Abstract

Mobility, as the ability among newcomers and citizens to move temporarily and circularly across international borders and between states, has become a pervasive norm for a significant portion of Canada’s population. Despite its pervasive nature and the growing public interest, however, current research has been limited in how Canadian policies are reacting to the ability of citizens and newcomers to move. This thesis seeks to fill that gap by analyzing Canada’s treatment of mobility within and across policies of immigration, citizenship and foreign affairs. An analytical mobility framework is developed to incorporate interdisciplinary work on human migration and these policy domains. Using this framework, an examination of policy developments in each domain in the last decade reveals that they diverge in isolation and from a whole-of-government perspective around the treatment of mobility. In some instances policy accommodates or even embraces mobility, and in others it restricts it.
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Introduction

In the summer of 2013 then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird travelled to Hong Kong to award Richard Li the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee Medal, an honour recognizing good citizenship for making a “significant contribution to a particular province, territory, region or community within Canada,” or “an achievement abroad that brings credit to Canada” (The Office of the Secretary to the Governor General, 2013). Richard Li is the son of Asia’s richest man, Hong Kong business tycoon Li Kai Shing and both the elder and younger Li are Canadian citizens. They gained their citizenship sometime in the last thirty years along with tens of thousands of other Hong Kong people around the time of the territory’s 1997 transition from a British colony to Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Richard Li has invested in several Canadian ventures; he and his father own a major Canadian based petroleum company, Husky Oil, and he has also heavily invested in the Canadian banking industry (Chase, 2015). At the same time, by all public accounts, the Lis resides full-time in Hong Kong where the vast majority of their business empire is located.

The intricacies of this situation are worth emphasizing. Richard Li, a dual-citizen, and full-time resident of Hong Kong was awarded a medal of good Canadian citizenship in a foreign territory by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Chase, 2015). The narrative of Mr. Baird and the Lis is an indication of the complex interactions between the Government of Canada’s immigration, citizenship and foreign policy, and an increasingly mobile Canadian citizen population. In 2006 the population of external citizens alone was estimated to include 2.9 million people, or nine percent of Canada’s political community (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2011).

Practices such as long-term residency outside of a country of citizenship, and the acquisi-
tion of multiple-memberships are meanwhile becoming increasingly contentious political issues. While a significant proportion of these external citizens are residents of the United States, and dual-citizens by birth rather than by naturalization, the smaller population of naturalized citizens and first and second generation dual-citizens living across the globe have attracted far more public and political attention. Events such as the evacuation of Canadian citizens from Lebanon in 2006 galvanized public awareness of the practices of this growing population (see Turner, 2006). Questions of loyalty, participation and the respective responsibilities of citizens and polities interacting outside of the territory of the state have arisen from this increased awareness in many multicultural, developed democracies with large newcomer and naturalized citizen populations, and in particular in traditional immigrant states such as Canada. Accusations of certain groups being ‘citizens of convenience’ and ‘passport shoppers’ (Turner, 2006; Harder & Zhyznomirska, 2012; Park, 2013) have led to public and policy discourse over the meaning and value of citizenship, and whether citizenship rights should be maintained for those who choose to move, live, and work outside of the country and maintain membership in other political communities. The political debate over the meaning and value of practices of external and dual citizenship, and the expectations of membership and participation has similarly entered a critical era of importance for Canadian society. A traditional conceptualization of immigration as a process of displacement from a homeland or state of origin followed by citizenship and long-term residence in a new country does not capture practices of mobility.

The Canadian government, in particular under Stephen Harper until October 2015, has meanwhile introduced extensive legislation to address aspects of the ability of newcomers and citizens to move across Canada’s borders. The attempt to control the ability of individuals to
move is reflected in a broad basket of policies, each narrowly defining the access to and exclusion from rights associated with mobility and displacement from the territory of the state. For example, immigration and citizenship policy focusing on selecting new residents and citizens based on their human capital has significantly narrowed the definition of who meets the qualifications to enter Canada for permanent residence. Policy over the past several decades has increasingly sought to select economic immigrants for the domestic labour market over other classes of immigrants (Reitz, 2005). Residency rules for acquiring citizenship meanwhile offer a fluctuating set of options that give newcomers the ability to reside most of their lives outside of Canada. At the same time, new citizenship policies have also attempted to restrict the rights of dual-citizens and external citizens who have the ability to live in other countries, by increasing the threat of citizenship revocation and other penalties such as loss of voter rights (Justice Canada, 2015d). Although some policy changes have attempted to limit the ability of newcomers and citizens to move, mobility as the right of every citizen “to enter, remain in and leave Canada” nonetheless continues to be enshrined in Section 6 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms (see Constitution Act, 1982). In many instances beyond this, policies appear to diverge between this right of mobility and the expectations of newcomers to become full members of Canada’s traditionally conceptualized domestic political community.

Public awareness and policy changes have meanwhile coincided with a growth in academic interest in the phenomenon of mobility among citizens and newcomers. One of the first authors to conceptualize the ability and desire of newcomers to remain mobile after acquiring permanent resident status and citizenship in a destination state was Aihwa Ong in her 1999 study of Chinese trans-Pacific migrants. *Flexible Citizenship* gave an early picture of the practices and
benefits of a mobile life-course that saw acquisition of citizenship for opportunity on both sides of the Pacific rather than for permanent displacement. Ong also identified it as a mobile life-course facilitated by favourable immigration and citizenship policies in destination states such as Canada (Ong, 1999, 135). Since Ong’s study was published, academic interest in the practices of transnational residency, and the state policies that interact with it, have expanded. Scholars have investigated different aspects of state approaches to newcomer and citizen mobility, which extend beyond the Canadian example. They question the evolution of domestic politics as a result of specific practices of mobility such as external residency and dual-citizenship (Stasiulis & Ross, 2006; DeVoretz & Woo, 2006), normative definitions of citizenship that problematize the ability to move (Carens, 2008; Bauböck 2006, 2009; Faist, 2008), the capacity of the state to realize policy goals in the context of international human movement (Brettell & Hollifield, 2014), and ultimately the value of mobility to the state, including as a tool or hurdle in the execution of foreign policy (Mitchell, 1989; Shain, 1994; Varadarajan, 2010; Greenhill, 2011). Literature with origins in a wide range of disciplines and methodological approaches have touched on these issues of mobility, citizenship, immigration and foreign affairs all in an attempt to explain empirical evidence that suggests that the traditional conceptualization of a linear migration continuum leading to territorial and sedentary citizenship is breaking down.

Despite the extensive scholarly work on aspects of mobility including dual-citizenship, residency and external-citizenship, a study of the spectrum of policy that mobility interacts with in Canada or elsewhere has not been undertaken. To begin this study, it is intuitive to investigate policies that establish the state’s expectations and restrictions to residency and necessary ties to acquire and maintain citizenship through naturalization, in other words citizenship and immigra-
tion policy. However, the ability to move has also taken nearly three million Canadians abroad as external-citizens (Asia Pacific Foundation, 2011). Foreign policy therefore also appears to be an integral part of understanding how Canada treats mobility across a broad basket of policies, and determining whether there is a coherent whole-of-government approach to the phenomenon. Despite often acting as separate policy domains, each one appears connected to the other by the ability of newcomers and citizens to move. The central focus of this thesis is therefore to address the public and political interest in mobility and particularly dual and external citizenship in recent years by attempting to explain how Canada treats mobility both within the policy domains of immigration and citizenship, and to begin looking at an expanding basket of policies through an examination of elements of foreign affairs. Is Canada treating mobility in a coherent manner, and if not, as the anecdotal evidence would suggest, is there capacity in the current interpretations of the role of mobility in isolated policy domains to treat mobility in complementary and mutually beneficial ways towards objectives across these domains?

The story of Mr. Baird and the Lis is just one example of complex and anecdotally incoherent treatment within and across Canadian policy. Immigration and citizenship policy objectives appear to consistently diverge as they interact with elements of the mobility of newcomers and citizens. Economic immigration selection programs seek human capital for the domestic labour market, while flexible residency requirements allow newcomers with permanent resident status to reside most of the time outside of Canada. Section 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms may define mobility as a right of all Canadian citizens (See Constitution Act, 1982), but policy changes in recent years have put this right of mobility for many dual and external citizens at risk. Outside of Canada, external citizen communities are meanwhile increasingly
tied to Canada’s trade, investment, security and bilateral engagements with the world. How this engagement takes place appears predicated on specific contexts, as will be discussed in Chapter Three. Coherent treatment appears limited by objectives that do not measure the interactions with mobility across policy domains in a whole of government approach. Traditional conceptualizations of the role of immigration in society, grounded in assumptions of linear movements of people across Canada’s borders and a domestic political community appear to hinder the capacity of the state to fully react to a transnational shift in citizenship.

In order to fully analyze the treatment of mobility across and within this broad basket of policies, including within legislation and the policy discourse, conceptual and analytical tools are needed. This thesis aims to take an inter-disciplinary approach by building an analytical framework around a number of social science concepts and theories that deal with human movement and policy. To this point these concepts have largely worked in isolation and not looked at different elements around the concept of mobility, however, taking a broad approach that incorporates multiple concepts and theories is necessary given the cross-cutting implications of mobility for Canada. As a multicultural political community, increasingly reliant on immigration for demographic growth, as a middle power globally dependent on effective and adaptable foreign policy, and as a liberal society engaged in democratic discourse that no longer ends at the physical borders of the country, Canada is uniquely confronted at various points by the nature of the international mobility of its newcomers and citizens.

Canada’s treatment of mobility is also evolving. The policies of the Liberal Government under Justin Trudeau are already reversing many of the approaches to immigration, citizenship and foreign policy developed during Stephen Harper’s ten years as Prime Minister, which are the
principle focus of this thesis. How the Liberal government will further transform Canada's treatment of mobility remains unclear at this early point in its mandate. The need remains, however, to identify the theoretical and conceptual tools necessary to analyze the interaction between Canada’s policy and mobility as it evolves regardless of the government. Understanding the state’s treatment of mobility is core to understanding how Canada will ultimately transform as a polity with a significant portion of its population beyond its boarders, and to what degree policy goals align around a common treatment of mobility.

**The Treatment of Mobility in Canadian Policy: Evidence and Analysis**

The analytical framework that this thesis builds will be used to investigate the treatment of mobility within and across immigration, citizenship and elements of foreign policy; in particular foreign trade and investment policy, and Canada’s post 9/11 anti-terrorism and Middle East policy. In Chapter One concepts drawn from studies in multiple disciplines that look at elements of human movement and immigration, citizenship, and foreign policy will be identified. In Chapter Two Canada’s policies will be investigated using this analytical framework. While particular emphasis will be placed on policy developments in the last decade in all three domains, policy beginning from the 1976 Immigration Act and the 1977 Citizenship Act, through to anti-terrorism legislation in 2001 will also be referenced to provide context for the origins of current government approaches. Finally, Chapter Three investigates the coherence of policy application through the same analytical framework using two real world ‘mobility case studies’.


**Literature**

The direction this thesis takes in building an analytical framework as well as identifying empirical evidence is indebted to the research and conclusions of other authors who have studied a broad range of concepts of human movement and policies that intersect with them. The limitations of independent concepts and the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of human movement has already been identified by other authors, given that the phenomenon touches on almost all aspects of human society (O’Reilly, 2013). This thesis casts a wide net to capture concepts from a variety of disciplines that may connect to Canadian policy and mobility. As will be discussed these different policy domains are often treated in isolation without recognizing the overarching links between them.

**Policy**

This study focuses on the last decade for two reasons: First, it aligns effectively with the advent of mobility studies as a means of understanding human movement. Some principle examples of these are contained in works by Sheller and Urry (2006) and Adey (2006). Second, in this period significant changes in Canadian immigration and citizenship policy have coincided with events that have attracted the attention of policymakers and the public to aspects of the phenomenon of mobility, including the evacuation of Canadian citizens from Lebanon in 2006. Empirical evidence constituting ‘policy’ is drawn primarily from legislation, Government of Canada promotional material, publicly distributed program and policy documents and expert analysis from civil society actors involved in the debates surrounding mobility. Updates to both IRPA and IRPR (IRPA, 2001; IRPR, 2002, 2015) and the Citizenship Act (1977, 2008, 2011, 2015) relating to
immigrant selection, residency, as well as citizenship acquisition and retention will be analyzed. Policies investigated include recent updates to the selection criteria for the skilled worker, investor and entrepreneur programs within IRPA and IRPR and updates to residency requirements for citizenship acquisition and retention in Bills C-37 (2009) and C-24 (2015), both updates to the Citizenship Act. Empirical evidence encapsulating foreign policy used for this study includes a survey of statements of policymakers and practitioners, of Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and legislation related to international trade and investment policy including the Investment Canada Act (1985). Canada’s anti-terrorism policy will also be included, but not limited to the last decade given that the Anti-Terrorism Act was legislated in 2001. Contemporary accounts and analysis of policies from academic and media sources complement these primary sources.

Finally, to supplement publicly available sources, interviews with practitioners in immigration, citizenship, and foreign policy were also conducted to gain insight into the formulation and implementation of policy. Five former and current executives and immigration officers within the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) at headquarters and at overseas missions were interviewed, along with political commentators during the summer of 2015. Formal interviews were conducted after approval from the University of Ottawa Office of Research Ethics and Integrity was received. While currently serving public servants were made aware of their right to anonymity in this study, most did not wish their statements to be directly cited indicating that they were not given permission by their Departments to speak on the record. Anonymous participation goes against the Government of Canada’s own values and ethics policy. Where permission was not given, insight from these interviews was used as background to direct research and give depth and purpose to the policy implications of this study.
**Case studies**

Recognizing that the treatment of mobility in Canadian policy does not end with stated objectives in written policy, two ‘mobility case studies’ will be analyzed through the same mobility framework in Chapter Three. The mobility of Hong Kong-Canadians, and Lebanese-Canadians will be examined to contextualize how policy treated them from their initial immigration, to citizenship acquisition to their contact with Canada’s foreign policy in the last decade. Both Hong Kong people and Lebanese present advantages for examining treatment of mobility across multiple policy domains. Both form global diaspora communities with links spanning almost every country on the planet. They are transnational societies where mobility is core to a broader identity shared among individuals separated by many borders and who are also members of various other political communities. The first major waves of Hong Kong and Lebanese people to Canada occurred in the same period, around the mid-1980s to early 1990s (Tabar, 2010; Tsang, 2007). This makes them two of the earliest significant communities not originating from Europe to establish themselves in Canada under the 1976 Immigration Act, the first immigration legislation to eliminate immigration limitations based on race or nationality. Lebanon and Hong Kong are also today home to the largest non-resident citizen communities, and per-capita dual-citizen communities among Canadians of non-European heritage. As foreign territories they are third and fourth in terms of population of Canadians abroad after the United States and Great Britain (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 12; Statistics Canada, 2011). Canada is further engaged in both countries through foreign policy. Canada has significant trade and investment interests in Hong Kong as an international finance hub and as a gateway to Mainland China. As part of a broader Middle East foreign policy, Lebanon meanwhile figures prominently in Canada's ap-
proach to regional bilateral relations, security, and terrorism among other priorities. In both cases studies, these mobile communities of dual-citizens entered Canada for diverse reasons surrounding specific events in their states of origin and who in large numbers now practice a mobile life-course, changing residency based around specific events where being in either Canada or their country of origin is advantageous (Ley & Kobayashi, 2007; Tabar, 2010). While not the only cases of dual and external citizens practicing mobility, they encapsulate many of the factors of mobility that interact with policy identified in the literature review in Chapter One and policy analysis in Chapter Two.

Mobility has become a pervasive and normal part of Canada’s political community. The ability to move of newcomers and naturalized citizens in particular has become a contentious subject in Canada’s political discourse. Canadians have demonstrated a vested interest in the participation and inclusion of this population, and in particular the role of mobile newcomers and naturalized citizens. Understanding how Canadian policy treats this integral aspect of the political community that now reaches beyond the borders of the territorial state is important to understand how Canada as a country reliant on immigration for demographic growth will evolve (Bauböck, 2000). The diverse approaches Canada takes through policy to address aspects of the ability of newcomers and citizens to move suggests that this treatment is not entirely coherent. Whether coherence exists in a broad basket of policies that interact with mobility could help to define whether Canada truly controls the future of its political community in a mobile world.
Chapter One
Building an Analytical Framework of Mobility

The State of Mobility in Literature: Pervasive, Normal and Misunderstood

A common and often repeated public and policy assumption of the process of immigration and citizenship acquisition in countries like Canada is that the process is linear. The entrance into the territory of a state for the purposes of establishing long-term residence is assumed to be followed by the acquisition of citizenship and physical presence, including labour market inclusion (Bloemraad, 2004). An image of the ideal new citizen as a full participant within the political, social and territorial community is the premise upon which immigration is presented as a state building apparatus. However, several authors argue that the grounding of this assumption in methodological nationalism makes it misleading (Bauböck, 2009; Glick Schiller & Salazar, 2013). Methodological nationalism “takes for granted that the boundaries of the nation-state delimit and define the unit of analysis” (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003, 579). These authors argue that methodological nationalism limits the terms and concepts of reference for analysis of phenomenon such as migration, the practice of which extends beyond the borders of a single state. They emphasize the need for new analytical tools that move away from the assumption of normalcy of the nation-state (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003).

With the growth in studies of transnationalism, diaspora, and return migration numerous authors have attempted to address the basic limitations of methodological-nationalism, how human movement and the ability to move play out internationally, and what role the state plays in these movements. The practices of dual and external citizens, including residency patterns have therefore become important elements of the evolving critical analysis of ‘migration,’ increasingly
recast through a new conceptualization external to methodological nationalism as ‘mobility’ (Glick Schiller & Salazar, 2013). Within this analysis are theoretical and conceptual tools to approach the state’s treatment of mobility through policy, and the consequent capacity of the state to react in a coordinated manner to the ability of newcomers and citizens to move.

**Conceptualizing Mobility**

The first step in developing an analytical framework around mobility is to define what mobility actually is, and how it might provide an alternative conceptual and analytical basis to methodological nationalism. ‘Mobility’ is defined here in simple terms as the ability to move. In the context of analyzing policy that interacts with newcomers and naturalized citizens of Canada, this thesis looks at mobility as the ability to move temporarily and circularly across international borders and between states (Pellerin, 2011), and includes the ability to reside both short and long-term across multiple polities as legal residents. ‘Temporarily’ does not necessarily denote short-term movements, but rather indicates that no movement is necessarily absolutely permanent.

‘Circular’ movements meanwhile refer to the ability to freely move both in and out of the territory of a state. While we studied in literature looking at temporary foreign workers (see Vertovec, 2006), ‘circular’ migration has been less of a focus on permanent residents and citizens. Nonetheless, mobility extends to those with ‘Permanent Resident’ status in Canada and citizens who may reside the vast majority of their lives in Canada or in another country, but who retain the right to enter, leave, and remain in Canada or another state at any given moment.

Mobility is more than the act of movement, captured in international human movement literature on ‘migration’ (see Zolberg, 1989). Instead, mobility research investigates inertia and
sedentary behaviour as not necessarily signs of a lack of the ability to move, but rather part of a process of mobility that includes periods of stasis (Adey, 2006). Focusing on the ability to move, rather than just the act of movement turns attention in policy analysis towards understanding interactions between the structures of states, and the individuals who may appear to be outside of the well-studied processes of migration, but nonetheless retain that integral ability to move in particular external and dual-citizens and permanent residents.

Policy in Literature

Immigration Selection Policy

The intuitive place to begin to look at the state’s treatment of mobility in policy is the policy that gives individuals the initial ability to enter the country and begin circular and temporary movements; immigration policy. Canada’s immigration policy is contained in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which lays out the criteria under which foreign nationals may be found eligible and admissible for immigration to Canada (Justice Canada, 2015a).

Studies of immigration policy, in particular Canadian immigration policy, have focused on the criteria for granting access to the state through immigration and the stated objectives and results of that policy. In particular, many studies have focused on the growing emphasis on economic immigration and the search for human capital. Ferrer, Picot and Riddell note that the complexity of Canada’s immigration system in the last two decades has grown along with an increasing focus on economic migration, which in 2014 represented around sixty-five percent of Canada’s total annual new arrivals (2014, 847). The authors argue that one of the major trends in recent years is to improve the economic outcomes of immigrants by advancing domestic labour
market priorities through human capital selection criteria such as education or professional credentials, sought-after personal qualities such as language skills and youth, or the capacity to invest in the destination economy (2014, 863). Reitz notes that in Canada these policies have succeeded in attracting hundreds of thousands of skilled professionals, investors and business people as part of a shift to a knowledge based economy (2005) where these human capital criteria are increasingly emphasized as essential. This is not a trend limited to Canada. Akbari and MacDonald (2014) investigate similar policy shifts in other immigrant states such as Australia and New Zealand. This collective trend is consequently developing alongside the growth of a class of global elite who are capable of gaining access to almost any labour market through the standardization of human capital criteria (Caletrio, 2012; Calhoun, 2002; Mahroum, 2000). As Caletrio (2012) argues, this shift towards elite mobility is creating an uneven distribution of power that transcends territorial state boundaries and is truly global in nature. Immigration selection criteria, as a first site of interaction between mobility and state policy, are focusing on an economic global elite on the basis of their human capital. These studies suggest that this focus is a concerted effort to treat the mobility of a specific group of newcomers as beneficial to the state, and that this treatment is increasingly standardized across a number of states competing for the same thing.

Dual-Citizenship Policy

Once a mobile individual gains access to the territory of the state through selection as an immigrant, they also usually gain access to the opportunity to acquire citizenship. Many states are introduced progressive economic immigrant selection processes that emphasis human capital and labour market viability: www.skillselect.gov.au, http://www.immigration.govt.nz/.

creasingly allowing this acquisition without a corresponding requirement to give up other citizenships. European researchers have paid particular attention to the treatment of multiple membership after the formation of the European Union (EU) as a factor in the liberalization of citizenship policy. Faist (2008) suggests that the adoption of dual-citizenship by a growing number of countries in the EU, contrary to historically restrictive multiple-membership policies, is a result of a pragmatic realization that the free movement of EU citizens across countries sharing open borders necessitates access to representation to form valid political communities (2008, 14). He argues that liberalization of citizenship laws to allow for multiple memberships encourages naturalization (2008, 7), as individuals are more inclined to obtain citizenship in a new state of residence if the risk of loss of their original citizenship is eliminated. Other authors have also pointed to naturalization through citizenship leading to better integration and higher rates of participation among newcomers, including in Canada (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012; Bevelander, 2012). These authors suggest that by allowing dual-citizenship the domestic benefit of immigration is maximized through effective integration.

Maintaining previous citizenship also allows these individuals to maintain the rights and privileges of membership in their country of origin. Various authors look at the evolutionary process of policy treating this as an acceptable or unacceptable practice. Studies of Canada’s treatment of dual-citizens are more demonstrative in this case given that multiple memberships have been allowed for almost forty years. Ben Herzog, for example, notes that where the original Canadian Citizenship Act (1947) did not allow dual-citizenship for fear of dual-allegiances, the transition towards an acceptance of it in the 1977 Act was a pragmatic attempt to incorporate the broadest number of Canadians under a single umbrella of membership. This reinforced the goals
of immigration policy in the last quarter of the twentieth-century that sought to liberalize and diversify entry, transitioning it away from a citizenship predicated on responsibility towards citizenship based instead on the allocation of rights (2014, 463-4). Rather than the opening of boundaries in an intra-state system in the case of the EU, in Canada this came as a result of a progressive demographic transition. Former linguistic and cultural majorities diminished in numerical dominance and along with greater diversity created the need to reframe dual-citizenship as acceptable. This was in order to incorporate newcomers from multiple backgrounds into a more heterogenous political community (Herzog, 2014).

Dual-citizenship nonetheless in both the case of the EU and Canada continues to challenge concepts of unitary allegiance and political cohesiveness when considering the ability of dual-citizens to represent, participate and reside in more than one polity. This continues to manifest in public debates around the question of ‘loyalty’ to a single state and whether or not exclusive loyalty is a reasonable justification to limit access to citizenship (Herzog, 2014, 455; Faist, 2004; Bloemraad, 2004). How states frame the mobility provided by dual-citizenship therefore appears to be based on what is both palatable to the public and necessary for the pragmatic advantages of allowing multiple memberships. The confrontation between a concept of dual-citizenship as an aspect of mobility rights within citizenship regimes, including Canada’s, versus loyalty according to Blatter (2011) is largely one internal to domestic democratic political communities. These communities on the one hand seek exclusivity to preserve the ability to act independently from foreign influence and on the other emphasize incorporation and the extension of rights of citizenship towards democratic inclusivity. This includes the ‘Charter right’ of mobility contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (See Constitution Act, 1982).
right of mobility as the ability to move between and hold membership in multiple polities, based on Blatter’s assertion, becomes both a right and a privilege in a diverse society of naturalized citizens and citizens born in the territory.

While debates over loyalty continue more in the public-political realm, in scholarly work they have been overshadowed by questions of whether dual-citizenship is contributing to a post-national, or transnational form of membership in states where loyalty to a single polity is no longer possible (Bloemraad, 2004; Schiller, 2005; Faist, 2001). Bloemraad (2004) for example argues that legal citizenship is generally considered to be bounded within a territorial entity. Territorial boundaries allow laws to be formed by democratic consensus that are then imposed upon the political community that chose them. In the words of Faist, “the people that are subject to the law are also its authors” (2008, 14). However, the more dual-citizenship and by extension external-citizenship grows among citizens of a particular country, the more laws cannot be imposed evenly on the political community. This is an issue also explored by Nina Glick-Schiller (2005) who suggests that citizens who reside across and have rights in multiple polities live within “transborder” spaces of divergent and overlapping institutions of legal norms, and consequently influence the development of laws within multiple states of citizenship, also selectively adhering to these laws by remaining between legal jurisdictions. According to Glick-Schiller (2005) and Bloemraad (2004) this has given way to an inability by a single state to fully control the implementation of laws and policies evenly on all citizens who live in these transborder sites.

What does the academic literature on dual-citizenship tell us about the state’s treatment of mobility, and what tools does it provide for the analysis of current Canadian policy? Dual-citizenship is shown to be at its most contentious when considering dual-allegiances, and the multi-
ple opportunities it provides. Transborder legal sites give dual-citizens the ability to move be
tween and influence the laws of multiple states, and therefore are seen to diminish the cohesiveness of the political community and the control the state has over its population. At the same time, however, the opportunity to be mobile, and maintain those rights is accepted by states as pragmatic factors in incorporating newcomers into the domestic political community. The works here demonstrate dueling intents in state treatment of dual-citizenship as an element of citizen mobility. They also suggest that sought after outcomes of dual-citizenship policy continue to be based in the domestic political community and grounded in methodological nationalism, rather than a broader conceptualization of mobile citizenship that extends beyond the territory of the state.

*Residency Policy and the Rights of Citizens while Abroad*

Studies identify similar dueling interests between accommodation and restriction of mobility in residency policy. Residency policy establishes the limitations to newcomers and prospective citizens’ mobility through requirements to remain in the territory of the state to maintaining their status. The gaps and anachronistic nature of residency policy is prominent in the case of Canada’s treatment of different groups living inside and outside the territory of the state, as argued by Joseph Carens (2005, 2008). Carens looks at the concept of residency based citizenship to highlight the uneven allotment of rights of temporary foreign workers in Canada versus other residents who have access to citizenship. He suggests that current Canadian policies actively attempt to limit access to rights for temporary foreign workers, keeping these low human capital residents of Canada in long-term precarious conditions despite participating as members of the polit-
ical community. He suggests this is anachronistic to liberal-democratic principles and that rights should be imparted based on residency, where the longer a person resides in a country, the more rights they should be assumed to be entitled to on the assumption that their involvement and participation grows with time (2008, 419, 428).

Normative arguments such as Carens’ problematize the uneven framing of residency in permanent resident and citizenship acquisition policy versus long term temporary resident status but do not go so far as to question the rights of external or dual-citizens. However, if rights continue to be restricted for some long-term residents of a state, it begs the question of how the same rights can be imparted to individuals who reside outside of their state of citizenship, where their participation in the political community is debatably more limited. Bauböck (2009) suggests the key error in this question is the absence of considerations of the contributions of external-citizens to the political community. He attributes this to methodological nationalism. Bauböck proposes that the growing accommodation of dual-citizenship is not just a pragmatic choice to encourage integration, but indicative of the realization by states of the not-insignificant connections of some non-resident citizens, and external factors of citizenship participation (2009, 477). He argues that while not identical to territorial citizens, the investment of external citizens in the citizenship regime of a given political community while abroad should be recognized in many cases, even while their claims to citizenship are simultaneously addressed to two independent governments (2009, 477). In his ‘stakeholder’ model of citizenship, Bauböck suggests that an individual’s stake in membership in a given political community must go beyond simple subjective preference, or residency, and that his or her autonomy and wellbeing must be linked to that membership upon acquisition (2009, 479). Biographical indicators in this case would allow for an as-
essment of stakes that extend into the past, while still requiring a lifelong interest in the polity’s future, allowing external citizens the opportunity for inclusion while distinguishing them from long-term non-citizen residents (2009, 483).

The contrasting conceptualizations of residency in the constitution of a political community of citizens proposed by Bauböck and Carens suggest that both the current and potential treatment of mobility through control of residency of newcomers and citizens has limitations. Residency based citizenship is proposed to overcome the limitations of residency policy that excludes individuals with limited perceived value to the political community as a result of their precarious status as temporary workers. Stakeholder based citizenship meanwhile proposes to address the limitations of current policy that provides rights to external citizens not commensurate with their participation in the political community relative to other citizens, while not ignoring the importance of residency as a key stake. In both instances, residency policy becomes central to understanding the treatment of mobility by the state, where a government attempts to determine who are valid members based on their physical location, either within or external to the state’s territory. For the purposes of this thesis, both concepts will be employed to analyze where current Canadian permanent resident and citizenship acquisition residency policy lies.

The concepts employed in these studies looking at immigration selection policy, dual-citizenship policy, and policies of residency and the rights of citizens while abroad all expose how states like Canada actively seek to control the ability of newcomers and citizens to move, by providing variable access to rights of movement and membership. By attempting to exert control over newcomer and citizen mobility, states may be able to seek out specific objectives, such as human capital immigration (Reitz, 2005), or an integrated domestic political community that is
accountable to the state (Faist, 2010). At the same time, however, it is apparent that mobility also presents considerable limitations by being treated as both a right and a privilege (Blatter, 2011). For example, mobility provided by dual-citizenship is accommodated to encourage citizenship acquisition, and in the case of Canada is then given as a universal right once citizenship is acquired. It is nonetheless also criticized for undermining the cohesive political community through the creation of transborder legal sites when citizens move abroad (Glick-Schiller, 2005). What appears consistent across the studies looked at here is that there are significant challenges with treating mobility in terms of its relationship to a political community of newcomers and citizens who reside exclusively within the territory of a state. While mobility is not defined as the pervasive overarching phenomenon that these policies attempt to address, the ability of newcomers and citizens to move nonetheless appears to be a commonly held factor connecting these policies, and the studies that look at them.

**Foreign Policy**

As numerous manifestations of the state’s treatment of mobility problematize the concept of the political community as exclusive to the territorial state, it would appear useful to move with mobile newcomers and citizens beyond the territory of the state, and look at how their mobility intersects with state policy as external residents. Does foreign policy treat mobility in the form of dual and external citizenship, and circular and temporary movement in a similarly variable manner? Pinpointing literature in the field of foreign policy that deals specifically with questions of mobility, in particular external and dual-citizenship is challenging. Questions of the influence of migration, ethnicity and diasporas on foreign policy arise in studies specific to destination coun-
tries such as Canada or the United States (Smith, 2000; Geddes, 2009) as well as in studies of particular thematic questions of migration (Mitchell, 1989), ethnicity (Carment & Bercuson, 2008), and diaspora (Shain, 1994). However, policy oriented commentary is confined within these studies, often focusing on the influence of migration on the formation of immigration policy, or development and trade policy as aspects of foreign affairs (Faist, 2008b). Questions of sovereignty and concepts of international relations, meanwhile, focus on structural components of migration and make limited reference to the specific foreign policy of individual states (Shain & Barth, 2003; Varadarajan, 2010).

Part of this may be explained by the ongoing separation of fields of study, where the study of immigration and citizenship is seen as distinct from the study of foreign affairs. Mitchell (1989) argues that this distinction is artificial and that the interaction between immigration policy and foreign policy outcomes are well defined. He establishes the need for a multi-level analytical embrace, integrating the study of migration-related domestic policymaking with foreign policy-making (1989, 683). For Mitchell, migration and foreign policy cannot be understood in isolation from one another, and the concepts and analytical approaches of both are insufficient to fully explain how each policy develops and interacts with human movement. As a telling example, he cites the role of exile, and exile politics over more than sixty years in forming and transforming the relationship between the United States and Cuba. He argues that the Cuban-American relationship cannot be understood outside of the context of a large and powerful Cuban exile community, who became citizens of the United States following departure from the island after the Revolution in 1959 and who have played a significant role in US politics as naturalized citizens ever since (Mitchell, 1989, 682; Shain, 1994, 826-827). At both the theoretical and empirical
level, Mitchell establishes the need to study foreign policy, immigration and citizenship together.

To build this multilevel analytical embrace Mitchell looks at three connections between immigration and foreign policy. One of these can be expanded to incorporate the ability to move rather than simply the act of movement defined in immigration: the role of actions on mobility in the execution of foreign policies (Mitchell, 1989, 688). While limited in number, several studies have attempted to tackle this subject, highlighting the need to address elements of citizenship policy and the interactive treatment of mobility within foreign affairs. Davia Stasiulis and Darryl Ross, for example, investigate the framing of the protection of external citizens by the state in the context of foreign and security policy. They characterized this protection as either a moral imperative or a form of selective enactment based on divergent policy considerations (2006). The authors suggest that ‘flexible sovereignty,’ where the state chooses to act in accordance with its sovereign responsibility to protect citizens in certain contexts, and pursue foreign policy interests in others, leaves vulnerable dual-citizens with fewer rights than other Canadians when it comes to contexts where other foreign policy interests appear to supersede those rights.

**Contextual Foreign Policy**

Investigating the full breadth of possible interactions between foreign policy and mobility would be challenging as an independent study, let alone within this thesis. For the purposes of elaborating on the two case studies in Chapter Three, two policy domains within foreign affairs show particular promise in investigating the role of actions on mobility in the execution of foreign policy as described by Mitchell: international trade and investment policy as it relates to Canada’s bilateral engagement with Hong Kong, and Canada’s post 9/11 Middle-East and anti-terrorism
policy as it relates to Lebanese-Canadians. Both are well grounded in foreign policy literature and figure prominently in Canada’s current foreign policy priorities.

*International Trade and Investment Policy: “Diaspora Strategies”*

Several authors have investigated how “diaspora strategies” (Boyle & Kitchin, 2011) attempt to leverage the mobility of their mobile citizens and those with cultural or kinship ties to a perceived “homeland”. India, for example, has taken significant steps to attract prosperous elements of the Indian community overseas in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Latha Varadarajan argues that this policy of diaspora engagement, in contrast to the post-independence nationalist movement that largely shunned the Indian expatriate community, was a pragmatic recognition of the economic opportunities of engagement with this population both in terms of investments in India and access to foreign markets (2010). As part of this initiative the Indian government established a high-level committee to investigate the location, situation and potential development role of its diaspora, which eventually led to the establishment of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs in 2004 (Rannveig Mendoza & Newland, 2012, 28).

Boyle and Kitchin (2011) note that this is not an isolated case. A growing number of countries around the world have established similar ministries to manage relations with mobile citizens and individuals identified as having connections to their country of actual or ancestral origin (Boyle & Kitchin, 2011). Establishing these external-citizen and diaspora related ministries has often connected specific diaspora strategies to foreign investment initiatives as an element of development policy in many immigrant origin states. The Migration Policy Institute (Rannveig Mendoza & Newland, 2012), for example, has developed a road map for such en-
gagement, highlighting among other things the engagement of developing nations in bilateral
dialogue with destination states where diasporas reside and where development funds may also
originate as an essential part of their foreign policy (Rannveig Mendoza & Newland, 2012).
While the emphasis in this literature is placed on the benefits to developing origin states, where
brain drain from emigration is a risk factor that may be mitigated by post-emigration investment
from diasporas (Felbermayr and Jung, 2009), developing migration origin states are not the only
countries looking at the benefits of a diaspora strategy. As Boyle and Kitchin (2011) point out,
Ireland maintains an Irish Abroad Unit within its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
which seeks to coordinate the state’s approach to diaspora engagement across government. This
includes participation by the Irish Industrial Development Agency (IDA), which is responsible
for the attraction and development of foreign investment in Ireland. While it targets any compa-
ny which might potentially locate in Ireland, the authors note that it has a successful track record
of recruiting “businesses owned and/or run by Irish or Irish-descent entrepreneurs and managers”
(2011, 20, 33). New Zealand maintains a similar arms-length government agency, Kea New Zea-
land, which promotes foreign investment, and the New Zealand brand (Boyle and Kitchin, 2011,
16). For the states mentioned here, mobility, in particular manifest in practices external and dual
citizenship, is a notable aspect of the execution of foreign trade and investment policy.

Canada’s Middle East Policy following 9/11: The War on Terror and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

A review of literature on Canada’s foreign policy engagement in the Middle East highlights two
significant elements. First, Canada’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict starting from just

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2 See https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/the-irish-abroad/
after the Second World War, and second Canada’s engagement in the War on Terror and the post-9/11 shifting approach to national security. The academic research on both will be elaborated here and links with mobility investigated in the next two chapters. Heinbecker and Momani (2007) examine Canada’s shifting position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and its role in shaping Canada’s Middle East policy. The authors argue that since the partition of Palestine in 1947, and in particular since the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, Canada has had a multifaceted presence in the Middle East that has helped it establish itself as a middle-power with the capacity to influence and broker regionally (Brynen, 2007, 73). Several authors have argued, however, that since just prior to Stephen Harper taking power in 2006 this even-handed approach has shifted towards a more pro-Israel stance. As Musu (2012) points out, where criticism and support for Israeli policy prior to the Harper Government were not seen as undermining Canada’s support for the Israeli state, increasingly support for the Palestinian state and criticism of Israeli policy were both seen as “incompatible with Canada’s friendship with the state of Israel.” (2012, 72). So significant was the shift that the Israeli foreign minister remarked in June 2010 that it was hard to find a country friendlier to Israel than Canada (Kestler-D’Amours, 2010). This has been argued to be in part as a result of the Conservative Party’s attempt to attract support from the politically mobilized Jewish diaspora in Canada away from the Liberal Party (Berry, 2010).

At the same time that Canada’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict was shifting, authors have argued that Canada was also reorienting Middle East policy around the threat of terrorism and national security issues. Canada introduced the Anti-Terrorism Act in December 2001 in reaction to the attacks of September 11 of that year. Both in Canada and around the world, policy reactions to the attacks immediately attracted attention for their racial subtexts. Badhi (2003), for
example, highlights the early adoption of racial-profiling of airline passengers as evidence of Canada’s air-transportation safety procedures moving towards discriminatory practices against Arabs and Muslims. Stasiulis and Ross (2006) similarly argue that the legal ambiguity of dual-citizenship allows for a discriminatory application of citizenship rights, at times around race, where national security interests overcome access to diplomatic protection to individuals who are members of more than one polity. They point in particular to securitization policies in the wake of 9/11 and the extradition, imprisonment and torture of Mahar Arar in Syria as primary examples. In the case of Mahar Arar, Canada was criticized for doing little to ensure the protection of his human rights, and for possibly having been complicit in the course of events that resulted in his arrest in the United States, and removal to Syria where he was tortured (2006, 335). Stasiulis and Ross’ analysis of dual-citizenship and foreign policy in the post 9/11 securitization and anti-terrorism environment reflects a contrasting vision of the arguments of Ong (1999). The ‘flexible citizen’ is able to opportunistically take advantage of the diverse rights of multiple citizenship enabled by facilitative immigration and citizenship policies. On the other hand, this access to rights and opportunities of citizenship are often limited by a state’s attempt to provide certain rights selectively to external citizens when that access confronts overarching national security and anti-terrorism oriented foreign policy goals. The authors refer to this as ‘flexible sovereignty’ and argue that it has become particularly evident in the post 9/11 security paradigm (2006).

Funk also argues that national security and Middle East foreign policy are intertwined (2007), as terrorism comes to be seen “not as an autonomous, existential threat to nation-states but as a threat to people, a symptom of a deeply dysfunctional regional and international security system in the greater Middle East region” (2007, 30). This has practical manifestations for Cana-
da’s approach to state-to-state relations and military engagements as well, argues Patrick James (2012). He notes that participation in the war in Afghanistan as an early major act of the Government of Canada in the Middle East following 9/11, moved Canada away from its traditional peacekeeping approach to the region that was established through the Arab-Israeli conflict, towards a renewed acceptance of a proactive security approach (James, 2012). Taken together, Canada’s policy in the Middle East and its anti-terrorism agenda since 9/11 have been characterized by a shift from an attempt to engage as a middle-power capable of influencing and peace brokering, towards active military engagement, and stronger support for Israel as part of a domestic diaspora strategy. Both can be seen in light of an overarching approach to terrorism that targets a specific geographic, racial and religious group. As will be discussed during a closer examination of citizenship and foreign policies in Chapter Two and Three, this agenda has altered how Canada treats citizen mobility.

While foreign policy, citizenship policy and immigration are often treated in isolation from one another in both literature and policy formation, Mitchell’s arguments for a multi-level analysis of immigration and foreign affairs, as well as the empirical evidence of studies on Hong Kong and Lebanon demonstrate the advantages of analyzing Canada’s treatment of mobility across policies. As mobile Canadian newcomers and citizens move across Canada’s borders, they move with foreign policies that project Canada’s interests internationally. To capture the treatment of mobility by an expanded basket of policies, this study will therefore employ an integrated multi-level approach similar to Mitchell’s (1989), focusing on mobility, and the policies that it interacts with in immigration, citizenship and in the execution of elements of Canada’s foreign affairs.
An Analytical Mobility Framework

The research looked at here spanning the study of immigration, citizenship and foreign policy points to the interaction of mobility and immobile structures in the form of policy as suggested by Adey (2006). Mobility, as the ability to move, interacts with a broad basket of policies, including immigration selection, dual and external citizenship policies, and foreign affairs. Many of the conceptual and empirical tools necessary to analyze these policies in the Canadian context already exist. Mitchell’s multi-level analytical embrace will be adopted as a basic framework for incorporating foreign policy into the analysis of mobility in Canadian policy, including the role of actions on mobility in the execution of the elements of Canada’s foreign policy already identified. The treatment of present day human capital interests of immigration selection criteria versus flexible residency requirements suggested by Mahroum (2000) and Reitz (2005) among others will be investigated at the first level of a multi-level analysis on immigration policy, where immigration selection initiates the states treatment of mobility by allowing the access of newcomers to the state’s territory. Concepts including ‘transborder’ citizenship (Schiller, 2005), and the breakdown in territorial assumptions of citizenship due to multiple membership (Bloemraad, 2004; Faist, 2008, 14) will meanwhile be employed to analyze recent developments in Canadian citizenship policy, in particular as they relate to dual-citizenship policy and restrictions placed on mobility, despite the pragmatic embrace of multiple-memberships (Herzog, 2014; Blatter, 2011). Faist (2004, 2008), Bauböck (2009) and Carens’ (2005, 2008) concepts of stakeholder and domestic residency based citizenship policies will be employed to examine Canada’s reaction to mobility in the form of external and dual citizenship in recent legislative updates, as well as the
diverse ways Canada currently treats citizens in the real world application of policy looked at in the case studies. Incorporating foreign policy, the concept of ‘diaspora strategy’ discussed by Boyle and Kitchin (2011) will be incorporated to analyze Canada's international trade and investment policy. The comprehensive analysis in Heinbecker and Momani (2007) on Canada’s foreign policy in the Middle East, and the concept of ‘flexible sovereignty’ developed by Stasiulis and Ross (2006) will meanwhile guide the investigation of Canada's post-9/11 anti-terrorism and national security policy in the region as it relates to mobility. Taken together, these conceptual approaches to analyzing different elements of policy form what will be referred to as an analytical mobility framework. This framework allows a broad basket of policies that interact with and treat mobility to be looked at around the central phenomenon of the ability of newcomers and citizens to move.

Testing the framework

On the basis of this analytical mobility framework, within Canadian immigration, citizenship and foreign policy, how do specific policy developments treat mobility? In the case of newcomer and citizens of Canada, several specific policies can be identified as interacting with mobility. Immigration selection policy, as the first point of access for newcomers and prospective citizens is the natural place to start this analysis. Immigration selection policy contained in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) (2001) and Regulations (IRPR) (2002) defines who is eligible to enter Canada for the purposes of establishing permanent residence, in this first instance giving an individual the right to physically displace to Canada. This occurs through streams of immigration that seek out specific benefits to Canada, in particular human capital (Marhoum, 2000; Reitz,
Immigration residency policy, also contained in IRPA and IRPR, meanwhile defines the rules of mobility after access is granted. Residency policy describes the duration of stay required for permanent residents to maintain their status, allotting mobility in the form of the right to reside part of the time outside of Canada while still expecting a certain level of residency in the territory.

At the same time that a mobile individual is maintaining their permanent resident status, they may also fulfill similar residency requirements as pre-requisites to citizenship acquisition. Canada’s citizenship legislation, which is largely contained in the Citizenship Act (1977), therefore also interacts with mobility by requiring that a certain time is spent in the territory of the state before the rights of full membership are granted. In this case the concepts of traditional, exclusive and residency based citizenship explored and challenged by a number of authors (Bloemraad, 2004; Faist, 2008; Blatter, 2011) and stakeholder citizenship proposed by Bauböck (2009) can be employed to examine how the state treats the mobility of newcomers and citizens around residency. Once citizenship is acquired, dual-citizenship allows individuals to reside in and maintain the expectations of rights from multiple states with implications for the democratic discourse (Blatter, 2011), further interacting with their ability to move within transborder sites described by Glick-Schiller (2010). In the case of Canadian citizenship, mobility also becomes an enshrined right in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (see Constitution Act, 1982). The mobility of citizens nonetheless now also increasingly interacts with rules on how citizenship status is maintained among dual and external citizens. The Elections Act for example restricts voting rights for external citizens (Justice Canada, 2015c), while anti-terrorism and citizenship legislation allow for citizenship revocation. Canada’s foreign affairs must also be considered as mobility has im-
lications for the execution of foreign policy (Mitchell, 1989), coming into contact with mobile external citizens and defining the division between contrasting goals leading to ‘flexible’ practices of sovereignty suggested by Stasiulis and Ross (2006). As mobility takes newcomers and citizens outside of the territory of the state, Canada interacts with their mobility in those states, where they may reside and participate as members of another political community. In the case of trade and investment policy, dual and external citizens can become key tools to foreign markets and investors, while they can also complicate Canada’s approach to bilateral relations and national security where the interests and responsibilities of the state and those citizens may diverge. The Investment Canada Act (1985), Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) and Combatting Terrorism Act (2012) along with amendments and focused policy documents will be incorporated into Mitchell’s multi-level approach where actions on mobility intersect with their execution. As a visualization of the analytical mobility framework Table One helps to demonstrate how the concepts presented here, from a wide variety of disciplines, provide potential avenues of investigating Canada’s treatment of mobility across a broad basket of policies. Each author deals with aspects of mobility through their analysis of specific policies in their own disciplines, but together they talk across these disciplines through a multi-level analytical framework, revealing interconnectivity.
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Chapter Two
Immobile Structures? Intersections of Mobility and Canadian Policy

As has been discussed, the three policy domains looked at in this paper each represent unique sites of exchange with mobility. This chapter looks at specific policy developments in the last decade in more depth, beginning with immigration policy, to observe how each treats mobility in isolation and relative to one another to determine if a whole-of-government coherence exists. Immigration policy now defines how a growing proportion of new members of Canada’s political community are able to gain access to both the territory of the state, and in the case of permanent resident status, some level of access to rights and benefits of that membership. This access represents the first level of Mitchell’s multi-level analysis (1989). Citizenship policy, as the second level in this analysis interacts with mobility in the allotment of further rights of membership including the universal right of mobility, and corresponding limitations to those rights through recent updates to the Citizenship Act. An analysis of foreign policy in the domains of international trade and investment, as well as Middle East and anti-terrorism policy meanwhile provides significant opportunity to define how the state treats mobility beyond traditional domains and within the realities of Canada’s substantial dual and external citizen population. The goal of this analysis is to determine whether these policies in isolation and collectively treat mobility in similar or divergent ways.

Immigration policy: residency versus elite mobility

Recently I had the rare opportunity to take a flight between Toronto and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Before the plane had left the runway in Toronto, my seatmate, who I will call Hassam, had struck
up a conversation. Hassam was born in Pakistan, grew up in Iraq and spent the latter thirty years of his life living and working in Saudi Arabia. He manages overseas equities for a Saudi Prince. Two years before I met him, Hassam had applied to immigrate to Canada. Under a previous iteration of Canada’s immigrant investor program, he loaned 800 thousand dollars to the Canadian government for a period of five years. In return he was able to move himself and his family to the suburbs of Toronto, where his four children now attend university and high school. Hassam meanwhile resides in Saudi Arabia visiting his family in Canada for a few months a year. He expressed no interest in living permanently in Canada, but indicated how much his family loves life in the Toronto suburb, and after two years how they have no interest in leaving.

Hassam and his family are emblematic of the complexity of the very particular division between objectives and outcomes in Canada’s immigration policy that attempt to balance the mobility of prospective immigrants against the human capital interests of Canada’s economic streams. One of IRPA’s core mandates is “to support the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions…” (Justice Canada, 2015a, 2). This mandate relates to the objectives of the economic immigration stream, which includes investor, entrepreneur and skilled worker programs. The eligibility of a foreign national for economic immigration is further defined in paragraph 12(2) of IRPR: “A foreign national may be selected as a member of the economic class on the basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada.” (Justice Canada, 2014, 14). This largely translates into policy that seeks out human capital in the form of criteria, albeit often changing, that are considered relevant to Canadian domestic labour market needs, including English language skills, employment and educational experience, and age. In the case of investor or entrepreneurs
it also includes intent to encourage investment in the Canadian economy and stimulate growth through participation in business ventures (Justice Canada, 2015a, 126). These criteria seek to attract the “best and brightest” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013, 12) to the benefit of Canada’s economy and labour market. Sixty-five percent of Canada’s planned admissions for 2015 were dedicated to economic class immigrants, and as a proportion of the whole of Canadian immigration levels it has risen steadily for the past two decades (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014).

**Mobility and Immigration Selection Policy**

The underlying principle of maximizing human capital within this system has been in place since the introduction of IRPA in 2001. A less complex version also existed in the Immigration Act of 1976 (Picot et al., 2014). Reforms to the selection process and criteria in the last fifteen years have broadly seen a focusing of these interests. Most recently Canada updated the skilled worker program, introducing the ‘Express Entry’ model in 2015. The Express Entry model is used to manage the intake of applications under the Federal Skilled Worker, Skilled Trades and Canadian Experience programs. Potential applicants indicate their human capital credentials on an online profile and are then screened into a pool of eligible candidates who have met a certain points threshold. They are then invited to apply or are given support in finding an employment offer in Canada towards obtaining sufficient points to meet the cut-off to be eligible (Government of Canada, 2014). The number of applications is capped per year, and only those with the highest

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3 The Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) changed its name in November 2015. This name change has not yet been reflected in Department literature. [http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=docs&doc=mog-ag-eng.htm](http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=docs&doc=mog-ag-eng.htm)
points are invited to move on to the next stage of the process. The Express Entry model is a focused version of the human capital model established in 2001 in IRPA and places increased emphasis on the domestic employability in Canada of a potential immigrant. 600 points out of a possible 1200 are awarded if an applicant has a valid employment offer (Government of Canada, 2014d). The introduction of the Express Entry program demonstrates the increasing desire of policy makers to not just capture, but also maximize the human capital derived from immigration selection policy towards domestic labour market inclusion. This is in line with Reitz’s (2005) assertion that Canada’s transition to a domestic labour market has dictated an increasing emphasis on a human capital model of immigration.

However, the best and the brightest are becoming a finite, globally sought after commodity with explicit criteria that commodifies the personal characteristics of potential immigrants as argued by Caletrio (2012). Canada competes with various other states for this human capital. Similar traditional immigrant countries such as New Zealand and Australia have developed nearly identical programs to Express Entry to attract an increasingly narrow group of economic elite. International competition between states that have introduced programs focused on human capital acquisition has created an environment where individuals with high human capital have more choices of immigration destinations. These choices create more opportunities for where their human capital can be invested in return for the benefits of residency and membership, and ultimately the ability to access a country as an element of their mobility.

4 The UK requires an investment of £2,000,000 for investor immigration, much like the express entry model, a valid job offer is almost always required to qualify for skilled worker migration (http://www.workpermit.com/uk/tier-2-visa.htm). New Zealand was the first country to introduce expression of interest programs (http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/stream/work/skilledmigrant/LinkAdministration/FormsAndGuidesLinks/onlineeoiform.htm)
The ability of mobile individuals to leverage competition between states has consequentially grown. A 2010 article in the *Journal of Wealth Management* titled “Canadian Citizenship: The Wealthy Global Family’s Safe Tax-Efficient Alternative” encapsulates this (McCollough, 2010). While the article emphasizes the taxation and wealth maximization benefits of Canadian citizenship, it also tellingly emphasizes the need to not hinder future mobility during the citizenship acquisition process by committing to an immigration program that slows or places burdensome residency obligations on would-be globetrotting elite. McCollough explores the differences between residency in different countries against Canada and highlights among other things the emphasis Canada places on selecting highly educated professionals for immigration, and its stable quota of around 250,000 immigrants a year (2010, 49). Under a section titled “A Means to an End” the article also refers to Canada as a “transit jurisdiction” towards visa free residency opportunities in other countries (McCollough, 2010, 55). The article expresses the benefits of mobility gained from a system of immigration that seeks out human capital, which also places few barriers on immigration for a specific global elite that meets Canada’s increasingly focused selection criteria. McCollough’s article is not just an outsider’s perspective on the intent of Canada’s immigration policy. Canada’s own promotional material for another economic program, the start-up visa, highlights the “no conditions attached” nature of Canada’s permanent resident acquisition against other states that offer only temporary resident status predicated on the success of business or investments made by an immigrant (Government of Canada CIC, 2013b). Canadian policy competes with various countries for the human capital of a narrow spectrum of global elite (Reitz, 2005).
In this initial instance of interacting with the mobility of newcomers by giving access to Canada’s territory and certain advantages of membership through permanent resident status, Canada’s immigration selection policies focus on the positive treatment of the unidirectional mobility of a very specific global elite. In and of itself this does not appear particularly significant, and reinforces the arguments of other authors (Caletrio, 2012; Calhoun, 2002; Mahroum, 2000) that states are increasing access for a particular group and offering incentives to attract them. However immigration selection is only the initial step in immigration policy’s interaction with newcomer mobility. Mitchell’s multilevel analytical embrace suggests that this selection policy cannot be looked at in isolation.

**Mobility and Immigration Residency Policy**

Residency policy inside of IRPA and IRPR reflects the flexibility born out of the competition among immigrant states for human capital. All objectives contained in Paragraph 3 of IRPA, from benefiting the economy of all regions of Canada (Justice Canada, 2015a, Subparagraph 3(1)(c)), to promoting successful integration of permanent residents (Subparagraph 3(1)(e) are domestic concerns. It is a central premise of IRPA that the purpose of immigration is grounded in the territory of the state. Inherent in this premise is methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003) where the outcomes of immigration are exclusively grounded in the domestic good, and as a result the full comprehension of the outcomes of mobility that go beyond territorial boundaries with the mobility of citizens are difficult to measure (Bauböck, 2009). The objective of ensuring the economic prosperity of all regions in Canada under sub-paragraph 3(1)(c) (Justice Canada, 2014, 2) is elaborated in residency requirements for successful permanent resi-
dent applicants. These requirements were first articulated in the 1976 Immigration Act that required half the year be spent in Canada. Under IRPA, all permanent residents are required to reside in Canada for 730 days in five years, or through a limited number of exceptions accompanying a Canadian citizen or permanent resident overseas (Justice Canada, 2014, 29). The 730 days is cumulative rather than consecutive.

The Act also requires that many individuals wishing to immigrate to Canada state their intention to reside. In the case of individuals seeking reunification through the family class, their Canadian-citizen or permanent resident sponsor is required to demonstrate that they will reside in Canada at the time that their sponsored family member becomes a permanent resident (Justice Canada, 2015a, 168). Within both the IRPA and IRPR, there is no enforcement or follow up clause connected to this obligation. For all intents and purposes, however, the law prescribes that individuals who enter the country with the intent of taking up permanent residence must establish that they will actually do so.

Two facts are significant in these elements of residency policy: First, so long as the 730 day requirement is fulfilled in progressive five year increments, permanent residents can effectively maintain their status indefinitely (Justice Canada, 2014, 29) while residing most of their lives outside of the territory of the state. Second, the intent to reside requirement imposed on individuals entering under economic programs do not require a permanent resident or citizen to sponsor them. The requirement that certain immigrants show an intent to reside appears to be an initial factor in creating a residency based citizenship regime that begins with permanent resident requirements. However, it is one that is only applied to family class immigration, while other newcomers in the economic streams are only subject to meeting residency requirements after
permanent resident status acquisition. While those residency requirements are intended to encourage integration in the Canadian labour market, their flexibility allows this to be avoided for most of a permanent resident's life.

The reasons for this flexibility appears to be related to international competitiveness already noted. In terms of strictness, Canada’s residency rules intentionally fall somewhere in the middle of what are referred to as the Five Country Conference (FCC) members; the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, who are seen as each others’ main competitors in attracting elite immigrants. As one former executive at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) put it; one of the goals of any residency policy is to maintain a competitive edge that does not scare away potential immigrants (A. Griffith, Personal Communication, August 26, 2015). As a result a middle ground between competitors allowing external residency of permanent residents is seen as necessary. Selection and permanent resident status retention criteria seek economic benefit by requiring residency through physical presence, but give the flexibility to mobile individuals, in particular in the economic class, to remain outside of the country the majority of the time. The result is that permanent resident status retention does not in reality require permanent residency in Canada. While emphasizing the requirement of physical presence for family member reunification through the intent to reside clause, residency requirements are flexible for more mobile economic class immigrants. Any benefits of this initial external residency are not articulated in IRPA’s core objectives, or elsewhere, while internal economic benefits are. Despite the apparent pragmatism of flexible residency in a competitive international environment, it is not legislated.

The coherence of this approach is also challenged by the fact that the indicators of suc-
cess of the economic streams of immigration are measured in the domestic economy only. Studies of the ability of immigrants to become economically established and their contribution to the Canadian economy, which are often cited as evidence by the Government of the measurable success of the economic stream programs, (Griffith, 2015) are consequently undermined by failing to incorporate the external resident population. The salary levels, employment statistics and labour market inclusion rates of mobile individuals living outside of the country are not captured in these studies, meaning the data necessary to determine the benefits Canada gains from flexible residency in the permanent resident process is only partially measurable. As a result economic selection criteria substantiated through domestic economic benefit of human capital accumulation do not account for the intent or outcomes of residency laws, which provide mobility in the form of flexible residency requirements. No matter the actual practices of mobile permanent residents, the control the state has over the outcomes of these economic streams cannot be accurately measured, and the coherence of the focused policies of selection and residency becomes questionable.

Immigration selection and residency policy are the first points of contact and exchange between the human capital interests of the state and the mobility interests of newcomers, in particular a global high-human capital cohort. As mobility is increasingly normalized and associated with the ideal ‘globetrotting elite’ (Mahroum, 2000) immigrant for which Canada must compete with other states to attract, the domestic value of that individual is overshadowed, rendering the stated outcomes of selection criteria less and less relevant.

\[5\] A few examples include (Reitz, 2007), (Grubel & Grady, 2012 - Fraser Institute), (R. Pendakur, 2000) and (Picot et al., 2014).
Citizenship policy: Dueling allegiances, dueling intents

Mobility and Citizenship Acquisition

As a second level in a multi-level analytical embrace, citizenship policy shows much of the same incoherence of immigration policy in its treatment of mobility. IRCC frequently refers to the ‘immigration continuum’ in defining policy and procedures that recognize the interconnectivity of immigration and citizenship (Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013, 10; Griffith, 2015). This continuum begins with selection overseas, continues through settlement in Canada, and ends with citizenship acquisition. The continuum is used to plan for services to newcomers through all periods of their transition to life in Canada. The immigration continuum is presented as unidirectional, effectively treating the practice of newcomer and citizen mobility as a domestic linear process (Griffith, 2013, 10). This has major implications for the treatment of mobility within citizenship policy overall.

Unlike IRPA (2014) Canada’s Citizenship Act (1977) does not state a set of overarching mandates. Rather, what it ‘means to be Canadian’ is the subject of political and public discourse that ultimately relies on a collective determination of the value of citizenship in a democratic political community (Kivisto & Faist, 2007). In the absence of legislated goals that do not exist in Citizenship policy, what mobility means to Canada’s political community in terms of external and dual citizenship is therefore of central importance as these two practices of mobility externalize the political community and render the democratic discourse no longer exclusive to the territory and domestic society of a single state.

While the Liberal Government that took power in 2015 has repealed many of the most contentious elements of Bill C-24 (Zilio, 2016), which came into force in June of 2015, the
changes are nonetheless indicative of the state, regardless of the party in power, struggling to coherently treat mobility. Bill C-24 is the latest in a string of updates that have altered, but not completely rewritten the principles of citizenship since the Citizenship Act which first came into force in 1977. The changes in the last decade have frequently become politically contentious including Bill C-24 and amendments in Bill C-37 in 2009, which changed who had access to citizenship. Changes in C-24 were in particular controversial as a result of the way they affect the rights of external and dual-citizens (Globe & Mail, 2014) feeding into the ideational and publicly debated role of citizenship, ‘loyalty’ (Blatter, 2011) and how mobility fits into it. In place of specific goals to achieve in granting citizenship, the primary function of the Citizenship Act (1977) is to lay out the criteria under which citizenship is gained and lost, and who is entitled to it (Justice Canada, 2015c, 3).

Citizenship ‘Selection’ Policy

While citizenship policy has no legislated core objectives, its place in the immigration continuum means it is often implicated in the goals of immigration policy. According to Andrew Griffith, former Director General for Citizenship Branch at IRCC and commentator on citizenship and multiculturalism issues, citizenship policy is often considered the “poor cousin” to immigration policy (A. Griffith, 2015). From a funding perspective, as an element of policy formation and intent, this is immediately evident. Only sixty-eight million dollars of IRCC’s 1.45 billion dollar 2015 budget was planned to be spent on the Citizenship Program. The Program’s mandate is to administer “the acquisition of Canadian citizenship by developing, implementing and applying legislation, regulations and policies that protect the integrity of Canadian citizenship” (Government of Canada, 2014). Despite the lofty mandate it is “chronically underfunded” or managed
with lapsing funds that must be continuously rejustified (A. Griffith, 2015). The immigration program and settlement services on the other hand are principle recipients of IRCC’s budget at almost 1.2 billion dollars combined. At least in how policy reform is funded, citizenship is heavily reliant on immigration selection policy and operational developments to provide potential clients and direction.

As a result of a lack of a clear and differentiated policy objective in the Citizenship Program, and a lack of resources to develop clear objectives, immigration policy mandates on what factors and criteria selectively create permanent residents can be seen as seeping into establishing who becomes a citizen. In recent years this has meant an increasing emphasis on economic immigration (Ferrer et al., 2014, 847). In combination, the growth in economic models of immigration and an increasing reliance on immigration for new citizens means that those with the most access to citizenship appear to be increasingly those with high human capital. Consequently the Citizenship Act’s de facto treatment of mobility is tied to that of immigration selection for the purposes of ‘selecting’ new citizens.

Citizenship Acquisition Residency Policy

The replication of selection in citizenship policy corresponds with a similar replication of citizenship residency policy. The first iteration of the Citizenship Act in 1977 required permanent residents to reside in Canada for a cumulative period of three years out of six before he or she was eligible to apply for citizenship. Bill C-24 raised the number of years of residency required to four in six. Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Citizenship Act, introduced in Bill C-24 also required that applicants be “physically present in Canada for at least 183 days during each of four calendar
years that are fully or partially within the six years immediately before the date of his or her application" (Justice Canada, 2015c). Before C-24 was introduced, the residency requirements did not expressly state physical presence or define annual requirements (Justice Canada, 2014b). As a measure that restricts mobility the change in the years of residency may pose challenges to would-be citizens by placing a greater onus on them to remain in the country.

However, it is a change moderated by the human capital interests of the state through immigration selection criteria. A longer residency requirement benefits those likely to find employment and stable, growing income in Canada during their required stay. As Picot et. al. found, these are mostly likely to be individuals selected under economic streams of immigration for their human capital (2014), or who otherwise have the necessary funds to survive in Canada without employment for longer periods, in what one senior immigration officer called their ‘jail time’ (personal communication, August 13, 2015). Those with high human capital who are prepared to invest it in return for mobility are consequently those who benefit from longer residency requirements. Residency policy within citizenship policy is pulling at two ends of the same rope in treating mobility. On the one hand, it encourages more Canadian residency before citizenship acquisition, reinforcing the value of long-term stay as key to citizenship, as suggested by Carens (2008). On the other it is doing so for an increasingly narrow group of global elite selected under economic immigration programs who are consequently more mobile due to their lack of financial dependence on residency (DeVoretz & Pivnenko, 2005). The ability of newcomers to move on the path to acquiring citizenship is predicated on a conceptualization of citizenship loosely defined and dependent on immigration selection criteria. As a result, the treatment of mobility in citizenship residency and ‘selection’ policy appears to share the same gaps between objectives
and outcomes as immigration policy, where domestic interests are undermined by a variable conceptualization of the value of remaining in Canada or living outside of the territory of the state.

Further complicating this already crowded playing field of policies that interact with mobility was the introduction of the ‘intent to reside’ clause in bill C-24. While this clause has since been rescinded with the rest of C-24, the debate that surrounded its introduction is worth examining as an indication of the growing critical discourse of the rights and privileges of mobility in citizenship policy, versus residency based citizenship expectations. The ‘intent to reside’ clause introduced in sub-paragraph (3)(b)(iii)) of the Citizenship Act by Bill C-24 (Justice Canada, 2015) required citizenship applicants to declare their intent to reside in Canada after acquisition in much the same way the requirement still exists in immigration selection. When C-24 was introduced the clause quickly gained attention from immigration, citizenship and mobility advocates who accused it of being against the human right of mobility enshrined in Section 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Heritage Canada, Section 6(1), 2013; Bronskill, 2015). While a failure to demonstrate intent within their citizenship application may have prevented certain opportunistic individuals from obtaining citizenship, it opposed the liberal conceptualization of Canadian citizenship enshrined in the right to mobility contained in the Charter. The intent to reside clause treated mobility as a negative component of citizen practices only among prospective naturalized Canadian citizens. It effectively required naturalized citizens to demonstrate their commitment to immobility in the form of Canadian residency, while nonetheless valuing mobility as an inalienable right in the Charter after citizenship is acquired.


**Mobility Policy as Citizens**

Once permanent residents meet the requirements and transition to citizenship, the confrontations between contrasting conceptualizations of membership and the treatment of mobility described in Chapter One become more pronounced. Dual-citizenship policy in Canada, while not actually legislated, provides significant mobility opportunity for those who are able to hold a Canadian passport along with another. The external citizenship that may develop out of residency opportunities associated with that additional membership meanwhile further interacts with policy as the role and value of citizenship overseas enters the discourse of the political community.

As was already discussed in Chapter One, the shift away from language of allegiance contained in the first Citizenship Act in 1947 was part of the reorienting of Canadian immigration and citizenship laws away from criteria connected to race, national origins, and quotas and towards acquisition via human-capital and residency based citizenship policy in place today (Herzog, 2014). This included removal of references to exclusions due to existing citizenship. Various authors have found a direct connection between economic success and citizenship acquisition among newcomers (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012; DeVoretz & Pivnenko, 2005). These authors argue that tacit acceptance of dual-citizenship is part-and-parcel of a recognition that retention of existing citizenship helps encourage the immigration, citizenship acquisition and integration of attractive immigrants. In 1977 accepting dual-citizenship can consequently be seen as a definitive step towards accommodating mobility born out of multiple membership, but with the ultimate goal of encouraging domestic interests of residency retention and integration. At the same time by not actually legislating the right of dual-citizenship into citizenship policy, questions of allegiance and loyalty that still pervade the public discourse today were avoided, ac-
commodating but not embracing the practice of holding multiple memberships.

*Mobility and the Loss of Rights - Citizenship Revocation and External Voting*

However, this accommodation and lack of legislated embrace can also contribute to the restriction of mobility around dual-citizenship. The introduction of expanded criteria for citizenship revocation in Bill C-24 coupled with Canada’s commitment to preventing statelessness and acceptance of dual citizenship create a contradiction of rights and privileges associated with mobility. Section 10 of the Bill (Justice Canada, 2014b) expands the circumstances under which citizenship can be revoked to include fraud that results in citizenship and certain crimes including treason and terrorism. Because Canada has committed to reduce statelessness internationally (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1961, Article 8), citizenship can only be revoked if an individual is a citizen of a country other than Canada. This includes Canadian born citizens. One of the first citizenship revocations in October 2015 was a Canadian born citizen convicted of plotting a terrorist act, Saad Gaya (Fine, 2015). Officials at IRCC concluded that he had retroactively gained Pakistani citizenship along with his parents after immigrating, despite being born in Canada. This allowed his citizenship to be revoked, as he would not be rendered stateless as a result. In this case, dual-citizenship facilitated a loss of mobility rights through citizenship revocation. Furthermore, citizenship became tiered. As a result of being members of multiple states dual-citizens were exposed to the possibility of having their citizenship revoked, relative to single-membership Canadians who would not face the same risk. The Canadian Bar Association argued that this also directly challenged the right to mobility under section 6(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by enacting exile as a form of punishment, which is prohib-
ited under the Charter (The Canadian Bar Association, 2014, 17-19). Revocation policy countered the spirit of the 1977 Citizenship Act that first allowed dual-citizenship, by creating a disincentive to become a Canadian citizen, or to maintain the citizenship of one’s country of origin, losing the benefits of such membership that have been identified for integration. The mobility allowed by dual-citizenship was reframed through C-24 as a justification for expulsion from Canadian territory, and created a threat to mobility for all dual-citizens that single-membership citizens would not face.

External citizenship has attracted similar restrictions that pose challenges to the embrace of mobility in the Charter. In early 2015 the Federal Court upheld Section 11 of the Elections Act restricting citizens who had resided outside of Canada for more than five years from voting in federal elections (Justice Canada, 2015d). An estimated one million citizens were affected. Although only around six thousand were estimated to have actually voted in the 2011 election, the change attracted high profile criticism from expatriated Canadians such as actor Donald Sutherland and Wayne Gretzky (Berger et al., 2015).

The decision to limit voting rights for external citizens is one that directly affects the mobility of individuals who may engaged and wish to participate in Canadian politics despite residing overseas for extend periods. Much like intent to reside, limiting voter rights assumes that a citizen should not be entitled to the same rights as any other citizen if they have not resided in Canada for a certain period, in this case five years. Similar to revocation clauses, external voting limitations create a *de facto* tiering of citizenship, where a fundamental right; the right to vote, is imparted unevenly depending on residency choices. It effectively forces mobile citizens to take advantage of one right at the risk of losing another; choosing between the right to remain mobile.
by residing outside of Canada, or the right to vote, by remaining or returning to Canada. Employing Bauböck’s stakeholder criteria here is useful. He argues that the right of enfranchisement is perhaps the most complex and fundamental stake a citizen can have. He suggests that a balance is necessary between recognizing an external political community, while also ensuring a stable core territorial population is not outnumbered by non-resident voters (2009, 488). While external voting restrictions in the Elections Act (Justice Canada, 2015d) appear to set a balance by imposing harsher criteria and forcing a determination of mobility rights versus universal enfranchisement, it also treats mobility in a restrictive manner that challenges its place as a universal right under the Charter. The dichotomous treatment of mobility as both a right and a privilege consequently results in an incoherence across Canada's citizenship program.

Citizenship in Transition?

What can be concluded about Canada’s current treatment of mobility within and across immigration and citizenship policy? First, Canadian policy in different domains treats mobility as something to restrict, accommodate and embrace as a right. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Constitution Act, 1982) is the only legislation that names mobility, and it appears to be the only citizenship policy to fully embraces it. While it is limited to citizens, it nonetheless establishes that all Canadians have the right to move freely in and out of the country. Meanwhile, flexible residency requirements in both citizenship and immigration policy and the acceptance of dual citizenship are both approaches to mobility that accommodate it in the form of limited external residency, often afforded by membership in another state. In both instances, accommodation is tied to domestic interests of encouraging integration and attracting specific individuals to the
benefit of the domestic economy and political community (Reitz, 2005; Caletrio, 2012; Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012; Bevelander, 2012; Faist, 2008; Bloemraad, 2004). Restrictive policies are also present. This includes limiting voter rights of external citizens, expanding grounds for citizenship revocation that only implicate dual-citizens, and requiring that prospective newcomers and citizens declare an intent to reside. These policies narrowly define the political community along traditional conceptualization of citizenship grounded in methodological nationalism through forcing citizens in a greater number of instances to decide when they should use their ability to move temporarily and circularly across international borders and between states.

Second, both restrictions and accommodations favour the mobility of a high-human capital elite, and have the focused intent to benefit the domestic economy. Economic class immigrants are not required to demonstrate an intent to reside. Programs that attract them emphasize the acquisition of permanent resident status with minimal strings attached in competition with other states (Caletrio, 2012). Citizenship residency policy is a ‘middle-ground’ (Griffith, 2015) that seeks to develop a tie to the domestic political community and economy, while still recognizing that ideal prospective newcomers seek out mobility as a part of their immigration choices. However, evidence supporting this underlying premise is grounded in research that does not measure the outcomes of immigration and citizenship beyond the territory of the state (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012). Whether mobility rights truly do result in greater integration of newcomers domestically therefore becomes questionable. The coherence of dual-citizenship policy is similarly challenged. The high-human capital global elite that represents around sixty percent of Canada’s annual immigration intake are accommodated through flexible residency policy and dual-citizenship policy that allows for sought after mobility (McCollough, 2010). They are also
better suited to measure and adapt to the risks of mobility inherent in restrictive policy as a result of their human-capital making them more employable, and offering a greater likelihood of stability where sedentary practices may be needed when residency policy becomes more onerous.

Third, while this may appear to indicate that there is some coherence in these individual policy approaches to mobility, around the principle of attracting and retaining human capital, this may not actually be the case when outcomes are examined against objectives. Flexible residency policies, dual-citizenship and the Charter right of mobility all place the control over how and where that human capital is applied in the hands of mobile dual-citizens with high human capital and alternative residency opportunities. For at least nine percent of Canadians, a portion of them selected under economic programs of immigration, the choice has been made to reside and invest their human capital elsewhere.

These policies are contentious, and at times divisive, because they unevenly treat mobility as both a universal right, and a privilege to be allotted in exchange for domestic benefits. The structure of democratic discourse around which citizenship laws are built breaks down, as the authors of laws are no longer subject to them (Faist, 2008). In the reverse case of voting rights, external citizens are no longer authors of the laws they are subject to. The table below may shift from one end of the spectrum of mobility to the other with time, sometimes emphasizing restriction as was the case in Bill C-24, and at other times accommodating and even embracing the ability of newcomers and citizens to move. Nonetheless, since the introduction of the Immigration and Citizenship Acts forty years ago, the same spectrum has existed, and the same incoherence has prevailed between domestic interests that seek to restrict mobility and the right of mobility as universal.
Collectively challenges to the coherence of citizenship policy changes reflect the limits of the principles of methodological nationalism, which look for domestic residency as a measure of success. This emphasis on the domestic benefits of restricting, accommodating or embracing mobility obscure a key factor: The value of external residents and citizens, as well as citizens with multiple memberships is not articulated coherently, if at all in Citizenship policies. A stakeholder conceptualization of citizenship (Bauböck, 2009) remains elusive in policy. Bauböck asserts that many external citizens do have significant ties to their country of citizenship even when residing long term outside of its territory, and should have rights allocated according to these stakes (2009). He suggests that differentiating based on stakeholder criteria would allow an equalization of rights between migrants and native-born citizens, and between mobile and sedentary populations (2009, 477). This would address to some degree the triangle of restriction, accommodation and embrace but around a more coherent set of principles that do not rely on residency as their basis. Recent policies that treated mobility in a restrictive manner may have established certain limitations to external and dual-citizenship creating a tiered conceptualization of membership, but they did not come with a corresponding articulation of the ongoing value to the state of mobile citizens, or the rights that are necessary to be maintained.

What remains to be seen is whether applying this analytical framework beyond immigration and citizenship policy in specific contexts where Canada interacts with newcomer and citizen mobility in a broad basket of policies reveals a more holistic approach to mobility, or further incoherence. Does any overarching coherence both within and across policies including foreign affairs exist that is hidden within studies focusing exclusively on the domains of immigration and citizenship normally associated with human movement across Canada’s borders? To begin this
investigation, elaboration of key policy developments in Canadian foreign affairs is needed. As principle elements of Canada’s foreign policy engagement within the ‘mobility case studies’ in Chapter Three, international trade and investment policy, and Canada’s Middle East policy approach in the context of terrorism and national security will be investigated.

**Foreign Policy and Mobility**

*Canada’s International Trade and Investment Policy*

In the last chapter ‘diaspora strategies’ (Boyle & Kitchin, 2011) promoting foreign investment were investigated as points of contact between mobility and foreign policy. Several states, both of origin and destination, were shown to use a diaspora strategy to engage with mobile citizens living overseas and holding multiple memberships in the promotion of investment opportunities and market access. Does Canada have a diaspora strategy within its foreign investment policy, and if so what does it tell us about how Canada treats mobility? The Department of Global Affairs manages the foreign investment and export promotion portfolios. The Department promotes Canada as a “stable and predictable” market, consistently outperforming G7 partners, with a diversified economy including multiple sectors for potential investment (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, 2013). The Department also maintains a Global Markets Action Plan for accessing overseas markets for Canadian interests (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, 2014). Canada’s international investment strategy includes Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs), which are bilateral agreements that set out rights and obligations for two-way investments. Negotiations on the first FIPAs began in 1989 and new FIPAs continue to be negotiated (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, 2016). Non-cit-
izens wishing to make direct investments through business ownership in Canada are meanwhile also subject to the Investment Canada Act (Justice Canada, 1985). There is no clear and coherent diaspora strategy within these foreign policy mechanisms. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade investigated a Global Citizens strategy in 2010 to engage Canadians abroad towards foreign investment opportunities (Boyle and Kitchin, 2011), no unit or organization similar to those in Ireland and New Zealand was established.

Nonetheless, Canada to some degree does engage in a strategy of leveraging its mobile citizens overseas within its broader foreign policy. While this will be explored in more depth and in context in the following chapter, it is worthwhile to note here that while informal, this engagement represents a treatment of mobility that further renders the whole of government approach incoherent. While limitation on voting rights for overseas citizens attracted protests from high-profile external citizens such as Donald Sutherland (Sutherland, 2015), similarly high-profile Canadians living abroad represent significant promotional opportunities for the Canadian brand. During Justin Trudeau’s inaugural trip to Washington to meet with President Barack Obama, for example, he also found time to meet with US-based Canadian born musician The Weeknd at a pre-summit invitation-only event jointly held by Canadian and US based think tanks (Logan, 2016). The event was also attended by US and Canadian lawmakers, diplomats and industry leaders giving significant two-way access to decision makers on either side of the border (Paterson, 2016). While lacking a formal institution for engagement with mobile citizens, in instances like this mobility is treated as a beneficial informal tool available for engagement and promotion of Canada’s brand overseas. Through this form of engagement, mobile citizens become stakeholders in the promotion of Canada, in many cases willingly serving the role of a
gateway to key individuals and organizations in overseas markets where Canada seeks investments or other trade advantages. By doing so they appear to fulfill significant elements of the stakeholder criteria for citizenship that Bauböck lays out.

Canada’s Policy Shift in the Middle East Post 9/11

As noted in Chapter One, there is a general consensus among researchers that Canada’s Middle East and national security policy has shifted since 9/11 with an increased emphasis on fighting terrorism, a subtext of racialization of security policy, and greater support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Policy orientation from 2001 onwards reflects crossover between these domains. Under Paul Martin and Stephen Harper Canada made several distinct policy changes that moved support for Israel from one of equilibrium, engaging as a middle-power capable of influencing and brokering in the region, to one of more absolute defence of the Israeli state and its actions. Under both Prime Ministers Canada’s UN voting record on issues relating to Palestine, Israel, and even mobility in the region began to change. This included blocking Palestine’s observer status in the UN, abstaining on a vote noting the findings of the International Court of Justice that Israel’s security barrier contravened international law, and opposing a non-binding resolution in the UN Economic and Social Council calling on Israel to allow Palestinian refugee women and children displaced in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war to return to their homes (Musu, 2012; Berry, 2010, 196-199; Gollum, 2012). Under the Conservative Government this pattern became more pronounced, and coincided with revoking humanitarian and civil society funding. While it had been the tenth largest donor in previous years, in early 2010 Canada ended funding to UNWRA, the agency responsible for managing Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. In 2009 Canada
also revoked funding to other civil society and non-government organizations who had spoken out on Israel’s human rights record, including Montreal based Alternatives, and Kairos (Kestler-D’Amours, 2010). In the later case the government attracted significant criticism, and accusations of misleading Parliament when Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenney stated to an Israeli audience that Kairos lost funding for having supported boycotts and sanctions against Israel. The Government later backtracked from this assertion, claiming the organization did not meet the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funding priorities. However, it was subsequently revealed that a departmental recommendation to continue funding for Kairos had been altered by the Minister’s Office to cut funding instead, with no apparent consultation (CBC News, 2011). Instances such as these helped to alter the perception of Canada as a balanced actor in the region, and defined a shift towards a more pro-Israel approach.

At the same time that Canada’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict was shifting, Canada was also reorienting broader Middle East policy around the threat of terrorism. It was not long before the two intersected. Under then Prime Minister Jean Chretien, Canada introduced the Anti-Terrorism Act in December 2001 in reaction to the attacks of September 11. The Act introduced new powers for law-enforcement and the Canadian security establishment (Jenkins, 2003; Justice Canada, 2001). The Conservative Government extended many of these powers in 2012 through the Combatting Terrorism Act (Justice Canada, 2012). One of the amendments of the original Act was to the Canadian Criminal code (Justice Canada, 2016) to add Subsection 83.05. This section allows the government to maintain a list of entities that either knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity (Justice Canada, 2016). A notable addition to this list in 2002 was the Lebanese organization Hezbollah (Government of
Hezbollah originally formed during the 1980s out of various armed Shia Muslim groups in Southern Lebanon fighting in the decade-long Lebanese civil war. It maintains military and political wings within Lebanon, largely autonomous from the Lebanese state and receives significant foreign backing from the Republic of Iran (Takeyh, 2006). Hezbollah has been one of the most consistently active belligerents in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the last twenty-five years. Acts of violence have included bombings on Israeli Embassies, rocket attacks on northern Israeli towns and frequent skirmishes with Israeli forces over the 1990s and early 2000s (CNN, 2006). By placing Hezbollah on the terrorist list, the post-9/11 national security orientation of foreign policy in the Middle East intersected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. As will be seen in Chapter Three, the characterization of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization was a foundation for the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 2006, and the subsequent interaction between the mobility of Canadian citizens evacuated from the territory and Canada’s Middle East foreign Policy.
Chapter Three
Contextual Treatment: Hong Kong and Lebanese-Canadian Mobility

The analysis of legislated policy reveals incoherence in the treatment of mobility at the outset of policy formation; in intended goals and objectives. To understand more fully how Canada treats mobility, however, the real world implementation and interaction of those policies also needs to be considered. In the two cases of mobility looked at here; Hong Kong and Lebanese-Canadians, practices by both communities have brought new focus to concepts of ‘citizenship of convenience’ and dual-citizenship in the public and political vernacular and have contributed to the evolving treatment of mobility around multiple policies. Immigration policy thirty years ago that provided initial mobility in the form of access to Canada will be analyzed alongside citizenship policy, and elements of foreign policy that have intersected with the existence of these two communities as mobile dual and external citizens. Using Mitchell’s multi-level analytical embrace these policy domains will be analyzed in each case study in order to determine whether a coherent whole-of-government approach to mobility actually exist.

Canadian Policy and Hong Kong-Canadian Mobility: Absent Human Capital

Between three and four hundred thousand Canadian citizens reside in Hong Kong. Most are naturalized Canadian citizens of Hong Kong origin, or their children. The vast majority immigrated to Canada in the last thirty years (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2011, 4). The phenomenon of mobility out of Hong Kong in this period is well studied. Ong’s analysis of the ethnic Chinese ‘flexible citizen’ (1999) was one of the first to establish how fundamental obtaining the citizenship of other countries was for a sought-after mobile lifestyle among Hong Kong people. Ong
argued that this was not for the express purpose of permanent emigration, but for the benefits that
came with multiple residency opportunities associated with the right of mobility for citizens.
This included insurance against political instability, and access to rights and privileges in a liberal
democracy such as Canada. Ong’s analysis of the familial and kinship relationship patterns
that allowed for opportunistic citizenship to take place, and for long-term external citizenship to
become a norm, reveals how mobility can first come into contact with state policy (1999, 44-45)
on the level of immigration policy in a multi-level analysis. Given their position as one of the
first large scale movements after the introduction of the 1976 Immigration Act and 1977 Citizenship
Act, the established mobile community that exists between Hong Kong and Canada is an
ideal case to investigate how real world mobility practices have been treated.

The racial and geographical quota system that characterized Canadian immigration policy
during most of the twentieth-century came to an end with the 1976 Immigration Act. Formerly
excluded ethnic Chinese residents of Hong Kong took advantage of this opening as worries grew
around the hand-over of the British colony to the PRC in 1997. In the 1980s and 1990s Canada
selected tens of thousands of Hong Kong residents for Canadian permanent resident status as
professionals, investors and entrepreneurs under newly introduced economic programs seeking
human capital (see Figure 5). The National Film Board of Canada film “Who Gets In” captures
this era well (Scott, 1989). The film observes the sometimes otherworldly interviews that took
place at the Canadian High Commission between immigration officers and Hong Kong entrepre-
neurs; from senior advertising executives to snake-skin wallet manufacturers (Scott, 1989,
37.28). Canadian policy at the time included a rapid expansion of personnel at the office (Scott,
1989) to maximize the opportunity to attract the human capital of an affluent well-educated
Hong Kong population looking to leave during what was considered an uncertain period for the territory.

Figure 1: Permanent Residents from Hong Kong 1980 - 2014
(Data Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2015a)

The convergence of Canada’s interest in high-human capital and motivation among Hong Kong people to seek out alternative residency options in the 1980s and 1990s was also facilitated by foundations of mobility already present in the territory. Hong Kong society leading up to the handover was made up of people with heritage from all aspects of Chinese society who had fled the instability of the early Twentieth Century PRC, who had the experience of practicing mobility, and often maintained first or second generation connections outside of the territory (Tsang, 2007). At the same time, Hong Kong was also uniquely placed as a British crown colony, with western educational, political, and social institutions that enabled much of the population to become bilingual, cosmopolitan, and with credentials and experience that fit into Canada’s economic immigration selection criteria. The population of Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s was
consequently ideally situated to seek out new opportunities elsewhere and insure against the uncertainties of the colony’s future (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005). Moreover, the existence of mobility in Hong Kong as a lifestyle choice was ideally situated to take advantage of the open doors of Canada, which had recently introduced a human-capital based economic immigration system under the 1976 Immigration Act.

Despite fears of economic, political, and social collapse that propelled widespread emigration from Hong Kong following the 1997 handover, the economy of Hong Kong boomed and tens of thousands of newly established Canadian permanent residents and citizens returned to seek employment in what was considered a more viable Hong Kong labour market (Li, 2005). As a result, an estimated ten percent of the population now has dual-citizenship from a variety of western states that opened their gates thirty years ago (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005, 115). Moreover, in the period between 1996 and 2006 twenty-four percent of naturalized Canadian citizens from Hong Kong immigrated back to Hong Kong from Canada (Asia Pacific Foundation, 2011, 14). This return movement is not the end of the story of Hong Kong mobility. An almost constant flow of mobile citizens and permanent residents now moves across the Pacific seeking out the benefits of residency in both Canada and the territory (Kobayashi & Preston, 2007).

*Hong Kong-Canadian Mobility and Immigration Selection and Residency Policy*

Immigration policy was integral to facilitating this mobility, but at the time showed no apparent awareness that return-migration would take place on such a large scale following immigration. Sub-paragraph 24(1)(a) of the Immigration Act (1976) set the precedence of accommodating mobility by allowing permanent resident status to be maintained for anyone who remained in
Canada for at least six months of the year (Justice Canada, 1976). At the same time, however, it sought extensive human capital in this largely elite group from Hong Kong with the introduction of the business classes of immigration under Section 114 of the Act. This section laid out selection criteria on the basis of “education, language skill, occupational or business experience and other personal attributes…” and justified them on the basis of determining the ability of select immigrants to “become successfully established in Canada” (Justice Canada, 1977, Section 114). The Act established the acquisition of human capital as a primary interest of immigration, while simultaneously providing extensive mobility through flexible residency that was then practiced through trans-Pacific movements by as much as half a million people. In the context of the goals of mobile individuals around the hand-over of Hong Kong to the PRC, this allowed a nexus to form between mobility and Canadian immigration policy, giving Hong Kong people access to sought-after residency opportunities through the accommodation of mobility in the form of flexible residency requirements and dual-citizenship.

The Accommodation of Hong Kong-Canadian Mobility

After the initial emigration from Hong Kong, a pattern of citizenship acquisition and life-course based residency developed. Studies since Ong’s have argued that Hong Kong people were not just driven by uncertainty over the economic and political stability of Hong Kong, but by pragmatic decisions between the social, political and economic opportunities available as residents of either Hong Kong or Canada (Ley & Kobayashi, 2007; Kobayashi and Preston, 2007). Hong Kong people in particular sought out the advantages of social and political security in Canadian citizenship, including access to education and retirement opportunities, as Kobayashi and Preston
found through detailed interviews among Hong Kong Canadians a decade after the hand-over. As both Hong Kong and Canada allowed their members to hold multiple-citizenships, there was also no risk to Hong Kong people’s existing mobility by acquiring Canadian citizenship. The pragmatic acceptance of dual-citizenship towards integration (Blatter, 2004; Herzog, 2014) as a key element of the 1976 Act succeeded in attracting hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong people to Canadian citizenship.  

Many Hong Kong-Canadians now take advantage of numerous aspects of multiple residency opportunities, and work around the limitations of residency policies. For example, a lack of post-secondary educational opportunities in the territory today encourages many Hong Kong-Canadian youth to seek out subsidized-education in Canada. Meanwhile, their parents remain in Hong Kong during the productive years of their lives that often overlap with their children’s education. Despite often being selected for immigration under economic streams that emphasized immigration for domestic economic benefit, these parents instead choose their children’s education as the overarching motivation to leverage mobility and strategically choose their country of residence (Preston et al., 2006). Many of these so-called ‘astronaut’ parents (Ong, 1999; Waters, 2003) in turn seek social and environmental opportunities of residency in Canada once they have secured their human capital investment in Hong Kong, either through leaving the workforce at retirement, or gaining sufficient financial stability to sacrifice the economic advantages of Hong Kong residence for long-term stays in Canada (Kobayashi & Preston, 2007). In all, almost half of dual Hong Kong-Canadian citizens in Canada take up residence outside of the most productive

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6 Following 1997 Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of the PRC. Hong Kong permanent residents are citizenship of the PRC but are entitled to special privileges, holding separate passports and unlike residents of Mainland China may hold the citizenship of another country (see Tsang, 2007).
periods of their lives, either prior to entering the workforce or after leaving it. According to the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS) (Statistics Canada, 2011) forty-seven percent of dual Hong Kong-Canadian citizens, or 98,375 individuals, who reside in Canada are between the ages of zero and 24 or 55 and older. These cohorts are considered low human-capital based on two factors: First, the limited points awarded to individuals aged 55 and older under the skilled worker program in IRPA, and second, the limited education and experience of individuals under 24 (Justice Canada, 2015a).

Hong Kong-Canadian mobility patterns do not indicate that immigration and citizenship policy in the 1980s and 1990s is directly responsible for these practices, however, the patterns themselves counter the stated objectives of policies. Immigration and citizenship selection, residency, and acquisition policy grounded in methodological nationalism sought human capital for domestic economic good, and increasingly the knowledge-based domestic labour market (Reitz, 2005). It found this human capital in a population of largely elite Hong Kong people who were looking for the political, social, economic and environmental benefits of mobility, and in particular multiple residency opportunities grounded in citizenship acquisition. As many as one in three first-generation Hong Kong-Canadians (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005, 112) do not fulfill the domestic objectives legislated in the Immigration Act (1976) and IRPA (2001). Mobile Hong Kong-Canadians existing in transborder sites (Glick-Schiller, 2005), where neither Hong Kong nor Canada completely controls their mobility, are able to selectively choose when to use their mobility through their lives regardless of these objectives.
Mitchell’s multilevel analytical framework (1989) for coherently analyzing immigration and foreign policy can be applied in the Hong Kong-Canadian mobility case study. In line with the elements of foreign trade policy explored in Chapters One and Two, the analysis will focus on the role of diaspora strategies in promotion of investment opportunities and access to overseas markets, and the treatment of mobility within these policies. Canada’s trade relations with the PRC have rapidly expanded since the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to the present day. China is now Canada’s third largest export destination and second-largest source of imports worldwide (Holden, 2008, 2). This rapid expansion has come with deepening trade policy, including bilateral agreements with the government of the PRC. Many of these agreements, including a FIPA, help address ongoing concerns over the uncertain legal and regulatory investment framework in China (Holden, 2008, 12). While Canadian businesses have shown interest in investment in China, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in the Chinese market have remained low relative to other countries, representing only 0.3% of Canada’s total investments worldwide (Holden, 2008, 13). Meanwhile, FDIs by China in Canada have faced significant hurdles as a result of concerns over foreign investments that could be injurious to national security. Investments backed by Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs); funds owned by the Chinese state, are considered particular risks (Moran, 2012). Sub-section 25.1 of the Investment Canada Act (1985) as part of Bill C-59 in 2005 was introduced to address concerns over national security and since then investments backed by SWFs have faced delays or failed completely (Holden, 2008, 7-11; Moran, 2012). Even as trade has greatly expanded within China in the last sixty years, the risk for outsiders of dealing with the government of the PRC has in part remained.
As a territory of the PRC, Hong Kong meanwhile does not act as an independent state in foreign policy, but retains a certain degree of autonomy in trade policy (Government of the People’s Republic of China, 1997, Chapter 7). Concerns over the rule of law and legal and regulatory frameworks of China do not exist in Hong Kong. Existing British institutions that are familiar with foreign investors and governments have remained relatively intact since the handover of the colony in 1997 (Tsang, 2007). While relations between China and Canada have at times been strained, in particular related to the PRC’s human rights record and the opaque operating environment, access to Hong Kong has continually remained open (Amis, 2015). The government of Hong Kong leverages its reputation for stability and safe access to the greater China in its own branding, characterizing the territory as an open “Gateway to China” (Brand Hong Kong, 2014). Canada is also heavily engaged in bilateral trade and investment relations with Hong Kong. In 2015 Hong Kong was Canada’s sixth largest export market and the second largest destination after the PRC for Canadian FDI in Asia (Government of Canada, 2015). Much as Hong Kong represents a stable equilibrium between China and the West for many of its mobile residents, the territory at the same time is a stable transitory political and economic environment for Canadian foreign trade and investment policy dealing with China as a whole.

Diaspora Strategies: Hong Kong-Canadian Mobility as a Tool of Trade and Investment Policy

In the context of overarching trade and investment policy with Hong Kong and the PRC, cultivating relationships with the city’s political and business elite to develop trade opportunities and gain access for Canadian companies in China has become a key approach for the Government of Canada (Government of Canada, 2015) as part of the Global Markets Action Plan (Foreign Af-
fairs, Trade and Development Canada, 2014). Elite Hong Kong-Canadians in position of influence in the government and business world in the territory are targeted by an informal foreign policy “diaspora strategy” (Boyle & Kitchin, 2011) as key points of contact between foreign policy and mobility in Hong Kong. Richard Li and his father are both Canadian citizens who have had various direct-investment interests in Canada, including within the banking and primary resources industries. Richard Li is also chairman of Hong Kong's largest telecommunications company, and his father is ranked the 31st most influential person in the world by Forbes Magazine (Chase, 2015; Forbes Magazine, 2016). Trade and investment missions actively seek out mobile Canadians such as the Lis in the territory (A. Griffith, 2015). While the Diamond Jubilee award ceremony may have been grounded in Richard Li’s philanthropic work in Canada, it was also an opportunity for Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to directly engage with two of the most powerful economic elite in all of China.

The value of engaging with high-profile economic figures like the Lis in the territory is bolstered by the cumulative influence of the large Canadian population in Hong Kong relative to other countries. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, is one of the largest Canadian chambers outside of Canada with over 1000 members, and includes over 180 Canadian companies in the territory (Government of Canada, 2015) and provides business referrals and advocacy services for its members lobbying both Hong Kong and Canadian officials. Given its connections in the territory and China, the Chamber is a regular stop on Canadian politicians’ itineraries (Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, 2016). In 2011 when speaking to a business group in Hong Kong on Canada’s foreign policy in Asia John Baird called Hong Kong, “with 295,000 Canadians as residents”, “Canada’s city in Asia” (Young, 2013). All throughout
these engagements of Canadian politicians and public servants in trade and investment initiatives in Hong Kong, the substantial person-to-person connections are emphasized.

Current Hong Kong Secretary of Commerce and Economic Development Gregory So is an encapsulated example of the treatment of mobility as a tool in investment promotion and market access in bilateral Hong Kong-Canadian affairs. So immigrated to Canada at sixteen and received his university education in Ottawa before eventually returning to Hong Kong to take on various government positions (University of Ottawa, 2008). He is now in charge of one of the most important portfolios in the territory, which is directly linked to international trade. In February of 2016, representing Hong Kong, So signed the Canada–Hong Kong FIPA. Minister of International Trade, Chrystia Freeland emphasized Canada's “strong trade ties and established trade and investment links,” as an indication that Hong Kong is a natural partner for Canadian businesses. Global Affairs Canada press material highlighted that one of these strong ties is the presence of 300,000 Canadians in Hong Kong and that some 500,000 people from Hong Kong live in Canada. Mr. So meanwhile emphasized Hong Kong as an “ideal gateway for Canadian businesses to tap into the vast market potential in the region, particularly the Mainland of China” (Global Affairs Canada, 2016). The successful signing of the agreement cannot be credited to Mr. So’s mobility, or the presence of 300,000 Canadians in the territory. There is also no indication that the FIPA or Mr. So’s status will lead to greater trade with Mainland China. However, these elements were all nonetheless emphasized in the shared statements of the Government of Canada and the Government of Hong Kong. This reflects the interconnected importance of trade and investment in China that the Government of Canada places on Hong Kong-Canadian mobility.
The Role of Actions on Mobility in Canadian Foreign Policy in Hong Kong

Mitchell’s multi-level policy analysis shows value in the Hong Kong-Canadian mobility case study. As an informal diaspora strategy, engagement with mobile Hong Kong-Canadian citizens relies on residency policy that allows Canadian citizens and permanent residents to live and work across the Pacific in transborder legal-sites where they maintain stakes in both societies. Canada’s decision to select Hong Kong elite in the 1980s and 1990s, while precipitated by the high human capital of this cohort for domestic economic interest, eventually led to significant mobility among new Hong Kong-Canadian dual citizens back to Hong Kong. This large external-citizen population has contributed to the conduct of foreign policy and the bilateral relationship between Canada and Hong Kong as tools of investment promotion and market access. While not formalized to the same level as in countries such as Ireland or New Zealand, this ‘diaspora strategy’ underpins the treatment of mobility in the context of Hong Kong as a benefit to foreign policy investment access and promotion initiatives, including overcoming limitations and risks associated with engaging directly with the PRC.

In the Hong Kong-Canadian context, foreign policy becomes a part of an expanded basket of policies interacting with these dual and external citizens as stakeholders in the Canadian economy (Bauböck, 2009). They are seen to have ties to Canada that justify recognition and maintenance of rights, despite having failed to live up to the domestic objectives of immigration policy and an ideal of territorial citizenship (Bleomraad, 2004). Given the incoherence of how mobility was and is treated in the policies that have created this unique mobile community, although the outcome is beneficial to Canada from a foreign policy perspective, there is little evidence to suggest that it was a coordinated intention of policy. Examining the case of mobile
Hong Kong-Canadians suggests that capturing the full treatment of mobility within Canadian policy means going beyond the traditional domains of immigration, and citizenship. At the same time, it appears Canada does not treat mobility in a manner that coherently seeks out mutually obtainable goals across policies. Rather, stakeholder criteria of citizenship appear to define the value of mobile external citizens, despite their confrontation with the policies that interacted with their mobility by allowing them access to and membership in the domestic political community.

**Canada, Lebanese-Canadian Mobility and the Middle East: Unwelcome Confrontations**

*The Origins of Lebanese-Canadian Mobility*

![Figure 2: Permanent Residents from Lebanon 1980-2014](Data Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2015a)

Lebanese society, much like that of Hong Kong, is one of diaspora and mobility. The Lebanese diaspora reaches from Canada, to Sub-Saharan Africa, to South-East Asia. An estimated fourteen million people identify themselves as ethnically Lebanese around the globe, of which only four million reside in Lebanon (The Economist, 2013). Unlike their Hong Kong counterparts who
came under economic streams, most Lebanese immigrated to Canada largely as family members of Canadian citizens and refugees in the 1980s and 1990s, during and after the Lebanese civil war (see Figure 2).

The large-scale movement of Lebanese out of their country during the civil war period was facilitated by proactive Canadian immigration policy that emphasized humanitarian protection and social immigration, including refugee resettlement and family reunification. In the mid-1980s, as the civil war intensified, for example, Canada set up a temporary office in Cyprus to help process the large number of refugees who were fleeing the violence. Citizens of Lebanon who had the money and ability to flee to Cyprus were rapidly processed and sent onward to Canada (Ibrahim, 1989). Since then sizeable Lebanese communities have established across Canada. In 2011, 190,000 residents identified themselves as ‘Lebanese’, while 83,375 stated Lebanon as their country of birth (Statistics Canada, 2011). Canadian immigration policy towards Lebanon in this era treated mobility in the form of access to the state through immigration as a necessity to be accommodated for a humanitarian movement in a time of crisis. This was in contrast to the general movement towards greater economic immigration that characterized this period. However, by relocating only those who had the means to travel from Lebanon to Cyprus, by default this policy also selected those with the economic means to do so, an economic elite in the relative terms of Lebanese society (DeVoretz & Woo, 2006).

The 2006 Evacuation: The Treatment of Lebanese External Residency and Multiple Membership

In the twenty years after first fleeing Lebanon, tens of thousands of Lebanese-Canadians would eventually return to their country of origin. In July of 2006 the return movement of these dual
and external citizens was thrown into the Canadian political spotlight following the invasion of southern Lebanon by Israeli forces. The 2006 war began when Hezbollah fired rockets on northern Israeli towns, crossed the border into Israeli territory and kidnapped two soldiers on July 12. Israel’s response was rapid. On the same day it launched airstrikes inside Lebanese territory, followed by targeted bombing of Beirut’s international airport on July 13. The destruction of the airport rendered the only air access point in Lebanon useless, creating the conditions for evacuations via ships to become necessary for Canada and other countries working to facilitate the departure of their citizens from the war zone. By July 16 Israel was targeting various areas in Beirut, and the following day began ground incursions into southern Lebanon (The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007). 14,000 of an estimated 45,000 Canadians in Lebanon chose evacuation.

Many of the Lebanese-Canadians who had returned to Lebanon in the intervening twenty years between hostilities cited memories of their past experience as justification for seeking evacuation provided by the Canadian government (Stasiulis & Amery, 2010). Stasiulis and Amery (2010) found that the choice to evacuate, and the choice of mobility was often connected to balancing the practical benefits of residence in Canada; through peace, security, rule of law, and employment opportunities, against strong ties of kinship and a sense of a homeland in Lebanon (2010, 90). Lebanese citizens, habituated to the threat of violence in their country of origin, used their mobility to seek out stability in residency alternatives in Canada as well as to maintain close connections and even long-term residency in Lebanon. The mobile lifestyle established by this group was one that defined citizenship stakes in both Lebanon and Canada, and was facilitated by flexible residency policies for permanent residents and the Charter right of
Mobility for citizens. Notably, despite the violence in 2006 the majority of Lebanese-Canadians already living in Lebanon chose to stay. Although they continued to have stakes in Canada as the safe and practical option for residency, most remained to be with non-Canadian family members (Stasiulis & Amery, 2010). Stasiulis and Amery’s analysis indicates the complex and context specific motivations for taking advantage of mobility in the form of dual-citizenship in the case of Lebanese-Canadians (2010). In this sense the Lebanese case study ties back to Ong’s (1999) study of the Chinese diaspora in demonstrating complex variables leading to individuals seeking mobility in the form of dual-citizenship acquisition and expanded residency choices. It also demonstrates that until 2006, residency policy facilitated these practices through evacuation.

*The Public Perception of Mobility and the Formulation of Citizenship Policy*

In contrast to the stated motivations and stakes in both Canada and Lebanon indicated by evacuees, Canada’s general public, political commentators and several politicians characterized the facts of the evacuation as problematic. A perception developed that the evacuees had weak ties to Canada. For example many were accused of having never been to the country as a result of having obtained citizenship by birth while their parents lived in Lebanon. Others were accused of having spent little time in the country after citizenship acquisition (Economist, 2006).

Commentators characterized the costs of the evacuation, at nearly eighty-five million dollars (Senate Standing Committee, 2007) as too high to justify given this perception of weak ties and evacuees were accused of being ‘citizens of convenience’ (Turner, 2006). The fact that most Canadian citizens who sought to flee Lebanon were dual-citizens of that very same country did not help, as their need relative to other Lebanese at similar risk as a result of the violence was
blurred. At its most basic the debate that developed around the evacuation of Lebanese-Canadian centred on the perception that the evacuees challenged a traditional conceptualization of citizenship that is territorially based, and predicated on uniform allegiance to a single state (Bloemraad, 2004). While the evacuation itself was carried to completion, and little evidence suggests that this debate in any way encumbered the government’s efforts, the policy reaction to the public discourse established the direction of updates to the Citizenship Act for the next decade. As the evacuation came to a close at end of July, 2006 Prime Minister Stephen Harper pledged to review dual-citizenship, evacuation and residency policy (Canadian Press, 2006). In 2009 Bill C-37 was the first major reflection of this pledge (Winters, 2014), and Bill C-24 (2015) the most recent and far-reaching evolution of the public debate that started with the evacuation. It is therefore worth compartmentalizing the discourse on citizenship in 2006, and the idealized traditional conceptualization around the evacuation to understand how it influenced this later policy treatment.

The Cost of Evacuation versus the Right to Diplomatic Protection

Canadian press and pundits cited the cost of the evacuation as too high given the perceived ties to Canada of those seeking government support to leave. The discourse on the cost associated with the evacuation evoked an image of opportunistic and undeserving evacuees receiving substantial Canadian public resources (McKie, 2015; The Economist, 2013). In contrast to previously examined support for the expansion of dual citizenship to encourage integration (Faist, 2008; Herzog, 2014), this characterization of evacuees suddenly problematized the practice of obtaining multiple memberships. Compounding this criticism of weak ties was the perception that
Lebanese-Canadians were using their citizenship as a safety net for this exact situation. Accessing diplomatic protection offered by Canada and leveraging the right of mobility to flee violence to a more secure country was criticized as an unacceptable form of citizenship. This was emphasized in the criticism by a number of politicians in multiple parties of almost 7000 evacuees who were reported to have returned to Lebanon following the end of hostilities less than a month after the evacuation (National Post, 2006; Globe and Mail, 2006). Nyers (2010) argues that this criticism was a reconceptualization of evacuation and diplomatic protection as a privilege rather than a right, and the end of universal ‘safe-citizenship’ towards a more exclusive treatment of access to diplomatic protection. In line with Stasiulis and Ross’ exploration of ‘flexible citizenship’, diplomatic protection was in this case challenged by a perception of a particular group being an exception, in this case Lebanese-Canadians. Stasiulis and Amery’s study of evacuee motivations demonstrates that Canada’s status as a safety net was a primary consideration around mobility. Whether this stake was substantial enough to justify the universal right of mobility within citizenship came into question for the first time in 2006.

*The Racialization of Mobility*

To call Lebanese-Canadians residing exclusively in Lebanon ‘citizens of convenience’ solely on the basis of weak ties and high costs, however, becomes problematic when comparing contrasting amendments to the Citizenship Act in the years following 2006. Park (2013) argues that the evacuation did not just problematize external and dual-citizenship along ties of residency to Canada, but along racial lines as well. Winter (2014) as well as Harder and Zhyznomirska (2012) both elaborate on this racialization, contrasting the controversy of evacuating Lebanese-Canadi-
ans seen as underserving of tax payer support, versus the “Lost Canadians” amendment to the Citizenship Act contained in Bill C-37 (2008). The “Lost Canadians” amendments gave automatic and retroactive citizenship to many US and British citizens who did not seek it, including World War Two war brides. Many of the amendments gave priority to recognizing citizenship lost prior to the 1977 Citizenship Act, during a period when immigration was still dominated by Europeans. It was seen as an accommodation of mobility to individuals that were desired citizens, but had few ties, versus amendments to the Citizenship Act also in Bill C-37 that aimed to limit access to citizenship of children of Canadians living abroad as a reaction to the controversy surrounding the 2006 evacuation (Harder & Zhyznomirska, 2012, 51, 54; Winter, 2014). In the words of Winter “kinship and whiteness” were conflated in the amendments of 2008/2009 in a way that made the citizenship of sympathetic non-white, non-Christian citizens “impossible” given a widespread assumption that the Canadians of the evacuation had weak ties, while those white “lost” Canadians living in the US had strong ones (2014, 48, 55). In this case, stakeholder citizenship criteria were defined along racial lines that embraced one group while problematizing and later excluding another through amendments in Bill C-37.

At the time of the evacuation, the idealized traditional notion of citizenship as exclusive (Blatter, 2011; Bloemraad, 2004), territorially based, and as some authors argue, racially homogenous was unlegislated. The evacuation and ensuing debate around the rights and privileges of mobile citizens problematized this mobility in a specific context, which eventually lead to universally applicable amendments to citizenship legislation. This is not, however, the end of the story of mobility’s interaction with Canadian policy during the 2006 conflict in Lebanon.
Canada’s foreign policy reaction to the invasion was within the context of both the fight against terrorism and shifting policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict described in Chapter One and Two. The Conservative’s first response to the 2006 conflict was releasing statements attesting to the “measured” nature of Israel’s actions (The Montreal Gazette, 2006) and attributing responsibility for the escalation of violence to Hezbollah terrorist organization listed in Canada’s Criminal Code. Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay condemned Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, saying the escalation of violence caused by the group would “exacerbate tensions in the Middle East, threaten lives of civilians, and risk a deteriorating humanitarian situation.” MacKay also called on Syria and Iran, Hezbollah’s principle backers to cease all financial support for the “terrorist organization” (12 July 2006). During a meeting of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on August 1, 2006 MacKay and other Conservative members similarly referred to Hezbollah as a “terrorist entity” and a “cancer on Lebanon” (Peter MacKay, 2006; Deepak Obhrai, 2006).

This reaction supported Israel’s own characterization of the conflict as it consistently presented Hezbollah as the belligerent and as a terrorist organization in its justifications for the invasion. For example Israel legitimized bombarding targets including Beirut’s international airport based on their role as conduits to supporting the activities of “terrorist organizations”, including as a means of removing the kidnapped Israeli soldiers from the country (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a). Defence Minister Amir Peretz speaking to the Israeli Knesset meanwhile characterized Hezbollah as a member of the “axis of evil” and the war as one against “states that support terrorism and fan the flames of hatred” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006b). Canada’s statements were in line with Israel’s own direct evocation of a battle against terrorism
to legitimize a military attack on Lebanon, against an organization listed by Canada as committing acts of terrorism.

As the evacuation of Canadians and citizens of other countries from the war zone began in earnest a week after Israel’s bombing campaign started, Canada’s allegiance to Israel and commitment to countering terrorism suddenly converged with the mobility of a substantial population of Canadian citizens residing in Lebanon, whose safety was put at risk by the violence. Stasiulis and Ross (2006), for example argue that Canadian citizens, and more broadly Lebanese civilians in the war zone in the south of the country were labeled de facto foreign combatants by Israel’s heavy bombing strategy in the South. One Israeli general in particular, when questioned how civilians would be protected in the war zone, indicated that Israel had determined that all civilians had been evacuated from the area, and as a result those who remained were treated as combatants (Stasiulis and Amery, 2010).

One instance encapsulates the confrontation that occurred during the conflict between Canada’s commitment to supporting Israel and its commitment to diplomatic protection for its citizens. On July 16th, three days before the evacuation began, a family of eight Canadian citizens from Montreal was killed by an Israeli shell (CBC News, 2006). The Government of Canada's statement on the incident did not attribute responsibility for the deaths, instead stating that they were killed “by shelling” (Peter MacKay, 16 July 2016). In contrast to directly naming Hezbollah, Syria and Iran as the aggressors responsible for the escalation of violence in statements of support for Israel’s invasion, Minister MacKay chose not to mention Israel as the state responsible for firing the shell that resulted in the death of Canadian citizens (Canwest News Service, 2006). Three days later Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Olmert spoke with Prime Minster
Harper. In a press release by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Olmert indicating that “Israel would render as much assistance as it could so that Canadian citizens would be able to leave Lebanon.” The statement ended by noting that “Canadian Prime Minister Harper expressed his support both for those steps that Israel is taking against Hizbullah [sic] and for Prime Minister Olmert at this difficult time.” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). The lack of attribution of responsibility for the death of citizens in Canadian statements on the war reflects a consistent treatment of support for Israel as the prevailing priority in Canada’s foreign policy approach during the conflict.

In contrast, Minister MacKay would later emphasize the importance of diplomatic protection during testimony to the Senate Standing Committee review of the evacuation: "the safety and security of Canadians is of utmost concern to the Government. Put simply, there is no higher priority. For this reason, extensive efforts were undertaken to meet the urgent needs of all Canadians seeking to flee the deteriorating security situation and return to Canada." (Senate Standing Committee, 2007, 5). While Canada clearly took great lengths to accommodate the 14,000 Canadians who wished to leave, the approach of the Government to avoid attributing responsibility for civilian and Canadian deaths during the conflict, and failure to associate Israeli military activities as a danger to citizen mobility in the area reinforces Musu’s assertion that criticism of Israeli policy was seen as “incompatible with Canada’s friendship with the state of Israel” (2012, 72). In the case of Canadian citizens caught in the violence, as Stasiulis and Amery note, this meant stopping short of any “condemnation by the Canadian government of the government of Israel or its military for its disproportionate force and indiscriminate bombing of civilian neighbourhoods which had produced these deaths” (2010, 85).
While not a clear determinant of Canada’s foreign policy direction in the conflict, the failure of the government to publicly associate Israel’s actions with Canadian citizen mobility reflects the challenge the latter posed to a clear narrative of support for Israel and anti-terrorism policy as part of Canada’s post 9/11 approach to the Middle East that moved away from a balanced approach where criticism was possible. While the evacuation did continue throughout the conflict, silence on the risk posed to Canadian citizens by Israel’s bombing campaign and ground war suggests a devaluing of mobility external citizenship in the government’s public framing of the conflict and as it relates to achieving other foreign policy goals, in this case support for an ally. Canada’s approach at the time attempted to decouple two policy domains of participation in the conflict, those of citizenship and foreign policy, however, within a multi-level analytical approach to policy, these different domains can be clearly have overlapping implications.

*Beyond Lebanon: External Residency and the Execution of Middle East Anti-Terrorism Policy*

The confrontation between external citizenship rights versus privileges has only become more acutely focused in the Middle East and towards Arabs and Muslims since the evacuation in 2006. Canada’s national security and anti-terrorism agenda in the region has intersected with the racialization of citizenship and foreign policy already highlighted by the development of racial profiling policies following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act in the same year (Bahdi, 2003). Reforms to the Citizenship Act in Bill C-37 and Bill C-24 in particular coincided with the evolving public and policy debates on Canada’s role in the Middle East and the country’s national security. The first wave of citizenship revocations under C-24 targeted individuals convicted under the Anti-Terrorism (Justice Canada, 2001) and Com-
The Mobile Citizen

batting Terrorism Acts (Justice Canada, 2012; Crawford, 2015). Meanwhile, Canada’s involvement in the war against the Islamic State in 2015 coincided with increasing threats of limitations placed on the mobility of Canadians in the region who may have wished to join the fight on the side of the organization. During the 2015 federal election campaign Prime Minister Harper pledged to go so far as to limit the travel of any Canadian to areas where terrorist activity was prevalent, again raising accusations of infringing mobility rights enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Galloway, 2015).

The debate over mobility beginning with the evacuation in 2006 has evolved to problematize dual-citizenship, external citizenship, and mobility in the context of that same security based foreign policy nexus. Residents of the Middle East, Arabs, and Muslims, citizens or not, are addressed in a context where terrorism, support for Israel, and national security are overarching foreign policy considerations (Barry, 2010; Heinbecker et al., 2007). Mobility is considered a tool of enemy combatants, even while it is normalized as a practice of other external citizens, as is the case in Canada’s foreign policy towards Hong Kong. However, contrary to the Hong Kong case of stakeholder citizenship criteria being incorporated as a result of alignment with foreign policy interests, mobility of Canadian citizenship in the Middle East has been articulated within the public debate around residency based criteria, where their absence from the state was considered ‘convenient’ (Turner, 2006). Bauböck (2009) gives a possible explanation for this lack of recognition for stakes in the context of national security foreign policy. He argues that dual participation, and external residency is only possible when governments and native electorates do not interpret the activities of external citizen populations as “threats to state security, territorial integrity and national identity”. By confronting these elements of the state, Lebanese-Canadian
mobility and mobility within the Middle East in later years confronted the two core rights of stakeholder citizens that Bauböck suggests must be maintained; the right of return, and the right to diplomatic protection (2009, 485). Canada’s foreign policy interests of national security and the fight against terrorism thus help to explain how Lebanese-Canadian mobility, and more broadly mobility of Canadians in the Middle East, has been problematized and restricted along racial and religious lines since the 2006 crisis and evacuation (Mitchell, 1989).

**Mobility Across Policies**

The outcomes of policy in three separate domains reflects the incoherence of the treatment of mobility in the context of Lebanese-Canadians, the 2006 evacuation and Canada’s foreign policy in the Middle East. In immigration policy, an initial intent to provide humanitarian and social access to Canada for Lebanese fleeing the civil war in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in the selection of mobile individuals, from a mobile society, who would eventually return in large numbers to their country of origin. While there is no evidence to suggest that this return movement was contrary to policy that selected them, the public characterizing of Lebanese Canadians as ‘citizens of convenience’ in 2006 that would lead to policy changes in Bills C-37 (2009) and C-24 (2015) does reflect a treatment of that mobility and the choices associated with it as problems.

The characterization of external and dual-citizenship as a problem instead appears linked to its confrontation with the idealized concept of residency based citizenship as well as the nexus with Canada’s Middle East policy including its changing approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and anti-terrorism activities (Carens, 2008; Blatter, 2011). One example of the policy-cutting implications of mobility can be taken from the focal point of Beirut’s international airport. By itself
the airport is as Peter Adey argues, a “mooring point of mobility” as people and things constantly move through the seemingly immobile structure (2006), however, in the case of the 2006 war, it is also a mooring point for Canada’s treatment of that mobility across policy. The airport was rendered useless by Israeli bombing on July 13th on the justification that it was being used by Hezbollah (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a). A day later Canada reacted by stating Israel’s response to Hezbollah’s belligerence was ‘measured’. However, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade investigation after the evacuation also determined that the “inability to use the Beirut airport was the greatest challenge facing Canadian officials” conducting the evacuation (2007, 9). The cost and logistical challenges of the eventual ship-based evacuation, both of which were further hindered by Israeli blockades and destruction of infrastructure, became the focal point for debates over mobility rights in Canada.

Evacuees were nonetheless accused of being ungrateful as a result of criticizing the quality of the boats, or the service of Canadian officials at the chaotic ports (Mckie, 2015). The perception developed by some commentators and Canadians was that the complicated evacuation was not worth the cost given the weak ties to Canada and opportunistic nature of the evacuees (The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007; Winters, 2014). The political pressure placed on the Conservative Government over this perception eventually led to a pledge to overhaul Canada’s evacuation policy. Before the end of 2006 Conservative cabinet members were signalling that a review of dual citizenship was in the works (National Post, 2006). When changes were eventually implemented in Bills C-37 and C-24 they had significant implications for millions of external and dual citizens of Canada, not just Lebanese-Canadians. While the destruction of the Beirut Airport was not the linch pin of Canada’s treat-
ment of mobility in 2006 or onwards in the Middle East, the contrasting policies of evacuation and support for Israel and Canada's own war on terror are encapsulated in this mooring point of mobility.

**Stakeholder Citizens or Citizens of Convenience?**

In the public and policy discourse around Lebanese-Canadian mobility of 2006 onwards the framing of the population of dual and external citizens in the Middle East as stakeholders (Bauböck, 2009) in the Canadian political community is not evident. Despite Lebanese-Canadians associating their autonomy and wellbeing as integrally tied to their citizenship (Bauböck, 2009, 479), as noted by Stasiulis and Amery (2010), such ties did not figure as a favourable aspect of Lebanese-Canadian mobility during the public and policy debate. Policy amendments similarly did not recognize this as a legitimate claim to stakes. While the racialization and hierarchical treatment of Canada’s ‘safe citizenship’, and an association of mobility with the fight against terrorism and national security appear to be part of the explanation for Canada’s treatment of mobility in the Middle East, it does not appear to be the whole explanation. Canada’s approach to diplomatic protection of citizens at the time also came up against the transborder (Schiller, 2005) nature of Lebanese-Canadian external citizens who were seen by Canadian pundits and politicians to be taking advantage of their existence as members of overlapping legal zones to obtain support through evacuation from a second country of citizenship that was perceived as their preferred place of residence. As a consequence, Canada identified and began closing this legally ambiguous site of transborder existence with amendments to the Citizenship Act in Bill C-37 and C-24. Aspects of mobility that might indicate enduring ties for at least part of
the population including investment in the polity’s future and reliance on it for their wellbeing (Bauböck, 2009, 483) are overshadowed in these amendments by the perception of weak ties and opportunistic citizenship acquisition. In the context of Lebanon in 2006 and the Middle East thereafter mobility was problematized, however the policy developments that followed would have universal restrictive implications, applying even where stakeholder criteria for external citizenship were defined by other policy advantages, as was the case with Hong Kong-Canadians.

**Context Matters: Hong Kong vs. Lebanese-Canadian Mobility**

This divergence of context-specific impetus for policy changes versus global policy application is a significant indication that a coherent treatment of mobility does not exist in policy formation and application across multiple contexts. The treatment of mobility in the two case studies reveal this incoherence, where policy diverges around restricting, accommodating and embracing mobility depending on the circumstances. Table Two below summarizes the full range of policy treatments present in these cases. A stakeholder concept of citizenship embracing mobility emerges in the Hong Kong case study when foreign trade and investment policy advantages of external citizenship are considered. On the other end of the spectrum, mobility in the Middle East has been problematized as a result of confronting Canada’s idealized and somewhat racialized perception of residency based citizenship as well as its anti-terrorism, Arab-Israeli and Middle East policy. The policy changes explored in Chapter Two fall between these two poles. A thread of consistent treatment is nonetheless revealed across the policy objectives analyzed in Chapter Two and the case studies of Chapter Three: Since the introduction of the 1976 Immigration Act and the 1977 Citizenship Act, the accommodation or embrace of mobility is generally
associated with the economic benefits of immigration and citizenship to Canada. Whether as stakeholders or as resident citizens, policy has emphasized a positive treatment of mobility where a benefit to the economy is evident.

**Table 2: Canadian Policy Treatments of Mobility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Treatment of Mobility in policy</th>
<th>Concept of membership employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Israeli policy and bilateral foreign affairs</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
<td>Residency Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security and anti-terrorism policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizenship revocation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intent to reside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rights of citizens abroad (voting rights)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imm. selection criteria</td>
<td>Accommodate</td>
<td>Stakeholder Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency policy (immigration)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency policy (citizenship)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rights of citizens abroad (diplomatic protection)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dual-citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade and investment policy (HK)</td>
<td>Embrace</td>
<td>Stakeholder Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter right of mobility</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Immigration Policy Objectives and Mobility versus Domestic Residency**

Despite this thread of consistent treatment of mobility, however, nowhere in Canadian immigration or citizenship policy are the benefits or limitations of external residency and dual citizenship manifested in foreign policy outcomes indicated. IRPA and IRPR (2014) state that the purpose of the economic immigration streams is to benefit the domestic economy and to select newcomers that are able to economically establish. While this is not the case for a large number of Hong Kong and Lebanese Canadians, without briefly investigating the domestic outcomes of immigration policy for these two groups, it is hard to say to what degree the contextual citizenship and
foreign policy elements of the two case studies that restrict, accommodate, or embrace mobility represent significant treatment relative to the stated goals of immigration policy.

**Figure 3: Population of Dual-Citizens Residents of Canada as Portion of Total Population by Place of Birth (Data Source: Statistics Canada, 2011)**

![Bar chart](image)

A review of the 2011 NHS (Statistics Canada, 2011) results for questions of country of birth, citizenship and residency along with the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada's own in-depth analysis of external residency (2011) reveals significant contrasts between immigration selection intent and residency outcomes among these two groups. Despite the stigma surrounding their mobility, Lebanese remain relatively less mobile than their Hong Kong counterparts. The proportion of Hong Kong born-Canadian citizens of working age living in Hong Kong is nearly sixty-two percent of the total population (Asia Pacific Foundation, 10-12). While forty-five thousand Canadian citizens born in Lebanon are estimated to reside there, among working age adults only forty-five percent live Lebanese born citizens live outside of Canada.\(^7\) Where Hong Kong-Canadian dual-citizens have amongst the highest rates of exit at twenty-four percent of the total citizen...

\(^7\) For the purposes of this study, working age includes individuals 25-54 based on 2011 National Household Survey (Statistics Canada, 2011) data breakdown by age.
The Mobile Citizen

zen population, Lebanese-Canadians are amongst the lowest, at just under six percent (Asia Pacific Foundation, 14).

Figure 4: Hong Kong vs. Lebanese Economic Migrants
(Data source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2015b)

In both the Hong Kong and Lebanese cases, immigration policy selected individuals that chose not to remain in Canada and contribute their human capital. However, where the acquisition of human capital was a sought after goal when selecting Hong Kong Canadians, citizens of Lebanon were selected under humanitarian and social grounds where human-capital was not a factor. Flexible residency requirements to attract mobile individuals with numerous choices in a competitive global immigration market (Caletrio, 2012; Griffith, 2015), the pragmatic acceptance of dual-citizenship for a cohesive domestic political community, and labour market outcomes (Herzog, 2014; Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012) resulted in significantly different mobility practices depending on the community. Lebanese-Canadians have nonetheless been treated as ‘citizens of convenience,’ resulting in significant changes in the Citizenship Act, while largely elite
Hong Kong economic immigrants who have mostly chosen to invest their human capital elsewhere, have been ignored, accommodated, and even embraced. This suggests that the contextual elements elaborated in the case studies, including foreign policy interests and traditional, regional, and racialized concepts of citizenship play a significant role in Canada's overall treatment of mobility. In both cases a core confrontation develops that is reflected in the policy analysis of Chapter Two: The ability of newcomers and citizens to move is treated in contrasting manners depending on the policy domain, and the contextual application of those policies.

**Mobility-Policy Nexus: Immigration, Citizenship and Beyond**

Examining two contrasting instances of mobility and foreign policy colliding in these case studies demonstrates that there are considerations that go beyond the limits of immigration and citizenship objectives. These considerations may justify or problematize mobility, engendering further incoherence when looking at treatment both within and across policy. For example, while immigration selection policy may fail to coherently approach achieving domestic immigration and citizenship policy goals, the real world outcomes of this policy may include benefits and risks to other policies such as foreign affairs. As is the case with Hong Kong-Canadian mobility this may encourage stakeholder criteria of citizenship to be defined by foreign policy’s treatment of mobility, including valourizing external and dual citizens within ‘diaspora strategies’ as a tool of foreign trade and investment policy. Alternatively, the mobility of a large external citizen population can confront foreign policy in a context where national-security, counter-terrorism and bilateral relations priorities shape how Canada reacts to threats to Canadians and the application of diplomatic protection. Public debate around the meaning of citizenship and policy changes
that react to this debate may in turn overshadow the relative success of mobility in creating a prosperous domestic population, as is the case for the Lebanese-Canadian mobile community.

The use of an analytical mobility framework that incorporates concepts covering a number of policy domains and applying a multi-level analysis that does not just look at a single policy in isolation (Mitchell, 1989) has proven valuable in the analysis of both of these case studies. Ultimately, while immigration, citizenship and foreign policy may in some instances see mobility as valuable, and in others see it as a problem, there is limited evidence to suggest that the treatment of the ability of Canadian newcomers and citizens to move in either case results in Canada retaining coherent control over the movement of individuals across its border towards the goals articulated in immigration policy, and towards ideational conceptualizations of domestic citizenship.
Chapter Four
Towards the Mobile Citizen

In March of 2015 John Baird announced his retirement from politics. Showing a remarkable level of mobility, within weeks he departed for the private sector, and quickly accepted multiple positions with several Canadian companies. In early April 2015 Richard Li, Queen's Diamond Jubilee Medal recipient, hired Baird as an advisor on international issues (Globe and Mail, 2015). Richard Li is one among an estimated 2.9 million Canadian citizens who call another country home. He is also one among an unmeasured number who claim membership in the political community of a country beyond Canada, and whose ties to Canada as naturalized, dual, and external citizens have attracted increasing scrutiny from the domestic political community (Asia Pacific Foundation, 2011). In terms of sheer wealth and influence, Mr. Li is also part of the upper-echelons of a global elite who benefit from Canadian immigration, citizenship, and foreign policy that have consistently focused on domestic economic advantages, and to that end have accommodated this specific form of mobility. At the same time, the outcome of Mr. Li’s mobility does not reflect the stated objectives of IRPA, which seeks to have newcomers establishing economically and benefit all regions of Canada (Justice Canada, 2015a). He also fails to meet more traditional views of citizenship that require domestic residency in exclusivity and participation in a territorial political community to achieve cohesive and controllable laws in a self-governing democracy (Faist, 2008; Bloemraad, 2004; Blatter, 2011; Schiller, 2005). Nonetheless, Richard Li was awarded a medal of good citizenship, reflecting the support of foreign policy and foreign policymakers such as Mr. Baird for Li’s mobility as a stakeholder citizen. At the same time, other mobile citizens have seen their external and dual-citizenship characterized as ‘convenient’ in the
political discourse and consequently restricted. All the while, in principle both Mr. Li and his fellow citizens around the globe share the universal right of mobility, enshrined in Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Constitution Act, 1982). The story of Mr. Li’s interactions with Mr. Baird is meant to illustrate that the Government of Canada’s treatment of mobility is variable, enigmatic and contextual. It is not the whole story of Canada’s treatment of mobility, but it is emblematic of a system that while consistent in certain interests, fails to coherently reflect these interests across a broad basket of policies that go beyond traditional domains of immigration and citizenship. Each policy domain examined in this paper treats mobility on the basis of achieving its own isolated objectives without fully accounting for the full interaction between the state and mobility across a broad basket of policy domains, undermining the ability of the state to coherently work towards each set of goals in a coordinated manner.

The interactions between mobility and Canadian policy likely go even beyond those analyzed here. By employing relevant concepts from other fields of social science, additional policies could be included under an expanded analytical mobility framework. Foreign policy domains beyond international investment, anti-terrorism and the Middle East, taxation law, infrastructure and urban planning, and agricultural policy are just a few possibilities. In a world where some authors argue all things are mobile (Adey, 2006), possible sites of policy analysis under this framework appear abundant. What is revealed through the analytical mobility framework used in this study is that Canadian policy interacting with newcomers and naturalized citizens through their access to the territory, opportunity to gain membership in the political community, and interaction with the state in external affairs treats their ability to move incoherently both within and across policy domains. Mitchell’s argument that policy objectives, approaches
and outcomes are interconnected, and that a multilevel framework is necessary is supported by the analysis of Canadian policy. Despite evident interest in controlling aspects of mobility within foreign, citizenship and immigration policy, by failing to recognize these connections, the control of the state is limited.

Much of this incoherence in the domains of immigration and citizenship policy appears linked directly to methodological nationalism (Bauböck, 2009; Wimmer & Schiller, 2003), where policy looks inward for measurements of outcomes and justifications, and fails to account for externalization of citizens and newcomers. This is the case with the contradictions in the treatment of human capital as a resource for the Canadian economy, versus the accommodation of flexible residency rules that allow for displacement of that capital outside of the state. The public and policy discourse that established the priorities of citizenship objectives similarly often returns to an idealized vision of residency based citizenship in exclusivity that does not recognize or incorporate the stakes of mobile and external citizens in Canada’s political community.

Foreign policy interests explain certain context specific impetus to establish external citizens as stakeholders in Canadian political community (Bauböck, 2009), placing some value in their residency outside of the territory of the state. In the case of Hong Kong-Canadian mobility, for example, the perceived advantages to Canada’s trade and investment interests in the territory and greater China of having a large and elite external-citizen population means that the state embraces the mobility of this population despite the loss of human capital for the domestic labour market. The treatment of mobile citizens in the Middle East, on the other hand, was formed around the cost of a publicly funded evacuation, problematizing external residence as evidence of ‘citizenship of convenience’ (Turner, 2006), the confrontation it posed to Canada’s shifting
approach to Middle East relations in the wake of 9/11, and a reorientation of support for Israel. This culminated in foreign policy and diplomatic protection priorities in 2006 and onwards lacking coordination and obscuring a coherent value of mobile of citizens despite evident stakes among external citizens in the Middle East. In turn, Canada’s interaction with mobility in situations where it is perceived as a threat to other interests, including within foreign policy, has given rise to ‘flexible sovereignty’ (Stasiulis and Ross, 2006), where citizenship rights at times are not protected along racial and religious lines. Policy changes in the last decade reflect a growing awareness to the realities of the ability and desire of newcomer and naturalized citizens to move temporarily and circularly across international borders and between states, but only sporadically and in an uncoordinated manner across policies. As a result mobility is embraced, accommodated, and restricted in Canadian immigration, citizenship, and foreign policy creating an incoherent whole-of-government application of that policy in the real world.

Despite a lack of coherent coordination of objectives articulated in policy, what is suggested from the analysis of Canada’s treatment in these domains in the last decade is that it can interact with specific forms of mobility in a consistent manner depending on the overarching goals of a given government. The government of Stephen Harper’s Conservatives, for example, consistently returned to the importance of economic solvency over most other considerations across immigration, citizenship and foreign policy. The Economic Action Plan of the Conservative Party during the 2015 federal election stated immigration reform as a priority to “ensure it complements the country’s economic needs” which included concluding free-trade agreements, skills development, and public infrastructure investment (Conservative Party of Canada, 2015). While the policies that this government enacted nonetheless failed to fully measure the implica-
tions of the restrictions put in place against the accommodations and embrace of mobility elsewhere, the nature of that allotment of mobility in policy was consistently directed towards the economically viable, human capital wealthy elite. As a result, the incoherence did consistently benefit a specific mobile group. Whether this will continue to be the case since the 2015 federal election brought the Liberal Government of Justin Trudeau to power remains to be seen.

What appears evident is that key elements of newcomer and citizen mobility is an ongoing priority, regardless of the government, now just as it was a decade ago when the Conservative Government was first elected. The first significant acts of the Liberal government in 2015 were related to elements of mobility. An early commitment to welcome as many as 50,000 Syrian refugees to Canada will no doubt expand the interactions between Canada’s foreign, immigration, and citizenship policies in the Middle East. Commitments to substantially increase annual immigration levels, and the repeal of Bill C-24 are also indications of mobility’s ongoing importance. Whether Canada is capable of reacting coherently to the mobility of newcomers and citizens appears dependent on an approach that incorporates common principles across policy domains on the value of this mobility, and the acceptance of the ability to move as a pervasive and normal part of the political landscape.

Can Canada Realize its Objectives in Immigration, Citizenship, and Foreign Policy?

When considering the transnational sites used by ‘transborder citizens’ (Schiller, 2005) even the total of nine percent of Canada’s citizen population residing overseas does not fully define the fundamental influence that mobility has on Canada and the challenges of coordinating treatment of mobility. Hassam, Richard Li, John Baird, and citizen revokees as a few examples are all indi-
individual cases that establish the qualitative importance of how mobility is treated in a multicultural, diverse and mobile political community like Canada, where citizenship legislation is ideational and heavily influenced through public and policy discourse. The death of eight Canadian citizens by Israeli bombs did little to alter Canada’s articulation of support for a key ally in the Middle East. The evacuation of a minority of the total Lebanese-Canadians living in Lebanon inspired a significant political and public debate on the role and value of citizenship, as some authors have argued because of the racial undertones of Canada’s citizenship, national security, and Middle East policies (Winter, 2014; Bahdi, 2003). At the same time, a larger and more mobile population in Hong Kong rarely if ever appears in the public discourse. Policy, which to this point has relied on assumptions of sedentary existence, domestic exclusive citizenship, and linear immigration to universalize and systematize Canada’s treatment of human movement are only likely to grow more anachronistic with time as the full complexity of mobility becomes clearer to the public and policymakers. Focusing on the interactions between mobility and immobile structures of the state in the form of policy (Adey, 2006) reveals both the expansive nature of mobility and the need for policy to react coherently to that mobility if the state wishes to control access to and membership in the political community as an integral aspect of its sovereignty (Mitchell, 1989). To do so it appears policy itself has to become more mobile, moving between foreign, immigration and citizenship domains via as a single unified government framework. This framework would have to recognize the diverse stakes mobile citizens have in Canada. As other countries with significant mobile citizen populations including Ireland and New Zealand have already started to developed such a framework that includes foreign policy elements (Boyle and Kitchin, 2011), the possibilities for Canada appear significant.
Looking Forward: Mobility Policy and the Mobile Citizen

If a core government policy framework on mobility were developed that incorporates a broad basket of policies in a coherent manner, what could it look like? The choice at its most basic appears to be one between restriction and embrace of mobility towards current and future members of the political community. To address mobility in absolutes, either through an immigration and citizenship regime that relies wholly on residency and exclusivity is attractive for certain elements of the treatment of mobility domestically such as the search for human-capital, but comes with serious limitations by failing to incorporate the value and necessities of external and dual citizenship (Carens, 2008; Blatter, 2011). Stakeholder citizenship presented by Bauböck (2009), on the other hand, provides a means of capturing both the desire for mobility and the benefits to the state of continuing to incorporate citizens who practice their ability to move.

A Residency Based Approach to Mobility

An immigration, citizenship, and foreign policy framework that removed the right of mobility to citizens, and required that membership be based on presence within the territory of the state, would address several of the counterintuitive factors in current Canadian policy. First, it would provide a coherent treatment of the issue of democratic accountability. In a residency based mobility framework, the authors of laws would also be their subjects (Faist, 2008; Bloemraad, 2004) and transborder sites (Schiller, 2005) where mobile citizens can exist outside of the legal jurisdiction of the state would no longer exist. The political community would be territorial, meaning that control of the state would be largely restored in determining access to and membership in that community. Domestic outcomes would also become measurable. As citizenship acquisition
would only occur within the territory the labour market integration and economic well being of immigrants would be fully captured in domestic census data already employed in studies such as Bevelander and Pendakur (2012). The human capital immigration selection system would direct 100% of new citizens towards the benefit of the domestic economy (Reitz, 2005) as citizens would no longer exist outside of the territory. A residency based citizenship such as that suggested by Carens (2008) would also recognize the inherent rights of non-citizen residents, including temporary foreign workers, demonstrating a significant progression in access to rights relative to the current system.

At the same time it would be regressive to only consider citizenship in terms of residency. It would go against the pragmatic move towards dual-citizenship for the purposes of incorporation suggested by Herzog (2014) and Faist (2008), where dual citizens would no longer exist outside of the state. It would also fail to address the investment in mobility that a high-human capital global elite currently make when selecting a country of immigration in a competitive international immigration market, and would limit Canada's competitive edge if human capital continued to be the emphasis of immigration selection criteria (Caletrio, 2012; Akbari & MacDonald, 2014). Canada’s current immigration objective of gaining domestic economic benefit by selecting the ‘best and brightest’ would consequently be undermined, even if the results could become more measurable as only those newcomers who chose to reside permanently in Canada would have a path to acquire and maintain citizenship. Of particular significance to understanding the value of a multi-level analysis of mobility and policy, a residency based citizenship regime would fail to address the benefits of external and dual citizens who maintain stakes in the state despite not residing within its territory. The Hong Kong mobility case study identified just
one possible set of benefits of mobility through ‘diaspora strategies’ in international trade and investment policy, however, the point remains that they do exist elsewhere, including Lebanon, and they are significant. A residency based citizenship regime therefore fails on several fronts to balance the pervasive and normal mobility of newcomers and citizens.

**A Stakeholder Approach to Mobility**

Stakeholder citizenship (Bauböck, 2009), on the other hand, addresses several of these hurdles to a coordinated policy treatment of mobility. Bauböck suggests that two overarching criteria should define who has claim to the rights of membership in a political community while overseas; those dependent on that community for long-term protection of their basic rights, and those who are or have been subjected to that community’s political authorities for a significant period over the course of their lives (2009, 479). This would not capture all potential external citizens, but would incorporate those with a significant investment in the political community to which they are physically external. Stakeholder criteria would also address instances where mobile citizens have overlapping claims to rights of citizenship with multiple countries by removing certain rights that are already protected in the country where they reside, eliminating significant trans-border sites between legal zones (Glick-Schiller, 2005).

Bauböck argues that only two rights should be provided unconditionally: the right to return and the right of diplomatic protection. Stakeholder criteria would therefore easily include Lebanese-Canadians as individuals requiring the long-term diplomatic protection of a state, which Lebanon could not provide, and justify the evacuation as facilitating the right of return. Bauböck’s conception of citizenship would also incorporate large numbers of Hong Kong-Cana-
dians who maintain life-course based “flexible citizenship” (Ong, 1999) that brings them frequently under the control of Canada’s laws (Kobayashi & Preston, 2007). Stakeholder citizenship further recognizes the ability to move and reside temporarily across different polities as an inherent interest of newcomers and citizens, complementing the progressive incorporation of multiple membership and flexible residency towards integration already in place in Canada’s immigration and citizenship system (Herzog, 2014). It is also important to note that stakeholder citizenship incorporates the absolute rights of residents of the territory of the state promoted by Carens (2008) suggesting that rights should be extended to those who are subjected to laws, even if they are not full members, including temporary skilled workers.

However, how the political community perceives mobility remains a limitation to stakeholder citizenship as a means of coherently treating the ability of newcomers and citizens to move. While stakeholder citizenship would embrace mobility as a right in unambiguous terms, at the same time it would create a *de facto* tiering of citizenship. All citizens would not be treated equally as rights would be limited for citizens residing long-term outside of the state where their rights are protected by an additional citizenship. This is something that remains contentious in Canada’s current debate on the rights and responsibilities of citizens and newcomers, as the challenges to Bill C-24 show (Black, 2014); the principle of citizenship as universal remains powerful despite its breakdown in policy treatment, and despite practices that result in uneven access to rights both within Canada and overseas. Whether a tiered form of citizenship can ever be accepted appears predicated on its acceptance by the majority of the population who still resides permanently inside of Canada, but who nonetheless remain inherently mobile.
Conclusion: The Benefits and Limitations of an Analytical Mobility Framework

In order to explain how Canada treats the mobility of its newcomers and citizens across immigration, citizenship and foreign policy this thesis has relied on a diverse collection of concepts and theories from studies looking at a broad range of subjects across these three domains. Placing these disparate fields of study and policy approaches under the analytical umbrella of mobility has demonstrable advantages, but also provides opportunities for future research. The framework has provided a basis for analyzing policies that seemingly act in isolation from one another, but that are shown to be interconnected when considering their treatment of the ability of newcomers and citizens to move. This analysis has supported the suggestion that Canada struggles to react in a coordinated manner to newcomer and citizenship mobility across policy domains due to divergent approaches in pursuit of isolated goals that either restrict, accommodate, or embrace mobility without a single overarching principle of the value of the ability of citizens to move.

However, the analytical framework developed here relies on concepts and approaches that in part emphasize trends in policy around mobility that may change. The interest in human capital of Canada and the ability of elites to take advantage of this search, for example, may not be so prominent a feature of policy implemented in the future, meaning that new concepts necessary to analyze and understand those changing policies will have to be incorporated into the framework. The overarching concept of mobility and a multi-level policy analysis proposed by Mitchell (1989) nonetheless show demonstrable advantages in expanding and evolving the
framework for the ongoing study of international human movement. The ability to move temporarily and circularly across international borders and between states, including the ability to reside both short and long-term across multiple polities as legal residents is connected to every Canadian citizen and newcomer at every point throughout their lives. While only practiced infrequently, mobility is nonetheless almost always present. A multi-level analytical policy framework recognizes this through the need to look at human movement across interconnected policy domains including foreign policy (Mitchell, 1989), and in instances both in Canada and overseas, where the possibility of movement is emphasized over the actual practice. An expansion of the mobility framework to an examination of an even larger basket of policies beyond those looked at here present real opportunities to overcoming the limitation of methodological nationalism in policy and analysis.

However policy may change, the importance of mobility to a diverse multicultural society of newcomers and naturalized citizens remains apparent. For Canada’s own diverse political community, which truly spans the globe, mobility is a pervasive part of a complex life-course. This life-course interacts with the state through the choices that newcomers and citizens make everyday on where they will live, how they will participate as citizens, and what rights and expectations are associated with their multiple memberships and lives that regularly take them overseas. In turn the state interacts with this mobility in a diverse way that extends beyond policy domains that are traditionally associated with human movement and membership in the political community. Hundreds of thousands of mobile citizens and newcomers now call multiple countries home, and in turn become actors in Canada’s engagement with the international community in an increasingly interconnected global environment. For Canada to succeed in adopting policy
that truly recognizes the full extent of mobility among newcomers and citizens, and to succeed in closing the gaps between the diverse objectives in multiple policy domains and the practices of mobile citizens, it appears necessary for policy to adapt and itself become mobile.
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