BERNARD OF AUVERGNE ON JAMES OF VITERBO’S DOCTRINE OF POSSIBLES: WITH A CRITICAL EDITION OF BERNARD’S REPROBATIO OF JAMES’S QUODLIBET 1, QUESTION 5 *

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Abstract

This paper first presents and discusses the Dominican theologian Bernard of Auvergne’s reprobatio of James of Viterbo’s Quodlibet 1, question 5 on the ontological status of divine ideas and possibles. It then examines the criticisms of that same doctrine by Godfrey of Fontaines and William of Alnwick, with a view to gaining a better understanding of the critical reception of James’s theory of possibles in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries. The critical edition of Bernard’s reprobatio follows in the appendix.

Key words

Ideas, divine knowledge, possibles, cognized object, act/potency

In question 5 of his first quodlibetal question, James of Viterbo defended the controversial thesis that possibles in the divine intellect are really distinct, in a qualified sense, from the divine essence.1

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Although James’s theory of possibles did not spark the same degree of passionate debate among medieval readers as those of, say, Henry of Ghent or Duns Scotus, it was nonetheless the object of close scrutiny by some major thinkers in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Thus Godfrey of Fontaines examines and criticizes it in the last sections of his Quodlibet 8, question 3, which is largely devoted to a critique of Henry of Ghent’s esse essentiae, an important source for James’s theory; and, some twenty years later, the Franciscan William of Alnwick, in his Quodlibet, wrote a lengthy and very detailed refutation of James’s doctrine.

The purpose of this contribution is to draw attention to a further critique of James’s doctrine of possibles – that of the Dominican Bernard of Auvergne – and to show how Bernard’s critical concerns echo some of those expressed by Godfrey and William. The hope is to gain a better understanding of the reception of James’s theory of ideas and possibles in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

Bernard, who was an ardent supporter of Aquinas’s theory of the real composition of being and essence, is perhaps best known for his polemical writings against Godfrey of Fontaines’ and Henry of Ghent’s criticisms of Aquinas’s doctrine, which were quite influential in the later Middle Ages. But he also wrote another series of less well-known and still unedited reprehensiones, i.e., refutations, targeting the first two Quodlibets of James of Viterbo – the most influential of the four quodlibetal disputations conducted by the Augustinian


3 Quodl., q. 8, ed. A. Ledoux, in *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de quodlibet [sic]*, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi, vol. 10 (Florence: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1937).

These *reprobationes* consist of detailed summaries of each article of James’s first two *quodlibeta*, with each summary followed by Bernard’s *reprobatio*. Bernard’s *reprobatio* of question 5 is one of his lengthier ones, and raises penetrating questions about James’s theory of divine ideas and possibles.

I will start (Section 1) by providing a summary of James’s theory as he presents it in *Quodl*. 1, q. 5, emphasizing those aspects of his doctrine on which Bernard focuses his critical attention in his *reprobationes*. I will then (Section 2) give an account of Bernard’s main counter-arguments, followed (Section 3) by a brief summary of the critiques of Godfrey of Fontaines and William of Alnwick. The final section considers whether James’s critics offer a fair characterization of his views. The critical edition of Bernard’s *reprobatio* of James’s *Quodlibet* 1, question 5, follows in the appendix.

1. James of Viterbo’s *Quodlibet* 1, question 5, in a nutshell

Question 5 of James’s *Quodlibet* 1 asks ‘whether the essence of a creature before it exists is a true being’. It is divided into three parts. James sets out his position in the first two parts, and presents and rebuts five objections to it in the third.

In part 1, James starts off by explaining that creatures before existence can be considered in two ways: from the point of view of God’s essence and from that of God’s power or causality. In the first way, a creature is identical with God; in the second, it is ‘other than and distinct’ from God, the reason being that power and causality both imply a relation to something distinct. James holds that it is possible

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5 It is unclear when Bernard penned this work. Almost nothing is known about his career and dates, except that he was a bachelor of theology at some point (there is no indication that he ever promoted to master), and that he was prior of the convent of Saint-Jacques in Paris in 1303, a position he was likely elected to shortly before that date. However, if we assume, following a suggestion of Mandonnet’s mentioned by Adriaan Pattin, that Bernard’s election as prior of Saint-Jacques put an end to his university career, that means that Bernard’s *reprobationes* would have been written within less than a decade of James’s first two *Quodlibets* (1293-1294). That would place them after Godfrey’s *Quodlibet*, which was written very shortly after James’s first *Quodlibet*, and at least fifteen years before Alnwick’s own *Quodlibet*. Regarding the dating of James’s first *Quodlibet*, see Wippel, ‘Dating of James of Viterbo’s *Quodlibet* I’ (see n. 2 above for the complete reference). For a brief account of Bernard’s critique of James’s theory of seminal reasons, see M. Phelps, ‘The Theory of Seminal Reasons in James of Viterbo’, *Augustiniana* 30 (1980): 271-283.

6 ‘Primo igitur modo, scilicet secundum quod res creatae sunt in Dei essentia ut essentia est, non accipiuntur ut a Deo distinctae, sed sunt idem quod divina essentia
to consider creatures in God’s knowledge (scientia) in the same two ways: as identical with God’s essence insofar as God knows his essence to be infinitely imitable, and as other than God insofar as God cognizes creatures as distinct from his essence. Creatures considered in the first way are what James calls divine ideas;7 considered in the second way, they are described as possibles or cognized objects.8 The purpose of the quaestio is to show that creatures considered in this second way are real in a robust sense.

James presents several arguments in support of this claim in part 2 of his question. One argument is that a cognized object has to be something, for the simple reason that ‘that which in no way is and is absolutely nothing is not (i.e., cannot be) cognized’.9 Another rather more involved argument is based on God’s mode of cognition. As the highest being in the order of nobility, God must possess the most perfect form of knowledge of things. But that is just to know things by or as their cause. God achieves this by cognizing his essence, ‘not simply insofar as it is his essence, but also insofar as it is a cause’.10 This means that God’s essence is both the cognized object (obiectum cognitum) – or, actually, what James elsewhere more properly calls the principal cognized object11 – and the ‘means [ratio cognoscendi] by which the effect, namely the creature, is known’.12 But if God knows something by cognizing his essence insofar as it is a cause, that is, as ratio cognoscendi, then he must know that of which he is the cause, for ‘it is always the case that that which is a ratio cognoscendi requires some other cognized thing’;13 and that cognized thing – or ‘secondary’ cognized object14 – must be truly other than the divine essence. James’s argument in support of this last claim is that, just as ‘nothing is a cause

[...] Secundo vero modo, scilicet secundum quod sunt in Dei essentia ut potentia et causa est, accepientur ut aliae et distinctae a Deo.’ James of Viterbo, Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 63, 34-38.
7 ‘Et ex hac cognitione, qua scilicet Deus cognoscit alia a se per suam essentiam ut causa est, sumuntur rationes ideales.’ Ibid., p. 64, 84-85.
8 ‘Si igitur cognoscit creaturas per suam essentiam ut causa est, oportet ponere aliquid alium a divina essentia esse obiectum cognitum.’ Ibid., p. 65, 99-100.
9 ‘Nam quod nullo modo est et omnino nihil est, non intelligitur; manifestum est quod creatura, etiam antequam sit in effectu, est aliquid ut obiectum cognitum.’ Ibid., p. 64, 67-69.
10 Ibid. p. 64, 79-81.
11 Ibid. p. 68, 232.
12 Ibid. p. 64, 91-92.
13 ‘Semper autem id quod est ratio cognoscendi sicut causa, exigit aliquid aliud cognitum.’ Ibid., p. 64, 92-93.
14 Ibid. p. 65, 233.
of itself, so too nothing can be a *ratio cognoscendi* of itself as cause’;\(^{15}\) in other words, if God is to truly cognize himself as a cause, he must needs cognize possible effects, and these perforce must somehow be different from him (otherwise the object of his cognition would not really be effects) and so, James thinks, must be real.

James observes that his position is identical to that of certain unnamed thinkers who claim that creatures before existing are ‘true things as exemplated’ – a pretty clear allusion to Henry of Ghent’s theory of the distinction between exemplar and exemplated thing.\(^{16}\) Just as this theory implies that there is a real distinction between exemplar and exemplatum, and thus that the *exemplatum* is a ‘real thing’, so too James’s theory entails that a creature as cognized object is distinct from that same creature qua divine idea, and so is itself a real thing.\(^{17}\)

James next goes on to explain that it is not necessary in order for something to be a (secondary) cognized object that it exist in actuality: it suffices for it to be possible.\(^{18}\) He then makes the crucial precision that the creature is possible not in virtue of anything proper to it (*potentia creaturae*), but by divine power alone (*potentia divina*). Creatures before existence as cognized by God are ‘true things’ in this sense. They are ‘more’ than mere beings of reason, but ‘less’ than actually existing beings. James calls them true beings in a qualified sense (*cum determinatione*).\(^{19}\)

To illustrate his position, James draws an analogy between creatures understood as possible or as cognized objects, on the one hand, and forms as existing in the potency of matter, on the other.\(^{20}\) A form before its full-fledged existence is something possible in matter. James takes this to mean that it is something real and distinct from matter. That he means ‘real’ here in a very robust sense is made clear by his

\(^{15}\) ‘*S*icut nihil est causa sui ipsius, sic nihil est ratio cognoscendi seipsum sicut causa.’ *Ibid.*, p. 64, 94-95.


\(^{17}\) ‘*O*portet ideam et ideatum, exemplar et exemplatum esse distincta, cum dicantur relativae, manifestum est quod creaturae, antequam habeant esse in effectu, sunt verae res ut exemplatae.’ James of Viterbo, *Quodl.* 1, q. 5, p. 65, 110-112.


\(^{19}\) ‘Et ideo, sicut dicitur quod creaturae antequam sint actu sunt verae res, cum hac determinatione scilicet ut obiectum cognitum, sic possunt dici verae res, cum hac determinatione scilicet ut possibiles, non quidem potentia creaturae sed potentia divina.’ *Ibid.*, p. 65, 120-123.

\(^{20}\) See *ibid.*, p. 65, 126 to p. 66, 136.
appeal to a text by Averroes to the effect that ‘the transition from potency to act does not yield an increase in the number but (an increase) in the perfection of being’. Creatures are, so to speak, ‘already there’ in the divine intellect (from which they are really distinct) in the number and variety they display once they are created in effectu; what they do not have is the perfection that accrues to them only as full-fledged existents.

James goes on to explain, this time with the help of Simplicius, that before actual existence possibles were ‘categorial beings’. In other words, they were sufficiently real to be subsumed under the various ‘predicaments’. This is an important precision: if possibles are subsumable under the categories, that means that they are not figments, but true objects of knowledge. Examples of figments are ‘chimaera’ and ‘goat-stag’; examples of ‘categorial beings’ that are true objects of knowledge are ‘man’ and ‘angel’. Of course, this understanding of possibility is not particularly novel in late thirteenth-century philosophy; what does make it novel is James’s additional claim that possibles are also real.

Although most of James’s discussion is framed in terms of whether creatures as cognized by God are truly beings before creation, the title of the quaestio, it will be recalled, was ‘whether the essence of a creature is a true being before it exists’. One of the last points James briefly examines before concluding part 2 of question 5 is whether this is in fact the case. Now it turns out that, according to James’s rather idiosyncratic theory of being and essence, the sentence ‘a certain essence is a being’ is not well-formed.

21 ‘Sicut supra dictum fuit per Commentatorem: “Translatio de potentia in actum non largitur multitudinem sed perfectionem in esse”, sic etiam creaturae, antequam sint actu, sunt aliquae res ut possibiles in Dei potentia. Et creatio non largitur multitudinem sed perfectionem in esse, quia, sicut post existentiam actualem est Deus et creatura, sic et ante ipsius existentiam actualem simul cum Deo erat creatura, non actu idest in propria natura, sed ut possibilis, scilicet in Dei potentia, et per consequens ut cognita in eius scientia.’ Ibid., p. 65, 128 to p. 66, 136.


a concrete term can never be predicated of an abstract one. However James tells us that if one is willing to concede for the sake of argument that the phrase ‘a certain essence is a being’ is well-formed, then the claim that ‘the essence of a creature is a being before creation’ would be true, provided ‘being’ is understood in the qualified sense.

In part 3 of his quaedestio James turns to the examination of five objections against the position he has just outlined. I’ll present objections 2 to 5, as Bernard has little to say about the first.

Objection 2 claims that James’s thesis that creatures as cognized by God are distinct from God is incompatible with Augustine’s claim that God before creation did not cognize anything ‘outside of himself’. James responds by appealing to the distinction between the ground of cognition (ratio cognoscendi) and the cognized object: insofar as God cognizes his essence, which is the ground of cognition, he does not cognize anything beyond himself; but insofar as creatures are the cognized object, he does.25

According to objection 3, if creatures before their actual existence are truly distinct from God and God cognizes them eternally, then something is coeternal with God – a heretical thesis. James responds that while nothing in the absolute sense (absolute) is coeternal with God, nothing prevents creatures as possible and cognized from being coeternal, at least in the qualified sense (cum determinatione).26

The fourth objection argues that actual existents must in fact coexist with God eternally just as essences do, since God knows possible essences as well as actual existents and knows them both in the same way – for according to Augustine God’s knowledge of things to be made is not different from his knowledge of those that are already made. The same argument had been directed at Henry of Ghent by Godfrey. Given the similarities between Henry’s theory of esse essentiae and James’s own doctrine of possibles, it was a natural enough objection to raise against the latter, and, as we will see, Bernard of Auvergne and William of Alnwick will do just that.27 James agrees that God eternally cognizes possibles and actual existents, but disagrees that this entails that existents are coeternal with God, for it is

25 James of Viterbo, Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 68, 218-229.
26 Ibid. p. 69, 238-244.
27 See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. 8, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, 37, and William of Alnwick, Quodlibet, ed. Ledoux (see n. 3 above), 462, 464. The objection is also found in Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 36, q. unica, in Ioannis Duns Scotti Opera Omnia, vol. 6 (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963), p. 281, 8-15.
eternity, not the actual existence of creatures, that is the measure of God’s knowledge.\footnote{[U]t aeternitas mensuret cognitionem Dei, non actualem existentiam creaturae.} Objection 5 argues that the only being creatures that are cognized by God have is cognized being \textit{in} God, not real being outside the cognizer. For if something exists only according to cognized being, then it exists only according to something that is in the cognizer; hence the cognized object cannot lie outside the cognizer. In his reply James once again appeals to the distinction between the ground of cognition (or principal cognized object) and the cognized object (or secondary cognized object). True enough, he explains, what is cognized is not distinct from the cognizer from the point of view of the ground of cognition, but the cognized thing itself may be distinct from the cognizer.

James concludes his question with a detailed discussion of a ‘uidetur quod sic’ argument he had presented in the introduction of his \textit{quaestio} when he was characterizing the competing points of view – namely, 1) that the essence of creature is a real being, and 2) that it is not. Since Bernard is critical of James’s response, it will be useful to recall both the argument and James’s answer to it.

The argument runs as follows:

That which moves the intellect is a true real being. But some things or essences that do not exist in actuality move the intellect. This is clear from the fact that science can be about things that do not exist in actuality. Hence, a created essence, before having existence in act, is a true real being.\footnote{Illud enim quod est motivum intellectus est verum ens reale. Sed res vel essentia non existens in effectu est motiva intellectus. Quod patet; quia scientia est de rebus etiam non existentibus in actu. Igitur essentia creatae, antequam habeat esse in effectu, est verum ens reale.} James in his answer explains that he agrees with the conclusion of the argument – i.e., that the essence is a true being before creation – but not with its minor premise that ‘some things or essences that do not exist in actuality move the intellect.’ For James, it is always the case that something that moves another from potency to act is itself in actuality. At this point, one might expect James to go on to explain that since science plainly is sometimes about things that do not actually exist, then the objects that move the intellect to knowledge are indeed in actuality, but only in a qualified sense, not in the full-fledged sense of actual existence. However this is not what he does. Instead,
he responds by appealing to an important principle of his theory of
knowledge to the effect that it is sufficient in order for some object \( A \)
to be understood, that the intellect be moved by some other thing, \( B \),
distinct from \( A \), that is either \( A \)'s cause or a resemblance of \( A \) or some-
thing having a particular agreement with, or standing in a particular
relation to, \( A \).\(^{30}\) Now it would not be surprising for an author who
believed that the only real being is real being in the absolute sense to
answer in this fashion. For according to such an author if knowledge
is had of non-existents, then there is nothing at all in reality (and in
particular no being in the qualified sense) that can ‘ground’ the
knowledge; that grounding would have to be provided by the cog-
nizer’s intellect. However, this is evidently not what James believes.
He thinks there are objects that have real being in a qualified sense.
Why then does he not say so in his discussion, and why does he appeal
to the causality of the cognizer? The answer is that the focus of James’s
discussion here is not on what kinds of real beings there are but on
whether it is always the case that real beings cause the knowledge that
is had of them; and James’s belief is clearly that it is not. This is par-
ticularly true in the case of God, whose knowledge of objects is not
casted by those objects. But while saying that God’s cognition is not
casted by objects, James may nonetheless still believe that there are
real objects in the qualified sense. As the foregoing account of his
views in *Quodl.* 1, q. 5, shows, he clearly does.

2. Bernard’s critique of James

Let us now turn to Bernard’s critique of James’s doctrine. The corner-
stone of James’s theory is the belief in the existence of two sorts of
real being: actual existents (or real beings in the absolute sense) and
possibles or cognized beings (real beings in the qualified sense).
Bernard wholly and unequivocally rejects that distinction. There is no
such thing as a real being in any other than the absolute sense (<1>).
He thinks that in postulating an additional class of real beings James
is guilty of a particularly crude form of *secundum quid et simplici-
ter* fallacy, namely inferring a thing’s reality from the fact that it is

\[^{30}\text{‘Non enim oportet, si aliquid scitur aut intelligitur, quod illud moveat intellectum. Sufficit enim ad hoc quod aliquid intelligatur, quod aliquid aliquid moveat intellectum, quod sit eius causa vel similitudo vel aliquam convenientiam et habitudinem habens ad ipsum.’ Ibid., q. 5, p. 71, 319-323. For the use of this principle in James’s theory of cognition, in particular Quodl. 1, q. 13, see my ‘La critique de la doctrine de l’abstraction de Jacques de Viterbe’, Medioevo 38 (2013): 235-262.}\]
cognized (<6>, <7>, <12>, <15>, <23>).

For Bernard, all there is are real things in the absolute sense and real things in a relative sense (secundum quid), having ‘existence’ only in the mind <15>. This pared-down ontology allows Bernard to construct Ockham-like arguments like the following one, with its rapid succession of disjunctions leading with apparent inexorability to the desired conclusion:

If you say that the cognized horse that is the cognized object is a true thing, I ask: what thing? Either a thing that is a horse, or a thing that is not a horse. If it is a thing that is a horse, then the following inference holds: ‘the horse is understood; therefore the horse exists’, and thus one would be proceeding from something’s being the case relatively to its being the case absolutely. If <it is> a thing that is not a horse, it cannot be anything other than God, inasmuch as the horse was understood by God eternally and so was not in actuality something other than God. But the divine reality is not some proper reality of the horse <15>.

According to Bernard, the kind of distinctness that accrues to a thing is a function of its mode of being. Since he believes that there are only two modes of being – being in act and being in potency – it follows that there will be two sorts of distinctness: distinctness in actuality, and distinctness in potency (<5>, <6>, <9>). Because creatures as cognized by God exist only in potency, the kind of distinctness that properly characterizes them is distinctness in potency. Although Bernard does not explicitly say so, we must assume that existing or being in potency does not denote a particular kind of being at all – otherwise he would be guilty of the same error as the one he decries in James. Rather, to say that something exists in potency in God is just to say that God is able to create that thing. Bernard appeals to the same act/potency distinction to account for the question of God’s relation to creatures: God is potentially related to the creatures he is capable of creating but has not yet created; and he is really related only to actually existing creatures.

Bernard does not think much of James’s arguments in support of the thesis that creatures are real beings before existence. One such argument, as we saw above, was that since ‘nothing is a cause of itself, so too nothing can be a ratio cognoscendi of itself as cause’. Bernard

31 Bernard directs the same criticism at Henry of Ghent: ‘non sequitur autem hoc est intellectum, ergo hoc est’, in Reprobatio decimi Quodlibet Henrici a Gandavo, ed. A. Pattin in ‘La structure de l’être fini’ (see n. 4 above), p. 732, 72-73.

32 This is the point Bernard appears to be making in Reprobatio decimi Quodlibet Henrici a Gandavo, ed. A. Pattin in ‘La structure de l’être fini’, p. 730, 1-8.
has two objections to this. The first is that since creatures exist only in potency before existence, they cannot really be causes of anything. The second is that the argument form is fallacious, for clearly, he reasons, causing oneself to exist is ‘harder’ than causing one to know oneself. But from the fact that some agent cannot carry a certain load it does not follow that he cannot carry half that load (<12>).

According to Bernard, James is right to contend that what is absolutely nothing cannot be cognized (<8>). He is also right to assert that for some thing to be cognized it is not necessary for it to exist (<14>). However, he is wrong to think that the only way of making a creature before existence a ‘something’ without turning it into an actual existent is to endow it with a sui generis extra-mental reality. For Bernard the reality of the cause, i.e., God, or of the similitude of the object existing in the cause, which is itself reducible to the reality of the cause, is a sufficient ontological ground for the creature’s intelligibility (<8>).

Since Bernard wholly rejects James’s distinction between two sorts of real being, it stands to reason that he should also reject the analogy James uses to illustrate that distinction. According to that analogy, which presupposes that matter and potency are distinct from each other, creatures are in the divine intellect in the way in which forms are present in the potency of matter. But Bernard denies that ‘the form insofar as it is in matter is other than matter.’ If the form in matter were distinct from matter, he argues, there would be two real potencies in matter, a view for which there is no support in Aristotle (<16> <17>).

As for Averroes’s claim that ‘the transition from potency to act does not yield an increase in the number but (an increase) in the perfection of being’, this should not be understood to mean that a creature’s form actually pre-exists in matter before its production. If anything, it might mean that matter pre-exists; more likely though, since it is composites that exist, it should probably be understood to mean that it is the composite that pre-exists in potency (<18>).

Bernard likewise thinks that James misinterprets Simplicius. A thing falls under a certain category in virtue of the real essence it has or is capable of having in reality, not in virtue of its being possible or being cognized, for these are merely accidental determinations of the essence (<19>).

Bernard closes his discussion of part 2 of James’s quaestio with a brief look at James’s answer to the question whether it is permissible to say that the essence of a creature is a being (<21>). As we saw above, James’s answer was that although he did not
consider the statement ‘an essence is a being’ to be well-formed, he
was willing to concede that if one did accept the predication as
permissible, then a creaturely essence could very well be called a
being. In his *reprobatio*, Bernard ignores James’s answer and takes
him to task instead for his views of ‘essence’ and ‘being’ as abstract
and concrete terms, respectively. He points out that *ens* is susceptible
of many definitions. If being is taken in Avicenna’s sense as imposed
from the act of being, then, true enough, being cannot truly be predi-
cated of essence. But being can also be considered from the point of
view of its commonness (*communitate*) to everything. In this case,
being is said to be divisible in act and potency, following Aristotle’s
definition in the *Metaphysics*, and the predication ‘an essence is a
being’ comes out as true. In sum, Bernard holds that James’s assertions
about the predicability of abstract and concrete terms fail to apply to
the ‘most common terms’, such as being, which are predicable of
everything.

Bernard next turns to James’s responses in part 3 of his *quaestio*
to consider the ‘doubts’ he had raised against his own theory.

In regard to objection 2, Bernard agrees that a distinction is
possible between God’s essence as *ratio cognoscendi* and the creature
as cognized by God, but he disagrees that one can argue from the fact
that ‘things […] are understood by the divine intellect as distinct at
the time of their existence’ to the conclusion that they have proper and
true reality. This is simply a case of illicitly moving from ‘*A* is thought’
to ‘*A* exists’ (<23>).

In his rebuttal of James’s answer to objection 3 – real things in
the qualified sense can be coeternal with God – Bernard explains that
he is willing to allow that creatures in God’s power or his knowledge
are coeternal with God, but suggests that this is not to allow much,
since creatures insofar as they are in God’s power are identical with
God.33 In any case, there is no reason to conclude that creatures so
construed have an additional ‘proper reality’ (<24>).

Bernard thinks that James is unsuccessful in countering the
fourth objection against his own theory to the effect that just as God
eternally cognizes the essences of things, so too he must eternally
cognize their actual being, so that creatures must pre-exist as ‘essences’
and as existents. His reasoning is that if James is going to say that

33 The same criticism is found in Bernard’s *reprobatio* of Godfrey’s third
Quodlibet: ‘cum nihil sit in eo [sc. in Deo] quod sit aliquid quam suum esse’. Reprobatio
tertii Quodlibet Godefridi de Fontibus, ed. A. Pattin in ‘La structure de l’être fini’ (see
n. 4 above), p. 693, 75.
there are eternal quiddities because God cognizes them, then he will have no choice but to say that actual existents are eternal as well, since God cognizes them too (<25>, <26>).

Bernard concludes his examination of James’s replies with a perfunctory look at objection 5. Once again, Bernard has no trouble acknowledging that creatures qua cognized are ‘in some way’ distinct from God, but he sees no need to conclude that they have ‘true reality’, i.e., that they are distinct in the robust sense demanded by James (<27>).

Let us now look at Bernard’s brief objection against James’s response to the ‘uidetur quod sic’ argument. This argument appeared designed to show that something real but non-existent can cause a cognizer to cognize it. However, the gist of James’s reply was to deny that it is necessary in order for an agent to know some object that the cognition be caused by that object; it is sufficient for the knowledge to be caused by something entirely different from it, viz., the cognizer himself or a resemblance of the object in the cognizer. To this Bernard mischievously comments: ‘Optime soluit’. Indeed, given that the thrust of Bernard’s solution to the puzzle posed by the ontological status of divine ideas is to say that their reality is none other than the reality of their cause, namely God, it is easy to see why he approves of James’s answer, since James appears to be defending the same view. But of course if this is really what James is doing, then, as Bernard is quick to point out, James’s solution to the ‘uidetur quod sic’ argument negates his entire case in favour of the existence of a class of ‘real beings’ distinct from actual existents (<28>).

In fact it is Bernard who misunderstands James here. Bernard believes that the object of intellection must be the efficient cause of intellection; and he probably thinks that if James is going to postulate the existence in the qualified sense of possibilia, it must be because he wants to make them play a causal role in the knowledge of non-existents in the absolute sense. He thus views James’s answer to the ‘uidetur quod sic’ argument – in which the object plays no causal role

34 The same argument as Bernard’s is found in Godfrey’s Quodl. 8, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, 37.
35 In his reprobatio of Quodl. 1, q. 12, Bernard writes: ‘Quod autem dicit quod anima formaliter se mouet, dicendum quod si formaliter intelligatur ut propria in natura sua habeat formam per quam est principium huius motionis specialiter quantum ad intellectum possibilem, falsum est; immo hanc formam habet ab obiecto.’ V 177vb; B 101ra. Further on, in the reprobatio of q. 14, he writes ‘quod autem dicit quod anima se cognoscit sicut alia, uerum est, non tamen fit ista cognitio per excitationem fantasie, immo illa fantasmata primo obiciuntur intellectui quem mouent, sicut obiectum mouet potentiam, licet hoc faciant in uirtute intellectus agentis’. V 178va; B 102ra.
– as inconsistent with that objective. But James, as we saw above, does not believe that the object of intellection is necessarily the cause of intellection. Thus, for him it is perfectly consistent to assert on the one hand that creatures ante existentiam have some sort of reality, and on the other that God is the cause of his own knowledge of them. The reason why James makes possibles real in a robust sense is not that they are the causes, but rather that they are the objects of cognition.

Despite this misunderstanding, there is no doubt that Bernard has faithfully captured the spirit of James’s position: James, as Bernard correctly saw, believes that there is a class of real things – cognized or possible beings – that is really distinct from the cognizer and from actual existents. Bernard denies this. For Bernard there is only one form of real being, actual being; and although creatures may be said to exist potentially in the divine intellect, this only means that God is able to make them exist actually, not that they possess in the words of Bernard a ‘propria realitas’ distinct both from God and actual existence. As for the objection that the cognized object per se, independently of its status as a potentially real existent, must surely be something, Bernard responds that its reality is none other than that of its cause (<4>).

3. Godfrey of Fontaines and William of Alnwick as critics of James

As I indicated in the introduction, James’s theory of ideas and possibles faced hefty criticism from Godfrey of Fontaines and William of Alnwick. Of course, there are significant philosophical differences between Godfrey and William, partly explained by the different contexts within which each was writing. Much of Godfrey’s metaphysics and psychology can be thought of as a reaction to Henry of Ghent; William’s philosophical agenda is largely shaped by his assimilation of and reaction to Duns Scotus, with whose theory of divine ideas he is in stark disagreement.36 Yet, as we will now see, despite these differences, there is much agreement between both men about what they think is wrong with James’s theory, and indeed much agreement between them and Bernard.

36 See O. Wanke, Die Kritik Wilhelms von Alnwick an der Ideenlehre des Johannes Duns Skotus (Bonn: Rheinische Friedrichs-Wilhelms-Universität, 1965).
a) Godfrey’s criticism of James

The key text here is Godfrey’s *Quodl.* 8, q. 3.37 The question is largely devoted to an exposition and criticism of Henry of Ghent’s doctrine that creatures before existence have a being of essence (*esse essentiae*) that is distinct both from their being cognized by God and from their being of existence (*esse existentiae*), but in the later sections of the question, Godfrey also turns to the related views of James of Viterbo in *Quodl.* 1, q. 5, offering short but scathing criticism.

Godfrey’s solution to the puzzle of a creature’s ontological status before creation rests on two distinctions. The first is a distinction between two kinds of being: diminished or cognized being, and real, extra-mental being. Diminished being is the being a thing has in the soul by virtue of its being cognized, ‘and that, Godfrey explains, is nothing else than the cognition of the thing.’ The second is the division of being into actual and potential being. Unlike Henry’s *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae*, which are metaphysical ‘parts’ of composites, being in act and being in potency each denote the whole composite, but considered in two ways: in potency when it exists in its cause, and in act when it exists in its ‘own nature’ (*propria natura*).38

Godfrey thinks that the puzzle surrounding the status of possibles can be satisfactorily resolved by appeal to these two principles. If one asks whether a particular thing or property, say rationality, before its instantiation has real being beyond its being cognized, the answer must be: ‘only in potency’, that is, only to the extent that God has the power to make that thing actually exist. Otherwise, considered in itself, ‘rationality’ has only cognized being. That, of course, is not to say that it is nothing at all, for ‘since its true real cause that contains it virtually is something real, the thing has being in it as in its cause.’39

Godfrey’s strategy for resolving the issue of the ontological status of the cognized object qua cognized is thus to shift the ontological weight from the object to the cognizer, God.

Let us now turn to Godfrey’s critique of James in the last section of *Quodl.* 8, q. 3. This critique is very short and quite repetitive.

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37 In addition to the articles by Gossiaux and Wippel listed in n. 1 above, see also by Wippel, ‘Dating of James of Viterbo’s Quodlibet I’ (see note 2 above for the complete reference).
38 ‘[N]on quidem secundum esse essentiae et existentiae, sed comprehendingo totam rem quantum ad utrumque esse qua realiter non sunt nisi unum.’ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* 8, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, 38.
Godfrey focuses most of his attention on the distinction introduced by James at the beginning of part 1 of his *quaestio* between the two ways in which God knows creatures: as identical with God’s essence, and as distinct from it. Godfrey thinks that the distinction is untenable, because it assumes that it is even possible for God to know creatures without knowing them as distinct. This erroneous assumption in turn reflects James’s failure to properly appreciate the difference between the actuality of God’s knowledge and the actuality of the thing known. It is true that God has actual, distinct knowledge of all possibles, both actualized and unactualized. But that does not imply that the things known enjoy actual or distinct being. To say that God knows creatures before their existence is just to say that ‘he knows them from the point of view of the otherness and distinctness that they are able to have in actuality and that they possess according to potential being’.

But even if one accepts the distinction between the two ways in which God knows creatures, namely as identical with his essence, and as distinct from it, Godfrey thinks it is still possible to give it an ontologically benign reading, one that does not involve endowing creatures as known by God as distinct from his essence with a ‘third being’ distinct from both real being and cognized being. Thus it is true that when creatures do not actually exist, God cognizes them as not actually distinct from his essence (in that sense they are identical with God’s essence); and it is just as true to say, insofar as creatures are really distinguishable from God, that God knows them as other and distinct from himself, i.e., as potentially distinct.40

The act/potency distinction is thus the key, in Godfrey’s eyes, to a proper understanding of God’s cognition of creatures. In the very last lines of the edition of *Quodl*. 8, q. 3, Godfrey repeats the phrase *nisi in potentia* – as in *non aliud nisi in potentia* – no less than eleven times, which might be as much an indication of the haste in which this passage was written, as of his irritation with James’s failure to grasp what was in his eyes a fundamental metaphysical principle.41

40 ‘Quod enim Deus intelligat creaturas in sua essentia ut essentia, et tamen non intelligat eas ut distinctas a sua essentia … hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo sic quod quando creaturae non habent esse in actu, cum sic non sint aliquid realiter distinctum in actu a Deo nec a quocumque alio, sic potest esse verum quod Deus res non existentes, possibiles tamen existere, et res existentes antequam existerent intelligit non ut distinctas actu a sua essentia, cum extra illam nullum esse reale habeant; sed cum habeant esse in potentia et sint res potentialae, hanc autem realitatem potentialalem secundum quam potentialae sunt realiter distinguibiles a Deo et ab invicem actu intelligi’. *Ibid.*, 49.

41 John F. Wippel has highlighted the importance of this principle in Godfrey’s metaphysics in his seminal *Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (see n. 2
To conclude this section, although Godfrey’s examination and critique of James’s theory of possibles is less detailed and less thorough than Bernard’s, it is clear that both authors agreed on two important and connected points: one is the appeal to the act/potency distinction; the other is the identification of the being of cognized objects with the being of God.

b) *William of Alnwick’s critique of James*

William of Alnwick in question 8 of his Quodlibet offers a much more detailed and thorough analysis of James’s views in *Quodl*. 1, q. 5, than Godfrey did. His critique is part of a larger project, namely establishing a theory of divine ideas in which ideas are identified exclusively with exemplars in the divine essence, and are no longer viewed as requiring a correlative cognized object or intelligible being. The arguments William directs at James are both more numerous and more varied than those of either Bernard or Godfrey. William evidently views James as a particularly clear illustration of the tendency found in other authors (the most notable ones being Duns Scotus and James of Ascoli) to reify the contents of the divine mind. Examining William’s discussion in full detail is beyond the scope of this article. It will be sufficient for our purposes to consider William’s reaction to five key theses or arguments he identifies in James’s question.

The first is James’s distinction between the essence qua essence and the essence qua power or cause. James, it will be recalled, had claimed that creatures insofar as they are present in God’s causality or his power are really distinct from God’s essence, because cause and power by definition both imply a relation to something distinct. William rejects this distinction: as productive power, God is really related to creatures insofar as they have a ‘being of existence’, that is, insofar as they really exist, for it is really existing things that are produced by God. Thus if creatures eternally present in God’s power were really distinct from God’s essence, that would mean that creatures would be eternally distinct from God according to a being of existence, an erroneous view – as well as a heretical one.⁴²

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⁴² ‘Si ergo creaturae, prout sunt in potentia divina ab aeterno, sunt distinctae a Deo ex natura rei, sequitur quod creaturae secundum esse existentiae fuerunt distinctae ab aeterno a Deo, quod falsum est, quia sic fuissent actu ab aeterno.’ William of Alnwick, *Quodl.*, q. 8, ed. Ledoux, 465.
William also rejects James’s claim (this is thesis 2) that God’s cognition of creatures by means of his essence qua *ratio cognoscendi* requires a corresponding cognized object, at least if this is understood to mean that the cognized object must be real. One consequence of such a view, William points out, is that since God cognizes not only the essence but also the existence of creatures (at least of those creatures that will actually exist), the creature’s existence would be eternally distinct from God. More fundamentally, though, it is simply wrong to believe that the *ratio cognoscendi* as cause requires some corresponding object in real being: if roses were annihilated, the species rose could still be in the soul without it requiring some cognized thing distinct or really distinguishable in real, representative, or possible being.

William also sees no reason to accept James’s thesis (thesis 3) that creatures as present before their existence in God’s science (*scientia Dei*) are distinct from God. What is true, William contends, is that God eternally cognizes creatures distinctly (*distincte*), not that he cognizes them to be distinct (*esse distinctas*) from him and one another. The reason here is a simple one: ‘that creatures before their existence are not distinct from God or one another, because what is nothing is not distinct from anything.’

A further point of disagreement concerns James’s understanding of the term ‘idea’. In particular, William objects to James’s assertion (thesis 4) that idea and *ideatum* (the ‘ideated’), exemplar and *exemplatum* (the ‘exemplated’), are really distinct in act on the grounds that they are relative terms. What is true, William retorts, is that the exemplar *in act* and the exemplatum *in act* are distinct in actuality; but there is no real distinction as long as the *ideatum* (which William calls the *ideabile*) and the *exemplatum* (which he calls the *exemplabile*, i.e., the ‘exemplatable’) are in potency, which is the case of creatures from eternity.

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44 ‘[C]reaturae, antequam sint, non sunt distinctae a Deo nec inter se; quod enim nihil est a nullo distinctum est.’ *Ibid.*, 467.

45 ‘Et ad illud quod additur quod idea et ideatum, exemplar et exemplatum, cum sint relative, sunt distincta in actu, dico quod, licet ita sit quod idea in actu et ideatum in actu, exemplar in actu et exemplatum in actu distinguantur, non tamen distinguantur quando ideabile est in potentia et exemplabile in potentia, sicut fuit creatura ab aeterno.’ *Ibid.*, 468.
Finally, William takes note of James’s comparison between creatures as distinct realities in God’s cognition on the one hand, and the forms as distinct in the potency of matter on the other – a comparison James thought was supported by Averroes’s assertion that ‘the transition from potency to act does not yield an increase in the number but (an increase) in the perfection of being’.\(^{46}\) However, William believes that this comparison is only effective if one subscribes to the doctrine of the inchoation of forms; it is ineffective against those who believe, as William does, that forms in no way pre-exist in matter: before existence, forms are simply ‘not other than matter’. The same holds true of creatures in God’s power: on the one hand, ‘a creature as long as it is in potency in the power of the agent is not that agent or God’ (presumably because something non-existent cannot be identical with or distinct from something existent); on the other hand, ‘the creature, according to the ratio by which it is in the power of the agent, is not distinct from the agent, because that ratio is nothing other than the agent’s power.’\(^{47}\)

As with Bernard and Godfrey before him, William clearly does not think that James’s arguments in favour of *possibilia* as real beings that are truly distinct from God’s essence are in the least conclusive; creatures ‘per se’ as cognized by God do not have any ‘real being’ other than the being of the cognizer. Moreover, William shares Bernard’s and Godfrey’s view that James’s error stems from a failure to adequately appreciate the difference between potential and actual existence.

4. Bernard, Godfrey, and William as Interpreters of James

Having examined the criticisms of James’s account by Bernard, Godfrey and William of Alnwick, one question that naturally comes to mind is whether these criticisms are *fair*. I have already suggested that Bernard misunderstood James’s treatment of the ‘uidetur quod sic’ argument in *Quodlibet* 1, question 5. However, while the issue raised by this argument, namely the issue of the cause versus the object of intellection, is an important one in its own right, it is somewhat

\(^{46}\) *Aristotelis metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et epitome* (Venice: Apus Iunctas, 1562), fol. 224A.

\(^{47}\) ‘Sic est in proposito: creatura antequam fiat, dum est in potentia agentis, non est agens nec Deus; et tamen creatura, secundum illam rationem qua est in potentia activa agentis, non distinguitur ab agente, quia illa ratio non est nisi virtus agentis, sicut illa ratio secundum quam compositum est in potentia materiae non est nisi in potentia media secundum quam est totum in potentia.’ *Ibid.*, 469.
peripheral to the problem of the ontological status of possibles. What I would therefore like to do in this last section is to briefly consider whether our three thinkers’ criticisms do justice to the Augustinian Hermit’s doctrine. I will limit myself to two questions that seem to me to be particularly important in this regard. First, is it the case that James does not grasp the act/potency distinction, as both Godfrey and Bernard charge? Second, is it the case that James’s theory commits him to saying that creatures qua existents are eternal, as Bernard and William both explicitly contend (see in particular Bernard’s rebuttal of James’s answer to objection 4 above (<25> and <26>), and William’s objection to James’s thesis 2)?

Regarding the first question, if the charge is that James hasn’t been rigorous in his application of the act/potency distinction, then there is a very clear sense in which the accusation is simply wrong. James is very careful and perfectly consistent in his use of these terms in the context of his theory. He reserves the word ‘actual’ and its cognates to refer exclusively to existing things. At no point in Quodlibet 1, question 5 – or elsewhere in his works for that matter – does James ever use the term ‘actual’ to refer to possibles. Granted, James does say that the possibles are real beings in a qualified sense, and that does suggest that they are actual in a sense of the term that Godfrey and Bernard would find objectionable. At the same time, however, James is very clear that possibles are real by the power of God,\footnote{See the passage quoted in n. 19 above.} by which he presumably means that they are real in the sense that God is capable of creating them. But this is not very different from the way in which Godfrey understands possibles. To see this we need only turn to Godfrey’s discussion of ‘categorial beings’ in his Quodl. 8, q. 3.\footnote{See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. 8, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, 40-41.}

In this section of the question, where he is arguing against Henry of Ghent’s esse essentiae, Godfrey explains that only those things that are possible objects of science are ‘categorial things’. Thus a non-existing rose, but not a chimera, can be said to be a ‘categorial thing’, because scientific knowledge is possible of the rose but not of the chimera. The reason for this, Godfrey explains, is not that non-existing roses possess a particular being of essence in themselves (esse essentiae secundum se), but rather that they possess real being in their causes (esse essentiae in causis suis); and that is just to say that the rose is such that God can create it or that it can be generated in matter. A non-existing rose is thus truly a substance because God can create it, Godfrey concludes; it is not however truly a substance in the
absolute sense (simpliciter) since it does not yet exist, but only in a qualified sense (cum tali determinatione).

Godfrey and James thus both agree that there is something ‘special’ about possibles, something that distinguishes them both from ficta and from bona fide existents; and they both agree that the reality of possibles is ultimately due to God’s causality. The difference between them is that James wants to say that possibles are such, not only by virtue of the fact that God can confer existence upon them, but also because they enjoy a distinct, irreducible kind of being – something denied by Godfrey (and by Bernard). To sum up, although James firmly situates possibles among real beings, he never refers to them as actual; and while it is true that James’s possibles are probably ‘more actual’ than Godfrey or Bernard would allow, the way in which James conceives of possibles is, in the end, not that different from the way in which Godfrey conceives them.

What about the second question? There is, at first glance, an obvious sense in which the accusation that creatures for James must be eternal not only qua essences but also qua existents runs afoul of James’s most explicit statements. To give just one example, in question 6 of his Questions on the Divine Categories, James writes that ‘things according to what they are in actuality were not eternally distinct from God, since they did not exist eternally’. But of course the fact that James explicitly ruled out that creatures quoad existentiam are eternal does not mean that he could not have been committed to this very view without realizing it – say because he did not realize it was implied by an important thesis he did subscribe to. This seems to be the tenor of Bernard’s objection in <26>. To recall, Bernard’s argument was that since James believed that quiddities are eternal because God cognizes them eternally, he had no choice but to accept that existences are eternal, since, clearly, God cognizes existences eternally too. However, Bernard is clearly wrong about James thinking that quiddities are eternal. Unlike Henry of Ghent, at least on a certain reading of Henry, it is not the case for James that essences are eternal properties of creatures to which existence accrues following an act of divine will. As I indicated previously, essence and existence for James are properly said of really existing things. It therefore makes little sense, on James’s view, to speak of quiddities as existing eternally before creation. What ‘exists’ eternally are quiddities as cognized, i.e., quiddities

50 ‘[Res], secundum quod sunt actualiter, non fuerunt ab aeterno aliud a Deo, quia non fuerunt actu ab aeterno.’ Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, q. 6, ed. Ypma, p. 182, 1050-1051.
as possibles; and the whole point of James’s argument is that quiddities as cognized are not the same as real quiddities. Likewise, in the case of existence, what is eternal is the creature’s existence as cognized by God, which is distinct from that creature’s existence:

One must say that the essence of a creature as much as the creature itself, or also its being, can be considered as either possible or in actuality; before it is essence in being in actuality it is something inasmuch as it is possible. This is why it was said above it makes no difference whether one enquires about the essence of a creature or about its being or about the creature itself, for each of these, before existing in actuality, is something in God’s power insofar as it is possible.\textsuperscript{51}

It is far from clear, therefore, whether Bernard – and hence William, whose argument is much the same – has much of a case against James in regard to the second question either. This is not to say that Bernard (or Godfrey and William) was not right about what is perhaps the most salient feature of James’s theory of possibles, namely James’s belief that possibles enjoy real true being that is distinct from God and creatures \textit{in effectu}. On this central point, Bernard and his secular and Dominican confrères, seem to have been spot on.

\textbf{Ratio edendi}

Bernard’s \textit{Reprobationes} are extant in five manuscripts.\textsuperscript{52} They are:

\begin{itemize}
\item V Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borghesiani 298, fols. 157ra-201va;
\item B Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. theol. lat. fol. 226, fols. 77ra-125vb;
\item E Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Codex Amploniana 321, fols. 63ra-92rb;
\item K Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 1577, fols. 96ra-132rb; and
\item T Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale 744, fols. 156r-192r\textsuperscript{53}
\end{itemize}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{‘Sic igitur est dicendum quod tam essentia creaturae quam ipsa creatura, vel etiam eius esse, potest accipi vel ut possibile vel ut in actu; et antequam sit in actu essentia vel esse est aliquid ut possibile. Ideo dictum est supra quod, quantum ad hanc quaestionem, nihil differt quaerere vel de essentia creaturae vel de esse ipsius sive de ipsa creatura, quia quodlibet horum, antequam sit in actu, est aliquid ut possibile in Dei potentia.’ \textit{Quodl.} 1, q. 5, p. 69, 256-261.}
\footnote{See Pattin, ‘La structure de l’être fini’, 681-682.}
\footnote{For the description of V, see A. Pelzer, ‘Les manuscrits de l’Italie et de la Cité du Vatican’, pt. 3 of J. Hoffmans and A. Pelzer, \textit{Étude sur les manuscrits des}

\end{footnotes}
The five witnesses divide into two groups: VBT, and EK. V and B, which are independent of each other, are by far the most reliable witnesses of the first group, while T, which depends on B, is evidently the work of a very inattentive copyist. As for E and K, although neither is the copy of the other, the texts they present are very similar. However, in many cases where they offer readings that differ in common from VBT, these readings make little sense. I have chosen V as the basis for the edition, mainly because it is the only witness that contains no major omission (though it does include two dittographies). B, by contrast, although I have found it to be virtually just as reliable, despite offering slightly different readings, has one long omission in <2>. I have followed V in all cases, except when it offers a reading that is clearly grammatically incorrect (in which case a grammatically correct reading was found in one or more of the other witnesses and was retained for the edition), or when all the other witnesses offer a reading that fits in the context as well as V’s, in which case I retained this consensus aliorum codicum for the edition, deeming it to reflect the reading of the archetype, and relegated V’s reading to the apparatus. In the one instance (<12>) where V offers a reading that is ungrammatical and no other witness provides a grammatical variant, I have supplied my own conjecture in angle brackets. V’s variants are the only single variants recorded in the apparatus; systematically recording the unusually high number of obvious individual mistakes, in particular but not only those of T, would have inflated the apparatus to unwieldy proportions with little if any gain in critical insight. Although I have not taken into account scribal self-corrections, I have signalled the interlinear and marginal corrections made by a second


54 E was not copied on K since K omits a passage (<7>), but not E. But nor was K copied on E, as E omits passages in <3> and <5> that are not omitted by K.
hand in the Berlin manuscript by means of the siglum B1. Finally, with a few exceptions, I have retained the original orthography, but I have followed modern conventions governing punctuation, the capitalization of proper names (as well as substantives used in lieu of proper names), and the italicization of titles.

Abbreviations used:

add. = addidit, addiderunt;  
corr. = correxit;  
hom. = homoioteleuton;  
inv. = inuerterunt;  
iter. = iterauit;  
om. = omisit, omiserunt;  
prae. = praemisit, praemiserunt;  
<...> = textus ab editore suppletus;  
(?) = lectio incerta editoris.
<REPROBATIO PRIMI QUODLIBET IACOBI DE VITERBIO>

<Reprobatio quinte questionis>

<V 164ra B 85va E 68va K 101va T 163rb>

<1> Non conceditur communiter opinio\(^1\) quam tenet, scilicet quod res antequam sit in effectu sit uerum ens reale ut objectum cognitum et ut possibile.\(^2\) Si enim res antequam essent in actu habeant aliquam realitatem, aut illa erat eadem cum realitate divina, aut alia.\(^3\) Si eadem, cum\(^4\) realitas divina non sit dicenda creatura nec realitas creature,\(^5\) non est dicendum quod creatura habeat aliquam realitatem propria antequam sit. Si alia, ergo cum illa realitas non incepert, erit ab eterno distincta a deo; fides autem nichil ponit ab eterno nisi deum.\(^6\)

<2> Preterea. Ila realitas ex quo est aliquid distinctum a deo, aut est facta aut non. Si facta, cum\(^7\) ergo\(^8\) nichil ponatur factum\(^9\) ab eterno, ipsa non erit eterna, cuius contrarium iste dicit\(^{10}\). Si non facta, ergo erit deus, quia ens reale\(^10\) non\(^11\) productum deus est.

<3> Quod autem dicit quod non habent realitatem absolute sed ut objectum cognitum et ut possibile,\(^{12}\) dicendum est quod uerum est quod habuerunt realitatem ab eterno ut objectum cognitum et ut possibile non conceditur K contra dictam determinationem opponitur, quia conclusio quam tenet, scilicet quod res antequam sit in effectu sit ens uerum reale ut objectum cognitum et ut possibile non conceditur E

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\(^1\) opinio\] conclusio BT
\(^2\) Non conceditur communiter opinio\] conclusio BT … possibile\] Contra dictam determinationem opponitur, quia conclusio quam tenet, scilicet quod res antequam sit in effectu sit ens uerum reale ut objectum cognitum et ut possibile non conceditur K Contra dictam … impossibile non conceditur E
\(^3\) alia\] et alia add. EK
\(^4\) cum\] om. B corr. B1 tamen T
\(^5\) creature\] causale B corr. B1
\(^6\) nichil ponit ab eterno nisi deum\] nichil ab eterno nisi deum ponit EK nichil ponit ab eterno cum deo T
\(^7\) cum\] om. VBT corr. B1
\(^8\) cum ergo\] inu. EK
\(^9\) ponatur factum\] inu. EK
\(^10\) ipsa … ens reale\] om. BT
\(^11\) non\] ut T nec corr. ex non B1
\(^12\) ut creatura est\] om. EK
\(^13\) res est\] inu. BT
\(^14\) non est dicendum\] dicendum non est EK

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\(^1\) Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 69, 251-252.
\(^{11}\) Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 65, 120-124.
ab eterno realitatem, nisi cum additione, non obiecti cogniti, sed ut fuerunt in essentia et imitabilitate diuina.

<4> Similiter, quod dicit quod habuerunt esse reale uerum ut possibile, dicendum quod non, quia realitas effectus in causa non est alius quam causa, et ideo asinus secundum quod fuit possibilis ab eterno non habuit aliam realitatem quam diuinam antequam esset.

<5> Quod ergo dicit quod res inquantum est in potentia dei est aliquid distinctum a deo, dicendum quod non est aliquid distinctum secundum actum ita quod realitas quam habet antequam sit sit distincta a deo, sed eo modo quo est distincta esse est, et ideo distincta est in potentia uestiqua in potentia solum est.

<6> Item. Intellectus diuinus qui fertur supra rem non solum secundum quod possibilis est sed etiam supra actualitatem quam aliquando habitura est in tempore, apprehendit eam ut distinguibilem pro tempore quo distincta est et in potentia solum est. Vnde uerum est quod Deus ab eterno apprehendit asinum esse distinctum ab eo pro tempore quo asinus actu distinctus est a deo. Sed propter hoc non sequitur: ergo asinus ab eterno est distinctus a deo secundum actum. Proceditur enim ab esse cognito ad esse uerum et reale et est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.

<7> Idem etiam processus est in alio dicendo sic: asinus fuit distincte intellectus a deo ut obiectum cognitum, ergo fuit habens aliam ueram realitatem. Fallacia est secundum quid et simpliciter, quia aliquid

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15 ab eterno realitatem
16 imitabilitatem
17 aliam realitatem
18 distinctum secundum actum
19 sit
20 deo
21 esse
22 possibilis est
23 aliquando habitura est
24 et
25 actu in praem.
26 erit pro tanto
27 propter hoc
28 a cum
29 proceditur
30 etiam processus est
31 distincte
32 est

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iii Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 65, 120-125.
iv Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 71, 309.
potest esse objectum cognitum absque hoc quod habeat aliquam propria realitatem, quia ad ipsum intelligendum sufficit perfecta cognitione cause effectus autem secundum quod est in causa non habet propria realitatem adhuc, sed solum realitatem cause, ex qua non potest concludi aliqua propria realitas in effectu.

<8> Per quod patet solutio ad confirmationem suam cum dicit quo quod omnino nichil est intelligi non potest. Dicendum quod urum est quod illud quod nullam realitatem habet nec in se nec in sua causa nec in suo similii intelligi non potest; res autem antequam essent etsi propria realitatem non habebant, habebant tamen realitatem cause quod secundum intellgebat quod perfecte intelligerentur.

<9> Patet etiam quod Deus nobilissimo modo cognoscit res, ut dicit, quia per se ipsum ut causa est. Sed quod implicat quod ex hoc sequitur quod res sunt distincte secundum actum a deo et ab eterno, quod probatur, quia causa refertur ad causatum, unde deus secundum quod causa refertur ad creaturam in qua est respectus realis, respectus autem reales non fundatur in non ente, dicendum est quod causa secundum actum refertur ad causatum secundum actum et causa in potentia ad effectum in potentia. Vnde antequam equus esset, deus ut causa in potentia referetur ad eum, et non actu, et

33 intelligendum] intellm BEK
34 cognitio] cause secundum quod add. B1
35 cause] causa est B anime T
36 quod] quid EK
37 causa] que add. E causam T
38 propiriam] umeram EK
39 aliqua] alia EK
40 cum dicit] om. EK
41 nichil] non EK
42 potest] res autem antequam essent etsi propria realitatem habet, nec in se nec in sua causa nec in suo similii intelligi non potest iter. V
43 cause sue] sue cause EK
44 Patet etiam] et patet EK
45 per] om. EK
46 implicat] implicatur EK
47 sequitur] om. EK
48 et ab eterno, quod] om. EK
49 probatur] probat V inprobatur E inprobatur quo pro actu K
50 causatum] causam E creatum T
51 est] om. BT
52 unde deus … causatum] om. per hom. EK
53 eum] deum B equm B1

*Quodl.* 1, q. 5, p. 64, 67-68.

*Vi Quodl.* 1, q. 5, p. 64, 73.
ideo nulla relatio actualis erat equi ad deum, sed potentialis que fundari potest in ente in potentia eo modo quo est in potentia; istam tamen relationem in potentia deus intellexit actu ab eterno, ita quod actu intellexit extrema

istius relationis, non quod actu essent, sed quod actu intellecta essent. Hec enim non contradicunt, scilicet quod intellectus actu in <V 164va> telligat id quod actu non est, sed in potentia solum, sicut patet in nobis. Vnde actu intelligo rosam que solum est in potentia.

<10> Et inde est quod intellectus diinus non imitatur per hoc quod extrema relationis ipsius ad creaturam que prius erant in potentia quantum ad alterum saltem, scilicet quantum ad creaturam, postea fiunt extrema relationis secundum actum, quia deus semper intellexit actu talem relationem, licet ipsa non fuerit semper in actu. Et per consequens intellexit creaturam ut distingui bilem uel distinctam in potentia ab eterno, uel etiam intellexit eam pro tempore pro quo distincta est secundum actum, sed ex nullo istorum potest concedi quod ab eterno sit distincta secundum actum.

<11> Quod addit quod semper illud quod est ratio cognoscendi alterum oportet esse aliud ab ipso, si intelligeret quod nichil potest sibi esse ratio cognoscendi, falsum esset, quia essentia diuinam est sibi ratio cognoscendi et similiter essentia angeli cum angelus intelligit.

<12> Nec ualet probatio sua cum dicit quod nichil est sibi causa ut sit, ita etiam nec ut cognoscatur. Hoc autem simile non est, quia res <B 86ra> antequam sit non potest esse causa nec sibi nec alterius, sed postquam

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54 sed potentia referebatur ad eum et non actu, et idee nulla relatio actualis erat equi ad deum
55 iter. V
56 extrema] esse EK
57 actu] multa add. EK
58 essent] iter. T essentia E
59 scilicet quod] inu. V
60 id] illud EKT
61 ipsius] om. EK
62 quantum] quam B corr. B1
63 scilicet] om. EK
64 fiunt] sint BTE
65 ut] om. BT
66 in potentia] om. V
67 etiam] om. V
68 erit] erat BKT
69 concedi] concludi B1 T
70 esse aliud ab ipso] quod sit aliud ab eo EK
71 intelligit] intellexit BT
72 hoc] et praem. B ex T

vii Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 64, 94-95.
est potest esse causa non sui\textsuperscript{73} simpliciter sed sue cognitionis in alio uel etiam in\textsuperscript{74} se si sit nature cognitiiue ut angelus. Vnde idem argumentum facit ac si diceretur: "Iste non potest ferre\textsuperscript{75} C, ergo nec L". Vnde procedit a maiori ad minus negatiue et fallit secundum consequens. Maius enim est quod res producatur in esse uero quam quod ipsa producat <T 163vb> se in esse cognito in alio cum esse cognitum sit esse secundum quid respectu esse ueri. Vnde patet quod alicquid potest sibi esse causa ut cognoscatur, licet non ut sit simpliciter\textsuperscript{76}.

\section*{<13>}
Quod autem postea dicit\textsuperscript{viii} de duplici consideratione essentie diuine, dicendum quod uerum est, sed per hoc non concluditur quod res sint actu distincte, sed distinguibiles; bene tamen concluditur quod deus intelligit eas ab eterno in actu et distinctas secundum actum non ab eterno sed pro tempore pro quo erunt, ut dictum est. Vnde fallit secundum quid et simpliciter, ut dictum est\textsuperscript{77}, cum dicit\textsuperscript{viii}: "Intellexit ab eterno res distinctas\textsuperscript{78} <K 102ra> secundum actum pro tempore quo erunt, ergo ab eterno sunt distincte secundum actum", non plus sequitur quam si argueretur sic: "Intellexit secundum actum res ab eterno futuras\textsuperscript{79} in tempore, ergo res fuerunt ab eterno". Sicut enim intelligere humanum non ponit\textsuperscript{80} rem in actu, ita nec diuinum nisi addatur uoluntas qua\textsuperscript{81} uelit rem esse in actu proprio.

\section*{<14>}
Notabile autem quod\textsuperscript{82} ponit uerum est, scilicet quod\textsuperscript{83} ad hoc quod res intelligatur non requiritur actualis existentia; et addi potest <E 69ra> quod nec realitas propria, sed sufficit realitas sue cause uel presentia\textsuperscript{84} sue similitudinis.

\section*{<15>}
Vnde quod addit quod res dicuntur uere res ut objectum cognitum est oppositum in adiecto, quia esse uero objectum cognitum non est uera res, sed secundum quid, sicut et esse cognitum. Vnde dicere quod equus intellectus sit uerus equus uel sit uera res\textsuperscript{85}, nichil est. Si enim dicas\textsuperscript{86} quod equus

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73} non sui]\textsuperscript{inu.} EK
\item \textsuperscript{74} etiam in]\textsuperscript{intra} EK
\item \textsuperscript{75} ferre]\textsuperscript{facere} EK
\item \textsuperscript{76} sit simpliciter]\textsuperscript{inu.} EK
\item \textsuperscript{77} Unde fallit secundum quid et simpliciter, ut dictum est]\textsuperscript{om. per hom.} EK
\item \textsuperscript{78} ab eterno res distinctas]\textsuperscript{res distinctas ab eterno K res ab eterno E ab eterno rem distinctam} T
\item \textsuperscript{79} secundum actum res ab eterno futuras]\textsuperscript{ab eterno secundum actum res futuras} EK
\item \textsuperscript{80} ponit]\textsuperscript{potest} EK
\item \textsuperscript{81} qua]\textsuperscript{BT}
\item \textsuperscript{82} autem]\textsuperscript{quod} add. ET
\item \textsuperscript{83} scilicet quod]\textsuperscript{inu.} V
\item \textsuperscript{84} presentia]\textsuperscript{principii} EK
\item \textsuperscript{85} uerus equus uel sit uera res]\textsuperscript{uera res uel uerus equus} EK
\item \textsuperscript{86} dicas]\textsuperscript{dicatur} EK
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{viii} Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 65, 96-102.
\item \textsuperscript{ix} Cf. Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 69, 252-253.
\end{itemize}
intellectus\(^{87}\) qui est obiectum cognition sit uera res, quero que res est: aut res que est equus\(^{88}\), aut res que non est equus. Si res que est equus, ergo sequitur: equus intellectus est\(^{89}\), ergo equus est\(^{90}\); et sic procedetur\(^{91}\) a secundum quid ad simpliciter. Si res que\(^{92}\) equus\(^{93}\) non est, non potest alia esse\(^{94}\) quam deus, secundum quod equus fuit intellectus a deo\(^{95}\) ab eterno et sic fuit alia res secundum actum quam deus. Realitas autem diuina non est aliqua propria realitas equi et ideo nullo modo \(<V\ 164vb>\) dicendum est quod si res\(^{96}\) fuerunt ab eterno ut objectum cognitum quod propter hoc habuerunt\(^{97}\) aliam\(^{98}\) propriam realitatem. Nec\(^{99}\) similiter per\(^{100}\) hoc quod fuerunt possibles ab eterno potest concedi quod habuerunt\(^{101}\) aliam\(^{102}\) realitatem in actu antequam essent nisi in potentia dei et nisi realitatem que deus est, non autem que\(^{103}\) sint ipse res sicut questio querit.

<16> Quod autem probat per simile de forma que preexistit in potentia materie, dicendum primo quod non est simile de rebus que nullo modo preexistunt nisi in potentia agentis et per consequens non habent realitatem nisi agentis secundum actum et de forma que si sit in\(^{104}\) potentia materie, habet alem realitatem \(<B\ 86rb>\) a realitate agentis. Tamen simpliciter dicendum est\(^{105}\) quod forma prout est in materia non est aliud quam materia. Vnde nullam realitatem habet alem a potentia materie, quia si poneretur forma preexistere in materia in potentia, aut esset eadem realis potentia cum potentia materie, et sic eadem esset\(^{106}\) realitas forme ut est in potentia et ipsius materie, \(<\text{aut esset alia et realis}\.\text{}>\). Si ponatur alia et realis, tunc in materia erunt due realis potentie ante\(^{107}\) inductionem forme in actu quorum una erit materia et alia non. Hanc autem potentiam realem non posuit Aristoteles qui non ponit nisi

87 intellectus\(\) intelligit EK
88 aut res que est equus\(\) om. B quia aut res que est equus B1
89 ergo … est\(\) iter. V
90 equus est\(\) inu. EK
91 procedetur\(\) proceditur EKT
92 que\(\) est add. EK
93 equus\(\) ergo add. EK
94 alia esse\(\) inu. EK
95 a deo\(\) om. EK
96 res\(\) non E om. K
97 habuerunt\(\) habuerint BT
98 habuerunt aliam\(\) aliam habuerunt E habuerunt aliam K
99 Nec\(\) sic VB om. T
100 per\(\) propter EK
101 habuerunt\(\) habuerint BT
102 aliam\(\) propriam add. EK
103 que\(\) quod EK
104 in\(\) om. E de K
105 est\(\) om. EK
106 eadem esset\(\) inu. EKT
107 ante\(\) q\(\)n V autem K
tria principia\textsuperscript{108} nature: materiam, formam, et priuationem. Ergo forma si existeret in potentia materie non haberet aliam\textsuperscript{109} realitatem a materia ut sic.

<17> Secundo soluitur planius, quia materia non est per se in potentia\textsuperscript{110} ad formam nisi receptitua, sed per se est in potentia ad compositum. Ad id\textsuperscript{111} enim quod per se sit et per se existit materia est in potentia et hoc non est forma sed compositum. Vnde materia est in potentia ad totum compositum quod per se sit in actu. Iste autem loquitur de\textsuperscript{112} forma ac si per se fieret et <T 164ra> ac si per se existeret\textsuperscript{113} in potentia materie, quod non conceditur a maioribus.

<18> Dictum autem Commentatoris\textsuperscript{x} uerum est quod translatio de potentia ad actum non largitur multitudinem sed perfectionem, quia totum quod fit actu per se prius erat in potentia. Non autem sic est intelligendum quod\textsuperscript{114} forma uel aliquid forme preexistat ante generationem, quia nichil ipsius preexistit, nec tamen\textsuperscript{115} creatur, quia non fit sed compositum cuius pars preexistit, scilicet materia uel etiam\textsuperscript{116} totum in potentia.

<19> Quod autem\textsuperscript{117} post\textsuperscript{118} dicit\textsuperscript{xii} quod ad hoc quod res in predicamento sit\textsuperscript{119} sufficit quod sit in potentia et\textsuperscript{120} in esse cognito, dicendum quod res per essentiam suam ueram quam nata est habere in rerum natura est in predicamento, non autem secundum quod possibilis, nec secundum quod cognita, quia ista duo esse sunt esse secundum quid et essentie secundum quid, secundum que nichil reponitur in predicamento. Nec alius intellexit Simplicius\textsuperscript{xii} nisi quod res ad hoc quod sit in predicamento sufficient quod sit essentia que

\textsuperscript{x} Averroes, Aristotelis metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eodem commentaris et epitome, in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. VIII (Venice: Apus Iunctas, 1562), fol. 224A.

ue\textsuperscript{121} preexistent\textsuperscript{122} uel\textsuperscript{123} nata sit preexistere.\textsuperscript{124} Tamen ut est in predicamento abstrahit et ab actuali existentia et a possibili et ab esse cognito. Omnia enim ista sunt preter rationem essentiae absolute considerate et\textsuperscript{125} ut est in predicamento.

\textless 20\textgreater  Ad illud ergo\textsuperscript{126} quod concludit pro solutione questionis, patet ex dictis quod non oportet dicere quod non existit secundum.

\textless 21\textgreater  Quod autem addit\textsuperscript{xiii} quod non est propria predicatio “essentia\textsuperscript{127} est ens,” dicendum quod si ens acciperetur solum\textsuperscript{128} pro eo quod existit secundum quod dicit Avicenna quod ens imponitur ab actu essendi, uerum dicit. Si tamen ens accipiatur in sua communidade quod dicit\textsuperscript{129} actum et potentiam, sic uera est ista: “essentia\textsuperscript{130} <K 102rb> est ens.” Nec tenet quod dicit\textsuperscript{xiv} de concreto et abstracto in terminis communissimis, quorum predicationem\textsuperscript{131} nichil potest effugere, et hoc maxime uerum est in nomine entis, propter quod etiam Philosophus 3\textsuperscript{o} Metaphysic\textsuperscript{e}V dicit quod ens non <B 86va> potest esse genus, quia nichil est de quo <V 165ra> ens per se non predicetur. Genus autem non predicatur per se\textsuperscript{132} de\textsuperscript{133} differentia\textsuperscript{134}, ut dicit.

\textless 22\textgreater  Ad dubitationes <E 69rb> autem\textsuperscript{135} quas ponit, prima non est contra dicta.

\textless 23\textgreater  Ad secundam\textsuperscript{136} cum dicit\textsuperscript{xv} in solutione quod licet ratio cognoscendi non distinguatur a deo, quia est\textsuperscript{137} essentia divina, tamen\textsuperscript{138} objectum cognitum distinguuntur, dicendum quod uerum est, sicut dictum est, non tamen propter

\begin{thebibliography}{13}
\bibitem{xiii} Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 66, 158-163.
\bibitem{xiv} Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 66, 159.
\bibitem{xv} Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. III, 3, 998b22 ff.
\bibitem{xvi} Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 68, 218-229.
\end{thebibliography}
hoc potest concludi quod res que ab intellectu diuino intelliguntur ut distincte pro tempore pro quo erunt, sint\textsuperscript{139} habentes realitatem propriam et ueram\textsuperscript{140}, immo est fallacia secundum quid, ut dictum est.

<24> Ad tertiam\textsuperscript{141}, quod dicit\textsuperscript{14} quod res in scientia dei et potentia sunt coeterne deo, dicendum quod uerum est, sed propter hoc non potest concludi\textsuperscript{142} quod in aliqua\textsuperscript{143} propria realitate sint ei coeterne, quia ut in potentia eius sunt\textsuperscript{144}, sunt idem\textsuperscript{145} quod ipse, ut autem\textsuperscript{146} in scientia, non habent\textsuperscript{147} nisi esse cognitum, quod longe est a uera\textsuperscript{148} realitate.

<25> Ad quartam dicendum quod obiectio bona est\textsuperscript{149}, quia sicut deus cognouit ab eterno quiditates rerum, ita\textsuperscript{150} et existentias; ergo qua ratione ponuntur\textsuperscript{151} quiditates eternae\textsuperscript{152} – quia scilicet deus cognouit eas – eadem ratione et existentiae\textsuperscript{153}.

<26> Nec ualet solutio quam dat\textsuperscript{154}, quia uerum est quod deus ab eterno\textsuperscript{155} cognouit res in actu et pro actu quem habiture erant in tempore, sed non sequitur propter hoc quod fuerunt\textsuperscript{156} ab eterno, unde obiectio remanet insoluta, quia uera est et eternitas mensurat diuinam cognitionem, non autem rem cognitam. Si autem uerum esset quod dicit\textsuperscript{157} quod quiditates sunt eterne, quia a deo cognoscentur ab eterno, oporteret quod sicut cognitio diuina mensuraret eterne, ita et res cognita que ab eterno esset, et sicut quiditates rerum, ita et\textsuperscript{158} existentiae, quod dicendum non est.

\textsuperscript{139} sicut VT sed utEK
\textsuperscript{140} et ueram] eternam EK
\textsuperscript{141} tertiam] 3\textsuperscript{m} K 33 T
\textsuperscript{142} concludi] om. B habere B1
\textsuperscript{143} aliqua] alia EK
\textsuperscript{144} sunt] om. V
\textsuperscript{145} sunt idem] inu. EK
\textsuperscript{146} autem] sunt add. EK
\textsuperscript{147} habent] esse add. EK
\textsuperscript{148} uera] om. BT
\textsuperscript{149} bona est] inu. EK
\textsuperscript{150} ita] om. EK
\textsuperscript{151} ponuntur] ponunt EK ponentur T
\textsuperscript{152} eternae] eternas E
\textsuperscript{153} et existentiae] debent ponere existentias eternas E dicunt ponere existentias
\textsuperscript{154} deus ab eterno] ab eterno deus EK
\textsuperscript{155} fuerunt] fuerit V fiunt B
\textsuperscript{156} quod dicit] om. EK
\textsuperscript{157} et] sic E et sic K

\textsuperscript{xvi} Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 69, 238-240.
\textsuperscript{xvii} Quodl. 1, q. 5, p. 69, 251-268.
\textsuperscript{xix} Cf. Quodl. 1, q. 5, 69, 252-255.
Ad quintam dubitationem patet ex dictis, quod licet creature inquantum objectum sint distincte aliquo modo a deo, non debet concedi quod propter hoc habeant aliquam ueram realitatem antequam sint.

Ad argumentum primum optime soluit, quia ad hoc quod res intelligatur sufficit realitas cause vel presentia similitudinis. Vnde in solvendo istud argumentum uidetur destruere totum fundamentum quare posuit res habere ueram realitatem antequam essent in actu.

Ad secundum etiam satis soluit.

Per dicta ergo patere potest ad omnia que dicit.

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