\item[34] Stacey and Wilson, \textit{The Half-Million}, 41.
\item[36] The position of company sergeant-major was an appointment that was usually filled by a warrant officer class 2. For more on the internal workings of an infantry company, see Delaney, \textit{The Soldiers’ General}, 20-37.
\end{footnotes}
Dan Spry would have agreed with Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery that commanders required technical and human skills to do their jobs. On the technical side, they had to devise operational plans, deliver clear orders, manage their unit’s human and material resources, and conduct operations. Human skills included working well with others, supervising and motivating subordinates, and building effective teams. Spry possessed all of these qualities. As The RCR’s Adjutant he had prepared unit operations plans and had handled administrative matters. Since his formative years as a Boy Scout, and as a young officer during the 1930s, he had shown a talent for leadership and an ability to get along with most personality types. He was also a quick learner. These things would prove useful in his wartime – and peacetime – careers.

The likelihood that Spry would his lead men into battle any time soon had faded by the end of September 1940 as the RAF’s continued ability to oppose the Germans in the air made a seaborne invasion militarily impossible. With the Battle of Britain won, 1 CID moved into winter quarters. The RCR occupied civilian billets in Reigate, located on the Surrey Downs south of London; Spry’s company occupied a mansion, Park House. For the rest of 1940, the growing Canadian land forces (the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division joined 1 CID that summer and fall) focused on individual soldier skills, road movement, and route marches. Regimental life during this time quickly came to resemble the garrison routine that Spry had known in the 1930s, with inspections, parades, professional development courses, sports, and – occasionally – some leave, all of which was interspersed between training events. Aside from an uneventful tour of coastal defence duty in Brighton from 5-29 December, The RCR stayed in Reigate until March 1941.

38 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15206, RCR War Diary, 23 September 1940.
Dan Spry was a company commander for about 12 months. Almost immediately, it was evident that developing his subordinates’ leadership abilities and promoting teamwork were among his top priorities. He understood that junior leaders had to know the jobs of their seniors should the need ever arise to act in their stead, and that such knowledge would give them the confidence to take on greater responsibilities. To his mind, “B” Company could only succeed if its members worked together, and he thus considered promoting teamwork to be an important part of leadership.\(^\text{40}\) It was for these reasons that, on 19 February 1941, Spry taught his NCOs how to do a military appreciation, a process within which a tactical problem is systematically analyzed to produce an operations plan.\(^\text{41}\) He also gave his officers chances to prove themselves. For instance, on 17 April one of his lieutenants led “B” Company during a battalion exercise.\(^\text{42}\)

For Major Spry, developing his subordinates also meant correcting their faults. After a company-level alert exercise held on 24 February he chided his platoon commanders for too slowly assembling their troops. Similarly, during Exercise DOG, conducted on 25 April, he felt that the NCOs had not performed to his desired standard. He repeated the exercise a week later; Spry told them that they had improved.\(^\text{43}\) As will be seen later, Spry’s focus on teamwork, the need to coach subordinates, and correcting faults were key components of his wartime – and peacetime – leadership style. But Spry made mistakes, too. For example, on 11 April 1941 he got his company lost during a battalion-level attack exercise.\(^\text{44}\) Such an error reflected a broader problem then plaguing Canada’s overseas army. Few divisional, brigade, or even battalion-level

\(^{40}\) Spry described his views on leadership in a postwar lecture. See LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-15, “Leadership in the Military Environment,” Lecture to Canadian Forces Staff College, 6 November 1967.


\(^{42}\) DHH, File 145.2R13(D6), “B” Company Log Book, 17 April 1941.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 24 February and 25 April 1941.

\(^{44}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 15206, RCR War Diary, 11 April 1941. This was Exercise HARE.
exercises had thus far been conducted, which meant that officers at nearly all levels of command, including Spry, had little chance to practice planning and conducting battlefield tactics.45

Like other Canadian soldiers during this period, most of whom were new to their jobs, Spry learned about leadership by watching those under whom he served. He and many others in The RCR had been very impressed with Lt.-Col. Vernon Hodson’s manner of encouraging his subordinates to learn.46 Hodson, however, returned to Canada in October 1940 to take up another appointment. A month later Lt.-Col. M.K. Greene, who had been the CO in the 1930s, replaced him.47 Within a few months the difference between the two men was readily apparent, as Greene struck some as being unconcerned with the men’s welfare. He reportedly went on outings to London most nights, leaving his driver in the car during air raids. The troops soon learned of the CO’s behaviour, and The RCR’s high morale and tight discipline began to slip. The divisional commander, Maj.-Gen. Pearkes, replaced Greene after learning of the situation from Captain George Kitching, who was then part of the 1 CID staff.48 The new CO, Lt.-Col. T.E. (“Eric”) Snow, rectified matters by leading through personal example and doing what he told his men to do. The RCR’s morale soared.49 Spry could not have failed to draw the appropriate lesson.

Dan Spry’s abilities as a company commander drew favourable notice. The rank and file had a good opinion of him, and the “B” Company’s log described morale as “quite good.”50 For their part, his superiors seemed to be grooming Spry for bigger things. In mid-October 1940 he served as acting brigade major for 1 CIB during a one-day exercise. This was unusual as such a role was normally performed by a major who had completed staff college, a qualification that

46 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, “Leadership in the Military Environment.”
47 Stevens, *The Royal Canadian Regiment*, 35. Hodson was promoted to command a newly-created brigade.
48 Kitching, *Mud and Green Fields*, 103-104. Kitching had been told about Lt.-Col. Greene’s actions by Major Neil Hodson, one of the former CO’s sons. Neil Hodson was then serving in The RCR.
Spry lacked. Other indicators came later. On 12 June 1940, he led the whole battalion during an assault exercise. Two weeks later, he was the chief umpire for a divisional signals exercise. Recognition of Spry’s abilities may also be seen in his transfer to lead Headquarters Company in July 1941, an organization nearly twice as large as “B” Company and more complex to run.

On 3 September 1941, Major Spry was posted to 1 CID Headquarters to serve as the General Staff Officer 3, Operations (GSO 3 [Ops]). Transfers between units and headquarters, and between command and staff appointments, were normal in the Canadian Army as it was part of an officer’s professional development. Spry would spend the next 23 months in staff jobs. Initially, he did so without formal training. To appreciate the significance of this fact, one must understand the staff’s role and training. As historian John A. English wrote, the staff “converts the ideas of a commander into orders and by working out all the details related to their execution frees his mind to deal with other, more important, matters.” This role was vitally important in modern warfare, as the size of armies numbered in the millions and advances in weaponry and communications caused an exponential growth in the volume and variety of details affecting operations. Officers selected to fill staff appointments required advanced training to understand how to manage all this information. Such training was (and still is) provided by a staff college.

Dan Spry’s posting to a staff job without formal training, and his rapid promotion, were not unusual for the time. Both resulted from Canada’s tremendous wartime military expansion. The army, for instance, grew from 4,169 regulars and 51,418 reservists in 1939 to 495,804 all ranks by 22 March 1944. Hundreds of units of all types were created, including the five divisions

51 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15206, RCR War Diary, 21 October 1940.
53 DHH, AHQ Report No. 57, 34. The RCR’s Headquarters Company had six platoons and had 208 all ranks.
54 LAC, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry Personnel File, Record of Service, 1 September 1939 to 30 September 1945.
– three infantry and two armoured – and two armoured brigades of First Canadian Army, which became operational on 3 April 1942. This rapid growth produced a huge and urgent demand for leaders. The scale of the problem may be seen by the fact that a single infantry battalion needed 38 officers and 119 NCOs from Corporal to Warrant Officer Class 1, or 18.5 per cent of its 850-man establishment. There were ultimately 41 such units in Britain and, in 1943, another 47 in Canada; all told, they needed 13,816 leaders. Other unit types had similar needs. A brigade headquarters, for example, had 18 officers, 34 per cent of its strength. If the infantry battalion’s combined percentage of officers and NCOs is applied to the army’s peak strength, the total is 91,724 leadership positions. While this is just an estimate, it likely reflects reality. C.P. Stacey has recorded that 42,613 individuals were commissioned in the CASF during the war. If the infantry battalion’s percentage of officers (4.5 per cent) is applied to the army’s total intake of 730,159 men and women, the result is 32,857 officers – 10,000 less than the actual number.

Spry’s posting to 1 CID Headquarters was illustrative of Canada’s lack of trained people to fill the staff positions in its rapidly expanding army. Just 45 Canadians had passed through the British Army staff colleges at Camberley in Britain and Quetta, India, during the interwar years, a fraction of the number needed for a single division. Other new organizations, like Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London and a host of headquarters and support units, also

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57 Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 4 and 48. The Army’s total strength in 1944 included 15,845 members of the Canadian Army Women’s Corps. For a description of First Canadian Army’s creation, see Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 98-104.

58 The British Army faced the same challenge. Of nearly 250,000 wartime officers, most had been civilians before the war. See David French, *Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany, 1919-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73.


60 DHH, AHQ Report No. 57, Appendix C, 58.

61 Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 131-132, and *Arms, Men and Governments*, 590. See also Appendix 3.

62 English, *A Study of Failure in High Command*, 57. Staff-trained officers were required to fill key positions within the divisional headquarters, each of the division’s brigade headquarters, and all of its battalion-sized units.
required trained staff. To remedy this shortfall, the army created a shortened War Staff Course based on a British model in 1941 and continued sending officers to attend British courses. These initiatives eventually filled the gaps. By 1945, the Canadian courses had graduated 1,010 staff officers. In the meantime, the army posted men who lacked formal training into staff jobs.

Dan Spry hoped to be selected for the British War Staff Course at Camberley, but until that happened he had to prove himself worthy of belonging to 1 CID’s staff. Such was surely the case with regard to his boss, Lt.-Col. Chris Vokes, under whom he would serve again in Italy. A tough Permanent Force officer who could come across as a bully, Vokes was a meticulous planner who demanded very high standards of performance and teamwork from his subordinates. He also had a reputation as a good teacher. Major Spry would have to learn quickly.

As the GSO 3 (Ops), Spry was a member of the “G” Branch (general staff), which dealt with operations and training. During large field exercises such as BUMPER (held in September 1941, it involved 12 British and Canadian divisions) and BEAVER I (a Canadian Corps event conducted three months later), he served as a duty officer in the divisional command post, where he maintained the situation map, wrote reports, and prepared movement orders for the divisional headquarters. As he had done in The RCR, Spry learned about leadership by observing others, especially the divisional commander, Maj.-Gen. George Pearkes. He had met Pearkes as a child – Pearkes had worked with Spry’s father in Calgary – and in the 1930s when Pearkes was the Director of Military Training. Spry was impressed by Pearkes, a First World War Victoria Cross

64 Toby Spry Collection, Dan Spry to Mr. and Mrs. Forbes, 2 November 1941. Dan Spry later recalled that the 1 CID staff was like “a family.” University of Victoria, Roy Fonds, Spry-Roy interview, 15 June 1967.
winner, recalling him as “a hard taskmaster” who “didn’t suffer fools gladly.” Still, Pearkes treated people well, which inspired great loyalty among his staff. Chris Vokes spoke for many when he wrote that “I have never met a man I loved and respected more than George Pearkes.”

In the fall of 1941, Dan Spry’s name was given to the Canadian Army Junior Selection Committee as a potential staff college candidate. In mid-December he was told that he would attend the Junior War Staff Course No. 8 at Camberley in March 1942. He reported there on the 12th of the month. For the next 16 weeks, Spry and 200 other officers (nine Canadians and 191 British) digested a huge volume of information. The curriculum consisted of two sections. The first covered staff duties and the characteristics of the various arms. The second section dealt with techniques used to plan and direct operations at the brigade, divisional, and corps levels, and included advanced lessons on how to do a military appreciation. In both parts, the students pored through an avalanche of reading material, attended classes, and participated in numerous syndicate and individual exercises. Such knowledge, while it was intended for military purposes, would also prove useful to many Canadians who became societal leaders after the war.

Staff college was the toughest academic test that Spry, who disliked schoolwork, ever faced. One of his Canadian classmates, Major W.S. Zeigler, later recalled that Camberley was “incredibly difficult, much more so than university. The homework was killing…” George Kitching, whose course ended as Spry’s began, agreed: “We worked six days a week from 8:15 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. After dinner, except Saturdays and Sundays, we would spend two hours writing

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67 University of Victoria, Roy Fonds, Spry-Roy interview, 15 June 1967.
68 Vokes, My Story, 73. For more on George Pearkes, see Roy, For Conspicuous Bravery.
69 LAC, RG 24, Volume 9873, Memorandum, No. 8 Junior War Staff Course, Camberley, 5 December 1941.
71 LAC, RG 24, Volume 9873, List of Officers Selected for No. 8 Junior War Staff Course, 19 January 1941.
72 John A. MacDonald, “In Search of Veritable: Training the Canadian Army Staff Officer, 1899-1945” (MA Thesis, Royal Military College, 1992), 116-117. A syndicate was a group of about ten students led by an instructor.
essays or military appreciations which would have to be handed in next morning.” As it turned out, Spry did extremely well. He earned a “B” grade, and was rated as the top Canadian on his course; most students got between “C-” and “C+.” The written portion of his course report told the rest of the story. Spry was assessed as being above average in terms of his mental ability, imperturbability, reliability, teamwork, and oral and written communication. Both his syndicate instructor, Lt.-Col. D.H.V. Buckle, and the college’s commandant, Maj.-Gen. M. Stopford, gave him high marks for his strength of character and pleasant personality, and they both asserted that Spry would be “best suited for employment with troops.” The course report concluded with the stellar assessment that Major Spry was “fit for command of a battalion at an early date.”

After completing staff training at Camberley on 2 July 1942, Dan Spry was posted to First Canadian Army Headquarters, located near Leatherhead. One week later he was selected to join a special staff, led by Brigadier Guy Simonds, to review Operation JUPITER, a Churchill-inspired scheme that proposed the seizure of airfields in Norway that the Germans were using to interdict Allied convoys bound for Russia. Spry helped Brigadier Simonds to write the Canadian appreciation, which concluded that JUPITER had virtually no chance of surprising the enemy. Based on this negative assessment, which the British Chiefs of Staff later described as “one of the clearest and most ably worked out appreciations which they had ever had before them,” Operation JUPITER was quietly shelved. Spry’s work on this high-profile project drew favourable comment from Simonds, a brusque and highly-skilled officer under whom he would

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74 Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 109-110.
75 DHH, Crerar File on A/Maj.-Gen. Spry, No. 8 Junior War Course, Staff College, Final Report on Major D.C. Spry, RCR (Cdn), and Extract from Minutes of Junior Selection Committee, 20 June 1942. See also DHH, File 530.30(D1), Folder Containing Results of Canadian Officers Attending Staff Courses. Only 22 of the 149 Canadians who attended Camberley during the Second World War earned a grade of “B-” or higher.
76 For Spry’s posting, see LAC, RG 24, Volume 9873, Leave and Postings Canadian Officers Now Attending No. 8 Junior War Course, 2 July 1942.
77 Stacey, Six Years of War, 408-410. Churchill had ignored the British Chiefs of Staff’s earlier assessment that Operation JUPITER was impracticable. For their comment on Simonds’s appreciation, see LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-1, Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton to Major Dan Spry, 13 September 1942.
later serve in Italy and in Northwest Europe. More importantly, it caught the eye of Lieutenant-General (Lt.-Gen.) Andy McNaughton, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of First Canadian Army. McNaughton was so impressed that he chose Spry to be his personal assistant. This was a plum appointment for Dan Spry, for it put him, a junior major, in close contact with the officer that some have called “the father of the Canadian Army.”

On 1 September, Major Spry took up his duties with Lt.-Gen. McNaughton. Much of the job involved arranging the GOC-in-C’s schedule, recording decisions, and passing on those decisions or the General’s orders to other headquarters or to his staff. Such duties required discretion and good organizational skills, not to mention an ability to work with demanding seniors like Guy Simonds, First Canadian Army’s Chief of Staff from 15 January to 3 April 1943. Above all, he had to be available should McNaughton require his services. Being the GOC-in-C’s personal assistant was a golden opportunity for Dan Spry to observe the conduct of a high-ranking commander. He must have immediately been struck by the diverse matters in which the General involved himself. Some issues, most notably McNaughton’s attention to detailed technical aspects of military equipment, had relatively little to do with his job as Army Commander and took up precious time that might have been better used to prepare his formation – and himself – for battle. Spry never criticized his boss’s behaviour, but it offered an important lesson regarding the need for senior commanders to focus on the essentials of their job.

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78 DHH, Crerar File on A/Maj.-Gen Spry, Memorandum, 31 August 1942.
81 Scholars have mostly criticized McNaughton’s attention to the technological details of military equipment. See for example Granatstein, The Generals, 70-71; Bill Rawling, “The Generalship of Andrew McNaughton: A Study in Failure,” in Bernd Horn and Dr. Stephen Harris, eds., Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 73-90; and English, A Study of Failure in High Command, 106-107. On the other hand, historian John Rickard has argued that McNaughton believed his focus on equipment would save many Canadian lives in battle. John Nelson Rickard, The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army, 1939-1943 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 91-92.
On a more positive note, he saw how McNaughton’s consideration for human matters inspired loyalty and affection among his subordinates. This, too, reflected the General’s priorities and his philosophy of command. Spry saw this for himself on 1 August 1943. On that day, McNaughton made time to attend the christening of Spry’s daughter, Margot, who had been born on 9 March 1943. Such behaviour was not uniformly the case among senior Canadian officers. Several historians have observed that generals such as H.D.G. (“Harry”) Crerar, Guy Simonds, and Charles Foulkes were known for their austere manner, and that they did not inspire the affection of the rank and file. Here, too, was an important lesson on how a senior leader’s human skills could influence the character of a large organization.

Other perks of Spry’s job derived from accompanying the GOC-in-C to high-level – and often highly secret – discussions. McNaughton’s papers reveal that Spry was privy to many important issues, from projected dates for the long-anticipated cross-Channel invasion of Europe to operations planned for the near term. Of the latter, the most notable was the invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY), within which 1 CID would participate in July 1943. Exposure to strategic plans like these gave Spry a far broader perspective on the war than that which was available to most officers of his rank. It also gave him the chance to meet leading political and military figures. These included Canada’s Minister of National Defence, Colonel J.L. Ralston; Lt.-Gen. Ken Stuart, Chief of the Canadian Army General Staff (Spry’s course officer during the “Long Course” in the 1930s); Vincent Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner in London; Britain’s

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82 DHH, Granatstein Notes, Betty Spry interview, 21 January 1992. Betty Spry related that the McNaughtons (the General’s wife was also in Britain) were equally kind to her.
84 LAC, McNaughton Papers, Volume 131. Regarding projected invasion dates, see Memorandum of Conversation – General McNaughton – Brig. Simpson, D.D.M.O (O) War Office, 1130 hrs on 6 January 1943, dated 7 January 1943. Spry was one of the first Canadians to learn of Operation HUSKY. LAC, RG 24, Volume 12306, Memorandum of a Conversation, General McNaughton-General Montague, CMHQ, 1430 hrs on 24 April 1943, dated 27 April 1943.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke; and South African leader Field Marshal Jan Smuts. As will be seen later, Spry’s wartime exposure to prominent persons such as these would prove quite useful in his peacetime career as a senior-level Boy Scout leader.

Recognition of Major Spry’s abilities came on 26 January 1943. According to the First Canadian Army Headquarters’ war establishment, Spry’s position could be held by a lieutenant-colonel. Knowing this, McNaughton arranged to have Spry promoted to the rank of acting lieutenant-colonel. Two weeks later, The RCR’s CO, Lt.-Col. Snow, submitted a promotion recommendation list to his superiors within which he rated Spry as one of The Regiment’s best majors, giving him top marks for leadership, responsibility, tactical aptitude, administrative ability, and mental alertness. Maj.-Gen. H.L.N. Salmon, who had replaced George Pearkes as the 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s commander in September 1942, agreed. Effective 26 April, Spry’s rank was upgraded from “Acting” to “Substantive” status.

By the end of April 1943, Dan Spry had been in Britain for just over three years. He had come a long way in that time, and not just in terms of rank. His military skills were certainly more sophisticated than those he possessed before the war, and the same could be said of his leadership abilities. Most officers and men who were then serving in First Canadian Army saw similar improvements. Soldiers and scholars alike have credited Lt.-Gen. Bernard Montgomery,
a British officer under whom the Canadians served from November 1941 to August 1942, rather than Lt.-Gen. McNaughton for this transformation. A ruthlessly efficient professional soldier with a well-deserved reputation as an excellent trainer of soldiers, “Monty” taught the Canadians how to plan and conduct training, and he demanded high standards of performance from all ranks. In this regard, he quickly concluded that several of Canada’s senior officers, including Maj.-Gen. George Pearkes, Spry’s former boss in the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, were not up to their jobs. Largely based on Montgomery’s colourful negative assessments, these individuals were sent home to Canada. Such improvements helped the Canadians become better soldiers, but training is very much an artificial environment. As the Canadian Army’s official historian, C.P. Stacey, rightly observed, “No training is entirely a substitute for experience of battle.”

Preparing for combat was why Canadian soldiers like Lt.-Col. Dan Spry were in Britain. At the same time, however, many of these people developed a broader conception of national identity and citizenship. To a certain extent, this was a natural by-product of military service. The Canadian Army was a national institution that existed to defend the nation and its people. Soldiers were expected to serve Canada’s interests before their own, a key message that was driven home from the moment they joined the army until the day they left the service. Also important was the fact that they came from all parts of the country and from all walks of life. Throughout their military careers, soldiers found themselves living and working closely with people with backgrounds that were very different from their own, in many cases for the first time in their young lives. The experience of one such person, Barney Danson, was typical. He later

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89 Lt.-Gen. Montgomery was then the commander of South-Eastern Command, which included the area that Canadian Army formations were then based. As such, he was McNaughton’s immediate superior. Individual soldiers have vividly recalled the effects of Montgomery’s methods on the Canadian Army’s military proficiency. Bert Hoffmeister’s views are in Delaney, *The Soldiers’ General*, 33-35. For those of Strome Galloway (an RCR officer), see Galloway, *Bravely into Battle*, 170-172. For the impressions of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, see Mowat, *The Regiment*, 48-49. For Montgomery’s influence on the Canadian Army as a whole, see Granatstein, *Canada’s Army*, 202-205 and English, *A Study of Failure in High Command*, 84-96.

90 Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 275.
described the Second World War as “a defining moment” for him and many of his peers, not least because of what they learned about Canadian society. He recalled that in the armed forces one could find miners, farmers, drifters, and ex-convicts. People from mainly English-speaking parts of Canada served alongside French Canadians, those from other ethnic groups, and aboriginals, whom Danson said were often nicknamed “Chief.” Danson surely spoke for many veterans when he remarked, “Steeped as our society was in British Anglo-Saxon culture, we hadn’t before realized just how culturally diverse Canada was...”91 Of course, few of these aspects of nationality were new to those with previous military experience, as did Dan Spry. For many others, it was a lesson that would greatly influence their approach to postwar life.

Canada’s military policies likewise promoted awareness of identity among those who served overseas. First and foremost of these was the dictum that Canadian soldiers would serve together under Canadian commanders. The force that Canada sent overseas was thus a national army, notwithstanding the fact that, owing to its small size, and enabled by its use of British organizations, doctrine, and equipment, it came under British control for operational matters.92 National identity was reinforced by the “Canada” patches that all Canadian military personnel wore on the shoulders of their uniforms. Secondly, as historian John Maker has argued, senior army officers like General McNaughton (who was also a former scientist) strongly supported the Canadian Legion’s efforts to provide the troops with vocational, technical, and citizenship adult education courses as a means of sustaining their morale, which – owing to a steady diet of repetitive training and no fighting – was beginning to suffer, and to give them training that

91 Danson, Not Bad For a Sergeant, 10.
92 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 1, 1867-1921 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 65-71. This policy, which originated in 1899 at the outset of the Boer War, remains a cornerstone of Canadian military policy. Canada’s use of British military organizations, training, and equipment resulted from a pivotal decision made at the 1909 Imperial Conference as a means of promoting interoperability – and thereby enhancing operational efficiency – between the military forces of the British Empire. See Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 1, 132.
would be useful on their return to Canada at war’s end. In other words, such education would not only make them better wartime soldiers, but also better peacetime citizens. The army’s use of education to promote nationalist conceptions of citizenship and identity thus resembled the approach used by many Canadian schools.\(^\text{93}\) Army officers were encouraged to talk informally to their men about Canada’s war effort and – significantly – Canadian citizenship. To do so, they used reference books like *The Battle of the Brains: Lectures*, produced in cooperation with the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, which taught soldiers about Canada’s history, ideals, and objectives, and stressed that they were in Britain to defend Canada and its democratic way of life. The army’s adult education training was popular among the troops, partly because they could see how they would benefit, but also because it tended to reinforce their burgeoning notions of national identity. John Maker has noted that, in the winter of 1940-1941, some 7,500 men enrolled in Legion-run courses. This figure represented 13 per cent of the 57,000 Canadians then in Britain. By July of 1942, that number had doubled. Two years later, a Canadian Army morale report showed that 40 per cent of returning soldiers reported that their knowledge of Canada had increased thanks to their wartime military service.\(^\text{94}\)

Dan Spry never said if he took a Legion-run course or spoke to his men about citizenship, but he knew about these programs because they were initiated while he was with The RCR. By May 1941 some 226 RCR soldiers, nearly one third of the unit’s strength, had taken Legion courses. Some of these men must have served under Spry.\(^\text{95}\) Then, too, as McNaughton’s personal assistant he would have known his boss’s views. As will be seen later, the army’s education program meshed well with his developing views about nationality and citizenship.


\(^{95}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 15207, RCR War Diary, 15 May 1941.
By the spring of 1943, Spry and other soldiers were aware of a third factor that promoted a sense of national identity among Canadians serving overseas: distance from Canada itself. Most of them had never been abroad before, and despite the fact that a good number developed close bonds with their hosts, Britain was not “home” but rather a foreign country, all the more so for French Canadians. Their extended separation from home and family – for years, in some cases – led to a degree of homesickness on the part of many Canadians. It also sparked a strong demand for welfare services such as mail, entertainment, and sports programs to maintain their links to home. For example, Spry’s “B” Company enjoyed softball, a North American game. Such sentiments, as much as the nature of military service and Canada’s nationalistic military policies, drew soldiers together as a community, defined at least in part by their nationality. In this way, soldiers’ heightened awareness of national identity became intertwined with, and helped promote, a sense of unity based on what they had in common as Canadians. This new perception, as will be seen later, would be magnified by their experience of battle.

Distance from Canada, however, also gave soldiers a chance to see their country as a whole. Vincent Massey, who as Canada’s High Commissioner in London during the war had plenty of opportunities to observe Canadian servicemen and women overseas, had this to say on the matter in his postwar book, On Being Canadian:

The Canadian serviceman not only symbolized his country, but today he is better equipped to understand it. He thought a good deal about Canada during the war years and was wisely encouraged to do so. Although he may have been out of touch with day-to-day events, he was able to gain a better idea of his country’s significance and meaning. This is true of many Canadian soldiers and airmen who found themselves serving in parts of Canada they had never seen before and knew little about. It is true also of members of our forces during their service abroad. It may sound absurd to say that a man can learn more about his native land in a period of absence from it, but the paradox is true. During the war large numbers of our fellow-countrymen were able to see their own country for the first time in

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perspective. They could appraise its institutions with some measure of detachment and compare them with others they saw around them. They were not, during this time, concerned as so many of us are with only one part of Canada, but were led to consider it as a whole. These men and women – many of them – have a fuller and better conception of their country than when they embarked from its shores.97

Dan Spry, who as a child had spent two years outside of Canada when his mother took him and his sister to be near his elder brother Graham at Oxford, fully agreed with Massey’s observation. In an address delivered to a Toronto audience in 1947, he said that “I believe that distance gives one the opportunity of seeing both the ‘woods and the trees.’ One can sit back a little bit and look at one’s country. [During the war] I could not but feel proud on every occasion on which I gave thought to my country, all that it stood for and that it has been doing.”98 As will be described in the next two chapters, such a perception took on a far more profound meaning once Canadians were exposed to combat conditions on the front lines.

In the spring of 1943, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s long sojourn in Britain came to an end. The Canadian government, bowing to growing frustration at home (mostly from English Canada) regarding the army’s inactivity since the outbreak of war in 1939, had been pushing Britain since the fall of 1942 to get its troops into action. On 25 April 1943, it quickly approved a British request for a Canadian infantry division and an army tank brigade to participate in Operation HUSKY, the forthcoming invasion of Sicily. General McNaughton selected the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade for the job. Just over two months later, on 10 July, these two formations landed at Pachino, on the island’s southeastern corner.99 The 38-day campaign that followed was the Canadian Army’s first sustained bout of

97 Massey, On Being Canadian, 6-7.
combat during the Second World War. It also profoundly affected Dan Spry’s future. In July, both the CO of The RCR, Lt.-Col. Ralph Crowe (who had succeeded Lt.-Col. Eric Snow on 24 February 1943), and the battalion’s second-in-command, Major Billy Pope, were killed in action within a few days of each other. Both men had been friends of Spry’s since his posting with “C” Company in London, Ontario in the mid-1930s. Their deaths created an urgent need to find a suitable officer to serve as The RCR’s CO. Thus it was that, in early August 1943, Lt.-Col. Spry was ordered to immediately proceed to Sicily and assume command of the battalion.

Dan Spry’s experience of military service in wartime Britain shows how thousands of Canadians learned important lessons about leadership, management, teamwork, and national identity during formal training courses, exercises, or by observing the actions of other, more experienced soldiers. Spry’s military skills grew immeasurably as a result of all of these things. As will become clear in subsequent chapters, mentors like Lt.-Col. Vernon Hodson, Maj.-Gen. George Pearkes, and Lt.-Gen. Andy McNaughton had a tremendous influence on Spry’s thinking about leadership, while his staff college training provided the intellectual basis for his technical abilities to plan, manage, and direct human organizations. Still, most officers and men quickly realized that everyone, even those with pre-war military experience like Spry, had much to learn about being soldiers. In the short term, it would be on the battlefields of Europe where they would demonstrate whether or not they could successfully apply the military lessons that they had learned during their training. In the long term, it would be at home in Canada that many of the country’s Second World War veterans would prove that they had learned useful life skills – and a few things about being Canadian.

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100 Lt.-Col. Snow left The RCR to command the Canadian Training Wing in Hampshire. Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 61. Major Pope died at Valguarnera on 18 July. Lt.-Col. Crowe was killed in action six days later at Nissoria. Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 75 and 79-80, and Horn, Establishing a Legacy, 127-131. For Spry’s friendship with these two men, see LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, “Roger Sunray.”

CHAPTER 3

BATTLEFIELD LESSONS (I)

*The Canadian regimental officer at his best...watched over his men’s welfare, and led them bravely and intelligently in battle.*

Historian C.P. Stacey

*You did things to protect your buddies.*

Army veteran Andrew Blake

*Here all that matters is what you [original emphasis] are, and we learn to recognize character and to respect it...*  

Naval veteran James B. Lamb

When the Canadian Army reached its peak strength of 495,804 all ranks in March 1944, nearly 20 per cent of them – 97,546 in all – were serving in its overseas fighting formations. By the end of July, all of these forces were engaged in combat. Canada’s front-line soldiers lived in a harsh environment within which they had to apply the military skills, teamwork, and, for the officers and NCOs, the leadership lessons that they had learned while training in Britain. Knowing that their lives were at stake, many of these people also gained a deeper appreciation for character and spiritual faith than they had ever known. Through Dan Spry’s experience, this chapter shows how these elements came together for men engaged in battle. Many of those who survived this ordeal, and came home as veterans, would find such lessons useful in civilian life.

Lt.-Col. Dan Spry assumed command of The RCR in Sicily on 12 August 1943, having departed from Britain a few days earlier where he had been serving as the personal assistant to Lt.-Gen. Andy McNaughton, the commander of First Canadian Army. He was now a battalion commander at age 30. Doing so in peacetime would have been unheard of, but by this stage of

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1 Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 275.
2 Former infantryman Andrew Blake, quoted in Broadfoot, *Six War Years*, 209.
4 Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 48, and *Six Years of War*, 109. Another 44,100 positions (nearly all men) were found in support units at the corps and army levels. A formation is a military organization consisting of two or more units (or formations) grouped under a commander. For Canadian Army formations, see Appendix 2.
the war it was not that unusual. For example, Lt.-Col. Dollard Ménard was 29 when he led the Fusiliers de Mont-Royal during the Dieppe Raid in August 1942, as was Denis Whitaker when he commanded the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in Normandy in 1944. Still, Spry must have found it a sobering moment. He knew that he was taking over a battalion with 38 days of combat experience under its belt, and that it had suffered 31 killed and 120 wounded or missing. He also knew that he owed his chance to command to the deaths of two friends, Ralph Crowe and Billy Pope. Such circumstances underlined the tenuous nature of battle and the fact that Spry, like all of the 2,310 officers and men who arrived in Sicily as replacements that August, had much to learn about war. Luckily, he would have time to re-acquaint himself with his regiment. Having been withdrawn from battle on 7 August, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID) was in a rear area near Militello. There, the troops were resting and training for the forthcoming invasion of the Italian mainland, code-named Operation BAYTOWN, planned for early September.

As the CO of a unit, Dan Spry was personally responsible for maintaining discipline, assuring its efficiency, and supervising and controlling his subordinates. He was also accountable for his unit’s vehicles, weapons, and equipment. Spry was assisted in his duties by a battalion second-in-command (a senior major), a regimental sergeant-major (the unit’s most senior NCO, usually a warrant officer class 1), an adjutant, and six company commanders. A large part of his responsibility as CO, however, entailed leadership. This aspect was not explicitly covered by

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7 This was likely why Spry drafted a summary of his estate for his wife before going to Sicily. Toby Spry Collection, Untitled Note, 1 August 1943. He never recorded his feelings about Crowe’s and Pope’s deaths.
8 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 165, 180-188. The Allied decision to invade Italy was made in Washington in May 1943. On 16 August, the Canadian government formally approved the participation of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade in this operation.
9 The Canadian Militia, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia – 1939 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1939), paragraphs 34 and 37, 7.
military regulations, but it was one that most senior officers recognized as vital.\(^{10}\) Admittedly, he would no longer have as much direct contact with his men as he had had in the past, as he and they were separated by three levels of command, namely section, platoon, and company. To influence their actions he would have to go through his immediate subordinates, the company commanders. Nonetheless, unit-level commanders such as Spry played a crucial leadership role. This was especially true in the army, where the CO, in addition to his command authority, served as the “head” of the regimental family. The CO’s leadership ability – or lack thereof – could dramatically affect a unit’s morale. As a veteran of The RCR, Strome Galloway, aptly put it, “Battalion mirrors the commander.”\(^{11}\) Moreover, infantry battalion commanders were expected to lead through personal example. In combat, this meant situating themselves well forward where they could influence their unit’s operations by giving on-the-spot orders and simultaneously encourage their men by sharing their risks. Little wonder that one battle-wise senior officer, Maj.-Gen. Chris Vokes, observed that “A battalion commander’s job is indeed harrowing; he is responsible for his battalion 24 hours a day, and quite directly, in battle and out of battle.”\(^{12}\)

With all of this in mind, Lt.-Col. Spry sought to get to know his troops, sort out how he would command his unit, and – above all – forge a cohesive fighting team. He must have been struck by the changes that had occurred during his two-year absence. Many of the officers were new arrivals, although a few old friends like Captain Strome Galloway and the padre, “Rusty” Wilkes, were still there. It was the same story for the NCOs and the men. Some had been posted out of The RCR, while others like John (“Spin”) Reid and Tom Burdett had been promoted to

\(^{10}\) For example, Lt.-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, who led the First Canadian Army from March 1944 until the end of the war, said that “The highest responsibility of an Officer in the Army – whether Non-Commissioned, Warrant, or Commissioned – is to effectively lead and command his men in battle.” Quoted in Geoffrey W. Hayes, “The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps, 1939-1945” (PhD dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1992), 139-140.

\(^{11}\) Mark Zuehlke Collection, Strome Galloway, interview by Mark Zuehlke (hereafter Galloway interview), Ottawa, Ontario, 6 May 2000. I am indebted to Mark for allowing me to use his interview notes.

\(^{12}\) Vokes, My Story, 171.
NCO rank or were now officers. The battalion’s structure had also changed. As depicted in Figure 3-1, it now had four rifle companies, a support company, and a headquarters company. It also had more people. An infantry battalion numbered 33 officers and 753 other ranks when Spry had last served with The RCR; it now had an authorized strength of 37 officers and 811 men.

![Figure 3-1 Infantry Battalion Organization, 1943](Source: DHH, AHQ Report No. 57)

One thing that had not changed was the great respect that The RCR felt for Dan Spry. “Spin” Reid remembered that “I looked forward to him taking over. He was a gentleman and was courteous to you regardless of rank.” Padre Wilkes agreed: he thought Spry was “an impressive

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and very capable leader.”¹⁵ Such memories were likely reaffirmed by the manner in which Spry assumed command. Tom Burdett said that the new CO did not immediately implement wholesale changes. What changes he did make, Burdett said, “came quietly, perhaps without knowing that one was adopting his teaching.”¹⁶ Spry’s method differed markedly from that of his predecessor. Strome Galloway remembered Ralph Crowe as a critical perfectionist who was “out to whip [his] newfound battalion into the peak of fighting efficiency, no matter what.” Tom Burdett agreed, saying that “Prior to Spry we had a CO who in my estimation was the wrong fit.”¹⁷ Little wonder that Spry’s quiet approach struck a positive chord amongst his battle-experienced subordinates.

Spry, of course, made some changes regarding how The RCR was run. Many of these were minor, but they reflected his priorities. These were promulgated in the “CO’s Memoranda Book,” which he initiated on 19 August to ensure that “all officers serving with the Battalion are acquainted with Regimental customs, procedures, and drills.” Spry’s memoranda covered a wide range of operational and administrative topics. Entry number 19 would be the most enduring, as it related to his mantra, “Never Pass a Fault.” This, Lt.-Col. Spry wrote, “is a guiding rule for all officers. A fault NOT checked may become a habit. Never put off until ‘Next time’ the checking of a fault.”¹⁸ Spry had expressed the same idea as a company commander, but as CO he took it to a new level. Strome Galloway, then a captain, recalled that Spry had this saying posted on signs throughout the unit’s area whenever it was not engaged in operations. One of Spry’s favourite expressions, “Never Pass a Fault” survived the war and is today The RCR’s official slogan.¹⁹

¹⁵ Reid interview, 12 August 2010, and Brodsky, God’s Dodger, 180.
¹⁶ Burdett letter to author, 5 October 2010.
¹⁷ Galloway, Bravely into Battle, 122, and Burdett letter to author, 5 October 2010.
¹⁸ RCR Archives, Series 7, Volume 10, File 32, CO’s Memoranda Book, 1 and 4.
This fact is significant. It reveals not only the deep respect that The RCR’s officers and men felt for Spry as their CO, but also that The Regiment incorporated this aspect of his leadership philosophy into its catechism. It stands as a powerful example of how one individual could influence the character of a human organization. Spry would have a similar impact in his later professional life as a senior-level Boy Scout executive.

During its sojourn at Militello, life in The RCR took on a garrison atmosphere. Training, parades, sports competitions, and visits by personages such as General Bernard Montgomery (then commanding the British Eighth Army, of which the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was part) and Lt.-Gen. Andy McNaughton, the GOC-in-C of First Canadian Army, were part of the daily routine. Dan Spry made the best possible use of this time by getting to know his people. He began this process on his first day in Sicily by visiting his sub-units. “B” Company, his old command that was now led by Strome Galloway, was an early stop. That evening, he met with the company commanders to discuss lessons that had been learned during the Sicilian campaign. While this was in preparation for a 1st Brigade study group scheduled for the next day, it gave him some valuable insight into their experience and their personalities. On the 22nd the CO arranged a “Get-Acquainted” party, as the unit contained many new officers – including himself. If they were to work as a team, he said, the officers had to know each other.

As he had done previously, Lt.-Col. Spry sought to promote cohesive teamwork, knowing it was essential if The RCR was to be successful in combat operations against the highly-skilled German army. Cohesion, as American military psychology instructor and former infantryman William Darryl Henderson has asserted, “exists in a unit where the primary day-to-day goals of

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20 Stevens, *The Royal Canadian Regiment*, 86. General Montgomery visited The RCR on 20 August 1943. General McNaughton arrived two days later.

the individual soldier, of the small group with which he identifies, and of unit leaders are congruent – with each giving his primary loyalty to the group so that it trains and fights as a unit with all members willing to risk death to achieve a common objective.” To accomplish this desirable military end, Henderson continued, a leader had to have a good relationship with his men, to be able to effectively relay organizational goals from higher commanders, and – perhaps most important – to lead his unit by personal example. This required a personal and empathetic leadership style rather than one based on directive management.22 Such a people-based approach to leadership was very similar to that which Dan Spry had learned as a Boy Scout years before. As will be seen below, it lay at the heart of his own philosophy and practice.

The comfortable lifestyle that characterized The RCR’s stay in Militello did not last very long. On 26 August 1943, Lt.-Col. Spry outlined 1 CID’s part in the forthcoming invasion of Italy to his key officers.23 The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade was to cross the Strait of Messina on the night of 2-3 September and capture the town of Reggio. The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 CIB), of which The RCR was a part, would land in daylight on 3 September, with orders to seize the village of Gallina and an airfield near Reggio. The 2nd Brigade would be held in reserve.24 A few days after Spry’s briefing, on 1 September, The RCR was transported to an assembly area near Messina, where the troops were told of the forthcoming operation. The next morning, Spry took his company commanders to a location where they could see the Italian coastline.25 That afternoon and evening, the unit’s officers and men prepared their weapons, their equipment, and themselves for battle.

23 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 26 August 1943.
25 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 29 August-2 September 1943.
The landings at Reggio proved uneventful. The Italians did not put up a fight, and there were no Germans in the area. By the time The RCR landed at 5:15 p.m. on 3 September, there was little to do. The next morning, along with the rest of the 1st Division, the unit headed inland, eventually moving northeast along a coastal road that ran to Taranto. Speed was essential so that the Eighth Army could link up with the U.S. Fifth Army and the 1st (British) Airborne

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26 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 3-4 September 1943.
Division, both of which were due to land on 9 September at Salerno and Taranto, respectively.\(^{27}\) By 17 September they were in the area of Scanzano. The 1\(^{st}\) Brigade remained there for the next ten days, guarding 1 CID’s right flank while the other two brigades drove northwest to Potenza. By the end of the month, the whole division was in the area of Canosa. In 27 days, it had covered 600 kilometres.\(^{28}\) Like most Canadian units, The RCR saw little fighting during this period. The Italians had surrendered on 8 September, and most of the German forces in southern Italy were battling the U.S. Fifth Army at Salerno. On the Canadian front, enemy opposition was generally limited to demolitions, mining, and a few rear-guard actions to cover their withdrawal northward to a defensive line that ran north-east from Gaeta on Italy’s west coast through the Apennine Mountains to the Adriatic town of Ortona. Once there, the Germans would stand and fight.\(^{29}\)

By the end of September, several aspects of Lt.-Col. Spry’s leadership style had become apparent. His insistence on high standards and his attention to detail proved to all that he was a no-nonsense commander. On the other hand, his courteous manner to all ranks, his insistence that his officers inform every man of what was happening, and small concessions like permitting the unit’s drivers to paint their sweethearts’ names on vehicle engine hoods marked him as a leader who treated his men with respect.\(^{30}\) However, Spry had still not proven whether he could “fight” his battalion. From October 1943 onward, he did just that.

Dan Spry’s first experience of combat came on 1 October, when his unit formed part of a divisional advance guard that included the 14\(^{th}\) Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment), the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, and the 27\(^{th}\) Anti-Tank Battery.\(^{31}\) This group led the advance

\(^{29}\) This was the “Bernhard Line.” Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 266-267, and LAC, RG 24, Volume 20445, Tenth (German) Army Order No. 6, “Preparations for Taking Up the ‘Bernhard Position,” 4 October 1943.
\(^{30}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 21 and 26 September 1943.
\(^{31}\) The Calgary Regiment belonged to the 1\(^{st}\) Canadian Armoured Brigade.
along Highway No. 17 from Foggia, through the low foothills of the Apennines towards the town of Campobasso. By 11:30 a.m., though, it had been halted near Motta Montecorvino, a small village perched atop a high hill. Initial efforts to capture the place were easily repelled by members of Germany’s 1st Parachute Division. After several hours of fighting, Spry – who had come under enemy fire for the first time when he went forward to see things for himself – was ordered to execute a battalion-level attack. At 5:00 p.m., he briefed his command team. By dawn on 2 October, the RCR had taken the village. A second fight to seize a German position on a ridgeline about 1,800 metres west of Motta broke out shortly thereafter, during which time Brigadier Howard Graham, 1 CIB’s commander, gave Spry just 100 minutes to come up with a plan, issue orders, and get his unit to the Start Line. The RCR took its objective by the morning of 3 October. Once again, Spry had been well forward so that he could influence the battle. This practice was not without risk. At one stage of the battle, an enemy armoured personnel carrier had come so close to the spot where he was lying that he could have touched its wheels.

Lt.-Col. Spry had won his first battles at a cost of seven dead and 24 wounded. More fighting followed on 4 October at the nearby town of San Marco. There, Spry tried to trick the enemy into withdrawing by using the machine guns of the carrier platoon, led by Sergeant “Spin” Reid, to bolster the firepower directed against the enemy. This action, along with a heavy artillery bombardment, convinced the Germans that the Canadians were about to launch a major assault. As Spry had hoped, they silently withdrew during the night.

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33 DHH, File 145.2R130119(D2), Account by Lt.-Col. D.C. Spry, Officer Commanding Royal Canadian Regiment, given to Capt. Hughes at Duronia on 27 November 1943, and Horn, Establishing a Legacy, 144.
36 Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 96-97; LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 4 October 1943; and Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 239.
Dan Spry’s performance during his first few days of combat is significant in appreciating his approach to leadership. Of signal importance – at least, as far as his men were concerned – was his ability to win battles. His plans revealed his understanding that tired and frightened men were more likely to achieve success with a simple concept than a complex one, and his orders were easily understood, as Tom Burdett has attested. He proved that he knew how to employ his forces, positioning himself well so that he could effectively direct his unit’s actions, and that he could make decisions quickly while under stress. Spry’s abilities to plan, coordinate, and communicate were also valuable because such skills were easily transferrable to civil life. As will be seen later, Spry and other wartime leaders would find them useful in peacetime, too.

These first battles highlighted Spry’s appreciation of the human element in battle. His front-line leadership proved that he was not afraid to share his men’s dangers, and both Tom Burdett and “Spin” Reid have recalled that Spry was cool and calm while under fire. Simply put, Spry led through example. British historian David French has noted that leaders who did so earned their troops’ respect, while historian Michael Howard (himself a British Army veteran) has observed that such behaviour was important in a volunteer army because such soldiers often needed inspirational leaders to carry them through the ugliness of war. Tom Burdett also recalled that Spry did not micromanage his subordinates. This showed trust on his part, which was seen in other ways. “Spin” Reid has asserted that Spry wanted people to tell him the truth.

37 Tom Burdett letter to author, 5 October 2010.
39 Tom Burdett letter to author, 5 October 2010, and Reid interview, 12 August 2010. Syd Thomson, a veteran of the Seaforth Highlanders, has said that “On the scale of 1 to 10, morale will go from 4 to 9 just by the appearance of a senior officer in the line when and where the bullets are flying.” Quoted in Delaney, The Soldiers’ General, 59.
41 Tom Burdett letter to author, 5 October 2010.
rather than what they thought he would want to hear, and that he “accepted criticism readily and was respected for it.”\textsuperscript{42} Trust on Spry’s part was repaid with respect and loyalty from his men.

Lt.-Col. Spry had also proven that he respected his men and cared for their welfare. The former was evident in his recognition of their contributions to his unit’s success. For example, he ensured that Sergeant “Spin” Reid and two of his men were awarded the Military Medal for their actions at San Marco. A few days later, Spry introduced Reid to 1 CIB’s commander, Brigadier Graham, as “the man who got our companies freed up.”\textsuperscript{43} Such a story must have spread rapidly in The RCR. That Spry cared about his men may be seen in a story involving the unit’s padre, Honorary Captain “Rusty” Wilkes. During his rounds one day Wilkes stopped at the 1st Brigade headquarters to visit a friend, whereupon Brigadier Graham invited him to a game of bridge. The game was interrupted by a call from Spry, who – fearing that Wilkes had been killed or captured – exclaimed, “Padre, we’ve been looking for you all day. Where the hell’ve you been? Get back over to the unit lines where you belong!” Wilkes later wrote that “Dan’s angry tones were to cover up his worry for my safety, because he was that sort of commander.” This little incident obviously meant a good deal to Wilkes, as he made a point of relating it in his memoirs.\textsuperscript{44}

After the war, Dan Spry and other wartime military leaders who could tap into the human element would find such ability as useful as being able to plan and conduct operations. In the short term, it strengthened the bond between Spry and his men. The nature of this relationship is best illustrated by an incident that took place on 24 November 1943, when Colonel J.L. Ralston, Canada’s Minister of National Defence, visited The RCR at its bivouac near Campobasso.\textsuperscript{45} Strome Galloway recalled that Spry, whom he described as a stickler for military etiquette, told

\textsuperscript{42} Reid interview, 12 August 2010, and Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{43} Galloway, “55 Axis”, 98, and Reid interview, 12 August 2010.
\textsuperscript{44} Brodsky, \textit{God’s Dodger}, 190-191.
\textsuperscript{45} During November 1943, most of 1 CID (less the 3rd Brigade) rested near Campobasso, then a Canadian recreation centre. For Ralston’s visit, see LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 24 November 1943.
his men that after the Minister finished speaking, he would call for “three cheers.” He stated that there would be no “tiger” (a raucous growl) following the three cheers, as that sort of thing was “simply not done.” What Spry did not expect was that Ralston would leap upon a table and yell, “Three cheers for your colonel, boys!” That, Galloway has related, was the first shock:

Only a few days before, the Colonel had made it known in no uncertain terms that the men under his command were men and not boys. The word “boys” was all right in some circumstances, but not officially, semi-officially, or even demi-officially. And certainly not on parade!

We obeyed the Minister’s wish. We gave three cheers for the Colonel. And it came from our hearts, for he was much respected. Then the Minister exceeded the bounds of regimental propriety. “And a tiger,” he bawled out. There was some hesitancy on the part of some, and there were funny looks on some faces. But we again obeyed our visitor from Canada. Beaming at the response, the Minister went one further. “And a tiger’s pup,” he shrieked in glee. And the skies of Italy echoed to a tiger’s pup.

The Colonel’s face got more deeply red each time his views on the proprieties were transgressed. But although only 30 years old, he had grown relatively wise in the ways of the world. He knew that a mere soldier can never cope with the words and deeds of a politician. His face broke into a sheepish smile. Inwardly I think that most of us smiled back at him. Even though he would never use the term himself, we became his “boys” on that grey and windy day.46

The toughest challenge yet faced by Dan Spry and his “boys” came in December 1943, when the Canadians fought a series of bitter engagements in and around the town of Ortona. These actions were part of a larger Allied operation aimed at taking Rome. The brainchild of General Bernard Montgomery, the plan called for the U.S. Fifth Army to attack along Italy’s west coast while the British Eighth Army, to which 1 CID belonged, would advance northward along the Adriatic seaboard, traverse several rivers, seize the town of Pescara, and then drive southwest along the Pescara-Rome highway through the Apennine Mountains to the Eternal City. Allied commanders believed that these assaults would force the Germans to quit Rome, but the plan was too ambitious because it coincided with winter’s arrival and the ground favoured

the defenders.47 The Eighth Army set off on 20 November, but it quickly bogged down as rain and sleet filled the rivers to overflowing. The roads and countryside were reduced to a sea of mud. Movement was nearly impossible, and the Germans fought hard for every metre.48 On 25 November, 1 CID was ordered to relieve the worn-out 78th (British) Division, which had led the Eighth Army’s assault, along the Moro River, a few kilometres southeast of Ortona.49

Map 3 The Adriatic Sector, December 1943-April 1944
(Source: Adapted from Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, Map No. 11)

48 German plans to hold central Italy are described in considerable detail in DHH, AHQ Report No. 18, “Information from German Military Documents regarding Allied Operations in General and Canadian Operations in Particular, The Campaign in Southern Italy (Sep-Dec 1943),” 6 December 1948, Appendix L, C-in-C South, Order for the Conduct of the Campaign, 1 November 1943.
49 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13727, 1 CID GS War Diary, 25 November 1943.
By 4 December The RCR was occupying a position near San Vito. It stayed there for the next three days. Meanwhile, the Germans repelled the 2nd Brigade’s attack on San Leonardo, while a separate –and successful –assault mounted by that same formation at Villa Rogatti was rendered useless because 1 CID’s engineers said that they could not build a bridge there to allow tanks and other supporting elements to move forward. By 7 December, only the 1st Brigade’s Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Hast & PER), which had mounted a third attack near the Adriatic coast, was on the north side of the Moro. These unforeseen events compelled the divisional commander, by then Maj.-Gen. Chris Vokes, to devise a new plan within which 1 CIB would take the lead. The 48th Highlanders of Canada would attack directly across the river towards San Leonardo. At the same time, The RCR would advance southwest from the Hast & PER bridgehead centred on San Donato, following a winding road on the plateau atop the Moro Valley’s north side (later called “Royal Canadian Avenue”). Put together, these assaults would secure San Leonardo. The 2nd Brigade and tanks of the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade would then push northwest and seize a major crossroads on Highway No. 538, code-named “CIDER.”

The 1st Brigade’s attack began at 4:30 p.m. on 8 December under the cover of massive artillery and close air support. For The RCR, things began to go wrong almost immediately. Its route of advance along “Royal Canadian Avenue” paralleled the German front lines, a risky move that exposed the unit’s right flank to attack. The battalion took intense artillery and mortar fire within minutes of starting off and had to ward off an immediate German counterattack.

50 Ironically, the 8th Indian Division built a bridge at Villa Rogatti shortly afterward by constructing it backwards from the enemy’s side of the river. The Indians dubbed it the “Impossible Bridge.” C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Volume 5, The Campaign in Sicily, 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973), 502.

51 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 297.

52 Chris Vokes replaced Guy Simonds as the commander of 1 CID on 1 November 1943. See Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 690. For his revised attack plan, see DHH, CMHQ Report No. 165, “Operations of 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Armd Bde in Italy: 25 Nov 43-4 Jan 44,” 27 November 1946, 81-82.

These events, combined with the onset of nightfall, created both confusion – Strome Galloway’s company was temporarily lost – and delays. By 7:00 p.m., The RCR had advanced only 900 metres. More artillery fire and a German thrust from San Leonardo halted The RCR halfway to its objective, in open ground and with no anti-tank or armoured support. Then, just before midnight, enemy tanks and infantry attacked from the northeast. Lt.-Col. Spry repelled them by calling down artillery fire around his unit’s position. Anticipating further attacks, he moved his troops to a sheltered position on the northern slope of the Moro River valley. On the 9th The RCR made a second attempt to reach San Leonardo. Faced with fierce German resistance, Spry disengaged his troops, and later that night The RCR regrouped on the Moro’s southern bank. Two days of stiff fighting had cost the battalion 21 dead and 53 wounded or missing.

The battle along “Royal Canadian Avenue” was Dan Spry’s toughest as CO of The RCR, and being on the receiving end of a determined German tank-infantry assault was a personal first. Throughout it all, he made the best choices possible in very trying circumstances. Spry’s decision to bring down friendly fire onto his position balanced the likelihood that some of his men might be hit against the dire threat posed to his unit by the German tanks. This move saved the day, although Toby Spry has said that for years after the war his father remained concerned that three of his soldiers had been wounded due to his decision. For their part, the troops no doubt appreciated that their CO had saved their lives.

54 DHH, File 145.2R13013(D1), Battle of the Moro, The Royal Canadian Regiment (n.d).
56 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 8 December 1943.
57 DHH, 145.2R13011 (D3), Account by Lt.-Col. D.C. Spry, RCR, 4 January 1944.
58 Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 111.
59 The 1st Brigade’s battle narrative called the Moro River crossing “the most difficult task and most hotly contested operation that the Brigade had yet encountered.” LAC, RG 24, Volume 10982, 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade Battle Narrative, “Battle for the Ortona Cross Roads and Battle of the Bulge,” (n.d.), 5.
For those who took part, the battle for the Moro River also reinforced lessons about teamwork, character, and spiritual faith. In combat, one’s ethnicity, language, religion, or social class was of no consequence. What did matter was an individual’s ability to work with other people in a harsh combat environment to achieve a common objective: to defeat a highly-skilled foe whose goal was to kill them. Cleve Conlon, who fought with the Governor General’s Foot Guards, a wartime armoured regiment, remarked that his military service “taught me how to get along with people.”62 Other Canadians expressed similar thoughts. Teamwork and loyalty went hand in hand. For most soldiers, loyalty meant fighting for their unit and especially their mates, as historian David Bercuson, military psychologist Darryl Henderson, and former infantryman Andrew Blake have asserted.63 The experience of combat thus bound people of all stripes tightly together and created within them a deeply-held sense of unity, one that fellow infantryman Jack Currie said differed from school or work relationships because “you both faced death together.”64 This sentiment would later affect veterans’ views on cooperative unity in the years after 1945.

Being an effective team member in combat demanded strength of character. Loyalty and discipline were two aspects; the ability to endure stick things out under stressful conditions was another. Part of this endurance came from a fear of letting your mates down when one was afraid for one’s life. Doing so required no small amount of courage, but not necessarily that which involved great heroics. The type of courage that earned the greatest respect from those who saw combat involved an ability to carry on despite knowing that doing so might result in death or injury. An anonymous infantryman likely spoke for many when he recalled that the best soldier he ever met was not a young “fire-breather,” but rather a 35-year old private who was five feet

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62 CWM Archives, Oral History Project, Cleve W. Conlon, interview by Mike Charrier, Ottawa, Ontario, 30 November 2005. For similar sentiments, see Historica-Dominion Institute, We Were Freedom.
63 Bercuson, The Fighting Canadians, 9; Henderson, Cohesion, 5-6; and Andrew Blake, quoted in Broadfoot, Six War Years, 209.
64 Jack Currie, quoted in McNeil, Voices of a War Remembered, 238.
tall, had been a washout in training, and was “the sloppiest bugger you ever saw.” In action, however, this same person became “the biggest guy in our outfit,” volunteering for night patrols, helping others carry loads of ammunition, and cracking jokes to keep morale up.55 People who did not see front-line service developed a similar fortitude. Margaret Fleming, who served in the air force and lost a husband during the war, came away from it all believing that “no matter what happened to you, you could keep on going.”66 For years after the war, thousands of veterans tried to pass such values and attitudes on to their children.

Battlefield conditions also led many soldiers to appreciate the spiritual side of humanity. Life or death in combat could sometimes be measured in mere millimetres, and a good number of people would come home with stories of near misses. Dan Spry did. On 9 December 1943, a German shell exploded just outside of his command post. The blast killed three men; Spry had escaped a similar fate by leaping into a latrine.67 Faced with such uncertainty, many soldiers sought comfort from religion, either through prayer or the services offered by the unit chaplains. As defence scientist Anthony Kellett has pointed out, 79 per cent of Canadian combat veterans surveyed in 1945 asserted that their faith in God had increased as a result of front-line service.68 Many of them would carry their new-found sense of spiritual faith into their peacetime lives.

The Moro River battle was Spry’s last as Commanding Officer of The Royal Canadian Regiment. On 16 December 1943, Brigadier Graham announced that, owing to a recurring issue with ulcers, Lt.-Col. Spry would henceforth command the 1st Brigade.69 Spry had led his unit for four months, but as Maj.-Gen. Chris Vokes pointed out, this was not considered unusual because

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65 Anonymous, Broadfoot, Six War Years, 211.
66 CWM Archives, Oral History Project, Margaret Fleming Interview, 21 December 1999.
68 Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 195. For some examples of Canadian veterans’ recollections of spiritual belief while they were in battle, see Galloway, Bravely into Battle, 126-130; Pearce, Journal of a War, 86; and Martin, Battle Diary, 131.
the average battalion commander, owing to the stresses associated with the job, spent just three months in his position.\textsuperscript{70} Major W.W. Mathers, The RCR’s second-in-command, took Spry’s place. According to Padre Wilkes, Mathers immediately upset his men by telling them that there would be “no more slackness, no more slovenliness,” thereby implying that those who had been killed or wounded at the Moro River had perhaps been just that.\textsuperscript{71} Why he would deliberately insult The RCR’s members \textit{and} simultaneously criticize Spry’s record as CO – Spry, although he had left the battalion, was still Mathers’s superior officer – remains a mystery. For those still serving in The RCR, Mathers’s ill-considered speech underlined two facts: that not all COs were cut from the same cloth, and that they were officially Dan Spry’s “boys” no longer.

For thousands of Canadian soldiers, the fighting did not end in mid-December 1943. More battles would follow in the coming months, during which they would learn other important lessons; Dan Spry would learn them as a formation-level battlefield commander. For now, his example shows how Canadian soldiers quickly put together lessons that they had learned about teamwork, leadership, and character during their training in Britain in an unforgiving combat environment. In Spry’s case, the evidence shows that he led his unit through personal example, as the best of The RCR’s COs in Britain, Vernon Hodson and Eric Snow, had done, and that he excelled at the human aspects of military command. Spry had also proved that he could handle battalion-level operations, something that had been well beyond his abilities prior to the war. In the short term, soldiers’ ability to learn and apply such lessons was essential for military success – and their survival. For those such as Dan Spry who would survive the war, such wartime lessons, made all the more meaningful because their lives were at risk, would profoundly affect the manner in which they approached their civilian lives upon returning home to Canada.

\textsuperscript{70} Vokes, \textit{My Story}, 171.
\textsuperscript{71} LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 16 December 1943, and Brodsky, \textit{God’s Dodger}, 203. Wilkes recalled that Mathers delivered his speech on 17 December during a unit parade.
CHAPTER 4

BATTLEFIELD LESSONS (II)

It is the additional capacity for intellectual grasp of all the complexities of their profession that will determine how far [young officers] can – or, rather, how far they should – ascend the ladder of promotion.

Historian Michael Howard

Each division in the Canadian Army in this last war was a cross-section of the Dominion...It has occurred to many of us who have returned from overseas, that if it was possible to bring such groups together so successfully in war, it must be possible to do so in peace.

Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry

Only a few Canadians became formation commanders during the Second World War. The basics of such positions were similar to those at the unit level, but running large military organizations demanded more sophisticated leadership and management skills. Such officers could also see, albeit with a broader perspective, what many soldiers sensed: that cooperative unity, made possible in war by pursuing a common goal, ought to be achievable in Canada in peacetime, too. Such lessons, as seen through Dan Spry’s experience, prepared many Canadian veterans for postwar citizenship and, for some individuals like Spry, to serve as societal leaders.

Dan Spry was not the 1st Brigade’s senior lieutenant-colonel when he assumed command of the formation on 16 December 1943. That was Ian Johnston, a militia officer who had led the 48th Highlanders of Canada since May 1943. Thus, Spry’s promotion may have struck former militia members as an example of the Permanent Force officer corps “feathering its nest.” This seems unlikely, as Brigadier Howard Graham, whose decision it had been, was himself a militia officer. Knowing that Bert Kennedy, the CO of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, had

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3 In fact, 60 per cent of Canada’s wartime divisional commanders, 75 per cent of brigade commanders, and 90 per cent of unit COs were militia officers. Granatstein, The Generals, 179-180.
only taken over in November, Graham may have thought it best to put a quick learner such as Spry into the brigade commander’s slot and keep at least one experienced man, Johnston, at the unit level, but he did not offer his reasoning, then or since.⁴ In any event, Spry got the job.

Spry’s assumption of brigade command coincided with the toughest fighting that the Canadians in Italy had yet seen. For six days the 2nd and 3rd Brigades had been trying to capture the “CIDER” crossroads, situated on Highway No. 538 about 2.4 kilometres southwest of Ortona. However, they had been bloodily repulsed by German paratroopers occupying positions in “The Gully,” a deep and narrow ravine that ran inland from the Adriatic coast along a course parallel to that of Highway 538.⁵ Both formations were worn out from their exertions and needed reinforcements. For this reason, the 1st Brigade was brought forward to deal the next blow.⁶

Dan Spry had little time to learn the practicalities of commanding an infantry brigade before taking one into battle. Of signal importance was the fact that such a formation was roughly three times larger than the battalion he had led. As depicted at Figure 4-1, an infantry brigade numbered some 2,650 officers and men and had three battalions, a support group (whose heavy weapons provided added fire support), and a brigade headquarters. All of this had several implications for Spry. As CO of The RCR, he had had to think of future battle requirements in terms of a few hours, but as a brigade commander he needed to plan at least a day or two ahead. He had to deal with a much broader range of details, coordinate his efforts with a large number of organizations, and figure out where to position himself so as to direct the brigade’s operations. Lastly, he had to adapt his approach to leadership. At the brigade level, he had much less contact with the troops than he had enjoyed as a battalion commander.

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⁴ Howard Graham’s reasoning is absent from his memoirs. See Graham, Citizen and Soldier, 191-192.
⁵ These soldiers belonged to the 1st Parachute Division. DHH, AHQ Report No. 18, 93.
⁶ Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 315.
Spry relied on his brigade headquarters staff to assist him in exercising command. While conducting operations, the headquarters was split into three groupings that were positioned at various locations within the combat zone.\textsuperscript{7} Just behind the forward-most battalions was 1 CIB’s tactical headquarters, where the brigade major (the senior operations officer in the brigade headquarters), a five-man operations staff, and the commanders of supporting arms such as artillery helped Spry to fight the battle by running the brigade’s command post and handling intelligence and liaison matters. A few kilometres back, in the brigade’s administrative area, was the formation’s main headquarters which coordinated 1 CIB’s immediate logistic needs. Further behind the main headquarters, in the divisional administrative area, technical support officers and

\textsuperscript{7} This manner of organization was known as the echelon system. Fighting and logistic units were similarly arranged on the battlefield.
NCOs worked in the 1st Brigade’s rear headquarters. This echeloned system reduced congestion in the forward areas and lowered the risk of breakdowns in command and control as the main headquarters could readily assume control if the tactical headquarters was out of action.

Communications services were provided by a section of the divisional signals unit.8

In planning his first brigade-level operation Dan Spry drew from the knowledge that he had gained at Camberley, which included brigade operations in all phases of war. It also seems likely that he had learned a few things regarding the roles of commanders and their staff by observing the actions of senior officers such as Maj.-Gen. Guy Simonds, who had led the 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID) prior to Chris Vokes. Like Simonds and Vokes, Spry believed that a commander’s job was to plan operations; the staff’s role was to assist by sorting out the details.9 His four months as CO of The RCR, too, had given him a good idea of what worked – and what did not – at the battalion level. Such practical knowledge balanced out staff college theories, and enabled him to assign realistic tasks to his units. Lastly, he knew most of the key players in 1 CIB, and they knew him. All of this helped Spry to prepare for battle.

Spry had two days to prepare his plan. He worked closely with the division’s Commander Royal Artillery (CRA), Brigadier Bruce Matthews, to develop the artillery fire support plan involving 250 guns. He also oversaw the efforts of his brigade staff, which coordinated matters of infantry-tank cooperation with the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade and dealt with a myriad of logistic issues.10 On the evening of 17 December, Spry briefed his COs and those of the

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8 For more on the organization of a brigade headquarters, see Grodzinski, Operational Handbook for the First Canadian Army, 17-25. The terminology used herein is that which was in use while Spry led the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade. LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 1 CIB Memorandum No. 1, 11 January 1944.

9 Regarding Simonds, see Brigadier Elliot Rodger’s comments in Granatstein, The Generals, 164. On Vokes, see Case, “The ‘Fightin’est’ Canadian General.” Spry’s views are in a pamphlet he wrote for the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in 1984, entitled “Command and Control Techniques in Battle at the Corps and Divisional Level – A Canadian Historical Perspective.” See LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-15.

supporting units. As he had done as a battalion commander, he opted for a very simple plan. In Phase I, the 48th Highlanders would attack across Highway No. 538 and cut the Villa Grande road about 1,800 metres northwest of “CIDER” to protect 1 CIB’s left flank. Next, The RCR would drive northeast to the Villa Grande road and then head south to take “CIDER.” In Phase III, both units would advance towards Ortona. The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Hast & PER), then engaged in operations at San Donato, would not be involved.11

Official historian Lt.-Col. G.W.L. Nicholson has asserted that the initial stage of the 1st Brigade’s attack on the “CIDER” crossroads “set a standard of almost faultless cooperation between artillery, infantry, and armour not previously attained by Canadians in the Italian campaign.”12 This assessment, echoed by other historians, reflects well on Spry’s first brigade-level battle. The 48th Highlanders captured its objective two hours after setting off at 8:00 a.m. on 18 December, at a cost of four dead and 20 wounded.13 The RCR’s attack, however, was a disaster. The supporting artillery regiments, unable to register their targets with observed fire prior to the attack, had had to rely on inaccurate Italian maps to plot where their rounds would fall.14 When The RCR advanced at 11:45 a.m., friendly shells fell on the Carleton and York Regiment south of “The Gully” and the 48th Highlanders to the north. Brigadier Matthews, who was then with Spry, shifted the barrage forward by 350 metres and halted the firing on The RCR’s right flank.15 With Canadian rounds now landing to their rear, the Germans poured a murderous crossfire onto their attackers, inflicting more than 100 casualties on The RCR; its CO,

11 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, Intelligence Log, 17 December 1943.
12 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 315.
13 For other assessments, see Bill McAndrew, Canadians and the Italian Campaign, 1943-1945 (Montreal: Éditions Art Global Inc., 1996), 76; and Zuehlke, Ortona, 228-230. For the 48th’s action, see DHH, File 145.2H13013(D2), 48th Highlanders of Canada – Operations Reports Torella-San Thomaso, 15 May 1944, 3.
Lt.-Col. Mathers, was one of the wounded. By nightfall, The RCR’s fighting strength was just 19 officers and 159 men.\(^{16}\) Spry must have been greatly upset to learn that many of his former subordinates had been killed or wounded in an attack that he had orchestrated. At the time, however, he could not afford the time to grieve. The objective still had to be taken, and he believed that “as a battalion, The RCR would be worthless from the point of view of morale unless they got onto their objective…”\(^{17}\) Spry ordered the unit to attack again the next afternoon. This time – largely because the enemy had withdrawn during the night – The RCR succeeded.\(^{18}\)

With the “CIDER” crossroads finally secured, the 2\(^{nd}\) Brigade moved into Ortona where it fought a bitter street battle from 21-28 December. At the same time, General Vokes ordered 1 CIB to cut the coastal highway about five kilometres northeast of Ortona, believing that this would force the enemy’s withdrawal to their next likely line of defence, the Arielli River. It was not, as one postwar critic has suggested, an easier alternative to the 2\(^{nd}\) Brigade’s ordeal.\(^{19}\) From 23 to 27 December, Spry’s men battled the Germans and the mud. By Christmas Eve, the Hast & PER and the 48\(^{th}\) Highlanders were cut off from each other and the rest of the brigade. The next day, Spry told The RCR to create a supply corridor to the Highlanders.\(^{20}\) Only when Canadian tanks arrived on 27 December was 1 CIB able to capture San Nicola and San Tommaso. The 3\(^{rd}\) Brigade took up the drive towards the coast. Their battles did not end until 4 January 1944.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{16}\) LAC RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 18 December 1943. Major Strome Galloway was temporarily placed in command of The RCR until Lt.-Col. Mathers returned to the unit from hospital in January 1944.

\(^{17}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 10982, Account by Brigadier D.C. Spry, commanding 1 CIB, given to Capt Hughes at S. Leonardo on 4 January 1944.


\(^{19}\) Brereton Greenhous, “Would It Not Have Been Better to Bypass Ortona Completely?”, *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (April 1989), 51-55. In this article, Greenhous argued that General Vokes should have avoided battle in the streets of Ortona and instead expanded the 48\(^{th}\) Highlanders’ salient, ignoring the fact that Vokes employed both the 1\(^{st}\) and 3\(^{rd}\) Brigades to do just that. See Captain Gordon C. Case, “Trial by Fire: Major-General Christopher Vokes at the Battles of the Moro River and Ortona, December 1943,” *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer 2007), 24.

\(^{20}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 15209, RCR War Diary, 25 December 1943.

The fighting during December 1943, which cost 2,339 killed, wounded, and missing, was the toughest that the 1st Division had yet seen. Its rifle companies, whose combined strength rarely exceeded 3,600 all ranks, suffered the most. On 3 January 1944, General Vokes reported that his nine infantry battalions would “not be in a fit condition to undertake further offensive operations until they have had a period of rest, free of operational commitments.”22 For his part, Dan Spry had been under enormous pressure to succeed where others had failed.23 Vokes had considered the 1st Brigade’s battle for the “CIDER” crossroads to be so crucial that he positioned himself at Spry’s headquarters. Having his boss at his shoulder must have made Spry uneasy.24 Vokes, however, was quite satisfied with what he saw. On 26 December, he told Lt.-Gen. Harry Crerar, commander of the newly-arrived I Canadian Corps, that Spry should permanently replace the invalided Howard Graham and be promoted to the rank of acting brigadier.25 Crerar agreed; National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa gave its approval the next day.26 At the age of 30, Dan Spry became one of the Canadian Army’s youngest brigadiers.27

Spry must have realized that his men had also judged his performance during this time, and that the events of 18 December might count against him. Human considerations such as these were typical of his approach to military command. He may have had such thoughts in mind when he visited The RCR on the 21st of that month to congratulate them for their performance.

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22 Ibid., 229-231.
23 Lt.-Gen. Sir Charles Allfrey, then Vokes’s corps commander, and General Bernard Montgomery, the Eighth Army commander, had both pressured General Vokes to move faster during the fighting in December 1943. Vokes, in turn, pushed Spry and the other brigade commanders. See Delaney, The Soldier’s General, 99.
25 LAC, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry Personnel File, Statement of Service and Qualifications, 7 October 1946. Field promotions were often based on acting rank. 1 Canadian Corps arrived in November 1943 and became operational on 1 February 1944. Its major components were a corps headquarters, 1st Canadian Infantry Division (which was already in Italy), and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 340-379.
26 DHH, Crerar File on A/Maj.-Gen. Spry, Crerar to McNaughton, 26 December 1943, and DEFENSOR to CANMILTRY, 27 December 1943.
Later that day he returned to toast The RCR’s 60th birthday with a few of the unit’s leaders.28 One of those present, Major Strome Galloway, recorded in his diary that Brigadier Spry “gave as his toast ‘Another 60 years’ and ‘Always look forward.’ He spoke feelingly, however, of recent severe losses.”29 On that score, it seems that The RCR bore him no grudges. Respect, not criticism, is found in The Regiment’s accounts of Spry’s actions on 18 December.30

The Canadians manned positions in the Ortona sector for the next four months. For the most part, the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade held the line and conducted patrols. Dan Spry used this time to settle into his job as brigade commander. On 11 January he introduced his practice of using memoranda to disseminate instructions on operations, training, and administration. Brigade memoranda, he wrote, would “provide units with a single source of information thereby reducing the number of small chits on varying subjects with which COs and Adjutants are now beset.”31 Having himself served in both of these roles, Spry was well aware of the heavy workload that his subordinates bore. This focus on communication, as will be seen later, was a consistently-present aspect of Spry’s leadership style, both during the war and also in his peacetime career.

Brigadier Spry also strove to rebuild his brigade for future battles. He began by taking stock of lessons learned in recent operations. At a conference held on 11 January, he and his key officers agreed that better cooperation with supporting tanks and artillery was required.32 In another instance, Spry counselled that platoon and company commanders had to balance the need for providing their men with personal leadership with that of retaining control. In his view,

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30 See for example Galloway, Some Died at Ortona, 199-200; Brodsky, God’s Dodger, 205; and Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 114-115.
31 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 1 CIB Memorandum No. 1, 11 January 1944.
32 LAC, RG 24, Volume 10982, File 264C1.033(D1), Discussions on Lessons of the December Battles, 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 0930 hrs, 11 January 1944.
many of them had become casualties because they had been too far forward.\textsuperscript{33} Successes, too, were analyzed. For example, on 2 March the 48\textsuperscript{th} Highlanders hosted a study session on its attack of 18 December.\textsuperscript{34} Spry’s views on teamwork came through in his brigade’s training, which was always necessary on active service because of casualties and postings. While the formation was in a reserve position from 11 to 28 February he ordered his units to focus on team training. He also set up a Brigade NCO School to train replacements for those who had fallen.\textsuperscript{35}

While a brigade commander’s battle management tasks were important, Dan Spry believed a brigadier had to be a leader. This was consistent with his philosophy that promoting teamwork and leading by example were key attributes associated with military command. He knew, as historian G.D. Sheffield has argued, that establishing mutual trust and understanding between a commander, his subordinates, and his staff was “the key to the issue of command.”\textsuperscript{36} Given his high-ranking position, the best way for Spry to do so was to build good working relationships with his leadership team, namely the unit commanders and his brigade staff. He expected – and trusted – that they would do the same with their subordinates.

It was with such goals in mind, as much as to see for himself what was going on in his brigade’s area, that Brigadier Spry – like many Allied commanders, both junior and senior – visited his units every few days. Visits, he later said, helped him to keep his people informed of what was going on and tell them the importance of their jobs. With such knowledge, he added, they were “far more likely to perform well in the fog of battle.”\textsuperscript{37} He would do the same thing in his peacetime career. Visits also allowed him to assess the capabilities of his COs. Bill Mathers,

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{33} DHH, CMHQ Report No. 165, 216-217.
\item\textsuperscript{34} LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 2 March 1944.
\item\textsuperscript{35} LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 1 CIB Memorandum No. 4, 9 February 1944, and Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-2, One-Line Diary, 1913-1956, entry for 11 February 1944.
\item\textsuperscript{36} G.D. Sheffield, ed., \textit{Leadership and Command}, 4.
\item\textsuperscript{37} LAC, Dan Spry Papers, “Command and Control Techniques in Battle,” A-5. Spry’s visits are recorded in the 1 CIB War Diary and Spry’s personal diary.
\end{itemize}
who returned to The RCR in January 1944, was a good trainer but had little experience as a commander; Spry may also have heard that Mathers had alienated many in his unit. The 48th’s Ian Johnston was a proven leader, while Don Cameron had only recently replaced Bert Kennedy at the Hast & PER. 

Visits, too, gave Spry an appreciation for the character of his units. The men of the Hast & PER, many of whom hailed from rural eastern Ontario, thought themselves tougher than their city counterparts in Toronto’s 48th Highlanders (the “Glamour Boys”) or the professionals of The RCR. In turn, those units dubbed their country cousins “Plough Jockeys.”

Such knowledge was useful for Spry in deciding how best to employ his battalions and their commanders, not to mention to boost morale by promoting friendly inter-unit competition. The value of visits was a lesson that he and other veterans would later put to good use in civilian life.

Spry also forged a good relationship with his brigade staff. The brigade’s war diarist noted that he met with them on 8 January, “spoke of the essential work that each one in the HQ has done in contributing to the success of the 1st Brigade in past battles,” and said that he knew he could count on the same support they had given to Howard Graham. This approach struck a positive chord. On 12 February, while the brigade was out of the line, they gave an orchard that they planted around the headquarters a tongue-in-cheek name, “Spry Memorial Park.” Spry got on especially well with Major N.L.C. Mather, his brigade major; they would work together again in the future. He also impressed the junior staff officers. One of these was the future author Farley Mowat, who wrote appreciatively about Spry’s efforts to get him promoted to Captain.

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38 For a brief description of the troops’ opinion of Johnston as their commander, see Kim Beattie, Dileas: History of the 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1929-1956 (Toronto: 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1957), 590. Don Cameron replaced Bert Kennedy as CO of the Hast & PER in late December 1943 after the latter was severely wounded in action. Mowat, The Regiment, 177.
40 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 8 January 1944.
41 Ibid., 12 February 1944.
42 Mowat, My Father’s Son, 36-46. In a letter to his parents, dated 15 March 1944, Mowat described Spry as “a good guy.” See page 43.
Dan Spry’s personal style of leadership was seen in other ways, too. For example, on 11 January 1944 he met with the brigade’s chaplains. Knowing the value of spiritual faith in battle – he observed that “there were not many non-believers in slit trenches” – Spry understood that the chaplains helped officers and men cope with the stresses of battle. In March, he spoke with the unit medical officers. He knew that they often worked so close to the front trying to save men’s lives that they often endangered own. He also showed concern for his men’s wellbeing. On 17 February, while driving to an Eighth Army leave centre at Bari, Spry made time to visit some of his brigade’s wounded at No. 1 Canadian General Hospital, located in Andria. He visited other wounded men at No. 15 Canadian General Hospital on 20 March in Caserta near Naples, while en route to the Anzio beachhead. Such actions reflected Spry’s belief that everyone in the brigade was important. They also showed his sense of responsibility for his men. All of this set a powerful example for others to follow. So, too, did his efforts to share his men’s risks and discomfort, although some of the brigade headquarters staff were less enthused. One of them, Farley Mowat, called Spry “a masochist” for insisting that the brigade headquarters be situated “under canvas in a muddy gulley out in the wide open countryside,” writing that Spry was “trying to prove that HQ is as tough and rough as the fighting troops.” Spry’s leadership style was not a wartime aberration, for he took the same approach in his postwar career.

The Canadians’ tour of duty in the Ortona sector ended in April 1944. On the 17th, Maj.-Gen. Vokes informed his officers that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division would be relieved by the 10th Indian Division and move to a training area further south. The 1st Brigade pulled out five

44 LAC, Spry Papers, Volume 2, One-Line Diary, 1913-1956, 9 March 1944. For example, the Hast & PER’s doctor was killed by German artillery fire on 22 December 1943. See Mowat, The Regiment, 154.
45 LAC, Spry Papers, Volume 2, One-Line Diary, 1913-1956, 17 February 1944. Spry was sent to Anzio to identify lessons that the Eighth Army could use in future operations. He was there from 18-31 March. Spry’s report was published in 1 CIB Memoranda. LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 4 and 26 April 1944.
46 Mowat, My Father’s Son, 28. This comment was in a letter to Mowat’s parents dated 28 January 1944.
days later. While en route, all identifying patches and flashes were removed from uniforms and vehicles so as to ensure security.\footnote{LAC, 1 CIB War Diary, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB Memorandum No. 28, 18 April 1944, and entries for 17-26 April 1944. Each regiment had cloth identification titles (called “flashes”) sewn onto the shoulders of its members’ uniforms. Coloured rectangular patches worn just below the unit flash were used to identify Canadian divisions. The 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s patch was red.} By 23 April, the division was bivouacked in an area just northwest of Campobasso. A new battle for the Canadians in Italy was in the offing.

Planning was well underway for a massive operation intended to break the deadlock that now characterized the Italian campaign. The Eighth Army’s offensive on the Adriatic front had been halted. In the west, the U.S. Fifth Army had repeatedly failed to crack the Gustav Line at Cassino which – along with its fall-back position, the Hitler Line – barred access to the Liri Valley leading to Rome.\footnote{McAndrew, \textit{Canadians and the Italian Campaign}, 93.} Worse still, an Allied force that had landed at Anzio on 22 January 1944 to outflank these positions had been bottled up by the Germans. To break the impasse, Allied commanders agreed to concentrate their forces west of the Apennines and launch a series of coordinated attacks in May.\footnote{Nicholson, \textit{The Canadians in Italy}, 389. This decision was made on 28 February 1944.} Code-named Operation DIADEM, the U.S. Fifth Army would attack along Italy’s west coast and through the mountains south of the Liri Valley, while the Eighth Army would smash through the Gustav and Hitler Lines and drive northwest through the Liri Valley to Valmontone, 37 kilometres from Rome. There they would link up with the Anzio divisions, which were to break out of their beachhead while the first two attacks were underway. These operations promised to destroy the German Tenth Army and gain Rome for the Allies.\footnote{Dancocks, \textit{The D-Day Dodgers}, 238.} Of greater importance was that they would compel the Germans to commit their strategic reserves to Italy, making them unavailable for use against the forthcoming cross-Channel invasion of Europe, then planned for 1 June 1944.\footnote{Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, \textit{Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943-1945} (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2004), 245. For invasion plans, see Stacey, \textit{The Victory Campaign}, 16-22.
The Eighth Army’s commander, by then Lt.-Gen. Sir Oliver Leese, decided to use XIII (British) Corps to break through the Gustav Line along the Gari River, while II Polish Corps captured the Abbey of Monte Cassino, which sat atop a 520-metre high feature that dominated the Liri Valley. Once the Gustav Line had been breached, I Canadian Corps, under Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, would attack the Hitler Line. Burns assigned that task to 1 CID and the attached 25th (British) Tank Brigade. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division (5 CAD) would exploit their breakthrough. To prepare for this assault, 1 CIB trained with British tanks at Troia on 1 May, and practised assault river crossings near Caserta from 5-13 May. On the 14th, three days after XIII

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53 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 1-13 May 1944.
Corps attacked the Gustav Line, Leese committed the Canadians. Early on 16 May, Spry’s brigade began clearing a front bounded by the Liri River on the left and Pignataro on the right.54

During the following week, Dan Spry again proved his ability to plan and conduct brigade-level operations. For most of this period he had a British tank unit (142 Regiment) and other forces to help his brigade.55 Initially, it was slow going. It took three days to cover the eight-kilometre distance from the Pignataro lateral road to an area just south of Pontecorvo, a rate of advance that owed as much to the terrain as it did to the actions of the German defenders. The brigade’s area was dotted by woods and grain fields, and it was easy to lose one’s way in the network of dirt tracks that criss-crossed through it. For instance, one company of the Hast & PER ended up spending most of 17 May fighting in the 48th Highlanders’ area.56 Much of the action was at the company level or below, and Spry had to rely on his battalion commanders to maintain control. Only by the end of 18 May were 1 CIB’s troops in sight of the Hitler Line.57

Allied commanders had hoped that the Hitler Line could be breached without a set-piece attack, but probing actions on 19 May made it clear that the enemy intended to stand and fight.58 Faced with the prospect of a deliberate frontal assault, General Vokes decided to make his main effort with the 2nd Brigade on his division’s right flank.59 This operation would occur on 23 May. Vokes, however, recalled the battering that his troops had taken around Ortona in similar actions the previous December. He thought that the rapid advance of the Corps expéditionnaire français, part of the U.S. Fifth Army, through the mountains south of the Liri Valley might force the

54 LAC, MG 31, Series G-6, Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns Fonds (hereafter Burns Papers), Volume 1, War Diary of Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, 14 May 1944, and RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 16 May 1944.
55 RCR Archives, Volume 9, File 14, 1 Cdn Inf Bde Order of Battle, 14 May 1944.
56 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 17-18 May 1944.
57 LAC, RG 24, Volume 10881, 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Liri Valley Battle, 29 May 1944.
enemy’s withdrawal. He thus told Spry to test the defences around Pontecorvo, writing that if 1 CIB could make a hole there by 22 May “I would drive the 2nd Brigade through this breach, instead of employing it in what promised to be a costly frontal attack.” Then, on 21 May, Vokes asked Spry to see if he could move a unit to the Liri River’s south side and attack the Hitler Line from the rear. Spry checked things out from French-occupied positions in the mountains just southwest of Pontecorvo, but saw that his troops would have to cross the Liri and then cross it again, all the while under enemy fire. Convinced that this was not doable, Spry so informed General Vokes. Vokes accepted this verdict, but he still hoped for success in the 1st Brigade’s area. That night, he ordered Spry to mount an attack on Pontecorvo at 6:00 a.m. on 22 May.

Brigadier Spry issued his orders to his unit commanders at 11:00 p.m. on 21 May. The 48th Highlanders, supported by British tanks, would assault the Hitler Line and capture Point 106, a piece of high ground that dominated the Pontecorvo-Aquino road. His other two units would exploit the breach. The 48th’s CO, Lt.-Col. Ian Johnston, was aghast. In six hours his men were to attack a well-defended position virtually alone and without proper reconnaissance. After the meeting, he told Spry that such a hastily-planned attack could only fail and cost many casualties. If ordered to proceed, he wished to be relieved of his command. Questioning what seemed a suicidal plan was not unheard of, but by requesting his relief Johnston was refusing to obey an order. Spry would have been justified in firing him, but he did not. Having seen the enemy positions himself, he sympathized with Johnston. General Burns, however, had endorsed the plan and Spry could do nothing to stop it. Not wanting to lose a good CO, he asked Vokes

61 Zuehlke, The Liri Valley, 248-249.
62 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 21 May 1944.
64 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 21 May 1944, and Beattie, Dileas, 543-545.
65 LAC, Burns Papers, Volume 1, War Diary, 21 May 1944.
for a six-hour delay. General Vokes exploded. Noon was the latest time that the 2nd Brigade could move to the right flank and still carry out the 23 May attack. If the 48th had not broken through by then, he would have to mount the frontal attack that he desperately wanted to avoid. Spry flatly replied that 1 CIB could not start at 6:00 a.m. Finally, they agreed to ten o’clock.66

This incident exemplified Dan Spry’s loyalty to his men and his strength of character. It took courage to “go to bat” on behalf of Johnston against Maj.-Gen. Vokes, whose hot temper was well-known throughout the 1st Division. Spry must have realized what Vokes was trying to do, and that his request to delay the start time of the 48th Highlanders’ forthcoming assault, while logical, would anger his boss. As for Vokes, he later wrote that he “could not help but feel Spry might have been a great deal more aggressive in driving his brigade in view of the quality of the enemy manning the defences in front of him.” Frustrated, Vokes withdrew the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards (1 CID’s reconnaissance regiment) from Spry’s temporary command.67

Initially, the 1st Brigade’s battle turned out as Lt.-Col. Johnston had feared. The 48th did blast its way into the Hitler Line, but it was surrounded on three sides. Lacking a suitable breach on the left flank, the 2nd Brigade’s attack went ahead on 23 May. That same day, the Highlanders fought their way to Point 106, but were again halted. At this point Spry threw in the Hast & PER. The “Plough Jockeys” broke through the Hitler Line and relieved the 48th. On 1 CIB’s right, the 3rd Brigade also broke through the German lines. That night, Spry ordered The RCR to take Pontecorvo; it was in their hands by the next morning.68 For the next six days, the 1st Brigade licked its wounds near Pontecorvo while the 5th Canadian Armoured Division pursued the Germans northward through the Liri Valley. After minor actions at Frosinone and Ferentino from

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67 RMC, Vokes Notebook, “The Liri Valley,” 29. The PLDG, whose activities as the divisional reconnaissance regiment were normally directed by General Vokes, was under Brigadier Spry’s command from 20-21 May 1944.
31 May to 3 June, 1 CIB halted near Anagni, 60 kilometres southeast of Rome. The next day, the U.S. Fifth Army entered the Eternal City instead of linking up with the British at Valmontone as originally planned. It was a lucky break for the Germans, who escaped to fight another day.

By this time, I Canadian Corps had been placed in reserve, and would remain so for the next two months. Refresher training, sports competitions, and study sessions were the order of the day. In keeping with his normal practice, Dan Spry visited his units and thanked his men for their valiant efforts in the Liri Valley. He also suggested that 142 Tank Regiment wear 1 CIB’s tactical symbol, a green bar superimposed on a rectangular red patch, as a battle honour. By 5 June, that unit’s tanks bore the 1st Brigade’s marking. For his part, Dan Spry was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO), a prestigious decoration that recognized meritorious conduct in combat by officers in a command job. General Vokes initiated the citation. Despite his frustration over Spry’s delay of the 48th Highlander’s attack on 22 May, he knew that 1 CIB had played a vital role in his division’s victory at the Hitler Line. He thus wrote that Brigadier Spry had “handled his Brigade with skill and determination, often under intense artillery fire and without regard for his personal safety,” and that he had played “a large personal part in the successful outcome of the battle.”

June and July saw several changes within the 1st Brigade. On 1 June Bill Mathers left The RCR to take over a training unit; whether or not Spry had any say in this transfer is not known.

Four weeks later Ian Johnston was posted to the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, where he

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69 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 24 May-3 June 1944.
70 The Fifth Army’s commander, General Mark Clark, thought that the British were secretly planning to enter Rome first. He thus disregarded his orders and took Rome himself. Bidwell and Graham, Tug of War, 335-336.
71 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 24 May, 5 June, and 10-23 June 1944.
72 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Distinguished Service Order Citation, 28 June 1944. Spry’s citation was also signed by Generals Burns, Leese, and Alexander, the latter being Commander-in-Chief Allied Central Mediterranean Force.
73 LAC, RG 24, Volume 15210, RCR War Diary, 1 June 1944. Some of Mathers’s men, including Strome Galloway, were relieved to see him go. Mark Zuehlke Collection, Galloway interview, 6 May 2000.
assumed command of the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade.74 Then, on 13 July, Brigadier Spry told his officers that General Burns had selected him to create a new infantry brigade, the 12th, within the 5th Armoured Division.75 Lt.-Col. J.A. Calder, the commander of 1 CID’s support battalion, would replace him. The 1st Brigade’s officers honoured Spry with a farewell dinner on 14 July, and gave him a German flare pistol as a parting gift.76 Spry must have been excited about this new job – while not a promotion, it indicated his superiors’ confidence in his abilities – but he was sad to leave the formation he considered home. Some of his men felt the same way.77

Spry brought several 1 CIB officers, including Major Mather, who would again be his brigade major, to assist him in his new job.78 He quickly found that his most pressing issues concerned morale and training. The 12th Brigade was to be created by using units that were already in Italy as extra Canadian infantry units could not be despatched to the Mediterranean without upsetting troop allocations for Northwest Europe, which the Allies had invaded on 6 June.79 This ad hoc solution resolved one problem while creating others. The members of the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, one of the new brigade’s units, so resented their conversion from armoured cars to infantry that they called the move a “stab in the back.”80 The 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment became an infantry outfit, too. In October 1944, it was re-designated as the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish.81 Both required extensive re-training: only the Westminster

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74 Beattie, Dileas, 590-591.
75 Lessons learned during the Liri Valley operations showed that the 5th Armoured Division (which had one armoured and one infantry brigade) needed a second infantry brigade. See Delaney, The Soldiers’ General, 164-165.
76 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 13-15 July 1944.
77 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-3, Letter to 1 CIB COs, 31 July 1944. Farley Mowat, who generally disliked senior officers, was one of those who regretted Spry’s posting. Mowat, My Father’s Son, 117.
78 Spry also took Captain B.S. Eby from the 48th Highlanders, Captain R.M. Dillon of The RCR, and 1 CIB’s Signals Officer, Captain E.A. Phillips, with him to the 12th Brigade’s headquarters. LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 13 and 15 July 1944. His reasons for doing so seem obvious: he wanted experienced officers in his staff, and he knew that all of these individuals had proven their abilities while serving in the 1st Brigade.
80 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14283, Princess Louise Dragoon Guards (hereafter PLDG) War Diary, 13-14 July 1944. The unit described the 13th of July, the date that it lost its armoured reconnaissance role, as “Black Thursday.”
81 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 481.
Regiment, the 12th Brigade’s third unit, retained its original role. Spry responded by explaining the reasons for the brigade’s creation to the men and by initiating an intensive training regimen. By 31 July, according to the brigade’s war diarist, most of the ill feelings were gone: “One can now sense the birth of excellent regimental and brigade spirits amongst all ranks, due in no small measure to the personality and energy of their leaders.” General Burns agreed with this observation. On 28 July, he observed that “Good progress was being made on the whole.”

As it happened, Spry spent just one month with the 12th Brigade. On 12 August 1944 Maj.-Gen. Bert Hoffmeister, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s commander, told him that he was to immediately leave for France and take command of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (3 CID) as an acting major-general. Spry later recalled that he was “staggered” by the news. At the age of 31, he had became Canada’s youngest major-general – only 68 Canadians held this rank or higher during the Second World War – and the youngest divisional commander to serve in the Canadian, British, or American armies during the war. Just under five years earlier, he had been a newly-promoted captain. Dan Spry had indeed come a very long way.

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Spry’s appointment as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 3 CID happened because its commander, Maj.-Gen. R.F.L. Keller, had been wounded when the U.S. Eighth Air Force accidentally bombed his headquarters on 8 August. Lt.-Gen. Harry Crerar, the commander of First Canadian Army, sought to replace him with a battle-experienced infantry officer.\cite{Copp2006} A flurry of messages between Crerar, Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London, and I Canadian Corps in Italy revealed that few such officers were available. Brigadier Sherwood Lett, who had been wounded in Normandy while leading the 4\textsuperscript{th} Canadian Infantry Brigade, was a contender but he was reluctant to assume such a heavy responsibility. Brigadier Ken Blackader, Keller’s temporary replacement, was deemed too old.\cite{Burns1944} From Italy, Lt.-Gen. Burns said that Brigadier J.D.B. Smith was his “ablest and strongest character, but [had] no infantry experience,” while Dan Spry was his “ablest infantry brigadier [but was] not yet ripe for promotion.”\cite{Burns2014} After consulting with Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds, by then commanding II Canadian Corps (of which 3 CID was part), Crerar made up his mind. On 11 August he told CMHQ that “Simonds recommends and I approve nomination Brig[adier] SPRY…for this appointment.”\cite{Ibid} Burns did not say why Spry was “not ripe” for promotion – it may have been his youth – but Simonds knew Spry and he thought that the latter was up to the task. For his part, Spry wasted no time getting to his new job. He left Italy for Britain on 14 August. After spending two days with his family, he reported to Generals Crerar and Simonds in Normandy. He took over the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Division later that night.\cite{Ibid}

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\cite{Copp2006} Terry Copp, \textit{Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 62. By this time in the Second World War, battle experience had become the Canadian Army’s main criterion for selection to senior battlefield command appointments. Hayes, “The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps,” 64.


\cite{Burns2014} LAC, Crerar Papers, Volume 3, Burns to Crerar, 10 August 1944.

\cite{Ibid} Ibid., Crerar to Montague, 11 August 1944.

\cite{Ibid} The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Division’s war diary says that Spry reported on 18 August 1944, but Crerar’s war diary, Spry’s diary, and the brigade war diaries all state that he arrived on the 17\textsuperscript{th}. The latter records are likely correct.
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Maj.-Gen. Spry recalled that it was “dark when I arrived at 3 Division. I was in the dark, too. I didn’t know anything about 3 Div except that its brigades numbered 7, 8, and 9. I had no real knowledge of the capabilities of any of the units – who were really reliable and hot-shot and who weren’t.”

This was key information that Spry had used to his advantage in Italy. Lacking it underlined the fact that he had much to learn about his new command. An infantry division was nearly seven times larger, and far more diverse an organization, than the brigades he had led in Italy. As depicted at Figure 4-2, a Canadian infantry division in 1944 comprised 926 officers and

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92 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987.
17,363 men serving in three infantry brigades, a machine gun battalion, a reconnaissance regiment, the divisional artillery’s five regiments, and several other supporting units. This exponential increase in scale and scope had a corresponding effect on the complexity of Spry’s battle management and leadership tasks. He would have to plan further ahead, coordinate with a greater variety of organizations, conduct operations over a much larger landscape, and deal with a broader range of operational and logistic details than he had ever done before. Exerting his personal influence on the troops, too, would be much more difficult to achieve as Spry would be further separated from his men by the chain of command that linked them.

Dan Spry had a divisional headquarters staff of about 55 officers that historian Terry Copp has described as a well-oiled team. The division’s senior operations officer, the General Staff Officer 1 (GSO 1), was a lieutenant-colonel named Don Minguay. As Spry’s chief of staff, Minguay supervised the activities of the operations, intelligence, and liaison staffs. The Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General (AA & QMG), Lt.-Col. Ernest Côté, looked after logistic support. Both men were highly capable and intelligent officers. So was the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA), Brigadier Stanley Todd. The brigade commanders were solid performers, too. Only his age had precluded the 8th Brigade’s Ken Blackader from divisional command. John Rockingham, a dynamic young brigadier who had just taken over the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (9 CIB) on 8 August, had done very well as CO of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. “Jock” Spragge, who replaced Harry Foster as the 7th Brigade’s commander on 26 August, had successfully led the Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada since D-Day. Spry could learn much from such men about his division and the nature of battle in what for him was a new theatre of war.  

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94 Copp, Cinderella Army, 6-7. For more on the organization of a divisional headquarters, see Grodzinski, Operational Handbook for the First Canadian Army, 26-30.
In assuming command, Dan Spry adopted the “quiet approach” that had worked so well in Italy. He knew that 3 CID’s casualties were the highest among the Commonwealth divisions during the Battle of Normandy.\(^95\) He also knew that Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds had sacked the 9th Brigade’s commander and two of that formation’s unit commanders after the failure of Operation SPRING in July 1944, and thought that his men might consider him as “a Johnny-come-lately.”\(^96\) It was an astute assessment. Ernest Côté, for one, had never heard of Spry but he was impressed by the fact that his new boss listened to his subordinates. Years later, Côté wondered if Spry’s “quiet approach” stemmed from a sense that, owing to his youth, people were watching him and he could afford no mistakes or, alternatively, that Spry felt it necessary to maintain a certain decorum because some of his subordinates were older than himself.\(^97\) Côté made good points, but Spry’s gentlemanly manner had long been part of his persona. He did not act as a “new broom,” but he made it clear that he knew his job. Such confidence sprang from his experience in Italy.

Dan Spry immediately took charge. He quickly relieved Don Minguay of the task of running daily staff meetings as Minguay had done during General Keller’s tenure.\(^98\) A few days later, on 28 August, he initiated divisional memoranda. The first of these was entitled “Never Pass a Fault,” the slogan he had made famous in The RCR.\(^99\) Spry also took the leading role in divisional conferences. Captain J.R. Martin, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s Historical Officer, attended one such meeting on 3 September and was “most impressed with General Spry’s able advice and ready decisions.” Twelve days later, he recorded Spry’s views on how he wanted divisional headquarters staff officers to conduct themselves:

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\(^96\) LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987.
\(^97\) Colonel Ernest Côté, interview by author (hereafter Côté interview), Ottawa, Ontario, 6 May 2012.
\(^98\) DHH, Granatstein Notes, Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Minguay, interview by Jack Granatstein (hereafter Minguay interview), Creemore, Ontario, 6 June 1991.
\(^99\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 10907, Personal Messages from GOC 3 Cdn Inf Div, Memorandum No. 1, 28 August 1944.
[The GOC] noted three points which he wished observed: (i) All staff officers must be cheerful no matter what the course of the battle. Glumness is contagious and its rot may spread. (ii) They must be polite; sharpness of speech [sic], even when caused by worry and over-work, will not be tolerated. (iii) No staff officer may refuse a request. If in his judgment it seems reasonable, he can grant it, but can not say no without first referring the matter to the GOC or to the GSO 1.

Spry’s “quiet approach” in dealing with his principal divisional staff officers and the brigade commanders paid him huge dividends. Decades later, he remembered that “I had a marvellous staff...who guided me and helped me tremendously. They and the brigade commanders became and remained life-long friends.” It was an approach that he used throughout his working life.

As he had done in Italy, Spry made visiting his units an early priority. This practice had been fairly easy when he was a battalion and brigade commander as his units were rarely located far from his headquarters. An infantry division’s elements, however, were usually spread out in an area covering several square kilometres. To overcome this practical challenge, Spry travelled in a radio-equipped scout car. Doing so allowed him to stay in touch with his headquarters and to pass on direction to his subordinate commanders in response to an ever-changing battle situation.

On 18 August he visited the 8th Brigade. The next day he called on 9 CIB, and on the 20th he saw two of his artillery regiments. This practice did not go unnoticed. Years later, Don Minguay recalled that Spry “wanted to know what was happening and he was always visiting the units.”

While General Spry was getting to know his new division, he was also directing its operations. His arrival coincided with the end of the Battle of Normandy. Six days later, the Allies were pursuing the Germans across France. By 30 August, Spry’s men had captured

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100 LAC, RG 24, Volume 17506, War Diary of Captain J.R. Martin, Historical Officer, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, entries for 3 and 15 September 1944.
102 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14141, 8 Canadian Infantry Brigade (hereafter 8 CIB) War Diary, 18 August 1944; Volume 14153, 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade (hereafter 9 CIB) War Diary, 19 August 1944; Volume 14461, 12th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery War Diary, 20 August 1944; and Volume 14472, 14th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery War Diary, 20 August 1944.
103 DHH, Granatstein Notes, Minguay interview, 6 June 1991.
Rouen. Spry’s main task during this hectic time was to keep his troop moving. To do so he travelled with his leading elements, reporting 3 CID’s progress to General Simonds each day.  

Meanwhile, higher-level events were shaping future operations. The Germans had been bombarding Britain with unmanned flying bombs (the “V-1”) launched from the Pas-de-Calais area since 12 June 1944. Meantime, by August the Allies were finding it increasingly difficult to supply their advance from the artificial harbours that they had built at the Normandy beaches; one had been severely damaged by a storm on 19 June. To resolve these issues, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, ordered General Bernard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, comprised of First Canadian and Second British Armies, to capture the Pas de Calais and secure Antwerp. As First Canadian Army was conducting operations on 21st Army Group’s left flank, Montgomery ordered General Crerar to capture the Channel ports.

To carry out these orders, Crerar directed one of his two formations, I (British) Corps, to Le Havre. His other corps, II Canadian Corps (2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, and 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Divisions), would capture Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. Lt.-Gen. Simonds, in turn, assigned the 2nd Division the first target; 3 CID would handle the rest. The Germans, however, also saw the Allied supply problem. On 4 September, Adolf Hitler ordered that the Channel ports and the Scheldt River Estuary, without which the Belgian port of Antwerp (captured by Second British Army that same day) would be unusable, be reinforced and held to the last man. The next day, 9 CIB was halted by stiff resistance southeast of Boulogne. Dan Spry and his staff began preparing a set-piece assault.

104 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13767, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division – General Staff (hereafter 3 CID GS) War Diary, 22-30 August 1944, and Dan Spry Papers, “Recollections of Activities as an Infantry Commander.”
106 Copp, *Cinderella Army*, 45-55; and LAC, RG 24, Volume 13712, II Canadian Corps War Diary, 31 August 1944. The 2nd Division, after taking Dieppe, actually cleared the coastal area from Dunkirk to the Dutch border.
107 Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 301.
108 LAC, RG 24, Volume 14153, 9 CIB War Diary, 5 September 1944.
The battles for Boulogne, Calais, and the nearby coastal batteries at Cap Gris Nez were General Spry’s first as a divisional commander. They were also rather unique as they were carried out by a single division operating mostly on its own rather than as part of a corps or army operation. Spry and his superiors quickly realized that 3 CID lacked the manpower to take all three places at once. Its brigades were under-strength – on 16 September, the 8th and 9th Brigades together were short 269 infantrymen – and at best the division’s rifle companies normally fielded 3,600 men in all. Intelligence reports also estimated that 5,500 to 7,000 Germans defended

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109 Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 326. First Canadian Army was then spread out from Le Havre in France to Ghent, Belgium, a total frontage of 232 kilometres.

110 LAC, RG 24, Volume 10913, Table Showing Shortages of Officers and Other Ranks Compared with War Establishment Strengths, 8 and 9 Cdn Inf Bdes, 16 Sep 44.
Boulogne, and that another 5,000 were in Calais.\textsuperscript{111} While their morale was believed to be low, Spry knew that even demoralized soldiers could inflict casualties. Each location would thus have to be dealt with in turn. General Crerar agreed. On 7 September, he told Lt.-Gen. Simonds: “Order of importance capture first BOULOGNE second DUNKIRK third CALAIS.”\textsuperscript{112}

Conducting the battle for Boulogne while planning future operations 35 kilometres away at Calais was something that an experienced commander would have found daunting. Simonds assisted Spry by writing the outline plans while the latter dealt with the details, an approach that has led Terry Copp to conclude that “the role of a divisional commander in a corps commanded by Simonds was normally a limited one.”\textsuperscript{113} To be fair, all army officers were trained to plan operations by thinking of the jobs that elements two levels lower in the chain of command would execute. Doing so avoided over-tasking one’s subordinates, and allowed a commander to control the battle.\textsuperscript{114} Still, there is little doubt that Guy Simonds distrusted his divisional commanders at this time. Spry’s predecessor, Rod Keller had made serious errors, and he would have been sent home had he not been wounded. Simonds did fire George Kitching, the 4\textsuperscript{th} Canadian Armoured Division’s commander, for failing to measure up. Charles Foulkes of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Division had not done well either, but he had General Crerar’s support.\textsuperscript{115} Dan Spry was unused to such treatment. In Italy, Chris Vokes had told him what to do and trusted him to sort out how do it. Spry took the same approach.\textsuperscript{116} Still, having served with General Simonds before, he knew that it was best to “mostly, agree with what he said.” Spry respected Simonds, and the two worked well together.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{111} It was subsequently learned that 10,000 German troops were then garrisoned in Boulogne and another 7,500 were defending Calais. See Stacey, \textit{The Victory Campaign}, 337 and 346.
\textsuperscript{112} LAC, Crerar Papers, Volume 2, Crerar to Simonds, 07 September 1944.
\textsuperscript{113} Copp, \textit{Cinderella Army}, 60-62.
\textsuperscript{114} DHH, File 143.3F 8009(D6), Operational Policy – 2 Cdn Corps, 17 February 1944, 5.
\textsuperscript{115} Delaney, \textit{Corps Commanders}, 234-238, and English, \textit{A Study of Failure in High Command}, 238-245.
\textsuperscript{116} For Vokes’s approach to military command, see Case, “The ‘Fightin’est’ Canadian General.”
\textsuperscript{117} LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987.
General Spry’s orders for the Boulogne and Calais operations revealed much about his approach to senior-level battle management. At Boulogne, he showed some imagination by improvising a battle group based on the divisional machine gun battalion to deceive the enemy regarding the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s strength. Spry and his staff also integrated a variety of additional resources, most of which had been arranged by Simonds, into the divisional plan. First Canadian Army provided heavy and medium artillery regiments, while four British coastal artillery pieces would fire from their positions at Dover. Spry would have more than 300 guns to support his attack. In addition, the Royal Air Force would use its bombers to blast the German positions. Lastly, the 79th (British) Armoured Division would assist the 3rd Division’s infantry by providing flame-throwing, mine-clearing, and other specialized armoured vehicles.

The assault on Boulogne was delayed until 17 September because many of the additional assets described above were not available until that date. Unexpectedly, the Germans fought hard. The battle lasted six days; Spry thought it would be over in just one. Similarly, the fight for Calais lasted from the 25th of September to 1 October. Only the batteries at Cap Gris Nez, captured by 9 CIB on 29 September, fell quickly. Throughout these engagements, Spry focused on directing and controlling his division’s actions. Significantly, he did not tell his people how to do their jobs. Years later, Spry said that “I knew that the best way to command was by developing confidence in subordinates – both ways. I had to have confidence in my brigade commanders, and hopefully they had it in me.” He did not “breathe down their necks.”

118 For copies of these orders, see LAC, RG 24, Volume 13767, 3 CID GS War Diary, September 1944, Appendix 13, 3 Cdn Div Op Order No. 5, Op WELLHIT, 13 September 1944, and Appendix 24, 3 Cdn Div Op Order No. 6, Op UNDERGO, 16 September 1944.
120 Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 338. The 79th Division’s role was to provide such specialist support.
121 LAC, RG 24, Volume 10907, Report on Op “Wellhit”: Capture of Boulogne Fortress, 17-22 Sept 1944, by 3rd Cdn Inf Div, (n.d.), 7. Most of these assets were used by I (British) Corps at Le Havre from 5-12 September.
122 Spry’s initial orders for the attack on Calais said that D-Day would “probably” be 19 September.
123 Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 344-354.
believing that “a friendly visit from one’s superior frequently gave that extra bit of confidence and thrust that ensured success.” It was a practice that he used throughout his life. John Rockingham was one who appreciated it, recalling that “[Spry] told me what he wanted me to do, and not how to do it.” So did Ernest Côté, who observed that “Spry never meddled” with his work. Spry did intervene on 18 September when he told the Camerons to take the heights of Herquelingue, south of Boulogne, instead of the Highland Light Infantry, thus freeing up the latter unit for another job. Several days later, after learning that the Germans in Calais were contemplating surrender, he arranged a 24-hour truce to evacuate the town’s population.

Maj.-Gen. Spry was lauded for his first divisional battle. General Crerar called it a “fine fighting achievement.” Even the Germans were impressed. Lt.-Gen. Ferdinand Heim, who led the Boulogne garrison, said that he knew “when the attack did come it would be thoroughly prepared to the last weapon, and that the Canadians would attempt to take the port with as few casualties as possible.” Spry, knowing that his men were responsible for 3 CID’s success, thanked them for their efforts by paraphrasing Shakespeare’s Henry V, telling them that “In years to come there will not be one of us who will not be glad to say of these battles, ‘I was there.’”

On the other hand, Dan Spry’s successes at Boulogne and Calais were diminished somewhat by the fact that the Germans had almost totally wrecked the port facilities in both places prior to their surrender. As such, the Allies would be unable to use Boulogne and Calais to

126 Côté interview, 6 May 2012.
128 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13767, 3 CID GS War Diary, 28-29 September 1944.
129 LAC, RG 24, Volume 10808, HQ 2 Cdn Corps Files, Crerar to Simonds, 1 October 1944.
130 LAC, RG 24, Volume 20437, Interrogation Reports, Special – German Commanders, Genlt Ferdinand Heim, 6 December 1945.
131 LAC, RG 24, Volume 10907, Personal Messages from GOC 3 Cdn Inf Div, Memorandum No. 4, 1 October 1944.
sustain their forces until the middle of October and November 1944, respectively. The fact that it took 26 days to take these enemy fortresses has also led some postwar authors to accuse Crerar of overestimating the enemy’s strength and failing to push his subordinates to move faster. None of these critics have suggested how Spry – whose formation suffered 995 casualties while battling a hard-fighting enemy in poor terrain – could have achieved his task any faster. Terry Copp has offered a more reasoned assessment of the situation, writing that “Simonds, Spry, and their staffs planned and the soldiers of 3rd Division carried out highly successful operations.”

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s next major battle would be in Belgium and Holland, where it would help clear the Scheldt Estuary so that Antwerp’s port could be put into service. Canadian planning for this operation had begun on 12 September 1944, when Field Marshal Montgomery “asked” General Crerar how soon he could accomplish that aim. By the middle of the month, preliminary skirmishes in the Scheldt region were underway. First Canadian Army’s plan of attack, which was mostly based on Guy Simonds’s recommendations to General Crerar, called for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division to drive northward from Antwerp and seize South Beveland. At the same time, Dan Spry’s division would clear the Breskens Pocket, an area bounded by the Leopold Canal and by the West Scheldt. The 4th Canadian Armoured Division would assist the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division by forming a firm base along the Leopold Canal and by mounting diversionary actions.

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134 LAC, RG 24, Volume 10518, Canadian Section, 2nd Echelon, Headquarters 21 Army Group, 3rd Cdn Inf Div Casualties, 25 September-01 October 1944. This figure included killed, wounded, and missing.
135 Copp, Cinderella Army, 82-83.
137 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13713, II Canadian Corps, Op SWITCHBACK Outline Plan, 2 Oct 44.
By 5 October, Spry’s division was ready for battle. The attack, code-named Operation SWITCHBACK, would begin on the following day. The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade (7 CIB) would start things off by seizing a bridgehead over the Leopold Canal near Middelbourg. It would be reinforced by the 8th Brigade. Then, 9 CIB would launch an amphibious attack near Hoofdplaat. Simonds had proposed simultaneous assaults on these fronts, but the 9th Brigade had been the last to arrive from the Channel coast and did not finish training with the amphibious vehicles it would use until the night of 7 October. This delay meant that 7 CIB would draw the enemy’s full attention. It was a risky move, but Spry had little choice but to proceed.

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139 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13767, 3 CID GS War Diary, October 1944, Appendix 8, Operations Order No. 9 – Operation SWITCHBACK, 4 October 1944.
140 Mark Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 235-237.
Initially, Operation SWITCHBACK did not go well. The Germans, who were far more numerous than expected, contested every metre of a flooded landscape within which vehicular movement was nearly impossible.\(^\text{141}\) By the end of 6 October, 7 CIB was barely holding two narrow bridgeheads. It took three days to secure a continuous front.\(^\text{142}\) The casualty list grew rapidly: by 12 October, the brigade had lost 533 killed, wounded, or missing.\(^\text{143}\) To make matters worse, 9 CIB’s assault had to be delayed to 9 October because it took that formation longer to get to its jump-off area than expected. When the attack came off the Germans, though surprised, quickly blocked the Canadian advance.\(^\text{144}\) It was at this point that Spry showed his ability to adapt to changed circumstances. Rather than committing the 8th Brigade to assist 7 CIB as he had originally planned, he sent it to the 9th Brigade’s beachhead on 10 October because that front showed the greatest likelihood of success.\(^\text{145}\) This move forced the enemy to withdraw from their positions opposite 7 CIB, which was finally relieved on 18 October. Spry ordered a three-day pause to rest his exhausted troops. Then, the bitter fighting resumed. It lasted until 3 November, when the last enemy positions near the towns of Knocke and Cadzand surrendered.

The Battle for the Breskens Pocket counted as a success for Maj.-Gen. Spry. It was also one of the Canadian Army’s most arduous operations of the war. In 29 days of combat, against a hard-fighting enemy and in appalling conditions – the dominant feature of the battlefield was water, in the flooded fields and nearly constant rain – 3 CID suffered 2,089 casualties.\(^\text{146}\) Many

\(^{141}\) While Spry had expected to find 4,000 Germans, there were 10,000. Denis and Shelagh Whitaker, *Tug of War: The Allied Victory That Opened Antwerp* (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Company Limited, 2000), 270-271.

\(^{142}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 14131, 7 CIB War Diary, 9 October 1944.

\(^{143}\) Copp, *Cinderella Army*, 100, and Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 395.

\(^{144}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 10908, 3 CID Operations, The Assault Across Savojaards Platt, 8-14 October 1944, (n.d.), and Volume 13768, 3 CID GS War Diary, November 1944, Appendix 23, Conversation GOC 3 Cdn Inf Div with Maj-Gen Eberding, GOC 64 German Inf Div – 1 November 1944.

\(^{145}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 13768, 3 CID GS War Diary, October 1944, Appendix 10, Operations Instruction No. 1 – Operation SWITCHBACK – 10 October 1944.

\(^{146}\) LAC, RG 24, Volume 10517, Battle Casualties Experienced in Clearance of Scheldt Estuary by Canadian formations, (n.d.). These casualty figures covered the period from 6 October to 5 November 1944.
Canadian soldiers were affected by the demoralizing nature of the battlefield. Survivors recalled that what they remembered most was constantly being wet, cold, and under fire.\textsuperscript{147} Spry was well aware of his men’s ordeal, and whenever possible he tried to get them a hot bath, dry uniforms, and a hot meal.\textsuperscript{148} Despite his efforts, morale plummeted. Dr. Robert Gregory, the 3rd Division’s psychiatric officer, reported that the soldiers he had treated believed that they had nothing good to look forward to such as rest or leave, and that “the only way one could get out of battle was death, wounds, self-inflicted wounds, and ‘going nuts.’”\textsuperscript{149} Even Dan Spry, normally cheerful in the face of adversity, was changed by the nature of the Scheldt battle. Stanley Todd later recalled that at one point Spry had wanted to quit – likely in SWITCHBACK’s early days, when the situation was at its darkest – but Todd talked him into hanging in for another day: “He wasn’t himself that day, was tired out.”\textsuperscript{150} Such an incident serves as a poignant reminder that generals are human beings, too. Then, too, his superiors were pressuring him to finish the job quickly.\textsuperscript{151} Combined with the inclement conditions, Spry must have been reminded of his experience in the Ortona sector just ten months earlier. Given all of this, he and the vast majority of his men would surely have agreed with an unnamed member of the divisional headquarters staff who, upon recording in the division’s operations log that Operation SWITCHBACK had ended, wrote beside the log entry the heartfelt words, “Thank God!”\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{148} Whitaker, \textit{Tug of War}, 282-283.
\textsuperscript{149} Dr. Robert Gregory, quoted in Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, \textit{Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945} (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 143-144.
\textsuperscript{150} DHH, Granatstein Notes, Brigadier P.A.S. Todd, interview by J.L. Granatstein, Ancaster, Ontario, 8 May 1991.
\textsuperscript{151} Spry later recalled that Generals Charles Foulkes (then the acting II Canadian Corps commander) and Simonds (then Acting Commander, First Canadian Army, as General Crerar was on sick leave) had both been “breathing down my neck.” LAC, Dan Spry Papers, “Recollections of Activities as an Infantry Commander.”
\textsuperscript{152} LAC, RG 24, Volume 13768, 3 CID GS War Diary, November 1944, Appendix 51, Daily Operations Log, 3 November, Serial 16, 0950 hours.
After spending the period of 4-10 November recuperating in the Belgian city of Ghent, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division moved to Nijmegen, Holland, where it relieved the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. It remained there for the next three months. A static front, the formation’s most important tasks were patrolling and preventing the enemy from destroying the Nijmegen bridge, which the 82nd had captured intact in September.\footnote{LAC, RG 24, Volume 13768, 3 CID GS War Diary, November 1944, Appendix 8, 3 Cdn Inf Div Op Order No. 10, 15 November 1944. The 82nd Airborne Division captured the Nijmegen bridge during Operation MARKET-GARDEN, the Allies’ failed bid to seize a bridge over the Rhine River and create a foothold in northern Germany.} By this time, several changes had occurred within Spry’s leadership team. Brigadier Ken Blackader was hospitalized due to illness in late September. His replacement, James Roberts, an armoured corps officer, recalled that Spry “gave me a good start to my new and untried career as an infantryman.”\footnote{James Alan Roberts, The Canadian Summer: The Memoirs of James Alan Roberts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 96.} Lt.-Col. Don Minguay and Lt.-Col. Ernest Côté were both posted out in November. So, too, was Brigadier Stanley Todd.\footnote{Copp, Cinderella Army, 185. Todd became II Canadian Corps’s senior artillery officer. Côté was posted to Ottawa. Côté interview, 6 May 2012.} Minguay’s replacement was Lt.-Col. N.L.C. Mather, Spry’s former brigade major in Italy. It seems likely that the General played a role in Mather’s posting.

During this time in the Nijmegen salient, Maj.-Gen Spry focused on rebuilding his division. Boosting his men’s morale was one of his top priorities. One way that he sought to achieve this end was to endorse a divisional nickname, “the Water Rats,” which he officially announced in a GOC’s memorandum on 9 February 1945.\footnote{LAC, RG 24, Volume 13768, 3 CID GS War Diary, GOC Memorandum No. 9, 9 February 1945.} In this way, he revealed his understanding that symbols such as nicknames fostered a sense of group identity – and thus, promoted good morale. Many military organizations adopted nicknames for precisely these purposes. The 3rd Division’s moniker was patterned after one of the most famous military nicknames of the Second World War, the “Desert Rats,” which the 7th (British) Armoured Division acquired while fighting in the North African desert. The “Water Rats” likewise
symbolized 3 CID’s *travails* in the Breskens Pocket, and it became a badge of honour. It was, however, more than just a name. It was also a logo that appeared on divisional route signs, although when this practice began is not entirely clear. The troops undoubtedly approved, and Spry, who had allowed The RCR’s drivers to paint their sweethearts’ names on unit vehicles while he was the CO, likely winked at the practice. Some senior Canadian officers were not so tolerant. General Crerar allegedly responded by saying “Take that lousy rodent down” when he saw a rat on 3 CID’s route signs.157 Exactly who was responsible for “the Water Rats” nickname is not known. Dan Spry claimed authorship in an interview given years later. 158 Author Peter Simonds, on the other hand, later asserted that Field Marshal Montgomery had suggested it near the end of the Scheldt battles.159 In any event, the name stuck. The “Water Rats” became a symbol of considerable pride among the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s officers and men.

General Spry also sought to restore his men’s morale by repeating techniques that he had successfully used in Italy. One was to make *everyone* feel that they were important members of *his* team. Spry visited unsung units like the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineer workshops, whose men repaired vehicles and equipment, commended his junior staff officers for their co-operation and loyalty, and showed great interest in the work of the division’s chaplains, its historical officer, Captain Martin, and that of Lieutenant Alex Colville, a war artist who joined 3 CID in October.160 Another important step was to ensure that replacement personnel had the training they needed to survive in combat. This was especially important in the fall of 1944 when a severe shortage of trained infantrymen resulting from higher-than-expected casualties

158 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987.
159 Simonds, *Maple Leaf Up, Maple Leaf Down*, 335-336.
forced the Canadian Army to adopt expedient measures like re-assigning men from other trades to the infantry.  

To alleviate this problem, Spry ordered that all new soldiers receive seven to ten days of training on weapons, minor tactics, and how to survive in the front lines. The members of Dan Spry’s division responded just as positively to these morale-boosting efforts as those who had served under him in The RCR and the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade had done. For example, on 1 January 1945 he was presented with a sheet of music, composed by Pipe Major Scott of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, entitled “Maj.-Gen. Spry’s Welcome to 3 Cdn Inf Div.” Also significant is the fact that the troops registered their approval of their GOC by calling him “Danny Boy” amongst themselves. It was for these and other reasons that Brigadier James Roberts credited Spry for the formation’s “surprisingly high” morale.

For Canadian soldiers in battle, however, an important aspect of morale related to their conception of the “brotherhood of arms.” The closeness between soldiers was a key aspect of front-line service. It overrode differences of ethnicity, religion, or social class, and it reinforced their sense of national identity. They belonged to Canada’s armed forces, and most of them served in Canadian units. And while Canadians fought under the operational control of British commanders after they went into combat, they did not think of themselves as British troops. They were acutely conscious of their national status. Dan Spry believed that most of his fellow soldiers felt this way, stating in 1947 that “I do not suppose that there was a soldier who slogged his way up Italy who was not terrifically proud to be a Canadian.” His assessment was correct. A member of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment likely spoke for many soldiers when he

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161 For an authoritative analysis of this subject, see especially E.L.M. Burns, *Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1956).
163 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13768, 3 CID GS War Diary, 1 January 1945; LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987; and Roberts, *The Canadian Summer*, 96.
eloquently, if rather bluntly, expressed such a national feeling during a street battle in an Italian village in September 1944. The regiment’s historian, Farley Mowat, later recorded the incident:

A German officer under cover of a white flag approached a beleaguered section of Baker Company and called upon it in these words: “Surrender you English gentlemen – you are surrounded and will only die.” Private “Slim” Sanford, a sniper and a man famed for his tongue, bellowed back a classic rejoinder. “We ain’t English.” “We ain’t gentlemen – and be Goddamned if we’ll surrender!”

The sense of identity felt by Canadians who were engaged in combat was furthered by the fact that they were, in every sense, a long, long way from home. The differences between the conditions within which they found themselves and their memories of Canada were many and obvious. Those who served in the army’s front-line formations resided in a violent world where dead people, devastated farms, and destroyed villages and towns were normal sights, and much of the local population faced the prospect of homelessness, starvation, financial ruin, or death. Faced with such terrible realities, it was not difficult for servicemen to think of Canada as an idyllic place, despite their unpleasant recollections of the Great Depression. Given all of this, one can readily understand why Dan Spry remarked to a peacetime audience that “[Canada] took on a rosy hue from the Adriatic coast [of Italy].” J.D. MacFarlane, the editor of First Canadian Army’s newspaper, The Maple Leaf, echoed Spry’s views in a book about one of the paper’s most popular features, a cartoon character named Herbie. A faceless private soldier, Herbie symbolized the thoughts and actions of all those who had served in Canada’s wartime army:

[Herbie] saw many things he didn’t like, a few he did. For the first time, he came to really appreciate his own country. He was proud to be a Canadian. He had grown up and his country had grown up with him. He didn’t like to be called “British troops.” He was a Canadian. He came from Canada. His first name was Herbie, his second name...Canadian. P[riva]te Herbie Canadian. That was it. That was important.

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165 Mowat, The Regiment, 217. See also Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers, 325.
167 J.D. MacFarlane, Herbie (Toronto: Thomas & Sons Limited, 1946), 20.
Conceptions of identity were intertwined with those of unity, which was a natural by-product of the teamwork that soldiers had learned was essential for success in battle. In Canada’s overseas army, this sense of cooperative unity had certain national implications. This was due at least in part to the fact that each of the Canadian Army’s overseas divisions, and several of its brigades, were made up of units from different parts of Canada. This policy helped to break down cultural and social barriers because it forced men to learn how to work together. It was a process that had begun while the army underwent years of training in Britain. Canadian High Commissioner Vincent Massey recalled hearing a Canadian officer say that “My battalion is brigaded with a battalion from the West and a French-speaking unit from Quebec. We get along splendidly because what we all want is to have a good brigade.” Such feelings became more deeply felt once Canadian formations went into battle, where soldiers depended on each other for survival. General Spry had seen evidence of this dynamic at work in Italy while he was a battalion and brigade commander, and he saw it again in Northwest Europe as a divisional commander. This cooperative unity was something that he and many other Canadian servicemen and women never forgot. As he told the members of Toronto’s Empire Club in 1947:

The strenuous training exercises and long marches [in Britain] did something towards breaking down the suspicions which one group had of another, but it was not until each division had been subjected to the full test of battle that it developed a really sound divisional spirit. From this test of fire the Nova Scotia miner’s son found that the lad from Quebec was just as good a fighter as he was; and that the Ontario boy fought side by side with the Prairie farmer’s son; and that the boy from the foothills could fight his tank as gallantly as anyone else; and the British Columbia lad “looked over the mountains” and saw that the rest of Canada wasn’t so bad after all. As some of you know, every Canadian division developed tremendous “esprit de corps.” This was possible because of the knowledge and confidence and trust which each unit and each individual had in his fellows…

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In early February 1945, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division launched into its next major battle. Aimed at clearing the area between the Maas and Rhine Rivers, Operation VERITABLE would be the largest operation ever conducted by a Canadian officer. General Crerar would have 449,865 men under his command, organized in three formations – II Canadian Corps, I (British) Corps, and XXX (British) Corps. Lt.-Gen. Brian Horrocks’ XXX Corps would take the lead during VERITABLE’s first phase. With five divisions under his command, including 3 CID, Horrocks was to clear the Reichswald Forest and secure a line running from Cleve to Gennep. Dan Spry’s division was to capture the area between the Rhine River and the Cleve-Nijmegen Road. Subsequent phases would break the German defences in the Hochwald Forest.

Map 7   The Rhineland, February-March 1945
(Source: Adapted from C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary, Map 12)

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170 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 381, and McAndrew, The Canadians in Europe, 126.
When the 3rd Division attacked on 8 February much of its area of operations was flooded. Spry’s men thus went into battle in amphibious personnel carriers. Initially, the enemy offered little resistance. On 15 February, having reverted to Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds’s command, 3 CID took over the 15th Scottish Division’s front, part of which included a wooded area southwest of Moyland. Spry ordered the 7th Brigade to clear it, but the German defenders fought hard and by 19 February the brigade had not captured Moyland Wood. Spry recalled that Simonds was pressuring him to move faster and that he, in turn, pushed his subordinates. Having commanded at the battalion and brigade levels, he well understood the problems that his men were facing:

The people upstairs, Montgomery and so on, seemed to feel that the pace of the battle could be carried on regardless of the realities of the situation – regardless of the weather, of the reduced air support as a result of weather, of the flooding, and the breakdown of the roads, tracks, and trails and of the ensuing supply problems. When troops are wet, cold, miserable, bloody-minded, scared, and tired, it takes time to move and assemble, re-assemble, and deploy them. Everything slows down…These personnel, logistic, geographic, and weather problems were being partially ignored by the senior commanders. They really didn’t understand the sharp end of battle. They had a mental block; they’d never been there. If we had taken a little more time, even another two or three hours of preparation, of reconnaissance, of plotting and planning at various levels, perhaps even my own, we would have done better, without the staggering and unnecessary losses. We rushed our fences.

Spry’s belief that his superiors had no experience of “the sharp end of battle” was not exactly true. Both Montgomery and Crerar had been in combat during the First World War – Montgomery had been wounded while commanding a platoon, while Crerar had led an artillery battery – and Simonds had led 1 CID in Sicily and Italy. He would have been closer to the mark by saying that the latter two officers sometimes crafted plans that were more ambitious than practicable. The Eighth Army’s failed operation on Italy’s Adriatic coast in December 1943 had been Montgomery’s idea. Similarly, Simonds would produce complex plans that his men found

172 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13768, 3 CID GS War Diary, 5-14 February 1945.
173 McAndrew, The Canadians in Europe, 133-134.
difficult to execute. As Maj.-Gen. Harry Foster remarked, “What looked good to Guy’s precise engineering mind on paper seldom worked in practice once the human element was added.”

Dan Spry could do little to influence events at Moyland Wood for his division’s narrow frontage precluded using additional forces. Meanwhile, casualties mounted. Jock Spragge, the 7th Brigade’s commander, left partway through this bitter battle. According to Terry Copp, General Simonds fired Spragge when he said that Moyland Wood’s defences were too strong for his brigade to handle. Spry, on the other hand, recalled that he had recommended that Spragge be pulled out because the man was exhausted. Both stories are plausible. In any event, Spragge’s successor was given time to prepare a coordinated attack. Moyland Wood fell on 21 February.

Jock Spragge was not the only senior commander who was tired. Spry recalled that in the early stages of Operation VERITABLE, General Horrocks had found him “asleep in my bunk in uniform, still mud on my boots. He looked in the door of the caravan, said ‘You need the rest,’ closed the door, and walked away.” Spry’s exhaustion, previously seen during the battle for the Breskens Pocket in October 1944, was understandable. While he considered his youth an asset – “I could do with very little sleep, and with a mug of coffee and a sandwich I could keep going” – he had been a front-line commander for 18 months. The battlefield never really slept. Long hours made a commander’s tasks of planning and making decisions mentally exhausting, which could impair one’s performance. Harry Foster believed that “fatigue can be as great a threat to a commanding officer’s survival as enemy shells or bullets.” It was for this reason that infantry battalion commanders typically spent just three months in their job. For soldiers serving “at the

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175 Foster, Meeting of Generals, 368. General Crerar took part in the battle for Vimy Ridge in 1917, and was awarded the DSO. Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 50-54. Montgomery likewise won the DSO for his actions. He subsequently served in staff positions during the First World War. Montgomery, Memoirs, 31-37.

176 Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 486. The 7th Brigade lost 485 killed, wounded, and missing in this action.

177 Copp, Cinderella Army, 216, and LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987.

178 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987.

179 Foster, Meeting of Generals, 395.
sharp end,” fatigue also stemmed from knowing that one continually risked death or injury. Even senior officers like Dan Spry were not immune from such possibilities. He had narrowly missed being hurt on 2 April 1944 when a church in which he was attending a service was shelled. A few months later in France, he and his aide-de-camp strayed behind enemy lines in their vehicle before realizing their mistake; they were lucky not to have been killed or captured.\footnote{LAC, RG 24, Volume 14076, 1 CIB War Diary, 2 April 1944, and Dan Spry Papers, “Recollections of Activities as an Infantry Commander.”}

For the moment there was no time for rest, for Spry or anyone else. Planning had begun for a new effort, code-named Operation BLOCKBUSTER, to break the German defences in front of the town of Xanten. Beginning on 26 February, this attack bogged down two days later when 3 CID fought to clear the Balberger Wald. Not until 6 March was the enemy subdued.\footnote{LAC, RG 24, Volume 10908, Operation BLOCKBUSTER: Report by Historical Officer, HQ 3 Cdn Inf Div, 5 April 1945, and Stacey, \textit{The Victory Campaign}, 498-514.}

By the time Operation BLOCKBUSTER ended on 8 March, though, Maj.-Gen. Spry’s superiors had reached a decision regarding his employment. Guy Simonds, frustrated by 3 CID’s slowness in capturing Moyland Wood and the Balberger Wald, blamed its commander, and he informed General Crerar that at times Spry “[had] shown a lack of quick tactical appreciation and of robust drive, in the midst of urgent tactical situations, which has somewhat handicapped him as a field commander.”\footnote{LAC, Crerar Papers, Volume 4, Crerar to Montague, 6 March 1945.} Crerar – an old friend of Dan Spry’s father – sympathized with Spry, but knew that if Spry lacked Simonds’s support he had to go.\footnote{Dickson, \textit{A Thoroughly Canadian General}, 402, and LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-18, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry, interview by unknown interviewer, (n.d.).} The question was: how to do so without wrecking Spry’s military career? Coincidentally, Crerar was looking for someone to replace Maj.-Gen. Hamilton Roberts, the GOC of Canadian Reinforcement Units (CRU) in Britain, who was retiring on 1 March.\footnote{Dickson, \textit{A Thoroughly Canadian General}, 402.} Lt.-Gen. Price Montague, CMHQ’s Chief of Staff, had suggested on 12 February that Brigadier Ken Blackader, who had recovered from his illness, fill
this position but Crerar had demurred, asking Montague to do nothing until he was sure a major-
general could not be found. With Dan Spry now available, Crerar wrote to Montague (another
Spry family friend) on 6 March recommending that Spry replace Roberts, touting his military
record and his strengths as a trainer of soldiers.\footnote{LAC, Crerar Papers, Volume 4, Montague to Crerar, 12 February 1945, and Crerar to Montague, 6 March 1945. Montague had told Spry that he would try to repay kindnesses that Spry and his father had shown him. LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-5, Montague to Spry, 4 September 1944.} Ten days later, the Minister of National Defence, by then the retired General McNaughton, weighed in by saying that an older man
should get the job, but Crerar said he would only accept a battle-experienced officer in whom he
had confidence and that Spry was his man. The appointment was approved on 19 March without
Spry’s prior knowledge.\footnote{Ibid., Crerar to Montague, 6 March 1945.} To ensure that Spry’s military career would not be harmed, Crerar
refused to submit a “Change of Employment” form, writing that “There is a certain stigma
attached to this procedure, which, in the circumstances, I should like to avoid.”\footnote{Ibid.}

While the Canadian Army’s official history states only that Spry left the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Canadian
Infantry Division upon assuming command of CRU, other writers have delved into the matter of
his departure.\footnote{Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 531n.} In 1987, popular historians Denis and Shelagh Whitaker wrote that while
Simonds relieved Spry because his division had faltered, they argued that the slowdown had
occurred because Spry and his men had been pushed beyond the limits of their endurance. This
was undoubtedly true. Spry later said that “I know very well I was pooped.”\footnote{Denis and Shelagh Whitaker, Rhineland: The Battle to End the War, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Company Limited, 2000), 230, and LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987.} Paul Dickson, in
his biography of General Crerar, repeated Simonds’s frustration with 3 CID’s recent slowness.\footnote{Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 402.} On the other hand, Guy Simonds’s biographer, historian Dominick Graham, opined that:
[Spry] liked the measure of independence he had enjoyed in the Eighth Army [in Italy] where orders could be the basis for discussion. With Simonds orders were orders unless you could explain your contrary position clearly and concisely. In a later stage in this battle [Moyland Wood], having decided that an order he had received was unlikely to lead anywhere except to more casualties, Spry and his CRA went to bed where they were found by Simonds, angry at Spry’s inactivity. \(^{191}\)

Graham’s critique was shaky on several levels. Firstly, he offered no verifiable source proving that Spry had gone to bed. He also provided no evidence to support his claim that Spry preferred life in the Eighth Army to service under Simonds – if he did, he never said so – much less the serious allegation that he had ignored a superior’s order. Lastly, it was unlikely that Spry could have challenged Simonds on tactical matters. He knew very well, as did most Canadian officers, that doing so risked being summarily fired.\(^ {192}\) As Maj.-Gen. Harry Foster, an old friend of Guy Simonds, observed, “You couldn’t argue with Guy; not and keep your job.”\(^ {193}\)

At the time, other officers had different ideas about Spry’s departure. George Kitching thought that it resulted from Spry telling Simonds that his division could not handle a task it had been assigned.\(^ {194}\) Spry was known to stand up for his men – his defence of Lt.-Col. Ian Johnston at the Hitler Line leaps to mind – and he might have done so again. Peter Bennett thought that Field Marshal Montgomery had fired Spry. This was unlikely, as senior Canadian appointments were only handled through national channels.\(^ {195}\) On the other hand, Bruce Matthews, a fellow divisional commander, thought, like Denis Whitaker, that fatigue was a factor in Spry’s relief.\(^ {196}\)

\(^{191}\) Graham, *The Price of Command*, 201.

\(^{192}\) Ibid. Graham offered no source for his allegations. It is not known if he spoke to an officer (who at his request must remained unnamed) who told J.L. Granatstein that Simonds had found Spry and his CRA asleep after an all-night poker game. The author has found no corroborating evidence for this story. DHH, Granatstein Notes.

\(^{193}\) Foster, *Meeting of Generals*, 368. Historian Douglas E. Delaney has noted that Simonds rarely sought input from others and only exchanged ideas with a small group of trusted people. Delaney, *Corps Commanders*, 227.


\(^{196}\) DHH, Granatstein Notes, Maj.-Gen. A.B. Matthews, interview by J.L. Granatstein, Toronto, 25 April 1991. At the time, Matthews was the commander of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division.
Regardless of the reason for his posting, Dan Spry was out. Simonds informed him of his new job on 20 March 1945, saying that he was badly needed in Britain to “sort out” the army’s reinforcement system. For Spry, it came as “a very great disappointment.” The next morning he told his principal commanders and his staff. That night, he spoke with the other ranks of the divisional headquarters. Brigadier James Roberts recalled that the news came as “a shock,” that Spry was “much appreciated by all of us in 3rd Division,” and that he would be greatly missed. Years later, a battalion commander in the 9th Brigade described Spry and Brigadier Rockingham as “the two best bosses I had.” Others likely felt the same way. Nonetheless, on 22 March Spry left for Britain. His successor, Maj.-Gen. R.H. Keefler, arrived later that day.

What to make of Dan Spry as a senior battlefield commander? Certainly, he was not cut from the same cloth as General Harry Crerar or Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds, both of whom displayed cold personalities and did not generally inspire the affection of their men. Nor was he boisterous, as was Maj.-Gen. Chris Vokes. Rather, Spry was more like Maj.-Gen. Bert Hoffmeister, whose wartime reputation was based on his ability to quickly grasp the technical aspects of his job and his great human skills. Spry, who as a pre-war platoon commander likely never imagined that he would one day lead a Canadian infantry division in battle, possessed the same abilities.

In the years since the war, historians have generally had good things to say about Maj.-Gen. Spry. Writing in 1991, popular historian Dan Dancocks painted a sympathetic picture of Spry’s actions while leading the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade at the Hitler Line, particularly

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197 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13716, II Canadian Corps War Diary, 20 March 1945, and Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, D.C. Spry interview, (?) October 1987. Simonds told Spry that he had been selected because all commanders would be confident that CRU was in good hands. Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, Simonds to Spry, 21 March 1945.
198 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13770, 3 CID GS War Diary, 21-22 March 1945.
199 Roberts, The Canadian Summer, 120. Similar sentiments are found in LAC, RG 24, Volume 15029, Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa War Diary, 31 March 1945.
200 DHH, Granatstein Notes. This person asked Granatstein not to attribute his comments to him.
201 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13770, 3 CID GS War Diary, 21-22 March 1945.
202 Stacey, “Canadian Leaders of the Second World War,” 64-72; Case, “The ‘Fightin’est’ Canadian General” 153; and Delaney, The Soldiers’ General, 227
with regard to his defence of Lt.-Col. Ian Johnston. Ten years later, another popular author, Mark Zuehlke, did the same.\textsuperscript{203} Considerably more has been said about Dan Spry’s performance as a divisional commander, which was the higher-profile job of the two. In 1993, J.L. Granatstein asserted that he rose to senior rank on merit.\textsuperscript{204} Two years later, W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous wrote that Spry “seem[ed] to have been competent,” high praise from two scholars who have mostly criticized Canada’s wartime generals.\textsuperscript{205} In 2000, Denis Whitaker, himself a highly-regarded combat officer, called Spry “one of [Guy Simonds’s] most astute commanders,” while in 2006 Terry Copp largely credited General Spry for the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Canadian Infantry Division’s record as “the most consistently effective formation – Canadian, British, or Polish – to serve in First Canadian Army.”\textsuperscript{206} Most recently, in 2015, Tim Cook said that Spry had “a feel for battle,” thereby recognizing the latter’s grasp of the technical and human skills associated with military command.\textsuperscript{207}

For Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry, the fighting was over. Through his story, one can see how some Canadians learned the sophisticated leadership and management techniques that were required to lead and direct large, complex military organizations in an unforgiving combat environment. One can also see how Spry, as did many thousands of other Canadian servicemen and women of all ranks, discovered that the experience of war included valuable lessons about national identity, citizenship, and cooperative unity. Veterans would carry these and other battlefield lessons with them into their civilian lives. For Dan Spry, the lessons of war would also provide him with the tools with which to carry out high-level civic leadership responsibilities in peacetime Canada.

\textsuperscript{204} Granatstein, The Generals, 262.
\textsuperscript{206} Whitakers, Rhineland, 231, and Copp, Cinderella Army, 293.
\textsuperscript{207} Cook, Fight to the Finish, 327.
CHAPTER 5

TRANSITIONS: WAR TO PEACE, SOLDIER TO CIVILIAN

I remember lying in a debarkation bunk...not wanting to go back to Canada because it represented the unknown. I kept asking myself what the hell was I going to do after being out of Civvie Street for five and a half years and who was I going to be able to talk to?

Anonymous

The cessation of hostilities in Europe in May 1945, and then in Asia in August, presented hundreds of thousands of Canadian men and women with the challenge of rejoining civilian life after their military service. The experience of this transition – from war to peace, from soldier to civilian – was different for each person. Still, most veterans had to address the same question as that posed by the individual quoted above: what to do next, now that the war was over? Through Dan Spry’s example, one can gain a sense of how Canada’s Second World War veterans did so, and why thousands of them incorporated wartime lessons into their civilian lives to help make peacetime Canada a better country.

The war in Europe was still raging when Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry arrived in Britain on 22 March 1945 to assume command of Canadian Reinforcement Units (CRU). After spending two days with his family – Betty was then pregnant, and his daughter, Margot, was two years old – he arrived at his new headquarters at Farnborough, about four kilometres north of Aldershot, in southeast Britain. Next to First Canadian Army, CRU was Canada’s largest and, given its role of providing replacement soldiers, most important army formation overseas. CRU had, for a variety of reasons, been reorganized several times during the war. By March 1945, its main elements were a headquarters and six Groups or training brigades, as depicted at Figure 5-1. Most of these

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1 Anonymous, quoted in Broadfoot, The Veterans’ Years, 18.
2 LAC, RG 24, Volume 16686, Headquarters Canadian Reinforcement Units (hereafter HQ CRU), General Staff (hereafter GS) War Diary, 25 March 1945. See also LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-6, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 27 March 1945. Spry had been on leave in December 1944.
organizations were situated in the Aldershot-Bordon area. As of 30 March 1945, CRU comprised 79,074 all ranks. Nearly half of this number, some 34,197 officers and men, were replacement personnel bound for the front lines.

Figure 5-1 Organization of Canadian Reinforcement Units, March 1945

(Source: LAC, RG 24, Volume 16696, HQ CRU AA & QMG War Diary, CRU Strength Return, 23 March 1945)

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3 LAC, RG 24, Volume 12531, CMHQ Administrative Order No. 46, Re-Organization of Canadian Reinforcement Units, 23 March 1944, and Volume 11216, Reorganization of Infantry in CRU, 26 July 1944. Bordon is situated approximately 17 kilometres southwest of Aldershot.

In terms of its personnel strength CRU was similar in size to an army corps, a lieutenant-general’s command.\(^5\) It was, however, an administrative organization, and as such Dan Spry must have thought that there was relatively little for him to do, at least in comparison to the previous 19 months when he had always been on the go, planning and conducting operations. Now, his main task was to ensure that CRU’s machinery ran efficiently so that the fighting formations were provided with well-trained replacements. A report produced by Lt.-Gen. E.W. Sansom on 29 March 1945 regarding the state of the Canadian Army’s reinforcement system stated that such was already the case.\(^6\) Sansom had concluded that “the present organization for training reinforcements overseas, both officers and other ranks, is functioning in a satisfactory manner and has reached a high standard of efficiency in all arms and services.” This high standard, he wrote, owed a great deal to the fact that field commanders had “loaned” battle-experienced officers and NCOs to serve as instructors. Their presence had improved the quality of training and morale among its trainees.\(^7\) None of this resembled what Lt.-Gen. Simonds had told Spry just two weeks earlier – that he was being posted to CRU to fix problems regarding the training and provision of reinforcements. What Spry thought of this obvious discrepancy is not known.\(^8\) He did not normally dwell on disappointment, so he likely made the best of things while he got to know his new command. On 27 March Spry met with his Group commanders. The following month, he visited the Canadian School of Infantry and various units of “F” Group.\(^9\)

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5 For example, the four divisions that normally comprised II Canadian Corps in 1944-1945 (three Canadian, one Polish) were established for some 66,000 all ranks. Corps troops numbered another 7,785 men. DHH, AHQ Report No. 57, Appendices C and D, 57-64, and Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 109.


8 Dan Spry’s son has said that his father rarely spoke about his time as the commander of CRU. Toby Spry personal e-mail to Gordon C. Case, 11 March 2016.

9 LAC, RG 24, Volume 16686, HQ CRU, GS War Diary, 27 March 1945, and 16-17 April 1945.
When General Spry took command of CRU on 25 March 1945 the war in Europe was nearing its end. In the west, seven Allied armies, including First Canadian Army, had cracked the enemy’s defences on the Rhine and were pouring into Germany. Meanwhile, Russian forces were preparing to attack Berlin from the east; their attack would begin on 16 April. Victory was close at hand. Once Germany was beaten, the Allies, including Canada, planned to transfer forces from Europe to the Pacific theatre to help the United States defeat Japan. Demobilization, in which CRU would play a significant role, would be Canada’s next major challenge.

It was clear to politicians and soldiers alike that demobilizing some 745,000 men and women would require extensive planning. Canada had needed four years to fully mobilize its military and industrial potential. Demobilization and retooling to a peacetime economy had to be completed in a much shorter timeframe. As early as 8 December 1939, the federal government had established an interdepartmental committee to study and report on how best to proceed with demobilization. Nearly two years later, on 1 October 1941, the Post-Discharge Re-establishment Order was enacted. This legislation set the stage for a comprehensive package of veterans’ benefits, known collectively as the Veterans Charter, which would be far more generous than those that were offered after the First World War. These included free university and vocational training for those who wanted it, loans to help soldiers start a business, a guarantee that veterans could return to their pre-war jobs, and preferential treatment for public service employment. The Veterans Land Act of 1942 offered a $4,800 loan to buy a farm. A new federal department, the

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10 This figure was established by subtracting the proposed 50,000-man postwar regular force from the peak wartime strength of the armed forces. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, Volume 2, 396-397, and Appendix 3.

11 Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 51. Canada’s war effort as a whole peaked by the end of 1943.


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Department of Veterans Affairs, was created in October 1944 to coordinate the administration of these programs. All of these measures were aimed at facilitating the re-integration of veterans into civil society. As Walter S. Woods, one of the Veterans Charter’s principal architects and the first Deputy Minister of the Department of Veterans Affairs, put it, “Rehabilitation training was regarded as a good investment for both the veteran and the country.” The troops learned the details of these programs through government-published pamphlets such as Back to Civil Life, which was distributed in August 1944.

Military demobilization planning also began early. In March 1943, CMHQ in London set up a Demobilization Committee. Seventeen months later, with Germany’s defeat seemingly imminent, a Director of Reorganization and Demobilization was named. It was immediately clear that a major hurdle would be the repatriation of some 350,000 overseas military personnel, along with tens of thousands of dependent spouses and children. This multitude would mostly travel by sea. Shipping, however, was in high demand and short supply, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington controlled its allocation through the Allied Shipping Pool. Canada could only request shipping, which would be ranked against operational requirements such as the movement of forces to the Pacific once the European war was over and the needs of nations like the United States with much larger numbers to repatriate. In March 1945, British authorities coordinating Commonwealth shipping requests informed Canada that it would receive 90,000 spaces during the first six months after Germany’s defeat. The government considered

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15 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 177, 8.
16 Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 432. Such was the prevailing view in late August 1944, given Germany’s disastrous defeat in Normandy and equally catastrophic losses in battling the Soviet Union.
17 DHH, File 114.3T1075(D8), Westbound Troop Movements, North Atlantic, June 1945-March 1947. Some 282,593 of these were Canadian Army personnel. See LAC, RG 24, Volume 18576, Memorandum, Canadian Army Statistics War of 1939-45, (n.d.). Most of the rest belonged to the Royal Canadian Air Force.
18 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 177, 74. The Combined Chiefs of Staff was a British-American staff charged with the strategic direction of the Allied war effort. It was headquartered in Washington, D.C.
this figure unacceptable, and it pressed for 150,000 berths. In the end, 214,994 military personnel and their dependants would return to Canada between 1 June and 31 December 1945.19

Military planners knew that personnel could not be moved directly from their current unit locations in Britain and the Continent to the ports because it would be impossible to coordinate such movement with shipping timings. Moreover, no port could accommodate large numbers of people. For this reason, the troops would proceed to staging areas located near the sea ports of embarkation, where they would be temporarily housed and kept busy until their ships sailed. In March 1943, CMHQ’s Transportation and Accommodation Sub-Committee wisely suggested that “as the area around Aldershot and Bordon is always likely to remain a Canadian area, the accommodation available there should be used as the basis of a plan for holding and evacuating through the United Kingdom.” The accommodation in question was that being used by CRU to house reinforcements. As such, repatriation could be best accomplished by using existing facilities and reversing the direction of personnel movement. This plan was quickly adopted. General Spry and CRU thus became key players in the repatriation of Canada’s troops.20

To put this concept of operations in motion, CRU required some organizational restructuring. On 26 April 1945, Spry and his senior operations officer attended an initial planning conference convened by CMHQ in London. Shortly after the war in Europe ended on 8 May, CMHQ held further meetings and directed the establishment of seven new repatriation depots by the end of that month. Four more would be added in June and July, in order to meet the urgent demand for housing.21 These repatriation depots would be allocated to the existing CRU Groups and Training Brigades, as depicted at Table 5-1.

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20 DHH, CMHQ Report No. 177, 58-59.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Under Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Thursley-Bramshott area</td>
<td>“E” Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Witley area</td>
<td>“E” Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Blackdown-Woking area</td>
<td>“B” Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Cove area</td>
<td>“B” Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Farnborough</td>
<td>“B” Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Aldershot area</td>
<td>14 Canadian Infantry Training Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(re-designated “A” Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Aldershot area</td>
<td>“A” Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Aldershot area (later Horsham)</td>
<td>“A” Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Haslemere</td>
<td>13 Canadian Infantry Training Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(re-designated “D” Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Leatherhead</td>
<td>“D” Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Cdn Repat Depot</td>
<td>Forest Row</td>
<td>“D” Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-1  Allocation of Repatriation Depots to CRU Groups, 1945
(Source: DHH, CMHQ Report No. 177, 62-67)

The creation of eleven repatriation depots was accompanied by the disbandment of eight reinforcement units (three armoured, two artillery, and one each of engineers, signals, and ordnance). The 14th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade was dissolved soon thereafter, and its headquarters was re-named Headquarters “A” Group on 4 June 1945. The following month, 13 Canadian Infantry Training Brigade was re-designated as “D” Group.22

By the end of May, General Spry had done what he could to prepare CRU for the oncoming flood of troops returning to Canada. Realizing that maintaining the morale of people who were anxious to go home would be a challenge, he told his subordinates to pay close attention to amenities such as cigarettes and mail.23 Meanwhile, in accordance with the army’s movement priorities, Canadian forces in Europe began preparing for repatriation.24 At this time, those priorities were based on the principle of “first in, first out,” although volunteers for the

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22 LAC, RG 24, Volume 16697, HQ CRU, AA & QMG War Diary, Re-designation and Conversion HQ 14 Cdn Inf Trg Bde to “A” Gp, 1 June 1945, Appendix 4, and DHH, CMHQ Report No. 177, 64.
23 LAC, RG 24, Volume 16697, HQ CRU, AA & QMG War Diary, 22 May 1945.
24 The War Cabinet Committee tentatively approved these priorities on 23 September 1944. DHH, CMHQ Report No. 177, 11-14.
Canadian Army Pacific Force (CAPF), who had to return to Canada for training prior to going to the Pacific, had top priority. Next in line were people with the longest military wartime service, with extra points for overseas duty, and those with families at home. While these high-priority individuals passed through the repatriation system, First Canadian Army – including 1 Canadian Corps, which had moved from Italy to Northwest Europe in March 1945 – would be reformed into five divisional groups and concentrated in Holland. They would return home in the same order of their arrival overseas. The 1st Canadian Infantry Divisional Group would be the first to leave. The last to go home would be the Canadian Army Occupation Force, which was based on the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, after it had completed its task in Germany.  

The flow of personnel returning to Canada began as the war was ending. As historian Dean Oliver has related, 450 men arrived at No. 2 Canadian Repatriation Depot on 8 May 1945, Victory in Europe Day. Another 3,022 troops appeared over the next six days. General Spry handled this sudden influx by sending most of the incoming men on leave and by ramping up soldier education programs. At the time, CRU could house up to 30,000 transient personnel; by July, after the addition of four repatriation depots, it could handle nearly 50,000. But Oliver was quite right in observing that these installations were “the major potential bottlenecks” in the repatriation system. Spry was well aware of this important fact. A far worse problem was that the availability of westbound shipping was unequal to the troops’ expectations, which were surely heightened by early, and optimistic, stories in the Canadian press and barrack-room rumours to the contrary. The fact that 15,665 personnel returned to Canada in June did little to satisfy

25 Stacey, Six Years of War, 432-433. For a scholarly analysis, see Oliver, “When the Battle's Won.”
26 Dean F. Oliver, “Awaiting Return,” 40.
thousands of other men who were impatiently waiting their turn in CRU’s camps. These soldiers were further angered when they found themselves quartered in what they considered were sub-standard barracks. With more and more men arriving from the Continent every day, and with their officers and NCOs seemingly exerting little control over them, the situation grew tense. This was particularly true within No. 7 Canadian Repatriation Depot in the Aldershot area, where on 3 July the unit’s war diarist wrote: “Serials are getting restless – with no definite word on when they may leave and the uncertainty of the future preventing any extra leave.”

Senior military officers knew that the men’s frustration regarding shipping could lead to violence. After the First World War, Canadian troops had rioted in several camps in Britain for the same reason. Dan Spry was certainly aware of the story. In June 1919, his father had been the Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster-General at Witley when Canadian soldiers had burned down several buildings, and Spry Senior had been a key witness in the subsequent inquiry. On the evening of 4 July 1945, the powder keg at Aldershot exploded. For several hours, a few hundred disgruntled and inebriated Canadian soldiers ran amok in the town’s streets, hurling abuse at passers-by and smashing windows. It was an ugly indicator of the men’s mood, and served notice that things could quickly worsen if authorities did not take charge of the situation.

Maj.-Gen. Spry was informed of the riot at 11:25 p.m. on 4 July. He immediately ordered “A” Group, located at Aldershot, to despatch officers and NCOs into town to get the rioters back to their barracks, and he sent Canadian military policemen to cordon off the area and prevent further damage. Shortly after midnight Spry went to “A” Group’s headquarters, where he learned that the rioters’ grievances revolved around the shortage of shipping, a belief that their food was

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28 Stacey, Six Years of War, 433, and Oliver, “Awaiting Return,” 44-47.
29 LAC, RG 24, Volume 16825, No. 7 Canadian Repatriation Depot War Diary, 3 July 1945. A “serial” was a group of people moving in the same transport at the same time.
30 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-11, Aldershot Disturbances – Background Material – Court of Inquiry on Disturbances at Witley Camp, and Stacey, The Half-Million, 170.
inadequate, and a lack of money for soldiers who were not proceeding on leave or going home. He then visited the Aldershot police station, where he advised British authorities to keep their military police and civilian constables away from Canadian troops wherever possible, thinking that such contact might cause more trouble and mar relations between Britons and Canadians. Before going to bed, Spry briefed CMHQ and obtained its approval to pay transient personnel.31

The following morning, Dan Spry addressed the men in each of “A” Group’s three repatriation depots. Some soldiers booed when he appeared before them.32 What Spry thought of this example of undisciplined behaviour is not known, but he wisely kept his cool. Beginning by explaining the shipping problem, he told the troops that every effort was being made to acquire more shipping space. Regarding the complaint about food, he said that they were on the same home service ration scale as British and other Dominion forces, and that it was much more than what the civilian population was getting. Spry then informed the men he had arranged for them to draw pay if they were not going on leave. He appealed to their honour as soldiers, telling them that their bad behaviour threatened to damage the Canadian Army’s high reputation, and that he expected officers and NCOs to maintain order and to look after their men’s welfare. Finally, Spry invited the men to ask him questions and to air their grievances. In addition to what he already knew, Spry found that they were dissatisfied by a shortage of cigarettes and what they thought were inadequate briefings about when they would be going home.33

Some of No. 7 Canadian Repatriation Depot’s staff were unimpressed by General Spry’s attempt to calm things down. The depot’s war diarist thought the men’s behaviour deserved a “blast,” which Spry did not deliver, while a few went so far as to call his speech “a hell of a poor

31 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-10, Court of Inquiry, Aldershot Disturbances, 17 July 1945, Evidence for Night of 4 July 1945, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry, DSO.
32 LAC, Volume 16746, Headquarters “A” Group War Diary, 5 July 1945.
33 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, Court of Inquiry, Aldershot Disturbances, Evidence for Night of 4 July 45, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry, DSO.
show.”34 Exactly why Spry took a softer approach is not known. He may have believed that a firmer stance would only exacerbate the troops’ hard feelings and make things worse. Then again, his “quiet approach” had always worked well in the past. He may have thought it would succeed in this situation, too. However, Spry’s speech did not defuse the tension in Aldershot, and neither did the doubling of Canadian military police patrols in Aldershot. Rioting broke out again on the night of 5 July, with more civilian property damage but no serious injuries as with the night before. Once again, Spry did not overreact.35 As he told a Court of Inquiry convened by CMHQ to investigate the riots, he used “A” Group’s officers and NCOs to try to reduce the size of the crowd. Only then did he get the military police to break it up and arrest the rioters. He added that he wanted to avoid having Canadian troops fighting Canadian military police, as that would have “a lasting unfortunate effect within the Canadian Army.”36

The fallout from the Aldershot riots, which caused $41,541 in property damage, was varied.37 On 6 July, transient personnel assigned to No. 7 Canadian Repatriation Depot were moved to camps farther away from the town. The same day, General Spry authorized the creation of a special (unarmed) infantry battalion, which was to be used as a reserve force to support the military police. He also rebuffed – wisely, in Dean Oliver’s estimation – a British offer of an armed security brigade, for the same reason that he had not wanted British military police involved during the riots. Court-martials were held for the most serious offenders. Surprisingly, three of the ringleaders were CAPF volunteers; six received prison sentences.38 The riots also had long-term effects, of which the most important was General Crerar’s decision,

34 LAC, RG 24, Volume 16825, No. 7 Canadian Repatriation Depot War Diary, July 1945, Appendix 5, “A” Wing War Diary, 5 July.
35 Oliver, “When the Battle's Won,” 329.
36 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, Court of Inquiry, Aldershot Disturbances, 17 July 1945. Exactly what Spry meant is not known. He may have been trying to ensure soldiers’ postwar respect for authority.
37 Stacey, Six Years of War, 433.
38 Oliver, “Awaiting Return,” 48-49.
made on 10 July 1945, to abandon points-based repatriation of individuals in favour of repatriation by unit. Crerar believed that Aldershot was proof of that system’s failure. Unit repatriation, he argued, was easier to administer and it allowed officers and NCOs to retain control over their men. Unfortunately, as Oliver has pointed out, this decision gave many soldiers the impression that fairness, which repatriation by length of service exemplified, had been replaced by administrative expediency. Ultimately, Crerar’s action caused further morale issues within Canadian Army formations waiting to go home.39

Within CRU, Maj.-Gen. Spry redoubled his efforts to boost morale. In July, recognizing that the repatriation depots were highly susceptible to the spread of rumours, he ordered the publication of a CRU Repatriation News Bulletin to keep the soldiers informed of the facts of their situation. That same month, CRU Headquarters announced that transient personnel could volunteer for paid work on the surrounding farms. Then, on 4 September, pipe and brass bands were established for most of CRU’s repatriation depots to entertain the troops.40 These were good initiatives, but the greatest boost to morale lay in Canada’s acquisition of more space on westbound ships. This happy occurrence came in August, when Japan’s surrender on 15 August eliminated the need to redeploy forces to the Pacific. Another key factor was that additional large passenger liners, like the Queen Elizabeth, were pressed into service to transport troops to their home nations.41 As a result of all this, August 1945 saw the return of 29,763 Canadian military personnel to Canada, while 37,593 more went home the next month. Some 30,615 all ranks departed in October, 17,145 more sailed in November, and another 36,023 left in December.42

39 Ibid., 51-52.
40 LAC, RG 24, Volume 16697, HQ CRU, AA & QMG War Diary, 15 and 19 July 1945, and Volume 12259, CMHQ Administrative Order No. 110, 4 September 1945.
41 Dean Oliver, “When the Battle's Won,” 268. Two weeks later, on 1 September, the government ordered the disbandment of the CAPF. Stacey, Six Years of War, 519.
As the memory of the Aldershot riots faded, many – if not most – servicemen and women returned to the important question of what to do once they were released. Some, including Spry, had been out of Canada for years, although Spry’s family was with him in Britain; memories of home had sustained them during their toughest moments. They must have wondered: Would there be jobs for people such as themselves who had little experience other than military service? Would the economic hardship and unemployment they had known during the Great Depression return? How would they rejoin society after having experienced war? Each soldier – private and general alike – had to decide upon a course of action that best suited them. In Spry’s case, this thought process began even as the war in Europe was ending. A hint of his thinking may be seen in a letter that Lt.-Gen. Montague sent to General Crerar on 15 May. Responding to the latter’s query regarding Spry’s suitability to serve as Commander of the Canadian Army Occupation Force in Germany, Montague wrote: “While Spry stated he would of course loyally serve where required, I gathered he did not wish to seek employment in either Occupation or Far East Force…” If Dan Spry did not want these jobs, what were his thoughts about his future?

Surviving correspondence between Spry and his brother Graham from this period reveals that his plans for the future did not include the army. The problem was that he had to remain in Britain for the foreseeable future, and he had few contacts outside of military circles. Spry had to find some way to circulate his name among those in Canada who might hire him. Coincidentally, Graham had also spent the war in Britain – he had been the personal assistant of a British cabinet minister, Sir Stafford Cripps – and Graham was returning to Canada to seek work. Graham had

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senior-level government and business contacts in both countries. The brothers were on good terms and, although their political outlooks were very different, they both believed in improving society through service to others. Dan Spry asked Graham to speak to potential employers on his behalf. Graham agreed to do so, and he began his job-scouting efforts in Ottawa in July 1945.45

For the next few months, the topic of Dan Spry’s job search featured prominently in letters between the two brothers. It seems clear that Spry had provided Graham with some points with which to guide his efforts, for he reiterated them in a letter dated 15 August:

(1) I think I can talk to people.
(2) I know I can organize and get others to work.
(3) I want to be in, and to serve Canada.
(4) I know nothing of Big Business, stocks, Bonds, etc.
(5) I am capable of writing, speaking, and spreading information.
(6) I want a fair amount of, or at least my share of, the “Four Freedoms” for which I am reputed to have been fighting.
(7) I am aware that this requirement automatically restricts the number of opportunities.
(8) When my task here is finished I want to leave the Army.
(9) In order to appreciate the position adequately I must get to Canada as soon as possible after I finish here. This I want to be before Spring 1946.46

The points enumerated within Spry’s letter offer historians a rare glimpse into how a Canadian soldier linked wartime military experience with the matter of postwar civilian employment. He recognized that his most valuable job assets were his ability to plan, organize, and direct the operations of large and complex organizations, not to mention his communication skills and his talent for leading and motivating people in stressful situations. It is clear that he believed such skills and abilities, products of his wartime military service, would be transferrable to a civilian career. It is also important that Spry wanted his post-military career, whatever it might be, to involve service to his country. This is compelling evidence that he had internalized the army’s

45 Graham’s Canadian job search failed, for which he blamed his socialist political past. He returned to Britain in December 1945, finding work with an oil company. Potvin, Passion and Conviction, 164.
46 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 15 August 1945.
ethos of service. Finally, these points also hint that Spry wanted to use abilities he had mastered during the war to help make peacetime Canada a better place. All of these, as will be seen in later chapters, were lessons that other Canadian veterans would apply to aspects of their civilian lives.

Dan Spry might have had clear ideas about his skills and desires, but such clarity did not extend to the process through which he would find a civilian job. From July to October 1945, he and his brother discussed a variety of civilian employment ideas. An early proposal was joining Canada’s foreign service, as is revealed in a letter from Graham dated 5 July:

The subjects we have been discussing before [my] departure have been pursued here without any definite result, some of the key people being still absent, but I am seeing Norman [Robertson] on his arrival in two days. I saw Charles [Ritchie] also. He had no word about either of the two cases. I have however planted the appropriate seeds at the key places and you can count on the most favourable consideration, I have little doubt. But what the cases will lead to is quite unknown. And there are certainly opportunities. On the other side, however, there is a general hesitation about successful young people from overseas, it is easily understood, and only takes the human form of a protectiveness of jobs already held or promotions in prospect supported by the argument what do service people know about these things? I don’t take it very seriously but it exists, and is to be recognized. There is the contributory factor that those who have come back at the top level have largely gone in for politics when they left the service and not always on the winning side. But so far as you are concerned, you have a high respect here all the way up the official scale and all will be well.47

Graham did speak with Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson about Dan Spry’s and, presumably, his own job search, but their discussion went nowhere. On 24 July Graham wrote to his brother, saying that Robertson had told him that “the ‘quota’ of generals was rather full” in the Department of External Affairs, but he promised to talk again in August after speaking with “the top people.”48 This may have been a polite brush off on Robertson’s part. Historian James Eayrs has asserted that there was a pervasive belief in the

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47 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-16, Graham Spry to Dan Spry, 5 July 1945. Charles Ritchie was the head of the Department of External Affairs First Political Division. See John Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 240 and 302.
48 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Graham Spry to Dan Spry, 24 July 1945.
federal government during this time that generals were not to be trusted as they would likely try to go beyond their jurisdiction. There were also some who felt that senior officers were too rigid in their thinking, and that they lacked the education and training to deal with security issues in the nuclear age. Norman Robertson and others in External Affairs had earned advanced academic degrees: very few general officers possessed such qualifications.\textsuperscript{49} If such dismissive attitudes regarding Canada’s senior military leadership existed in the Department of External Affairs as Graham Spry indicated in his letter, or could be found throughout the government as Eayrs has alleged, they came straight from the top. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who until early 1946 was also the Secretary of State for External Affairs, was well known for his deep suspicion of generals.\textsuperscript{50} By 15 August, with no further news on this front, Dan Spry admitted that while he still had “the yen for a soldier diplomat’s life,” he thought his chances of securing such an appointment were rather remote.\textsuperscript{51}

At the same time that Graham Spry was exploring postwar job opportunities for his brother in Canada’s foreign service, he kept his eye out for other options. Despite the fact that Dan Spry knew nothing about the world of business, but did know how to direct and manage large organizations, Graham advised him of such an opportunity on 24 July that he thought might appeal to a person seeking to engage in some form of public service:

I sent you some newspaper cuttings about a large-scale housing scheme which with government encouragement is to be financed by a group of Canadian insurance companies...I am not fully acquainted with all the details...But this is clear: first, the housing is in the first instance for returned soldiers, second, there are two top jobs, the technical construction side and second the general managerial side...The second is what interested me, and I suggested your name for consideration to E.J. Tarr. I told him you would only be interested in it as a public


\textsuperscript{50} For example, C.P. Stacey described King as “unmilitary and anti-military.” Stacey, \textit{Canada and the Age of Conflict}, Volume 2, 17.

\textsuperscript{51} LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 26 July and 15 August 1945.
service job related to returned soldiers and explained all the true and untrue reasons why you would be just the man for it. The appointment is not in his hands but in the hands of a committee based in Toronto or Montreal and representing the insurance companies participating...You may or may not hear from Toronto, or Montreal. But the job seemed to me big enough and public enough to interest you and I also thought it not without its value that the business community should be aware that you might perhaps be interested in business jobs in due course...52

Here, too, Graham emphasized Dan Spry’s desire for a public service role, but the latter was never contacted by the housing scheme’s organizing committee.53

By 15 August Spry had come up with more ideas: “What about Canadian clubs? Institute of International Affairs – League of Nations Society – Montreal Gazette – Southams – McLean’s Publishing House – a University chair of Military Studies – or MP – or Dominion or Provincial Planning Committees…? Oh Hell – there are a million things to do – but I can’t see the trees for the wood at 3,000 miles.”54 This letter revealed his frustration with the lack of responses from potential employers, his inability to conduct his own job search as he was still in Britain – and perhaps his indecisiveness. Still, Spry carried on. On 27 August, he told Graham that he wanted to find a financier to help him buy a small newspaper in Nova Scotia, after which he would seek election as a federal Liberal. Spry thought his ties to Dalhousie might help him as he had been the editor of the student newspaper, although he had been asked to leave the school in 1932. Spry said that he had “lots of friends down there,” and had “youth and overseas experience which is not too abundant in [the Liberal] party.”55 Graham’s subsequent letters do not say if he contacted the Liberal Party about his brother’s aspirations, but he did check out Southam Incorporated, a national newspaper chain that had operations in Nova Scotia.56 This plan, too, fizzled out.

52 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Graham Spry to Dan Spry, 24 July 1945.
53 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 15 August 1945, and Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Graham Spry to Dan Spry, 31 October 1945.
54 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 15 August 1945.
55 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 27 August 1945.
56 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Graham Spry to Dan Spry, 14 September 1945.
On 24 August Graham had provided Dan Spry with names of British officials he could contact regarding job opportunities in Britain, and he offered to write letters of introduction on Dan’s behalf. At the same time, knowing that Canada’s unemployment rate was then growing, Graham urged his brother to keep “a firm hold on the army ladder – burning no bridges until there is a dry river to cross.”⁵⁷ He repeated this advice two months later, on 31 October:

I have been writing to and calling on people and have got nowhere…the unanimous advice is to stay in the new 50,000 armed forces with six militia divisions…If you want to be a civilian, be one. But avoid gambling everything at once. In other words, aim for security first. I think if I were you, I would go in for a business career that promised reasonably surely to make some money…Then, you can buy newspapers and do as you please…At the moment, competition is furious. Brig[adier] Stan Todd has been here since June and not a nibble, not a single nibble…what I find is – you write, you call, and nothing happens e.g. not a word more did I hear about the housing scheme job. My friend wrote the letter – then silence…Here the woods are full of men, and all the treetops are full, too…⁵⁸

General Spry had the luxury of good connections through his brother Graham and having a well-paying military job. Not every veteran was so lucky, a situation that flies in the face of Canadians’ warm recollection of immediate postwar prosperity. Fewer than 200,000 of them returned to the jobs they had held prior to joining the armed forces through the provisions of the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, a component of the Veterans’ Charter. The rest, as Graham Spry pointed out, had to compete for what jobs were available in an economy that was only beginning to transition from wartime to peacetime production. Not surprisingly, Canada’s unemployment rate had grown in the months after the war. In April 1946, more than 70,000 male veterans were unemployed.⁵⁹ As it turned out, the country’s unemployment problem proved to be a temporary reality as the economy began a prolonged boom, and the vast majority of Canada’s

⁵⁷ LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Graham Spry to Dan Spry, 24 August 1945. Canada’s unemployment rate grew from 2.0 per cent to 2.75 per cent in 1945. Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada Since 1945, 19.
⁵⁸ LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, Graham Spry to Dan Spry, 31 October 1945.
Second World War veterans eventually found some sort of employment after rejoining the civilian work force.

The thought process that drove Dan Spry’s job search in the summer and fall of 1945, and especially his effort to figure out how to transfer his military skills to a civilian job, is indicative of the mental struggle that many servicemen must have gone through in deciding what to do after their military service.60 The degree of difficulty that they had in making the transition from soldier to civilian varied according to the individual, as may be seen in oral historian Barry Broadfoot’s *The Veterans’ Years*. Unlike most of his fellow soldiers, however, Spry was not a wartime volunteer, and thus one wonders why he, a high-ranking and successful professional officer, desired to leave the army. One important reason, as Spry told his brother on 15 August, was boredom: “I continue to read a great deal but only see the occasional person to whom I can talk [about] anything but ‘repatriation or the future of the Army.’ Both are dull. Anyway – some feel the Army is doomed in view of the Atom bomb.”61 He reiterated this point twelve days later, writing that “I still feel I just can’t stay on at this sort of business for 20 years.”62 Other considerations revolved around the realities of peacetime military service. While staying with the colours offered security for himself and his family, such a plan entailed aspects that Spry increasingly considered intolerable. He expressed such feelings in a letter dated 23 October:

> Time marches on and I don’t want to find myself trapped into the Occupation Force when my job here is over in the early Spring…If I stay in I am almost bound to have to go to Germany, and this is not acceptable because (A) it would mean separation from my family of which I have had enough and (B) it would be two or three years thrown down the drain. It is all very well to say there is a military future, but the old boys are NOT getting out, I am still NOT confirmed, I would have no incentive because I would be unable to act under the usual restrictions, I am NOT interested, and there would be nothing to aim for. Security is delightful and very acceptable but not at the price of mental stultification for

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60 Most servicewomen returned to domestic duties. See Prentice, et al., *Canadian Women: A History*.
61 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 15 August 1945.
62 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 27 August 1945.
another twenty years in Germany and [as] DOC [District Officer Commanding] Regina. So you see, I must find some other road to march. So easy to say, so difficult to find (at 3000 miles range).63

General Spry’s suspicions regarding his probable role as Commander of the Canadian Army Occupation Force in Germany were well founded. Since 16 May 1945 General Harry Crerar, the commander of First Canadian Army and the key decision-maker for senior-level army officer appointments, had planned that Maj.-Gen. Spry should replace Maj.-Gen. Chris Vokes as that organization’s commander at the end of the year so that Vokes could retire.64 Spry was also correct in assuming that senior officers such as Lt.-Gen. Charles Foulkes and Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds would not retire, and that they would get the plum jobs in the peacetime Army.65 Then, too, if he was not confirmed in the rank of major-general – his rank was still “acting” – he would have to revert to brigadier, his last substantive rank.66 For these reasons, Spry thought that he had “peaked” too soon, and that there would be little of interest to do in the army for years to come.67

Despite wanting to leave the army, by November 1945 Dan Spry decided to take his brother’s advice and remain in uniform. Given the circumstances at the time, it was the right decision. He had had no luck in finding a suitable civilian job, and with a wife and two young children to support – his second child, Toby, was born on 19 September 1945 – he believed he could not jeopardize his family’s domestic security. Such an attitude, as historian Doug Owram has convincingly argued, was shared by a good many of Spry’s generation. Having known only

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63 LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 23 October 1945.
66 Spry’s rank as major-general should have been confirmed as “substantive” one year after his promotion, on 18 August 1945. This did not occur until 3 February 1946. LAC, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry Personnel File, Adjutant-General to District Officer Commanding, Military District No. 4, 8 February 1946.
the instability caused by economic depression and war in their lives to date, they valued domestic security above all else in the postwar period.\textsuperscript{68} Assuring his family’s wellbeing by remaining in the army likely seemed a bit more palatable to Spry after he received a message from CMHQ on 13 November saying that his next job would be Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS) in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{69} Spry’s selection for this prestigious appointment was a clear indication of his high standing in Canada’s army, his acting rank notwithstanding. The news was not a surprise, as he had already been told about it by an unnamed source acting in confidence. Spry was very pleased by the news, writing to his brother a week earlier that “It is the only job I would accept.” Still, he had not entirely given up on finding a suitable civilian job, saying that “I hope it will give me the time and the opportunity to look around before taking my next step into a new life.”\textsuperscript{70}

General Spry’s new appointment in Ottawa remained a guarded secret for the time being. In the meantime, with the number of Canadian servicemen overseas gradually shrinking, he dismantled CRU. In September, Spry had reduced several units and “F” Group Headquarters to nil strength.\textsuperscript{71} Two months later, he requested permission to disband “C” Group. In December, he issued a plan that called for eliminating “D” Group and eight repatriation depots by the end of the first quarter of 1946.\textsuperscript{72} Finally, on 24 December, CMHQ issued an announcement that Spry would immediately hand over his duties to Brigadier Ken Blackader and return to Canada.\textsuperscript{73} A few days later the Sprys sailed from Southampton aboard the Queen Mary. They arrived in New York on 3 January 1946. After some days of leave in Halifax, the family travelled to Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{68} Doug Owram, “Canadian Domesticity in the Postwar Era,” 208-209.
\textsuperscript{69} LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, Deputy Adjutant-General, CMHQ, to HQ CRU, Appointment of Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry, DSO, 13 November 1945.
\textsuperscript{70} LAC, Graham Spry Papers, Volume 3, Dan Spry to Graham Spry, 8 November 1945.
\textsuperscript{71} LAC, RG 24, Volume 11698, HQ CRU, AA & QMG War Diary, September 1945.
\textsuperscript{72} LAC, Volume 12259, Commander CRU to Chief of Staff CMHQ, Disbandment of Units Within CRU, 14 November 1945, and Volume 16699, HQ CRU, AA & QMG War Diary, December 1945, Rundown Timetable – CRU. HQ CRU was disbanded on 22 July 1946. Stacey, Six Years of War, 433-444.
\textsuperscript{73} LAC, Volume 16686, HQ CRU, GS Staff War Diary, 28 December 1945.
There, on 15 January, Spry reported to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Lt.-Gen. Charles Foulkes, a fellow RCR officer and the man who undoubtedly played a deciding role in arranging his job as VCGS.74

Returning to Canada after having served overseas must have been something of a culture shock for many veterans. After all, there was none of the physical destruction that they had seen in Europe and elsewhere. Canadians suffered comparatively few hardships during the war, even with an acute housing shortage and the rationing of gasoline, certain food items, and other commodities.75 Then, too, the country’s fiscal situation was in a much better state than it had been six years earlier. By the war’s end Canada’s Gross National Product had more than doubled, and the federal government’s income had also grown. J.L. Granatstein has asserted that this wealth, combined with the nation’s good war record, promoted “a feeling that Canada had the resources and Canadians the ability to provide a good life for all.”76 This was very different from the conditions that Spry and many other returning servicemen and women remembered. Despite this good fortune, there was an nagging current of fear regarding Canada’s future. Politicians, citizens, and veterans alike worried that wartime prosperity might be followed by an economic crash as had happened after the First World War, and that reintegrating hundreds of thousands of veterans into civilian life might cause high levels of unemployment and civil unrest.77 Such fears were not uniquely Canadian. As American historians Michael D. Gambone and Suzanne Mettler have written, many in the United States had similar concerns.78

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74 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-2, Record of Service (n,d.).
75 For the war’s effects on domestic Canadian life, see Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers, and Graham Broad, A Small Price to Pay: Consumer Culture on the Home Front, 1939-45 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).
76 Granatstein, Canada’s War, 419-421. For example, revenue from income taxes came to $112 million in 1939. In 1945, they totalled $809 million.
77 For more on this matter, see Owram, “Canadian Domesticity in the Postwar Era,” 211-212, and Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada Since 1945, 45.
If Canada had changed as a result of the Second World War, so, too, had veterans. Most had left their homes as young, inexperienced men and women: they came home as mature, worldly-wise adults. Soldiers who had served in forward areas had seen the horrors of modern warfare. Many of them, including Dan Spry, had risked their lives and had lost friends. Then, too, Spry and thousands of other Canadians who had been front-line leaders had borne the heavy responsibility of issuing orders that they knew would result in the death or injury of others. Experiences like these left some veterans with physical and mental scars. Spry, for one, had nightmares for years after the war, although his son has said that their frequency diminished with the passage of time. Many former soldiers wanted to put the war behind them and get on with their lives. Most of them, although proud of their wartime service, did not – and felt that they could not – talk about the war with those who had not been there. It was only decades later that a few veterans did so. Here, too, Spry’s behaviour was fairly typical. The first recorded instance in which he spoke to others about his experience of command in battle was a talk he gave in 1982, and it did not include war’s harsh realities. Spry’s family members have also said that he rarely spoke about the war other than to relate funny stories, and that Remembrance Day was a sombre time in the Spry household. Strikingly, his closest friends in peacetime tended to be men who had been wartime comrades. These friends included John Rockingham, who had led a brigade in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and T.E. Snow, a fellow RCR officer. Spry, Rockingham, and Snow understood each other in a way that those who had not gone to war could not.

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79 For analyses of veterans’ physical and mental challenges, see Tremblay, “Going Back to Main Street,” 160-178, and Copp, “From Neurasthenia to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” 149-159. For individual recollections, see Broadfoot, *The Veterans’ Years*. Toby Spry related Dan Spry’s experience to the author on 8 December 2013.

80 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, “Recollections of Activities as an Infantry Commander.” In many cases, it was not until the early 1990s that Second World War veterans began telling some of their stories to their fellow Canadians. One way in which they have done so is as volunteer speakers through Historica Canada’s *The Memory Project*.

Notwithstanding the wish of many veterans to put the Second World War behind them, thousands of them – including Dan Spry – returned home with the idea of applying their wartime lessons in their peacetime lives. The reasons why they did so varied according to the individual. Most people, like Spry, had little experience other than that which they had gained in the armed forces. It made perfect sense for them to seek civilian jobs where they could utilize skills they had learned during their military service. For others, applying wartime lessons involved a desire to make Canada a better place than that which they remembered. Such an activist sentiment was apparent in the federal election results on 11 June 1945, when 32 per cent of the military vote went to the left-leaning Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, nearly double that of the civilian vote (17 per cent). J.L. Granatstein has said that this phenomenon may have reflected a fear that unemployment would be their lot after being released from the armed forces. On the other hand, thousands of Canada’s Second World War veterans also viewed themselves as future nation-builders. An anonymous member of their number spoke for many of his peers when he recalled that “I had sort of pledged myself...to making Canada a better place by making myself a more worthwhile citizen of Canada.” As will be shown in Chapters 7 and 8, the Canadian Legion put this forward-looking philosophy into action after the war’s end, thereby playing a leading societal role in communities large and small across Canada. Spry fell into this category, too. His children have both said that he returned home from the war greatly concerned about the future of youth. He had seen the deaths of many young people while he had been overseas. The more he thought about it, the more he wanted to do something to prepare them for their future responsibilities as adult citizens. American ex-servicemen and women had similar ideas. As

83 Anonymous, quoted in Broadfoot, *The Veterans’ Years*, 196-197.
84 Margot Gowing interview, 2 August 2013, and Toby Spry interview, 8 December 2013.
historian Michael Gambone has asserted, “The overwhelming majority [of Second World War veterans] made a basic decision to build a better America and pass this accomplishment along to the next generation.”

Upon arriving in Ottawa, General Spry got his family settled down and focused on his new duties, which he began on 3 February 1946. As VCGS, Spry was responsible to General Foulkes for the activities of the army’s General Staff, which had a number of directorates dealing with operations and planning, intelligence, signals, training, operational research, history, coastal and anti-aircraft defences, and the Reserve Army. The Canadian Army was still trying to adjust to postwar realities. On 25 June 1945, the CGS had provided the Minister of National Defence, General (retired) A.G.L. McNaughton, with the army’s recommendations for its peacetime structure. Briefly, it wanted an Active Force of 55,788 all ranks, a Reserve Force of 177,396 men, and a Training Force of 48,500 men between 18½ and 19½ years of age, the latter of whom would undergo one year of obligatory military training and then serve in the Reserve Force. This ambitious plan was intended to avoid Canada’s military unpreparedness in the event of a future conflict. It was a laudable goal, but the Cabinet Defence Committee flatly rejected the army’s plan. Such a negative outcome was hardly surprising. Prime Minister King was the Committee’s chairman, and his suspicion of military men – and their ambitious plans – never lessened. On 19 December 1945, the Cabinet authorized a regular army with a maximum strength of 25,000 officers and men, subject to its approval of financial estimates. King, a long-time foe of conscription, was incensed by the army’s universal military training scheme, calling it “perfectly

87 For an organization chart depicting National Defence Headquarters (Army) in April 1945, see Stacey, Six Years of War, Appendix J.
outrageous.”\textsuperscript{90} Canada’s peacetime army would not be nearly as large as Foulkes, Spry, and other senior officers had naively hoped. As it turned out, the regular army could not even fill its restricted manning ceiling of 20,079 officers and men. In fiscal year 1946-1947, for example, it numbered just 15,563 men and women.\textsuperscript{91} Canadians, it seemed, had had enough of soldiering.

In the years after 1945, Canada faced a very different strategic situation from that of the 1930s. Relations between the Soviet Union and the West had begun cooling even before the war’s end. Then, on 6 September 1945, a defecting Soviet cipher clerk named Igor Gouzenko informed Canadian authorities in Ottawa that a Soviet spy ring had infiltrated both the Department of External Affairs and the segment of the Canadian scientific community that had assisted the United States in developing the atomic bomb. A shocked Prime Minister King came to the uncomfortable realization that the Soviet Union might one day launch a war against the West. If that happened, Canada, an ally of both Britain and the United States, and geographically situated between the two main protagonists, would be threatened. Combined with Britain’s economic and military weakness – the country had been bankrupted by the war – it was clear that much closer military cooperation with the United States would be necessary.\textsuperscript{92}

Fortunately, a bilateral forum was already in place within which such cooperation could be effected. This was the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), which had been created by Prime Minister King and President Franklin Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, New York on 18 August 1940 to address shared continental defence concerns. The PJBD was a wartime entity, but by May 1944 Canadian military planners had rightly concluded that it would be equally useful in

\textsuperscript{90} Granatstein, \textit{Canada’s Army}, 315. Similarly, the Royal Canadian Navy was told to plan for a maximum of 10,000 all ranks instead of the 20,000 it had proposed, while the Royal Canadian Air Force got a manning ceiling of 15-20,000 regulars instead of the 30,000 it wanted. Stacey, \textit{Canada and the Age of Conflict}, Volume 2, 396-397.

\textsuperscript{91} DHH, AHQ Report No. 90, 18. For an analysis of the relationship between Canadian military personnel numbers and morale in the immediate postwar years, see Eayrs, \textit{In Defence of Canada}, Volume 3, 119-136. A breakdown of the Army’s 25,000 positions is found at DHH, File 112.21009(D106), CGS to Heads of Branches, Chairman, War Establishments Committee, 30 April 1946.

peacetime. From the Canadian perspective, the Board offered the advantage of being an advisory rather than an executive body, within which Canada had an equal voice. It was also a military-civilian organization. Each country’s national section was led by a civilian, and included a senior representative of the navy, army, air force, and the diplomatic corps. Through the PJBD, Canada would have a means of expressing its views to senior American officials increasingly concerned about securing their country’s northern flank against Soviet attack. The Americans no doubt perceived benefits of continued military cooperation with Canada, too.

Perhaps because General Spry’s job included overseeing the army’s plans and operations, General Foulkes had him replace Maj.-Gen. H.F.G. Letson, the commander of the Canadian Army Staff in Washington, D.C., as the army’s PJBD representative on 1 March 1946. At this time, Spry and his fellow military delegates were also members of the Canada-United States Planning Committee, later called the Military Cooperation Committee, which was then drafting a postwar continental defence plan. Released on 5 June 1946, the Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan assumed that, by 1950, the Soviets would be capable of attacking North America with missiles and long-range bombers, and that they might soon have nuclear weapons. To counter these threats, the joint military planners called for a continental air defence system that would see long-range radar, fighter aircraft, and bases deployed as far north as possible to counter what they believed was the likely Soviet approach. They also suggested creating naval patrols to guard the continent’s maritime approaches, and Arctic-capable ground forces to deal with land incursions. All of this would come under a bilateral command and control structure.

93 LAC, RG 24, Volume 21038, “Permanent Joint Board on Defence History,” by Major D.J. Goodspeed, 10 June 1960, 3-4.
94 DHH, File 112.3M2(D281), Committee on Post Hostilities Problems Joint Drafting Group, Preliminary Draft, Postwar Canadian Defence Interests in United States Defence Projects in Northwest Canada, 6 July 1945.
95 DHH, File 112.3M2(D213), PJDB Files, Foulkes to Letson, 25 February 1946.
96 The Canadian military members of the PJBD in the spring of 1946 were Commodore H.G. deWolf (representing the Royal Canadian Navy), Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry, and Air Vice Marshal W.A. Curtis (the Royal Canadian Air Force representative). LAC, RG 24, Volume 21038, “Permanent Joint Board on Defence History,” 10.
For a variety of reasons, this military plan was not implemented. It does, however, reveal the type of high-level staff work with which Dan Spry dealt.

Another important strategic-level bilateral military document that General Spry had a hand in writing was the PJBD’s 35th Recommendation, which was promulgated on 12 February 1947. This document declared that it was in the interest of both Canada and the United States to continue collaborating through the PJBD, and proposed several avenues of military cooperation. These included using standardized equipment, organization, and training; reciprocal provision of military facilities; bilateral personnel exchanges; and exchanging observers during exercises. This document raised the hackles of some sovereignty-conscious Canadians, including Prime Minister King, who insisted on some rewording before Cabinet approved it on 20 November 1946. Spry demonstrated his nationalist credentials in a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet Defence Committee regarding an American proposal to set up weather stations in Canada’s North. He recommended that the United States be required to ask Canada’s permission before starting any activity on Canadian soil, that Canadians should comprise most of the personnel employed at permanent facilities, and that any publicity should stress the joint nature of such projects. The Cabinet Defence Committee accepted Spry’s recommendations on 6 June 1946.

Demobilization and closer military cooperation with the United States were high priority tasks for the Canadian Army and General Spry. Like most of Canada’s military officers at this time, he brought considerable wartime operational experience to the table. This gave him the practical knowledge needed to distinguish between a good military plan and an impracticable

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100 Kikkert, “Pragmatism and Cooperation,” 59-60.
one, and an understanding of how to run an effective war-fighting organization. As the army’s second-highest staff officer, however, Spry also needed to be capable of navigating the political channels in Ottawa and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). Having such a skill was vital, and it was largely why Charles Foulkes, whom Douglas E. Delaney has described as a “Master Bureaucrat,” was appointed CGS in the summer of 1945 instead of Guy Simonds, who was an outstanding commander but was seen by Crerar as uncompromising and likely to anger Canada’s politicians.\(^{101}\) Spry understood the importance of such political skills, but while he could get along with most people, including, as has been shown, difficult superiors like Simonds, he was not a politician at heart. What he thought of this aspect of the VCGS job is not known, as he spoke little about it with his family. Given his background and skills, Spry no doubt found his work with the PJBD and operational matters stimulating. Still, Toby Spry has opined that his father would have had some difficulty tolerating the “political soldiers” in Army headquarters.\(^{102}\)

While Dan Spry was getting used to being VCGS, an opportunity to serve Canada in a senior capacity outside of the army unexpectedly came to him. For some time, the Canadian Boy Scouts Association had been seeking a replacement for its Chief Executive Commissioner, Dr. John A. Stiles, who had held the post since 1930 and – at the age of 70 – wanted to retire. As such, its Dominion Executive Board had approached the armed forces in June 1945 requesting that it recommend a senior officer, about 40 years old, with “[a] good war record, high leadership qualities, aggressive [and] energetic with good judgement and speaking ability,” for the post. A salary of $6,000-$10,000 a year, a very good wage in 1945, awaited a successful applicant.\(^{103}\)

\(^{101}\) Delaney, *Corps Commanders*, 295 and 209-211. Simonds had “butted heads” with Crerar during the war.

\(^{102}\) Toby Spry interview, 8 December 2013, and Toby Spry personal e-mail to Gordon C. Case, 11 March 2016.

Maj.-Gen. A.E. Walford, the army’s Adjutant-General, was unable to find such an officer in Canada, and he forwarded the request to CMHQ in London. Three weeks later CMHQ’s Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Price Montague, provided a list of 17 officers, ranging in rank from colonel to major-general, but he did not approach these men to determine if they wanted the job. At the time, the Boy Scouts must have thought the military option was a dead end.

Interestingly, Dan Spry’s name was not on Montague’s list. Notwithstanding this omission, the upper echelons of the Canadian Boy Scouts knew of his wartime exploits, as they had been well-publicized by several Canadian newspapers. On 5 October 1944, B.H. Mortlock, then the Boy Scouts’ Associate Editor of Publications, asked Spry to write an inspirational message for the Boy Scouts at home. Spry, then leading the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division through the battle for the Breskens Pocket, duly obliged. His message appeared in the February 1945 edition of the Scouts’ journal, The Scout Leader. Then, too, the Assistant Dominion Commissioner for Training, W.L. Currier, Jr., had known of Spry when the latter had been a Rover leader in Halifax, although the nature of their relationship is not known. By the end of 1945, the Dominion Executive Board had concluded that Dan Spry was the man for whom they had been searching. One of the Board’s members, G. Robley Mackay, recalled a meeting held on 21 November at which W.H.J. Tisdale had put Spry’s name “at the head of his list” to replace Stiles. The rest of the Dominion Executive Board concurred. Decades later, Betty Spry told historian J.L. Granatstein that the Boy Scouts were so eager to obtain her husband’s services that Jackson Dodds, a leading member of the Boy Scouts Association, had met the Sprys “at the pier”

105 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-5, Spry to Mortlock, 31 October 1944, and The Scout Leader, February 1945.
107 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 24 April 1953, 9, and Volume 7, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 21 November 1945.
upon their return to North America. Betty may have overstated the truth somewhat. In September 1946 General Spry told newspaper reporter Kenneth C. Cragg that he was approached shortly after assuming his duties as VCGS. Mackay apparently drew that task, later saying that he “had the privilege of interviewing [Dan Spry] when he came from the other side.”

G. Robley Mackay recalled that for many weeks Spry would not say if he would accept the job. Feeling that the opportunity might be lost, Mackay made one last try. Only then did Spry say that he was prepared to talk. It seems clear that he had needed time to assess the situation. By staying in the army, Spry would have career stability and financial security: in 1946, a major-general’s base pay was $7,680 per year, plus a $360 annual married allowance. He would also be able to continue working with people of like mind and attitude. The primary disadvantage of this option was limited rank progression and – potentially – years of boredom. On the other hand, the job of Chief Executive Commissioner seemed to meet Spry’s criteria regarding an ideal post-military career. It would allow him to use his military skills in a way that would serve Canada, and it offered a chance to return to the Movement that had shaped his youth – and that he had greatly enjoyed. His income would be about the same as his army pay. Perhaps most importantly, being the Boy Scouts’ Chief Executive Commissioner would allow him to pursue his postwar mission of helping prepare youth for adult citizenship. Having weighed these factors, Spry made his decision. In mid-April 1946 he contacted R.C. Stevenson, the Chairman of the Boy Scouts’ Dominion Executive Board, and told him that he would accept the Association’s offer.

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108 DHH, Granatstein Notes, Betty Spry interview, 21 January 1992. For the organization of the upper echelons of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association, see Chapter 6.
110 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 24 April 1953, 9-10.
111 The pay for a major-general is found in “Pay and Allowance Regulations for the Canadian Army, 1946,” a copy of which is attached to a Treasury Board meeting Minute dated 4 October 1946. LAC, RG 24, Volume 6413.
112 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, R.C. Stevenson to Major-General Dan Spry, 17 April 1946.
On 20 April 1946, Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry gave General Charles Foulkes his written request for release from the Canadian Army.\footnote{LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, Spry to CGS, Release from Canadian Army, 20 April 1946.} It is worth noting that he was not entitled to the financial benefits that were available to the 734,735 servicemen and women who were discharged between May 1945 and December 1946, such as a rehabilitation grant (30 days of pay and a dependants’ allowance for service exceeding 183 days) or a $100 clothing allowance.\footnote{England, \textit{Twenty Million World War Veterans}, 73, and Woods, \textit{Rehabilitation}, 462.} The reason for this was simple: Spry was a Permanent Force officer leaving the army on his own volition, and thus his circumstances were covered by existing military regulations. These dictated that he was entitled to receive one month’s leave with pay and allowances for each five-year period of service. As he had 12 years of full-time service, this amounted to a total of two months and one week of paid leave. On the other hand, he had been unable to complete his disembarkation leave upon returning to Canada because he had had to report to NDHQ on 15 January. He asked that the remainder of that leave (19 days) begin on 1 June 1946. Lastly, he asked to be posted to the Reserve of Officers, and to retain his rank of major-general.\footnote{LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, Spry to CGS, Release from Canadian Army, 20 April 1946. Spry was initially placed on the Retired List. In October 1951, he was transferred to the Supplementary Reserve.} NDHQ approved these requests.

It is also important to note that when Dan Spry retired from the army on 15 June 1946 he forfeited receipt of a military pension for he lacked the requisite years of qualifying service. Despite this fact, when he requested his release he asked that the Minister of National Defence, by then D.C. Abbott, authorize a grant or gratuity in lieu of a pension, based on his “presumably satisfactory service both in peace and war” and that his subsequent employment was “in the nature of service to the Nation and the welfare and training of its youth.”\footnote{Ibid.} This was an unusual request, as Spry must have known that he was asking for more than he was entitled to as laid out in military regulations. Perhaps he thought that his wartime record and future employment with
the Boy Scouts would be enough to convince the army to “fudge” the rules. If so, Spry erred in his judgment of the situation because the Defence Department’s Pensions and Claims Board refused to approach the Defence Minister with such a request. It argued, rightly, that General Spry was not retiring for reasons of “efficiency or economy in the Service,” and as such its hands were legally tied. Undeterred, Spry appealed the Pension Board’s verdict directly to General Foulkes on 13 May. Three days later the Minister of National Defence ended the matter, writing that “I do not feel that the circumstances of [Spry’s] case are such as to justify my making a special submission on compassionate grounds to the Governor-in-Council.”

Dan Spry would receive the amount he had contributed to the Pension Fund during his service in the Permanent Force, but nothing more. He might not have liked Abbott’s answer, but it was certainly the proper decision.

Hundreds of thousands of Second World War veterans, one of whom was Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry, thus rejoined the ranks of Canada’s civilian population at war’s end. Spry’s thoughts on the matter were typical of those of many other veterans, in the sense that the transition from soldier to civilian was one that nearly all of Canada’s wartime military personnel had to make. His own experience was also unique because every person’s situation represented the product of their own individual circumstances. And while many former servicemen and women sought to put the war behind them, there were undoubtedly thousands of others who emulated Spry by deciding to use wartime lessons in their peacetime lives for their country’s benefit. In so doing, they began the process of helping to influence the character of postwar Canada.

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117 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-15, Judge Advocate-General to CGS, 13 May 1946, and Minute from Minister to CGS, 16 May 1946.
CHAPTER 6

PROVIDING POSTWAR LEADERSHIP

We knew we had to have a good organizer, a man with vision, and a man sold on the merits of Scouting...I feel strongly that we owe an awful lot of thanks to Dan Spry for the healthy condition of Scouting in Canada today.

G. Robley Mackay

In the years after 1945, Canada’s Second World War veterans could be found in nearly every element of a society that generally respected their achievements and sought their active participation. Of this number, thousands who had served in wartime leadership positions would eventually figure among Canada’s political, business, and civic leaders. A few of that cohort, such as Dan Spry, would attain national prominence; the rest could be found serving their fellow Canadians in communities across the country. As may be seen through Spry’s experience, he and other former servicemen and women applied wartime lessons about leadership, management, and teamwork in the course of providing societal leadership. In so doing, they shaped the character of many of Canada’s postwar institutions and thereby influenced the lives of their fellow citizens.

Before examining the manner in which Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry applied wartime lessons to his new duties as Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association, it is worth discussing in greater detail why the Association wanted him for such an important job. As was related in Chapter 5, the Boy Scouts were looking for a young senior military officer with a good war record, outstanding leadership qualities, and excellent speaking abilities. There were several reasons for insisting on such criteria. Certainly, a young man would have the time and the energy to serve the Association for many years to come. The Boy Scouts’ preference for a senior officer, though, was indicative of its appreciation of the qualities that such an individual would bring to

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1 Mackay, a member of the Boy Scouts’ Dominion Executive Committee, made these comments when General Spry left the Canadian Boy Scouts Association in 1953. LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 24 April 1953.
the table. It had nothing to do with encouraging militarism among Canada’s youth. The Boy Scouts had no ties with the armed forces, although its members wore uniforms and some of its leaders were former military men. The Scout Movement described its activities as “peace Scouting.” Rather, the members of the Dominion Executive Committee, some of whom had served in the armed forces during the First World War, understood that senior military officers had undergone rigorous training and had been promoted on the basis of merit.\(^2\) Such individuals could be relied upon to have excellent planning, leadership, and management skills, and be able to motivate others to work as a team. Then again, the armed forces’ ethos of service strongly emphasized duty, loyalty, and character, values that matched those described in the Scout Law. Spry had proven that he had all of these qualities during the war, and on top of that he had a good pre-war Scout record. The Association’s senior leadership had every reason to consider him to be the ideal candidate for the job of Chief Executive Commissioner.

The Boy Scouts’ appreciation for what General Spry offered their organization reflected the thinking of many Canadians, notwithstanding the warnings offered by some media outlets that servicemen had been hardened by their experience of war.\(^3\) The prevailing contemporary opinion was that veterans had returned home with skills and values that would be useful in civil life. Such thinking may explain why 60 per cent of people polled by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in March 1945 said that they supported the peacetime conscription of youth for a “health-building” program that included military training.\(^4\) The federal government was similarly convinced of the value of the training that Second World War veterans had gained. This attitude was no doubt influenced by the knowledge that federal money had paid for such training and its

\(^2\) At a Dominion Executive Committee meeting in June 1946, five of the 18 attendees present were veterans. LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 14 June 1946.

\(^3\) For more on this aspect, see Keshen, *Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers*, 264-265.

\(^4\) Granatstein, *Canada’s War*, 421. This figure included most Quebeckers: just 21 per cent were opposed.
recognition that veterans were a large bloc of Canada’s voting population. By 1951, for example, veterans constituted 35 per cent of men aged 25 to 49. Reintegrating these men and women into civil society was therefore crucial to the success of the country’s postwar reconstruction. Most Canadians agreed, knowing that the economy needed the skills, services, and the buying power of this large body of people if the country was to avoid a return to Depression conditions. As such, and in addition to implementing the Veterans Charter, through which roughly 80,000 individuals undertook vocational training and became skilled tradesmen, while 54,000 others attended university and entered the professions, the federal government sought to determine how military skills that veterans had learned during their wartime service could be translated into civilian qualifications. To this end it created a Royal Commission on Veterans Qualifications on 19 April 1945. This body was led by Wilfrid Bovey, a First World War veteran who had run the Canadian Legion’s Educational Services section throughout the Second World War.

The Bovey Commission’s Report offers a unique insight into how skills acquired through military service were perceived in Canada in the years after 1945. In the main, the Commission studied and made recommendations regarding technical equivalencies between the military and civilian environments, in fields such as meteorology, radar, maritime navigation, and nursing. However, it also examined human skills, such as instructional ability – the commissioners felt that veterans with such abilities might help fill a nation-wide lack of teachers – and leadership. Regarding the latter subject, the Bovey Commission heard from Milton F. Gregg, a distinguished veteran of both world wars who had earned the coveted Victoria Cross for his valorous actions.

5 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1951 Census, Tables 19 and 63. In 1951, 890,915 people reported service during the Second World War only. That same year, there were 4,786,328 adults aged 25-49.
6 Neary, On to Civvy Street, 202 and 215.
7 Wilfrid Bovey, et al., Royal Commission on Veterans Qualifications, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1945-1946), “First Interim Report,” 22 June 1945, 1. Wilfrid Bovey, a First World War veteran, was still serving in this capacity when he was appointed to lead the Royal Commission.
8 Ibid., 33-51.
on the Western Front in 1918, and was then serving as the President of the University of New Brunswick.⁹ Gregg described to the Commission members what he called the “L” factor (leadership), which he said “is made up of many things of which the following are a few examples: character, sense of responsibility, initiative, stability, perception, enthusiasm, group value, team-work, perseverance, personality.” Pointing out that a good number of veterans who had learned such skills “had little or no [original emphasis] occupational or technical skills before the war [and had] acquired little or none during their service that can normally be converted to peace-time needs,” he argued that “If we don't give [the “L” factor] a special place now there will be no incentive for young people in the future to try to attain it.” He therefore recommended that every effort be made to bring former military leaders “in close contact with youth training in such roles as physical direction, recreational leaders, scout masters, directors of summer camps and even rural school teachers...” The Bovey Commission agreed with Gregg. It used his submission to support recommendations regarding veterans’ employment in personnel work “in the business and professional fields and for advisory positions in industry.”¹⁰

Dan Spry, aged 33, took up his new responsibilities as the Boy Scouts’ Chief Executive Commissioner on 6 September 1946, having retired from the Canadian Army the previous June. He approached his new job in the same manner as he had during his military career, beginning with re-acquainting himself with the organization he had left in Halifax in 1932. In some ways, little had changed. Much of the Boy Scouts’ training program, particularly regarding its focus on developing character in the country’s male youth, remained as it had been when Spry was a boy. A high-level conference held in August 1943 to address Scouting’s perennial problems – such as how to structure its activities to retain older boys, and a perceived uneven quality of adult

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⁹ In 1947, Gregg entered federal politics. He held three cabinet posts, including Minister of Veterans Affairs.
leadership, which senior Boy Scout executives considered to be the root cause of the older boy retention issue – produced no significant changes.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, Canada’s Scouts had garnered a good deal of popular support as a result of their public service work. During the 1930s they collected toys, canned foodstuffs, and clothing, and had solicited donations for the needy in cities and towns across the country.\textsuperscript{12} These efforts were expanded upon during the Second World War. The Boy Scouts assisted the Red Cross with clothing relief drives and blood donor clinics, collected used books for distribution to military hospitals, and were an integral part of Canada’s wartime civil defence organization, acting as messengers and helping to man first aid posts.\textsuperscript{13} Canada’s Boy Scouts were not alone in such endeavours. Scouts in other parts of the world performed similar tasks throughout the war.\textsuperscript{14}

The Canadian Boy Scouts Association’s structure was also little changed from what General Spry remembered. It was then part of the Imperial (later Commonwealth) Boy Scouts Association, which represented all of the Commonwealth nations in the Boy Scouts International Conference, the global Scout organization that at the time had its headquarters in London.\textsuperscript{15} At the national level was the Canadian General Council, its role being to promote and carry out the Movement’s objectives in Canada. This assembly was chaired by the Governor General in his capacity as Canada’s Chief Scout. Its membership included two representatives from each province and the members of the Dominion Executive Committee, the latter of which constituted the General Council’s senior leadership team. The Executive Committee itself consisted of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Jeffrey Bonhomme, “‘In Step with Canada’s Future:’ The Restructuring of the Boy Scout Movement in Canada” (MA Thesis, University of Windsor, 1992), 59-65.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 47.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Scouts Canada Museum, The Boy Scouts Association, Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Canadian General Council for the Year Ending 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1945, 13-26.
\item \textsuperscript{14} For more on wartime Scouting, see especially Hilary St. George Saunders, \textit{The Left Handshake: The Boy Scout Movement during the War, 1939-1945} (London: Collins, 1949).
\item \textsuperscript{15} Created in 1922, the International Conference is known today as the World Organization of the Scout Movement. Vallory, \textit{World Scouting}, 22. After October 1946, Canada provided its own delegation to the Boy Scouts International Conference.
\end{itemize}
President, the Honorary Secretary, the Honorary Treasurer, and the Honorary Counsel, all of whom were elected by the General Council; the Chief Executive Commissioner and the Dominion Commissioner, both appointed by the Committee; the provincial presidents and commissioners; and several other elected members. The Dominion Executive Committee managed the General Council’s affairs through the Chief Executive Commissioner, who supervised the Dominion Headquarters in Ottawa, developed national policies, and oversaw the activities of the provincial bodies. From 1931 to 1947 there was also a Dominion Executive Board. Its membership included many who served on the Executive Committee, which may help explain why it was subsequently disbanded. The various provincial associations were structured in like fashion, with each of them having a president, a general council, an executive committee, a commissioner, and an executive commissioner, the latter being a full-time staff position. Their mandate was to encourage and supervise Boy Scout activities that were being conducted within their respective provinces. At the community level where two or more Scout groups existed were district commissioners, supported by local associations with their own officers and executive committees. The district commissioners inspected the Scout groups, conducted badge testing, and promoted the Boy Scout Movement within their localities. Scout groups were made up of Wolf Cub packs (boys aged 8-11), Boy Scout troops (for ages 12 to 17), and Rover crews (youths aged 18-21), and were supported by local committees that acquired facilities, carried out administrative duties, and conducted fundraising. This organizational structure is depicted at Figure 6-1. The majority of the adult leaders at the national, provincial, and local levels were volunteers. Dan Spry was one of the Canadian Boy Scouts’ few professional executives.

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16 Canadian General Council of the Boy Scouts Association, *Policy, Organization, and Rules for Canada* (Ottawa: Dominion Headquarters, 1948), 9-10. As Chief Scout, the Governor General was the Boy Scouts’ patron.

17 Ibid., 10-18.
Notes

1. The Canadian Boy Scouts organization had been part of the Imperial (later Commonwealth) Boy Scouts Association since 1908. Canadian Headquarters reported to the Imperial Headquarters in London.

2. In October 1946, the Canadian Boy Scouts Association attained full membership in the Boy Scouts International Conference. The Boy Scouts International Bureau served as the secretariat for the International Conference.

Figure 6-1  The Canadian Boy Scouts Association, 1948
(Source: Adapted from Canadian General Council of the Boy Scouts Association, Policy, Organization, and Rules for Canada [1948], 7)
To appreciate Dan Spry’s role as Chief Executive Commissioner, one must understand the profound differences between a military organization and the Boy Scout Movement. The former, as described in previous chapters, is an autocratic body within which commanders are empowered to issue orders that subordinates are compelled by military law to obey. On the other hand, as Spanish scholar Eduard Vallory has noted, Scouting is “an educational movement based on voluntary commitment of individuals that operates as a network, carrying out their activities at local level through a network of Scout groups belonging to national associations worldwide.”18 Another important aspect of Scouting is that it is democratically organized. These topics will be examined later. For now, it is sufficient to note that decisions made by the Movement’s global body, the International Conference, were based on consensus, and that national associations had a considerable amount of leeway in shaping Scouting’s principles and methods to suit their country’s cultural conditions. This highly democratic model extended to the Scout group level, where adult leaders acted more like older brothers than officials.19 This meant that Spry, as Chief Executive Commissioner, could not issue orders in the way that he had done in the army. Some former military officers might have experienced some difficulty adjusting to such a milieu, but for Spry it was not a problem. Having been a Patrol Leader and a Senior Rover’s Mate as a boy, he was very familiar with the Boy Scouts’ methods of operation, and his leadership style while serving in the Canadian Army had never been dictatorial. As will be seen below, he was able to tailor his approach to suit the Boy Scouts’ voluntary and democratic character.

While familiarizing himself with the Scouts’ organization, General Spry got to know some of its key personalities. He was acquainted with the Governor General, since April 1946 the Viscount Alexander of Tunis, as Alexander had commanded the 15th Army Group in Italy.

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18 Vallory, World Scouting, 68.
19 Ibid., 78-80. This latter aspect is a key aspect of the Scout method.
while Spry had served there. Alexander remembered Spry too, telling the Canadian General Council that “You can take it from me you have got a good man.”

Most of the rest were new to Spry; all were distinguished societal figures. Canon Henry J. Cody, the Association’s president, was a much-respected cleric and educator from Ontario who had led several civic societies and committees during a career spanning more than 40 years. Reginald C. Stevenson, the chairman of the Dominion Executive Board, was a chartered accountant, a director of the Canadian Naval Service Benevolent Trust Fund, and the Governor of the Montreal General Hospital. One of the most dedicated Scouters was Jackson Dodds, the chairman of the Finance Committee. A First World War veteran and former General Manager of the Bank of Montreal, Dodds had already been a provincial commissioner for both Manitoba and Quebec. In 1947 he became Dominion Commissioner.

Several other high-ranking members within Canada’s Boy Scouts also had military backgrounds. For instance, Lt.-Col. M.L. Douglas was a member of the Dominion Executive Board, while Major A.A. Pinard was a member of the Dominion Medal Board. Some of the provincial representatives then serving in the Dominion Executive Committee were also former soldiers. Lt.-Col. L.H. Millen, Ontario’s provincial president, was one of them.

As the senior-ranking member of the Boy Scouts’ professional staff, Dan Spry’s role involved more than just supervising the activities of the Dominion Headquarters in Ottawa. A significant aspect of the job involved planning, on a national level, how the Canadian Boy Scouts Association would meet the challenges of the postwar world. Here, Spry was uniquely qualified.

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20 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 14 June 1946. In Italy, Alexander had visited the 1st Canadian Infantry Division where he met Dan Spry, one of the formation’s brigadiers. Alexander had also been a signatory to Spry’s Distinguished Service Order citation. See Chapter 4.
21 B.M. Greene, ed., Who’s Who in Canada, 1947-1948: An Illustrated Biographical Record of Men and Women of the Time (Toronto: International Press Limited, 1948), 833-834. Cody, it will be recalled, had also supported school cadet corps while he was Ontario’s Minister of Education from 1918 to 1919. See Chapter 1.
22 Ibid., 1471-1472.
23 Ibid., 1067-1068. The job of Dominion Commissioner was an honorary appointment.
Having led large and complex military organizations during the war, he was used to thinking and acting at a high level. Particularly important was the fact that his military training, especially at staff college, had given him a simple and flexible method, known as an “appreciation,” with which to analyze a problem and develop a workable plan. This process involved four sequential steps: determining the objective to be achieved; analyzing the factors affecting achievement of that objective; devising possible courses of action based on the factors; and selecting the best option, which would form the basis of the plan.\(^\text{25}\) An appreciation could be done quickly in one’s head when faced with a simple situation demanding immediate action. A complex problem with a longer timeline often required an appreciation to be produced on paper. In the Canadian forces, this process was taught to thousands of officers and NCOs. Lacking other experience, it made sense for Spry to use this military methodology to resolve problems he faced in his civilian life.

It is known that Dan Spry applied military methods to his planning efforts while he was Chief Executive Commissioner because there is evidence of its use in an extraordinary document called Plan OPPORTUNITY. A strategic-level plan in the sense that it provided policy direction on a national level, Plan OPPORTUNITY would serve as the blueprint for Canadian Scouting activities for the next several years. At the time, this plan was widely acknowledged as being Spry’s “baby.” Given that Plan OPPORTUNITY was the first of its kind in the Canadian Boy Scouts Association’s history, it is worth examining it in some detail.\(^\text{26}\)

The fact that General Spry briefed the Dominion Executive Committee on Plan OPPORTUNITY when it met on 8 November 1946 suggests that he had begun thinking about it sometime earlier, likely during the two-month period between leaving the army and taking up his


\(^{26}\) On being credited for Plan OPPORTUNITY, see Scouts Canada Museum, The Boy Scouts Association, Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Canadian General Council for the Year 1953, 3. The Boy Scout archival records contain no evidence of a similar document prior to 1946.
duties with the Boy Scouts.\textsuperscript{27} Using the appreciation process he had learned, Spry began by determining what the Association’s objective should be for the postwar period. After reviewing recent history, he concluded that society’s broad support of Scouting, of which favourable public opinion seemed sufficient evidence, proved that the Scout Movement offered much that would benefit Canada’s youth. He knew that the Association’s membership, which in 1945 totalled 87,161 Cubs, Scouts, and Rovers, represented just 8.1 per cent of the 1,063,600 boys aged 8-17 years – and thus eligible to join Scouting – and that membership numbers had dropped a fair bit during the war because a good number of Scout leaders had joined the armed forces.\textsuperscript{28} Putting all of this together, Spry deduced that there was a need to expand Scouting activities, and that it was up to the Association to organize itself so that such an expansion could be achieved. In this way, he arrived at the Plan’s declared objective: “To provide the \textit{OPPORTUNITY} [original emphasis] for every Canadian boy who so desires, to join the Scout Movement.”\textsuperscript{29}

Having determined the objective, Dan Spry then examined factors that he thought would affect its attainment and drew deductions from that analysis. His review of the international and domestic situation focused on the dangers of war between East and West and, closer to home, Canada’s regional, linguistic, and cultural differences. Spry concluded that Scouting’s character-based program would convince people seeking peace and the preservation of Canada’s way of life to support Scouting. He reasoned that because churches, schools, and homes were important influences on children’s lives, “all those who would see these three institutions strengthened and assisted in their efforts should support Scouting...”\textsuperscript{30} In assessing the impact of Canada’s

\textsuperscript{27} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 8 November 1946.
\textsuperscript{29} Toby Spry Collection, \textit{Scout Leader Supplement}, “Plan Opportunity: Report of National Scout Conference at Montebello, Quebec, April 14-18, 1947” (Ottawa: June 1947), 5.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
geography, Spry believed that the most efficient means of administering the Association was to empower local and provincial councils regarding routine matters, while Scout policies “should be developed and coordinated on a *national basis* [original emphasis] to ensure unity of effort and purpose, and a uniformly high standard of training and service.” This deduction surely had military origins, as the armed forces used the same approach. Next, Spry examined Scouting’s finances, which he thought were unstable because they relied on a small federal grant, profits from uniform sales, annual membership subscriptions, and donations. This, he opined, limited its capacity to expand. He addressed the quality and quantity of Boy Scout volunteers and full-time staff, believing that the Scout Movement needed “more people doing less, better,” as a large time commitment might deter the best candidates, and that it had to rid itself of ineffective people. 31

Lastly, Spry analyzed issues like the perceived problem of juvenile delinquency; the potentially negative effect of media such as magazines and movies on boys’ attitudes; the probability that extremist groups like the Communist Party would target youth groups for support; the need for liaison with like-minded civic bodies; and public relations, which he thought could be improved through the personal example of every member and through community service. 32

Spry’s analysis of these and other factors resulted in three possible courses of action. The first entailed making no changes to what the Boy Scouts was already doing. Alternatively, the Association could give up its struggle to shape the lives of the nation’s youth, and accept that the global situation was so dire that no single organization could change it for the better. The third option held that Scouting *did* exert a great influence on the Canadian people and the world, and *could* be a positive force for cooperative unity in Canada. 33 The Boy Scouts’ senior leadership selected the latter path. These were men who sincerely believed in what they were doing; in an

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31 Ibid. Spry attributed this observation to Lord Rowallan, then the Commonwealth Chief Scout.
32 Ibid., 6.
33 Ibid., 7.
interview in November 1946, Spry had compared Scouting to “a crusade.”\textsuperscript{34} An ambitious expansion campaign appealed to such individuals and their innate idealism, and held forth the promise of an exciting future. It was with such thoughts in mind that Plan OPPORTUNITY’s text concluded by saying that “There is no choice but to improve and expand the Association’s activities and efforts, in order that every boy in this Dominion may have the opportunity of joining the Movement in which he can take his part in the quest for this great conception.”\textsuperscript{35}

While Plan OPPORTUNITY was Dan Spry’s idea, he did not produce it in isolation. The day after briefing the Dominion Executive Committee, he reviewed his draft with the provincial commissioners. The plan was then rewritten and distributed for discussion by district committees across the country. Spry said that this would prepare the provincial presidents, commissioners, and executive commissioners to finalize the document at a special conference that was to be held at Montebello, Quebec, from 14-18 April 1947.\textsuperscript{36} He, no doubt, knew that obtaining such a broad base of input would almost certainly guarantee the provinces’ support for Plan OPPORTUNITY. Spry had used the same approach as a military commander: he developed the plan, but was open to input from others to make its execution more effective. In a volunteer organization like the Boy Scouts, it was an astute move that promoted cooperation and trust in his leadership.

The Dominion Executive Committee adopted Plan OPPORTUNITY in principle on 12 February 1947. The Canadian General Council granted its approval in April.\textsuperscript{37} Many of its organizational aspects had been implemented months earlier, as handling management issues such as these was a second major part of Spry’s job. One of his first innovations was to create

\textsuperscript{34} Toby Spry Collection, Dan Spry Scrapbook, “Major-General Daniel C. Spry Speaks Annual Meeting Barrie Boy Scout Assn.,” \textit{The Barrie Examiner}, November 21, 1946.

\textsuperscript{35} Toby Spry Collection, \textit{Scout Leader Supplement}, “Plan Opportunity,” 7. Whether Spry “situated the appreciation,” a military expression that refers to making the analysis of a problem fit a pre-determined solution, cannot be conclusively proven. Still, he likely knew that an expansion plan would find the most support.

\textsuperscript{36} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 8 November 1946.

\textsuperscript{37} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 12 February 1947, and LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 18 April 1947.
advisory committees to assist the Dominion Executive Committee. These bodies would address matters affecting training, publications, public relations, religion, administration, finance, stores, and honours and awards; each would have a senior member from the related department in the Dominion Headquarters as its secretary. In this way, Spry would remain informed of what the advisory committees were doing while ensuring that the committees had professional advice. He also proposed that each province create a similar set of advisory committees.38 This idea was readily adopted, and almost immediately it paid off. As Spry told the Executive Committee on 23 January 1948, “We are getting the sort of advice which we can’t afford to buy.”39

The Dominion Headquarters would also undergo some modification. Three of its existing departments – Training, Editorial (re-named in 1947 to Publications) and Stores – would deal with the same sort of issues as they had in the past. On the other hand, it seemed clear that the planned increase in Scouting activities necessitated the creation of two new departments, Public Relations and Administration. The former would inform the public and the Scout membership of the goings-on within Canadian Scouting through the media, handle tours and visits, and conduct national campaigns. The new Administration Department would absorb the existing Finance Department. In addition to financial matters, this body would manage the Association’s internal administration, deal with legal affairs, personnel, honours and awards, and conduct statistical research to assist in future planning. Lastly, a pool of executive field commissioners, under the control of the Chief Executive Commissioner, would be maintained for employment on special projects.40 These organizational changes, which were tweaked to a certain degree over the next two years, are reflected in the shaded areas of Figure 6-2.

40 Toby Spry Collection, Scout Leader Supplement, “Plan Opportunity,” 8, and LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 8 November 1946.
Figure 6.2 National Level Organization of the Canadian Boy Scouts, 1949

Each of the Dominion Headquarters’ five departments would be headed by an executive commissioner. Some of these positions were already occupied, but others needed filling. Spry involved himself in the process of finding candidates that fit the desired qualifications (these are described later in this chapter). In 1946, for example, he nominated Ernest F. Mills, then serving as Manitoba’s Provincial Executive Commissioner, to fill the Training Commissioner’s post. The Commonwealth Chief Scout, Lord Rowallan, had praised Mills for his work in that province, and Mills had done well executing training duties elsewhere in Canada at the behest of the General Council. Spry also sought out well-qualified men among the ranks of Canada’s veterans – in the 1940s, few women served beyond the local level in the Canadian Boy Scouts Association. As he told the General Council, “We have trained many leaders in the Armed Forces. Those men have had experience in leading others and molding thought and action, and it seems to me that given the right direction many of these men will come into Scouting and give us a helping hand.” It was with this thinking in mind that Spry personally recruited a former army officer, Lt.-Col. George Edward Simmons, to serve as the Executive Commissioner for Administration. To further entice qualified men into the Boy Scouts’ professional ranks, Dan Spry recommended the creation of a special committee to review terms of employment, remuneration, and pensions for full-time staff, of which there were 60 working at the national and provincial levels in 1950. One product of this effort was a pension plan, which came into effect in April 1950. Certainly, Spry himself stood to gain from the latter innovation, as he did not have a military pension to fall back on once he reached retirement age.

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41 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 8 November 1946.
42 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 14 June 1946.
Another aspect of General Spry’s efforts to improve the Boy Scouts’ management of its affairs related to its internal administration. His army staff college training and service as a front-line commander had taught him the theory and practical uses of standardized staff organization and procedures, and he recommended that similar methods be implemented within the Canadian Boy Scouts at the national, provincial, and local levels. Directly related to this was his insistence that Boy Scout districts direct communications intended for higher levels of authority through their respective provincial headquarters.46 Here, too, Spry’s wartime experience influenced his peacetime thinking. He knew that well-defined channels of communication minimized the likelihood of confusion and kept people at all levels informed. Such measures, he believed, would go a long way to improving the Canadian Association’s administrative efficiency, a highly desirable state of affairs that, in turn, would facilitate its expansion. These measures were simple, effective, and could be readily used by civilian organizations as well as the armed forces.

Spry knew that the Boy Scouts needed a lot more money to fund its expansion, but obtaining such funds was not easily done. A national fundraising drive was the ideal solution, but the General Council believed that the Association’s commitments ruled out such a campaign before 1950. In the meantime, profits from uniform sales and annual membership subscriptions were unlikely to generate the desired sums, and so Spry, along with other senior Scout leaders, drafted an interim financial plan.47 Part of this temporary solution involved efforts to convince the federal government to increase its annual $9,000 federal grant to the Movement. In February 1947 Dan Spry and Reginald Stevenson wrote to Prime Minister King, who referred the matter to Minister of Finance Douglas Abbott, last seen as the Minister of National Defence.48 Several months later, Stevenson and Jackson Dodds approached Abbott with a request for $100,000,

48 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 12 February 1947.
which amounted to roughly one dollar per member. Abbott must have been shocked by such a large request, as it represented an eleven-fold increase over that of the previous year. Combined with the fact that several other civic groups sought more money, he offered Stevenson and Dodds little hope that the Cabinet would approve their request. The Boy Scouts’ federal grant did rise to $15,000 in the 1948-1949 fiscal year, and it remained at that level for the next several years. This 66 per cent increase in federal funding was helpful, but it was only a partial success.

At the same time that Dan Spry and others tried to secure more federal funding, the Scout Movement sought increased donations from individuals and groups. Here, too, Spry tried to help by delivering the Boy Scouts’ message to Canada’s business leaders. This approach may be seen in his address to Toronto’s Granite Club on 2 December 1947:

I think it is particularly important to business and industry in Canada to remind themselves continually that they enjoy a so-called free enterprise system and all the benefits that come from that system, because the majority of the people in this country will it to be that way...I say to you gentlemen in business, in industry and in the professions, if you value our Canadian way of life, if you would see it maintained and improved, then it is up to you and your friends to support anyone who is endeavouring to produce citizens who think, act and believe the way you do.

Spry made similar speeches at other places, but it is difficult to ascertain if his efforts produced larger donations. In 1947, the Canadian Boy Scouts Association received $1,816.55. The following year saw only $700 in donations, but by 1949 the figure had rebounded to $1,748.50. On balance, Spry seems to have had but limited success, but his efforts and drive were noteworthy for seeking to improve a stagnant situation.

49 The Canadian Boy Scouts Association had a total of 98,477 adult leaders and boy members in 1946. Scouts Canada Museum, Annual Report for 1946, 67.
50 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 23 January 1948, and LAC, RG 6-F-4, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (hereafter Department of Citizenship Fonds), Department of Finance to the Canadian Boy Scouts Association, 12 July 1948.
General Spry’s fundraising speeches were indicative of a third major aspect of his leadership role as Chief Executive Commissioner, namely communications. Part of this task involved speaking to two major elements: provincial and local Boy Scout groups across the country, and external bodies such as community service clubs, business associations, and religious organizations. One can gain a sense of this facet of Spry’s job by reviewing the highlights of his travels, which he recorded in a series of one-line diaries. These and other documents reveal that he was frequently on the move and spoke to a broad range of people. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this point. For most of March 1947 Spry was in western Canada, where he addressed Winnipeg’s Empire Club on the 11th, delivered a radio speech in Edmonton on the 14th, met with Vancouver’s Rotary Club on the 18th, and on 20 March made two radio speeches and spoke to the Canadian Club in Regina. In June he addressed Scout groups in southwestern Ontario, at Niagara Falls, Hamilton, London, Kitchener, and Windsor.53 Spry returned to the Canadian West in the summer of 1948, when he visited large centres such as Vancouver, Victoria, and Calgary, and small towns like North Battleford, Saskatchewan and Brandon, Manitoba. From 14-20 November of that year, Spry was travelling in Quebec’s Eastern townships.54 Most of November 1949 was spent in the Maritimes, where he visited Boy Scouts in each province and spoke to groups such as the Rotary Clubs in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.55 The following year (1950), the Dominion Headquarters staff travelled 156,912 kilometres as part of their duties. Spry accounted for 29 per cent of the Headquarters’ total, or 46,568 kilometres.56

53 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, One-Line Diary, 1913-1956, entries for 11, 14, 18, and 20 March, and 2-9 June 1947.
54 Ibid., entries for 10 July-22 August and 14-20 November 1948. Spry did not specify the exact locations where he spoke while in the Eastern Townships, but rather described this as a “tour.”
55 Ibid., entries for 4-18 November 1949.
Surviving copies of Dan Spry’s speeches from this period reveal an emphasis on a few central messages selected according to the characteristics of a particular audience. When speaking to an external group he usually concentrated on the Boy Scouts’ purpose, its place in society, and – most importantly – why his listeners should offer it their support. His address to Toronto’s Empire Club on 23 January 1947 was fairly typical of this genre. Spry told his listeners that Scouting aimed to “produce the kind of citizens which you and I would like to have around us,” called it “a way of life” that encouraged understanding and tolerance in a world living under the threat of nuclear war, and concluded by saying that the Scout Movement needed the support of “every right-thinking citizen.”

In a speech that he delivered in Quebec’s Eastern Townships in November 1948, Spry described the Boy Scouts as an “an investment” that produced citizens with a belief in democracy and stable communities. Through words such as these, General Spry hoped to inspire as many people as possible to volunteer their time, their services, to donate money, or lend their influence in furthering the Association’s objectives.

When addressing an internal audience like a provincial or district Boy Scout organization Spry also sought to motivate, but in those instances his main goal was to bolster their morale and to provide his listeners with concrete ideas on how they could help strengthen Scouting in their respective communities. He gave such a talk when he met with the South Central Boy Scout Conference in Kitchener on 3 April 1948. Spry emphasized the need for good leadership at the Scout troop level and he appealed to his audience’s sense of duty as Scouters, saying that “those who assume the responsibilities of leadership are indeed ‘God’s gentlemen.'”

Spry said much the same thing three years later in an address that he delivered to a Quebec Provincial Scout

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Conference. He described the Boy Scouts as a good investment for both the boys and their adult leaders, and concluded by telling his listeners that “If you have a firm belief in Scouting’s possibilities, set a good example in your own personal life, exude enthusiasm in your program activities, and, above all, take with you on your trail a lively sense of humour, you will be giving to your county, your province, and your country, something far beyond even our most hopeful expectations.”

Like his skill in high-level planning, Dan Spry’s ability to communicate ideas to others was traceable to his military experience. Good oral communication skills were essential for the effective conduct of operations, as orders had to be delivered clearly and concisely to minimize the inherent confusion of battle. All officers and NCOs were trained to do this, and Spry had had innumerable opportunities to practise such skills in his various military appointments. Moreover, in combat he had learned that a commander’s ability to inspire others was vital in dealing with men risking their lives to carry out his orders. Such abilities were also applicable in Spry’s role as a senior leader of a volunteer body. He had to articulate his ideas so that Scout leaders at all levels would understand his vision for the future and then adopt it as their own. At the same time he had to motivate members and supporters alike to help him expand the Boy Scouts’ societal reach, while convincing the public that putting their sons into Scouting was the best thing they could do for their children, community, and country. To do so, he adapted what he had learned during the war to his peacetime role as Chief Executive Commissioner of Canada’s Boy Scouts.

General Spry’s effectiveness as a public speaker also owed much to the fact that he – or perhaps more accurately, his war record – was well known across the country. His promotion to the rank of brigadier and his appointment to divisional command at age 31 had both been widely

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reported in Canada’s newspapers. Much of this attention, of course, owed a great deal to Spry’s youth; he was the epitome of the young, successful wartime commander. His war record delivered a few unspoken messages. For external audiences, it said that Spry was an intelligent, dynamic leader who had risen to high rank on merit, and as such their money – and especially their sons – would be in good hands. For the Association’s members, Spry’s wartime service was proof of his ability to plan, organize, and motivate people to work together. Both groups must have drawn confidence from such knowledge.

Dan Spry displayed a considerable amount of personal energy in his effort to “sell” the Boy Scouts. His youth certainly helped. In April 1947, he was just 34 years old. It was indicative of Spry’s work ethic, no doubt a product of his years of military service, that he did his utmost in performing his duties. Then, too, getting out of his office to see and be seen had always been part of his leadership style. He was confident that he could do so, as he told the Executive Committee in June 1947, “because everyone [in the Dominion Headquarters] knows what he has to do and how to do it.” For their part, the Boy Scouts’ leadership were impressed with Spry’s promotion efforts. For example, Ontario’s provincial commissioner, Lt.-Col. L.H. Millen, remarked after attending one of General Spry’s speeches in 1947 that “He’s a grand salesman for us”.61 Six months later a member of the Dominion Executive Committee, Sydney E. Webster, said that “the Scouters in [the Montreal] District were willing to follow [Spry’s] lead.”62

Spry’s speaking engagements attracted plenty of media attention, as may be seen in his many scrapbooks of newspaper clippings. For example, Spry’s view that Scouting could be a unifying factor at home and abroad, which he expressed during a tour of western Canada in March 1947, was publicized in Calgary’s Albertan, Vancouver’s News-Herald, and Saskatoon’s

Star-Phoenix on 14, 19, and 21 March 1947, respectively.\textsuperscript{63} Local newspapers even heralded his upcoming visits. On 11 October 1949, The Edmonton Bulletin announced that a “distinguished wartime military leader, now head of the Boy Scouts Association” would visit the city the next week.\textsuperscript{64} Such coverage boosted the popular image of both the Boy Scouts and its Chief Executive Commissioner. It reflected the mostly favourable light in which Canadians viewed Scouting and Canada’s former military leaders, some of whom, like Spry, had very public postwar profiles.

Media coverage of General Spry’s activities complemented another objective put forth in Plan OPPORTUNITY, namely to enhance Canadians’ awareness of Scouting by expanding the Association’s public relations effort. Achieving that end was why Spry had created a separate Public Relations Department in the Dominion Headquarters, and had recommended that similar bodies be established at the provincial and district levels.\textsuperscript{65} With his strong encouragement, the Boy Scouts’ public profile grew dramatically in the years immediately after the war, a fact that may be seen in the number of articles published on Scouting each year in Canadian newspapers. In 1946, the year that Dan Spry was named Chief Executive Commissioner, Scout activities were the subject of 8,232 news clippings nationwide.\textsuperscript{66} By 1951, that number had jumped to 12,117, an impressive 47 per cent increase.\textsuperscript{67} Certainly, word about Scouting was spread to a far greater degree in communities across the country during Spry’s tenure.

The Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee reveal that Dan Spry also spent a lot of time coordinating and liaising with organizations having objectives similar to those of the Boy Scouts. Expanding upon such activities was prescribed in Plan OPPORTUNITY, but whereas the


\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., “Chief of Boy Scouts In City Next Week,” The Edmonton Bulletin, 11 October 1949.

\textsuperscript{65} Toby Spry Collection, Scout Leader Supplement, “Plan Opportunity,” 9.

\textsuperscript{66} These statistics are found in LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13941, Annual Report for 1948, 19.

Plan recommended that volunteer officials conduct such efforts, Spry thought this was an important leadership function and thus he played a key role. For example, in June 1947 he told the Committee that he, the Deputy Chief Executive Commissioner, W.L. Currier, and the Executive Commissioner for Training, E.F. Mills, had met with representatives of the navy, army, and air force, the Canadian Camping Association, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs.\textsuperscript{68} By the end of the year, under Spry’s leadership, Dominion Headquarters had also contacted the Department of Mines and Resources, the National Council on Physical Fitness, and the Religious Education Council. In succeeding years the Boy Scouts worked closely with bodies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, St. John Ambulance, the federal Departments of Citizenship, Northern Affairs, and Defence, and Canada’s civil defence organization, to name but a few. At the same time, Spry sought to improve relations within the larger Scouting community. This included liaising with the Boy Scouts of America and the Inter-American Boy Scouts Advisory Committee, and maintaining a good working relationship with the Canadian Girl Guides Association.\textsuperscript{69} Of particular importance was the Canadian Association’s relationship with two separate, but affiliated, Scout organizations in Canada. The first was La Fédération des Scouts catholiques de la Province de Québec, which was created in 1934 following Cardinal J.M.R. Villeneuve’s request to merge Catholic Scout groups in Quebec into a homogeneous organization.\textsuperscript{70} The second was the Salvation Army Life Saving Scouts, renamed the Salvation Army Boy Scout Groups in 1948, which had been established in Canada in 1915.\textsuperscript{71} Both bodies followed the tenets and methods of Scouting, and both had representation within the Canadian General Council.

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\item\textsuperscript{68} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 11 June 1947.
\item\textsuperscript{69} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 23 January 1948.
\item\textsuperscript{70} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 6, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 15 June 1934.
\item\textsuperscript{71} Bonhomme, “The Restructuring of the Boy Scout Movement in Canada,” 81-82.
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Liaising with external groups was not really new. The Boy Scouts had worked with several groups before and during the war, and had cooperated with the Girl Guides for years. However, just as the scope and scale of communications and public relations work increased exponentially under Dan Spry’s leadership, so, too, did the Boy Scouts’ liaison effort. Spry, like all wartime leaders, had been trained to coordinate his command’s operations with those of other elements. He likely had little difficulty convincing the Canadian General Council that expanding liaison activities would benefit the Boy Scouts Association. One way that the Boy Scouts would gain was by obtaining resources to support its activities. Such was the case in Spry’s dealings with the armed forces, which could – and did – provide the Scouts with a myriad of services. An early example of this occurred in the summer of 1947, when the Royal Canadian Navy, owing to a change in previously-planned sailing dates, agreed to transport 35 Scouts aboard its aircraft carrier, HMCS Warrior, to attend the World Boy Scout Jamboree in France. Two years later, the Department of National Defence supported the first Canadian Boy Scout Jamboree by providing the venue, the Connaught Ranges located just west of Ottawa, 400 circular tents and 50 marquee tents, 1,500 tables, assorted camp gear, and the bands of the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Governor General’s Foot Guards for afternoon displays. Spry’s former military rank and his army connections presumably helped in obtaining such support. Other organizations made similar contributions. The band of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police performed during the Governor General’s inspection, while the St. John Ambulance provided a registered medical practitioner who set up and, with the assistance of several St. John Ambulance volunteer nurses, ran the Jamboree’s hospital at no cost to the Boy Scouts.

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82 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 11 June 1947. A jamboree is a large gathering of Scouts that may be held at the national or international level. See Chapter 8. 83 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 14 October 1949.
In other instances, General Spry sought the influence of high-ranking individuals rather than material services. For example, on 21 October 1947 he solicited the assistance of Hugh Keenleyside, who in addition to being Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources was the Chairman of the Northwest Territories Council, about that department’s support of Scouting in the North. Keenleyside replied that “So far as this Department is concerned, you may rely upon our sympathetic and indeed enthusiastic cooperation.” Spry had similar success with Dr. Doris W. Plewes, the Executive Secretary of the National Council on Physical Fitness, when on 29 September 1948 he requested her help in making a film called *The Sport of Orienteering* available to Scoutmasters. One week later, Plewes told Spry that she had forwarded his letter to the provincial Directors of Physical Fitness and Recreation with the suggestion that they recruit all youth groups to view the film. She further assured Spry of her organization’s “sincere desire to cooperate with the Boy Scouts in every way possible.” The influence of senior appointments such as these no doubt “greased the skids” when it came to the Boy Scouts’ dealings with lower-ranking members of government departments and agencies.

The apparent ease with which Dan Spry dealt with the press, senior public servants, and other leading figures is another example of the manner in which he adapted wartime lessons to his postwar role as a senior Boy Scout leader. While serving as General McNaughton’s personal assistant in 1942 and 1943, Spry had frequently met high-ranking and well-known men such as Britain’s General Sir Alan Brooke and South Africa’s Field Marshal Jan Smuts. After he became a general officer in August 1944 he continued to work closely with senior military figures in the

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Canadian, British, and American forces. As a result of this wartime experience, Spry was accustomed to conducting business at senior levels.

One might conclude that Spry’s goal in cooperating with so many external groups and agencies was solely to obtain benefits for the Boy Scouts. His intentions, however, were not one-sided. He had always thought of himself as a team player, a sentiment that had become deeply ingrained through his experience of cadets, Scouting, team sports, and 14 years of military service. Spry was not alone in this regard. Thousands of his peers had been likewise influenced during their boyhood through schools, churches, and youth groups, and as young adults by their experience of wartime teamwork. It was thus natural that Dan Spry would encourage the Boy Scouts to support like-minded groups. Such cooperation will be examined in later chapters with regard to the Scout Movement’s efforts to shape children’s character and develop future citizens.

Encouraging teamwork, especially among the Boy Scouts’ senior leaders, was a major aspect of Spry’s approach to his job as Chief Executive Commissioner. Achieving such a goal within a national organization of volunteers, in a country characterized by regional, cultural, and linguistic diversity, would have been a daunting challenge for anyone. Spry, however, had faced similar situations during the war in his various command appointments. He would use many of his wartime team-building techniques in his new role as a peacetime civic leader.

General Spry’s effort to acquaint himself with Canada’s key Scouting figures, described earlier, was a first step in promoting teamwork amongst its leadership. He soon discerned that Jackson Dodds was a strong team player. Significantly, it was Dodds who had moved that the Dominion Executive Committee adopt Plan OPPORTUNITY, a clear sign of that influential Scouter’s support.\textsuperscript{76} Lt.-Col. George Simmons, whom Spry had recruited to be the Executive Commissioner for Administration, was another ally. Simmons played a leading role in planning

\textsuperscript{76} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 12 February 1947.
the first and second Canadian Jamborees, and became one of Dan’s closest friends. Individuals such as these assisted Spry’s teambuilding efforts.

One method that Dan Spry used to encourage teamwork within the Dominion Executive Committee was through a Chief Executive Commissioner’s newsletter. The purpose of this form of internal communication, the first of which was distributed to Executive Committee members and executive commissioners in July 1947, was to keep the Association’s senior leadership informed of key developments between meetings. Such newsletters were brief, usually three or four pages. According to the minutes of the 10 October meeting of the Executive Committee, Spry’s initiative met with interest and approval. T.E. Saul, one of the representatives from Manitoba, was particularly impressed. Spry’s use of a newsletter to keep senior Scout leaders in the picture was not revolutionary. It was, though, highly reminiscent of his wartime practice of using memoranda to inform subordinates of policies that he wished to be implemented.

Cooperation between the Chief Executive Commissioner and Scout leaders across the country was enhanced through other means, too. From the beginning, Spry had made clear his intention to consult with the provincial commissioners on matters of national importance like Plan OPPORTUNITY, an approach that must have earned him their confidence. So did his frequent visits, where he passed on his vision for Canadian Scouting and other key points. The minutes of Executive Committee meetings show that the Dominion Headquarters and provincial associations were working well together. Such was certainly Spry’s perception. In early 1948, he opined that “Canadian Scouting is beginning to become one family instead of ten.” Several provincial and district leaders felt the same way. For example, Reverend Nelson Chappel of Toronto said that “I have been very much pleased at the improvement of the feeling of the people

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77 Toby Spry has recalled that Simmons, whom he knew as “Uncle George,” was a frequent guest in his parents’ home. Toby Spry, personal e-mail to author, 17 July 2014.
78 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 10 October 1947.
with whom I work that there is wholehearted cooperation and sympathy, and a great deal of work has come from the personal work that General Spry has done.” Such a view indicates that senior Canadian Scout leaders credited Spry with this atmosphere of teamwork.

Dan Spry’s application of certain human skills, which he had further developed during his wartime military service, help to explain his apparent success in developing teamwork within the Canadian Boy Scouts. The fact that he did not micromanage others was important. Spry understood that such an approach fostered distrust. His goal was precisely the opposite. From mentors like George Pearkes, and through his own experience, Spry had learned that successful leadership required that trust be established between leaders and followers, and thus he did not “breath down the necks” of his subordinates. Other key elements were his courteous treatment of others, and his great ability to work in harmony with all manner of personalities. Such practices, which defined Spry’s leadership style, had paid handsome dividends during the war in terms of teambuilding. He rightly believed that they would work well with Canada’s Scout leaders, too. They were volunteers, not soldiers, and in many cases the provincial and district Scout leaders had a far better grasp of local conditions, and a good deal more Scouting experience, than did he. Spry’s collegial approach was undoubtedly the best choice to use within such an environment.

While General Spry’s efforts went a long way to enhance teamwork among senior leaders of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association, there were naturally some areas of disagreement. One of the most significant of these revolved around the desire of French-Canadian Catholic Scout groups in mainly English-speaking parts of the country to re-establish links to Catholic Scouting in Quebec, which had been severed after the Canadian General Council and La Fédération des Scouts catholiques signed a Memorandum of Agreement in April 1935. As historian James

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79 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 23 January 1948. When Spry said “one family instead of ten,” he was counting the Dominion and nine provincial organizations. At the time, Newfoundland was not yet a Canadian province.
Trepanier has noted, this matter was dealt with in various ways. From the 1930s to the 1950s Catholic leaders in New Brunswick worked with the provincial Boy Scouts association to ensure that French Catholic Scouts would have a place.80 Things were different in Ontario. In November 1945, the Ottawa diocese requested that the Canadian General Council create a federal district of French-speaking Scout units that would report to the Dominion Headquarters and enjoy the same privileges as La Fédération. The Dominion Executive Committee rejected this idea, largely to avoid setting what it thought would be a bad precedent, but the issue arose again soon after Dan Spry became Chief Executive Commissioner.81 Recognizing the potential damage to Scouting’s cohesion and its image as a force for cooperative unity in Canada if the matter was not handled in a diplomatic manner, Spry recommended that the Canadian General Council approve La Fédération’s request to put Ottawa’s French-speaking Scouts under a diocese commissioner. At the same time, he obtained the Council’s permission to allocate office space in the Dominion Headquarters for a French-Catholic executive commissioner, who would serve in a liaison role.82 After further meetings with La Fédération, Spry concluded that cooperation would be best served if French-speaking Scout troops in dioceses straddling the Ontario-Quebec border were allowed to join the Quebec organization if they so wished. It was not an ideal solution as such a move would disrupt the structural and organizational integrity of the Ontario Boy Scouts. On the other hand, Spry said, “Some Scouting was better than none,” a comment that reflected his belief that exposing boys to the Scout Movement was the main priority. The Executive Committee agreed.83

By January 1948, Spry reported that relations with La Fédération had “greatly improved.”84

80 Trepanier, “Building Boys, Building Canada,” 133.
81 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 21 November 1945.
83 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 12 December 1946.
84 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 23 January 1948. Nothing further regarding this matter can be found in Spry’s personal papers.
During the 1940s and early 1950s there were similar incidents involving the Timmins, Ontario diocese and that of Saint Boniface, Manitoba. In both cases, as James Trepanier has noted, their requests to join the Quebec body were rejected. Trepanier has argued that such events were part of an ongoing effort to create a united French-Canadian Catholic Boy Scout movement, within which boys in all parts of Canada would be taught the ideals of French-Canadian Catholicism and nationalism. Such an organization was created years later, in 1960, under the name Les Scouts catholiques du Canada.\textsuperscript{85} Dan Spry’s personal views on matters regarding cooperative unity will be dealt with in Chapter 8. Still, events such as these serve as a clear reminder that developing a sense of unity and teamwork among the country’s Boy Scouts could be a difficult task.

A further major plank in General Spry’s work to expand Canadian Scouting centred on improving the quality and the quantity of the Boy Scouts’ volunteer and professional leaders. This matter was a perennial concern. In 1943, for example, the Association believed that the uneven quality of adult leadership explained its difficulty in retaining older boys.\textsuperscript{86} Here, too, Spry’s military experience was beneficial. Fourteen years as an Army officer, and especially his service as a front-line commander, had taught him a few things about “good” leadership. Personal example, he knew, was of prime importance, as people would follow individuals who did what they expected others to do. Serving one’s subordinates by putting their welfare before one’s own was another critical aspect. So, too, was showing respect to others through courteous behaviour. These were human skills that Spry had demonstrated while serving in the army. He also had a lot of experience in developing and supervising subordinate leaders. Equally important was his understanding that the quality of leadership had a direct bearing on an organization’s

\textsuperscript{85} Trepanier, “Building Boys, Building Canada,” 131-148. The Ontario Provincial Council rejected the Timmons request. La Fédération turned down the request from Saint Boniface.

\textsuperscript{86} Bonhomme, “The Restructuring of the Boy Scout Movement in Canada,” 63.
performance. In the army, he had found that effective organizations usually had good leaders. Conversely, the presence of poor leadership often explained why some units performed at a low standard. All of these principles, Spry believed, could be applied to the Boy Scouts.

Dan Spry realized that improving the Boy Scouts’ leadership cadre started with the manner in which leaders were selected. The Association’s manual, *Policy, Organization, and Rules for Canada*, provided general guidance on this subject. Section 17 addressed leadership appointments, within which Scout group committees, local associations, and commissioners were advised to “take every precaution to ensure that no one whose character is open in any way to suspicion shall be admitted to leadership in the Movement…”87 This direction was expanded upon for prospective members of the professional executive staff. The 1947 version of the Boy Scouts’ policy on the subject stipulated that such individuals had to have exemplary personal and home lives and belong to a religious denomination, these being key aspects of Scouting. Other desirable elements included a good Scout background, administrative ability, and an aptitude for outdoor activities, qualities that were also useful for leaders at the troop and pack levels.88

General Spry knew from his own experience that the armed forces paid careful attention to selecting its leaders. During the war, for example, the Canadian Army introduced “scientific” officer selection practices that included psychological and educational testing.89 Such measures were obviously impracticable in a civilian volunteer movement, but Spry felt that the Boy Scouts could do better in this regard. As he told Toronto’s Scouters in December 1947:

Please if you have anything to do with it, insist upon careful initial selection. Let us be right about the fellow in the first place...Why be right in the first place? We know that Scouting methods, ideals, and principles are perfectly sound in the opinion of the best educationists and child experts and particularly in the view of

89 Hayes, “The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps,” 125-164.
the churches...It is sound, but we also know that there are local failures from time to time. Think about those failures. The weird looking Scoutmaster to whom you send your boys on Friday night! Do not blame the Scout movement...Where we have failures it is not through faulty basic methods, it is through misapplication...I do not think, gentlemen, that we are going to produce those rugged, adaptable young Canadians unless we can call on the very best brains, the best young leaders and boy-men that this country has to offer.  

One can see in Spry’s remarks the Boy Scouts’ concern for the moral quality of its leaders. Scouting took its duty to children and their safety seriously. Fears about adult predators existed in the late 1940s, too. As Spry told a Boy Scout Conference in Kitchener in 1948, “We won’t get better and more leaders till we dispose of the creepers. This will automatically attract good men.” For his part, Spry introduced annual performance reviews for the professional staff within the Dominion Headquarters, and he suggested that the provincial commissioners do the same. These reviews covered aspects like mental aptitude, resourcefulness, administrative ability, cooperation, skill, and responsibility; members would be rated using a numerical scoring system with word pictures for each assessment factor. In many regards, General Spry’s system resembled the military personnel evaluation methods with which he was personally familiar.

Dan Spry had some ideas about where to look for leaders of the calibre that he thought the Boy Scouts deserved. As was related earlier, he thought that Canada’s Second World War veterans were a likely source. He knew that some servicemen who had been Scouters before the war had already returned to the fold, and that the Dominion Executive Committee felt certain that many of the 767 leaders that the Association gained in 1946 fell into such a category. Spry had brought ex-servicemen into the Dominion Headquarters in 1946, but he wanted many more of this type. As he said to Ottawa’s Gyro Club on 14 May 1947:

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93 Scouts Canada Museum, Annual Report for 1946, 34.
The war crisis gave these men the opportunity to show their worth...During the war these men moved about our country on training and they learned a great deal about Canada and Canadians. This developed understanding, confidence, and respect for the other fellow. These feelings were strengthened in the test of battle and have given the veteran a broader approach to life and have therefore better fitted him for shouldering responsibility and giving leadership to his community and country.\textsuperscript{94}

The most obvious place for the Boy Scouts to find potential leaders among the country’s veteran population was the Canadian Legion. On 6 February 1948, Spry asked Legion President Maj.-Gen. C.B. Price for the Legion’s support, writing that he was “particularly impressed by the fine results which are attained by Scoutmasters who are also veterans of the Armed Forces.” He attributed this outcome to their “sense of discipline, their wider outlook, and their training,” and asked Price how the Boy Scouts and the Legion could best cooperate. Such cooperation, he said, would be “to the advantage of the young lads, and secondly to the advantage of [the Legion’s] membership in that such activity would give them some opportunity of further service to their communities.”\textsuperscript{95} In April Spry followed up with a request to meet with Price, but for reasons that remain unknown they did not meet. There is no indication of such in either the Canadian Legion’s surviving records or General Spry’s one-line diaries.\textsuperscript{96} Undeterred, General Spry tried again in the spring of 1950 to win the Canadian Legion’s support. This time he was more successful, and in June he published an article in the Legion’s magazine, \textit{The Legionary}, entitled “Scouting and the Legion.” He pointed out that the Boy Scout Movement and the Legion had common values, saying that they “differ[ed] only in the fact that Legionaries [\textit{sic}] ‘through dust of conflict and battle flame’ have proved their loyalty through service, while Boy Scouts are preparing themselves for future service which, pray God, may be in an era of peace and

\textsuperscript{94}D.C. Spry, “Address to the Ottawa Gyro Club,” Ottawa, 14 May 1947, Toby Spry Collection.
progress.” Spry also noted that 59 Legion branches had sponsored Scout groups, and he asserted that all of them were well-run. This, he wrote, was “a great tribute to the leaders themselves and to the branches who give the support so necessary to successful Scouting.” He concluded by appealing for even greater assistance from veterans:

The Boy Scout Association is anxious to increase the number of Scout Leaders in order that more boys may benefit from this training. Within the Canadian Legion there are thousands of young men who are most suitable for this worthwhile service. I hope we shall see more and more young veterans coming forward with offers of assistance in this great task of training boys to be the sort of neighbours we all want to have about us.

Surviving records reveal that Dan Spry planned to follow up his article by asking the provincial Scout commissioners to contact the Legion organizations for their respective province to discuss “ways and means of interesting the individual members of the Canadian Legion in Scout Leadership.” It is not known if this consultation occurred. The degree to which Spry’s appeal to the Legion induced more veterans to become Boy Scout leaders is also unknown, as the Boy Scouts did not maintain such statistics. However, many of them were fathers of the postwar baby boom. Like other parents, some of these men likely became Scouters to be involved with their sons’ activities. If the 35 per cent representation of veterans in Canada’s male population aged 25-49 years in 1951 was reflected in that year’s number of Scout leaders (11,861 men), roughly 4,151 Scouters may well have been ex-servicemen. What is a matter of record is that by 1960 the Legion was Canada’s largest sponsor of Scouting, with 134 Scout groups and 7,000 boys. By 1964, the number of Legion-sponsored Boy Scouts had grown to 13,000.

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98 A sample of Spry’s proposed letter is found at LAC, RCL Fonds, Reel M-8517, File 19-1-25, W.L. Currier (Deputy Chief Executive Commissioner) to T.D. Anderson (the Legion’s General Secretary) 9 June 1950.
General Spry knew that non-veterans could also be good Scouters, and that getting more – and better – leaders would dramatically affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to expand. For its part, the Association considered a one-to-ten ratio of adult leaders to boys as ideal to provide proper supervision, but after the Second World War the number of leaders had lagged behind that of boys. For example, in 1949 the Boy Scouts’ leadership cadre had increased by 6.3 per cent, while the figure for boy members rose by 7.3 per cent.\(^{101}\) After studying the matter, Spry concluded that prospective leaders would be attracted to the Scout Movement by “efficiency in community service, adequate facilities for training, and informed public support.” More adult leaders, he reasoned, would allow more boys to join, which in turn would expand Scouting’s societal reach in Canada.\(^{102}\) Believing that achieving all of this would require a national effort, Spry began work on a second strategic plan, which like its predecessor, Plan OPPORTUNITY, was given a military-sounding code name, Plan ACHIEVEMENT. It went into effect on 28 April 1950.\(^{103}\)

Plan ACHIEVEMENT entailed three lines of effort. First, every Scout group was to study its strengths and weaknesses, and set annual targets of achievement in the areas of service, leadership, and supporters for the years 1951 to 1953. Service targets would include community projects and emergency assistance. Targets relating to leadership focused on increasing numbers, leadership training, facilities, and equipment. Supporter targets would invigorate Scout group, district, and provincial councils, and promote Ladies Auxiliary services that could assist Scouters by organizing fundraising and social events. Group targets for the year 1953, when a second Canadian Jamboree would be held, were provided to enable local leaders to develop progressive

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\(^{103}\) Plan ACHIEVEMENT was originally entitled “Plan MAPLE LEAF,” but its name was changed after Spry and the provincial executive commissioners agreed that “achievement” was the objective. See LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 28 April 1950. While Plans OPPORTUNITY and ACHIEVEMENT had military-sounding code names, their format differed markedly from that of a military order.
goals for the previous two years. Second, district councils were to coordinate the plans of Scout groups within their areas. Provincial councils would supervise the districts, while Dominion Headquarters provided advice and monitored progress nationwide. Lastly, Scout districts were encouraged to provide speakers to explain Scouting’s needs to service clubs and schools, and to enlist media support. Spry also counselled Scout groups to pay close attention to dress and deportment, which he believed would enhance the Boy Scouts’ image. Finally, the Plan would reward Cub packs, Scout troops, and Rover crews that achieved their performance targets.\textsuperscript{104}

Dan Spry recognized that Plan ACHIEVEMENT’s success depended on local efforts. In October 1950 it was getting “a very favourable reception.” Three months later, the Executive Committee heard that “packs, troops and crews were taking the plan up with enthusiasm and that with the help of Provincial and District Commissioners and their staffs should be a success.”\textsuperscript{105} They were right, but only to a degree. By 1951’s end, some 550 Cub packs, 403 Scout troops, and 16 Rover crews had qualified for the Plan ACHIEVEMENT award, a success rate of 21 per cent, 17 per cent, and 8 per cent, respectively.\textsuperscript{106} Only partial figures have survived for 1952. These reveal that 437 Cub packs, 207 Scout troops, and six Rover crews in five of the ten provinces achieved the standard. Results for 1953 are unknown.\textsuperscript{107} A total of 3,102 packs, troops, and crews earned ACHIEVEMENT crests over the Plan’s three-year duration.\textsuperscript{108} Membership also increased, from 116,899 boys and 11,861 leaders in 1951 to 143,561 boys and 14,282 leaders in 1953 as boys belonging to the baby boom generation reached the right age to join.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{104} Toby Spry Collection, Canadian General Council, “Plan ACHIEVEMENT,” 2-8.
\textsuperscript{105} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 13 October 1950 and 26 January 1951.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid. No finalized figures for 1952 or 1953 were provided in the latter year’s Annual Report.
\textsuperscript{108} “Plan Achievement – A Recapitulation,” \textit{The Scout Leader}, Vol. 31, No. 9 (June 1954).
In reading the records of the Dominion Executive Committee and a Scout Leader editorial published in June 1954, one gets the sense that the Association’s leadership was a bit disappointed by Plan ACHIEVEMENT’s results. What had begun so promisingly seemed to fizzle out by 1953. That year’s Annual Report only mention of the plan was that it was Spry’s initiative. The boys’ ages, 8-17 years for Cubs and Scouts, was likely an important factor; it can be hard to keep children’s interest. Dan Spry expressed his views on 25 April 1952:

All Provincial Commissioners received a letter from me several weeks ago in which I said there were three reasons why this has not been more successful. (1) Unit targets were set too high, (2) Interest slackened when Scouters realized this, and I feel that in some cases District and Provincial Commissioners could have pushed this a bit harder, (3) Again I felt that District and other officials, and we at CHQ could have pushed a bit harder. We never thought the Plan would be 100% – nothing ever is. The fact that we have achieved something should be some satisfaction to all of us. I think that if we can keep it up we will achieve over a 2 ½ year period a considerable development, probably more than we would have done if we had not had a Plan...My own opinion is that after the [1953] Jamboree we must...hope that you and your District Commissioners will do your jobs of supervision, encouragement and advice so that the Scouters will get down to real Troop Scouting...\[^{110}\]

Spry’s criticisms seem a bit tough. It was not like him to blame others for the failure of a plan that he had devised, having never done so as an Army officer, which leads one to suspect that he was frustrated with Plan ACHIEVEMENT’s limited success. Spry had always counselled others to “Never Pass a Fault” – he used that phrase during a Dominion Executive Committee meeting on 23 January 1948 – and he had always led by personal example.\[^{111}\] Seeing what he perceived as failings of leaders at the provincial and district levels in such areas, he likely felt bound to point them out. Spry’s comments did not go unchallenged. In a rarely-documented example of “pushback,” the Executive Committee’s representatives from British Columbia protested that “We feel we have done all we humanly could to push Plan Achievement. We got


\[^{111}\] LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 23 January 1948.
30% which we feel isn’t too bad, and on top of that we did lead and we are quite satisfied. We feel that Plan Achievement has been a good thing for us…” Eli Boyaner of New Brunswick agreed: “We feel that a great deal has been accomplished...if the Plan has fallen down I think we can place the blame on the Provincial and not the District Commissioners.”112 Dan Spry made no further comment. Undoubtedly, he felt there was little to be gained, and potentially much to lose in terms of the teamwork he had built up in Canadian Scouting, if he pressed his point.

If Plan ACHIEVEMENT did not fully live up to General Spry’s expectations, his efforts to improve adult leadership training produced better results. This too, was a key aspect of Plan OPPORTUNITY. Spry’s concept included several facets, such as creating regional training teams and encouraging employers to grant employees leave with pay to attend Scout courses. His most significant innovation was to standardize advanced practical training for Scouters.113 Like the Scout Movement itself, such training had originated in Britain with Lord Baden-Powell, who in 1919 had created a training centre at Gilwell Park, just outside of London, for such a purpose. Similar outdoor training had been conducted in Canada since 1924, but as it was run at the provincial level the methods that were used varied greatly. In some areas, it was possible to obtain the qualification by attending classroom lectures.114 To address such deficiencies, Spry proposed the creation of a standardized Canadian Scouters’ Training Course. As he said to the Dominion Executive Committee, “There is a great need among the Executive staff to give them a sense of belonging to a service. A training course of this sort would help to accomplish that, by getting them together and giving them some common training.”115 In 1948, the Association thus leased a piece of property near Dunrobin, Ontario (west of Ottawa), to be used as a leadership

112 Ibid., 25 April 1952.
113 Toby Spry Collection, Scout Leader Supplement, “Plan Opportunity,” 10. The Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee offer no evidence that Canadian employers granted leave to Scout leaders to attend courses.
training centre. The first course was held from 1-19 June, and was attended by 32 professional staff from across Canada. In 1949, a total of 13 full-time staff and 12 volunteer leaders attended. By 1953, Scout executive training included lessons in public speaking, building Scout councils, conducting financial campaigns, and developing training courses.

The initiatives described above were just some of those that Dan Spry undertook during his tenure as Chief Executive Commissioner, which lasted from September 1946 until he became Director of the Boy Scouts’ International Bureau in November 1953. He was involved in other major projects, which included two national Jamborees, in 1949 and 1953, and a survey of boy members to get their views on the Boy Scouts’ program. Spry also strove to expand Scouting in Canada’s North, got the Association into peacetime civil defence work, and he cooperated with government departments, churches, and schools to instil the ideals of character and citizenship among the country’s boys. Spry remained extremely active, insisting that more be done to improve Scouting. As he told the General Council in April 1950, “There is an urgent need and we must keep pushing so that the opportunity is taken to give benefit to the boy of today. The opportunity is so fleeting...” Spry’s effort to do his best in serving the Boy Scouts, and to put such service before his own wants, were values he had learned as an army officer.

Assessing Dan Spry’s success as Chief Executive Commissioner is difficult to quantify – and qualify. He was a national-level executive, whereas Scouting was largely conducted at the local level. The Canadian Association did see rapid growth during his tenure, from 89,986 boys and 8,491 adults in 1946 to 143,561 boys and 14,282 adults in 1953. The number of Cub packs,

118 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13941, Annual Report for 1949, 5, and Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 24 April 1953.
120 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 28 April 1950.
Scout troops, and Rover crews also increased. In 1946, there were 3,640 in all; by 1953, some 2,352 new packs, troops, and crews had sprung up, a 64.6 per cent increase. The Boy Scouts’ representation within Canada’s eligible boy population also grew during this period. A Boy Scout study written in 1958 showed that in 1947, Cubs had represented 12.2 percent of Canada’s boys aged 8-11 years. Five years later, in 1952, this was 15.1 per cent. The representation of Scouts had also expanded, increasing from 6.4 per cent in 1947 to 7.5 per cent by 1952. Such exponential growth was undoubtedly helped by a high birth rate – the baby boom – and the admission of hundreds of thousands of immigrants during the 1950s. A later study, produced in 1961, postulated that the accelerating rate of urbanization also played a part, as most Scout groups were situated in towns and cities. Whether or not membership growth resulted from good organization and management, the study’s author wrote, was hard to say.

Notwithstanding this, it seems clear that Dan Spry’s strategic planning efforts helped to create the conditions that allowed the Boy Scouts’ postwar expansion to be effectively managed. His contribution, though, went far beyond his involvement in planning. His improvements to the Boy Scouts’ internal organization and administration made it more capable of dealing with the increased workload that accompanied the explosive growth in membership, while his speaking abilities boosted Scouting’s public profile and the morale of local leaders. Spry’s use of good people skills resulted in a higher degree of teamwork among the Association’s senior leadership and with like-minded governmental and non-governmental entities. He raised the standard of adult leadership, not only by creating an advanced training centre but by setting a highly positive standard for leadership.

personal example of what a Boy Scout leader could – and, perhaps should – be. For the purpose of the present study, Spry definitely played an important role in getting Second World War veterans involved in the Canadian Boy Scouts Association in the years after the war, not only to manage the organization at the national level but also to provide leadership at the local level. All in all, he achieved a great deal during his seven-year tenure as Chief Executive Commissioner of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association.

Certainly, the Boy Scouts’ senior leadership believed that Dan Spry had made significant quantitative and qualitative contributions to Canadian Scouting. The Association recognized his many accomplishments in its 1953 Annual Report, observing that “He was the prime mover in the organization of Plan Opportunity and Plan Achievement...The success of these plans will long remain a tribute to General Spry’s leadership...” Spry’s great enthusiasm and dedication to the Scout Movement had been infectious. Thus, his announcement at the Canadian General Council meeting on 24 April 1953 that he was leaving Canada to become the Director of the International Bureau in London must have been met with mixed emotions. Comments made by some of the Council members indicate that such was the case. G.R. Mackay, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, opined that “[Spry] brought vigour and keenness to our organization in Ottawa and throughout the country.” He concluded that “We owe an awful lot of thanks to Dan Spry for the healthy condition of Scouting in Canada today.” Another member, Colonel M.L. Douglas of Brockville, Ontario, observed that “It is hard to applaud when you feel you are losing something big,” but added that “when we give Dan Spry his last big roll of applause here we are doing it partly because of the wider field of Scouting he is now entering, we are doing it for – as Mr. Mackay said – what he has done for Scouting in Canada, and I believe we are also doing it out of pure affection.” Jackson Dodds summed up the General Council’s view by saying that

“[Dan Spry] has done a splendid and wonderful job for us.” For his part, Spry said he was leaving “without any qualms because I do feel that Scouting in Canada is in reasonably good shape.”

On a personal and professional level, Spry would be missed.

It must be stressed here that Spry’s provision of societal leadership in peacetime did not end when he left the Canadian Boy Scouts Association in 1953 to take up his duties as Director of the Boy Scouts’ International Bureau. As will be seen later, he remained a leader throughout his life. Of equal importance is the fact that Spry’s trajectory as a leading figure in Canadian society was not unique, as many other Second World War veterans also applied wartime lessons about leadership, management, and teamwork in their civilian lives. Exactly how many of them did so is impossible to accurately determine as making such a determination would require life-course biographical data from these individuals, the vast majority of whom are deceased. Given this reality, and the fact that neither government departments nor veterans’ organizations alike had much need for such information to carry out their duties, it is not surprising that no official statistics address this issue.

On the other hand, there is evidence that former wartime military leaders did provide leadership in civilian life during the postwar years, and that some of them – including Dan Spry – did so almost immediately upon hanging up their uniforms. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, this tendency was evident among the 54,000 veterans who attended universities through the provisions of the Veterans Charter. Many student-veterans considered assuming campus leadership roles to be an entirely natural thing to do. As one such individual explained to oral historian Barry Broadfoot, “It was inevitable. Most of the fellows had been trained as leaders of one sort or another....”

For their part, university authorities had no doubt that such behaviour

126 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 24 April 1953.
127 Anonymous, quoted in Broadfoot, Six War Years, 408-409.
had its roots in military service. As the University of Saskatchewan’s president told the Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans on 25 February 1946, “The services have done a remarkable job in developing a maturity of outlook and a sense of responsibility which should be conserved and developed on the university campus.”

This phenomenon also occurred in the United States. As Michael Gambone observed, Second World War veterans became “a force in student government” at colleges throughout the United States in the years immediately after the war. Another early example was seen in the field of entrepreneurship. On 3 January 1947 the Department of Veterans Affairs announced that 16,489 former servicemen had established businesses in communities across Canada. Many of these new businessmen had 20 to 25 employees working for them, and most were doing well. In one unspecified region, just six of 253 veteran-owned enterprises were considered likely to fail. Such successes implied that these new business owners possessed managerial skills, not to mention leadership and the ability to promote teamwork. This knowledge no doubt stemmed from wartime service.

As time passed, veterans of the Second World War increasingly became leaders in many sectors of Canadian society. By 1972, veterans of that conflict, 761 in all, accounted for 34.7 per cent of the 2,191 prominent Canadians enumerated in the 1971-1972 edition of Who’s Who in Canada. As is depicted at Appendix 5, some 445 of them had become business owners or senior management executives, accounting for 58.5 per cent of all veterans listed and 20.3 per cent of the total entries in the 1971–1972 Who’s Who. Some of this group headed companies with thousands of employees nation-wide, and managed tens of millions of dollars worth of business. They included well-known names such as John Bassett, the Chairman of Baton Broadcasting Ltd.; Gerald Bronfman, the President of Kensington Industries Ltd.; and Philip Oland, President

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128 Neary, On to Civvy Street, 204.
of Moosehead Breweries Ltd. All of these men had served as officers during the war. Other influential business figures who had been wartime military leaders were Allen Lambert, the President of the Toronto Dominion Bank; Marcel Vincent, the Chief Executive Officer of Bell Canada; and Robert Butler, the Chief Executive Officer of T. Eaton Company Ltd.\footnote{These statistics were derived by analyzing individual records found in Herbert E. Barnett, Hugh Fraser, B.A., and Terry M. Whelpton, B.Sc., \textit{Who's Who in Canada, 1971-1972: An Illustrated Biographical Record of Men and Women of the Time} (Toronto: International Press Limited, 1971). For Bassett, Bronfman, Oland, Lambert, Vincent, and Butler, see pages 411-412, 779, 1260, 9-10, 59, and 190-191, respectively. See also Appendix 5.}

Second World War veterans also became political leaders. While none became Prime Minister, several became federal cabinet ministers responsible for leading large departments and managing large budgets. One can get a sense of the presence of veterans in Canadian political life by reviewing statistical data regarding the composition of federal cabinets from 1945 to the 1980s. As may be seen at Appendix 8, from 1948 to 1957 – the years during which Louis St-Laurent was Prime Minister – five of the 34 individuals who occupied cabinet posts had served during the 1939-1945 period, some 14.7 per cent of the total. At this time, such veterans were still young and just coming into their own. That figure doubled during John Diefenbaker’s ministry. Eleven of the 38 people who filled cabinet positions from 1957 to 1963, and fully half of Diefenbaker’s first cabinet, were veterans. From that point until the end of Pierre Trudeau’s first ministry in 1979, ex-servicemen and women made up no less than 15 per cent of the total number of people holding cabinet office. Ten per cent of Joe Clark’s cabinet in 1979-1980 were veterans. Just two served in Pierre Trudeau’s second period in office (1980-1984), while the last veteran, George Hees, retired from cabinet office in November 1988. He was 78 years old.\footnote{Parliament of Canada, PARLINFO, House of Commons, Ministers of the Crown, \url{http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Compilations/FederalGovernment/MinisterProvincial.aspx?Province=&Ministry=3225148e-288a-46ef-8d2f-64c44a259427&Region=} (accessed 1 November 2016), and Biographical Information, Military Service, \url{http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/lists/ParliamentarianAge.aspx?Menu=HOC-Bio&Chamber=03d93e58-f843-49b3-9653-84275c23f3fb} (accessed 3 September 2016). For Diefenbaker’s first cabinet, see “The New Cabinet,” \textit{The Legionary}, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (July 1957), 5. George Hees had been a wartime major.
Some federal ministries had more Second World War veterans as cabinet ministers than others, as may be seen at Appendix 9. The Department of National Defence topped the list, with 11 of 20 ministers having such experience. Among these individuals were Doug Harkness (an army lieutenant-colonel) and Paul Hellyer, who had briefly been a lance bombardier in the army. Barney Danson, the minister from 1976 to 1979, was a former army lieutenant, while Gilles Lamontagne had been an air force flight lieutenant. The department with the next highest number was Veterans Affairs. Nine veterans served as Minister, out of a total of 17 individuals who held the appointment. These included Milton F. Gregg, a First World War veteran who had risen to the rank of brigadier during the Second; Hugues Lapointe, Gordon Churchill, and Marcel Lambert, all of whom had been lieutenant-colonels in the army; Roger Teillet, a former air force flight lieutenant; and Daniel MacDonald, who had been an army sergeant. Other departments had respectable numbers of veterans at their political helms, too. These included the Department of Public Works (25 per cent, or five of 20 ministers), the Department of Fisheries (18.8 per cent), and the Postmaster General, at 17.6 per cent. On the other hand, only one Second World War veteran served as ministers of Finance, Justice, or National Health and Welfare (the latter was Judy LaMarsh, an ex-sergeant with the Canadian Women’s Army Corps), while the Department of External Affairs had none. Lincoln Alexander, the Minister of Labour in 1979, and Canada’s first black Member of Parliament, had been an air force corporal.


134 LaMarsh was also Secretary of State from 1965 to 1968. LaMarsh, Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage, 47 and 231.

The federal departments that these veterans ran were, in several instances, both sizeable and complex. National Defence eclipsed all others. By 1956 it had 54,805 civilian employees, and a further 117,000 uniformed personnel were serving in the navy, army, and air force. In that year its operating budget was also quite large, at $1.83 billion. By 1975, it was $2.98 billion. Veterans Affairs, although smaller, also had a sizeable workforce. In 1947, it numbered 21,098 people, and after 1950 it remained at about 13,000 employees until the mid-1960s. Its annual budget amounted to $605 million in 1946 (more than National Defence in that same year), and was averaging about $240-$350 million a year until the mid-1960s. Running organizations such as these demanded leadership and management skills, things that veterans who had been officers or NCOs had learned and practised during their wartime military service.

Thousands of Second World War veterans also became managers within the federal civil service after 1945, but their exact number is unknown because the Civil Service Commission of Canada did not develop statistics depicting such information. However, the Commission did state that veterans had been hired to fill all job levels, including executive positions, and it produced statistics on the number of veterans that federal departments hired during the postwar years. For example, during the period 1945-1951 some 104,275 veterans had been hired by all departments to fill permanent and temporary jobs. Many of them must have filled management positions in a civil service that numbered from 115,908 people in 1945 to 124,580 men and women by 1951.


While statistical data is not available, some civil service management appointments were announced in news releases, as may be seen in a few examples from the Department of Veterans Affairs. On 18 June 1945 Colonel George L. Cameron became the Advisor on Dental Services. Nearly one month later, on 23 July, Major Agnes Macleod was named Matron-in-Chief, and on 13 September Maj.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, the former commander of I Canadian Corps in Italy, became the Director-General of Rehabilitation. Other appointments in the fall of 1945 included Flight Lieutenant L.B. Connery (he became Superintendent of Publicity) and Colonel P.C. Klaehn as the administrator for “S” District in Saskatoon.\footnote{LAC, RG 38, Volume 372, News Releases No. 89 (18 June 1945), No. 92 (23 July 1945), No. 112 (13 September 1945), No. 113 (17 September 1945), and No. 130 (6 October 1945).} As time passed, other veterans who joined the civil service rose to senior-level appointments. Ernest Côté, last seen as a staff officer in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, joined the Department of External Affairs shortly after the war. By 1968 he was Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources in 1968. Two years later, he became Canada’s Deputy Solicitor-General.\footnote{Côté, Réminiscences et souvenances, 115 and 122.} James Roberts, another 3rd Division alumnus, was the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce in the early 1960s.\footnote{Roberts, The Canadian Summer, 191-249.}

The presence of so many Second World War veterans in senior positions within federal departments affected the manner in which they operated. Such was the case in the Department of Veterans Affairs for the period 1948-1968, during which five of six ministers were themselves veterans. Milton F. Gregg, for example, was openly sympathetic to veterans. During negotiations with Newfoundland over how veterans’ benefits would be managed after joining Confederation – Newfoundland offered less to veterans than did Canada – Gregg’s willingness to do right by the former’s veterans clinched a deal that saw them receive most of what Canadians got.\footnote{For the details of these complicated negotiations, see Neary, On to Civvy Street, 261-272.} General E.L.M. Burns, the department’s deputy minister from 1950 to 1954, was of like mind. Although
Burns had a wartime reputation of being a dour individual, his daughter has reported that he approached his duties in Veterans Affairs with the attitude that he had looked after “the boys” during the war, and that he would do the same in peacetime. On one notable occasion, she said, Burns dressed incognito and went to see for himself how his department’s staff was really treating veterans, an indication of the deep concern he felt for their welfare. With leaders like Gregg and Burns setting the tone, it was little wonder that the Department of Veterans Affairs gained a reputation for being generally supportive to veterans.

The stewardship of veterans also influenced the development of national defence policy and the country’s military organization. At the strategic level, it was General Charles Foulkes, last seen as the army’s Chief of the General Staff, who as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee played a defining role in Canada’s decision to join a bilateral continental air defence with the United States, the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), in 1957. The Defence Minister who recommended that Prime Minister Diefenbaker approve this move was George Pearkes, Spry’s former boss in the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. Another of Spry’s former superior officers, Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds, served as the CGS from 1951 to 1955, a period during which the regular army grew to 49,000 all ranks, its highest postwar strength. Among many notable accomplishments, Simonds created three new regular infantry regiments (the Black Watch, the Queen’s Own Rifles, and the Canadian Guards), restored the 1st Canadian Division to the regular force order of battle (like First Canadian Army and its five divisions, the 1st Division had been disbanded shortly after the war’s end), and established an immense training area for the army, Camp Gagetown, in central New Brunswick. He also reorganized the army’s command

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142 DHH, Granatstein Notes, Dr. Mary Burns, interview by J.L. Granatstein, Manotick, Ontario, 22 May 1991.
143 Roy, For Conspicuous Bravery, 287-294. As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Foulkes held what was then Canada’s highest military appointment. Today, that position is called the Chief of the Defence Staff.
structure, thereby creating what J.L. Granatstein has described as Canada’s “first true General Staff.”

Other Spry associates, such as Chris Vokes and George Kitching, served in a variety of senior posts. All of these latter-named officers had learned the art of senior leadership during the war, as did Dan Spry. They, too, used wartime lessons to frame the manner in which members of a national institution – in this case, the Canadian Army – thought and acted.

Veterans became provincial and municipal leaders, too, but statistical data does not exist and websites of provincial legislatures and municipalities do not typically provide biographical information on past members. Notwithstanding this, some individual examples may be cited.

“Duff” Roblin, a former wing commander in the air force, was the premier of Manitoba from 1958 to 1967. He initiated a provincial social welfare system, had the Winnipeg Floodway built to divert the annual spring runoff from the Red River that often flooded the low-lying parts of Winnipeg, and oversaw the construction of hospitals and seniors homes.

John Robarts, a naval lieutenant, transformed Ontario during his premiership (1961-1971). During his tenure, five new universities and the province’s community college system were built, as was the GO commuter rail service and Ontario Place, a recreational facility in Toronto for underprivileged children.

Robarts also brought French language education into Ontario’s public schools. Both men no doubt used the leadership and management skills that they had learned during the war in their civilian careers. Their initiatives positively affected the lives of many Canadians.

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144 Graham, The Price of Command, 240-264, and Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 336-342.
147 For a popular biography of John Robarts, see Steve Paikin, Public Triumph, Private Tragedy: The Double Life of John P. Robarts (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2005). A naval lieutenant was equivalent to an army captain.
Veterans who undertook municipal leadership made a difference in people’s lives, too. One such individual was Henry Baker, Regina’s longest-serving mayor (1959-1970, and 1973-1979). A former air force flight instructor, Baker is described in the city’s web page as “a natural leader” who oversaw the construction of the city’s arts centre, skating rinks, and its present city hall.148 Jack Leslie, Calgary’s mayor from 1965 to 1969, had been an air force pilot. During his time in office he initiated the development of his city’s parkway path system, built low-cost housing, and implemented several environmental projects.149 Two of Edmonton’s mayors, Vincent Danzer (1965-1968) and Ivor Dent (1968-1974), also had served in the air force.150 No doubt veterans provided the same sort of leadership in other Canadian municipalities.

There are no statistics for Second World War veterans in peacetime leadership roles in community service groups like the Lions Club or the Kiwanis, but many of them must have done so. Such people did lead the Canadian Legion and the Sir Arthur Pearson Association of War Blinded (SAPA) in the years after 1945. Their efforts will be examined in later chapters. Cliff Chadderton, an army major who lost a leg in battle, was the Chief Executive Officer of the War Amps for many years. In addition to helping disabled veterans he founded the Child Amputee Program, which has assisted thousands of families across Canada with cost of artificial limbs for child amputees. Chadderton also chaired the National Council of Veteran Associations, in which he played a key role in developing several important pieces of veterans’ legislation.151

As the above examples suggest, many veterans who became leaders and managers in the years after 1945 had performed similar roles during their military service. As may be seen at Appendix 5, some 643 of the 761 Second World War veterans in the 1971-1972 edition of *Who’s Who in Canada* had been officers or NCOs. The ranks of 111 others are not known, while seven reported that they had not earned a military rank. To a certain extent, one could attribute such a trend to the university educations that they received through the Veterans Charter. Walter S. Woods, one of the Charter’s main authors, was of the view that “it is certain that out of the more than fifty thousand students must come a great number of our leaders in business, professional and public life for the years that lie ahead.”

Suzanne Mettler, writing decades later about the American experience, made a similar argument. She argued that military service had “readied [veterans] for leadership development; the education and training offered by the G.I. Bill then offered the actual skills that enabled them to take the next steps.”

Events appeared to validate Walter Woods’s assertion, and Suzanne Mettler’s work is an excellent piece of scholarship that is unique in the historiography of veterans’ contributions to society. However, her belief that wartime service only “readied” veterans for postwar leadership, and that higher education gave them the “actual skills,” seems incorrect. Higher education likely enhanced their potential for higher income and social prominence, but many of them had already been leaders during the war. As veteran John Mink told Mettler, it was wartime military service, followed by government-funded education and training, that prepared him and his peers to be peacetime leaders. American journalist Tom Brokaw echoed Mink’s view. After interviewing several veterans for his best-selling book, *The Greatest Generation*, he concluded that “the

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153 Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizen*, 111.
154 Ibid., 106.
military training and discipline required to win World War II became an accelerated course in
how to prepare a young generation to run a large, modern, and complex industrial society.”

Learning theory offers a more satisfying explanation as to why many Canadian Second
World War veterans became societal leaders after 1945. Simply put, they were greatly changed
by the experience of learning and practising leadership during their wartime service, and they
acted accordingly thereafter. This transformational process may be seen in Dan Spry’s story.
While his upbringing and pre-war military experience gave him the basics of leadership, in 1939
he was only capable of leading small groups. By 1945 he had learned how to lead and direct
large organizations and he transferred such abilities to his role as Chief Executive Commissioner
of Canada’s Boy Scouts. It was a similar story for other veterans who became postwar leaders.
Most of them lacked pre-war leadership or management experience because they had been too
young to be entrusted with such responsibilities. Such was the case for 601 of the 761 veterans in
the 1971-1972 edition of Who’s Who in Canada. The ones with pre-war experience were almost
all older men, thirty of whom had served in the First World War. Similarly, Robert Innes has
argued that wartime service began a process that saw some aboriginal veterans in Saskatchewan
become community leaders by the mid-1950s. There were, of course, some military leaders
who seemed to have a natural ability for such a role. Dan Spry was one, and there were others
like him. Whether or not leadership is an innate or a learned skill is debatable. What does seem
clear is that the circumstances of the Second World War – the need to fill thousands of command
and staff positions in Canada’s much-expanded armed forces – created the opportunity within
which the majority of the country’s wartime leaders learned about leadership and management.

155 Brokaw, The Greatest Generation, 45.
156 Barnett, Fraser, and Whelpton, Who’s Who in Canada, 1971-1972. Several other individuals with pre-war
experience had worked in family-owned businesses.
157 Innes, Alexander Innes, “The Socio-Political Influence of the Second World War Saskatchewan Aboriginal
Veterans,” 109-110.
Practicality also played a part, for Dan Spry and thousands of other Second World War veterans. What Milton F. Gregg had told the Bovey Commission was absolutely correct. Military leadership and management techniques were readily adaptable to civilian purposes, and as has been previously shown, business management texts published after 1945 described methods very similar to those used by the armed forces for planning, organizing, directing, and managing business operations. Dan Spry had performed just such tasks during the war, and so did tens of thousands of other Canadians who served as wartime officers or NCOs. He used the appreciation process he had been taught at staff college in Britain to develop operational plans, and he used written and oral communication skills to direct and motivate his subordinates. In his various staff jobs, he had prepared management documents such as tables and spreadsheets, and had collected statistical data. It was this sort of military experience that led Spry to tell his brother Graham that he considered his leadership and organizational skills to be his principal “selling” points while he was searching for a civilian job after the war’s end. Given all of this, it was understandable that, as Chief Executive Commissioner of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association, he could easily see that the principles that applied to leading, directing, and managing the affairs of a volunteer organization were the same as those that he had used within the Canadian Army. Armed with this understanding, Spry, and no doubt many other ex-servicemen and women, simply tailored his approach to the organizational culture within which he found himself serving.

General Spry freely acknowledged using military leadership and management techniques in his job as Chief Executive Commissioner. So did other Second World War veterans. Bert Hoffmeister, another wartime major-general, credited his military experience for his successful business career after the war; he became President of MacMillan Bloedel Limited, a lumber

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158 Toby Spry, personal e-mail to author, 17 July 2014. Toby said that his father advised him on how to deal with various matters when Toby was serving as a senior executive of the St. John Ambulance.
export firm, in 1951.\textsuperscript{159} People who worked alongside or for veterans also saw – and appreciated – this tendency. Dominick Graham has asserted that Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds, who became Deputy Director of the Halifax Insurance Company in 1955 after retiring from the army, was hired to establish procedures and manage people, and that “Guy was an excellent advertisement for army methods.”\textsuperscript{160} Such behaviour was not confined to generals. To cite one example, Alex McIntosh, a wartime major from London, Ontario, became the co-founder of Beaver Foods, which by the mid-1980s had thousands of employees working nationwide. Beaver Foods had a reputation as a people-oriented company, an attitude that came straight from the top. After a client dinner in June 1985 McIntosh personally thanked each and every member of the kitchen cleaning staff for their unsung efforts. Such behaviour likely owed much to lessons that McIntosh had learned while leading an infantry company in battle, where everyone was an important member of the team.\textsuperscript{161} Other Canadians can likely recount similar examples from their own life experience.

Through Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry’s experience as Chief Executive Commissioner of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association, one can see how Second World War veterans applied lessons they had learned about leadership, management, and teamwork in their postwar civilian careers. Spry’s leadership had a markedly positive effect on the Boy Scouts’ internal management, and he played a leading role in expanding the Association’s societal reach during the period 1946-1953. Thousands of other veterans, armed with similar wartime lessons, also provided effective leadership in nearly every facet of Canadian society. While veterans were certainly not alone in the ranks of Canada’s postwar leaders, their individual and collective actions helped to shape the character of many Canadian institutions and influenced the lives of large numbers of Canadians.

\textsuperscript{159} Delaney, \textit{The Soldiers’ General}, 227.
\textsuperscript{160} Graham, \textit{The Price of Command}, 275.
\textsuperscript{161} After the war, Alex McIntosh joined the Army Reserve and rose to the rank of brigadier-general. The author, who served in the 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment from 1978 to 1984, knew McIntosh as the unit’s Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel. In 1985, the author was also a Beaver Foods management trainee.
CHAPTER 7

SHAPING CHILDREN’S CHARACTER

Scouting endeavours to develop in the boys good character, not for its own sake but character with a purpose – the [original emphasis] purpose – good citizenship.

Maj.-Gen. D. C. Spry

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Canadian society underwent significant changes while the world fell under the nuclear shadow cast by the Cold War. Believing that such developments had serious implications for the country, and especially its youth, many Canadians – including Second World War veterans like Dan Spry – strove to instil in the nation’s children the values that comprised their conception of “good” citizenship. Part of this effort pertained to moulding their character, particularly with regard to socially desirable qualities such as spiritual faith and morality, loyalty, discipline, self-reliance, and an ability to endure and overcome hardship. Through Spry’s thoughts and actions as a senior Boy Scout leader, one can discern some of the ways in which veterans used wartime lessons to teach Canada’s youth about this important aspect of citizenship, within the overarching context of the Cold War. In so doing, they helped shape the nature of the country’s postwar society.

It will be recalled from Chapter 5 that, in the spring of 1946, Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry had decided to leave his post as the Canadian Army’s Vice Chief of the General Staff to become Chief Executive Commissioner of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association. He did so because the latter position allowed him to use skills that he had learned during wartime in a way that would serve Canada, while simultaneously allowing him to return to Scouting and – most importantly – to pursue his peacetime mission of preparing youth for adulthood and citizenship. The times themselves undoubtedly played an important part as well. The late 1940s was a period of change,

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one that instilled both confidence and anxiety among Canadians about the future. On the positive side, a booming economy, a rising standard of living, and the introduction of universal social programs like family allowances (1944) and those contained within the Veterans Charter promoted a sense of economic security. Buoyed by such fortune, large numbers of Canadians built homes, with some 367,900 housing units erected between 1945 and 1949 alone.\(^2\) They also began having babies in record numbers. The 1951 census reported 4,250,717 children aged 0-14 years, about a million more than ten years earlier.\(^3\) As Doug Owram has pointed out, these two phenomena also resulted from a deeply-held feeling on the part of young couples like the Sprys that they had to make up time lost to wartime service.\(^4\) Domestic confidence was also reflected in Canada’s increased participation in world affairs, the topic of a later chapter.

Postwar confidence and prosperity, however, were overshadowed by uncertainty. On the global scene, relations between the Communist bloc and the Western democracies worsened after the war. In June 1948, the Soviet Union blockaded the overland supply routes to the Allied sectors in Berlin. War was only narrowly averted by the Berlin Airlift. The next year, Mao Tse-Tung’s Communists won China’s civil war, and Russia detonated an atomic bomb. Then, on 25 June 1950, Communist North Korea invaded the Republic of South Korea, sparking a “hot war” within the Cold War that involved hundreds of thousands of United Nations troops and an even greater number of Chinese. At home, the Gouzenko espionage affair of 1945 served notice to Canadians that the Cold War would also be fought in Canada. In response to such events the federal government, led since November 1948 by Louis St-Laurent, took several steps.\(^5\) In 1949 Canada joined eleven other nations in a new defensive alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty

\(^2\) Bothwell, Drummond, and English, *Canada Since 1945*, 82-83.
\(^3\) Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1951 Census*, Table 19.
\(^4\) Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, 4-30.
Organization (NATO), the first time that the country had done so in peacetime. In 1950, Canadian troops went to fight in Korea. One year later, thousands more were permanently stationed in Europe as part of NATO land and air forces (another “first”), while Canada’s all-volunteer regular forces grew from 50,000 to 100,000 all ranks over the next few years. At home, treason and sedition laws were given new teeth, immigration and citizenship rules were tightened to weed out Communist infiltrators, and civil defence measures were put into place. The Communist Party was not outlawed, but suspicion of communist sympathies was enough for people to be shunned by unions, the armed forces, and the public service alike. Political scientist Reginald Whitaker and journalist Gary Marcuse have described these internal measures as the makings of a “national insecurity state.” If so, they were the product of the times.

Canada’s Cold War fears were supplemented by worries about the country’s social fabric. Increased urbanization and industrialization were, to a great extent, interpreted as positive signs of progress. On the other hand, these things also implied higher rates of urban poverty, vice, and crime. The arrival of 2,151,505 immigrants between 1945 and 1962, too, concerned Canadian-born citizens. Other developments, such as the rapidly-expanding degree to which American popular culture influenced daily life, seemed to indicate that the nature of the country that Canadians had long known was quickly disappearing.

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6 NATO’s original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 2, 417. For Canada’s early Cold War foreign policy, see Denis Smith, Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 (Toronto: University Press, 1988). On Canadian military policy in the years after 1945, see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume 4, Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).


8 Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada Since 1945, 140-142.

9 For Canadian attitudes and policies regarding immigration during the Cold War, see Iacovetta, Gatekeepers, and Kelley and Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic, 311-343.

10 Some Canadian nationalists feared America’s increasing domination of Canada. See especially George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965).
Dan Spry kept himself well informed of current events, but a review of his surviving speeches reveals that he hardly ever spoke about the economy or the baby boom *per se*. This is not to say that he did not appreciate their significance. It was clear that a strong economy would improve the Boy Scouts’ chances of obtaining funding with which to expand its activities, while a higher birth rate meant that Scouting could be offered to more boys. Neither phenomenon, however, was seen as a societal problem that required resolution. One thing that Spry *did* speak a great deal about, and took action on, revolved a matter that *was* a contemporary concern: how best to shape the character of Canada’s youth, given the context of the times, so that they would become good citizens.

Adult concerns about youth were nothing new, but they took on heightened significance in the years after 1945 because of the rapidly growing number of children, urbanization, and the emergence of the “teenager” as a distinct societal group.  

It was in anticipation of the important role that youth would play in Canada’s postwar reconstruction that Prime Minister King had created the Canadian Youth Commission in 1943. Although this body focused more on people aged 15-24 than those in their early teens, its members believed that youth were an important part of a contemporary spirit of rejuvenation that would greatly affect Canada’s direction in the future.  

Young people, and societal issues associated with them, could not be ignored. Of the various types of youth problems, juvenile delinquency – a term that by the 1940s encompassed criminal and non-criminal but nonetheless undesirable behaviour – was widely seen as a serious societal problem.  

This attitude was a carry-over from the war years, during

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11 Comacchio, *The Dominion of Youth*, 204.  
13 An article published in 1946 called juvenile delinquency “one of the most serious and pressing issues facing Canada now that the war is over.” Gerald Zoffer, “Underworld Evil Breeds Juvenile Delinquency,” *Saturday Night*, 12 January 1946, 6-7, quoted in Owram *Born at the Right Time*, 143.
which many fathers had left home for military service and thousands of mothers had taken up
jobs to support their families. With less parental guidance, and the seedier aspects of city life
close at hand, juvenile arrests had risen sharply, from 9,467 in 1939 to 13,802 in 1942.\textsuperscript{14} After
the war, the media continued to popularize the image of the rebellious teenager despite the fact
that the incidence of youth crime in Canada had dropped to its lowest level in twenty years.\textsuperscript{15}
The credibility of media articles was surely boosted when famous authority figures shone a
spotlight on youth crime. In October 1945, J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the United States’
Federal Bureau of Investigation, flatly asserted that the most dangerous criminal element then in
America was the juvenile delinquent.\textsuperscript{16} Scholarly works, written by experts like sociologist
Clement S. Mihanovich, added weight to the discussion. Mihanovich called juvenile delinquency
in the United States “rampant and wild,” quoted statistics showing that from 59 to 85 per cent of
America’s adult criminals had rap sheets dating to their youth, and argued that, if revealed early
in a child’s life, “delinquent trends and manifestations may be curbed or eradicated at their
source.” Failing to combat this scourge, he wrote, could have serious consequences for future
generations, as youths currently engaged in delinquent behaviour would one day become parents
and might, through their negative example, teach their children to do the same.\textsuperscript{17} These were
American authorities, but because of the close similarities between American and Canadian
culture they reinforced popular Canadian thinking that Canada \textit{did} have a juvenile delinquency
problem. As such, Canada’s societal leaders and child experts sought ways to deal with it.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{14} Keshen, \textit{Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers}, 205.
\textsuperscript{15} Owram \textit{Born at the Right Time}, 141-143.
\textsuperscript{16} J. Edgar Hoover, quoted in Clement S. Mihanovic, \textit{Principles of Juvenile Delinquency} (Milwaukee: The
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 2-11. A few years later, other sociologists argued that concluding adolescents were in revolt was a
“little premature.” For example, see Herbert A. Bloch and Arthur Niederhoffer, \textit{The Gang: A Study in Adolescent
\textsuperscript{18} For a recent study of juvenile delinquency in Canada, see D. Owen Carrigan, \textit{Juvenile Delinquency in
General Spry understood society’s fears about youth in general and their character development in particular. This was not at all surprising given his role as Chief Executive Commissioner of Canada’s Boy Scouts. Then again, like many men his age and younger, he was also a father. When he began his Scouting duties in the fall of 1946 his daughter, Margot, was just over three years old and his son, Toby, had just turned one. Like other parents, Spry was concerned about his children’s future. Still, his postwar speeches show that he was a bit more sanguine about Canada’s youth than were other commentators. As he related to Toronto’s Granite Club on 2 December 1947, “I remember not so many years ago my father and his friends considering that I and some of my friends were pretty retrograde, and yet it seems to me that a good many of them ended up commanding destroyers, battalions and bombers [during the war].” This wartime lesson led Spry to conclude that youth in the late 1940s were not “any worse or any better” than previous generations had been, and as such he advised his audience “not be too down-hearted about it.”\(^\text{19}\) He approached youth from a positive perspective, not a negative one.

Spry was nonetheless convinced that “the responsibility is still ours to see that they grow up trained to live sanely in what is almost bound to be a rather insane world.”\(^\text{20}\) This meant, at least in part, that adults needed to teach children about values that the Boy Scouts believed were key aspects of character, such as spiritual faith and morality, loyalty, and discipline. “These qualities,” he said, “do not just happen – they are not innate. They result from the joint impact of our churches, homes, and schools upon the lives of every one of us.”\(^\text{21}\) Such had certainly been Spry’s experience and, for that matter, that of many of his generation. As historian D. Owen Carrigan has pointed out, Canadian authorities were firmly convinced that home life was a

\(^{20}\) Ibid.  
\(^{21}\) D.C. Spry, “Guns Are Not Enough!”, Address to the Young Men’s Canadian Club, Montreal, Quebec, 25 January 1951, Toby Spry Collection.
deciding factor in juvenile delinquency, and the country’s churches and schools had long been teaching children values and ethics in the belief that morality and good character were the basis of a stable civil society.\textsuperscript{22} The degree to which Spry had internalized such values was evident in his conduct during his military career. His opinions must have carried a fair bit of weight in contemporary discussions about youth. After all, he was the Chief Executive Commissioner of Canada’s largest youth organization, the Boy Scouts Association, and a highly respected former soldier. Spry’s thinking about character values reflected that of his time. As Cynthia Comacchio and Michael Gauvreau have asserted, there were many in postwar Canada who believed that there was a socially defined role, largely based on white, middle-class, and Anglo-Protestant ideals, for which children had to be trained from infancy and especially during adolescence so that they could become responsible citizens.\textsuperscript{23} Sociologists like Charles Mihanovich agreed. He argued that preventing juvenile delinquency “had to be done at the source, that is, through the resources needed by all children: the home and parents, the church, the school with its broadened concepts of education, and the community.”\textsuperscript{24}

Dan Spry believed that the Boy Scouts could help Canadian churches, families, and schools teach children about character by “strengthening their influences and filling the gaps between these institutions wherever they occur.”\textsuperscript{25} He was certain that such help was needed:

We feel that Scouting has a very great part to play in conjunction with the church, the home and the school in the development of young Canadians. It is a well known fact that only about fifty per cent of our population has any real religious affiliation. The results of this are well known to all of you. In many cases our homes are not contributing to the upbringing of young lads the way they did in the past. I draw your attention to the greatly increased divorce rate and to the housing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Carrigan, \textit{Juvenile Delinquency in Canada}, 283-294.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Comacchio, \textit{The Dominion of Youth}, 190-191 and 213, and Gauvreau, “The Protracted Birth of the Canadian ‘Teenager,’” 214.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Mihanovich, \textit{Principles of Juvenile Delinquency}, 18-19.
\end{itemize}
shortage, both of which have unfortunate results in the standards of family life and on the way in which our young people are being brought up. In the case of the schools, we are all willing to put our children into somebody else’s hands for several hours each day and yet we accept the fact that our school teachers are amongst the most unfortunately paid group in the country.\(^{26}\)

The “gaps” that Spry referred to primarily comprised children’s leisure time. By the early 1950s, many childcare experts believed that play was a vital aspect of a child’s growth and learning. At the same time, adults thought that children lacked judgement and thus were easily led astray, a tendency that, if not held in check, could ultimately lead to delinquent behaviour. The logical conclusion to such thinking was that playtime required a certain degree of adult guidance.\(^{27}\) Outside of the home, this was largely the province of churches, sports associations, and youth groups. Put another way, organized recreation like that provided by the Canadian Boy Scouts Association was seen as an excellent means through which character and citizenship values could be passed on to society’s youngest members.\(^{28}\)

General Spry had his own views regarding leisure, asserting that Scouting could be a socially beneficial pastime. While appreciating that the increased use of technology had given people more free time than ever before, he felt that the misuse of such freedom “[was] the clue to the success or failure of a civilization.”\(^{29}\) Spry thought that this was happening in his time, as may be seen in a speech that he delivered to the members of the Dominion Executive Committee in 1947. He decried what he thought was a growing trend to watch instead of participating in sports and other aspects of life, and argued that the nature of twentieth-century assembly line production was “making it difficult for individuals to say ‘That is my handiwork’ and take pride in its efficiency and beauty.” Scouting, Spry said, could mitigate the dangerous societal effects of

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\(^{27}\) Comacchio, The Dominion of Youth, 190-191, and Owram, Born at the Right Time, 84-85.  
\(^{28}\) Owram, Born at the Right Time, 100.  
such trends because it “can take the lad of eight years of age and carry him through to eighty.” Through Cub and Scout activities, boys could learn to participate in life, and by earning badges they could develop a desire for achievement. Rover Scouting would give older youths “the opportunity of learning how to live as an adult citizen by training the man to believe he must give service to his community...the rent he pays by his space on earth.” Finally, men could give back to their communities by serving as Scouters. As Spry put it, “Some of the most active and useful leaders in the Scout Movement throughout the world are sixty and seventy years of age and very, very few of them look their age...There must be something in it – Scouting has given them the ability wisely to make use of their freedom from toil.”

A major reason why Spry thought that Scouting could play an important part in teaching children about character lay in his appreciation of the difference between the Scout Movement’s teaching methods and those usually used by schools and churches. Boy Scout scholar Eduard Vallory has described it as “a system of progressive self-education” that involves a commitment to shared beliefs and principles, learning through practical rather than classroom activities that involve teamwork among peers, and cooperation between young people and adults. Instead of attending formal lectures or sermons, Boy Scouts would learn by participating in games and adventures, earning merit badges, and performing good deeds. In emphasizing “learning by doing,” the Scout method thus resembled that which was espoused by Italian educator Maria Montessori, who introduced her teaching approach in the early 1900s. Spry considered that all of this complemented the efforts of other societal elements in teaching children about character:

Scouting is in itself a method of education while at the same time it dovetails neatly with the programme of more formal educational institutions. Scouting teaches the boy to live with his fellows, teaches him to give and take, and

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30 Ibid.
develops the desire for information. This information he must search out and analyze for himself. Information of this sort is not spoon-fed to the Scout. The result is he [that] values highly what he learns by his own efforts at collection and collation. Our recent Boy Survey shows that this is one of the four main reasons why boys join Scouting. They know they will gain useful information. We must realize that the boy has the desire for knowledge. What a pity, and indeed how tragic, if we do not provide the opportunity for him to gain the ability to perceive and analyze. Without this he would be just another frightened fawn in a steel plant.32

Dan Spry’s focus on the individual drew, at least in part, from the tenets of the Boy Scout Movement. Vallory has described the purpose of Scouting as being “the education of individual persons [original emphasis] and not the direct transformation of society.” Within this model, individual Scouts would determine their own educational process, assisted and encouraged by their fellow Scouts, while their adult leaders would be expected to act more like big brothers than as teachers, clerics, or coaches. This process, of course, would also be guided by the individual’s observance of the Scout Law. Moreover, as Vallory has pointed out, Scouting does not try to define an ideal society. Instead, it seeks to mould responsible citizens, armed with a moral compass and capable of independent and critical thinking, who are capable of deciding for themselves what their ideal world should be – and will then play an active part in making it happen.33 Spry made the same point in a speech he delivered in 1948 when he told his listeners that “the individual was the basis of society.”34

Spry’s views regarding the value of the individual no doubt had much to do with his own military experience. Having often been responsible for the training of soldiers – his abilities in this regard was the official reason for his transfer to command Canadian Reinforcement Units (CRU) in March 1945 – he understood the importance of individual training. This particular type of training involved teaching skills that officers, NCOs, and soldiers needed to execute their

32 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 29 April 1949.
33 Vallory, World Scouting, 107, 64-65.
individual military function. Some of these skills, like weapons handling, communications, or first aid, were considered “basic” and were taught to everyone. Others were specific to a military trade, like the artillery or the infantry. Still others, such as the appreciation process used to develop military plans, and the methods used to deliver orders, prepared selected soldiers to assume leadership roles. Developing such individual abilities was the prerequisite to what the army called “collective training,” within which soldiers learned how to work effectively as members of a team at various levels, i.e., section, platoon, company, etc.  

Spry considered that the same principles also applied to teaching youth about character and citizenship. It would be nearly impossible to create a sense of community and instil the value of service to others without a foundation built upon the qualities that contemporary society associated with character.

General Spry’s views regarding the individual’s place in society and the complementary roles of families, churches, schools, and youth organizations in teaching children character values also reflected those of the Canadian Youth Commission. In the course of its work, this diverse group of government, business, educational, and religious leaders developed theories on the nature of postwar society, democracy, and citizenship, and how youth fit into the overall picture. The commissioners believed that individual personalities were the source of democratic attitudes, and that families, churches, schools, and volunteer groups were mainly responsible for inculcating such attitudes because they had the closest contact with children. The commissioners also opined that such an education ought to be conducted using a “learning by doing” approach. The Canadian Youth Commission’s attitudes were perhaps to be expected, given that its makeup included teachers and clerics. Still, they indicate how closely contemporary thinking about how children should learn individual values meshed with that of Spry and the Boy Scouts.

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35 For a contemporary military source regarding training, see Canadian Army, Canadian Army Training Pamphlet No. 3. Principles and Organization of Training, 1941, 5.

The Boy Scouts’ conception of character training involved teaching boys about a number of individual qualities. Of these, Dan Spry believed that “the spiritual aspect of Scouting is the most important,” adding that “It is the one that ex-Scouts remember long after they have forgotten how to tie a bowline or a sheepshank.”37 It was for this reason, he noted, that “duty to God” appeared first in the vows contained within the Scout Promise.38 For its part, the Scout Law declared that a Boy Scout was a friend to all (including animals), was courteous, helpful, and was “clean in thought, word, and deed.”39 The latter’s moral and spiritual aspects were apparent. Like Christianity’s Ten Commandments, the Scout Law was a moral code of conduct, although it described what a Scout should be in favour of proscribing certain behaviours. The central importance of the Scout Law was evident in that boys and adults who joined the Scout Movement promised to observe its tenets in their daily lives. As Tim Jeal has written, in making the Scout Promise the new member was expected to change in a manner similar to that of a religious convert. Equipped with his brotherhood’s uniform, and by following its tenets, the new Scout “could be [original emphasis] all the things that the Scout Law states a Scout is.”40 It was surely with such principles in mind that Spry once told an audience of Scout leaders that, “The spirit of Scouting is the same as the fundamentals of all religions.”41

General Spry was convinced that encouraging spiritual faith among Canada’s boys was essential, especially given the realities of the Cold War. He expressed this facet of his philosophy in an address to the Young Men’s Canadian Club in Montreal on 25 January 1951, which he had appropriately entitled, “Guns Are Not Enough!”:

40 Jeal, Baden-Powell, 394.
There must be a spiritual resurgence amongst men. There must be a greater faith in a Supreme Power more omnipotent than man. We must remember that man usually turns to his Maker in the face of fear and confusion. We have, many of us, seen it in battle, so often. But now we must see it in our days of so-called peace. We must encourage the development of our ability to overcome fear by a greater confidence in our own physical powers, and in that spiritual power without which great things have never been accomplished. We must ensure that we, ourselves, and more importantly, the next generation, are capable of rising above pettiness, intolerance and selfishness, in order that a greater proportion of our people may live “for the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Dan Spry’s beliefs regarding the importance of spiritual strength had much to do with his wartime experience. Matters of spiritual faith were an integral component of troop morale, the maintenance of which was an important task for military commanders like he had been. But Spry had also risked death on several occasions, as did many people who served in front-line areas. Such narrow scrapes no doubt helped to make spiritual faith a more meaningful component of his life than was perhaps the case before the war. As was related in an earlier chapter, such views were fairly common among Canadian combat veterans of all stripes. General Spry knew that spiritual strength had helped him and many other soldiers to cope with the stresses of battle. He reasoned that it could help young Canadians to manage fears stemming from the Cold War.

In asserting that the spirit of Scouting followed that of all religions, Spry was not arguing that the Boy Scouts should supplant Canada’s churches in teaching boys about moral matters. On the contrary, he thought that Scouting constituted “the practical application of religion, not a religion itself.” He recognized the personal and social importance of the country’s churches, which was certainly the case in the period following the Second World War. A poll conducted in 1945 showed that 95 per cent of Canadians believed in God. More significant was the fact that from 1945 to 1960 Canadians underwent a surge in religious sentiment, an event that surprised

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most observers because there had been little forewarning of its coming. As John Webster Grant has related, the first indicator of such a change was an exponential growth in Sunday school attendance. According to Grant, enrolment “doubled and quadrupled as war veterans sought to ensure that their children would inherit the Christian values they had fought to preserve. Then, when ministers suggested that children were likely to take Christianity seriously only if they saw evidence of their parents’ interest in religion, young couples took the hint and began to attend church with unaccustomed regularity.”45 As a result, most denominations saw a startling growth in their membership. By 1960, for example, the United Church of Canada had more than 250,000 new attendees.46 Grant’s emphasis on the role of veterans in this postwar spiritual revival reveals his recognition of the societal influence of this large component of Canada’s population. Insofar as veterans were concerned, Grant argued that such men and women wanted to be recognized as normal citizens, and that they believed church membership and sending children to Sunday school were parts of the “normalcy” that they wanted to re-establish in their lives. Such attitudes, he added, were tied to “an atmosphere of social conformism that was typical of the period.”

Grant also attributed part of the seriousness with which Canadian churchgoers took their religion to Cold War anxieties. As they had done during the war, people turned to the churches for answers to their spiritual concerns.47 Canada’s experience of postwar religious revival was not unique. As American historian Robert D. Putnam has noted, church membership and attendance also rose sharply in the United States during the period 1945 to 1960. Given that 80 per cent of American men born in the 1920s underwent wartime military service, one may deduce that many of the new churchgoers were likely Second World War veterans and their young families.48

45 Grant, The Church in the Canadian Era, 160-161.
46 Owram, Born at the Right Time, 105. The United Church’s membership rose from 750,000 to one million.
47 Grant, The Church in the Canadian Era, 162.
48 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 69-72, 254, and 268.
Given such societal views, it would have been difficult for any organization to compete with the churches in the field of moral and spiritual education, and neither Spry nor the Boy Scouts sought to do so. To the contrary, the Scout Movement had always cooperated with Canada’s religious denominations. One way it did so was by encouraging churches to sponsor local Scout groups. This approach had borne fruit in the years prior to Spry’s return to Scouting. By 1945, 1,272 of a total of 2,157 Scout groups – some 59 per cent – had religious sponsors. Sponsorship meant that these churches had agreed to support and promote the Movement within their community. Community service groups, the Canadian Legion, parents’ associations, and schools did the same in the belief that Scouting offered tangible benefits to the community. As sponsors, they had no control over the policies or activities of their affiliated Scout groups. Rather, they typically provided facilities such as meeting areas, offices, and storage space. In some instances, members of sponsoring organizations also served as Scout leaders.

It was with the aim of enhancing cooperation with Canada’s churches that Dan Spry had included a Religious Advisory Committee as part of his system of advisory bodies to assist the Dominion Executive Committee. This initiative, it will be recalled, was implemented in the fall of 1946 as part of Plan OPPORTUNITY. He suggested that this group include representatives from all denominations, and that it help the Boy Scouts to develop its religious policies. Spry also proposed matters for the Advisory Committee to consider. These included creating regional and district religious advisory committees, producing policies for Scouters whose troops were not affiliated with a church, developing training courses for clergymen involved in Scouting, and preparing what Spry called “a special short order of service” for use at Scout troop meetings.

49 Scouts Canada Museum, Annual Report for 1945, 65. Church sponsors included the Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran, United, Baptist, and Roman Catholic churches, as well as synagogues and the Salvation Army.
50 Vallory, World Scouting, 80.
By March 1947, Gerald H. Brown, the Religious Advisory Committee’s chairman, reported that the heads of several religious bodies were interested in taking part. Brown’s untimely death that May delayed the Advisory Committee’s work, but the Reverend Nelson Chappel, a member of the Dominion Executive Committee and Secretary of the Religious Education Committee of the Canadian Council of Churches, took his place. In January 1948, Spry told the Boy Scouts’ senior leadership that Chappel’s efforts had produced a better understanding of Scouting among church leaders. He also said that the creation of provincial and district advisory committees was well under way, and that several courses had been run at theological colleges “to train respective Protestant and Catholic clergy in Scouting.” The religious community’s acceptance of these initiatives underlined its approval of the Canadian Boy Scouts and its societal aims.

In addition to initiating the Religious Advisory Committee, Spry often spoke to religious bodies. For example, in May 1951 he addressed clergymen in London, Ontario. He outlined the Scout Movement’s religious policies, and described how Scout groups worked with sponsors such as churches. He said that Scouting could help churches in their moral education efforts by making religion more practical for boys, and called Scout meetings a “mid-week link” to Sunday school. Spry also pointed out that boys in a church-sponsored Scout group were often members of the congregation, and that most Scout groups conducted church parades – another way of exposing boys to religion. Lastly, he asserted that doing one’s duty to God was a key aspect of Scouting, and that by performing good deeds the boys were practising what they learned in church. He had delivered the same messages to clergics in Westboro, Ontario, the previous year.

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54 D.C. Spry, “What Scouting Can Mean For Your Church,” Address to the London District Clergy Dinner, London, Ontario, 10 May 1951, and Untitled Address delivered at All Saints Anglican Church, Westboro, Ontario, 20 May 1950, Toby Spry Collection. A church parade is an occasion in which a formed body of people (military, Boy Scouts, etc.) “parades” at a church to attend a religious service.
General Spry was a strong supporter of other Boy Scout endeavours to promote moral and religious education, one of which introduced a Religion and Life Award in 1946. This new badge was not Spry’s initiative, but rather that of Association President Canon Henry Cody and John Stiles, Spry’s predecessor; they had begun work on the project some years before. Still, it was Spry who approvingly presented the new award to the Dominion Executive Board for that body’s blessing when it convened on 2 October 1946. According to the Minutes of that meeting, the award’s purpose was “to give greater emphasis to the spiritual aspects of Scouting, and to bring the work of sponsoring churches into a closer alliance with the Movement.” In keeping with the Boy Scouts’ non-denominational aspect, the criteria for earning the award were left to the national officials of the various churches. The Religion and Life Award meshed with Spry’s belief in the importance of spiritual faith. Given his views on achievement, he also likely thought the boys would get satisfaction from earning the new badge and, in turn, might internalize some of the religious aspects of their denominations. There is some evidence that Spry’s assessment was correct. For example, one year after the badge’s introduction, 80 per cent of the 1st North Sydney Nova Scotia Troop had earned the Religion and Life Award.

Dan Spry’s efforts to instil morality among Canada’s boys went beyond religion. Like many adults in North America during this time, he believed that films, magazines, comic books, and other like material could profoundly affect boys’ attitudes and actions. These influences, he pointed out, could be either good or bad. On the one hand, films and written material could teach children about social mores while addressing teenage concerns like popular music and fashion. At the other end of the spectrum were Hollywood films that seemed to glorify a rebellious youth culture. Doug Owram found that at least sixty such movies were produced during the late 1940s.

55 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 2 October 1946.
56 Robert E. Milks, 75 Years of Scouting in Canada (Ottawa: Boy Scouts of Canada, 1982), 186.
and 1950s. Owram is probably correct in arguing that few boys would have worn a leather jacket and risk being shunned as a “hood” by girls, but the lesson of such films seemed clear to adults. If they did not bring up children up in the “right” way, delinquent behaviour would result.

It was with this thinking in mind that Spry argued that the Canadian Boy Scouts needed to develop policies to counter the media’s potentially bad influences. In Plan OPPORTUNITY, he suggested that provincial Scout associations initiate relationships with the provincial film censorship boards, and that a policy be developed to promote magazines and comic books that Scouting considered suitable for young people, as he thought it would be difficult for the Boy Scouts to get those with dubious content removed from circulation. Such proposals were rather surprising, given that freedom of expression was a democratic value Spry had fought to preserve. To protect Canada’s children, though, he thought them worthy of study. On a more positive note, Spry proposed a library service within which the Dominion and provincial associations would provide Scout publications to local libraries. Some public and school libraries, he observed, were already stocking such books. In his view, this was something that should be expanded upon.

All of these initiatives, Spry believed, would keep Canada’s boys on the right moral path. The Dominion Executive Committee agreed with the principle behind his suggestions, but decided to proceed with the library service only, perhaps because the others encouraged censorship.

Maj.-Gen. Spry’s emphasis on the spiritual aspects of character had a certain degree of influence on Canadian Scouting during the late 1940s and early 1950s. There is no question that he set the tone by creating a Religious Advisory Committee, by speaking about religious and moral issues, and by supporting the Religion and Life Award. Given that his job was to develop

57 Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, 144-146.
58 Toby Spry Collection, *Leader Supplement*, “Plan Opportunity,” 6-10. The Canadian Boy Scouts’ national records do not indicate if the Association actually tried to have suspect publications removed from circulation.
national plans and policies, one can conclude that he was successful in this area. Statistics that were compiled by the Dominion Headquarters also show that Spry successfully expanded cooperation with the churches. The number of church-sponsored Scout groups grew while he was Chief Executive Commissioner, from 1,309 in 1946 to 2,005 by 1953, an increase of 53.2 per cent. This growth echoed that of the Association, which rose from 2,208 to 3,395 Scout groups during the same period. On the other hand, the percentage of church-sponsored Scout groups within the total remained constant, at 59 per cent.\(^60\) Such successes notwithstanding, the amount of spiritual activity that actually occurred at the local level during Spry’s tenure is difficult to determine. Executing policy was the job of thousands of volunteer leaders across Canada, and the Boy Scouts did not compile statistics on their detailed activities. Undoubtedly, some Scouters were more diligent than others in pushing spiritual and moral messages.

While Spry emphasized spiritual faith, he was convinced that this alone would not be enough to develop in young people the emotional stability he believed they would need to cope with the realities of the Cold War once they became adults. Such stability, he pointed out, also required a sense of loyalty, which constituted the second vow within the Scout Promise:

> In the [Scout] Promise we talk about “Duty to the King,” but we mean a lot more than just the duty to the King – we mean duty to our country. We also mean all sorts of concentric loyalties. From the first smack on the bottom that any of you ever had suspended by your heels upside down, you will perhaps realize that at that particular moment you probably had absolutely no prejudices, no loyalties other than your natural loyalty to whoever was going to feed you. But that moment of a wriggling pink individual – from then on [in] it’s life, it’s had one circle after another described about him, or her, as an individual. A loyalty to parents and home, and another loyalty to church around that, and another loyalty to the local gang in the neighbourhood. Perhaps another loyalty to the school football team or the Butterfly Club, or whatever it is he goes into. Another loyalty to good old Oshkosh or whatever the town is he lives in, and the Province and his Country. Some day, let’s pray that there’ll be another concentric loyalty around us all which perhaps will be loyalty to the Brotherhood of Man.

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\(^60\) Scouts Canada Museum, Annual Report for 1946, 68, and Annual Report for 1953, 64.
The interesting thing about concentric loyalties is that concentric circles do not cross one another – they strengthen one another. That’s one of the things you can think of when you think of the second part of the Scout Promise. Loyalty – a lot of loyalties, strengthening one another and making up the whole man or the whole woman.

Spry then added that Scouting could help boys to develop loyalty to Canada’s traditions:

There is also loyalty to our heritage and to our traditions – many of which are in danger of being flung away carelessly and needlessly in this insane time in which we live. Scouting has shown that it is one of the agencies which can retain and maintain tradition and custom without making tradition and custom bugbears. I am the last person to suggest that tradition and customs should be retained just because they are traditions and customs, but I am the first person to insist upon them being maintained if they give us something and if they do something for us and prepare us that much better to face the future.  

Dan Spry did not specify the traditions to which he was referring, but by linking Scouting to the conservative idea of a nation he was suggesting that the Scout Movement served a political purpose, its apolitical stance notwithstanding. Loyalty to country took on special significance in the context of the postwar years, given the widespread loyalty to country that Spry and millions of other Canadians had shown during the Second World War and Cold War fears of communist subversion. Helping Canada’s boys to develop a sense of national loyalty through Scouting, Spry remarked, would serve as “a necessary bulwark against some of the nonsensical, but attractive, lollipops held out by the Communist agents of Russia, working so diligently amongst the youngsters here and in many other places.” It was with this philosophy in mind that the Canadian Boy Scouts Association published a pamphlet entitled *The Scout Movement and Communism* in 1947. In addition, as Spry wrote in Plan OPPORTUNITY, the Canadian Boy Scouts had to carefully consider the loyalty factor as part of its selection process for prospective adult leaders:

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It is typical of practically all radical and extremist movements that they make concerted efforts to inculcate their theories in the minds of the young. Through the cell system, or other means used by these organizations, extremist leaders are specially trained to worm their way into positions of leadership in youth movements, and thus spread their ideologies through the facilities of recognized public movements. Therefore, the greatest care must be exercised in the selection of leaders and in the investigation of their connections before permitting them to serve as leaders in the Scout Movement.64

Clearly, General Spry was saying that individuals with known or suspected associations with communism or other extremist ideologies were potentially as dangerous in the role of Scout leaders as those of questionable morals, as they could turn boys’ minds away from Canada’s societal values and the tenets of Scouting. Spry and the Canadian Boy Scouts were not alone in such attitudes. Other national Scout organizations said the same thing in the 1940s and 1950s, and in some instances they stamped out what they believed were dangerous elements within their midst. For example, as British historian Sarah Mills has noted, the British Boy Scout Association exposed – and, in at least one case, dismissed – members who belonged to or sympathized with the Young Communist League because such “Red Scouts” were considered to be threats to the Movement and to their fellow Scouts.65 In 1951, the British Association also published an anti-communist pamphlet entitled *A Challenge to Scouting: The Menace of Communism*, which laid out the reasons why communism was incompatible with Scouting. Firstly, the authors wrote, Communists were atheists, and as such they could not do their duty to God. Secondly, because communism was diametrically opposed to constitutional democracy, a Communist Scout would be unable to do his duty to the King. Above all, Communists did not recognize a moral code such as the Scout Law.66 All of these elements were central concepts to Scouting.

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Loyalty, as General Spry said, had many dimensions for a Boy Scout. In addition to being loyal to one’s country, the Scout Law held that members were to be loyal to higher authority – “A Scout obeys orders of his parents, Patrol Leader, or Scoutmaster” – and to their peers within the Scout Movement – A Scout is “a brother to every other Scout.” Spry and many of his peers had been taught this multi-faceted concept of loyalty as children, but its significance took on far greater meaning as a result of their military service. A military leader was expected to be loyal up and down the chain of command. That meant that the leader had to obey orders given by a superior officer, but he also had to protect his men against the excesses of unreasonable orders. Spry’s stout defence of Lt.-Col. Johnston, who as CO of the 48th Highlanders had refused to lead what he thought was a suicidal attack on the Hitler Line in May 1944 (see Chapter 4), was one example of this trait. He was thus well qualified to counsel Scout leaders about loyalty. Then, too, Spry had demonstrated his own loyalty to the Boy Scout Movement through his tireless efforts to expand the Canadian Association’s membership, while his initiative to create a pension plan for its full-time staff proved his loyalty to those who served under him. Spry’s personal conduct was an excellent example from which Canada’s Boy Scouts could learn about loyalty.

Discipline constituted a third element of individual character that General Spry thought important to teach children. This was a perennial subject of adult concern. For example, in 1945 Canadian psychologist Samuel Laycock wrote that “More parents are failures in the field of discipline than in any other field.” That Spry considered discipline to be important is easily understandable. During the war, he and other soldiers of all ranks found that well-disciplined units often had better leadership, better morale, and a better performance record than did those with poor discipline. This life lesson reinforced the positive aspects of discipline that Spry had

learned as a young Cub and Boy Scout: “I think Scouting has taught me a sense of discipline and consideration of others which was extremely useful to me in the army, and I think the same characteristics are extremely valuable in any walk of life.”\textsuperscript{69} Certainly, discipline would be a valuable asset for people in coping with the stresses of the Cold War environment. The Canadian Boy Scouts’ senior leadership shared Spry’s thinking in this regard, as may be seen in the words of the Association’s President, Canon Henry Cody:

The problem of youth delinquency presses for solution. It seems to be prevalent in all lands after a great war. Discipline has been relaxed in the absence of elders. Without a rightful measure of discipline there cannot be a proper development of character. True freedom is possible only under law...Scouting can do much to solve this problem of delinquency. Its discipline is enjoyed by its members, and is learned by doing things together under the general direction of a law of honour and unselfishness. It emphasizes self discipline as the ultimate aim. To do what we please without regard to the rights of others or to seek always what is soft and comfortable, will bring anarchy, feebleness and disintegration.\textsuperscript{70}

Spry’s intent to promote discipline was evident from the moment he assumed his duties as Chief Executive Commissioner. As he had done with regard to spiritual faith and loyalty, Spry devoted a paragraph to discipline in Plan OPPORTUNITY, writing that “high standards of discipline, dress, and deportment should be demanded from all leaders” because “failure to respond to this demand results in adverse public criticism.”\textsuperscript{71} Spry’s focus on the leaders was consistent with his longstanding belief in leadership by example. Here, too, he and many others had learned this in the armed forces. Good military leaders were those who set positive examples for their men to follow; they did not order their men to do something that they themselves were not prepared to do. Spry firmly believed that leadership by example was a universally applicable concept. If the adult Scouters conducted themselves in accordance with the Scout Law, and were smartly dressed in their uniforms, the boys in their charge would be more likely to emulate them.

\textsuperscript{69} Toby Spry Collection, Dan Spry Scrapbook, “Spry Firm in Belief of Value,” 22 September 1946.
\textsuperscript{70} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 16 April 1948.
\textsuperscript{71} Toby Spry Collection, Leader Supplement, “Plan Opportunity,” 11.
In the Boy Scouts, the concept of discipline had much to do with self-discipline, as Dan Spry explained in a speech delivered in Montreal:

Scouting is giving our lads discipline, not the narrow stupid discipline of a Hitler Youth, but that sort of discipline without which no human being is really quite happy. No one is naturally an anarchist. Man’s natural lot is to be in a service with the ritual and discipline of a free service – a service which he chooses of his own free will. This is Scout discipline which is accepted by the boy and his leader voluntarily as free men...A free man is not one who is permitted to do as he likes; he is one who willingly accepts a discipline and makes it his own, because he understands its value.  

Spry’s explanation of Scouting’s approach to discipline may have been intended to reassure adults in the audience that, despite ongoing fears to the contrary, the Scout Movement was not trying to make militarists out of the country’s boys. To the contrary, his words reflected contemporary thinking espoused by so-called “child experts” about how children should be taught discipline. William Blatz, then a leading Canadian child psychologist, counselled parents that discipline should not be “a system of chastisement,” and that one should not discipline children but rather help them learn how to live under “a plan of discipline.” The Boy Scout Movement fully subscribed to such an approach, for the concept of freely accepting “Scout discipline” was a key point insofar as it was concerned. Members made the Scout Promise on their own free will, and having made that promise, they undertook to observe the code of conduct laid out in the Scout Law. Spry and other Scout leaders knew that people needed self-discipline to follow through on the Scout Promise. As was the case with religion, members of the Boy Scouts would learn about discipline by undertaking activities that required its application.

General Spry understood that self-discipline involved people’s ability to control their behaviour. One aspect of self-control revolved around what was – and is – often seen as a key component of masculinity: aggression. As Canadian Professor of Education Christopher J. Greig

73 William Blatz, quoted in Gleason, Normalizing the Ideal, 109.
has observed, child psychologists, mental health experts, and other postwar commentators all agreed that a certain degree of aggression within boys was natural and desirable. Standing up for oneself and fighting fairly were considered socially acceptable forms of male behaviour. On the other hand, fighting unfairly or committing wanton acts of violence were undesirable traits, and normally associated with the image of the “bad boy.” Rather than stamp out all forms of male aggression, boys needed to be taught how to control their impulses. It was with the idea of prevention in mind, Greig asserted, that many large North American cities had set up boys’ clubs in the years after 1945. By teaching city boys the “right kind” of masculine behaviour through the mentoring of positive adult male role models, juvenile delinquency rates could be lowered and young “toughs” could be trained to become productive citizens in their adult lives.74

Dan Spry had similar ideas. In Plan OPPORTUNITY, he had concluded that Scouting could serve as “a means of helping the boy who is not socially adjusted, both before he gets into difficulties, and through the special institutions designed to help him when he does.” Spry thus recommended that the Association work closely with juvenile courts and corrective institutions. With regard to the latter, it should help them set up Scout programs, if they so desired.75 At the same time, Spry enthusiastically supported efforts to establish Boy Scout groups in what he and his contemporaries called “less chance” areas, namely the poor working-class neighbourhoods of Canada’s cities. Here, too, his emphasis on such localities reflected contemporary opinion. Since the 1920s, sociologists had argued that the incidence of juvenile delinquency would be higher in the centre of urbanized areas than in their outskirts, and that there was a correlation between areas of “social disorganization” and delinquency. Despite the fact that later studies in the United States found that such was not always the case, many experts still believed that gang behaviour

was, as American sociologist Herbert Bloch wrote, “a product of interstitial areas in which the conditions of poor housing, inadequate recreational facilities, poor schools, low economic status, deficient civic services, ethnic differences, and a variety of other conditions combine to destroy a sense of communal solidarity.” Poor working-class neighbourhoods, which in the postwar years had greatly expanded as a result of urbanization, industrialization, and immigration, met all such criteria – or so many experts believed at the time. As Bloch pointed out, the term “gang” was usually associated with economically underprivileged groups, while labels such as “peer group” or “club” were typically applied to adolescent groups from middle-class families.76

Spry had a few reasons for thinking that Scouting would be attractive to boys from tough inner-city neighbourhoods. Firstly, its training program emphasized physically and mentally challenging outdoor activities that would appeal to their sense of toughness. A second aspect revolved around the psychology of boys and gangs. Since the 1920s, experts had argued that belonging to a gang was a natural part of boys’ lives, and that it was in this way that they learned how to develop cooperative relationships.77 Scouting’s founder, Baden-Powell, had seen this tendency decades earlier, asserting that much of youthful crime stemmed from the same “gang instinct” upon which Scouting’s Patrol system was based.78 By giving boys the opportunity to join a new gang – a Boy Scout troop – their group instinct could be directed along a socially desirable path. Spry expressed his views on all of this to the members of Toronto’s Empire Club on 16 February 1950. He described his encounter with what he called “less chance” boys at the Toronto District Boy Scout camp near Haliburton, Ontario, a couple of summers earlier:

76 Bloch and Niederhoffer, *The Gang*, 4-7. Bloch was one sociologist who discounted this theory.
78 Baden-Powell, *Scouting and Youth Movements*, 11. See also Chapter 1.
I went out by canoe in moonlight to a little rocky island to attend a camp fire of boys from what we sometimes call your “Less-Chance areas.” These young lads from poor homes, in many cases disrupted homes, were in one of your Toronto Scout troops run by three enthusiastic young men. As we gathered on the island one of the leaders jokingly said to the boys, “Here you are lads, you are on this little island. There is no food and no canoes are coming back. What are you going to do for food?” One of these little cut-throats, with a nasty little leer, said, “OK, Skipper, let’s cut up Benny.” Now the same lad, a few minutes later, amazed me, when this group of Scouts, some 35 or 40 of them, representing about 10 different racial groups, and several different faiths, sat around in the light of the camp fire and sang, in almost beautiful voices, the Indian’s [sic] version of the Lord’s Prayer.

Those boys were not angels, we were not trying to make them into angels. We were just trying to make them into the sort of citizens you want to have in this city.79

Spry was not being derogatory in describing one of these boys as “a little cut-throat.” Rather, he used this expression to convey to his listeners – a gathering of well-heeled citizens of Toronto – that this particular lad was a tough customer, the kind of boy that many people would try to avoid meeting on the street – or wish seeing in association with their children. He thus made an important point about what he believed was the Canadian Boy Scouts Association’s primary objective: to provide character training for all of Canada’s male youth, including those from the seedier neighbourhoods of Toronto, so that they could grow up to be good citizens.

It must be understood that Dan Spry believed that tough kids from working-class urban neighbourhoods were not the only ones who could get into trouble. He knew that children living in isolated communities, with little of interest to occupy their leisure time, could adopt the same sort of behaviour. To cite one example, Spry’s military contacts were then telling him that such a situation had arisen at some of Canada’s military bases. Convinced that introducing Scouting to the mix would alleviate this problem, Spry helped the armed forces to establish Cub packs and

Scout troops at military bases across the country. As he proudly related to Toronto’s Empire Club in early 1950, his initiative quickly paid off:

Since the war, we have organized Scout Troops in out-of-the-way military establishments such as Camp Borden, Shilo and Chilliwack. We are very proud of the fact that we have Cub Packs and Scout Troops in almost every army camp in the country. I know of one particular camp where the Commanding Officer told me he had been having a lot of trouble with young boys – “Barrack Rats,” they call them – damaging government property, breaking windows, etc. He said that when Cub Packs and Scout Troops were organized that disappeared, and they had not had a broken window for weeks, and he laid it all to the door of successful Cubbing and Scouting.80

Another aspect of General Spry’s work to teach Canada’s Boy Scouts about discipline related to maintaining a high standard of dress while wearing the Scout Movement’s uniform. Here, too, he drew from his own experience. Dress had been as much a part of his military life as discipline. Spry believed that the two went together because they affected how outsiders would perceive an organization, and for this reason he included the subject of dress in his paragraph on discipline in Plan OPPORTUNITY. Other Scout leaders with prior military service, including Baden-Powell, had similar views. Then, too, contemporary attitudes regarding dress entailed a certain degree of formality. People normally donned their best clothes when going to church (their “Sunday best”), while the stereotyped 1950s housewife wore a dress and makeup.81 Given all of this, Spry would certainly have supported, and might even have initiated, the introduction of a new Scout manual, *Smartness in Scouting*, in 1948.82 This publication informed its readers on the proper manner of wearing the Boy Scout uniform, and provided detailed instructions regarding ceremonial aspects such as the Scout salute, Troop foot drill, and the conduct of Troop inspections. Interestingly, its content bore striking similarities to that of a military dress manual.

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82 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13941, Annual Report for 1948, 18, and Canadian General Council of the Boy Scouts Association, *Smartness in Scouting* (Ottawa: Canadian Headquarters, 1948). There is no conclusive evidence that a Scout dress manual was Spry’s initiative, but it would have been consistent with his thinking.
Dan Spry’s initiatives with regard to discipline within Canadian Scouting seem to have resonated with some of its young members and adult leaders. A survey conducted in 1948 to obtain the boys’ perspective on the Scouts’ program revealed that a majority of them credited “good” discipline for producing a “good” Scout troop. Conversely, “bad” discipline ranked highly among their dislikes. In both instances, as Spry would have anticipated, the boys felt that their leaders were responsible. Regarding dress, most boys claimed that they liked the Boy Scout uniform, and reported that their Scoutmasters nearly always wore their uniforms.83 Perhaps the best evidence that Canadian Boy Scout leaders held similar attitudes is that they continued using *Smartness in Scouting* for years after Spry left the Canadian Association.84 All of these things would indicate that his ideas regarding discipline and dress met with contemporary approval.

Spry’s efforts to shape the character of Canada’s boys included teaching them about the sort of men they ought to be once they became adults. As he put it in a speech in 1951:

> Scouting has a sole aim – to produce men – not to produce angels – God forbid. We want to produce reasonably decent acceptable sort of men – the sort of people you would like to have as your neighbour in five or ten years’ time. The sort of men you’d like your daughter to marry. The sort of young man you’d like your son to be. And, as I have said many times, the sort of young man you and I should be. I think you can say that Scouting is trying to produce the sort of Christian gentlemen who is “acceptable in a drawing room and damned useful in an emergency” – that is about as good a definition of what we are trying to do as I know.85

General Spry’s use of the phrase “Christian gentleman” invoked a traditional ideal of manhood that emphasized what Christopher Dummitt has described as “manly virtue and stoic expression.”86 It was a conception that still held a fair degree of currency in the postwar years, when it was widely accepted that a man’s duty was to provide for and protect his family and


86 Dummitt, *The Manly Modern*, 4-5.
community, while a woman’s role revolved around running a household for a husband and
children.87 Such attitudes had long been predominant in Canada, but some scholars have argued
that the degree to which Canadians embraced them in the years after 1945 was due, at least in
part, to their experience of economic depression and war. Doug Owram has asserted that part of
Canadians’ desire for the security represented by family and home during this time was their
association with traditional gender roles, and thus normalcy would finally be restored after years
of uncertainty. Using a gender-based theory, Christopher Dummitt has argued that massive job
losses among men during the Depression, combined with large-scale female employment in
previously male-dominated jobs during the Second World War, threatened the traditional role of
male breadwinner. To restore men’s position in society, women were compelled to return to
domestic life so that male veterans would have jobs.88 Whether or not this was predicated on
restoring male power over women, as the gender-based argument implies, few in the 1940s or
1950s challenged the nature – or the value – of traditional male and female roles.

Contemporary views about manhood understandably influenced the manner in which
adults perceived boys. Christopher Greig, who studied boyhood in postwar Ontario, has argued
that contemporary conceptions of “ideal” boyhood included personal traits such as teamwork,
selflessness, honesty, fearlessness, and emotional toughness. Such qualities had been necessary
for men to cope with combat in wartime, and would be useful to boys who would become
husbands, fathers, workers, or, should the Cold War become “hot,” soldiers. During this same
time, however, psychologists and other child experts warned that such traits were threatened by
urbanization and the growing tendency for men to work in non-physical jobs. The result, they
argued, would be a generation of effeminate boys. Similar concerns had been raised at the turn of

87 Finkel, Our Lives: Canada After 1945, 11.
88 Dummitt, The Manly Modern, 1, 29-30. For feminist perspectives, see Pierson, “They’re Still Women After
All” or Prentice, et al., ed., Canadian Women: A History.
the twentieth century, but the fact that many fathers in the new suburban neighbourhoods had to commute to their jobs in the cities, thereby leaving mothers to raise their boys, made the matter seem all the more pressing. An effeminate boy could become a homosexual, which was then considered to be a serious moral flaw.\footnote{89} In the context of the Cold War, however, homosexuality had other implications. Security experts believed that Communist agents would blackmail homosexuals into engaging in espionage or other subversive activity in exchange for keeping their secret. Homosexuals applying for civil service jobs requiring access to classified material were often refused employment, while those already working in a government department were transferred to posts where they would not pose a risk to national security.\footnote{90}

Based on Dan Spry’s surviving speeches, it seems clear that his description of a Christian gentleman who was “acceptable in a drawing room and damned useful in an emergency” meant an individual whose character combined qualities like morality, loyalty, and self-discipline with adaptability, self-reliance, and an ability to endure and overcome hardship, which he described as “ruggedness.” Scouting aimed at teaching boys all of these things. Interestingly, Spry connected the latter qualities with what he believed were characteristics of everyday life in Canada:

I think one of the most outstanding characteristics of Canadians is their \textit{adaptability} [original emphasis]. That is why the broker from Bay Street became a good bombardier in a Blenheim [bomber] over Berlin, and why the Prairie farmers’ sons were expert tank commanders and drivers, and why Saskatchewan boys became good sailors. That spirit of adaptability is the spirit of Canadians...I believe that this adaptability should be, and can be built up, reinforced and used to the utmost. This adaptability includes a ruggedness.

I do not suppose there is anybody in this room, regardless of your own or your families’ incomes, who at some time in your younger days did not have to shift for yourself. It is part of our Canadian way of growing up, that young lads go on harvesting expeditions, work on the Great Lakes freighters, or go off into the North country on surveying parties in the summer, and a thousand and one other jobs. Personally, I remember working as a stevedore on the docks in Halifax.

\footnote{89} Greig, \textit{Ontario Boys}, x-xxiv.  
\footnote{90} Whitaker and Marcuse, \textit{The Making of a National Insecurity State}, 163-184.
very glad I did, and my father thought it was a good idea. I am sure you were glad too because you found you really had initiative and self-reliance tucked inside you. If you did not have these characteristics, you would not be the leaders of industries, and professions; but you did. I think this way of growing up in Canada can give us that ruggedness, that self-reliance; and I only hope that Canadians will continue to put their boys out on tests like that regardless of whether they need to do so for dollars or not.91

General Spry’s point that adaptability went together with ruggedness and self-reliance was important, for it addressed contemporary concerns about the damaging effects of urban life. Boys needed to learn how to handle challenging circumstances while they were young so that they could one day assume positions of greater responsibility and cope with larger, and more complex, problems. Spry had learned this lesson as an army officer. His physical and mental resilience, combined with his great ability to quickly learn the essentials of a new job, had been instrumental in his rapid rise to senior rank. Looking at the bigger picture, though, he argued that people’s self-reliance and ability to overcome hardship had benefitted Canada, saying that “This continent was opened up and is being developed by men who are prepared to take a chance – who are rugged individuals – born with Canadian adaptability.” He worried that the country’s hardy pioneer spirit was being lost through increased urbanization.92 Such views reflected contemporary societal fears, described earlier, but they also derived from Scout doctrine. Lord Baden-Powell had founded Scouting to counter the threat to the British Empire’s future posed by the moral and physical weakness of British youth. He asserted that the type of man the Empire needed was vigorous, strong, and healthy in body and in spirit: to achieve that goal, a boy needed to “train [himself] up to be strong, healthy, and active as a lad.”93 Baden-Powell had seen men like this serving in the Dominion contingents in South Africa. The Boers, too, had shown self-reliance and the courage to overcome adversity. Such men would be physically and mentally

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93 Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys, 187.
able to defend democracy against aggressor nations. A Canadian Scout manual published in 1949 echoed Baden-Powell, saying that Scouting’s aims were “to develop sound health habits, strong bodies, and sanely thinking minds.”

The need for boys to be able to withstand hardship was a recurring theme in Dan Spry’s postwar speeches. For example, at the Toronto Boy Scouts’ annual dinner on 28 February 1948, he counselled his listeners that “rugged Scouting is the answer.” Two months later, as the guest speaker at a Father and Son Banquet held at Parkdale United Church in Ottawa, he made the same argument. Spry encouraged the boys in attendance to “go for rugged Scouting,” while suggesting to their fathers that ruggedness was a valuable aspect of being a Scout. He expressed similar thoughts during a tour of Quebec’s Eastern Townships in November 1948.

Spry did more than just talk about developing self-reliance and stamina among Canada’s Boy Scouts. He strongly encouraged activities that would be mentally and physically demanding, a good example of which was winter camping. He knew from his own experience in Northwest Europe during the harsh winter of 1945 that living outdoors in cold conditions was an arduous undertaking. It was with that memory in mind, combined with his knowledge that many Scout groups stayed indoors during the winter, that he recommended that “in consultation with other organizations and the Armed Services, the [Training] Department should prepare advice and material on suitable winter clothing, training methods, equipment, accommodation, etc.” By the fall of 1947, the Dominion Executive Committee had approved a winter uniform consisting of a ski cap, parka, pants, and boots. At the same time, the writing of a Boy Scout winter camping

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94 Canadian General Council, Scouting, It’s Aims & Methods, 8.
97 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 10 October 1947.
manual was well underway; it was published in 1950.98 Equipped with proper gear, Canada’s Scouts began to venture outdoors during the cold winter months. The Association’s Annual Report for 1948 noted that “The continuing stress on more rugged Scouting has borne fruit with a tremendous increase in winter camping reported from many parts of the country.”99 This trend continued in subsequent years, as the Annual Reports for the years 1950 to 1952 attest.100 Spry believed that such activities greatly aided the boys’ development into what he called “the men of tomorrow.” As he said to Toronto’s Empire Club in February 1950, “We have had boys fifteen years of age, properly equipped, sleeping out in tents and lean-tos in 30 degree below zero weather. If that does not make men of them, I don’t know what will.”101

General Spry’s efforts to toughen up Canada’s boys through outdoor activities like winter camping may strike modern readers as a simplistic way to promote manliness, but at the time they meshed well with contemporary societal attitudes and Boy Scout doctrine. They were also quite popular among their target audience. The 1948 Boy Scout Survey revealed that most boys were attracted to Scouting by “the opportunities it presents to learn new things” and “by a love for camping and adventure,” and that they enjoyed outdoor Scout activities above all others.102 Two years later, the editor of The Scout Leader opined that Scouters should consider the word “new” as a reminder to “put the emphasis on those parts of the Scout program, hiking, camping, exploring, pioneering, stalking, tracking, etc., which the boy can get from no other source.” Regarding camping, the editor added that “camping with an objective...provides the means and the trail to adventure.”103 Spry must have found such supportive language very gratifying.

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102 “What Was Learned From The Boy Scout Survey,” 48.
Notwithstanding popular support for the efforts of Boy Scout leaders like Dan Spry to develop in Canada’s boys manly qualities such as self-reliance and being able to cope with hardship, a few postwar commentators questioned their continued relevance. In 1947, American sociologist Herbert S. Lewin argued that concepts like self-reliance had “lost much of their meaning in a world in which the opportunities for individual achievement and initiative are clearly limited by an economic and social structure, which in spite of fluctuations is pretty well-organized and patterned.” Thus, most young people would be “forced to work under conditions that demand a mechanical and standardized performance rather than individual resourcefulness.” Lewin feared that continuing to uphold ideals whose meaning had been lost or changed would only frustrate youth. Based on this reasoning, he recommended that the Boy Scout Movement “make those adaptive changes which are required by the altered social conditions.”

More recently, some Canadian scholars have argued that promoting self-reliance and stamina were key aspects of the Boy Scouts’ effort to counter what it thought were threats to masculinity. Historian Ross Bragg has asserted that such was the case from the time that Scouting was introduced in Canada to the end of the 1920s, suggesting that Scouting was “a backlash against maternal suffrage.” Writing in 2014, Christopher Greig echoed elements of Lewin’s thesis. He said that efforts made by Canadian Scout leaders, including Spry, to encourage individualism, while simultaneously endorsing the sort of cooperative teamwork that would be useful in the corporate world, were contradictory in nature. He also incorporated part of Bragg’s argument. Rather than rejecting ideas like self-reliance and stamina as “an anachronistic vestige of nineteenth-century masculinity,” Greig wrote, the Boy Scouts

“demonstrated a tendency to promote this model of masculinity over the corporate boyhood as an antidote to an increasingly feminized society” resulting from increased urbanization. The Scout Movement did so, he claimed, by invoking “a mythologized past, where men learned how to be men in the rugged outdoors.” This emphasis on self-reliance, toughness, and outdoor adventure, Greig concluded, “spoke to fears of a ‘crisis’ in masculinity and degeneracy in men.”

Lewin, Bragg, and Greig have some valid points. There was indeed much in the Boy Scouts’ program that hearkened back to longstanding societal beliefs about boys and manhood. Scouting’s program in the late 1940s and 1950s was very similar to that of 1908, when the Scout Movement was founded. Greig is also correct in pointing out that many people, of whom Dan Spry was one, believed that postwar urban life was making children soft. On the other hand, he and Lewin may be on less firm ground in asserting that the Boy Scouts’ aim of teaching boys both self-reliance and teamwork were contradictory and likely to cause frustration. At the time, Spry and a good number of other people sincerely believed a person could be both self-reliant and a team player.

Such had certainly been the experience for hundreds of thousands of Canadian men and women during the Second World War who had served in the armed forces. In a military context, being self-reliant and able to handle hardship meant that one possessed the individual skills and the stamina to be able to do one’s job and cope with the mental and physical stresses of battle. That was the purpose of individual training, which was the prerequisite to collective training. It was during the latter type of training that individuals learned how to serve as an effective member of a fighting team. Having gone through this sequence, and having put their training to the test in combat, a sizeable number of veterans no doubt considered self-reliance and toughness to be much more of an asset than what Greig called an “anachronistic vestige of nineteenth-

106 Greig, Ontario Boys, 70-73.
century masculinity.” Given that a majority of them became parents after the war, it should not be surprising that they believed that teaching their children to be self-reliant team players would pay them dividends, too. Having survived the Depression and the war, they knew that such skills were useful in everyday life. However, they also knew that the Cold War might “heat up.” If that happened, Canadians of all ages would need to have a degree of self-reliance and a sense of teamwork. Notions such as self-reliance also reflected what Michael Gauvreau has said was a contemporary Canadian conception of democratic citizenship built on a foundation of individual responsibility.107 The late 1940s and 1950s, after all, were the early days of Canada’s welfare state. While government-funded old age pensions and family allowances were welcome innovations, a majority of Canadians prided themselves on their ability to look after themselves. Few wished to be considered a burden on their families or on society. Doing so, they knew, required a certain degree of “rugged” self-reliance on their part.

Dan Spry’s focus, as has been related throughout this chapter, was on developing the character of Canada’s boys through Scouting. However, it was perhaps indicative of the true nature of society in the late 1940s and early 1950s – much of which is popularly remembered in terms of stereotyped “manly” men and stay-at-home housewives – that pushing things like rugged self-reliance among Canada’s children was not directed exclusively at boys.108 In fact, the Canadian Girl Guides Association encouraged self-reliance and the development of mental and physical stamina in its training program for girls. This fact is readily understandable, for the Girl Guides had been founded in 1909 on the same principles as those of the Boy Scouts – and by the same founding family. Lord Baden-Powell’s wife, Olave, who by 1914 had replaced his sister, Agnes, as the head of the Girl Guides, was of the same mind as her husband, arguing that “girls

108 On the development of such stereotypes, see for example Gleason, Normalizing the Ideal.
must be partners and comrades rather than dolls.”

To be equal partners, girls and women had to have similar qualities of character as boys and men. It was with this radical (for the times) thinking that the Girl Guides’ manual, Girl Guiding (1918) held up Laura Secord, the Upper Canadian heroine of the War of 1812, as an example of what a Girl Guide should be. Trekking alone across the wild countryside of the Niagara Peninsula to warn the British of an impending American attack, Secord had demonstrated duty, loyalty, self-reliance, and a great deal of physical and mental stamina. To help twentieth-century girls attain such qualities, the Girl Guides promoted camping and other outdoor activities for much the same reasons as did Scouting for boys. As recent scholarship has shown, membership figures for the Girl Guides were comparable to those of the Boy Scouts in the 1950s. Evidently, many Canadian parents thought that self-reliance and the ability to overcome hardship were important for boys and girls.

Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry’s performance as Chief Executive Commissioner of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association demonstrates that he strove to help Canada’s male youth to learn about the conservative, socially desirable qualities that together comprised contemporary society’s notion of character so that they would become good adult citizens. It is impossible to determine exactly how many people were influenced by his efforts regarding such matters. It is a matter of record that Canada’s Boy Scout membership grew from 90,303 in 1946 to 143,561 by the end of 1953. These were considerable numbers, given that Canada’s male population aged 8-17 years numbered 1,058,400 in 1946 and 1,251,900 in 1953. However, there were always boys joining and leaving the Boy Scout Movement. For this reason, the number of boys who were exposed to

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109 Olave Baden-Powell, quoted in Vallory, World Scouting, 16.
111 By the end of the 1950s some 250,000 boys and girls were enrolled in Cubs and Brownies (the Girl Guides’ equivalent to Cubs) in Canada. Owram, Born at the Right Time, 102.
113 LAC, Seywerk Papers, Volume 4, “Age and Membership in Canadian Scouting,” Table 2, 26.
Scouting’s character training was surely greater than the membership totals. At least some of them were probably influenced by what they learned as Scouts about character.

General Spry continued to work for the betterment of boys’ character after he left Canada in 1953 to serve as Director of the Boy Scouts’ International Bureau. He was certainly not the only Second World War veteran to do so in the postwar years, but exactly how many emulated his example is impossible to determine because there are no national statistics that provide such information. Still, the actions of veterans’ groups and individual veterans alike reveal that many of them engaged in youth work that involved character-building programs. Their reasons for doing so were as individual as the people themselves, but their shared experience of war must have been an important factor. Many, having learned the importance of character during their wartime military service, wanted to pass those values on to their children. Others came home believing that they had to do something useful to justify having survived the war. As was the case for Spry, they had a peacetime mission. Learning theorists would also postulate that veterans’ experience of war had changed their perceptions about character, and that they thus applied what they had learned after they returned home. All of these things were evident in Spry’s life history. They came through in the actions of other ex-servicemen and women, too.

On a national level, the most visible expression of veterans’ efforts to help children develop the attributes of good character was seen in various projects initiated by the Canadian Legion. The Legion’s senior leadership shared Dan Spry’s fear that the rapidly growing number of children after the war’s end might be accompanied by an increase in juvenile delinquency. In 1947, W.W. Murray published an article in The Legionary in which he asserted that, while youth work was challenging, doing so represented an investment in Canada for organizations like the Legion that “have the national interest at heart.” Murray pointed to the societal disruptions that
had taken place during the war years. As a result, young people were looking for guidance. It was in this regard that he thought that the Legion was especially well equipped to help. “Youth will listen to war veterans when they will turn a deaf ear to others,” he wrote, because of “the disciplined lives of the veterans, their natural kindliness, sympathy and understanding for the younger generation.” This tendency, Murray said, made veterans “naturals” for youth work, adding that “It would be better for the country that these qualities be applied to the constructive work of forming the character of the Canada of the future, than that they be wasted by lack of use.”114 With this activist philosophy in mind, the Canadian Legion set out to help young Canadians learn about character, in ways defined by veterans themselves.

One of the most important and widespread elements of the Legion’s character-building program involved promoting physical fitness. Fitness had been an important part of people’s lives during their wartime military service. As George C. Machum, a veteran of both world wars, a lifelong sportsman, and the first chairman of the Legion’s National Sports Committee rightly observed, “Every veteran knows the value of physical fitness. The high tempo and intensive action of the battle front and all that goes with active service demands condition and that extra stamina that comes from training and regular living.”115 Likewise, participation in sports had been a pleasant reminder of home for hundreds of thousands of Canadians who served overseas. There were, however, other motives that prompted the Legion’s promotion of physical fitness and sports programs in the years after 1945. James Hale has suggested that some legionnaires saw such activity as a means through which they could recapture the camaraderie that they fondly remembered from their military service.116 This may have been part of their thinking, but

115 George C. Machum, “Operation Fitness,” The Legionary, Vol. XXII, No. 11 (May 1947), 10. For more on Canada’s wartime military sports programs in Britain, see Maker, A Home Away From Home, 222-279.
116 Hale, Branching Out, 120.
it seems too self-centred to have been a major consideration when one considers Murray’s words and veterans’ attitudes regarding service to others (described in Chapter 8). It is more likely that Legion members believed that participating in sports helped people to develop what they thought were desirable character traits like loyalty, discipline, and stamina, not to mention cooperation, tolerance, and teamwork. Promoting sports would help make Canada a better place in the future by strengthening its youth and keeping them out of trouble in the present. In short, they would be better citizens. 117 As the Legion’s President observed in 1950, “We as a group of patriotic citizens could not give any finer service to our country than by helping to increase the physical standard of the population through the promotion of sport and recreation.” 118 The Legion, too, stood to gain. Decades later, in 1970, the National Committee on the Royal Canadian Legion Sports Training Plan issued a report stating that sponsoring sports activities “helped bridge that communication gap between the Legion and the general public, especially the youth of this country,” would give veterans and citizens a reason to get involved in their communities, and would go a long way in promoting a positive image of the Legion in Canada and overseas. 119 All of these motives were strikingly similar to those expressed by Dan Spry regarding the Boy Scouts’ character-building endeavours.

In 1946, the Canadian Legion launched a nation-wide youth sports program called Operation FITNESS; it also created a national committee to coordinate its activities. 120 Encouraged by these moves, Legion branches across Canada sponsored hockey teams, baseball clubs, and other athletic activities. Then, in 1956, the Legion entered the national track and field

scene by financing an initiative that an Ontario-based branch had sponsored. This was the Canadian Olympic Training Plan (it was renamed the Canadian Legion Sports Training Plan in 1957). A Canada-wide project, it brought top-ranked coaches and young athletes together to train for international meets. National clinics were held in Toronto from 1957 to 1961. They were attended by more than 650 athletes, with total operating costs of $75,000 that were borne by the Legion. This project achieved impressive results. For example, 11 of the 15 Canadian track and field athletes that competed in the 1960 Olympic Games had attended Legion-run clinics.121

In 1962, the Legion began to expand its track and field program by conducting the First Canadian National Clinic for Track and Field Coaches at Guelph, Ontario. This event was run by Geoffrey Dyson, formerly the Chief National Coach of Britain. Dyson was also named Director of the Legion’s Sports Training Plan and the National Clinics. The Legion provided most of the funding for its coaching clinics, with additional support in the form of a $50,000 federal grant. From 1962 to 1967, nearly 1,200 coaches passed through the Legion’s coaching clinics, and these coaches passed on their knowledge to thousands of young athletes across the country. In 1966 the Legion launched another national project, supported by the federal government and the Canadian Track and Field Association, called the Canadian National Summer Training Camp. Aimed at athletes aged 15-19, the camp aimed to build what the Legion called “a strong, well-balanced Canadian National Track and Field team for the future.”122 For the most part, the camp’s coaching staff were graduates of the Legion’s clinic at Guelph. Conducted on an annual basis, each summer camp was attended by about 90 athletes. The Legion considered this program an outstanding success, and pointed to several benefits that it had produced among the athletes

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121 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 42, Royal Canadian Legion Submission to the Canadian Advisory Council on Fitness and Amateur Sport, 9 September 1968, and Bowering, Service, 213.
122 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 42, Submission to the Canadian Advisory Council on Fitness and Amateur Sport.
who had participated in it. These included promoting a sense of challenge and inspiration, a rapport with their coaches, and instilling maturity, confidence and leadership, the latter of which the Legion credited to what it described as the camp’s “discipline and attitude.”

By 1968, the Legion estimated that 3,500 track and field coaches had participated in Legion-run coaching clinics, and that 50,000 young athletes had benefitted from the training that those coaches had received. Two years later the Legion’s Sports Training Plan ended, as the federal government – without warning – transferred its annual grant to the Canadian Track and Field Association. Despite this setback, the Legion’s support of track and field continued at the provincial and branch levels. Then, in 1975, the Legion began conducting annual national track and field meets that have continued until the present day. At the provincial level, too, various Legion bodies undertook sports initiatives intended to promote good character and citizenship. For instance, in 1961 the New Brunswick Command established a youth leadership camp. The Royal Canadian Legion’s Dominion Secretary, Donald M. Thompson, observed that this camp had three main objectives: “to assist in developing the students’ organizing abilities, leadership techniques and personal skills through athletics and recreational activity; to encourage in each boy or girl a continuing sense of responsibility, cooperation, confidence and personal integrity; and to train leaders in coaching, officiating and programme organizing to the end that such leaders can fulfill useful roles in their schools and community.” Each year, thirty boys and thirty girls were selected to attend the camp. By 1968, at least 500 youngsters had taken part.

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123 Ibid.
124 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 42, Royal Canadian Legion Sports Training Plan, Report to the 22nd Dominion Convention of the Royal Canadian Legion, 26-31 May 1968.
In the years after 1945 the Canadian Legion initiated other projects that, at least in part, sought to shape children’s character. One of these was a Foster Fathers Program (later renamed the Legion Children’s Program), which kicked off in the late 1940s to ensure the welfare of children whose fathers had been killed while serving in the armed forces during the war. This program provided the families of such children with food and clothing, and assisted with their education. Significantly, veteran foster fathers were expected to provide their young charges with “inspiration,” which no doubt included lessons on character and how to conduct themselves as future adults.  

The Legion also sponsored youth organizations. One of these was the Boy Scouts, as described in Chapter 6. Canada’s army, sea, and air cadet units were another, largely because the Legion greatly valued what the cadet movement stood for: to teach youths between the ages of 12 and 18 about leadership, fitness, teamwork, citizenship, and elements of good character like loyalty, discipline, stamina, and integrity. Then, too, the Legion’s support of cadet units may also have stemmed from its belief that, in a Cold War world, universal military training was the best means through which Canada could meet its military requirements, should the worst occur.  

A Legion branch’s sponsorship of a cadet unit typically involved the provision of facilities for training and administration, while some branches also gave financial support. To cite one example, all such manner of support was the case for Royal Canadian Legion Branch No. 55 in Woodstock, Ontario, which has sponsored No. 2833 Oxford Royal Canadian Army Cadet Corps since 1972.  

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127 Bowering, Service, 216.  
The scope of the Legion’s youth work may be seen in a circular letter produced in July 1964. In that year, Legion membership totalled 200,000 veterans of the Second World War, and another 61,000 who had served during the First World War. Given their comparative youth, veterans of the 1939-1945 conflict were more likely to be involved in youth programs. Some 1,263 Legion branches in communities across Canada sponsored youth sports. Of these, 700 branches were involved in hockey, 462 sponsored track and field, and 720 branches focused on softball or baseball. More than 1,400 branches were sponsoring programs other than sports, such as Scouts, Cubs, and Girl Guides.131 Their collective efforts touched the lives of hundreds of thousands of children. In 1960, Clifford Bowering wrote that roughly 100,000 boys were playing team sports under the Legion’s supervision.132 By 1964, that number had grown to 133,650 children.133 How many young people took part in other Legion-sponsored youth activities can only be guessed at, but the number must have been considerable. Most of these children were likely unaware of the Legion’s real purpose in organizing sports and other youth activities. It is just as likely that some of them came away from such activities with a greater sense of self-discipline, stamina, and fair play, as did members of Canada’s Boy Scouts.

Not all Second World War veterans were members of the Canadian Legion – for some unknown reason, Dan Spry was not – but a good number of them worked with volunteer youth groups during the postwar years. As was related in Chapter 6, thousands of veterans did so as Boy Scout leaders. One of these men was a former paratrooper named Mervin Jones. Ted Patrick, who had been an infantryman with the Irish Regiment of Canada, was another.134 Then, too, as Doug Owram has noted, thousands of other young adults – many of whom were veterans

131 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 41, Dominion Command Circular No. 64/2/4, 9 July 1964.
132 Bowering, Service, 215. Interestingly, Bowering did not comment on girls’ teams.
133 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 41, Dominion Command Circular No. 64/2/4, 9 July 1964.
– joined community service clubs like the Lions Club, the Shriners, or the Knights of Columbus in the postwar years. Many of these groups sponsored youth sports and other activities aimed at promoting the development of good character.\(^\text{135}\) A few individual examples will serve to illustrate this point. John C. Reid, who had served with Dan Spry in The RCR before and during the war, was deeply involved with youth track and field in London after retiring from the army in 1965.\(^\text{136}\) Art Powell, another Londoner and a former naval petty officer, was found in the mid-1980s serving as a Navy League Cadet instructor teaching 9-13 year old boys and girls about basic seamanship – and qualities of character such as loyalty and discipline.\(^\text{137}\) In Port Stanley, Ontario, an ex-member of the Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service named Nora Ketchum helped local schools and youth services.\(^\text{138}\) And in Woodstock, Ontario, Dieppe Raid survivor Edwin Bennett was for many years an enthusiastic fundraiser for the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and several other local youth groups.\(^\text{139}\) One could find similar examples in other communities across Canada, as Second World War veterans dedicated their time and energy to help youth develop attributes of good character.

Recent American scholarship has revealed that a good number of men and women who served in the American armed forces during the Second World War undertook similar actions. For example, Michael D. Gambone’s research revealed that, by 1947, more than five million boys had played Junior League baseball on teams that had been organized by the American Legion. Like their Canadian counterparts, Gambone asserted, U.S. veterans sought to teach boys “basic acts of personal dignity through good sportsmanship” while they learned how to play the

\(^{135}\) Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, 99-100.
\(^{137}\) The author, then serving as an officer in the Army Reserve in London, met Mr. Powell during this time.
\(^{138}\) Neary, *On to Civvy Street*, 278.
game. Another American scholar, Suzanne Mettler, found that by 1955, roughly 1.9 per cent of all American adults, of which many were veterans, had become Boy Scout leaders, while another 9 per cent of adults belonged to parent-teacher associations. “The fact that veterans were parents of the baby boom,” Mettler wrote, “helped to explain a good share of their civic involvement.” Such a finding echoed those of Canadian scholar Doug Owram.

The most pervasive means through which Canada’s Second World War veterans tried to shape the character of the country’s children was surely through their role as parents of the baby boom generation. Such individuals carried with them the lessons that they had learned about character during their formative years, both before and especially during the war. It only would be natural for some of them to have tried to pass on those that they found valuable to their children. They did so in many ways. In addition to taking their families to church, veterans gave their wholehearted support to their children’s participation in extra-curricular activities that would help them to learn about character through practical application, such as sports teams, youth clubs, and youth movements like the Boy Scouts. Veterans also taught character values within the framework of family life. Toby and Margot Spry, for example, have recalled that while their father did not force religion on them, the Sprys regularly went to church as a family. While Dan Spry was a loving individual, he was also a disciplinarian, and he espoused high standards of dress and personal conduct that he expected his children to meet. He stressed loyalty – one was not to speak ill of family members to outsiders – and he strongly encouraged his children to partake in outdoor activities. As has been demonstrated above, such attitudes reflected those expressed by many Canadians in the 1940s and 1950s. For their part, the Spry children grew up to appreciate what their father had taught them about character values. Toby

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has described his father as “the most influential person in my life.”¹⁴² Many other people who grew up from the late 1940s to the 1960s were likely influenced, at least to some degree, by a veteran-parent’s attempts to pass on what they thought were valuable lessons about character, the youth counterculture of the 1960s notwithstanding.

Not every Canadian veteran of the Second World War involved themselves in youth organizations during the years after 1945. For that matter, not all postwar youth leaders were veterans, and there were undoubtedly ex-servicemen and women who made no effort to teach their children about character. Those who did, however, shared certain things with Dan Spry. Having survived the Second World War, they had similar life experiences. The majority of them were or were about to be parents and, as with Spry, they would have been concerned about their children’s well-being. As such, they could scarcely have failed to note postwar societal concerns about juvenile delinquency, let alone remain ignorant of the stark implications of the Cold War. With such experiential and contextual factors in mind, Spry, veterans of all stripes, and people with no wartime military service strove to prepare Canada’s children for the trials of adult life by teaching them about spiritual faith and morality, loyalty, discipline, self-reliance, and how to cope with hardship – qualities that had become much more meaningful to them as a result of their experience of war. By doing such things, they sincerely hoped to produce what General Spry called “the sort of people you would like to have as your neighbour in five or ten years’ time.”¹⁴³ It was, as he aptly put it, character building with a purpose: good citizenship. Trying to shape children’s character was one way in which Dan Spry sought to achieve his peacetime mission of preparing young people for the responsibilities of adult citizenship. Other Canadian Second World War veterans, both individually and collectively, did so, too.

¹⁴² Margot Gowing interview, 2 August 2013; Toby Spry interview, 19 October 2013; and Toby Spry personal e-mail to author, 9 January 2015.
CHAPTER 8

TEACHING AND PRACTISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

The fate of North American democracy rests to no small part on the assumption of veterans of their full responsibilities as citizens.

Robert England

In Canada, the years after 1945 saw a heightened focus on matters related to citizenship. Some Canadians, including recent veterans like Dan Spry, sought to teach the country’s youth about certain aspects of democratic citizenship, such as a belief in democracy and an ability to apply democratic principles, a sense of cooperative unity, and a willingness to serve others. At the same time, others – again including veterans – assumed active roles in Canada’s democratic life. This chapter examines, through Spry’s example, some of the ways in which Second World War veterans applied wartime lessons about the ideals and duties of citizenship to their civilian lives. In so doing, they helped to shape the nature of democratic life in postwar Canada.

To appreciate the manner in which Spry strove to help boys become good democratic citizens in the years after the Second World War, one must understand his thinking about the Cold War. There is little doubt that Spry’s attitude was moulded by his life experience. Like most Canadians, Spry remembered how the Western democracies had tried to avoid war during the 1930s by appeasing the totalitarian dictators, only to see a global conflict erupt in 1939. Like other veterans he knew the face of war, and he was greatly disturbed to see history apparently repeating itself. In a 1951 speech aptly entitled “Guns Are Not Enough!”, Spry remarked that it was “unfortunate, ridiculous, and disappointing” that victory in 1945 had not produced peace but rather “a change of opponent and a change of conditions.” His desire to avoid seeing the onset of a new war notwithstanding, he fully supported Canada’s participation in NATO, arguing that

1 England, Twenty Million World War Veterans, 220.
the country’s geographic position and its close ties to both the United States and Great Britain made a policy of defensive neutrality “extremely hazardous.” Collective security through NATO made good sense. “Is it not better,” he said in 1948, “to strengthen and support one another in the face of a threat?” 3 Spry believed that Canada had emerged from the Second World War with international responsibilities, and he thought that most Canadians, including veterans, would support their country doing its bit to ensure peace. He compared Canada’s options regarding NATO to the “Maple Leaf” signs that First Canadian Army had used to mark its main supply routes during the war, whereby the “Up” route sign indicated the road to follow to get to the front lines and the “Down” route sign led to the rear, and generally safer, administrative areas:

If we are really prepared to play our full share in the maintenance of peace, order and stability in the world, then we are on the route “Maple Leaf Up” – if not – we are on “Maple Leaf Down” and we should not expect to have too much to say in the decisions of the next few years concerning the pace and direction in which the affairs of the world move. If we take this route we must be prepared to follow events instead of helping to shape them. 4

General Spry considered that Western disarmament had been a serious mistake, but he understood why it had happened: “All of us said ‘there must be peace. We must disband our armed forces, bring home our soldiers, sailors and airmen.’” 5 Spry thus agreed with Canada’s rearmament after the Korean War broke out, calling it “sound and sensible for all the Western Powers to devote greatly increased proportions of their national efforts to the rebuilding of defence forces.” He said that if the West failed to restore its military power “we present an open invitation to aggression, and we encourage Russian interference with our wider interests in trade and commerce, which can ultimately affect, very drastically, our standard and way of living.” Still, with a world war as a very recent memory, Spry deeply regretted that money that might

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4 Ibid.
have been used to fund schools, hospitals, and youth organizations like the Boy Scouts would instead have to be spent on the armed forces. He also worried that Canada’s young men would have to return to uniformed service to defend the country from possible Soviet aggression.6

Dan Spry’s thinking about the Cold War reflected that of many Canadians at the time. In 1947, an opinion poll found that 67 per cent of respondents considered communism a serious threat. Veterans were among that group. That same year, the Canadian Legion flatly stated that “Communists are absolutely not wanted within the Legion.” The following year, it began purging members who were suspected of being Communist sympathizers.7 In 1950, delegates at the Legion’s national convention passed a resolution calling for heightening Canada’s military preparedness. The organization’s Grand President, General Harry Crerar, likely spoke for many veterans when he warned that war could spread so quickly to other parts of the world that Canada’s potential military strength might “never get the chance to be converted into real dynamic force.” Such unpreparedness, Crerar went on, could come at a high price: “To a nation, a temporary high cost of living is nothing compared with the permanent high cost of dying.”8

Given his military background, General Spry’s support of Canada’s diplomatic and military policies during the late 1940s and early 1950s was understandable. His thinking about the nature of the Cold War, however, contained a certain philosophical element:

The world population is at war now – fighting for the future – searching for security – pining for peace of mind – hoping for some hidden hand of help. This war is being fought not on land, sea and in the air – but in men’s minds. In such a war reason is the best weapon. The form which society takes in the future will determine the circumstances in which the individual will have to fight his private conflict of ideals...How we think and act determines the world condition.9

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6 Ibid.
In Spry’s view, then, the ideological war between the Communist bloc and the Western democracies was more than a clash between opposing political and military structures. It was a battle for people’s minds, with victory going to the side best able to influence the thinking of others. In such a struggle, Spry said, “ideas are more effective and more important than bombs” because “ideas have changed the world over the years of history far more than technological advances have done.”

In his view, a key concept that separated democracy and communism, and thus a central aspect of the Cold War battle for people’s minds, revolved around the worth of the individual. Democratic theory held that the individual was of central importance and that the needs of society should be balanced against the preservation of individual freedoms. Spry fully agreed with such thinking. Communist doctrine, on the other hand, stressed the needs of the state and that of the collective majority, and assigned little value to individual liberty. The fact that the Communist bloc would use both espionage and subversion to expand its influence, as the Gouzenko affair of 1945 revealed, also shaped Spry’s views. He concluded that young people would be easy targets for such tactics, and by 1948 he had stated that “The Boy Scout Movement believes that the battle is joined in the war of ideas.”

Spry was not alone in this opinion. As Michael Gauvreau observed, some members of the Canadian Youth Commission believed that a postwar “battle of ideas” was coming, that “the minds and hearts of youth will be the fighting ground,” and that “the issue will be the worth and dignity of the individual.”

Notwithstanding his belief that the “battle of ideas” had already begun, General Spry was convinced that most people did not want another war. He thought it was essential to “make it abundantly clear [to the world’s leaders] that the masses wanted peace,” and argued that such an

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end might be achieved by educating youth about citizenship. He argued that the Boy Scouts, as a non-sectarian and non-political body, had a duty to aid such an effort because citizenship training was the principal job of Scouting.\textsuperscript{13} Such training had two interdependent components. Firstly, as was related in the previous chapter, young people needed a solid foundation of character values so that they would develop the emotional stability that Spry believed was necessary to cope with Cold War realities. Secondly, children needed to be taught certain outward expressions of citizenship, such as the ability to apply democratic principles, a sense of cooperative unity, and a willingness to serve others. Scouts would learn these things during their leisure time through the Scout Movement’s participatory educational approach, thereby complementing the citizenship training provided by churches, schools, and families. The result would be a citizenry able and willing to build and defend democracy for decades to come.

Dan Spry believed that teaching youth about democratic principles and processes was of the utmost importance if the West was to win the Cold War “battle of ideas.” As he wrote to the Director of the Boy Scouts’ International Bureau, Colonel J.S. Wilson, in 1953:

\begin{quote}
I believe that this “war” can only be won by a real desire for knowledge. Democracy, to be successful, requires a higher standard of general knowledge among its citizenry than any other system of government. If our system is not to be destroyed or forgotten as an historical “flash in the pan,” the desire for this requisite knowledge must be encouraged and developed wherever the opportunities to do so present themselves and, indeed, wherever and whenever these opportunities can be created...I believe that Scouting, when properly and efficiently carried out, can do a tremendous amount of good in this urgent, vital, and dangerous area of man’s make-up.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Spry’s assertion that the Boy Scouts could be useful in teaching democratic values was based, in part, on his understanding of the Movement’s aims, methods, and organization. He would have agreed with Eduard Vallory’s assessment that Scouting is “first and foremost an

\textsuperscript{13} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Dominion Executive Board Meeting, 30 April 1946, and D.C. Spry, “Scouting and International Understanding,” 16 October 1948, Toby Spry Collection.

\textsuperscript{14} LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-21, Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry to Col. J.S. Wilson, 8 April 1953.
idea: that through games and adventure, adolescents can take responsibility, develop their potentials, and internalize the societal values of coexistence that form the basis of citizenship.”¹⁵ Vallory, of course, was talking about democratic citizenship. After all, Lord Baden-Powell had created Scouting with the aim of building up British male youth so that they would be able and willing to defend that country from external threats like those posed by Germany. Similarly, Spry noted that “If our democratic way of life is to survive these difficult years it is essential that all of us make our contribution to the development of the citizens of tomorrow who will be intelligent enough to believe our way of life is worthwhile and who will be stable and sane enough to defend their rights and their country.”¹⁶ Thus, while Scouting considered itself a non-political entity, its tenets supported one of the West’s Cold War objectives: instilling in people a belief in democracy and the will to defend it. What better way to fight a war of ideas against the forces of communism than with an idea on how to produce good democratic citizens?

Dan Spry would also have accepted Vallory’s statement that democracy is “a necessary precondition for the development of the Scout Movement and for its unity.” This is apparent in the manner in which the Boy Scouts functions. Although it has a hierarchical structure, with an international body and secretariat, national associations, and local Scout groups, the Boy Scouts actually operates like a network, within which its parts are united by common aims, principles, and standards but act according to local circumstances. Moreover, the Movement’s officers at all levels are elected by their peers, decisions are made by discussing and agreeing upon matters rather than by diktat, and all members have equal votes.¹⁷ Such elements, as Spry reminded a Boy Scout audience in 1949, were key aspects of a democratic system of governance:

¹⁵ Vallory, World Scouting, 51.
¹⁷ Vallory, 69-78.
We have a system of elected representatives charged with the responsibility for the development of policy and the administration of the Association. This closely parallels our democratic system of government. Our members are being trained to employ the democratic process as a means of ensuring “the greatest good to the greatest number” while respecting the rights and aspirations of minorities. This is democracy in action.\footnote{LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 29 April 1949.}

Put another way, members of the Boy Scouts, in the company of their peers and guided by their adult leaders, learned about democracy by participating in the day-to-day activities and decision-making that took place within the Movement. This reflected Scouting’s “learning by doing” educational method as well as its focus on educating the individual youth rather than directly transforming society. As was described earlier, the Boy Scouts did not define an ideal society but rather sought to produce good individual citizens. All of this was consistent with the democratic principles regarding the role of the individual in society.

General Spry had been taught the basics of democratic principles as a boy through the mutually reinforcing influences of home, school, church, and the Boy Scout Movement. He had then fought for those principles during the Second World War while serving as an officer in the Canadian Army. That searing experience gave Spry the opportunity to see firsthand the tyranny of totalitarianism. In 1947, he told the members of Toronto’s Granite Club that some of the German soldiers he had encountered on the battlefields of Europe were “young animals,” and that it was his firm belief that “in the last war, after some difficulties, we proved that democracy can be the most efficient type of structure for governmental and social organization.”\footnote{D.C. Spry, “Scouting and the Future,” 2 December 1947, Toby Spry Collection. Spry’s audience would have well understood his point about “young animals,” as memories of atrocities committed by German soldiers against Canadian troops by the 12th SS (Hitler Youth) Division in Normandy in 1944 were still very fresh in Canada.} Then again, as a parent he likely wanted to ensure that his children grew up believing in democracy, as he had done. If he could help other people’s kids do so, too, it would further his postwar mission of preparing Canada’s youth for the responsibilities of adulthood.
Canadians generally shared Spry’s beliefs about democracy. Many veterans certainly did, having themselves grown up in a democracy and then having fought for it during the war. But Dan Spry’s thinking about democracy, youth, and the manner in which the Boy Scouts could teach boys about citizenship also mirrored that of the Canadian Youth Commission. As historian Michael Gauvreau has written, that body’s members thought that young people “stood at the centre of a participatory vision of citizenship in which democracy was defined in psychological and cultural terms as a ‘way of life’ – a realm of values centred on the individual – rather than as a set of political or institutional adjustments.”\(^{20}\) Spry had a similar opinion, often telling his audiences that Scouting was a way of life and not just “a game for little boys in short pants.”\(^{21}\) Gauvreau also noted that the commissioners’ belief that democracy centred on the individual led them to conclude that the best means of promoting democratic citizenship was through “the sub-political terrain of family, school, church, and voluntary community organizations [emphasis added]” because these entities had the greatest contact with individual people. Working together, they could provide kids with an integrated education about the ideals associated with democratic citizenship. Significantly, the commissioners recommended using a “learn by doing” approach to achieve this end.\(^{22}\) All of this matched Dan Spry’s views and those of the Boy Scout Movement.

A majority of Canadians during this time would also have agreed that democracy was a way of life. Recent scholarship on the subject of adolescence in postwar Canada suggests that many people believed that community-based, adult-led youth groups ought to transmit socially desirable values to the country’s children so that they would grow up to be responsible members of society. This implied teaching youth about the behaviours and attitudes associated with good character and democracy. Cynthia Comacchio has argued that Canadians largely saw this as a

community responsibility, one that was tied to a perceived need to organize children’s recreation. By participating in youth clubs and youth movements like the Boy Scouts, boys and girls would engage in organized play outside of family, church, and school – but with their full support – and would thereby learn the responsibilities of cooperative living. Youth groups, Comacchio said, could thus be described as vehicles through which national norms and ideals could be passed on to Canadian-born children and those of newly-arrived immigrants.  

General Spry promoted Scouting’s citizenship training activities by telling audiences across Canada about how the Scout Movement could help schools, churches, and families teach youth about democracy. This was a key topic in speeches he gave to Toronto’s Granite Club in 1947, the Canadian Clubs in Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, and Fort William, Ontario during his 1949 cross-country tour, and the Young Men’s Canadian Club in Montreal in 1951. He also stressed that the Boy Scouts promoted loyalty to Canada and its democracy (described in Chapter 7), and that democracy was worth fighting for. In the latter instances, Spry’s opinions appear to have been sought out because he was a former general with a good wartime record. Still, he was also well known as Chief Executive Commissioner of Canada’s Boy Scouts. For some of his listeners, such a speech no doubt established a link between Scouting and the defence of democracy.

Another aspect of Spry’s effort to ensure that Canada’s boys learned about democracy involved establishing a good working relationship between the Boy Scouts and the Citizenship Division of the Department of the Secretary of State, the federal body charged with developing knowledge of Canada amongst all Canadians and integrating both aboriginal peoples and

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23 Comacchio, *The Dominion of Youth*, 190-192.
immigrants into mainstream society.\textsuperscript{25} This was part of his program to expand the Association’s liaison with governmental and non-governmental organizations, an approach he believed would help all such parties to achieve their citizen-building goals. The educational mandate of the Citizenship Division, which by 1950 had become the Citizenship Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, meshed well with the Scout Movement’s aim of teaching boys about citizenship. To Spry, it was obvious that the two groups ought to work together.

Interestingly, the Citizenship Division’s Director, Frank Foulds, also a member of the Boy Scouts’ Dominion Executive Board, raised the desirability of mutual cooperation when that body met on 15 May 1945. He said that the Citizenship Division saw the value of “non-sectarian, non-political and non-propagandist” youth movements in assimilating “New Canadians” and in training other boys, and that it was eager to support the Association.\textsuperscript{26} Put another way, the Citizenship Division sought to use the Boy Scouts as part of its citizenship education plan for immigrants. Surviving records indicate that little was done about Foulds’s offer until late 1946, by which time Dan Spry was Chief Executive Commissioner. On 2 October, the Board directed Spry and Foulds to continue discussing how the two groups could cooperate, which hints that they were already working toward that end.\textsuperscript{27} One month later, Foulds proposed an action plan to the members of Dominion Executive Committee. Wishing Scouting to be offered to immigrant boys, especially those of other than British or French stock, he offered his Division’s full support to the Boy Scouts “in recommending to potential leaders in youth work, the training courses available in Scout leadership.” The Committee approved, saying that “Every effort will be made on the part of our Association to make Scouting available to new Canadians of European

\textsuperscript{25} Formerly the Nationalities Branch of the Department of War Services, the Citizenship Division joined the Department of the Secretary of State in November 1945. Ivana Caccia, \textit{Managing the Canadian Mosaic in Wartime: Shaping Citizenship Policy, 1939-1945} (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 207.

\textsuperscript{26} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 15 May 1945.

\textsuperscript{27} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 2 October 1946.
stock.” The fact that the Boy Scouts began cooperating with the Citizenship Division after Spry’s arrival strongly suggests that the latter’s influence was crucial. In any event, the two groups worked together for the next several years.

This cooperative arrangement between the Citizenship Division and Canada’s Boy Scouts has historical significance because it reveals that the latter’s non-political status was not entirely true, notwithstanding its lack of affiliation with a political party. Rather, the Boy Scouts actively sought to help define and subsequently produce citizens that would be loyal to Canada and defend democracy against communism. This sort of activity was last seen in Chapter 7 with regard to the Boy Scouts’ efforts to instil loyalty – a key aspect of individual character – among Canada’s boys. It was also the case for the Movement’s citizenship training program. Scouting was thus inclusive in the sense that it welcomed people from all backgrounds and social classes, but it was also assimilative by promoting conservative, middle-class, and government-approved notions of citizenship. Achieving both ends was socially desirable at that time, but they also had a clear political dimension. In Cold War Canada, where the threat of communist subversion was seen as a clear and present danger, assuring the loyalty of the expanding immigrant community was of paramount importance. While the Boy Scout Movement always described itself as a non-political organization, it was an active participant in the Cold War “battle of ideas.”

The mutual concern of the Citizenship Division and the Boy Scouts for what they called the “New Canadian” boy related to the tremendous influx of immigrants to Canada during the postwar years, some 2,151,505 of them between 1946 and 1962. While the federal government initially restricted immigration to those it felt would not alter the country’s ethnic makeup, it relaxed such policies at the end of the 1940s, owing to the needs of a booming economy. As a

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result, many newcomers – nearly 250,000 men, women, and children – were displaced persons and other European refugees, while others came from “Iron Curtain” countries such as Ukraine, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.\(^{29}\) The admission of so many people of such diverse backgrounds raised serious concerns among Canadian authorities. It was clear that these foreigners would need help to acquaint themselves with Canadian customs and to become contributing members of a democratic society. On the other hand, those arriving from Eastern Europe raised the spectre of national security problems, and as a result such immigrants were forced to undergo security screening to weed out Communist infiltrators.\(^{30}\) For its part, the Canadian Boy Scouts Association was well aware that many new arrivals were children, and it saw the burgeoning immigrant population as a source of potential members.\(^{31}\) Getting these boys into Scouting would be consistent with the Scout Movement’s “open-door” membership policy. It would also help fulfil the Association’s main postwar aim, expressed in Plan OPPORTUNITY: to provide every Canadian boy the chance of becoming a member.

By the spring of 1947, Dan Spry and Frank Foulds were pursuing a few initiatives aimed at getting immigrant youth into Scouting. For example, they sought to obtain the names and addresses of immigrants so that provincial Scout associations could contact them.\(^{32}\) This was not a unique approach, as several other civic groups were also trying to help new arrivals fit in by acquainting them with their programs. As it turned out, contacting immigrant boys came with unintended consequences. By June 1948, Foulds was reporting that immigrant families were becoming “thoroughly bewildered” by the collective efforts of these organizations. He suggested contacting boys who had been Scouts in European Displaced Persons camps, but added that “we

\(^{29}\) Kelley and Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic*, 313.

\(^{30}\) For more on Canadian policies and practices to assimilate immigrants during the Cold War, see Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers*. For security screening, see Kelley and Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic*, 342-343.

\(^{31}\) LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 11 June 1948.

\(^{32}\) LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 18 April 1947.
must be very careful not to add to their bewilderment.” Spry also sought Foulds’s advice on how to approach a group called “Farm Forum,” as that group was interested in sponsoring “Lone Scouts” or Scout troops in rural areas. Cooperation with the Citizenship Branch was dealt a severe blow when Frank Foulds died in April 1952. As the Dominion Executive Committee sadly observed, he had given “invaluable guidance and leadership to Canadian Scouting in its endeavours toward integrating New Canadians into its ranks.” Despite this unfortunate setback, cooperative efforts with the Citizenship Branch continued apace. For instance, in the early 1950s Boy Scout groups in several parts of Canada requested – and used – Citizenship Branch literature to teach their young members about democratic principles and processes.

Spry avidly pushed the enrolment of immigrant boys into Canadian Scouting in his public speaking activities. For example, on 2 December 1947 he told the members of Toronto’s Granite Club that “If we are to integrate those people into our society, surely we must do something about it. I believe that Scouting is one of the agencies which can do a great deal to speed the process of integration.” Regrettably, Spry added, the Boy Scouts lacked the people, money, and facilities to do so, thereby repeating his standard message that the Scout Movement needed public support to accomplish its societal goals. On other occasions he asked: “Are we doing enough to integrate these people into our Canadian society [so that they may become] the sort of Canadians we want?” Here again, Spry’s words suggest that bringing immigrant boys into the Boy Scouts’ ranks may have had as much to do with assisting the process of cultural assimilation as it did with teaching such children about democratic attitudes and behaviours.

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33 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 11 June 1948.  
34 LAC, Department of Citizenship Fonds, File CB 9-3, Spry to Foulds, 12 February 1948. “Lone Scouts” were individual Boy Scouts living in isolated, usually rural, parts of Canada.  
36 For example, see LAC, Department of Citizenship Fonds, File CB 9-3, R. Ken. Joran (British Columbia Provincial Executive Commissioner) to Canadian Citizenship Branch, 15 July 1952.  
Whether or not Canada’s Boy Scouts succeeded in drawing large numbers of immigrant boys into its membership cannot be determined, as it did not compile statistics on such matters. However, the Association’s efforts to engage with children living in poor, urban working-class neighbourhoods likely had some impact on immigrant families, for that was where they often settled. Such would have been the case in major centres like Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver.

General Spry’s efforts to educate children about democratic citizenship also included aboriginal youth living in Canada’s North. Convinced that such training would contribute to what he called “the future development of community life,” he worked closely with the federal Department of Mines and Resources. In 1947, he won the approval of Hugh L. Keenleyside, the department’s deputy minister, to send a field commissioner once each year to push Scouting in northern communities. By 1951, that Department was providing funds to defray the Boy Scouts’ training costs.\(^{39}\) With this backing, the Boy Scouts went to work. In many places, RCMP officers, clerics, and teachers – all of whom could be counted on to push democratic ideals – served as Scout leaders, and trip reports submitted by Spry’s field staff reveal that they enjoyed some successes. In 1950, Field Commissioner H.C. Northcott wrote that “The people seemed to agree that the Scout program had a great deal to offer their boys,” and noted that new Scout groups had been set up in the Northwest Territories at Hay River and Fort Vermillion.\(^{40}\) The following year, another field commissioner, Paul Krueger, reported similar findings: “All responsible people I talked to commented on how Scouting had in each case vastly improved the behaviour of the boys.” He added that Scouting in the North posed challenges, such as “the nomadic nature of the natives,” but he believed that achieving the Movement’s aim of creating

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\(^{39}\) Scouting had been in the North since 1912. Trepanier, “Building Boys, Building Canada,” 168. Keenleyside sent a copy of his letter to Spry to the Northwest Territories’ Inspector of Schools, further proof of his department’s support of the Boy Scouts’ citizen-building efforts. LAC, RG 85, Volume 231, Boy Scouts, Keenleyside to Spry, 27 October 1947. The department’s grant amounted to $500 per year.

\(^{40}\) LAC, RG 85, Volume 231, H.C. Northcott, Field Trip of the Northwest Territories, 30 March 1950.
better citizens was possible. For instance, the Fort Smith Boy Scouts had “white, [half]-breed, and Indian boys doing Scouting as a group [while] still following individual interests.”

Dan Spry was not the only veteran engaged in teaching Canada’s youth about citizenship. The Canadian Legion also played an active role, one that represented both a continuation and an expansion of its wartime citizenship training activities. As stated in a Legion circular letter that was circulated in June 1948, the Legion had resolved at its 1946 national convention to “take the initiative in educating the youth of the community...in the fundamentals of Canadian democratic government, with particular reference to the Constitution and governmental procedure, both Federal and Provincial.” It did so believing that it had “a serious obligation...to make Canada a success in peace as it did in war.” Colonel Wilfrid Bovey, the Legion’s Dominion Honorary Counsellor on Education, would run the Legion’s postwar citizenship education program. This was nothing new for Bovey as he had run its Educational Services section during the war.

Recognizing that education was a provincial responsibility, the Legion’s Provincial Commands were asked to set up committees to plan and conduct citizenship education within their regions. By 1948, many of them were doing so. In Nova Scotia, the Legion had placed citizenship manuals in the province’s high schools and showed citizenship films like This Canada of Ours to sea cadet units in Digby. The New Brunswick Command was promoting citizenship lectures, and planned to create study groups to examine issues of national and international concern. Quebec Command’s education committee arranged for veterans to talk to children during Education Week, and it created a committee to study a resolution in favour of a Canadian Bill of Rights. Ontario Command went even further. It called its education committee

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the “Committee on Citizenship,” and like the Boy Scouts was sending addresses of immigrants to their nearest Legion branch so that they could be given citizenship education. To aid in these efforts the Legion published a booklet in 1948 entitled *Canadian Democracy and Citizenship Action*, which described Canada’s form of government and contrasted democratic methods to those used by the Soviet Union. That same year, the Legion distributed 7,276 copies of its citizenship manual across the country. By 1952, the Legion had also established awards for secondary school students and adults who had made outstanding contributions to citizenship in their community. With roughly 200,000 legionnaires in 2,000 branches across Canada, the Legion’s actions spoke for the ideals of a sizeable number of ex-servicemen and women.

In some regards, the Canadian Legion’s interest in citizenship training resembled that of the Boy Scouts. For example, the Legion was worried that new immigrants were not being given what its Interprovincial Committee on Education called “adequate arrangement to ensure their becoming useful citizens.” In 1948, this Committee recommended that the Legion advise the federal government that it could be of assistance in this matter if it was provided the names and destinations of new immigrants. It also suggested that the government be requested to enact legislation stating that immigrants only be granted citizenship after having passed examinations in language and citizenship. Nothing came of the latter proposal, and written citizenship tests did not come into use in Canada until the mid-1990s.

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44 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 49, Legion Circular No. 48/17, Report of Standing Interprovincial Committee on Education.
cooperated with governmental agencies and departments. In 1950, Legion President L.D.M. Baxter reported that the Legion’s education committee was working closely with the Canadian Citizenship Council, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Displaced Persons, and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration on citizenship education matters.48

Second World War veterans did more than teach youth about democracy through the vehicle of citizenship education programs: they were also active participants in the country’s political machinery. It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that veterans provided political leadership at all levels of government. Many others served in non-leadership parliamentary roles, too. As may be seen at Appendix 6, roughly 11.4 per cent of the members of the House of Commons in 1945 had seen wartime service. That figure jumped to a high of 22.3 per cent during the period 1957-1962. In 1962, veterans’ representation in the House dropped to 16.6 per cent, and levelled off to an average of 14.8 per cent until 1974. Thereafter their numbers shrank, as veterans aged and retired from public life.49 A similar pattern was discernible in Parliament’s upper chamber, although the peak came a bit later, likely because of the difference in average age between members of Parliament and those of the Senate. As depicted at Appendix 7, the Senate had four Second World War veterans in 1945, or 3.5 per cent of the total of 112 Senators. By 1965 that figure had nearly tripled, rising to 13.2 percent (16 of 121 members). From that year until 1980, men with wartime military service made up no less than ten per cent of the Senate’s membership.50


50 Ibid. The last remaining veteran in the Senate, Archibald Johnstone, left in June 1999.
The same thing happened in the United States, but to a greater degree. By 1960, fully 60 per cent of those serving in the U.S. House of Representatives were veterans, largely because American political parties nominated them over non-veterans. Interestingly, voters did not indicate a preference for people with wartime service. Their Canadian counterparts, for whatever reason, did not take the same approach in choosing candidates for political office.

Second World War veterans also served in provincial legislatures – a few were premiers – although statistics showing their representation do not exist. Still, their presence in parliamentary bodies at all levels over a 55-year period meant that they helped to shape legislation affecting virtually all aspects of Canadian life, from provincial education policies to national defence. That they began doing so shortly after the war’s end, and continued in significant numbers for decades thereafter, speaks to conceptions of duty and service that no doubt stemmed from their wartime service. It also reflected their belief that they were well qualified to participate in the democratic process. As an editorialist wrote in *The Legionary* in 1947, “A man who has offered his life for Canada in her hour of desperate need is more likely to have the national welfare of Canada at heart than one who hasn’t.” Such a view, the author added, was “a natural position for the Legion to take,” and was not intended to denigrate parliamentarians who had not themselves served.

This statement makes clear that Canadian veterans themselves believed that the experience of war had changed their thinking about democratic citizenship.

For some veterans, a second means of participating in democracy involved working with government departments to effect legislative changes. Such activity was no different from those of other interest groups found in Canadian society. The Canadian Legion played a key advisory role in developing provisions of the Veterans Charter like preferential hiring and employment

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51 Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens*, 132-133.
52 “Politics, Communism, and the Legion,” 27.
seniority rights, and it cooperated with the federal government on several issues. These included veterans’ allowances, pensions and, by the 1980s, those related to an aging population. Other veterans’ groups did the same. In the late 1940s, the Sir Arthur Pearson Association of War Blinded (SAPA) convinced the Department of Veterans Affairs to raise pensions for war-blinded veterans and those provided to spouses and survivors by 25 per cent. Two decades later, SAPA worked with the Committee to Survey the Organization and Work of the Canadian Pension Commission, a federal task force led by Mr. Justice Mervyn J. Woods (a naval veteran who had been the Legion’s Dominion President from 1960 to 1962), to increase certain types of payments to disabled or blinded war veterans. The federal government accepted the Woods Report in March 1971, a move that Serge Durflinger has called “the greatest legislative change to the pension system since the Second World War.”

Another example of veterans’ activist participation in democracy occurred in 1973 when the Royal Canadian Legion became convinced that Canada faced a host of serious societal problems. These included rejection of authority, lack of public support for law and order and a corresponding increase in crime, increased drug abuse, the collapse of the family unit as a cohesive societal structure, foreign influence over Canadian industry and culture (especially that of the United States), and a heightened focus on provincial interests that might well imperil Confederation (no doubt a reference to growing Quebec nationalism). After setting up a committee to study the matter, the Legion launched a highly ambitious program called ACTION – A Commitment to Improve Our Nation – the following year. As the ACTION Committee’s

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53 Stevenson, “Employment and Seniority Rights for Veterans,” 98. For the Legion’s work regarding veterans’ allowances, see for example LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 75, Report of the Dominion President, 13th Dominion Convention, 9-10. For a brief overview on the Legion activities regarding aging, see Hale, Branching Out, 203-205.
54 Durflinger, Veterans with a Vision, 225-229.
56 Durflinger, Veterans with a Vision, 241.
report of June 1974 stated, elements outside and within the Legion believed that the Legion, by virtue of its record in war and peace and its association with communities across the country, would be “the ideal quarterback to coordinate the efforts of the citizens of Canada in cooperation with various associations, groups and societies.” As such, the Legion’s aim in taking on this project was “to make the quality of life in Canada truly worthy of the men and women who built this country and of those who gave their lives to preserve it.”

Put another way, the Legion sought to express its own values through democratic action. It was a laudable objective but the Legion’s leadership failed to clearly articulate ACTION’s goals, which had the effect of confusing legionnaires about what was expected of them. As a result, ACTION fizzled out a few years later. Despite its mixed results, the Royal Canadian Legion’s ACTION program represented “grass-roots” democracy in action, as the Legion sought input from Canadians at the local level and offered a means through which their ideas could be implemented to improve Canadians’ quality of life. The freedom to undertake such an endeavour, and the democratic means through which it was carried out, was just the sort of thing that veterans had fought to preserve during the Second World War. It also exemplified the deeply-held commitment to democracy that many of them felt during the postwar years.

Citizenship, in the context of the Cold War, involved more than learning and applying democratic principles and procedures. It also entailed an attitude of unity based on tolerance, cooperation, and mutual respect. Instilling this sense among Canada’s boys comprised a second manner in which Dan Spry sought to help Canada’s boys become good citizens. Here again, the times played a part in his thinking. He sincerely believed that, as had been done during the

58 Hale, Branching Out, 198-201.
59 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 18, Report of the ACTION Committee, 25th Dominion Convention, 7.
Second World War, Canadians had to find a way to overcome their longstanding differences – regional, religious, linguistic, cultural, and class – and come together as a people if Canada was to retain its independence and democratic way of life in the Cold War era. Failing to do so, Spry reasoned, could have serious implications. In 1948, he warned audiences in Toronto and in the Eastern Townships of Quebec that the security the country hoped to gain by joining NATO could easily be destroyed by social or political disunity, both nationally and internationally. Another possible and equally undesirable outcome related to the very fabric of Canadian society. As Spry told the General Council of the Canadian Boy Scouts in April 1949, “Without this spirit of willingness to cooperate the state must take over control in order to ensure peace and order. This is the first step to Communism – and the police state, and the subjugation of the freedom of the individual.” Helping Canada’s youth develop an appreciation for cooperative unity was, in Spry’s opinion, a key aspect of teaching them about democratic citizenship.

General Spry was firmly convinced that the Boy Scouts offered a vehicle through which cooperative unity could be encouraged in Canada, and he frequently expressed this idea in his public speeches. For example, he told Toronto’s Empire Club on 23 January 1947 that “Through its common Promise and Law, which require Duty to God, loyalty to their country, and helpfulness to others, its method of training, and its unity of purpose and community of interest, this Movement is able to bring together boys of all races, creeds, and colours.” As such, Spry continued, “Scouting provides that common ground upon which tolerance, fellowship and goodwill can flourish,” and thus “Scouting can overcome traditional ‘fences’ which have been erected over the years between various regions, denominations and races.”

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61 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 29 April 1949.
tied his thinking about Scouts and unity to the Cold War “battle of ideas,” saying that “I believe that because Scouting deals with ideas it can be one of the most effective means of bringing up the next generation to believe that there is five per cent of good in the other fellow regardless of class, creed or colour.”63 This, he said, provided boys and men “with a community of interest – the fertile ground on which unity of spirit and outlook can grow.”64 Spry might have been advocating assimilation, but he was probably thinking about the Scout brotherhood. Yet another unifying aspect of Scouting was that it was an interdenominational and international body. As such, Spry said, the Boy Scouts was “one of the few Movements...which is striving to develop the sort of citizens who will be capable of living together sanely in an insane world.”65 He nonetheless reminded his audiences that Scouting was just one avenue of teaching Canada’s boys about cooperative unity. Churches, schools, and families also had an important part to play: the Boy Scouts’ proper role in society was to complement their educational efforts.

Spry’s beliefs regarding unity were partly derived from his understanding of the Scout Movement’s philosophy and its educational method. Regarding the former, a Canadian Scout manual published in 1949 stated that one of Scouting’s principal aims was to develop “in all boy types the ability to ‘get along with others’” [original emphasis].66 Boy Scouts would learn how to do this, as Eduard Vallory has pointed out, by participating in games and outdoor adventures with their peers.67 To be capable of coexisting, individuals needed to consider the sensitivities of others, and to be willing to cooperate. As was related in Chapter 7, Dan Spry thought that the Scout Movement had taught him “a sense of consideration for others” that he found “extremely useful” while he was in the army. Scouting was a good foundational experience, but wartime

66 Canadian General Council, Scouting, It’s Aims & Methods, 10.
67 Vallory, World Scouting, 51.
military service surely deepened Spry’s belief in the value of consideration and cooperation. In the Canadian and other Allied armed forces, leaders were expected not only to command their subordinates so as to accomplish their mission, but also to look after their wellbeing, insofar as the military situation allowed. In a similar vein, cooperation was part of teamwork, a key aspect of military service. Spry considered promoting teamwork to be an important part of leadership, and his efforts in this regard while he was an army officer and the Boy Scouts’ Chief Executive Commissioner usually met with success. For Spry, being considerate and cooperative with others came naturally.

Dan Spry’s wartime service had convinced him that achieving cooperative unity in postwar Canada was both desirable and possible. No veteran would have wanted to see internal discord. They had fought to protect Canada, and were invested in its success. Spry expressed his thoughts on the possibility of unity to the Boy Scouts’ Canadian General Council in June 1946:

During the war, one of the big lessons I learned was that it was possible to bring together soldiers or sailors or airmen from every part of Canada, from every walk of life, every religion, every political viewpoint, and make them over into platoons, divisions, and corps, etc., and somehow or other, under proper leadership, they would fight as well as any other soldiers anywhere at any time. Perhaps we were all striving for something, some common objective. That has taught me that given a common ideal or a reason, or a goal, there is no basic foundation for the bickering and intolerance that one occasionally sees occurring between regions, provinces, religions, and races...It is the ideal, the reason, the object which brings them together.68

Spry said the same thing to Toronto’s Empire Club seven months later, adding that he and many other servicemen and women had returned home thinking that Canada’s wartime unity should also be achievable in peacetime.69 That large numbers of veterans had such postwar views is indeed plausible, as most of them would have seen this unifying dynamic at work in their wartime military units. One’s thinking could easily be transformed by such an experience.

68 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 14 June 1946.
Veterans were not the only Canadians who emerged from the Second World War with a new sense of unity. The external conflict that the war represented had the effect of bringing people together, a common human response upon which sociologists have long commented.\(^{70}\) Defeating the enemy became the unifying goal. Such was the case in Canada after the fall of France in June 1940. As a result of this military disaster, Canada’s prosecution of the war, which since September 1939 had been waged on a “limited liability” basis, became an unlimited effort and it remained so until the war’s end in 1945. Canada’s wartime unity remained a popular memory for many Canadians who experienced the Second World War on the home front.\(^{71}\)

This social definition of Canadian unity was linked with new thinking about national identity, especially for those men and women who had served overseas. As was shown in earlier chapters, the combination of several factors – the fact that people from all parts of Canada served together in national units and formations under Canadian commanders, the citizenship training that was available through the Canadian Legion Educational Services, distance from Canada, the experience of battle, and even the “Canada” flashes on their uniforms – led many soldiers to see their country as a unifying entity. In 1947, Dan Spry said that such thinking “is something that a million Canadians in the Armed Forces and all the other people who travelled during the war particularly have inside them now which can give us an increased strength to go on in these troublesome and difficult days.”\(^{72}\) General Harry Crerar, writing in his capacity as the Grand President of the Canadian Legion, agreed with Spry’s statement:

> I believe that the Canadian Army has already made an outstanding contribution to the development of a national outlook among our citizens...I talked to hundreds of these men about their travels in Canada. It was inspiring to hear from them what they had learned about their own vast country and about the other Canadians who lived in other provinces – a knowledge essential to our citizens if they are to

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\(^{71}\) On this theme of wartime unity, see for example Granatstein, *Canada’s War*.

contribute to the development of national understanding and sound national policies...\textsuperscript{73}

For Spry, Crerar, and a good number of Second World War veterans, wartime experiences moulded their attitudes regarding unity and identity in the years after 1945.

Spry’s belief that Canada’s wartime unity ought to be achievable in peacetime tied in with developments in contemporary Canadian thinking regarding citizenship. Historian Ivana Caccia has argued that, prior to 1939, many Canadians were of the view that citizenship included being an upstanding member of one’s local community, respecting democratic and societal institutions, and serving the common good when called upon to do so.\textsuperscript{74} Certainly, as was shown in Chapter 1, these elements were key components of the conservative, middle-class ideals that Spry and thousands of his peers had been taught by their families, schools, churches, and youth groups in the 1920s and 1930s. Caccia further declared that Canada’s experience of the Second World War changed all of this. In her view, the country’s expansion (and in some instances, the creation) of national institutions and programs such as the armed forces, the civil service to manage the government’s control of nearly every aspect of wartime life, and social welfare projects like family allowances, had had the effect of extending Canadians’ notion of community from the local level to the national level. This in turn led to what she called “a new discourse of nationhood and citizenship,” one that was “conceived to unite Canadians to live together and believe in such motivating ideas as democracy, civic-mindedness, tolerance, freedom, Christian values, and fundamental rights of individuals.” Within this new discourse, Caccia added, some policy-makers concluded that “the symbolic value of ‘Canadian citizenship,’ when exempt from any particularism of geography, language, origin, creed, colour, or class, could have a powerful impact on the sense of unity within the borders, provide a sense of belonging, and offer a greatly

\textsuperscript{73} Crerar, “Pre-vision and Provision,” 37-38.
\textsuperscript{74} Caccia, \textit{Managing the Canadian Mosaic in Wartime}, 204.
needed single point of national identification [emphasis added].”

It is difficult to find fault with Caccia’s assessment. After all, such a conception of cooperative unity and national identity was precisely the lesson that Dan Spry and many thousands of other Canadian men and women had learned during their wartime military service.

It was in this context that the federal government introduced two initiatives it thought would promote social unity and national identity: adopting a distinctive Canadian flag, and creating a unique Canadian citizenship. The former proposal, as historian José Igartua has noted, went nowhere. Many English Canadians at the time believed that replacing the Union Jack as Canada’s official flag was unnecessary and unpatriotic despite Prime Minister King’s assertion that a distinctive flag need not mean one without a Union Jack. The Red Ensign, which had been flown over government buildings for years, and under which Canadians had fought during the Second World War, had one, while proponents of the idea thought that its retention symbolized colonial status. The Canadian Citizenship Act, on the other hand, became law in January 1947. Although it also provoked heated debates about retaining Canada’s ties to Britain - Canadians had been British subjects until this time – the government argued that a unique Canadian citizenship would promote unity and national identity. As Paul Martin, King’s Secretary of State put it, “There has been too little, not too much, national pride in this country...It is not enough to be a good ‘Bluenose’ or a good Ontarian or a good Albertan. Sectional interests and sectional differences must be overcome if we are to do our best for Canada.”

Believing that Scouting offered a means of teaching boys about cooperative unity, Dan Spry sought to help make it a reality. The best publicized and most enduring way in which he tried to promote unity was in connection with two national Scout Jamborees, the first of which

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75 Ibid., 204-206.
76 Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution, 33-34.
77 Paul Martin, quoted in Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution, 18-19.
was held in 1949. To understand the significance of this initiative, some background information is necessary. Jamborees have long been an important part of the Boy Scouts’ method of teaching boys about cooperation, the first being held in London in 1920. From that point on, international jamborees were held at four-year intervals, save the period from 1938 to 1946 owing to the Second World War; they resumed in 1947. Eduard Vallory has observed that Baden-Powell had originally sought to replicate the international spirit of the Olympic Games through competitive sports. However, this approach produced rivalry rather than harmony between national Scout contingents, and he discarded competition in favour of singsongs, skits, and other such activities. Baden-Powell did not discount the existence or importance of national feeling. Instead, he used it to further his purpose. International Scout jamborees and other international Boy Scout camps that are conducted each year have built upon the national identities, cultures, and religious beliefs of their participants to create what Vallory has described as a “sentiment of global belonging.”

Familiar as he was with Scouting’s philosophy, and combined with his experience of wartime unity, Dan Spry understood Baden-Powell’s motive in conducting jamborees. He also knew that their history proved that boys from different cultures could come together and have little difficulty getting along, pointing to the 1947 jamboree in France, which he had attended, as “an example to the weary, wrangling adult world!” Spry thought that similar results could be achieved in Canada, and that such a lesson would give the country’s boys a lesson in the kind of unity that they would need as adults to cope with the Cold War – and to build a stronger country.

The fact that prior to 1949 there had never been a Canadian jamboree, and that two such events occurred during Spry’s tenure as Chief Executive Commissioner, strongly suggests that this was his initiative. The idea of conducting a Canadian jamboree was seriously considered

78 Vallory, World Scouting, 21 and 163.
during a conference in April 1947, at which Spry’s Plan OPPORTUNITY was discussed. The provincial associations were supportive, and that October the Dominion Executive Committee decided to hold a national jamboree from 16-24 July in the vicinity of Ottawa. The Committee also set up a planning committee “consisting of one member to be nominated by each Provincial Council, the Chairman to be nominated later, the Secretary to be Lt.-Col. G.E. Simmons [the Executive Commissioner for Administration].” Spry’s suggestion that a national Jamboree be held every four years at various locations in Canada, so that “every Scout would have an opportunity to see a Jamboree, either Canadian or international during his Scout career,” was likewise accepted.\(^\text{80}\)

Planning for the first Canadian jamboree continued for the next year. Spry, although not the lead planner, was intimately involved. In January 1948 he announced that a suitable location had been found – the Connaught Ranges, a military camp just west of Ottawa – and said that “endeavours [were] being made to lease it for the year 1949 with permission to work on it in 1948.” Spry added that he hoped to convince the armed forces to do the engineer work.\(^\text{81}\) Such arrangements were likely enabled through his military connections. He also urged the Dominion Executive Committee to invite the Boy Scouts of America to send a group, and he arranged for the Governor General, the Viscount Alexander of Tunis, to officially open the Jamboree.\(^\text{82}\)

Canada’s first national jamboree was held from 16 to 23 July 1949. The Association’s Report for that year called it “one of the greatest events since Scouting came to Canada in 1908.” Nearly 2,800 Boy Scouts, adult leaders, and officials attended. They came from all parts of Canada, including Newfoundland, its newest province, and included 125 members of La

\(^{80}\) LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 10 October 1947.
\(^{81}\) LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 23 January 1948.
\(^{82}\) For the American invitation, see LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 11 June 1948. For Alexander’s acceptance of Spry’s invitation, see LAC, RG 7-G-26, Secretary of the Governor General, Volume 85, Maj.-Gen. H.F.G. Letson to Maj.-Gen. D.C. Spry, 8 April 1949.
Fédération des Scouts catholiques, 38 Salvation Army Scouts, and groups from the United States and Cuba. During this time, the boys put on regionally-themed displays, visited the Parliament buildings and museums in nearby Ottawa, listened to concerts put on by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police band and the Central Band of the Royal Canadian Air Force, attended religious services, and participated in camp fires and sing-songs, to name just a few of their activities.

Dan Spry later remarked that the jamboree had come off even better than he had hoped. This was certainly true from an organizational perspective, but given that some of its principal organizers were former senior army officers this was perhaps to be expected. He also thought that the jamboree’s success boded well for Canada’s societal unity. Spry delivered this message to several audiences during his cross-Canada tour in the fall of 1949 in a speech called “Scouting a Factor in Canadian Unity.” As his comments were often repeated in local newspaper articles, his views on Scouting as a potential force for unity became even more widely known. In his address he described the Boy Scouts’ community of common purpose, and said that jamborees promoted that sentiment. Regarding the Canadian jamboree, Spry argued that it had “debunked” three obstacles to Canadian unity, namely religion, language, and geography. He pointed out that 14 different denominations had been present at Connaught and that there had been no unpleasant incidents. Language, too, was not problematic, as boys tried to communicate with each other in English, French, and even Spanish. Lastly, he argued that the factor of geography was overcome because the Boy Scouts had pooled transportation costs so that boys from all parts of the country could attend. All of this, he said, contributed to cooperative unity in Canada by developing

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83 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13941, Annual Report for 1949, 11 and 41-42.
85 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 14 October 1949.
86 Newspaper coverage of Spry’s speeches during his 1949 cross-Canada tour is found in a series of his scrapbooks held by the Scouts Canada Museum. See for example “Canadian ‘Myths’ Debunked: Three Big Obstacles Overcome by Scouts”, Calgary Herald, 14 October 1949, and “Scouts Prove Religion, Language, Geography No Barrier to Unity,” Vernon News, 20 October 1949.
citizens who knew and respected each other. Spry was also convinced that the Jamboree’s lessons on unity would spread to others who had not been in attendance. As he told a group of Rotary Club members who visited the Jamboree on 18 July, “This debunking process will have a chain reaction amongst the pals and parents of the hundreds of Scouts at Connaught Camp. This is good for Canada. These Scouts have learnt that it is good to be a Canadian.”

General Spry was certainly correct in describing the unifying effect of belonging to a group with common goals and ideals, and his view that the First Canadian Boy Scout Jamboree had provided boys from across Canada with a unique opportunity to get to know each other, albeit briefly, was just as reasonable. Some of them likely learned new things from boys from other parts of the country and made friendships in the process, as Spry had seen Scouts do at international jamborees that he had attended. On the other hand, the fact that there had been no religious squabbles, and that English-Canadian and French-Canadian Scouts had spoken to each other in the other’s language, did not necessarily mean that the boys thought of their nation as a unified entity as Spry hoped. Jamborees could do relatively little to shape boys’ appreciation for political unity or national identity because their main focus was on encouraging the community of interest that the Scout Law entailed. Furthermore, just under 3 per cent of Canada’s Boy Scout youthful membership attended the first Canadian jamboree at Connaught – there were 100,180 boys in 1949 – and that membership only accounted for 8.7 per cent of the country’s male population aged 8 to 17 years. Such limited representation could not greatly affect Canadians’ views on political unity or national identity.

Of all of Dan Spry’s initiatives during his tenure as Chief Executive Commissioner, national jamborees have been the most enduring. A second Canadian jamboree was held during the summer of 1953, again at the Connaught Ranges. While fewer were in attendance – some 2,196 Scouts from Canada, the United States, Cuba, Mexico, Grand Cayman, and Australia, along with 200 support staff – the Association considered it an even greater success because it had been conducted using lessons learned from the first.\textsuperscript{90} Eleven more Canadian jamborees have been conducted since 1953.\textsuperscript{91} Thanks to Spry, national jamborees became an important means through which the Boy Scouts have tried to teach Canada’s youth about cooperative unity.

Other Second World War veterans promoted unity in Canada, both cooperative and that of a political nature. For example, the Canadian Legion was known as a place where military rank had no bearing on one’s status, notwithstanding the fact that until 1972 its membership was restricted to those who had voluntarily served in the armed forces during wartime. In the Legion, one could find former generals like Harry Crerar and privates like Bill Lumsden, the latter being elected Dominion President in 1952.\textsuperscript{92} One could find a similar mix at a SAPA reunion, although one could only gain entrance to that body by being war-blinded.\textsuperscript{93} In such groups, diverse people worked together. Veterans also joined civic organizations that were heterogeneous in their memberships’ makeup in terms of ethnic background and economic status. Suzanne Mettler found this to be true for 80 per cent of American veterans who got involved in postwar civic work. She concluded that membership in diverse groups “did much to give their members a

\textsuperscript{90} Scouts Canada Museum, Annual Report for 1953, 12-13. It was felt that lower attendance at the Canadian Jamboree was likely due to Canada sending Scout contingents to Queen Elizabeth’s Coronation, the American Jamboree, and the World Rover Moot, all of which occurred in the late spring and summer of 1953.

\textsuperscript{91} The most recent national jamboree was held in Alberta in July 2013; it was attended by 6,516 boys and adults. Scouts Canada, “Another Great Year of Scouting Adventures: 2012-2013 Annual Report,” 9, \url{http://www.scouts.ca/sites/default/files/AR2012-13-Web-en.pdf} (accessed 30 March 2015).

\textsuperscript{92} Hale, \textit{Branching Out}, 114 and 185-186. In May 1972, the Legion opened its membership to members of the regular armed forces. As of January 1974, veterans’ children could join, but were denied voting privileges.

\textsuperscript{93} Durflinger, \textit{Veterans with a Vision}, 90.
sense of common citizenship and mutual understanding of those with circumstances different from their own.”

Mettler’s work suggests that American veterans, like Canadians, came away from the war with a sense of unity based on what they had in common with each other.

The Royal Canadian Legion also encouraged national political unity in Canada. This was perhaps best seen after René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois swept into office in Quebec in 1976. Many Legion members were horrified by Lévesque’s plan for Quebec to separate from Canada. For example, the chairman of the Legion’s National Constitution and Laws Committee opined that such an event represented “the gravest threat to our nation that has ever occurred.” Trained as they had been in the armed forces to take action against threats, doing nothing was not an option that the Legion’s senior leadership was prepared to entertain. As former Legion President Bob Smellie put it, the fact that the Lévesque government had stated that it would launch an information campaign to convince Quebeckers of the merits of separating from Canada meant that the Legion had a responsibility to argue in favour of Quebec’s remaining in Canada. Bob McChesney, another recent Dominion President, agreed, saying that the Legion’s purpose in combating Quebec separatism was “to unearth good reasons why and how other Canadians may be able to influence Quebeckers to vote against separation.”

Meanwhile, in 1977, the federal government created a Task Force on Canadian Unity under the leadership of Jean-Luc Pépin (who had been a federal cabinet minister) and former Ontario Premier John Robarts, a naval veteran, to support the varied efforts of the public and voluntary groups regarding unity and advise the government on national unity issues. The Legion offered this federal body its full support – and that of its nearly 2,000 branches in communities large and small across Canada.

95 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 27, Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Ad Hoc Committee on National Unity, 29-30 October 1977, 1-6.
To accomplish its objectives the Legion established its own unity task force in 1977, using the ACTION Committee (which was still in operation) as its foundation. Unity had been one ACTION’s major areas of concern. The Royal Canadian Legion Task Force on Canadian Unity had a broad mandate that included several main lines of effort. In addition to soliciting the views of Legion members regarding national unity and informing them of the Legion’s activities in this area, the task force would encourage Provincial Commands to form similar organizations and make recommendations on Legion policies regarding Canadian unity. It would also work closely with the public, other societal groups interested in national unity, and the media. As always, much of this effort would be undertaken at the Legion branch level. 97

In fact, the Royal Canadian Legion had taken measures to promote political unity even before the Quebec election. Some of these had been carried out as part of the ACTION program. For example, in 1975 the Legion donated $50,000 to the Canada Studies Foundation for high school textbooks. Another project redrew the logo of the Legion’s Poppy Campaign to show a map of Canada without provincial borders and the motto “United in Remembrance.” Other initiatives came in 1977. In January, the Legion issued a press release reaffirming that all Legion members were loyal to one Canada. The next month, a conference of the Legion’s provincial presidents and secretaries agreed to have Legion Magazine, the successor publication to The Legionary, re-print articles on Canadian unity that had appeared in other publications. In May 1977, the Legion’s Quebec Command formed a provincial unity committee that decided the best way to promote national unity was to inform the rest of Canada about Quebec’s views. It hired a firm of socio-economic researchers and communicators to publish four such articles in Legion Magazine, starting in December. Further articles written by authors such as historian Ramsay Cook were planned to provide the non-Francophone view. Lastly, the Legion informed the

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Pépin-Roberts Commission that it fully supported the early repatriation of Canada’s constitution.\textsuperscript{98}

The Royal Canadian Legion’s message of unity was an easy sell in most parts of Canada. However, it faced significant challenges in such endeavours in Quebec, not least because of its history. The Legion had long been a unilingual English-Canadian organization, and from 1925 to 1977 only two francophones – Léo LaFlèche and Redmond Roche – had served as Dominion President.\textsuperscript{99} Then again, many legionnaires, and a good number of English-Canadians, nursed bitter memories of Quebec’s anti-conscription stance, which had led to two political crises during the Second World War in 1942 and 1944, and the fact that Quebec’s wartime enlistments as a percentage of its male population of military age had been the lowest of Canada’s provinces.\textsuperscript{100}

To overcome such negative elements, Legion Magazine obtained the services of Jean-Marc Poliquin, a well-known and respected Quebec journalist, to edit its French counterpart, La revue Legion, and it began to publish articles describing the important part that Quebec played in Canada and praising the province’s distinct culture. The Legion also assumed a non-partisan, low-key approach in the weeks prior to the Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association, which was scheduled for 20 May 1980, to avoid inflaming the situation.\textsuperscript{101}

In the end, Quebeckers voted 2-1 to stay in Canada.\textsuperscript{102} The legionnaires were no doubt pleased. Some of them, most notably those in Quebec Command, had worked hard to help ensure such an outcome. Their efforts showed that Canada’s Second World War veterans, who by the 1970s made up the majority of the Legion’s members, were willing to fight for the country’s

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{98} LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 27, Minutes of the Special Ad Hoc Committee on National Unity, 29-30 October 1977, 2, and Royal Canadian Legion Submission to the Task Force on Canadian Unity, (1977?).
  \item \textsuperscript{99} Hale, \textit{Branching Out}, 202.
  \item \textsuperscript{100} For a good scholarly analysis of these political crises see J.L. Granatstein and J. Mackay Hitsman, \textit{Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada} (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977). For Quebec’s enlistment figures, see Stacey, \textit{Arms, Men and Governments}, 590.
  \item \textsuperscript{101} Hale, \textit{Branching Out}, 202.
  \item \textsuperscript{102} Bothwell, Drummond, and English, \textit{Canada Since 1945}, 385-387.
\end{itemize}
political unity. Fifteen years later, when another Quebec nationalist government pushed hard for political separation from Canada, the Royal Canadian Legion would do so again.103

At the same time that General Spry and other Second World War veterans sought to teach Canada’s youth about democracy and unity, they also tried to inculcate them with a willingness to serve others. Spry believed that citizens had a duty to serve by virtue of being members of a community.104 Here again, his thinking was partly influenced by the Boy Scouts’ philosophy, as one of the main tenets of the Scout Law stipulated that “A Scout’s duty is to be useful and helpful to others.”105 Spry’s military experience, on the other hand, must also have been a considerable factor. As he told the Dominion Executive Committee in April 1946, his life as an army officer had been dedicated to serving Canada and those who had served under him.106

Spry’s beliefs about service reflected those of many Canadians who survived the Second World War. On the home front, hundreds of thousands of people – men and women, old and young, rich and poor – had served their country while undertaking a myriad of activities that included organizing scrap metal drives, participating in blood donor clinics, or running canteens to support local military bases.107 Thousands of them, along with the country’s veterans, carried this life lesson about service into their peacetime lives, as was seen in the expanded membership rolls of community service groups during the years after 1945.108 For a good number of veterans, though, their postwar thinking included a belief that they owed a debt of service to friends who had not survived the war. Lloyd Tomczak, who was blinded during the ill-fated Dieppe Raid in August 1942, eloquently expressed this view to his war-blinded peers years after the war’s end:

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103 Hale, Branching Out, 203.
105 Canadian General Council, Policy, Organization, and Rules for Canada (1951), 3-4.
106 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13939, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Board, 30 April 1946.
107 Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers, 30. For an example of a community’s war service effort, see Serge Marc Durlflinger. Fighting From Home: The Second World War in Verdun, Quebec (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006).
108 Owram, Born at the Right Time, 99-100.
No one denies that we have all had our moments of anguish, both physical and mental. But are we not so much better off than those whom we left behind? Would they not cheerfully and gladly put up with a disability just to be here with us and have the right to live in this wonderful country? We all know that this is so…Every day of our lives let us show our appreciation by living each day to the best of our ability in unselfish service to our country, our community, and our fellow man. If we can pass this on to our children, and in turn to their children, we can help to ensure that the memory of their sacrifice will be held sacred for all time to come.  

Barney Danson, a former lieutenant in the Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada who entered federal politics in 1968, recalled a similar motivation. Three of his closest friends had been killed during the war, and while he recalled being “devastated” by their deaths, their memory infused him with “an unshakable determination to play a part in determining the direction our country was to take. For them and for so many others who never lived to become veterans, I resolved to do everything I could to make sure that their deaths had not been for nothing.”

The Canadian Legion had similar views regarding service. That such was the case is not surprising, as its membership consisted entirely of veterans and the organization itself had been created to serve the needs of others. In 1948 the Legion’s Grand President, General Harry Crerar, echoed Dan Spry’s belief that service was a citizen’s duty, writing that “We have definite need in this country for less emotional oratory on ‘freedom’ and ‘self-determination,’ and a lot more consideration and development of that essential requirement in a democracy – a sense of general, communal responsibility.” Perhaps the best expression of such sentiments, however, came in 1955 in an article published by the Legion’s Dominion President, The Very Reverend John O. Anderson, in The Legionary. Given this paper’s tremendous influence on the Legion’s actions in later years (described below), its key elements are reproduced here:

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109 Lloyd Tomczak, quoted in Durflinger, Veterans with a Vision, 313.
110 Danson, Not Bad For a Sergeant, 11.
Think for a moment of any of your comrades who did not come back. Ask yourself what kind of a country, what kind of a community, they would have wanted for their children? Furthermore, what kind of children would they have wanted? Ask yourself these questions, and I doubt that you will have to search for an answer. For it becomes quite obvious that the Canadian Legion has another duty – a moral obligation to this country and its people...

We have dedicated ourselves to preserving the principles of democracy. Surely we don’t have to preserve these principles for ourselves, for our own membership. Any man who has experienced a war in the service of a free country has formed his own lasting impressions of freedom. Then what are we preserving, and for whom are we preserving it? And is preservation enough?...

I suggest we substitute the word “promoting” for “preserving.” Then we get a preview of the Legion’s course of action. Freedom is a living thing, a changing thing, which must keep pace with the times...Therefore, the Legion’s secondary characteristic, the one which must be developed, is branch activity within the community [original emphasis]. The Legion must adopt the outward look. The words freedom and democracy are only symbols. What they signify incorporates the best features of our community life. So the Legion’s duty is to promote these features...

The poem says, “From failing hands we throw the torch, be yours to hold it high.” I suggest we dedicate ourselves to kindling the flame of that torch in those who will carry it into Canada’s future; that we do it with the devotion and unselfishness which has characterized our past activities. If we do this now, two hundred years hence this nation will look upon the grave of the last Legion member and say: “Here lies a Legionary. He served his country diligently in war and peace.”

Such views were not uniquely Canadian. As American scholar Michael Gambone wrote, for many of his country’s Second World War veterans the drive to serve others began with their enlistment in the armed forces. He quoted Marine Corps Staff Sergeant Frank V. Gardner, who likely spoke for millions when he wrote the following while fighting on the island of Okinawa: “I prayed to God for peace and resolve[d] to make my life worthwhile. I told God that if I survived…I would return home and devote myself to the service of my country in peacetime.”

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113 Gambone, *The Greatest Generation Comes Home*, 80, and Frank V. Gardner, quoted in Ibid.
Dan Spry often spoke to audiences about the notion of service to others. The topic came up naturally when he addressed Boy Scout audiences about the meaning of the Scout Promise and the Scout Law. On other occasions, he told non-Scout audiences that Scouting was worthy of support because it emphasized service to others by the individual and the group. Spry pointed out that the Scout Movement’s global membership performed “millions of Good Turns each day,” and that Scout groups put in “millions of public service hours.” Doing so, he suggested, was habit-forming. He also argued that one of Scouting’s great contributions to society was that it could help boys become “able to organize themselves, their lives, and their time, to the benefit of themselves and their communities.” Such ideas tied in with Spry’s belief that individual citizens had responsibilities to those living around them. Lastly, he pointed out that adults, too, could serve their community and their country by becoming Scout leaders. Doing so, of course, would allow the Boy Scouts to train more boys, and thus increase its production of good democratic citizens.

General Spry strove to expand the Canadian Boy Scouts’ public service activities during his tenure as Chief Executive Commissioner. One important initiative involved taking on a civil defence role. This was not really new for the Association as it had done the same thing during the Second World War. In the early 1950s, however, the military threat facing Canada was far more direct. Soviet bombers had the range to strike targets in North America and, as a close ally of the United States, Canada could expect no immunity from attack. This threat became all the more terrifying after the Soviet Union acquired its own nuclear weapons in 1949. Further, the federal government feared that North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950 might

constitute a precursor to a world-wide communist offensive. If the West’s attention and military resources were focused on Korea, Soviet forces could attack the democracies of Europe, which would lead to a global conflict.\textsuperscript{116} By the early 1950s, all levels of government had re-established civil defence organizations in response to such fears. Later, in 1957, the Canadian Army’s reserve units would be re-assigned from combat to civil defence duties.\textsuperscript{117}

The Canadian Boy Scouts began thinking about civil defence shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea. The Alberta members of the Dominion Executive Committee raised the matter on 13 October 1950, to which General Spry replied that he had initiated talks with Maj.-Gen. (retired) F.F. Worthington, Canada’s Civil Defence Coordinator. Worthington agreed that the Boy Scouts would have an important civil defence role, the details of which would be announced later. In the meantime, the Executive Committee passed a resolution stating that “The Boy Scouts Association supports the principle of Civil Defence and is prepared to cooperate with the duly constituted Civil Defence authorities at the National, Provincial and Municipal levels and to this end desires instructions to be issued by Canadian Headquarters for the increased training of Scouts in preparation for such public service.”\textsuperscript{118} It was released to the media the next day.\textsuperscript{119}

A few factors explicate the Boy Scouts’ desire to get involved with civil defence. Patriotism was certainly part of it, as a robust civil defence organization would be vital in a nuclear war aimed at the civilian population. More importantly, civil defence work offered a means of teaching boys about service, a key aspect of the Scout Movement’s citizenship training program. This line of thinking coincided with General Worthington’s views. As historian

\textsuperscript{116} For more on this subject, see Eayrs, \textit{In Defence of Canada}, Volume 4, 206-207.

\textsuperscript{117} During the Second World War, Air Raid Protection organizations were set up in many parts of Canada. For more on Canada’s Cold War civil defence program, see Andrew Burch, \textit{Give Me Shelter: The Failure of Canada’s Cold War Civil Defence} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). For the Army’s role, see Granatstein, \textit{Canada’s Army}, 350.

\textsuperscript{118} LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 13 October 1950.

Andrew Burtch has noted, Canadian and American civil defence authorities in the early 1950s were then linking public awareness programs about civil defence with concurrent governmental efforts to promote national unity and identity. They argued that all citizens needed to get involved in civil defence to defend their democratic rights. In short, doing so was an obligation of citizenship. This was why Worthington was eager to gain the cooperation of Canada’s largest youth movement in the country’s civil defence effort. At the same time, he obtained formal agreements with the Canadian Legion, the St. John Ambulance, and the Canadian Red Cross Society. The Boy Scouts’ participation in civil defence thus constituted an important part of an overarching federal government plan to protect Canadians in the event of a major conflict.

On 26 January 1951, Dan Spry told the Dominion Executive Committee that he and General Worthington had finalized the Boy Scouts’ part in civil defence. In accordance with Civil Defence Memorandum No. 9/51, the Boy Scouts would provide a messenger service for the national, provincial, and local civil defence organizations, trained Scouts to help conduct damage surveys, and Scouts to work with the Air Raid Warden Service. Rovers and older Scouts would be selected and trained to perform light rescue work. Scouts would assist the evacuation of urban centres by providing traffic control along routes and by manning transit camps and reception areas. To identify housing for evacuees, Boy Scouts would help prepare billeting reconnaissance reports. Lastly, Scout instructors would teach local groups about “first aid, knotting and lashing, and elementary pioneering.” The Executive Committee endorsed these roles. Spry also said that the Dominion Headquarters had prepared a bulletin summarizing aspects of Scout training applicable to civil defence, copies of which would be distributed to the various provincial civil

121 DHH, File 112.3M2(D22), Department of National Health and Welfare Civil Defence, Civil Defence Memorandum No. 9/51, 13 March 1951.
122 Ibid.
defence organizations. He further stated that national civil defence authorities would issue
badges to recognize Scouts that had received civil defence training.123

Over the next two years, General Spry initiated a number of civil defence measures. One
of these was a Boy Scouts’ National Emergency Plan, which he wrote. This plan described the
manner in which the Boy Scouts would prepare for “emergencies ranging from the gradual
mobilization of the country for world war, to full scale atomic, bacteriological or chemical
warfare attacks on our centres of population.”124 Spry said that “Scouting’s first and, perhaps,
most difficult task will be to carry on Scouting, continuing to develop the self-reliant all-round
citizen who will play his full part in any task assigned to him.” He stressed that the Boy Scouts
needed to push Plan ACHIEVEMENT, to concentrate on civil defence “as our big Emergency
job,” to organize itself so that it could assist national and local authorities, and to “ensure the
security and maintenance of a National Headquarters so as to be in a position to give leadership
during the emergency, and to coordinate reorganization afterwards.” Regarding the latter, Spry
expected that all of the departments within the Dominion Headquarters (less Administration)
would have at least one person remaining after the younger men had joined the armed forces. He
anticipated being recalled for military service, too, an eventuality that would necessitate finding
a new Chief Executive Commissioner. To ensure the survivability of the Dominion Headquarters
in case of a bombing attack, Spry recommended that an air raid shelter, a warden’s post, and a
first aid post be prepared in the building it then occupied (306 Metcalfe Street in Ottawa), and
that all headquarters staff members receive training in first aid and civil defence duties. Lastly,
he directed that the National Emergency Plan would be updated on an annual basis.125

123 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 4, Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 26 January 1951.
Plan,” (1951?), 1.
125 Ibid., 2-5, and Toby Spry interview, 8 December 2013.
In other Boy Scout civil defence measures, Spry worked through General Worthington’s office to arrange for selected Boy Scout leaders and executive commissioners to attend both atomic and bacteriological courses and the Civil Defence Staff College. By the spring of 1951, Spry himself had attended civil defence forums in Hull, Quebec.\footnote{Scouts Canada Museum, Annual Report for 1950, 12, and Annual Report for 1951, 14.} He also introduced Boy Scout civil defence training bulletins. The first was issued in the latter half of 1951. A second, which introduced training ideas for Scouters to use in their troops, was already in the works.\footnote{Scouts Canada Museum, Annual Report for 1951, 14, and Annual Report for 1952, 10.} At the same time, he forged working relationships between the Boy Scouts and civil defence organizations at the national, provincial, and local levels. By April 1953, the Boy Scouts’ civil defence work had become so extensive that Spry, seeing the need for a full-time civil defence training coordinator, asked the Department of Finance for money to hire one. The Finance Department rejected his request on the grounds that the government was wary of establishing grants for voluntary organizations to fund civil defence work. A Finance official wrote that the department would consider raising the Boy Scouts’ $15,000 annual grant, but only on the basis of its “general place in society.” He offered Spry a crumb by saying that the government might pay out-of-pocket expenses such as printing or postage that were incurred by the Boy Scouts’ civil defence efforts.\footnote{LAC, Department of Citizenship Fonds, D.C. Spry to Honourable D.C. Abbott, Minister of Finance, 29 April 1953, and K.W. Taylor, Department of Finance, to Dr. G.F. Davidson, Deputy Minister, Department of Health and Welfare, 23 September 1953.} The Association never did hire a civil defence coordinator.

Spry often communicated his thoughts on civil defence through the Association’s monthly publication, \textit{The Scout Leader}, which went to Scouters across the country. For example, in January 1951 he expressed the hope that “all groups will busy themselves with preparatory training in first aid, rope work, traffic control, observation and deduction, life-saving, etc.,” and he encouraged leaders to “be prepared to make a real contribution to Canada’s civil defence.”
Spry tied civil defence training to the Boy Scouts’ motto, “Be Prepared,” writing that “This matter of being prepared is not something merely to be talked about, hoping it is true, but that it means that every boy is, in fact, trained to that degree and is being trained continually.”

Civil defence was just one of the many ways in which the Boy Scouts served their fellow Canadians during Dan Spry’s tenure. The Association’s Reports for 1947 to 1953 are full of examples of Boy Scouts performing community service. For instance, in 1948 Scouts across Canada assisted the Red Cross, St. John Ambulance, Community Chests, and the Canadian Tuberculosis Society, to name a few. A popular history of Canadian Scouting, published in 1982, contains many similar examples. Spry’s promotion of service was no doubt enabled by the Boy Scouts’ growth, from 98,447 boys and adults in 1946 to 157,843 in 1953. More members meant more people exposed to Scouting’s citizen-building tenets who could, in turn, conduct more service-related activities. These were precisely the results that Spry and most Scout leaders sought. Then, too, the Korean War context likely made civil defence work an “easy sell.” The Report for 1951 reveals that most provincial associations conducted such training, while that for 1952 indicates that the Boy Scouts participated in “a great many realistic exercises held in conjunction with local Civil Defence Authorities.” Scout historian Robert Milks has noted other examples. In 1951, Scout troops helped the Civil Defence Commission of York Township, Ontario, distribute pamphlets entitled *Survival Under Atomic Attack* to the public; they handed out 30,000 copies. Two years later, a member of the 1st Dundurn Scout Troop won $25 for being the best student out of 109 boys that attended a High School Fire Wardens’ Training Course.

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130 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Reel C-13941, Annual Report for 1948, 26. For examples during Spry’s tenure as Chief Executive Commissioner of Canada’s Boy Scouts, see Milks, *75 Years of Scouting in Canada*, 180-208.
133 Milks, *75 Years of Scouting in Canada*, 199 and 208.
Spry’s postwar efforts to encourage and expand the Boy Scouts’ national and community service activities reflected those of many other Canadians who had undergone military service during the Second World War. This was certainly evident with regard to Canada’s largest veterans’ organization, the Canadian Legion. It was not very long after the war’s end that some Legion branches got involved in community service projects. Former Dominion President Mervyn Woods later opined that, after the war, “One man at [a] branch could pretty well look after the local vets who needed help, and you had thousands of members on your hands. The question was, what to do with them?” This, Woods, said, was how the Legion’s community service work began: “It was a natural thing for us after the war. We had been trained to get a job done, and we had collected a wide variety of skills. The man who had been to war had a postgraduate degree in a number of things.” Another former Legion president, Bob Smellie, agreed, saying that “At the local level, it wasn’t really a conscious decision to turn to community work. It was really just a matter of seeing a need and filling it.”

There were, perhaps, other elements at play in addition to Woods’s and Smellie’s belief that the Legion’s community service work in the years after 1945 “just happened.” Historian Jonathan Vance has argued that Second World War veterans tended to approach the memory of their wartime service very differently than had their First World War forebears who had returned home to rising unemployment, political turmoil, and economic strife. Faced with a depressing future, many First World War veterans, represented by the Canadian Legion, had looked to the past as a place of refuge. The years after 1945, on the other hand, were very different in Canada. The economy, after getting off to a slow start, was booming. People felt a sense of security made possible by new social welfare programs, jobs, and political stability. Notwithstanding the fears resulting from Cold War tensions, most people – including Second World War veterans – looked

forward to their future. For many of those veterans, their communities represented that future. As such, they sought ways to make their communities a better place within which to live.

It was Dominion President John Anderson’s article in The Legionary in 1955, within which he described the Canadian Legion as having to choose between stagnation or being “a vital, active force in Canada’s future,” that galvanized the Legion’s membership regarding community service. Many of the Legion’s postwar activities in this regard centred on youth. Its national-level promotion of youth sports, described in Chapter 7, was one of the Legion’s early community service projects. Within a very short period of time, the Legion was heavily involved in several other youth-related community service works. By 1964, some 1,400 branches across the country were supporting cadet units, Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, 4H clubs, junior fish and game clubs, bands, and dances for local teenagers. Branches also conducted essay contests, and provided scholarships and bursaries. Such activities involved the expenditure of considerable funds. In 1964, the cost of Legion scholarships and bursaries alone averaged $265,000 per year, spread over 1,000 Legion branches that were participating in the program.

The Legion’s community service work was not entirely focused on the country’s youth. For instance, it established housing developments for senior citizens that by 1960 were valued at more than $3 million. These low-rent developments were constructed in communities such as Vancouver, Chilliwack, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Kitchener, Montreal, and Moncton. While most of the Legion-sponsored accommodation was reserved for veterans and their dependants, elderly Canadians of limited financial means could apply for residence.

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136 Anderson, “Where Do We Go From Here?”, 15. Legion historians Clifford Bowering and James Hale have both credited Anderson for the Legion’s community focus. Bowering, Service, 211, and Hale, Branching Out, 117.
137 LAC, RCL Fonds, Volume 41, Dominion Command Circular No. 64/2/4.
138 Bowering, Service, 214.
In most instances, the Canadian Legion’s community service activities focused on satisfying local needs. As Clifford Bowering has noted, the years 1958-1959 were typical in this regard. In British Columbia, the Grandview and West Vancouver branches sponsored local blood clinics, while other branches supported the Canadian National Institute for the Blind’s Eye Bank. Several Legion branches in Alberta supported libraries, tuberculosis clinics, and volunteer fire departments. In Ontario, the Legion financed the construction of parks, swimming pools, and other recreational facilities in numerous towns and villages, and it assisted other service clubs in projects like providing summer camps for children and transportation for children with physical disabilities. The Quebec Command sponsored the Quebec Chapter of the Canadian Foundation for Poliomyelitis, and it assisted local welfare services. Branches in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island donated medical equipment and distributed toys to needy children.\footnote{Ibid., 218-223.} The Legion’s greatest social impact was felt in small communities. Typical of these was a 750-person village on Vancouver Island to which Robert England had retired after leaving the civil service. In a letter that he sent to the Legion’s Dominion Secretary in August 1953, England described his local Legion as “the centre of the village, sponsoring Boy Scouts, maintaining a scholarship at the Courtenay collegiate [sic], keeping up a Beneficiary Fund, and running a club for the members that would do credit in any city, on a membership of about 180.”\footnote{LAC, RCL Fonds, Reel M-8514, File 17-10, Robert England to T.D. Anderson (General Secretary of the Canadian Legion), 23 August 1953.} With all of this activity, conducted by legionnaires across the country, it was understandable that by the 1960s the Royal Canadian Legion had become Canada’s largest community service organization.\footnote{Bowering, Service, 218-223. The Royal Canadian Legion still advertises itself in such terms today. See the Royal Canadian Legion, Dominion Command, “About Us,” http://www.legion.ca/who-we-are/ (accessed 15 October 2016).} These were veterans who “walked the walk” when it came to serving their fellow citizens.
It was largely through community service activities, like those that were carried out by the Canadian Legion, that the veterans’ vision for Canada was implemented. Other veterans’ organizations served their communities, too. One of these was SAPA, which had always worked very closely with the Canadian National Institute for the Blind (CNIB) and had participated in a number of CNIB fundraising efforts. In the late 1950s, however, SAPA’s leadership sought out ways that the organization could help Canada’s civilian blinded in addition to the country’s war-blinded population. As Serge Durflinger has noted, this train of thought led SAPA to focus its efforts on the young members of Canada’s civilian blinded, and in 1959 it adopted the following aim: “to encourage blind and visually impaired students to further their education so that they may live full and contributing lives.” As a result, SAPA created the Sir Arthur Pearson Association Scholarship Fund, which would be funded solely by war-blinded Canadians. This program kicked off in 1960 when three blind high school students received $50 each towards their university education. It was not a huge sum, even by the standards of the day, but it was surely appreciated by the recipients. By 1968 the SAPA scholarship program was further expanded with the development of $25 scholarships for blind students entering secondary school. This novel program, Durflinger asserted, “rapidly became an important raison-d’être of SAPA,” and gave SAPA’s members “a powerful sense of purpose.” As such, he wrote, Canada’s war blinded “had become donors, not just recipients.”

While veterans’ groups were undoubtedly the most visible manner in which Canada’s Second World War veterans helped their communities, thousands of others served their country in the years after the war as civil servants. This path was made possible by provisions within the Veterans Charter, whereby federal government departments were directed to give preferential

142 Durflinger, Veterans with a Vision, 284.
143 Ibid., 287.
hiring treatment to veterans. They were taken on in considerable numbers, as may be seen at Appendix 10. In 1946, male and female veterans filled 31,098 of a total of 53,174 permanent and temporary civil service appointments. Veterans accounted for 79.8 per cent of all males hired in that year, and 58.5 per cent of all male and female appointments. Similar percentages were achieved in 1947. From that point until 1962 the figures for veterans gradually diminished, but even in that year some 10.6 per cent of all federal civil service hires were people with wartime military service. In all, 140,438 male and 3,395 female veterans filled permanent and temporary positions within the federal civil service during the period 1945-1962, accounting for 27.4 per cent of 525,555 Canadians who became federal government employees.144

Some federal government departments attracted higher numbers of veterans than others. During the period from 1945 to 1962, for example, the Department of Veterans Affairs hired the greatest number of ex-servicemen and women, with a total of 30,665 permanent and temporary appointments. The Post Office and the Department of National Defence were close behind, taking on 28,965 and 27,449 veterans, respectively.145 Ted Patrick, mentioned earlier, was one of these individuals, becoming a documents research clerk with National Defence.146 These results were unsurprising. Veterans Affairs supported the veterans' community, while National Defence was familiar ground for ex-servicemen and women. At the opposite end of the spectrum were the Department of the Secretary of State, with 185 veterans hired, and the Department of Justice, which took on just 174 veterans. In such instances, the education levels required for such work may have inhibited some people from submitting their applications.147

144 A detailed breakdown of male and female hires, for both veterans and civilians, is found in Hodgetts, et al., *The Biography of an Institution*, Table 7, 505. These figures may include some First World War veterans and some individuals who served in the Korean War.
145 Hodgetts, et al., *The Biography of an Institution*, Table 6, 504.
146 Duffy, “War Veteran was a ‘Giving Person.’”
147 Hodgetts, et al., *The Biography of an Institution*, Table 6, 504.
A few points must be made about the statistics cited above. Firstly, some veterans who obtained federal civil service jobs had been disabled as a result of their wartime service, and were granted special preference within the already established veterans’ preference in federal government hires. By 1949, the Civil Service Commission reported that about 5,000 of them had obtained civil service jobs, a figure that represented the total number of disabled veterans that had been hired by the federal civil service during the 25-year period that followed the Second World War. Secondly, the Civil Service Commission’s calculations did not include veterans who remained in the armed forces after the end of the Second World War, or those who returned to the colours when Canada rearmed in the early 1950s. As such, the actual number of veterans in the employ of the federal government, either in civilian jobs or as uniformed personnel, certainly exceeded the 143,833 civil service hires cited by the Civil Service Commission. Finally, the Commission’s attitude regarding veterans appears to have been highly positive, as it went out of its way to encourage them to apply for civil service jobs and ensure that their applications were successful. In this regard, it worked closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs, military discharge depots, and veterans’ organizations like the Canadian Legion.\footnote{Ibid., 470-471.}

The presence of so many Second World War veterans in the civil service, particularly in federal departments that had attracted large numbers of them, affected the manner in which those departments served Canadians – and how the services those departments provided were seen by Canadians. That this was so speaks to the important part that the professional civil service plays in shaping government policies and delivering programs to the public. Then, too, these people were in the prime of their lives when they became public servants. Veterans were mostly young, many were dynamic characters, and they believed in the value of serving others. A good example of this may be seen in the Department of Veterans Affairs. Veterans could relate, on a very
personal level, with the circumstances of ex-servicemen and women asking for the department’s assistance, and they did so in a way that people who had not undergone military service could not. Veterans’ groups immediately took notice. For instance, Serge Durflinger has recorded that SAPA’s relationship with Veterans Affairs was quite good in the 1940s and 1950s. During this time veterans filled that department’s clerical offices and, as was related in Chapter 6, they were led by equally empathetic superiors like Milton F. Gregg and E.L.M. Burns. By the early 1980s, however, nearly all of these people had retired. Their replacements were mostly civilians who lacked their predecessors’ understanding of the military environment in general and the circumstances of war-blinded veterans in particular. As a result, SAPA’s relationship with Veterans Affairs lost its former collegial nature and took on a strictly bureaucratic flavour.149

Veterans continued to serve Canada as members of the armed forces during the postwar years. Many of the generals previously mentioned in this study – Foulkes, Simonds, Kitching, and Vokes – filled senior military appointments, as was related in Chapter 6. Within the lower rank levels, Strome Galloway and “Spin” Reid, last seen serving in The RCR under Dan Spry, were two of many who remained in uniform after the war, while veterans of 1939-1945 made up the bulk of the men who volunteered to fight in Korea in 1950. Their first commander was Brigadier John Rockingham, last seen serving as a brigade commander in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division under Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry.150 From the 1940s to the mid-1960s, a considerable number of officers, NCOs, and other ranks with wartime experience could be found throughout the peacetime navy, army, and air force. Their perceived impact on the quality of Canada’s armed forces cannot be understated. To cite just one example, in 1957 the commander of the British Army of the Rhine, General Sir Alfred Dudley Ward, called the Canadian brigade group

149 Durflinger, Veterans with a Vision, 201, 321, and 333.
150 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 322-323.
that served under his command “the best fighting formation in the world.” The positive influence of such people largely explains J.L. Granatstein’s description of the period from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s as “the golden age of Canadian military professionalism.”

Beyond membership in veterans’ groups or in the civil service, individual veterans served their communities or their country in a myriad of ways during the postwar years. Those who participated in Canada’s democratic institutions as elected members certainly did. So, too, did people like George Pearkes and Lincoln Alexander, who served as Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia and Lieutenant Governor of Ontario, respectively. The same can be said of veterans involved in youth work, such as “Spin” Reid, Art Powell, Nora Ketchum, and Edwin Bennett, as was described in Chapter 7. In communities across Canada, other former servicemen and women served others by becoming police officers, firefighters, engineers, doctors, dentists, or lawyers. Regarding the latter profession, some did so at the highest level. As may be seen at Appendix 11, from 1973 to 1989 at least two of the nine members of the Supreme Court of Canada were Second World War veterans. From 1979 to 1984, there were four of them, including Brian Dickson who served as Canada’s Chief Justice from 1984 to 1990. Still others volunteered countless hours of their time to community organizations of all types.

Canadian Second World War veterans were not unique in performing community service work in the years after 1945. In the course of her research, American historian Suzanne Mettler found that her country’s veterans joined civic organizations in droves in the years after 1945, and that fraternal organizations, service clubs, labour unions, professional societies, churches, and

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church-affiliated bodies, flourished as a result. “Through such intense activity,” she aptly commented, “these Americans earned their reputation as the ‘civic generation.’ Their involvement in public life epitomized cherished ideals at the heart of American democracy; widespread participation by ordinary citizens and the articulation of political voice by a broad cross section of the populace.” Mettler asserted that veterans “treated the right to vote as a hallowed obligation. They cared deeply about the public good and considered participation in American democracy to be both a privilege and a duty.”\footnote{Mettler, \textit{Soldiers to Citizens}, 3 and 163.} Another American scholar, Michael D. Gambone arrived at similar conclusions. He found that Second World War veterans “became unstoppable philanthropists, raising money for all manner of causes.” Like their Canadian peers, they involved themselves in community projects. For example, the American Legion Community Development Corporation worked hand-in-glove with authorities at all levels of government to help solve the problem of a severe housing shortage that sprang up just after the war.\footnote{Gambone, \textit{The Greatest Generation Comes Home}, 81-82 and 189. See also Chapter 7.}

Significantly, American historian Robert D. Putnam has pointed out that the values and social habits of this generation of his countrymen were formed during what he called “a period of heightened civic obligation,” namely the Second World War. As was the case in Canada, the war unified the population and Americans responded by engaging in a wide variety of volunteer civic activities. Putnam went on to assert that “those who lived through those days and felt that sense of community carried that with them into their adult lives,” and noted that similar surges in civic activity had occurred in the United States during and after the American Civil War and the First World War. He concluded that “war a powerful force for social change.”\footnote{Putnam, \textit{Bowling Alone}, 267-268, 271-272. Interestingly, Putnam’s research indicated that veterans’ rate of civic engagement did not exceed that of other men in their generation. See Note 42 on page 485. While this American result may have implications for future studies regarding Canada’s Second World War generation, it does not change the fact that Canadian veterans were very much involved in civic activities in the years after 1945.} Notwithstanding the
fact that Putnam was writing about the American experience, there are clear similarities to that of Canada.

This chapter began with Robert England’s assertion that “The fate of North American democracy rests to no small part on the assumption of veterans of their full responsibilities as citizens.” Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry and thousands of other like-minded Canadian veterans of the Second World War did just that. Transformed by their wartime lessons regarding democratic citizenship, which were all the more meaningful because they learned them at a time when their lives were at stake, some veterans strove to teach Canada’s youth about democratic principles, cooperative unity, and service to others. Others served their communities and their country as elected or appointed officials, civil servants, armed forces personnel, or as members of veterans’ groups and community service clubs. In so doing Second World War veterans from all walks of life, serving alongside people who had experienced the war on the home front as young adults, helped shape the nature of democratic life in postwar Canada.
CHAPTER 9

BUILDING A BETTER POSTWAR WORLD

Scouting is a world brotherhood, and I believe it can assist in the development of a large group of people all over this globe who have something in common. It seems to me that if you can develop this common ground there is some hope for the world. If we do not, there does not seem to be much hope, and if there is no hope, we must consider the last six years of war entirely wasted.

Maj.-Gen. D. C. Spry

The decades after the Second World War saw far greater Canadian participation in global affairs than ever before. This new internationalism largely derived from lessons that Canadians – including veterans – had learned from their experience of war, and their realization that the Cold War made isolation impossible. Canada, they believed, could – and should – help shape world events. Such beliefs may be understood through an examination of Dan Spry’s thoughts and actions. This chapter demonstrates Spry’s deep-rooted sense of internationalism through his activities as the Director of the Boy Scouts’ International Bureau, and argues that this stemmed from wartime service. While Spry was exceptional in filling a high-profile international position, there is evidence to suggest that, as a body, Canada’s veterans felt and acted the same way.

Dan Spry’s involvement with the world Boy Scout organization occurred in the context of a period of heightened political and non-political internationalist sentiment. The idea of an intergovernmental body aimed at promoting inter-state cooperation was first attempted after the First World War with the creation of the League of Nations. The League’s founder and most ardent proponent, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, believed that this new body would prevent future wars of aggression through the application of collective security measures. However, its members, which included Canada but not the United States, as the U.S. Senate did not ratify the

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project, refused to use military force to counter the aggressive acts of Italy, Japan, and Germany during the 1930s. As a result, the League proved to be an impotent force for peace, and a second global conflict broke out in 1939. Despite this failure, another American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, urged the Allied nations fighting the Axis powers to build a successor organization, and in October 1945 the United Nations (UN) came into being. Like its predecessor, the main purpose of this new world body was to maintain peace. Unlike the League, its members proved more willing to apply military force to counter aggression, and they did so during the Korean War of 1950-1953. The UN embodied a broad sense of internationalism, with agencies to address global matters such as war refugees, health, food, finance, and human rights. Above all, it represented the hope that another world war could be avoided through collective security.

The spirit that led to the creation of the League of Nations and the UN was also found in non-political international bodies like the Boy Scout Movement. Sir Robert Baden-Powell had created Scouting to produce citizens who would be able to defend the British Empire, his remedy for perceived weaknesses in Edwardian Britain’s male youth. The First World War, however, changed Baden-Powell’s thinking. As early as 1916 he was planning an international meeting of Scouts to promote, as he put it, “the spirit of brotherhood among the rising generation throughout the world, thereby giving the spirit that is necessary to make the League of Nations a living force.” This first international Boy Scout Jamboree was held in London in August 1920. All of this, as British historian John Springhall has observed, constituted “a subtle and effective re-orientation of Scouting,” within which the Movement “projected an image of League of Nations

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3 The UN’s early internationalism was closely associated with the public works of Eleanor Roosevelt, the president’s widow. For more on this topic, see for example John Allphin Moore, Jr. and Jerry Pubantz, *The New United Nations: International Organization in the Twenty-first Century* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 59-63.

internationalism and later of world Commonwealth brotherhood.” From this time forward, the Boy Scouts sought to produce global citizens rather than citizens of the British Empire.

The UN and international Scouting were organized on similar lines. The Boy Scouts had a governing body resembling the UN’s General Assembly, called the International Conference, which was made up of delegations from its member nations. Its role, as a 1961 Scout publication observed, was “to promote throughout the world unity of purpose and common understanding in the fundamental principles of Scouting...and to facilitate the development of Scouting in all parts of the world.” The Boy Scouts’ executive body, the UN’s equivalent being the Security Council, was the International Committee. It had twelve members, each from a different country, who were elected by the Conference. This committee, led by a chairman selected from its ranks, represented the interests of world Scouting rather than those of its members’ nations. Acting on the International Conference’s behalf between its biennial meetings, one of the International Committee’s important roles was to approve the admission of prospective member nations to the Conference. Lastly, the Scout Movement had a permanent secretariat called the International Bureau, its version of the UN Secretary-General’s office. Consisting of a small professional staff led by a full-time Director who was appointed by the International Committee, the Bureau was responsible for global policy development, strategic planning, financial and administrative management, and all matters pertaining to training, liaison, publications, and public relations of a universal nature. The Boy Scouts’ international structure, as it existed in 1957, four years after Dan Spry became Director of the Boy Scouts International Bureau, is depicted at Figure 9-1.

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5 Springhall, Youth, Empire, and Society, 63.
6 Boy Scouts International Bureau, Facts on World Scouting (Ottawa: Boy Scouts International Bureau, 1961), 4-12. Each member country could send up to six delegates to the International Conference. All countries, even those with one delegate, had six votes. No country could have more than one person on the International Committee at the same time.
Figure 9-1  Organization of the International Boy Scout Movement, 1957
International Bureau, 1955-1957, 30-31)
While the thinking behind the Boy Scouts’ internationalism and its organization were similar to those of the UN, its manner of operation was rather different. All member countries had equal status, unlike that of the five permanent members of the UN’s Security Council which had the right to veto that body’s resolutions. Moreover, the international Scout organization had no executive power over the national associations. Each association could decide how Scouting would be conducted in its country, so long as it complied with the Scout Movement’s aims, principles, and methods. Lastly, world Scouting consisted of both the national Scout associations and individual members through their personal commitment to the Scout Law. Put another way, upon joining Scouting a person not only became a member of a local Scout troop, but was also part of a world-wide brotherhood united by a common purpose and shared values. As Eduard Vallory has observed, it was this sense of universal belonging that made Scouting a global movement. Yet another difference lay in Scouting’s apolitical stance. Such elements defined the environment within which General Spry served as the Director of the International Bureau.

It was within the context of postwar internationalism that, in 1949, Dan Spry stepped forth onto the world stage as an elected member of the Boy Scouts International Committee. He did so just three years after becoming Chief Executive Commissioner of the Canadian Boy Scouts Association. That Spry agreed to take on such a task in addition to his extensive national responsibilities was perhaps unremarkable, given his enthusiasm for Scouting and his seemingly boundless energy. There were, however, other considerations that likely influenced his decision to take this step. As has been previously demonstrated, he was firmly convinced that the Boy Scouts, as a non-sectarian and non-political youth movement, was well positioned to help families, churches, and schools teach youth about individual character values and the attributes of democratic citizenship, and that it had a duty to do so. Such an education, he argued, was

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vitaly important if the world’s democratic nations were to prevail in the “battle of ideas” that characterized the Cold War. Spry knew that the mistrust between the Western democracies and the Communist bloc could lead to a global war, and it was his view that the Scout Movement could make a real contribution to world peace. He asserted that one of Scouting’s greatest strengths lay in the tenets of the Scout Law, through which it could help to build bridges between peoples of different religions, cultures, races, and political views. General Spry summarized his thoughts on these matters in an address to Toronto’s Empire Club on 23 January 1947:

Unfortunately, while we are able to establish and maintain the peace, order and good government within our political boundaries, we have not carried this thought forward into the international field...Perhaps we will never reach such a stage of perfection, but I can assure you that so long as we fail to organize the peoples of this world so that the will of the majority can be implemented through its elected representatives who are capable of enforcing this will, there will continue to be a state of anarchy amongst nations. I doubt if it is possible to so organize ourselves unless there is a great mass of world citizens dedicated to the belief of such a conception...I feel that the world-wide Scout movement can help to bring up young people of today to be worthy citizens of tomorrow – citizens, intelligent enough to appreciate democracy, and prepared to play their part in the establishment of a world free from fear and suspicion.

Spry expressed similar ideas to several Canadian audiences. For example, in a series of radio broadcasts he delivered in Edmonton, Vancouver, and Regina in March 1947, Spry told his listeners that “through Scouting it is possible to bring Moslem and Hindu boys together in India; it is possible to bring the Arab and Jewish boy together in the same Scout camp.” One year later, in October 1948, fourteen months after attending the first postwar World Scout Jamboree in France, he told a Regina audience in an address that he entitled “Scouting and International Understanding” that “Scouting has shown that it is possible to mix thousands of boys of every background without disharmony.” Dan Spry expressed virtually the same message in an article

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9 Ibid. See also Spry, “One Scouting World,” 159.
entitled “One Scouting World,” which was published in the International Journal a few months earlier.11 The ideas contained in these quotations, especially that the Boy Scout Movement could help the world’s boys become “worthy citizens of tomorrow,” matched what he often told Canadians about how Scouting could help to instil the ideals of democratic citizenship among Canada’s male youth. It was a highly idealistic vision of global harmony, and perhaps even a bit naive. Still, it was a view that was grounded in Spry’s personal experience.

Spry’s philosophy regarding the Boy Scout Movement’s usefulness in promoting global harmony was greatly influenced by what he had learned as a wartime soldier. Like other veterans, Spry knew the face of war as only those who had experienced it could know. And although he accepted the sad reality of human conflict, the idea of a global nuclear conflict was too awful to contemplate. General Spry also knew from his wartime service that the pursuit of a common objective could unite people of varied backgrounds. So, too, did thousands of other Canadians, veterans and non-veterans alike. Given this formative lesson, Spry concluded that it was worth trying to steer young people – not just those of Canada, but of the whole world – towards tolerance, understanding, and goodwill, if repeating recent history was to be avoided. He thought that Scouting was one way that this lofty goal could be attained.

While Spry’s beliefs regarding internationalism drew from the key tenets of Scouting and the lessons that he had learned during the Second World War, they also reflected contemporary Canadian attitudes. But the country had not always proven fertile ground for such sentiments. While Canada had joined the League of Nations in 1919, successive Canadian governments did all that they could to avoid international commitments that might require military action. William Lyon Mackenzie King, Canada’s Prime Minister for most of the interwar period, considered

mediation a much more effective tool in maintaining peace than collective security.\textsuperscript{12} King firmly believed that involvement in foreign wars, in light of English Canada’s deep sentimental ties to Britain and a generally isolationist sentiment in French Canada, would divide the country along cultural and linguistic lines as had been the case during the First World War. Preserving Canada’s political unity, in King’s opinion, was of the utmost importance. As he put it, “Our own domestic situation must be considered first, and what will serve to keep Canada united.”\textsuperscript{13} It was with this thinking in mind that he doggedly pursued a foreign policy of “no commitments” during the 1930s even as the international situation increasingly signalled the coming of another major war.\textsuperscript{14} Canadians, many of whom were struggling to cope with the economic hardships resulting from the Great Depression, generally supported King’s approach.

The Second World War, during which Canada made significant military and economic contributions to the Allied cause, changed all of this. By 1945, it was a middle-ranked power. Buoyed by self-confidence, many Canadians believed that their country had the resources, the ability, and – most importantly – the responsibility to help maintain world peace. This new sense of internationalism was apparent in Canada’s increased participation in world affairs. Canada was a charter member of the UN and dramatically expanded its overseas diplomatic presence. By 1947 Canada had 36 diplomatic missions in place: in 1939, there had been just five.\textsuperscript{15} In the years following King’s retirement in November 1948 there were more changes to the country’s foreign policy, many of which stemmed from the Cold War. As was seen earlier, Canada joined NATO in 1949, sent troops to Korea in 1950, and stationed military forces in Europe in 1951.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} King, a labour relations expert, told the League of Nations on 29 September 1936 that “mediation and conciliation rather than punishment” was “desirable” in dealing with international disputes. See Walter A. Riddell, ed., \textit{Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 1917-1939} (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), 320.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Case, “The Lessons of Munich,” 73-75.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Stacey, \textit{Canada and the Age of Conflict}, Volume 2, 376-394.
\end{itemize}
Canadians of all stripes, including the membership of the Canadian Legion and the left-leaning Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, approved of such actions.\textsuperscript{16} That veterans were supportive made sense, despite their loathing of war. They understood the consequences of doing nothing to counter aggression and, as Robert England noted, “veterans, because of their past training and service abroad, [were] more conscious of military power than any other group.”\textsuperscript{17} This was no doubt true for many of them, but their views on global affairs was also moulded by overseas service. Distance from Canada not only gave them a greater appreciation of their country, but also a better understanding of Canada’s place in the world. Part of this perception stemmed from the Canadian Legion’s wartime citizenship courses which, in addition to national matters, had encouraged soldiers to think about Canada’s international position. For example, a pamphlet called \textit{The Battle of Brains: Lectures} suggested that officers ask their troops questions like “What is meant by saying that Canada’s front line of defence is in Europe?” As John Maker has noted, many soldiers knew the answer to that question. They understood the importance to Canada’s defence of being involved internationally.\textsuperscript{18} In 1948, General Harry Crerar wrote that discussions between officers and men that sprang up during and after such courses promoted the development of “a rational, collective, public opinion” upon which “national decisions – social, economic and political – are nowadays so intimately dependent.” He opined that this experience, combined with that of war, had made “the Canadian ex-soldier of every rank...a better citizen than when he entered the Canadian Army,” and that “the time is fast approaching when the young veterans of the Second World War...will be taking a dominant part in the shaping of the future of Canada, its position in the British Commonwealth, and its part in world affairs.”\textsuperscript{19} Two

\textsuperscript{17} England, \textit{Twenty Million Veterans}, 217.
\textsuperscript{18} Maker, “A Home Away From Home,” 204.
\textsuperscript{19} Crerar, “Democracy and Citizenship,” 7 and 34.
years later Robert England echoed Crerar, writing that “Just as victory could not have been won without these men, so world peace and human rights everywhere and national solidarity at home are unobtainable without their aid and sympathy.”

When Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry joined the Boy Scouts’ International Committee in 1949, its top priority was to rebuild Scouting in Europe. At that time, European Scout associations comprised 19 of the 43 national associations that had survived the war. Of those countries, only three had remained neutral while hostilities were ongoing. Most of the rest had been occupied by Nazi Germany and the Boy Scouts were thus forced to “go underground.” The war’s end brought both hope and new concerns. Throughout Europe, Scout groups emerged from the shadows and tried to resume operations. On the other hand, several eastern European nations that had fallen under Soviet domination at the war’s end, such as Lithuania, Albania, and Romania, banned their pre-war Boy Scout associations. Pro-Soviet governments in Hungary and Czechoslovakia took the same approach. The international Scout Movement faced other challenges, too. These included a recurring shortage of funds, a lack of qualified and experienced headquarters staff to manage a global organization and promote a cohesive approach to Scouting worldwide, and poor internal communications, owing to the great distances between Scouting’s member nations.

Rebuilding the Boy Scouts’ pre-war footprint, let alone expanding its global presence, represented a huge challenge.

Aside from participating in International Committee and Conference meetings, there is scant evidence in Dan Spry’s papers or those of the World Scout Bureau describing the nature of his contributions to world Scouting during the period of 1949 to 1951. Still, it seems that he impressed those with whom he served, for in 1951 the International Committee appointed him as

20 England, Twenty Million World War Veterans, 222.
Deputy Director of the International Bureau for a period of two years. László Nagy, a former Secretary-General of the World Organization of the Scout Movement, has asserted that this was part of a long-range plan to find a suitable successor for the Bureau’s Director. Colonel John S. “Belge” Wilson, a former deputy police commissioner and wartime colonel, had held the post since 1938 and wanted to retire in two years’ time. Nagy’s thesis makes sense. Putting Spry into the Deputy Director’s chair for two years would allow him to become more involved in the affairs of international Scouting. It would also test his effectiveness on a world stage.

In General Spry, Wilson and the members of International Committee must have felt that they had “hit the jackpot.” They gave Spry full marks for having given up what most believed was a promising military career to be Canada’s Chief Executive Commissioner. They also knew that the Canadian Association was undergoing unprecedented growth. That Spry had achieved such results while also serving on the International Committee spoke to his energy, dedication, and leadership. For these reasons, the Committee was convinced that Spry had the requisite qualities to be the Director. Spry, cognizant of the Committee’s plans, used the appreciation process he had learned in the army to decide whether to take the Deputy Directorship. After weighing several factors and concluding that such a move would allow him to “make a real contribution” in helping to create a better postwar world, he accepted the job. Spry also decided to remain in Ottawa as Canada’s Chief Executive Commissioner, and for the next two years he performed both roles simultaneously. He did, however, resign his seat on the International Committee. Jackson Dodds, a fellow Canadian, replaced him.

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23 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, Appreciation of Personal Circumstances, 29 September 1951.
General Spry soon discovered that being Deputy Director demanded a good deal of his time. As Colonel Wilson stated in his 1953 Biennial Report, Spry had “complete responsibility, under the Committee and Director, for International Scouting in North, Central and South America and the Caribbean and for enquiries into and the study of such special subjects as may be assigned to him by the Director.” Knowing that the North American associations were doing well, Spry concluded that his main task was to help the Scout organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean. In so doing, he held to the management style he had learned in the army and was using as Canada’s Chief Executive Commissioner. He began by studying reports describing the Scouting situation. Next, he sought the views of people within and outside of the Boy Scouts with first-hand knowledge of Latin America. He then went out to see things for himself, working closely with Salvador Fernandez, the Movement’s Travelling Commissioner for Latin America.25

As may be seen in Wilson’s Biennial Report for 1951-1953, a whirlwind of activity soon followed. From February to April 1952 Spry visited the national Scout associations of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In February and March the next year, he toured Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. After each visit he gave the national Scout leaders ideas about how they could cope with – and hopefully resolve – their local issues.26 In some instances, those challenges were immense. For example, in 1952 Spry described things in Ecuador as “a lost cause thanks to the unwillingness of the Scout officials and the leaders of the Church to come to some sensible understanding,” although he succeeded in “persuading the Bishop of Guayaquil to appoint a Chaplain with the only really active Troop as an experiment.” Spry was more hopeful about other countries. He thought Scouting in Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru

26 Ibid., 17-19.
was in good shape because Church and Scout authorities cooperated with each other.²⁷ During these tours, Spry met with political, business, and church leaders to obtain their support for the Scout Movement. For instance, he met Chile’s president in 1952.²⁸ Wilson’s 1951-1953 report stated that Spry’s efforts produced “greater understanding of the aims and intentions of Scouting, and in more cooperation in the development of the Movement,” and that there was “a rising tide of enthusiasm in most Associations” within the region.²⁹ Spry had done well in Latin America.

For his part, Colonel Wilson was even more convinced that Dan Spry was the right man to succeed him, saying that world Scouting “require[d] as Director a man of energy, persistence, and vision” to oversee its future.³⁰ What was so impressive about Spry’s performance was that he had achieved good results in Latin America while carrying out his extensive Canadian duties, which included overseeing Plan ACHIEVEMENT and, in 1953, a national Scout jamboree. The British, however, indirectly expressed some concerns about Spry’s appointment in a letter that A.W. Hurll, Britain’s Chief Executive Commissioner, sent to Wilson about the Boy Scouts’ constitution.³¹ Hurll suggested restricting the Director’s travel budget as a cost-saving measure, and limiting the term of office to two years. He also remarked that paying Wilson’s successor £5,000 per year was “entirely unreasonable” – Wilson had been allotted an honorarium of £900 per annum – and that men nearing retirement age within the universities or other fields might be persuaded to become the Director “if their superannuation contributions could be continued.” It is not known if Spry requested such a salary, or if the International Committee offered to him.³²

³⁰ Ibid., 45.
³¹ The World Scout Bureau archives reveal no other opposition to Spry’s appointment as Director.
In any event, Wilson flatly disagreed with Hurll, writing that in his view such constraints would weaken the Director’s role and that no suitable person would accept a two-year term.\textsuperscript{33} Further, he had a pension and did not need the Scout Movement’s pay, while Spry was a young man with a family. Why would he want to be the Director if he would earn less than he did in Canada? Colonel Wilson’s private correspondence reveals that he thought there were other reasons for the British concerns about Spry. Part of it was based on what he called “differences of opinion” between the Canadian and British Associations, although Wilson did not identify what these differences were. He had also heard that Hurll himself wanted the Director’s job.\textsuperscript{34} Wilson did not publicly comment on the matter of his successor, but he duly warned Spry and he sought the support of other International Committee members in opposing the British point of view. For his part, Spry told Wilson that he considered Hurll’s ideas “nonsense,” and added that if the British persisted he could not accept the Directorship. This was no ultimatum: Spry was simply unwilling to serve in what he believed might be a poisonous environment.\textsuperscript{35} Fortunately, as most of the International Committee disagreed with Hurll’s recommendations, they rejected them. The way was clear for General Spry to succeed Colonel Wilson as Director as planned.

One wonders if other factors were also at work. László Nagy has described Colonel Wilson as an authoritarian who had enemies in the Boy Scout Movement.\textsuperscript{36} Hurll may have feared that Dan Spry, another military man, would act in the same manner despite the fact that Spry’s actions to date offered no signs of such behaviour. Alternatively, the Director’s position had always been held by a Briton, and Scouting was a British initiative. If Hurll wanted the Director’s job, part of his thinking may have involved ensuring that Britain retained its control. If

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  \item \textsuperscript{33} World Scout Bureau Archives, File 532.1, Constitution, Director’s Monthly Report for April 1952.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid., Wilson to Jean Salvaj (Swiss member of the International Committee), 27 May 1952, and Wilson to Spry, 1 May 1952. The author found no trace of a British-Canadian dispute in the Canadian Boy Scout archives.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid., Spry to Wilson, 2 May 1952.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Nagy, \textit{250 Million Scouts}, 127.
\end{itemize}
so, and there is no evidence that such was the case, it would have been a very nationalistic approach for a person aspiring to fill a role like the International Bureau’s Director. Canadian nationalists might also wonder if British concerns about Spry had to do with the fact that some Britons looked down on Canadians as “colonials,” an attitude that Spry had no doubt come across during the war.37 Here, too, there is, no evidence that Hurll thought in such a way.

Whatever the reasons for British worries about Dan Spry’s selection as Director, events moved quickly after Hurll’s suggestions were rejected. On 15 April 1953, Colonel Wilson told the Canadian General Council that the International Committee had invited Spry to be the Director of the International Bureau. By this time, the latter had already told Wilson that he would accept the job.38 That same month, Spry resigned as Canada’s Chief Executive Commissioner. In the fall of 1953, he moved his family to London and assumed his new duties.

Richard T. Lund, a British-born member of the International Bureau since 1922, later wrote that prior to Spry’s arrival “there was much speculation amongst us as to what the future held and what sort of new developments would be put in hand by this dynamic young man.” He then added, “We did not have long to wait.”39 Such was indeed the case, as Spry immediately began developing plans aimed at improving the Bureau’s internal administration so that it would be capable of managing the international Scout Movement’s future expansion.

High-level planning, of course, was nothing new for General Spry. He had done the same thing as an army officer and, more recently, in the Canadian Boy Scouts Association. What was different, however, was the scale and scope of such plans. Never before had he been faced with a challenge like framing the future of a large international organization. Still, Spry knew the wants

37 Spry likely saw this while serving as Lt.-Gen. McNaughton’s personal assistant. McNaughton’s vehement assertions that Canada was an ally often irritated senior British officers. Granatstein, The Generals, 66.
38 LAC, Boy Scouts Fonds, Volume 1, Minutes of the Canadian General Council, 24 April 1953.
and needs of the world Scout Movement, having spent the previous four years as both a member of the International Committee and as the Deputy Director. As always, Spry applied the planning methods he had learned in the army, and had successfully used as Canada’s Chief Executive Commissioner. That process began with producing a written appreciation of the situation facing world Scouting. This document, which was entitled “The Future of the Boy Scout Movement,” was ready by January 1954. It outlined the factors that he believed affected the Boy Scouts’ future development, and it proposed options to guide the International Committee’s actions. These factors included many that Spry had stressed in Canada, such as Scouting’s religious aspects, the influences of home and school, the need to give boys challenging adventures, the importance of liaising with other like-minded organizations, the need for more and better-trained leaders, and the importance of community service. Other considerations included promoting purposeful leisure, the impact of national and international political instability on Scouting’s operations and future expansion, and the need for the International Bureau to provide national associations with information so as to maintain the Scout Movement’s unity of purpose. Spry’s paper also discussed the need to improve training programs, the value of international gatherings, and the importance of providing regional Scout publications in local languages.40

After analyzing these and a few other issues, Dan Spry gave the International Committee two possible courses of action. Firstly, the Boy Scout Movement could continue doing what it had done in the past, and try to expand Scouting with its current limitations on manpower and funding. This approach had seen some success, but he questioned whether, “in view of existing world conditions, is there time for Scouting to make haste slowly?” Alternatively, Scouting could adopt a more proactive approach by focusing on providing information about its purpose,

methods, and place in society to Scout and especially external audiences. Spry pushed for the second option. As he wrote in his appreciation, “Information is the key to the future successful growth of the Scout Movement,” and he argued that an accelerated information campaign offered several advantages. Improving the passage of information within Scouting would promote understanding and unity of purpose among the diverse national associations. At the same time, Spry believed that telling the world about the Boy Scouts would “attract to the Movement the approval, support, and assistance all Associations require if they are to administer effectively the facilities which are essential to successful Scouting.” The main disadvantage of the second option was its need for more manpower and funding than was then available. The International Committee, after reviewing Spry’s appreciation, unanimously approved it in September 1954. Still, the Committee, cognizant of the plan’s financial and manpower implications, decided that it was to be “put into effect step by step as and when conditions permit.”

What seems striking about this plan, unlike others that Spry had written, was that it did not include an inspirational, philosophically-based mission. Perhaps he was trying not to be seen as overtly political, i.e. anti-communist, but one wonders if Spry missed an opportunity to link the need to grow Scouting with the cause of promoting peace. Had his plan been grounded on helping boys around the world learn about character and citizenship as a counter to Cold War tensions, it may have established the sense of common purpose and that he sought to achieve.

On a more positive note, it is clear that Dan Spry’s views regarding the importance of information derived from his wartime military background. During the war, he had learned that the efficient passage of information was vital for commanders to exercise command and control.

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41 Ibid.,” 6-7.
43 For example, Plan OPPORTUNITY sought “to provide the OPPORTUNITY for every Canadian boy who so desires, to join the Scout Movement.” Toby Spry Collection, “Plan Opportunity,” 7.
and that coordinating one’s efforts with those of other units or formations was essential for success. Spry believed that the world Scout organization needed to do the same. Therefore, as he had done as Canada’s Chief Executive Commissioner, he played a leading role in promoting such thinking. He did so, as Dick Lund later wrote, by “‘telling the story’ of Scouting as often as possible and in as many and varied places as could be found.” He recalled Spry writing in the Boy Scouts’ journal, Jamboree: “So much of the Scout programme only takes place away from the glare of the public view. Let us not hide our light under a bushel. To be assisted we must be understood. To be understood we must be known. To be known we must be seen and heard.”44 It was with this thinking in mind that Spry initiated monthly meetings between the International Bureau and the Girl Guides’ World Bureau to exchange information and ideas.45 He also worked to improve existing relationships with international bodies like the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the YMCA, and the World Assembly of Youth, to name but a few.46 At the same time, Spry hosted social events in the Bureau’s offices for diplomats of nations belonging to the Boy Scouts’ International Conference so that they could learn more about world Scouting. On one such occasion, 11 foreign representatives attended. He held similar events for members of the British press.47 General Spry pursued such efforts with the zeal of a missionary. Dick Lund was of the opinion that Spry’s schedule was “far too ambitious and exhausting,” but he added that “With greater experience of his responsibilities and of his own physical stamina, [Spry] learnt, the hard way, to pace himself more carefully and not let himself be destroyed by his own burning enthusiasm.”48

46 Ibid., 32. Other organizations included the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Rotary Club, the Kiwanis, the Salvation Army, and the World Council of Churches.
As well as aggressively “selling” international Scouting, Spry tweaked its organizational structure. This, too, was part of his overall plan. He quickly established regional study groups to examine ways to improve member retention rates, enhance communications, and promote closer cooperation with religious authorities.\textsuperscript{49} He also created advisory committees to handle matters like publications, public relations, and Scouting for handicapped boys. This, too, was nothing new for Spry as he had done the same thing in Canada. Like their Canadian counterparts, these new advisory bodies were made up of senior Scouters and civilian experts, many of whom were former Scouts who had volunteered their services. The composition of the Advisory Committee on Scouting with the Handicapped was fairly typical. As Spry himself observed, it consisted of individuals from nine countries, included “specialists with knowledge of rehabilitation training, orthopaedic work, and the care of the blind and the deaf,” and dealt with related agencies like the Conference of World Organizations Interested in the Handicapped, the World Council for the Welfare of the Blind, and the International Society for the Welfare of the Cripples.\textsuperscript{50} Spry’s international advisory committees were also similar to their Canadian counterparts in Canada in the sense that they were not empowered to make policy decisions, but rather to provide the International Committee with ideas for moving forward. He knew that the advice that these volunteer bodies could provide was priceless. Lund recalled Spry saying that “We are getting free advice and ideas from experts whom we could never afford to hire.”\textsuperscript{51} He had used the same words several years earlier to describe the advisory committees that he had created in Canada.

While Dan Spry was busy creating international advisory committees, he made certain that the Bureau’s staff were efficiently organized. Doing so was essential, for in 1953 the Bureau had just four executives and five secretaries; by 1961, these numbers had only grown by one

\textsuperscript{49} Toby Spry Collection, “The Future of the Boy Scout Movement,” 7-9.
\textsuperscript{50} World Scout Bureau Archives, File 636, Director’s Circular Letter No. 16 of 1954, 9 July 1954.
\textsuperscript{51} World Scout Bureau Archives, “History of the Boy Scouts World Bureau,” 110.
each. It was a very small group to handle the workload of a large – and growing – international youth movement. As a 1961 Scout publication rightly put it, “The Scout Movement has probably the smallest headquarters of any world organization of such major importance.” Dick Lund has asserted that Spry made it “crystal clear what he expected of [the staff] – which was all to the good.” Spry’s emphasis on internal organization can be traced to his wartime service. As an army officer, he had learned that well-defined lines of responsibility and accountability within a staff organization were absolutely essential for its efficient conduct of operations. Spry had taken such an approach in Canada as Chief Executive Commissioner. He did the same thing while he was Director of the International Bureau – and for the very same reason.

General Spry also sought to promote teamwork within the Bureau and to help his few executives develop the broad outlook that he felt that an international staff ought to possess. As the Director, he travelled extensively to visit national Boy Scout associations around the world, and the experience had taught him much about the nature of international Scouting. Other Bureau members also conducted official visits, but Dick Lund, who in 1953 was Spry’s deputy, had little knowledge of the world outside of Europe. Spry’s handling of this matter exemplified the manner in which he tried to further the education of his international colleagues:

Dan Spry felt that my horizons should be widened and he therefore instructed me to pay a visit to both the United States of America and to his native Canada. The main purpose of the latter was to have a look at the proposed site of the 8th World Jamboree which was being hosted by Canada, at Niagara-on-the-Lake [in 1955], to give what assistance I could in helping with Canada’s plans, based on my experiences at the previous seven Jamborees, and to talk to boys at various Canadian centres. I was then to go to New York City and get to know more about my brother Scouts of America and then come back, it was hoped, less asymmetrical – at least mentally – than when I left the shores of England...I had a wonderful, if strenuous visit, and it certainly opened my eyes...Back home in

53 Boy Scouts International Bureau, Facts on World Scouting, 12.
England I reported fully to Dan Spry and expressed as best I could my gratitude for the wonderful opportunity he had given me of seeing for myself how the “other half” of our brotherhood lived and played.55

In this instance, Spry not only helped Lund to expand his knowledge of the world outside of Europe, but he also gained an enthusiastic supporter for his plans to develop world Scouting.

Dan Spry fully recognized that achieving his goals would require more money than the International Bureau was then taking in, and over the next couple of years he employed a variety of methods to improve the Boy Scout Movement’s finances. By 1956 he was able to tell the International Committee that the Bureau’s income had nearly doubled, from £16,622 in 1954 to £30,691. In Canadian dollars, this represented an increase from $45,285 to $84,731.56 To a large extent, Spry accomplished this feat by increasing the annual registration fees paid by member nations, and by getting more donations from international foundations, corporations, and private citizens.57 He also initiated minor fundraising initiatives, one of which saw the International Bureau selling new and used stamps that had been donated by Scouts and friends of Scouting.58 However, he and the International Committee both knew that even this additional funding was inadequate if the Bureau was to meet its current needs and those that would be required by the Movement’s planned growth. In September 1956, the Committee thus directed Spry to prepare a long-range development plan to address this deficiency.59 Spry and his team went to work. A few months later, he distributed a document that he code-named Operation JUBILEE to the national associations for their review.60

55 Ibid., 111-113.
Operation JUBILEE, so named because it was to begin during the Movement’s Golden Jubilee in 1957, was a far-reaching, five-year action plan. It was unoriginal in its objective – “to promote the further development of the Boy Scout Movement” – but novel in the methods that it proposed using to achieve that aim.\(^61\) Of these, Spry’s recommendation to move the International Bureau from London to Ottawa was perhaps the most innovative – and the most contentious. He expressed several reasons for such a proposal. Firstly, Spry believed that large corporations and foundations, many of which had their headquarters in North America, were the best source of the funding that Scouting needed to carry out its ambitious expansion plans, and he knew that North American tax laws encouraged donations to groups such as youth movements through generous tax deductions.\(^62\) To maximize the Bureau’s chances of obtaining large financial donations from such bodies, it would have to be in regular contact with them. Moving the Bureau to Ottawa, Spry argued, would make such contact both possible and cost-effective as travel costs from Ottawa to America’s financial centres were much less than those from London. A second advantage was that Canadian labour laws regarding the employment of persons of different nationality were less restrictive than those of Britain, which would allow the Bureau’s staff to become more international in its composition. Another “plus” of Ottawa was that it offered the Bureau what Spry called “reasonable access” to Scout Regions around the world.\(^63\) Put together, he concluded, moving to Ottawa promised greater efficiencies and increased financial resources.

Spry’s argument was also based on political considerations. An Ottawa-based Bureau would operate in a country lacking a negative international reputation as a colonial power. This was an important consideration, given that decolonization, which had begun in 1947 with India’s

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\(^61\) Toby Spry Collection, “Operation JUBILEE,” paragraph 1, and Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 137.
\(^62\) Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 132.
\(^63\) Toby Spry Collection, “Operation JUBILEE,” paragraphs 12-16, and Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 137. Historically, many of the International Bureau’s staff had been Britons.
independence from Britain, was an ongoing trend that would accelerate into the 1960s, and that the Boy Scouts sought to expand in the developing world. With offices in Britain, Spry had often found it hard to convince people of the Bureau’s political neutrality. Similarly, if one accepted the logic of moving the Bureau closer to potential funding sources in the United States, setting up in a major American city like New York would be unpalatable to states wary of American international policies and perhaps worried that the Boy Scouts of America would come to dominate world Scouting. Canada, on the other hand, was earning a reputation as an international go-between. In 1954, Communist China had asked Canada to serve as a member of international commissions that had been set up to oversee the settlement of a lengthy colonial war in Vietnam between France and indigenous communist-nationalist forces. Two years later, Canada played a leading role in resolving a thorny international crisis. Egyptian President Gamal Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal: in response, British, French, and Israeli forces launched military operations to regain international control of the Canal Zone and oust Nasser from power. Lester B. Pearson, then Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, was instrumental in creating a UN intervention force, which included Canadian troops and was led by a Canadian officer, Maj.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns. In 1957, Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Spry believed that Canada, despite its staunch Cold War anti-communist stance, epitomized the internationalist spirit, and that Ottawa offered neutral ground for the Boy Scouts’ headquarters.

The logic behind moving the International Bureau to North America generally made sense, although one could argue that Montreal, then Canada’s most “international” city and a key business hub, might have been a better choice. Ottawa lacked such distinctions in the 1950s; one

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wonders if Spry had personal reasons in mind, having previously lived there. Still, moving the Bureau proved a touchy issue when Operation JUBILEE was discussed at the 16th International Conference in August 1957. Some countries, such as Britain and the United States, strongly favoured the plan which, it must be emphasized, contained several recommendations in addition to moving the Bureau’s offices. These included hiring additional full-time staff for the Far East, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa to promote Scouting efforts in those regions, and appointing more Bureau staff to deal with matters of finance, relationships, public relations, and training. On the other hand, the French, the Belgians, and the Swiss opposed moving the Bureau to Ottawa by January 1958 as was stipulated in Operation JUBILEE, and they insisted that a decision on the matter be postponed until the International Conference’s next meeting in 1959. The International Committee rejected this proposal to split Operation JUBILEE into two discreet parts. The International Conference then unanimously approved Spry’s plan, and authorized the Committee to carry out its provisions “as soon as practicable.” To Spry, this decision served as an important vote of confidence in his ideas to expand the Boy Scout Movement worldwide. He was then asked to serve as the Director for another four years. Spry agreed to do so.

Surviving records do not indicate why the British supported moving the International Bureau to Ottawa, but given their well-known concern for the Scout Movement’s finances they probably considered the Bureau’s ability to raise more funds for Scouting to be more important than its location. Insofar as the objections of France, Belgium, and Switzerland are concerned, a clue may be found in an internal British report on the Conference. It noted that, after the French had stated their objections, the American delegation “protested against the French speech (really on the assumption that the speaker had said one thing about [the] U.S.A. and meant another –

which he had!).” It seems likely that the Americans were protesting some sort of anti-American comment, and that the Europeans were objecting to moving the Bureau to Ottawa because they feared that even close proximity to the United States might give the Boy Scouts of America too much influence within world Scouting. The matter was eventually ironed out, as the International Conference’s approval of Operation JUBILEE suggests. It did, however, reveal something of the jealousies and suspicions that occasionally plagued the Boy Scout Movement. In this regard, the Boy Scouts proved to be little different than the increasingly fractious UN. It would not be the last of such occurrences during Spry’s tenure as the International Bureau’s Director.

The Bureau’s move to Ottawa was conducted from December 1957 to March 1958 in accordance with a military-style instruction that Dan Spry code-named Operation RIDEAU. By April of that year, the Bureau was operating in its new offices on the third floor of the recently-built Commonwealth Building, located in downtown Ottawa at 77 Metcalfe Street. Spry was already hard at work on the main thrusts of his plan, proving that executing Operation JUBILEE was not a significant impediment to maintaining the Bureau’s tempo of operations.

By the summer of 1959, most of Operation JUBILEE’s key initiatives were underway. On the personnel front, Spry had hired a new Executive Commissioner for Publications, a Swede named Lars-Erik Lingstrom. An Executive Commissioner for Relationships, Thomas J. Keane, a retired U.S. naval officer, was working from an office in New York provided by the Boy Scouts of America. The Scout Movement’s Regional Executive Commissioner for Latin America, who had toiled for years on his own, had two new assistants. In the Far East, the number of full-time Scout executives had likewise expanded with the hiring of two field commissioners, while a Far

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70 Toby Spry Collection, Boy Scouts International Bureau, “OPERATION RIDEAU,” (n.d.).
71 Boy Scouts International Bureau, Facts on World Scouting, 12.
72 Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 137.
East Scout Advisory Committee had been set up and was conducting operations. In the Middle East, a new Regional Executive Commissioner was actively promoting Scouting.\footnote{World Scout Bureau Archives, File 530, Boy Scouts International Committee Biennial Report, 1957-1959, 11-12.}

As was the case for Dan Spry’s previous Boy Scout expansion plans, improving internal and external communications was an important aspect of Operation JUBILEE. Regarding the former, one of the most enduring examples of Spry’s influence related to a project initiated by Britain’s International Scout Club in May 1958, whereby Scouts from all over the world met each other via amateur radio to “further the bonds of international friendship and brotherhood.” This event, called the “Jamboree on the Air” (JOTA), was a great success. The International Bureau played an active part, and thereafter took responsibility for organizing the JOTA, with Spry’s encouragement.\footnote{World Scout Bureau Archives, File 636, Director’s Circular Letter No. 8 of 1959, 20 April 1959.} By 1962, some 49 countries were involved, growing to 70 by 1964.\footnote{World Scout Bureau Archives, File 530, Boy Scouts World Committee Biennial Report, 1963-1965, 19. In 2014, a total of 157 countries took part in the JOTA and a Jamboree on the Internet. World Organization of the Scout Movement, “Jamboree on the Air and Jamboree on the Internet,” http://world-jotajoti.info/ (accessed 30 June 2015).}

At the same time, Spry improved and expanded the Bureau’s external relations. He wooed the media, and by 1959 he was telling the International Conference that the Canadian press, radio, and television outlets were providing good coverage for world Scouting events and visits by prominent guests to the Bureau’s offices. Spry also noted that the Bureau’s executive staff members were in much demand as speakers, not only at Canadian Scout events, but also at service clubs and other community organizations.\footnote{World Scout Bureau Archives, International Committee Biennial Report, 1957-1959, 50.} On another front, he maintained close and regular contact with member countries having diplomatic missions in Ottawa. He did the same with international bodies, in many instances visiting their headquarters. For example, in the late 1950s Spry obtained financial assistance from UNESCO in publishing a Boy Scout book entitled \textit{Serve by Conserving}, which described the Scout Movement’s “Worldwide Conservation Good
Turn” program. He also cooperated with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, headquartered in Beirut, which during the period of 1961-1963 assisted the World Bureau (the International Bureau was re-named in 1961) in providing Scouting for boys in refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.77

A key part of Spry’s effort to expand the Scout Movement’s external connections, and a major reason for the move to Ottawa, involved establishing an Executive Commissioner for Relationships to facilitate liaison with UN agencies and the headquarters of large international community service organizations like the Rotary Club, the Lions Club, and the Kiwanis. This office opened in New York City in January 1958, but it proved to be less successful than Spry had expected. Relationships Commissioner Thomas Keane was primarily employed as a fundraiser. But, as Spry later wrote, Keane achieved little on his own, and his two-year contract was not renewed. In 1961, E.F. Dunstan was hired as a Special Representative, but a great deal of effort on his part also produced limited results. He was let go in 1963.78 Why these two men were unsuccessful in raising funds is not known, but it seems likely that Spry had more “clout” than they did. As the Bureau’s Director, he spent a lot of time in New York meeting with high-ranking people, using the Relationships office as a base of operations. While doing so was part of his job, his frequent presence may have inadvertently diminished the perceived authority of his representatives. Then again, Spry was used to playing a direct role in fundraising, having done so as Canada’s Chief Executive Commissioner. Regardless of the reason, the apparent failure of the New York Relationships office reflected badly on General Spry, and it must have caused some in world Scouting to question Spry’s judgment in moving the Bureau to Ottawa.

In fact, Operation JUBILEE’s most important goal had been to obtain the funds that Spry believed were necessary to develop world Scouting to its fullest extent. Achieving this end was the main reason why he had recommended the move to Ottawa, and surviving evidence shows that it produced immediate results. In 1957, the last year the Bureau’s offices were located in London, donations and grants income totalled $28,308. By the end of 1958, the Bureau’s first year in Ottawa, that amount had skyrocketed to $110,338, nearly a 400 per cent increase. Spry and his team worked hard for that money. Dick Lund recalled that “We left no source untapped, so long as it had no political or other ‘strings’ attached.”

More money greatly increased the International Bureau’s capabilities. In 1958, it was able to equip Scout groups at leprosy centres in the Fiji Islands, the Cameroons, and India. The Bureau also expanded its visits program. Visits were an important means through which Spry and his team encouraged unity of effort within world Scouting, helped national associations, and promoted Scouting with political, business, and religious leaders, both in member nations and in Latin America, the Far East, and Africa where the Movement was trying to expand. For example, in 1958 Spry visited Formosa, South Korea, Japan, Hawaii, Belgium, Great Britain, Greece, Monaco, Italy (where he had a private audience with Pope Pius XII), and Sweden. In that year, he and other Bureau members conducted 106 visits in 52 member countries, seven overseas branches, and seven unaffiliated countries. By 1962, the number had grown to 184 visits.

The International Bureau’s ability to fund new programs, regional offices, and more visits contributed significantly to the Boy Scouts’ growth during the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1952, the year before Dan Spry’s appointment as Director, there had been 55 member countries and a

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82 Ibid., 33-34.
83 World Scout Bureau Archives, World Committee Biennial Report, 1961-1963, 16.
total membership of 5,561,993 adults and boys.\(^{84}\) By 1961, those numbers had increased to some 69 national associations and 8,876,707 members.\(^{85}\) Four years later, world Scouting comprised 85 nations and had 10,035,540 members in all.\(^{86}\) At the same time, the global Scout Movement became increasingly diverse. In 1922, the year the International Bureau had been created, European countries comprised 22 of Scouting’s 31 member states, or 70 per cent of the total.\(^{87}\) By the time Dan Spry became the Director of the International Bureau, in 1953, 63 per cent of Scouting’s member associations – 35 out of 55 – were from non-European countries. By 1964, 61 of 81 Scouting nations (75 per cent) were located outside of Europe. Most of this astonishing growth occurred in the developing world. The Middle East and Africa collectively rose from five to 20 national associations during this time, while those in Asia grew from ten to 20 member nations.\(^{88}\) Increased diversity within world Scouting was also evident in a series of “firsts” for the Movement. For example, in 1955 Canada hosted the World Jamboree at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, notable because it was the first time that this event had been held outside of Europe. Four years later, it was held in the Philippines.\(^{89}\) The year 1958 saw the first Far East Regional Scout Conference, also hosted by the Philippines.\(^{90}\) Another “first” came in 1961 when C.C. Mojekwu, a Nigerian, was elected to the International Committee, a body whose membership had been dominated by developed countries. Even the World Bureau’s staff, long a British preserve, had become more multinational. By 1961, it employed 12 men of eight nationalities. This figure included those who served in the Bureau’s regional offices.\(^{91}\)

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\(^{87}\) Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 129. 
\(^{89}\) Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 129-139. 
\(^{91}\) Boy Scouts International Bureau, Facts on World Scouting, 12.
While the postwar baby boom played a part in world Scouting’s massive expansion in the 1950s, Dan Spry’s leadership was instrumental. It was he, more than any other person, who had travelled the globe “selling” the message of the Boy Scout Movement to politicians, religious leaders, and businessmen. It was Spry who convinced the International Committee to support Operation JUBILEE. Without the additional funding, manpower, and regional representation that the Boy Scouts gained through this plan, its growth in the Far East, the Middle East, and Africa would certainly not have been as great. The Scout Movement fully recognized the importance of Spry’s efforts. In 1961, he was awarded Scouting’s highest honour, the Bronze Wolf, for having “contributed inestimably to the expansion of the Movement.”

Achieving all of this was precisely what General Spry and the International Committee had sought, but the Boy Scouts’ greater numbers and expanded presence worldwide meant a corresponding demand for the World Bureau’s support and advice (Scouting’s three international bodies were re-designated as “World” in 1961). It was perhaps inevitable that Spry’s efforts to increase the Bureau’s funding, as much as they improved matters, were ultimately not enough to satisfy this heightened demand. Compounding the problem was the fact that donations from wealthy sponsors had dropped, from $136,000 in 1961 to $105,000 by 1964. This decrease was somewhat offset by increased revenue from registration fees, which had risen in lockstep with the growth of global membership because they were based on the membership numbers reported by member nations. By 1963, however, as it was clear that higher registration fees were not enough to pay for the Scout Movement’s desired level of activity, the World Committee grew worried about the Bureau’s limited working capital – the financial reserves that enabled it to continue operations if there were delays in receiving membership fees and other income. For this reason, Spry had to reduce the Bureau’s expenses until an adequate reserve had been built up.

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92 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-20, Citation for the Award of the Bronze Wolf.
Cost-cutting measures included cancelling Bureau staff conferences, reducing the scale of training initiatives in the Far East, leaving an executive staff position in the Far East Regional Office unfilled, cutting back on publishing Spanish-language books for the Latin American Region, and indefinitely postponing the hiring of executive field staff to help and train Boy Scout associations in newly-independent African countries.\textsuperscript{93} These measures had the desired effect. By September 1964, the Surplus Account had grown from $1,192 in 1962 to $36,737.\textsuperscript{94} Spry had gotten world Scouting more money, but it did not match his – or the Movement’s – ambitions.

While many in world Scouting applauded the Boy Scouts’ tremendous expansion, by the early 1960s it was becoming obvious that exponential growth had also created a concomitant need for greatly improved means of managing its activities. As László Nagy has pointed out, “It was a long way from the good old times when the Founder alone, and later the Director of the Bureau could take important far-reaching decisions without any prior consultation.” Scouting’s increased diversity, coupled with the creation of regional offices, made greater coordination a necessity. Various questions arose, including which bodies had decision-making authority, which ones could allocate resources, and who was responsible for dispensing information. All of this, Nagy added, led some senior Scout leaders to fear that the world Scout organization would become increasingly bureaucratized and authoritarian in nature.\textsuperscript{95} For his part, General Spry understood from his military experience how efficient coordination and control measures could benefit the Scout Movement. His ability to arrange such things was why he had been selected for the Director’s job. On the other hand, he knew that an authoritarian approach would not be supported by the members of a volunteer movement, and it seems doubtful that he would have

\textsuperscript{93} Toby Spry Collection, “Boy Scouts World Bureau,” 11. Regarding the Bureau’s financial situation at this time, see also Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 138.
\textsuperscript{94} World Scout Bureau Archives, World Committee Biennial Report, 1963-1965, 10.
\textsuperscript{95} Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 141.
suggested – or adopted – such a management style. Instead, Spry and the World Committee tried to improve the Scout Movement’s management through amendments to its Constitution. Such measures, Nagy has asserted, were often improvised and had little overall effect.96

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Boy Scouts in the early 1960s revolved around differing opinions regarding the manner in which Scouting ought to be conducted. There were two main schools of thought. The first was a spiritual form of Scouting that focused on teaching character values that encouraged inner growth. The second took a more pragmatic view by emphasizing training, effectiveness, and efficiency. It sought to produce men who would be loyal and competent. The differences between the two schools, however, went beyond that of how Scouting was presented to boys, for they also disagreed about the role of the Scout Movement’s adult leaders. Supporters of the spiritual approach harshly criticized their pragmatic counterparts for seeking to create, in László Nagy’s words, “a huge ‘kindergarten’ for big children under the label of Scouting.” The “pragmatists,” in turn, accused the “spiritualists” of being too idealistic. In reality, the two schools of thought were complementary, and there was every reason why Scouting ought to contain elements of both.97 Certainly, that was how Dan Spry saw things.

As the dispute between the schools of Scouting became more heated, Spry tried to preserve the Scout Movement’s unity and refocus its leadership on expanding Scouting. He did so by producing a follow-up plan to Operation JUBILEE, code-named IMPETUS, which he distributed for comment in the summer of 1964. Aiming to “create fresh Impetus throughout the Boy Scout Movement,” it identified what Spry believed were the Boy Scouts’ current needs. These included reviewing its activities to ensure that it could provide Scout training for all boys who wanted to join, adjusting its approach to changing social conditions, and reviewing its

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 142-143.
educational methods. To satisfy these needs, Plan IMPETUS proposed actions at the national, regional, and world levels to improve the Movement’s leadership, training, public relations, liaison, international coordination, and administration. All of this was consistent with beliefs and methods that Spry had long espoused, and that his Scout colleagues had always supported.

This time, such support was not forthcoming. When the World Committee convened in Luxembourg from 17-20 September 1964 it set Spry’s plan aside, opting instead to establish a World Scout Study Commission that would examine the Boy Scouts’ situation and propose reforms. An American member of the Committee, W.D. Campbell, made this recommendation, saying that the Boy Scouts of America believed a comprehensive, objective study of world Scouting was “highly desirable and long overdue.” He added that Plan IMPETUS would be “useful to any high level review Commission which might be established,” but he nonetheless insisted that this review be conducted by an external group made up of “leading world citizens including some who currently are or have been members of the world Scouting committee.” The World Committee immediately – and unanimously – agreed. It further decided that Amory Houghton, an American industrialist, philanthropist, and a former President of the Boy Scouts of America, should lead the World Scout study.

Surviving records of the Luxembourg conference provide no reasons why the World Committee chose not to follow Dan Spry’s prescription to heal Scouting’s ills. It may have thought that the Scout Movement’s problems required further examination and not immediate actions. The fact that the Americans had offered to finance the study may also have been a factor. Alternatively, some of the Committee’s members may have thought that Operation JUBILEE had not delivered what Spry had promised. László Nagy later wrote that “great hopes

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99 Toby Spry Collection, Minutes of Boy Scouts World Committee Meeting, 17-20 September, 1964.
100 Ibid.
were pinned on the fact that there were certain advantages in moving the Bureau to new headquarters,” and that Plan IMPETUS was created to salvage the situation but it was “no more successful than its predecessor.” Plan IMPETUS was never implemented, but Nagy makes it clear that some in world Scouting thought that Operation JUBILEE had failed. In a similar vein, General Spry, thanks to his military rank and the fact that he had been the Director since 1953, may have struck some as representative of the old way of doing things. At a time when social conditions, notably the culture of youthful revolt against the conservative values espoused by their parents and the Boy Scouts, seemed to dictate new methods, Plan IMPETUS proposed “more of the same.” For these reasons, some World Committee members may have concluded that the Movement not only needed new ideas, but also a new Director.

There is no evidence that the World Committee sought to force Dan Spry out by rejecting Plan IMPETUS, but that was the net result. Having had no prior knowledge of the American proposal, Spry thought that he had been “blind-sided” by men that he thought of as friends. László Nagy has suggested that Spry saw the Committee’s decision as ingratitude, while Spry’s daughter has said that he had become frustrated by Scout politics. Both elements were surely involved. However, Spry also believed that the Committee had shown that it lacked confidence in his leadership. Not only had it consigned his ideas to the dustbin, but it had, unwisely, in his view, given the Americans full responsibility for studying the Scout Movement’s situation. Such a move, he felt, would give a single country too much influence over world Scouting. Then, too, he knew that some national associations would view an American-led study as likely to be anything but neutral in its recommendations. Spry was right. On 23 October 1964, Michel Rigal, General Commissioner of the Scouts de France, told Spry that he feared the Americans’ “will for

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101 Nagy, 250 Million Scouts, 137 and 143. In 1965, Nagy was not yet involved in world Scouting.
102 Ibid., 144, and Margot Gowing interview, 2 August 2013.
power.”

As a result of all this, Spry lost confidence in the Committee that he had faithfully served since 1953. On the Luxembourg conference’s final day, he announced his retirement. Not wishing to cause problems for the Scout Movement, Spry agreed to stay until the next World Conference in September 1965. In the meantime, he would support Houghton’s study.

Many people in the Scout community were stunned by Dan Spry’s announcement. Dick Lund, who attended the Luxembourg meeting, wrote that he had had a feeling that “it was not going to be the happiest meeting.” But he had no inkling that the World Committee would take such action – or that his boss would quit as a result. The Bureau’s staff was shocked, too, and its members looked to the future “with considerable anxiety.”

That future was increasingly tense. Spry’s relations with the Committee sank to a new low in November when he learned that the British had known of the American proposal prior to Luxembourg. Spry was understandably hurt by what he felt was bad faith. In his view, the World Committee had “destroyed [the] position of Director,” and as far as he was concerned it was now just “a business relationship between [a] Director and twelve men.”

Then, adding insult to injury, the Committee decided in March 1965 to create a subcommittee to examine relocating the World Bureau from Ottawa to Europe. For Spry, this decision must have been further proof of the Committee’s rejection of his ideas.

On a larger front, France and other European countries had by this time formally objected to what they saw as an American take-over of world Scouting, just as Spry had foreseen. László Nagy has asserted that some of these countries also questioned Amory Houghton’s suitability to lead a study on Scouting because he was neither an educator nor a sociologist. Houghton, who

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103 Toby Spry Collection, Rigal to Spry, 23 October 1964.
104 For Spry’s thinking at this time, see Toby Spry Collection, Memo of Telephone Conversation with Rann Alexatos, 23 November 1964, and letter to Henri Bourreau, 1 December 1964.
105 Toby Spry Collection, Minutes of Boy Scouts World Committee Meeting, 17-20 September, 1964, 24-25.
107 Toby Spry Collection, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Rann Alexatos, 23 November 1964, and Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Henri Bourreau, 23 December 1964.
108 Toby Spry Collection, Minutes of Boy Scouts World Committee, 5-7 March 1965.
had volunteered for the job in good faith and, like Spry, had earned the Bronze Wolf for his outstanding service, was upset by such criticisms and he resigned in December 1964. With that, the World Scout Study Commission dissolved. In the short term, no further action on such lines would be taken.\textsuperscript{109} The Luxembourg meeting had produced nothing save internal division.

The actions of some World Committee members at Luxembourg did have a certain air of duplicity. The larger question is: who was right regarding the question of how to fix Scouting’s problems? Certainly, there are arguments to be made on both sides. Plan IMPETUS was written by people within the Scout Movement, and as such it likely contained “blind spots” about how Scouting ought to fit into the 1960s \textit{milieu}. Then, too, Spry had been the Director for a long time, and he might have gotten a bit stale in the job. Bringing in external experts to study the matter was probably a good idea. In Spry’s defence, the Scout Movement’s internal problems had been present for some time, and doing a lengthy, and expensive, study would do little to resolve them quickly. Such a study was conducted by the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies under a former Hungarian Boy Scout, Dr. László Nagy, after Spry’s departure; it was funded by the Ford Foundation. Completed in 1967, it called for big changes at the highest level. These changes, most of which took place from 1969 to 1971, included moving the Bureau to Geneva (this occurred in 1968), beefing up its staff, increasing the size and capabilities of the existing public relations and publications sections, and creating two new divisions, research and communications; improving coordination between the World Conference, the Committee, and the Bureau; forming an Operations Committee to expand Scouting; and replacing the Director with a Secretary-General exercising greater executive powers.\textsuperscript{110} Ironically, many of these ideas,

\textsuperscript{109} Nagy, \textit{250 Million Scouts}, 144. For France’s objections, see Toby Spry Collection, letter from Michel Rigal, 27 November 1864.
\textsuperscript{110} Vallory, \textit{World Scouting}, 33, and Nagy, \textit{250 Million Scouts}, 144-148. The Ford Foundation is an American privately-held global foundation that aims to advance human welfare. Nagy was Scouting’s first Secretary-General.
with the exception of moving the Bureau, were practically identical to those that General Spry had recommended in Plan IMPETUS and previously in Operation JUBILEE, but had never been implemented because of the Scout Movement’s chronic lack of money. Nagy’s study group was able to implement Spry’s original proposals because the World Bureau had raised $1,000,000 in the late 1960s to pay for them, although the Bureau’s financial problems resurfaced soon thereafter.\textsuperscript{111} In light of all of this, and with the added benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that Spry’s Plan IMPETUS was not so far off the mark after all.

At the World Conference held in Mexico City in the fall of 1965, Dan Spry bade a final farewell to the Boy Scout Movement. He thanked all of those with whom he had worked over the years for their friendship and, perhaps especially with regard to the World Bureau staff, their loyalty. He summarized his philosophy about the role of an “international servant:”

...the International Servant should be a go-between; he should be trusted by the people of various points of view and I think, if I have learnt anything about it, whoever this ideal is, he certainly should learn to listen; he should learn that an International Servant does not command or govern or control. That is the role of the elected volunteer, or the elected officer in any organization, whether it is the UN or anywhere else. But the International Servant does have the responsibility and the duty of thinking, of planning and advising, suggesting, sometimes pushing a little bit without even appearing to do so, one hopes, and this ideal person ought to be a bit like Caesar’s wife, above all suspicion. He should, I would think, be able to balance facts for and against an idea or a proposition...and try to propose something of the middle ground, of the middle position, where the meeting of minds can be arranged...\textsuperscript{112}

In keeping with his modest nature, Spry commented that he had done none of these things, but that he had tried to do some. Only in very general terms did he refer to the internal discord then plaguing world Scouting. He remarked that people belonging to a large, diverse international body like the Boy Scouts would naturally have different views, and opined that “diversity is not

\textsuperscript{111} Toby Spry Collection, “Plan IMPETUS.” For the Boy Scouts’ funding issues in the years after Spry’s departure, see Nagy, \textit{250 Million Scouts}, 154-164.

\textsuperscript{112} World Scout Bureau Archives, File 532.3, Report of 20\textsuperscript{th} Boy Scouts World Conference, Mexico City, 26 September to 3 October 1965, “Address by Major-General D.C. Spry, 2 October 1965,” 122-123.
incompatible with unity, but it does require an educated goodwill and good intent.” Lastly, he indirectly addressed his reason for retiring, saying that an international servant must be always prepared to “take a position if a point of basic principle is involved.”113 With those words, Spry handed the Directorship over to his deputy, Dick Lund, who would serve in that role until the spring of 1968.114 Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry’s 19-year career as a professional Scout leader was over.

Upon announcing his retirement, General Spry received tributes from around the world. For example, M.A. Hafez of the United Arab Republic wrote that he considered Spry “a good leader & a big brother,” and attributed much of Scouting’s growth in the Arab world to his “sincere cooperation & goodwill.”115 Humberto Pasos, a Mexican Field Commissioner, hailed Spry as “an example of abnegation, work, struggle and initiative of new and beneficial ideas for the Scout Movement.”116 Perhaps the most fulsome tribute, however, came from a fellow Canadian. George Beers, a close friend who had previously served with Spry in the Canadian Boy Scouts Association, had joined the World Bureau team in Ottawa as an executive. In an editorial in World Scouting appropriately entitled “Tribute to a Leader,” Beers wrote:

The Boy Scout Movement has been blessed with outstanding leadership by men of imagination and courage who have translated their idealism into action. These leaders, respected and often beloved by those they led, have been the torches lighting the way for millions of boys to enjoy the greatest game in the world. Now we pause to pay tribute to an outstanding leader of such leaders, Major-General Daniel Charles Spry...

The only summary that can hope to adequately describe his performance in this role, in this very limited space, is to recall that country after country throughout the free world have praised his dynamic leadership and bestowed their highest decorations on this great international...The task he set himself and the pace at which he worked seem in retrospect, to have been almost impossible. However if one were to say this to Dan Spry, he would probably smile and reply, “Well, look at all the other ‘impossible’ things yet to be done and the opportunity you have to do them.”

113 Ibid., 122-127.
115 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, M.A. Hafez to Dan Spry, 26 October 1964.
116 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, Humberto Pasos to Dan Spry, 23 December 1964.
There are thousands of wonderful anecdotes one would like to tell about Dan. Those of us who had the privilege of working professionally with him will recall many, but perhaps one may be selected. Because he travelled so much promoting the Movement, Dan always kept notes. He encouraged Cubs, Scouts and others to give him their ideas and criticisms. During the innumerable nights he spent alone in a tent, hotel room or on an aircraft, he sifted these notes and eventually arrived home bubbling with ideas. For the first two or three days after his arrival in the office there would be an avalanche of short memos to all his staff asking why this or that had not been done, what did they think of this idea, come prepared for a full discussion on this plan or suggest suitable action for this situation. Then would follow a meeting sparked with a “well done” for those who deserved it. The result was always like a wonderful fresh breeze blowing all of us into eager action. Inevitably some of the ideas were unworkable, but whoever said so had to prove why. The important thing was that there were always ideas and challenges coming from a great leader...117

Dan Spry would be missed by many people in world Scouting.

General Spry’s individual contribution to internationalism as Director of the Boy Scouts’ World Bureau was exceptional. Spry, however, was not the only Canadian veteran of the Second World War who sought to promote global peace through internationalism in the years after 1945. Veterans’ groups like the Canadian Legion, and individual Second World War veterans serving with the UN, NATO, and other international organizations and agencies, were likewise engaged.

While General Spry was telling others about Scouting’s place in the world, the Canadian Legion was doing much the same thing regarding Canada’s international responsibilities. One way that it did so was through its citizenship training program (described earlier in Chapter 7). As J.C.G. Herwig, then the Legion’s General Secretary, pointed out in 1947, this program was intended to cover not only the Canadian way of government, but also “the responsibility of Canada as a member of the United Nations.”118 Such a topic would thus be part of citizenship training activities offered to the country’s youth, new immigrants, legionnaires, and the general population through the Legion’s 2,000 branches across the country. At the same time, the Legion

sought to promote an interest in and an understanding of world affairs among its own members, as well as among other Canadians, through articles in its monthly magazine, *The Legionary*. Most of this publication’s issues included at least one item about world affairs. Not surprisingly, many of these articles dealt with topics that had a military component. For example, in a June 1954 article entitled “You and the Hydrogen Bomb,” Group Captain Alfred Watts wrote that Canada was “a favoured nation among the nations and from that flows a responsibility to know, to understand and to lead,” and added that ordinary people with a general knowledge of global affairs could help shape the country’s foreign policies by making it clear to politicians and diplomats what they, the people, wanted.\(^{119}\) Five years later, Willson Woodside, then the National Director of the United Nations Association of Canada, made a strong argument in favour of Canada’s continued participation in NORAD and NATO. Woodside asserted that doing so represented the country’s commitment to contribute to bilateral and multilateral efforts to maintain global peace by presenting a strong front in the face of an apparently hostile Communist bloc.\(^{120}\) Similar articles are a common feature of today’s *Legion Magazine*.

A second aspect of the Legion’s internationally-motivated activities in the years after 1945 lay in lobbying the federal government to implement certain domestic policies in response to external factors stemming from the Cold War. A good example of this revolved around the question of national selective military service for in peacetime. The Legion broached the subject with the Louis St-Laurent government in 1950 after its national convention passed a resolution recommending such a measure. Two years later, with war raging in Korea, then Dominion President Alfred Watts had to report to his fellow legionnaires that the Legion was like “a voice crying in the wilderness” in its efforts to convince federal policymakers that Canada faced “a

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\(^{120}\) Willson Woodside, “This Talk of Neutrality,” *The Legionary*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1 (June 1959), 9. Willson’s article was in response to the advice of contemporary commentators that Canada should adopt a policy of neutrality.
very grim [international] situation.”121 In 1954, the Legion passed another resolution on national military service, arguing that it was necessary “in order that the responsibility for the defence of Canada be equally distributed among all Canadians of service age and to assure [sic] that young Canadians never again be exposed to hazards of combat without proper and adequate training.”122 Like the Legion’s previous attempts, this appeal went nowhere. Undaunted, Legion officials briefed Prime Minister St-Laurent and members of his cabinet on national service in November 1956.123 Once again, the politicians were unmoved.

It should come as no surprise that the Legion was unsuccessful in convincing the federal government to implement compulsory military service. Prime Minister King had flatly rejected the idea when senior military officers had recommended it shortly after the end of the Second World War. In the context of the prosperous mid-1950s, the Legion’s proposals for the same thing had just as little chance of implementation, despite the obvious danger that Cold War realities posed for Canada’s national security. Popular support for universal military training, while it had existed to a certain extent in Canada when the war ended in 1945, had long since evaporated and no politician was likely to support it. Furthermore, the government could argue that it was beefing up Canada’s military readiness by permanently stationing Canadian land and air forces in Europe and by doubling the size of the regular armed forces. The Legion’s attempts to influence this aspect of domestic policy, while unsuccessful, showed its determination to push for Canada’s military preparedness in response to what it considered was a dangerous international environment.

122 LAC, RCL Fonds, Reel M-8516, File 15-54-57, Brigadier H.L. Cameron (Department of National Defence) to T.D. Anderson (Dominion Secretary of the Canadian Legion), Departmental Comments on Resolutions of the 15th Dominion Convention of the Canadian Legion, 26 October 1955. The Canadian Legion’s views were not so far out of step as they might appear, as most NATO nations had by this time imposed national military service.
123 LAC, RCL Fonds, Reel M-8525, File 34-29-1, Brief to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, November 9, 1956.
Another facet of the Canadian Legion’s internationalist endeavours involved liaison with organizations focused on world affairs. Some of these groups were uniquely Canadian, like the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Others, such as the United Nations Association in Canada, were Canadian branches of international non-governmental organizations. For instance, from 5 to 6 June 1954 the Legion’s Dominion Secretary, T.D. Anderson, participated in the annual study conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, along with the representatives from several federal government departments and a variety of non-governmental organizations. Topics of discussion at this meeting included Canada’s relationship with the UN, NATO, the British Commonwealth, and the United States, matters involving external trade and immigration, and contemporary issues such as the degree to which Canada should develop closer relations with Asian countries. Through regular contact with such organizations, the Legion’s senior leadership sought to keep itself informed of current international matters and, where desirable, ensure that the voice of Canada’s veterans was included in Canadian discussions.

The Legion also monitored the activities of the World Veterans Federation, which was created in 1950 with the twin aims of promoting the welfare of veterans and global peace. In December 1952, Legion President Bill Lumsden attended its annual conference as an observer, but he was ambivalent about the merits of joining the Federation. Lumsden thought that the Federation’s intentions regarding veterans’ rehabilitation had some promise, but he held out little hope that it could do much about world peace because it had no real power and little influence. Still, he echoed the philosophies of the Boy Scout Movement and Dan Spry by observing that if the cumulative effect of bodies like the Federation promoted the idea that international problems could and must be resolved without going to war, then the Legion should consider membership.

On the other hand, Lumsden worried that it would be impossible to keep politics out of the Federation, and that membership might entail substantial financial commitments. If such was the case, he recommended against membership.\footnote{LAC, RCL Fonds, Reel M-8518, File 19-1-27, Legion Circular No. 53/3/2, 7 January 1953, Report to the Council by the Dominion President Regarding the World Veterans Federation Conference, 8-11 December 1952.} As it turned out, the Canadian Legion did not join the World Veterans Federation, likely because the British Legion did not do so.\footnote{LAC, RCL Fonds, Reel M-8518, File 19-1-27, Legion Circular No. 54/2/7, 24 June 1954, Outline Information Regarding the World Veterans Federation.}

Other Canadian veterans’ organizations developed an international focus in the decades after the Second World War, too. One of these was the Army, Navy and Air Force Veterans of Canada, the president of which became a vice president of the World Veterans Federation in 1951.\footnote{Ibid.} Another was the Sir Arthur Pearson Association of War Blinded (SAPA), which in 1961 expanded its youth scholarship program to blinded children of other countries. In that year, the scholarship’s recipients included a Nigerian student and one from Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).\footnote{Durflinger, Veterans with a Vision, 284-287.}

In addition to Dan Spry, some Canadian Second World War veterans played leading roles in international organizations in the 1950s and 1960s, although few of them had the same high profile. One of those who did was Maj.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, who served as the Chief of Staff for the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in the Middle East from 1954 to 1956, and subsequently led the UN peacekeeping force in Egypt from 1956 to 1959.\footnote{Granatstein, The Generals, 144.} Another example was General (retired) Andy McNaughton. During the period 1945-1962, he variously served as Canadian representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, chairman of the Canadian section of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Canada’s delegate at the United Nations, and member of the International Joint Commission.\footnote{Swettenham, McNaughton, Volume 3, 104-351. The latter was a Canada-United States organization.} Other Canadians who operated on the world stage mostly did so as politicians, soldiers, or diplomats on
their country’s behalf. Among them were veterans previously mentioned in this study. George Pearkes, Douglas Harkness, Paul Hellyer, Barney Danson, and Gilles Lamontagne represented Canada in NATO during their tenure as Minister of National Defence from the 1950s to the 1980s. Generals Charles Foulkes, Guy Simonds, and George Kitching dealt with their military counterparts in the United States, Britain, and in NATO, with the latter serving as Canada’s National Military Representative at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe from 1958 to 1962.131 Ernest Côté and James Roberts, who had served under Dan Spry in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, were appointed as ambassadors in the early 1970s.132 Another Canadian who had a prominent profile overseas was Maj.-Gen. Bert Hoffmeister, who as the commander of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division had briefly been Spry’s boss in Italy. He was the Agent General for the province of British Columbia in London from 1957 to 1961.133

On a separate front, the World Committee’s dismissal of General Spry’s advice on how best to tackle the problems facing Scouting in 1965 symbolized how the societal influence of Canada’s Second World War veterans slowly began to fade as the years after the war’s end turned into decades. Of course, a good number of these men and women were still playing valuable roles in nearly all facets of Canadian society, and would continue doing so for several more years. Nonetheless, as a group the veterans were aging, and with age would come a decrease in their effect on society. Spry, who was just 52 years old when he retired from Scouting, and somewhat older than many who served during the Second World War – on average, they were in their early 40s in 1965 – was on the leading edge of this curve.

131 Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 269-276.
133 Delaney, The Soldiers’ General, 227.
Lastly, Dan Spry’s contribution as the Director of the Boy Scouts’ International Bureau stands as a good example of how many Canadian Second World War veterans approached their civilian lives with a sense of mission. Some of them provided societal leadership. Others tried to teach children about character, while still others taught and practised democratic citizenship. Thousands more joined organizations that actively engaged in community or national service. Spry, in his capacity as an international servant, did all of these things as part of his mission to help prepare youth for adulthood in a Cold War world. His thoughts and actions clearly reflected lessons that many Canadians, veterans and non-veterans alike, had drawn from their experience of the Second World War. Tolerance, cooperation, and establishing a common ground between people of diverse backgrounds, all of which veterans had seen in action during their wartime service, were crucial if the world was to avoid another global war. To their mind, Canada and Canadians had both the ability and a duty to help shape world events. It was this sort of thinking that motivated Spry and other Canadian ex-servicemen and women, both as individuals and as members of veterans’ organizations, to do their part in building a better postwar world.
CONCLUSION: VETERANS IN POSTWAR CANADA

They served till death! Why not we?

General Sir Arthur Currie

As the years after 1945 turned into decades, the men and women who had served in Canada’s armed forces during the Second World War finished their full-time working careers. This transition did not mean that they then faded into history. As it turned out, just the opposite occurred as thousands of veterans across the country, one of whom was Dan Spry, played active societal roles until the end of their lives. Spry’s experience shows how these people put into action a final lesson of war: that service to others could – and should – be a lifelong endeavour. Veterans applied this and other wartime lessons in their efforts to shape Canadian society.

Historian Doug Owram has argued that Canada’s postwar period, which he said was characterized by a desire for security, a focus on domestic life, and a faith in the “good versus evil” nature of the Cold War, was ending by the mid-1960s. This development, he wrote, owed much to twenty years of prosperity that had eroded Canadians’ memory of the Great Depression and the Second World War. Other factors included growing doubts about Canada’s involvement in the Cold War, a lessening of youthful respect for and loyalty to political authority, perhaps best seen in their protests against the Vietnam War then being waged by the United States, the rise of Quebecois nationalism, and increasingly liberal attitudes on morality that made the idea of “family” seem rather quaint and old-fashioned. All of these things, Owram concluded, had the effect of loosening the societal bonds that had held Canadians together in the late 1940s and 1950s.2

1 Currie led the Canadian Corps from 6 June 1917 until the end of the First World War. Significantly, as historian Peter Neary has noted, the Canadian Legion emblazoned these words on its official stationery for many years after its creation in 1925. Neary, On to Civvy Street, 23.
2 Owram, Born at the Right Time, 161-183.
Certainly, some of the social changes that occurred in Canada and elsewhere during the 1960s were due to differences in generational experience. As American scholar Robert Putnam has postulated, the Second World War was an intensely unifying experience for the generation of young adults that survived it, and they carried the memory of the war’s collective successes for the rest of their lives. People from virtually all ethnic backgrounds, religions, and social classes had served alongside each other. The war touched most communities and families, with men and women serving in the armed forces at home and overseas, working in war industry, or taking part in volunteer activities that supported the country’s total war effort. Putnam was writing about Americans, but as has been shown in earlier chapters, such was the case for Canadians, too.

The Second World War generation’s children, on the other hand, did not come of age during a similar, universally-experienced unifying event. The Cold War was not the same as the “hot” war that preceded it, and the Vietnam War was a socially disruptive conflict. Whereas most American men born in the 1920s and a good number of Canadians saw wartime military service, only a fraction of their children would do so. For example, in 1963 roughly 120,000 Canadian men and women – just 0.7 per cent of the country’s population of just over 18 million – were in uniform. Military production during the 1960s was not the economy’s main focus. As a result of this difference in life experience, Putnam found that American baby boomers tended to be far more “distrusting of institutions, alienated from politics, and...distinctively less involved in civic life” than were their parents, and they “put great emphasis on individualism.” Here again, the Canadian experience was strikingly similar to that of the United States. While Canada’s veterans certainly tried to teach their children about character and citizenship, some of them must have wondered during the turbulent 1960s if their efforts in doing so had truly been successful.

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Dan Spry paid varying degrees of attention to such things. Spry’s children have reported that their father was relatively unaffected by the counterculture of the 1960s, an indication that his faith in youth remained a constant in his life. The emergence of separatism in Quebec, on the other hand, led him to worry that Canada might soon face political disintegration. Despite such concern, he did not get involved in politics. Spry was a soldier at heart, not a politician. He also watched from the sidelines while Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson fought to introduce a new Canadian flag in 1964. He agreed with Pearson that Canada was no longer a country of two founding peoples, English and French, but rather one with an increasingly diverse population owing to expanded immigration, and that a national flag ought to bring Canadians together.  
Spry’s approach differed from that of the Royal Canadian Legion, which railed against the proposed Maple Leaf design and, in conjunction with the federal Conservative Party, argued that the Red Ensign should be Canada’s flag. It was not that the Legion’s members could not see the unifying value of a national flag. From their perspective, though, the Red Ensign already fulfilled that function as an important symbol and reminder of wartime unity and service; the Legion had used the Ensign as its own flag since 1957.  
Years later, historian J.L. Granatstein criticized the Legion’s actions, saying that the flag debate represented “the only great [political] issue on which the Canadian Legion spoke out with force.” One can agree that the Legion’s very public opposition to the maple leaf flag earned it negative publicity, as the maple leaf had long been recognized as a Canadian symbol. However, the Legion voiced strong opinions on other political matters of national import, like foreign and defence policies and the country’s unity, and in some instances it had taken their views to the highest level of government. Similarly, veterans were not

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5 Toby Spry, telephone conversation with author, 29 July 2015, and Margot Gowing interview, 2 August 2013.
6 For the Legion’s views, see Hale, Branching Out, 139-146. For a scholarly analysis, see Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution, 171-192.
indifferent to societal issues that they thought mattered, as the Legion’s conduct of its ACTION
(A Commitment to Improve Our NATION) program during the mid-1970s demonstrated.

Notwithstanding their interest in the events that were unfolding around them, in the mid-
1960s many Second World War veterans were busy supporting their families. Dan Spry was no
different. With no pension income from the army, and still fairly young, he had to continue
working.8 Surprisingly, he entered the business world in 1965 as President of Glenland Limited,
a Montreal-based property investment and development company affiliated with a British-owned
international construction firm called Sir Robert McAlpine.9 Such a move was a significant
departure from the service-oriented culture of the army and the Boy Scouts. Why he did so, and
the nature of his duties, are unknown because he left nothing about his time with Glenland in his
papers.10 Insofar as the company’s motivation in hiring Spry is concerned, his children have
always believed that its owners wanted to use their father’s global contacts to expand their
business. As to why he left Glenland in 1970, Toby Spry has opined that business was not his
father’s “cup of tea.” The Spry children have also recalled that he lost money that he had
invested in the company.11 Spry undoubtedly left Glenland Limited with a certain sense of relief.

General Spry’s next full-time vocation was better aligned with his interest in international
work and his ethos of service. In 1968, while still working with Glenland Limited, he undertook
some consulting projects for the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which
was created that same year. CIDA, which had replaced the External Aid Office, part of the
Department of External Affairs, was the federal agency responsible for coordinating Canada’s
bilateral, voluntary, business, food, and humanitarian aid to developing countries. Led by a

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8 Chapter 5 and Toby Spry interview, 19 October 2013.
9 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, File 2-1, Personal History Form, 7 July 1970.
10 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, One-Line Diary, 1957-1967. Spry often spent a couple of days a week in
Montreal attending to Glenland business.
president who reported to the Minister of External Affairs, CIDA also handled Canada’s involvement with UN development agencies and most multinational technical assistance programs. According to Toby Spry, his father became involved with CIDA because of his association with Maurice Strong, the agency’s first president. Exactly how and when their relationship began is unclear. They may have met through their membership in the Overseas Institute of Canada, a non-profit organization that coordinated the efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and promoted public participation in overseas development. In 1966, Spry had been the Institute’s president. Alternatively, Spry may have met Strong, who was not really a bureaucrat, but rather a self-made millionaire who was involved with a variety of groups, while he was raising funds for Scouting. Regardless of how it happened, Strong knew Spry as a former senior Boy Scout executive with global connections that would be very useful for CIDA.

Initially employed as a consultant, by 1970 Spry had become the Deputy Director of CIDA’s NGO Division, which had been created the previous year to facilitate collaboration between the federal government and non-governmental organizations like the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), the Canadian Save the Children Fund, and the YMCA, all of which were deeply involved in international development. As Deputy Director, his main job was to help oversee and administer the Division’s various development projects. Such projects were varied and global in nature. For example, in the period 1971-1972, the NGO Division managed more than $37 million that funded 421 different projects in developing countries in

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14 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-21, Spry to Rowallan, 24 March 1966. Spry mentioned his leadership of the Overseas Institute in this letter. For the frequency of his involvement, see Spry’s one-line diary entries for 1965-1967. For Strong’s early background, see Morrison, *Aid and Ebb Tide*, 59.
15 Such is Toby Spry’s opinion. Toby Spry, telephone conversation, 29 July 2015.
16 Morrison, *Aid and Ebb Tide*, 69-70, and LAC, MG 28, Series I-270, OXFAM Canada Fonds, Volume 81, Romeo Maione (NGO Division Director) to Jacques Jobin (Executive Director, OXFAM), 21 August 1975.
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean – regions with which Spry had become familiar during his time as Director of the Boy Scouts World Bureau.17 Spry’s one-line diary entries reveal that he regularly dealt with OXFAM regarding its overseas efforts, and that he travelled to Mexico, Guatemala, and Costa Rica on CIDA business.18 In 1974, the NGO Division created an International NGO Program that provided funding to support organizations involved in adult education.19 Spry was involved in this activity, too. Such projects appealed to his desire to serve and his internationalist views. International development work, like preparing children for adulthood, was a way that Spry could help make the postwar world a better place.20

Although Dan Spry’s service in CIDA seemed to mesh with his interests, he retired from the agency on 30 December 1976, having served for six years.21 Two factors seem to have driven his decision to leave. Firstly, Spry was then 63 and suffering from several health-related issues.22 Secondly, he had grown frustrated with CIDA’s bureaucratic culture and internal politics, as his children have both recalled.23 Then again, Spry was used to being in charge and getting things done by dealing directly with other decision-makers. Such methods were anathema in the civil service, where processes ruled. Spry was not alone in his dissatisfaction. Historian David Morrison has said that in the 1970s many of CIDA’s staff members were “disillusioned by the political, commercial, and bureaucratic milieu of the aid program,” and that the agency’s work environment was poisoned by “a high level of organizational infighting.” As a result, a number

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19 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 70, 128-129. For a description of CIDA’s International NGO Program, see LAC, MG 28, Series I-95, National Council of the YMCA of Canada Fonds, Volume 337, CIDA International NGO Program, International NGO Division, Special Programs Branch, (?) November 1974.
20 LAC, R-14041, International Council of Adult Education Fonds, Volume 73, Spry to Kidd, 3 October 1974, and Kidd to Spry, 14 November 1974. Little is known about Spry’s work in CIDA, but as a deputy director he would not likely have had direct involvement with the NGO Division’s projects. At the time of writing, the project files contained in RG 74, Canadian International Development Agency Fonds were classified as “Restricted.”
22 Toby Spry, telephone conversation, 29 July 2015.
23 Margot Gowing interview, 2 August 2013; and Toby Spry, telephone conversation, 29 July 2015.
of senior-level managers left the organization. Spry’s frustration with CIDA’s internal politics likely explains why his papers contain practically nothing about his activities with the agency.

Spry was much more enthusiastic about his part-time activities. Besides his presidency of the Overseas Institute of Canada during the 1960s, he renewed his old relationship with the Princess Louise Fusiliers, the Halifax-based militia unit that he had joined in 1932. From 1969 to 1974, Spry was the regiment’s Honorary Colonel. One part-time endeavour, however, stood out above the rest. In April 1965, The RCR’s Executive Committee unanimously nominated General Spry to succeed General Charles Foulkes as Colonel of the Regiment, based on his wartime record and continued interest in The RCR. On 25 June, Air Chief Marshal F.R. Miller, then the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), asked Spry to accept this honorary appointment for a period of five years. Spry replied that he would be “deeply honoured” to do so.

The regiment to which General Spry returned in 1965 had changed a lot since he left the army. It had two regular battalions, one of which was stationed at Wolseley Barracks in London while the other served in Germany as part of Canada’s NATO contingent. The Regimental Headquarters, the RCR Band, and the RCR’s recruit depot were also in London, while a reserve battalion, the 3rd, had garrisons in London, Woodstock, and Stratford, Ontario. There were two other honorary appointments in The RCR in addition to his. These were the Colonel-in-Chief, since 8 December 1953 His Royal Highness, Prince Phillip, and the 3rd Battalion’s newly-appointed Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, Brigadier Russell H. Beattie. As General Foulkes pointed out, Spry’s duties as Colonel of the Regiment, like all honorary appointments in the Canadian armed forces, were “advisory, and extend[ed] to matters such as the conformity of

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28 Stevens, *The Royal Canadian Regiment*, 300. At the time of writing, Prince Phillip is still Colonel-in-Chief.
dress, the maintenance of Regimental customs and other matters like Regimental charities, histories, and awards.” To carry out these functions, Spry was authorized to visit all elements of The RCR and, when required, consult with the CDS.29 Put another way, Spry’s role centred on fostering *esprit de corps* throughout The RCR and providing a link between its regular and reserve elements. He thus would have a prominent voice regarding The Regiment’s affairs.

Spry was not happy about the state of Canada’s armed forces in the 1960s. In 1964 the federal government, on Defence Minister Paul Hellyer’s recommendation, had begun the process of unifying the navy, army, and air force into a single service, to be called “the Canadian Armed Forces,” to eliminate what Hellyer called “inadequate coordination and joint planning at the strategic level” and inefficiencies resulting from replicated support systems. Such a move, he argued, would result in administrative efficiencies that would free up funds to buy badly-needed equipment.30 Hellyer also sought to replace the distinctive uniforms and rank insignia worn by the three services with a green uniform and a rank structure to be worn by all. Many military members opposed such steps, believing that the elimination of cherished traditions would destroy morale; some quit in protest.31 Spry was one who thought that Hellyer’s reforms were mistakes.32 Hellyer was unmoved, and the *Canadian Forces Reorganization Act* was passed in 1968. Worse was yet to come. In 1969, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau forced deep cuts on the armed forces. By the end of that year, authorized personnel strengths had been slashed from 110,000 to 80,000. Canada’s 10,000-man overseas NATO contingent was halved, and then transferred from the British Army of the Rhine to serve in southern Germany with the Americans. The Regular Force lost five regiments that had been added in the 1950s – they were replaced by two new French-

29 General Charles Foulkes, quoted in Stevens, *The Royal Canadian Regiment*, 316, and Canadian Forces Administrative Order 3-4, Honorary Appointments, Annex C.
30 Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, 2-4, 32-37, and 164.
language units – and the Army Reserve was reduced from 23,000 to 19,000.\textsuperscript{33} Such measures were perhaps not surprising, given the 1960s environment. The fact was, just 25 years after the Second World War and despite the Cold War, most Canadians appeared unconcerned about their country’s military affairs. Social programs and the needs of the economy took precedence. To veterans like Spry, it must have seemed that their countrymen had forgotten one of the hard-learned lessons of the Second World War: that military weakness in dangerous times posed a serious risk to Canada’s security. It was a lesson that they could never forget.

The lack of political support for Canada’s armed forces, combined with anti-military sentiment arising from the Vietnam War, made the job of promoting esprit de corps within The RCR a tough challenge. Still, Dan Spry’s understood the importance of morale – a lesson learned by many veterans – and he gave it his best effort. As he had done during the war, and later as a Boy Scout executive, he tried to boost spirits by visiting the Regiment’s members. The year 1966 was typical. Spry was in London from 4 to 6 March, where he inspected The RCR Depot and attended a 3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion reception. The next month he visited the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion during a weekend training exercise at Camp Ipperwash, Ontario. He spent eight days in June with the 3\textsuperscript{rd} and the London-based regular elements. On 9 September, he saw the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion prior to its departure for a six-month peacekeeping tour on Cyprus.\textsuperscript{34} Spry followed a similar routine in succeeding years.\textsuperscript{35} Exactly what he said during these visits is not known. Toby Spry believes that his father tried to reassure the troops that the army still had a future. This seems likely, for that was the substance of his article in The RCR’s magazine, The Connecting File, in the summer of 1965.\textsuperscript{36} Then, again, as Joe Aitchison – who was himself Colonel of the Regiment from 2011 to 2015 –

\textsuperscript{34} LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 2, One-Line Diary, 1957-1967, entries for 4-6 March, 15-17 April, 17-24 June, and 9 September 1966.
\textsuperscript{36} Toby Spry, telephone conversation, 29 July 2015, and The RCR, \textit{The Connecting File} (Summer 1965), 8.
observed, Spry was “kind of a folk hero” in The RCR because of his war record.37 A highly-decorated veteran such as Dan Spry could inspire young soldiers simply by being with them.

General Spry took other steps to promote morale, too. For example, in 1969 he initiated a regimental small arms competition that was intended, as The RCR’s website has put it, to “foster comradeship and friendly competition within the Regiment as well as improving the standard of marksmanship.” The Major-General Spry Competition remains a popular event.38 Two years later, Spry led the way in creating The RCR Trust Fund, a charitable organization that would manage money raised to support aspects of Regimental life that were not publicly funded, notably The RCR Museum and ceremonial dress uniforms, and to provide financial assistance to RCR veterans and their families.39 Such things were important for morale. The RCR Museum was the repository for The Regiment’s proud past, while the white pith helmets and scarlet tunics of ceremonial dress would instil pride in soldiers serving in an era of bland green uniforms. The worthiness of helping needy veterans went without saying.

The RCR was so impressed with Dan Spry’s performance as Colonel of the Regiment that in 1970 it obtained approval from National Defence Headquarters to extend his term by five years.40 The next year, The Regimental Executive Committee nominated Spry for the Order of Canada and, in 1973, the Order of Military Merit (OMM), based on his long service to Canada in war and peace. The OMM recommendation letter cited Spry’s “unusual human qualities and the high qualities of leadership which profoundly builds confidence in all with whom he associates,” and noted that “by his example, a whole generation of Canadians both in public and private life

have been inspired to pursue lives dedicated to the service of their community and country.” The same could be said for the effect that thousands of veterans had on Canada in the postwar years. For reasons that remain unknown, Spry – whom Britain had appointed as a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (CBE), and whom Belgium had made a Commander of the Order of the Crown with Palm and Croix de Guerre 1940 with Palm, in recognition of his wartime service – received neither the Order of Canada nor the OMM. Despite this oversight, in 1975 The RCR succeeded in having Spry’s term extended for a further three-year period.

General Spry relinquished his appointment as Colonel of the Regiment on 9 July 1978 at a parade that was held during The RCR’s 95th Anniversary Reunion in London. A news reporter wrote that Spry was “choking back tears” as he returned the salute of 900 soldiers, representing all elements of The Regiment, who marched past him on the reviewing stand. Such a response was entirely understandable: this was his last hurrah. That night, at a regimental dinner held in his honour, letters of congratulations were read out. One, written by Prince Phillip, observed that “[Spry’s] influence and example have done a great deal to maintain the traditions, morale and high standards for which the Royal Canadian Regiment has such a deserved reputation.” On that note, Spry’s official relationship with the regiment that he loved ended.

For Dan Spry, the years after 1978 were quiet ones, as may be seen in his one-line diary entries. He had previously needed several pages to cover a single year’s activities. The year 1979 took up one page, the years 1983 to 1986 needed just two in all. The most likely reason for this

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43 LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-13, newspaper clipping, Ken Smith, “Memories Draw Old Soldier,” The London Free Press, 10 July 1978, A-4. The author, then a brand-new private in the 4th Battalion, watched this parade from the bleachers on the south side of the Wolseley Barracks parade square.
44 Toby Spry Collection, Mess Dinner menu, 9 July 1978, and letter from Prince Phillip, (?) 1978.
was that, like other Second World War veterans, Spry was aging and facing health problems. His diary entries for 1980 to 1982 covered only medical issues.\textsuperscript{45} He had slowed down.

Notwithstanding his slower pace, General Spry maintained his military ties by serving as a guest speaker at the Canadian Forces Staff College in Toronto. He had first done so in August 1967, when he spoke about military leadership.\textsuperscript{46} From 1982 to 1986, the College invited Spry to discuss the challenges that senior commanders had faced while conducting operations at the corps and divisional levels during the Second World War. In 1983, the college paid him to write a pamphlet on the same subject.\textsuperscript{47} Spry also kept in touch with The RCR. He was always invited to regimental events, and he was a regular guest speaker for the annual Regimental Officers Indoctrination Course, where he talked to new officers about proper conduct. He did so until October 1988.\textsuperscript{48} Spry’s children have both recalled that their father loved talking to the staff college students and The RCR’s newest officers; being around young people helped him feel alive.\textsuperscript{49} His listeners got something out of it, too. In 1982 Colonel G.R. Hirter, the Staff College’s commandant, told Spry that students had been overheard using the principles he had spoken about to support their arguments in syndicate discussions.\textsuperscript{50} In a similar vein, the author recalls an RCR officer who attended the Regimental Officers Indoctrination Course in 1984, Major Greg Miller, telling him that he always remembered Spry’s message that RCR officers should leave things better than they had found them.\textsuperscript{51} This was a latter-day version of Spry’s oft-used

\textsuperscript{46} LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-14, Colonel R.G. Kingstone, to Major-General D.C. Spry, 18 August 1967.
\textsuperscript{47} The Staff College’s letters of invitation to Spry for 1983-1986 are in LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, as are the details of the College’s contract. Spry completed the pamphlet on 31 March 1984.
\textsuperscript{49} Toby Spry, telephone conversation, 29 July 2015, and Margot Gowing interview, 2 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{50} LAC, Dan Spry Papers, Volume 1, File 1-14, Colonel G.R. Hirter to D.C. Spry, 22 October 1982. As was the case when Spry attended staff college, a syndicate was a group of about ten students led by an instructor.
\textsuperscript{51} The author served with Major Miller in the Canadian Army. The date of this conversation is not recalled.
mantra, “Never Pass a Fault.” Such thoughts, delivered by a soldier of Dan Spry’s stature, left an indelible impression on a generation of officers in the Canadian Armed Forces.

Spry was not the only Canadian Second World War veteran who lived up to the mantra of life-long service to others. While it is not possible to research every person who did so, some individual cases will suffice to bring out this point. One outstanding example was Arthur Boon of Stratford, Ontario. In 2005, when Boon was in his eighties, he received a Minister of Veterans Affairs Commendation in recognition of his outstanding work in promoting the welfare of veterans and public remembrance of their societal contributions. His citation noted that he had served his country as a member of the Army Reserve from 1946 to 1980, had undertaken local community service as a member of the Royal Canadian Legion over a 56-year period, and had been a first aid instructor for St. John Ambulance for 42 years. In a similar vein, Paul Mercier and Archibald Johnstone, the last veterans to belong to the House of Commons and the Senate, respectively, were both 75 years old when they left public life. Brian Dickson, a Supreme Court justice from 1973 to 1990, retired at the age of 74.

Such longevity of service was also the case for many of the individuals who have been mentioned in this study. “Spin” Reid, who served with General Spry in The RCR before and during the war, was lionized by London’s Memorial Boys and Girls Club for having served the most years of all of its volunteer members. Tom Burdett, another RCR veteran, spent many

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years helping the Unitarian Service Committee, the Canadian Mental Health Association, and the Canadian National Institute for the Blind.\(^{56}\) Nationally-known artist Alex Colville, who served under Spry in the 3\(^{rd}\) Canadian Infantry Division as a war artist, was the Chancellor of Acadia University from 1991 to 2001.\(^{57}\) Barney Danson was in his seventies when he got involved with the Sir Arthur Pearson Association of War Blinded in the 1990s.\(^{58}\) Ed Bennett of Woodstock was the Honorary President of the Oxford Historical Society until his death on 11 November 2010.\(^{59}\) Mervin Jones, the former paratrooper, was involved with Scouting for nearly 50 years after the war’s end. Soldier-turned-civil servant Ted Patrick was also a long-time Scout leader.\(^{60}\)

There were countless others like these people in communities large and small across Canada. For example, Jan de Vries, who parachuted into Normandy on D-Day, spent most of the year 2004 leading fundraising campaigns in support of the Juno Beach Centre Museum.\(^{61}\) Eileen Gibson, once a member of the Royal Canadian Air Force Women’s Division, was remembered on her death in 2013 as having “filled her life by being active and helping others” as a volunteer at her church and also at the Etobicoke General Hospital.\(^{62}\) Cliff Chadderton, perhaps the best-known Canadian veteran of the Second World War, headed the War Amps until he was 90 years of age.\(^{63}\) These Canadians were not alone. American researchers have found that men and women with similar wartime service generally remained active in their communities in their later years.\(^{64}\)


\(^{58}\) Dursflinger, Veterans with a Vision, 311-312. Danson, who lost an eye during the war, became totally blind.


\(^{60}\) Bayard, “Veteran Paratrooper Recalls Events of D-Day,” and Duffy, “War Veteran was a ‘Giving Person.’”


\(^{64}\) See for example Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Home, 190, and Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens, 4.
In his last years, Dan Spry’s decades of service to others were recognized by the two organizations to which he had dedicated much of his life. Despite having had limited contact with Scouting since leaving the Movement in 1965, the Nova Scotia Boy Scouts Council dedicated a room in a newly-built Scout building in Halifax in his honour in 1983. Halifax was where he spent several years as a Scout and Rover. The Canadian Forces also honoured Spry. On 18 May 1984, the Royal Military College of Canada awarded him an honorary doctorate of Military Science. His citation described him as “a man whose contribution to the leadership of Canadian youth, both in peace as well as in war, is outstandingly evident.” That contribution ended on 2 April 1989. At the age of 76, Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry passed away in Ottawa. He was laid to rest in the Veterans and War Dead section of Ottawa’s Beechwood Cemetery.

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In studying the influence of Second World War veterans on postwar Canadian society, one must face the thorny matter of assessing the scope and nature of their contribution. Such a task can be as difficult as determining the best method with which to study the subject. After all, the number of men and women who applied wartime lessons regarding leadership, character, citizenship, and internationalism to their peacetime lives can never be fully known. Still, learning theory and the commonalities of their life experience in war and peace suggest that the number of those who did was not inconsiderable. So, too, does the fact that they constituted a large portion of Canada’s population. This study has demonstrated that these people did have an influence on Canada’s institutions and workplaces, and that they touched the lives of many

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Canadians. That influence can be understood through the documented life history of Maj.-Gen. Dan Spry, which bridged the worlds of civilians, the armed forces, the Boy Scouts, and veterans.

Of course, not every man or woman who served in the Canadian armed forces during the Second World War thought and acted in exactly the same manner that Dan Spry did. Not all veterans were good, giving, serving people – the armed forces had its share of criminals, too – although many certainly fit that description, at least to some degree. Similarly, one could learn both good and bad lessons from the experience of war, or be strengthened or destroyed by it. More to the point, not every Canadian left the armed forces after the war with a sense of mission that drove them to provide leadership, mould children’s character, teach others about citizenship, or build a better world. A good number of them immediately put the war behind them. Bill Irvine of Winnipeg likely spoke for many when he recalled that he “simply got a job and moved on.”

Notwithstanding all of this, there is no doubt that many thousands of Canadians returned to civilian life having been transformed by lessons learned during their wartime military service. Some of these lessons had their roots in veterans’ pre-war upbringing. Spry’s story shows how his attitudes, and those of thousands like him, were initially shaped by the mutually supporting influences of family, school, and church, all of which tried to instil in them conservative values such as loyalty to family and country, discipline, teamwork, spiritual faith, and service to others. Youth groups like the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides sought to do the same during children’s leisure time, while also giving youngsters their first exposure to citizenship training and practical leadership. The times, too, influenced the early thinking of those who would fight for Canada during the Second World War. If nothing else, the economic hardships of the Great Depression taught young people that adult life was not always an easy ride, even for the lucky few who were employed, as Spry discovered while serving as a young officer in London and Halifax.

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War’s outbreak in 1939 changed everything for Dan Spry and his peers. Wartime military experience underlined and solidified their early life lessons, and gave these (mostly) young men and women new perspectives about themselves, Canada, and the world. While each veteran saw the Second World War through the lens of their individual perspective, there were nonetheless commonalities of experience, and lessons that could be drawn from that experience, that were not bound by ethnicity, social class, or military rank. Men and women of all backgrounds – rich and poor, famous and unknown, city dwellers and rural folk – served together in military units where they learned the value of teamwork and saw how the pursuit of a common objective – defeating the enemy – promoted a sense of unity. A good number of them developed a greater understanding of what it meant to be a Canadian because they were members of a national institution (the armed forces). They drew strength from what they had in common. Learning how to lead others was another common experience. Men and women learned how to direct and manage organizations, and how to motivate people under highly stressful conditions. These and other lessons were reinforced by military service in a theatre of war, something that hundreds of thousands of Canadians experienced on land, at sea, and in the air, both overseas and in certain parts of North America. The duty to serve others, a key element of the military ethos, became second nature for those who served as leaders, and for all soldiers who depended on each other for their survival. Most servicemen and women quickly realized that character had greater meaning than social status. Wartime service taught them the value of discipline, while many of those who saw combat reported coming out of the war with a deeper spiritual belief. Above all, veterans discovered the ugliness of war. Having lost friends, or having narrowly escaped death or injury themselves, they appreciated life. Many responded by seeking to better themselves, their fellow citizens, their country, and the world once the guns finally fell silent in 1945.

Through Dan Spry’s story, one can see how the experience of war changed veterans’ thinking and abilities regarding leadership, how they applied such lessons to become postwar societal leaders, and the effect that their leadership had on Canadian institutions. Prior to 1939, Spry knew how to lead and control small groups. By 1945 he was able to plan and direct the operations of large and complex organizations, as was seen by his successful command of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and Canadian Reinforcement Units. This knowledge prepared him – indeed, it qualified him – to serve as a senior Boy Scout executive. Spry’s first national-level development plan, and those that followed, bore the indelible imprint of the military appreciation process that he and thousands of officers and NCOs had learned and used in wartime. His use of this simple technique revolutionized the manner in which the Canadian Boy Scouts Association approached national-level planning. Moreover, Spry’s application of military organizational principles made the management processes of the Canadian and World Scout headquarters more efficient than they had previously been. He was just as effective in using the communication skills that he had honed during the war to “sell” Scouting to national and world leaders alike. In this manner, combined with his extensive use of visits to acquaint himself with the far-flung elements of Canadian and global Scouting – another leadership technique he had learned during the war – Spry got the political and financial support that enabled the Canadian Boy Scouts Association to grow by roughly 50 per cent during his tenure, and the Scout Movement’s global footprint to nearly double.68 Lastly, by using methods he had learned during his wartime military service about motivating others, he built cohesive management teams in Canada’s national Scout headquarters and the International Bureau. Given all of this, it is not too much to say that, from 1946 to 1965, Dan Spry did much to frame the nature of Canadian and world Scouting.

One can see the same sort of lessons, and the effects of their postwar application, in the actions of other Canadian Second World War veterans. It is worth repeating that the vast majority of ex-servicemen and women who became sports coaches, community service leaders, executives, business owners, senior civil servants, premiers, or federal cabinet ministers after the war’s end had no such experience when they joined the armed forces. It was also no accident that nearly all of these people had been leaders during the war. As with Spry, that experience gave them the tools with which they shaped the organizations that they led or managed in peacetime. Some veterans found themselves leading organizations that were as large, or larger, than the Boy Scouts. Doug Harkness, for instance, had 172,117 uniformed and civilian personnel under him in the Department of National Defence in 1960, with a budget of $1.5 billion. Many others had lesser positions, but the leadership skills needed to run a youth hockey team or a civic group were basically the same. Their actions affected the lives of Canadians across the country. How many veterans and their families benefitted from a sympathetic hearing by the Department of Veterans Affairs from 1945 to the mid-1960s, when their wartime peers occupied not only the ministerial position but also a high proportion of the department’s managerial desks? “Duff” Roblin and John Robarts no doubt used the leadership and management skills that they had learned during the war in their subsequent roles as Premier of Manitoba and Premier of Ontario. Canada’s history, and surely those of Manitoba and Ontario, might have been very different had veterans not applied wartime lessons about leadership and management to their civilian careers.

Were it not for the war, many of these people might not have become societal leaders at all.

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General Spry’s experience illustrates the manner in which some veterans used lessons that they had learned during the war in their peacetime efforts to mould the character of Canada’s children. Spry was convinced that loyalty, discipline, self-reliance, and the ability to endure and overcome hardship, all qualities that he found were essential in wartime, would help Canada’s boys in their social adjustment. This belief underlay his encouragement of Scouting at military bases and in tough urban neighbourhoods, and would prepare them to be responsible citizens. His narrow escapes from death during the war also led him to promote spiritual faith within the Canadian Boy Scouts. Above all, teaching boys about character would make them into what Spry called “reasonably decent acceptable sort of men,” a notion that combined the values described above.70 Such qualities had helped him cope with wartime challenges. By initiating training programs like winter camping, Spry sought to teach Canada’s youth the same lesson. He took a very similar approach with his own children.

Here too, Spry’s thoughts and actions mirrored those of other Second World War veterans. As a group they had a tremendous impact on Canada’s churches in the years after 1945 because thousands of them – and their families – joined congregations. Many of them did so with the aim of helping their children to learn about the moral and spiritual values that had sustained them in battle, and for which they had fought.71 The Canadian Legion’s stalwart support of youth sports and character-building activities like Scouting and the cadet movement, executed on a national level by hundreds of Legion branches across Canada, owed much to its membership’s appreciation for elements of character like discipline, loyalty, and stamina. The Legion also significantly improved the quality of the country’s track and field program. Such worthy projects touched the lives of hundreds of thousands of Canadian boys and girls. The fact that thousands of

71 Grant, The Church in the Canadian Era, 162.
veterans enrolled their sons and daughters in youth movements like the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides, both of which underwent exponential growth in the 1950s and 1960s, likewise spoke volumes about their desire to have their kids develop the attributes of good character. Other veterans no doubt tried to pass on character values to their own children at home. Such character-building efforts were part and parcel of Canadian social life for years after the war’s end in 1945.

Dan Spry’s efforts to teach and practice democratic citizenship reveals much about the varied manners in which Second World War veterans strove to preserve and strengthen Canada’s democracy in a Cold War world. Spry believed that Scouting could help the West win the Cold War “battle of ideas” by teaching as many boys as possible about democratic principles and processes. He emphasized the need for cooperative unity among Canadians, a phenomenon that he had seen during the war, and he encouraged its development among the country’s youth by instituting national Boy Scout jamborees. Spry promoted service to others, a key element of military service and, in his mind, of democratic citizenship, by getting Canada’s Boy Scouts involved in civil defence activities and by encouraging them to step up their community service activities. All of these things, he believed, would go a long way in producing good Canadian—and global—citizens.

Thousands of other Canadian Second World War veterans emulated Spry’s thoughts and actions regarding citizenship in the postwar years. The Canadian Legion’s citizenship education program echoed that of the Boy Scouts in that it sought to aid native-born and new Canadians alike in understanding and appreciating the democratic way of life for which legionnaires had fought. The veterans who served in parliamentary bodies or as civil servants after the war’s end helped to establish policies that affected the country, most provinces, and the nature of political governance. Perhaps most importantly, veterans’ efforts to serve their communities as members
of the Royal Canadian Legion, other veterans’ organizations, a host of other civic-minded clubs and societies, and as individual citizens benefitted the lives of Canadians throughout the country.

Lastly, General Spry’s performance on the world stage as the Director of the Boy Scouts International (later World) Bureau, while certainly exceptional, was representative of the war’s transformational effect on contemporary Canadian attitudes, including those of Second World War veterans, about their country’s role and responsibilities in the years after 1945. He believed that Scouting could make a real contribution to world peace and, wishing to do what he could to help avoid a third major war, he led the Boy Scout Movements’ global organization in the 1950s and 1960s. Spry’s actions were emulated by other veterans. The Legion’s steadfast support of Canada’s participation in the UN and NATO, its efforts to educate Canadians and legionnaires alike about Canada’s interests in international affairs, its lobbying the federal government to ensure Canada’s military preparedness in a dangerous world, and its liaison with groups like the Canadian Institute for International Affairs and the World Veterans Federation bore similarities to elements of Spry’s international work in the Boy Scout Movement. Individual veterans, too, like Maj.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns and General (retired) Andy McNaughton, played influential roles in the UN and in bilateral organizations. George Pearkes, Doug Harkness, Barney Danson, and Gilles Lamontagne, all of whom served as Canadian defence ministers from the 1950s to the early 1980s, did likewise.

What motivated Second World War veterans such as Dan Spry to play active roles in Canadian society during the postwar years? Certainly, each individual had his or her own reasons for doing so, but for many of these men and women their lessons of war boiled down to a deeply-felt sense of mission. Here, too, Spry’s example offers interpretive value. He believed that he owed a debt of service to those who had not survived the war, and that he had to help build a

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better postwar world so that their deaths would not have been in vain. Preparing young people to assume adult responsibilities was Spry’s chosen path to achieve that end. Then again, as an army officer he had belonged to an organization whose ethos revolved around service to others. Put together, they constituted a powerful reason for Spry to assume a leading role in the Boy Scouts, first in Canada and then on the world stage, within which he shaped their institutional nature and touched the lives of millions of children. He held the same view until his life’s end. A good many other veterans, both in Canada and elsewhere, thought and acted in much the same way.

Dan Spry’s story shows how many Second World War veterans were both conservative and forward-looking in their efforts to build a better Canada in the years after 1945. Spry likely spoke for many of his peers when he said that he was “the last person to suggest that tradition and customs should be retained just because they are traditions and customs, but I am the first person to insist upon them being maintained if they give us something and if they do something for us and prepare us that much better to face the future.”73 He and the Legion believed that the conservative ideals of character and democratic citizenship that churches, schools, and national institutions like the armed forces and the Boy Scouts had traditionally espoused were worth retaining because they had continued relevance. As such, teaching children about these ideals was an important way that Spry and the Legion could help to shape Canada’s future. On the other hand, veterans and indeed most Canadians in the late 1940s and 1950s felt confident and hopeful about their country’s and their own futures, their ever-present fears about the Cold War notwithstanding. This progressive sentiment was reflected in an explosion of veteran-led community service projects across postwar Canada. For the Legion and individual veterans alike, such endeavours were a meaningful way that they could help to build a better country.74

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Canada’s Second World War veterans, as has been noted throughout this study, were not alone in their efforts to contribute to Canadian society in the years after 1945. Many people who experienced the Second World War as young adults on the home front also played important parts. Still, it is the veterans who have largely been overlooked in Canada’s postwar history, and today, that cohort is rapidly slipping away. At the time of writing, there are certainly fewer than 70,000 remaining of the 1,037,409 men and women who returned to civilian life after their wartime service; hundreds of them pass away each month.75 Soon, they will slip into history. Nothing can be done to prevent their passing, but the memory of how veterans like Maj.-Gen. Daniel Charles Spry were transformed by their experience of the Second World War and subsequently sought to provide societal leadership, shape the character of Canada’s children, develop future citizens, and build a peaceful world through internationalism need not die with them. These people – Canada’s own “Greatest Generation” – influenced the nature of the country’s institutions and workplaces, and touched the lives of many Canadians. They helped make Canada the sort of place that it was in the years after 1945.

APPENDIX 1

THE BOY SCOUT PROMISE AND LAW, 1919

The promise which every boy takes on joining this Association is in the terms following:

On my honour I promise that I will do my best –
   To do my duty to God and the King,
   To help other people at all times,
   To obey the Scout Law.

The Scout Law is as follows:

1. A Scout’s honour is to be trusted.
2. A Scout is loyal to the King, and to his officers, and to his parents, his country, his employers, or to his employees, and his comrades.
3. A Scout’s duty is to be useful and to help others.
4. A Scout is a friend to all, and a brother to every other Scout.
5. A Scout is courteous.
6. A Scout is a friend to animals.
7. A Scout obeys orders of his parents, patrol leader, or scoutmaster without question.
8. A Scout smiles and whistles under all difficulties.
9. A Scout is thrifty.
10. A Scout is clean in thought, word, and deed.

## APPENDIX 2

### CANADIAN ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY, 1939-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Organization</th>
<th>Basic Composition (Note 1)</th>
<th>Commanded By (Note 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>A land formation comprising two or more corps, plus army-level artillery, signals, engineers, medical, and logistics units. The strength of an army varied from 100,000 men and upwards, depending on the number of corps assigned to it.</td>
<td>General or Lieutenant-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>A land formation made up of two or more divisions (often a mix of infantry and armoured divisions), plus corps-level artillery, signals, engineers, medical, and logistics units. The strength of a corps varied considerably, from 40,000 all ranks and upwards, depending on the number of divisions assigned to it.</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
<td>A land formation comprising three infantry brigades, divisional support battalion, three field artillery regiments, one anti-tank regiment, one anti-aircraft regiment, plus divisional signals, engineers, medical and logistics units. In 1945, an infantry division consisted of 917 officers and 17,158 men.</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>A land formation made up of three battalions, a brigade support group, and a brigade headquarters, comprising 2,647 all ranks.</td>
<td>Brigadier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion (Note 3)</td>
<td>A land unit comprising four rifle companies, a headquarters company, a support company, and a battalion headquarters. An infantry battalion numbered 38 officers and 812 men in 1945.</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Company (Note 4)</td>
<td>A sub-unit of a battalion, made up of three platoons and a company headquarters, totalling five officers and 120 men.</td>
<td>Major or Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Platoon (Note 4)</td>
<td>A sub-sub-unit of a company. The platoon had three sections and platoon headquarters, and comprised one officer and 36 men.</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Section</td>
<td>The Canadian Army’s lowest level of organization, totalling 9-10 men.</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTES

1. The composition of the above organizations is based on war establishments as they existed on 31 May 1945, and does not account for structural changes (of which there many) that occurred during the war. Strengths for corps and army are approximate only. In battle, units were rarely manned to their full establishment, owing to casualties, illness, and other reasons.

2. It was not uncommon for a command position to be under-ranked at times, as a result of casualties or otherwise unavailability of personnel holding the appropriate rank.

3. In the infantry, a battalion could also be called a “regiment” if it had one battalion only. An armoured, artillery, engineer or signals battalion-sized unit was always described as a regiment.

4. In an armoured, artillery, engineer, or signals unit, a platoon-sized element was called a “troop.” A company-sized element was known as either a “squadron” (armoured and signals) or a “battery” (artillery).
APPENDIX 3

PERSONNEL INTAKE AND STRENGTHS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES, 1939-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel Intake</th>
<th>Peak Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Navy</td>
<td>98,474</td>
<td>6,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Notes 1 and 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Army</td>
<td>708,535</td>
<td>21,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Notes 1, 3, 4, and 5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
<td>222,501</td>
<td>17,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Notes 1 and 6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Female Personnel</td>
<td>4,518</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Note 7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,029,510</td>
<td>49,941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 48, 416, and 590.

NOTES

1. These figures do not include female medical personnel.

2. The Royal Canadian Navy reached its peak strength in January 1945.

3. Canadian Army intake figures include those who volunteered for general service and those who were conscripted for home defence service under the terms of the *National Resources Mobilization Act*.

4. Some 22,046 Canadian Army members transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy or the Royal Canadian Air Force, and are included with the army intake.

5. The Canadian Army attained its highest wartime strength in March 1944.

6. The Royal Canadian Air Force arrived at its highest strength in December 1943.

7. Other female personnel served in the medical services, mostly as nursing sisters.
## APPENDIX 4

### DISTRIBUTION OF CANADIAN SECOND WORLD WAR VETERANS, 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Territory</th>
<th>World War II</th>
<th>Both World Wars</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newfoundland</strong></td>
<td>6,541</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>6,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>4,071</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prince Edward Island</strong></td>
<td>5,802</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>6,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>3,652</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>3,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nova Scotia</strong></td>
<td>44,869</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>47,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>15,705</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>16,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>29,164</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>30,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Brunswick</strong></td>
<td>30,720</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>32,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>13,673</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>14,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>17,047</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>17,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quebec</strong></td>
<td>139,348</td>
<td>6,196</td>
<td>145,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>17,814</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>19,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>121,534</td>
<td>4,932</td>
<td>126,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontario</strong></td>
<td>376,880</td>
<td>16,765</td>
<td>393,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>73,447</td>
<td>3,343</td>
<td>76,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>303,433</td>
<td>13,422</td>
<td>316,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manitoba</strong></td>
<td>57,330</td>
<td>2,454</td>
<td>59,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>15,362</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>15,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>41,968</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>43,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saskatchewan</strong></td>
<td>48,263</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>50,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>24,998</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>26,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>23,265</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>24,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alberta</strong></td>
<td>69,842</td>
<td>3,478</td>
<td>73,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>22,975</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>24,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>46,867</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>51,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British Columbia</strong></td>
<td>108,863</td>
<td>7,336</td>
<td>116,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>29,311</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>31,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>79,552</td>
<td>5,261</td>
<td>84,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yukon</strong></td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>1,155</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northwest Territories</strong></td>
<td>932</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CANADA</strong></td>
<td>890,915</td>
<td>43,056</td>
<td>933,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>221,035</td>
<td>11,395</td>
<td>232,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>669,880</td>
<td>31,661</td>
<td>701,541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1951 Census*, Table 63, Population Reporting Service in World War I and World War II.
APPENDIX 5

LEADING SECOND WORLD WAR VETERANS
IN CANADIAN SOCIETY, 1971-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacetime Occupation</th>
<th>Wartime Military Rank</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Union</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crown Appointee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer/Non Profit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>635</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 6

SECOND WORLD WAR VETERANS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1945-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>House of Commons Membership</th>
<th>Second World War Veterans</th>
<th>Veterans as a Percentage of the House of Commons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>1945 to 1949</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>1949 to 1953</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>1953 to 1957</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>1957 to 1958</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>1958 to 1962</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>1962 to 1963</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>1963 to 1965</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>1965 to 1968</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>1968 to 1972</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>1972 to 1974</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>1974 to 1979</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>1979 to 1980</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd</td>
<td>1980 to 1984</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd</td>
<td>1984 to 1988</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th</td>
<td>1988 to 1993</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th</td>
<td>1993 to 1997</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th</td>
<td>1997 to 2001</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# APPENDIX 7

## SECOND WORLD WAR VETERANS IN THE SENATE, 1945-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Senate Membership</th>
<th>Second World War Veterans</th>
<th>Veterans as a Percentage of the Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>1945 to 1949</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>1949 to 1953</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>1953 to 1957</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>1957 to 1958</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>1958 to 1962</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>1962 to 1963</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>1963 to 1965</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>1965 to 1968</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>1968 to 1972</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>1972 to 1974</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>1974 to 1979</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>1979 to 1980</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd</td>
<td>1980 to 1984</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd</td>
<td>1984 to 1988</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th</td>
<td>1988 to 1993</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th</td>
<td>1993 to 1997</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th</td>
<td>1997 to 2001</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX 8

SECOND WORLD WAR VETERANS IN FEDERAL CABINETS, 1935-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Individuals Holding Cabinet Office</th>
<th>Second World War Veterans</th>
<th>Veterans as a Percentage of Cabinet Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>Mackenzie King</td>
<td>1935-1948</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>Louis St-Laurent</td>
<td>1948-1957</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>John Diefenbaker</td>
<td>1957-1963</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Lester B. Pearson</td>
<td>1963-1968</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>Pierre Trudeau</td>
<td>1968-1979</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>Joseph Clark</td>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>Pierre Trudeau</td>
<td>1980-1984</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>John Turner</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>Brian Mulroney</td>
<td>1984-1993</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>Kim Campbell</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>417</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTES:

1. These figures include the Prime Minister, who in some ministries also held cabinet portfolios. For example, Mackenzie King was also Canada’s Minister for External Affairs.

2. The first Second World War veteran to serve in a federal cabinet, General (retired) A.G.L. McNaughton, was appointed in 1944.

3. Some veterans served under more than one prime minister and in more than one department.
APPENDIX 9

SECOND WORLD WAR VETERANS AS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT MINISTERS, 1935-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Total Ministers</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Second World War Veterans</th>
<th>Veterans as a Percentage of Total Ministers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Affairs</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defence</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaster General</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solicitor General</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Health and Welfare</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of the Privy Council</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Affairs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTES:

1. The above is a partial list of federal government departments.

2. The names of several ministries changed during this period. For example, the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration was renamed the Ministry of Manpower and Immigration from 1966 to 1977. From 1977 to 1994, it was called the Ministry of Employment and Immigration.

3. The Postmaster General was a federal cabinet position until 1981, after which the Post Office became a Crown corporation.

4. Some veterans served under more than one prime minister and in more than one department.
## APPENDIX 10

### SECOND WORLD WAR VETERANS IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE, 1945-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Veterans Hired (Male and Female)</th>
<th>Total Civil Servants Hired (Male and Female)</th>
<th>Total Strength of Federal Civil Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>10,936</td>
<td>41,085</td>
<td>115,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>31,098</td>
<td>53,174</td>
<td>120,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>18,252</td>
<td>33,366</td>
<td>125,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>14,771</td>
<td>34,149</td>
<td>118,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>13,025</td>
<td>32,252</td>
<td>123,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>8,409</td>
<td>24,213</td>
<td>127,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>7,784</td>
<td>29,763</td>
<td>124,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>8,258</td>
<td>32,262</td>
<td>131,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>6,682</td>
<td>32,659</td>
<td>165,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4,965</td>
<td>28,639</td>
<td>171,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3,355</td>
<td>23,857</td>
<td>181,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>3,059</td>
<td>26,092</td>
<td>182,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2,680</td>
<td>No results available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2,471</td>
<td>21,344</td>
<td>195,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>21,370</td>
<td>197,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>20,056</td>
<td>195,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,735</td>
<td>24,859</td>
<td>202,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>19,338</td>
<td>205,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>143,833</strong></td>
<td><strong>525,555</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**NOTES:**

1. The aggregate figures of veterans and total civil servants hired include both permanent and temporary civil service positions.

2. Total federal civil service employment figures for 1957 are not available.
APPENDIX 11

SECOND WORLD WAR VETERANS IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, 1956-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Judges</th>
<th>Second World War Veterans</th>
<th>Veterans as a Percentage of Supreme Court Judges</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td>1963</td>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>1967</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>1969</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>Brian Dickson appointed Chief Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>Brian Dickson retired as Chief Justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled using individual records found in
Supreme Court of Canada, “Judges of the Court, Current and Former Puisne Judges,”
(Accessed 3 September 2016).
APPENDIX 12

UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA ETHICS APPROVAL NOTICE

File Number: 04-13-01
Date (mm/dd/yyyy): 06/03/2013

Université d’Ottawa University of Ottawa
Bureau d’éthique et d’intégrité de la recherche Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

Ethics Approval Notice
Social Science and Humanities REB

Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serge</td>
<td>Durflinger</td>
<td>Arts / History</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Christopher</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Arts / History</td>
<td>Student Researcher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

File Number: 04-13-01

Type of Project: PhD Thesis

Title: "A Realistic Idealist": Major-General Dan Spry, the Lessons of War, and the Shaping of Postwar Canada

Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy) | Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy) | Approval Type
-----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
06/03/2013                  | 06/02/2014               | Ia

(Ia: Approval, Ib: Approval for initial stage only)

Special Conditions / Comments:
N/A
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