UNSC Reform in a Post-Cold War Era

UNSC REFORM IN A POST-COLD WAR ERA: ELIMINATING THE POWER OF VETO

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Eliminating the Power of Veto

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Abstract
The culmination of the Cold War period marked significant changes in the international system. The division of power shifted from the influence of a bipolar world in which the Soviet Union and United States were on opposite sides of the political spectrum, to the development of what is now dually classified as a unipolar and/or multipolar world, in which democracy has flourished. The new world order has also signaled the rise in power of several mid-level countries, not to mention the emergence of numerous new developing nations. As a result, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has also seen various changes, from a more prominent human rights and peacekeeping agenda to a greater inclination for member state cooperation. However, aside from these changes there has also been increased criticism as to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the institution. These critics, particularly in the form of UN members, have called for the UNSC to be reformed. They argue that the UNSC needs to be more reflective of the twenty-first century, more representative of its heavily increased members and overall more transparent throughout its decision-making process. This call for change has sparked several reform proposals, from increasing the number of permanent members who sit on the Council, to once again merely increasing the size of the Council’s non-permanent membership, to the more controversial option of eliminating the power of veto. Although there is a general consensus among UN members that reform of the Council is necessary, there has been a longstanding debate as to what this reform should entail and how it will be implemented in order to maximize UNSC efficiency. In response to this dispute this paper will argue that if the objective of restructuring the Council is enhancing both its effectiveness and legitimacy, then the most viable option for reform is the elimination of the power of veto held by its five permanent members (P-5).
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I. Introduction

Since its inception in 1945, the effectiveness and legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been continually called into question. This perception of structural inefficiency has brought forward several criticisms in reference to the Council’s voting system, membership, distribution of power, representation and transparency during its decision-making process. These criticisms have been amplified since the end of the Cold War in 1991. The fall of the Soviet Union marked a major change in the international division of power causing a shift from a bipolar world to a consequently intertwined unipolar/multipolar world. This shift has served to strengthen the outcry for UNSC reform by United Nations (UN) members. Mistakenly or naively it was believed that the end of the Cold War would translate into a more efficient Security Council. States believed that with the end of years of negotiation paralysis and ideological differences between the East and West, that Council members would automatically always reach an agreement on matters of peace and security (Berdal, 2003). However, even though cooperation was facilitated with the end of the war, the Council did not become a more effective organ to the extent that was anticipated. Therefore, UN members have reached a general consensus that moving forward Council reform is a vital necessity. Yet, the dispute lies in what form this change will take. Meaning, what the reform will entail, how the UN Charter will be amended and how it will affect interaction among its members. As a result, the continual disagreement among UN members regarding the concept of change has led to an array of botched attempts to reform the Council. Member states have not been able to approve any of the recommended proposals for UNSC reform. This failure to implement any significant amendment to the current institutional structure of the Council, can be argued to stem from an unwillingness of the permanent five (P-5) members to relinquish any of the power they wield within the
international body. During the creation of the UNSC ensuring the participation and cooperation of the current P-5 members (United States (US), China, Russia (then the Soviet Union), United Kingdom (UK) and France) within the institution was of pivotal importance. As such, in order to motivate P-5 collaboration they were granted certain concessions that elevated them above other Council members. Primarily, these five members were issued a permanent seat on the Council and the power of veto. Yet, from the onset the notion of gifting the P-5 members with the power of veto was never truly popular and since then justifying its continual existence has become increasingly challenging. However, as can be expected, though dubbed by many as an undemocratic mechanism, the dissolution of the veto power has been continually contested by its proprietors, which in turn has made the debate regarding reform even more difficult. Therefore, in addressing this plea for change this paper will examine the following question, what is the most viable method for reform in order to cultivate a more effective and legitimate UNSC in a post-Cold War era? In response to this question, this paper will argue that if the aim of reform is indeed to make the UNSC more efficient and reflective of current times than the most feasible option for reform is the elimination of the power of veto.

In the last few decades many academics have tackled the question of UNSC reform. They have examined the challenges the Council is facing in a post-Cold War world and contributed their analysis in reference to current reform proposals. Through the evaluation of the distinct reform options, these authors have looked into the implications, challenges and repercussions each method of reform would imply. As a result of this examination many academics have reached the conclusion that the current Council reform stalemate is a true reflection of the complexity of the situation. Furthermore, the majority of academics such as Kourula, Kanninen and Robert Synder have concentrated their research primarily on the Council’s issues in the areas
of equitable representation and power. As a result, they have focused on analyzing the reform proposals that deal with Security Council expansion. For the scope of this paper, the intention of arguing in favour of the elimination of the veto power is not to definitively discredit expansion as a viable method for reform. Instead this paper does in fact recognize that expanding the Council, especially the size of its permanent members, could in fact serve to enhance the body’s overall representation and make the organ more reflective of current times. However, though representation and the new world order are key contributory elements, they alone cannot guarantee a more effective institution. Particularly, expansion does not ensure improvement in the Council’s transparency, especially within the decision-making process. Additionally, merely expanding the Council would not improve the Security Council’s efficiency in reference to the successful adoption and implementation of UN resolutions. On the contrary, increasing the number of state interests being voiced or even incrementing the number of states with the power to veto decisions could actually serve to make the decision-making procedure even more difficult. As such, mirroring arguments by authors like, Jane Boulden, David Malone, Sahar Okhovat and Shashi Tharoor which are rooted in the utilization of reform in order to enhance the Security Council’s overall legitimacy, transparency, effectiveness, representation and eliminating the perception of undemocratic privilege all arising from the veto power, this paper will serve to illustrate why the removal of the veto would in turn make the UNSC an overall more effective institution. This paper will differ from other works in that it will not only look at one component of the veto, rather it will congruently bring together and examine all of the elements mentioned above in order to demonstrate the obstacle the veto poses for the Security Council and inclusively for the reform process itself.
In order to construct this argument cohesively it is essential to establish a theoretical framework in order to understand the interactions between states within the confines of this international organization (IO). Traditionally, when discussing the ineffectiveness of any IO, especially the organs that compose the UN, the primary theory under which to operate is neorealism. This theory does have its merits when it comes to explaining certain state behaviour in the international spectrum. However, neorealism does not recognize that importance of IOs in facilitating state cooperation. Instead neorealism postulates that as the world is in a constant state of anarchy, nations of the world can only secure their survival through the pursuit of their own national security. This inclination to act solely based on national interests tends to maximize the benefits of defecting from international agreements and cooperation, leading to fear, suspicion and eventual conflict (Mearsheimer, 1994). For realists the natural state of the world is one of competition, in which the sole objective of nations is to outrank all others in reference to power. As a result of this constant state of competition realists consider that IOs are subservient to state interests and as such will always remain inherently ineffective (Ferguson, 2005). Yet, in reference to the Security Council many of its inefficacies could be lessened or even remedied with the dissolution of the veto. Another theory that in recent decades has been used to analyze international relations has been social constructivism. Unlike realism, constructivism characterizes the international system and state interactions as a society that is guided by a set of rules and norms of behaviour (Reus-Smit & Snidal, 2008). Moreover, constructivist theory claims that international organizations have a more autonomous character. Meaning, that they are not considered to be merely the reflection of states’ wills. Quite the reverse, in distinction to realism, constructivism is founded on the notion that international relations are a reflection of historically and socially constructed ideas. In Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore’s, “Rules
for the World International Organizations in Global Politics” the notion is developed that IOs are bureaucracies that have the authority to make rules and thus exercise independent power (Barnette & Finnemore, 2004). Barnette and Finnemore argue that, “bureaucracies are…authorities in their own right, and that authority gives them autonomy vis-à-vis states, individuals, and other international actors” (Ferguson, 2005, p.232). Barnett and Finnemore go on to suggest that IOs, “have a strong measure of autonomy from their member states” (Ferguson, 2005, p.232), yet in the case of the UNSC this separation is not clear. On the contrary, the UNSC has an established history of having the national interests of its members, chiefly those of its P-5 members and their allies, consistently influencing its agenda and in turn its resolutions. This illustrates that one of the principle infringements upon having a more permissible Council is in fact a consistent lack of institutional autonomy. Therefore, for the scope of this paper it is necessary that the chosen conceptual framework not only acknowledge the ability of IOs to operate in an effective manner, facilitate cooperation between states, but also draws on the parallel between state cooperation and national interests. These are all traits that are encompassed by neoliberal institutionalism. Neoliberal institutionalism is composed of both liberal and institutionalist ideologies which argue that IOs such as the UNSC are promoters and mechanisms through which international cooperation is made possible. Similarly, to realism, neoliberal institutionalism acknowledges states as the primary actors of the international system, recognizes that the international system is anarchic, that states are self-interested and that uncertainty hinders relations between nations (Slaughter, 2011). Further, neoliberal institutionalists accept the central realist assumption that state behavior is rooted in power and interest (Reus-Smit & Snidal, 2008). However, neoliberal institutionalism differs from realism in its emphasis on cooperation and institutions. This theory focuses on the interdependence of states
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in order to enhance international cooperation, stipulating that as interactions between states are primarily of an economic, financial and cultural nature, in which diplomacy is crucial than conflict arising from security issues can be averted (Mearsheimer, 1994). Meaning, that within the realms of security and chiefly the political economy, in which the main objective is the pursuit of mutual benefits and economic gains collaboration between states is possible. Further, neoliberal institutionalists believe that international institutions, “exert a causal force on international relations shaping state preferences and locking them into cooperative arrangements” (Baylis, Smith & Owen, 2008, p. 120). However, according to neoliberal institutionalism, the primary obstacles that prevent cooperation among countries with mutual interests is the infamous “prisoner’s dilemma” and non-compliance (Mearsheimer, 1994). As in realism, states have difficulty cooperating out of fear that the other parties involved might defect, as a result instead of capitalizing on the benefits of mutual cooperation, states tend to try to outmaneuver one another in order to gain an advantage. In reference to the UNSC the issue of the prisoner’s dilemma was vastly seen during the duration of the Cold War, in which the US and Soviet Union, through the use of their veto, seldom allowed any UN resolution to pass out of fear that this would provide a tactful advantage to their adversary. Today, the same issue persists among Council members, though to a lesser extent. P-5 members have been known to utilize the veto power out of fear that other countries might reap benefits that in turn could perceivably place them at a disadvantage or in order to prevent having to comply with an unbenevolent resolution. Thus, the veto is often used by the permanent members in order to ensure that their advantages and that of their allies are maximized. This imbalance of power leads to an ineffective institution as the Council’s decisions do not always pursue mutual benefits for all its members. Hence, this paper will propose that in order to feasibly deter the P-5 from using the
veto to defect on mutually beneficial decisions the UNSC must revoke the power of veto. In order to demonstrate why the elimination of the veto is the most plausible method for change this paper will be divided into four primary sections: the first section will outline the history of the UNSC focusing on the origins and purpose of the power of veto; the second section will illustrate the reasons why reform of the Council is necessary; while the third segment will recount past successes and failures of attempts at reform, whilst at the same time analyzing alternative proposals to emend the Council; lastly, the final section will specifically analyze the implications of eliminating the power of veto illustrating why this is the most feasible option in the pursuit of a more effective and legitimate organ.

II. Historical Context

i. Creation of the UNSC

Before examining the future of the UNSC it is imperative to first comprehend the dynamics and circumstances under which it was created. The UNSC was established in 1945 as one of the six organs that compose the UN. It was formed on the remnants of arguably one of the worst international conflicts in history, World War II (WWII). During the process of formulating the Council, the not so distant failure of its predecessor, the League of Nations, decades earlier was firmly present. As a result, in order to prevent another failed attempt towards collective security and international cooperation under the parameters of an IO, the primary objective became to attract the participation of the world’s major players, a component that lacked in the creation of the League of Nations. Though, similarly to the League of Nations, the UN was created to prevent another international conflict of the magnitude of WWI and WWII. More precisely, the UN and by extension the UNSC were created, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (UN Charter, 1945). This purpose tends to be strongly associated with the notion of
collective security. Though the UN Charter does not explicitly mention the phrase collective security, because in the words of Michael Howard, “it smelled of the failures of the 1930s” the expression is still firmly embedded in Chapters I, V, and VII of the Charter (Eisendel, Malone & Ugarte, 2016, p.3). For example, under Article 1(1) of the Charter member states must, “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace” (Eisendel, Malone & Ugarte, 2016, p.3). This provision goes hand and hand with Article 24, which stipulates that the UNSC is tasked with ensuring the “maintenance of international peace and security” (López-Jacoiste, 2010, p.275). Thus, in order to ensure this form of global security, under Article 43 states have committed to the UNSC, “armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security” (López-Jacoiste, 2010, p.275). Overall, it is through the enforcing arm of the UNSC that the United Nations addresses global threats, conflicts, and in-humanitarian acts. The Council is the UN organ that issues resolutions and interventions that strive to subside these international conflicts. It is this form of policing that founders Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had in mind when formulating the composition of the UN. For them and other world leaders of the time it was evident that in order to establish a new working world order it would have to be done through the “institutionalization of the ‘Four Policemen’ concept” (Nadin, 2014a). The founders of the UN intended that the most powerful nations of the time; China, US, UK, Soviet Union and France, as a later addition, collectively work together to maintain peaceful interactions between states. In other words, these four countries were expected to cooperate for the sake of ensuring international security by “policing” the rest of the world (Nadin, 2014a). This “great power principle” is one of the UNSC’s most distinctive qualities, whereas the General Assembly (GA) operates under the notion of “sovereign equality of states” the UNSC
ultimately grants special status to countries it dubs as the most powerful (Synder, 1997). As such, these five nations make-up the totality of the permanent members on the Council, the remainder of the council is currently constituted by ten other countries. These members are not permanent and serve on the Council for a period of two years. Furthermore, these states are selected through an election process within the GA. The selection of member states is not solely based on the national merit of a country on the international forum, but is also linked to regional representation. Meaning that membership is geographically distributed as follows: two states from Western Europe and other, two from Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, three from Africa, and one from Eastern Europe (Gordon, 1994). Regionally distributing state membership is intended to ensure cultural diversity and a minimum form of world representation within the Council. All 15 of the UNSC’s members have the responsibility to attend its meetings. Though Council meetings are not fixed, the UN Charter requires that the Security Council meet every fourteen days. However, a meeting may be called outside the framework of its mandatory gestation on the basis of: a request by a member state, a request by the General Assembly or Secretary General, a contingency rooted from the UN Charter, or an initiative by the President of the UNSC (Gruenberg, 2009). During these informal meetings, attendees are normally composed of member states who have specific interests intertwined with the topic on the agenda, as well as any party with a stake in the discussion, regardless of whether or not they are a member of the UN. However, though outside groups may be involved in the discussion they by no means have any say in the Council’s decisions (Gruenberg, 2009). In order for a Security Council judgement to be binding:

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting (Lendman, 2015).
Therefore, although ten of the Council members do not enjoy permanent status, simply because of the collective number required to pass a resolution, the activities of these non-permanent members significantly influences UN action. Additionally, the Council and its decisions are in essence politically motivated and as such are subject to the political processes of collective decision-making (Nadin, 2014b). Meaning, that as Security Council decisions are intrinsically reflective of the interests of its members, states must undergo a process of political negotiation in order for a communal resolution to be reached. As a result, cooperation among member states is normally only possible to the extent that the interests of members reasonably coincide (Nadin, 2014b).

Which is why the end of the Cold War facilitated multilateral cooperation between Council members, which in turn increased UNSC activity to wider spectrum of agenda items (Boulden, 2006). Subsequently, current Council activity generally extends to five forms of circumstances: first, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons proliferation; second, international conflict; third, intra-state conflict; fourth, crosscutting; and lastly, quasi-legislative agendas (Nadin, 2014a). Overall, from the beginning the objective the Security Council was expected to fulfill was very clear, preventing another world war, a purpose that has rarely been contested. Yet, the facet of the Council which tends to spark debate and criticism is the question of the how? How well is the UNSC fulfilling its responsibilities? How is the Security Council reaching its decisions? How is power within the Council distributed? And how can the Council be improved? These are all questions that will be examined in the following sections of this paper.

ii. The Power of Veto

During the negotiation process of the United Nations a pivotal point of debate was whether or not the founding member states that were already being granted Council seat permanency, should also be gifted with the power of veto. The veto allows any permanent member to cast a negative
vote that can block a Council resolution. Originally the power of veto was intended to act as a mechanism that would ensure the cooperation of the P-5 members. The founding fathers of the UN composed of the victors of WWII wanted to implement a tool that would safeguard their national interests, the interests of their allies or proxy. Further, the veto would serve to prevent the adoption of any policy that any one or all P-5 members considered to be detrimental. Overall, the veto was viewed by the P-5 members as a means of protection, an insurance policy that was profusely utilized throughout the duration of the Cold War. During this time the United States and Soviet Union invoked the veto in order to impede one another from gaining the upper hand, whilst protecting their allies from unfavourable Council decisions. The Cold War truly showcased how the veto can be used as a resolution roadblock and elicit Security Council stagnation. Yet, during the San Francisco Conference of 1945 when the UNSC was being conferred, P-5 members relentless fought for the adoption of the veto, going so far as to threaten their withdrawal from the UN if it was not granted. Thus, states were faced with the decision of either having, “an organization with great power privilege,” or having “no organization at all” (Nadin, 2014a). Ultimately, the decision favoured the latter and the veto was embedded into the UN Charter. The power of veto is found under Article 27(3) of the Charter, which states that decisions on everything except procedural matters will be made by the “concurring votes of the permanent members” (UN Charter, 1945). Though, the veto is not explicitly named the interpretation is clear, no Security Council resolution will be passed without the agreement of all five permanent members. However, in the early days of the Council there was vast debate as to whether the phrase “concurring votes” meant that all P-5 members had to vote affirmatively for a resolution to be adopted, the question lay in whether or not a P-5 member had to vote at all or if they could simply abstain. This question was soon answered in 1946, when the Soviet Union abstained from voting on a resolution in
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reference to the Spanish question and it was still passed (The Veto, 2015). Although reluctantly this quickly set a precedent whereby the practice became that “concurring votes” is interpreted to mean either an affirmative vote or an abstention (The Veto, 2015). Furthermore, Article 27(3) goes on to say that, “in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting” (The Veto, 2015, p.2). In other words, a permanent Council member is barred for invoking its power of veto on disputes in which it is directly a stakeholder. This stipulation was intended to limit permanent members from using the veto in order to benefit during an international conflict. Yet, the permanent members of the Council have tended to adhere to this resolution only insofar as it has been convenient and/or beneficial. For example, on March 14th, 2014 Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have dubbed the planning of the Crimea as invalid (The Veto, 2015). This illustrates that the P-5 members are not above violating the restrictions placed on them, if it means securing their individual interests. Which is why there is the general perception among a majority of UN members that the veto or even the mere threat of utilizing the veto is undemocratic. Opponents of the veto believe, P-5 members tend to abuse their power for their own gain even if it is to the detriment of international peace and security, the founding principle of the UNSC. Therefore, though the original need for the veto was to attract the involvement of the world’s “great powers” and enhance their ability to cooperate in an international setting like the UNSC was valid, the power itself has been unfavourable as to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Council. As such, numerous appeals for Security Council reform have been made.
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III. A Call for Reform
Why is Reform Necessary?

From its foundation in 1945 the UNSC has always faced disapproval, however, the end of the Cold War has reignited the force behind these criticisms, manifesting in a call for reform. The demand for Council reform became stronger with the culmination of the Cold War because as previously mentioned this marked the beginning of a new world order. That is to say, the world and consequently the countries that compose it are living in a world quite different from the one they were exposed to in 1945. As such, the needs of nations have undergone a metamorphosis, causing them to want IOs, like the UNSC, to evolve and be more reflective of their new priorities. Thus, this section of the paper will focus on three primary reasons utilized by member states in order to justify the need for Security Council change; power, representation and transparency.

i. Power

The post-Cold War era brought forth many changes to the international system, one of the most significant transformations was in reference to the distribution of world power. Firstly, the most evident shift of power was the fall of one of the two “superpowers” of the time, the Soviet Union. The fall of the USSR gave way to the end of a nearly forty-year rivalry with the United States, in which both countries practiced extreme influence on opposite sides of the earth, a struggle manifested in a bipolar world order. The end of this bipolar world gave birth to a conjointly unipolar/multipolar world. Unipolar because as the victor of the Cold War the US became an unrivaled hegemonic state, reflected in America’s supremacy in the; armed forces, global politics and international financial system. As a result, the US has been deemed the great world power of this generation. Therefore, under this context it is vital that any reform the UNSC might undergo, have the support, for better or for worse, of the American delegation. The second major shift in
power caused by the fall of the Soviet Union was the emergence of multi-polarity. Multipolar as a notion of international relations is a two-sided coin. On the one hand, the dissolution of the USSR saw the emergence of various new states, states that eventually became members of the UN and that now demand that their voices are heard and equally represented. On the other hand, multipolar refers to the rise in power of developing nations. Countries, particularly those that make-up the G-4 (Germany, Japan, India & Brazil), categorized as “middle powers” have quickly climbed the global hierarchy and have become more influential on the international stage. The rise in power of these states calls into question whether the UNSC remains a true reflection of world power. Just as realism, neoliberal institutionalism recognizes the influence of power on the international system with the slight difference that it does not view power as an impediment of international cooperation. Instead, neoliberal institutionalists view power as a tool which states can utilize for international negotiations. Since the political economy influences state behaviour, in that states are likely to cooperate in order to ensure economic gain, in this section it will be argued that states also act and cooperate with one another in order to protect their investments. Meaning that nations are likely to cooperate under the confines of an IO if the return on their contributions in the form of; military capability, political clout and economic prowess, are repaid with greater influence within the institution in question. In order for this exchange of resources for international power to be mutually beneficial not only for the states involved or for the IO itself, but for international politics more in general, it is important for this exchange to only be undertaken by states who can handle it. Meaning, that if the Security Council is going to successfully deal with issues pertaining to international security, it will need a wide array of resources, resources that can only be made available by the powerful nations whom possess them (Synder, 1997). Therefore, the Council
should not seek to enter an arrangement in which power is exchanged with “weaker” states, as they are more likely to defect, making cooperation within the organ more challenging.

a) Military Power

Military capability is a quintessential measurement of power. A state’s military force has historically been used in order to determine not only countries’ defensive measures but to classify the potential threat a nation can pose offensively. In relation to the UNSC, military power is of extreme importance as it is a recourse for enforcement. Article 42 of the UN Charter introduces the use of military force:

Should the SC consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (Gordon, 1994, p.30).

Therefore, as the Security Council’s main objective is the assurance of ‘international peace and security, military forces have often been a vital resource in fulfilling this responsibility. The UN Charter under Chapter VII, specifically garners the Security Council with the ability to enforce its decisions militarily, if necessary (The UN Security Council, 2012). Further, it is through the military contribution of its members that the UN has the troops required for peacekeeping missions, humanitarian interventions, anti-terrorism initiatives and in some cases the imposition of sanctions. Particularly, since mid-1988, there has been a stark increase in the number of peacekeeping missions the UN has undertaken. This is due to the fact that Security Council members have been more likely to agree on measures that should be taken in relation to security issues, not to mention that the sheer number of conflicts, primarily internal in nature, have also increased heavily (Yilmaz, 2005). Successful or not UN interventions in Bosnia, Congo, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, El Salvador and East Timor, to name a few, would not have been at all possible without the support of a military force. The personnel that are sent in
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representation of the United Nations in the fulfillment of different missions are mainly composed of; troops, police forces, UN military experts and civilian personnel (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations). The majority of this personnel is volunteered by UN member states; of which it is interesting to note that the major contributors of UN troops are not P-5 members but instead developing countries. The practice of developing nations being the top ten troop-contributing countries became precedent upon the culmination of the Cold War era. For example, in March 2006, there were a total of 71,823 UN personnel involved in peacekeeping interventions, of which the top ten contributors were all developing countries (Boulden, 2006). A decade later and the same is true of troop-contributing countries in 2016. For 2016, the total number of UN personnel volunteered by member states for peacekeeping operations was 100,376 and again the top contributors (top-19) were all developing nations (Troop and Police Contributors, 2006). This illustrates that the countries contributing the most to the Security Council’s biggest resource for the implementation of its resolutions are in fact nations who are considered the least powerful and whom in turn are granted the least amount of power within the Council. It is interesting that states that might not have the largest national military force are the ones sustaining the UN’s martial capability. This illustrates that the resources being donned on the Security Council unrequited to realist thought are not the reflection of the world’s current division of power. Contrarily, it is the countries with the least amount of power whom are contributing the most, an imbalance causing these contributory states to question their continual military support of the IO. Aside from military power, one of the most critical forms of authority within the UNSC is political clout.

b) Political Power

As the UNSC is at its core a political body it makes sense that the greatest method to exude influence within the organ is politics. Playing the political game during negotiations is
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quintessential for members who wish to have a voice, particularly states who on their own do not represent a strong force. One of the Security Council’s most alluring features is the binding nature of its decisions for all of its members, however this is counteracted by its limited membership and the fact that the veto has concentrated Council power in a few states (Mahmood, 2013). Which is why contrary to realist thought the power enacted by the Security Council cannot be reduced to the material power of its individual members, i.e. the P-5. As a result, the non-permanent members of the Council have consistently seen the benefit in communal cooperation in order to counterbalance the power of the P-5. The ten non-permanent member have reaped the benefits of using political ingenuity to magnify their power within the organization. For insistence, prior to the end of the Cold War, the ten non-permanent members of the Council utilized politics to play both superpowers against one another. In order to amplify their power and that of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), many developing states became “intermediaries” or “helpful fixers” willing to serve as buffers so that cooperation could be possible (Malone, 2003). The NAM movement was essentially the most ostentatious expression of states working together towards collective action, they strived to counterbalance their shortcomings in; economics, social, technological and military indices (Moritán, 1992). The states that composed the NAM movement represented more than three-quarters of the world’s population and their primary objective was the promotion of cooperation in order to enhance both economic and trade policies (Moritán, 1992). Overall, the NAM movement showcases the important role that politics plays within the Security Council negotiation process. It is only through the use of diplomacy, negotiation and often times political pressure that states can advance matters of individual interest onto the Council’s agenda. Since the Security Council requires collective action to function and because member states do not always have the same priorities or views, the ability to politically manoeuver within the decision-making
process is fundamental. As the five permanent members have the power of veto at their disposal as tool for negotiation, it is crucial for the non-permanent members to be able to cooperate amongst themselves, so as to have at minimum a leverage in power of numbers over their permanent counterparts. Lastly, political power also serves as a method of pressure on behalf of the UNSC as a whole. Meaning that because the Security Council enjoys the support of arguably the most powerful nations in the world (mainly the P-5 members) this automatically grants its enactments with an extra layer of political clout. That is to say, for example if the UNSC imposes sanctions on a developing nation, that country is more likely to adhere to the decision because it knows that the Security Council is backed by the political strength of its members, and as such non-compliance would most likely result in severe repercussions. This form of political power does grant the UNSC a greater sense of international authority by reducing the likelihood of non-compliance from its members. Yet, the problem becomes when decisions do not favour the “powerful” and they withdraw their support and choose not to comply with decisions not in their national interest. This is especially seen in reference to the P-5, which is why other UN members classify their behaviour as hypocritical (Forsythe, 2012). However, since it is the permanent members that wield the majority of the world’s power and inclusively are the ones that primarily garner the Council with power, such as in the realm of economic recourse, it is very problematic to challenge their actions.

c) Economic Power

The final form of power that bestows a form of control to Security Council members is economic competency. Similar to that of military power, economics act as a vital resource for the continual operation of the United Nations. In other words, without sufficient funding from its members, the UN would not be able to carry out the resolutions issued by its enforcing arm. For insistence, anti-terrorist movements and peacekeeping operations not only require appropriately
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trained personnel but also call for vast amounts of funding. Funding that is distributed from the UN’s annual budget. The UN’s regular budget is set every two years by the Fifth Committee, which is responsible for administrative and budgetary matters (Tables and Charts on UN Budget). The UN’s budget is destined to deal with the UN’s core activities and is financed through assessments to all UN member states. Nations contribute funding according to their economic capacity, but the Fifth Committee has set a “ceiling” of 22% in order to prevent the UN from becoming overly dependent on any one of its members (Tables and Charts on UN Budget). Furthermore, the Security Council’s five permanent members, as the main proprietors of ensuring international peace and security, are required by the General Assembly to contribute a larger share to the overall budget (Financing Peacekeeping, 2016). However, by referring to Appendix III at the end of this paper, one can note that even though the P-5, are amongst the top ten monetary contributing nations, aside from the US and China which are the members that contribute the most, mainly Germany and Japan seem to make greater economic contributions then three of the five permanent members (UK, Russia and France). It is because Germany and Japan are amongst the UN’s top financial benefactors, that these nations have continually been behind propositions for Security Council reform. These states call for their increased contributions to the organ to be recognized and rewarded with greater institutional influence and power. This is a point that will be further examined in the following sections. Continuing with the notion of economic power, financial contributions do serve as a measuring stick of the division of power in the world. States that are able to volunteer the most funding tend to be countries who enjoy a more stable national economy and thus can afford to donate more money to the UN’s budget. However, the monetary contributions made by these states come with tight strings attached. As the contributions made by member states are what facilitate; international
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conferences, public information work, human rights promotion and special UN missions to conflict areas, states know that if they were to revoke their annual contributions, the UN would not be able to continue fulfilling its everyday functions (Tables and Charts on UN Budget). Which is why, member states, particularly the major contributors, can utilize their economic power as a bargaining tool to leverage support, from other less influential states, on matters of particular interest to them. Inclusively, economically fortified members can use finances in order to influence how other states vote on a resolution, in order to achieve their desired outcome. Hence, as economic resources are one of the major gears that allows the continual functioning of the United Nations, it is important for the major players to feel that their role within the body they are financing is one of mutual benefit. The continual exclusion of powerful states that contribute vast amounts of resources will be a continual source of conflict if not addressed in the reform of the UNSC. Consequently, in addition to the need for the Security Council to be increasingly reflective of member state contributions, there is also the need for the Council to be more representative of its increased membership.

ii. Representativeness

The issue of representativeness within the Security Council is one that has garnered increased support since the end of the Cold War. The emergence of new states and the rise in power of several developing nations, which resulted in a marked increase in UN membership, caused many member states to unite in their petition for greater representation within the Council. Traditionally, the UN as an IO has been founded on two principles: first, the “sovereign equality of states,” a principle which is reflected in the contingency of the GA and second the “big power” principle which is reflected within the Security Council (Synder, 1997). Therefore, historically the concept of representativeness has always been linked more closely with the first
principle and thus, in extension with the General Assembly. However, states are no longer satisfied with this distinction and call for a bridge in the gap. This demand for increased representation takes on two main forms. The first form and arguably the least realistic and advisable, is increased regional representation. As there has been a boom in UN membership since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council is no longer a proportionate representation of the world. Originally, when the UN was created, the Security Council was composed of 11 members out of a total UN membership of 51 countries, which means that approximately 22 percent of member states were represented on the Council (Tharoor, 2011). However, today there are 193 member states of which only 15 are members of the Security Council, a huge decrease in representation. As such, many nations do not feel that they are adequately represented on the organ. Thus, as states are aware that because of sheer efficiency the Council cannot be overtly increased, they have called for the increase to be geographically motivated. UN members want the Security Council to be representative of the world’s population distribution in congruence with the countries that they represent. For example, Europe, which only accounts for 5 percent of the world’s total population, is overly represented on the Council, currently enjoying 33 percent of the Security Council’s membership (Tharoor, 2011). This form of over representation is viewed as an overt expression of inequality between the privileged (developed nations) and the “have nots” (developing countries). Moreover, both Africa and Latin America do not have representatives in the form of a permanent member, while Asia is underrepresented (Background on Security Council Reform). As such, the second form of representational reform which has acquired the most support from member states, is the proposal for the Security Council to be more indicative of the states in power. As discussed in the previous section, power is an important mechanism necessary for the functioning of the Council, and as a result there is a valid
partially realist argument to be made that the representation of the Council members be reflective of the world’s powers and their contributions. This argument is further supported by the fact that Council members are tasked with the enforcement of global security and as such need to be composed of states that can utilize their national recourses to successfully implement Council decisions. In other words, it is of vital importance that countries that do not have verifiable global influence not be given the responsibility of making decisions with international repercussions because they will not be able to support the implications of set verdicts. Overall, as UN member states fully recognize that Security Council reform is necessary there must be a balance between incorporating states with efficiency of power and subsiding the need for representation of weaker states. One way to subside this need for an increase of representation is through the enhancement of Council transparency.

iii. Transparency

The final reason that has motivated states to call for UNSC reform has been the increased need for Security Council transparency, particularly during its decision-making process. This need for greater transparency steams from the practice of the Secretariat to hold private meetings with some or all of the five permanent members. This tendency became a regular occurrence with the culmination of the Cold War. These private consultations prior to formal Security Council meetings are intended to expose cases to the P-5 members and scope out whether or not a resolution may be reached, not only in terms of the votes required for a decision to pass, but also to become aware of whether or not the P-5 will refrain from invoking the power of veto. To some extent this practice is useful as it has allowed for the Council to successfully draft and pass several resolutions that on the contrary might not have been efficaciously negotiated. For example, in order to prevent P-5 members from enforcing their veto power, the President of the
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Council has been known to consult the permanent members individually or sometimes as a group during an emergency in order to gage their position (Nicol, 1991). However, the issue lies from the perspective of other member states, that view the increasing use of these informal meetings for decision-making purposes, of which no formal record is kept, as just another means of exclusion of non-permanent members and another way for the P-5 to exude their power (Malone, 2003). Both non-permanent members of the Council as well as members of the General Assembly view the use of these meetings as a delegitimizing and undemocratic practice. They believe that the use of these consultations in order to make Council decisions minimizes the voice of the other states not included in the meetings, states that are elected by the GA in order to represent the interests and will of UN members more broadly. Furthermore, this practice serves in accompaniment of other excluding structures, such as the ability of the permanent members, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to issue legislation quickly with the very limited participation of other countries; further allowing them to make rules that apply only to others and not to themselves (Lowe, 2008). Therefore, there is a general consensus that increased transparency within decision-making proceedings will be able to further legitimize Security Council actions. As such, when discussing UNSC reform it is important to understand that the mere increase of permanent members or of the Council more in general will not instantaneously translate into a more efficient or competent Council, but instead it is necessary for any form of Council reform to independently address the nature of the Security Council’s decision-making process and particularly the transparency under which these proceedings take place (Sarwar, 2011). Hence, as there is no question as to why UNSC reform is necessary, UN member states have already begun work in order to reach an agreement and there has already been attempts made at bringing about change to the Security Council and its structure.
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VI. Reform: Success & Failure

i. 1965 Expansion of UNSC Membership

As the reformation of the UNSC is by no means a simple task there have been many difficulties throughout the process, extending its discussion to a decades long debate. Yet, the initial means of reform, in the form of expanding the size of the Council’s membership, was implemented successfully. The discussion of restructuring the composition of the Council had received little support and had been rejected several times on behalf of the permanent members. However, in 1963, after UN membership increased from its original 51 states to 112, the need for reform could no longer be ignored or postponed (Lau, 2003). Therefore, in 1965 the UN Charter was amended to include resolution 1991 A (XVIII), on the expansion of the Council and state membership was incremented from 11 to 15 (Sarwar, 2011). Apart from reflecting the influx of new UN member states that followed the decolonization of several nations, the expansion was also meant to echo the increased membership in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Weiss, 2014). Therefore, after two decades since its creation the General Assembly decided to expand the number of non-permanent members from six to ten (Kugel, 2009), allocating five of the ten non-permanent seats to African and Asian states, one to an Eastern European state, two to Latin American states, and two to Western European (and other) states (Lau, 2003). The expansion of the Council was successful in its intended objective of being more representative of the new composition of the UN, however, today this same purpose has once again emerged and member states are calling for another expansion of the Council to reflect once more the growth in UN membership. Unfortunately, no one overarching solution that satisfies and protects the vested interests of the majority of members, especially those of the P-5, has been found. The following two sections will examine the history and potential of the two most popular proposals
for UNSC reform.

ii. Further expansion of non-permanent UNSC members

The topic of UNSC reform has been a matter of discussion for several years and in this time there have been several proposals made in order to frame what this change should look like. As noted above in drawing up proposals for reform the main implications of consideration have been equitable representation, power distribution and the enhancement of transparent transactions. With this in mind one of, if not the most, popular proposition has been to mimic the success of the 1965 Council membership expansion and to once more simply increase the number of non-permanent members sitting on the Security Council. As a result, the question of incrementing the number of Security Council member states was reintroduced as an agenda item for consideration in the GA in 1979 (Kourula & Kanninen, 1995). In the beginning, the supporters of commencing negotiation on this proposition in the Assembly included: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, India, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka (Kourula & Kanninen, 1995). The original proposal was in the form of a background paper, in which member states justified their joint initiative through the declaration that there was under representation within Council membership of the new UN members which had increased dramatically since the last expansion in 1965 (Kourula & Kanninen, 1995). It was argued that by increasing the size of the Security Council once more, that the issue of representation and in turn that of legitimacy would automatically be resolved. However, the initiative did not have sufficient support and thus during the General Assembly’s 1979 session, it was decided that the paper would only be included as a provisional agenda item to be discussed more at length at the next session (Kourula & Kanninen, 1995). This process of discussion in which addressing the issue directly, was constantly postponed continued for several sessions. However, during its
1992 meeting the GA placed the issue of Security Council reform on its agenda, where it remains today. This resulted in the formation of the, “Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council” (Working Group for short) (Kugel, 2009, p.3). The primary objective of this Working Group was for the UN to have a specific task force concentrated solely on Security Council reform efforts. Which is why the GA tasked the Working Group, whose membership is open to all UN members, to consult with fellow member states on how to proceed with the Security Council reform issue (Kugel, 2009). Yet, this time around the topic of expansion was not as simple. Member states have not been able to agree on the exact size of the expansion, on whether or not the expansion should pertain only to non-permanent members, and whether or not new members should be granted certain powers such as the power of veto, if they are granted permanent status. This division has resulted in the creation of different groups focused on promoting what they believe to be the most viable solution. For insistence, some UN members including: Italy, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Pakistan formed an interest group named, Uniting for Consensus. This group has focused on advocating an increase in the number of non-permanent members based on regional representation (Mahmood, 2013). In addition, the group has campaigned against incrementing the number of permanent seats on the Council. They have argued that this would only increase the number of member states classified as, “new centers of power” both inside and outside the confines of the UN (Mahmood, 2013). Furthermore, in December 2004, the Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, suggested two proposals for expansion, both of which consist of enlarging the Council to 24 members (Membership Including Expansion and Representation):
Model A proposes adding six new permanent seats, with no veto, and three new two-year term elected seats. Model B creates a new category of eight seats, renewable every four years, and one new two-year non-renewable seat (Membership Including Expansion and Representation).

Both these proposals highlight the contrasting views of UNSC reform, in which members do not see eye to eye. Expanding the number of non-permanent members has been the proposal with the most support for two main reasons. On the one hand, P-5 members, do not want other states to be granted permanent status as this would mean gifting them with powers, that could be used to lessen their own influence over Council decisions by giving these new members new forms of leverage during decision-making proceedings. On the other hand, smaller-weaker states do not want to see an increase in the number of states with overarching powers like the veto, as this would put them at an even greater disadvantage. Which is why Pakistan has called for increasing the number of non-permanent members in an effort to balance the power of veto of the P-5 members (Pakistan calls for increasing UNSC’s non-permanent members to check veto power, 2010). As a result of UN members not being able to reach a consensus, during the GA’s 2008 session member states agreed to move the deadlocked reform discussion from the Working Group to intergovernmental negotiations in an informal plenary of the General Assembly. In doing so member states unanimously adopted resolution 62/557 that would address five primary areas: categories of membership, the question of the veto, regional representation, size of an enlarged Security Council, working methods of the Council, and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly (Kugel, 2009). Overall, the proposal of expanding the number of UNSC non-permanent members does have an allure as a viable option as it could serve to increase representation and be used to counter-balance the P-5’s power of veto.

However, when looking for a reform option that will enhance effectiveness and legitimacy combined this option is still lacking. Depending upon how it is framed, simply increasing the
number of non-permanent members does not translate into a more competent institution. More does not always equate to better. Just because more member states sit on the Council does not mean that decisions will be reached more efficiently or that negotiations will be more transparent and thus legitimate. If anything, if the “wrong” states are granted a seat, negotiations could become harder, especially if the states do not have the international authority needed to back-up the positions they take. Furthermore, the states that have the most valid cases in demanding membership, mainly the G-4 countries, have a claim for permanent membership as a result of the power that they represent and the contributions they make to the Council.

iii. Expanding number of permanent seats

In discussing UNSC reform the most avidly discussed option has been, as previously mentioned expansion. Yet the shape of this expansion has been varied. The culmination of the Cold War in the late 1980s, shone a new light on the matter of Security Council expansion. As the division of power in the world had shifted member states came forward requesting they be granted a permanent seat on the Council. During this time both Germany and Japan began campaigning for permanent seats in addition to Italy who believed they also merited permanent status. However, with the development of the European Union (EU) and the prospects of a common EU foreign policy, Italy decided to withdraw its permanent seat request (Sarwar, 2011). In discussing, whether or not Security Council expansion should be in the form of increasing the number of permanent member states, the most important component under consideration has been for the Council to be reflective of the world’s current powers. As such, the primary candidates advocating for a permanent seat on the Council have been the G-4 members i.e. Germany, Japan, India and Brazil. The case for including these countries as permanent members is the strongest because of the global position they hold. Firstly, in 2016 Japan and Germany
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were the third and fourth largest contributors to the UN budget respectively, ahead of three of the current permanent members (France, UK and Russia) (See Appendix III) (The UN Security Council, 2012). Second, both India and Brazil’s bid is rooted in their claim of representing a large proportion of the population in the developing world, having rapidly growing economies, in addition to the fact that their contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping initiatives are vital (Mahmood, 2013). Although all G-4 members are great contributors of UN troops and essential contributors to the UN budget (See Appendices II & III), the permanent membership of these states has been consistently contested by at least some of the P-5 members, as well as other member states due to regional rivalries and internal national conflicts (Weiss, 2014). This unwillingness to recognize the important international position these nations represent is considered by some states as unjust because if these countries’ contributions supersede those of at least three of the permanent members why then should their role in the Council be of a lesser status (Tharoor, 2011). Specifically, in reference to Germany and Japan, whom under the UN Charter are still referred to as “enemy states,” as it was the victors of WWII (the Allied Powers) who drafted the Charter and created the UN. Moreover, the current composition of the Security Council’s membership impedes the recognition of state’s contributions to the Council’s work in the shape of; participation in peacekeeping missions and the evolution of world affairs in the more than six decades since the IO was created. Both India and Brazil are prime examples of this form of discrimination (Tharoor, 2011). However, three of the five permanent members (UK, France and Russia), recognizing that all G-4 countries play a vital role in UN activity, have voiced their support in granting these countries permanent status (The UN Security Council, 2012). However, there has been continual debate as to whether or not these states apart from being granted a permanent seat on the Council should also be given all the same privileges,
particularly the power of veto, that the original permanent members enjoy. Furthermore, there has been a contrast among the G-4 as to whether or not they would even be willing to accept a permanent seat without the power of veto. In the case of Brazil, Foreign Relations Minister Celso Amorim stated that, the Brazilian government would accept a permanent seat on the UNSC even if, as a new member, it did not have the power to veto decisions (Brazil would accept UNSC seat without Veto Power, 2015). On the other hand, India has denounced this rationale and claimed that new permanent members of the Security Council should have the same powers, including the veto, as the other permanent members (Indian foreign minister meets UN secretary-general, 2005). Aside from the issue of granting new members the Council’s most controversial power, another deterrent in issuing Germany and Japan’s permanent status lies in the regional uproar that could emerge. Firmly based only upon considerations of power Germany and Japan should be given permanent seats, however, doing so might result in political ramifications that could be detrimental to the international forum. Adding Germany and Japan to the permanent member line up could result in a North-South rivalry amongst members, which in turn could lead to clashes based on ideologies and vested national interests (Synder, 1997). This in turn would nullify the purpose of reforming the Council, which is to enhance the institution’s efficiency. Furthermore, though it is true that the G-4’s contributions and role within the Security Council should be formally recognized by awarding them permanent status, it is also true that if the veto remains in play this addition will not necessarily equate to a more valid international body. On the contrary, simply having more states with the power to veto Council decisions will lead to increased difficulty during the negotiation process, as there will be more members with the means of legally protecting their national interests. In addition, it is argued particularly in reference to India and Brazil, that the addition of these countries as permanent members would satisfy the
desire of developing member states to be more lucratively represented within the Council. Yet, the reality is that although both candidates are still categorized as developing countries their economic and political realities highly differ from the composition of truly less fortunate nations. Moreover, though it is not viable for weaker states (true representatives of the developing world) to be granted permanent membership as they lack the international power that could validate such a decision, these same nations must realize that the election of stronger middle powers such as India and Brazil might not be as beneficial to them as they might think. In other words, although permanent member states have been known to defend the interests of their allies, they never do so by prioritizing the needs of others over that of their own countries. Therefore, even though the need for reform is undeniable, the reality remains that states are either unwilling and/or unable to come to a consensus as to what method of reform will ultimately lead to the best improvement for the efficiency of the UNSC in its entirety.

V. Eliminating the Veto

In analyzing the current issues of legitimacy, transparency and representativeness for which reform has been called, one of, if not the primary root causes seem to trace back to the power of veto. However, of all the proposals suggested for UNSC reform arguably the most controversial and debated has been the elimination of the veto. Since it was amended into the UN Charter, the veto has always had its skeptics and critics who have seen this power as a mechanism that is both undemocratic and that delegitimizes the notion of “sovereign equality” for all UN members. As such, the following section will illustrate all the reasons why removing the power of veto from the Security Council will in turn enhance the organ’s effectiveness and legitimacy.
i. New World Order

A reason why member states are calling for UNSC reform to include the elimination of the veto is due to the fact that the same need that originally existed for the veto during the UN negotiation process in 1945, no longer applies to the current world order. The permanence which was a function of WWII, in which the pre-eminence of the victorious side was essential to garner their support, is no longer relevant in a world that has changed politically, economically, and demographically. In 1945, implementing the power of veto was closely tied to the creation of the United Nations. If the founders of the UN had voted against granting the permanent five members, the veto privilege than the US and Russia would have most likely not have accepted the creation of the IO. However, more than fifty years later, and the debate on the existence and use of the veto continues, reinvigorated by many cases of veto-threat as well as actual veto use (The Power of Veto). UN member states argue that the existence of veto power makes the UN operationally an oligarchy, allowing a few individual member states to control all critical outcomes (Howell, 1998). These states argue that if the world’s geopolitical system has changed, then the Security Council should be reflective of this new world (Security Council Reform). This is rooted in the fact that since 1945, though the world has drastically changed the Council has in response changed very little. Since the formation of the UN, some states have fallen, others have risen, UN membership has increased tremendously, the international distribution of power has shifted and globalization and new technologies have forever altered the way in which countries interact both diplomatically and in times of conflict. At a minimum two of the five members (UK and France) that both currently enjoy permanent status and the power of veto, no longer wield the same international authority and influence they did at the end of the Second World War. On the contrary, neither France nor the UK benefit from the same economic superiority and
influence of the past. Furthermore, once one of the most distinguishing and threatening characteristics of the Security Council’s five permanent members, was that these were the only countries with nuclear arsenals at their disposal. Yet, this previously exclusive club is beginning to be breached. Other nations are now acquiring, illegitimately or not, nuclear weapons for example, India and Pakistan (Beck, 2004). This showcases the fact that power, in this case enhanced by militarily threatening capabilities, is no longer concentrated solely in the P-5 members. Further, as noted above, G-4 countries like Japan and Germany have surpassed in international influence current permanent Council members. Therefore, as the world’s distribution of power has changed in response to international shifts in economic, political and military capabilities it only makes sense that IOs like the UN illustrate this change. It no longer makes sense for the Security Council to elevate in status countries that are arguably weaker in many sectors than other member states, merely because they were once on the winning side of an international conflict. Similarly, states, primarily Germany and Japan, should not be denied the recognition they deserve because they were on the losing side of a war over sixty years ago. Overall, since current holders of veto no longer merit such a power and because member states are reluctant to allow new states to acquire the privilege than the most obvious solution would be to dissolve the power all together. The world is always changing and as such so are the states that compose it and the international realm under which they operate. Thus, granting states a power like the veto, simply so the UNSC can be reflective of current times, will probably lead to the same predicament in another fifty years or so when the division of power shifts once again. So, instead of trying to anticipate whose acquisition of the privilege is currently justified and whether or not it will be justified in the immediate future, it would make the most sense to simply eliminate the cause of the discord. In addition, the veto has been one of the main reasons for the
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continual halt on UNSC reform as the permanent members continue to veto reform proposals. One of the main reasons the G-4 members have not been able to achieve permanent status on the Council, is because the P-5, particularly China, do not want these states to have this privilege. Therefore, since the structure of world affairs has and most likely will change again, it is quintessential for root causes to be expunged. In this case, it is the controversy of the power of veto. For sixty years this power has been denounced by the majority of UN members yet it is still enforced. This leads to the conclusion that if in all this time this mechanism has not been able to break away from its correlation with undemocratic and unequal practice, then it is no longer an issue of the current status of the world, but a clear indication that the tool itself is flawed. Eliminating the power of veto is not only the most viable option for reform because of the new world order, but it is also compatible with the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the veto has been less readily used.

ii. Minimal use since the end of the Cold War

The veto has been infrequently utilized in the post-Cold War era, which coincidently has also seen a vast increase in the implementation of UNSC resolutions. The stark rise in the adoption of Security Council decisions, particularly in the early years of the post-Cold War era, illustrates that member states can reach agreements without the need of the veto power. The end of the Cold War, saw the emergence of new patterns in regards to the use of the veto. For example, France and the UK have not individually cast their veto since the fall of Berlin wall, instead their most recent veto votes, were in conjunction with the US, to prevent the condemnation of the US invasion in Panama (The Veto: Security Council Report). Another change in the use of the veto has been in relation to China. Historically, China has cast the veto the least in comparison to the other P-5 members, however this has since changed. Since 1990
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China has cast eight of its 11 vetoes, including six since 2007. Furthermore, Russia has cast 13 vetoes in this period, 10 of which have been in the same 2007 timeframe. Contrastingly, the US has resorted to the veto 16 times since the end of the Cold War and has since become the P-5 member to have invoked the veto the most (Okhovat, 2011). However, though patterns have changed and some P-5 members have become more likely to invoke the veto than others, the overall pattern has been for a decline in its use. Though this regression of the veto certainly does not imply that the P-5 members are ready to give up this power it does serve to showcase that the veto power is not an essential component of the decision-making process. Furthermore, the correlation between the decline in the use of the veto and the increase in UN decisions, resolutions and approved missions, signals that the veto actually serves as an impediment to effectual state cooperation among Council members. This notion is further demonstrated in Appendix I, which shows that in the years immediately following the culmination of the Cold War, the period between May 1990 and May 1993, it was the longest period without the invocation of the veto (Okhovat, 2011). In general, the 1990s marked the beginning of the veto being invoked more and more extraordinarily. For instance, between January 1990 and December 1999 only nine draft resolutions were vetoed a number that only rose to fourteen during the early 2000s (Okhovat, 2011). This is a marked difference from the time of the Cold War when the veto was cast regularly, particularly by the US and Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, during this time the veto was utilized in order to botch the efforts these two superpowers deemed as detrimental to their stake in the war, to that of their national interests or to that of their allies. But, once the Cold War ended so too did the decades long resolution stalemate that had plagued the Security Council (Nicol, 1991). Though the current political environment is starkly different from those early years, particularly in reference to the delicate and once again tense
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relationship of the P-5 members, this does not diminish the claim that the UNSC can in fact
function and make decisions without the use of the power of veto. Additionally, the decrease in
veto implementation has not only allowed for the Council to reach decisions more efficiently, but
has also permitted its agenda to expand in order to include the new realities of international
conflicts. In the post-Cold War era the UNSC has prioritized peacekeeping missions, anti-
terrorism initiatives and post-war reconstruction. In other words, on average, the Security
Council has been able to reconnect with its core objective of maintaining international peace and
security. Furthermore, eliminating the power of veto coincides not only with a more cooperative
interaction between members, but with member states implementing different negotiation
mechanisms. The power of veto’s strongest attribute is the pressure it allows the P-5 members to
place on other member states in order to sway a decision in their favour. The use of the veto or
merely the threat of using it automatically predetermines whether or not a draft resolution will be
amended. However, in the last few decades with states less eager to invoke its power they have
had to utilize different methods of compulsion during the decision-making process. This in turn
has served to nullify the importance of the veto. Member states, inclusively the wielders of the
veto, are using less extreme yet more effective methods of persuasion. For example, the use of
political and economic pressures. Member states are more likely to use diplomatic methods, such
as trading member states for support on issues. For instance, the US might support the French
delegation on a matter if at a later time, France agrees to return the favour. Similarly, behind
closed doors certain member states may threaten economic sanctions in the form of taxes if other
members do not vote in their favour. These forms of negotiation though not technically more
ethical, serve to pressure states towards a consensus which is then reflected by a majority vote.
Contrarily, the use of the veto during a resolution showcases that a P-5 member does not hesitate
to go against the will of the majority in order to ensure national interests, which ultimately delegitimizes the decisions of the Council and is even detrimental to the image of the P-5 members constituting the veto. In other words, diplomatic pressure is the lesser of two evils. Whilst the veto maximizes the benefits for a few, diplomatic negotiation even in the form of pressure casts a wider net and tends to benefit a larger number of members. Not to mention the fact that UNSC decisions that are passed without the interference of the veto are considered to be more legitimate. Therefore, as the Security Council has been able to successfully increment its number of amended resolutions during a time in which the veto was hardly used (primarily the early years of the post-Cold War era), this leads to the conclusion that it is not absolutely necessary for effective Council decision-making. So, if there are alternative more legitimate methods of negotiation that do not reek of vested interests as the veto does, the most viable option would then be to eliminate it.

iii. A Status Symbol

Today, one of the veto’s primary roles is to serve as a reminder of international status. The veto power is essentially a status symbol not only within the United Nations but also within the confines of the international sphere. Unfortunately, the power of veto not only serves as a mechanism of exclusion, but it additionally symbolizes the division of power between the “haves” and “have-nots.” Overall, the P-5 members of the Security Council have gained special distinctions from other member states not only in reference to the power of veto. For example, the permanent members of the UNSC are also given permanent standing within other UN bodies, including the ECOSOC and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Mahmood, 2013). Furthermore, the citizenry of these five permanent members are granted increased possibilities of obtaining executive positions within the UN Secretariat (Mahmood, 2013). This only serves to widen the
perception by other UN member states that the five permanent members are adorned with elevated status within the IO, placing other members in a category of “second-class citizens.” This perception is supported further by the fact that the P-5 members are able to utilize the power of veto to denounce any General Assembly UNSC candidate nominee. In other words, the permanent members on the Council essentially control admission into the organ, limiting the ability of non-allies or developing countries from being elected. Similarly, in regards to the policy-making process, when it comes to the enforcement of Council decisions and even the imposition of sanctions, the “Big Three” (China, Russia & US) all tend to have double standards. Often times these three members make demands of other member states that they themselves are unwilling to accept or adhere to (Forsythe, 2012). Such as in the case of Nicaragua v. the United States of America (1986), in which the ICJ ruled in favour of Nicaragua and imposed sanctions on the US government, reparations which the US never paid because they did not agree with the court ruling (I.C.J, 1986). Though this ruling was issued by the ICJ and not by the Security Council it is still relevant, as it is the UNSC that that enforces decisions made by the Court. Yet, when it comes to enforcing decisions on the P-5, especially on the “Big Three,” the Council is unable to effectively fulfill its function. In fact, the US has previously threatened to veto peacekeeping operations if its request to have American peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) exempted were not met (Okhovat, 2011). For this reason, the veto only serves to perpetuate a feeling of entitlement, inclusively, a feeling of being “untouchable,” whereby the rules apply only to those who do not have the final say in the shape of the power of veto. Hence, in order to subside this ineffective notion of inequality, where it would seem that some nations are above the “law” it would be extremely beneficial to eliminate the power of veto. If member states continue to perceive the P-5 as members that do not adhere to the rules and that do not implement Council
Eliminating the Power of Veto

decisions made by the majority, then other members will begin to follow suit. If this form of non-compliance is perpetuated by other UN members, then not only the Security Council but the UN itself will become obsolete. UNSC members need to be reassured that the Security Council is in fact an IO that serves the will of the majority of the world’s powers and not just those of the top five. The Security Council needs to be viewed as an international mechanism that can operate semi-autonomously from the national interests of its members.

iv. A form of ensuring National Interests

Since its inception the veto has been utilized by the permanent members as an insurance policy, one in which the use or even the mere threat of invoking the veto has acted as a means for the P-5 to ensure the well-being of their own national interests or that of their allies. This role of insurance has been detrimental to the legitimacy of the body as the veto in many occasions has been implemented regardless of the will of the majority. In the time before the commencement of the Iraq War in 2003, both France and Russia claimed they would not support a new resolution sanctioning war, thus leading the US, UK and Spain to withdraw their petition and go to war without the authorization or support of the UN (Kafala, 2013). This highlights the tensions that were generated within the institution over the issue of Iraq because of the close national ties P-5 members had over the matter, particularly the United States (Berdal, 2003). The matter of going to war with Iraq was nationally tied to the terrorist attacks that had occurred on American soil on 9/11. Therefore, even though the Security Council denounced entering Iraq, the US remained adamant in its objective of demonstrating national strength and bringing the culprits to justice, and so they ignored the Council’s pronouncement and declared war. Overall, in recent times, the veto has been responsible for the inactivity and lack of official pronouncement on behalf of the Council on major international conflicts, not only in reference to Iraq in 2003 but also in; the
2008 conflict in Georgia, the 2009 massacre of Sri Lankan Tamils and the recent ongoing conflict in Syria (Okhovat, 2011). All of these examples showcase the way in which the permanent members of the Council use their power of veto in order to limit/guide the Security Council’s agenda. Furthermore, this illustrates a move away from the early post-Cold War days in which the veto was rarely used, back to a pattern in which the veto is invoked in order to further national gains. As was already shown these means of veto utilization is heavily inefficient and places the UNSC in a state of inaction and in turn irrelevance. Additionally, the P-5 members have been consistent in their use of the veto in order to control the items that make it onto the Security Council’s agenda. The permanent members have not been shy in using or threatening to use the veto in order to ensure a certain outcome or decision. Further, just as the permanent members have utilized the veto to limit and/or direct the issues and conflicts placed on the UN’s agenda, similarly they have also been able to ensure that matters they have no interest in are not given priority and thus left unattended (Boulden, 2006). There is no better example of the US exhibiting extreme power within the UN than in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US has on countless occasions thwarted the General Assembly from condemning Israeli policy and has used its power of veto to deflect criticism and UNSC action on Israel (Sid-Ahmed, 1999). For example, in 2006 the US cast two different vetoes on draft resolutions calling on Israel to halt military operations in Gaza, which were endangering civilians (Subjects on the Security Council Vetoes). The US’s relentless protection of Israel has been highly criticized by UN member states because on more than one occasion the US has been the lone defector on UNSC resolutions, which has resulted in the continual conflict and loss of life in the region (Bailey, 1998). However, due to the continual backlash American attitudes towards Israel are now changing. In its final months in office the former Obama administration decided not to veto
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a Security Council resolution for Israel to cease Jewish settlement activity (Morello & Eglash, 2016). This demonstrates that the US realizes it can no longer put its national interests with regards to Israel above international security and the legitimacy of its role within the Security Council. However, the continual use of the veto in order to ensure national interests has led to the veto being classified as an abusive power by the President of Iran, Dr. Ahmadinezhad during a GA meeting. The president stated that during the Lebanese war it had been evident that some P-5 members had used the veto to pressure other member states to postpone passing a cease-fire resolution in order to allow for their allies to reach their objective (Iran Press, 2006). He went on further to question how the UNSC can be expected to efficiently fulfill its job when those making the decisions are directly involved in the conflict (Iran Press, 2006). This demonstrates that member states question the legitimacy and overall effectiveness of UNSC action because of the P-5’s use of the veto power. Member states realize that the P-5 use the veto for national gain and in order to secure the Council’s influence is limited when they themselves are involved in an international conflict. Most recently, the lack of action on behalf of the Council in relation to the Syrian crisis has sparked many critics to denounce the power of veto even further, dubbing it as an impediment for UN effectiveness. In fact, the US, the member state most notoriously known to use the power of veto in order to pursue national interests, has blamed the Russian delegation for the Council’s inaction in Syria. The US has gone so far as to suggest that Russia’s veto power should be taken away, “…Russian vetoes threaten the Security Council’s legitimacy…it challenges its hegemonic agenda, blocking efforts to authorize war on Syria and other important actions” (Lendman, 2015). This has all led to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Hussein, to call for the immediate limitation of the permanent member’s veto power in order to be able to resolve the current humanitarian crisis in Syria (UNSC member’s veto
power key to global power balance, 2016). The unsustainable crisis in Syria has made it an international priority and is forcing member states, especially the P-5, to cooperate. Member states have grown increasingly concerned with the situation, especially since there have been reports of nuclear weapons being developed in Syria. It has become clear to UNSC members that Syria must be addressed directly in order for international peace and security to be protected, not to mention that it is not in any of the UNSC member’s interest for Syria to have access to nuclear weapons. As such, in late 2016 the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 2314 in order to extend the UN’s mandate for the Organization’s Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Joint Investigative Mechanism to include the responsibility of determining the use of chemical weapons in Syria (Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2314, 2016). Both Syria and the other examples mentioned here are only a handful of the examples that exist of the P-5 abusing their power of veto in order to further their nation’s well-being, which goes to show the magnitude of ineffectual decision-making caused by the veto. In fact, the veto power in recent times is only limiting the Security Council’s ability to act, which in turn discredits its purpose and role in the international system. As has been seen there are several proposals for UNSC reform, yet the most viable option is the elimination of the veto. Eliminating the veto would make the UNSC a more effective and legitimate institution. Firstly, it would automatically remove the ability of the P-5 from preventing a Council draft resolution, supported by the majority of members, from being passed. The current system allows for legislation that has been approved by a majority of votes of elected UN representatives, to be stifled by the ability of one country to veto. This not only goes against the will of the majority but also delegitimizes the UNSC decision-making process. Taking away the P-5’s power of veto would also enhance the body’s transparency as there would be a heavy decline in the need for the Secretariat or President
of the Council to meet with the P-5 behind closed doors in order to pass a resolution. This would allow for UNSC members states to feel that the organ is promoting a greater sense of equality and balance of power. Overall, the elimination of the veto would enhance the ability of the Council to further increase the number of resolutions it is able to pass, particularly in times of crisis, such as in the urgent case of Syria. Moreover, if one of the P-5 members themselves, the US, is even blaming the veto for Council inefficiency, be it the Russian veto or not, the underlining problem here still remains the power of veto. Therefore, it is clear that eliminating it from the institutional structure of the organ would in turn serve to improve the Security Council’s ability to react to international conflicts. Having illustrated the reasons why eliminating the power of veto from the UNSC would be the method of reform that would lead to the greatest enhancement of legitimacy and effectiveness of the international body, the final section of this paper will examine the implications such a reform would entail.

VI. Implications of Eliminating the Veto

Being able to theoretically justify the elimination of the power of veto is a much simpler task than actually having to examine the realities such a reform would encompass. Even though many have been able to substantiate why the elimination of the veto is the best option for UNSC reform, it is critical to examine whether or not this could ever be transformed from a proposition into an actual UN Charter amendment. Further, as this form of reformation is the most controversial, especially among the great powers, it is important to consider whether or not pursuing this method of change is worth the trouble. This section will thus consider these questions and examine the repercussions that would result from the UNSC eliminating the veto power. Firstly, in order for the veto power to be eliminated the UN Charter would have to be amended. Under Chapter XVIII Article 108:
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council (UN Charter, 1945).

Thus, this demonstrates that there are provisions under which the UN Charter could be amended. It is likely that if a proposition for eliminating the veto power were drafted and taken to the GA, that because the majority of UN member states denounce the power, that based solely on the number of votes need that the resolution could pass. However, the dilemma lies in that fact that all five permanent members would have to support such a resolution because if not, ironically under the Charter they could simply veto the proposal. Both Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter allow the five permanent members to use their power of veto to denounce any amendment to the UN Charter (Okhovat, 2011). Herein lies the major challenge facing any form of UNSC reform, obtaining the unanimous approval of all five permanent members. The P-5 members have historically been reluctant to any form of UNSC reform, but have especially condemned the elimination of the veto, as the majority feel that it will only serve to limit their power within the international body. Therefore, the P-5 members have been more supportive of a moderate expansion of the Council, in which either the number of permanent or non-permanent members is increased, however making sure that these new members permanent or not are not given their same privileges (Mahmood, 2013). This paper would agree that any form of Security Council expansion should not look to increment the number of veto holders. On the contrary, expanding the number of permanent members to include the G-4 countries is arguably a valid form of change in order to improve the representation of power within the UN organ, however granting these states the veto would only augment the number of states with the power to invalidate Council decisions in favour of national interests. Therefore, this paper would
recommend that in order to minimize the loss of authority of the P-5, which is an important motivator for their continual support and participation within the UN, that they retain their permanent status (Paul, 1995). The purpose here is not to discredit or unacknowledged the vital role the great powers of the world (P-5 & G-4) serve within the UN and all of its organs, rather it is to recognize that there is an efficiency problem generated by the power of veto. Therefore, as it is essential for the continual operation of the UN, that the key world players continue contributing to the organization, they should be allotted an elevated status in the shape of permanent residency, however, this influential role should no longer include their ability to veto UNSC and GA decisions. This leads to another possible implication if the veto were to be eliminated, the potential for the dissolution of the United Nations. As the P-5 members resented any opposition to their privileged status during the UN negotiation process and made the veto a necessary condition for their participation in the intergovernmental organization, it is likely that if the veto were to be removed that they, or at least some of them, would opt to withdraw from the organization (Mahmood, 2013). In 1945, the decision was clear either grant the P-5 the power of veto or renounce to any possibility of forming an IO with their support. The withdrawal of any number of the P-5, especially of the “Big Three” would eventually lead to the collapse of the UN, because without their participation the Council’s decisions would be practically irrelevant. Not only because of the major contributions each permanent member makes in the form of resources, but also because the idea of an IO without the participation of the world’s major authorities, would automatically invalidate the entire institution. Therefore, it is crucial for the UN member states to guarantee the approval of the P-5 members for any resolution directed towards the elimination of the veto to be successful. This need for permanent member, especially the US and Russia, approval is what has made pursuing this method of reform extremely
Eliminating the Power of Veto

difficult. Which begs the question, is the elimination of the veto worth pursuing? The answer here would be yes. Yes, seeking the dissolution of the veto is worth it because if achieved the benefits reaped by the Security Council in the forms of enhanced efficiency and validity would achieve without question the primary purpose of reforming the Council in the first place. There is no question as to why eliminating the veto is so controversial, but there is also no question as to the negative effects being fomented through its permanency. Yet, realistically it is highly unlikely that in the current global environment the P-5 would accede to the removal of their veto power. Particularly, the true test will lie in gaining the support of the “Big Three” as both France and the UK have recognized the deficiency of sustaining the power of veto. In fact, France has already put forth a proposal to limit the influence of the veto over Council decisions. In response to the atrocities of the Middle East and the Council’s continual inability to respond France has suggested that the veto power of the P-5 be limited in cases of humanitarian crises (Swart & Pace, 2015). This proposal echoed the sentiments of New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murray McCully, who expressed that allowing the use of the veto in times of grave international conflicts, in this case Syria, was causing the UNSC to lose international creditability (Security Council members should consider limited veto right, New Zealand tells UN debate, 2012). Though this proposal is not for the elimination of the veto but merely for its limitation, it showcases the growing frustration of UN members in reference to the veto power. Furthermore, initiating procedures to limit the veto highlights that the though the elimination of the veto might not by any means occur in the immediate future that it could be a possibility if it continues to thwart UN action. Though the objective at hand is challenging, it is not impossible. Furthermore, though slowly, some of the P-5 members are already beginning to realize that using the veto is becoming more and more challenging as it puts into question not only their credibility
but also their soft power within the institution. Which could mean that if the P-5 members can be
made to see that the benefits they are reaping from the veto no longer outweigh the costs of
invoking it, then there may be a window in which they could under the right circumstances be
persuaded to support its elimination. Overall, the UN in pursuing to reform its Security Council
must ask itself what change will have the most prolonged effect and how will it serve to improve
the international body in the long-run. If examined in depth the answer will be clear, from the
beginning the power of veto has been the most detrimental impediment of the UNSC and its
internal proceedings.

VII. Conclusion

In conclusion, the UNSC is the most prominent forum for international cooperation of the
twenty-first century. It is unique in its ability to issue legally binding resolutions, agreements and
sanctions. Overall, the Security Council is the only international body of this time, with the
means of promoting and maintaining international peace and security. Therefore, if member
states wish to sustain and ultimately improve the efficiency and legitimacy under which this
institution operates reform is inevitable. The UNSC must be reformed and member states all
generally agree on this point. It is evident that the Security Council is no longer a true reflection
of the current world order. The Council lacks greater institutional transparency during its
decision-making process. It desperately needs to be more reflective of the twenty-first century’s
geopolitical environment, if it hopes to continue to rely on the generous contributions of its
members. Overall, the question is not whether the UNSC should be reformed, but how? There
have been countless proposals in reference to reforming the Security Council, varying from
different deviations of expansion to the notorious elimination of the veto. Yet, this paper sought
to demonstrate that if the objective of UNSC reform is the overall improvement of institutional
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competency and legitimacy than the best option for restructuring would be the removal of the veto mechanism. This was done through an extensive review of the history of the UNSC, an analysis of why reform is necessary, an examination into reform proposals and finally an in-depth look at the flaws of the veto and what eliminating it would mean. Overall, it was demonstrated that the veto has done more harm than good in the realm of UNSC effectiveness. The veto has only continued to perpetuate a divide between UN members in which status and power are the sole measures of authority. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, the world saw the emergence of a new division of power in the international spectrum and the Security Council and its permanent members have yet to adapt. Therefore, though UNSC reform is a multi-faceted procedure it is vital to look beyond surface problems and correctly identify root causes of conflict. Member states should no longer permit themselves to be pressured into the will of the few. If the UNSC is expected to flourish and perpetuate the continual cooperation of its members, it must be able to operate without the over-shadowing of national interests. Overall, the Security Council must act as a true representative of international relations and sustain the will of the majority above the dissolution of the few.
Appendices

Appendix I: Changing Pattern in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council

Table shows number of times veto was cast, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>China*</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>USSR/Russia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>261</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1976-85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-55</td>
<td>(1*)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>83</td>
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Appendix II: Top 10 Contributing Countries to UN Budget

**Contributions to the UN Regular Budget in Percentage (2016-18)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>3.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7.921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix III: The top 10 providers of assessed contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations for 2016 are:

1. United States (28.57%)
2. China (10.29%)
3. Japan (9.68%)
4. Germany (6.39%)
5. France (6.31%)
6. United Kingdom (5.80%)
7. Russian Federation (4.01%)
8. Italy (3.75%)
9. Canada (2.92%)
10. Spain (2.44%)

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https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/40069.html

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