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The Cultural Conceits of Subnational Governments of National Minorities:
A Comparative Analysis of the Cultural Policies of Québec, Scotland, & Catalonia

Abstract:
Cultural policy research typically emphasises national and local policies in its studies, while studies of subnational and regional policies tend to be less common. Between the levels of country and city, however, there is a vast array of cultural policy-types that is often cast aside or underrepresented in the literature – this, despite the fact that a number of prominent subnational governments of national minorities have been extremely active in developing their own cultural policies and institutions. Unlike their national or local counterparts, however, these subnational governments often contend with an additional layer of complexity when developing cultural policies, as their history and their population differ from that of their country’s cultural majority – which often leads to a different understanding and appreciation of their cultural identity and sense of nationalism. It is with this complexity and difference in mind that this thesis examines the cultural policies developed and implemented by subnational governments expressing a different national identity from that of their country – in particular, the Canadian province of Québec, the United Kingdom nation of Scotland, and the Spanish region of Catalonia – with the purpose of exploring the ways in which cultural policies are used to shape and influence a sense of cultural identity. Drawing on the economies of worth framework elaborated by Boltanski and Thévenot and the theory of governmentality developed by Foucault, this thesis developed a type analysis of cultural policy for national minorities as a means of exploring not only the ways in which their policies differ from that of their majority counterparts, but to offer a unique understanding of their culture and cultural/social predicament. Through its type analysis, this thesis found that the cultural policies of national minorities exhibited a unique trend in terms of: their application of the cultural industries as vehicles for the development and growth of their cultural/national identities; their support of culture and art as drivers of economic development and social cohesion; and their appraisal of artists and cultural producers as symbolic and literal ambassadors of cultural identity both nationally and internationally. More specifically, far from simply introducing policies that endeavour to preserve and protect cultural traditions and heritages as it has long been suspected, national minorities are developing policies that emphasise the creative aspects of culture and seek to grow their cultures identities through the production and dissemination of new works or forms of culture and art. In other words, the cultural policies of national minorities exhibit a discursive temporality: there is an acute awareness and appreciations of the culture of the past, juxtaposed by approaches to culture that seek to ensure the culture continues (and evolves) beyond the present.

Keywords: cultural policy; cultural industries; national identity; national minority(ies)
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Introduction

In many political and social circles, the term “culture” has become a four-letter word; it is a broad and ill-defined concept that tends to be employed with some trepidation. For many, culture is a concept evoked duplicitously in conjunction with some sort of politically-charged agenda – and often at the expense of the perceived “normative values” of the state. Even countries that have historically prided themselves on multicultural values have demonstrated scepticism vis-à-vis culture’s perceived divisiveness and political application (Bloemraad, 2007, pp.317-318). Complicit in framing culture as a political vehicle is cultural policy – a term, by its very nature, teeming with political overtones. It is perhaps, in part, for this reason that cultural policy has often been met with a measure of apprehension in cultural studies discourse – at least insofar as the practical side of policy is concerned (McGuigan, 1996, p.5). The argument follows that culture and politics should remain separate – a separation that cultural policy and its analysis outright ignore (p.7). Complementing cultural studies’ reservations, cultural policy has often played the role of afterthought or oversight in the broader context of public administration and public policy discourse. Even when cultural policy is the focus of analysis, the most fervent of cultural policy researchers will couch it in the context of instrumentalizing culture, often (if not always) in conjunction with other policy fields (e.g. Gray, 2007; Belfiore, 2006) – affirming, at the very least, concerns that culture is inherently (and perhaps nefariously) political. In other words, culture and cultural policy have, at best, been undervalued and, at worst, been characterized as politically driven.

Fundamentally, however, it can be argued that cultural policies serve to promote and convey ideas and ideals – in particular, the ideals of a state or nation as interpreted by the government du jour. After all, it is through cultural policies that governments are able to regulate,
support, and communicate specific forms and expressions of culture, many – if not all – of which serve to foster a unique sense of shared identity – of community – within their constituencies. In particular, cultural policies – both explicitly and implicitly – determine “how the arts are supported, who decides what is broadcast, what pastimes [are] encouraged, when certain languages can be spoken or customs practiced, how we educate our children and treat our elders, how we relate to our diversity as a nation and to the rest of the world” (Adams & Goldbard, 1993, p.231). Historical precedence would indicate that, short of explicitly dictating what is culturally acceptable, education and cultural policy have long been vehicles for educating the masses on what is “sweet and light” as a means of “tempering their dangerous and vulgar propensities” (Arnold, 1970, as ctd. by McGuigan, 1992, p.21). In other words, cultural policies – through their usage to promote certain ideas or values – can act as a means of socializing the public in ways that best serve a government’s interests.

If it can be said that culture – and, by extension, cultural policy – has been undervalued in public policy discourse, the same cannot be said for its actual importance in national and international contexts. In a day and age when technological advancements and the broader processes of globalization have destabilized the boundaries between states and challenged the sovereignty of governments, questions of culture and cultural identity have taken on a new significance. As such, culture is now at the forefront of the international agenda “in a way it has never been in the past” precisely because its status both challenges and is challenged by the debates surrounding globalization (Graves, 2005, pp.177-178). If nothing else, culture can be said to be a defining and ideational characteristic of human societies. It is through culture – and its expression and application – that societies “make sense of and reflect their common experiences” (Hall, 1981, pp.21-22). The concept of culture, through its ostensible and ubiquitous nature, enables individuals to express themselves, challenge their dispositions, and create meaning –
literal or symbolic – and understanding of themselves and the broader world (Lewis & Miller, 2003, pp.2-3). By extension, government support for arts and culture – in the form of cultural policy – represents an embrace of certain forms or ideations of culture and cultural identity – and it is, at least implicitly, through cultural policy that questions of cultural identity are formalized in political and cultural discourse (Paquette, 2012, p.1). For this reason, cultural policy – regardless of its ultimate intent – plays a significant role in shaping the identity of a nation or a state. The ability of a government to employ culture in this capacity, however, is being challenged by globalization.

Globalizing processes, fuelled by commercial and media conglomerates whose franchises espouse a “cultural conservatism and nostalgic reformatism” that appeals to a broad liberal-minded audience (Parker, 2002, p.22), have led to a progressively homogenized global culture – one which ensures prominent staples of modern and popular culture are present in virtually every corner of the world. As similar global inputs and pressures are being introduced to various localities throughout the world, these localities are invariably led “to do various things in much the same way” (Ritzer, 2011, pp.167-168). Short of reducing barriers to culture, this cultural homogeneity has been a cause for concern in many countries – to the point where international organizations – such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – have gone so far as to identify globalization and “trans-global corporate giants in the audio-visual media industries” as direct threats to certain, vulnerable cultures or cultural expressions (Throsby, 2010, pp.161-162). The fear is that, as global processes shape and reshape culture, indigenous cultures are at risk of being either consumed or subsumed by a broader, global culture. Consequently, far from the classic categorical definition(s) of culture as (a) “absolute or universal” values, (b) the ensemble of “intellectual and imaginative” works known to humanity, and/or (c) social practices and particular ways of life (Williams, 1981, p.43), culture
has become a battleground on which many governments have fought to stake a claim to their nations’ respective identities and reassert a form of difference between them, the global culture proliferated through globalization, and the culture of other nations. Cultures and societies that fail to take the challenges of globalization seriously “run the risk of inadvertently conceding intellectual and social spaces won through constant struggle for national, cultural and economic identity” (Breen, 1993, as ctd. by Bennett et al., 1993, pp.11-12). In the global context – and in the face of globalization – almost all indigenous cultures have effectively become cultural minorities and must, therefore, act to preserve their culture or risk assimilation.

Stark as this outlook may be, globalization has led to a reassessment of the role and place of cultural policies vis-à-vis culture as a symbolic order around which identity is formed. In particular, it is as a tool for socialization and mobilization that cultural policies have had a unique evolution in recent decades – specifically in their capacity to mobilize individuals of a particular nation or culture. In effect, cultural policies establish and support a framework around which individuals can develop a shared or collective identity – in some cases a national identity. This shared identity has often been contextualized around historical events or activities that hold significance for the state or its people. To this end, when discussing themes of identity and community, cultural policy literature often emphasises their connection to heritage and heritage institutions (Crooke, 2010, pp.16-17). However, as a result of global trends, governments have shifted much of the focus of their cultural policy away from heritage, towards cultural consumption – and, in the process, have shifted the purpose of cultural policy “towards becoming an arm of economic policy” (Throsby, 2010, p.5). As a result, over the last two decades, much of the cultural policy that has been implemented in the developed and developing worlds, alike, has been focused on establishing the cultural and creative industries – that is to say, the industries that are “involved in the production and consumption of culture,” or, more specifically, “the
production of social meaning” (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, pp.11-12) – as legitimate and “defined” industries that can provide “communitarian benefits” and social inclusivity (Cunningham, 2014, pp.29-30). Rather than instrumentally employing cultural policies to achieve other (non-cultural) policy outcomes, governments are now implementing cultural policies in a way that allows them to use the cultural industries to reassert their states’ cultural identities – the very same industries that, through globalization, have arguably threatened those identities. This, in effect, represents a paradigm shift in the ways in which governments use cultural policy.

The fact that cultural policy trends, in recent decades, have pointed towards an industry/economic-based approach suggests that government reliance on the cultural industries has become the norm. The cultural industries have, if nothing else, moved closer to the centre of economic action in the developed world – to the point where they are as much drivers of the economy as are the more traditional industries that develop “real” or “durable” goods (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, pp.1-2). This proliferation of (and reliance on) the cultural industries speaks, in part, to its pervasiveness in everyday life: its diffusion is one that “few societies, past or present, can match” while its application is one that can best be described in terms of democratization (Toffler, 1964, pp.27-28). Much like culture, itself, the cultural industries have influence in virtually every facet of day-to-day life – to the point where, as early as the 1960s, more than one in six individuals in the United States, alone, were directly involved in the industries themselves (Toffler, 1964, p.27). When accounting for secondary or voluntary employment, more recent numbers would suggest as high as 65% of the population in Western societies is involved in the cultural industries in some capacity (Cunningham, 2014, p.132). Simply put, the cultural industries occupy an important role in social, cultural, and economic life, a role which affords them a measure of influence over how people form their identities and senses of self. In this capacity – and in their capacity as producers of ideas and social meaning –
the cultural industries, when properly channeled through cultural policy, can serve to further government agendas with respect to cultural identity (often expresses as nationalism or national identity).

Where this cultural policy paradigm shift has, perhaps, been most readily observed is in the context of national minorities – that is to say, cultures that exist in a minority context within their country, but enjoy a measure of constitutional recognition from another, often dominant culture. More so than their majority counterparts, national minorities are at risk of seeing their cultures gradually erode in the face of social and political pressures – pressures both within and without the state apparatus. Even in situations where national minorities are recognized and protected by a state, they rarely benefit from the same privileges or social conditions as the majority culture (Lacassagne, 2012, p.179). Thus, national minorities are in a unique situation insofar as they are almost always disadvantaged. On the one hand, national minorities must navigate an environment where they play second fiddle to the “majority group in the state” they live in (Hammer, 2007, p.174). Governments in multicultural (or pluri-national) situations almost invariably “advance one culture at the expense of the other” – not so much because the government inherently prefers or favours one culture over the others, but because practicality often necessitates policy choices that benefit one culture at the expense of others (p.174). On the other hand, because the cultural majority is generally favoured, national minorities are disadvantaged in the context of the cultural marketplace (pp.174-175) – a marketplace which is often, if not always, influenced by demand economics. For national minorities, the cultural marketplace of their country is not always proficient in providing them with consumable culture that satisfies their desires/demands, never mind consumable culture that is representative of their identity. As such, national minorities are uniquely positioned when it comes to cultural policies, and the formation and maintenance of their cultural identities: where the cultural policies of
cultural majorities might be able to specifically target certain social and cultural concerns/issues, national minorities must navigate through tumultuous waters en route to policy that both preserves the culture of the minority while also, in many respects, adhering to the cultural overtones and edicts of the majority culture. And, by and large, this dynamic has been observable in many of the cultural policies employed by national minorities in recent decades.

It is with this context in mind that this thesis examines the cultural policies of national minorities with unique cultural, historical, and nationalist programmes – most notably, the national minorities of Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and Spain, as regionally represented by the province of Québec, the country of Scotland, and the region of Catalonia. These national minorities (and their governments) have exhibited characteristics that make them unique to cultural policy development studies. First of all, the governments of these national minorities have typically had to contend with the dual reality of being a majority culture in their respective regions, but a minority in the broader context of their country. Second, these national minorities have all been offered a form of legal/constitutional recognition by their federal/national counterparts – a recognition that has, if nothing else, served to politicize their minority/majority status. Third, in recent history, these national minorities have, to varying degrees, expressed desires – and, in some instances, made deliberately (albeit legal) attempts – to secede from their countries. Fourth, culture and identity occupy important places in the public discourse of these national minorities, and, as a result, their governments have developed institutions specific to the promotion and/or sustainment of their respective cultures. Finally, these national minorities often contend with isomorphic pressures, from both their federal governments and global/international forces, which challenge their cultures and identities. In the face of these pressures, however, the Québécois, Scots, and Catalonians have all evidenced – in no small part through their cultural policies – a pronounced cultural resilience where their respective identities and ambitions for
greater autonomy/sovereignty are concerned. Given these circumstances, it is easy to surmise that there is something different or peculiar about national minorities – particularly where their cultural policies are concerned – something that merits further investigation. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to better understand the conditions under which these national minorities develop cultural policy.

More specifically, this thesis asks: what are the main characteristics of the cultural policies of national minorities? Do their cultural policies (and culturally-significant policies) and institutions evidence a certain form, structure, or approach that helps distinguish them from the approaches of other (often majoritarian) cultures? What are the distinctive values and/or normativities that these policies and institutions embody? And finally, are there any definitive characteristics to these policies that are recognizable or carry over across multiple contexts? To address these questions, this thesis employs a multi-case study analysis of Québec, Catalonia and Scotland, in conjunction with a discourse analysis of their policy documents and reports. This thesis focuses on cultural policies introduced by these national minorities throughout much of their respective histories, though a strong emphasis is placed on the policies introduced from the early 1990-onward. This later period, in particular, corresponds to an era of significant cultural policy development (or redevelopment) for the respective cases. With this in mind, Québec represents a somewhat unique case insofar as it had begun developing a cultural infrastructure and cultural institutions (such as a Ministry of Cultural Affairs) as early as the 1960s – a development that, at the time, was relatively novel in all contexts of cultural policy, not just in a national minority setting. As such, Québec has a somewhat deeper history where cultural policy is concerned, relative to the other cases, and is, consequently, explored over the course of two chapters.
To further this analysis and achieve a measure of comparison between the three cases, this thesis focuses on questions of identity and, more specifically, on how identity is problematized in cultural policy development and discourse. The intersection between cultural policy and identity is relatively unique in the context of national minorities insofar as they must contend with the challenges of articulating, problematizing, and mobilizing their identity issues through cultural policy while avoiding the pratfalls associated with the common caricatures and clichés of nationalism. This thesis has sought to articulate this dynamic from an institutional perspective, drawing on an understanding of policy instrumentality that is not an ethical manipulation, but (following a Foucauldian ethics) a creative process. Moreover, this thesis took its cues from the economies of worth framework developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) to establish a type analysis of its own that helps frame the commonalities (and differences) that exist between the cases under review.

With all of this in mind, chapter one of this thesis sets out to provide an overview of the research problem, beginning with an assessment of the field of cultural policy studies and many of its current debates/concerns. The chapter closes by placing the questions of cultural identity and nationalism into the broader context of the field. Chapter one also provides a deeper look into the specific issues surrounding the questions of cultural identity and minority cultures. Chapter two presents the theoretical framework; it explores the concepts and theories underpinning cultural policy and cultural industries literature. Chapter two also delves into the particular details of the theories used to explore and analyse the research question, namely Foucault’s theory of governmentality and Boltanski and Thévenot’s economies of worth framework. Chapter three offers a detailed overview of the methods used to conduct this thesis’ research. Chapters four through seven delve into the thesis’ case studies and present the bulk of its research and analysis. Chapters four and five explore the public and cultural policies of Québec. Chapter four, in
particular, focuses on the historical context of Québec’s cultural identity – beginning with the arrival of the British in 1759 and culminating with the Québec Referendum on succession (and its aftermath) in 1980 – and the public and cultural policies of those periods – and their role in shaping Québec’s society and culture. Chapter five picks up with Québec’s public and cultural policies beginning in the mid-1980s and delves significantly into Québec’s 1992 la politique culturelle and more recent developments with the province’s “Société de développement des entreprises culturelles” (SODEC). Chapter six explores the devolution of Scotland and the gradual emergence of cultural policy as a significant shaper of Scotland’s cultural and national identity. Similarly, chapter seven looks at the evolving cultural identity of the Catalan people throughout the decades following re-democratization (1975-onward) – examining, in particular, the adoption of language laws following years of cultural repression at the hands of a dictatorship.

The final section of this thesis – the conclusion – provides a theoretical engagement with the question of cultural identity in the context of national minorities. In the final chapter, this thesis concludes by emphasizing a number of common characteristics that are found across the three cases. Namely, through its type analysis, this thesis found that the cultural policies of national minorities exhibit a unique trend in terms of their application of the cultural industries as vehicles for the development and growth of their cultural/national identities; their support of culture and art as drivers of economic development and social cohesion; and their appraisal of artists and cultural producers as symbolic and literal ambassadors of cultural identity. More specifically, far from simply introducing policies that endeavour to preserve and protect cultural traditions and heritages, the national minorities of Québec, Scotland, and Catalonia are developing policies that seek to grow their cultures identities through the production and dissemination of new works and/or forms of culture and art.
Chapter 1 – Cultural Policy & Identity: A Literature Review

Questions and considerations of identity, and the construction thereof, have been the focal point of much debate in the social and human sciences in recent decades – though, perhaps, underwhelmingly so in public administration and policy discourse. While these debates have primarily centred on the ontological understanding of what it means to be a person, the questions these debates raise, nevertheless, are widely concurrent with, and have strong practical implications for, legal and political systems the world over (du Gay, 2007, p.21). At the heart of these debates is the question of whether an individual is the “author” of his or her actions, a “free agents” who is “directed by a sovereign and integral consciousness” (du Gay, 2007, p.21); or whether the identity to which an individual ascribes is, in the words of David Hume, “fictitious” (Chomsky, 2000, p.182), and their choices but the product of the socio-cultural environment in which they were raised. Where these considerations become most salient in policy discourse is with respects to notions of culture and cultural identity – particularly in the context of national or regional identity. Fundamentally, nationalism or national identity is a concept often evoked as a means of describing the sense of unabating loyalty or esprit de corps individuals express or exhibit towards their nation-state and its symbolic representations (Current Sociology, 1973, p.9).

Historically, nationalism has been associated with the efforts of political leaders to create a unified identity for their citizenry. These efforts, however, have been primarily associated with administrations of pre- or quasi-democratic eras – that is to say, of times when political leaders “were trying to create loyal citizens” through indoctrination and homogenization (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004, pp.166-167). It comes, therefore, as somewhat of a perplexity to many scholars that questions of nationalism have re-emerged in modern democratic societies, particularly in places where national minorities exist (Hamilton, 2004; Béland & Lecours, 2005).
Inherent in culture and identity’s prominence in the development of a cultural or national identity (or the concept thereof) is their ability to be purposed by nationalist and/or political movements for socio-political gains. Nationalism is “foremost a form of politics” – one whose power to control and influence cultural traits, as often as not, manifests through social and cultural policy (Béland & Lecours, 2005, p.678). According to Béland and Lecours (2005), policy can serve nations or nationalist movements in a number of respects. For instance, certain policies can be approached and “articulated” as symbols for a “wider set of values, societal priorities, and political culture” (p.678). Policy, in this case, is symbolic in the sense that it infers control and autonomy: states and sub-states that develop and implement policy are enacting a measure of control over their constituencies. In the case of national minorities, obtaining a measure of control over policies that were previously under the purview of the state is both a literal and symbolic victory around which nationalist movements can build momentum towards self-determination. In other instances, policy can be approached and incorporated into the identity of a culture or a nation. Policy, in this context, represents a “tangible manifestation of the existence of a political community”: it serves to substantiate and validate the social and cultural values and ideals of a nation or a group (p.679). In this respect, policy is intrinsically linked to the concept of community and is often the mechanism through which “a society consciously reproduces its own identity” (Miller, 1995, as ctd. by Béland & Lecours, 2005, p.680). Thus, the role of cultural policy in questions of cultural identity should not go underestimated. Nor should the role of the cultural industries, for that matter, go underestimated.

Reflection on identity has become increasingly salient in modern times, as the survival of identity – both individual and social – has been put at risk by globalizing forces. From a sociological perspective, a social identity represents “the internalization of the rules, expectations, and norms associated with specific social roles as aspects of the individual self”
Social identity, thus, serves as a means by which individuals and groups come to identify and distinguish themselves from others and each other; it is how membership in a group is established and how boundaries to that group are maintained (Gill, 2005, p.84). From a cultural perspective, then, identity can serve as both a means of shaping and protecting a culture. As such, the very concept of identity is, arguably, one of the single most important “universal human needs”; it is through identity, both personal and social, that individuals gain meaning and understanding of their (socially constructed) culture (Bauman, 1999, p.xxxi). When one is acutely secure in their sense of identity – when “belonging becomes natural” – little thought or reflection is given to identity (pp.xxix-xxx). For such a sense of security to truly exist, Bauman (1999) contends, one must belong to a “locally confined” world – a world where there is a strong distinction between being inside that world and being outside of it (p.xxx). However, as global factors continue to play an ever-increasing, albeit often subtle or implicit, role in social and personal life, the way in which identity works as a boundary has shifted, and its ability to protect culture has eroded.

With this in mind, this chapter provides a review of the literature as it relates to cultural policy, identity, and national minorities. The first objective of this chapter is to illustrate how issues of identity have become prevalent in cultural policy and cultural studies literature. After presenting the main grids used to discuss identity in cultural policy research – in particular, in the contexts of cultural instrumentality and/or economic tools – the chapter will progress towards an overview of the literature in the field. Drawing on the different approaches to cultural policy employed throughout various regions of the world, this chapter explores the relationship culture (and cultural policy) can have with the development of a cultural and/or national identity – particularly where concepts of cultural production are concerned. The second objective of this chapter is to formulate this thesis’s research question, drawing on the evidence presented in the
literature as a means to this end. Cultural policy research, it is argued, has neglected the complexities of cultural policy development and identity, especially when they intersect with issues of nationalism. With this in mind, as a means of elaborating the research question, this chapter will provide a working definition of the research’s object, “national minority.”

1.1: Cultural Policy Research & Identity: Between Instrumentality & Economy

In cultural policy research and discourse, issues of identity have long been approached with a measured reluctance by scholars and academics. The reason for this reluctance has much to do with the fact that “questions of culture seem to touch a nerve” within policy discourse – particularly in the context of bi- or multiculturalism – and quickly devolve into “anguished questions of identity” (Rosaldo, 1993, p.xxi). However, it is precisely because of these heated debates that questions and considerations of identity and culture have progressively, become more prevalent in public and cultural policy discourse – to the point where they have served to fuel new ways of approaching and understanding cultural policy – and new ways of approaching culture and (cultural) identity formation though cultural policy. To truly appreciate the significance of cultural policy’s place in the development and sustainment of a cultural identity, however, it is first important to understand the evolving nature of cultural policy and cultural policy discourse. In cultural policy research, the literature on identity tends to serve one of two distinct perspectives or schools of thought: one driven by a view of cultural policy as a tool for identity construction; and one that sees cultural policy primarily as a tool for economic development. This second view, in particular, has raised a number of unique questions as they relate to the nature of identity, specifically with respects to notions of commodification.
1.1.1: Instrumentalizing Identity: Conventional Approaches to Cultural Policy & Identity

Conventionally, cultural studies researchers have approached cultural policy from two unique, albeit interrelated angles: a hegemonic angle – which draws on notions of proprietorship and practicality when addressing state intervention in matters of culture; and an identity angle – which approaches culture as a mode or vehicle for developing and maintaining a cohesive cultural identity within a nation or region. The first angle – the hegemonic angle – insists on an understanding of cultural policy as a form of regulation of cultural productions and offerings – introduced and enforced by the state, often as a means of exercising a measure of influence over its populace (McGuigan, 2003, pp.24-25). In this context, hegemony – defined as the influence or leadership a(n often dominant) group, state, or nation exercises over other (less dominant) groups or states (Gramsci, 1971/2014, p.12) – is exercised through the application of cultural policy onto the various forms of cultural production and consumption. In this first instance, researchers have been interested in understanding, on the one hand, how and why governments support the development of certain arts and forms of heritage; and, on the other hand, understanding the place of the public in supporting the development of some forms of art or artistic experiences over others. What is implicit in this understanding of cultural policy is that, even though the focus of these policies is on regulating arts and culture, their role is not simply to sustain the arts for the sake of the arts. Rather, this perspective of cultural policy touches on questions of taste and, more specifically, the space (i.e. resources) governments are willing to allocate towards culture (Kondo & Khan, 2011, pp.65-66) – provided that culture is predicated on utility.

From this first perspective, a debate has emerged in cultural policy studies literature surrounding the notion that art and culture should be instrumental to society beyond mere aestheticism (Gray, 2007; Belfiore, 2002; Gibson, 2008). Belfiore (2006) defines the notion of
instrumentality in cultural policy as a trend that conceives art and culture “as a means towards the fulfilment of other, not artistic, policy objectives” (p.230). The emphasis for instrumental cultural policy stems from a “need for arts and cultural policies to demonstrate” a benefit beyond the aesthetic for the creation of culture (Gray, 2007, p.203). For those that support the introduction of instrumental cultural policies, the argument follows that cultural policy should promote the production and dissemination of culture that provides a benefit beyond what falls within the policy realm of cultural policy. This is in line with a prevailing public scepticism towards government intervention into the cultural sector – that government funding of the arts should or could be best spent elsewhere (Lemasson, 2015). To this end, cultural policy should endeavour towards supporting other policy fields – such as infrastructure, urban development, and industry, to name a few. For those that oppose instrumental cultural policy, the concern is not so much with cultural policies being instrumentalized, per se – as cultural policies and, by extension, culture have been instrumentalized to varying degrees for as long as there has been cultural policy. Rather, concern is focused on the changing attitude governments have displayed towards culture in recent years. In particular, governments are now using cultural resources in a way that moves them away from the primarily cultural purposes of cultural policies and puts emphasis on their otherwise secondary purposes (e.g. generating economic growth) (Gray, 2007, p.205).

It is with the secondary purposes of culture in mind that the second approach – or angle – to cultural policy has been interested in exploring how policy development informs identity production. In particular, this approach questions the role of cultural policy in the development of cultural identities (such as national and regional identities): does cultural policy reinforce these identities? If so, to what extent do these policies reinforce identity? Does cultural policy offer different expectations of or for collective, cultural identities? These are but a few of the questions that permeate cultural policy discourse in the context of cultural identity. These are important
questions to consider because an inherent and, perhaps, central purpose of culture is its capacity to ascribe and express identity. Culture offers individuals or peoples a means of contextualizing and conveying their personal and/or communal narratives and “helps [them] define who they are” (Throsby, 2010, p.20). In this respect, culture can and does operate as both an implicit and explicit determinant of identity – which, in its broadest terms, is a “self-definition” that serves to integrate the roles an individual assumes in the various facets of their lives – including cultural and national roles – in order to facilitate a coherent understanding of themselves (Myers, 2007, p.171). Moreover, cultural can serve as a “powerful reference for national identity” – particularly for nations or cultures that have established figurative (and sometimes literal) boundaries vis-à-vis other nations or cultures (Béland & Lecours, 2005, p.678).

For many governments or nation-states, culture has become “one of the most forceful and visible” tools for integrating citizens into national societies (Flew, 2005, p.244). It is through culture that states are able to establish identity and ideational constructs of what constitutes the nation vis-à-vis other nations. Because, regardless of if it is through the “application of cultural hegemony by the dominant class or as the formulation of ‘imagined communities’ through everyday ritual and representation, […] ‘nation-states cannot be understood, or even defined, apart from their achievement of some degree of cultural identity’” (Schudson, 1994, as ctd. by Flew, 2005, p.244). In other words, the cultural features of [cultural] identity are essential to defining the social boundaries of a nation and society “to which individuals are integrated” (p.244). In this respect, political action in the context of cultural policy and identity can be seen as a form of “discursive intervention calculated to influence where the lines of alliance and division between different actors […] actually get drawn” (Bennett, 2007, p.623). Cultural policy applied in the formation of a cultural identity, thus, can serve to create unity within a nation or a
state, and distinction between multiple nations or states – even if, in some cases, that unity comes at the expensive of diversity.

Although much can be said of the significance cultural policy plays in developing and maintaining a sense of social and cultural cohesion and identity within a state, there has been little of substance said regarding the actual role of cultural processes in the construction of a national (or cultural) identity (Schlesinger, 1987, p.219). While it can be said that culture acts as a “means of achieving” the objective of social and national “unity,” this is a “thoroughly idealist and voluntarist perception of the construction of the desired social order” (pp.220-221). Rather, (national) cultures “may be thought of as sites of contestation in which competition over the very boundaries and nature of the national community routinely occurs” (Schlesinger, 1997, p.372). As such, it is at least in part through culture – and the policies that broadly govern it – that governments are able to, on the one hand, “hermetically construct a realm of national conduct and identities,” and, on the other hand, map “social relationships […] into national constructions of the social” (Bennett, 1998, p.279). In other words, culture can serve as a vehicle through which governments are able to influence and inform the collective or communal identity of their people – a vehicle through which they can forge or re-forge, shape or reshape, the collective identity around social norms or approaches that best serve the governments’ whims.

If culture can be said to be a tool for government socialization, then cultural policy is the instrument that forged that tool. Cultural policy operates as a mechanism through which governments are able to participate in, control, and/or influence – both explicitly and implicitly – the culture that is produced and disseminated within their borders. As governments set the rules within their borders, they invariably play a role in literally every aspect of the production process of culture (Becker, 2008, p.165). It is, thus, in the context of cultural production that governments have arguably had their most immediate impact in shaping cultural identity. In point of fact, in
recent years, arts and heritage have been employed by governments as a means of fostering a sense of social inclusion (Ashley, 2012; Ménard, 2004) – an objective that is very much at the heart of cultural identity and nationalism. Oftentimes, the degree to which a government is willing to support certain artistic and cultural endeavours is predicated on that endeavour’s commitment to social inclusion (Belfiore, 2002, p.93). Thus, cultural policies have an implicit role in shaping not only how culture is created, but also to what purpose it is ultimately employed.

1.1.2: Identity, Social Classes & the Cultural Industries Research Programmes

In recent years, notions of cultural policy have coalesced with notions of economy and productivity to produce new narratives in cultural policy discourse (or, in some cases, to dust off old narratives and offer them a new lease on life). Among the narratives to emerge or be most affected by this economic slant to cultural policy discourse has been those related to the cultural industries. Most notably, the cultural industries narratives have had an impact on reconceptualising cultural policy development as a predominantly economic approach to culture – to the point where it now permeates how governments think of and approach culture. From a research perspective, the cultural industries have generally been approached from the context of their role in the production of culture and their economic impact (e.g. Hesmondhalgh, 2007; Throsby, 2010; Becker, 2008). Often, authors will look at the cultural industries from the vantage of a particular industry – such as television, radio, print, or theatre, to name a few – to suss out specific trends or concepts unique to the industry in question, or to engage with questions related to the mass production of culture in relation to its status as popular or high culture. And, to a certain degree, the economic approach to the cultural industries has not been wrong. After all, culture is almost inescapably enmeshed in economic considerations as it, more often than not,
falls within the legal purview of the cultural industries (Ménard, 2004, pp.57-59). It has long been acknowledged that the cultural industries approach their consumer base as “an object of calculation; an appendage of the machinery” and treat their product – culture – as “symbolic constructs […] moulded according to certain pre-established formulae and impregnated with stereotypical settings characters and themes” (Thompson, 1990, p.99). In fact, almost everything about the cultural industries is calculated, to the point where the industries have been able to create the illusion that certain forms of culture and art are “unsellable” to the general public – that they are cultural goods that transcend the marketplace (i.e. classical music played on the radio) and belong to the public domain. This, however, masks the fact that “a series of commercial transactions take place outside the act of consumption itself,” leaving cultural consumers with the impression “of an unmediated encounter with the work of art” (p.99).

While the cultural industries’ impact on cultural consumption and production practices is a good starting point, seldom does cultural policy or cultural industries research programmes delve into the deeper questions and considerations regarding their influence and implication on the development of cultural identity and nationalism. The very fact that the cultural industries exercise a significant degree of economic and legal control over the production and dissemination of culture – never mind the implicit control they exercise over the modes and means of consumption – suggests that the industries also possess the ability to shape taste and, by degree, shape identity with respects to the type of cultural products people consume. The cultural industries, rather than offering individuals choice or novelty, function as a reflection of “a social reality which is reproduced without the need of an explicit or quasi-independent justification or defense, since the very process of consuming the products of the cultural industry induces individuals to identify with the prevailing social norms and to continue to be as they already are” (Thompson, 1990, p.100). Moreover, much as Max Weber’s iron cage sought to offer a
rationalized and bureaucratic account of human action, so too do the cultural industries operate as a sort of “iron system” that offers individuals a “universe of objects” to choose from that are “essentially identical and thoroughly commodified” (p.100). In other words, the cultural industries are, by measure of commodifying culture, directing individuals towards certain, finite outcomes and social norms – towards certain cultural identities.

In this respect, the cultural industries are establishing parameters inside of which culture can be consumed, herding individuals towards what they perceive to be desired and pleasurable outcomes and social orders (Adorno, 1991). In doing so, the cultural industries are creating a form of cultural identity predicated on the consumption of culture – a sort of consumer culture that subsumes other forms of culture to generate a unified, homogenous culture. Culture, thus, has become a question of consumption wherein the cultural industries can mould cultural identity to fit ideal consumption practices – in effect, commodifying the very notion of identity. It is in this respect that it can safely be argued that the cultural industries hold, at the very least, some measure of influence or impact on shaping the dynamics of cultural identity and nationalism.

However, this influence sits “uneasily within the public policy framework” precisely because, as industries, the cultural industries are primarily focused on economic gain (Pratt, 2005, p.31). Consequently, the policy contexts in which the cultural industries find themselves, and the role of public and non-profit organizations in regulating them, have yet to be thoroughly explored (Leslie & Rantisi, 2006). Part of the reason for this is that there have been “few real theoretical or policy models” developed that thoroughly address the cultural industries vis-à-vis policy (O’Connor, 1999, as ctd by Galloway & Dunlop, 2007, p.19) – and fewer, still, that address the cultural industries in relation to cultural identity and nationalism.
1.2: French Emersion: Cultural Policy as National Discourse

If there is a sense from the literature that little has been said of the cultural industries’ relationship to cultural/national identity formation, the same cannot be said for cultural policy and its application to nationalism. One country that has offered a unique albeit nationalist approach to its cultural policy is France. If there is one thing that can be said of France’s approach to cultural policy, it is that it is often wrought with contradiction. Since the 1980s, French cultural policy has served as an international example of a cultural policy framework that is arguably second to none in terms of its public spending, its numerous public institutions, its omnipresent political discourse, and its high degree of volunteerism (Dubois, 2010, p.19). Moreover, French cultural policies have been distinct in their emphasis on fostering a strong sense of national pride and identity through the preservation of the country’s distinct cultural traits, the promotion of creative and expressive freedom, and the promotion of the democratization of culture (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2012, pp.580-581). In this respect, French cultural policy has served as an archetype – or a type par excellence – of cultural policy, one that represents a “classic” approach in terms of its emphasis on culture as a fundamental right for which the state is fundamentally responsible for promoting and administering to its citizens (p.578).

With this in mind, French state cultural policy has been primarily concerned with promoting “high” culture over that of “mass” or popular culture – even going so far as to institutionalize its distinction between high and popular culture (Dubois, 2011b, p.395). This approach however, began to evolve during the “Malraux” period of French cultural policy of the 1960s – a period named for the then-Minister of Cultural Affairs whose policies tended to rebel “against the academic canons of beauty ordained by the Institut” in favour of contemporary art (Girard, 1997, p.107). Underscoring this dynamic is the fact that France has maintained a “long
tradition of state intervention in the cultural industries” – including, more recently, “enormous investments” in its telecommunications infrastructure (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p.124). Yet even as the French government has embraced its country’s cultural heritage and identity via democratization of culture, it has also been paradoxically open to the evolving nature of culture and the blurring lines between high culture and low culture – to the point of being almost bipolar in its approach.

This fact was epitomised in the late 1970s when the Parti socialiste denounced the cultural industries in one breath, and in the early 1980s when French Minister of Culture, Jack Lang, embraced Hollywood with another – even going so far as to award American cinematic action star, Sylvester Stallone, the much coveted and highly distinguished le Chevalier award, by far one of “France’s highest cultural honour” (Bennett, 1997, p.69). In a first instance, this embrace of Hollywood – and, more broadly, of popular culture – was indicative of the French government’s desire to “extend French cultural policy” to forms of culture “previously excluded” from policy consideration (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p.138). In a second instance, the French government saw popular culture as a means through which to “lure” its people to high culture and high cultural institutions. In a third instance, popular culture was seen as a means of using culture instrumentally, for non-cultural purposes (Dubois, 2011b, pp.398-399). Far from being solely the purview of cultural matters, French cultural policy has been devised “to address ‘civilization issues’ and uncertainties about the future” (Dubois, 2011a, p.494).

This seemingly frenetic/contradictory approach to cultural policy, however, was as much an “attempt to slam the door on France’s colonial past as the empire was being dismantled” in the post-War era as it was an attempt to mimic the “culturally and economically expansionist” United States (Looseley, 2005, p.146). On the one hand, France was experiencing a sort of crisis of identity (and, certainly, a loss of power) following the Second World War. The country’s position
as a “key player in worldwide politics” had been significantly weakened by the socio-economic fallout of the war (Vigoureux, 2013, p.382). This erosion of power was made all-the-more tangible by the push for (and eventual acquisition of) independence by France’s African colonies during the 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, France saw the emergence of the United States (and Russia) as a world power – occupying a position it once held (p.382) – and simultaneously sought to simultaneously mimic their success culturally while offering the world (through la Francophonie) a cultural alternative to American hegemony (Auplat, 2003). Ironically, this approach placed France in a “pseudo-colonial relationship with the United States” that sat uneasily with France as its “sense of itself as a coloniser in its own right remained intact” even though it was now drawing inspiration from the policies/approaches of what was a former colony (Looseley, 2005, pp.146-147). To this end, while efforts were made by the French government to support and invigorate France’s cultural industries, most notably its film industry – going so far as to draw inspiration from the American market – a concerted effort was, nevertheless, made to ward off Americanization of the French culture (McGuigan, 1996, p.92) – a process that goes a long way towards explaining the nationalist agenda of French cultural policy.

Despite its overall success in promoting nationalism and warding off Americanization, Dubois (2010) suggests that French cultural policy has been marred by a sense of disillusionment – often projected by the country’s intellectual and artistic communities (p.19). Ironically – and where the French cultural sphere, perhaps, differs most from its Anglo-Saxon counterparts – France’s artists and intellectuals have historically approached government intervention into matters of culture with a measure of aversion, often bordering on apprehension or trepidation (Ahearne, 2006, p.323). This aversion – largely fuelled by a culture of intellectual and artistic figures defined by their individualistic and anti-authoritarian approaches and willingness to publicly question authority and, more importantly, the policies they employ – has enabled French
intellectuals to serve as a form of “extra-governmental cultural-political action,” one which has
broadened the “frames of reference” of cultural policy to “bear on given political problems and
issues” (pp.323-324). By serving as an extra-governmental action, artists and intellectuals have
allowed themselves to become politicized and, in the process, helped usher in the notion that arts
and culture should be accompanied by a “social mission,” one that is aimed at, among other
things, addressing questions of social exclusion (Looseley, 2004, p.16).

And, to a certain degree, this social mission has been a success, albeit a bittersweet
success. For instance, by the late 20th century, France was able to reduce its levels of material
poverty, a contributor to social exclusion – though they did so at the expense of proliferating
“other forms of social and cultural disadvantage” (Bennett & Savage, 2004, p.8). In many
respects, the social mission of French cultural policy has been a response to its colonial past – a
way of, to a certain degree, expulsing itself of its identity as a coloniser. Many of these policies
were introduced as a response to a series of “successive waves of migration from former African
colonies” following World War II, and essentially serve to whitewash – both literally and
figuratively – the cultural damage caused by French colonialism (Looseley, 2005, p.145). It is in
this respect that the achievement of social inclusion was somewhat bittersweet.

In its attempts to deny the “colonial dimension” of its national identity, France opened the
doors to a “logic of segregation and expulsion” wherein many of those who immigrated to France
post-war were moved from “urban shanty-towns […] to the now notorious high-rise suburbs”
(Ross, 1995, ctd. by Looseley, 2005, p.147). The predominantly white middle class was then left
to “its sanitised city spaces,” while everyone else was left “outside” (Looseley, 2005, p.147). The
problem with such policies, Bennett (1997) notes, is that while one of the primary justifications
of cultural policy is its use in “strengthening national identity and prestige,” it is a justification
that even if it is accepted as a “desirable objective,” has become “too easily […] associated with
chauvinism and xenophobia” (p.73). By doing so, however, France was able to “remove the colonial legacy from its line of sight,” a process which facilitated its democratization approach to culture by reifying the notion that the non-public of culture was a homogenous block that could be converted to a public via “pre-packaged culture” hand delivered by the government (Looseley, 2005, p.147).

This segregation was seen as a necessary evil by the government as it allowed them to establish a need for cultural funding to support the development of new cultural institutions to reach these segments of the population “who had never attended a concert, […] an opera, […] a play” (Dubois, 2011a, p.497). In doing so, however, the French government ironically ushered in a wave of cultural democracy discourse that sought a greater degree of pluralism and inclusiveness in its public policy (Looseley, 2005, p.148) – and with this cultural democracy, came new opportunity for popular culture and the broader cultural industries to, once again, exert a measure of influence on French culture. In its efforts to protect its national identity, France arguably provided the market (i.e. the cultural industries) a greater measure of autonomy in influencing cultural consumption in the country – and, to a certain degree, a measure of influence in the cultural and national identity of the French people. Rather than exclusively being retrospective in its approach, French cultural policy must now be somewhat forward thinking as well. Yet, if there is one thing that is definitive of French cultural policy, it is that it has established a firm “us” and “them” dichotomy – whether it be between the French and other countries, nationals and immigrants, or between the public and non-public – that has not quite been pierced by popular culture and the cultural industries that produce it. Consequently, French cultural policy has emerged as a space of contention between France’s colonial past and its future in a progressively globalized world. The challenge now for France – and for most countries and cultures, for that matter – is finding opportunity in this new environment.
1.3: Producing Identity: Policy, Identity, & the Cultural Industries

As important as culture has become to questions of identity, so too has culture’s relationship to work “paradoxically […] also become more important” in relation to the increased production of cultural content in “the knowledge and service economies” (Holden, 2006, p.23). Cultural production or, more specifically, the “making of art” has come to occupy a “special position among human practices” – to the point where some schools of thought would argue that to be an artist or cultural producer is possibly the “highest of all callings” (Heilbrun & Gray, 2001, p.3). Yet, despite the sometimes esteemed position afforded to artists and producers, the cultural industries – the very industries responsible for the production of culture – have been met with a measure of “notoriety” when discussed as a policy object (Pratt, 2005, p.31). In many circles, the cultural industries are seen as sitting “uneasily within the public policy framework” primarily because they are, by definition, “commercially oriented” (p.31). The very notion that culture can or should be used for commercial purposes has left some scholars red in the face. The argument follows that art and culture are or should be seen as “above ‘mere commerce’” and that economists should “keep their dirty hands off of it” (Heilbrun & Gray, 2001, p.3).

This trepidation towards the cultural industries, in many respects, runs counter to the prestige conferred upon the “making of art” – which, itself, stems from an idealized image of the cultural artist (and his or her work) as “the source of cultural value” – a source whose own livelihood is argued to be secondary to the inherent value of his or her work (Garnham, 1985/1993, p.54). The rationale behind this argument, according to Garnham (1985/1993), is born from a tradition that sees culture as being “separate from, and often actively opposed to, the realm of material production and economic activity” (p.54). The logic follows that if or when the artist fails to reach a sufficiently large audience to support themselves and their craft, it is not the artist’s fault – but that of the market; the role of the government, then, is to correct the market
failure (p.54). Fuelled by a socialist tradition that opposes “the capitalist mode of production,” culture and the market are seen as “inherently inimical” (p.60). Simply put, to evoke the cultural industries as “central to an analysis of cultural activity and public cultural policy” is to defy a “whole tradition of idealist cultural analysis” (p.54).

And yet even the most basic processes of making art and culture almost invariably involve some form of money exchange or economic function – at the very least to either acquire materials or purchase/develop equipment needed to make art (Becker, 2008, p.3). The simple fact is, art and culture “are produced by individuals and institutions working within the general economy” (Heilbrun & Gray, 2001, p.3). As with virtually every facet of human life, art and culture are inescapably enmeshed in economic questions and considerations (Ménard, 2004, p.57). For this reason, it is almost impossible to approach questions of contemporary culture and cultural production without also considering the economic elements associated with culture and the industries primarily responsible for its production. It speaks to the notion that the cultural industries are inherently and implicitly hegemonic – understood, here, as the influence, leadership, or in some cases, dominance of the cultural industries over virtually all matters cultural – an influence that can and does have implications for cultural identities.

In the all-too-often hegemonic rhetoric of Western society, identity is often established and understood through difference and concepts of otherness – and often couched in dichotomies of dominance and subordination (Rutherford, 1990, p.8). Difference, in this context, is seen as a “motif for the uprooting of certainty”; it represents change, transformation, and hybridity (p.8). Paradoxically, Rutherford (1990) notes, the cultural industries have begun to embrace difference as a means of selling cultural commodities, as “things that will enhance our uniqueness and individuality”; otherness is “sought after for its exchange value, its exoticism and the pleasures, thrills and adventures it can offer” (p.9). However, as cultural products become an “increasing
proportion of international trade,” governments have sought to introduce policies that serve to both protect their cultural and national identities and, interestingly enough, their local cultural industries (Huhmann & Saqib, 2007, p.75). The rationale behind this protectionism is that protecting the local industries from their larger, foreign, and often United States-based competitors is necessary to “maintain the integrity of the domestic culture” (p.75). In other words, as a way of counteracting the effects globalization (and foreign cultural industries) has on their cultural and national identities, governments have sought to bolster their own cultural industries. However, in doing so, governments are not just contesting the realities of globalization, they are also allowing for new opportunities to emerge through and, sometimes, in collaboration with the cultural industries.

1.3.1: Economic Underpinnings: Evolving Trends in Cultural Industries Policy Discourse

It is with economic considerations in mind that Holden (2006) suggest that the relationship between culture and industry has been largely fuelled by a sense that, in government, funding and support for culture and the arts must be justified in some way that goes beyond mere aestheticism – that culture, despite its “real meaning in people’s lives and in the formation of their identities,” is not viewed as a public good in the same way that healthcare or education are (p.12). Rather, governments’ concern with culture is with respects to its potential for economic regeneration, social inclusion, fostering health and vibrant community cohesion, and the like – concerns which, ironically, are of little-to-no concern to the public (p.24). Underscoring this relationship is a tension in cultural policy discourse between what Gibson (2001) describes as two competing paradigms to cultural policy: a social/cultural development or humanistic rationale for arts/culture funding and an economic development or industrial rationale (pp.9-10). On the cultural development side of the equation, the emphasis of cultural policy is on the human
uses of culture – in particular, on how globalization has impacted culture and on how cultural policy can challenge that impact through “the preservation and promotion of national, regional, and local culture understood as part of identity formation” (Wise, 2002, p.222). The economic development approach, on the other hand, emphasises the importance of economic globalization, post-industrial redevelopment, and the promotion and cultivation of the cultural or creative industries in developing countries (p.221).

While the two competing cultural policy paradigms are by no means mutually exclusive, Wise (2002) suggests that they are often viewed as dichotomous or conflicting because each implies a different role for government with respects to culture (p.222). On the one hand, the cultural development perspective infers an obligation to the government to deliver culture as a public good or as a form of cultural protection, with access to cultural amenities – such as museums and publicly funded cultural spaces – being seen as a right established through citizenship (Gibson, 2001, p.10). On the other hand, the cultural industries perspective opens the door to more creative approaches to cultural development – approaches that, in some cases, remove the state “as primary supporter” of the arts (Wise, 2002, p.222). It is through this latter perspective and its associated approaches, in fact, that much effort has been made by governments towards “enhancing their ‘creative’ character” – often at the local level, and often through extensive economic development and revitalization projects that seek to bolster existing cultural amenities and target new cultural industries (Rosenstein, 2011, p.9). In this context, the cultural industries discourse has been particularly attractive and influential to government policy circles because of how it “hardwires creativity to innovation and economic growth within knowledge economies” (Luckman, 2013, p.72).

The shift in cultural policy focus towards creative cities and local economies has been important insofar as it has opened up possibilities for policymakers to develop policy that is not
uniquely national in scope or intent. Moreover, this shift has allowed governments to focus their attention on “dynamism and creativity as social resources” while divorcing themselves of the obligation of defining and judging the merits of cultural works that is often implicit in cultural policy (Jeannotte & Straw, 2005, p.275). Instead, those choices are being made by and through the market. Thus, by offering more cultural choice via the cultural industries, governments are allowing “both individuals and groups [to] willfully construct identity through their taste in everything from food and clothes to fine art and music” (Connor, 2013, p.28). As such, questions of cultural policy are no longer about how to fund the arts, the question has become one of why and what kind of arts are funded (Gibson, 2001, p.4).

Cultural policy’s role in matters of cultural identity is often predicated on its ability to moderate the cultural industries. Where the cultural industries – or its sometimes synonymous, sometimes would-be successor, the creative industries (Pratt, 2005; Ashton & Noonan, 2013) – comes into play in questions of (cultural) identity and nationalism is in their capacity to create and dictate the overtures of culture and cultural consumption. Though much ambiguity surrounds the definitional conceptions of the cultural and creative industries, it is perhaps sufficient to know that both invariably refer to how cultural goods are produced and disseminated in modern economies and societies; they both deal with questions of creation (Ashton & Noonnan, 2013, p.4). The very notion of creating – a notion intricately and arguably irrevocably connected to the concept of the cultural industries – often evokes a romanticised image of newness and innovation, of “bringing something [new] into being” (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011, p.3). Underscoring creation is the notion of creativity – a notion which, broadly, refers to the asymmetric processes involved in the production of culture and inherently linked to the Barthian concept of the author (Toynbee, 2003). In academic and policy circles, a significant level of prestige has been awarded
to the notion of creativity in recent years, to the point of bordering on what Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011) describe as fetishism (p.3).

From an economic perspective, the fetishism of creativity is, in part, due to the view that creativity is an “inexhaustible source of growth” – one which is often associated with business and industry (Menger, 2006, as ctd. by Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011, p.3). It is as a source of growth that “creativity” has become a “ubiquitous policy term” that extends beyond cultural policy, into education and economic policy fields (among others) (Neelands & Choe, 2010, p.287). Thus, adding an element of “creative” rhetoric to cultural policy discourse – namely in the form of the cultural industries – enables governments to draw connections between cultural policy and other policy fields (Cunningham, 2014, pp.10-11). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the cultural industries have emerged, in recent decades, as a growing force in “contemporary capitalism” and have been “assigned a pivotal role in economic regeneration” (Murdock, 2003, p.15) – the prevailing assumption behind which is that culture-led regeneration works in a sort of Reganomics or trickledown effect “insofar as it enhances the quality of life of the wider community” by bringing more opportunity for cultural participation and creativity (Bailey, Miles, & Stark, 2004, p.47).

It is in the context of economic regeneration, particularly at the local and/or regional level, that part of the fetishism behind creativity – and, by proxy, the cultural/creative industries – can also be explained. In many policy circles, the cultural industries are seen as having the potential to provide a cultural experience of economic value, one that – far from the homogenized cultural experiences offered through globalizing processes – can be customized to fit specific cultures or regions (Aoyama, 2007, p.103). This perspective has, in large part, been supported by the creative class theory/creative city approach espoused by Richard Florida (2012), which suggests that the key to regional economic prosperity is through the attraction and retention of
what Florida dubs the “creative class” – a class that consists of relatively affluent young professionals who work in fields that require a measure of creativity and innovation (Florida, 2012, pp.8-10) and/or fields that support the production and dissemination of culture (Timberg, 2015, p.10) – by means of cultivating a creative and cultural environment that appeals to creative types (Cunningham, 2014, pp.154-155). In this context, the city or region, itself, is moulded around various cultural activities and artifices in such a way as to offer individuals the ability to modulate their experiences and – at times, should they wish – contribute to them (Bailey, Miles, & Stark, 2004, p.48). Thus, governments are drawing on creativity to revitalize and reinvent their local economy and identity as a “creative economy” – that is to say, an economy built around the creative sector as a source of “economic dynamism” (Throsby, 2009, p.182).

This almost grassroots or romantic view of the cultural industries coincides with what Willis (1990) suggests is a growing scholarly emphasis, in cultural studies, on the “symbolic work of everyday life” (as ctd. by Murdock, 2003, p.15) – in large part pursued through “reading, viewing, shopping and DIY [Do It Yourself] culture” (Murdock, 2003, p.15). Inspired by Roland Barthes’ classic thesis that stresses the preeminence of the consumer’s interpretation of a work of art/culture over that of the work’s author, this emphasis – in many respects – valorizes “consumption as a pivotal site of identity formation” by highlighting the significance consumption can have on the ways in which individuals self-identify and by means of the agency they derive through their consumptive choices (pp.15-16). As purveyors of cultural production and consumption, the cultural industries, thus, have begun to hold a privileged position in identity formation – at the individual level, but also at the local and national levels. For instance, the consumption of music – a popular example of a cultural product produced through the cultural industries – can be seen as an expression of self-identity as it serves as an indicator of cultural capital; it can be seen as expression of local or community identity in its ability to capture or
represent local sounds and scenes; and it can be seen as an expression of national identity, firstly “through cultural policies (as with content quotas) aimed at promoting locally produced music,” and secondly through the music’s association to specific genres or national settings (Shuker, 2008, p.280).

Far from being exclusively about consumption practises, much of the policy discourse surrounding the cultural industries suggests that the products it creates – the culture artefacts it develops – are or “will be part of a new economy to replace the old model of Fordist manufacturing” that is, in many respects, seen as obsolete (O’Brien, 2014, p.51). Policy initiatives that promote the cultural industries have long been aimed at replacing the ever-declining manufacturing industries with those of the “information society” and “knowledge economy” (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011, p.4). Arguably, however, by employing cultural policy towards economic purposes, the policy itself becomes a sort of implicit economic policy – to the point where the implicit “dwindles in relevance and […] becomes just another arm of government economic policy (Throsby, 2009, p.182). Despite the relative ease with which the optimistic view of the cultural-industries-as-economic-savior can be (and has been) refuted, the cultural industries narrative has, nevertheless, had a strong impact on cultural policy discourse. Where this influence has been most saliently felt is with respects to local/regional policy initiatives that seek to “suffuse” their labour markets and urban economies with “a discourse of creative labour and creative industries” (O’Brien, 2014, pp.51-52). In fact, significant efforts have been made to recognize the broader elements of the cultural industries – such as performance artists, cultural industries workers, and design professionals – elements that go beyond industries to include labour (Murray, 2005, p.39).

The lust for creative labour was perhaps best exemplified through the emergence of the internet and digital technologies in the 1990s as powerful information and social media tools.
With the advent of the internet and digital technologies, emerged a wealth of new firms and job opportunities, and a demand for skilled, technical workers capable of coping with the needs of a budding information sector (Schmidt-Braul, 1999, p.127). Demand for workers in the information and multimedia sector was so great, in fact, that for a number of years there were considerable shortages in its labour force – to the point where it became routine for companies to poach employees from their competitors with promises of higher wages and benefits. Unsurprisingly, financial institutions saw opportunity in the rapid growth of the information sector and were quick to lend their support to many of the sector’s fledgling enterprises (Tremblay & Rousseau, 2005, p.299). Likewise, many regional governments – seeing an opportunity to bolster their local economy – have sought to draw these enterprises to their regions through various tax credits and policy incentives (p.308). Among the sectors and industries most widely affected (and benefited) by these policy incentives have been the multimedia and digital technology sectors of the creative industries (Schmidt-Braul, 1999, pp.127-128). It is here, with respects to the multimedia sector, that the cultural industries have perhaps been furthest ahead of other industries, particularly in their ability to deliver an almost absolute customizability to their consumers. While notions of being able to customize a car in a showroom and have it delivered to the customer within a few hours remains a veritable pipe-dream, digital technology has evolved to the point where such processes are now possible with other forms of art and cultural production (Manovich, 2001, pp.36-37).

1.3.2: From Hollywood with Love: Hegemony, Soft-power, & Global Success

Where creative labour and digital technology have arguably had their most significant impact is with the film industry – most notably with respects to Hollywood. Ever a poster-child for the creative class theory (re: Florida, 2012) – one that has not only cemented a region’s
cultural identity but also served to draw in creative types and industries – Hollywood, as a location, has long been synonymous with the American film industry (Frank, 2012, p.73). As the tenets of Richard Florida’s creative cities thesis and those of a now classic film, *Field of Dreams*, would suggest, “if you build it, [they] will come”; and true to form, Hollywood – as the premier locale for film production – has grown into a prominent site of cultural economy, in the process becoming a hotspot to many of the world’s richest and most luxuriant celebrities and a huge tourist attraction in its own right (p.80). Likewise, Hollywood also serves as a creative/economic cluster, where the “economic advantages of co-location” are reflected by the ways in which “input-providers” (i.e. actors’ agents, special-effects firms, etc.) are localized around major film companies (Throsby, 2010, p.132&138) – effectively creating a form of vertical disintegration and cross-industry subcontracting between firms and major film companies, perhaps best defined as an “entertainment industry complex” (McGuigan, 1996, p.90). While Hollywood has become a localized centre of “production relationships and local labour market activities,” it has also become “a disembodied assortment of images and narratives” whose presence is “felt across the entire globe” (Scott, 2004, pp.33-34). In other words, Hollywood has become as much a physical location – whose local culture and cultural economy is sufficient to draw in the creative class – as it has a ubiquitous idea or notion that carries with it significant power relative to other cultural industries the world over – and even other clusters within the industry, itself.

More than its relationship with cinema, however, Hollywood has, in many respects, become a symbol for “media hegemony and the exercise of economic and cultural powers” (Kim, 2004, p.207). It perhaps goes without saying that technology (i.e. software) and entertainment (i.e. popular culture) are among the United States’ largest exports (Swann, 2000, p.27), and Hollywood’s symbolic place at the forefront of those exports has left many scholars questioning to what extent American culture is affecting (and potentially homogenizing) indigenous cultures.
According to Kim (2004), Hollywood’s cultural influence has been a concern primarily because, historically, Hollywood has exercised an unparalleled, one-way economic dominance in foreign theatrical markets (p.208). Even British cinema, which is one of the largest entertainment industries in the world, has only ever been, at best, a “very bad second place” imitation of the ubiquitous juggernaut that is Hollywood – in large part because British cinema’s fewer resources and smaller market has resulted in products that pale in comparison to their United States counterparts (Perry, 1982 p.160). Perhaps the single most prevailing threat to Hollywood’s economic dominance, digital piracy, is itself, ironically, an indicator of Hollywood’s hegemonic influence: a significant portion of digital piracy occurs in developing countries where American content and culture are viewed as being “synecdoche for modernisation” (Cunningham, 2014, pp.68-69). If nothing else, Hollywood’s dominance in foreign markets has been seen to erode the film industries of other nations while promoting a version of American culture that “has become global, colonizing local markets, audiences, and industries” (Semati & Sotirin, 1999, p.176).

Part of Hollywood’s success – both nationally and internationally – has arguably come from its ability to present concepts and current affairs in ways that are easily understood and relatable to a broad audience base. Research into the popularity of American films – and, in particular, post-9/11 American military films – reveals a narrative trend that places the United States’ military at the forefront of global security – effectively offering a “space where the ambiguity and complexity of world politics is replaced with certainty” (Löfflmann, 2013, p.282). The appeal of these movies has been their ability to provide audiences with “a clear vision” of the world in times of uncertainty (p.282). This speaks to what Beck (2003) describes as a prevailing sentiment in the cinema industry that movies that can be understood in the simplest of film narratives – that is to say, films that have a plot that can be explained in under 25 words – are
more likely to be produced than films that have or make use of “high concepts” (pp.9-10). This sentiment is bred by a production process that often emphasises “precedent and analogy” over innovation (p.10). However, this approach to film making and, more broadly, American popular culture can be potentially problematic in its portrayal of American and Western culture – particularly when exported to foreign markets that do not possess the contextual pedigree to understand or appreciate the cultural nuances of the product (Ivey, 2008, pp.128-129). Not only do these productions run the risk of offering the world a skewed and often stereotypical portrayal of Western society, they also often lack any “calculation, coordination, or policy purpose” in their portrayals outside of those of the military-industrial complex (p.131). In other words, American cinema has arguably exchanged a realistic portrayal of its nation for bombastic, pro-military imagery that condenses real-world issues into simplistic, often dichotomously “good” or “evil” understandings of the world.

Inherent in cinema’s portrayal of the American military is a relationship between Hollywood and the United States government via the Department of Defence’s Office of Public Relations and the Special Assistant for Entertainment Media. This relationship is predicated, in a first instance, on the Department of Defense consulting with filmmakers in an effort to better capture the reality of the military (Löfflmann, 2013, p.282). In a second instance, as Hollywood has progressively become a greater force in the United States’ economy, its role in the United States’ military-industrial complex has evolved to the point where it is “merging with (or becoming a replacement for)” the military-industrial complex (Hozic, 1999, p.290). This shifting reality is evidenced by the fact that many former military bases have been appropriated by Hollywood and converted into film studios, and by the fact that many of the computer companies that once worked for and with the military are now shifting their focus to Hollywood productions (p.290). In offering its insights to Hollywood, the United States government is, perhaps, not so
much eliminating skewed perceptions of Western culture as it is directing certain perceptions (i.e. expressions of their hegemony) in ways that are more favourable to them. Thus, from an international perspective, Hollywood can be seen as a vehicle for United States hegemony; Hollywood offers a portrayal of the United States government’s hard power (i.e. its power to threaten and coerce) through an application of Hollywood’s soft power (Davison, 2006, p.468) – that is to say, its ability to “achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion” (Mattern, 2005, p.583). Some authors, such as Davison (2006), would contend that the relationship between Hollywood and the United States government is such that the distinction between one’s soft power and the other’s hard power is semantical at best – that the “soft” power of Hollywood translates into “hard” power for the United States government.

Curiously, however, while it can be said that American popular culture, as epitomized by Hollywood, is hegemonic in nature, it is as much a “hegemony of invitation” as it is one of “subjugation (and self-colonization)” (Wagnleitner, 2001, p.450). Following World War II, the message(s) found in American popular culture – the democratic, economic, and political messages that stood against the perceived threat of Communism – resonated outside the United States. According to Wagnleitner (2001), American culture became synonymous with “wealth, power, youth, and success” – becoming both the “centre of capitalist culture of consumption” and, itself, a sort of commodity that can be consumed (p.460) – albeit one that was propagated, in no small part, thanks to military victories and large scale cultural propaganda campaigns (p.451). In this context, cultural hegemony is expressed not through coercion, but through a “complex process of winning consent to the prevailing order,” primarily through social saturation (McGuigan, 1992, p.63) – an application of its soft power (Davison, 2006, pp.467-468). The role, then, of Hollywood – and of all media institutions and industries, for that matter – is to “maintain, defend, and develop the theoretical or ideological ‘front’” of the government (Gramsci,
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1971/2001, pp.45-46). The forms of culture produced and promoted by Hollywood serve, in some capacity, through their homogenizing processes, to “‘cement’ a society into a relative – though never complete – unity” (Bennett et al., 1981, p.192). In this context, hegemony, via cultural production, serves to connect the masses to society’s leading groups – both politically and consciously (p.199). Through this connection, social leaders are able to exercise a measure of influence on the cultural practices and identities of the masses.

In many respects, Hollywood and, on a more basic level, network television – as a social experiment – is perhaps the closest representation of what would happen if culture was left to the “devices of the commercial market”: it functions to both commodify culture and as a “shill for the sales of other commodities” (Graves, 2005, pp.95-96). For some in the media industry, the only thing that matters is whether their product was watched (and by how many people); the concept of culture, itself, is of little-to-no interest when producing cultural commodities such as movies or television; only whether people watched the show is of interest (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011, p.200). As such, given the relative dominance of Hollywood and the broader media sector over popular culture – and, by extension, cultural identity – the result of this system is that public outlets that cater to the tastes and interests of minority cultures are sometimes few and far between (Graves, 2005, p.96). This can be problematic given that Hollywood’s share of the worldwide cinematic market borders on monopolistic. When coupled with policies that support economic globalization and promote free-trade and market deregulation (Doern, Pal, & Tomlin, 1996) – policies that facilitate Hollywood’s penetration into virtually every market on the planet – the result is that individuals will often choose the glamorous and otherworldly fictions of Hollywood productions over the often comparatively inferior (at least from a production standpoint) productions of the local markets. Thus, by extension, policy in the context of
globalization is inherently supporting the hegemony of the cultural industries – in the process, allowing notions of cultural democracy (i.e. the market) to prevail.

1.3.3: Cultural Imperialism & Hegemony: Global Approaches to Cultural Policy, the Industries, & Post-Colonial Discourse

The emergence of Hollywood and American culture as dominant forces in cultural discourse is representative of a “conceptual shift” in cultural anthropology away from the view that culture is “unchanging and homogeneous” (Rosaldo, 1993, pp.34-36). This shift, which has been attributed to the “historical conjuncture of decolonization and the intensification of American imperialism” following the Second World War, bought with it a restructuring in the way societies are analyzed, wherein the concepts of groups and minorities became more prominent and the study of culture and cultural difference took on new, arguably less colonially-influenced, significations (pp.30-35). In short, this shift brought with it a greater awareness of (and, arguably, appreciation for) cultural diversity and pluralism (pp.43-45). It is a growing recognition that the presumed isomorphic nature of culture in the social sciences – that cultures and societies conform to the geographic boundaries of a nation-state – is fundamentally problematic (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997/2002, pp.65-66). While using “space, place, and culture” in this capacity has served as a “central organizing principle,” it has often done so at the expense of recognizing: (a) individuals “who inhabit the border […] of national boundaries”; (b) the plurality of different – often minority – cultures and subcultures that cohabit the same localities; and (c) the interconnected nature of space in explaining/understanding social and cultural change (pp.66-67). This latter point, in particular, is important as it suggests that if:

[S]paces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking differences through connection (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997/2002, p.67, authors’ emphasis).
In this respect, the rise and prominence of Hollywood coincides with and is symbolic of both a literal and figurative shift in the world order – literal in the sense that it symbolized the colonial powers of the past (e.g. Great Britain, France, and Spain) giving way to the imperial powers of the present (e.g. the United States), and figurative in the sense that it brought with it a new way of approaching culture and identity.

Paradoxically, however, the dominance of Hollywood in the global-cultural sphere is also emblematic of the imperialist nature of American culture. More specifically, this dominance highlights how the United States’ media-culture “is a subject of the general system of imperialism”; that is to say, it supports the “economic objectives of the decisive industrial-financial sectors” (Schiller, 1991/2001, pp.318-319). For this reason, cultural and economics can sometimes seem almost indivisible: like other forms of production, cultural production has its own political economy – one that infers that cultural outputs are both ideological and profit-serving (p.319). Even with many of the United States’ media assets and enterprises having been sold to or acquired by foreign interests in recent years (i.e. Japan, Germany, Britain, and other competing groups in other nations), Schiller (1991/2001) notes that the United States’ media-cultural dominance remains such that other markets continue to draw upon and adopt its practices – to the point where many of the cultural products being produced by competing national and transnational groups are virtually identical to those produced by the States (p.327). What this suggests is that Hollywood (and the United States’) cultural saturation and incomparable success, both domestically and internationally, has set the template for other markets – a template that implies that if the system “isn’t broken, don’t fix it.” In other words, Hollywood has served as a template for a new form of cultural imperialism wherein cultural difference is recognized but is invariably influenced through the interconnected nature of the Hollywood system and model.
As such, even as the United States has cultivated a cultural dominance that seems unshakable, it inherently draws its power from (post)-colonial discourse and the influence of former colonial powers. It is a dominance that, arguably, grew out of a sense of inferiority felt by the United States regarding its culture that dates back to the country’s colonial roots (Toffler, 1964, p.3). This inferiority complex was spurred by European critique and debasement of American culture – a critique that has led to a prevailing stereotype that Americans are uncultured and unsupportive of the arts (pp.3-4). While the notion that the United States government does not significantly engage in the arts and culture sector is perhaps warranted and justifiable – at least relative to the support some countries give to their culture sectors – this laissez-faire approach is largely the by-product of Hollywood and the American media and entertainment sectors’ commercial success (Mulcahy, 2010, pp.89-90). Because of this success, however, the United States government often takes a backseat to the private sector when it comes to the regulation of culture – often acting only indirectly in its application. Culture in the United States is largely driven and regulated by the market, with the state acting only in a limited capacity with regards to certain cultural institutions (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2012, pp.583-585). This approach, in many respects, has provided a significant amount of control over culture (and its production) to market-driven sectors and industries – a point that becomes more salient to the question of national minorities when considered in the context of how relatively dominant and seemingly ubiquitous United States culture has become internationally.

1.4: Empirically Yours: Cultural Policy in the UK

In comparison to France and the United States, cultural policy in the UK views culture and the arts as being largely the domain of the private and personal spheres – though traces of the United States’ influence on British cultural policy can easily be found (Hesmondhalgh, 2007,
While cultural policies in Britain are designed to support these spheres, they do so in a relatively limited/arm’s length capacity. When intervention into cultural matters does occur, it tends to follow two broad principles: that citizens have the right to culture and that there is an intrinsic value attached or associated to the culture being produced. This approach promotes a certain measure of democratization of culture – though it acknowledges the private or personal choices involved in the consumption of culture (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2012, p.582). It is with choice in mind that, beginning with the 1997 election of the British Labour Party – colloquially known as New Labour and led by Tony Blair – a new wave of cultural policy was introduced in the UK which sought to renew the British nation by fostering a sense of “social cohesion and a more inclusive society” (Belfiore, 2002, p.92). More specifically, the UK’s cultural policy of recent decades has been driven towards promoting greater cultural participation via partnerships between municipalities, the private sector (re: cultural industries), and civil society (Poirier, 2005).

These policy efforts, many of which fell under the banner of “Cool Britannia” – an early branding effort on the part of the New Labour government devised to promote the British cultural industries while modernizing the British national identity (Volkerling, 2001, p.445; Navarro, 2016, p.229) – highlighted the emergence of the cultural/creative industries as one the UK’s “most celebrated” economic sectors. Through Cool Britannia-themed policies, considerable effort and resources were devoted to encouraging entry to and participation in the cultural industries as a means of growing these industries (McGuigan, 2009, p.296). In fact, the Blair administration’s Cultural Industries Task Force of 1998 went so far as to suggest that “the value of the creative industries to the UK domestic product” is superior than that of all of the country’s other forms of manufacturing (as ctd. by McGuigan, 2009, p.296). Inherent in this approach is the notion that creativity is a form of human capital that must be nurtured and cultivated (Ashton & Noonan,
In so doing, the UK has effectively established creativity as a hegemonic term, one by which relations of power can and have been established between those who are creative and those who are not (pp.6-7). Cultural employment, however, is less a sociological notion than it is a category constructed by and for government (cultural) policies (Dubois, 2013, pp.26-27). This discourse can be problematic as it “reinforces the normalization and naturalization of capitalism itself,” positing individuals – and their skills, attributes, and capacities – as the “means to a [capitalist production] end” (Levitas, 2004, p.50).

Prior to New Labour’s arrival, governmental cultural institutions in the UK were, in large part, an extension of the government in power – and often operated in what could best be described as a political vacuum (Selwood, 2010, pp.54). However, with the election of New Labour, a greater emphasis was placed on the role of cultural policy and on achieving greater social and cultural results through cultural funding (p.55). To some authors, this shift in British cultural policy was indicative of a renaissance in conceptualizing art and culture as instrumental (Belfiore & Bennett, 2007, p.140). With this in mind, the policy indicators used in the UK’s cultural policy have primarily sought to measure the social impact of arts and culture on individuals and communities (Poirier, 2005, p.235). To this end, these indicators have been developed with an all-encompassing understanding of cultural participation that includes amateur practices, new media, audiovisual practices, popular culture, and social media (p.237). In other words, the UK has sought to redefine its cultural identity in the context of a creative economy predicated on new and evolving cultural industries. When this discourse is coupled with Cool Britannia’s dual purpose of reinventing or reinvigorating Britain’s national identity and supporting the cultural industries, an argument can be made that the UK has established an association between identity and commerce – one which suggests that the relative strength of a national identity is correlated to the success of a country’s cultural industries.
Ultimately, while New Labour’s approach was communitarian in nature and in “self-understanding,” it is an approach that went “beyond the national context to embrace global politics and markets” (Delanty, 2003, p.155). After all, between British colonialism and United States’ global-cultural hegemony, English has become the world’s premier international language – and is predominantly used in the sciences, communications, affairs, and entertainment sectors (Selwood, 2010, p.58). This means that the British cultural industries are such that they can effectively extend beyond the UK, much in the same way that those in the United States have. In fact, the British music industry has rivaled its American counterpart since as far back as the 1960s (p.58). Yet despite this success, Britain’s cultural and economic status in the world market is a shell of what it once was. Britain’s global status had been on a steady decline since the First World War, but was precipitated by its embracement of free trade and its support of the United States during the two World Wars – a decision made to preserve its power, but that ultimately led to the rise of American economic hegemony (McGuigan, 1996, p.120). As such, this shift in Britain’s approach to cultural policy – and its emphasis on “global communities” over national agendas (Delanty, 2003, p.156) – can perhaps be seen as a response to its waning economic influence on the global scene. Short of developing a cultural market that can rival or even surpass that of the United States, the UK is arguably reframing their place in the world as a culturally progressive society, one that – not unlike the States – is open to letting the (global) market dictate its cultural productions, but only to a certain extent. Gone is the swagger of the once-world beating empire, in its place the more humble creep of a refined cosmopolitan capital of culture.

However, in embracing a more open and receptive role in the realm of culture, the UK is arguably employing a passive form of colonialism. Given that British cultural products are principally produced in the English language – and localized in British settings (i.e. movies and television) – understanding and appreciating those products ideally requires a working
knowledge and understanding of the English language and culture (Spivak, 2012, pp.36-37). However, if the ideal way of understanding and consuming British culture, in a decolonized context, is in English, then this ideal perpetuates “the process of producing an out-of-date, British Council-style colonial bourgeoisie in a changed global context” (p.37). It accentuates an implicit cultural dominance that is rooted in colonial discourse. While the physical act of colonizing is no longer present, the cultural industries – through their dissemination of British cultural commodities – serve as an ideational vehicle for colonization. It is a means through which the British national identity can be reaffirmed through cultural dissemination.

Even in cases where cultural products are translated into other languages and/or modified to fit local contexts – a process of cultural mediation that has been largely routinized in the 21st century, in no small part thanks to globalization – the process is often network and government regulated, and often “profundly re-shapes” the product to the point of affecting its value, meaning, and success (Barra, 2013, p.101). Even the slightest of changes to words, jokes references, phrase structure, and even intonation (in cases of audio-visual products) can serve to reshape the intentions/message of the original author (p.102). While some might see cultural mediation, in this context, as a form of resistance to, or negotiation of, cultural imperialism (Sassen, 2007), others have seen it as an impediment to understanding the true meaning of the work – to the point where grassroots communities of amateurs have emerged to offer bootlegged translations of works that remain truer to their original language and context (Barra, 2009, p.517). While this endeavour is noble in its intent, it invariably affirms the notion that certain cultural industries enjoy a “hegemony of invitation.” It also affirms the multifaceted role the cultural industries play in influencing, supporting, or, in some cases, inverting the cultural (and national) identities of its consumers.
1.5: Bollywood or Bust: Localization & Global Culture

Despite the dominance of certain cultural industries – such as Hollywood – in the international market since the 1970s, there do remain modestly successful markets for cultural commodities in non-Western countries. This is perhaps best exemplified by the Indian equivalent to Hollywood, the portmanteau-ish Bollywood, and, to a lesser extent, the Hong Kong film industry (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, pp.229-230). India, in particular, has proven to be a market that Hollywood has had noticeable difficulty piercing – in large part because, prior to the 1990s, India was a “highly interventionist, quasi-socialist state” that had a strong input in its cultural market (p.128). The advent of Bollywood has been both an economic and cultural necessity as it originally served as a form of cultural protectionism, offering Indians a form of homemade culture while also blocking Hollywood productions from entering the market (p.231). Although India’s ban on Hollywood productions was lifted in the mid-1990s, Bollywood remains the dominant cinematic force in India in large part because Hollywood has had trouble competing with the culturally-specific productions of Bollywood that largely drew on India’s “long traditions of theatre and religious epics” and that often differ in narrative structure and form from their Hollywood counterparts (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p.231). Ironically, however, this has led to Bollywood becoming trapped in a sort of “purgatory” wherein its market, outside of India, is perhaps best described as niche (Ebrahim, 2008):

[A]t any given time, [Bollywood is] too Indian to be accessible to Western audiences, too north Indian-centric for the rest of south Asia, too imitative of Hollywood to be appreciated as authentic among North Americans seeking something exotic, too potent of an imposition of an Indian version of modernity on other traditional societies, or too low culture to qualify as real art for snobs of national origins (Ebrahim, 2008, p.63).

Consequently, Bollywood productions have largely and historically served as vehicles for Indian culture and nationalism.
It is in acknowledgement of and response to India’s past under British colonial rule that many of Bollywood’s productions have centred on decolonization and/or on the rise of Indian nationalism. Ironically, the rise of Indian nationalism is the product of its colonial past, having emerged as a response to the British nationalism that was pushed upon India during British rule (Paranjape, 2003, pp.114-115). India came to be under British rule as a result of the East India Company, a private corporation that had established a trade (and later military) presence in India during the 17th century (Farooqui, 2007, p.44). Eventually, the East India Company metamorphosed from a “giant commercial corporation” into an “instrument of colonial governance” that would eventually be commandeered by the British crown following the Great Revolt of 1858 (p.44). Consequently, British culture was introduced to, and had a significant impact on, Indian culture. Unlike other British colonial projects, where extensive settlement took place (e.g. Australia), the British did not seek to eliminate the aboriginal population of India; rather, Indian culture and society served to shape British society in India, offering a sort of cultural reciprocation (Marshall, 1997, p.90) – a fact that has been expressed in Bollywood productions. Among the most popular motifs in Bollywood films has been the “defeat of British (colonial) rulers at the hands of Indians” – with British defeat often occurring in a game of cricket (Chakraborty, 2003, p.1879). More than other cultural practices, cricket has become a practice “shared by the colonizer and the colonized alike” (Farred, 2004, p.94). In many respects, cricket has become to India what football is to Brazil or Mexico; it has become, according to Farred (2004), a “defining cultural practice” and a national obsession. As such, the image of the colonized defeating the colonizer at its own game is both a cultural manifestation and site of India’s resistance to British rule during the imperial era (p.94).

This nationalism, however, has been put to the test “amid a global conjuncture […] of significant political and economic events” – which include the global recession; escalating levels
of unemployment, income disparity, and social unrest; and war, coupled with structural readjustment in India pushed by the World Bank and the explosion of the media industry throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Murty, 2012, pp.259-260). In many respects, this conjuncture represents what Murty (2012) describes as a sort of “ruptural moment” in Indian culture, largely precipitated by economic liberalization and globalization (p.261). In response to these events, many of Bollywood’s recent films have promoted the notion of the “nation as family,” targeting the middle class as “the only group that can ultimately save the nation” from corrupt politicians – both nationally and internationally (Srivastava, 2009, p.708; Mankekar, 1999, p.304). Rather than completely and passively succumb to Westernization via globalization, Bollywood (and its native audience) has “demanded” a compromise between Western culture and its own: that Western culture adapt to Indian culture through “glocalization” – a process that seeks to capture the dynamics of the local and the global as “mutually formative” concepts rather than dichotomous (Rao, 2010, pp.1-5). In some cases, glocalization is viewed as the process in which “a practice undergoes local transformation” as it is being “diffuse[d] globally” (Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013, p.707). Nevertheless, the logic of glocalization follows that while the unique “imposition of the global on the local can induce moments of anxiety attended by a sense of fear or loss” in an audience, the application of the local onto the global enables the audience to better identify with the production (Rao, 2010, p.15). Thus, glocalization involves a form of domestication of global imagery – one which Bollywood has successfully achieved in many of its productions.

Because of approaches such as glocalization, many authors would suggest that the non-Hollywood markets represent “dynamic centres of audiovisual production” that serve to “contest and recontest” the global market dominated by Hollywood (Scott, 2004, p.57). However, there is a caveat in presenting these markets as a form of resistance to the hegemony of Hollywood: while Hollywood may possess a monopolistic hold of the cinema market, Hesmondhalgh (2007) warns
that “there is no simple equation between Hollywood and cultural homogeneity” (p.234). In fact, the seeming diversity of Hollywood’s productions is emblematic of the diverse audience it caters to domestically. Moreover, while Hollywood productions can be said to be wasteful vis-à-vis its international counterparts, Hesmondhalgh (2007) contends that the quality of its productions (and the relatively positive treatment it exhibits towards its workers) should not be underscored (p.234). Rather, where markets such as Bollywood and Hong Kong offer the most significant response to Hollywood is in their aesthetic contributions: by adopting Western approaches and aesthetics to their domestic productions – through glocalization, no less – these markets are creating “international aesthetic diversity and quality” (pp.234-235). This diversity is significant, if for no other reason than it demonstrates a creative turn in smaller markets’ approaches to hegemonic institutions and the seemingly unbridled power of globalization. But more than a trend in niche marketing, glocalization speaks to the role of audiences in pushing for a stronger, culturalized element to their media consumption – a fact that is, perhaps, spurred ironically by an increase in transnationalism.

Though Bollywood has primarily been studied as a national or localized cinema – one that is important only to the people of India and to its “diasporic communities around the world” – advancements in technology have facilitated its product dissemination to a much broader audience – and arguably to the point where it can be seen to exert as much “ideological and cultural influence” as Hollywood (O’Neill, 2013, p.255). In fact, Bollywood has been among the most innovative industries in its approach to global dissemination, particularly in contrast to Hollywood. Among its approaches, Bollywood has actively embraced legal downloading as a means of both targeting and disseminating its products to foreign markets, while also combating potential piracy by making its products more easily accessible (Cenite et al., 2009, p.216). Moreover, while Bollywood might not share the same degree of financial success as Hollywood,
it has managed to carve out a place for itself as the producer of the largest number of films each year, a large portion of which consist of musicals – around which a significant recording industry has emerged (Karim, 2003, p.11). In this respect, while Bollywood has not so much displaced or dislodged the hegemony of Hollywood, it has – at the very least – offered a relatively and easily accessible alternative – an alternative that embodies the culture of an aboriginal and diasporic people, but also employs the cultural industries and globalization in a way that enables that culture to counter outright homogenization. More than an alternative, however, Bollywood represents an example of how cultural policies can be used to, at once, develop an almost uniquely local industry and protect the local/indigenous culture from the homogenizing influences of broader, global markets.

1.5.1: Global Ambitions: The Cultural Industries in China & East Asia

In recent decades, many countries have begun “tiling” their industrial profile “perceptibly in the direction of a new and creative economy” (Scott, 2005, p.461). Emerging from this tilt towards cultural industries are concerns about “the notion of ‘culture and development’” – that is to say, the context in which culture is developed or “the relation of an autonomous sphere of culture to national or local identity” (Pratt, 2008, p.98). For many countries, the internationalization of their once national cultural markets – through various modes of globalization, such as free trade – has had significant implications on their local cultural industries – particularly from an economic perspective (Antrosio & Colloredo-Mansfield, 2006, p.14). In some cases, these implications have been positive – with certain sectors seeing unexpected boosts that go beyond global explanations. In other cases, local markets have been hurt by foreign competition to the point where businesses devoted to foreign imports have set up shop in local markets and cater to a tourist consumer group oblivious to the products’ place of
origin (p.14). Because of these dynamics, some authors have argued that cultural products should not be included as part of free trade agreements. According to Pratt (2008), the logic behind these arguments is twofold: in a first instance, the “historical power of cultural industries is focused in the U.S.” and free trade will serve only to fortify that power; in a second instance, the “loss of cultural and symbolic markers” through free trade undermines the “political and social cohesion that constitute the nation state” (p.98). Yet despite these arguments (and the challenges they present), many governments are making concerted efforts to approach cultural activities and the cultural industries as crucial components of their economies (Power, 2003, p.169) – to the point where the cultural industries are often viewed as “the driving force for a country to maintain a competitive edge in the global division of cultural trade and […] production” (Wai, 2006, p.334).

The Asian cultural industries, for instance, have been described in certain policy research circles as “fast-growing” and “the engine of economic growth” for many Asian countries (Wai, 2006, p.333). China, in particular, has become an interesting market for Western countries (and researchers) – both in terms of its approaches to service management and its production of commodities. This interest has been fuelled by growing economic interactions between China and Western society that have, in part, resulted from “service [provision] becoming an increasingly growing business” (Tsang, 2011, p.670). As globalization gradually decreases national differences – at least in terms of “hard aspects, such as technology” – competitive advantage for tourism and service firms is increasingly coming in the form of employees, with culture (and cultural values) playing an increasing role in differentiating one service provider from another (pp.670-671). The fact that Chinese culture tends to veer towards a more collective orientation, coupled with its willingness to embrace cultural change and accept Western practices into its own, has arguably made its service industry among the most competitive in the world (pp.677-678). This competitiveness has also impacted China’s production sector where, through
sheer volume alone, China has become “by far the largest exporter of tangible creative goods” in the world, with a market share in the neighbourhood of “20 percent in 2005, and an annual growth rate of about 18 percent over the period 2000-2005” (Throsby, 2010, p.41).

Much of the expansion and change seen in the Chinese cultural industries can be attributed to, firstly, China’s “accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)” and the subsequent “penetration” of transnational media corporations into the Chinese market; and, secondly, the domestic market’s actors using this penetration as an opportunity to pursue industrial and policy change (Zhao, 2003, p.54). The Chinese publishing industry, for instance – which has historically been subjected to significant government regulation and censorship – has, in recent years, seen its regulations relaxed due to international influence and market pressures. Far from balking at this influence, the Chinese government has “recognized” it as beneficial to its industries – going so far as to embrace industrial reforms that have opened the door to the privatization of its cultural industries (Taylor, 2013, p.373). Also underscoring this change is China’s embracement of the cultural industries as industries that: (a) yield a high rate of return on investment; (b) whose “excellent” products do not depreciate in value over time; (c) have relatively few entry barriers; (d) have a “stronger ability to absorb” labour relative to other industries; and (e) are able to “penetrate” and “melt” with other industries in order to have a significant impact on the national economy (Shuguang & Yunpeng, 2011, p.2079). Additionally, the cultural industries are acknowledged for consuming less resources and having less of an impact on the environment than their manufacturing counterparts; the cultural industries are seen in China to “mainly produce spiritual products” whose “source” is creativity and content is their “core” (p.2079). Simply put, the expansion of the Chinese cultural industries can be attributed to an appreciation for their ability to produce highly coveted products relatively inexpensively. It is
an interest that is born from Western society’s influence, with North American movies – such as Titanic – having had a particular impact on the evolution of the industries in China (p.2079).

On the local scene, and drawing on Western practices and approaches to cultural policy, various cities throughout China have begun incorporating cultural/creative industries policies into their five year cultural policy plans, ala the Floridian model of urban renewal (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011, p.5). The application of five year plans highlight the growing international importance of the cultural industries, in China, in questions related to culture, intellectual property, and urban regeneration – not to mention that these policies can be “implemented cheaply, and [are] easily marketed as benign interventions” (p.5). These plans also come in the wake of China transitioning its economy away from a “planned socialist economy to one relying increasingly on the market” – a process that began in the 1970s and continues to this day (Shan, 2014, p.115). Prior to this “loosening up” of its economic approaches, China’s cultural resources were exclusively owned by the state, and cultural production and dissemination were controlled though state investment and state-operated institutions; cultural producers were effectively seen as “national cadres in the propaganda system” (p.116).

There remains, nevertheless, a measure of concern in China regarding the adoption of Western culture and practices through cultural policy – most notably with respects to the entry of foreign media into the country and its potential ramifications for the survival of Chinese culture (Zhao, 2003, p.55). While the Chinese government recognizes the “growing cultural awareness of its rising middle class and the importance of developing international cultural relationships as well as those with an economic and political base” (Taylor, 2013, p.371), it also recognizes that foreign media and the broader processes of globalization can and do have an influence on China’s culture and cultural identity – an influence that some would argue is leading to cultural imperialism and homogenization (Zhao, 2003 p.56). Consequently, there has been a growing
sense in China that the answer to preserving its culture is through mobilizing its capital and resources towards making its cultural industries more competitive with transnational corporations. Following the logic that, if given the choice, Chinese citizens prefer local cultural products that promote Chinese culture and nationalism over Western or foreign products, Chinese cultural policy has emphasised developing a domestic market that offers products with the production value of a Hollywood, but with the cultural sensibilities of the Chinese market (p.55).

In effect, China has sought to develop a market that is akin to Bollywood in its efforts to revitalize its economy and remain globally competitive (Pang, 2007, p.413).

Where these efforts to develop (or redevelop) a domestic cultural market have perhaps been most evident is in Hong Kong, where policymakers have favoured the cultural industries in recent decades as an economic revitalizer – most notably with respects to its animation, comic, and film industries (Wai, 2006, p.337). However, if Asian industries such as Bollywood can be said to have made some progress in establishing an alternative market to the hegemonic offerings of its namesake, the same cannot entirely be said of the Hong Kong cultural industries. For instance, since its height in the 1950s and 1960s, the Hong Kong film industry has struggled to regain its “prominent place” in both the global and its local markets (Leppert, 2011, p.19). This decline, ironically, is underscored by the fact that, since the 1980s, Hong Kong (as with the broader Chinese market) has seen its economic structure transformed “from […] manufacturing-based into one predominantly dependent on service sectors” (Wai, 2006, p.334). Much of this transformation can be attributed to the relocation of Hong Kong’s manufacturing to the Chinese province of Guangdong where there is a greater abundance of land and labour. With manufacturing no longer as prominent in Hong Kong, support services and creative sectors have gradually taken their place, though not without a share of controversy and public concern. For many, the concern stems from the “volatile nature of a service-dominated economy” where
unemployment can quickly escalate in times of economic uncertainty (p.336). It also does not help that, despite the importance placed on the creative sector as a driver of economic prosperity, its economic impact has been negligent in Hong Kong (p.337).

A variety of factors have been attributed to the cultural industries’ relative ineffectiveness in living up to their promise of fostering economic growth in Hong Kong – ranging from inadequate tools for measuring their impact, to the transformative impact of cultural industries on the local economy, to the “dynamic relationships between the local creative economy and the mainland market” (Wai, 2006, p.339). One of the most immediate impediments to the success of Hong Kong’s cultural industries has been the region’s limited size and “highly uncertain” commercial prospects resulting from the relationship Hong Kong shares with the mainland (p.340). As a former colony of the UK trying to rediscover its Chinese nationalism while also preserving its local identity and place as a global economic hub, Hong Kong has essentially been trapped between two paradigms: “nationalisation and global capitalism” (Pang, 2007, p.414). It is a precarious situation for Hong Kong’s cultural industries as they must grapple with producing culture that, to a certain degree, embraces the “national” Chinese market in a way that is “economically driven and therefore compliant with globalization,” but also captures the tastes and flavour of the local market (p.424). It is a situation made all the more precarious by the fact that, since its sovereignty was transferred back to China in 1997, the prestige that the name “Hong Kong” once carried has eroded in mainland China (p.413). Moreover, certain cultural sectors in Hong Kong, such as the animation and film sectors, are barred from producing cultural products for mainland China without forming partnerships with local mainland companies. Additionally, despite China’s overall relaxation of its restrictions on the cultural industries, many Hong Kong producers still complain that China’s censorship policies “excessively restricts the creativity” of their productions, limit their ability to penetrate into the broader Chinese markets,
and scare away foreign investors (Wai, 2006, p.342). The result of this situation has led some industries to relocate to mainland China rather than grapple with the socio-economic barriers of remaining in Hong Kong (pp.341-342). In other words, Hong Kong’s cultural industries, despite their global ambitions, are largely boxed into their local market.

Where the Hong Kong cultural industries have arguably had middling success in effectively creating cultural markets that compete both nationally and internationally with Western markets, other East Asian markets have fared better. Almost ironically, many of the challenges Hong Kong has faced with its cultural industries have come in the midst of a veritable “cultural renaissance” in East Asia over the last few decades (Otmazgin, 2011, p.307). This renaissance has largely been “rooted in the growth of [East Asia’s] economies and booming consumerism,” much of which has come in the form of “massive circulation of pop culture products, such as films, pop music, animation, comics, television programs, and fashion magazines” (p.307). What is interesting about this renaissance is that while some of these products have been imported from the United States and Europe, many of these pop culture products are homegrown, coming from regions such as Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. Moreover, this renaissance highlights the growth of East Asian cultural industries, not just within East Asia, but also abroad (p.309).

In South Korea, for instance, since liberalizing its media in the 1980s, its cultural industries have massively expanded and have made waves on the international scene through its cultural exports (Otmazgin, 2011, pp.311-312). Between 2001 and 2014, the export revenue generated by the South Korean cultural industries increased from just under $660 million in United States Dollars (USD) in 2001 to more than $4.3 billion USD in 2011 – an increase of 553 percent (Kwon & Kim, 2014, p.422). Among South Korea’s most notable cultural exports has been rapper, Psy, whose hit song *Gangnam Style* garnered unheralded international fanfare and
was a chart topping hit on 33 music charts – “including the UK’s Official Singles Top 100 chart” – while his follow-up hit, *Gentlemen* set a record on Youtube for being the fastest video to reach a 100 million views (p.422). Underscoring this success was considerable efforts from the South Korean government to “aggressively” promote its cultural industries as a means of fostering national economic growth (p.423). To this end, the South Korean government has introduced policies and policy agencies focused on improving its cultural industries’ infrastructure, technology, and finances with the ultimate goal of making them “more export-oriented” (Otmazgin, 2011, p.316). Moreover, as the videogame industry and digital content have proven to be lucrative fields for South Korea’s cultural industries, the South Korean government has targeted them with the goals of making South Korea “the world’s leading country in the field [of gaming]” and “one of the world’s top five digital content providers” (p.317).

Taking a similar approach to South Korea, the Japanese cultural industries – in particular, its hardware manufacturing industry – have made splashes internationally through their aggressive acquisition of the American software manufacturing industries in Hollywood (McGuigan 1996, p.90). This acquisition process has, at times, “cast doubt” onto the “longevity of the vertical disintegration moment” of the Hollywood system (p.90). This doubt, however, has largely subsided over the years as Hollywood has, rather than buckle under the pressures of foreign markets and their acquisition of American industries, found opportunity in these acquisitions to expand into foreign markets – to the point where the industry’s international revenue has gone from being equal to its domestic revenue in 2000, to more than double its domestic revenue in 2009 (Walls & McKenzie, 2012, p.199). Rather, where Japan’s acquisition of hardware and software manufacturing industries has arguably had its most enduring cultural impact on the global sphere is not in the film or cinema industries – though a strong argument can
be made for the impact of Japanese anime in Western culture (Jenkins, 2006, pp.164-165) – but with the videogame industry.

Primarily spearheaded by an oligopoly of console manufacturers – in particular, the Japanese companies Sony and Nintendo and the American company Microsoft – the videogame industry operates on a business model wherein videogame consoles (or hardware) are generally sold at a loss, while game software (produced by both the aforementioned manufacturers and a host of independent game developers and third party game publishers) is sold at a premium – at levels that more than offset the losses incurred through hardware sales (Dyer-Witheford & Sharman, 2005, pp.188-189). With sales approaching $68 billion worldwide in 2012, the videogame industry has emerged as not only the world’s most profitable cultural industry, but one of its most profitable industries, period (Solís-Martínez et al., 2015, p.43) – surpassing the film, music, and pornography industries in the process (Gray & Nikolakakos, 2007, p.93). At the forefront of the videogame industry is Japan, whose already “competitive consumer electronics industry” coupled with its pre-existing comics and animation industries laid the foundation for much of the industry’s innovation (Aoyama & Izushi, 2003, p.426). The prominence of Japanese firms in the videogame industry has become such that some authors have gone so far as to describe it, along with the prominence of the United States, as hegemonic (Latorre, 2013, p.136). While United States and British-based cultural products – exemplified by the likes of “Hollywood films, rap music, and in commodities such as Levi’s Strauss jeans, Coca-Cola, and Nike shoes” – have had an enduring, often dominating impact on other markets – often marginalizing “national players into a niche market” in the process – the Japanese videogame industry has stood out as “an exception to this trend in the western world,” enduring and even striving where other industries have failed (Aoyama & Izushi, 2003, pp.423-424).
From a policy perspective, the success of the cultural industries in countries such as South Korea and Japan has precipitated a shift in cultural policy approaches in East Asia (Otmazgin, 2011, p.313). In the past, cultural policies in the region often served the dual role of promoting national culture and “prevent[ing] the infiltration of ‘foreign’ culture”; however, the economic advantages promised by the recent success of their cultural industries has led some countries to intervene in ways that would see their industries expand their exportation of cultural goods as a means of “amassing national wealth” (p.313). It is an approach to policy that is open to interpreting and “valorizing” culture and cultural products “for their economic value” rather than entirely or exclusively for their intrinsic or cultural value (p.313). To a degree, it is a shift in policy approaches that harkens to the infamous instrumentalization approach to cultural policy. However, more interestingly, it is a shift in policy approaches that arguably underlies an evolving “eat or be eaten” mentality towards culture. Whereas the cultural policies of East Asian countries were once passive or defensive in their approaches to culture and cultural preservation – seeking primarily to ensure that their respective cultures were safeguarded from outside forces – the recent and widespread success of some of their exports has given these countries the courage to take a more (pro)active approach to developing and disseminating their culture both nationally and abroad.

Inherent in much of the discourse surrounding the East Asian approaches to cultural policy and the cultural industries – as with those of European and North American approaches – is an emphasis on distinction. In particular, there is a sense that, as the cultural industries are progressively becoming pillars of economic prosperity throughout the world, countries are beginning to consolidate their efforts around specific industries as a means of differentiating themselves from their competitors (i.e. other countries or nation-states). In effect, it is a soft method of establishing boundaries between countries and nations – to assert a measure of
nationalism by establishing a clear delineation of their cultural industries relative to the rest of the world. It is an approach that coincides with Rutherford’s (1990) assertions that the application of the cultural industries can be, paradoxically, a detriment to identity and distinction, but also a supporter of difference – albeit as a selling point for cultural commodities (pp.8-9). Drawing on this latter application, some countries have been successful in reaffirming their cultural and national identity in ways that have arguably added new layers to the scholarly discourse surrounding nationalism.

1.5.2: Trading Spaces: Cultural Policy & Diaspora

Emerging from globalization and serving to inherently promote a form of glocalization – in particular, the aspect of the local appropriating the global – are transnational communities. These communities are, in large part, the by-product of immigration and migration, and are described as “variously migratory, diasporic, [and] hybrid in their composition” (Delanty, 2003, p.158). Because of the particularly transient nature of transnational communities, they often “transcend” the place in which they reside; their cultural identities are, consequently, in a state of being defined; it is an identity that is almost nomadic in nature (p.158). Almost paradoxically, transnational communities are evolving in a “planet-spanning yet common arena of activity,” drawing on new telecommunication technologies to bridge gaps in physical distance and international borders in order to, in some cases, “speed up historical patterns of activity” and, in other cases, embrace new forms of human interaction (Vertovec, 2003, p.ii).

The diasporic nature of transnational communities, in particular – or, more specifically, the communities defined as diaspora – has been of increasing interest to researchers of culture and identity (Alfonso, 2013, p.260; Karim, 2003). Diaspora are communities defined as existing “somewhere between nation-states and ‘traveling cultures’” insofar as they “involve dwelling in a
nation state in a physical sense, but travelling in an astral or spiritual sense that falls outside the nation-states space/time zone” (Cohen, 1997, as ctd. by Carter, 2005, p.54). Not to be confused with simple migration, diaspora represent a displaced group that “share a certain collective consciousness of group distinctiveness and memory of homeland” coupled with a “social solidarity in a new/host country” (Wan, 2014, p.3). This solidarity is built around a diaspora’s ability to “(re)create home by instilling [...] resonance into the spaces they occupy” through the use and practice of their native language(s), customs, art forms, arrangements, and ideas (Karim, 2003, p.10). Emerging trends in the 21st century would suggest that diaspora, in no small part thanks to globalization, are progressively becoming modestly large scale – a relatively new phenomenon in the historical context of diaspora (Wan, 2014, pp.13-14).

The concept of diaspora has increasingly become widespread in academic, journalistic, political, and popular circles in recent years (Kenny, 2013, p.1). While the term “diaspora” has historically been associated with or used to define Jewish people in exile, the term has come to be used in conjunction with a “multitude of ethnic, religious, and national communities who find themselves living outside” their territory of origin (Carter, 2005, p55). These communities are distinguished from other (im)migrants by their sense of collective identity and resistance to assimilation; they often maintain connections with their homeland and other “co-ethnics in their host country” – often at the expense of making connections with the native people of their host country (Missbach, 2013, pp.1058-1059). While some authors have sought to define diaspora through a “closed set of characteristics,” (Karim, 2003) – such as being dispersed from their native land; possessing a collective memory, myth, or vision of their home; sharing a belief that they are not fully accepted into their host society; possessing an idealized vision of their ancestral home and maintaining a belief that they can someday return to it; sharing a belief that members should be committed to maintain/restore said home; and possessing a strong ethnic group
consciousness (Reis, 2004, p.43) – others have approached the concept from a “broader range of human dispersals” – and caution has been given with respects to understanding diasporas as ideal types (Karim, 2003, pp.1-2). Still, some authors argue that diasporas are not rigid constructs, but are in a state of constant flux – beyond any uniform or rigid categorization (Bardenstein, 2007). Regardless of how it is defined or understood, modern diaspora are a complex construct and the reasons “for their formation [are] manifold” (Reis, 2004, p.47). This reality is accentuated by the fact that, by 2013, the number of international immigrants throughout the world had reached 3.2 percent of the total world population – or a little more than 232 million people, up from 175 million in 2000. If nothing else, this represents a relatively significant (global) demographic trend towards diaspora (Wan, 2014, p.177).

Historically, the presence of a diaspora in a host country was almost invariably seen as an open invitation to the “internationalisation of ethnocultural conflict” – in some cases, between the host nation and the diaspora; in other cases between the diaspora and its country of origin (Kellas, 1991, pp.194-195). In its original, religious connotation, the concept of diaspore was strongly linked to the idea of a people being forcibly dispersed into exile – a process that, by its very nature, implies some form of conflict between the exiled and exiling (Wan, 2014, p.123) Some authors even position diasporas as being against both “global and national structures of dominance” – as being in a “third zone,” neither with or a part of their host country, nor of their country of origin (Karim, 2003, p.5). Underscoring these dynamics is the notion that “one of the key projects of modernity – nationalism – is faced with a serious crisis” as a result of diaspora: rather than nationalizing ethnicities, nations are being ethnically diversified by “the global spread of corporate capital” and shifts in demographics associated with diaspora (May, 2003, p.22). More specifically, this shift is seen as undermining traditional approaches and arguments for cultural policy “rooted in notions of a homogenous nation state and inviolable national borders”
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... (Baeker, 2005, p.284). Diasporas exist in a context of duality, in a “spatial identity” that is manifested on “two geographic scales”: transnational and national (Tyner & Kuhlke, 2000, pp.233-234). The diasporic identity is transnational insofar as its communities are “dispersed across several countries”; and it is national in its unabating loyalty to its home country. In this respect, diasporic identity is arguably pan-national (p.234) – a concept that many governments seem ill-equipped and ill-at-ease to deal with.

Despite the challenges diasporas potentially pose to a country’s national and cultural unity, some authors suggest that diaspora can, in certain contexts, “encourage” nationalism and unity (Lachenicht & Heinsohn, 2009, pp.8-9) – albeit a nationalism that inherently supports the diaspora’s homeland. New trends in migration and understanding of diaspora accentuate positive connotations associated with the concept, and highlight the social and economic connections countries and nations are now building and maintaining with their diaspora (Wan, 2014, p.123). While diaspora are often portrayed as “alternatives to the structures of worldwide capitalism,” Karim (2003) contends that the opposite is true – that diaspora, in fact, are active participants in transnational economics (p.5). In return for capital investment, many governments actively reach out to their diaspora, offering them political incentives, in an effort to ensure ongoing “economic support” (Kenny, 2013, p.101). In accepting to provide support to their home countries, diasporas are establishing economic and intellectual networks that are, according to Lachenicht and Heinsohn (2009), cosmopolitan in nature, but inherently necessary to ensure the survival of the diaspora’s national identity (p.13).

The shifts in demographics associated with diaspora have also offered a number of opportunities to the cultural industries and for cultural policymakers to tap into and cultivate their nation’s cultural reach. While the members of diaspora may be leaving their homelands behind – in the process relinquishing their “physical links” to their ancestral territory – they often maintain
emotional, mythical, and linguistic ties to their native land. These links can be – and often are – supported or reinforced by the consumption of cultural products that cater to the “nostalgic reminiscences” of the diaspora (Karim, 2003, p.3). Thus, diasporas represent markets, each with unique demands for specific (foreign) cultural products, which the cultural industries can and do tap into – a process that is facilitated, no less, by globalization and progressive transnationalism (May, 2003, p.23). Even in cases where the market fails to offer any sort of cultural commodity to a diasporic community, the community will often fill the proverbial void with its own, unique cultural productions (Naficy, 2003, p.52). These products invariably serve to reinforce the cultural identity of the diaspora – but have also served as the foundation for “new developments in mass media institutions and practices worldwide that have resulted in the emergence of so-called minority and ethnic” cultural productions (p.51).

One of the primary concerns for policymakers, vis-à-vis the promise the cultural industries bring to diasporic cultures in the form of cultural products from their homelands, is ensuring that such products do not, in some way, “cause economic and social harm to [the host] country” (Karim, 2005, p.156). Conversely, however, policymakers must also ensure that their policies do not veer too far into protectionism, least they intend to isolate their nation’s culture from the rest of the world (p.156). It is for this reason that authors, such as Karim (2005), encourage policies that embrace cosmopolitanism. In some cases, however, the harm comes not so much from the products, but from the diaspora, themselves. Wei and Balasubramanyam (2006) indicate that many diasporic groups have been known to bring cultural products (often in the form of technology) and “know-how” from their host countries back to their countries of origin – effectively polluting the indigenous culture (pp.1608-1609). This process of “cultural pollution,” however, can be somewhat of a two-way street. In some cases, diasporic culture can have a prominent impact on the culture of the diaspora’s host nation. The Hokkien language, for
instance – a language that originated in “other parts of the Chinese Diaspora” – has become a symbol of the pro-independence movement in Taiwan (Taylor, 2008, pp.62-63). Serving as a vehicle for the rise of Hokkien in Taiwan is the local cultural industries. In fact, Taiwan is the only society in the world where “there remains an industry of any note dedicated to the production of songs, television programmes and films in Hokkien” (p.64). What this represents – perhaps uniquely in the context of Taiwan, though certainly worth considering in the broader context of national minorities and diaspora – is a cultural industry, whether intentionally or not, that is playing a role “in challenging state narratives about ethnicity and identity” (p.74).

One of the defining characteristics of contemporary diaspora communities – one which represents a paradigmatic shift relative to the more prominent frameworks of diaspora – “is their distinctive sense of themselves and their identity as oriented towards the cultural present, not some lost or ‘true’ homeland” (Gabriel, 2011, pp.341-342). Gabriel (2011) contends that the discourse of “displaced community” associated with diaspora is one propagated by right-wing nationalists seeking to “bolster anti-immigrant sentiment” (p.343-344). Rather than simply being conceptualized as a displaced community, diaspora are becoming “agents of change” through their resistance of the dominance of the nation-state and their ability to mobilize resources towards that power resistance (p.345). This resistance speaks to the notion that diaspora are trying to “reterritorializ[e] and re-embe[d] their identities in other imaginings of space” (Karim, 2003, p.9). It is from this reterritorialization and reimagining of diaspora that many authors have begun re-examining “the culture of diaspora as a means of understanding and even embracing the new modes of postnational citizenship” (Mirzoeff, 1999, p.1). It is in the context of postnationalism, and the seeming inability of governments to cope with it, that Stuart Hall describes society as being at the “in-between of different cultures” (p.2). That is to say, that Western society is entering a space where conceptions of cultural identity and nationalism are
being renegotiated, and the concept of diaspora has emerged as a possible alternative for engaging with this new cultural space.

There is an inherent danger, however, in approaching diaspora as an “attractive alternative” to the “formal structures of national culture” (Mirzoeff, 1999, p.8). The sudden attractiveness of the diasporic label – of individuals discovering their diasporic roots – can be problematic in that it invites the possibility that virtually anyone can be defined as diasporic (pp.8-9). The reality is that diasporic migration has been largely influenced by colonisation and trade connections (Karim, 2003, p.3) – to the point where entire countries are diasporic in nature. However, in acknowledging and, in some cases, embracing their diasporic history, the notion of diaspora has become “a way of life” for some countries, one that is rife with class fragmentation as its norm (Mirzoeff, 1999, p.9). To address this reality, a number of governments have adopted the strategy of mestizaje or hybridity – the idea of integration through racial mixing (Doremus, 2001) – as a means of integrating its people while also offering a sign of resistance to the former colonial powers responsible for their fragmented, diasporic society (Mirzoeff, 1999, p.9). Ironically, this mestizaje is similar to approaches used by imperial administrators in the 19th century – an approach used to homogenize their cultures (p.9). Rather than affirming the multicultural nature of diaspora, this approach served to implicitly support colonial discourse. As such, dismissing the cultural dominance of former colonial empires and modern hegemonic cultures is, perhaps, premature (Schiller, 1991/2001, p.318).

1.6: Nations, Subnational Governments, & States: Towards a Research Problem

In the previous sections, the main orientations of cultural policy literature – as they relate to issues of identity – were presented. These orientations – exemplified, in large part, by the French, British, and American approaches to cultural policy – constitute what some authors have
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posited to be the core archetypes of cultural policy, with the approaches employed by other
countries/nations (i.e. India, Japan, etc.) serving as hybrids of the three (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre,
2012, pp.578-579). Common to all of these approaches to cultural policy is their function in
proposing and supporting a certain sense of identity. Complementing these orientations was the
presentation of an interconnected literature that focuses on globalization and some of its
underlying processes, such as colonialism and diasporic forms of cultural consumption. As it
stands, with these orientations firmly in mind, it can reasonably be concluded that the cultural
policy literature is, in fact, relatively ill-equipped to properly (or adequately) conceptualize the
cultural policies of national minorities operating in semi-autonomous subnational states. The
unique context presented by national minority governments and their cultural policies have been
relatively unexplored in academia. While cultural research has variably covered Québec, Catalo
da, and Scotland, relatively little of it has incorporated the contextual dynamics of cultural
policy-as-vehicle-for-identity-formation in these regions – and even less of it has done so in a
comparative analysis. Rather, it is with an almost self-explanatory sense of the implicit
importance that culture has to identity that their policies have been approached. In reality,
however, the question remains: what kind of connections are these policies articulating for
identity?

It goes without saying that how a country applies cultural policy can offer a window into
how it interprets and prioritizes culture and identity. The fact that there has been a pronounced
shift in the world’s cultural policies towards more economically- and industrially-driven
approaches is nothing new. Where there is a discernible gap in the literature, however, is with
respects to the cultural policies of national minorities in this evolving context. Contending with
the dual pressures of both their domestically dominant counterparts and the broader global
market, national minorities must navigate and compromise with an uncertain terrain, where even
national majorities must contend with isomorphic pressures from without. Given the importance of culture and identity to national minorities – coupled with the growth in importance of the cultural industries as a paradoxical vehicle for cultural diversity and homogenization, facilitated by globalization – the role of cultural policy to these minorities has arguably taken on a new signification – one that has been left largely unexplored. The question of how a national minority maintains (and, in some cases, grows) its cultural identity within its country’s borders while also respecting and adhering to the newfound realities of a globalized and, arguably, more cosmopolitan environment is an avenue that offers considerable room for exploration. It is in this respect that this thesis’s research question comes into salience.

1.6.1: National Minorities

In recent decades, questions of identity have come to play a more prominent role in policy discourse, in no small part due to the growth (and increased awareness) of cultural diversity and multiculturalism as “national issues” (Ogbu, 1995, p.189). The longstanding triadic notion of “one nation/one language/one state has given way to something closer to one world, many states, and plenty of cultures” (Arraiza, 2011, p.113). In the process, policy narratives have shifted away from an “ethnically homogenous idea of the nation state” towards a conception of the state that recognizes and awards “power distribution” between groups – in some cases, through the provision of powers of autonomy; in other cases, through policies that recognize and respect cultural diversity (p.113). It is with this recognition and awareness of cultural diversity in mind, that culture and cultural policy discourse has taken a more pronounced interest in cultural and national minorities (Hammer, 2007, p.170). While the notion of “national minority” has been difficult to consensually define, Preece (1998) offers one of the more comprehensive definitions of the term:
[A] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, well-defined and historically established on the territory of the state, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion, or language (as ctd by Malloy, 2005, p.20).

In many cases, these groups have had to fight – both literally and figuratively – to maintain their existence, and establish a degree of separation from their society’s dominant group(s). To this end, these groups have often adopted the “language of ‘nationhood’” as a means of expressing and justifying a desire for greater recognition, autonomy, and, in some cases, the ability and right to self-govern (Kymlicka, 1998, p.127). As such, the emergence of identity as an interest in policy discourse is as much a product of the political “pendulum” swinging in favour of cultural diversity as it is a desire to head off any potential social conflicts (Arraiza, 2011, pp.113-114).

Yet, the notion that individuals would actively want to be identified or recognized as part of a minority group or culture – of any kind – is a relatively novel concept, having only really emerged in the latter end of the twentieth century (Berbrier, 2002, p.554). In the North American context, the term “minority” was often used in relation to European immigrants before it gradually evolved into a concept that offered a sense of recognition, legitimacy, and “moral power” to its signifiers (pp.554-555). Underscoring the emergence of minorities as legitimate groups is a seminal debate on the “importance of culture for individuals and groups” – a debate that highlights a growing understanding that it is both “wrong for a state to attempt to bring about the assimilation of cultural minorities” and that measures should be taken “to preserve their identity and culture” (Hammer, 2007, p.170). However, as many authors have been quick to point out, conceptually, “culture” is neither easily defined nor easily analysed. It is a concept that is “at once utterly familiar, but also complex and hard to fully pin down” (O’Brien, 2014, p.2). Nevertheless, the importance of culture for national minorities is salient: it has “a largely
unconscious enveloping effect on members of the group, defining the horizon of possibilities open to them, from amongst which to choose their course of action” (Hammer, 2007, pp.171-172). Consequently, understanding what culture is has become an important challenge in cultural policy discourse as it relates to national minorities.

How a government might go about employing cultural policy, however, is arguably contingent on how they interpret cultural identity. According to Hall (1990), there are two different ways of thinking about cultural identity: the first posits that cultural identity can be seen as a “shared identity, a sort of collective ‘one true self’” (p.223); the second posits that cultural identity, as much as it is built on similarities, is also built on “critical points of deep and significant difference which constitute ‘what we really are’ [...] or ‘what we have become’” (p.225). In the case of the former, cultural identity serves as a reflection of the “shared history and ancestry” that hold a people together – it is the ensemble of “historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us [...] with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history” (Hall, 1990, p.223). In the case of the latter, cultural identity is a question “of becoming” as much as it is “of being” – that is to say, that cultural identity is in a state of constant flux; it is subject to “the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power” (p.225). In other words, it is not enough to simply look at the past to identify one’s culture; one must also consider the interplay of time (and context) and the way(s) in which it can change a person’s understanding(s) and interpretation(s) of their identity(ies). This latter view of cultural identity, in particular lends itself well to “contemporary politics of identity in general” (McGuigan, 1996, p.141). Part of why it lends itself well to politics of identity is that it is “consistent with the evident creativity of youth and popular culture [...] upbeat and optimistic” (p.141) – that is to say, that it offers a conception of cultural identity that is rebellious in nature, that allows those who identify with it a sense of
agency with respects to understanding and shaping the identity moving forward, even if such agency is illusionary in nature.

1.6.2: Cultural Policy & the Subnational Cultural Imagination

Contemporary notions of nationalism tend to embody the idea of self-identification – in particular, identification with a particular nation or nation-state. This self-identification is often the product of an imagined association with the community that constitutes the nation (or nation-state) in question – often described in terms of an “imagined community” or “imagination of community” (Elgenius, 2011, p.7). This imagined community often constitutes the cultural, political, and socio-economic factors shared by people within a certain nation or nation-state. This community is imagined insofar as the individuals that comprise the community (or nation) are superficially connected; there is no genuine, intimate, or face-to-face relationship that these individuals share. Rather, what bonds individuals into the imagined community of a nation are shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and/or geographic origins (Anderson, 1991, pp.6-7). The nation, itself, is understood to be the “bearer of identity and culture within a framework” provided by the state which, itself, is “justified by the nation” (p.7-8). In this respect, nationalism can be seen as a “theory of political legitimacy” (Gellner, 1983, p.1); it is a “socially defined concept” which varies depending on the circumstances in which it is employed (Haymes, 1997, p.544), but around which the concepts of nation and nation-state are built and maintained. From this perspective, the nation and, by extension, nationalism is an imagined concept, borne of political creativity and symbolism. With that being said, the fact that nationalism is an imaginary concept “does not […] make it any less essential for providing the political cohesion necessary for a self-governing modern state” (Diamond & Plattner, 1994, p.xi).
A more active approach to cultural policy, exhibited in many countries and nations in recent decades, highlights a growing trend towards focusing on specific sectors of the cultural industries rather than on the whole of the industries. In doing so, many governments are arguably hitching their proverbial horses to a specific form or type of culture which, itself, becomes a fixture of the country’s cultural identity – at least from a broad, generalized, almost stereotypical perspective. While the media and cultural industries found in most countries are virtually the same – at least in terms of their functionality (i.e. a television industry, regardless of country, produces and disseminates television programs) – the actual content they produce is unique to the circumstances and contexts of their respective countries (Stokes, 1999, p.1). How these industries are structured and regulated by the government can “contribute” to the character or identity of their respective countries or nations (p.1). If countries selectively support specific cultural products or industries as a means of gaining or maintaining a level of global recognition and traction, they do so potentially at the expense of other cultural industries and their contributions to the country’s cultural identity. In other words, the cultural industries that a government supports through its policies can, to a degree, come to characterize a country or a nation – both in terms of the content those industries produce and the perception people have of those industries and, by extension, the nations, themselves. In this respect, cultural policy plays an undeniable role in influencing identity through virtually every facet of cultural production and consumption.

The objective of this thesis is to better understand the unique conditions for cultural policy development offered by national minorities. While it can be reasonably hypothesized that there is something different to the cultural policies of national minorities relative to their majority counterparts, the intent of this thesis is to uncover or evidence the typical characteristics – or type – of these policies. While it almost goes without saying that the cultural policies of virtually every culture, the world over, serve the purpose of promoting and protecting their respective
cultures from global isomorphic pressures, in the case of national minorities, however, there is arguably an added layer of pressure from the state, itself. In the face of global and state pressures, national minorities – such as the Québécois in Canada, the Scots in the United Kingdom, and the Catalonians in Spain – have evidenced a pronounced cultural resilience where their respective identities and ambitions for greater autonomy/sovereignty are concerned. What is it, then, that sets the cultural policies of these minority cultures apart from their majority counterparts? Do their cultural policies (and culturally-significant policies) evidence a certain form, structure, or approach that helps distinguish them from the approaches of other (often majoritarian) cultures? With these questions in mind, this thesis explores the ways in which identity and identity issues have been recognized, problematized, and mobilized in the development of national minority cultural policy.
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework

Conceptions of cultural policy – and its subset, cultural/creative industries policy – have long played a pivotal role in shaping the way in which institutions, practices, and agencies are produced, understood, and viewed (Lewis & Miller, 2003, p.2). Implicit in the purpose of cultural policies is their goal of “find[ing], serv[ing], and nurtur[ing] a sense of belonging through educational institutions and cultural industries” (p.2). It is this goal, specifically, that posits cultural policies as a source of cultural identity and nationalism. In particular, state institutions – which are both the products and producers of policy – “function as operative and sometimes oppressive gatekeepers to peoples’ movements and enfranchisement” (Hurley, 2011, p.9). With that being said, the concept of the nation (or nation-state) – and all the policies it implies – is often, alone, insufficient to fully capture the “multiple and moving identities that typify the contemporary world” (pp.9-10). How culture (and cultural production) is derived often serves as a means through which governments can develop and emblematically capture the esprit or essence of a cultural or national identity. To this end, the cultural industries – and the cultural policies that govern them – serve as vehicles through which governments can implicitly shape the narratives surrounding cultural identity. But how governments employ the cultural industries in their endeavours often comes down to the question of how governments conceptualize, mobilize, and change policy. These considerations are, themselves, draped in the veneer of a progressively globalized environment and discourse – emblemizing an “era” that is “sometimes glossed as one of ‘neoliberal governmentality’” (Gupta & Sharma, 2006 [2013], p.337).

With this dynamic in mind, cultural policy can be approached through a myriad of different theoretical lenses. For the purposes of this paper, and in line with the field of Public Administration’s long tradition of drawing from multiple disciplines (Van Thiel, 2014, p.1), this
thesis draws on theories of public policy (as they relate to cultural policy) along with a number of cultural studies and social science concepts – in particular, the cultural industries, cultural identity, minority cultures, globalization, and nationalism. More specifically, this paper draws on the theories underling the Foucauldian concept of governmentality and the economies of worth framework to explore the underlying relationship that cultural policy has with identity formation and maintenance in national minorities with strong nationalist agendas. The intent in using these concepts and theories is, in a first instance, to guide and clarify the concepts used in this thesis’ research and analysis; and, in a second instance, to support the development of a type analysis of the cultural policies of national minorities.

2.1: Thinking Government: Conceptions of Public Policy

Public policy often carries with it a measure of definitional or conceptual ambiguity and complexity – often a consequence of the ill-defined nature of its specific object(s) (McGuigan, 2003, p.24). In its simplest terms, public policy is understood as what governments do. This notion of public policy encompasses the idea that governments “not only 'power' […] they also puzzle” (Heclo, as ctd by Hall, 1993, p.275). Power, in this context, is expressed through a government’s ability to address or reconcile social conflicts, and is manifested through the enactment of public policy. When policy changes, it is an indication that “the possession and relationships of power among conflicting groups [in society]” have, themselves, also changed (Heclo, 1974, p.305). Where the question of puzzlement comes into the equation of policy is through uncertainty – or the process of “collectively wondering what to do” (p.305). Puzzlement, in this sense, involves a considerable learning curve vis-à-vis addressing the often conflicting or competing interests of a society with limited or finite resources. Confounding this puzzlement is the fact that the government must also navigate and negotiate with the numerous political actors
involved in the policymaking process – many of whom have competing interests. It is not enough for policy to accommodate the wants of specific interests; policy must also acknowledge “who might want something, what is wanted, what should be wanted, and how to turn even the most sweet-tempered general agreement into concrete collective action” (p.305). Thus, the puzzlement of policymaking can be described as a form of learning wherein policymakers deliberately attempt “to adjust the goals or techniques of policy” based on past experience and justified as being, in general terms, on “society's behalf” (Hall, 1993, pp.275-280).

Following this logic, policy change has been described as occurring through a relatively incremental process. For the most part, policy decisions are seen as routine, and serve only to refine or amend existing policies (Bennett & Howlett, 1992, p.275). When the routine no longer works – or when situations or circumstances arise that a policy is ill-equipped to handle – policy change will involve a “rethinking […] of the dominant view about fundamental aspects of a policy” by policy elites, with the ultimate goal of either reaffirming or changing policy belief(s) (May, 1992, pp.337-338). This process tends to occur through an almost trial-and-error-like basis, where past policy failures inform policymakers on “what not to do,” while policy successes stand as exemplars for future policy action(s) (Meseguer, 2005, p.70). With these processes in mind, many state theorists stress the autonomy of the state in the policymaking process, emphasizing “the role of ideas in policymaking,” and describing the process as taking place “largely inside the state itself” (Hall, 1993, p.276). In other words, the contention is that states require a measure of autonomy from societal forces in order to allow “policy formation to be characterized by learning rather than by conflict” (Bennett & Howlett, 1992, p.281).

However, just as state theorists underline the significance of the state in the process of policymaking and policy change, actor-centric or network-centric theorists put greater emphasis on the role of non-state actors and interest groups in the development, dissemination, and
evaluation of public policy (Bennett & Howlett, 1992, pp.280-281). The idea follows that states are inherently bound to society by a “network of institutionalized relations that structure the flow of information, resources, and pressures between public and private sector” (Hall, 1989, as ctd. by Bennett & Howlett, 1992, p.281). It is through these social relations that networks of actors develop around specific interests, institutional arrangements, and organizational ties – and, more specifically, it is through these relations that networks of actors can impact the state’s “capacity to implement certain policies” (Hall, 1989, as ctd. by Bennett & Howlett, 1992, p.281). These groups or networks of actors tend to be viewed by theorists (of a pluralist persuasion) as being “the basic political form” – that is to say, that they encompass the idea that the political landscape is littered with groups/networks representing, often, competing interests that vie for their share of the proverbial (and often limited/finite) resource pie (Olson, 1971, p.117). The influence these groups have on the ways in which policy is formulated is often a question of their size and ability to mobilize around their specific interests (Olson, 1971, pp.117-118). Perhaps ironically, it is often smaller groups or networks that have the greatest measure of control and influence on policy (and political parties) by virtue of the facility in which they are able to mobilize around policy issues and mitigate internal conflicts within the group (p.49).

The fact that groups, within the policy context, are competing with each other for limited resources (and advocating for specific types or forms of policy) has led to the emergence of a “third” group, a group which Sabatier (1988) describes as “policy brokers.” Policy brokers are a group of actors principally concerned with finding a political (or policy) compromise between competing interests in lieu of conflict (Sabatier, 1988, p.141). It should be noted, however, that policy brokers fall along a continuum between “advocate” and “broker” – wherein even the staunchest of brokers, themselves, have specific policy slants that they will (at least inherently) advocate for, just as advocates may exhibit concerns vis-à-vis maintaining the system even if that
system does not yield the results they seek. This dynamic is important as it informs the ways in which policy groups or coalitions are formed: not so much in terms of maximizing short-term self- or group-interest, but in terms of a group’s system of beliefs in the context of convenient coalitions that offer a measure of (policy) stability over time (pp.141-142). Policy, in this context, occurs through the interactions between groups and policymakers – and, more specifically, is derived through “experiencing or debating a given policy,” with good policy designs being those that “foster opportunities for social learning” (May, 1992, p.334).

2.2: Cultural Policy & the Cultural Industries

Historically, where culture and identity are concerned, policy has been used variably as a form of socialization to direct citizens away from certain practices or cultural identifications, towards other, more amenable forms of culture – amenable, at least, where government priorities (e.g. language) are concerned. These policies have often been introduced with the ambition of pushing or promoting a more unified cultural or national identity (Anderson, 1991). It is a form of socialization that harkens to a question that often underlies cultural policy discourse: the idea of the trade-off – or the notion that supporting one culture or form of culture is often done at the expense of another or others (Gibson, 2008, p.255; O’Brien, 2014, p.5). To wit, this notion of the trade-off in cultural policy speaks to the assumption that “that cultural programs and their consumption have real social and political power effects” (Gibson, 2008, p.255). These power effects serve to shape the way in which actors in the policy process navigate the field of cultural policy and, in the process, learn (May, 1992). The implications the power effects of cultural policy have with respect to the question of nationalism are twofold: in a first instance, these effects imply that any particular cultural or national identity is a commodity or resource – one whose existence is both limited and juxtaposed with that of other identities; in a second instance,
these effects inform the priorities of both governments and groups within the cultural fields vis-à-vis the culture and identities they identify with and support. The extent to which these priorities are aligned with the public’s interest is a question of importance, but one that is often complicated by the intricate natures of policy and identity.

While ideally, policy is implemented with the goal of utilitarianism, conventional wisdom suggests that it is not always feasible for policymakers to consult the public to ascertain the majority preference when it comes to the social utility of resource allocation. Consequently, policymakers are often left to their own devices when developing policies (Lindblom, 1959, p.81). This autonomy allows policymakers a degree of freedom to assert their own social and political slants when developing policy, and, in some cases, categorically shape the debate around certain policy issues. In the case of cultural policies, these policies are evoked by the state as a means of “mediating social relations and their representations” (Beale, 1999, p.435). This mediation occurs through the establishment of cultural norms and institutions “through which ideas about culture are negotiated and cultural expression realized” (p.435). Implicit in this discourse is the notion that culture is defined by the government, through its policies, “as those activities deemed worthy of support by public authorities” (Bennett, 1997, p.68). For these policy decisions to have any sort of impact, however, they must be legitimized politically. To this end, explanation, justification, and persuasion “play important roles” in the development, implementation, and maintenance of policy – a development which is “guided by a discursive process of developing and refining ideas” (Fisher, 2003, p.184). Where cultural identity or nationalism is concerned, policy can and has been used to legitimize a government’s rule and the sense of nationalism it espouses – with nationalism, itself, serving as a “conscious, self-protective policy intimately linked to the preservation of imperial-dynastic interests” (Anderson, 1991,
In this respect, policy can serve as a legitimizer of a nation’s nationalism insofar as it emanates “from the state and serv[es] the interests of the state first and foremost” (p.159).

With this in mind, through their various cultural policy decisions, governments have come to play a substantive role in not only the production and dissemination of art and culture (Becker, 2008, p.165), but also in establishing the parameters around which culture is defined as such. As is often the case with all those involved in the production of culture – whether it is artists, audiences, suppliers, or distributors – governments have a vested interest in the culture they contribute to. It comes as little surprise, then, that governments will, on the one hand, make calculated policy decisions that promote and benefit cultural productions that support their political and aesthetic interests and agendas; and, on the other hand, take action against cultural productions that conflict with their interest – sometimes going so far as to ban or censor them (pp.165-166). In many respects, through cultural policy, governments are seeking to effect change to (or exert control over) the structuration – that is to say, the “rules and resources recursively implicated in social reproduction” (Giddens, 1984, p.xxxi) – of the organizational field that comprises the cultural industries (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, pp.64-65).

When considering issues related to the development of cultural policies in the context of the cultural industries, a number of theoretical underpinnings emerge. Perhaps the most obvious and immediate are the concepts and theories that delve into the nature of the cultural industries. From a practical and pragmatic perspective, the cultural industries have long been defined in terms of their economic and profit-seeking nature. Without waxing too much into poetics, the cultural industries are summarily defined as the system in which “profit-seeking firms” produce cultural products for national and international consumption and distribution (Becker, 2008, p.122). The cultural industries are characterized by their employment of “modes of production and organization,” akin to those of industrial corporations, in the production and dissemination of
“symbols in the form of cultural goods and services [often] as commodities” (Garnham, 1993 [1985], p.55). These industries serve to “fuse” the old and familiar into a “new quality” – one that is tailored for “consumption by the masses” and which, by design, determine their mode and means of consumption, forming a system that is near-seamless (Adorno, 1991, pp.98-99). This system serves to filter “new products and ideas as they flow from ‘creative’ personnel [...] to the managerial, institutional and societal levels of organization” (Hirsch, 1972, as ctd. by Becker, 2008, p.122). In this context, societal levels of organization refer to the broad collective of relatively unpredictable individuals and groups that comprise the “audiences” of the cultural products developed by the creative industries (Becker, 2008, pp.122-123). Underscoring this understanding of organization is the notion of the self/other that is inherent in the concepts of consumer and producer – of audience and industry – a distinction that permeates much of the cultural policy discourse and literature.

The “self/other paradigm,” born from colonialism, is inherently linked with the question of inclusion/exclusion found in much of the contemporary cultural policy discourse (Looseley, 2005, p.148). This inclusion/exclusion dichotomy is perhaps most saliently expressed in the debate surrounding cultural policies that strive for the democratization of culture and those that promote cultural democracy – that is to say, a debate between whether policies should seek to protect and bring high culture to the masses or treat all culture equally, allowing individuals in the process to choose whatever forms and genres of culture that brings them the most pleasure (Evrard, 1997, pp.167-168). Inherent in both the policies that promote cultural democracy and those that promote the democratization of culture is the notion that culture (and cultural policy) must be instrumental in its practice and approach. The concept of instrumental cultural policy is often presented as a trend that conceives art and culture “as a means towards the fulfilment of other, not artistic, policy objectives” (Belfiore, 2006, p.230).
2.2.1: The Instrumentality of Cultural Policy in Identity Formation

The emphasis on instrumental cultural policy stems from a “need for arts and cultural policies to demonstrate” a benefit for creating culture that goes beyond the mere aesthetic (Gray, 2007, p.203). In the case of cultural policies that promote nationalism and foster a sense of national identity, instrumentality is apparent in both the policies that promote the democratization of culture – particularly with respect to the notion of protecting the culture and cultural elements that define a state’s identity – and the policies that promote cultural democracy – particularly in their potential to institutionalize cultural forms that feel (or are) marginalized, and/or are not highly esteemed or recognized by governing bodies – something that Zolberg (2003) contends is needed for the survival of certain forms of marginalized culture (p.300). It is perhaps ironic, then, that instrumentality inherently brings cultural democracy and democratization of culture policies in line to serve the same purpose: namely, adhering to the interests of the creative class – the proverbial arbiters of cultural taste. On the one hand, as the creative class, by definition, informs cultural taste (Florida, 2012, p.37), it arguably sets the tone for what is deemed high culture and low culture in society, and can, thus, have an impact on the forms of culture that are protected through cultural policy. On the other hand, as the creative industries are largely comprised of members of the creative class (O’Brien, 2014, pp.56-57), it stands to reason that the creative class has significant input in the overall production of mass culture. Moreover, as nationalism is often the subject of elite discourse (Beissinger, 1998), it perhaps goes without saying that the creative class, as the new elite (Florida, 2012), is influencing its message and the policies that govern it.

Thus, it can be said that instrumentality is at the heart of cultural policies that promote certain cultural identities or exhibit a nationalist flare – particularly where the cultural industries are concerned. In effect, the instrumentalization of culture is strongly linked to the cultural industries and is often driven by economic factors rather than cultural/societal factors (Wilson,
2010, p.370). That said, where instrumental cultural policies that promote nationalism arguably differ from the norm is that they are very much in tune with cultural and social factors. While, certainly, instrumental cultural policies draw upon the creative industries as a means of developing a sustainable and relatively independent economy (insofar as any state or sub-state’s economy can be independent), the economic factors are a means to an end – an end that is unquestionably cultural and societal in nature. The use of instrumental cultural policy as a means of fostering a sense of cultural identity has arguably been most prominently seen at the sub-state level, in provinces and regions with strong nationalist parties and agendas. What this thesis seeks to explore are the ways in which cultural policy, through its instrumentalization, can be used to promote a sense of national identity within sub-states. In particular, this thesis focuses on how and to what extent sub-states and their cultural policies have drawn upon the cultural industries as a means of generating a national identity. As the cultural industries are often – if not always – a crucial component of the development and dissemination of culture, it stands to reason that policies aiming to use culture to foster nationalism would invariably affect the cultural industries in some capacity.

2.2.2: The Commodification of Culture & Identity

Perhaps the most important element underlying the concept of the cultural industries is its relationship with culture and cultural policy. The very notion of the cultural industries – and in, particular, its emphasis on “material production and economic activity” – runs counter to the now classic, albeit highly prevalent, “tradition of idealist cultural analysis” that views culture as something separate from economic or fiscal functions (Garnham, 1985/1993, p.54). “True” art or culture, the argument follows, is divorced from any/all economic considerations, with public art gallery’s serving as bastions for art collections that are seen as being “beyond the dreams of
private avarice” (Carey, 2005, pp.xi-xii). Proponents of this idealist view contend that public cultural policy – particularly in the form of government subsidies to the arts – supports the notions that culture “possesses inherent values” that are “fundamentally opposed to and in danger of damage by commercial forces,” that these values are universally needed, and that this need is not or cannot be satisfied by the market (Garnham, 1985/1993, p.54). It is in this context that the role of cultural policy is seen as a means of addressing the market’s shortcomings by offering a democratization of culture that caters to the cultural needs of the masses –needs which the cultural industries do not address by virtue of those needs being economically or fiscally unprofitable. In fact, concern over the fiscal nature of culture vis-à-vis the cultural industries has long been a seminal critique of the cultural industries whose impetus is often geared towards profiting via the mass production of culture, regardless of its historical, symbol, or cultural significance.

Mass productions – or products that are mass produced – take their “places in a society distinguished by incessant transmission and an inexorable movement of decline” (Cooper, 2001, p.23). This decline is of the “aura” surrounding the “age of commodification,” spurred by the “death of the symbol” as a result of the commodification of cultural products through means of mass production (Eagleton, 1981, p.52). From a pragmatic perspective, a commodity is often understood as “an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another” (Marx, 1894/2009, p.1). A more nuanced understanding of a commodity, however, posits it as a product of human labour, one which possess an “abstract use-value” that is independent from its exchange value (pp.2-3). In this respect, the commodity carries a sort of “fetish character” insofar as it is, on the one hand, a “veneration of the thing made by oneself” and, on the other hand – and as an exchange value – it “alienates itself from producer to consumer” (Adorno, 1991, p.38). In the context of cultural production, a commodity can be seen
as a “mysterious thing” because producers will confer upon it a certain “social character” that is emblematic of the labour put into the commodity itself, while the consumer “worships” the money paid towards acquiring or experiencing the (cultural) commodity in question – instead, seeing the act of consuming, itself, to be a criterion of success over the value of the labour put towards acquiring the financial capital required to consume (p.38). In other words, the act of consumption carries with it a greater symbolic resonance than does the symbolism or meaning inferred by the cultural product being consumed.

As cultural products become commodified, their symbolic resonance diminishes as the volume of products increases – to the point where the symbolism of the original product, itself can lose all meaning. In other words, mass production is emblematic of the world’s impermanence (Cooper, 2001, p.23) – of the fact that eventually everything, even the mass products themselves, has an end or a “best before” date. The impermanence of cultural productions and the erosion of their symbolism through mass production (and subsequent reproduction) reconceptualises the relationship the audience or organization has with culture. The act of mass producing culture serves, in certain respects, to diminish its social significance and separate the notions of critical reception from those of pleasure. In broad terms, new inventions are often viewed with a measure of criticism and scepticism, while standard and longstanding conventions are viewed with a measure of satisfaction and pleasure – though often without criticism (Benjamin, 1936/2008, p.26). The pleasure derived from consuming cultural goods tends to subvert the capacity of individuals to think critically (Bernstein, 1991, p.11). Mass consumption – that is to say consumption on a massive scale, such as through television and film outlets, and often in the company of others – tends to manufacture a groupthink of sorts where, collectively, people tend to form or share a coinciding viewpoint or opinion that accentuates the absence of critical thought (Benjamin, 1936/2008, pp.26-27). What mass production – and, by
association, the cultural industries – produces or “reactivates and reinforces,” however, is the social aspects that underlie working-class relationships (Bourdieu, 1984, p.387). From this perspective, the cultural industries serve as a vehicle that, in one instance, erodes the critical thought of the industries’ audiences, and, in the next instance, brings those audiences together through a sense of shared social connectivity or identity.

To this end, the cultural industries offer governments a unique tool through which to develop a sense of community and cultural identity. As the domain of entertainment, the cultural industries offer pleasure, meaning, and social identity; they maintain a measure of power over their audience insofar as they are able to promote and portray the “subordinate” as different from the ordinate (Fiske, 1987, p.326). It is through this measured difference that the cultural industries can, in effect, control and moderate political action (p.326) – and it is in this capacity that the cultural industries are arguably most attractive to governments. However, governments’ use of the cultural industries in this capacity, in recent decades, has been marred by two overarching trends: the cultural industries tend to cater to the dominant middle-class tastes and particular conceptions of culture and nation; and governments have had a difficult time understanding the popular pleasures or popular tastes of the middle-class (p.324). Consequently, the cultural industries hold a measure of power, not just over the dominant middle class, but over the government as well, when it comes to influencing social groups. This capacity to influence social groups invariably assures the cultural industries a measure of power with respect to the development of a national identity – for the cultural industries are, by and large, producing a sense of belonging and a sense of community where, arguably, no community existed before.

That being said, governments – particularly those in developed countries – are not without their means of influence. Governments will often use “subtle and closely-knit procedures” to manipulate and control social networks (de Certeau, 1984, p.179). Amongst these procedures are
administrative and panoptic systems such as police, education, and healthcare services. These systems serve to create and enforce belief in a society. However, these systems are losing credibility: as their power increases, their authority dilutes (p.179). This credibility is contingent on belief – a belief that functions on the “reality-value” one ascribes to it. The most common means of ascribing reality-value is through the fictionalized conjecture that is citation. Citation and, more specifically, self-citation have become, perhaps, the most effective tools in creating belief – it is through citation that individuals and groups develop referential simulacrum. This dynamic is most saliently manifested, in contemporary terms, through surveys. Government and political parties, in particular employ surveys as a means of creating belief around a fictionalized version or understanding of a nation or a country (pp.188-189).

In this context, cultural policy operates as a mechanism through which government can control the cultural output of its cultural industries and establish the underlying meaning or purpose of cultural productions –effectively creating the belief needed to ensure panoptic systems remain credible. From this vantage, cultural policy can be seen as an expression through which governments define their role in bringing to fruition “their preferred mediascape” (Abramson, 2001, pp.301-302) – the environment in which media and culture are encapsulated. In its broadest sense, the mediascape represents both the technological production and dissemination of information and the “images of the world created by these media” (Appadurai, 2000, p.326). The mediascape acts as a locale within which “worldwide” identity formation occurs. This identity formation is a product of or a response to the contemporary globalized environment, one through which the media often seeks to support geographic boundaries and establish a “self/other distinction along the lines of our media/their media” (Sosale, 2010, p.211). In this light, cultural policy acts as a mechanism to protect and reinforce the self/other distinction – a distinction which is often at the root of policies aimed at developing a cultural identity.
2.3: Conceptualizing National Identities

Conceptually, there are as many definitions and understandings of nationalism as there are theories to explain the concept (Karolewski & Suszycki, 2011, p.57) – which is to say, there are a lot. To be sure, nationalism has been “a powerful political force” and the “subject of endless debate” on its meaning, content, and historical specificity (Keating, 2001a, p.1). From an historical perspective, the concept of nationalism – or, at the very least, the components from which the concept has been largely defined – can be traced as far back as the Roman Empire (Hirschi, 2012, p.10) – though many authors tend to situate the birth of nationalism, in its modern context, towards the end of the 18th century and, in particular, attribute it to the climax of the French Revolution (Kedourie, 1966, p.9) and the rise of the industrial revolution shortly thereafter (Pauly & Grande, 2005, p.10). This period gave rise to a “transformation in the manner” in which Western society began to react “to the world in all realms of experience” (Mannheim, 1936, p.67). Theorists began questioning their everyday experiences and started analysing the world from a more “nationally differentiated ‘folk spirit’” – one which was vested in the currents of historical-political thought (p.67). But to, perhaps, truly appreciate the concept of nationalism as it is used today, it is best to understand it in the context of democracy.

Nationalism is built on the premise that the “state is a universal institution of human society” (Gellner, 1997, p.6). From this premise, nationalists describe nationalism, itself, in similar terms, that is to say, as a self-evident “universal, perennial and inherently [...] valid principle” – one which manifests naturally through society and social order (p.7). This principle is acknowledged by many authors as being a fiction – one which nationalists inherently know to be false or imagined and to have been “conspicuous” in its absence at various points in history (pp.7-8). It is, however, through the false (or fictional) tenets of this principle that nationalism can (and does) manifest as either a sentiment or a movement. On the one hand, nationalism can
be understood as a sentiment in the sense that it “arouses” a feeling of anger if/when the political principle is violated, or a feeling of satisfaction if it is “fulfilled.” On the other hand, nationalism can be understood as a movement in the sense that such feelings of anger or fulfillment can “actuate” individuals into a movement (Gellner, 1983, p.1). Underscoring both the sentiment and movement of nationalism is the implicit notion that they are fabricated, in some way, by the state or through its auxiliaries – which sometimes includes the cultural industries. On the other hand, in what can perhaps best be described as a causality dilemma (or a chicken or egg debate), nationalism also functions as a conceptual or imagined device for creating nations where they did not previously exist (Anderson, 1991, p.6).

If there is one thing that defines democratic societies, it is that they “always emerge in distinct communities”; there are no historical records of democracies emerging spontaneously (Nodia, 1994, p.6). In fact, democracies tend to be highly rationalized systems of rules “legitimated by the people” under the presumption that those rules are there for the protection of their best interests (p.5). In this respect, imagination plays a prominent role in contemporary understandings of nationalism, serving as a basis for the ways in which people belonging to (or identifying with) a specific culture or nation will act or interact with other members of the same nation. While individuals may identify with and “share” an intrinsic and/or communal bond with other members of their nation/culture, that bond is often imagined insofar as the individuals in question seldom share any semblance of a relationship outside of having been born in the same geographic region (Anderson, 1991, p.6). Outside of, perhaps, the most “primordial villages of face-to-face contact,” even the more immediate notion of “community” can be considered imagined by most accounts (p.6). How one distinguishes one community from the next – one nation from the next – largely centres on the “style in which they are imagined” (p.6). In a first instance, nationalism is “imagined as limited” insofar as no single nation imagines itself
encompassing all of humankind; rather, nationalism serves as an implicit form of distinction between multiple groups or communities of people (p.7). In a second instance, nationalism is often imagined as sovereignty – in no small part “because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” (p.7). Thus, in many cases, nationalist aspirations bear with them aspirations of freedom. It is with this freedom in mind that, in a final instance, nationalism is imagined as a community of equals – one which evokes a sense of pride and belonging to the point where people are willing “to die for such limited imaginings” (p.7).

Why people are willing to die for their imagined community is a question that often revolves around cultural considerations (Anderson, 1991, p.9). Monuments and war memorials, for instance, often serve as “arresting emblems” of nationalism in modern culture, there to exemplify the sacrifice of individuals who were prepared to die to ensure the survival and continuance of a national identity (p.9). Yet, beyond the symbolic significance attributed to one’s sense of national identity, the emergence of the concept of nationalism coincides with a decline in “axiomatic” value of three “fundamental cultural concepts” in the 1800s: the notion that script-language offered a measure of ontological truth; the belief that society is built around “high-centre monarchies”; and the conception of temporality, wherein “cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of man essentially identical” (p.36). The sum of these cultural concepts provided people with a sense of being and belonging; without them, people began searching for other outlets to link “fraternity, power, and time meaningfully together” (p.36). For many, that link came in the form of nationalism, with cultural production – largely in the form of print media in nationalism’s early conceptions – serving as a vehicle for its dissemination (p.46). In other words, culture has served and continues to serve as a significant impetus in the development and dissemination of nationalism.
From an ontological perspective, concepts of nationalism have been deeply ingrained in the concept of the “nation.” For its part, up until the 18th century, the term “nation” was used as a plural noun to describe the “collection of individuals who, by constant intercourse, come to acquire some traits in common” and “those people who inhabit a certain extent of country defined within certain limits, and obeying the same government” (Kedourie, 1966, p.14). This understanding of the nation, however, began to take on a more politically driven meaning in the 19th century. From absolutist, to constitutional, and then, finally, to democratic, the concept of state evolved from one of monarchy to one of self-determination through a dialectic process informed by concepts of parliamentary, popular, and State sovereignty espoused by the likes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and, later, Max Weber (Pauly & Grande, 2005, p.10). Emerging from this dialect on the nation is a concept that views the nation as a “body of persons who could claim to represent – or to elect representatives for – a particular territory at councils, diets, or estates” (Kedourie, 1966, p.14). This new, politicized understanding of a nation brought with it a doctrine that presupposes a “criterion” for determining: 1) who (i.e. the “unit of population proper”) should be considered part of a nation; 2) how power should be legitimately exercised within the nation, and 3) the hierarchical organization of a nation’s society (p.9). This criterion was effectively known and defined as nationalism – and it is, ultimately, through nationalism, that the political aims of the nation or national group are articulated and promoted (Harris, 2009, pp.4-5). To this end, if there is one, common trait to be found in the various conceptions of nationalism, it is that they seek to “vest political sovereignty in ‘the people’” – to the point where “people” and “nation” often become synonymous (Ignatieff, 1993, p.3).

From a politically philosophical perspective, nationalism is a concept that treads between two (or, by some accounts, three or more) ideal-types or idealized, albeit highly incompatible, perceptions of life in the context of a nation: civic and ethnic nationalism (Keating, 2001a, p.3).
The first of these ideal-types, civic nationalism, suggests that a nation is composed of “all those – regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language, or ethnicity – who subscribe to the nation’s political creed” (Ignatieff, 1993, p.3) This type of nationalism often manifests as a “collective enterprise of its members […] rooted in acquired rather than ascriptive identity” (Keating, 2001a, p.6). The basis of civic nationalism is territorial in nature, and built around “common values, institutions, and patterns of social interaction” (p.6). Anyone is welcome to join the nation “irrespective of birth or ethnic origins, though the cost of adaptation varies” (p.6). More often than not, civic nationalism begins “from the individual and builds to the nation” in its approach to recognizing individual rights (p.7). By contrast, the second type of nationalism, ethnic nationalism, presupposes that an “individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen” (Ignatieff, 1993, pp.4-5). Moreover, ethnic nationalism suggests that it is the nation that defines the individual, not the individual who informs/defines the nation (p.5). This type of nationalism is also sometimes perceived as a barrier that restricts one’s ability to express oneself in terms of their own choosing – instead, forcing them to conform to the norms and values of the state. Nationalism, in this context, is seen as an obstacle that can and must be overcome in order to achieve self-determination (Beiner, 1999, pp.1-2). Ethnic nationalism sometimes serves as a “catch-all term for any social division which cannot be otherwise categorized, for example by class, ideology or gender” (Keating, 2001a, p.4). In either case, nationalism can be described in terms of a moral claim that justifies or entitles the use of violence as a means of defending one’s nation from “enemies, internal or external” (Ignatieff, 1993, p.3). In other words, a claim to nationalism can effectively serve to determine the proper conditions under which violence can be used to protect a people’s right to self-determination.

It is, arguably, in the context of determining the proper conditions for violence that nationalism has largely become associated with the Third World – or, more specifically, the
“rhetoric of anticolonialism and anti-imperialism” that underpins the ethnic conflicts that are seen to originate from developing or Third World countries (Diamond & Plattner, 1994, p.ix). In Europe (and Western Society as a whole), the concept of nationalism lost a lot of lustre following the Second World War – replaced by physical and psychological exhaustion, “world-weary” cynicism, and anxiety over the emergence of Soviet communism (Smith, 2014, p.31). Rather than nationalism, people sought solace in “economic survival and liberal democracy,” underscored by “greater individualism and scepticism towards state-inspired national rituals” (p.31). While nationalism saw a renaissance of sorts following the collapse of the Soviet Union, its “popularity” was divisive. On the one hand, nationalism was viewed as a “liberating force” that freed “captive nations” from the clutches of communism and allowed them a greater measure of autonomy; on the other hand, nationalism was seen as a “retrogressive force that threaten[ed] minority rights and peaceful relations among states” (Caplan & Feffer, 1996, p.3). Proponents of nationalism argue that it is “not an end in itself,” but a means toward developing a more egalitarian and cosmopolitan society (Diamond & Plattner, 1994, p.xi). Opponents of nationalism, on the other hand, have been quick to point to the collapse of the Second International in 1914 and the rise to power of Nazi Germany in 1933 as examples of where and how nationalist movements – when employed in developed countries – can lead to devastating outcomes (Dunn, 1999, p.27). Simply put, nationalist movements do not always constitute democratic movements; the definition of the people who constitute the “nation” is not always inclusive (Ignatieff, 1993, p.3).

More often than not, however, once nationalism has been accepted by a sufficient number of people – by a majority of the state, in most cases – it ceases to be recognized as nationalism. For this to occur, the national majority must adopt or integrate “cultural elements from minorities,” often in the form of cultural policies that recognize and protect the cultural rights of
minorities (Winter, 2009, p.1). In doing so, national majorities seek to portray themselves as “open and tolerant” societies. However, despite this intent, national majorities remain culturally specific – that is to say, these national majorities exhibit a specific and distinct culture. As a result, national majorities will often “reproduce their nationalism without reference to their cultural particularity” – and when they do reference their cultural practices, it is often done as a means of legitimizing “the established order of society” (p.1). To “mitigate” their cultural particularity, national majorities will often “project” difference onto minority or sub-nations as a means of asserting a measure of power over the minorities – and to inherently establish, in the process, a cultural dichotomy between the majority and minority (pp.1-2). This sort of “us” and “them” dichotomy serves as a sort of “counterimage” between the inclusive majority that embraces ethnic and cultural difference, and the exclusive minority that is seeking to distinguish itself from the majority (Winter, 2014, p.132). In other words, majoritarian nationalism, in the context of inclusiveness, is a façade that serves to undermine the intentions of the minority nationalism – and arguably guilt or shame them into assimilating and/or culturally integrating into the majority.

Thus, it is through cultural integration that the “political consciousness” of being part of or having membership in a nation takes hold (Habermas, 1998, p.493). In this respect, nationalism is “a form of consciousness that presupposes an appropriation […] of cultural traditions” – albeit a highly selective appropriation that, more often than not, cherry-picks the cultural elements that are most favourable for the purposes of the majoritarian culture (p.493). This consciousness, which originates in an “educated bourgeoisie public” or elite, “spreads” through various channels of mass communication and public media. Through the elite and public media, many of the artificial or imagined aspects of nationalism come to fruition. These artificial aspects serve the elite by making nationalism more susceptible to manipulation or misuse.
Where this misuse is perhaps most evident is with respect to the cultural elements integrated or discarded by nations. By its very nature, culture is fluid; it varies from one community to the next. Because of its fluidity, culture and cultural traits are invariably subject to change – a change which, under certain organizational contexts, can be deliberately controlled (Gellner, 1997, pp.2-3). By measure of selectively integrating or adopting specific cultural traits and traditions into its national identity, nations (and national movements) are exerting control over the ways in which those traits evolve over time and, by extension, controlling their nation’s identity.

2.4: From Thinking Government to Government Thinking: Governmentality – Concepts & Theories

To understand what is meant by governmentality, it is perhaps best to begin with an understanding of what “government” actually means in the context of governmentality. In the Foucauldian tradition, government is defined as the “conduct of conduct” – that is to say, conduct in the sense of leading or directing (Dean, 2010, p.17). More specifically, this understanding of government – which shares more than a passing connection to the classic, Heclovian notions of public policy “as what governments do” – presupposes that government is comprised of just about any “calculated and rational activity undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies” (p.18). Moreover, these agencies employ a “variety of techniques and forms of knowledge” in the pursuit of shaping “conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors” for various definitive albeit shifting ends – the likes of which have “a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes” (p.18). In other words, government represents the ensemble of activities that conduct – that “shape, guide, or affect” – the conduct – in this case, the behaviour – of various social actors (Gordon,
It is through this ensemble of activities that governments seek an “unconditional obedience, uninterrupted examination and exhaustive confession” from their constituents (Foucault, 1980b/1999, p.157). From this understanding, “government as an activity” can be (and often is) concerned with the various “relations between self and self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty” (Gordon, 1991, pp.2-3).

With this consortium of activities in mind, Foucault set about developing the concept of governmentality as a means of broadening the study of government “beyond just the state” (O’Brien, 2014, p.29). When defining governmentality, Foucault (1978/1994) identifies three key characteristics. The first is the “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calculations, and tactics” that facilitate the exercise of a “specific albeit complex form of power” that targets apparatuses of security as its “target population, […] principal form of knowledge political economy, and […] essential technical means” (p.244). The second is the emergence, through the pre-eminence of a form of power best defined as “government,” of a series of specific governmental apparatuses and a “complex of knowledges [saviors]” (p.244). The third is the transformation – or governmentalization – of the Medieval state of justice into the administrative state of the 15th and 16th centuries (and onward) (p.244). Inherent in the concept of governmentality is the sense that governments and states are no longer defined by territory, but by the mass of their populations – with social control of the state coming from the apparatuses of security (p.245). With security in mind, Foucault (1979/1999) notes that political action is “reflective and perfectly aware of its specificity” – emerging from the doctrines of “the reason of state” and the “theory of police” (p.145). The reason of state is a doctrine that seeks to define the principles and methods of state government while distinguishing it from other forms of authority
– such as familial or religious authority. This doctrine, among other things, defines governing as an art – one which seeks to reinforce the state and, in doing so increase the state’s strength vis-à-vis that of other states. The theory of police, on the other hand, positions the police – the apparatuses of security – as a governmental technology “peculiar to the state” (p.147). To this effect, the role of the police is to reinforce the power of the state: “the police [...] supply [men] with a little extra life; and by so doing, supply the state with a little extra strength” – a process which is accomplished by controlling communication (p.149).

It is with control – of communications and, to a large degree, culture – in mind that the notion of governmentality is conceptualized as a process or approach wherein governments try to manufacture citizens who will respect and adhere to their policies (Barnett et al., 2008). This manufacturing is to the point where the “practices of individuality become invested by relations of power” in ways that “individuals and families” go about fulfilling their “socially prescribed duties” under the impression or belief that it is of their own volition (Howe, 2002, p.56). In this sense, government – as a concept – is understood as capturing the “emerging techniques, institutional as well as scientific, of social production and social control,” with “governmentality” serving to further its analysis (O’Brien, 2014, p.29). As such, governmentality can be seen as a concept that seeks to understand the degree to which governments have effectively socialized their citizens.

With governmentality, Foucault was not so much attempting to develop an “alternative theory of the state” as he was trying to shift focus onto the “practises and rationalities that compose the means of rule and government” (Kerr, 1999, p.174). Rather, in shifting its focus away from state theories, proponents of governmentality argue that they are better able to “analyze the complex and heterogeneous ways in which contemporary authorities have sought to shape and regulate economic, social and personal activities” (p.174). In establishing this line of
reasoning, Foucault set about distancing the study of government from the political rhetoric that had long permeated the social sciences. Foucault did so, in part, by placing an emphasis not just on the power dynamics of government in relation to their constituents, but also on the modes or practices through which power is exercised (Hatchuel et al., 2005, p.9). Rather than simply explore the nature of power in the context of what groups or individuals possess it, governmentality is more concerned with the “practices of power” – that is to say, where it is installed and how it produces effects in the everyday lives, actions, and interactions of individuals (Macleod & Durrheim, 2002, p.43). In this context, power is “immanent to everyday relationships” – including, among others, “economic, exchanges, knowledge relationships, [and] sexual relations” (p.43). As such, individuals, themselves, are “an effect of power” (Bevir, 1999, p.65). Analysis of power, therefore, must ascend, beginning first with its “infinitesimal mechanisms” before moving on to the means and methods through which those mechanisms have been “invested, colonized, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination” (Foucault, 1976b/1980, p.99). In other words, the governmentalist approach is one that traces “the operation of power as it creates subjects, discourses, and institutions through time” (Bevir, 1999, as ctd. by Raco, 2003, p.77).

To this end, the concept of governmentality is often divided into two distinct aspects – rationalities and technologies – as a way of distinguishing between the “knowing” of a phenomenon and the process of “acting upon it” to elicit or enact change (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.15). In its first aspect, governmentality can be understood as rationalities, programs, or mentalities (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.15; Dean, 2010, p.24) – a notion often interchangeable with the “art of government” (Gordon, 1991, p.3). In particular, governmentality, in this first aspect, deals with “how we think about governing”; it explores the different rationalities or mentalities of government (Dean, 2010, p.24). The notion of “mentality” carries with it the idea that “thinking
is a collective activity” – one that is “a collective, relatively bounded unity [...] not readily examined by those who inhabit it” (pp.24-25). Moreover, the plurality of “rationalities” or “mentalities” infers that there is not one, unique rationality; rather, there are multiple rationalities – multiple “styles of thinking [and] ways of rendering reality thinkable” so as to make it “amenable to calculation and programing” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.16). However, these rationalities all exhibit a certain, discernible “family resemblance” in their ways of “thinking and acting” (p.17). Emphasis, here, is placed on how “the thinking” involved in the “practices of government” is explicit and embedded – in language and other technical instruments – to the point that these practices are often taken for granted and seldom questioned by their practitioners (or by society for that matter) (Dean, 2010, p.25). The art of government, therefore, comes from a government’s ability to “govern without governing society, or the development of reflexive government” – a rationality behind which “the ends of policy also become their means” (Raco, 2003, p.76). The logic follows that “when power operates from a distance” people are less aware of how or why their “conduct is being conducted” and are, therefore, less likely to question an absence of consent in the process (Murray Li, 2007, p.275).

Inherent in the first aspect of governmentality is the notion that individuals are subject to the “absolute” power of the state, “subjects of and subject to [its] power and protection” (Scott, 1995, p.202). Law or policy, in this context, is employed (or deployed) “as an instrumentality” – a means toward the “political end of commanding obedience” from the populace (p.202). That being said, laws themselves, are seldom used outside of as a tactic to “arrange things in such a way” as to achieve the desired ends (Foucault, 1978, as ctd. by Scott, 1995, p.202). Instead, the rational aspects of government mentalities rely on society’s collective knowledge of a “government of nations” – often in the context of “taken for granted” government activities, such as its role in the “national economy,” and often disseminated to the masses through “a certain
class of specialists” such as economists and experts (Dean 2010, p.25). Experts, in this context, function as a failsafe, adjusting the relationship between state and citizen in moments of uncertainty or unrest – mitigating potentially “destructive” processes and ensuring that corrective interventions “foster beneficial processes” (Murray Li, 2007, pp.275-276). These processes, however, can be quite expensive (pp.275-276). For this reason, governmentality asks the question of how to introduce economy – “the correct way of managing individuals, goods, and wealth within the family” – into the “management of the state” (Foucault, 1978/1994, p.234). The idea behind this approach – which speaks to the inherent (and perhaps idealized) nature and purpose of government, itself – is to “secure the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etcetera” (Foucault, 1991, as ctd. by Murray Li, 2007, p.275). Because these objectives are not easily achieved on a population-wide level, governments must operate by “educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs” (Murray Li, 2007, p.275). In some cases, governments have used cultural policy as a means of “reconstituting citizen subjects loyal to a particular form of dialogue” (Ouellette, 2003, p.119). Simply put, the mentality of governmentality is one where citizens are socialized to see and rely on government (and government intervention) to the point where it becomes second nature – to the point where government becomes a staple of modern existence.

By emphasising government mentalities, Foucault arguably laid the foundation for what Hatchuel (2005) describes as an “epistemology of collective action” – one which enables researches to more effectively analyze contemporary modernity (p.15). Far from the Kantian tradition of approaching modernity research in the context of rationality, this approach is oriented towards the actual limits of necessity (p.16). Through the rationalities of governmentality, governments have artificially set conditions so that their constituents, “following only their own self-interest, will do as they ought” (Scott, 1995, pp.202-203). In implicitly defining what their
citizens “ought,” governments are defining both the ends they are seeking and the “right” methods of achieving those ends – a process that speaks to a calculated, tactical approach to achieving “optimal results” (Murray Li, 2007, p.276). Moreover, this process speaks to how governments attach themselves to “technologies for bringing improved states into being” (p.276).

It is in the context of actualizing or “rendering operable” government rationalities that the second dimension of governmentality – technologies – can be understood (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.15). Specifically, what is meant by technologies is the “assemblages of persons, techniques, institutions, [and] instruments for the conducting of conduct” (p.16). These technologies are, perhaps, best described as “processes” prescribed to individuals “in order to fix, maintain or transform their identities with particular ends in view” (Foucault, 1981, as ctd, by Goldstein, 1999, p.42). The first of these technologies are the “technologies of production.” These technologies allow for the production, transformation, and manipulation of things – such as, for instance, cultural productions or symbols. The second type of technologies is the “technologies of sign systems.” This type of technologies facilitates the use of signs, symbols, meanings, and/or significations. The third type of technologies is the “technologies of power.” It is through this third type of technology that individual conduct is determined and “submit[ed] to certain ends or dominations” (Foucault, 1978/1994, p.146). The final type of technologies is “technologies of the self.” This latter technologies-type allows individuals “to effect [...] a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls” with the goal of transforming themselves (p.146). According to Foucault, these technologies operate in such a way as to offer an individual “a mastery of the self by the self or a knowledge of the self by the self” (Goldstein, 1999, p.42). In other words, these final technologies provide the means by which individuals are able to know themselves and, more importantly, exercise a measure of agency in shaping their own identities – or, at the very least, they provide the illusion of agency.
Implicit in Foucault’s discourse on technologies – and in particular, technologies of the self – is a notion he defines as “subjectivation” – a term, in the Foucauldian vernacular, that ambiguously serves to suggest that “subject-making” is not simply a matter of subjection; there is a measure of human agency involved in the process of becoming a subject (Goldstein, 1999, p.43). In other words, technologies of the self operate as mechanisms for subjectifying an individual, first through “interpersonal mechanisms of power/knowledge necessarily involving an element of coercion”; then, through an individual’s “illusory conviction” that they are “acting autonomously and [are] engaged in a ‘purely’ reflexive act of self-fashioning on the basis of values freely assented to” (p.44). Underscoring subjectivation, then, is consideration of “thought” – that is to say, that government activity, as it relates to governmentality, is “made possible by and constrained by what can be thought and what cannot be thought at any particular moment in our history” (Rose, 1994, as ctd. by Thrift 2000, p.205). This is an important consideration as it informs the ways in which knowledge and knowledge production serve to produce populations that, in turn “preserve and reproduce social order” (O’Brien, 2014, p.29). Central, if sometimes implicit, to the preservation and reproduction of certain social orders are the ways in which Foucault’s technologies – through space and institutions – inform and produce individual and collective identities “through the inscription of particular ethical formations, vocabularies of self-description and self-mastery, forms of conduct and body techniques” (Rose, 1999, as ctd. by Thrift, 2000, p.206). In other words, questions of subjectivation are inherently connected to identity formation insofar as the concept is linked to how individuals not only perceive themselves, but how they perceive themselves in the broader context of society. In the case of national minorities, for instance, their perceptions of self are inherently rooted in the context of being a minority who is subject to a cultural majority.
2.4.1: The Power of Cultural Identities: Applying Knowledge, Power, & Governmentality

One of the key challenges inherent in much of the identity scholarship is that “it has few theoretical moorings”; researchers often approach the concept from an “intuitive, commonsensical manner” (Goldstein, 1998, p.41). Generally, scholars have focused on one of two phenomena when exploring the concept of identity: consumption – namely, “lifestyles, advertising, and shopping” – or “the ‘intimate’ sphere of home, relationships sexuality, and family life” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.173). These approaches, however, often characterize identity through “enhanced reflexivity, autonomy, or uncertainty” – often at the expense of recognizing the enacting influence or subjugation that social institutions and environments, such as the workplace, can have on a person’s identity (p.173). As such, contemporary theoretical interest in identity almost begs to be approached from Foucault’s technologies of self as they offer a “finely historically attuned” approach to questions of identity – one which is “capable of adjustment according to the different intellectual, institutional, social and political environments in which selfhood is embedded at historical moments” (Goldstein, 1998, p.41). From the Foucauldian perspective, then, questions surrounding the development of a cultural or national identity are often wrapped up in the interrelated notions of knowledge, power, and truth.

In broad strokes, and in a modern technologically and multimedia driven society, power is almost exclusively “conferred through the optimal management of knowledge” (Lévy, 1997/1999, p.1). Knowledge is “governed by certain rules” that determine what can and cannot be accepted as truth, what constitutes evidence and proof, and how and to what extent these criteria can be used (Rabinow & Rose, 1994, p.xii). Thus, the way in which knowledge is governed – controlled – infers power, and those who govern knowledge possess power. Power, in many respects, manifests as a form of operation “of political technologies throughout the social
body” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.185). These technologies function as rituals of power which, in turn, determine the “nonegalitarian, asymmetrical relations” in society. Generally, political technologies are not restricted to political institutions, and similarly cannot be identified or be specifically attached to any one institution. However, when applied or localized to an institution, such as policy institutions – or, in the context of this thesis, cultural (industries) policy – the result is that of bio-power – the order created in a “realm” through the promise of welfare (pp. xxii & 185). As such, power “only exists when it is put into action,” and the “exercise of power” constitutes both a relationship between people and “a mode of action upon the actions of others” (Foucault, 1982, p.219-221).

In the context of identity, power is derived by those who exercise a measure of control over the discourse surrounding culture. Given its intricate links to culture and nationalism, identity often falls under the purview of cultural producers and, more broadly, cultural industries. Given that power “plays a directly productive role” and that bio-power “really begins its take-off” in contexts where political technologies “find a localization within specific institutions” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.185), it can be argued that – as the primary, localized producers of culture – the cultural industries exert a profound measure of power over cultural, regional, and nationalist discourse. Recall, there are four major types of technologies in the Foucauldian lexicon – though many more can be found throughout his writings – that often function in conjunction with each other and with respect to certain forms of domination: technologies of production; technologies of sign systems; technologies of power; and technologies of the self (Foucault, 1978/1994, p.146). In conjunction, the third and fourth types of technologies form what can best be described as governmentality (p.147). In this light, the establishment of a cultural identity can be seen as an apparatus of security in the sense that, through its development and maintenance, social control of the state is maintained – if not explicitly, then most certainly
implicitly. As an apparatus of security, cultural or national identity fosters or, perhaps more accurately, socializes – in part through discipline and punishment (Goldstein, 1998, pp.42-43) – a sense of subjugation and obligation to the state, without which individuals would not be held in check nor would they have the moral or social responsibility or obligation that is inferred from being part of an organization or state. It is, arguably, in the manufacturing of this sense of obligation and belonging to the state (or to an organization or culture) that the cultural industries exercise a measure of power over identity-formation.

With power (or control) in mind, perhaps the most salient forms of Foucauldian technologies with respect to questions of cultural identity and cultural policy are cultural technologies and, more broadly, technologies of the self. In particular, cultural technologies function as the systemic machinery of “institutions and organizational structures and processes that produce particular configurations of knowledge and power” (McGuigan, 2002, p.31). The problem, however, with conceptualizing cultural technologies in terms of power in the context of culture (i.e. cultural power) is that it assumes that power can be localized in “one group or another” and/or that “power operates systematically” (Hills, 2002, p.43). These are assumptions that have the potential to “disturb and disrupt one another, rather than being logically or materially harmonious” (p.43). Instead, cultural power emerges as a result of the “interference between, and the amplification of, different moments of othering and different moral dualisms” (pp.43-44). These dualisms serve as a means of distinction, of differentiation, between one’s self and others; they establish parameters within which an individual can identify. Thus, questions of cultural technology and power are often wrapped up in conceptions of identity, self, and the broader technologies of self – that is to say, there is a measure of, not unlike with the concepts of cultural identity and nationalism (Freake, Gentil, & Sheyholislami, 2011), identifying one’s self through differentiation.
It is from this perspective that an individual can be said to be “an effect of power” (Goldstein, 1998, p.42). As previously discussed, technologies of the self presuppose a measure of subjectivity that is “founded or constituted through interpersonal mechanisms of power/knowledge [...] involving an element of coercion” (p.44). Subjectivity, thus, is a manifestation of an individual’s convictions – convictions that are “ultimately [...] illusory” in nature (p.44). These illusory convictions suppose that individuals act autonomously and “engage in a ‘purely’ reflexive act of self-fashioning on the basis of values freely assented to” (p.44).

From the perspective that cultural identity (and national identity) is a cultural artefact built around the imagined political community that is the nation (Murcott, 1996), the construct of a national identity is then necessarily built around the illusionary values that an individual, group, or community coercively accept(s) or acknowledge(s) as self-fashioned. This perspective highlights an “inversion” of the principles of antiquity: where once knowledge of one’s self was considered a “consequence of the care of the self;” now, knowing one’s self is seen as a “fundamental principle” while “taking care of one’s self” is seen as immoral (Foucault, 1978/1994, pp.149-150). Paradoxically, knowing one’s self is a form of self-renunciation (p.149) – a form of acquiescence to the state or institution to which one belongs.

In certain contexts, knowledge (including knowledge of one’s self) represents a form of currency – one that is “produced in order to be sold” and “consumed in order to be valorized in a new production,” with the ultimate goal being that of “exchange” (Lyotard, 1979, p.4). The production of knowledge, itself, is arguably linked to the “three major types of techniques in human society” outlined by Habermas that permit individuals to produce, manipulate, and transform: the techniques of production, signification, and domination – with perhaps the latter, domination, being the most important when it comes to knowledge of self and, by extension, technologies of self (Foucault, 1980a/1999, pp.161-162). Thus, the value of knowledge and ideas
go beyond mere reference to objects; value must be “determined by the degree of [...] utility” of the ideas in question (Durkheim, 1972, p.251). This corresponds with the theory of practice which suggests that “objects of knowledge are constructed” around the principle that their construction should be a “practical activity oriented towards practical functions” (Bourdieu, 1977, p.96). To this extent, the value of knowledge is intrinsically linked to its practicality. The utility of knowledge, then, particularly as it relates to identity, is in the practical way knowledge permits the state to dominate the individual, to create or foster the ideal citizen replete with national pride and belonging.

To maintain the legitimacy of its identity, the state must “insist on [a] linkage” between organization and culture – one which often necessitates that the organization “be composed of persons of the same culture” (Gellner, 1997, p.6). In other words, states often require that their leadership and institutional power rest in the hands of members of their national culture (p.6). The reason for this, inherently, is that it ensures a measure of continuity with respect to the existing, majority culture; however, it also allows said majority culture to exert control over minority cultures. While states may welcome multiculturalism and diversity within their borders – in fact, from the 1970s onward, countries such as Canada, Australia, and the majority of those belonging to the European Union have adopted official multicultural policy to promote and enrich the diversity of their states (Baycan-Levent, 2010, p.566) – there have, nevertheless, been ongoing debates surrounding their merits vis-à-vis economic growth, prosperity, and efficiency. For this reason, many countries have introduced policies aimed at, on the one hand, ensuring the continued cultural identity and nationalism of its citizens, and, on the other hand, integrating or indoctrinating a sense of nationalism into its migrant populations (p.569). In point of fact, in recent decades, migration has played a significant role in shaping – or, more aptly, in some cases, reshaping – modern concepts of state sovereignty and cultural identity – and it is through cultural
and intercultural policy that governments and sub-state governments have sought to strike a balance between maintaining their cultural identity(ies) and augmenting and integrating an “ethno-culturally diverse” immigrated labour force into their society (Blad & Couton, 2009, pp.646-657).

2.5: Normalizing Cultural Policy: Conceptualizing Polity through the Economies of Worth

Implicit in the discourse surrounding integration is the idea that there is a particular logic or rationality to government action where identity is concerned – a strategic approach to the overall process of identity formation. In the economy of conventions mould, the argument follows that rationality, itself, is a social construct that both shapes and is shaped by policy (Rousselière & Vézina, 2009). For its part, the economy of conventions is a theoretical construct that explores “how identity, values, and practices are articulated within a particular institutional framework” (p.242). This is an important consideration in the context of how individuals and organizations formulate identities. This is particularly true in the information age when a “crisis of legitimacy” – fuelled by global networks of “wealth, power, and information” – has begun to erode or void the “meaning and function of institutions of the industrial era” – including political and bureaucratic institutions (Castells, 1997, p.354). As the world becomes progressively more globalized, the urgency and agency of institutional ideologies are becoming “deprived of actual meaning in the new social context” (pp.354-355). Consequently, the sources of what Castells (1997) defines as legitimizing identity – that is to say, the identity(ies) “introduced by dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination” over other social actors (p.8) – are being “drained away” – to the point where concepts of shared identity have begun to dissolve without any new identities (shared or otherwise) necessarily emerging to replace them (p.355).
This process speaks to what Castells (1997) describes as the emergence of a world “exclusively made of markets, networks, individuals, and strategic organizations” that are governed by “rational expectations” that often break down in the face of self-interest (p.355). It is as a response (and counterpoint) to this “new world” that many countries have discarded all pretenses to legitimacy by pursuing nationalism as a means of “clawing back from history to the principle of power for the sake of power” (p.355). From a theoretical perspective, then, institutional theories allows for a nuanced understanding of institutional change in the context of globalization. In a first instance, it offers an explanation – beyond mass production (e.g. Adorno, 1991; Benjamin, 1936/2008) – for how and why cultural policy and the cultural industries have had a significant, often homogenizing effect on culture. In a second instance, it offers a means of interpreting the rationale of cultural policies introduced by national minorities in what is progressively becoming a globalized world. One of the most popular theoretical formulations of the economy of conventions is the work of Boltanski and Thévenot, in what is now known as the “economies of worth” framework.

Underscoring many of the dynamics implicit in institutional discourse are questions of justification and legitimacy. In particular, these questions touch on the ways in which individuals and institutions come to agree or disagree on certain actions (or inactions) – how individuals and institutions address the accord or disaccord that can emerge through their social interactions, and how they ultimately justify whatever decision(s) they make (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.39). It is with accord and disaccord in mind that Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) developed the foundations of what they define as the economies of worth (sometimes referred to as orders of worth) – an approach and framework that fundamentally seeks to understanding how and why individuals (or groups) are, on the one hand, able to voice their disagreements or displeasures in exchanges with others without having to resort to violence; and, on the other hand, develop...
lasting accords in spite of those disagreements (p.39). In many respects, the economies of worth framework offers an approach that seeks to move beyond “accounts of society that reduce all social relationships to issues of power or interest” (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.230). While Boltanski and Thévenot acknowledge that questions of power and interest – and even violence – play a prominent role in the ways in which social actions are analysed, their argument is that a world in which human relations are governed uniquely by questions of power and interest is problematic insofar as it is untenable in the long run and is evocative of a sort of a “wicked utopia” (utopie du pire) (Boltanski, 2003, as ctd. by Blondeau & Sevin, 2004, par.1). Instead, the economies of worth framework is focused on how the “mundane and not so mundane aspects of life” meet a “standard of justifiability” and serve as “the template for social action” (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.230). In other words, the framework offers a template through which normative values and symbolic orders can be examined, and through which their justifications can be understood.

In developing the economies of worth, Boltanski and Thévenot drew on peoples’ capacity to criticize as their starting point for analysis. In particular, they recognized that, in human relationships, there are invariable moments when an individual will experience discontent with the other person (or people) in their relationship – to the point where they will voice their discontent. In order for their criticism to carry any weight, the person expressing discontent must be able to offer some form of justification for their criticisms – much as the person whose actions are being criticized must offer a justification of their own in defence of their actions (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.230). Implicit in this process of justification is the notion that individuals possess “shared conventions or principles to make their claim acceptable to others” (Lemasson, 2015, p.2). It is with this notion of shared conventions in mind that the concept of worth comes into play:
‘Orders of worth’ govern criticisms and justifications that claim legitimacy (1) on the grounds that evaluations of worth ascribe qualifications for the common good and thus benefit all; and (2) on condition that these qualifications not be permanently ascribed to persons as statuses but rather be put to an in situ reality test (Thévenot, 2014, p.8).

When these two conditions (i.e. “the common good and reality test”) remain unmet – which is often the case – a sense of injustice emerges in the individuals involved (Thévenot, 2014, p.8). With this in mind, and through the study of disputes in the context of everyday life, Boltanski and Thévenot identified six shared “higher” principles or “principles of equivalence” (modelled as polities or cités) through which individuals are able to evaluate the worth of a justification (Lemasson, 2015, p.2) – though the emphasis on justification often comes at the expense of other forms of action or engagement and without offering much in the way of a new philosophical outlook (Latour, 1995, pp.8-9).

Drawing on a series of classic works in the occidental tradition of political philosophy, the polities model of the economies of worth seeks to establish a sort of grammar to test the veracity of common human qualities within certain contexts or worlds (Boltanski, 2003, as ctd. by Blondeau & Sevin, 2004, par.9). The rationale in establishing six polities is to acknowledge that there is no general or uniform conception of justice in society. Rather, there are, at the very least, “six different ways in which action can be deemed just” – each of which forms the basis for how someone can rationalize their actions (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.232). Serving as the theoretical basis of the economies of worth framework, the polities are complemented by a more applied construct, what Boltanski and Thévenot define as the “common worlds” (Rousselière & Vézina, 2009, p.242). In total, there are six common worlds, each closely associated with one of the six polities: inspired, domestic, opinion, civic, industrial, and market (Lemasson, 2014, p.3). Like the polities, the common worlds are modelled around historical constructs that have varying degrees of influence in the way people justify their actions. Through the common worlds – and
the polities that govern them – individuals are able to “coordinate themselves” and assign “people and things to an order of worth” as a means of justifying social inequalities (Rousselière & Vézina, 2009, p.242). Each world “is populated with distinctive subjects (people), objects (things), qualifiers (identifying state of worthiness), relations, schemes of classification and forms of legitimacy” that provide the basis for how “people interact on terms of justice” or injustice (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.232). These interactions can occur within specific common worlds or between multiple worlds – and are made more complex by the fact that subjects almost always belong to multiple worlds at any given time. For instance, a person can belong to both the industrial world from a professional or employment perspective and the domestic world from a cultural or familial perspective. The actions an individual takes, then, are informed by the worlds they belong to and are often the product of choosing the principles of one world over those of another within a specific context or circumstances (e.g. establishing a work-life balance).

The underlying assumption made with the application of the common worlds is that they “are sufficient to describe justifications performed in the majority of ordinary situations” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p.369) – but that they are, by no means exhaustive in their coverage. There is a certain marge de manoeuvre in terms of both the polities and the common worlds – a fact that some authors have acknowledged and exploited in their own research (e.g. see Latour (1995) for an ecological polity and common world). In fact, it is this margin for interpretation and expansion that makes the economies of worth an attractive theoretical framework for this thesis. While Boltanski and Thévenot’s existing common worlds are comprehensive and serve to cover a wealth of ground in terms of day-to-day interactions and their justifications, what is arguably the most important takeaway from their work – at least where this thesis is concerned – are the methods they used to develop worlds. More than simply establishing the worlds that govern social interaction, Boltanski and Thévenot provide the
methodological groundwork for other researchers to build on their existing worlds and polities and/or develop or interpret new worlds of their own. It is in the application of interpreting a new type of common world – a world of cultural policy in the context of national minorities – that this thesis makes use of the economies of worth framework.

2.5.1: The Rule of Six: Boltanski & Thévenot’s Common Worlds

Seminal to the development of a new common world is understanding the polities and worlds Boltanski and Thévenot originally devised. These worlds were built around the cité model which offers a means of differentiating states of worth. However, the economies of worth approach goes a step further by introducing and establishing principles of justice as a means of understanding how worth is applied to individuals and measured (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.162). The first polity (and world), the polity of inspiration (la cité inspirée), defines worth “through the attainment of a state of grace” (Lemasson, 2015, p.3). Specifically, it is a polity built on the works of Saint Augustine – in particular, his seminal City of God – and grounded in the notion that worth “is viewed as an immediate relationship to an external source from which all possible worth flows” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p.370). In this context, worth is measured by a person’s willingness to renounce glory for the greater good of inspiring others (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.115). Emphasis, in this polity, is placed on creativity, singularity, and grace – or, more specifically, one’s willingness to relinquish fame and fortune in the endeavour of creating and inspiring through creation (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.232). It is in the process of renouncing recognition – or in the pursuit of creation regardless of recognition – that an individual will attain a “state of grace,” which itself serves as the barometer of worth in the world of inspiration (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p.370). This polity also involves a renouncement of stability and routine, and a sort of embracement of an ascetic lifestyle that ensures the measure of
a person’s identity within the other polities or worlds. Relationships, in this polity, are the product of creation: every person creates and is created by others – a process that necessitates openness and an accepting attitude (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, pp.202-203).

The second polity (and world), the domestic polity (la cité domestique), measures worth through one’s hierarchical position in the context of a chain of personal dependencies derived from a universe under the direction and hierarchy of God or a sovereign of some sort (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.116). Drawing on Bossuet’s *La Politique tirée des propres paroles de l’Écriture sainte* as its exemplar, this polity places an emphasis on traditions and individuals’ “personal dependencies”; worth is understood in the context of hierarchical trust (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.232) – that is to say, that worth is derived through the trust individuals infer onto those belonging to a higher order in the hierarchical structure of society. It is by maintaining trust in the hierarchy as prescribed by God that social order is, in turn, maintained. Thus, with the domestic polity, an individual’s worth is measured by the relations they entertain and maintain with others. These relations become a question of order in the context of families or genealogical relations – particularly when residing in the same household. Often, younger generations will defer to older generations as a sign of respect and in acquiescence to the hierarchical order of the household (and, more broadly, society) (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.210). In this context, objects – such as gifts – often serve the dual role of reinforcing the hierarchical relationships between people – in terms of the value and/or significance of a gift in relation to the giver’s hierarchical position – and recognizing the worth of others – in terms of the symbolic value of the individual/relationship inferred by a gift (p.212). Beyond gifts, the domestic world confers value on behaviour, favouring etiquette, respect, and good sense acquired through habit and practice – to the point where it becomes second nature (pp.210-212).
In contrast to the first polity, and drawing on the hierarchical nature of the second, the third polity (and world) – the polity of opinion or fame (la cité de l’opinion) – measures worth in the context of public opinion (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.126). Taking its cues from Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, this polity suggests that worth is contingent on “conventional signs of public esteem” (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.232). In other words, the more famous a person is – or the higher their public esteem – the greater their intrinsic worth is perceived to be in the polity of opinion. But, as is implied by Boltanski and Thévenot’s application of the Leviathan, fame and public esteem can be and all too often are fleeting – and there is always someone waiting in the proverbial wings to assume their place atop the hierarchy of fame (or, as it were, in the spotlight).

Where this polity differs most significantly from the domestic polity, however, is that it does not value memory or tradition. Opinion can change and fame can be forgotten from one day to the next – a concept, Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) note, made famous by Andy Warhol’s assertion that everyone in the future will be famous for fifteen minutes (pp.222-223). In the context of the polity of opinion, then, much emphasis is placed on one’s image or brand. If the public does not understand the meaning of the image a person (or organization) is trying to convey – if their image is damaged, deteriorated, corrupted, or lost – then, as with the typical news cycle, it will be long forgotten by tomorrow (p.230).

Heavily influenced by Rousseau’s *Social Contract (Contrat social)*, the fourth polity (and world), the civic polity (la cité civique), similar to the domestic polity, stresses the importance of hierarchy and sovereignty – in particular, the notion that “civil peace depends on the authority of a sovereign whose position, above the lusts of individuals, secures the common good” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p.371). Where this polity differs from the domestic polity, however, is in its disembodied view of sovereignty: a sovereign “is formed by the convergence of human wills” (p.371). In this case, worth is measured by one’s willingness to relinquish their
personal interest in favour of the common or public good (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, pp.137-138). Emphasis, here, is placed not on the individual, but on the pre-eminence of the collective – of groups of people who are governed by the same sets of rules and values, and who are willing to subordinate their personal interests for those of the general interest (p.231). This polity and its world exist primarily – if not exclusively – in the context of a state, often in the form of a republic or democracy, wherein the people are represented by an elected body or office (p.239).

The next polity – the industrial polity (la cité industrielle) – understands worth as a product of efficiency, and measures it “on a scale of professional capabilities” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p.372). This polity, inspired by the works of Saint-Simon, draws on class distinctions to stress the idea that work in the context of industry relies on various degrees of generality under which individuals will come to form links (and groups) with those who work in the same environment and on the same hierarchical level (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.155). In this context, worth is maintained through “technical efficiency, planning, expertise and long term growth” (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.232). It is in the industrial world that technologies and scientific pursuits have their place – a fact that emphasises how, despite its name, this common world is not uniquely or specifically industry-focused (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, pp.252-253). Rather, the order of this world is built around an organization, and rests on the abilities of those within the organization to ensure it functions normally by properly responding to needs in a way that is efficient (p.254).

The final polity, the market polity (la cité marchande), is based around an understanding of worth as the “distribution of goods in accordance to market law” (Lemasson, 2015, p.3). In other words, this polity revolves around the classic economic notions of supply and demand. The market polity (and world) draws its influence from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, positing competition as its underlying principle (Rousselière & Vézina, 2009, p.242). In this polity, the
worth of an individual or object is measured (or ranked) by their performance in the market (Annisette & Richardson, 2011, p.232). Individuals compete for scarce resources and commodities; those who perform best in this competition – that is to say, those who are relentlessly opportunistic in their ability to “spot and seize” market opportunities, “unhampered” by emotion or personal links – are deemed worthy (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p.372). This competition serves a dual role in the market world: on the one hand, it serves to keep the interests of individuals in check by attaching prices to commodities – effectively controlling who can and cannot purchase said commodities (or is able or unable to sell their commodities); on the other hand, it establishes a measurement of worth insofar as only the individuals who are capable of purchasing (and/or selling) commodities are deemed worthy – or, more specifically, it establishes that worth is a product of wealth (p.372). By contrast, those who are unworthy are those who do not have wealth, or those whose products/commodities are seen as unfit, defective, or unwanted (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.245).

It should be noted that the market world should not be seen as belonging uniquely to the sphere of economic relations. Rather, the economic actions that emerge through this world are coordinated by two principles: the marketplace and industrial orders (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.241). In other words, the economic aspects of the market world are the products of compromises with other worlds – though most notably with the industrial world. With that said, the market world is one that is populated by more than just buyers and sellers; it is also populated by what Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) describe as omnipresent objects – objects that, to varying degrees, hold an intrinsic value that goes beyond what the market might objectively dictate – whose role in the coordination of an actor’s actions is typically ignored by economists who see its factor as independent of the actions/influence of others (p.242). In other words, there are certain objects whose value deviates from what the market would otherwise establish – by virtue of
carrying sentimental value, having previously been owned/used, as the result of damage or defect, or due to modification or transformation (e.g. a napkin signed by a famous artist) (p.243).

In his more recent works, Boltanski – along with Chiapello – (2005) outlines a seventh “justification regime”: a projects-oriented cité (p.168). This polity is built around the notions of “mobility, availability, and the variety of one’s personal contacts” as a means of navigating and understanding a world that has increasingly become networked (p.168). Greatness in the projects-oriented cité is measured by activity. An individual’s life is seen as being comprised of an ongoing series of projects and activities; value is seen, here, as the pursuit of activity – of a forward-seeing view of the world. The outcome of the project or activity is secondary to the action of pursuing an activity. This cité embraces adaptability and flexibility (p.169). A person is deemed “great” in this cité if they are able to use their qualities “to contribute to the common good” in ways that generate feelings of “trust” (p.170). The project-oriented individual does not lead others with an authoritarian approach, but with a managerial process that entails tolerance and respect (p.170). While this cité offers a unique approach to understanding an individual’s motivations in making decisions/compromises, it arguably differs from the other cités in the economies of worth framework insofar as it focuses on the individual’s context and not so much on the world’s context. Moreover, unlike the other cités, the projects-oriented cité arguably offers a less expansive and adaptive set of principles than the original six cités; the projects-oriented cité is focused on a managerial approach that is much more context-specific in its application (i.e. management in the context of a project) than the other cités are in their application. Nevertheless, what this seventh polity evidences is the fluid, open-ended nature of the economies of worth framework – and, in particular, the framework’s openness to the development or construction of new worlds.
While each of Boltanski and Thévenot’s (and Chiapello’s, for that matter) common worlds exhibits definitive elements and characteristics unique to those worlds, there are evident overlaps and commonalities between the different worlds. This overlap is attributed to the cité model, itself, which seeks to acknowledge the impermanence of a state of worth and its application to a world’s objects (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.164). This impermanence helps explain how, when two or more worlds – each governed by different principles of equivalence – meet or connect, “ordinary criticisms are made possible” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, as ctd. by Lemasson, 2015, p.3). Because the measurement of worth comes in different forms – and because the subjects of different worlds employ different rationales in their measurement of value and justification – disputes can and will often emerge from these connections – either in the form of a contention or in the form of a clash (Lemasson, 2015, pp.3-4). How these disputes are resolved is a question of compromise between the polities of the various worlds – the nature of which highlights the fluidity and adaptability of the common worlds. It is, ultimately, this impermanence – this fluidity of principles and polities – that enables the construction of new common worlds within the economies of worth framework.

2.5.2: Categorical Analytics: The Economies of Worth Ideal-type

Although – as Latour (1995) contends – it can be said that the economies of worth offers little of value in way of new theories of society or moral philosophies, it nevertheless offers “an original theoretical matrix for registering the grammars of moral evaluation” (Blok, 2013, p.495) – one which has significant value in the analysis of cultural policy. In particular, the economies of worth offers a means through which cultural policy can be categorized and justified within a pre-set number of social contexts – contexts which, as mentioned, are generalizable enough to encompass a sufficient stratum of society. Moreover, the economies of worth offer a strong
complementary, albeit counterbalancing, process of justification to the isomorphic processes intimated in institutional discourse. Rather than homogeneity, the common worlds of the economies of worth framework offer idiosyncratic expressions of justifications of action – though justifications that falls under the purview of a standardized regulative system of axioms. In this context, isomorphism operates between common worlds, operationalizing the “how” (i.e. the process), but not the “why” (i.e. the rationale), of justification. Finally, as Lemasson (2015) suggests, the economies of worth offers a way of conceptualizing cultural policy as something other than “an expression of power” or as “discourse hiding some other interests”; it allows for the conceptualization of cultural policy as a form of compromise, as the product of “commonly shared ideals” (p.5). In this respect, the framework’s application is arguably more methodological in nature than theoretical – in large part because its approach, evocative of Max Weber, offers an analytic categorization that is akin to an ideal-type. Specifically, the framework offers thirteen (13) interrelated analytical categories for analysing common worlds/polities and that serve as a basis for categorizing the fundamental elements of the natural order in a given common world – namely, a world’s subjects (its repertoire of subjects), objects (repertoire of objects and devices), qualifiers (state of worth), and verbal relations (natural relationships between beings) (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.177).

The first of these analytical categories, a superior common principle (principe supérieur commun), indicates that common worlds are characterized by a principle that coordinates the people/beings within the world through the establishment of equivalencies. More specifically, the superior common principle serves to qualify (or establish a state of worth for) a world’s beings in a way that allows for a relatively objective measurement of their worth; it is a principle by which the worth of two individuals can be compared and contrasted (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.177). Following a similar logic, the second category, the state of worth (état de grand), suggests
that each common world characterizes its states of grandeur differently, with each state operating on a scale of general to particular, of unworthy to worthy. The more worthy individuals act as guarantors of the superior common principle; they serve as a reference point by which less worthy individuals measure importance and act in accordance with achieving a higher level or degree of worth – often articulated in the context of the common good (pp.177-178). This leads to the third analytical category, human dignity (dignité des personnes), which posits that, within common worlds, individuals share a sense of humanity that allows them to raise themselves in service to the common good. This sense of human dignity anchors each common world – though it is expressed differently in each world, often as a form of human aptitude specific to the world in question. These aptitudes are what enable agreements between people to be reached (p.178).

The fourth and fifth analytical categories of the common worlds – the repertoires of subjects (repertoires des sujets) and of objects and devices (répertoire des objets et des dispositifs), respectively – suggest that a common world possesses categorical listings of individuals and objects, often based on their state of worth – from worthy to unworthy (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, pp.178-179). In the case of repertoires of objects and devices, their measure of worth – from one common world to the next – is unequally developed and often contingent on the worth of the subjects involved (p.179). This unequal development is, in part, the product of the sixth analytical category, which indicates that each world possesses an investment formula (formule d’investissement) that establishes the basis by which worth is obtained – often contextualized as a sacrifice made towards achieving a measure of worth. An investment formula is seen as an important element of a common world insofar as it establishes a sense of balance between sacrifices – often expressed as a sacrifice of the pleasures associated with less worthy states – made as an investment towards (future) benefits – often expressed as an attainment of a greater order of worth through provisions to achieve a greater good (p.179). Underscoring the
investment formula is the seventh analytical category, *rapport of grandeur/worth* (rapport de grandeur), which posits that, within each world, there is an underlying relationship between orders of worth wherein the order of worthiness encompasses lesser orders by virtue of its ambition to achieve a greater good (pp.179-180).

The eighth analytical category takes the seventh a step further by suggesting that there are *natural relations between beings* (relations naturelles entre les êtres) of the common worlds. This category identifies, through verbs, the relations that exist between subjects and objects from the various worlds/polities, and posits that these relations must be harmonized with the *worths* of the beings in question. In some cases, the relations will be of an equal footing; in others, there will be a hierarchical order. How these relations are identified and harmonized is largely contingent on the polities of the common worlds at play (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.180). This leads to the ninth analytical category, which posits that each common world possesses *harmonious figures of the natural order* (figure harmonieuse de l’ordre naturel) – that is to say, a harmonious distribution of states of worth within a society that conforms to the investment formula. These figures serve as evocations of the reality of a world’s superior common principle (p.180). The tenth category suggests that each common world has a *test model* (épreuve modèle) that serves to verify/validate the world’s reality in moments of uncertainty – when the natural tenets of the world are challenged or put to the test. The eleventh and twelfth categories indicate that each world possesses its own *mode of expressing judgement* (mode d’expression de jugement) and *form of evidence* (forme de l’évidence) that serve, respectively, to validate the test – characterizing the superior common principle of each world – and evidence the modality of knowledge belonging to each world (p.181). The final category suggests that each world or polity has a *state of unworthiness and decline* (état de petit et déchéance de la cité) that is emblematic of
a deficiency (or deficiencies) in a world and/or elements of a worth of a different or denounced nature (p.181).

Much like Weber’s ideal-type, the characteristics/analytical categories of the economies of worth framework allow for a measure of codification where polities or common worlds are concerned. While not all of these categories are necessarily present in any given world, they nevertheless provide a basis for developing a type analysis – one which can be adapted and extended to other conceptions of worlds or polities, and can be applied to concepts such as public policy. It is with these categories in mind that this thesis draws on the economies of worth to provide contextual insight into the idiosyncratic nature of cultural policy, with the ambition of establishing a world of cultural policy in the context of national minorities. Far from simply applying the economies of worth to cultural policies, this thesis will use the framework as a basis for establishing a common world or ideal-type(s) of national minorities’ cultural policies, wherein Boltanski and Thévenot’s common worlds and polities serve as exemplars to deconstruct and categorize the inherent normative elements of national minorities’ policy regimes. Simply put, characteristic elements of the economies of worth categorical analytics are broad and expansive enough to offer a methodological means through which policy justifications can be understood and assessed.

2.6: Orders of Policy: Towards a Type Analysis of National Minorities’ Cultural Policy

The economies of worth, in its capacity as a theoretical matrix, serves as an analytical tool that contributes “to political sociology by offering a dual view: of the dynamics of composite conflicting communities and of the dynamics of composite personalities or complex personal identities” (Thévenot, 2014, p.9). This dual view is deemed necessary for understanding the
“metamorphoses of modes of government and of selves that we observe nowadays” – particularly given the now wide acceptance of how “policies and tools associated with neoliberal governance strongly affect the constitution of the self,” in some cases requiring “auto-regulation and auto-management of the self” (p.9). It is only Foucault’s governmentality and technologies of the self, Thévenot (2014) contends, that have ever truly sought to theoretically grapple with these metamorphoses jointly – though, even then, “the two conceptualizations are not analytically interconnected” (p.9). The economies of worth framework, then, serves as a theoretical apparatus to fill this analytical divide. Thusly, it is the intent of this thesis to draw upon the economies of worth framework to accentuate and nuance the theoretical gaps implicit in Foucault’s governmentality and technologies of self. In other words, Foucault’s theoretical lenses provide an historical and theoretical depth and understanding to the processes of power involved in (cultural) policy development, while Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework provides an analytical process through which to filter various policies for the purposes of a more nuanced interpretation.

However, just as the economies of worth offers nuances to governmentality, so too does governmentality offer complementary, more theoretical elements to the economies of worth. As such, rather than solely drawing on the economies of worth as a means of classifying cultural policy, this thesis will also draw on Dean’s (2010) analytics of government – itself, derived from governmentality. This analytics is comprised of at least four dimensions that help in the understanding of “how” people govern and are governed within different regimes (p.33). These dimensions consist of: 1) characteristic forms of visibility (i.e. “ways of seeing and perceiving” the world and society); 2) distinctive ways of thinking and questioning – the process in which individuals rely on “definite vocabularies and procedures for the production of truth”; 3) specific ways of acting, intervening, and directing – each of which is comprised of “particular types of practical rationality” that rely on “definite mechanisms, techniques and technologies”; and 4)
characteristic ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors, or agents (Dean, 2010, p.33). The key element of this analytics, according to Dean (2010), is its ability to offer “regimes of practice” – such as the common worlds of the economies of worth – “a reality, a density and a logic of their own” (pp.32-33). Moreover, the analytics of government avoids “premature reduction” of regimes to “an order or level of existence that is more fundamental or real” (p.33). In other words, the analytics of government offers a theoretical rigour that addresses the lacunas in the economies of worth highlighted by Latour (1995) and Blok (2013). While there is certainly overlap in Dean’s (2010) analytics of government with Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) economies of worth, the analytics as a derivative of governmentality offers a deeper understanding of government action in the form of policy – particularly from the perspective of power. A parallel can be drawn between the principles of equivalence (i.e. polities) and Foucault’s technologies of the self – particularly with respects to how they both serve to influence and inform action.

More than creating the ideal citizen, knowledge – in the context of governmentality – serves as a mechanism through which modern society is governed (O’Brien, 2014, p.29). The emergence of the nation-state over an “individual sovereign(s)” speaks to the development of “specific governmental apparatuses and […] a complex of saviours” that encompasses both the state, itself, and networks that steer the nation’s state-centric narrative (pp.29-30). It is from the “ensemble [of] institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calculations, and tactics” that forms the basis of knowledge that governments are able to exercise power (Foucault, 1978/1994, p.244). Power, in this context, emerges not from repression, but from production – and it is with respect to production that cultural policy is most saliently applied to the context of identity (O’Brien, 2014, pp.30-31). However, as the concept of mass production, in recent years, has transitioned towards “individualized and diversified consumption regimes” (Miller & Rose, 2008,
p.173), it is not enough to simply understand cultural policy as an exercise of government power over the production power of the cultural industries. Questions of trade-off and compromise must also be considered. This is particularly relevant in dealing with contexts of cultural identity, nationalism, and/or regionalism, where little work has been done with respects to political exchange and compromise (Keating, Cairney, & Hepburn, 2009, p.52). As such, a theoretical framework built around notions of governmentality in relation to economies of worth should offer a wealth of conceptual understanding in terms of the evolving power dynamics of the cultural industries in the contemporary, globalized world(s).

In particular, Foucault’s theory of governmentality serves as a conceptual anchor to this thesis, providing a perspective on how cultural policy can be used to socialize a public around a specific cultural identity. For this reason, cultural policies are largely approached as technologies of self, there to elucidate the power dynamics at play in the societies being studied. The economies of worth framework, thus, serves to operationalize the various elements and worlds at play in the formulation of cultural policy; the framework is used in this thesis to deconstruct the components of a cultural policy as a means of better understanding and analyzing the political and social forces at play in identity production – and ultimately determining to what extent commonalities and trends emerge in the policies of national minorities. It is with these considerations in mind that this thesis posits that, drawing on the analytical categorization of the economies of worth in conjunction with the theoretical rigour of governmentality, a cultural policy type analysis can be developed for national minorities. Taking the economies of worth framework as its basis, the following table (Table 1) has been devised as a means of deconstructing and analyzing cultural policies:
### Table 1: The World of National Minority Cultural Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical Categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Case Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superior common principle</td>
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<td>State of worth</td>
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<td>Human dignity</td>
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<td>Repertoires of subjects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repertoires of objects and devices</td>
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<td>Investment formula</td>
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<td>Rapport of grandeur/worth</td>
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<td>Natural relations between beings</td>
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<td>Harmonious figures of the natural order</td>
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<td>Test model</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mode of expressing judgement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of evidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of unworthiness and decline</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Through the case study analysis presented in the following chapters, this thesis will populate this table as a means of categorically understanding and exploring the nature of national minority cultural policy. The thirteen analytical categories of the economies of worth framework offer a strong basis for establishing an ideal-type categorization of policy that, ideally, provides new insights into the functions of national minority cultural policy.
Chapter 3 – Methodological Framework

The object of this thesis, broadly, was to explore the cultural policies employed by the governments of national minorities – specifically, the province of Québec, the country of Scotland, and the region of Catalonia. These national minorities have each demonstrated a strong nationalist programme – beyond that of the broader countries they belong to – and a strong sense of cultural identity. To what extent and in what forms these national minorities have, through their cultural policies, endeavoured to promote their cultural identity was of particular interest. More specifically, this thesis examined the style(s) and form(s) of cultural policies that are both implicitly and explicitly designed to foster a sense of cultural or national identity. Moreover, this thesis explored how these policies have been used to, in some cases, draw in the cultural industries from other regions. In the process, this thesis looked at the types of cultural industries most prominently targeted. As this thesis is primarily grounded in the field of Public Administration, it followed the mould of a case study analysis. Additionally, this thesis employed discourse analysis in its approach to analysing the cases in question. The research behind this thesis was primarily of a qualitative nature. Qualitative research entails the gathering of data regarding a social phenomenon through “nonstatistical inquiry techniques and processes” (McNabb, 2002, p.267). The objective of qualitative research is to understand the event, circumstance, or phenomenon being studied (p.89).

3.1: Research Design

The design of this research was primarily based on the case (or multiple case) study approach of public administrative sciences. The case study approach focuses on the particular case of an “agency, organization, person, or group” (McNabb, 2002, p.278). The case study offers a means through which to define the organization that is being studied (p.278). In
particularly, the cases studied in this thesis have all been recognized as having strong cultural identities and, at times, prominent nationalist movements. Moreover, these cases have all variably made use of their cultural policies – particularly in recent decades – to, as this thesis argues, foster a sense of nationalism both within and without their respective borders. Meyer (2001) notes that case studies are “widely used in organizational studies in social science disciplines” (p.329). As predictive theories “do not and probably cannot exist” within the social sciences, its disciplines tend to focus on context-dependent knowledge – something that case studies can and often do amply provide (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.223). Unlike other research strategies, the case study has “virtually no specific requirements” (Meyer, 2001, p.329). This lack of specific requirements is both a strength and weakness to the case study approach: it is a strength in the sense that it allows the design and data collection procedures to be specifically tailored to the research question, but a weakness in the sense that it provides little in the way of structure. Nevertheless, this lack of specific requirements allows for a more contextual approach to research, particularly when researching “contemporary phenomena in real-life contexts” (p.330).

The choice of using the case study approach was, in large part, influenced by the nature of the issues being explored in this research. As the emergence of nationalist movements in developed countries tends to be relatively limited, the case study approach allows for a more focused and specific engagement with the cultural policy dynamics at play in the sub-states of national minorities. Moreover, as the case study approach is relatively open and receptive to a wide variety of “theory or conceptual categories that guide the research and analysis of data,” it allowed for the use of various – and sometimes competing theories – in the analysis and assessment of the cases in question (Meyer, 2001, p.331). In particular, it allowed for the flexibility needed to integrate/apply the theory of governmentality into the categorical analysis underpinning the common world type of the economies of worth framework.
3.2: Sample

For the purpose of this research, three cases were selected: Québec, Scotland, and Catalonia. The reason these regions were selected is because they are among the most widely noted and publicized regions in Western Society to have prominent national minorities with sub-state nationalist movements. These regions are also noted for having strong cultural heritages and identities that figure prominently in their efforts to foster/develop a national identity – and have, in the past, figured prominently in processes of power devolution, from federal to regional. Finally, given that culture and identity occupy important places in the public discourse of these national minorities, their governments have developed cultural institutions specific to the promotion and/or sustainment of their respective cultures. These institutions – in particular, through their publications and policies – provided a wealth of information with respects to the culture and cultural policies of the three cases.

3.3: Collection of Data

According to Yin (1989), the case study approach to research typically “combines data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations” (as cited by Meyer, 2001, p.336). For the purpose of this thesis, the primary form of data collection came in the form of document analysis. The purpose of using document analysis in this research was to analysis the extent to which policies promote the development and maintenance of a national identity. In particular, this thesis analysed key policy documents and official press releases developed by the aforementioned case regions, and assessed to what extent they promoted nationalism – both explicitly and implicitly. Moreover, this analysis assessed the role of the cultural industries in the development and maintenance of a national identity by keying in on policies that, to some extent, are aimed at the cultural industries. Below (Table 2) is a sample list
of the policies and policy documents that were analysed in this thesis (for an exhaustive list, please consult Appendix A – List of Policies and Policy Documents Analyzed):

Table 2: Sample List of Policies and Policy Documents Analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Name</th>
<th>Country /Region</th>
<th>Year of Publication</th>
<th>Main Objective(s):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Catalanian Statute of Autonomy | Catalonia | 1979 & 2006 | • The Statute of Autonomy outlines the role of the Catalanian government following the democratization of Spain in the mid-1970s.  
• The 2006 version serves as an update and amendment of the 1979 version. |
| Catalanian Language Act | Catalonia | 1998 | • The Language Act provides linguistic recognition for Catalonia’s official language – Catalan – and outlines the Catalanian government’s responsibilities with respects to preserving and promoting it.  
• The Act also provides recognition of Spain’s official language – Castilian – and the province of Aran’s cultural language – Aranese. |
| The Catalan Institute for the Cultural Companies: Report | Catalonia | 2012 | • This report provides an overview of the role and function of the Catalan Institute for the Cultural Companies – the organization responsible for overseeing Catalonia’s cultural industries. |
| La politique culturelle du Québec: Notre culture, notre avenir | Québec | 1992 | • La politique culturelle provides an affirmation of the province of Québec’s cultural identity.  
• The policy outlines how the government sought to support the creators and promote citizen engagement and participation. |
| Société de développement des entreprises culturelles (SODEC) | Québec | 1994 | • This document provides an overview of the purpose and intent of SODEC.  
• The document also outlines the role of SODEC in relation to social and economic purposes. |
| Remettre l’Art au monde (Politique de diffusion des arts de la scène) | Québec | 1996 | • The goal of this policy is to bring the public closer to the arts.  
• The policy document outlines the government’s role in the diffusion of arts to citizens. |
| Scotland Act | Scotland | 1998 | • This policy establishes and outlines the devolution process of Scotland’s parliament following the devolution referendum of 1997. |
| The Creative Industries Framework Agreement | Scotland | 2009 | • This document outlines an agreement that establishes how support for the creative and cultural industries will be delivered.  
• The document identifies recommendations on how to deliver support while also providing gaps in the current support. |
Drawing on these policies and policy documents, this thesis explored the following questions and considerations when analysing the nature of the compromise(s) inherent in the cultural policies of the cases studied:

- The policy(ies) genesis: how and why was a policy(ies) first proposed, and what did its initial form look like in comparison to the actual policy(ies) that was implemented.
- The objectives the policy(ies) sought to address.
- The cultural industries: the role and/or purpose of the cultural industries in the development and implementation of said policy(ies).
- The political and social landscape: how do/did current social and political values influence or effect the policy(ies) in question.
- The role or sense of national and/or cultural identity in the development of policies (i.e. is identity taken into consideration when developing policies?)
- The socio-economic factors that are or were taken into consideration when developing the policy(ies).
- The inclusiveness (or intended inclusiveness) of the policy(ies) in question.
- The future of the policy(ies) (i.e. is the policy sustainable? Is it a policy that would survive a change in government and/or government philosophy?).

Furthermore, key documents, such as Conference talks, minutes from meetings, and Hansards from parliamentary debates – among others – were reviewed. Keywords used in the analysis of these documents include: culture; identity; nation; nationalism; heritage; cultural industries.
3.4: Method of Analysis

There are a number of different methods that exist for the analysis of qualitative data. Invariably all include, to some degree, six broad phases: 1) organization of the data; 2) generation of categories, themes, and patterns; 3) codification of the data; 4) application of the ideas, themes, and categories; 5) search for alternative explanations; and 6) writing of the report of findings (McNabb, 2002, p.296). At each progressive step in the analysis, the volume of data collected is reduced in order to better and more precisely address the research question. As research is seldom a straightforward and linear progression of steps, it stands to reason that the order of these phases might not follow the “logical sequence” listed above (pp.296-297). Moreover, certain steps, depending on the data collected, might be unnecessary (i.e. the search for alternative explanations is primarily a contingency for if sections of the data collected leads to “dead ends”) (p.296). For the purpose of this thesis, the following steps were taken in the process of analysing the data collected: 1) Chronology of Cases; 2) Codification of Data; 3) Description of Cases; 4) Application of Theory to the Cases; 5) Comparison of Cases; and 6) Analysis.

Data collected through policies, laws, policy documents, government sanctioned/funded research projects, and papers was coded and analyzed using the analytical categories of Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) economies of worth framework. Cultural policies were coded based on their purpose/intent, in conjunction with the socio-economic and political factors informing the policies, and as they related to the categories that characterize common worlds/polities (and compromises between the common worlds) as elaborated by Boltanski and Thévenot. In a first instance, policies were broadly coded in terms of the framework’s thirteen (13) categories:

1. Superior common principle
2. State of worth
3. Human dignity
4. Repertoires of subjects
5. Repertoires objects and devices
Given the nature of the common worlds – and the overlap between the polities of each world – coding cultural policies using the economies of worth’s analytical categories was not an exact science; certain policies can be too complex to reduce to a single common world. For this reason, coding also involved factoring in the social context in which the policies were introduced. For this reason…

- Policies related to inspiring (cultural) creation (or participation in culture) were coded as belonging to the world of inspiration.
- Policies related to heritage, tradition, and/or patrimony were coded as belonging to the domestic world.
- Policies related to image, brand, or recognition (often in an international context) were coded as belonging to the world of fame or opinion.
- Policies related to the public good or to serving a broader social purpose were coded as belonging to the civic world.
- Policies related to innovation, the production and dissemination of culture, and the development and structuration of the cultural industries were coded as belonging to the industrial world.
- Policies related to economic and market growth, dissemination, and market support were coded as belonging to the market world.
3.5: Limitations

One of the challenges – and opportunities – with using Boltanski and Thévenot’s economies of worth framework in coding and analysing policies and policy documents is that their framework was originally conceived in the context of understanding business organizations and the types of interactions and compromises that occur within that environment. As such, much of Boltanski and Thévenot’s vernacular and many of their descriptions are rooted in business terms that do not always serve or apply to public policies. At times, it proved challenging to appropriate and translate those business terms – such as productivity, efficiency, innovation, staff, boss/management, etc. – into terms that were applicable to policy and government. For instance, while the economies of worth framework, with its civic world, offers a common world that can serve as an avatar for government (and government intervention), it is often couched in concepts of labour laws or labour unions – concepts that are not always applicable in certain policy discourses, let alone cultural policy discourse. However, this also offered an opportunity with respects to interpreting and applying the framework to cultural policies. The framework is sufficiently broad enough to allow for some manipulation and interpretation of the types of interactions and compromises that occur between common worlds. Moreover, the framework provides the necessary components to develop a new common world of one’s own, ensuring that virtually all forms of compromise and justification can be covered by the framework.

Limitations also existed with respects to language. In particular, in extremely rare cases, there were certain policy documents from Catalonia that were only available in Catalan or Castilian. While, ideally, translations of these documents would have been obtained, limited resources and time made it unfeasible to acquire translations in a timely fashion. To mitigate this limitation, secondary sources were used in a complementary fashion with the official documents that were found and analyzed. When absolutely needed, excerpts of these policy documents that
has been translated by other authors were used for the purposes of analysis – though these translation were used sparingly as, in the vast majority of cases, English translation of policies were available.

3.6: Ethical Considerations

In compliance with both the University of Ottawa’s Ethical Booklet and the moral standards of Public Administration research, a number of ethical concerns were considered and addressed in the research of this thesis. This thesis complied with the principles of truthfulness, thoroughness, objectivity, and relevance. This means that this research does not purposefully lie, deceive, or employ fraud. The research did not harm any participants and did not cut corners: all findings, whether good or bad, were reported (McNabb, 2002, pp.36-44). Furthermore, as much of the information on the internet is susceptible to falsification and/or fraudulent reproduction and circulation, particular care was taken to ensure that any and all information collected was done so legally and primarily from official government websites. Given that there were no human subjects involved in the research of this thesis – and given that the documents used were all publicly accessible, the staff at the University of Ottawa’s Research and Ethics Board concluded that no research clearances were needed.
“Tout au long de son histoire, le Québec s'est façonné à même sa propre culture.” – Robert Bourassa, Premier Ministre du Québec, 1992

Chapter 4 – Cultural Identity in Québec

Without question, among the most definitive traits of Québec’s society is its culture. Perhaps more than any other province (or territory) in Canada, Québec is recognized by and distinguished for its culture – and, in particular how the province’s culture informs its peoples’ collective identity. The question of Québec’s cultural identity is one that many of the province’s academics, intellectuals, and politicians have spent decades “busily engaged in elaborating” in the hopes of “locating the distinctiveness of Québec” (McRoberts, 1995, p.5). This emphasis on identity is even stressed in the mission statement of Québec’s Ministry of Culture and Communications (le ministère de la Culture et des Communications), which states that the ministry seeks to “contribute to the affirmation of the province’s identity and cultural vitality, to favour citizens’ access to and participation in cultural life, and to encourage the development of communications” (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015a, par.1, own translation) – a mission that involves a network of organizations and societies including la Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec (BAnQ), le Conseil supérieur de la langue française, and le Société de développement des entreprises culturelles (SODEC), among a host of others. To put it simply, culture and identity hold a particular place in Québec society – to the point where, regardless of the political party in power, they have generally been seen as necessities that require protection and development (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.277).

Much as the question of Québec’s cultural identity has been a point of elaboration for many scholars, the question of why there has been such a strong push in Québec to have the Québécois recognized as a distinct culture, nation, or society – unique from that of the broader Canadian culture – is one that has been a point of contention for many of the subject’s
commentators – particularly those who feel it will inevitably lead to secession (Kymlicka, 1998, p.130). Part of this divisiveness stems from the belief that an individual can only belong to one culture or nation: it is argued that the Québécois must decide if they identify as “Québécois” first or as “Canadian” first. The argument follows that if the Québécois choose the former, then their loyalties are not with Canada and they should have every right to secede from the country; however, if they identify as the latter, then Québec should relinquish its claims to special status and self-determination (pp.130-131). In fact, Canada’s polity is largely regionalized, accounting for what can perhaps best be described as a weak national unity vis-à-vis its neighbours to the south, the United States of America. Rather than the strong nationalism of an “expansionist power” like the United States, Canada’s nationalism is perhaps more akin to that of a “small state struggling to preserve its independence” (Forbes, 1978, as ctd. by Perlin, 1997, p.76). It is, in part, due to Canada’s relatively “fragile” and regionalized sense of national identity that sub-state nationalism has become a prominent component in Canadian political discourse – with separatist political parties, such as the Parti Québécois (at the provincial level) and the Bloc Québécois (at the federal level) emerging as sometimes dominant voices in Canada vis-à-vis the more marginal secessionist or nationalist claims by minor parties or groups in Alberta, Northern Ontario, and Newfoundland (Jackson et al., 2004, p.7). Accentuating this regionalism – and often serving as a point of contention between the federal and provincial governments – is the fact that culture (and cultural policy) “is an area of concurrent jurisdiction” in Canada (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2008, p.336). This concurrence has often led to what some authors would describe as inept or incoherent cultural policy, wherein the focus of federal policy is often on the operational functions of culture (i.e. how to produce more Canadian culture) rather than on the “fundamental issue of whether and why there is too little cultural output” (Dowler, 1996, p.328) – a focus which some authors contend serves to delegitimize the public sphere in favour of a “market
ideology” (Zemans, 1997, p.113). Where a central or unifying logic has historically been found in federal cultural policy is with respects to “national security” – that is to say, as a means of promoting and protecting Canadian culture and identity from the “incursion” of foreign (often popular) cultures, in particular that of the United States (Dowler, 1996, p.329).

If it can be said that the Government of Canada contends with the outside – often isomorphic – pressures of dominant popular cultures, then the province of Québec contends with an additional layer of pressure coming from its own country. As the Government of Canada has, at various times, pushed towards developing a common, national cultural policy, Québec cultural policy has often come in response – pushing for greater autonomy in its purview of culture (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2008, p.348). The argument forwarded by many French Canadian intellectuals and politicians has been that French Canadian culture is in a weakened state comparatively to the dominant English culture of Canada (and North America), and that its survival is contingent on Québec developing a more comprehensive cultural policy to protect and promote its cultural heritage (Lemasson, 2015, p.7). Given that Québec’s culture is often viewed as unique in the context of North America – a context that reflects its history, people, and geopolitical environment (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.278) – then the element of cultural distinction in Québec cultural policy, which has troubled many cultural scholars (e.g. Kymlicka, 1998, 1999), can arguably be seen as being less about secession and more about (cultural) protection. In other words, how one interprets Québec’s cultural policy is often a reflection of how one interprets the policy’s justification.

With the question of justification in mind, this chapter provides an historical overview of Québec’s society and identity – from pre-Confederation up until the mid-1980s – as a first step towards elaborating a new common world in the spirit of Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) economies of worth framework. The purpose of providing an historical overview is to establish
and understand the context in which cultural policy in Québec has evolved, and the rationale behind its justification. More specifically, this exercise provides a starting point for developing a cultural policy common world – one which acknowledges the fact that while justifications can come from multiple common worlds (Lemasson, 2015, p.4), there is often a superior or dominant world that can (and does) exercise a measure of influence and power over the prevailing (policy) discourse. In the case of a national minority, the argument put forth is that an underlying common world of cultural policy can be identified in the social and historical contexts of the minority in question.

4.1: Québec Society – Pre-Confederation (1760s to 1860s)

To truly appreciate the depth of Québec cultural identity, it is important to approach it from an historical perspective. If nothing else, Québec’s cultural identity is one that was arguably born through the endurance of considerable conflict and adversity. Historically, French Canadians have fed off distrust of the English (Derriennic, 1995, p.22). Conventionally, much of this distrust – and, consequently, much of what is understood as Québec’s national identity – can be traced back to the 1700s, in particular, 1759 – the year in which the British exorcised the French crown from North America (Lacassagne, 2012, p.181; Keating, 2001a, p.77). Prior to the British’s assumption of power, the Catholic Church and the religious community had been dominant forces in Québec society and culture – first, by having established some of the province’s first educational institutions; and second, through its amateur scholars, collectors, and bibliophiles who brought artistic, ethnographic, and scientific collections to the region (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.191). The Church’s power was largely conferred by France’s King Louis XIV, who saw his North American colonies – collectively known as la Nouvelle-France, with Québec serving as its capital (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.190) – as an opportunity to create his ideal society:
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natural-born, French, and Roman Catholic (Moogk, 2000, p.60). To facilitate this vision, the
King established a rapport of grandeur for the colonies by declaring them the “exclusive domain”
of the Church and introduced policies that barred “Protestants and foreigners” from immigrating
to la Nouvelle-France (p.60). Socially and economically, the French colonials who immigrated to
la Nouvelle-France largely consisted of former military; disgraced nobles; relatively uneducated,
destitute, and/or unattached youths; and lower class citizens. In other words, the French
colonialists who immigrated to la Nouvelle-France primarily consisted of the poor, but not needy,
who were seeking a new opportunity to better their lives (Monière, 1978, p.40). The end result
was a predominantly working class society, operating under the purview of the Catholic Church,
and largely without a true or definitive bourgeoisie (Balthazar, 2013, pp.44-45).
By the end of the 17th century, however, the region of Nouvelle-France now known as
Québec had already shed its French nomenclature and was more commonly referred to as
“Canada” (Balthazar, 2013, p.43). Left to their own devices, the colonial inhabitants of Canada
began developing a cultural identity distinct from that of France – and, by degrees, distinct from
that of other colonies in Nouvelle-France (McRoberts, 1993, p.41). While the Church sought to
curb their behaviours, the inhabitants of Québec partook in cultural practices that deviated from
that of France. Nouvelle-France’s penchant for fashion, swearing, drinking, gambling, and
dancing were all frowned upon by the Church, while its theatre “was looked dimly upon” (Mann,
2002, p.7) – to the point of it being censored by the Church in certain cases (Moogk, 2000,
p.258). Nevertheless, the people of Nouvelle-France persisted in their cultural practices that
challenged the Church’s authority without necessarily undermining it (Mann, 2002). For its part,
France had grown relatively ambivalent to its colonies over the previous centuries and these
developments were largely met with indifference. This ambivalence was, arguably, most saliently
on display when, in 1759, the French exhibited relatively little concern when British fleets began


invading its colonies (McRoberts, 1993, p.40). With its conquest of North America, however, the British began implementing policy geared towards establishing a new rapport of grandeur and natural relations through the assimilation of Québec’s French inhabitants, first by placing the Church of England in power, then by introducing policies that abolished the “traditional seigneurial system of land tenure” and declaring English the official language (Keating, 2001a, p.77). To say the least, these moves impacted the role and place of the Catholic Church in Québec society and served, whether intentionally or not, as a detriment to Québec’s cultural heritage.

Despite some of their more controversial changes to Québec society, the British did bring some positive outcomes to Canada and, more specifically, Québec. In particular, Québec saw its socio-economic status consolidated and expanded under British rule; not only did the province maintain its status as Canada’s premiere shipping port – a status it maintained up until the end of the 19th century – it also saw the city of Montréal develop into the economic centre of Canada (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.191). Additionally, a number of industrial and cultural innovations and devices were introduced to Canada and Québec by the British – most notably printing presses, journals, libraries, and bookstores (p.191). Nevertheless, and in spite of some of the more positive changes brought about by British rule, many French Canadians – particularly the elite and the Catholic community – remained sceptical of the British and their interventions (p.191). By 1774, with unrest and rebellion mounting in the southern North American colonies – which would eventually culminate with the American Revolutionary War – and fearing that the French colonialists would join the rebellions taking place there, the British began to relax their restrictions and assimilative policies, allowing for certain legal accommodations vis-à-vis the French language, culture, and legal system (Keating, 2001a, p.77). The subsequent introduction of the Québec Act of 1774 officially presented a new rapport of grandeur by according the people
of Québec the right to live the “French way of life” within the province, while also recognizing their right to form a distinct society within North America (Burelle, 1995, p.33).

The rationale of the British Empire, at the time, was to marry the resolve of the British North American colonies that had remained loyal to the crown during the American Revolution to the French Canadians’ desire for cultural survival as a means of building a country distinct from that of the United States (Burelle, 1995, p.33). In other words, the accommodations the British Empire offered the Québécois with the Québec Act of 1774 represented a form of compromise – one which, drawing on the economies of worth framework, builds on an engagement between civic (i.e. where worth is measured by one’s willingness to relinquish personal interest for the greater, public good) and domestic (i.e. where one’s worth is measured by their personal dependencies within a particular hierarchy, with an emphasis on tradition) common worlds (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991) as a means of establishing a new superior common principle that exhibits traits of a new, cultural-oriented world: a unified and distinct culture in the British North American colonies. In this case, the civic world is represented by the British Empire and their pursuit of civil peace (i.e. a unified front in North America) and the domestic world is represented by the French Canadians’ retention of their traditions – represented by their language and culture, and serving as both a literal and symbolic critique of the British’s prior interventions. Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) note that when compromises are established between the domestic and civic worlds, a measure of humanity is evoked – that is to say, that a measure of flexibility is exerted on the part of the civic world (i.e. in some cases, a bending of the rules) in order to develop a level of trust between the two worlds (pp.373-374).

In the case of the Québec Act of 1774, flexibility was emphasised in the British’s willingness to acknowledge the Québécois’ right to their language and culture – an aspect that clashes, to a certain extent, with the civic world’s principle of relinquishing personal interest in
favour of the public good insofar as it acknowledges and protects the interests of a certain segment of the public as unique or distinct from that of the general public as a whole. In doing so, this compromise evokes an investment formula that is novel to both civic and domestic worlds: it pursues social cohesion through the preferential treatment of one culture over another (or others, as the case may be). In this respect, the Québec Act of 1774 arguably established the foundations for natural relations between beings (i.e. French and English Canadians) and a rapport of grandeur to moderate those relations – and even, perhaps, eased a potential/eventual assimilative transition.

Despite the British’s accommodations, however, many of the French Canadians continued to see themselves as a conquered people and as second class citizens compared to their English counterparts – sentiments that have carried over and continue to be prevalent, to varying degrees, in modern times (Balthazar, 2013, p.48; Derriennic, 1995, pp.30-31). The prevailing sentiment of being second class citizens would be reaffirmed in 1791 with the introduction of a new Constitutional Act. This act came about as a response to a swell of British Loyalists who had emigrated to Québec from the United States following the American Revolution (Balthazar, 2013, p.52). To accommodate the Anglophone loyalists, while also avoiding any sort of socio-political or cultural clash with the – at the time – vastly majoritarian French population, the British government introduced an investment formula that would split the province into two – Upper- and Lower-Canada – and would establish a new rapport of grandeur and natural relations between the French and English. Upper-Canada was to be populated by the loyalists, who would follow British law, while Lower-Canada was to be populated by the French population, who would be allowed to continue following its previous social and cultural regime – including seigneurial land transfer, the practice of French customs, and the recognition of the Catholic Church as a prominent force in stately matters (p.53). Additionally, the people of Lower-Canada
were given a governing assembly elected by the people – one of the first and longest lasting assemblies of its nature in the world (Derriennic, 1995, p.31). However, this elected assembly was only granted limited power which, if need be, could be overturned by a higher, non-elected, legislative council headed by the governor. Unsurprisingly, this division of power proved to be contentious, and the two governing bodies would quarrel on numerous occasions – providing fodder for civil unrest and a basis for French Canadian nationalism (Balthazar, 2013, p.54).

This civil unrest would culminate with rebellion in 1837: the Lower-Canada Rebellion (or, more colloquially, the Patriot War) of 1837-1838 and, to a lesser extent, the Upper-Canada Rebellion of 1837 (Bonthius, 2003). The first of these rebellions, the Lower-Canada Rebellion, is one that might not have been if not for Louis-Joseph Papineau’s charisma and leadership in rallying the people of Lower-Canada (re: Québécois) around the notions of canadiens français and nationalité – concepts that, at the time, were still relatively novel (Mann, 2002, pp.69-70). Through Papineau’s challenge of English authority and the Church, he was able to translate nationalism into something tangible, something that the Québécois could understand and identity with (p.70). Leading up to the rebellion, Papineau’s political party, la Parti patriote, had held a majority in the House of Assembly for the better part of two decades; yet many of their proposed policy reforms were rejected by the British Parliament (CBC, 2001, par.1-2). These parliamentary rejections fuelled discontent in the general public – many of whom saw them as a sign of bad government and an affront to their national identities. Serving as a last straw, Papineau and his party brought a political manifesto outlining 92 resolutions – many of which dealt specifically with democracy and nationalism – directly to London in 1834 (Monière, 1978, p.131). In particular, these resolutions called for a new investment formula that would democratize Canada’s political apparatus and offer greater recognition to Canadians’ national rights (pp.131-132). For the most part, these resolutions were rejected; after three long years of
deliberation, only 10 of the 92 resolutions were adopted (pp.139-140). Following this news, the Parti patriote wasted little time organizing rallies and protests, its confidence in the British government completely shattered; within months, it had bloomed into rebellion (pp.140-141).

November 6th, 1837 marked the beginning of the Lower-Canada Rebellion (Monière, 1978, p.140). The initial rebellion lasted all of three weeks before the rebels were thoroughly defeated. Following the defeat, Papineau and other prominent members of the rebellion fled to the United States (Turner, 2006, p.97). While two smaller skirmishes would occur in February and November of 1838 – the culmination of which comprised the whole of the Lower-Canada Rebellion – much of the drive for the rebellion had been lost following the first defeat in 1837 (Mann, 2002, p.77). For its part, the Upper-Canada Rebellion was a much shorter and decidedly less serious affair than the Lower-Canada Rebellion, lasting little more than a month – but serving as an example of how English Canadians were equally as discontent, albeit for different reason, with the British government as were their French counterparts. Some historical evidence has suggested that the Upper-Canada Rebellion was strongly influenced by the rebellion in Lower-Canada, and implies some measure of political solidarity between the two Canadas (Turner, 2006, pp.97-98). All told, the defeat of these rebellions had all but squashed the “sporadic” dreams of Canada’s liberal francophone middle class of achieving independence or, even, annexation by the United States (Keating, 2001a, p.78).

4.1.1: Canadian Confederation (1867)

Perhaps the lesson to be learned from the Upper- and Lower-Canada Rebellions was that there was considerable unrest in the British colonies and a strong desire for political reform. To investigate the situation, the British government dispatched Lord Durham, “a modern businessman with racist views,” as its consort to Canada (Mann, 2002, p.78). The result of
Durham’s investigation was the *Report on the Affairs of British North America (1839)* – a report that, if nothing else, served to further fuel the French Canadians’ sense of injustice and apprehension towards the English. The report in question recommended, among other things, that Upper- and Lower-Canada be amalgamated and that the French contingent of the population be, once again, assimilated (Balthazar, 2013, p.73). For Lord Durham (1839), it was but a matter of time before French Canadians were assimilated by the English anyhow; amalgamating the two Canadas would simply expedite the process:

> It is but a question of time and mode; it is but to determine whether the small number of French who now inhabit Lower Canada shall be made English, under a Government which can protect them, or whether the process shall be delayed until a much larger number shall have to undergo, at the rude hands of its uncontrolled rivals, the extinction of a nationality strengthened and embittered by continuance (Lampton (Lord Durham), 1839, p.130).

In other words, Durham felt it would be in the best interest of French Canadians to precipitate a state of unworthiness and accept assimilation rather than establish a new rapport of grandeur or natural relations between the French and English that would see them treated on more equal footing. With little other recourse, the French population – led by reformer Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine – sought collaboration with the Anglophone population to find a resolution that would ensure the continued survival of the French language and culture in Canada. While this approach served to stave off assimilation, its end result was the minoritization of the French culture – a condition that, while practiced from 1841-onward, would only become a reality in 1851 when the Anglophone population finally surpassed the French (pp.74-75). By this point, French Canadian culture had seen its prominence and state of worth in North America erode to a point where the threat of assimilation had become a reality. In this case – as with the Québec Act of 1774 – a compromise was eventually made between the civic world of the British Empire and the domestic world of Lower-Canada – albeit a compromise that resulted from a specific conflict
and that highlighted a shift in the power relations between the two common worlds. No longer were French Canadians seen as necessity to the unity of the British North American colonies; now they were seen by some as a nuisance.

In part as a response to this shift in power relations – and in part as a means of seeking out “greener pastures” during a period of socio-economic turmoil in Canada – a large wave of Lower-Canada residents – primarily consisting of French Canadians – began emigrating south of the border, to the United States, and, to a lesser degree, to various northeastern regions of Ontario and the Canadian Prairies – most notably Manitoba – in the 1830s and 1840s (Hayne, 1982, p.11). For the most part, these French Canadian immigrants largely consisted of labourers seeking work in sawmills and textile factories in New England – though large concentrations of French Canadians also settled further west in regions such as New York State, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and California (Hayne, 1982, p.12; Brière, 1988, p.66). All told, between 1820 and 1950, more than a million French Canadians had immigrated to the United States – establishing the foundations of Québécois diasporic communities throughout the country, though none so pronounced as that of New England (LeBlanc, 1987, p.214). The immigration of French Canadians to the United States was significant enough to even warrant mention in Lord Durham’s report (Hayne, 1982, p.12). In response, the provincial government introduced a moderately successful program in 1870 to subsidize the repatriation of Québécois wishing to return to the province (p.13). A second program was introduced shortly thereafter that encouraged and assisted the “clearing and settlement of unoccupied areas of the province” in a sort of colonization process of Québec’s vast wilderness – and that, incidentally, fit well with the Catholic Church’s nationalist ideology of Québec (p.13). The purpose of this second program was twofold: first, it served to encourage the province’s potential emigrants to stay – a process that would ensure that they would preserve their French and Catholic heritages; second, it
allowed the Church to isolate these colonists away from the potential influence of “Anglo-Saxon materialism and urban corruption” (p.13).

Rising from these policies – and serving as a window into the mindset of the Québécois and, more specifically, the Catholic Church – was a period of Québec literature, promoted by the Church, which dealt with the questions of Québec culture and identity in the wake of emigration and British colonialism (Hayne, 1982, pp.13-14). From around 1830 to 1860, the literature produced in Québec largely served as a political project centred on protecting the French Canadian identity from the assimilative policies of the British Parliament. Under the Church’s direction, Québec literature began to take on a nationalist flavour in the latter half of the century, centering around the trifecta of “race-religion-sol” (race, religion, land) (Ferraro, 1998, p.59). It is a literary movement that evoked a “revolutionary” spirit and characterized the emigrant francophone traversing the northern extremes of North America as a heroic figure (Costisella, 1968, p.7). It is a literature that, at once, challenged the cultural policies recommended in the Report on the Affairs of British North America – and, more broadly, the political regime that would endorse them – and affirmed a national and cultural identity that was distinctively French Canadian (pp.7-8).

In no small part because of the efforts encapsulated in this literary movement, the recommendations made in the Report on the Affairs of British North America, although implemented, failed to completely squash the French culture and language in Canada. Through these efforts, along with those of LaFontaine and the Church, the French language and Catholic religion continued to be practiced and observed in the newly formed province of Canada (Balthazar, 2013, p.76) – and, in a way, serving as a critique of the civic world (British) by the domestic world (French Canadian). Moreover, the French language was increasingly employed in government, where legislature often operated under an informal principle of “double majority”
between the English and French (i.e. legislation had to be approved by both a majority of English and French representatives) (Dyck, 2004, p.94). Efforts to assimilate the French culture in Canada were further quelled in 1867, with the Canadian Confederation – wherein the dominion of Canada was formed among the British colonies of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. During the process of Confederation, the province of Canada was separated into two, self-governing provinces: Ontario and Québec (Keating, 2001a, p.77). With this separation, the newly minted province of Québec gained a measure of autonomy with respect to its culture and language vis-à-vis the rest of Canada. This environment proved germane to the emergence of a more pronounced nationalist movement in Québec, one which took its lead from the Catholic Church and built itself around a shared culture and language (Balthazar, 2013, pp.77-82).

In many respects, the Canadian Confederation marked a paradigmatic shift – not just for Canada, itself, but for the province of Québec. It is a shift that enabled the provincial government (and Catholic Church) to exert a greater measure of control over the running of the province – particularly with respects to culture and language. Up until this point, while Québec and its people had almost predominantly been characterized by the domestic world in their endeavours to protect and continue practicing their French heritage and culture, they were ultimately under the rule of the civic world – epitomized by the British. With the Confederation, however, a compromise between multiple common worlds was brokered – and with it, power was shifted from the British Empire to the newly formed Canadian government and its system that offered greater autonomy to its provinces. Part of this compromise essentially involved revisiting and reinstituting the policies introduced in the Québec Act of 1774. As former Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier (1871) indicated, one of the primary reasons Canada’s founding fathers sought federation was to conserve the unique and exceptional position Québec held in North America (as ctd. by Burelle, 1995, pp.33-35).
Yet, because of this shift – or perhaps in spite of it – a line had been drawn in the sand between Québec and the rest of Canada – one that has been called out at various points in the country’s history whenever political figures have been inclined to forget it (Burelle, 1995, p.35). It is a line that stressed the natural relations between Québec and the federal government, though it had been strained and challenged by various factors throughout the years. The political and historical processes preceding Confederation – particularly with respect to Québec and French Canada – had left their mark on Québec’s relationship with the rest of the country, one that established the province and its people as culturally distinct – a distinction that has, at times, proven difficult for the federal government to accommodate (Kymlicka, 1998, p.7). As such, the processes preceding Confederation established a cultural dichotomy between French and English, between French Canadian and English Canadian, which is still felt in Canada today – and which has often been an emphasis in Québec’s cultural policy. But more importantly, the early pre-Confederation history of Québec laid the groundwork for the province’s prevailing – sometimes nationalist in nature – cultural identity. This history highlights the roots of an emerging superior common principle and state of worth in the province of Québec that have gone on to inform much of the province’s cultural policy in the intervening century and a half.

4.2: From Silent Decolonization to Silent (i.e. Quiet) Revolution: The Gradual Modernization of Québec (1870s-1960s)

While the French language has “always been […] the most important” carrier of collective identity in Québec, the Catholic Church has historically been the second most important (Keating, 2001a, pp.77-78). Following the Canadian Confederation, the Catholic Church found itself in a position of significant social and political influence within the province of Québec and the broader French Canadian community. It should be noted that, following
Confederation, French nationalism in Canada was not exclusive to the province of Québec; much of the French Canadian nationalist discourse extended throughout all of Canada, and was represented primarily through the French-Catholic community. At the time, the role of the Church in the lives of French Canadians was, in fact, quite prominent – to the point where the Church was seen as being “far more crucial than […] any other institution,” the state included (Behiels, 2006, p.497). Far from being simply a religious institution that the people looked to for spiritual and moral guidance, the Catholic Church was rooted in French Canadians’ social lives, to the point where being a “French Canadian patriot and not […] a practicing catholic was unthinkable” (Hero & Balthazar, 1988, p.50).

It is with this influence in mind that the Church came to emblemize the “preservation of old values” over any sort of “concrete accomplishment” in the province of Québec (pp.49-51). Largely influenced by “priests fleeing revolution and secularization in France,” the Church sought to foster a “vision of French Canadian identity rooted in traditional values and opposed to industrialization, urbanization, and modernity” (Keating, 2001a, p.78). Simply put, the Church permeated French Canadian life in Québec to the point where most of the province’s social, economic, and political activities fell within the parish’s structure. The Church’s influence and interventions in these activities – coupled with the province’s already sordid and checkered past with federal governments – was among the catalysts for the Government of Québec’s (GoQ) eventual leeriness towards any sort of state intervention into its affairs (pp.49-51).

As one of the primary vehicles of French Nationalism at the time, the Church had a prominent influence on the province of Québec’s views of social policies and programs introduced by the federal government – to the point where the federal government’s interventions were unwelcome and, at times, seen as an encroachment on Québec’s provincial jurisdiction. These views were often skewed towards seeing federal policies as forms of “cultural imperialism
that threatened to undermine the distinctiveness of [Québec] society” (Banting, 1997, p.279). The fear was that, given the opportunity, the federal government would use its “democratic” powers to compromise Québec culture. As such, the Church did not believe in democracy, seeing it as a vehicle for modernization and industrialization – things the Church adamantly opposed at almost every turn (Guindon, 1988, p.107). Federal intervention was only tolerated when absolutely necessary, but “preference [was] given to non-state institutions” – such as “those organized around the Church” (Keating, 2001a, p.79). Any pressures to modernize Québec society – both within and outside the province – were shut down by Québec premier, Maurice Duplessis (p.79) – who was in office from 1933 to 1936 and 1944 to 1959, a period now described as La Grande Noirceur (the Great Darkness). Consequently, many of Québec’s social programs were falling behind those of the rest of Canada by the onset of the 1960s (Guindon, 1988, p.279).

Similarly, the Church strongly opposed the entry of secular, American labour unions into Québec during the 1920s – a sector where the Church has arguably, albeit somewhat ironically, had its most enduring impact on Québécois culture. With the support of the provincial government, the Church was able to “suppress” the labour union movement and, in the process, confirm its privileged position in Québec society (Keating, 2001a, p.79). In exchange, the Church ensured its ongoing support to the provincial government (p.79). On top of suppressing the incursion of labour unions from the south, the Church opted to form a trade union of its own, the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada (CTCC) (Hero & Balthazar, 1988, p.50) – which eventually secularized and became the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), currently the second largest trade union in Québec (Guntzel, 1993; CSN, 2014). Prior to its secularization, however, the CTCC primarily served as a vehicle for the Church to defend “traditional French Canadian values,” oppose state intervention in social and education sectors, and promote “collaboration with the business community” (Guntzel, 1993, p.146). In many
respects, the development of the CTCC established a new device for Québec’s cultural repertoire of objects: it was the establishment of a new institution whose purpose was to support the social, economic, and cultural objectives of the Church as they related to the province. Additionally, the CTCC’s introduction supported an investment formula that emphasised Québec’s independence relative to outside forces.

However, the emergence of the CTCC also, arguably, served as a precursor of things to come for the Church in particular and the province more broadly. On top of promoting an investment formula that privileged Québec’s autonomy, the creation of the CTCC evoked elements of a compromise between the domestic and market worlds. As Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) note, when the domestic and market worlds compromise, it is often – from a Jansenist perspective – in the context of the market helping to stimulate a failing charity of some sort, and often done as a means of obligating or indebting a person to the market (or business) (pp.379-380). In other words, nothing is free; the fact that the Church had sought some measure of refuge in the business (i.e. market) world speaks, perhaps, to a certain erosion of its influence over Québec culture and politics. In many respects, the Church’s greater interest in and reliance on market forces denotes a paradigmatic shift in its approach to influencing public policy in the province and underscores, more broadly, its willingness to compromise with other worlds in order to maintain its social and cultural status.

4.2.1: New Horizons: The Paradigmatic Shift of the Quiet Revolution

As it were, it was not long after World War II that the Catholic Church’s dominance in Québec’s culture and politics began to wane. The post-war years, in fact, were notable for being a “high point” for the federal government – wherein much national and provincial growth can be attributed to federal interventions – and a “low point” for the GoQ – marked by an accelerated
decline as a result of either government inactivity, in certain cases, or activity that was
detrimental to the province’s prosperity (Dion, 1973/1976, p.33). This period was also marked by
intense artistic creation and cultural production in Occidental countries (Gouvernement du
Québec, 1992, p.VI) – much of which reflected a changing attitude towards government and, in
some places, the Church. In Québec, a new, better educated, well-travelled, and open-minded
elite began to emerge – an elite that was willing to explore the possibilities that came with
international development and expanded social programs, even if that meant challenging the
traditional nationalist values of the province (Hero & Balthazar, 1988, pp.51-52). The ideas of
this new elite would finally come to a head in the 1960s, when elements of the Quiet Revolution
(la Révolution tranquille) began to take hold in the province (Béland & Lecours, 2007, pp.409-
410). In what can perhaps best be described as a paradigm shift, the Quiet Revolution
emblemized a transitory period in Québec society following the death of Conservative Premier
Maurice Duplessis in 1959 and the subsequent election of Liberal Jean Lesage in 1960. Among
its top priorities, the Lesage government set about implementing reforms geared towards
modernizing Québec society and government (Labrie, 2006, p.1038).

The belief of the time was that the GoQ was lagging – that the role of the (provincial)
state was underdeveloped relative to that of other places (Heintzman, 1983, p.4). Primarily
pushed by the social and economic elites of the province, there was a growing sense that much of
the province’s delays and underdevelopment were inherently the result of the Catholic Church’s
prominent role in French society and its emphasis on tradition and the past. However, far from
being an outright rejection of tradition and the past, the Quiet Revolution represented a new
mentality or ideology – a new way of viewing the world and Québec’s place within it. The fact
that the Church and its clerical institutions began to atrophy in the wake of the Revolution was
merely a side-effect of the changing attitudes and values of the Québécois – the sign that a
cultural revolution truly did occur (Gingras & Nevitte, 1983, pp.692-693). Consequently, the Quiet Revolution brought with it considerable change in the province of Québec – first in its challenge of the hereto then tradition-oriented way of life in Québec, and secondly in its desire to see French Canadians shed their “subordinate status” vis-à-vis the dominant English population (Elkin, 1969, p.112). With the social changes brought about by the Quiet Revolution, the nexus of power within Québec shifted and the “pervasive role of the church was largely overturned” (Barrington-Leigh, 2013, p.208). Although its role has been significantly reduced, the Catholic Church’s place (and legacy) in Québec culture has remained relatively intact. In retrospectives found in policy documents, even the GoQ (1992) has offered relatively positive – if brief – accounts of the Church’s role in the province’s cultural heritage (p.1) – going so far as to suggest that the Church offered a greater space to non-religious entities in the context of socio-political institutions and activities (i.e. culture and education) during the Quiet Revolution (p.3).

What is evident is that, prior to the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s taking hold and altering the landscape of Québécois (and Canadian) society and nationalism, much of what was understood as French Canadian nationalism was espoused through religious channels and, as such, made Québec nationalism “a cultural more than a political phenomenon” in Canada (Hero & Balthazar, 1988, p.51). This cultural phenomenon set the French Canadian population of Canada and Québec apart from the non-French population – which, in itself, was not such a difficult task given the historical nature of the French/English dichotomy in Canada (and abroad). More importantly, however, nationalism as a cultural phenomenon arguably gave French Canadians a sense of identity that went beyond mere subjugation; it gave them a raison d’être, a rallying point around which they could identify and possibly move beyond their conquered past (Guindon, 1988, p.108). It should be noted that, despite its apprehension of democracy and overall distrust of the Government of Canada, the Catholic Church was not an advocate for
Québec secession, per se; the Church was relatively content with Québec’s place in Canada, provided the federal government’s interventions in provincial affairs remained at arm’s length. Rather, it was the move towards modernization – and away from the Church – that led to a renewed sense of nationalism – one which advocated for secession from Canada (p.110).

Given the overall circumstances of this period in Québec’s history, a number of parallels can be drawn between the prominent cultural discourse of this period in Québec and the common worlds defined by Boltanski & Thévenot (1991), most notably the domestic world – and its emphasis on tradition and personal dependencies – as exemplified by the Catholic Church. Through its influence on virtually every facet of day-to-day life in Québec, the Church served as purveyor of French tradition in Québec, but did so through the outright opposition to industry and progress – an opposition made salient by many of the province’s policies and political stances vis-à-vis the federal government. What is perhaps most interesting about this period, however, is not so much that it can be described as a conflict between the domestic and industrial worlds – between the Church and progress – but that it is a conflict that does not see its resolution through compromise – at least not a compromise between the two worlds in question. Rather, what we see is a form of paradigm shift – symbolized by the Quiet Revolution – wherein the domestic world of the Church is supplanted by progress and the evolution of Québec culture. Where compromise arguably does occur is with respects to cultural policy – a policy promoted by a new class of elite whose interest lay not simply in preserving French culture tradition, but in expanding and growing it. To do so, this new elite sought to establish a new cultural policy framework that would both support the Québécois identity while also encouraging the province’s modernization.
4.2.2: The State of Affairs of Culture in Canada: The Royal Commission – A Brief Aside

This thesis would be remiss not to briefly discuss the importance of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences 1949-1951 (better known as the Massey Commission – named for its Chair, Vincent Massey – or sometimes the Massey-Lévesque Commission – named after the commission’s Québec representative, Georges-Henri Lévesque) to both Canada and Québec (Jackson & Lemieux, 1999, p.10). The Commission, appointed in 1949, was devised to, as its name implies, investigate the state of affairs of the arts and cultural sectors in Canada, and make recommendations accordingly. More specifically, the primary task of the Commission was to “examine certain national institutions and functions” as they relate to science, literature, art, music, drama, films, and broadcasting and provide policy recommendations for the federal government (Royal Commission, 1951, p.3). At the time, the Commission was noted for being “unprecedented” – if not in the context of culture, then certainly in the context of Canada (p.3). The report indicates that Canada is faced with two challenges with respects to culture: the first, noted for being common to most states, is the question of how the government can provide financial assistance to “projects in the field of the arts and letters” without “stifling” the creative efforts and inspirations of Canadian citizens; the second is providing consistent support given both the federal government’s structure and in a way that is “in harmony” with the country’s diversity (p.5).

The Massey Commission also raised concerns regarding the relative pressure and influence American culture had (and certainly continues to have) over Canadian culture and day-to-day life (Royal Commission, 1951, pp.11-13). While the report recognized and appreciated the intellectual and cultural aid provided to Canada by the United States – and acknowledged the “generous support” that had been given to Canada by American foundations such as Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Guggenheim – the Commission noted a growing frustration from Canadians
over the loss of its creative power and the “erosion of its own distinctive personality” (Creighton, 1976, pp.185-186). Moreover, there was an evident “brain drain” of Canadian talent pursuing education in the United States and then accepting positions there rather than returning to Canada (Royal Commission, 1951, p.14). Thus, in tacit acknowledgment of, and agreement with, the Frankfurt School’s criticisms of American mass culture, the Massey Commission placed its focus on encouraging the development of Canada’s mass media industries as being under the purview of the public sector, and provides a rationale for the establishment of publicly funded cultural institutions to serve this end (Druick, 2012, pp.138-139; Collins, 1990, p.60). In fact, the Commission explicitly denounces the idea that its purpose, in any way, was to educate the Canadian public on questions of culture and cultural consumption; rather, its focus was on providing citizens with a greater breadth and opportunity to access and appreciate culture (Royal Commission, 1951, p.5). Promoting and supporting mass media – and, in particular, the public organizations (i.e. the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)) responsible for its dissemination – as a public sector service was seen as a way of ensuring that the culture reaching Canadians was of a certain quality (p.25). In other words, the Massey Commission proposed both a new investment formula that prioritises the media sector over other cultural industries and a new understanding of Canadian culture’s state of worth relative to that of the United States.

The Massey Commission’s recommendations also placed emphasis on what it defined as “gathering points for culture,” namely: mass media and broadcasting; cultural institutions; education (i.e. universities and scholarships); and the fine arts (Finlay, 2004, p.218). While the Commission’s report offers recommendations in support of each sector, there is an underlying emphasis on “nationalization, depoliticization, excellence, and diversity” as characterizing elements of what the Commission envisioned for a “state-supported culture for Canada” (p.218). Where media is concerned, the report recommended that broadcasting remain “under the control”
of the federal government, with the CBC serving as parliament’s purveyor of radio broadcasting operations (Royal Commission, 1951, p.287). The CBC’s role would be such that no private broadcaster would be permitted to operate in Canada without first acquiring permission from the CBC (p.288). Emphasis was placed on ensuring that the CBC and its subsidiaries remained politically neutral and relatively uncommercialized (p.290). Culturally, recommendations were also made for the CBC to develop a second French-language network that would provide French broadcasting to Canada’s Maritime and western provinces (p.297). Similar provisions were recommended with respects to the production and dissemination of television content (p.303).

Where cultural institutions – including universities and scholarships – were concerned, perhaps the “most important recommendation” the Massey Commission made was for the creation of a “Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities, and Social Sciences (Stewart & Kallman, 2006, par.8). The purpose of this new institutional body would be “partly advisory, partly administrative” and full parts “able to resolve many of the problems which led […] to the establishment of this Royal Commission” (Royal Commission, 1951, p.370). The rationale for the creation of such a council was that there did not exist in Canada an organization that functioned for the arts as the “National Research Council [did] for the natural sciences” (p.371). While the Commission acknowledged the existence and importance of the Arts Council of Great Britain – particularly with respects to the promotion and dissemination of English culture – the Commission did not want to create a Canadian Council that paralleled the British institution (p.375). For this reason, the council proposed by the Commission would “stimulate and help voluntary organizations” within the fields of arts, letters, humanities, and social sciences to “foster Canada’s cultural relations abroad, to perform the functions of a national commission for UNESCO, and to devise and administer a system of scholarships” in support of the activities of scholars and post-graduate students (p.377). This recommendation
would eventually lead to the creation of the Canada Council for the Arts in 1957, following the ratification of the Canada Council Act (Jackson & Lemieux, 1999, p.10).

Overall, the Massey Commission’s findings and recommendations were well received in Canada, with the exception of Québec where the Duplessis government argued that the Commission’s recommendations encroached on provincial responsibilities (Stewart & Kallman, 2006, par.11). Moreover, the Commission’s emphasis on Canadian nationalism elicited strong reactions from the country’s French communities, in general, and served as additional fuel for Québécois nationalism (McLaughlin, 2012, p.144). As a result, the Commission (and its report) served to highlight a division between the English and French visions of Canadian nationalism. While both sides saw (group or national) culture as the foundation of a state’s political legitimacy, each had varying perspectives on what “culture” actually signified. For English Canadians, the common good of the state was built around diversity and cultural exchange between diverse groups; culture was produced and consumed by citizens, and required government intervention to protect it (p.155). For French Canadians, the Canadian State was, above all else, a political compromise between two nations; (national) culture was seen as homogenous, coming from familial socialization, a shared history and language, and a shared collective conscience; it was through a common culture that the common good was to be assured (p.155).

In this respect, the Massey Commission’s recommendations were seen more as a supportive mechanism to the English-framed idea of Canadian nationalism than the French; they were seen as reasserting a rapport of grandeur between the French and English that posited the English as dominant and the French as subservient. Opponents of the Commission’s recommendations, most notably André Laurendeau – who would later serve as one of the principal architects of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963) – openly
challenged the report’s federal leanings, suggesting that the report went against and even denied the bicultural nature of Canada (McLaughlin, 2012, p.156). In response to these criticisms, George-Henri Lesvesque pleaded with members of the religious and educational communities to publicly support the Commission’s findings, arguing that, far from challenging the bicultural nature of Canada, greater federal intervention into cultural affairs would serve to support and protect French Canadian culture (as ctd. by McLaughlin, 2012, p.156). With this in mind, the Massey Commission does present a rapport of worth between French Canadian and English Canadian cultures, with an investment formula that stresses the importance of national (Canadian) unity through cultural diversity – though arguably at the expense of biculturalism (i.e. English and French). Given that the Massey Commission was, in large part, built around producing a sense of Canadian identity as a means of fostering/securing a common good (McLaughlin, 2012), it can reasonably be said that its recommendations constitute a reconsideration of what was, at the time, understood to be the public good – the superior common principle – of Canadians.

The fact, however, that the Massey Commission created a sense of concern in Québec – and within the broader French Canadian community – with respects to its culture suggests that the proposed compromise outlined in the report challenged the French Canadian domestic world. The Commission sought a more prominent engagement from the federal government in cultural matters, but, in doing so, arguably broke with the “etiquette” of Québec’s domestic world by seeking to reorganize – if you will – its hierarchical structure. While, fundamentally, the argument can be made that the Massey Commission – through its engendered support of cultural diversity (Royal Commission, 1951, p.4) – intended to support French Canadian culture, there is an equally strong argument to suggest that, in the contexts of Canada and Québec, cultural diversity as envisioned by the Commission compromised the sanctity of the bicultural vision of
Canada that many French Canadians held. Ultimately, with respects to national identity, the Massey Commission – and the disaccord that would come from it vis-à-vis French Canadians – served as a precursor to the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and to the province of Québec’s sovereigntist leanings (McLaughlin, 2012).

4.3: Culture & Convergence: Cultural Policy in Québec – 1960s to the 1990s

The 1960s ushered in a new wave of cultural policy in Québec – much of which was emblemized by the election of le Parti libéral du Québec in 1960 (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.188). For some, the election of le Parti libéral marked what has been described as an emergence/or moving away from *la Grande Noirceur* – an emergence which led to significant changes in the social and political discourse of French Canadian culture (Lapalme, 1988, pp.24-25). Precipitated by soon-to-be Attorney General of Québec and Minister of Cultural Affairs Georges-Émile Lapalme’s 1959 manifesto, *Pour une politique* – which provided “the rationale for a coherent and comprehensive state intervention in cultural matters” – the newly elected GoQ took little time in making history with the introduction of the ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec (MACQ or MAC) in 1961 (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.277) – today known as the Ministère de la culture et des communications du Québec (MCCQ or MCC) (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015b). The first ministry of its kind in North America, the MAC was at the heart of many of Québec’s fundamental cultural policies – many of which either still remain or had a significant, almost enviable impact on Québec cultural development vis-à-vis other provinces, territories, and countries (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.183). At their core, many of the policies initially introduced by the MAC sought to introduce an investment formula that would democratize culture – that is to say, make works of high culture accessible to the general public (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.289).
However, due to limited budgets at the time, some of the more ambitious endeavours of the MAC were constrained (p.289)

Devised as a ministry that would coordinate and manage the ensemble of the province’s cultural activities as they relate to cultural life in Québec (Lapalme, 1988, p.95), the MAC also offered the province a framework to promote the national identity of French Canadians – and later, the national identity of the Québécois (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.289). At the time, French Canadian and Québec nationalism was very much an expression of the Québec government’s desire “that Canada […] better reflect its bi-national character” (Rocher, 2014, p.26). In particular, the MAC’s emphasis on the French Canadian identity was fuelled by growing concerns that the Government of Canada’s ambition to develop a “common cultural policy for all of Canada” would undermine Québec and francophone culture and identity in favour of a homogenized (Anglophone) culture (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2008, p.348). Adding to the Québécois’s already growing resentment of the rest of Canada, the 1963 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism – established by the federal government in part as a response to the growing nationalist discourse and separatist movement in Québec and in part as a means of responding to the “French Canadians’ desire to see their culture and language better recognized from (and in) the rest of Canada” – found that Francophones were grossly underrepresented in the country’s economic and political elite (Lemasson, 2014, p.3). These revelations served to further “fuel the separatist movement in Québec” by establishing a dichotomy between the Anglophone “haves” and the Francophone “have nots” (p.3). Thus, inspired by France’s approach to cultural policy – not to mention its appointment of a Ministry of Culture in 1959 (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.VI) – the MAC drew on the philosophies of many of Canada’s prominent French philosophers in developing its approach to French Canadian culture – many of whom advocated for the “preservation of traditions inherited from the French settlers” under the
ideology of “la Survivance française” (French survival) (Lemasson, 2015, pp.6-7). As Lapalme (1973) believed – and as is evidenced by the ideology of survival – while one “could live without formal education,” one does not exist “without culture” (as ctd. by Handler, 1988, p.39).

In particular, under the leadership and guidance of Lapalme, the MAC “sought to enhance the French legacy in cultural matters” as a means of resisting cultural assimilation (Lemasson, 2015, p.7). In doing so, the MAC established a definitive superior common principle: the primacy of the French language and culture in Québec society. The challenge, however, was transitioning from la Survivance française to la Vie française – from mode of survival to facet of everyday life (Lapalme, 1988, p.87). This challenge, in many respects, speaks to the concept of governmentality – in this case, of making the very essence of French culture an integral and unequivocal part of life in Québec, arguably to the point where explicit cultural policy is no longer needed. However, as Lapalme (1988) suggests, the question of cultural survival has remained prevalent in Québec’s cultural policy discourse primarily because it resonates well with the electorate – particularly during opportune moments (p.87). The implication of this prevalence is that, much in the mould of the inspired world of the economies of worth, the policies to preserve, protect, and ensure the continuance of French Canadian culture of the 1960s were successful, but that the "glory" of that success has been renounced in favour of a continued discourse of survival – arguably for its political application. According to Lapalme (1988), even le Parti libéral – with its doctrine of culture that Lapalme, himself, had crafted – has, outside of a few seemingly serendipitous occasions, been guilty of emphasising the survival aspects of cultural policy, particularly during election periods when it is “infinitely easier to exploit sentimental reactions [of voters] then to cater to reason” (p.87, translated by author).

Regardless of the intent or implications of Québec’s cultural policy discourse, an ambitious endeavour was undertaken by the MAC in the early 1960s to introduce a cultural
policy program that not only protected Québec culture, but also promoted Francophonie – both within the province and on the national and international stages (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.282). For the MAC, culture was a fundamental right and essential part of social unity and cohesion – it represented a state of worthiness – and it was its responsibility to ensure Québec was fully in control of its culture:

[C]’est essentiellement par la culture qu’une collectivité s’exprime, traduit sa mentalité, en d’autres termes s’identifie à ses propres yeux, se reconnaît, a la fierté de l’être moral qu’elle édifie. Le temps est venu, pour l’État du Québec, de prendre en charge, de plein droit, le domaine culturel, dont, comme on le verra, il a la responsabilité (Livre Blanc, 1965, as ctd by L’Allier, 1976, p.18).

The first step in implementing this policy program was targeting and emphasising the absolute importance of the French language (Lapalme, 1988, p.88). Among the MAC’s first initiatives was the introduction of four agencies dedicated to the championship of the French language and culture. The first agency was a Linguistic Bureau tasked with monitoring and ensuring a standard and proper use of the French language in official settings and correspondences. The second was a Provincial Office for Urbanism, which was responsible, on the one hand, for protecting the “French character and history” of existing heritage sites and, on the other hand, planning the development of future sites that would promote French Canadian culture. The third office was an Extra-territorial French Canada Branch responsible for promoting the province of Québec on the international scene, while also serving as a “gathering point” for Francophones living in other parts of North America. The last of these agencies was a Cultural Affairs Department devised to oversee the other three agencies while also supporting the arts and culture (Lemasson, 2015, p.7). With these agencies in place – and in conjunction with the Ministry of Education and, later in the 1960s, the Ministry of Immigration and Ministry Communication (which, itself, was later amalgamated with the MAC to form the MCCQ) – the MAC would serve as a fundamental contributor to social change in Québec (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.290). These agencies served, in
many respects, to reinforce the province’s state of worth, supporting and encouraging cultural preservation, integration, and growth.

In her analysis of Lapalme’s approach, Lemasson (2015) contends that the ensemble of agencies introduced under the MAC represents a compromise between three of Boltanski and Thévenot’s common worlds: the domestic world insofar as this approach seeks to reaffirm and embrace the French heritage and traditions “inherited” from French settlers; the world of fame (or opinion) in the contexts of both the continued survival of the French Canadian identity and the expressed desire to increase “the international influence of French Canadians by reinforcing cultural relations with francophone countries and regions”; and the civic world through the “unprecedented” emphasis on government intervention in cultural matters expressed by the development of so many agencies (p.7). While this analysis may hold true for the early days of Québec cultural policy under the Parti libéral and Lapalme, by the 1970s Québec had begun moving away from its French cultural policy leanings. Instead, the MAC opted for a hybridized approach to cultural policy, drawing on both the French and British traditions, that would delegate cultural “responsibilities to crown corporations and to relatively autonomous funding organizations,” while simultaneously “developing […] strategies to build financial partnerships with the private sector” – all of which would be centrally regulated by the MAC (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2008, p.348). This emphasis on delegation and deregulation of cultural responsibilities represented a shift not just in policy approaches, but in policy ideologies. It is a shift that indicates a greater acceptance of the market and its place in cultural matters, particularly with respects to both the production and consumption of culture. It is a compromise that harkens to the now-classic cultural policy notion of cultural democracy – of offering the populace a greater access to all things culture, regardless of the culture’s perceived status or message. This is
an important transition in Québec cultural policy (and policy discourse) as it establishes the foundations for much of the policy that would come over the next few decades.

The late 1960s onward was a period of significant change in Québec – a change defined by modernization, a greater international presence, and a renewed and evolving sense of nationalism. As modernization continued to take hold of Québec society and as the province’s cultural policy continued to expand its approach to the production and dissemination of culture, a distinct (Québécois) nationalist flavour began to take root in and inspire much of the province’s cultural policy and production (Garon, 2005, p.161). Facilitating the growth of this nationalist sentiment was an accelerated development of cultural offerings from both institutional and industrial sources. On the one hand, the government was offering a steady stream of financial support to its artists – through the aforementioned autonomous funding organizations – which largely resulted in an increase in the production value of artistic and cultural products. On the other hand, with policies being introduced focused on expanding the reach, scope, and size of the cultural industries, the volume of cultural products available invariably increased in kind (Garon, 2005, p.161). As the volume and channels of cultural production increased in Québec, so too did the MAC’s operations. Throughout the latter half of the 1960s, the MAC expanded its regional presence and the scope of its mission – first by opening five regional offices in various cities and towns throughout the province (i.e. Montréal, Hull, Sherbrooke, Trois-Rivières, Chicoutimi et Québec), then by increasing its staff by almost 700 (Saint-Pierre, 2010, pp.289-290). On top of expanding the operations of its cultural institutions, Québec began to take a keener interest in the world outside its door. More than ever before, Québec had become acutely aware of its place in the world, and was more open to people and international ways of life. Even as the Québécois sought to develop a territorial society uniquely their own, they also kept an eye (and a keen interest) on what was happening elsewhere (Balthazar, 2013, p.167). To this end, the MAC also
established the *Service de la coopération avec l’extérieur* in 1966 to consult the minister of cultural affairs on virtually all cultural exchange policies within other international jurisdictions (Harvey, 2011, p.32).

### 4.3.1: The World of Tomorrow: Expo 67 & the Nationalism of Québec Culture

Serving as a window into the modernization and nationalization of Québec – not to mention its growing acceptance and interest in international affairs – was Expo 67 – an international world fair and exposition held in Montréal in 1967, in part to commemorate the 100\(^{th}\) anniversary of Canada’s Confederation (Hurley, 2011, p.3). Titled, *Man and His World*, Expo 67 served as a thematic exhibition of human progress and modernity – and, as such, served as a display of the lengths to which Québec had modernized its society over the decade. The Expo, itself, was initially opposed by many Canadian journalists and politicians who feared it would detract from Canada’s Centennial anniversary – a concern that was later assuaged by linkages made between the two events, including the inclusion of an acknowledgement to Canada’s Centennial in the Expo 67 program and a celebration at the Expo on July 1\(^{st}\) of that year (Expo 67 Programme, 1967 – Retrieved from Collections Canada, 2002). Requiring the support of all three levels of government to ensure Expo 67’s success, the federal government legislated the incorporation of the Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World Exhibition – a crown corporation that delineated the responsibilities of each level of government with respects to the Expo (Libraries & Archives Canada, 2015). As such, while the Expo would take place in Québec and would offer the province an opportunity to showcase itself (and its distinct culture) to the world, it was a joint project that would also showcase and celebrate Canada and Canadian culture.
However, not only did Expo 67 offer Québec an opportunity to “catapult” itself into the international spotlight, it also highlighted Québec’s nationalist aspirations. Perhaps one of the more subtle examples of these aspirations being put on display came via the Québec Pavilion – one of 90 that served to represent various countries and facets of human achievement (Hurley, 2011, p.3). Of note, the Québec Pavilion presented Jacques Cartier – the explorer who discovered and claimed the territory now known as Canada for the French – as a tourist and not as a founder. This is a portrayal that Hurley (2011) describes as a form of revisionist history that repositions Québec’s history as not one of discovery by the French and cession to the British, but as a “territorial identity and integrity” that existed prior to European colonization (p.32). In this respect, Expo 67 represented an invitation to the Québécois to “(re)discover and (re)colonize” their territory; it was a means of making salient Québec’s transition from a “cultural entity […] to a nation-state” (p.32). In other words, the Québec Pavilion of Expo 67 was arguably a symbolic and public invitation to the people of Québec to renegotiate their collective identity. More importantly, however, Expo 67 represented an invitation to renegotiate Québec’s domestic world in the context of a compromise built around validating and promoting Québec’s distinct cultural identity. On the one hand, the Expo was pushed and developed as a means of increasing the status and profile (i.e. fame) of the province on the international scene; on the other hand, the Expo served as a way of – at least implicitly – drawing attention to (and creating discourse around) a specific issue (in this case the socio-historical context around which Québec’s cultural and national identities are built). In this respect, Expo 67 arguably served as a test model for Québec’s superior common principle insofar as it provided the province with a stage to present its culture and society to an international audience.

While Expo 67 would eventually be heralded as a huge success – for not just the province of Québec (and city of Montréal), but for Canada as a country (Collections Canada, 2002, par.1-
4) – one must question whether or not this sentiment is somewhat misguided – at least where Canada is concerned. For instance, while many of Canada’s top performers were on display at the Expo, so too were a number of French Canadian artists known for their Québec-nationalist political leanings. Of particular note were Pauline Julien and Gilles Vigneault (Department of Public Relations – Textual Records, 1967, Retrieved from Collections Canada, 2002). Vigneault, in particular, was scheduled to play his popular song, *Mon pays* – a song that, for many, along with his song *Gens du Pays*, has been seen as an unofficial anthem of Québec nationalism (Fournier, 1966, p.53). This inclusion of a separatist element to Expo 67 – at least from the Québécois side of things – signals an emphasis on a superior common principle predicated on the distinction of Québec culture from Canadian culture, with the artists in question serving as both subjects and harmonious figures of the natural order. In particular, the artists’ inclusion indicates who Québec, at the time, identified as the harmonious figures of its natural order: artists whose work evoked definitive, nationalist sentiments. From a policy perspective, their inclusion certainly implies a political message on the part of the Québec government. It serves as a mode of expression in terms of denoting the provincial government’s cultural ambitions vis-à-vis the dominant English Canadian culture. Moreover, this case illustrates that there can be multiple worlds – and compromises – at play in any given situation. When multiple actors from the same common world work together in establishing compromises with other worlds, while they may all adhere to the same fundamental principles, their specific objectives and motivations may differ depending on the common worlds with which they are establishing compromises.

4.3.2: Québec Society and the MAC in the late 1960s

As Québec took a greater/more active role in its cultural sphere – both domestically and internationally – it also took a stronger stance, politically, in recognizing itself as a distinct
society within the predominantly Anglophone North America – a fact highlighted not just implicitly by Expo 67, but explicitly by a series of policies and agreements made by the provincial government in the late 1960 to support Franco-Québécois culture and education (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.291). Included among these agreements were an accord made with France in 1965 to facilitate cultural cooperation between the province and country with respects to the French language and cultural and artistic exchanges (Harvey, 2011, p.32), and a series of cultural accords made in 1969 with the French communities in the Canadian provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick, and the American state of Louisiana (pp.36-37). These accords all served to accentuate the importance of the French culture and language as common principles around which the Francophone identity and community could be built and unified, as well as to establish natural relations between French communities in North America and abroad. Domestically, among the most notable policies to emerge in this period was Bill 63: An Act to Promote the French Language in Québec. The stated objective of Bill 63 was to “ensure that the English-speaking children of Québec acquire a working knowledge of the French language and that persons who settle in Québec may acquire the knowledge of the French language and have their children instructed in such language” (Assemblée nationale du Québec, 1969, par.2). Through its application, Bill 63 – under the Minister of Education’s “direction” and through the auspices of the French Language Bureau – sought to “correct” and “enrich” the use of the French language in both spoken and written contexts (par.14).

While Québec expanded the scope of its cultural production, administration, and relations with provincial and international French-speaking communities and countries, it began to do so with an eye towards distancing itself from its “Canadian” nomenclature. Many of the province’s elites who had been advocating for greater autonomy from the rest of Canada began abandoning the label of “French Canadian” in favour of “Québécois” (Lacassagne, 2012, p181). The logic
followed that, as the majority of the population of Québec was Francophone – coupled with the seminal role of provincial governments in “the development of social policy” within the context of Canadian Federalism – it was easier to develop an “autonomous (and separatist) idea of Québec” within the “political space (polity)” of a provincial territory than to push for a concept of nationalism that extended beyond the province’s boarders (p.181). As a result, Québec began distinguishing itself from French Canadians in other provinces and territories; it no longer including them as part of its nationalism (Balthazar, 2013, p.167). In other words, the nationalist movement in Québec was no longer advocating for French Canadian nationalism; instead they were advocating for a Québec nationalism (and sovereignty) – a distinction that, on the surface, may be subtle, but in practice is anything but.

By the 1970s, however, the MAC began to run out of steam. Despite the MAC’s ambitions, its budget had remained relatively modest over the preceding 15 years compared to its expanding scope and reach, and many of the projects it had intended to follow through on were left to the wayside (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.216). Simply put, the MAC’s budget was being spread too thin vis-à-vis its mission and objectives. Budgetary problems had been a significant issue for the MAC, dating back to Lapalme’s tenure as minister – a point Lapalme, himself, highlighted in his 1964 resignation letter to then-Québec premier Lesage, suggesting that with a shoestring budget and limited discretionary powers, it no longer made sense to even have a ministry of culture (Lapalme, 1964, as ctd. in Le rapport du tribunal de la culture, 1975, pp.70-73). According to Lapalme, as a result of limited resources, his position effectively granted him the right to refuse requests for ministerial support to cultural endeavours, but refused him the right to accept them (“Ce droit de refuser il m'est accordé totalement et intégralement. Le droit d'accepter m'est refusé”) – as Lapalme felt that, more often than not, he was forced to refuse (p.71). It is even noted in a green paper published by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs in 1976 that during
Lapalme’s tenure (and beyond), the ministry’s budget was less than half a percent of the province’s total budget – a modest figure in comparison to other departments and agencies (L’Allier, 1976, p.93). As such, coinciding with the emergence of Québec’s nationalist movement was a growing scepticism of MAC’s role vis-à-vis the province’s culture and cultural identity, and, more specifically, its approaches to cultural development and cultural policy. Additionally, pressure was beginning to mount from the province’s cultural and intellectual communities for the MAC to focus its efforts – and modest budget – on exclusively supporting the Québécois culture (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.216).

As a means of addressing these concerns, the MAC created a Service for Cultural Industries in 1973 (Harvey, 2011, p.42) with the purpose of expanding the scope and service of the cultural industries in the province of Québec and abroad. Among the service’s most prominent contributions to Québec cultural policy was their report, Mission technique en Europe sur la distribution du livre, des journaux, des revues et des périodiques, published in 1976 – a publication that, as its name implies, sought to assess European approaches to the dissemination of print media as a means of addressing what was seen as a floundering and poorly developed cultural sector in the province of Québec (Service des industries culturelles, 1976, p.81). In particular, the Mission technique had as its mission to elaborate a policy that would help increase reading in Québec, in all its forms, and increase the methods by which reading could be favoured over other cultural practices (p.1). The concern was that the weak print media sector was compromising Québec culture by offering an insufficient range and supply of Québec-produced literary products to necessarily meet the population’s demand. The report notes that the primary challenge the Québec print media sector faces is competition from cultural activities, new and old – such as television, radio, music, sports, camping, travelling, and a host of other hobbies – that consumers are more readily interested in because of their broader accessibility and relatively
smaller budgetary and time commitments compared to reading (and the purchase of Québec-produced literary products) (pp.82-83). In this respect, the report suggests that these quandaries are both commercial and cultural in nature: commercial in the sense that the weak development of the Québec publishing sector was seen as a question of distribution and cost; cultural in the sense that the absence (and potential loss) of Québec cultural literature was seen as symptomatic of the challenges Québec culture and identity faced vis-à-vis the rest of North America – a problem that was seen as being both individualistic and collective in nature (p.93).

To address the issues surrounding the print media sector, the Mission technique puts emphasis on the provincial government’s mandate to protect the collective interests of the province while being “the only one capable of doing so with a measure of efficiency” (Service des industries culturelles, 1976, p.93, own translation). To this end, drawing on the European practices that were deemed most salient to Québec’s context, the report recommends that the MAC act as catalyst in the foundation of a centralized publication house (maison du livre). This publication house would reunite editors and libraries under one umbrella, and serve as a centralized hub in the distribution and dissemination of Québécois print media within the province (p.85). To this end, the MAC would offer financial support in efforts to start-up the publishing house, ensure that loans to that end were granted, and/or in the effort to reduce the cost of distributing products – particularly in marginalized or out-of-the-way regions of the province (p.85). It was envisioned that the publication house would eventually grow to become the province’s central importer and exporter of literary productions (p.88). In order to actualize this endeavour, the report recommended a hybrid approach to governance of the publication house that follows the model of the Canadian Press: a cooperative organization consisting of representatives from the public, private, and not-for-profit sectors (pp.107-108).
The implications of the Service for Cultural Industries – and its publications – suggest that the GoQ was seeking answers to its critics through engagements with the cultural industries. In this case, by offering a means through which the province’s print media sector could grow – particularly in the context of competing with other cultural sectors that were deemed more popular – the GoQ sought to expand the offerings of Québec’s cultural industries in a fashion that utilizes the industries, themselves, to promote the province’s identity – a process that was arguably devised to influence and support the civic link that can exist between culture, cultural consumption, and identity. From this perspective, it can be argued that the government was seeking to influence the province’s domestic world by tapping into the “innovation” of the industrial world as a symbolic gesture to indicate the government’s progress with respect to the concerns voiced by its critics. It is a policy that reinforces print media’s state of worth through its propagation within Québec society and abroad. It establishes a policy priority to promote and disseminate specific forms of Québec culture – in this case, print media which has long been recognized as an important vehicle for the proliferation of a national identity (e.g. Anderson, 1991). In this respect, the policy arguably also serves to reinforce the superior common principle of valuing and promoting Québec’s cultural identity through the valorization of a cultural industry-as-harmonious-figure.

Despite the GoQ’s efforts to address concerns raised regarding its cultural support, a cultural tribunal and subsequent report – published by the revue journal, Liberté, in 1975 – offered a scathing review of the MAC following a “series of demonstrations organized by politically engaged artists and cultural workers unsatisfied with the MACQ” (Lemasson, 2014, p.8). Many of the province’s artists and intellectuals accused the MAC of being inert in its approach to cultural development, citing the fact that the ministry had seen a turnover of five ministers since 1970 – a period coinciding with la Parti libéral du Québec’s return to power under
the reigns of Robert Bourassa and contributing to instability in a ministry whose mission was seen as fundamental to Québec society and identity (Saint-Pierre, 2011, pp.216-217). Presided over by Marcel Rioux, a prominent French Canadian intellectual and Québec nationalist, the cultural tribunal report highlighted a need for the Québec government to exercise cultural sovereignty through a more vigorous and generous application of the cultural industries (Tribunal de la Culture, 1975, pp.8-9). While the report acknowledges that, as a result of the Canadian Confederation, cultural sovereignty in Québec is something that exists on two levels – on the provincial and federal levels – the report’s authors found it problematic that Québec’s cultural industries were receiving more support and creative freedom from the federal government than they were from the province (p.9). The fact of the federal government’s interventions into Québec cultural policy was repeated by the Québec Minister of Cultural Affairs the following year, though contextualized to stress that the provincial government’s abilities to intervene in the province’s cultural affairs was greatly diminished by its lack of funding – adding that the provincial government would be remiss to ask artists and creators not to collaborate with the federal government when it offers them opportunities and resources the province cannot (L’Allier, 1976, p.98).

Accentuating the concerns of Québec’s artists and intellectuals was the fact that much of the province’s cultural space was being occupied by the cultural productions of other countries – many of whom occupied a dominant position in the cultural industries and boasted a strong economy relative to Québec (Tribunal de la Culture, 1975). The question of class – and, more specifically, class identity – re-emerged as a prominent issue from this discourse and implies, to a certain degree, that the efforts to modernize the province attached to cultural policy had not succeeded (or, to a certain degree, that the question of modernity had largely become rhetorical in Québec policy). This point was stressed by the fact that Anglo-Canadian interests were
dominating the Québec economy at the time, accounting for 83 percent of all managerial and executive positions in the province. Moreover, the average salary of French Canadians in Québec was 35 percent lower than their Anglophone counterparts – a fact made arguably more egregious when considered in the context that unilingual Anglophones had average salaries above those of bilingual French Canadians (Rocher, 2014, p.27). To address these concerns, the GoQ introduced Bill 22 in 1974 – an Official Language Act. This act, which superseded the aforementioned Bill 63, recognized the French language “national heritage” that the GoQ was “duty bound to preserve” by any means necessary (Gouvernement du Québec, 1974, par.1). If nothing else, Bill 22 served as a more definitive and overt assertion of the province’s superior common principle, serving to recognize the primacy and cultural significance of French in Québec beyond its status as the province’s majority language. However, Bill 22 was met with little fanfare from the Québécois (CBC, 2014, par.12).

Similarly, as a means of assuaging growing discontent towards the GoQ, the Minister of Cultural Affairs, Jean-Paul L’Allier, released a green paper in 1976, Pour l’évolution de la politique culturelle, which sought to establish a dialogue and agenda for the province’s cultural policy moving forward. L’Allier (1976) notes that the purpose of the paper was not to critique or judge the cultural policy that had come before – or, in some cases, the policy that never was; rather, the paper was to serve as a renovation of the current cultural policy, a means of rapidly detecting where the policy’s strengths lie and accentuating them as much as possible – or, if applicable, to correct and modify the policy where needed (pp.7-8). Among the most prominent concerns outlined in the report was a reaffirmation of the relative lack of budget at the disposal of the MAC – a fact that had impeded many of the ministry’s initiatives and resulted in the department having only ever satisfied approximately 20 percent of all demands made to them. Concerns over the ministry’s lack of communication with other departments and agencies –
particularly with respects to developing Québec’s (cultural) industries and commerce – and its skeletal crew of employees were also highlighted as significant impediments to the ministry’s service delivery (p.95). All of these factors, it was acknowledged, served to make the ministry a scapegoat and a symbolic representation of discontent for conservatives, creators, and distributors of Québec culture (p.95) – to the point where tensions were reaching a point where no amount of budgetary increase could repair the damage between the ministry and the cultural sector (p.96).

In response to these concerns, the green paper stressed the importance of communicating with the province’s artistic/creative community when developing a cultural policy (a concern that was, perhaps, influenced by the fact L’Allier had previously served as the provincial government’s Minister of Communications):

Répétons-le, il est impossible de songer à pouvoir mettre de l’avant de véritables politiques culturelles pour le Québec sans d’abord une communication vigoureuse, soutenue et permanente avec les différents milieux de la création chez nous (L’Allier, 1976, p.98).

In other words, the green paper recognizes Québec’s creative community as harmonious figures of the natural order, figures who exemplify worth in the context of Québec’s culture and cultural identity. However, the green paper also notes that the province’s ability to properly develop lines of communications with the artistic community was somewhat hampered by the federal government’s involvement in Québec culture through its own funding and support to the province’s artists and the cultural industries (L’Allier, 1976, p.98). Moreover, the federal government’s ambitions to create a distinctly Canadian culture are incompatible with the Québécois culture being recognized and favoured as distinct, homogenous, and dynamic (p.98). As a result, the report argues that there will always be two cultural policies at play in Québec: a vigorous federal policy and an as-yet to be fully realized provincial policy – the former of which often negates the latter, while the latter naturally opposes the former and its policy of assimilation
(pp.99-100). It is for this reason that the green paper offers, as its solution, a compromise between the federal and provincial governments where each would coordinate their cultural funding efforts and share authority over cultural policy. For this to happen, however, the green paper suggested that Québec’s cultural policy needed to be renovated and the ministry’s budget increased to a point where it could functionally serve its purpose and work with the federal government on more even footing (p.100).

While, certainly, the green paper emphasises a need for collaboration between the federal and provincial governments – not to mention a call for an increased budget and the development of stronger lines of communication between the MAC and the two tiers of government – the paper, nevertheless, represents an appeal to the electorate and to the province’s cultural industries. This appeal essentially asks for patience as the MAC acknowledges and seeks to address its various deficiencies and lacuna. In this respect, and without laying too much blame on his predecessors, L’Allier arguably sought to present himself (and his ministry) as a sympathetic and relatable figure to the general public – as someone who, while not necessarily responsible for the policies his ministry had implemented prior to his arrival, was willing to take action to course-correct. This act of ingratiation serves to establish a rapport of grandeur between the MAC, the general public, and the various levels (and hurdles) of government at play in the development and implementation of cultural policy. This is further evidenced by the ministry offering to use the opportunity of “renovating its policies” to introduce new priorities that would better reflect the Québécois’s interests – such as protecting and developing the province’s culture; improving services to citizens working in the cultural sector; and a better use of cultural resources – particularly in urban and rural planning (L’Allier, 1976, p.194) – all concessions that were introduced to reassure the public and which, arguably, served to accentuate the role of the MAC vis-à-vis the cultural industries and cultural development, as well as establishing a common
principle that values and promotes Québec’s culture and identity. In this case, with a provincial election looming but a year away – and with culture being a prominent concern for many Québécois – L’Allier’s green paper can be seen as a proposed compromise – at least implicitly – to give him and his party the opportunity to make good on the policy renovations he outlines.

However, rather than offer confidence to its constituents, the Québec government’s interventions – such as Bill 22 and the green papers – were seen as ineffective half measures that were largely rhetorical in nature. This ineffectiveness, coupled with federal interventions and the economic status of the Anglophone population, contributed to a growing sense of internal colonization within the province of Québec “based on a cultural division of labour” (Rocher, 2014, p.27). As such, going into the 1976 provincial election, there was a significant push towards a fresh voice in government – one that was arguably more in-tune with and representative of the province’s current state of mind (and sense of identity): enter le Parti Québécois.

4.3.3: Gens du Pays: Re-evaluating Québec Identity

In 1968, from the ashes of various other nationalist and sovereigntist parties, Québec saw the emergence of arguably the province’s most prominent and successful modern pro-independence political party: le Parti Québécois (Rocher, 2014, p.27). While le Parti Québécois would only garner a modest 10 percent of the vote in the 1968 provincial election, the party’s popularity quickly rose – to the point where, by 1976, it would assume power of the province (Keating, 2001a, p.81) – an outcome that, among other things,signalled a rejection of the compromise implied by L’Allier’s (1976) Pour l’évolution de la politique culturelle. At the time of their election to office in 1976, le Parti Québécois had garnered 41 percent of the vote and 71 of 110 seats in the Québec National Assembly, up from 30 percent of the vote and just six seats
in the previous election (Rocher, 2014; Lemasson, 2014, p.3) – a sure sign that the people of Québec were ready for a change. One of the first signs of this change came in the form of the Charter of the French Language (often referred to simply as Bill 101). Introduced in 1977 to replace Bill 22, the Charter of the French Language establishes French as the official language of the province, wherein it serves as “the instrument by which [the majority French-speaking] people has articulated its identity” (Gouvernement du Québec, 2016, par.1).

In many respects, the Charter was born out of “antithetical feelings of fear and confidence” – coupled with feelings of rejection – that the Québécois were being threatened as a distinct society and that the province could do “as well or better on its own” as it could as a province of Canada (Schmid et al., 2004, p.232). With the Charter, the Québec government has sought to assure “the quality and influence of the French language” by making it not only the “language of government and law,” but also the “normal and everyday language of work, instruction, communication, commerce, and business” – while also remaining fair, open-minded, and “respectful of the institutions of the English-speaking community of Québec, and respectful of the ethnic minorities” to whom the government acknowledges their contributions to the development of the province (Gouvernement du Québec, 2016, par.2). Inherently designed to address the disparity that existed between the Anglo- and Francophone communities of Québec, the Charter of the French Language insists on the pre-eminence of the French language, stressing the necessity of French-first communication in virtually every facet of Québec society – including the private and educational sectors (par.46 & 72). In this respect, Bill 101 serves as both a policy tool and a symbolic object or device whose purpose is to promote the province’s superior common principle: a unified, (French-speaking) culture.

To ensure compliance of the Charter, the Québec government expanded the role of the Office Québécois de la langue Française to “define and conduct Québec policy on linguistic
officialization, terminology, and the francization of the civil administration and enterprises” (Gouvernement du Québec, 2016, par.159). In this respect, the Charter draws from elements of the civic and domestic worlds; it draws on the socio-cultural character of the Québec population in developing an extension of civic rights that consists of “constructing jurisdictional instruments and establishing persons into collectives” in a way that brings elements and concerns that are otherwise part of the private sphere into the public sphere (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.377, translation by author). In this case, the Charter, itself, establishes linguistic rights as fundamental collective rights – rights that are best served and protected through their continued and ongoing application. Additionally, the Charter establishes strict guidelines under which individuals must be taught/instructed in the French language, offering only limited and highly specific circumstances under which exceptions can be made (Gouvernement du Québec, 2016, par.72-88) – necessitating, if nothing else, that the vast majority of the province’s new arrivals or immigrants are required to learn French and acclimate to Québécois culture. In doing so, the Charter reinforces the province’s superior common principle – the valorization of Québec culture and identity – and establishes its state of worth and the measures by which human dignity is to be observed.

Beyond language laws, among the new government’s first acts of business was to create regional councils on culture (Harvey, 2011, p.46) – an action that harkens to L’Allier’s (1976) green paper of the previous year. These councils consisted of private, autonomous, and non-profit organizations that were drawn from the cultural sectors and were tasked with representing the different cultural and territorial elements of their respective regions. Additionally, these councils were granted a formal status, by the ministry, to make recommendations in the sector(s) related to their expertise(s) (p.46). This emphasis on regional councils was, in part, to develop and stimulate regional culture through a network of organizations that would: (a) actively support and
develop the cultural industries; (b) serve as a structuring associations for artists and artistic organizations; (c) establish partnerships between municipalities; and (d) foster cooperation between and with other governments within and outside of Canada (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.6). This regionalized approach, however, was also used, in part, to emphasise the fact that Québec culture comes from the people themselves, not the government – an assertion that places onus on the Québécois, as cultural subjects, to take a more active role in the development of their culture:

Ce sont les Québécois qui font et feront leur culture. Ce n'est pas le gouvernement du Québec. Mais le gouvernement n'étant pas un rassemblement hétéroclite d'administrations, il doit participer à cette tâche de tous les citoyens (Ministre d'état au développement culturel, 1978, p.9).

While the government would establish and broadly oversee the regional councils, the councils were, by and large, responsible for their cultural endeavours, serving as harmonious figures whose responsibilities were, essentially to promote and disseminate Québec’s culture and identity in regions of the province that were culturally underrepresented or underserviced.

In this context, the Québec government saw its role in cultural matters as that of a sort of reluctant arbitrator, making culture choices only in the context of what they – as elected officials representing the general population – saw to be in the best interest of the Québec public – and only as a means of better facilitating cultural production and consumption:

L'apport du consommateur, du technicien, de l'animateur social est tout aussi indispensable que celui de l'intellectuel et du créateur. Il ne faut rien laisser échapper du réel et les témoignages des citoyens en font tout autant partie que les œuvres des écrivains, artistes, philosophes, sociologues, économistes ou spécialistes du travail. Ce qui donnera à ce concert à plusieurs voix sa cohérence et son unité, c'est le but poursuivi, qui est de donner son sens plein à la vie de l'homme et de la femme d'ici, de lui donner les moyens de vivre mieux et de se développer selon ses goûts et ses talents (Ministre d'état au développement culturel, 1978, p.4).
In other words, the GoQ’s position on cultural policy in the late 1970s was largely premised around the notion of guiding the province’s culture (and cultural production) in ways that would serve other facets of Québec’s society, while allowing the province’s harmonious figures a degree of creative freedom and human dignity. At the time, while the provincial government had gone to great lengths to modernize its society over the preceding two decades, there was still a sense that much could be done to further its modernization process – that Québec remained underdeveloped vis-à-vis other nations (Ministre d’état au développement culturel, 1978, p.4). This modernization process, however, first required a philosophical reorientation with respects to cultural policy – one that placed emphasis on its instrumental capacities.

In terms of its effect on cultural policy in the province of Québec, this change in philosophy was, arguably, most saliently observed in la politique Québécoise de développement culturel (développement culturel) – a 1978 publication by the Québec ministry on the state of cultural development – a newly minted department that, in order to remain concurrent with the federal government’s cultural policy regime, grouped together Québec’s various ministries related to culture and cultural vocation (i.e. cultural affairs, education, communications, leisure, and immigration) (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.205) – that highlighted the province’s approach to culture (and cultural policy) moving forward. Taking its cues from many of the world’s modern nations – and in a nod to the findings in Rioux’s (1975) cultural tribunal report (p.9) – the développement culturel highlights Québec’s need for and ambition to develop a global policy for culture (une politique globale de la culture). Seeking to take the efforts of the MAC’s pervious ministers a step further, développement culturel stresses the importance of acknowledging and acting upon the relationship culture shares with social, economic, and territorial/regional factors – in particular, positing that cultural development is inseparable from economic, social, and regional
planning/development, with the cultural industries playing a prominent role in informing economic priorities (Ministre d'État au Développement culturel, 1978, pp.1-5).

Une souveraineté culturelle qui ne s'appuie pas sur une forte assise économique est illusoire. Un progrès économique axé sur la seule productivité technique devient vite inhumain. Les schémas régionaux de développement obéissent à des impératifs sociaux et culturels aussi bien qu'économiques. Pours'actualiser et rayonner, une culture a besoin du support des industries culturelles (Ministre d'État au Développement culturel, 1978, p.3).

As such, développement culturel is presented as a framework for integrating cultural policy with economic, social, and regional development policies (p.4). It is also a policy that harkens to the instrumentality discourse prevalent in much of the contemporary cultural policy studies (e.g. Belfiore, 2002; Gray, 2007).

But more than just a framework for developing culture, the développement culturel document presents an invitation to take up the proverbial gauntlet in the province’s efforts in gaining autonomy and self-determination from the federal government (Ministre d'État au Développement culturel, 1978, p.5) – an effort that, while valiantly pursued by past ministers, had never really lived up to their perceived potential. In effect, développement culturel represented an unapologetic call to arms to the people of Québec to embrace the establishment of a cultural policy that would unite the Québécois under a defined cultural/national identity:

Ce moment capital de notre histoire collective, le gouvernement veut le vivre en solidarité avec la population. Car il s'agit de notre avenir national qu'il nous faut enfin définir tous ensemble dans la ligne de notre identité, de nos aspirations, de nos besoins (Ministre d'État au Développement culturel, 1978, p.6).

This approach arguably taps into elements of the civic and market worlds in its efforts to reinforce the superior common principle of cultural integration and unity. The report’s emphasis on cultural development going hand-in-hand with economic, social, and regional development implies a measure of economic consideration was involved in developing this policy – an emphasis that shifts the government’s approach to cultural policy away from being exclusively
about the survival and promotion of Québec culture and identity, and onto the notion of cultural policy (and development) as being a driver of economic prosperity and independence. While modernization and economic development had been implicit objectives of much of Québec’s cultural policy in the preceding years, the *développement culturel* document offered a concrete instance of where these objectives were made overt. Moreover, it was a concrete instance of where identity politics began aligning cultural and economic development with Québec nationalism and separatism. In this respect, the document establishes a clear line between the province’s common principle and the means through which to evidence its validity – in large part through economic objectives and benchmarking.

4.3.4: Cultural Development & Convergence: Québec Cultural Policy in the 1980s

The agenda of the nationalist movement in Québec came to a head in 1980, with the province’s first referendum on secession from Canada (Keating, 2001a, p.81). Although not a cultural policy, in itself, the 1980 Québec Referendum – and the documents surrounding it – is worth discussing as it reveals much about Québec’s cultural and national identity, as well as providing a window into the cultural perspective Québec held in relation to the rest of Canada. Prior to the referendum, the GoQ had issued a white paper, *Québec-Canada: a new deal. The Québec government proposal for a new partnership between equals: sovereignty-association*, outlining what a relationship between Canada and Québec would look like in the event that the GoQ was successful in its bid for secession (Rocher, 2014, p.28). By this point, the GoQ (1979) was of the opinion that renewing Canadian federalism was impossible “in such a way as to meet the needs of both Québec and Canada” (p.33). Citing the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism of 1963 (colloquially known as the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission) – which indicates that a minority, such as the Québécois, “feels that its future and the progress of its
culture are not entirely secure, that they are perhaps limited, within a political structure dominated by a majority composed of the other group” (as ctd. by le Gouvernement du Québec, 1979, p.38) – as grounds for why Canada’s federalism formula was not working and needed changing (p.44).

The proposal, itself, is noteworthy for suggesting the introduction of a sovereignty-association between Canada and Québec wherein the two “communities” would enter into a sort of partnership or association that would grant the province of Québec the sovereignty needed to establish itself as a separate state, while maintaining many of the economic unions they share – such as currency:

Given the situation of our two communities, and because the economic space that Canada and Québec share must be both preserved and developed, the Québec government wants to propose to the rest of Canada that the two communities remain in association, not only in a customs union or a common market but in a monetary union as well. Thus Canada can be preserved intact as an economic entity, while Québec can assume all the powers it needs as a nation to ensure its full development (Gouvernement du Québec, 1979, pp.53-54).

Through its “New Deal,” the GoQ effectively established an investment formula (and a protocol for the natural relations between Québec and Canada) for its superior common principle: it established the terms by which the province was willing to sacrifice social, cultural, and economic cohesion with the national majority in order to achieve a satisfactory level of independence and autonomy. In this case, with their white papers, the GoQ made it clear that they wanted to establish a distinction between the province and Canada, though it wanted to maintain a measure of connectivity or slippage via economic associations. Unsurprisingly, the rest of Canada was not sold on this proposition – arguing that: (a) it would make Québec “an equal partner with the combined rest of Canada”; (b) it assumes political relations should “be based almost exclusively on political and cultural communities”; and (c) it assumes that Québec is alone in its regional differences vis-à-vis the rest of Canada (Rocher, 2014, p.29). Neither were
the Québécois, for that matter, sold on the proposition of secession – with close to 60 percent of the province’s eligible voters voting “no” in the referendum (Rocher, 2014, p.32).

Although the “yes” side of the referendum ledger lost the vote by a fairly significant margin, the reality of the vote was arguably less cut and dry: a strong proportion of those who voted “no” were supporters of Québec nationalism – albeit via a renewed federalism rather than secession (Balthazar, 2013, p.212). As a result, even though the “yes” side may have lost the referendum, the Parti Québécois – a strong driving force behind the referendum – retained a strong following which allowed them to keep their place in power in the next provincial election, receiving more than 49% of the vote and winning 80 of a possible 122 seats in the Québec National Assembly (Rocher, 2014, p.33). With its new lease on power, the Parti Québécois’s cultural policy of the first half of the 1980s was marked by a reshuffling, deregulation, and decentralization of services and programs. Although the province’s cultural policy remained largely focused on developing the province’s national identity, it now placed an emphasis on neoliberalism (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.205). The release of the Ministry of State and Cultural Development’s 1981 publication, *Autant de façons d’être Québécois: Plan d’action à l’intervention des communauté culturelle*, signalled this change in the government’s approach and philosophy: “Québec society does not need to adopt the principles of multiculturalism; the development of the province’s diverse cultural groups occurs through the collective vitality of the French society that is Québec” (translation by author, as ctd. by Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.218). Rather than follow in the footsteps of the Canadian government in promoting multiculturalism, the GoQ sought to foster a culture of convergence where, rather than a juxtaposition of different cultural traditions, there would be an effort to converge those traditions into a collective culture – one which would avoid assimilation through integration (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.218).
With convergence in mind, emphasis was placed, on the one hand, on regionalizing the management of cultural affairs; and, on the other hand, on developing a network of crown corporations and agencies that would take over the day-to-day management of certain cultural jurisdictions – though they would remain under the purview of the MAC (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.219; Harvey, 2011, p.56). A number of prominent agencies would emerge during this era, including la Société de développement des industries de la culture et des communications (SODICC) – an agency devised to promote the cultural and communications industries in Québec – and la Société générale du cinéma (SGC) – an agency tasked with supporting and enriching Québec’s cinema industry (Harvey, 2011, pp.59-60) – both of which would later be merged under the la Société générale des industries culturelles (SOGIC) under the Liberal regime of Robert Bourassa in the latter half of the decade (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.219). The objective of these agencies was, by and large, to ensure that the population of Québec received greater access to cultural services through the (controlled) expansion of the cultural industries (p.219) – an expansion that arguably offered the government a better means of assuring cultural convergence by expanding the scope and reach of its cultural industries policy while also keeping in line with the ongoing effort to modernize the province’s services.

The moves made by the GoQ in the effort to expand its cultural industries and foster cultural convergence signal a state of worth that emphasises the privileged status of the cultural industries in developing and creating culture that serves the underlying superior common principle of promoting Québec’s distinct cultural identity. Greater emphasis in the 1980s was placed on developing and growing the province’s cultural industries via networks of crown corporations and agencies representing various factions and sectors of cultural industries – to a point where those industries would be better equipped to develop and disseminate culture, would have greater autonomy and discretion over the regulation of their respective sectors (Saint-Pierre,
2011, pp.218-219), and could, arguably, be self-sufficient to continue developing cultural products without the interventions of government. In this respect, these policies served as modes of expressing judgement: they established cultural priorities for the province through an emphasis on using cultural objects and devices (i.e. industries and cultural institutions) that served to promote the province’s superior common principle. An argument can be made that the push towards cultural convergence – in part through the establishment of regional networks of crown corporations and agencies – was, itself, a means of fostering a consensus around what constitutes the province’s cultural identity and heritage. By emphasising convergence, the government allowed for individuals to establish or maintain a bijective relationship with their cultures while stressing the dominance of the French language as an underlying cultural unifier. While it is debatable to what extent this approach was successful – given the fact that Québec voted into office a non-nationalist party in 1985, one can surmise that it was not a swaying point in favour of the Parti Québécois – it nevertheless underscores a prevalent theme in Québec cultural policy leading up to the 1990s: an emphasis on the cultural industries as a vehicle for cultural integration and identity formation.

4.4: Man & His World: The Modernization of Québec Cultural Policy

From the Quiet Revolution to the re-election of the Parti libéral du Québec in the 1980s, there was one common denominator that repeatedly surfaced in Québec’s cultural policy (and policy discourse) during this period: the question of (cultural and social) modernization. It is only, arguably, in cases where extreme examples of nationalism occurred that we see a deviation from this norm in Québec’s cultural policy – at which point, these deviations usually denoted a shift in priority towards protecting the province’s cultural identity in the face of national (i.e. Canadian) and, to a lesser extent, international pressures that sought to influence the Québec
identity. From a theoretical perspective, it is interesting to note that the emergence of nationalist parties and movements in national minorities often speaks to liberal post-industrial ideals. Namely, these movements often represent “pro-market and assertive civic parties” that see their sub-nation’s autonomy as a means of securing and maintaining the “liberal benefits of the modern nation-state” while offering a more democratic and deterministic alternative to a perceived “unresponsive modern mega-state” (Hamilton, 2004, p.658). Unsurprisingly, it also has been said that modernity and liberal society in Québec was born during the Quiet Revolution (Allor & Gagnon, 1994, p.30). Though this modernity came relative to the rest of Canada, it nevertheless had a significant cultural impact on Québec society in terms of a rapid expansion of the “intellectual technologies and models of democratic interventions” available to the province – the result of which saw “an extended struggle over the forms of state action and legitimation, the rationalities of state interventions into the economy, and over new articulations of collective identity” (p.30). In other words, modernity forced Québec to grow up – to make choices that were not always easy or popular, but that certainly served to shape the province’s identity vis-à-vis the rest of Canada.

Underscoring much of the cultural policy that came out of Québec from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s is an orientation towards the management of the cultural sector. The role of the MAC, regardless of the party in power, tended towards managing culture – both in terms of dealing with, at times, budgetary constraints and in developing an infrastructure in which the province’s cultural life and cultural industries could thrive (Lapalme, 1988, p.95). In this respect, the cultural policy that emerged in Québec during its period of “modernization” tends to gravitate towards the industrial world of the economies of worth framework – and often necessitated a change or evolution of the domestic world (most notably with respects to the displacement of the Catholic Church in Québec’s domestic hierarchy). With the introduction of agencies such as the
MAC and Ministre d'État au développement culturel, and policies such as the Charter of the French Language, there was an evident push towards directing Québec’s culture (and cultural production) towards the betterment of Québec society and, in doing so, developing a sense of generality (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.155) or homogeneity among the people of Québec – a sort of inherent group-forming approach to cultural policy. These policies, coupled with the 1981 publication, *Plan d’action à l’intervention des communautés culturelles*, served as a contrast to the federal government’s approaches to culture – as exemplified by the Massey Commission’s (1951) and the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission (1967) – that espoused multiculturalism and bilingualism. Instead, taking an approach akin to what is described in Foucault’s (1978/1994) theory of governmentality, Québec’s cultural policies of the post-Quiet Revolution era arguably sought to shape its citizens through the application of culture – both in terms of the production and dissemination of culture and in the way it was consumed (i.e. through language laws) – using the industrial world’s polity to unify the province’s people around common elements or traits.

As modernization took hold in Québec, it also brought with it an evolution in the province’s approach to cultural policy and the cultural industries. While the 1960s and 1970s essentially saw the development of a cultural infrastructure in the province – one that could support the cultural sector and promote Québec’s cultural and national identity – the 1980s brought with it an emphasis on using that infrastructure to augment the province’s cultural industries – a trend that would carry over into the next few decades. In other words, putting policies in place to protect its culture (and identity) gave way to policies that went a step further and sought to expand and grow that culture. In this respect, there is a shift in Québec’s policies, from reactive to proactive. It is an authoritative turn that, far from resting on the laurels of guaranteeing the maintenance of its culture, implies a challenge to the status (and status quo) of Québec and French Canadian society in both Canada and abroad. If the decades immediately
following the Quiet Revolution served as a social and cultural awakening in Québec, then the period beginning in the 1980s was arguably one of reinvention.

4.4.1: A Type Analysis of Québec’s Cultural Policy Up to the 1990s

With all of this in mind, a common world analysis of national minority cultural policy begins to take shape. Already, the cultural policies of Québec, post-Quiet Revolution, provide a sense of how a common world based around cultural policy would be devised. When broken down, Québec’s cultural policies reflect the categories typifying a common world. In particular, the cultural policies that emerged during this period placed a strong emphasis on establishing and supporting the province’s culture – particularly as it relates to identity and language. In this respect, the valuation and promotion of a distinct, unifying Québécois culture serves as a superior common principle, largely predicated on the survival and growth of the French language. In the post-Quiet Revolution era, this principle was perhaps best exemplified with the concept of la survivance française – a notion that succinctly guides most of Québec’s cultural policy throughout this period and (as will be seen in the next chapter) beyond.

Table 3:
The World of National Minority Cultural Policy – Québec (pre-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical Categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Case Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superior common principle</td>
<td>The superior common principle underlying the cultural policy of national minorities is the valuation and promotion of a distinct, unifying (national minority) culture or identity.</td>
<td>La Survivance française (French Survival) à la Vie française (Lapalme, 1988): the establishment of French (Canadian) culture and language as fundamental forces in Québec society.</td>
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With a superior common principle strongly in place, many of the other analytical categories begin to take form. The state of worth, in the context of a national minority, manifests in terms of cultural integration and convergence, with individuals who converge with or assimilate to the
collective/unified culture of the national minority being deemed worthy. Among the most worthy are the individuals who produce culture that is relevant or contributes to the national culture.

| State of worth | The state of worth is measured in terms of cultural cohesion, integration, convergence, assimilation, and propagation: an individual who can identify as a cultural citizen – one who is active and integrated into the national culture – is worthy. Often individuals or industries that produce (national) culture are singled out or conferred a privileged status in the cultural policy. | “(C)’est essentiellement par la culture qu’une collectivité s’exprime, traduit sa mentalité, en d’autres termes s’identifie à ses propres yeux, se reconnaît, a la fierté de l’être moral qu’elle édifie” (as ctd by L’Allier, 1976, p.18). |

Following from the state of worth, is the common world’s understanding of human dignity. In the case of a national minority, human dignity is recognized through cultural policy in at least one of three ways: (a) a person’s abilities or aptitudes to create or be creative; (b) a person’s willingness to participate and take action; and (3) in the recognition and acceptance of cultural heritage and tradition. While Québec’s cultural policy emphasises the dignity of its French heritage, it also recognizes the importance of its British and First Nations communities – albeit to a somewhat lesser extent.

| Human dignity | Human dignity is recognized and/or established through: 1) The cultivation/development of aptitudes in creativity; 2) Cultural participation and action; and 3) The recognition and preservation of heritage and tradition. | “Cette politique ne peut puiser qua des sources anciennes et nouvelles. Elle reflète la réalité d'un peuple enraciné ici depuis des siècles et qui a défendu avec acharnement son identité. Elle témoigne de l’apport des autochtones, les plus vieux habitants de ce pays, de l'influence des Britanniques et des autres minorités implantées sur notre sol. (Ministre d'état au développement culturel, 1978, p.1). |

Underscoring human dignity is a policy’s recognition of a repertoire(s) of subjects – that is to say, the individuals and/or groups who are specifically targeted by said cultural policy. In the case of Québec’s early cultural policy, the emphasis was primarily on individuals who, in some way, serviced or forwarded the superior common principle – in this case, the promotion and valuation of Québec’s culture and identity.

| Repertoires of subjects | A repertoire of subjects in cultural policy principally consists of artists and amateurs, citizens, (cultural) industries and institutions, creators/ producers, and, in certain contexts diaspora and international markets. | "Ce sont les Québécois qui font et feront leur culture. Ce n'est pas le gouvernement du Québec. Mais le gouvernement n'étant pas un rassemblement hétéroclite d'administrations, il doit participer à cette tâche de tous les citoyens" (Ministre d'état au
In a similar vein, a repertoire of objects and devices in the context of cultural policy consists of the objects and devices that hold some form of cultural or symbolic significance while also providing a measure of support – intrinsic or extrinsic – to the superior common principle.

| Repertoires of objects and devices | The objects and devices of cultural policy primarily consist of cultural products and artefacts, cultural and heritage sites, symbols, language(s), and educational materials and policies. | “WHEREAS the French language, the distinctive language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking, is the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity” (Bill 101, 1977 [2016], preamble). |

Tying all of the disparate elements of the common world together – namely the subjects and objects – in a way that promotes the common principle and state of worth is the cultural policy’s investment formula. In the case of a national minority, the cultural policy’s investment formula manifests in terms of the national minority’s cultural priorities, and is often understood as a trade-off or sacrifice of sorts. In particular, these trade-offs tend to occur along the lines of the democratization of culture versus cultural democracy; cultural pluralism versus cultural homogeneity; and social cohesion with the national majority versus expressions of cultural or national (minoritarian) identity and/or independence. During the post-Quiet Revolution era, arguably the most notable example of an investment formula came in the form of the New Deal document of 1979, wherein the Government of Québec proposed a formula for the province’s succession from Canada.

| Investment formula | The investment formula of a cultural policy operates on at least one of three fronts, and tends to function in relation to the establishment of cultural priorities – often understood in the form of a trade-off or sacrifice: 1) The trade-off between the democratization of culture and cultural democracy; and/or 2) The trade-off between cultural pluralism and homogeneity; 3) The trade-off between cohesion/harmony with the national majority and expressions of cultural/national identity and independence. | “Thinking of the future the Government of Québec proposes a constitutional formula which would replace the present federal system and at the same time respect the legitimate feelings of Quebeckers towards Canada” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1979, p.47). |
Accentuated by the investment formula is the rapport of grandeur or worth. For the cultural policy of a national minority, the rapport of grandeur is often established as an operationalization of the relationship between the national minority and other cultures – most notably cultural groups/minorities residing within the jurisdiction of the national minority. Generally, the rapport of grandeur presents a hierarchical order for the cultures in question, establishing one culture – usually the national minority’s culture, at least within the context of its own cultural policy – as the preferred or preeminent culture. In cultural policy, a rapport of worth is perhaps most saliently observed in language policies where one language is established as the official language in most social and/or cultural settings.

| Rapport of grandeur/Worth | The rapport of grandeur or worth of a cultural policy operationalizes the relationship between different cultural groups, nationally-recognized cultures (i.e. national minorities, national majorities, cultural minorities), and/or institutions/organizations (i.e. government and cultural industries). These rapports tend to manifest hierarchically, wherein one culture (or institution) is given preferential or preeminent treatment relative to other cultures. | “[Bill 63] ensure[s] that the English-speaking children of Québec acquire a working knowledge of the French language and that persons who settle in Québec may acquire the knowledge of the French language and have their children instructed in such language” (Assemblée nationale du Québec, 1969, par.2). |

Taking the rapport of grandeur a step further, the natural relations between beings in national minority cultural policy is often presented in terms of the power dynamics between the national minority and national majority. More specifically, the national relations tend to be presented in terms of the delineation of responsibilities between the federal government and the national minority’s government.

| Natural relations between beings | The natural relations between beings are presented in cultural policy as the power dynamics that exist between levels of government and levels/statuses of cultures (i.e. majority and minority culture; national and regional culture). Often, natural relations will be presented as cultural guidelines or rules of engagement between national majorities and minorities (e.g. the division of policy responsibilities between the federal and regional/territorial governments). | “The Québec government wants to propose to the rest of Canada that the two communities remain in association, not only in a customs union or a common market but in a monetary union as well” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1979, pp.53-54). |
In the context of a national minority’s cultural policy, the harmonious figures of the natural order are often represented by culturally-active citizens such as artists or cultural producers. These individuals serve as harmonious figures in large part because they are revered, in cultural policy, for their abilities to produce cultural products and artifacts – particularly when those products are representative of the policy’s superior common principle.

For a national minority, a cultural policy test model, more often than not, comes in the form of public opinion or reception of the policy, itself – particularly in terms of its visibility and recognition on a global stage. A prime example of a test model in the case of Québec was Expo 67 – an event that, in some respects, served as a “coming out” party for Québec nationalism.

In the context of national minority cultural policy, judgement is, more often than not, expressed in terms of the perceived social and economic benefits a policy provides to the minority’s culture. A policy is judged to be worthy if it provides tangible benefits to the society. With this in mind, evidence to support judgement tends to come in the form of said tangible benefits.
Finally, a state of unworthiness and/or decline in the context of a national minority comes in the form of cultural decline or assimilation into the national majority. In the case of Québec, the state of unworthiness is not explicit in its cultural policy – in large part because it is implied by the superior common principle. Québec’s cultural policies assume that a failure to promote and provide value to the Québécois culture (and language) would yield a state of decline akin to what Lord Durham (1839) predicted in his Report on the Affairs of British North America.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of unworthiness and decline</th>
<th>A state of unworthiness is manifested as a decline in cultural participation, integration, and expression. This decline is often presented as erosion of the national culture and language and/or through assimilation into the national majority’s culture.</th>
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<td>“It is but a question of time and mode; it is but to determine whether the small number of French who now inhabit Lower Canada shall be made English, under a Government which can protect them, or whether the process shall be delayed until a much larger number shall have to undergo, at the rude hands of its uncontrolled rivals, the extinction of a nationality strengthened and embittered by continuance” (Lord Durham, 1839, p.130).</td>
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Chapter 5 – Cultural Industries in Québec

In the previous chapter, the focus was placed on examining the evolution of Québec’s cultural policy in parallel to the evolution of its cultural (and national) identity – from its colonial past up to the 1980s, with a specific emphasis on the policies that emerged during and following the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. Drawing on the economies of worth framework established by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) as a means of interpreting the socio-economic contexts of the time, a contrast was observed between the cultural policies of Québec governments that held a strong nationalist vision of the province to the policies of governments that still largely embraced a federated vision. The cultural policies of nationalist governments tended to exhibit elements concurrent with a compromise between the civic and domestic worlds – that is to say, their policies they tended to stress the significance of heritage and tradition. Comparatively, the cultural policies of more federalist governments exhibited traits more closely associated with compromises between the civic and industrial worlds – that is to say, these policies were often geared towards an efficient and effective modernization of the province and its cultural services. The balance between these two approaches resulted in a cultural sector that saw, at times, ambitious expansion – albeit often deemed underfunded by the ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec (MAC) – entwined with a distinct appreciation for the Québécois culture and identity – though an appreciation that was sometimes at odds with the broader vision of Canadian culture and identity espoused by the federal government.

This chapter will focus on the transition that took place in Québec society beginning in the latter half of the 1980s, following the 1980 referendum and the re-election of the Parti libéral
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du Québec in 1985, all the way to present day. As with the previous chapter, this chapter will focus on applying the economies of worth framework to the cultural policies introduced and policy documents published during this period as a means of further elaborating a type analysis of cultural policy.


If the period between the 1960s and 1985 can be said to have been a period of modernization and social progress in the province of Québec, the end of the 1980s represents a shift towards cultural diversification (Burgess, 2002, pp.43-44). The 1985 provincial election, in particular – which saw the return to power of the Parti libéral du Québec, again under the leadership of Robert Bourassa – was a significant moment insofar as it suggested a shift in the perspective and approach of the electorate: away from nationalist/sovereigntist discourse, towards concerns that had been largely left to the wayside during the Parti Québécois’ reign (Balthazar, 2013, p.222). While the nationalist movement had maintained some measure of momentum following the referendum of 1980 (particularly in view of the Parti Québécois’ victory in the 1981 provincial election), it was soon after stunned into almost absolute immobility following the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 (Balthazar, 2013, p.214). While the then-premier of Québec, René Levesque, ultimately chose not to sign the Constitution Act – due, in part, to a sense of isolation and exclusion from the proceedings and, in part, to disagreement with the federal government and other provinces over the contents of the new constitution and its accompanying Charter of Rights – the fact that he had even negotiated with the federal government was seen as a sign that he had given up on Québec sovereignty. Perhaps ironically, Levesque’s counterpart in the Parti libéral du Québec, Claude Ryan, had also come under fire for
being too nationalist in his approach throughout the constitution proceedings – choosing to side with the Parti Québécois after feeling slighted that the federal government had opted to begin patriation proceedings prior to the 1981 provincial election. Consequently, this stance would later cost Ryan leadership of the Parti libéral (Hero & Balthazar, 1988, pp.66-67).

As a result of the “extremist [political] trends” observed by both major parties throughout the constitutional proceedings, coupled with various other social and economic hardships wreaking havoc on the province at the time, many Québécois lost their appetite for nationalist discourse – preferring, instead, a government that would address the province’s more immediate concerns (Hero & Balthazar, 1988, pp.66-67). With the 1985 election, the Québécois finally had an opportunity to make a change in government, opting for the Parti libéral du Québec under the recently returned leadership of Bourassa.

From a policy perspective, the return to power of the Parti libéral du Québec in 1985 saw the introduction of more functional cultural policies and programs – policies that were, at once, more favourable to municipalities, regions, artists, and creators (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.219). The tendency in Québec’s cultural policy was shifting towards new, more flexible, and systematic strategies modulated by parameters determined on a situation-by-situation basis (de la Durantaye, 2012, p.287). To this end, the government placed emphasis on expanding the role and function of the cultural industries – first by introducing policies that recognized the professional status of artists and creators, and then by introducing policies that gave greater autonomy to (cultural) associations and organizations in the regulation of their professions (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.219). All the while, these policies provided the government with measures to take a more active role in the overall development of the industries themselves when and if needed. Greater efforts were also placed on developing and promoting independent cultural producers – most notably those of the literary, cinematic/television, and music industries – through the development of an
“economic tissue” (*tissu économique*) through which such producers could be organized and systematized in ways that ameliorated their economic prosperity (de la Durantaye, 2012, p.288)

Throughout 1986 and 1987, a series of cultural policies were introduced or amended to reflect the changing nature of the government’s more economically-inclined approach to culture. Among these policies were the interrelated Cultural Property Act (loi 15), the Act Respecting the Montréal Museum of Fine Arts (loi 16), the Archives Act (loi 17), and the Cinema Act (loi 18) – all of which served to define the terms and scope of their respective cultural products and industries, while also establishing a measure of structure for the broader cultural sector (Harvey, 2011, p.64). For instance, the Cultural Property Act served (and continues to serve), in a first instance, to define and distinguish the various forms of cultural property – the province’s repertoire of cultural objects and devices – that can exist and are acknowledged by the Government of Québec (GoQ) as being culturally significant (and worth preservation). These properties include: “a work of art, a historic property, a historic monument or site, an archaeological property or site or a cinematographic, audiovisual, photographic, radio or television work” (Gouvernement du Québec, 2012, par.1). In a second instance, the act introduced an advisory body – the Commission of Cultural Goods of Québec (*le Commission des biens culturels du Québec*) – and established its mandate and responsibilities with respects to cultural property that has been acquired by a recognized museum or archival institution (as outlined in the Act Respecting the Montréal Museum of Fine Arts and Archives Act, respectively) (par.2-7.11). Of particular note, the Cultural Property Act outlines in what respects cultural property is recognized as such, and provides the parameters under which fair market value is established – in accordance with taxation law – for a cultural property acquired through donations to museums or other cultural institutions (par.7.12-7.15). In other words, the Cultural Property Act outlines a state of worth for culture in very literal – very economic – terms.
In a similar vein, the Cinema Act – and its predecessor, the Act Respecting the Cinema – functions as a guideline to ensure that Québec’s policy on cinema promotes and coordinates the Québec film industry. More specifically, the Cinema Act indicates that Québec’s (cultural) policy as it pertains to cinema shall be devised (and its application supervised) by the Ministry of Culture and Communication (previously the MAC (whose change in name and purpose will be discussed more at length in section 5.2.3)) – though it must be presented/proposed to the provincial government beforehand – in order to achieve the following objectives:

1. the establishment and development of the artistic, industrial and commercial infrastructure of the cinema industry; 2. the development of a Québec cinema and the spread of cinematographic works and culture to all parts of Québec; 3. the establishment and development of independent and financially autonomous Québec enterprises in the field of cinema; 4. the conservation and utilization of the existing stock of cinematographic works; 5. the respect of the right of artistic property over films and the establishment of mechanisms to oversee the production, exhibition and distribution of such works; 6. the participation of television enterprises in producing and broadcasting Québec films (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015e, par.4).

Moreover, the Cinema Act grants the Régie du cinema – a government agency that reports directly to the Ministry of Culture and Communications (MCC) – responsibilities over the classification of films in the form of stamps that identify the content of a film and ensure that it conforms to the province’s distribution and language laws (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015e, par.77-87). In other words, the Cinema Act mandates a very “hands on” approach to the cinema industry. With the Cinema Act, the MCC has essentially become responsible for establishing and developing Québec’s cinema industry, ensuring its success and sustainability, and ensuring the promotion of Québec cultural productions – to the point where arguably every facet of the cinema industry must run through the purview of the MCC at some point – a fact that, as strongly intimated by Becker (2008), is a reality for virtually every cultural industry at some point. In this respect, the Cinema Act serves as an investment formula insofar as it establishes the parameters
by which the Québec government is willing to support and engage in the development and dissemination of cinematic products in the province.

Among the changes that were made to the Cinema Act was the introduction of the Act Respecting the Société générale des industries culturelles (SOGIC) in 1987. SOGIC was a crown corporation established through the amalgamation of the Act Respecting the Société de développement des industries de la culture et des communications (SODICC) with the Société générale du cinéma (Harvey, 2011, p.66). Much like its predecessor, SODICC, SOGIC’s responsibilities were primarily geared towards the promotion and support of Québec’s cultural industries. To this end, the objectives of SOGIC were twofold:

(a) to promote the creation and development of undertakings engaged in the fields of (1) book publishing; (1.1) cinema; (2) communication services, including television, radio, cable service, videotapes, audio-visual production, newspapers, periodicals and software; (3) recording, video-recording and video-cassettes; (4) performing arts, including theatre, entertainment, music, dance and singing; (5) arts and crafts; (6) immoveable cultural property; (7) any nature designated by regulation of the Government; (b) to contribute to the increase of the quality, genuineness and competitiveness of the productions of those undertakings, and to ensure their distribution (Gouvernement du Québec, 1995, par.4).

In other words, SOGIC’s mandate broadly established that the agency would serve to ensure the wellbeing and success of virtually all things culture (and cultural industries-related) in the province of Québec. It is a mandate that distinctively establishes the importance of the cultural industries to the province, but also stresses the importance of their success in terms that are implicitly economic. More than just speaking to the economic application of the cultural industries, however, the objectives of SOGIC imply a governmental emphasis on the instrumentality of culture. In particular, these objectives imply a distinct purpose for the products produced by the cultural industries – a purpose that goes beyond their aesthetics. The idea that the quality and genuineness of Québec’s cultural productions could be put in question – to the point where government intervention was required to remedy these “deficiencies” – suggests that “art
for art’s sake” was not a primary concern when SOGIC was introduced. Rather, the ability to market and distribute (i.e. sell) quality products was one of SOGIC’s focal points – one which served to establish and reinforce an economically-driven state of worth for culture, establish an investment formula that emphasised instrumentality and cultural democracy over the democratization of culture, and highlight how SOGIC measured human dignity in the context of increasing the competitive genius of the province’s cultural offerings.

Complementing these new or amended policies was the expansion of the MAC’s budget – from just under $95 million (CND) at the onset of the 1980s, up to almost $260 million by the end of the decade (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.219). Including the budgets of other provincial ministries that supported cultural and artistic activities, the GoQ was spending close to $900 million by the end of 1990 (pp.219-220). Moreover, the provincial government had taken a far more significant role in the cultural affairs of the province, increasing its participation in activities to over 47 percent – far surpassing the participation rate of the federal government (31 percent) and the province’s municipal governments (22 percent) (p.210). Simply put, the latter half of the 1980s saw the GoQ take a more active role in the province’s cultural development – and, in doing so was ensuring that its policies better reflected the social reorientation that was implied through the demise of the Parti Québécois in the 1985 election. Thus, from an economies of worth perspective, the cultural policies of the late 1980s emblemized a shift in the GoQ’s approach, away from what could be described as a compromise between the civic and domestic worlds – in the context of nationalism – towards a compromise that was more evidently rooted in the market world.

In the case of policies such as the Cultural Property and Cinema Acts, they were introduced as a means of providing Québec’s cultural sectors with a measure of structure that was previously lacking (Arpin et al., 1991, pp.47-48). Moreover, these policies – and policies like
them – introduced a measure of centralization into the cultural policy process that had also been lacking. In the process, these policies gave greater breadth to the role of the MAC (and later MCC) and the provincial government in matters directly related to the cultural industries – in particular, with respects to quality of their products and ability to be competitive. Even crown corporations, such as SOGIC, were purposed towards augmenting the quality of the cultural industries’ productions – which, if nothing else, would serve to help make those productions more marketable which, in turn, allowed the cultural industries a greater potential to remain productive and prosperous.

And to a large degree, these endeavours proved successful. Many of the independent cultural producers targeted by these policies benefited greatly from these strategies – to the point where they now represent the majority of the actors in certain cultural industries in Québec (de la Durantaye, 2012, p.288). In contrast to the policies (and government regimes) of previous decades – many of which arguably sought to expand the cultural industries without necessarily being concerned with their quality or sustainability – these new policies were largely built with an eye towards ensuring that the industries remained solvent. Far from simply luring emerging cultural industries to Québec with financial incentives, this new approach offered a system – a structure – that sought to ensure that the these industries did not fizzle out when or if governmental funding ceased.

5.2: Consolidating Culture: La Politique culturelle du Québec

The reorientation of Québec society throughout the late 1980s – ushered in and emblemized by the election of le Parti libéral du Québec – placed a renewed emphasis on cultural policy as a tool for developing and dissemination Québec culture by supporting and enlarging the province’s cultural industries. This point was accentuated by the adoption of a new cultural
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policy in 1992, *la Politique culturelle du Québec: Notre culture, Notre avenir* (Garon, 2005, p.161; Harvey, 2011, p.77). This new cultural policy came on the heels of a 1991 parliamentary commission on culture led by Roland Arpin – and its subsequent report, *Une politique de la culture et des arts* – which found that there was a growing demand for cultural policy to “irradiate” virtually every facet of government activity in Québec (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, pp.8-9). The commission served as a platform around which the people of Québec could debate the very nature of culture in the province (p.14). The commission noted that, because of the unique context of Québec’s society – in particular, of being the sole province in all of North America to be of a predominantly French Culture – the state needed to permanently intervene in the cultural domain – something that the MAC had not been able to do to great effect throughout its 30 year history (Arpin et al., 1991, pp.18-19). In their report, the commission highlighted the fact that there had been a profound shift in the diversity and intensity of cultural practices in the province throughout the 1980s – a shift that necessitated a more concrete and permanent response from the government. This shift was variously attributed to a number of significant socio-economic factors – most notably population, language, and cultural context – which were seen as being sufficiently significant to continue to colour Québec’s cultural policy discourse and choices in the years to come. Consequently, these factors warranted considerable attention from the provincial government (p.45).

For its part, the federal government had addressed the diversification of culture in Canada with the ratification of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act in 1988. The Multiculturalism Act serves as an extension to the rights conferred by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in his 1971 declaration of multiculturalism as “official government policy” within Canada’s bilingual framework (Richter, 2011, p.37) and in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Leroux, 2014, pp.134-135). Broadly speaking, the Multiculturalism Act seeks to preserve and
enhance Canada’s multiculturalism through the recognition and promotion of Canada’s cultural and racial diversity as a “fundamental characteristic” of Canada’s “heritage and identity” (Government of Canada, 1988, par.3). Furthermore, the Act recognizes the importance of encouraging the participation and engagement of “individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society”; it seeks to establish the foundations for which a diverse range of cultures can strive within the Canadian context (par.3). The rationale behind the Government of Canada’s approach to multiculturalism was to address “unanticipated negative consequences” of the Bilingualism and Bicultural Act – namely, the “singling out for privileged treatment the two official-language communities” of Canada, the French and English (Cairns, 1995, p.42). As such, the Multiculturalism Act is notable for providing official status to ethnic and cultural differences beyond the classic English/French binary – though there has been “considerable debate about [the Act’s] precise significance and purpose” when it comes to the actual preservation of those differences (Hiller, 2006, p.214).

Despite the Act’s implicit message that national minorities “are encouraged to maintain their own ethnic cultures in Canada,” the reality of the matter is that maintaining one’s culture in a new country is “virtually impossible” – and only further complicated in a country such as Canada where isomorphic pressures towards “anglo-conformity or franco-conformity” remain prevalent despite assertions of cultural equality (Hiller, 2006, p.216). Moreover, for many citizens in Québec, multiculturalism has been seen as “an attempt to detach race and ethnicity […] from language and culture – ultimately negating the status conferred to the Québécois as a “founding race” by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Leroux, 2014, p.136). Consequently, as an implicit acknowledgment of this reality, Québec’s “response to multiculturalism” has been “multifaceted” and relatively unique within the Canadian context (p.135). Québec’s cultural policies of the 1990s, in particular, reflected “a made-in-Québec”
approach to “cultural pluralism” that more closely approximate “interculturalism” than they do “multiculturalism” (pp.135-136). Thus, it is, in part, with diversity and interculturalism in mind that Arpin et al. (1991) set about reporting on the state of culture in Québec.

5.2.1: Market Orientation: Une politique de la culture et des arts (1991)

First among the factors contributing to the diversification and intensification of cultural practices in Québec, highlighted by Arpin’s (1991) parliamentary commission on culture, was the evolving nature of the province’s population. As was the case in many of the world’s occidental countries at the time, Québec found itself with an aging population (coupled with longer life expectancies) and a greater number of women participating in the workforce (which, itself, was partially attributed to the province’s decreasing birthrate). Both of these demographic trends were found to have had a significant impact on skewing the types and degree of cultural consumption of the province’s people (Arpin et al., 1991, p.45). Additionally, the province boasted significant First Nations and Inuit populations who had held strong to their cultural identities. Similarly, the province’s Anglophone population had remained relatively prominent in Québec’s cultural life over the decades and were credited with, among other things, the introduction of many of the province’s cultural and educational institutions. Finally, the province’s population had significantly diversified as a result of the immigration of diverse populations – replete with diverse cultural backgrounds and practices – to the province in the decades following World War II. It was estimated that since the end of the 1940s, more than a million immigrants from all over the world had immigrated to Québec – many of whom had centralized in Montréal, and accounted for approximately 20 percent of the city’s population (p.46). These new “ethnic communities” of immigrants were seen as an opportunity to open Québec up to greater international participation and integration (p.46) – a sort of test model, if you will, for greater
internationalization. All told, these various changes to the demographics and population of Québec had resulted in a distinctly diverse population – one that was seen as an uncontestable richness for the province’s cultural plans.

A second factor highlighted in the commission’s report that was shaping Québec’s culture and cultural policy was language. Notwithstanding the evolving nature of Québec’s population – nor its potential to expand Québec’s place on the global scene – the French language was identified as being seminal to Québec culture and identity – to the point where it was seen as necessary for the government to do whatever was necessary to ensure that French was valued and its presence and influence felt on the international stage (Arpin et al., 1991, p.47). To this end, the commission outlined the Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration’s (Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l’Immigration) principles as they relate to immigration and integration: 1) Québec is a society where French is the common language of public life; 2) Québec is a democratic society where everyone’s participation and contribution are expected and favoured; and 3) Québec is a pluralist society open to multiple visions or interpretations (of its society) provided that they remain within the limits of the province’s fundamental democratic structure and do not undermine the necessity of intercommunity exchanges (p.47). In other words, while Québec was open to and respectful of the use of other languages, the province insisted (and continues to insist) that its public language is French and that those who live in the province should respect its use in social/public contexts.

The final factor that the commission highlights in their report was the province’s cultural context. Setting the stage for Québec’s cultural context, the commission notes that since the 1970s, the province’s cultural sector had seen itself become progressively more structured, in large part thanks to government interventions (Arpin et al., 1991, p.47). Notable among these interventions was: the adoption of legislation favouring culture – such as the Archives Act,
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Cinema Act, and SOGIC to name but a few; the professionalization and development of cultural activities and cultural professions; an increase in the cultural practices of citizens as a result of an increase in cultural offerings, an elevation of the public education levels, and an overall improvement in the standard of life; and the industrialization of a large part of Québec’s culture (pp.47-48). Many of these achievements, it was noted, came at a time when the province experienced a number of phenomenon directly impacting the cultural sector – namely cyclical financial crises, under-capitalization of cultural industries’ commercial and industrial enterprises, accelerated technological advancements, and under-funding from the government (pp.48-49). However, despite the formidable structuration of the cultural sector – formidable in terms of the number and types of organizations devoted to the production and dissemination of Québec culture – the commission found that its ensemble was considerably asymmetrical in its delivery, diversity, and accessibility throughout the province (p.57).

Additionally, changes in the way people were practicing and consuming culture were also taking root in the province. Much of the diversification and intensification of cultural practices observed in the province was being attributed to the “coming of age” of the Baby Boomer generation as the province’s (and country’s) dominant economic demographic. Now entering their 40s, the Baby Boomers were demonstrating a proclivity to cultural activity far greater than previous generations. This intensification of cultural activities – particularly where the consumption of traditional/classic or high culture was concerned – was strongly associated to the Baby Boomers’ higher levels of education and affluence relative to previous generations (p.49) – both of which are socio-economic factors strongly linked to an individual’s propensity to partake of or consume works of high culture (Bourdieu & Darbel, 1969). Similarly, there was a marked evolution of youth culture – away from traditional or classic forms of cultural consumption (i.e. reading, frequenting museums, etc.) towards more popular forms (Arpin et al., 1991, pp.49-50).
A telling trend in this cultural evolution was that Québec youth were gravitating towards cultural productions that were often non-francophone in origin (i.e. popular music, mass media productions) (p.50).

These trends, the commission believed, signaled a need for governmental actions to better address the province’s evolving cultural landscape – actions that would include the development and expansion of the province’s culture and arts sectors, favour access to culture, and increase the efficiency of the government and its partners’ interventions in the management of Québec’s cultural mission (Arpin et al., 1991, pp.50-51). Moreover, the commission cautioned that culture should be established as an essential need – one that should be seen as necessary for the province’s social life and approached by the government as a fundamental right. The commission also stressed the need for the government to support and develop the province’s cultural dimension with a measure of vigour comparable to what it employed in support of the province’s social and economic dimensions (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.9).

To this end, the commission recommended, first and foremost, that the MAC be granted administrative and budgetary authority over the province’s cultural activities as a means of ensuring that the government was offering a constant flow of support to cultural development and keeping abreast of the cultural dimension of policy decisions (Arpin et al., 1991, p.278). The commission felt that, in order to address many of the cultural sector’s lacunas, the MAC needed to take a more significant leadership role in cultural development. This meant establishing a clear, well-understood, and shared mission for the ministry; clearly delineating the cultural responsibilities of the ministry vis-à-vis other public departments/ministries; and more direct public intervention in the creation, production, stimulation of demand, and/or regulation of the markets – all while ensuring creativity remained relatively unobstructed (pp.180-181). The various other recommendations of the commission all converged along similar lines: that it was
of the utmost importance that the GoQ improve its support of Québec’s cultural life; establish strong and lasting connections between culture and education; take into consideration the unique needs and circumstances of the various regions in the province; and give new life and urgency to governmental action as it relates to the arts and culture in Québec (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, pp.8-9).

In many respects, the commission – and its report – can be seen as a critique of the then-current state of cultural policy in Québec and an invitation for policy reform. It is a critique in the sense that it suggest that the cultural policies in place were insufficiently addressing the evolving needs of the Québec public. While those policies had gone a long way towards building up the cultural industries and offering the Québec public an array of homegrown cultural commodities, they were fast becoming ill-equipped to deal with the changing nature of Québec, itself, and its place in the world at large. It is a proposed compromise that draws on the province’s civic and domestic relationships in the sense that it asks for an extension of civic rights (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.377) – in particular, it posits culture as an essential need that should be recognized in the province of Québec as a fundamental right. Moreover, it presents a need for greater government intervention in the cultural sector as a means of expanding its reach and output. The implication, in this context, is that there was a market deficiency where the cultural industries were concerned, and that corrective measures were needed from the government to properly guide the production and dissemination of the cultural industries and, at times, to stimulate an interest – to stimulate a market – that might not otherwise exist. This market deficiency arguably comes as a result of Québec’s unique place in the North American market – as a predominantly Francophone region in an otherwise English-dominated continent. As such, a need to develop and disseminate cultural products that would not only compete with those of the
dominant market, but would rival them in quality – as intimated by SOGIC’s mandate – was seen as a necessary endeavour for safekeeping Québec’s cultural identity.

When considered in the context of governmentality, the act of stimulating and encouraging interest in a particular product or market implies a form of consumer mobilization – one that speaks to the notion of subjectivity. By some measures, the act of consumption can be seen as offering the consumer a form of personal or individual achievement. More specifically, through the act of consumption – and the “relations surrounding consumption” – individuals “achieve pleasures, exert powers, find meanings, construct diverse subjectivities and enact sociality in a creative and innovative manner” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.114). However, consumption in this context is “organized in a field whose dynamic is the quest for profit,” and is shaped by “a power relationship in which producers and their agents impose their meanings and values upon others” (pp.114-115). In other words, the sense of achievement derived from consumption is false; it is a sensation that is artificial, constructed by the market. It is a construct whose origins are rooted in the scientific management and Fordist era when, as a result of expanded capitalist production, there was a need to not only create new markets, but to also educate the public on becoming consumers – a process greatly facilitated by media and marketing (Featherstone, 2007, p.14). It is in this respect that some critics have gone so far as to deride this system as “giving rise to ‘an atomized, manipulated mass who participate in an ersatz mass-produced commodity culture targeted at the lowest common denominator’” (p.14). With this in mind, the commission’s recommendations for the GoQ to take greater initiative in directing the production of culture and, in some cases, stimulate a demand for said culture implies a measure of manipulation – of encouraging what people consume and in what ways they consume it.
5.2.2: Culture in Action: Breaking Down La Politique culturelle du Québec (1992)

In addition to the parliamentary commission on culture’s recommendations, the GoQ (1992) found that, as it approached the new millennium, it was faced with a series of new challenges with respects to its place as a distinct society – such as accelerated internationalization of trade; the globalization of markets and industries (including the cultural industries); the evolving place of la Francophonie in the world; and the emergence of new technologies. With respects to its cultural industries, the government found that a strong penetration of foreign cultural products into the Québec market, coupled with the province’s own products being clumped in with those of the rest of North America in the eyes of many of the European markets, had left the province’s industries – not to mention the province’s identity – in a precarious position. These international concerns were coupled with a number of more immediate concerns facing the province: integration of immigrants, regional development, jumpstarting Montréal’s economy, and supporting the city of Québec in its role as national capital (capitale nationale) of the province. Consequently, establishing a new investment formula that reflected these changing dynamics was seen as being of the utmost importance:

L'envergure des interventions du ministère des Affaires culturelles s'accroît et déborde vite des tâches inscrites dans son mandat original. La commercialisation des arts, le développement des industries culturelles, l'urbanisme et l'aménagement du territoire, ou encore l'adaptation aux nouvelles technologies de reproduction des œuvres sont autant de nouvelles activités qui sollicitent son appui. Elles exigent des formes inédites d'intervention et de nouvelles compétences en matière de gestion culturelle (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.5).

Thus, the rationale behind this new cultural policy was that Québec needed a clear definition of its position on culture relative to the international scene – a position which would affirm the province’s cultural identity vis-à-vis other national cultures, while also offering support to the province’s cultural industries to ensure their competitiveness with foreign markets to the point
where they could become an essential instrument both to Québec and to regions abroad (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, pp.6-7).

To a certain degree, the new cultural policy was built around the traditional axes of culture that were firmly under the purview of the MAC: letters and arts, heritage, and the cultural industries (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.15). However, the new policy expands this scope to take into consideration (and address) broader aspects of culture in Québec: the importance of the French language; a greater openness and understanding of world culture; a greater focus on the regional and international dimensions of culture; access to culture; and an appreciation of the role of education and media on culture (p.15). In effect, the idea was to transition the role of the MAC away from primarily cultural management towards being the broad orienteer of the whole GoQ’s approach to culture (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.220); the responsibility of managing artistic support programs would, instead, be conferred to autonomous organizations, such as le Conseil des art et des lettres (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.123). No longer was it sufficient to view culture as being outside the purview of other policy sectors; with the changing global environment, culture needed to be treated as a definitive priority. To facilitate this process, the MAC would be given a new mandate that provided it a greater breadth of power to pass judgement where cultural policy is concerned:

Le ministère de la Culture aura un mandat axé sur les orientations, le suivi et l'évaluation périodique de l'application de la politique culturelle, en concertation avec les autres ministères et organismes d'État intéressés. Des mécanismes de liaison assureront ces échanges interministériels. À cette fin, des répondants seront désignés dans chacun des ministères et organismes d'État concernés par la politique culturelle (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.124).

In other words, the MAC would take both an initiator and leadership role with other ministries when it came to cultural affairs. To this end, the ministries of Tourism and Leisure, Hunting, &
Fishing were paired off with the MAC as a means of jumpstarting the economics surrounding Québec’s cultural and tourism sectors (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, pp.13-14).

In addition to this pairing of ministries, direct partnerships were established with the ministries of Municipal Affairs, Communications, Higher Education and Science, Industries, Commerce and Technology, International Affairs, Finances, Cultural Communities, and Immigration (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.14). All told, more than 20 ministries and government agencies were brought together through partnerships and affiliations resulting from the new cultural policy – an ambition that had long been held since the days of the green paper published in 1976 (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.220). The idea behind these partnerships and affiliations was that working through and with other ministries would allow the MAC to more broadly and easily achieve its mandate without stepping on toes or exceeding its policy purview. Moreover, these partnerships would ensure that overlap or redundancies in services did not occur. Finally, these partnerships would serve to actively acknowledge the relative ubiquity of culture in Québec society.

With this in mind, the new cultural policy acknowledges the importance and passion of artists and creators in the artistic and cultural progress of Québec’s society, firmly establishing them as harmonious figures of the natural order. For the government, human dignity is observed through access to and participation in culture – a life necessity that no one should do without: "[L]a culture est un bien essentiel et la dimension culturelle est nécessaire à la vie en société, au même titre que les dimensions Sociale et économique" (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.15). A state of worth, in this context, is measured in terms of artistic and cultural progression attaining a remarkable -- beyond expectations -- level of recognition: "Si la progression artistique et culturelle de la société québécoise atteint des niveaux remarquables, on le doit principalement aux efforts et à la passion qui animent nos créateurs et nos artistes" (p.vii). These elements
underscore the beginnings of a new, more thoroughly entrenched approach to cultural policy, predicated on a common world that emphasizes a greater role and place of cultural production and dissemination.

Drawing on this newfound emphasis on production and dissemination of culture, the new policy established that the government’s interventions in cultural affairs would be primarily focused on the aspect of creating (Québécois culture) in the context of what the government described as three axes or orientations of cultural sustainment: affirming Québec’s cultural identity; supporting local talent and industries; and ensuring citizen access to and participation in the province’s cultural life (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.15). Then-Minister of Cultural Affairs, Liza Frulla-Hébert, believed that the application of these three orientations would provoke a major change in governmental action in the cultural sector – wherein culture would hold a privileged position along with governmental preoccupations in economic and social affairs (p.VII).

In adopting this new cultural policy, the GoQ hoped to solidify its contributions to the province’s cultural development to a point where, regardless of what the future might hold, the Québécois culture (and its citizens/repertoire of subjects) would thrive: "En adoptant sa politique culturelle, le gouvernement témoigne de son désir profond de doter les Québécois et les Québécoises d'un cadre de développement culturel qui leur permette de s'épanouir, peu importe le sens futur de l'histoire" (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.VIII). Acknowledging that the cultural industries were evolving in a context where “capitalism was difficult,” keeping up-to-date with technological advancements was expensive, and the need for practical training was ever-expanding, the Québec government sought to address these challenges by regrouping and consolidating its cultural services under one policy and establishing partnerships and strategic
alliances with other departments, agencies, levels of government, and private sector organizations (p.10).

5.2.2.1: The First Axis: Affirming Québec’s Cultural Identity

With the first axis – affirming Québec’s cultural identity – the policy notes that there are a number of cultural stakes at play that the government must consider when intervening in cultural matters. The most immediate of these stakes are Québec’s Francophone character and its history (and the testimonials that still exist thereof). Additionally, and serving as a nod to the findings of the Commission on Culture, the cultural policy acknowledges Québec’s demographic diversity as a prominent stake when intervening in cultural matters. In particular, the policy recognizes the province’s prominent Anglophone population, its diverse immigrant population, and its First Nations populations – all of which are acknowledged for having made significant contributions towards the province’s rich cultural identity, life, and heritage (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.16). Finally, the policy identifies the need for the province to be willing to engage in the international exchange movement (p.16). Underscoring these stakes are three primary objectives built into the cultural policy, centred on achieving the goal of affirming the province’s cultural identity: valorising the French language as a means of expressing and accessing culture; valorising Québec’s cultural heritage; and an openness to cultural exchanges and dialogues – that is to say, a willingness to create intercultural dialogues within and without Québec society (p.23).

First among these objectives is the valorization of the French language (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.25). This objective is centred on the collectivity of Québec’s society, and emphasises the preservation and development of the elements on which the Québécois identity was founded: its language, customs, beliefs, celebrations, and rites. The French language, in particular, is noted for being a strong purveyor of the Québec identity, and its importance is
stressed in relation to the future of Québec and the Québécois culture. The policy recognizes that, over the centuries, the French language in Québec has evolved – through the incorporation of First Nation words, the retention of archaic terms, and the introduction of neologisms unique to the province – to become a language that distinguishes the Québécois from other nations whose dominant language is French. In other words, French – and, in particular, the French that is spoken in Québec – has become a defining trait of Québec’s cultural identity – to the point where it colours virtually every facet and manifestation (i.e. cultural production) of Québec’s culture (p.25). To this end, the cultural policy indicates that the GoQ remains intent on employing the Charter of the French Language in its endeavours to valorise the use of the French language through three broad approaches: improving mastery of the French language (pp.26-27); encouraging the diffusion and consumption of cultural products and œuvres offered in French (p.28); and accentuating the government’s efforts to cooperate and develop partnerships with other Francophone nations as a means of reinforcing the common potential to create and produce cultural commodities and to enlarge the prospective channels of diffusion and distribution (p.31).

This first objective, of valorisation the French language, emphasises Québec’s superior common principle of valuing its culture and cultural identity. In particular, the objective highlights the relationship that exists between the Québécois identity and the French language in a sort of appreciation of the shared history between language and people. The emersion of French into the very fabric of Québec’s culture speaks to concepts of worth and natural order: the French language is as much a tradition of the Québécois as it is a natural extension of their cultural identities. Additionally, the objective encourages the diffusion and consumption of cultural products – both in terms of the diffusion of French cultural commodities and the potential enlargement of the market through international partnerships with other French nations. In both cases, the emphasis on product development, dissemination, and encouragement of consumption
– of creating interest – is concurrent with the idea of an investment formula: the policy promotes the expansion of the overall market through a formula of investment as a mean of assuring access to a common good. It is an approach that posits the market – and its cultural commodities – as necessary for promoting the Francophone element of Québec culture and identity. In doing so, the GoQ established that its language policy – the Charter of the French Language – is insufficient in encouraging and promoting the use of the French Language in the province. Rather, a greater emphasis on the market is needed to ensure that there is a measure of French-language saturation that goes a step beyond what policy, by itself, can achieve. This is not to say that the Charter has not been effective in promoting the use of French in the public sphere of Québec, but simply that, in order to compete with the isomorphic pressures of the predominantly English-speaking North America, Québec needs to offer its citizens cultural commodities that can compete in terms of quality with those of the dominant market. In effect, by looking to create market relationships with other Francophone communities, the GoQ has arguably sought to establish a French-serving market that can, to some degree, rival that of the dominant, English-speaking market of the United States – a market whose penetration into Canada has long informed the cultural policies of the country and its provinces (Collins, 1990, p.xi-xii; Zemans, 1997).

Where this first objective offers an approach to valorising Québec’s culture that is largely informed by the province’s cultural industries and cultural production, the second objective – of valorising Québec’s history and heritage – is more prominently informed by governmental institutions. To begin, the second objective acknowledges the importance of heritage and patrimony as a symbol – one that possess an essential pedagogical character (un caractère pédagogique essentiel) and ever-growing, irreplaceable cultural, social, and economic material value (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.33). The policy outlines the fact that, conceptually, the
term “patrimony” has evolved over the years to encompass everything from buildings to popular stories, and encompasses any and everything from the ensemble of material goods, documents, traditions, customs, œuvres, know-how, familial life, education, and institutions of a society. In short, patrimony covers everything from the distant past to recent (cultural) productions (p.33). Fuelling this second objective, however, was a concern – shared by virtually all societies in relation to their respective cultures – over an inherent (outside) menace or danger that threatened Québec’s culture and identity (p.35). To address this type of concern, governments will often establish laws to preserve and protect their heritage and patrimonial sites – such as museums, archives, and libraries – and cultural objects from erosion and decay (p.33). To this end, the GoQ sought to place emphasis on the interpretation of heritage and its use as both a cultural resource and collective material as a means of preserving its heritage in both a literal and figurative sense (p.34).

The need to protect the province’s heritage has been a prominent component of Québec’s cultural policies since as far back as the 1920s, with the introduction of the Act Relative to the Conservation of Monuments (Loi relative à la conservation des monuments et des objets d'art ayant un intérêt historique ou artistique) (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.35). Heritage, it was believed, is something that belongs to the current generation as much as it does to future generations. By privileging heritage, the GoQ sought to make its citizens more aware of their rich collective history so that that knowledge could be better applied in each person’s everyday life (p.34) – a process that implicitly recognizes and seeks to foster a greater sense of human dignity. To this end, the cultural policy puts emphasis on making the province’s heritage and patrimonial inventories and sites accessible to the general public as a means of better educating the Québec people on their heritage. Support and encouragement is given to municipalities and organizations, working in the heritage sector, who promote a patrimony that is integrated into community life
Similarly, because museums are seen as ideal locals for both access to and preservation of heritage items, support has been given to establishing a museology network to improve public access to heritage services and resources (p.43). These efforts, the policy notes, require the MAC to take on new, arguably more complex, intervention priorities where the question of patrimonial conservation is concerned (p.44). For this reason, the government indicates its intention to revise its objectives with respects to its classification of patrimonial objects and goods, as well as its approaches to the restoration of heritage objects. Likewise, the policy highlights the goal of improving the quality of the province’s heritage site architecture, improving the quality of the construction of its sites, and improving the quality of the repair or renovation of cultural equipment (p.46).

Overall, this objective firmly establishes elements akin to a common world as presented by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991). In particular, it recognises and reinforces a sense of human dignity while promoting and preserving a cultural repertoire of objects and devices in the form of heritage sites and projects. Moreover, the objective establishes a rapport of grandeur and natural relations between citizens, cultural organizations and institutions, and the different levels of government involved, primarily through its emphasis on preservation, promotion, and education. These natural relations, notably, harken to concepts of governmentality insofar as they infer that the Québec government, through its application of cultural policy in relation to heritage, is effectively controlling the conduct of its constituents by means of shaping discourse (Dean, 2010, pp.17-18) as it relates to the province’s history and heritage. The policy, itself, serves as a tool for governmentality insofar as it confers authority to the MAC over classification and interpretation of heritage objects – an authorisation that allows for a measure of control over the message/knowledge conveyed through heritage objects and sites. After all, by whom and how heritage documents and objects are compiled for institutions – such as museums, libraries, and
archives – can greatly inform biases within the knowledge and information presented (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011, p.257). Moreover, the objective of valorising the province’s heritage by means of educating Québec citizens – to the point of having an effect on their everyday lives – indicates an intention to socialize. In doing so, the government is arguably employing heritage as a means of manufacturing citizens who valorize a certain, controlled vision/interpretation of Québec heritage and culture.

Similarly, the third and final objective of the cultural policy’s first axis involves the reinforcement of cultural dialogue in the province. With an influx of immigrants throughout the century, coupled with an increase in travel and mobility of the Québec people – who, as a result, have brought diverse cultural influences to the province – and a geopolitical position that makes Québec unique to the Americas in its appeal to and relations with European counties – relations that make the province “confluent” with culture from multiple continents – the province of Québec has been seen as a veritable intersection of cultural wealth (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.49). The policy notes, however, that with this wealth of culture, the people of Québec have gained a greater insight into other cultures, and a greater desire to be active not just in Québécois culture, but in a universal culture that transcends borders. Of note, many artists, creators, and citizens have identified a desire to engage in international culture as a means of developing and resourcing themselves (p.50). Moreover, while Québec society is Francophone, it is not just Francophone; there are Anglophones, First Nations, and a host of other cultural communities that identify as Québécois and desire the development of a stronger relationship with the provincial government. Simply put, the policy identifies a need for cultural exchanges and dialogues between the diverse communities within the province and with foreign communities (p.50).
With this in mind, the cultural policy outlines how the government intends to valorise the contributions of its diverse cultural communities. The government notes that, where culture is concerned, the Anglophone community has expressed a need for assurances that they will benefit from the government’s interventions in the cultural sector – particularly with respects to protecting their culture from the strong penetration of foreign products into the market, most notably from the United States, and acknowledging the contributions of the Anglophone community to the province’s cultural life (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.51). Moreover, Anglophone artists have asked for the same opportunities to access funding and support from the province that their Francophone counterparts receive – of which the government indicates, in the policy, it will address.

With respect to the diverse immigrant cultures and cultural communities that have settled in Québec, while the province appreciates and welcomes the cultural communities’ contributions to the province’s culture – particularly with respects to developing links with foreign cultures and markets – it nevertheless acknowledges a need to help integrate immigrants into Québec society. The policy suggests that integration into Québec society is a process that is greatly facilitated when: (a) a clear invitation to immigrants is evidenced (through official policy), (b) the image of Québécois culture is rich and inviting, and (c) its Francophone character is manifested and its relationship to the broader Francophonie community is valorised (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, pp.52-53). To this end, the cultural policy piggybacks on the government action plan already put in place with respect to immigration and integration (p.53).

When it comes to the First Nations communities of the province, the policy acknowledges that the MAC has been concluding agreements with the First Nations communities for a number of years with the goal of conferring responsibility for their cultural development to organizations belonging to the community. With that said, the government indicated its intentions to continue
supporting First Nations culture through financial aid, technical support, training, and programs adapted to the specific needs and realities of First Nation artists and creators (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.54).

Finally, with respects to Québec’s presence in international forums and networks, the policy indicates that the province’s predominantly French heritage and culture have opened the door to a host of cultural commodities from international markets that are generally more diversified than those found in the rest of North America. In particular, the cultural offerings of Europe offer Québec an assortment of products that rival what is offered by the United States (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.55). Similarly, because access to foreign markets is a two-way street, many of Québec’s artists are finding the means to distinguish themselves in new markets – in large part, through international networks of professionals. This penetration of local artists into foreign markets has been seen as an asset to the Québec government in terms of both showcasing elements of Québec’s cultural identity to an international audience and expanding the reach of the province’s cultural industries into those same markets. For instance, some Québec publishing houses were bringing in anywhere from 10 to 30 percent of their profits from foreign markets, while the audiovisual sector saw, through sales to foreign markets, revenues north of $400 million over the four year period leading up to 1992 (p.56). With this in mind, the government outlined its plan in la Politique culturelle to continue, on the one hand, supporting the dissemination of Québec culture and cultural products to foreign markets and, on the other hand, welcoming foreign artists and organizations (and their cultural products) into the province in order to strengthen cultural exchanges between nations (p.57).

Through this third objective, the GoQ’s acknowledges and embraces the diversity of Québec’s population and its potential for creating relations on an international level – elements that suggest a rapport of grandeur and a model to test its validity. In this case, a rapport of
grandeur is presented with respects to the non-Francophone Québécois communities – both in terms of their cultural status vis-à-vis Québec’s predominantly Francophone population and through acknowledgement of their concerns regarding cultural assimilation and the assurances given that the government will respect their cultures to a certain extent. Underscoring the GoQ’s willingness to respect and embrace the cultural diversity of its non-Francophone communities is the ambition to expand the province’s place and profile (and that of its artists and creators) in international forums and networks; the province’s diverse communities are seen to provide opportunities to further the province’s international connections and relationships through their diasporic connections with their countries of origin. In this respect, the embracement of cultural diversity can be seen as a test model for developing and bolstering Québec’s profile (and culture) internationally as it helps draw attention to (the quality and diversity of) the province’s cultural productions as a means of developing a “climate” conducive to the dissemination and overall growth of its culture.

5.2.2.2: The Second Axis: Supporting Local Talent and Industries – The Introduction of le Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec

Drawing on the themes of the first axis, the second axis of Québec’s cultural policy – supporting local talent and industries – identifies “creation” as the heart of all policy dedicated to the development of arts and culture (La création est au cœur de toute politique dédiée au développement des arts et de la culture) (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.59). By the government’s measure, creation is a quintessential element of cultural life, not to mention cultural production, and dissemination:

Elle peut être vue, sous un angle très général, comme recherche d'authenticité, dépassement, expression d'émotions intimes, représentation symbolique de valeurs collectives ou quête de l'universel. Pour l'artiste ou le créateur, elle est une réalité quotidienne où doivent s'allier une démarche personnelle, l'atteinte des exigences de la profession et la nécessité de subvenir à ses besoins. Pour les
In order to foster creativity, the government notes that creation needs to be autonomous and free of constraints that might undermine its sense (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.59). For this to happen, artistic endeavours need to take place in an environment that favours progress and offers support to the artistic community without expecting any sort of tangible or immediate benefits in return. With that said, the GoQ’s responsibilities with respects to creation are to establish clear objectives and rules by which it will offer support to the artistic communities – all while ensuring that it remains neutral and transparent in its approach (p.60).

Recognizing that creation requires freedom to truly prosper – freedom of artistic choice, message, support, and association with other artists – the GoQ (1992) outlines its plan to support artistic liberty through the introduction of a new autonomous management organization responsible for “harmonizing” the government’s programs supporting the arts and culture with the objectives of the cultural policy (pp.61-62). This new organization – le Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec (CALQ) – was charged with supporting “creation, experimentation, production and dissemination in the realms of the visual arts, the arts and crafts, literature, the performing arts, the multidisciplinary arts, cinema and video, the digital arts and architectural research” throughout the province, while also broadening the “influence of artists, writers, arts organizations and their works in Québec, Canada and abroad” (Gouvernement du Québec, 2013b, par.1). To this end, the CALQ (2015) offers a variety of bursaries and subsidies to professional artists, writers, and architects with the goal of supporting their research and creation, training, residencies in both Québec and abroad, relocations, promotion, the mastery of their oeuvres, and/or the showcasing of their work at events (p.15). Similarly, the CALQ offers subsidies and support programs to non-profit and independent artistic organizations in an effort to ensure their
everyday function and support their promotion, production projects, market development, dissemination of Québec products, and engagement with other artists and organizations at national and international events. The CALQ also provides bursaries and subsidies to support the evaluative capacities of juries, consultative committees, and/or selection committees in the arts and culture scene (p.15).

As well as offering support in the form of bursaries and subsidies, the CALQ (2015) promotes and creates awareness of Québec’s artists and creators through the awarding of prizes in excellence and creation – such as, for example, l’Ordre des arts et des lettres du Québec (p.17). The rationale behind these awards and bursaries is that this form of recognition is the most appropriate way of acknowledging the contributions of artists and creators to Québec society – many of whom, without these sorts of awards, seldom see any significant material or professional gains from their work (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, pp.62-63). Moreover, the CALQ (2015) supports the development of new models of creation, dissemination, and management as they relate to the shift towards digitization in the arts, as well as the development of synergies between artistic and literary communities (p.13). The CALQ also offers support to associations of professional artists and organizations working in the cultural sector (p.15). Likewise, the CALQ encourages, through its Mécénat Placements Culture program, the medium and long-term capitalization of cultural organizations through the procurement of private funding, the funding of short-term needs, and the dissemination of artistic activities in foreign markets (p.15). While its services are primarily geared towards artists, professional writers, and non-profit organizations, the CALQ estimates that its reach and mission effect (and benefit) virtually everyone in the province of Québec because the artistic endeavours it supports contribute to both the cultural fulfillment of the population and the economic development of workers in the arts and literary sector(s) (p.99).
It is with cultural fulfillment and economic development in mind that the GoQ (1992) recognises artists and creators as professionals who require a measure of social and economic protection (p.68). While laws – such as those respecting the professional status of artists (e.g. la Loi sur le statut professionnel et les conditions d'engagement des artistes de la scène, du disque et du cinéma and la Loi sur le statut professionnel des artistes des arts visuels, des métiers d'art et de la littérature et sur leurs contrats avec les diffuseurs) – have offered artists some protection and certainty vis-à-vis their work, the cultural policy acknowledges that most artists and creators subsisted on relatively weak, fluctuating, and often poverty-level incomes (p.69). While trade unions were noted for having helped address some of the financial concerns of artists and creators in certain cultural sectors, more could be done to help artists overall. Without going so far as to create new funding regimes to support artists whose incomes fluctuate, the cultural policy highlights the introduction of tax exemptions to artists and creators for the purchase of artistic supplies (p.73). Moreover, as a means of providing artists and creators with the skillsets and training needed to legitimately strive in their chosen cultural sectors, the MAC was charged with overseeing professional arts schools – in a way that parallels the education sector – while the CALQ was responsible for overseeing the professional development of artists, creators, and artistic professionals (pp.74-75).

Additionally, in its application as a support system for artists and creators, the CALQ was made responsible for supporting and sponsoring artistic organizations – both financially and creatively. In particular, the policy acknowledges that cultural organizations and associations are seldom financially successful enough to sufficiently support their activities/enterprises. As such, public funding is seen by the GoQ (1992) as fundamental for the success and continuance of cultural organizations. To this end, the cultural policy establishes the CALQ as responsible for managing the provincial government’s funding to cultural organizations and outlines
modifications to the rules regulating financial assistance to cultural and artistic organizations so as to allow for more frequent dispersals of funding (i.e. more than once a year) and to allow funding periods of more than one year. These amendments, it is believed, afford artistic organizations a stability and certainty needed to plan long-term (pp.81-82). In addition to these changes, the CALQ was also mandated with financially supporting cultural organizations in the hiring and integration of new workers as a means of ensuring that new and emerging artists are given the opportunity to properly enter into the cultural sectors (pp.83-84).

In many respects, the CALQ serves as a government-mandated vehicle (or device) for promoting Québec’s superior common principle and state of worth. With CALQ, there is a strong push from the government towards creation as a means of sustaining the cultural industries. After all, creativity and creation are prominent elements of CALQ’s mission statement, with approaches to supporting and sustaining the cultural activities of the province’s repertoire of subjects and, more specifically, its harmonious figures – namely artists, creators, and cultural organizations – figuring significantly in its objectives. As an agency largely tasked with supporting creation and creativity through the management and disbursement of funding to artists and organizations, the CALQ’s purpose is arguably that of an enabler: the CALQ enables creation, but it also enables desire. Providing artists and creators with resources to create, the CALQ is arguably providing them with the potential to, as Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) put it, develop something new that people covet. In effect, the CALQ’s support allows for the creation of new markets that might not otherwise exist; the CALQ’s is a mandate that harkens to the notion of “if you build it, they will come” – provided that there are sufficient resources and support invested in that building process. It is with respects to providing resources to artists and organizations, then, that the establishment of the CALQ can be seen as a corrective measure for the market in terms of ensuring that artists remain sufficiently solvent to continue their craft.
The CALQ’s mandate acknowledges that most artists, creators, and cultural organizations cannot adequately make a living in their chosen professions and fields without some form of government intervention. Given that artistic professions are largely market driven – that is to say, for example, that an artist’s income is often predicated on there being an actual market demand for their work – the fact that the government must intervene to ensure their relative success speaks both to the market’s failure in adequately correcting for such deficiencies and to the overall public’s undervaluing or lack of appreciation for certain artistic endeavours – a point that, to the cultural policy’s credit, is addressed in its third axis (re: Gouvernement, 1992, pp.97-119, and covered in the following section). Nevertheless, the implication of the CALQ’s existence – at least as it is presented in the cultural policy and through its own, more recent publications – implies a certain level of selectivity, on the government’s part, where culture is concerned. Rather than allowing the market to decide what cultural products and endeavours succeed or fail, the government is actively choosing, through the CALQ, to support cultural endeavours that might otherwise fail – implying that what might be “popular” is not necessarily what is best for the cultural vitality of Québécois society. To this end, the CALQ’s is a mandate that arguably serves to mitigate the potential for cultural imperialism and assimilation that arises from dominant and popular industries (i.e. Hollywood); it is a form of investment formula that promotes the democratization of culture over cultural democracy. By emphasising the sometimes less popular or marketable forms of culture, the CALQ is essentially providing a forum to those forms (and their creators) – ensuring that, at least in principle, citizens will have access to them should they choose.

It is perhaps somewhat ironic, then, that as a final element of the second axis, the cultural policy outlines a strategy for developing the province’s cultural industries. As industries that generate billions of dollars in revenue each year and employ thousands of Québécois, the GoQ
(1992) identifies the cultural industries as an important strategic cluster for the overall economic development of the province (pp.85-86). However, the development of the cultural industries, themselves, rests largely on the quality of the cultural products being produced by the industries and on the competitiveness of the market(s) in which those products are produced (p.88). Through collaboration and consultation with the representatives of the cultural industries, the GoQ established – through the Ministry of Finance – a strategy that would: (a) improve the capitalization of the cultural industries by facilitating the increase of production, manufacturing, and exportation for certain industries; (b) introduce fiscal measures that would bear on the Sociétés de placement dans l'entreprise Québécoise (SPEQ) – which includes all business investment companies in Québec recognized and registered as private corporations by the government (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015f, par.1); and (c) provide tax credits to cultural industries for the purposes of capitalization (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.89).

Moreover, recognizing that Québec’s cultural industries are insufficiently equipped to satisfy the province’s economic and financial performance measures without some form of government intervention, the cultural policy indicates that the government has introduced regulatory mechanisms into the market as a means of protecting its industries from the competitive challenges of foreign markets and enterprises (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, pp.91-92). Laws, such as the aforementioned Cinema Act, were cited as having had a positive impact in ensuring that Québec’s cultural industries remain competitive, and are credited with ensuring their survival domestically and aiding in their expansion internationally. However, the Québec government believed that in order to alleviate some of the cultural industries’ reliance on their domestic market(s), ongoing efforts were needed to help them expand their operations internationally – while also protecting them from the incursion of foreign markets domestically (p.92). To this end, the policy indicates that the GoQ has defended the interests of the province’s
cultural industries internationally – in the context of trade negotiations with the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which would later be replaced by the World Trade Organization) – and has made strides towards fostering alliances between cultural industries enterprises through international delegations and offices (pp.92-93). To further this defence, the cultural policy indicates that the mandate, role, and structure of public organizations tasked with supporting the cultural industries – most notably, SOGIC – would be revised in collaboration with the industries/organizations, themselves, in an effort to ensure that these private organizations participate in the elaboration of the government’s orientations as they relate to culture (p.94).

On the surface, supporting the cultural industries under the auspices of protecting them from outside markets infers a statement of worth and a desire to uphold it: the policy acknowledges the significance of the cultural industries to Québec, from cultural and economic perspectives, but remains cognisant of the fact that many of these industries are vulnerable to outside markets if left without some form of government intervention. These interventions, thus, serve as a form of compromise to correct for the cultural industries’ inability to adequately support themselves in the context of a broader, international market. In essence, by offering support to its cultural industries, the GoQ is employing a form of cultural protectionism; the government is not only protecting the cultural industries, themselves, but is seeking to protect the culture that the industries produce – a culture that originates from Québec. The importance given to the cultural industries through the cultural policy denotes a level of trust in terms of the province’s economic and cultural prosperity. By offering support to the local cultural industries, the GoQ is establishing a relationship with them – a rapport of grandeur and natural relations – that implies reciprocal expectations in the form of specific goods – in this case cultural productions that remain definitive to Québec’s cultural identity.
In this respect, the cultural policy serves as an implicit invitation to the cultural industries to produce culture that might not necessarily or immediately bear fruit economically, but that the government will more than readily subsidize to ensure that the cultural industries, themselves, are able to prosper long term domestically and, potentially, internationally. Trust, in this case, comes in the form of the cultural industries’ willingness to produce culture that adheres to the government’s expectations. Given the emphasis in the CALQ’s mandate to ensure artists and organizations have the freedom to create, there should be no explicit directive on what sort of culture artists/creators are expected to create; however, given that the purpose of the second axis is to support local talent and industries, there is an implicit directive to produce culture that is distinctly local, distinctly Québécois. Otherwise, there would be no need or purpose behind supporting local talent; the government would simply let the market play out in Darwinian contexts. The act of supporting local talent and industries, then, is an act of supporting local culture – one predicated on the supposition that the cultural industries will, indeed, produce local, Québécois culture.

5.2.2.3: The Third Axis: Citizen Access to and Participation in Cultural Life

The final axis of the 1992 cultural policy places emphasis on providing citizens with access to cultural life. The GoQ (1992) indicates that, just as culture is given life by citizens through their participation and consumption of culture, it is also inseparable from the population as it contributes to their quality of life by creating dreams and sparking imagination (p.97). To this end, the GoQ used the frequency by which citizens visit cultural institutions – such as museums and libraries – and consume cultural products as indicators for evaluating the relationship between culture and society. Through these indicators, the GoQ was able to establish to what degree citizens were accessing and participating in cultural life.
By the end of the 1980s, for instance, the GoQ estimated that the average Québec household spent approximately $600 annually on cultural products – such as books, movies, and music CDs. Similarly, in 1989, at least 71 percent of Québécois over the age of 15 had frequented at least one public spectacle – such as the cinema, music, theatre, and/or dance – over the course of the previous year, while 78 percent of Québécois had visited a cultural establishment – such as a book store, library, museum, or heritage site – over the same time period (p.107). With that said, more than 72 percent of the province’s population indicated a desire to frequent cultural events and institutions more often (p.107). The role of the government with respects to culture, then, was seen not to determine or dictate what citizens consume, but to simply provide them with greater access to culture (and cultural activities) (p.98).

With this in mind, the GoQ’s (1992) indicates that among the most effective ways of increasing access and participation to culture is to sensitize citizens to its existence – to cultivate an awareness and appreciation of culture through an understanding of the province’s repertoire of objects and devices:

L’accès au monde de la culture et des arts suppose une familiarisation avec les oeuvres et l’univers culturel; tout objectif de démocratisation de la culture se tourne donc forcément vers l’école, qui doit jouer un rôle fondamental pour ouvrir la voie aux valeurs culturelles (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.11).

As a first measure for sensitization, the cultural policy privileges the education system as a vehicle for culture and cultural appreciation. Emphasis was placed, on the one hand, on reviving artistic and cultural education in schools and other scholarly milieus and, on the other hand, sensitizing youth to arts, culture, and history through an educational action plan that would bring students more directly in contact with cultural activities (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.100). To this end, the action plan outlined in the cultural policy would involve: supporting the development of artistic and cultural projects in schools; a re-examination of the place and role of
arts in educational programs and pedagogies; supporting research and experimentation in the educational approaches employed in schools with respects to disseminating cultural education; the integration of a cultural dimension to basic training of students, most notably with respects to arts, literature, and history; the creation of an arts week; and the support of special training projects in arts, music, and dance (p.106). Additionally, the action plan would involve sensitizing youth to culture through a joint initiative between artists and scholastic commissions that would expose youth to the arts through access to a broader range of activities related to the actual production or animation of culture. Permanent mechanisms would also be put in place between the Ministry of Education and the MAC to produce tools for collaboration between public and scholarly libraries as a means of developing collections, and sharing resources and best practices (p.106).

As a second measure for fostering access to culture, the cultural policy singles out the media as perhaps the most efficient vehicle for cultural sensitization and promotion (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.101). In fact, media outlets – most notably radio and television – are identified as the cultural industries that, despite competitive pressures from outside markets, remain the most prominent disseminators of Québec culture in the province. With media outlets in mind, the cultural policy indicates the government’s intention to establish protocols that would allow for elaboration and experimentation with respects to both the development and dissemination of new cultural programming – as well as programming directly related to arts and culture – while also ensuring that these industries remain prominent and successful domestically (p.103). Additionally, a protocol for collaboration would be establish between the MAC and Radio-Québec (now Télé-Québec) – a provincial crown corporation whose mission is the tele-diffusion of educative and cultural products and programming to the public (Télé-Québec, 2015, par.1). Created in 1969, Radio-Québec was mandated with creating a
taste for and favouring the acquisition of knowledge, promoting artistic and cultural life, and providing a reflection of the regional realities and diversity of Québec society (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015g, par.16) – all elements highlighted by la Politique culturelle as important for promoting citizen access to and participation in cultural life. Thus, it was believed that, through collaborations with Radio-Québec, the MAC could better actualize its objectives as they related to access, participation, and – to some degree – sensitization of culture.

Beyond sensitization, the GoQ (1992) found that one of the biggest challenges to citizens’ access to culture was assuring that there was a sufficient variety of cultural products available to them (p.109). For this reason, the government sees its role in the matter of cultural access as one of facilitation: it encourages the circulation of diverse cultural products and seeks to foster greater interactions between the province’s regions. While much of the province’s cultural production occurs in major metropolitan areas – such as Montréal and Québec City – the cultural policy notes that there is a pronounced need to expand the scope and dissemination of the cultural productions of the province’s other regions. To this end, the cultural policy singles out the province’s major cultural institutions – most notably l’Archives nationales du Québec, la Bibliothèque nationale du Québec, le Musée d’art contemporain de Montréal, le Musée de la civilisation, le Musée du Québec, le Société de la Place des Arts de Montréal, la Société du Grand Théâtre de Québec, and la Société de radio-télévision du Québec – as important purveyors of cultural dissemination on whom the province should more readily rely upon in its efforts to achieve an equitable distribution of culture throughout the provinces many regions (p.110). With this in mind, the government outlines its intent to create a “bureau des tournées” that would function under the purview of the CALQ and would encourage the circulation of cultural products through the province’s major cultural institutions (p.111). Moreover, the MAC would assure that the programming of the major national cultural institutions featured expositions and
spectacles of “excellence” coming from the various regions of the province – not just from Montréal or Québec City (p.111). Additional efforts would be centred on putting in place an action plan with the province’s regions to establish their needs with respects to developing their cultural institutions and maintaining their cultural equipment (p.112). Likewise, an intervention plan was to be devised to improve the accessibility of libraries and the services they offer (p.114).

All told, the third axis’ approach to providing citizens with access to culture – in large part through sensitization – recognizes a state of worth (i.e. cultured citizens) and establishes an investment formula (i.e. the privileging of certain forms of culture over others) to see it through. The application of Radio-Québec/Télé-Québec, for instance, essentially serves to educate or socialize the public; its function is predicated on informing taste and transmitting knowledge to the masses – of enculturating them. In this sense, it is arguably the equality of certain forms of culture that is being sacrificed in favour of a knowledge and appreciation of a specific type or form of culture that is seen as offering the Québécois the necessary tools to more readily access and participate in the province’s cultural life – of attaining a state of worth. While not explicitly stated, the third axis implies that the type of culture the masses are used to – the type of culture they are engaging with/in on a daily basis – is insufficient for them to truly appreciate and access the culture the government is espousing, that is to say the province’s culture. Conspicuously absent from the third axis – and, in particular, its reliance on statistical data – are any baseline indicators or forms of evidence to establish if a) the culture being consumed is Québécois in origin, and b) if the level of consumption indicated is comparable to other provinces or countries. Given the overall nature of the axis, it can reasonably be assumed that the culture being consumed in Québec was not primarily of Québec origin.

The purpose of educating and sensitizing citizens to culture, then, despite the policy’s assertions to the contrary, is to direct them towards a certain form of culture – one that is offered
through many of the province’s prominent cultural institutions and is distinctly Québécois in origin. After all, the point of cultural sensitization is to offer those being sensitized with an “awareness and understanding” of different cultures/cultural difference(s) (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2014, p.73); the act of educating the public on the offerings of their own culture implies, if nothing else, that their consumption and participation in local culture is not at a level deemed sufficient by the provincial government – that their awareness and understanding of their local culture is insufficient. Thus, the third axis serves as a process that is Bourdieusian, in a sense, as it acknowledges the need to educate the masses on culture – to provide them with the cultural capital needed to truly appreciate culture (Bourdieu & Darbel, 1969). But more than simply creating an appreciation for culture, the Québec government is seeking to create an appreciation of Québec culture. In doing so, the GoQ has arguably implemented an implicit reconceptualization of the high/low culture dichotomy evident in Bourdieu’s analysis – albeit one where high culture is understood as local or Québécois culture and low culture is understood as “all other culture” not originating in the province. This is not to suggest a devaluation of foreign culture by the Québec government, but rather a repositioning or reordering of culture that emphasises the fundamentality of Québec culture to Québec identity and cultural life.

5.2.3: M.A.C? It’s Easy as M.C.C.: Cultural Reshuffling in Québec

Perhaps the most immediate outcome of the cultural policy was the rebranding and reorientation of the MAC. With the new policy in place, the government needed to revamp its existing ministry – both in structure and in legal terms – to adequately take charge of the province’s cultural affairs. The new policy meant that the ministry would have a much broader mandate, built around the three axes of the policy, and would require the legal authority to plan and put into practice the objectives of the cultural policy (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992,
The ministry would also be responsible, in conjunction with other ministries, for ensuring that the policy’s objectives were followed through with, and in evaluating the policy’s effectiveness and application. Liaison mechanisms – such as establishing respondents, in each ministry and state organization whose responsibilities deal with culture, who would report directly to the MAC – would be introduced to ensure inter-ministerial exchanges. Similarly, the ministry would be responsible for coordinating and harmonizing its activities on a regional level (p.126). Additionally, as part of its broader mandate, the MAC was merged with the Ministry of Communications to form the Ministère de la Culture et Communications (MCC) (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.290). This change, in large part, came about as a result of the cultural policy’s first axis and the association it made between culture, communication, and la Francophonie (Harvey, 2011, p.80).

In the context of globalization, American cultural imperialism, the conglomeration of multimedia, and the rapid development of new technologies, the role of the newly minted MCC was (and continues to be) oriented towards offering a structured coherence to the ensemble of cultural industries and sectors belonging to what is described as the “new economy” (Poirier, 2005, p.240). In effect, multimedia and telecommunications had become considerably competitive (cultural) sectors throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in large part through globalization and through their ability to pierce into new markets (Saint-Pierre, 2010, p.295). It is under these conditions that, despite the cultural policy’s assertion that it serves three distinct clienteles – community, creators and artists, and citizens – and is preoccupied with functions related to those clienteles (in conjunction with the three axes) (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.137), there is a strong sense that the policy is favouring the cultural industries in much of its approach. Elements of the industries are woven into each axis – and, to a degree, are woven into the MAC’s rebranding: the integration of communication into the ministry’s title broadens its scope to
include communication in the form of language, but also in the form of cultural production. The act of producing culture is, itself, a form of communication. Moreover, the fact that many of the most recognizable cultural producers and distributors can variably be defined as communications or telecommunications companies is indicative of the degree to which the industrial aspect of culture is fundamental to *la Politique culturelle*. But the rebranding of the MAC also serves as recognition of the evolving nature of cultural production and consumption in a day and age when people have become more inclined to consume culture through multimedia and telecommunications technologies – such as the internet (Lemieux, Luckerhoff, & Paré, 2012, p.40). To this end, *la Politique culturelle*’s approach offers a distinct recognition and expressed need for Québec’s cultural policies to evolve in conjunction with – rather than apart from – the cultural industries.

5.3: From Culture to Communication: Constitutional Crisis & the Evolution of Québec Society & Cultural Policy

In all of its efforts to offer an expansive and exhaustive cultural policy, it is interesting to note that at no point in *la Politique Culturelle du Québec* is there any explicit reference to Québec nationalism. Even in the policy’s first axis, whose purpose is to affirm the province’s cultural identity, there are no allusions to Québec nationalism or national identity. In fact, the only implicit reference to nationalism (or national identity) in the entire document comes in the introduction section wherein the policy is, in part, justified as a means of affirming Québec’s cultural identity in the same way other national cultures use policy to protect theirs (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.7). While the absence of any nationalist discourse in *la Politique Culturelle* is not entirely surprising given its authors were members of the province’s federalist party, the Parti libéral, its absence is noteworthy given that the policy was introduced
amidst what has perhaps been the province’s most fiercely intense period of nationalist/separatist discourse (Balthazar, 2013, p.260). And commentators were quick to point out the peculiarity of the timing of la Politique culturelle du Québec’s release for precisely this reason: the policy came on the heels of a financial recession – that affected not only the province of Québec, but the whole of Canada – and constitutional debates that were arguably shaking the foundations of Canada’s federalism (Saint-Pierre, 2011, p.220; Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2008, p.345). Given this precarious context, the policy arguably navigates a fine line between comprehensive policy and fodder for political discourse. The fact that the policy, itself, plays up the importance of cultural production undoubtedly goes a long way towards navigating its purpose outside the purview of any explicit political landmines where nationalism is concerned; however, this approach also speaks to the way culture has been valued in Québec’s cultural policy: it is, more often than not, a means to an end. In this case, while the ends might not be nationalistic in any explicit sense, they are no less political in their approach to economizing culture.

Nevertheless, much of the concern or critique regarding la Politique Culturelle was largely overshadowed by the constitutional and sovereigntist debates – an outcome that was perhaps not entirely unwelcomed by the Québec government. Two prominent country-wide constitutional accords had failed to fully or adequately address the concerns of all parties involved – and served to weave much disaccord into Canada’s political landscape. The first of these accords, the Meech Lake Accord (1987), sought to offer Québec recognition as a distinct society with rights to self-government “in language and other areas essential to its cultural survival”; however, the accord failed to garner any real support in the rest of Canada, where it was seen as granting Québec special privileges that the other provinces were not being afforded while ignoring the demands of First Nations groups (Ignatieff, 2000, p.77). The second accord, the Charlottetown Accord (1992), sought, among other things, to acknowledge Québec (and First
Nations populations) as a distinct society and achieve its endorsement of the Canadian Constitution Act. However, the Charlottetown Accord was unable to find support via referendum from the majority of Canadians, the Québécois included (Barnes, 1995, pp.28-29). The results of these failed accords was a re-ignition of sovereigntist discourse in Québec (Balthazar, 2013, pp.232-236) – a discourse which, once again, called into question Québec’s place vis-à-vis the rest of Canada and which created a palpable divide between the province and the federal government (Keating, 2001a, p.83). This divide was accentuated by an increase in popularity, in Québec, for independence – a popularity that was attributed, in part, to a growing dissatisfaction with the federal government. At the onset of 1993, polls suggested that approximately 43 percent of Québécois were in favour of independence, with anywhere between 52 and 57 percent of the population open to renegotiating, with the rest of Canada, the province’s sovereignty status; by 1994, almost 50 percent of Québécois were in favour of separation (Cloutier & Irwin, 1994, p.165). Simply put, an appetite for independence was growing in Québec in the early 1990s, and many of the efforts put forth by the federal government to quell that appetite only seemed to increase it.

This growing division between Québec and the rest of Canada was perhaps most evidently observed in three separate, albeit interrelated votes – each occurring a year apart from each other: the 1993 Canadian federal election, the 1994 Québec provincial election, and the 1995 Québec sovereignty referendum. With the federal election of 1993, a wave of political change took place throughout all of Canada. After two consecutive majority governments under the reign of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, the people of Canada had become discontent with the way the country had been run for the previous nine years. What followed was an historically interesting election for two reasons: the first reason was that, for the first time since Confederation, the Liberal Party of Canada obtained a majority government without the
support of Québec; the second reason was that the support Québec might have otherwise given to
the Liberal Party was, instead, given to a new federal party, the Bloc Québécois – a sovereignist
party exclusive to the Province of Québec (Drouilly, 1994, pp.63-64). The Bloc Québécois would
finish the election fourth in overall popular vote (though it received almost 50 percent of the vote
in Québec) and second in total number of seats obtained in the house of commons with 54 –
making it the first party other than the Liberals or Conservatives to sit as official opposition to the
government (Drouilly, 1994, p.68; Keating, 2001a, p.84) The election of the Bloc Québécois
served as a distinctive divide between Québec and the rest of Canada insofar as its elected
officials served as Québec delegates in the house of commons, whose role was not to represent
the “Canadian dimension” of Québec, but to “completely displace it” (Cairns, 1995, p.324). In
other words, the emergence of the Bloc Québécois as official opposition served to politically
establish an “us versus them” optic to federal politics in Canada, while returning to salience the
independence movement in Québec on the national scene (Balthazar, 2013, p.250).

This optic of a Québec/Canada divide would be further supported with the re-election of
the Parti Québécois in 1994. Described as the “second period” of a political hockey match (the
first having been both the rejection of the Charlottetown Accord and the election of 54 Bloc
Québécois representatives to the house of commons), the re-election of the Parti Québécois was
seen by its leaders as a sign that the “third period” – a referendum – was theirs for the taking
(Lesage, 1994, p.181). Despite this optimism, the 1995 referendum narrowly ended in defeat for
the Parti Québécois, with the province voting “no” to independence by a margin of 54,288 votes
(Drouilly, 1997, p.119). The referendum’s result – and subsequent fallout – served to offer a
pulse on the province’s socio-political environment at the time; whether intentionally or not, it
brought to the forefront many of the social and cultural obstacles facing Québec, both internally
and externally. But more importantly – at least for the purposes of this research – it offered a new
significance to *la Politique Culturelle du Québec* (1992) and to Québec’s cultural policy in general. All of a sudden, the purpose and message of *la Politique Culturelle*’s first axis, in particular, took on a new importance as it dealt with the fallout of a referendum (and its leader) that left many non-Francophone Québécois feeling alienated and ostracized by the Parti Québécois (Balthazar, 2013, p.259).

In this respects, *la Politique Culturelle* served as a precursor to and an opportunity for change in Québec – both in terms of culture (and the government’s approach to culture), but also in the way it could be applied to rehabilitate the place and sense of community within the province for both Francophone and non-Francophone Québécois alike. After all, the cultural field “had become primary in the process by which governments constructed their legitimacy and fostered a sense of citizenship” (Straw, 2005, p.194), and, to a large degree, *la Politique Culturelle* – and its three axes – serves to support that legitimacy through its application. Yet, following the 1995 referendum, there has been a noticeable shift in the way cultural policy is applied in Québec – a shift that arguably seeks to re-legitimize the government’s place in Québécois society. While this shift can, in part be attributed to the gradual implementation of *la Politique Culturelle*, it is also indicative of the broader cultural policy trend in Québec that saw the province’s policy approach shift from an institutionalization of classic culture (such as theatre, arts, and music) with the creation of the MAC in the 1960s, to an industrialized approach with the creation of SODICC in the late 1970s (that placed greater emphasis on film, television, and shows), and, finally, to a more civically responsible approach beginning in the years directly following the referendum and coinciding with the creation of the MCC – one built on the ideals of democracy and citizenship (Lemieux, Luckerhoff, & Paré, 2012, pp.16-17), but that also draws on the popularity of the cultural industries to support and encourage citizen participation.
5.3.1: Solidifying Culture: From SOGIC to SODEC

Among the more prominent cultural policy changes to emerge post-1995 referendum was the establishment of la Société de développement des entreprises culturelles (SODEC). SODEC came into existence through the adoption of Law 14 in 1994 – a law that introduced SODEC as a replacement for both SOGIC and the Québec Institute for Cinema (Harvey, 2011, p.81). With the Parti Québécois in power, an accentuation was placed on la Politique Culturelle’s axes as they related to identity and the cultural industries; as such, SODEC emerged, in large part, as an acknowledgement that the cultural industries – and, in particular, the multimedia and telecommunication sectors – were assuming an increasingly important role in Québec’s economy and should, therefore, be better insulated (Poirier, 2005, p.240). Officially introduced in 1995, and much like its predecessors, SODEC has been mandated with supporting the cultural industries in their production and dissemination of Québec culture – including the media sector (SODEC, 2013, p.5). In particular, SODEC seeks to support the development and sustainment of organizations operating within the cultural industries throughout all of Québec (SODEC, 2014a, par.1-2) – a mandate that draws heavily from the second axis of la Politique Culturelle. The members of SODEC’s 15-member council, appointed by the provincial government, largely consist of representatives of the various sectors of the cultural industries (SODEC, 2013, p.5).

In large part, SODEC’s support is aimed at improving “the quality and competitiveness” of the products and services offered by cultural and media enterprises “in Québec, elsewhere in Canada and abroad” (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015h, par.17). In addition to support services, SODEC is also responsible for administrating financial assistance, within the scope of its financial assistance programs, to cultural enterprises by means of:

1. a loan; 2. a guarantee of full or partial repayment of a financial commitment; 3. an investment based on the anticipated profitability of a project or an enterprise, in return for a share in the profits, royalties or any other form of compensation; 4.
a subsidy; (5) assistance that is partially repayable on the basis of revenues, if any; (6) any other form of assistance authorized by the Government (Gouvernement du Québec, 2015h, par.18).

To facilitate the provision of its financial aid, SODEC has both created and been involved in partnerships with venture capitalist organizations. Among the most notably of these partners are le Fonds de solidarité FTQ – a capital fund created in 1983 by the Fédération des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ) in response to the recession Québec found itself in and which serves to help create and preserve jobs through capital investment in small- or medium-sized businesses (Fonds de Solidarité 2016, par.1). More recently, SODEC has worked with and supported le Fonds d'investissement de la culture et des communications (FICC) – a venture capital created in 1997 and jointly sponsored by le Fonds de solidarité FTQ and SODEC with the aim of supporting Québec companies “in the field of culture and communications, contribute to their development, growth and profitability; and support the presence of new generations of entrepreneurs” (FICC, 2016, par.2). Similarly, SODEC has worked with and supported le Fonds Capital Culture Québec (FCCQ) – established in 2011 by the provincial government and le Fonds de solidarité FTQ to help support cultural enterprises, represented by a broad range of cultural industries, whose ambitions are to export their creative products or projects to markets outside the province (SODEC, 2014c; FCCQ, 2012).

Beyond its financial support of the cultural industries, SODEC is also mandated with “documenting and understanding” the convergence that occurs between the economy and culture (Ménard, 2004, p.11). For SODEC (2013), culture and communication serve as important contributors to (and evidence of) economic prosperity: "La culture et les communications contribuent grandement au développement économique du Québec" (p.10). With this in mind, SODEC (2014a) has taken up the challenge of addressing both artistic and business creation (création artistique et d’affaires) by using entrepreneurial language in its cultural development
and by emphasising culture as a sector for economic development (par.3). According to SODEC, it is only in developing a strong knowledge and understanding of the cultural industries that SODEC can better understand the industries’ situation(s) and adjust its approaches to supporting them accordingly (par.5). And, to a large degree, SODEC has proven successful in its mandate as it relates to economic development: within the first few years of its introduction, SODEC had a profound impact in reinvigorating Québec’s cinema and television industries into prominent contributors to Québec’s economy and cultural productions (Perreault, 2006, p.8). More recently, SODEC has even made waves with respects to the tax incentives it has provided to the cultural industries – and, in particular, the media sector – as a means of encouraging the production of foreign films in Québec – an industry noted for “creat[ing] or support[ing] approximately 4,500 jobs and in excess of $200 million in economic benefits to the province (Desmeules, 2009, par.4).

Yet, despite having had a measure of economic success domestically, SODEC (2013) notes that Québec’s domestic market is relatively limited and strongly penetrated by foreign products. Significant concern and caution has been raised with respects to the penetration of foreign and non-French cultural content into Québec – noting as an example that, in recent years, Anglophone music concerts in Québec have seen an increase in their frequency and attendance while Francophone concerts saw a decrease (p.10). For this reason, SODEC (2014a) has strived to create a balance or reciprocity between its market and foreign markets as a means of embracing and promoting cultural diversity (par.6-8). For this reason, SODEC has made a consorted effort to increase its support to artists and industries, and expand its reach and services to artists and industries (SODEC, 2013, pp.11-12) – an approach that has proven somewhat successful in not just increasing the exposure of Québécois artists in the province, but internationally as well. In 2007 alone, Québec’s cultural exportation amounted to more than half
a billion dollars in revenue for the province and its industries – an outcome that, while SODEC certainly contributed to, it concedes was facilitated, in no small part, by globalization (p.10).

Part of this success has also been attributed to Québec’s unique cultural and linguistic status in the North American market, with the sheer strength of its culture being credited for the preservation of “le visage français” of Québec society (SODEC, 2013, p.10). In this light, SODEC arguably functions as a device that supports the province’s state of worth: it serves to address (or correct) the challenges to Québec’s culture and identity that invariably emerge through the market – in large part through the approbation of (or opposition to) certain cultural industries and ventures within Québec. Through SODEC, the province of Québec is able to direct – even if only in moderation – the ebbs and flows of its cultural industries and its citizens’ cultural consumption and, by extension, their cultural identities.

It is arguably with “le visage français” in mind that SODEC’s (2014a) mandate identifies a link between Québec’s identity and the success of its artists both domestically and internationally (par.6) – a link that recognizes artists as harmonious figures and, if nothing else, implies a relationship between culture and the economy through its emphasis on artistic success.

While SODEC is quick to acknowledge that it serves as a partner organization to la Politique Culturelle insofar as it contributes to the economic growth of the cultural industries, it does so with an eye towards favouring the creative expression of Québec society and affirming its cultural identity (SODEC, 2013, p.5). To SODEC, culture is an integral part of Québec’s national identity; but culture is something that needs to be more frequently consumed and appreciated by the Québécois for its worth to be actualized. By improving the visibility and accessibility of Québec’s culture, SODEC believes it can help bolster the economy and the financial standing of its artists and cultural industries, while raising the status of the province’s culture both nationally
and internationally – a prospect that arguably establishes artists and creators as harmonious figures in the context of Québec’s cultural policy world:

La culture, partie intégrante de notre identité nationale, enrichit au quotidien la vie des Québécois, et elle doit être davantage fréquentée par les citoyens de toutes les régions. Améliorer la visibilité et l’accessibilité à la culture d’ici participe à la survie économique des créateurs et de toute une industrie. La renommée de nos artistes hors de nos frontières et notre dynamisme culturel profitent à toute la société et cela participe activement à la reconnaissance du savoir-faire québécois sur l’échiquier mondial (SODEC, 2013, p.19).

In a similar vein, SODEC’s former CEO and President, François Marcerola has even gone so far as to suggest that Québec is “a prime example of the fact that a strong cultural identity creates a favourable, even necessary environment for the development of cultural industries” – to the point where culture is viewed as an “economic lever” that has flourished, in large part, thanks to cultural policies that have supported a “balance between economic and cultural objectives (as ctd. by Santoro et al., 2013, p.170). In other words, even when the questions of identity and community come into play in SODEC’s mandate, these considerations are often framed in the context of their economic merit in (and to) Québec society.

In this respect, it can be argued that SODEC is thoroughly entrenched in the market world of the economies of worth framework. SODEC’s predominant focus – of furthering Québec’s place in the cultural market through the support and proliferation of the province’s cultural industries – speaks to the market world’s competitive streak and of its desire to establish the commodities (of Québec culture) in a more desirable light vis-à-vis its rival markets (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, pp.244-245). However, the fact that SODEC, by nature, is a cultural institution with broad purviews over the production and dissemination of Québec culture – not to mention a range of influence over its cultural identity – also suggests that, far from simply belonging to the market world, SODEC also serves the purposes of a superior common principle that values the distinct cultural identity of the Québécois. For instance, on top of its support of the cultural
industries, SODEC has also been charged with protecting and conserving (and renovating) heritage and patrimonial sites and real estate (SODEC, 2013, p.8). Among its early initiatives, SODEC (2014b) introduced the Place-Royale Commission in 1996 as a means of encouraging citizen participation in the conservation of and valorization of patrimonial sites in the Place-Royale quarter of Québec City – the location of 26 of the 31 SODEC-owned real estates (par.3). Place-Royale is significant for being the “cradle” (berceau) of French civilization in North America and, consequently, holds a significant importance to both the Québécois and the broader French Canadian community (SODEC, 2013, p.8).

Thus, SODEC’s role in preserving historic and culturally-significant real estate, such as the Place-Royale, speaks to a recognition and embrace of the human dignity and state of worth that accompany heritage and tradition – though, as the City of Québec’s (2015; 2016) tourism department’s recent campaigns would imply (not to mention SODEC’s own affirmations of the need to enhance and ensure the commercialization of Place-Royale (SODEC, 2013, p.18)), this preservation has invariably served an economic purpose. SODEC’s ambitions for Place-Royale would effectively see it become a cultural and commercial hub that people would actively want to visit and be a part of (p.19). In this respect, SODEC serves both a literal and figurative transformative purpose in its revitalization of some of Québec’s heritage sites – a transformation that seeks to court and domesticate a global marketplace, in this case the tourism industry. By preserving heritage places – and by allowing those places to take on an economic dimension through tourism – SODEC is effectively addressing a lacuna in the cultural industries by revitalizing and remarketing historical attractions as new and exotic, and doing it in a way that accentuates the province’s unique history and cultural identity. In effect, SODEC is creating (re: preserving) a marketplace that might not otherwise exist without its interventions. In this respect, SODEC’s approach to Place-Royale serves as a test model for internationalization: to what
degree it draws in foreign markets will be a measure of the Place-Royale initiative’s overall success.

In creating a test model of Place-Royale, however, SODEC arguably inverses an element of the domestic/market world compromise. Typically, these compromises seek to make personable a global market to the domestic world (e.g. making a client feel welcome in an office or business environment) (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.380); however, the argument can be made that SODEC is seeking to make the domestic world personable to the global market (i.e. promoting the culture and heritage of Québec, through its cultural/historic sites, as a means of attracting outside markets). The end result is something akin to Florida’s (2012) creative cities theory, where SODEC is trying to revitalize the past in order to usher in the future. In other words, SODEC’s approach is one that approaches all forms of culture as a commodity ripe for consumption.

5.3.2: From SODEC to Social Inclusion & Accessibility: Remettre l’art au monde

With the framework and priorities outlined in la Politique culturelle firmly entrenched in Québec’s approach to culture, and with SODEC serving as the proverbial muscle of Québec’s cultural policy as it relates to the cultural industries, what followed were a series of policies arguably aimed at consolidating the government’s place in the various cultural sectors. Among the most notable of these policies include a museum policy in mid-1994 – Réseau muséal Québécois: énoncés d'orientations – followed by a music policy in the summer of 1994, and the creation of a group-council to redefine the role and mission of Radio-Québec in 1995 (Harvey, 2011, pp.82-85). Le Réseau muséal Québécois, in particular, is notable for outlining the provincial government’s role in helping to conserve cultural heritage and make it more accessible to the population of Québec (MCC, 1994, p.3). The justification for government intervention in
museology was fourfold: museums, along with libraries and archives, are the primary places for the conservation and dissemination of a society’s collective memory, which makes them ideal locales to provide better access to national, regional, and local heritage; museums serve an essential pedagogical purpose in cultural development; museums contribute to the affirmation of cultural identity; and museums offer a globalized window into artistic and cultural realities that helps create a link between culture, education, and recreation (p.2).

Following the theme of accessibility introduced in le Réseau muséal Québécois policy, Remettre l’art au monde was introduced in late 1996 as Québec’s first ever cultural policy related to the diffusion of stage-related art (p.92). Where SODEC’s focus is largely on the promotion and enhancement of the cultural industries, Remettre l’art au monde is a policy that arguably seeks to engage citizens in less obvious or immediate cultural practices than those driven by the media. Remettre l’art au monde was introduced, first and foremost, to promote the dissemination of culture by reinforcing the relationship citizens have to theatre and stage art (MCC, 1996, p.1). In this capacity, Remettre l’art au monde is a policy that seeks to sensitize and develop publics for – as well as increase public access to – a broader and more diverse range of cultural events and spectacles (Daigle, Gauthier, & Petitpas, 2008, p.6).

The rationale for the Remettre l’art au monde policy was largely social and cultural in nature: it was believed that favouring the dissemination of arts in their most favourable conditions possible – particularly where stage art is concerned – was vital for creating exchanges and relationships between citizens and artists – between the public and the oeuvre (MCC, 1996, p.1). Concerns were also expressed that Québec citizens were progressively consuming more English-language and foreign stage art (i.e. music) than they were French – particularly in metropolitan areas of the province (pp.35-36). In other words, the MCC hoped, through Remettre l’art au monde, to provide greater access to French-language stage art and foster a taste for it
among the public, as it was thought that only by inscribing art into the memory and practices of a society that culture comes alive ("parce qu'une culture est vivante lorsque les œuvres s'inscrivent dans la mémoire et les pratiques d'une société") (p.1). In this respect, the policy is driven, in large part, towards not just sensitizing audiences, but actually creating them – a fact made salient in the policy’s priorities (p.26). The policy’s primary target, in its attempts to create and sensitize audiences, were schools and the education system, as schools often serve as the entry point for young peoples’ access to culture (p.28) – a “gateway drug” to culture, if you will. With this in mind, Remettre l’art au monde outlines three broad principles around which the policy is built: mobilizing various interests around projects that will allow them the opportunity to work in partnership; providing sufficiently broad and flexible action to account for the different needs and challenges of Québec’s various regions, as well as those of the province’s different artistic disciplines; and the ongoing/continuation of its actions over the medium- and long-term as a means of ensuring their outcomes are evident (p.19). In this respect, Remettre l’art au monde largely falls under the pretext of the third axis of la Politique culturelle insofar as it seeks to increase access to culture – though, as with SODEC, there is an inherent emphasis towards the economic side of culture, particularly as this policy seeks to encourage citizens to consume. The policy even acknowledges the economic benefits of citizens consuming stage-related art, noting that the revenues generated from such consumption increased from $58.7 million in 1989 to $82 million in 1994 (p.5).

In many respect, Remettre l’art au monde endeavours towards similar ends as SODEC, albeit through different means: SODEC supports the cultural industries primarily through its funding and support services, while Remettre l’art au monde supports them through the creation and sensitization of audiences towards the industries’ craft(s) – in no small part through the assurance that there is a broader offering from which audiences can choose. The ambition of
Remettre l’art au monde, thus, is as a policy that seeks to create both a supply and demand – to establish natural relations – for stage art that might not otherwise exist. In doing so, however, Remettre l’art au monde also lends itself to the notion of governmentality insofar as the policy strives to create an audience and establish a state of worth for stage art – and to, in some respects, socialize citizens into appreciating certain forms of culture that were seen as undervalued or underappreciated by Québec society and, perhaps, even Canadian society as a whole. In fact, the Massey Commission (1951) expressed similar concerns in its report 45 years prior: it was feared that Canadians were insufficiently informed and/or aware of the music offerings of Canadian composers, that access to such offerings was limited, that spaces/outlets for presenting music were limited and not far reaching, and that US culture was affecting the production of Canadian culture because it was more easily accessible (pp.185-187); similar fears were expressed with respects to theatre and drama (pp.193-200), as well as ballet (pp.201-203) – all of which are concerns that have remained prevalent in Canadian cultural discourse up to the present (for example, re: Collins, 1990; Saint-Pierre, 2008; 2011). The fact that, Remettre l’art au monde touches on similar issues that, more broadly, affect the whole of Canada speaks to the inherent realities of a national minority – particularly one that is distinguished culturally and linguistically from its country’s dominant culture: not only does the minority often contend with the same pressures as the cultural majority, it also contends with pressures from the cultural majority, itself.

It is with this in mind, that an interesting – albeit implicit – distinction is made in Remettre l’art au monde, between Canadian and Québec content and stage art: Canadian dance companies are presented in the same context as foreign companies:

D’une part, au théâtre, moins de 1 % des spectacles sont des productions étrangères en saison régulière; de même, en danse, l'accueil de compagnies
canadiennes et étrangères occupe une place plutôt modeste et dans des créneaux très précis (MCC, 1996, p36).

While the implication is modest, it nevertheless suggests that Canadian acts are seen by the MCC as foreign to Québec – as originating from outside Québec, or, more, aptly, that Québec is foreign to Canada. It is a subtle – and arguably innocuous – distinction, but it is one that is not even made in la Politique culturelle, where other provinces in Canada are acknowledged as such: “les autres provinces canadiennes” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.6, p.30) or le “reste du Canada” (p.113). This distinction, perhaps, speaks to the policies of two different parties: la Politique culturelle was introduced by a federalist party, le Parti libéral, while Remettre l’art au monde was introduced by a sovereigntist party, le Parti Québécois. It does certainly speak to the underlying difference observed by many scholars with respects to Québec cultural (industries) policy vis-à-vis the rest of Canada: “what goes on with the Québec equivalents still remains cloaked in its differences” (Dorland, 2012, p.7, emphasis is the author’s).

5.4: Social Cohesion in an Evolving World: Cultural Diversity & Economic Development in Québec

In recent years, Québec’s cultural policies have tended to veer towards acknowledging and, at times, embracing the province’s cultural diversity – while also supporting and preserving Québec’s cultural identity and language through various economic development strategies. This engagement, in no small part, was fuelled by the efforts of some of the province’s “leading professional associations of the cultural milieu” in response to concerns that the proposed OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment – a draft agreement that sought to establish rules of engagement for international investment between OECD countries (OECD, 1998, p.7) – would compromise the province’s ability to properly and freely develop cultural policy and govern its cultural sectors (MCC, 2016b, par.1; Coalition pour la diversité culturelle, 2016, par.1).
Consequently, in the late 1990s, a series of non-governmental groups and coalitions were formed – most notably the *Coalition pour la diversité culturelle* and the *Groupe franco-québécois sur la diversité culturelle*, both of which formed in 1998 – geared towards supporting, among other things, Québec’s cultural diversity provincially and abroad. While the Government of Québec supported these organizations in their endeavours, it officially introduced the *Secrétariat à la diversité culturelle* in 2000, as a sub-section of the MCC, to serve as a vehicle for a more proactive governmental approach to diversity (MCC, 2016b, par.4). In particular, the *Secrétariat* serves as a monitoring agency, keeping abreast of international culture, the links “between commerce and culture,” and research in the field of culture and cultural diversity (MCC, 2016a, par.1). Additionally, the *Secrétariat* takes part in consultations with other Québec departments and similarly advises ministers and government authorities on issues related to cultural diversity (par.1).

Beyond its role in monitoring cultural diversity and consulting/advising other provincial government agencies, the *Secrétariat à la diversité culturelle* also serves to emblemize the Government of Québec’s response and commitment to UNESCO’s 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions – a convention for which Québec is recognized as being the first government in the world to approve (MCC, 2016c, par.1-6). Underlying Québec’s support of the convention was a distinctly economic consideration: defending the “special nature of culture in international trade negotiations” (Québec Premier Jean Charest, 2005, as ctd. by the MCC, 2016c, par.6). The Convention, for its part, advocates that governments integrate culture into their development policies “as a means of establishing conditions conducive to sustainable [economic] development” (MCC, 2012, pp.8-9). Taking this notion to heart – and in compliance with the province’s Sustainable Development Act – the MCC (2012) developed an action plan devised to help ensure culture becomes an economic driver for
the province. A “key component” to this action plan was the MCC’s (2012) 21-objective charter, *Québec’s Agenda 21 for Culture*, which seeks to ensure cohesion between sustainable development and culture. The charter identifies culture as being closely linked to economic development “because of its ability to shape knowledge-based societies and its contribution to employment and tourism industry growth and urban and regional revitalization” (MCC, 2012, p.10). Drawing on the vernacular of Richard Florida’s creative cities approach, the charter expands on this point to suggest that culture, as a “powerful catalyst for creativity,” is “strategically significant in today’s economy” in its capacity to foster innovation (p.10). As such, providing support to preserve Québec’s cultural diversity is seen as “crucial to assuring the viability of [the] society’s growth” (p.13).

With supporting culture in mind, *Québec’s Agenda 21 for Culture* outlines 21 objectives, devised by the MCC through consultations with the public that were mediated by leaders from various social sectors, as they relate to economic development. These objectives primarily deal with recognizing and respecting Québec’s diverse culture while also recognizing and utilizing its potential for creativity and, by extension, economic growth (MCC, 2012, pp.15-18). Of particular note, the charter encourages the recognition and promotion of Québec’s cultural identity “by protecting its tangible and intangible heritage in all its forms and throughout the territory” and the assurance that the French language remains the “common language of public life” – provided it is done so in a way that is respectful to the English, First Nations, and Inuit cultural communities residing in the province (p.15). Economically, the charter encourages the recognition of culture as a “driver of sustainable economic development at the local, regional, and national levels” by encouraging “cultural entrepreneurship” and supporting its place in economic planning that extends into international contexts and settings (p.17). To this end, the charter endeavours to develop new models of economic support for culture and promotion of patronage (pp.17-18).
Curiously, the charter also encourages the provincial government to support the adaptation of the cultural industries to the “internet and digital age” (p.18) – implying the cultural industries have been, themselves, ill-equipped at transitioning to the digital age. Overall and nevertheless, the Government of Québec agreed with the objectives outlined in *Agenda 21* and officially adopted them in 2011, with all 122 of Québec’s government ministries and organizations consequently being required to put in place actions to contribute to the charter’s objectives before March of 2015 (MCC, 2013b, p.4).

To this end, the MCC (2013b) introduced a new action plan, *Notre Culture, au cœur du développement durable: Plan d’action 2013-2015*, as a means of both updating its approach to sustainable development and addressing many (though certainly not all) of the objectives established in *Agenda 21* (p.5). Specifically, the new action plan, in complying with *Agenda 21*, seeks to ensure that Québec’s cultural life, economic development, and social community all flourish through actions that seek to: preserve and valorize Québec heritage and patrimony; improve the living environment of citizens; and maintain and develop the infrastructures that facilitate access to cultural and community goods, services, and activities (MCC, 2013b, p.8). The action plan also seeks to develop and maintain partnerships with other levels of government and with cultural organizations or enterprises in efforts to further develop the province’s culture (pp.10-11). Similar efforts have also been made towards encouraging cultural philanthropy (p.14). Moreover, the action plan outlines the MCC’s intentions to collaborate with the education sector to provide artists with opportunities to either hone their craft or teach it (p.15). In a similar vein, the action plan indicates the MCC’s intent to introduce measures to improve the overall socioeconomic conditions of Québécois artists and producers in an effort to help make their creative work more economically sustainable (pp.15-16).
With this overall approach to sustainable economic development, the MCC (2012) arguably recognizes the economic benefits of and encourages investment in culture – both governmentally and through the fostering of business support and partnerships (p.18). The implicit message of this approach is that supporting culture results in net gains for Québec – both socially and economically (MCC, 2013b, p.2). It is an approach that acknowledges the worth of culture and establishes natural relations to ensure its state of worth is attained. The fact that much of this investment comes in the form of support for artists and cultural industries serves both to recognize them as harmonious figures in the context of culture and cultural policy, but implies that, in some ways, there has been a market failure – at least in terms of providing said artists with a sufficient audience to help them live comfortably on their own means. Moreover, the fact that the MCC (2012; 2013) stresses the importance of promoting Québec culture and heritage internationally suggests a test model exists in this case. As with SODEC’s mandate vis-à-vis Place-Royale, the MCC’s emphasis on promoting Québec culture and heritage both domestically and abroad suggests a bridging of local and global markets – a sort of socialization and acquiescence to diversity or difference.

Given the influence the UNESCO Convention has had on the MCC’s economic development policies – not to mention the implications of the UNESCO Convention in terms of both an international cultural law that guides the development of cultural policy and the exchange of culture between nations (UNESCO, 2005; Bernier & Ruiz Fabri, 2006) – it is fair to say that many of the MCC’s objectives serve the dual role of expanding and solidifying the province’s cultural offerings while also ensuring that policy mechanisms are in place to allow for an influx of culture into the province without compromising Québec’s cultural identity. In this respect, *Agenda 21* and the *Notre culture* action plan serve as reassurances – of trust-creation (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.379) – to the domestic world both with respects to promoting and
supporting cultural diversity from within and without the province, and with respects to protecting and preserving Québec’s culture and identity. In other words, while the government has been willing to accept and embrace cultural diversity – particularly if it opens and enables economic exchanges that could benefit the province and its people – its acceptance of diversity has been contingent on it not compromising Québec’s cultural identity. In effect, these policies and objectives have served as a subtle form of socialization – of not just citizens but of the public sector, itself (MCC, 2013b, pp.6-7) – in anticipation of the opportunities and challenges that inherently come from promoting cultural diversity while also advocating for the protection and preservation of a distinct cultural identity.

5.5: Québec Culture & Cultural Industries Moving Forward

Since the introduction of la Politique culturelle de Québec 1992, Québec’s approaches to culture and cultural policy have predominantly followed its three axes: affirming Québec’s cultural identity; supporting local talents and industries; and supporting citizens’ access to and participation in cultural life (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992). The fact that these three axes invariably address questions of identity through access to and consumption of culture (and cultural commodities) brings to salience the implicit importance of the cultural industries – as creators and disseminators of culture – to the process of identity formation. This is perhaps more so the case for a national minority, such as Québec, whose geo-political environment is dominated by cultures whose primary language is English, than it is for a country such as Canada – which, while noted for dealing with its own degree of cultural imperialism at the hands of the United States (and its cultural offerings), predominantly operates from a position of greater power than does Québec (which, for its part, must contend with the isomorphic influences of not just its country, but its continent as a whole). In such a context, the cultural industries arguably
take on a new significance for a national minority by providing them with the tools to communicate and (re)produce their cultural identity. It is an importance that was highlighted in Canada as far back as the 1950s with the Massey Commission’s Report, and it is an importance that was, arguably, brought to the fore in Québec by the gradual shift in the province’s cultural policy throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, towards a market world orientation.

The emphasis placed on organizations such as SODEC and CALQ, through Québec’s cultural policies, denotes the importance of cultivating a repertoire of cultural devices and productions – primarily through the cultural industries – that highlight and make appealing the distinct nature of a culture or nation. And yet, the province’s focus on more market-oriented cultural policies (and policy approaches) also highlights the competitive nature of not just the cultural industries – which, by virtue of their nature, cannot help but be competitive in terms of developing and maintaining their “market share” vis-à-vis other industries or sectors within their industry – but of cultures, themselves. The rationale seems to be that the only way to preserve and protect a culture is by making it economically appealing and viable – of creating an arbitrary or artificial value for a culture that will ensure both its survival and growth. It is only, arguably, in situations of market failure – where the value of culture is insufficiently recognized or simply seen as insufficient in its ability to stop cultural erosion – that the GoQ’s policies have swayed from their market orientations (i.e. the Québec Charter of Values). On the one hand, infusing culture with value seems like a noble endeavour; by adding value to culture, governments are arguably establishing a tangible – albeit implicit and approximate – measure to something that is, more often than not, intangible in nature.

Value, in this context, is akin to appreciation: the Québec government’s intent, to a large degree, is evidently to encourage appreciation of the province’s culture and identity by weighting it with value (or a value system) that its people will more readably understand. On the other hand,
it raises the question of how one can add value to what should, idealistically, be priceless. This question has been at the heart of cultural industries discourse for many years now, with no clear answer – and this thesis certainly has little grounds to offer a definitive one of its own. However, the question of culture’s value is important given the implications it has for identity. The notion that a price can be placed on a cultural identity and that that identity can be bought or sold is significant for national minorities: it is this sort of valuation that makes the cultural industries an appealing vehicle for identity discourse.

Québec’s case provides an example of how a solid cultural infrastructure – backed by government support via cultural policy – can lead to a greater valuation of one’s national culture. While the (cultural) policies that emerged in the Quiet Revolution and post-Quiet Revolution eras (1960s-1990) were, for a number of years, marked by the question of modernization, the Politique Culturelle era (1992-onward) has seen a greater push towards cultural expansion and growth. As Lapalme (1988) alluded to – decades after his seminal Pour une politique – Québec’s culture and language are not nearly in as dire straits as some political leaders or parties would have society think. The infrastructure is seemingly in place to ensure Québec’s culture not just survives, but thrives; as such, Québec can no longer be said to be an entirely “un-modern” province without the necessary means for ensuring its cultural and economic survival; Québec is now a province that, from a purely cultural perspective, is innovative and at the cutting edge of cultural production in certain cultural industries (Martin et al., 2012, pp.1-2). The fact that Québec has made strides, through its cultural policies and programs, to expand the scope of its culture and cultural industries beyond the province – beyond even the country, to encompass all of la francophonie (that is to say the world’s French-speaking communities) (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.29) – suggests an ambition to grow Québec’s culture and identity – and, in doing so, grow the province’s economy via is cultural industries.
It is an ambition, however, that seems somewhat half-hearted in nature. While certainly Québec is open to growing and exporting its culture, there remains a certain degree of apprehension or hesitancy towards the importing of foreign culture(s) – particularly when such culture might challenge or compromise Québec’s existing culture and identity. This hesitancy underscores one of the fundamental challenges national minorities face, not just within the context of their host-countries, but in the context of globalization: the challenge of being cosmopolitan while also preserving their cultural identity in a way that allows them to remain distinct vis-à-vis other cultures and nations. Québec’s cultural policies and broader approaches to culture evidence an effort to find a balance between cultural acceptance and cultural protection; the province’s signing of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions speaks to that effect. Yet it is a balancing act that most countries and states struggle with, in large part because of the often transient nature of culture. Thus, cultural preservation often gives way to cultural production and dissemination; the cultural industries, consequently, take on a more significant role precisely because they facilitate both of these ends.

In the case of Québec, the role of the cultural industries has arguably become as much about growing the province’s culture as it has been about branding the province. SODEC’s role in supporting and growing the reach of Québec’s artists and industries internationally suggests as much: that establishing a distinctly “Québécois” image or notion of culture on a global scale will help grow and make recognizable Québec’s cultural identity. In an ever-globalizing world, where questions of sovereignty have taken a backseat to diplomacy and where culture is increasingly and more easily accessible via its commodification, the value of a cultural identity extends only as far as it is sellable. The fact that Québec has made a concerted effort to engage its cultural industries as a means of selling its culture on side the province indicates a willingness to take a
proactive approach to dealing with the sometimes homogenizing pressures of both its domestic (re: country) and international environments. However, in doing so, Québec has woven the cultural industries into the tapestry of its culture; much of Québec’s cultural policy, in its current iteration, is predicated on the cultural industries and their ability to facilitate the application of la Politique culturelle’s three axes. In this respect, Québec’s culture (and cultural policy) is, at least in part, contingent on the cultural industries’ willingness to play ball, so to speak. The mandates of SODEC and, to a lesser extent, CALQ would suggest that the Québec government is both cognisant and willing to provide incentives to the cultural industries to ensure their cooperation in producing and promoting Québec culture.

The question, then, is, to what extent do the cultural industries hold court over Québec’s culture and cultural policies? Recently, the MCC (2016d) announced plans to update la Politique culturelle as a means of accounting for new social and global realities that have taken root since the policy was first introduced almost a quarter century ago. As of the writing of this thesis, the MCC is in the midst of consultations with the public and representatives of the cultural community and industries. While it is too soon to speculate what this new policy will hold, it seems obvious that identity and language will form a significant part of it – and one can bet their lucky dollar that the cultural industries will undoubtedly figure prominently in both its formulation and eventual application. For good or bad, the cultural industries exert a significant amount of influence over Québec’s culture and cultural policy, and so long as the cultural industries bring socio-economic and cultural benefits to the province, they will continue to play a prominent role in the province’s identity.
5.5.1: A Type Analysis of Québec's Cultural Policy – From la Politique Culturelle to Present

When considering Québec’s cultural policies, it is interesting to chart their evolution prior to and following the introduction of la Politique culturelle. While most of the province’s policies post-Politique culturelle have remained relatively consistent with those of the pre-Politique culturelle era – at least in terms of their categorical makeup and relative compliance with the common world typology – there is a pronounced shift in tone and approach. The post-Politique culturelle era’s policies are arguably more nuanced and more receptive to cultural diversity. The superior common principle no longer stresses survival, but is now focused on further valorizing Québec’s culture and cultural industries – an approach that still serves the same underlying principle of ensuring the continuance and growth of Québec’s culture (with a continued emphasis on the French language), albeit in a vernacular that is somewhat less urgent, though certainly not less poignant in its intent. Where the question of cultural survival takes on greater significance, arguably, is in the province’s rapport of grandeur and natural state between beings – both of which establish boundaries around Québec’s culture vis-à-vis the dominant Anglo-Canadian culture and the cultural minority communities of the country and province. In other words, while the notion of cultural decline or unworthiness is less prominent in Québec’s cultural policies, it remains a consideration – one which, as the Bouchard-Taylor (2008) commission implies, is a constant element of the French Québécois’ dual identity of being a minority in the country and a majority in their province (p.187).

In many respects, the shift in Québec’s cultural policy discourse in recent decades suggests a maturation in the ways the province understands and approaches culture and cultural policy. This is not to say that the underlying elements of the common world has radically changed – in fact, there arguably remains significant overlap in terms of how the province
understands and defines its state of worth and its rapports of grandeur – but that the province has refined its approach to an art. For instance, similar to the policies of the previous chapter, with *la Politique culturelle* and the policies that have followed, worth has largely been measured through the achievement of artistic and cultural progress that benefits all of Québec society. The more remarkable the cultural achievement, the more worthy is the individual who achieved it. Human dignity has, again, primarily been expressed in terms of culture being an essential part of social life – to the point where it is implied that cultural participation is a necessary and important element of society and the economy. As with the previous era of Québec’s cultural policy, the repertoires of subjects and objects remain relatively static, with only minor variations to account for the emergence of new technologies and social realities. Ultimately, much of Québec’s cultural policy since the early 1990s has been built towards providing greater access to culture as a means of ensuring human dignity and increasing the worth of its citizens.

With that said, where Québec’s more recent cultural policies have deviated most vis-à-vis those covered in the previous chapter is with respect to its onus on the cultural industries and its recognition of the economic value of cultural production. The investment formula of Québec’s recent cultural policies reflects this change most saliently – particularly with its emphasis on supporting the cultural industries and encouraging cultural development and the commercialization of art as a means of bettering Québec society. This development suggests that the market – and the cultural industries, in particular – have had a significant influence on the way Québec’s cultural policies have been approached and influenced over the last two and a half decades. While many of the definitive elements of Québec’s cultural policy have remained consistent and have carried over from the pre- to post-*Politique culturelle* eras, there is a clear industrial inflection in the way the province defines its cultural policies in the more recent era. Arguably, this industrial inflection indicates an evolution in the province’s approach to cultural
policy – representative of a growth and maturation in its appraisal (and use) of cultural policy as a vehicle for cultural preservation and growth in the context of globalization. In a world that is progressively defined in terms of internationalization and globalization, remodelling one’s cultural policies as a way of both keeping abreast of global and cultural changes demonstrates an innovative and forward-thinking approach to culture and identity. A more pronounced emphasis on expanding the province’s cultural reach to an international level – and recognizing and revering international artistic and cultural success – underscores much of Québec’s more recent policy – a fact that can be reflected typologically.

Nevertheless, despite variances between the policy approaches of the two periods of Québec’s cultural policy (as delineated by this thesis), the common world typology allows for a consistent comparison of their respective policies. Each policy (or document) covered, thus far, when deconstructed, has displayed elements that correspond to most or all of the analytical categories. When taken as a whole, however, Québec’s cultural policies, from la Politique culturelle-onward, demonstrate characteristics of a common world (Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical Categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Case Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superior common principle</td>
<td>The superior common principle underlying the cultural policy of national minorities is the valuation and promotion of a distinct, unifying (national minority) culture or identity.</td>
<td>Valorization of the French language, supporting local talent and industries; and providing citizens with access and participation in cultural life (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992).</td>
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<tr>
<td>State of worth</td>
<td>The state of worth is measured in terms of cultural cohesion, integration, convergence, assimilation, and propagation: an individual who can identify as a cultural citizen – one who is active and integrated into the national culture – is worthy. Often individuals or industries that produce (national) culture are singled out or conferred a privileged status in the cultural policy.</td>
<td>&quot;Si la progression artistique et culturelle de la société québécoise atteint des niveaux remarquables, on le doit principalement aux efforts et à la passion qui animent nos créateurs et nos artistes&quot; (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.vii).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human dignity</td>
<td>Human dignity is recognized and/or established through:</td>
<td>&quot;[L]a culture est un bien essentiel et la dimension culturelle est nécessaire à la vie en société, au</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repertoires of subjects</td>
<td>1) The cultivation/development of aptitudes in creativity; 2) Cultural participation and action; and 3) The recognition and preservation of heritage and tradition.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>même titre que les dimensions Sociale et économique” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.15).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repertoires of objects and devices</td>
<td>A repertoire of subjects in cultural policy principally consists of artists and amateurs, citizens, (cultural) industries and institutions, creators/producers, and, in certain contexts diaspora and international markets.</td>
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<td>&quot;En adoptant sa politique culturelle, le gouvernement témoigne de son désir profond de doter les Québécois et les Québécoises d'un cadre de développement culturel qui leur permette de s'épanouir, peu importe le sens futur de l'histoire&quot; (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.viii).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment formula</td>
<td>The investment formula of a cultural policy operates on at least one of three fronts, and tends to function in relation to the establishment of cultural priorities — often understood in the form of a trade-off or sacrifice: 1) The trade-off between cultural pluralism and homogeneity; 2) The trade-off between the democratization of culture and cultural democracy; and/or 3) The trade-off between cohesion/harmony with the national majority and expressions of cultural/national identity and independence.</td>
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<td>&quot;L'envergure des interventions du ministère des Affaires culturelles s'accroît et déborde vite des tâches inscrites dans son mandat original. La commercialisation des arts, le développement des industries culturelles, l'urbanisme et l'aménagement du territoire, ou encore l'adaptation aux nouvelles technologies de reproduction des œuvres sont autant de nouvelles activités qui sollicitent son appui. Elles exigent des formes inédites d'intervention et de nouvelles compétences en matière de gestion culturelle” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.5).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapport of grandeur/Worth</td>
<td>The rapport of grandeur or worth of a cultural policy operationalizes the relationship between different cultural groups, nationally-recognized cultures (i.e. national minorities, national majorities, cultural minorities), and/or institutions/organizations (i.e. government and cultural industries). These rapport tend to manifest hierarchically, wherein one culture (or institution) is given preferential or preeminent treatment relative to other cultures.</td>
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<td>“The primacy of the French language is a core principal within Québec society. French is the official language of Québec and is vital to its culture and social fabric. All sectors of society share the responsibility of making French the normal common language of public life. This goal is pursued in a spirit of openness and respect for the linguistic and cultural diversity that exists in Québec’s English and cultural communities as well as the First Nations and Inuit, all of whom are full-fledged members of our society” (MCC, 2012, p.9).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural relations between beings</td>
<td>The natural relations between beings are presented in cultural policy as the power dynamics that exist between levels of government and levels/status of cultures (i.e. majority and minority culture; national and regional culture). Often, natural relations will be presented as cultural guidelines or rules of engagement between national majorities and minorities (e.g. the division of policy responsibilities between the federal and regional/territorial governments).</td>
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<td>“[I]t must be understood that for French-Canadian Quebecers, the combination of their majority status in Québec and their minority status in Canada and North America is not easy. It is a difficult apprenticeship that began in the 1960s and, which, obviously, is ongoing. However, this duality is another invariant with which Québec society will always have to contend” (Bouchard &amp; Taylor, 2008, p.187).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harmonious figures of the</td>
<td>The harmonious figure of the natural order of cultural policy is often presented as culturally-</td>
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</table>
|                        | "La renommée de nos artistes hors de nos frontières et notre dynamisme culturel profitent à
| natural order | active citizens or artists/producers. Cultural producers, in particular – such as artists and industries – are revered for their ability to evoke, through their productions (and the dissemination thereof), the realities of the superior common principle – as do, in certain contexts, cultural and symbolic figures. | toute la société et cela participe activement à la reconnaissance du savoir-faire québécois sur l’échiquier mondial” (SODEC, 2013, p.19). |
| Test model | Public opinion/reception, internationalisation, cultural visibility, and global recognition are used as test model(s) in cultural policy. In certain cases, public action, elections, and, referendums can also be seen as test models. | “Le ministère de la Culture aura un mandat axé sur les orientations, le suivi et l'évaluation périodique de l'application de la politique culturelle, en concertation avec les autres ministères et organismes d'État intéressés. Des mécanismes de liaison assureront ces échanges interministériels. À cette fin, des répondants seront désignés dans chacun des ministères et organismes d'État concernés par la politique culturelle.” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.124). |
| Mode of expressing judgement | Judgement is based on the perceived social and economic benefits derived from any particular cultural policy objective or priority. In other words judgement is expressed in terms of what it brings to the national minority’s culture. | “La culture et les communications contribuent grandement au développement économique du Québec” (SODEC, 2013, p.10). |
| Form of evidence | In the context of cultural policy, evidence of the modality of the world’s knowledge is often presented in the forms of economic and social value and through the growth of culture – often tangibly measured through cultural integration, production, consumption, and exportation. | “Toutefois, les Québécois doivent demeurer vigilants devant l’omniprésence et l’attrait qu’exercent sur eux les produits anglophones de masse” (SODEC, 2013, p.10). |
| State of unworthiness and decline | A state of unworthiness is manifested as a decline in cultural participation, integration, and expression. This decline is often presented as erosion of the national culture and language and/or through assimilation into the national majority’s culture. |
“I believe we can now make the development of our creative drive, our imagination, the next major enterprise for our society.... I believe this has the potential to be a new civic exercise on a par with health, housing and education.” – Jack McConnell, First Minister of Scotland, 2003

Chapter 6 – Culture, Politics, & Identity in Scotland

If it can be said that Québec’s cultural identity has a strong linguistic component driving its nationalist movements and agendas, the same is less true for the nationalist movements in the United Kingdom (UK) – though language politics and policy have come into play in Wales’ nationalist discourse, albeit perhaps not as pronouncedly as it has in Québec (Thomas, 1997). Rather, the nationalist movements in the UK’s sub-states have been largely fuelled by the prospect of devolution – leading to separation – based on the principle of subsidiarity – that is to say, decision making powers “should be devolved to the most appropriate level of governance” (Raco, 2003, p.75). Drawing on pre-existing nationalist and regionalist identities and histories, the devolution movement in the UK primarily sought “to promote new systems of governance which […] seek to deliver a range of socioeconomic benefits through more responsive and open decision making processes, enhanced policy legitimacy, and more relevant and effective policy measures” (p.75). In other words, devolution was sought by the UK’s sub-states as a means of acquiring greater authority and autonomy over the ways in which their respective sub-states are governed. And, for the most part, devolution has been achieved in the UK: in 1997 and 1998, a series of referenda introduced by the Tony Blair-led British Government granted Scotland a devolved parliament “with primary legislative and tax varying powers”; granted Wales a devolved assembly “with secondary legislative powers”; and granted Northern Ireland “new legislative and executive structures based on a devolved assembly” (Bradbury, 2003, p.545).

The push for devolution by the UK’s sub-states – which largely began in the 1960s and 1970s – represents a stark contrast to the historically centralized structure of the British
Government (Lazer, 1977, pp.49-50). Lord Falconer – former Lord Chancellor and (and sole) Constitutional Affairs Secretary for the British Government during devolution – described the process of devolution as a “fundamental shift” wherein “power has been devolved to new institutions with closer links to the people they serve” (Falconer, 2006, as ctd. by Mitchell, 2006, p.468). Inherently, the goal of devolution was strategically political: “to guarantee the Union of the United Kingdom” (Falconer, 2006, as ctd. by Mitchell, 2006, p.468). If the UK was a union of nations, then the logic followed that devolution would serve as a means of guaranteeing the rights of each nation within the union, while “taking into account and respecting” their distinct natures and interrelationships (Mitchell, 2006, p.468). To address the distinctiveness of each sub-state, the “package of measures contained in each devolution statute” was devised to address “particular problems and aspirations” associated with each sub-state by providing them with “sufficient power to satisfy local political conditions while also addressing the dissatisfaction felt in the most far-flung parts” of the UK (Leyland, 2011, pp.251-252).

While devolution addressed a number of local aspirations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, it also unintentionally “triggered a process of ongoing constitutional change” – largely the function of an asymmetric distribution and exercise of power (Leyland, 2011, p.252). As a result, devolution has taken different turns in each nation. For instance, Scotland has largely seen devolution as a stepping stone towards full independence. This fact was made particularly salient in recent years, first by the election of the Scottish National Party – which has long advocated for independence – to a majority government in 2011 following a minority win in 2007 (Adam, 2014, pp.47-48), and then by the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum – which was narrowly rejected by 55.3% of the Scottish population (BBC, 2014a). In a more nuanced progression, the Welsh Government was granted further devolved powers with the introduction of the Government of Wales Act 2006, which included the “the promise of further powers to
come” (Owen, 2008, p.103). Finally and conversely, however, devolution in Northern Ireland has been somewhat tumultuous. Northern Ireland’s devolved parliament was suspended indefinitely in October, 2002, following a series of shorter suspensions that began in February, 2000 – primarily resulting from an impasse between the sub-state’s unionist and republican parties regarding the decommissioning of parliamentary weapons (Ezzamel et al., 2005, pp.46). During this time, parliamentary power in Northern Ireland was restored to the Westminster parliament (Birrell, 2007, p.298). It would not be until May of 2007 before the devolved government would return to Northern Ireland (Gray & Birrell, 2011, p.15). Suffice it to say, devolution in the UK has followed different paths in the country’s nations, with outcomes that – as much as not – reflect the unique historical trajectories and cultures of each nation. Nevertheless, devolution has offered Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland a measure of autonomy to pursue power in ways that, at times, challenge the sovereignty of the British Government.

This chapter explores the nature of devolution and cultural identity in the UK as it relates to Scotland, in particular. The choice of Scotland over the other devolved countries in the UK is influenced by the fact that the Scottish model has, arguably, pushed the logic of devolution the furthest of the UK nations, possessing now a largely autonomous legislative with only certain powers/responsibilities conferred to the central British government (Cole & Thuriot, 2010, p.323). Similar to previous chapters, the focus of this chapter is on Scotland’s cultural policies through the prism of the economies of worth framework. Emphasis was placed on examining Scotland’s policies in relation to their historical and socio-economic context – with a particular focus on recent developments in Scotland’s cultural policies and creative industries, most notably in the form of the Creative Scotland program. Where it was relevant, policies and documents that were not explicitly culture-related, but that dealt with/addressed Scottish nationalism and national
identity, were consulted to provide additional context and insights into Scotland’s cultural identity.

6.1: Clash of Titans: Early Cultural Identity & Nationalism in Scotland

Of the three UK nations to receive devolved powers from the British Government, it is Scotland that has had the most widely publicised and recognized nationalist movement in recent years – in no small part thanks to its 2014 referendum for independence (which, as mentioned, ended in defeat). If anything, the independence referendum is but the most recent in a long series of clashes – both political and physical – between the Scottish state and the British Empire/Government. Historically, Scotland (and its nationalist movement) has had an uneasy and often precarious appreciation of British rule – and it is undoubtedly for this reason that Scotland has been an “unusual country” insofar as its national identity has existed since as far back as the late 13th century (Williamson, 2009, p.51). Beginning in the late 13th century, Scotland found itself in a situation of survival. The death of Scotland’s King Alexander III in 1286, followed by the untimely death of his heir Margaret in 1290, had left the kingdom with no fewer than 13 claimants vying for the throne (Walton, 2006, p.114). To address the ensuing political uncertainty, Scotland’s Royal Chancellor and Bishop of St. Andrews, William Fraser, enlisted the aid of England’s King Edward I to mediate the situation and help choose a new Scottish ruler (Reid, 1945, pp.284-285). Edward I, however, saw this as an opportunity to expand his rule into Scotland through a surrogate – in this case, by supporting John Balliol, the strongest claimant to the Scottish throne, under the conditions that he acknowledged the “supremacy” of England over Scotland. Under these conditions, Edward I was able to “exploit Scotland, overrule her courts, demand military service from her people, and tax her for the benefit of England” largely unopposed (Walton, 2006, p.114).
However, when Balliol began to refuse England’s overtures, Edward I quickly deposed him – the result of which began what is now referred to as the “War of Independence (1296-1328)” (Ichijo, 2004, p.9). Consequently (and unsurprisingly), throughout the 14\textsuperscript{th} century, Scotland found itself at odds with the English crown’s claim to its land and people, fighting vigorously to “secure its own monarchical and parliamentary institutions” (Keating, 2001a, p.199). The War of Independence between Scotland and England would prove to be an important moment for Scottish national identity as it served as a rallying point for the disparate classes of people who identified as Scottish. Regardless of social or economic status, the people of Scotland saw themselves as distinct from their English invaders (Walton, 2006, p.115). In fact, many historians have attributed England’s invasion of Scotland during the War of Independence as being a precursor to the rise of Scottish nationalism (p.115). While the concept of nationalism is often seen as a factor or force that emerged post-French Revolution of 1789, signs of its existence can be traced to this period in Scotland (Webb, 1977, p.15). In particular, the Scottish exhibited a strong sense of spatially-defined identity that separated its people from that of the English. This distinction was furthered by Scotland’s willingness to develop relations with other European powers – such as France and Germany – that had a strong influence on the country’s culture and legal system (pp.15-16).

**6.1.1: Joining the Club: The Unification of England & Scotland (1300s-1800s)**

As intermittent war between Scotland and England continued for the better part of two and a half centuries (from 1286 to about 1550), Scotland slowly saw its power and prosperity relative to England erode under the latter’s continued pressure to unify the two countries (Webb, 1977, p.14). As a result, Scotland began relying more heavily on its relations with other countries to ensure the country’s continued existence. Perhaps the most important of these relationships
came through the Auld Alliance with France (p.14). Initially, the alliance proved beneficial to Scotland as it saw much of England’s “ambition, money, men, and energy” tied up in dealing with the French (p.14). Dealings with the French became so prominent that, for a period in the mid-1500s, “French interest dominated Scottish political and ecclesiastical policies” (Reid, 1973, p.25). However, when coupled with the ongoing pressure from England, the French’s dominance of Scotland left it in a situation of confusion and political chaos (p.25). As a result, the Scottish people were left with little alternative but to play on the rivalry between England and France to ensure its ongoing independence (Keating, 2001a, p.199). This situation, however, came to a head with the Protestant Reformation of the 1560s – a period during which the Church of Scotland broke away from the Papacy, largely through assistance from the protestant English, and introduced protestant practices to the country (Holmes, 2014, pp.115-116). While Reformation sought many things, almost unanimously it sough reformation of “‘discipline,’ of the ‘lives’ of the clergy, of their ‘manners’ and their ‘morals’” (Donaldson, 1972, p.1). Simply put, it sought to reform the “ecclesiastical polity” as a means of addressing perceived abuses by the Catholic Church (pp.1-2). For many, papal authority had become wasteful, inefficient, and an overall “obstacle to good government” (p.44).

As Protestant Reformation “swept through Scotland” in the 1550s and 1560s, it brought with it a new “religious dimension to Scotland’s national identity” (Walton, 2006, p.120). Reformation had come late to Scotland relative to other countries in Europe. By the 1560s, more than “forty years had passed since […] the beginnings of the reformation” in places such as Germany, Rome, Denmark, and Norway”; as such, “Reforming opinions” had had “ample time to [gradually] penetrate to Scotland” (Donaldson, 1972, p.29). Leading up to the 1560s, it had become apparent that a “period of decision had been reached and that affairs could not simply drift” (p.31). While this had given the Church of Scotland ample time to prepare, it had quickly
become evident that no amount of preparation could hold off the inevitability of reformation (pp.31-32). A desire for change was evident in Scotland, supported by a sense that the taxes the country paid to the papacy were not benefiting the people of Scotland in any significant way (p.46). For their part, the protestant reformers supported a union between Scotland and England because they believed it would “advance both their cause and their religion” (Walton, 2006, p.120). To this end, the reformers sought to incorporate a nationalist flavour to their rhetoric and ideology – first by espousing anti-French sentiment, then by pushing the idea that the “nationalist spirit of Scotland,” through the Calvinist doctrine of the Protestants, was superior to the Episcopal Church in England (p.120). This approach proved to be effective – both in swaying the masses against the French and in growing the Protestant movement. By 1560, the French had been completely expelled from Scotland (pp.120-121).

With the protestant movement in full swing and the French’s political dominance over the country reduced to nil, Scotland’s efforts to maintain its independence invariably shifted towards the English monarchy (Keating, 2001a, p.199) – in large part out of necessity. As the 17th century approached, Scotland found itself in the precarious situation of being a small, albeit “relatively consolidated” country that was “poorly positioned in the kill-or-be-killed geopolitical environment” of Europe at the time (Greer, 2007, p.18). On the one hand, Scotland’s exports and colonial expansion efforts were effectively being stymied by larger empires to the point of stagnation. On the other hand, Scotland’s geographic location relative to England, coupled with its alliances with France and Spain – both of whom were Catholic rivals to England – had made it both a highly coveted region and a potential threat to England. As such, “unable to beat the great powers” of the era, Scotland was left with little choice but to join one (p.18).

The choice of which great power to join was facilitated by two factors: the expulsion of the French and the succession of Scotland’s king, James VI, to the throne of England in 1603
This union, dubbed the Union of Crowns, brought Scotland and England under one sovereign. However, this was largely seen as “a purely personal” union predicated on the “king remaining the true source of authority in both countries” (Bogdanor, 1979, p.75). In all other contexts, the two countries remained relatively separate and distinct for well over a hundred years (p.74).

While the Union of Crowns brought Scotland a reprieve from war (at least for a quarter-century, the country lost much to the English in way of recognition and resources. James VI moved his royal court to London as a means of consolidating his rule over the more powerful and wealthier country; with him went much of Scotland’s nobility (Webb, 1977, p.17). The result of this exodus was a shift in power between the English and Scottish, “inclining [Scotland] a little more towards the emergent commercial class” than towards the affluent upper class (p.17). Efforts were made by the king to strengthen relations between the English and the Scots; however, the “English Parliament would have nothing to do with it” (p.18). Likewise, because the Scottish felt as though they had little autonomy outside of the Union of Crowns, their parliament rejected policies that would further unify the two nations – such as free-trade and the naturalization of the Scottish people as English (pp.18-19). Complicating matters for the king was the question of the power conferred to him through law. Many of his opponents worked adamantly to ensure that he did not have the power to govern without parliament – an “encroachment” on his powers that James VI (and his successor, Charles I) strongly resisted (Nobbs, 1952, p.87). For James VI, parliament was meant to be an assembly who would inform and guide the king’s decisions; he saw its “independent leanings” as a means of furthering the private interests of the members of parliament over those of the public good (p.86). As a result of this resistance, parliament lost trust in James VI (and later Charles I) – to the point where, by 1641, the king’s opposition was pushing to “deny him any public position at all” (pp.87-88).
Exacerbating the situation between king and parliament were religious differences. James VI “rejected puritanism on political grounds,” choosing instead the Episcopalianism of the Protestant reformers who supported the king’s right to “rule as divine” – provided that the church be allowed to govern itself as an independent body “separate […] of the realm” (Nobbs, 1952, p.88). Following the death of James VI in 1625, Charles I followed in his father’s footsteps, though taking his father’s work to the “extreme” (p.89). In particular, Charles I sought evidence to prove he was a descendent of Adam, a claim that – if validated – would make him king of England and Scotland and the “rightful head of the church” (Webbs, 1977, p.19). The result of this extremism was “profound conflict” in England and Scotland that eventually led to a revolution and subsequent execution of Charles I (Ichijo, 2004, p.10). Both the English and the Scottish found themselves at odds with the “practice of absolutism” – particularly in a day and age of “commercial expansion” – and chose to fight against it (Webbs, 1977, p.19). While the Scottish – under the guidance of the Church of Scotland and its Presbyterian structure fought alongside the anti-royalist English led by Oliver Cromwell, there remained prominent and divisive differences between the two factions. Firstly, for Scotland, rejecting the Episcopalianism of the king was akin to rejecting Anglicization; although the English fought for the same goal, their reasons for doing so were not the same. Secondly, despite their rejection of the king’s absolutist approach, the Scottish were “not prepared to go as far” as the English in deposing the king; as Charles I was a “Scottish Stewart King,” there was a strong sense of resentment on the part of the Scots for his execution (pp.19-20).

In response to Charles I execution, the Scots had named his son, Charles II, their new king. This decision proved to be unfavourable with Cromwell and the English, and, as a result, served as a strong motivator in their “successful invasion and conquest” of Scotland in 1651 (Webbs, 1977, pp.19-20). Cromwell’s conquest of Scotland “resulted in the complete submission
of the Scots” (Walton, 2006, p.126). Far from simply losing their freedom to the English, Scotland was “forced to submit to Cromwell and his ideas for a union, not just of crowns, but also of nations” (p.126). By this point, following the revolution to depose Charles I, the Scots were “too weak to resist” Cromwell, and submitted to the formation of his new commonwealth with little opposition. For some Scots, the commonwealth actually proved to be advantageous from an economic perspective; for most, however, the commonwealth was met with hostility and antagonism (p.126). The commonwealth, however, would prove to be relatively short-lived, lasting little more than a decade. Within a year of Cromwell’s death in 1658, Charles II – with the blessing of both the Scottish and English people – was reinstated as monarch of both countries (Ichijo, 2004, p.10).

The reinstatement of Charles II meant that, once again, both countries would be ruled separately by the same king. And, for a time, this situation worked well for the Scots. However, much like Cromwell’s commonwealth, the proverbial honeymoon with Charles II would prove to be relatively short-lived. The Scots, notwithstanding their “anti-Charles I sentiments,” had continued to believe in and support the monarchy as a symbol of Scottish pride and independence. Once the Scottish people realized, however, that Charles II had no intention of returning to Scotland, the sheen of his position began to wane (Walton, 2006, pp.126-127). Adding to the Scots’ discontent was the fact that Charles II did not support the Scottish covenant and actively opposed their Presbyterian church. The result of this opposition soon led to a series of revolts between 1666 and 1680 (p.127). Of these revolts, perhaps the most important with respects to Scottish nationalism was the Battle of Bothwell Bridge, which, despite being a loss for the Scottish, served as a catalyst for the re-emergence of nationalist and anti-English sentiment in Scotland (p.127).
Following the revolts, Charles II’s successor, James II, did not fare much better – serving, instead, to exacerbate the situation (Nobbs, 1952, p.129). James II, a Roman Catholic, “challenged the national church” and expanded his monarchical powers beyond anything previously seen – pushing, once again, the absolutism of his post (pp.129-131). Unwilling to provide their king with that measure of sovereignty, James II’s kingdoms quickly mobilized a response. By 1688, only three years into James II’s reign, the king was overthrown in what is now referred to as the Glorious Revolution (p.157).

Within 20 years of the Glorious Revolution, England and Scotland had arrived at a point where they were prepared to abandon their previous Union of the Crowns in favour of an incorporated union – not entirely unlike Cromwell’s commonwealth (Nobbs, 1952, p.157). For the English, this new union was not born of a desire to subjugate Scotland. Instead, it was a “geopolitical” manoeuvre to shut the proverbial backdoor that was Scotland from being an access point to other European powers (Greer, 2007, p.43). Moreover, given the significance of religion in Scotland, the country posed an ongoing challenge to the monarchies it shared with England insofar as those monarchs had sought, to no avail, to establish “common religious observance across” both kingdoms (p.44). As such, the chosen solution to these problems came in the form of a new union. This union, however, would require the dissolution of the Scottish parliament, with certain elements of it being absorbed into a new parliament that would recognize the Scots as relative equals to the English (Nobbs, 1952, p.157). The rationale for this move was to “eliminate separate, and potentially pro-French, Scottish politics” that may have remained in Scotland (Greer, 2007, p.44). Beyond the dissolution of its parliament, Scotland was allowed to retain the structure of its “aristocracy, church, universities, and law” – though they would eventually be reshaped by UK government intervention – and would effectively be allowed to govern itself in its day-to-day affairs (p.44). For larger concerns, the position of Secretary of
State for Scotland was introduced to “handle Scottish Affairs” and serve as liaison and representative for Scotland in London (Keating, 2001a, p.203). In all other respects, Scotland remained an almost autonomous state in all but the most executive of decisions.

6.1.2: Cultural Consequences of Unification

One of the consequences of the Scottish nobility relocating to England following the Union of Crowns was that they had become progressively Anglicized over the years (Webb, 1977, p.18) – and, as a result, had a decisive impact in pushing the Scottish parliament to “reluctantly vote itself into Union with England” (McMillan, 1996, p.77). As such, Scotland’s decision to join the Union and dissolve its parliament was a choice wrought with controversy – and, to a degree, continues to be a source of contention between the Scots and English. The union, epitomized through the Union with England Act 1707 (often referred to as the Treaty of Union in Scotland) (Greer, 2007, p.18), was approached more as a “union of policy” than as one of “affection” between two nations (Walton, 2006, p.127). For the Scots, unification was seen as “a constitutional settlement” that would guarantee Scotland’s national institutions and recognize its distinct cultural identity (Bogdanor, 1979, p.77). And, for their part, the English were all too willing to accommodate this view of the union provided the Scottish no longer posed a threat (Greer, 2007, p.44). In other words, the Union of 1707 between Scotland and England was, in its initial understanding, more of a business agreement between two partners than an amalgamation or integration of cultures and identities.

When first introduced, however, the Union proved unpopular in Scotland. Many of the Scots, if given a choice, would have rejected the union in a referendum. Compounding the Scots’ dissatisfaction was the fact that, immediately following unification, the British parliament began ignoring some of the Union Act’s provisions (Bogdanor, 1979, p.79). Consequently, from the
time of unification in 1707 to around 1750, there was considerable “unrest” in Scotland, culminating with the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 (Webb, 1977, p.27). The rebellion, under the leadership of Charles Edward Stuart, grandson of James II, sought to regain the Scottish crown. However, by this point, many of the Scots had come to accept the Union. Consequently, the rebellion proved to be divisive amongst the Scottish people – particularly between the Protestant Lowlands and the Catholic Highlands, the latter of whom supported the rebellion (Ichijo, 2004, pp.10-11). Ultimately, the rebellion ended in defeat for the rebels, with their punishment coming in a decisively cultural fashion: the British government sought to repress the Highland culture, beginning with the removal of clan chiefs’ “hereditary jurisdictions” for their violation of the Union Act, and followed with banning the use of bagpipes and the wearing of kilts in highland society (Webb, 1977, pp.28-29). It should be noted, however, that the rationale for this cultural suppression was not inherently assimilative, but because the British government genuinely saw the Highlands as a threat to Britain’s security and sought a sufficiently demonstrative way of quelling that threat (Keating, 2001a, p.200). An additional consequence of the rebellion was the abolishment of the position of Secretary of State for Scotland, replaced by a manager who would “distribute patronage in Scotland” and deliver “Scottish votes to the government of the day” (p.203). This situation would last until the mid-19th century, at which point overall control of Scotland was “passed into the hands of the Lord Advocate” and the day-to-day “business of administration was carried out by the burghs and assorted boards” (p.203).

Ironically, suppressing the Scottish Highlands would later serve to strengthen the Scottish identity as it reduced Scotland’s ethnic divisions (Keating, 2001a, p.200). Moreover, the ban on certain Scottish cultural symbols – and the consequent and gradual decline of the Celtic Scottish culture in the Scottish Highlands – has been significant for Scottish identity as the “myth of a Celtic Scottish past […] serves as the popular historical perspective of many Scots” today (Webb,
1977, p.29). Many of the Highland symbols – such as the bagpipes and kilts – have since been adopted by the Scottish nation, as a whole, and have even become “pressed into the service of the British state” (Keating, 2001a, p.200). Nevertheless, the fact that the British government took steps to repress elements of Scottish culture – which also included, throughout the 19th and much of the 20th century, the repression of Catholics and their exclusion from political life throughout all of Great Britain (p.200) – underscores an evolution in the ways in which the Scottish approached their cultural and national identity. Following unification, Scottish nationalism took on a different significance, transforming from a “primarily political to cultural nationalism” (Walton, 2006, p.128). Emphasis was placed on defending the distinctiveness of Scottish culture and language through “other guises” that were not overtly rebellious or dissident in nature (p.128). Rather than trying to separate themselves from their former enemy, the Scottish now sought to “maintain the nation” within the context of Great Britain and the United Kingdom (p.129). Ultimately, for many Scots, the socio-economic benefits and opportunities provided by “belonging to one of the most powerful and successful nations on earth” outweighed the cultural pain that came with it (McMillan, 1996, p.77). And for a period (approximately 1750 to 1850), Scotland’s national identity took a backseat to the economic prosperity brought to the country by its union with England, with people oftentimes referring to Scotland as “North Britain” (Bogdanor, 1979, p.90).

In many respects, the Union Act of 1707 serves not only as a contract between Scotland and England that merges the two kingdoms into one, it also offers a repertoire of objects in the form of stabilizing instruments such as shared laws, free trade, and a unified/amalgamated parliament (UK Government, 1707/2015, pp.1-3). It is a union that also establishes a rapport of grandeur through its acknowledgement of the differences between the two nations – in terms of laws, culture, and religion – and allows for such differences to persist, provided that they do not
encroach or contradict the edicts of the Union Act (pp.6-7). From a cultural perspective, however, the Union Act also introduced a superior common principle through stabilizing instruments that rebranded and re-symbolized Scotland and England into one, cohesive entity. From the name “Great Britain,” to the flag – a composite of the two nations’ flags, the Scottish Cross of St Andrew merged with England’s Cross of St George (pp.1-2) – there is evidence in the Union Act of efforts made by Great Britain to create a shared identity between the two nations – to reconceptualise the civic links of the Scots and the English, if you will, into a unified people, with shared legal and cultural apparatuses. For this reconceptualization to occur, however, a paradigm shift with respects to Scotland’s domestic world was required. In this case, the shift came both in Scotland’s willingness to accept a union with Britain – an act that would have seemed unheard of by previous generations – and in the way it began to approach and preserve its national identity post-unification. The fact that Scotland began approaching its nationalism less as a political agenda and more as a culture expression of its identity (Walton, 2006) indicates that the Scots were willing, at least at the time, to negotiate elements of their culture (i.e. domestic world) in order to broker a union with the English. In this case, the act of agreeing to a union with the English represents a form of rebirth into a life or world where the Scots identify as both British and Scottish, but where the Scottish element of that duality needed to be expressed through alternative, arguably more creative, channels.

6.2: Scottish Delight: The Emergence of Contemporary Nationalism in Scotland, 1930s-1990s

Overall, and notwithstanding the Jacobite rebellion, Scotland and England were able to find a measure of understanding and peace following unification (Nobbs, 1952, p.168). Moreover, as the UK government expanded the scope of its power and deliverables in
transitioning into a welfare state, power was gradually conferred onto Scotland (and its institutions) as a means of both reducing the central government’s burden and providing Scottish institutions with a greater involvement in the broader affairs of the UK (Greer, 2007, p.44). From 1885 to the 1960s, Scotland saw executive power gradually return to the country, to the point where Scotland’s Secretary of State – reinstated in 1885 – was awarded responsibility over social and environmental policy and was granted powers to plan and co-coordinate economic development in Scotland (Bogdanor, 1979, p.80). Even as the central government began taking greater interest in and responsibility over essential services such as housing, healthcare, and education, and oversight of local governments throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Scottish authorities and institutions were usually allowed a larger measure of autonomy over their country’s services than were the other countries in the UK (Greer, 2007, pp.44-45) – though the fact that there was little in the way of a coherent regional government in Scotland remained a concern for many Scots (Lynch, 2011, p.236). The relationship between Scotland and England, however, would take a dramatic turn as the socio-economic and political landscape of Scotland shifted throughout the early and mid-20th century, in large part as a response to economic turmoil (Greer, 2007, p.41).

Precipitating changes in Scotland and England’s relationship was that much of Scotland’s “story” following the two World Wars was characterized by “decline and struggle to transform itself into a new society with modern industry” (Ichijo, 2004, p.11). In part, this decline can be attributed to Scotland’s industries producing over their capacity during the First World War which resulted in an unbalanced economy and the eventual decline of some of the country’s staple industries. Prior to the First World War, Scotland was a veritable economic powerhouse, routinely outperforming the rest of the UK on a per capita basis. This position of power, however, steadily decreased throughout the early part of the century, to the point where, by the
1920s, Scotland’s unemployment rate was 125 percent higher than the UK average and its gross domestic product had stagnated at a 0.4 percent annual increase – a pittance compared to the 2.2 percent annual increase observed in the rest of the UK (Pittock, 2013, pp.19-20). Educationally, Scotland’s universities saw a decrease of five percent in their enrollment throughout the better part of the 1920s and 1930s – a stark contrast to the rest of the UK, where the education system was rapidly expanding. Likewise, Scotland’s population began to stagnate, with more than a quarter of individuals born in Scotland between 1911 and 1980 emigrating to “greener pastures” (p.20). Scotland did not fare much better following the Second World War, as the country began dealing with economic problems the likes of which paralleled those of the Great Depression (Greer, 2007, pp.47-48). Amongst those problems was the fact that many of Scotland’s industries had gone into recession and, despite efforts to salvage and reconstruct them – such as the Scottish colliery restructuring program – many of them were simply too far gone to help (Halliday, 1990, p.18). It is worth noting that even though Scotland’s heavy industries might not have been significantly diverse, they were culturally important, “bound to a nexus of cultural self-representation […] which stressed the masculinity, skill, hardness, endurance, decency, solidarity and egalitarianism of the Scot” – a sort of “gritty, male working class” identity (Pittock, 2013, pp.48-49). As such, the downfall of these industries served as a “shot to the gut” of Scottish identity and pride, and left a veritable hole to fill as far as Scotland’s sense of cultural masculinity was concerned.

If there is a silver lining to be had from this period for Scotland, it arguably came in the form of cultural development. The 1930s, in particular, saw the creation of the National Trust for Scotland and the Saltire Society, apolitical and charitable organizations that served (and continue to serve) in the support and development of Scottish culture (Pittock, 2013, p.21). Established in 1931, the National Trust serves Scotland through the promotion, preservation, and conservation
of “natural and human heritage that is significant to Scotland and the world” (National Trust, 2016a, par.1-2). Prior to its creation, the preservation of Scotland’s heritage sites largely fell under the purview of the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty – a charitable organization that served the whole of the UK, but was found to be inadequately serving Scotland’s needs. Rather than continue under a situation of neglect, the Association for the Preservation of Rural Scotland – a charity devoted to the preservation and care of, as its name implies, the rural areas of Scotland – opted to create a trust of its own for Scotland (National Trust, 2016b, par.1-2). The National Trust for Scotland was officially recognized by an Act of Parliament in 1935, wherein it was conferred the responsibilities previously held by the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest as they specifically relate to Scotland (National Trust for Scotland Order Confirmation Act, 1935). For its part, the National Trust has managed to preserve a number of historical places and objects that serve an important role in the history of Scotland and the identity of its people – many of which would have been lost forever were it not for the Trust’s interventions (National Trust, 2016a, par.4-5).

In a similar vein to the National Trust for Scotland, the Saltire Society was founded in 1936 as a response to a sense, within Scottish society, that Scottish culture was poorly appreciated. A general sense of “pessimism about the condition of Scottish culture and way of life” permeated the country; the Saltire Society’s founders sought to address this sense of malaise towards Scottish culture by promoting and celebrating “the uniqueness of Scottish culture and […] heritage” as a means of reclaiming “Scotland’s place as a distinct contributor to European and international culture” (Saltire Commission, 2011, p.7). In its efforts to celebrate Scottish culture, the Society has established as its goals to: increase awareness of Scotland’s “distinct nature and cultural heritage”; enhance the “quality of Scotland’s contribution to all the arts and sciences” through the encouragement of “creativity, inventiveness, and the achievement of the
highest standards of excellence”; build on the “achievements of the past” as a means of advancing Scotland’s “standing as a vibrant, creative force in European civilisation”; and “improve all aspects of Scottish life and letters” while also strengthening Scotland’s “cultural links with other countries and peoples” (p.7). To this end, the Society undertakes a wide variety of activities, ranging from “campaigning, debating, discussing, and representing” Scottish culture, to holding presentations, commemorations, awards, and performances to celebrate it (p.8). The expressed objective of these events has been to foster discussion and debate on important cultural issues, which will ideally inform and stimulate the general public as a means of promoting the developing “sound policy for Scotland’s future” (Saltire Society, 2016, par.1).

While neither the National Trust for Scotland nor the Saltire Society are political or governmental in nature, they are important to Scotland’s cultural identity in the context of this thesis as they serve as a form of corrective measure to perceived deficiencies or lacuna in government and cultural policy. From their inceptions, these organizations worked in relative isolation, with few other organizations servicing culture to the degree that they did. In fact, it would not be until 1967 before an official public body to support and fund the arts in Scotland – the Scottish Arts Council (SAC) – would come into being (Saltire Commission, 2011, p.9). The fact that both the National Trust for Scotland and the Saltire Society sought to strengthen Scottish culture and heritage, and reassert its place both nationally and internationally, arguably, indicates a desire to strengthen the relationship Scots had with their culture and identity. Given the social and economic context of Scotland in the 1930s and 1940s, this emphasis on Scotland’s culture and heritage arguably speaks to an absence of and a desire for cultural pride – or, in the vernacular of the economies of worth, a desire for a definitive common principle and state of worth. This desire, when coupled with the absence of any significant government action with respects to Scottish culture, highlighted a governmental ambivalence towards Scottish culture
that citizens sought to address through alternative means. As the Scottish economy and society eroded, the National Trust for Scotland and the Saltire Society, in contrast, sought to conserve something: Scottish culture. In doing so, these organizations also offered Scots a symbolic refuge around which they could unite. And, for many Scots, these organizations served as vehicles for cultural revival in Scotland; they served as vehicles for holding Scotland together in a time when “there was no visible and effective power” doing so (Scott, 2010, p.64).

6.2.1: Growing Discontent in Scotland

As Scotland’s industries began to fail and as the federal government, through the provision of welfare, began to take a more prominent role in the day-to-day lives of Scots, the ability of Scottish institutions to influence society and “aggregate their demands through the established political parties” began to erode (Greer, 2007, p.47). The growth of the UK’s welfare state challenged the social status and influence of Scotland’s traditional networks and institutions, such as neighbourhoods, political parties, social clubs, charities, and the church (p.47). Services such as healthcare and public transportation, as well as the emergence of new mass media industries and “cheap, effective transport and communications,” allowed individuals a greater breadth of personal autonomy and mobility (p.48). With this newfound mobility, the people of Scotland were opting to live in new towns and urban areas instead of the institutionally- and population-dense cities and communities they worked in. This demographic shift, consequently, diminished the importance of neighbourhood institutions and authorities, such as parishes and churches. In fact, among the most prominent casualties of this social and demographic shift was the Church of Scotland, which saw much of its power and influence rapidly dissolve as citizens moved to urban areas outside of cities. Exasperating the situation for the church was the fact that urban redevelopment in cities was creating “giant new peripheral housing projects” that brought
with them unique transportation and infrastructure problems that effectively cut them off from the church (p.48).

It is in the context of social and economic decline that the Scottish National Party (SNP) emerged as a legitimate political option for many Scots. Established by John MacCormick in 1934, the SNP was initially devised to secure a parliament for Scotland within the UK framework. However, it was not long before MacCormick was “ousted” as a separatist, and the party followed suite (Bogdanor, 1979, p.91). Under the banner of separatism, however, the SNP soon found itself dismissed by the public as a “picturesque party of cranks and faddists” (p.91). Yet, over the years, the SNP managed to gain some traction with the Scots, in no small part because of the socio-economic situation Scotland and the greater UK found themselves in. Drawing on the issues that plagued the country, the SNP reframed Scotland’s economic problems as nationalist issues instead of simply class issues – an approach that was, at the time, novel in UK politics (p.93). While nationalism had “never been the exclusive property of one party” in Scotland, the SNP came to represent its “clearest expression,” (Keating, 2001a, p.219), offering the Scots, in many respects, a political alternative not unlike what the Québécois have had with the Bloc Québécois.

Picking up the slack left by other parties, the SNP took a sort of “collective action” approach to campaigning, in the process drawing in many of the disenfranchised voters who had been affected by the collapse of Scotland’s older social organizations (Greer, 2007, pp.48-49). By 1955, SNP’s support had grown to the point where it was successfully competing in elections; by the mid-1970s, the SNP had significantly grown in popularity and become the second largest party in Scotland, only narrowly missing out on becoming the country’s largest (Bogdanor, 1979, pp.91-93). Much of the early success of the SNP, however, has been attributed to disillusionment with government – particularly with the Labour and Conservative parties. When disillusionment
was at its highest, rather than simply not vote, Scots would often vote for the SNP as a sign of protest – and not necessarily a sign of nationalism (pp.93-94).

With that being said, the gradual emergence of the SNP as a legitimate political party did coincide with an increased appetite in Scotland for greater independence from the UK (Greer, 2007, p.41). In many respects, Scotland’s disillusionment with government had come to mean more than simply voting for a fringe party with outlandish or untenable policies as a sign of protest; for some, it had come to be seen as an opportunity to devolve the country’s parliament and reclaim a measure of autonomy vis-à-vis the UK. For instance, in 1949, the Scottish Covenant Association – a political organization whose purpose was to establish a devolved Scottish parliament – began a petition to lobby government to “secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs” (Scottish Covenant, 1949, p.341). The idea behind the petition was not to separate from the UK, but to acquire better governmental representation for Scotland:

We, the people of Scotland who subscribe this Engagement, declare our belief that by reform in the constitution of our country is necessary to secure good government in accordance with our Scottish traditions and to promote the spiritual and economic welfare of our nation. We affirm that the desire for such reform is both deep and widespread throughout the whole community, transcending all political differences and sectional interests, and we undertake to continue united in purpose for its achievement. With that end in view we solemnly enter into this Covenant whereby we pledge ourselves, in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom, to do everything in our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs (Scottish Covenant, 1949, p.341).

To its credit, the petition secured more than 1.6 million signatures – almost a third of the Scottish population at the time. Some of the Covenant’s members estimate that that number would have been far higher had it been “anything like a complete canvass of the population” (Scottish Covenant, 1949, p.341). While the Covenant was not prepared to go as far as the SNP in its endeavours to secure greater autonomy for Scotland – that is to say, it was not prepared to
advocate for separation as the Republic of Ireland had – it did want to see Scotland reclaim a measure of power over its state. The Covenant’s rationale was that the UK government was far too centralized in England and, as a result, Scotland’s essential services and needs were being neglected – a reason they attributed to the emigration of many of “Scotland’s best blood” (p.343). Often, the Covenant found that policies implemented by the government with respects to Scotland were either ineffective, ill-suited to Scotland’s needs, or only implemented after “prolonged and damaging delay” – and very seldom did these policies take into account the cultural and national character of Scotland (p.344).

Despite the Scottish Covenant Association’s assertions that their view represented the majority of Scots, there were still many who opposed the idea of devolution. In 1952, a Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs (1954) – commissioned to “examine the deterioration that is widely held to have occurred in recent years in the relationship between Scotland and England” (p.12) – found that opinion was divided in Scotland with respects to the devolution of parliament, with many organizations representing trade and industry being opposed to the idea (p.10). By contrast, many political parties and organizations expressed interest in some measure of devolution – ranging from the Scottish Covenant Association’s proposed devolved system similar to that of Northern Ireland, to the “more radical proposals” of organizations such as the SNP, the Scottish National Congress, and the Scottish Committee of the Communist Party, all of whom advocated for “complete self-government for Scotland” (p.10). The Commission took particular aim at the Covenant’s manifesto and petition, arguing that its wording was ambiguous and lacked both supporting arguments and any appreciation for the implications and potential impact devolution could have on Scottish and UK society. The Commission concluded, on the matter of devolution, by dismissing the validity and influence of the Covenant’s petition – citing its lack of impact on recent elections that had dealt prominently with the question of separation – and by
questioning the sincerity of the SNP and Scottish National Congress – the former of whom refused to “reveal their membership” while the latter were a self-described pressure group whose primary purpose was to “stimulate bodies such as the Scottish National Party to further and more effective action” (p.11).

Interestingly, it is worth noting that the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs (1954) insisted that its intent was not, in any way, “to include considerations of Parliamentary devolution” in its report (p.10). Rather, the Commission’s purpose was to provide explanations and recommendations for how to address Scottish discontent. While the Commission acknowledges that there was a “widespread feeling [in Scotland] that national individuality is being lost,” they found that there was little grounds to substantiate that feeling as a reason for discontent (pp.12-13). Instead, the Commission pointed to increased government intervention in the day-to-day lives of citizens, economic disparity in the post-war era, and a “lack of knowledge of the present administrative arrangements” – in particular, the fact that many of those arrangements had already devolved certain Scottish affairs to local governments and/or Scottish departments – as the three main causes of discontent in Scotland (p.16). The idea that a “new-found nationalism” had emerged in Scotland was dismissed as a “feeling of frustration” (p.16). Given that the “Scot’s pride in Scotland as a nation is no mere creation of the last few decades,” but a “heritage from centuries of history and tradition,” implied to the Commission that any desire for greater autonomy – a desire that had not been consistently expressed since the Union of 1707 – was born from modern considerations and concerns that were not cultural in nature (p.16). With that said, the Commission does suggest that UK and Great Britain ministers should offer greater recognition to Scotland’s national status, as opposed to treating it as a region (p.95).

Overall, the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs’ report provides an interesting look into the state of affairs of Scotland and its place within the broader UK during the early part of
the 1950s. Conspicuous by its absence in the report, however, is any significant discourse on Scotland’s culture. While the report does acknowledge Scotland’s national distinctiveness relative to the other member-states of the UK, it dismisses this distinction as being a factor in Scotland’s discontent with its place and relative autonomy in the UK. The fact, however, that the Commission felt the need to comment on devolution – despite assertions that its intent was not to do so – speaks to the level to which devolution had emerged as a serious topic of concern for both citizens and government alike. The process by which the Commission explores the topic and concludes that Scottish nationalism and identity have seemingly little importance in understanding why Scotland was discontent is emblematic of a form of governmentality. The report arguably serves as a tactic to shift discourse away from abstract, cultural concerns, towards concerns that could be addressed through more immediate and tangible interventions (i.e. addressing Scotland’s housing, health, and unemployment concerns (Royal Commission, 1954, p.95)).

The Commission’s approach offers a rationality that, to a degree, served to devalue the significance of Scotland’s national identity and culture as driving forces in the country’s social and political affairs. To suggest that Scotland’s national identity was an historical trait that had little bearing on modern considerations and contexts implied that identity was not a prominent consideration in British politics – ironic given that the War of Independence the British had fought with the Republic of Ireland three decades before was based, in part, on Irish nationalist disaccord (Hopkinson, 2002; Pittock, 2013). Similarly, the fact that the Commission so readily dismissed the SNP and its “radical” proposals for separation underscores the fact that the party, particularly in its formative years, oscillated between being a political party and cultural movement in its efforts to promote separation (Lynch, 2011, p.237) – a fact that, if nothing else, indicates the degree to which proponents of Scottish nationalism saw the issue of devolution as a
cultural issue. It is also interesting to note that the Royal Commission’s findings arguably reassert the concerns of the National Trust for Scotland and the Saltire Society: the UK government, at the time, was inadequately supporting (or, in this case acknowledging the importance of) Scottish culture and identity. Whether or not the Commission’s conclusions were actually sound is less important than the fact that, as history would show, nationalism and cultural identity became important drivers for devolution in Scotland.

6.2.2: The Introduction of the Scottish Arts Council in the 1960s

If the place of culture and national identity in Scottish society were somewhat downplayed in the 1950s, their role took on an arguably new political significance during the 1960s. The introduction of the aforementioned Scottish Arts Council (SAC) in 1967 – an executive non-departmental public body that primarily served as one of the government’s “main channels” for funding arts in Scotland” (SAC, 2010, par.5) – came about, in part, in response to the then-recently elected Labour party’s ambition to “create a new social climate for the arts” (Galloway & Jones, 2010, p.30). The SAC’s existence technically began in 1942, in the form of the unfortunately named Scottish Committee of the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts – or the Scottish Committee of CEMA for short. By 1947, however, the Committee was subsumed by the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) – where it technically remained until 1994 when it was devolved to the Scottish Office (p.27). In 1967, the Committee was rebranded SAC – a name it would keep until 2010 when it was merged with Scottish Screen to become Creative Scotland. Despite being an arm of the ACGB for most of its existence, however, the nature of the SAC’s relationship with ACGB allowed it virtually autonomous control over Scotland’s cultural policy – and with that control, a measure of influence in sustaining “a sense of Scottish nationhood within the framework of the British state” (pp.27-28). This autonomy,
however, has been strongly contested as little more than a myth, propagated to “disguise informal political influences in the arts” (p.29).

The “myth” of the SAC’s autonomy can, to some degree, be traced to the fact that, prior to devolution, much of Scotland’s cultural policy “aligned with the rest of the UK” (Orr, 2008, p.310). This alignment, in part, came as a result of a 1965 white paper, *A Policy for the Arts: The First Steps*, introduced by the Labour government’s Ministry of the Arts. The report is noteworthy for being the first of its kind in the UK to specifically address culture and the arts. The report and the recommendations it made, however, arguably served to challenge the autonomy of the SAC (Galloway & Jones, 2010). In the paper, the Ministry of Arts (1965) describes how the relationship between state and artist is “not easily defined,” but requires a level of distance to avoid “State patronage dictat[ing] taste or in any way restrict[ing] the liberty of even the most unorthodox and experimental of artists” (p.5). However, the Ministry adds that in order to sustain a “high level of artistic achievement,” artistic communities require “more generous and discriminating help” from local, regional, and national levels of government (p.5). Moreover, the white paper acknowledges a growing awareness and discontent with the general state of affairs of Great Britain’s cultural sector and, more specifically, the way in which arts and culture have been managed. This discontent was seen as symptomatic of systemic problems that ran deep in British society: people had been “conditioned by their education and environment to consider the best in music, painting, sculpture and literature outside their reach” (p.5). Additionally, there was a growing sense that culture had become inaccessible to the “under-privileged majority” (p.20).

Consequently, while the government was fully prepared to acknowledge and try to remedy the cultural issues affecting the country, it fully acknowledged that there was no “easy or quick way” of bringing about the necessary changes (Ministry of the Arts, 1965, p.5). To this
end, the white paper outlined a series of government proposals to address the UK’s cultural issues – many of which had a direct impact on the ACGB and, through association, the SAC. Among the most prominent of these proposals were recommendations to establish a centralized government department – the Secretary of State for Education and Science – to oversee governmental responsibilities as they relate to the arts; more “systematic planning and a better coordination of resources” among the various levels of government; and an overall increase to the level of funding provided to the arts. The ACGB (and SAC) would continue to serve as a funnel through which funding for arts and culture would be allocated (pp.16-17).

As a quick aside, it is also worth noting that the 1965 white paper stresses the importance of the cultural industries and the need to make culture alluring to citizens. In particular, the paper identifies the media industries as new and developing industries whose role in the development and dissemination of culture is invaluable (Ministry of Arts, 1965, p.16), while the need to make culture more interesting and accessible was seen as way of redressing societal discontent – particularly where younger generations were concerned:

Nor can we ignore the growing revolt, especially among the young, against the drabness, uniformity and joylessness of much of the social furniture we have inherited from the industrial revolution. This can be directed, if we so wish, into making Britain a gayer and more cultivated country (Ministry of the Arts, 1965, p.20).

While the white paper acknowledges that the media industries – and their cultural products – are primarily the domain of public organizations, and that the government, itself, has little say in their operations, these industries were seen to offer “enormous opportunities” with respects to the arts – opportunities that lent themselves to both artistic experimentation and development, and to the overall “enrichment and diversification of […] culture (Ministry of the Arts, 1965, p.16). In other words, from the white paper, a connection can be drawn between the cultural industries and a desire to make culture more enticing to the general public – a connection that is both evocative
of the Floridian creative cities thesis and Foucault’s governmentality. In the case of the former, there is a sense from the white paper that a stronger application of the cultural industries could yield positive economic and social results, serving as a form of investment formula for fostering social cohesion. In the case of the latter, the Ministry of Arts alludes to the idea that culture can be used to direct the behaviour of citizens, as a form of socialization, as a means of addressing social discontent. The paper’s emphasis on education – and its recommendation that responsibilities for culture be transferred to the Secretary of State for Education and Science – also stresses the point that culture, under the proper direction, was seen as having a socializing effect. In fact, this transfer of power was originally seen as a threat to “arm’s length” administration of culture, but was later pursued as necessary in order for the government to “put its own steer on the arts” (Galloway & Jones, 2010, p.31). This is an important consideration given that the arm’s length principle, as it relates to the arts, has been seen as a necessary mechanism to prevent “political interference in cultural expression,” with Fascist and Stalinist regimes cited as examples for why this principle should be upheld (Hamilton & Scullion, 2002b, p.36).

Returning to the question of the SAC, then, there is something to be said about the influence A Policy for the Arts had on the SAC’s mandate and public perception. Initial response to the white paper was mixed, particularly within Scotland where it was felt that the cultural overtures outlined in the report encroached on the Scottish Committee’s cultural jurisdiction and consequently led to disputes between the Committee and the ACGB (Galloway & Jones, 2010, p.31). The transfer of cultural responsibilities to the Department of Education and Science was seen as problematic for two reasons: 1) it was seen as encroaching on the aforementioned arm’s length principle; and 2) because education was, at that point, a devolved responsibility; ergo, it was believed that culture should be devolved as well. It is believed that this dispute led to the
“symbolic elevation of the Scottish Committee’s status” exemplified by its rebranding as SAC and a relative commitment to the arm’s length principle in the form of a “double arm’s length” relationship between the SAC and the federal government (with the ACGB sitting an arm’s length between the two) (pp.31-32). Even with this elevation of status, the SAC was largely seen as a state instrument, there to administer funding at a local level and follow the overarching directives of the UK government. Skepticism regarding the SAC’s “arm’s length status,” however, largely came as a result of confusion regarding “the relationship of ministers and Executives to SAC and the cultural sector,” and to a sense that there was an overall lack of coherent vision for the arts in Scotland (Hamilton & Scullion, 2002b, pp.36-37). The fact that the SAC operated at “double arm’s length” made little difference to the general public when they had little sense of who was ultimately responsible for culture in the country.

Despite the overall confusion regarding its role, the SAC had an impact on the state of Scottish culture and cultural policy that should not be understated. Its main objectives had been to increase Scottish participation in the arts, support Scottish artists in attaining their “creative and business potential,” and placing “arts, culture and learning at the heart of creativity” (SAC, 2008, p.8). In its early years, nationhood and national identity were factors that the SAC “relied upon” to “fend off centralized forces at the UK level” (Galloway & Jones, 2010, p.36) – they effectively served as a superior common principle for guiding the SAC’s approach to cultural policy. When the need arose, the SAC was unapologetic in its support of nationalist cultural endeavours and organizations as a means of exercising its autonomy relative to the ACGB and as a means of justifying its funding in the context of the UK’s funding formula, modest as that funding often was (p.36). Suffice it to say, and regardless of its status or public perception, the purpose of the SAC was to support and help develop Scottish culture.
6.2.3: Referendum on Devolution – 1979

Where Scottish nationalism had largely been a “ghostly presence” in UK politics throughout the 1930s up to the 1950s – often used as a “threat” by the Secretaries of State for Scotland as a means of acquiring greater resources from the federal government – the 1960s saw its “challenge” become “tangible” (Greer, 2007, p.50). By the 1970s, discontent in Scotland had arguably reached a new height; the Empire was “finally gone,” the memories of war were “fading into history,” social-democratic consensus was “crumbling,” and economic “stagnation and mismanagement” were forcing Britain into “an ever-steeper decline” relative to the rest of Europe (McMillan, 1996, p.78). Buoying the idea of independence for Scotland was the discovery of oil in the North Sea; this newfound resource fuelled many Scots’ belief that an independent, self-governed Scotland could actually be a reality (p.78) – even if that reality was achieved through devolution instead of outright independence. Even the thought of “limited measures of autonomy” brought with it a profound effect on Scotland’s “intellectual climate” and a “surge of confidence and optimism” for the public at large (Scott, 1991, p.155). This period also proved significant for Scottish culture and cultural policy, with the place of Scotland’s cultural identity taking a more prominent place in devolution discourse. The Saltire Society, for instance, held a series of conferences on the issue of devolution throughout the 1970s and 1980s to discuss the potential consequences autonomy would have on the cultural life of Scotland and what cultural and arts policies should be pursued in the event of a devolved Scottish parliament (Scott, 2013, par.5). Among the outcomes of these conferences was the introduction of the Advisory Council for the Arts in Scotland (AdCAS) – a council, comprised of members of organizations from within the arts and culture fields, devised to act as both a “think-tank and a means of exchanging ideas between the organisations and the new administration” post-devolution (Scott, 1991, p.155). In particular, the AdCAS would draft arts and culture policies for the purpose of
encouraging the development of Scottish Culture and lobbying the government to adopt them (AdCAS, 1991, p.10).

In its 1991 publication of selected papers, AdCAS provides the first draft of a policy for the arts established by the Saltire Society at a conference it held in 1977 – and which would prove to be the impetus for the creation of AdCAS in 1981 (p.7). The policy draft describes Scotland’s desire for devolution resting “fundamentally on the conviction that Scotland has a distinctive national character which is worth preserving” (AdCAS, 1991, p.7). If not for this national character, the Saltire Society contends, the “campaign for devolution, autonomy, or independence, would rest only on administrative convenience or efficiency” – a relatively “minor matter unlikely to engage enthusiasm or a sense of purpose” the way considerations of Scotland’s identity had (p.7). While this sense of identity was being expressed through Scotland’s various “institutions and attitudes” – such as its education and legal systems, and through “thought on political, social and religious questions” – the Saltire Society felt that it was through the arts that Scottish identity was being most clearly expressed (p.7). As such, the Saltire Society felt that the arts should be considered not just a luxury or minor matter, but “an essential part of the Scottish revival” and a necessary element in creating a healthy society (p.7). In other words, the Saltire Society hoped to establish a superior common principle that would bring to salience the Scottish identity. This essentialism, coupled with the fact that Scotland’s culture and heritage had to contend with the more-often-than-not inadvertent influence and imposition of England’s traditions and values, necessitated greater government intervention into the arts – albeit an involvement that was “limited and indirect,” facilitated by “independent bodies to avoid the risk of a political bias” (p.7).

The proposed arts policy outlined by the Saltire Society would have involved the introduction of a Scottish Ministry for the Arts which would have worked closely with the
Ministry of Education in its development and application of culture and arts policies. Initially, this ministry would operate through existing institutions – most notably the SAC and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) – until it was able to function autonomously (AdCAS, 1991, p.8). The existing institutions, themselves, would be devolved from the British structure and would cease to receive funding or support from their British (or, rather, English as would be the case following devolution) parent organizations. As the arts were seen as providing a high return on investment, the new policy would require the government to extensively increase its arts funding – even if that meant reducing government funding to other policy sectors. This new ministry would also expand its understanding of “art” to the widest possible definition of the term so as to allow for the greatest possible coverage of Scottish cultural and artistic expression. (p.8).

Endeavours to work with the Scottish film industry, create a National Theatre, and expand Scotland’s publication industry would all be undertaken as a means of revitalizing Scottish culture – all of which would be encouraged through various subsidies and tax exemptions (pp.8-9). Promotion of Gaelic and Lowland Scottish culture and language would also be made at every possible opportunity. Finally, and perhaps a little too self-servingly, the Saltire Society indicates that this new ministry would be welcoming of the “views and recommendations of organizations in the cultural field, such as the Saltire Society, the National Trust for Scotland, [and] the Scottish History Society” among a host of others – all of whom would serve as the basis for what would become AdCAS (p.9). All-in-all, this policy draft would serve as the basis for much of the Saltire Society and AdCAS’s agenda throughout much of the 1980s (pp.5-6).

While the Saltire Society’s draft of a proposed arts policy is arguably idealistic in its ambition, it does offer a window into the perspective of Scottish cultural and arts organizations in the context of potential devolution. The policy draft rearticulates the Saltire Society’s longstanding assertions that Scottish culture and arts were being inadequately served and
underappreciated by the federal government. Although the Saltire Society (and the AdCAS, for that matter) reiterates its status as a non-political organization that “takes no sides on political matters” in the policy draft (AdCAS, 1991, p.10), the proposed arts policy indicates that the Saltire Society was (and continues to be), at the very least, an opportunistic organization that has not been averse to using the political context to further its agenda. The policy draft, by requesting greater recognition of the overall place of culture in Scottish society, essentially implies that the government was failing its citizens by not prioritizing culture and the arts. By presenting its policy draft as an option for a Scottish Assembly in the eventuality of devolution, the Saltire Society arguably establishes that it – along with many of Scotland’s other cultural organizations – did not believe that their concerns regarding Scottish culture would be addressed by the British government. In doing so, whether intentional or not, the Saltire Society brought a political dimension to its cultural discourse and implicitly took a stance with respects to the question of devolution.

It is also interesting to note that, given the relative absence of government intervention in the cultural sector, the Saltire Society’s art policy draft significantly emphasises the cultural industries as drivers of culture and economy. While the draft, itself, might represent a compromise between the inspired and civic worlds, the policies it espouses are arguably grounded in a civic/market world compromise. This emphasis on cultural industries – such as the film, theatre, and publishing industries – speaks to a desire for a policy that supports culture without necessarily controlling or politicizing it. Moreover, the policy accentuates the economic factor of culture – in particular, its high rate of return on investment. In this respect, the Saltire Society’s proposed policies would have arguably served to instrumentalize Scottish culture – perhaps as a means of ensuring that Scottish culture could be both self-sustaining and progressive. After all, one of the key rationales for creating a Scottish cultural agenda was a
“determination to rid the country of [its] historical clichés, inferiorism, and misunderstandings” (Pittock, 2013, p.149); the fact that the proposed policies stress cultural and artistic creation rather than sustainment suggests that the Saltire Society was aware of and willing to address the negative perceptions that coloured Scottish culture. As such, the proposed policies arguably seek to add value – or at least the perception of value – to Scottish culture by making it economically viable – making it something people would be willing to invest in.

For its part, the SNP had ridden the coattails of the North Sea oil discovery to significant success in the UK’s 1974 general election – winning 11 seats in parliament on a campaign that emphasised “It’s Scotland’s Oil” (Bogdanor, 1979, pp.96-98). With this new measure of political power, the SNP was able to introduce “a range of policy measures to address Scottish issues including legislation to create a regional assembly in 1978” (Lynch, 2011, p.243). This legislation, the Scottish Act 1978, served as a preamble for a referendum on devolution. In particular, the Scotland Act outlined the procedures to be taken to establish a devolved Scottish Assembly in the event of a successful referendum – which was scheduled to occur the following year (Greer, 2007, p.43). The Act, itself, would have provided the newly established Scottish Assembly with a limited measure of legislative power – contingent on the approval of the Secretary of State before being submitted to the UK Parliament for their approval (Scotland Act, 1978, p.8). Moreover, the Assembly would only be permitted legislative power over “devolved matters” within Scotland itself (p.41). This meant that the Assembly was not permitted to pass legislation that involved, among other things: conferring power with respect to borrowing or loaning money; introducing, abolishing, and/or altering a tax; public bodies identified as under the purview of a Minister of the Crown; and/or amending the Scottish Act (pp.41-42). In other words, the Scottish Act 1978, had it been implemented, would have provided the Scottish Assembly with only a narrow and precise scope of legislative power. It is for this reason that the
Act was seen as little more than a measure to restrain “a worrisome Scottish Assembly given as a concession” – one which was deemed so confusing that it was questioned to what extent a Scottish Assembly (or even the UK parliament, for that matter) would have even been able to properly interpret their powers (Greer, 2007, pp.144-145).

Perhaps one of the most interesting outcomes to emerge from the Scottish Act 1978 was the introduction of a last minute amendment – known as the 40 percent rule (Ichijo, 2004, p.46) – that stipulated that the “yes” vote in the referendum required at least 40 percent of Scotland’s total registered electorate to vote yes in order for the Act to pass. In other words, it was not enough to simply win with a majority of the votes; the referendum required a minimum percentage of the population to have voted, and to have voted yes. This amendment would prove costly to the proponents of devolution: while the final vote was 51.6 percent in favour of devolution versus 48.4 percent opposed, 36.3 percent of registered voters did not vote – meaning the “yes” vote only obtained 32.9 percent of the total possible vote (Taylor, 1997, par.112-115).

The loss of the referendum would prove costly to the SNP, with its membership becoming fractured in the wake of defeat. The UK general election later that year saw Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government come into power, largely at the expense of the Labour Party and SNP – the latter of whom was reduced to just two members of parliament (Greer, 2007, 67). Consequently, there was almost “no effective legislative opposition” for the Conservative government (p.69). In this position, the Thatcher-led Conservatives set about introducing “a contentious free-market vision of society” primarily supported in the southeast region of England (McMillan, 1996, p.78). Voters in Scotland, Wales, and northern England, however, were largely opposed to these policies and, as a result, a greater sense of regionalism began to emerge in British politics (p.78). This opposition, however, did not stop Thatcherism from impacting the
cultural sector, shifting its emphasis towards an economic model that explicitly sought the commodification of culture (Hamilton & Scullion, 2002a, p.135).

Although the Thatcher-era would prove to be alienating to much of the UK throughout the 1980s (McMillan, 1996, pp.78-79), it did not stop her government from winning successive elections in 1983 and 1987 (Pittock, 2013, pp.47-48). Observers have noted that the division between Scotland and England, in particular, “became more pronounced” during the Thatcher-era – in no small part due to widening socio-economic gaps between the two (Ichijo, 2004, pp.46-47). Part of Thatcher’s success, in hindsight, has been attributed to the economic boon that North Sea oil proved to be – with many observers now questioning to what extent the benefits of the oil revenues could have been greater, both for Scotland and the UK as a whole, had the Thatcher government allocated and invested them better (Pittock, 2013, p.48). At the time, many in Scotland felt that were “the value of North Sea oil” assigned exclusively to Scotland, their dependence on the UK would have been eliminated (Keating, 2001a, p.213). Instead, the Scots found themselves in a situation where its manufacturing industries were on relatively greater decline than they were in England, while its unemployment numbers – notwithstanding North Sea oil – remained higher than those of all of Britain (Ichijo, 2004, p.47).

As these socio-economic factors were taking their toll on Scotland and England’s relationship throughout the 1980s, the SNP was introducing an “Independence in Europe” policy that saw the party shift its stance from being Europe-averse to being the “most pro-European party in Scotland and perhaps in the United Kingdom as a whole” (Ichijo, 2004, p.47). This policy acknowledged that the notion of “absolute sovereignty of a state was impossible” in a globalized world and, as such, “had to be relative, […] restricted by mutual international agreements” (p.48). It was, nevertheless, for this reason that the SNP believed Scotland needed to reacquire its sovereignty: so that it could be the one negotiating the terms of their international
agreements (p.48). However, the greatest impediment to Scotland’s sovereignty was not the UK, itself, but a perceived fear of being isolated by England should Scottish independence be achieved. For this reason, the SNP advocated for “Independence in Europe” as a means of “safeguarding” Scotland’s economy and industries while simultaneously countering the fear of isolation (pp.48-49). In other words, with this approach, the SNP essentially introduced an “unambiguously separatist” policy platform that sought to make the prospect of secession less threatening to Scots by framing it as the country becoming part of Europe rather than being cut off from England – all the while opposing European integration and emphasising “Scotland’s future as a self-reliant nation-state (Keating, 2001a, pp.224-226).

6.2.4: Referendum on Devolution – 1997

Overall, the 1980s proved to be a decidedly forgettable decade for supporters of Scottish nationalism and the SNP (Levy, 1990, p.vii). The SNP’s most memorable and popular policy of the decade – the aforementioned “Independence in Europe” policy – ironically proved more popular with Scots than the SNP, itself – and ultimately did little to sway voters to the SNP’s cause. Part of the policy’s popularity stemmed from the reality that, despite the fact that the majority of the Members of Parliament elected by the Scots were of opposition parties, the Conservative party remained in power (Ichijo, 2004, p.50). Consequently, the Scots felt relatively isolated politically, with their established political parties – such as the SNP – holding little to no power in influencing policy beyond providing platforms with appealing ideas, but little else. As a result, the Scots began putting support behind various civic and interest groups who worked towards and advocated for a Scottish parliament (pp.50-51). Groups and initiatives such as the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) (later rechristened the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament (CSP)) and the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) – a coalition, formed in
1989, of representatives of civic Scotland and some of the countries more separatist-leaning parties – began to emerge as prominent actors in the endeavour to promote constitutional change (Ichijo, 2004, p.51; Scottish Executive, 2012).

By 1995, SCC had presented a report to the UK government outlining a “blueprint for devolution” and proposals for how to implement an elected Scottish parliament (Scottish Executive, 2012, par.4). In particular, the report sought to quell any misconceptions pertaining to what devolution would look like by introducing natural relations between the two countries, stressing that a Scottish parliament would take sole or shared responsibility for “all functions except those retained by the United Kingdom Parliament” (SCC, 1995, p.4):

The primary matters to be retained to the United Kingdom Parliament would be defence, foreign affairs, central economic and fiscal responsibilities, social security policy, immigration and nationality issues. The Scottish Parliament will therefore have powers in relation to the economy and business, health, education, leisure and social welfare and the legal system and regulation (SCC, 1995, p.4).

The argument for this division of power was that it would allow a Scottish Parliament to “develop and sustain a quality of life which is best for the people living in our country” in a way that would allow it to be “directly accountable to the people of Scotland” as policies would be made by Scots, for Scots, in Scotland (SCC, 1995, p.4). Culturally and educationally, the SCC (1995) felt that the creation of a Scottish Parliament would enable it to better regulate these sectors and ensure that they retained their “uniqueness” relative to other systems in the UK and the rest of the world, and allow for the “purest expression of the nation’s character” (pp.15-16).

With respects to culture and the arts, in particular, a Scottish Parliament’s responsibilities would be “for example, [to] cover the distribution of lottery proceeds through appropriate agencies and areas where prospects could be enhanced such as the Scottish film industry” (p.16). The argument followed that being able to direct its cultural funding would allow the Scottish Parliament to “bring together all the local and national bodies” in the cultural fields as a means of
better directing resources and otherwise “fragmented provision[s]” and providing “greater access to activities for everyone from beginners to top level performers” (p.16). To its credit, many of the proposals made by the SCC in its 1995 report served as the basis for the UK government’s devolution proposals in 1997 – which were “overwhelmingly supported in a Referendum on September 11, 1997” – and would later serve to inform many of the eventual Scottish Parliament’s policies (Scottish Executive, 2012, par.4-5).

If there is one thing that can be said of Scotland in the years following its first attempt at devolution in 1979, it is that it began to achieve a sort of cultural autonomy “in the absence of its political equivalent” (Pittock, 2013, p.139). Similar to the Republic of Ireland before its separation from the UK, the Scots began emphasising their identity as a cultural phenomenon that required preservation and promotion instead of simply a political or nomenclatorial distinction that differentiated the country from the other countries in the UK (p.139). Even before the referendum, cultural redevelopment – advocated by the likes of the Saltire Society – had begun to take hold in Scotland, with many of Scotland’s historical cultural institutions (e.g. the Royal Scottish National Orchestra, the Scottish Opera, and the Scottish Ballet among others) finding new leases on life (pp.139-140). Politically, throughout the 1980s, the AdCAS was successful in gaining the attention of government officials and even had a number of its policy points implemented, including the devolution/establishment of the SAC in 1994 (p.140) – which had previously existed autonomously under a Royal Charter (Schlesinger, 2009, p.136). By this point, an appetite for devolution had, once again, reared its head in Scotland, with the devolution of the Arts Council serving as a precursor of things to come. This time, however, Scotland was not alone in its pursuit of devolution: so too were Wales and Northern Ireland (Cole & Thuriot, 2010, pp.322-323).
From a political perspective, one of the primary lessons learned from the 1979 Scottish referendum was that “any devolution referendum should be fast and on the principle of devolution rather than the detail” (Greer, 2007, p.88) – a sentiment undoubtedly shared, now, by some Québec sovereigntists. It was a lesson taken to heart by the Tony Blair Labour government who, within months of being elected in 1997, wasted little time in implementing an “asymmetrical devolution model granting different degrees of autonomy to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland” (Guibernau, 2006, p.64). In the years preceding the 1997 UK election, the Labour Party had presented itself as a progressively pro-devolution party – in part because the SNP’s assertions that voting Labour was splitting the vote and allowing the Conservatives to remain in power was proving true, and in part because prominent pro-devolutionists had moved to the top of the party’s hierarchy and had made devolution a top priority for the party (Deacon, 2006, p.85). Moreover, many of the pro-devolutionist members of the Labour party had affiliations with the CSP and SCC (and other likeminded organizations/initiatives), giving them access to many of the reports and policy drafts developed by the pro-devolutionist movement (pp.85-86). Thus, when the Labour government came into power, much of the groundwork for devolution had already been in place. However, before devolution could occur, a Referendum was required to determine: 1) if citizens agreed that there should be a Scottish parliament, and 2) if citizens agreed that Scotland should have tax-varying powers (p.116). On September 11th, 1997, with a little more than 60 percent of the population voting, 74.3 percent of Scots voted in favour of a Scottish parliament and 63.5 percent voted in favour of it having tax-varying powers (p.118) – sufficient to clear the “40 percent rule” established during the previous referendum (Greer, 2007, p.90).

As with the Referendum in 1979, a Referendum Act was created in preparation for the possibility of devolution in 1997. Similar to the Scotland Act 1978, the 1998 edition outlines the
responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament and the conditions under which members can be elected to the parliament. Where the two documents differ most significantly is in their allocation of power and, arguably, their interpretability (Greer, 2007, p144-145). In particular, the 1998 Act grants the Scottish Parliament the power to create laws provided those laws did not “form part of the law of a country or territory other than Scotland, or confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as regards Scotland” (Scotland Act, 1998, pp.13-14). In other words, unlike the Scotland Act 1978, the 1998 edition of the Act actually provided the Scottish parliament with legitimate power to enact laws and create policy – in effect, it offered Scotland the purview to establish and protect a more definitive superior common principle. With respects to culture, the Scotland Act 1998 establishes that Scotland holds dominion over much of its culture and heritage – though with reservations as they relate to the BBC and the British Broadcasting Acts of 1990 and 1996 (pp.89-90) – a situation that far from simplifying matters, often offered an additional wrinkle in Scotland’s cultural policy process.

6.3: New Beginnings: Cultural Policy & Industries in the Devolved Scotland

Following the Referendum of 1997, devolution was not an immediately easy process for Scotland; a number of significant changes occurred in Scotland’s socio-political landscape as a result of devolution that complicated the process. The early years of devolution, in particular, were not without their share of issues and controversies. Within the first three years of devolution, Scotland had seen the role of First Minister, at this point under the governing rule of the Labour Party of Scotland, change hands twice (Hazell, 2003, p.6) – in no small part due to the untimely passing of Scotland’s inaugural First minister, Donald Dewar, a little more than a year into his term (Mitchell et al., 2003, p.119). Dewar’s successor, Henry McLeigh, lasted all of one year as well before he resigned amidst controversy surrounding his financial arrangements, his
ability to maintain good relations between Scotland and England, and his overall leadership
abilities (pp.119-120). Some measure of stability was found with McLeigh’s successor, Jack
McConnell, who remained in office for two terms. Since then, only two new First Ministers have
been elected to office – the most recent being Nicola Sturgeon of the SNP, elected in 2014
following the country’s failed bid for independence (BBC, 2014b). While the question of
“Independence in Europe” or “Scotland in Europe” did not figure prominently in the devolution
vote in 1997, the issue remained prevalent in Scottish society following devolution, with the SNP
continuing to advocate for it (Ichijo, 2004, pp.55-56). In fact, the “Independence in Europe”
policy had a significant influence on the SNP’s approach to independence leading up to the
independence referendum in 2014 (Dorman, 2014; Scottish Executive, 2013).

From a cultural standpoint, Scottish culture was largely celebrated following devolution
as being a “key factor that made devolution possible” – to the point of being romanticized and
mythologized (Hamilton & Scullion, 2002a, pp.137-138). A sense of shared culture is credited
with having unified politicians, community leaders, church goers, labour unions, and the
artistic/cultural community under a single cause. Devolution even brought with it a renewed
interest in reconnecting culturally with Scotland’s diaspora, a prospect that was deemed relatively
unlikely pre-devolution when many of Scotland’s cultural institutions and policies were still
under British purview (Stewart Leith & Sim, 2014, p.1).

For its part, the artistic community, in particular, was “all too easily assumed” to have
been a strong advocate of devolution (Hamilton & Scullion, 2002a, p.137). After all…

It was the poet who articulated our national identities as both nostalgic and radical;
it was the film maker who presented Scotland in all its beauty and quirky nature to
the wider world; it was the singer who told of Scotland's industrial devastation at
the hands of an uncaring Westminster government; it was the fine artist who made
us look at ourselves and our cities in a new 'cool' way. In these ways Scotland's
artists defined us for ourselves and, inevitably, also re-defined our place in the
world as a nation capable of at least being able to run our own domestic affairs (Hamilton & Scullion, 2002a, p.137).

Yet despite the importance given to the role of arts and culture in supporting the devolution movement in Scotland, there has been a relative lack of vision, clarity, and rigour in debates regarding culture since devolution (Hamilton & Scullion, 2002a, p.141). From a policy perspective, Scottish cultural policy has been equally inconsistent in its appraisal and support of arts and culture. Part of the problem has stemmed from the fact that, since devolution, no fewer than 10 ministers of culture have headed the Ministry of Culture – a turnover rate of one minister every 18 months (Stevenson, 2014b, p.133). This turnover is underscored by the fact that the responsibility for cultural in Scotland has shuffled through a series of iterations and ministries (and sous-ministries) over the years, beginning with the Ministry for Culture and Sport in 1999; followed by the Ministry of Environment, Sport and Culture in 2000; followed by the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Sport in 2001; the Ministry for Sports, the Arts and Culture in 2001 as well; the Cabinet Secretary for Culture and External Affairs in 2011; and, currently, the Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Europe and External Affairs since 2014 (Bonnar, 2014, pp.138-139).

Similarly, cultural funding from the Scottish Executive has also been a complicated affair, “with funding provided by a number of government departments and agencies to a diverse range of [non-departmental public bodies] and other sponsored bodies, each with their own remits, roles and priorities” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p.18).

This instability resulted in a “series of consultative processes, a cultural commission (CC) and three draft legislative bills” all aimed at addressing Scotland’s cultural issues – and all of which had varying degrees of success in helping to (eventually) provide Scotland with a comprehensive cultural policy (Bonnar, 2014, pp.136-137). Part of the problem for Scotland, where culture is concerned, has been that the Scottish Executive does not exercise exclusive
authority over cultural policy in the country; the British Parliament also exercises a measure of control. More often than not, issues that fall solely within the Scottish jurisdiction – such as education and language recognition – have been addressed with relative ease by the Scottish parliament since devolution; issues requiring cooperation with other jurisdictions and authorities have had decidedly less success and often “remain unresolved” (p.137). Because certain cultural powers remain under the purview of the British Parliament – most notably broadcasting and foreign affairs – the process by which Scotland has developed and defined its cultural policy has largely been iterative, “marked by consultative processes in the public domain” (p.136).

Moreover, many of the cultural policies and approaches advocated by the Scottish Parliament since devolution have borrowed from ideas introduced by the federal government, and have often centred on the role of Scotland’s creative industries and creative economy in the context/framework of globalization (Schlesinger, 2009, p.135). Consequently, at times, the Scottish Executive’s legitimacy vis-à-vis cultural policy has been called into question given that what they have offered or pushed is comparable to what the British Parliament has offered. As such, since devolution, Scotland’s cultural policies have often been driven by socio-economic factors first and cultural factors second (Cole & Thuriot, 2010, p.324) – the result of which has been a somewhat uneven approach to cultural policy.

A clear example of this cultural policy trend comes in the form of Scottish Screen – the former national screen agency for Scotland, established in 1997 and amalgamated with the SAC in 2010 (Scottish Screen, 2010a, par.1-2). The primary purpose of Scottish Screen was to “drive an integrated screen policy across Scotland and across the screen industry” through its multifaceted roles as advisor to government, advocate to industry, development agency, and strategic investor (par.2). Through these roles, Scottish Screen sought to “inspire audiences, support new and existing talent and businesses, educate young people, and promote Scotland as a
creative place to make great films, award-winning television and world renowned digital entertainment” – with a particular emphasis on “building a sustainable future for the screen industries” through “the development of talent, ideas, businesses, skills and audiences” as a means of guaranteeing success (Scottish Screen, 2009, p.2). In other words, Scottish Screen’s mandate established a distinct superior common principle – the promotion of Scottish culture – while also elaborating a state of worth (i.e. inspired audiences), an understanding of human dignity (i.e. through educating youth and developing talent, ideas, business, and skills), and an investment formula that places an emphasis on developing and growing the Scottish cultural industries by means of strategic investment. Additionally, Scottish Screen presented a framework to distinguish natural relations between the agency, the government, cultural industries, and audiences – between the various levels of cultural producers and consumers (e.g. Becker, 2008).

Prior to its merger with the SAC, Scottish Screen boasted among other things that, through its efforts to attract and develop businesses and skills for Scotland’s screen industries, more than 80 production companies based in Scotland had “generated a turnover of £1.2 billion per year”; creative and digital businesses were contributing more than £2.8 billion annually to Scotland’s economy; and that 9.3 percent of the UK’s screen industry sales – a figure totalling more than £1.2 billion annually – had been generated in Scotland (pp.8-9). Overall, it is relatively safe to say that Scottish Screen’s approach took a market orientation, with outcomes largely measured in terms of their economic benefits. Even Scottish Screen’s outcomes with respects to its goal of inspiring and educating audiences were couched in market terms:

Over 500,000 admissions to Cultural Cinema Hubs each year; 16 million admissions each year to Scotland’s cinemas; Cineworld Glasgow is the tallest cinema in the world and the busiest, by customer base, in the UK (Scottish Screen, 2009, p.5).
If there is only an inherent sense from Scottish Screen’s publications that its approach was economically driven or motivated, then there is overt evidence to that effect on its website: “Scottish Screen recognises its responsibility to achieve value for money (VFM) from all of its activities (Scottish Screen, 2010b, par. 2). This responsibility was agreed to through a financial memorandum between Scottish Screen, the Scottish Executive, and the SAC (par. 1) – which indicates quite saliently, again, that the government’s ambitions where culture was concerned following devolution were strongly market oriented, with an investment formula that tended to sway more towards cultural democracy than the democratization of culture.

Notwithstanding the example of Scottish Screen, Scotland has made strides since devolution towards redeveloping what, for some, has been a neglected culture, identity, and cultural sector, and of offering a more comprehensive and coherent cultural policy framework – even if Scotland’s cultural policy has yet to truly actualize as such (Stevenson, 2014b, p. 133). In its efforts to develop such a framework, the Scottish Parliament held a series of key consultations between 1999 and 2010 (Bonnar, 2014, p. 136), culminating with perhaps the country’s most important policy initiative of the post-devolution era: Creative Scotland. These consultations served as a barometer to gage the Scottish appetite for culture and cultural policy. In a certain respect, these consultations also served as a sort of reclamation project for Scottish arts and culture: they allowed citizens to offer their input into the development of a coherent cultural policy for Scotland, providing a blueprint for what areas of the cultural sector needed emphasis and/or support from the government.

6.3.1: Consultations on Culture: A National Cultural Strategy for Scotland (1999)

Up until devolution, the SAC had remained the primary funding and development organization for the arts in Scotland. However, with devolution came a need for cultural policy...
review. Given that cultural policy was seen as having played an important role in supporting “a devolved nation delineating a nationhood within the boundaries of a larger state,” it began to play a more prominent role in political discourse (Stevenson, 2014a, p.179). Taking their cue from the 1999 Scottish Executive’s Partnership for Scotland publication, the Ministry for Culture and Sport launched a consultative process with the ultimate goal of developing a national cultural strategy (NCS) for Scotland (Keenlyside, 2000, p.1). In total, 15 public meetings were held with approximately 750 individuals actively involved in Scottish cultural life; an additional 350 responses were received through mail (Keenlyside, 2000, pp.2-3). Chaired by a focus group comprised of city councillors and representatives of national organizations such as Scottish Screen and the SAC, the consultations found that there was a “general enthusiasm for the Strategy and the chance for Scotland to lead within the UK by making a commitment to culture at government level” (p.3). There was also a sense from these consultations that a NCS could “improve understanding of culture within and outside Scotland” – a prominent concern given that the consultations encountered problems “with the word ‘culture,’” particularly with respects to its definition and the perception that culture is “associated with elitism and therefore create[s] a barrier for many people” (p.3). With this said, the consultation also found that respondents generally wanted the government to adopt the “widest definition of culture” possible, one that would encompass all of Scotland’s ethnic, linguistic, and social communities (p.3). Likewise, access to culture (and cultural funding) was seen by some of the consultation’s respondents as being a “basic human right, enshrined in the form of an entitlement” (p.3). To this end, respondents encouraged the Strategy to take an inclusive approach to providing citizens with opportunities to access and actively participation in culture, instead of simply providing opportunities for citizens to passively spectate (p.4). Museums, arts, heritage, and sports were all cited as vehicles for fostering social and cultural inclusion (p.17).
Where cultural funding was concerned, the consultation for a NCS for Scotland noted that respondents found the public funding process to be “too complicated and opaque”; people wanted to see the process simplified and made more transparent (Keenlyside, 2000, p.3). This was particularly true for community groups who felt that large, national and centralized organizations were being favoured by the government’s cultural funding process. A number of respondents – most notably visual artists – singled out the SAC – which operated as intermediaries and non-departmental funding agencies for the government – as being wasteful and poorly structured for supporting the culture community. Some respondents suggested that the SAC, in particular, should be either restructured to provide greater support to artists and the artistic community or altogether abolished (p.20). Otherwise, it was felt that a large organization like the SAC was too powerful for its own good, and often wielded its power to promote its own artistic/cultural agendas and tastes at the expense of others (p.17) – an ironic critique given the original intent of the government to establish the SAC as an arm’s length organization in order to avoid State patronage dictating taste (Ministry of the Art, 1965, p.5). Many of the respondents also indicated a desire to change the government’s nomenclature from “subsidy” to “investment” to reflect a “more positive” image of funding for the arts and culture (Keenlyside, 2000, p.4). There was also a sense from respondents that local governments insufficiently valued cultural activities and facilities, and, as a result, many of Scotland’s cultural facilities – such as museums and art venues – had suffered (p.4). Respondents indicated a strong inclination towards supporting and preserving traditional Scottish arts, encouraging the NCS to take a balanced approach in its valuation of traditional, classic, and contemporary art forms (p.5). Artists, in particular, expressed a desire to see the government support them in the business and commercial aspects of their craft (p.5). There was a perception from respondents that there was a significant skills and training gap as it related to the entrepreneurial aspects of the cultural sector. This gap, it was intimated, was
negatively affecting Scotland’s cultural industries and their overall competitiveness. Thus, the NCS, provided it adequately intervened and supported the cultural industries, was seen as having a potentially positive role for Scottish cultural production and dissemination – particularly from an economic perspective (p.17).

Finally, the NCS was seen as a potentially important vehicle for Scotland’s cultural and national identity. Many consultation respondents indicated that heritage, history, and traditions were all important elements of Scottish identity; however, many felt that there was a “general lack of understanding and knowledge” in Scotland with respects to its culture (Keenlyside, 2000, p.12). At the time of the consultation, most people living in Scotland had “not been taught about their history or heritage at school or at home,” meaning that most Scots did not have a “rounded understanding of what it means to be Scottish” (p.12). Underscoring this lack of understanding was a sense that the image of Scotland had been caricaturized “as a tartan and shortbread culture”– a perception that many people felt could be reformed and improved through various cultural media sectors, most notably television and film (p.5). To address these shortcomings, respondents indicated a desire to see the education system’s curriculum incorporate education on and recognition/understanding of Scotland’s traditional culture – most notably language and traditional arts and music (pp.12-13). Perhaps the most interesting element to come out of the NCS consultation was that “Scotland might identify and celebrate its own culture” – a concept that many commentators found “unimaginable” before devolution (Bonnar, 2014, p.140).

Overall, the consultation on the NCS revealed an appetite in Scotland for more proactive government interventions into the cultural sector and, more broadly, the cultural life of Scottish citizens. More pertinently, however, the consultation revealed a conflict between the Scots’ perceptions of and desires for Scottish culture and the government’s heretofore hands-off approach to culture and heritage. Because of the government’s relative neglect, the sense of
identity the Scots had of themselves was somewhat conflicted: there was a sense of cultural identity, but not necessarily an understanding or appreciation of that identity. The opinions expressed in the consultation draw on Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1991) domestic world polity with respects to both citizens’ desire to see a greater emphasis placed on cultural heritage, but also in the way that – at least from Keenlyside’s (2000) presentation of the consultation’s findings – respects and is willing to defer to the authority of government. In particular, the respondents indicate a seeming enthusiasm towards the NCS and the possibilities it presents with respects to government intervention into culture. The fact that the consultation’s respondents indicated a desire to see the government offer greater support to Scotland’s artists and cultural industries also suggests an openness and willingness to initiate a civic/market compromise; it implies that the market has failed in some respect and requires government intervention to correct it. Culturally, the findings of the consultation suggest an absence (or negligence) of a superior common principle – or, at the very least, of a salient valuation and promotion of the Scottish culture and identity on the part of its government. To its credit, the government’s willingness to listen to its cultural community draws on the civic world’s polity insofar as the consultation, itself, infers an emphasis on the collective and “public good” over any sort of personal interest (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p.231).

As a follow-up and next step to the NCS consultations, the Scottish Executive (2000) released Creating Our Future... Minding Our Past, a progress report on the NCS in 2000. Arguably, the report’s most salient contribution to Scotland’s cultural policy was its identification (and elaboration) of the NCS’s four, broad strategic objectives (or superior common principle(s)):

Promote creativity, the arts, and other cultural activity; celebrate Scotland’s cultural heritage in its full diversity; realise culture’s potential contribution to education,
promoting inclusion and enhancing people’s quality of life; assure an effective national support framework for culture (Scottish Executive, 2000, p.1).

Under each strategic objective, the report highlights a series of key priorities and “current/next steps” for the coming years. These key priorities covered a wealth of cultural and cultural sector concerns – though they were, for the most part, more flash than substance due, in large part, to an absence of actual baseline results from the previous year. As a result, priorities often ranged from being practical/economic in their purpose (e.g. facilitating a climate supportive to cultural sector workers; enhancing Scotland’s creative/cultural industries (Scottish Executive, 2000, pp.4-7)); to being ambitious in their intent (e.g. celebrating artistic and cultural excellence; promoting Scotland’s languages as cultural expressions and cultural access points; conserving, presenting, and promoting interest in, and knowledge of, Scotland’s history and cultural heritage (pp.10-13)); to being idealistic in nature (e.g. promoting and enhancing education and lifelong learning in, and through, the arts, culture, and heritage (pp.20-23)); to being broad and vague in their application (e.g. developing wider opportunities for cultural access; maximising the social benefits of culture (pp.24-28)); to being almost idiosyncratic and/or nonsensical in their descriptions (e.g. developing a national framework of support for cultural provision appropriate to the 21st century (p.31)).

Beyond a broad overview of “what is to come,” little is given in the report to indicate any actual progress. The Deputy Minister for Sport, the Arts and Culture, Allan Wilson indicates in his forward to the report, that over the previous year, much had been accomplished in way of funding and resource allocation for sports and culture. In particular, Wilson notes that the National Museum of Scotland received sufficient funding to abolish its entrance fees, while £3 million was allocated for a Strategic Change Fund to be distributed over a three-year period to non-national museums, to support excellence in traditional arts, and to “support and attract major
events to Scotland” (Scottish Executive, 2000, p.2). Wilson also offers the caveat that as important as funding is to arts, it “is not everything” (p.2). For this reason, Wilson indicates that the NCS “sets out a wide range of actions to ensure that [Scotland’s] cultural sector gains strength and momentum” (p.2).

Additionally, Wilson singles out a series of key cultural areas in which he would like to see progress made in the coming years: Scotland’s international image; social inclusion; the creative/cultural industries; and collaboration with local authorities. With respects to Scotland’s image, the focus was on presenting Scotland’s cultural life “in its widest sense” in a way that augmented the “perception of Scotland across the world” (Scottish Executive, 2000, p.3). This would be accomplished through an events strategy aimed at promoting cultural tourism, including the development of an events program “to ensure that the contribution of Robert Burns is more fully recognised and realised” (p.3). Questions of social inclusion would be addressed through targeted approaches aimed at Scotland’s “least advantaged communities,” with emphasis placed on the “key role” culture and sports “can play in raising the quality of life” (p.3). For their part, the cultural industries would be emphasised for their contributions to the economy, with organizations such as the SAC and Scottish Enterprises collaborating to ensure that the contributions of the cultural industries were maximized. Finally, working with local authorities was highlighted as important for the “guidance and best practice advice” local authorities brought to the table (p.3).

Unsurprisingly, many commentators have criticized the NCS and its Creating Our Future… Minding Our Past (2000) report for being bereft of evidence or vision (e.g. Bonnar, 2014; Hamilton & Scullion, 2002a). The absence of any tangible results suggests the report was devised to both acknowledge the cultural issues outlined in the previous year’s consultation and provide a broad overview of how the government intended to address those issues. In other
words, the report served to provide a semblance of progress where Scottish culture was concerned – though it did provide a salient and definitive superior common principle in the form of its four strategic objects. With this in mind, the report serves as a device for the government to inform its public – most notably its “artists, performers, curators, and all others who work in the cultural sector” who are singled out as being the underlying reason for having a Cultural Strategy to begin with (Scottish Executive, 2000, p.4) – of its cultural priorities moving forward. It is arguably an exercise in shaping public opinion insofar as it offers a broad enough range of priorities to appease virtually every community of its cultural sector and industries, while also establishing a guiding principle for its cultural policy moving forward.

6.4: Rinse & Repeat: The Cultural Commission 2004-2005

If Creating Our Future… Minding Our Past (2000) offered little in the way of a coherent vision for Scotland’s cultural policy, the Cultural Commission and its 2005 report offer a heartier approach to developing Scottish culture. The Commission, itself, was first introduced in a 2004 Cultural Policy Statement published by the Scottish Executive, and was largely built around a 2003 speech by then-First Minister Jack McConnell in which he stress the importance of developing Scotland’s culture and cultural sector: McConnell’s “ambition” was to see culture become a “civic exercise on a par with health, housing and education” (as ctd. by Cultural Commission. 2005, p.1). In fact, the Cultural Policy Statement stresses the salience of the First Minister’s speech in both its and the commission’s approach to deliberating on the state of Scottish culture:

The Cultural Commission (the Commission) will use the First Minister’s St Andrew’s Day speech and the Minister’s policy statement to provide a policy context to their deliberations. The Commission’s procedures and findings will acknowledge the First Minister’s statement that, “Our devolved government should have the courage and faith to back human imagination, our innate creativity, as the
most potent force for individual change and social vision” (Scottish Executive, 2004, p.10).

With this in mind, the Cultural Commission’s report outlines what it believed “need[ed] to be done to achieve [McConnell’s] ambition” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p.1). The report includes more than 130 recommendations that covered the full gamut of cultural issues surrounding Scotland, ranging from the endorsement of legislation that would grant Scottish citizens the right to “fulfil their creative potential, take part in cultural life, an enriching communal life in a satisfying environment; and participate in designing and implementing cultural policy”; to establishing a distinct Scottish broadcasting channel (pp.275-286). Suffice it to say, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the Commission’s recommendations in their full measure. With this in mind, there are some key elements from the report that are worth highlighting.

Similar to what the NCS did before it, the Cultural Commission (2005) undertook a “comprehensive review of culture in Scotland” (p.292). Much of this review involved consultations with stakeholders from the cultural sector and the general public, and broadly dealt with cultural concerns such as education, institutional infrastructure, and delivery of and access to services (p.293). Drawing from the work of the NCS, the Commission (2005) also broadly defined “culture” as being: the arts, including drama, dance, literature, music, the visual arts, crafts, film; the creative industries, including screen and broadcasting; museums and heritage; galleries; libraries; archives; and architecture (p.12). For the Commission, Scotland served as the “custodian of a significant part of the Western world’s heritage in its libraries, archives, historic buildings, galleries and museums” – though a custodian in need of recognizing and taking advantage of the “significant opportunities for growth” offered by the creative industries and digital media (Cultural Commission, 2005, p.1).
Of particular note, the Commission (2005) chose to interpret the First Minister’s ambition as being primarily a question of access – of ensuring that “every person in Scotland can share in any cultural activity that is publicly funded” (p.1). As a means of addressing access, the Commission identified the education system as an important catalyst (i.e. device) for changing the way Scotland approaches culture and cultural services, and outlines three main areas of focus it feels education could help elaborate: creativity, confidence, and well-being (p.6). When it comes to creativity, the Commission was not alone in its assessment of the education system: both the NCS and Learning and Teaching Scotland – a public organization devised to assess and develop Scotland’s education system – are referenced by the Commission for acknowledging the importance of “developing creativity in schools” (p.7). In the case of Learning and Teaching Scotland, creativity – when properly integrated into the classroom through, for example, arts courses – is credited with regulating student behaviour, encouraging participation, and reducing absenteeism. As such, the education system was presented as a vehicle for nourishing creativity: “the principle goal of education is to create people who are capable of doing new things […] people who are creative, inventive discoverers” (Piaget, as ctd. by Creative Commission, 2005, p.7). For the NCS, when creativity was properly nourished, it could help individuals flourish in virtually every facet of their lives – a sentiment strongly shared by Scotland’s government, educators, and business leaders (pp.7-8).

Where the Commission (2005) saw culture and creativity having their most salient impact on Scottish society was in their capacity to be economic drivers. Citing Richard Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class (2002) – and the application of his economic indicators in European nations – as a rationale for emphasising the growth of Scotland’s creative/cultural industries in its recommendations, the Commission noted that work must be done to make Scotland “a place that is attractive to creative people” (p.6). The Commission indicated that because Scotland’s
population was both aging and in decline – in large part due to declining birth rates – a greater reliance was being placed on immigration for population sustainment. To maximize the potential of this reliance on immigration, the Commission believed efforts needed to be taken to ensure that the creative class – as presented by Florida – were not only attracted to Scotland, but were sufficiently enticed to stay (p.13).

The Commission (2005) also saw creativity as a factor for building confidence. As with creativity, the Commission emphasised the importance of the education sector in cultivating confidence and self-esteem, pointing to the integration of arts in schools as an example of how education and creativity could improve one’s self-esteem: “we believe that an individual schooled in the arts is a person of greater confidence and therefore of greater competence” (p.68). For this reason, the Commission suggested the development of programs that would provide students with the opportunity to work with cultural organizations and enterprises, to develop vocational skills and build their confidence in various cultural fields (p.68). Similarly, internships and mentorships were encouraged as a means of providing students with experience and networking opportunities (p.77). As with creativity, however, the Commission’s recommendations for building confidence placed a premium on its economic benefits. The Commission suggested that just as artists “need help to sell” their work, so too do Scottish citizens “need help in gaining the confidence to buy” artists’ work (p.101). To this end, the Commission commended the Scottish Arts Council for having developed a guide for “understanding and choosing art and a scheme to defray payments of the item chosen” (p.101). Similarly, partnerships with the private sector were lauded as a means of displaying and eventually selling the works of Scottish artists (p.101). Among the Commission’s other suggestions for boosting confidence was to ensure that people had access to events, people, and institutions that “inspire” and evoke a sense of national pride, while also ensuring that a
framework was in place to allow Scottish talent to “participate and exhibit at the highest level” (p.9). Part of ensuring this access, however, would mean increasing baseline funding to core-funded cultural organizations – an exercise that, itself, would require building public confidence by demonstrating the merit of these organizations through their cultural contributions (p.130).

With the economic benefits of creativity and confidence put front and centre in the Cultural Commission’s report, it is perhaps ironic that the Commission approached the issue of well-being by effectively asking its readers to put aside economic considerations. Rather, the Commission encourages well-being be approached from the perspective of citizen satisfaction or happiness:

One of our Thinking Group members told us of his secondment with the Greek government where their ambition is to reduce all measurement of public policy down to one indicator – are people happier. This is a bold aspiration for government but is arguably its most genuine desire (Cultural Commission, 2005, p.10).

With happiness in mind, the Commission also highlights the New Economic Foundation’s view on well-being: “Policy traditionally focuses on growing the economy, when all the evidence suggests this has little impact on well-being” (as ctd. by Cultural Commission, 2005, p.10). Rather, the Commission’s focus on well-being was built around trying to assess to what degree culture (and cultural policy) is improving the quality of life of the Scottish people (p.24) For this reason, the Commission identified a series of elements it felt could better accentuate the well-being of Scots vis-à-vis culture, including: the implementation of well-being audits that would allow governments to better assess their cultural services and determine where best to allocate funding; the development of a “well-being economy” through the provision of “high-quality” work that is, at once, purposeful, challenging, and offers opportunities for socializing; a broader, more well-rounded education system and curriculum that promotes emotional, social, and physical well-being; providing greater investment in early-years education and parental leaves as
a means of offsetting future health, education, and social work; and strengthening civil society through community engagement (p.10).

Where the Commission’s report arguably differs most from the NCS’s is in its outline of three proposed options for change – all of which included (a) a cultural assembly “initiated and serviced by” an as-yet-unnamed development agency, referred to as “Culture Scotland (all variants),” that would be charged with bringing “together all parts of the cultural sector”; and (b) required local governments to “liaise directly with the Scottish Executive for their annual funding” (Cultural Commission, 2005, pp.228-233). The first of these options was to develop two limited liability charitable companies – Culture Scotland and the Culture Fund. The first of these companies, Culture Scotland, would serve as a “strategic planning hub” for the cultural sector, clearing up a lot of the government dependency and overall confusion and cluster in the cultural sector’s institutional infrastructure (p.232). Culture Scotland would serve, in a similar fashion to the SAC: as an intermediary that advocated to the government on behalf of the cultural sector; as an assessor of funding applications; as a mentor to facilitate policy development and national standards; as a promoter and developer of national development strategies; and as a supporter of creative talent and new thinking/knowledge creation (p.235). The second of these companies, the Culture Fund, would serve to both foster “enterprise within the [cultural] sector” and as a treasury for the sector (pp.233-234). The fund’s key functions would be disbursement of funds; brokering development financing between the private sector and the cultural sector; investment in the cultural sector; and monitoring the financial data of the cultural sector (pp.236-237). This option required that pre-existing non-departmental public bodies – namely SAC and Scottish Screen – be disaggregated and reassembled into Culture Scotland and the Culture Fund (p.237).

The second option outlined by the Cultural Commission (2005) was to develop a government agency that would take a more proactive/leadership role in the cultural sector and
would be responsible for its funding. Culture Scotland would serve as an advisory agency and would, once again, act as intermediary between the government and local authorities and organizations within the cultural sector. In this respect, Culture Scotland would operate in a similar fashion to existing non-departmental public bodies – such as the SAC and Scottish Screen, who would, as in the previous option, be disaggregated (Cultural Commission, 2005, p.238). Culture Scotland would be largely responsible for the same measures as it was in the previous option – albeit without the responsibility of advocacy (p.240). In this case, advocacy and funding would be separated, with advocacy being provided by a new non-governmental public body: the Centre for Creativity. The Centre would operate at arm’s length from government and would, in addition to advocacy, assume responsibility for coordinating “think tank work on the cultural sector” and financial development services that are beyond the purview of the government, itself (pp.238-241).

The final option outlined by the Cultural Commission (2005) was to create a federation of existing non-departmental public bodies. In this option, Culture Scotland would serve as a “high-level partnership” between the existing public bodies (p.243). This federation would essentially serve two purposes: bringing separate agencies together to form a unified “cultural front” for the purpose of advocacy; and to take part in strategic development (p.243). The rationale for this final option stemmed from the fact that many of the exiting agencies had already begun meeting in an informal fashion. However, caution was given with formalizing this sort of arrangement: there may not have been a serious appetite for it in the cultural sector; and the fact that this federation would involve existing agencies who are already familiar and comfortable with the existing cultural infrastructure could “handicap” the possibility of introducing any real or impactful changes (p.244). Nevertheless, this federation would include the introduction of a Centre for Creativity that would function as an “operation agency,” similar in purpose to in the
previous option, but with a “strong development brief and some revenue funding from the Scottish Executive” (p.245).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, based on its evaluation of the three options in conjunction with the status quo, the Cultural Commission (2005) found the first option to be most ideal, meeting all of the Commission’s criteria as they related to “fitness for purpose, impact on sector, and cost effectiveness/best value” (p.248). Comparatively, the Commission found the second option met most of its criteria, while both the third option and the status quo met very few of its criteria. In fact, the Commission felt that there was relatively little variance between the third option and the status quo and consequently dismissed them as holding little value beyond continuing a system that was clearly not meeting the social and cultural needs of Scotland (p.248). Overall, the Commission’s conclusions called for the streamlining and centralization of the government’s role and interventions in Scotland’s cultural sector. The underlying message of the report was that there were too many non-departmental public bodies operating in Scotland’s cultural sector – a fact exhibited in the report’s graphical presentation of the status quo of the cultural sector’s infrastructure (see Figure 1 below) – and that radical, arguably paradigmatic, changes were needed if there was to be any hope for change.
What is evident, based on what followed, is that the Cultural Commission’s (2005) findings and recommendations were not made in vain. Within a year of the report’s publication, the (new) Minister for Tourism, Culture and Sport, Patricia Ferguson – speaking on behalf of the Scottish Executive – responded to the Commission’s report (and the subsequent discourse it created) with a report of her own: Scotland’s Culture (Bonnar, 2014, p.142). In this report, Ferguson outlines the Scottish Executive’s strategic visions for future cultural policy – including key initiatives, legislation, investment, and infrastructure changes – the latter of which was identified as being needed in order to implement other policy decisions (p.142). The Minister’s report, itself, parrots many of the Cultural Commission’s findings, indicating that “Scotland’s culture sits at the very heart of the nation’s life and identity” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p.3), but that its cultural agencies lack a “strategic, coherent delivery of culture” (p.7). The report furthers this sentiment by suggesting that delivery bodies, such as the SAC and Scottish Screen, were the products of pre-devolution and, as such, were devised “for a different age and different priorities” (p.7). Furthermore, after reviewing the Commission’s report, the Scottish Executive agreed with
the notion that there needed to be significant infrastructure changes in order to reduce bureaucracy in the cultural sector and eliminate the confusing system presented in the exhibit above (pp.8-9). In addition to pursuing infrastructural changes, the Executive pledged to increase its funding from £187 million to £214 million while focusing its funding on “initiatives that will make the biggest contribution to national priorities” (p.10). With that being said, the Scottish Executive did not agree with the Cultural Commission’s preferred option for a new cultural infrastructure. The Executive felt that the Commission’s focus on “best value” was not keeping in the spirit of cultural delivery, nor was it supported by many cultural bodies and commentators (p.28). For this reason, the Executive developed its own infrastructure model that would be built around a new cultural development agency: Creative Scotland.

This new infrastructure model would focus on the “function and the delivery” of the Scottish Executive’s “three core responsibilities for cultural provision”: recognizing and nurturing Scottish cultural talent; promoting the “best of Scotland’s Cultural treasures” that were in the care of its National Collection; and “to make the best of the nation’s performing activity available through the work of the national performing arts companies” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p.29). More specifically, the new infrastructure would emphasise the growth and development of Scotland’s cultural sector, the preservation and conservation of its national arts and culture, and the promotion of excellence through the development of standards and entitlements (p.48). Underscoring each responsibility was the goal of providing greater access and services to citizens and an overall desire to involve local governments and authorities in the process of cultural development and the establishment of national standards (pp.48-49). Unlike the Cultural Commission’s choice option to essentially tear down Scotland’s cultural infrastructure and rebuild from scratch, the new infrastructure would involve the amalgamation of the SAC and Scottish Screen into a single agency as a means of addressing cultural development,
with the responsibilities associated with supporting the national performing arts companies being transferred directly to the executive and responsibilities associated with the archiving of artistic products being transferred to Scotland’s National Archive (p.48).

Overall, the new infrastructure outlined by the Scottish Executive offered a more concrete and overarching approach to cultural policy than the NCS did – though its superior common principle to promote and valorize Scottish culture remained consistent and relatively unchanged from what was presented five years previous. Beyond a more concretized common principle, the new infrastructure presented an investment formula that sought balance between new culture and old: it would add structure to Scotland’s cultural sector, while also respecting the sector’s existing domains and customs. In other words, there is a sense that this approach sought to restructure the cultural sector without completely dismantling it as a way of both addressing the proverbial cracks in its structure and ensuring that the existing cultural community was not alienated in the process. While the Executive acknowledged that change was needed, it was not prepared to commit to a completely new policy paradigm to achieve that change. In this respect, the new infrastructure would provide the foundations for a new approach to cultural policy that would, at once, pay homage to the existing structures and institutions and promote new structures; the infrastructure would establish a state of worth in terms of acknowledging the importance of creativity and innovation of new and attractive cultural industries, while also recognizing the human dignity of the pre-existing cultural community.

6.5: When Two Become One: The Creation of Creative Scotland-Onward

Following the Scottish Executive’s response to the Cultural Commission, it wasted relatively little time in executing its plan to introduce a new cultural sector infrastructure spearheaded by Creative Scotland. In late 2006, the Scottish Executive (2006b) released a
consultation document, *Draft Culture (Scotland) Bill*, which further outlined the executive’s rationale for introducing a new infrastructure and merging the SAC with Scottish Screen, and provides a legislative overview of what needed to be done to proceed with the endeavour. Among other things, the draft bill nuanced the reason for amalgamating the SAC with Scottish Screen – “it makes sense and should be more efficient to have one public body address such closely related issues and ideas” (p.6). The draft bill also emphasised *Creative Scotland*’s role as it relates to the cultural industries: to support their success and to serve them in an economic development role (pp.6-7). The powers conferred to *Creative Scotland* broadly allowed it “do anything which appears to it to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of, or in connection with, or appears to it to be conducive to, the exercise of its functions” which included:

(a) engage in any business or undertaking; (b) form, promote or acquire (whether alone or with others) companies; (c) form partnerships with others; (d) enter into contracts; (e) make grants and loans; (f) accept gifts of money and other property; (g) invest sums not immediately required in relation to the exercise of its functions; (h) undertake or execute any charitable trust; (i) obtain advice or assistance from any person who, in *Creative Scotland*’s opinion, is qualified to give it; (j) commission research; [and] (k) with the consent of the Scottish Ministers, borrow money, acquire and dispose of land, establish or take part in the setting up of organisations having functions similar to the functions of *Creative Scotland*, [and] make charges for the provision of goods or advice or other services in such circumstances and of such amounts as *Creative Scotland* may determine (Scottish Executive, 2006b, p.33; 2009, pp.90-91).

Unsurprisingly, the draft bill was met with concern from parliament over the broad remit it offered *Creative Scotland*, not to mention the overall lack of clarity it provided relative to its set-up costs (Stevenson, 2014a, p.179). Similar concerns were also expressed by the cultural community, through media and the press. Such concerns, however, were often “voiced as thinly veiled arguments for and against Scottish nationalism” (Hibberd, 2009, p.334). The Scottish Executive’s justification of *Creative Scotland* as a means of “simplifying and streamlining” public agencies while also reducing bureaucracy proved to be controversial to many Scots
While much of the draft bill would ultimately be discarded with the election of the SNP in 2007, the impetus of Creative Scotland was not (Stevenson, 2014a) – with virtually everything that was established in the draft bill in relation to Creative Scotland coming to fruition in the Scottish Executive’s (2009) Public Service Reform (Scotland) Bill (pp.14-16 & 88-93).

As such, Creative Scotland (2015) was officially introduced in 2010 to serve as the (non-departmental) “public body that supports the arts, screen and creative industries across all parts of Scotland on behalf of everyone who lives, works or visits” the country (par.1). In its inception, Creative Scotland’s (2011) ambition was to see Scotland “recognized as one of the world’s most creative nations by 2020” (p.4). The organization’s vision is to see Scotland’s arts, screen, and the cultural industries “valued and recognized,” and to make the country a place where artists and creative people “flourish and thrive, and where everyone, everywhere, is interested and curious about creativity” (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.6). In this respect, creativity is established as a state of worth:

Creativity and the arts is the mirror by which we see ourselves, understanding who we are and who we might be. They make us appreciate our weaknesses, face our fears and, most importantly, appreciate the humanity in us all (Searle, as ctd. by Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.16).

In effect, Creative Scotland strives to see Scotland emerge as an environment where “everyone actively values and celebrates arts and creativity as the heartbeat for our lives and the world in which we live” (p.13). Moreover, Creative Scotland seeks to support this vision of culture while also supporting and encouraging the expression of Scotland’s diverse cultural and linguistic (re: Scottish and Gaelic) heritage and traditions – something it feels can foster a greater sense of community and, somewhat implicitly, nationalism (p.19). With this in mind, Creative Scotland’s remit provides it with responsibilities to: 1) identify, support, and develop “quality and excellence in the arts and culture from those engaged in artistic and other creative endeavours”;

(Birrell, 2009, p.23).
2) promote the “understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment of the arts and culture”; 3) encourage access and participation in arts and culture; 4) realize the national and international value and benefits of arts and culture; 5) encourage and support “artistic and other creative endeavours which contribute to an understanding of Scotland’s national culture” as a way of life; and 6) promote and support Scotland’s (cultural) industries and other commercial activity, primarily through the “application of creative skill” (p.33).

To these ends, Creative Scotland (2014b) broadly serves as a funder, advocate, development body, and influencer of the cultural sector (p.35). Moreover, Creative Scotland seeks to develop partnerships with both public and private organizations – not to mention artists and creative people – in the hope of establishing “strong, collaborative, and flexible relationships” through which greater cultural development can be achieved (p.37). In effect, the role of Creative Scotland – which “spans both intrinsic and commercial creativity” – is to offer opportunities to artists and creative industries “in relation to untapped markets and place-making” (p.49). Acknowledging the importance of the UK’s creative economy – and the fact that it is growing at a rate “much faster than the overall economy” – Creative Scotland seeks to promote the success of Scotland’s creative industries through the establishment of “strong connections across the arts, screen and creative industries” as a means of maintaining their “creative impact and economic gain” (p.49).

Since its establishment, Creative Scotland (2015) has been responsible for distributing funding to artists and industries with the goal of enabling “people and organizations to work in and experience the arts, screen and creative industries in Scotland,” and as a means of fostering and bringing to life “great ideas” and creating culture (par.2-3). In its approach to funding, Creative Scotland (2014b) emphasises the human element of culture:
Organisations and individuals that we support work collaboratively and imaginatively to increase opportunities for people to engage and participate. They explore new ways and platforms for people to access artistic and creative work and help audiences to engage with a diversity of experiences. This will include providing explanations, interpretations and translations where appropriate (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.19).

Financially, Creative Scotland (2014a) receives its funding primarily from two sources: “Grant in Aid funding from the Scottish Government, and Lottery funding from the UK National Lottery” (p.5). Additionally, Creative Scotland also receives “restricted funds” from the Scottish Executive that are earmarked for specific cultural activities and funds from partner organizations with whom they “collaborated on specific projects” (p.5). This funding is then distributed to artists and creative industries in accordance to the agency’s five broad ambitions: 1) the recognition and valuation of excellence and experimentation in arts and culture; 2) the provision of access to artistic and creative experiences; 3) the use of imagination, ambition, and creativity to transform places and the overall quality of life of the Scottish people; 4) the bringing to life of ideas “by a diverse, skilled, and connected leadership and workforce”; and 5) the furthering of Scotland’s desire to be recognized as a “distinctive creative nation connected to the world” (Creative Scotland, 2014b, pp.17-21). Underscoring these ambitions are four interconnected themes that inform virtually all of Creative Scotland’s work: encouraging the creative learning and adaptability of cultural organizations; ensuring equalities and diversity in the cultural industries; supporting the expansion of Scotland’s digital output, as well as skills development in the sector; and ensuring that the cultural sector works in a sustainable manner to help protect the environment (pp.24-28).

With these ambitions in mind, Creative Scotland’s (2011) support of the cultural sector represents an investment formula – one which establishes the criterion for government support while also stipulating an expected return on investment, “whether financial or otherwise, for the
nation as a result of the support given” (p.3). More specifically, *Creative Scotland* (2014b) delivers “a modest portfolio of investment to commercial organisations able to repay their funding” which, in turn, allows the organization to “recycle subsidy and benefit others” (p.48). Moreover, *Creative Scotland*’s ambition to see Scotland benefit from its culture and cultural production also suggests a statement of worth via the instrumentalization of the country’s culture – a process which coincides with a period in the UK where cultural policy has begun to transition away from embracing the aesthetic value of art and culture, towards “embracing its social and instrumental impact” (Archer, 2014, p.193). This underscores the fact that *Creative Scotland* was built “against a background of economic drivers” that have “factored into the organization’s corporate plan” (p.193). This has led many commentators to – rightfully or wrongfully – conclude that what matters most for *Creative Scotland* is economic growth “rather than intrinsic cultural worth” (p.193). The executive of *Creative Scotland*, however, has indicated that it prefer not to make separations between “artistic, social and economic values,” preferring instead to view them as “important and interdependent” factors that, when combined, “generate value” (p.193). Rather, *Creative Scotland* (2014b), in its most recent 10-year plan, outlines how the organization is “interested in exploring how [it] might develop an approach to resourcing creative capital, helping artists and creative people develop and refine ideas which can feed their work and help sustain an economic base for growth and development” (p.48). *Creative Scotland* adds that “intrinsic value” has been linked “to theories developed around wellbeing economics” – that is to say, theories built on the notion that a happy society that “holds a sense of wellbeing” is more likely to be “productive and generate greater levels of economic return” than a society that is discontent (p.48). In other words, even as it endeavours to support Scottish culture for its intrinsic value, there is an inherent ambition in *Creative Scotland*’s approach towards economizing that value, towards making it instrumental to Scottish society. It is a statement of worth that suggests
that culture is measured as worthy only insofar as it yields positive returns for the Scottish society – that it values and promotes the image and identity envisioned by the Scottish Executive and people.

It is relatively safe to say, then, that, in its short life, Creative Scotland has ambitiously sought to strike a balance between intrinsic and economic approaches to culture – or, more appropriately, sought to fuse the two into one approach. While, certainly, Creative Scotland evokes elements of a civic/market world compromise in its emphasis on returns, the ambition to synthesize intrinsic and economic values speaks to a more pronounced engagement between the domestic and market worlds. The desire to make Scotland a globally recognized cultural hub (Creative Scotland, 2011; 2014c) serves the dual role of personalizing Scottish culture (and identity) for a broader audience while also establishing a domesticated relationship between the local and global markets; it serves as a test model for verifying and validating the Scottish reality on an international stage. In this respect, there are parallels to be drawn between Creative Scotland’s approach and that of Québec’s SODEC insofar as both are agencies seeking to broaden the reach of their local cultural offerings while raising the international profile of their respective national minorities. If there is a difference to be found in their respective approaches, however, it is arguably in the inherent importance of culture for each national minority’s identity: while, in Québec, culture and language have played a prominent role in shaping the province’s cultural identity, it has predominantly been socio-economic factors that have shaped Scotland’s.

Scotland’s relatively newfound emphasis on culture, primarily since post-devolution – and the way it has been presented as a seminal part of Scotland’s ongoing economic development – suggests that economics considerations and the class implications that can often accompany them are ingrained into the cultural identity of the Scottish people or, at the very least, the cultural approach(es) of its government. Much of Scotland’s history and relationship with
England has been shaped by a (real or perceived) class division – between the working-class Scots and the “bourgeois” English. Given this socio-economic division, the fact that Scotland would emphasise economic value in its approaches to cultural policy, to emphasise its relationship to intrinsic value, suggests Scotland has a symbiotic understanding of culture and wealth: while Scotland’s cultural policies are invariably driven by market world principles, those principles overlap with Scotland’s culture – they overlap with its domestic world principles. In a certain respect, the argument can, thus, be made that the economic emphasis of Scotland’s cultural policy is, itself, an emphasis on culture. This is not to suggest that Scottish culture is inherently economic in nature, nor is it to reduce the country’s culture to economic considerations; rather, the idea is to suggest that Scotland’s cultural identity is class conscious – and this class consciousness has informed the country’s approach to cultural policy and identity. Thus, it is almost fitting that, where economic considerations, for a long time, informed Scotland’s culture and identity, it is now cultural considerations that are informing its economy.

6.6: Moving Forward: Scottish Cultural Policy Post-Referendum 2014

For a “strong but small” country such as Scotland, there has been a measure of security in remaining part of a larger entity such as the UK – particularly in relation to the UK’s larger economy and membership in “major international organizations” such as the United Nations, the European Union (at the time of this writing, at least), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), among others (Ichijo, 2009, p.169). This reliance has, consequently, led to two broad schools of thought where Scottish cultural identity and nationalism are concerned: the classical view which posits that, even in an ever-increasingly globalized world where absolute sovereignty is no longer plausible, sovereignty remains “an essential property” of a nation’s self-determination; and the more recent view that suggests that as sovereignty has been devalued by
globalization, there is little point in seeking it in places where it serves no purpose to even seek it – rather, it is better to remain a nation within a larger state entity (p.169). This latter school of thought can perhaps best be described as an “association-seeking” nationalism, as its primary interest is not so much absolute independence, but rather the establishment of “group-differentiated rights and a special status as a distinct society” within the context of a larger state (Lluch, 2011, p.204). Given the outcome of Scotland’s 2014 referendum on independence, it seems that, for the time being at least, the Scottish people have chosen to embrace an association-seeking nationalism – something that, relatively speaking, has been reflected in the country’s cultural policies.

With that said, it is somewhat debatable to what extent Scotland’s cultural policy would have evolved differently had the Scots voted in favour of independence. In fact, if the white papers published by the Scottish Executive (2013) in preparation for the 2014 referendum are any indication, Scotland’s cultural policy would have followed relatively the same trajectory as what has been evidenced by Creative Scotland in recent years. In the papers, the Executive indicated a desire to distinguish its approach to culture from that of Westminster by recognizing “the intrinsic value of culture and heritage, and […] not just value them for their economic benefit, substantial though that is” (p.19). The Executive added that “[w]ith independence we will have new powers over the economy to encourage our culture and creative sectors” (p.19). In other words, seemingly not much would have changed with respects to Scotland’s approach to cultural policy: the country’s policy would have still sought to bridge (or eliminate) the gap between the intrinsic and economic values of culture. What is perhaps most interesting about the Executive’s assertions, then, is not so much its proposed approach drawn almost verbatim from Creative Scotland, but, rather, its ambition to distinguish Scotland’s cultural policy approach from that of England. It is an interesting ambition given that, despite its distinction as a separate entity, many
researchers have continued to approach Scottish cultural policy as UK cultural policy – ignoring some of the more prominent changes in Scotland’s cultural policy that, far from converging with the policies of England, have diverged in ways that have allowed Scotland to further distinguish itself from its UK counterparts (Stevenson, 2014b, p.133). It is also made interesting by the fact that, perhaps ironically, former British Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith (1998) published a book – Creative Britain – which outlines his vision for British cultural policy which emphasises the relationship between culture and creativity, and their importance to the “modern” British economy – a relationship he underscored by recognizing the intrinsic value of culture and the need for government intervention to nurture it (p.1). In other words, the Scottish Executive’s ambition to distinguish its approach to culture from that of the UK government is perhaps more bark than bite.

If there is one thing, then, that can be said of Scotland’s cultural policy since devolution, it is that it has emblemized a sort of (re)awakening of Scotland’s sense of culture and identity – one that had, for a long time, lied dormant. The efforts employed by the Scottish Executive to promote and support the growth and development of Scottish culture – something that was arguably neglected pre-devolution – suggests a sort of reconnection with Scotland’s heritage and past, a sort of invitation to reassess Scotland’s identity in the context of the UK and Europe. And yet, the emphasis of Scotland’s cultural policy on economic considerations also underscores the notion of independence – the idea that, through self-sustaining cultural industries, Scotland can inherently move beyond any sort of (economic) reliance on the UK. The fact that Scotland’s cultural policies have evidenced a measure of historic/heritage appreciation – a “potent” element in “the construction of nationalism” – in conjunction with economic aspirations (Bhandari, 2011, p.670) suggests that even if Scotland has rejected independence from a purely sovereigntist perspective, it is still pursuing a sort of economic emancipation. In other words, what the case of
Scotland evidences in terms of the cultural policies of national minorities is that far from simply being a tool for regulating all things culture, it is a tool for cultural, social, and economic transformation.

Where Scotland’s case differs most from that of Québec – and, as will be seen in the next chapter, Catalonia – is with respects to how fully-formed/actualized its cultural identity is. Whereas Québec and Catalonia both exhibit strong cultural identities, differentiated from that of their respective cultural majorities largely on the grounds of language, Scotland’s distinction from that of England is not so readily apparent. Certainly, there are cultural distinctions between Scotland and the other countries of the UK, but there is arguably nothing as definitive as language to set it apart. Much of the historical distinction between Scotland and the rest of the UK has been built on socio-economic and/or religious differences – many of which have eroded over the centuries. The fact that, for a long time, the impetus for Scotland’s cultural preservation and promotion came from voluntary and private sector interests (i.e. the Saltire Society) indicates a failure (or oversight) on the part of government where culture was concerned. More importantly, it indicates that culture was not as significant a priority for the Scottish people as it was or has been for the Québécois or Catalanians. This cultural oversight or negligence, however, can imply one of two things: that Scotland’s underappreciated its culture and heritage, and, consequently, left it largely unattended up until recently; or that the Scots were confident in their sense of cultural identity, to the point where protection and preservation were seen as unneeded or of little importance. In either case, Scotland’s seemingly renewed interest in its culture – as exemplified by its recent cultural policies (namely Creative Scotland) – is revealing.

Scotland’s case indicates that a push for sovereignty and independence – and the broader concept of cultural differentiation that often accompanies them in the context of majority/minority cultures – are not enough to sustain the cultural identity of a national minority
– even those with prominent nationalist movements. Cultures often strive on more substantive forms of expression – a fact that Scotland’s Executive has seemingly taken to heart since its devolution in the late 1990s. It implies that building an identity on difference alone is unsustainable in the long run; more significant and intrinsic expressions of culture are needed in order to maintain and substantiate a culture and its identity. Cultural policy, in Scotland’s case, has allowed the country to rebuild and (re)negotiate its cultural identity on grounds that go beyond geographic and socio-economic differences between it and England; these policies have allowed Scotland to forge a cultural identity that can be selective in its approach to identity formation – selective in the cultural and historical elements it wishes to put on display (e.g. Bhandari, 2011). In this context, the cultural industries, facilitated by internationalization and globalization (Doern, Pal, & Tomlin, 1996), have provided Scotland with a means to both its ends: the ability to shape its culture and cultural identity while also offering the country the opportunity to advance its economic independence.

The seemingly diverse and inclusive nature of Scotland’s cultural policies as they relate to the cultural industries (i.e. Creative Scotland) serves as a sign, then, that the realities of a national minority seeking to preserve and promote its cultural identity in an increasingly globalized world are not as “cut and dry” as simply establishing protective mechanisms. There is a growing need – and trend – in the cultural policies of national minorities for cultural adaptability, mingled with a willingness to allow their cultural identities to evolve as a form of continuity. While it might be overly simplistic to suggest that Scotland’s cultural policies suggest an “if you cannot beat them, then join them” approach to supporting its cultural identity vis-à-vis the rest of the UK and, to a certain degree, the world; there is an underlying openness in these policies to explore new avenues of cultural expression that takes into account Scotland’s place in the broader world. More and more, the idea of cultural preservation comes not from barring down the proverbial
hatches and locking out outside influences, but from a willingness to open one’s culture (and cultural identity) to outside forces – it is a willingness to take risks and be an active part of the global community.

6.6.1: A Type Analysis Scotland’s Cultural Policy

With the introduction of Creative Scotland, the Scottish Executive established a definitive policy framework for its culture – one that saliently embodies most of the elements of a common world. Similar to the case of Québec – particularly in la Politique culturelle-era of policy – Scotland’s superior common principle focuses on promoting Scottish culture and heritage in all its unique richness. A certain typological overlap between Québec and Scotland occurs throughout much of their recent cultural policy, with a strong emphasis placed, in both cases, on promoting their respective cultures internationally and recognizing the cultural contributions (and successes) of their artistic/creative communities. Scotland’s investment formula, for instance, indicates that while Scotland recognizes the importance of its cultural heritage, it retains an eye on the future and on the growing importance of new cultural industries and cultural products as social and economic drivers. Implicit in this recognition is the idea that the best way to grow the culture (and/or awareness of it) is by expanding its reach beyond the national minority’s regional borders. To do so, Scotland’s approach draws on the cultural industries, and establishes creation/production and creativity as the defining elements around which a state of worth is measured. Individuals who participate or engage in cultural life – particularly those who actively contribute to the nation’s culture and identity – are revered as harmonious figures insofar as they embody the superior common principle established by the Scottish Executive and promoted by Creative Scotland.
While the policies (and policy initiatives) introduced and supported by Creative Scotland advocate and promote the national minority’s culture, the question of cultural survival is not a prevalent theme the way it was in the earlier era of Québec cultural policy. Similar to the more recent era of Québec policy, where Scotland’s cultural policies do imply a measure of cultural (and identity) protectionism is with respects to the country’s relationship to its federal government. The natural relations between Scotland and the UK government are relatively systematic and definitive, with clearly delineated responsibilities. While Scotland has expressed a desire for greater cultural autonomy – a fact reflected in its policy documentation leading up to the 2014 referendum – there is little to suggest that its Executive would significantly alter their cultural policy approach were they to achieve a greater level of authority over their culture. For the most part, while Scotland’s repertoire of grandeur does prioritize Scottish culture (and the Scots and Gaelic languages), it does so conjunctively with the ambition of promoting the country’s diversity and fostering a sense of equality among its various cultural communities (Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical Categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Case Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superior common principle</td>
<td>The superior common principle underlying the cultural policy of national minorities is the valuation and promotion of a distinct, unifying (national minority) culture or identity.</td>
<td>“Promote creativity, the arts, and other cultural activity; celebrate Scotland’s cultural heritage in its full diversity; realise culture’s potential contribution to education, promoting inclusion and enhancing people’s quality of life; assure an effective national support frame-work for culture” (Scottish Executive, 2000, p.1).</td>
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<tr>
<td>State of worth</td>
<td>The state of worth is measured in terms of cultural cohesion, integration, convergence, assimilation, and propagation: an individual who can identify as a cultural citizen – one who is active and integrated into the national culture – is worthy. Often individuals or industries that produce (national) culture are singled out or conferred a privileged status in the cultural</td>
<td>“Creativity and the arts is the mirror by which we see ourselves, understanding who we are and who we might be. They make us appreciate our weaknesses, face our fears and, most importantly, appreciate the humanity in us all” (Searle, as ctd. by Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.16).</td>
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**Table 5:**
The World of National Minority Cultural Policy – Scotland
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human dignity</th>
<th>Human dignity is recognized and/or established through:</th>
<th>&quot;Organisations and individuals that we support work collaboratively and imaginatively to increase opportunities for people to engage and participate. They explore new ways and platforms for people to access artistic and creative work and help audiences to engage with a diversity of experiences. This will include providing explanations, interpretations and translations where appropriate&quot; (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.19).</th>
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<tr>
<td>Repertoires of subjects</td>
<td>A repertoire of subjects in cultural policy principally consists of artists and amateurs, citizens, (cultural) industries and institutions, creators/producers, and, in certain contexts diaspora and international markets.</td>
<td>&quot;We want to ensure our funding benefits the widest possible range of people in Scotland and beyond. That will mean encouraging the people and organisations that we fund to think carefully about how they connect with hard-to-reach people in remote rural locations or communities who do not have easy access to the arts, screen or creative industries because of economic disadvantage, disability or social circumstance&quot; (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.42).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repertoires of objects and devices</td>
<td>The objects and devices of cultural policy primarily consist of cultural products and artefacts, cultural and heritage sites, symbols, language(s), and educational materials and policies.</td>
<td>“Scotland is custodian of a significant part of the Western world’s heritage in its libraries, archives, historic buildings, galleries and museums. We recognise that the creative industries and digital media offer significant opportunities for growth in the cultural sector in the next ten years and we recommend supporting this trend vigorously. The Commission is also clear that the broader cultural sectors – the performing and creative arts as well as the collections – add value and bring credit to our society” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment formula</td>
<td>The investment formula of a cultural policy operates on at least one of three fronts, and tends to function in relation to the establishment of cultural priorities – often understood in the form of a trade-off or sacrifice: 4) The trade-off between cultural pluralism and homogeneity; 5) The trade-off between the democratization of culture and cultural democracy; and/or 6) The trade-off between cohesion/harmony with the national majority and expressions of cultural/national identity and independence.</td>
<td>“Artistic and creative forms are increasingly developing links and overlaps, driven by new knowledge and connections through digital opportunities, convergence, cross-platform or 360 approaches to creativity. In future these will only increase in prevalence. While we have an important role in supporting the preservation of traditions, we are also interested in understanding and supporting the development of future ways of working. As such we will make space for crossover between forms within our strategies” (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.47).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Rapport of grandeur/Worth | The rapport of grandeur or worth of a cultural policy operationalizes the relationship between different cultural groups, nationally-recognized cultures (i.e. national minorities, national majorities, cultural minorities), and/or institutions/organizations (i.e. government and cultural industries). These rapports tend to manifest hierarchically, wherein one culture (or institution) is given preferential or preeminent treatment relative to other cultures. | “We believe that participation and engagement with the arts can help promote equality and contribute to wellbeing. People from diverse communities, backgrounds and of all ages can discover significant life opportunities through access to the arts. Equalities are about supporting a diverse culture in Scotland, enabling all artistic and creative voices to be heard and working to maximise opportunities to engage with, and participate in, arts throughout the country. We
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Natural relations between beings</strong></th>
<th>The natural relations between beings are presented in cultural policy as the power dynamics that exist between levels of government and levels/statuses of cultures (i.e. majority and minority culture; national and regional culture). Often, natural relations will be presented as cultural guidelines or rules of engagement between national majorities and minorities (e.g. the division of policy responsibilities between the federal and regional/territorial governments).</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Harmonious figures of the natural order</strong></td>
<td>The harmonious figure of the natural order of cultural policy is often presented as culturally-active citizens or artists/producers. Cultural producers, in particular – such as artists and industries – are revered for their ability to evoke, through their productions (and the dissemination thereof), the realities of the superior common principle – as do, in certain contexts, cultural and symbolic figures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Test model</strong></td>
<td>Public opinion/reception, internationalisation, cultural visibility, and global recognition are used as test model(s) in cultural policy. In certain cases, public action, elections, and, referendums can also be seen as test models.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode of expressing judgement</strong></td>
<td>Judgement is based on the perceived social and economic benefits derived from any particular cultural policy objective or priority. In other words judgement is expressed in terms of what it brings to the national minority’s culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Form of evidence</strong></td>
<td>In the context of cultural policy, evidence of the modality of the world’s knowledge is often presented in the forms of economic and social value and through the growth of culture – often tangibly measured through cultural integration, production, consumption, and exportation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State of unworthiness and decline</strong></td>
<td>A state of unworthiness is manifested as a decline in cultural participation, integration, and expression. This decline is often presented as erosion of the national culture and language and/or through assimilation into the national majority’s culture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

will work to foster understanding and establish positive attitudes between people from different cultural backgrounds. We will also fulfil our statutory requirements to support and promote the value of indigenous culture and language, such as Gaelic and Scots” (Creative Scot-land 2014b, p.26).

“The primary matters to be retained to the United Kingdom Parliament would be defence, foreign affairs, central economic and fiscal responsibilities, social security policy, immigration and nationality issues. The Scottish Parliament will therefore have powers in relation to the economy and business, health, education, leisure and social welfare and the legal system and regulation” (SCC, 1995, p.4).

“Artists and creative individuals are the lifeblood of the arts, screen and creative industries. Personal talents, passion, integrity, curiosity and hard work underpin our shared creative system at every level” (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.41).

“International dialogue and benchmarking at the levels of policy, strategy and performance will bring rewards in stimulating innovation, dialogue and recognition from beyond the sectors” (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.21).

“The five ambitions for the arts, screen and creative industries over the next ten years are: Excellence and experimentation across the arts, screen and creative industries is recognised and valued; Everyone can access and enjoy artistic and creative experiences; Places and quality of life are transformed through imagination, ambition and an understanding of the potential of creativity; Ideas are brought to life by a diverse, skilled and connected leadership and workforce; Scotland is a distinctive creative nation connected to the world” (Creative Scotland, 2014a, p.9)

“Over 500,000 admissions to Cultural Cinema Hubs each year; 16 million admissions each year to Scotland’s cinemas; Cineworld Glasgow is the tallest cinema in the world and the busiest, by customer base, in the UK” (Scottish Screen, 2009, p.5).
“In matters of culture, Catalonia should become the equivalent of a state, Catalan society fully nationalized.” – Joan Guitart, Catalan Minister for Culture, 1990, as ctd. by Crameri, 2008, p.1

Chapter 7 – Cultural Distinction & Identity in Catalonia

Catalonia is a relatively autonomous region (and nation-state) of Spain located in the north-eastern reaches of the Iberian Peninsula, bordering France. Its landmass is larger than Belgium and its population exceeds that of Denmark (Balcells, 1996, p.1). Politically, Catalonia is one of 17 cultural communities in Spain that enjoys a measure of autonomy and power that, while “far inferior” to the member states of federated republics such as the United States and Germany, provides it with a measure of cultural and collective recognition that sets it apart from other national minorities (p.1). Despite its size and place in the world, Catalonia remains a relatively unknown commodity to the English-speaking parts of the world. In fact, Catalonia is often confused with another autonomous region of Spain: the Basque Country. The reason for this ignorance of Catalonia is largely political in nature. Up until recent history, Catalonia was not recognized as a political entity in Spain, and its culture was subjected to systematic elimination (McRoberts, 2001, pp.1-2). For its part, Spain has historically been regarded as having “a problematic political structure needing […] radical reforms” (Solís, 2003, p.4). This political structure has, at times, been the source of much conflict, leading regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country to question “the centralized power of the state” at various points (Oskam, 2014, p.51). Despite this problematic structure – and despite the adversity Catalonia has face throughout the centuries, in part because of said structure – not only has Catalonia (and its culture) endured, but it has become an “integral part” of Spain, serving as one of the country’s major international trading centres and as a dominant political and economic hub in the western Mediterranean (McRoberts, 2001, p.1). So long as Spain remains “constituted as a
multi-lingual and multi-cultural space,” it has been largely believed that Catalonia will remain a part of it (Solís, 2003, p.4).

However, in recent years, the political structure of Spain has, once again, become a source of contention in Catalonia – enough so that the Catalan population has given up on the idea of reforming Spain” as a means of “achieving what they consider to be an acceptable fit for Catalonia within the framework of the Spanish State” (p.1). While, historically, Catalans have had a “strong movement for self-determination and autonomy,” recent aspirations to those ends have largely been spurred by both the central government’s “hostile attitude” towards Catalan autonomy and the economic uncertainty that came with the financial crisis of the late 2000s (Oskam, 2014, pp.51-52). Having been denied the formal option of a referendum by the Spanish Prime Minister, the people of Catalonia took their discontent to the polls with an unsanctioned vote on independence on November 9th, 2014. While the vote lacked any sort of legal effect, it did serve to gage the degree to which Catalans had an appetite for constitutional change and an indomitable sense that greater autonomy was needed for Catalonia to once again strive (López, 2015, p.237).

Further accentuating this desire for change has been the question of Catalonia’s cultural identity and distinctiveness vis-à-vis the rest of Spain (Liñeira & Cetrà, 2015, pp.257-258). Where Québec’s cultural identity exhibits a strong linguistic element, and where Scotland’s identity is reflective, in no small part, of an association-seeking nationalism, Catalonia’s cultural identity can arguably be said to sit somewhere in between the two. Academically (and historically), Scotland and Catalonia have served as “easily comparable” because they are both “middle-sized,
stateless nations [...] in Western Europe with old identities, relatively recent regional autonomy, nationalist parties that grew up from the late 1960s onward, and many exponents of ‘civic nationalism’ that ask for autonomy and inclusiveness but [not] xenophobia” (Greer, 2007, p.15). Moreover, both Scotland and Catalonia provide comparable examples of “bottom-up regionalization” promoted by social and political forces rather than state-imposed shifts in responsibility and/or state-driven political agendas. It also does not hurt that both nations use each other as examples in their respective domestic politics and policymaking processes (pp.15-16). Where Catalonia represents a strong comparative to Québec is with respects to the cultural and linguistic elements of their respective cultural and national identities. Much like Québec, Catalonia approaches language in an inclusive manner (Kaufmann, 2008, p.460). In fact, language sits at “the centre of all claims for Catalan nationhood,” and distinguishes Catalonia from “all other would-be nations, including the Spanish one” (McRoberts, 2001, p.6). More recently, comparisons between Québec and Catalonia have been drawn from an economic perspective (Keating, 2001a, p.167). Parallels have also been drawn between Catalonia and Québec (along with Greenland and Scotland) as a means of promoting a “clear pro-independence movement” (Crameri, 2011, p.64). All told, all three societies exhibit cultural and national identities “rooted in historical experience” but that have been strategically reshaped “in accordance with contemporary reality” (Keating, 2001a, p.263) – thus making them unique cases for comparison.

With this in mind, this chapter – like its predecessors – explores the nature of the Catalan cultural identity through an analysis of its history and cultural policy. Emphasis was placed on policies that were introduced in the last quarter of the 20th century-onward, following the end of the Franco dictatorship in Spain – a dictatorship that was particularly challenging for Catalan culture, in no small part because it sought to eradicate it. While Catalonia is not the only self-
identifying nation within Spain, and certainly not the only one to have gained any measure of autonomy – the Basque Country and Galicia, for instance, have also obtained similar provisions to Catalonia – Catalonia is, by far, the largest and, along with the Basque Country, the most recognizable of Spain’s nationalities. Moreover, given that, between 1980 and 2003, the same coalition and leader remained in power in Catalonia, the Catalans offers a relatively unique case of a democratic region whose cultural policies had the opportunity to develop and evolve over a long period of time under the same regime (McRoberts, 2001, p.4). For their part, Catalonia’s cultural policies have evolved in a high profile and relatively transparent fashion, largely in response to desires: a) to see Catalan culture regain a place of prominence in the region following the Franco regime; b) to differentiate the Catalan culture and identity from those of Spain; and c) to have Catalan culture prominently featured in Catalanian political discourse as a means of acknowledging culture’s importance to the Catalan peoples’ sense of identity (Crameri, 2008, pp.4-5). For the purposes of understanding this evolution, this chapter has been divided into two sections: the first briefly covers the evolution of Catalán’s cultural identity and nationalism, largely in the context of the Spanish Civil War and Franco dictatorships. The second section explores and analyses Catalán’s cultural policies in the years since the Franco dictatorship through the theoretical lenses of the economies of worth framework and governmentality.

7.1: Culture Clash: The History of Catalanian Nationalism

Much of the contemporary academic (and, for that matter, political) discourse surrounding Catalonia’s national identity is framed around the Spanish Civil War (1938-1939) and the subsequent Francisco Franco dictatorship of Spain (1939-1975). The emphasis on this period, in large part, can be accounted for by “the exclusionary nationalist discourse of the [Franco] dictatorship” – a discourse which sought to develop a “unified, homogenous” Spain through the
suppression of regional sentiment and nationalism (i.e. Basque, Galician, and Catalan) (Townson, 2012, p.vi). As such, since the collapse of the Franco dictatorship, nationalist discourse pertaining to (and emerging from) the regions of Spain has largely been focused on the reclamation, legitimation, promotion, and defense of national identities that were put at risk – and the subsequent developments that have challenged the hegemony of the current, democratic Spanish state (p.vi). Among the most salient of these developments where Catalonia is concerned is with respects to its acquisition of the status of autonomous community in 1980, which has since been accentuated by a growing independence movement within the region (Crameri, 2011, p.53). However, to focus solely on the reclamation of Catalanian nationalism in the latter part of the 20th century would be to ignore the socio-historic context in which Catalonia’s national and cultural identity was forged (McRoberts, 2001).

Where Québec’s nationalism can arguably trace its roots to the 18th Century, Catalonia’s national identity can be traced back much further – to as far back as the Middle Ages (McRoberts, 2001, p.6). It was during the Middle Ages – in particular, the 10th and 11th centuries – that the region of Catalonia “emerged as a defined territory and jurisdiction with its own language and culture” – one whose language, in particular, played a prominent role in differentiating the Catalans from their neighbouring regions (i.e. Castilian and Occitan) (Keating, 2001a, p.141). Prior to this emergence, the Catalan people had seen their territory (and people) passed on from one ruling regime to another – beginning with the Romans in the 5th century, the Moors in the early 8th century, followed by the Charlemagne-led Franks in the late 8th century – the latter of whom incorporated Catalonia into the Spanish March and placed it under the relatively nominal, feudal rule of a count (Corriols, 1933; McRoberts, 2001, p.9). Catalonia’s feudal relationship with the Franks, however, would come to an end in 988, when the Count of Barcelona – ruler of the Catalans – renounced ties to the Frankish king (Keating, 2001a, p.141).
Now, with a measure of control over its own destiny, Catalonia entered a number of confederal and imperial relationships, beginning with the Catalan-Aragonese confederacy in 1137 and culminating with the formation of the kingdom of Spain in 1516. During this time, Catalonia developed a number of representative institutions – including a parliament and executive or, more specifically, a corts and Generalitat (Laitin, 1989, p.298) – that would survive the various governing regimes and which provided Catalonia with a measure of autonomy vis-à-vis the Spanish monarchy (Keating, 2001a, pp.141-142).

While it would be misleading to suggest that the Catalans represented a nation-state in the Middle Ages – particularly as the concept and the underlying principles of nationalism had yet to truly manifest and take root at that point in history – it can be said that the development of Catalonia’s representative institutions helped solidify a cultural identity that was contractual in nature, and that had “little space for [...] the unilateral imposition of authority” (Keating, 2001a, p.142). In other words, the Catalans were content with being part of the Spanish monarchy, provided the monarchy remained primarily a customary institution with limited power and sovereignty within Catalonia (Keating, 2001a, p.142). These power relations, however, did not sit well with the Spanish monarchy – particularly after the Catalans refused to supply Spain’s military in return for protection (McRoberts, 2001, p.14). After a number of attempts to force assimilation upon the Catalans – including the adoption of the Castilian language as the official language of the monarchy (Laitin, 1989, pp.299-300) – and after an increasing push for centralization from the Spanish monarchy, the Catalans opted for rebellion in 1640 rather than acquiesce to Spain’s overtures. This eventually led to French intervention on behalf of Catalonia – though it culminated with the signing of a treaty between the French and Spanish in 1651, signalling the end of the rebellion (McRoberts, 2001, p.14). Among the consequences of the rebellion and subsequent treaty were that Catalonia was to lose its independence – though it
maintained a measure of autonomy – and was forced to cede the regions of Roussillon and Cerdagne to France (Dowling, 2012, p.2; McRoberts, 2001, p.14). This lose would prove to be particularly brutal for the Catalans – seen by many as a “mutilation” of the region – and left a bitterness between the Catalans and the Spanish monarchy that would only intensify throughout the intervening decades through conflicts and skirmishes, most notably during ongoing Spanish/French conflicts (Zimmermann & Zimmermann, 1997, p.36).

Catalonia’s autonomy was further compromised following the death of Charles II, then-ruler of Spain, in 1700. In his will, Charles II appointed his grand-nephew – and grandson to then-ruler of France, Louis XIV – Philip V of the House of Bourbon, as successor. This appointment came much to the chagrin of many of Europe’s powers who saw Philip V’s familial relationship to the French as problematic. Consequently, the European powers formed a coalition behind Archduke Charles of Austria and the House of Habsburg, who they pushed to succeed as ruler of Spain. Thus began the War of the Spanish Succession (Zimmermann & Zimmermann, 1997, pp.36-37). As supporters of the House of Habsburg, Catalonia suffered a significant blow when the rival Bourbons won the war and Philip V was officially sworn in as king (McRoberts, 2001, p.15). Among his first acts of power, Philip V imposed a more centralized governing regime (Dowling, 2012, p.2) – one which, among other things, sought to suppress Catalan’s autonomy (McRoberts, 2001, p.15). As a result of this centralization, in 1714, Catalonia’s autonomous, representative institutions were abolished (Guibernau, 2007, p.20) and the Catalan language was “put under severe threat” (McRoberts, 2001, p.15).

Throughout the 1700s, Catalan culture and language increasingly fell under Spanish influence and assimilation – and it would not be until the 19th century before the Catalan culture saw any form of substantial renaissance, and not until the 20th century before its modern language was standardized (Brown & Ogilvie, 2009, pp.190-191). The Bourbon-imposed assimilation of
Catalan culture was so exacting, “it is difficult to perceive any distinctive autochthonous response to the overarching supernational identity” in the 18th century; for all intents and purposes, Catalan had been assimilated by most measures of the word (Keown, 2011, pp.13-14). That being said, if there is one definitive factor that ensured the survival of the Catalan culture during its period of cultural austerity under the rule of the Bourbon hegemony, it was the inability of Catalan society’s lower classes (i.e. illiterate peasants and workers) to “desist from the use of their maternal idiom for everyday discourse or the celebration of their local customs” (p.14). In this respect, Catalan became the culture of the disenfranchised, the impoverished, and the working classes. The Catalan culture survived, in large part, through cultural activities and events – such as theatre spectacles and festivals – that served as a means of unifying the lower classes of Catalonia around shared cultural experiences.

Tacitly facilitating the Catalan culture’s survival throughout the 18th century was the fact that, despite Spanish decrees against the use of the Catalan language, the Spanish language was seldom employed in Catalonia’s primary education or notarial documents until well into the 19th century (Balcells, 1996, p.17) – while the Catalan language, itself, remained the language of choice for most Catalonian locals up until the First World War (Strubell, 2011, p.125). While the general Catalan populace had continued to employ and embrace the Catalan culture and language, the same could not be said for the Catalan bourgeoisie. Much like their counterparts in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Catalan aristocracy adopted the language and customs of their conquerors, embracing its “corresponding social prestige and recognition” (Keown, 2011, p.15) – further cementing the class divide in Catalonia along lines of not just wealth and resources, but along lines of culture as well. It is perhaps for this reason that, in 1833, an ode written in Catalan by an “ex-pat” banker of “high standing” from Barcelona – Bonuventura Carles Aribau – took on an air of profound cultural significance when it was published in a review (p.15). For the first
time in decades, the Catalan culture was being openly acknowledged and employed by the Catalanian higher classes – employed in a “‘high’ function from which it had long been excluded” (Strubell, 2011, p.128). This ode inherently served as a precursor to the recovery, in 1859, of the medieval Jocs Florals poetry contest – a contest which many of Catalonia’s young, up-and-coming poets used as a vehicle through which to explore the Catalan language (pp.128-129). These contests proved to be particularly popular – to the point where they inspired a sense of pride within the Catalan culture and towards the use of the Catalan language that had been made dormant by Spanish policy (Keown, 2011, p.16).

The re-emergence of the Catalan language during the late 1800s and early 1900s – in both everyday parlance and in actual business and economic terms – gave way to more pronounced initiatives that sought to re-integrate and consolidate the Catalan language and culture – a culture which had been largely fractured and regionalized as a result of the Spanish’s assimilative policies (Strubell, 2011, pp.128-129). During this time, Catalan’s elite had lost a measure of faith in the Spanish monarchy – particularly in the wake of Spain losing its two remaining colonies in 1898. This was notably damaging to Catalan’s bourgeoisie insofar as many of them had major holdings in the now-former colony of Cuba, with as much as 60 percent of the region’s exports having previously gone to the island nation (McRoberts, 2001, p.27). The Catalan elite’s concerns with the Spanish regime were further confirmed when, in need of paying off its war debts, Spain began to raise its taxes. As such, a growing discontent within the Catalan elite coincided with the renaissance of the Catalan language and culture – culminating with the emergence of nationalist and unitary political parties who emphasised a growing need for Catalan autonomy (p.27). By 1907, the Catalans had a full-fledged unitary political movement, Solidaritat Catalana, which sought, among its primary policy priorities, to recover the Catalan language for “official use” (Strubell, 2011, p.129). These initiatives and political movements
eventually led to increased Catalan autonomy and policy vis-à-vis its Spanish supernational counterparts, with the Catalan language and culture increasingly playing a prominent role in almost every facet of Catalan life (pp.129-130). Through these changes, Catalonia was able to unify its provincial councils into one consolidated administration, the Mancommunitat, which served to modernize and expand Catalonia’s infrastructure and government services, and further legitimate the resurgence of the Catalan language (p.130).

However, Catalan autonomy would be relatively short lived – in large part due to what can best be described as “a series of failed political experiments” that took place in Spain during the first half of the 20th century (Greer, 2007, p.18). Beginning in 1923, a coup d’état by the Captain General of Catalonia, General Primo de Rivera, brought with it a halt to the Catalan nationalist movement and a renewed repression of the Catalan language and culture (Strubell, 2011, p.130). Among his first acts of power, General de Rivera forbade the use of the Catalan language and flag in public and abolished the Mancommunitat. In their place, the new regime sought to develop a “politique de prestige” founded on public works (Zimmermann & Zimmermann, 1997, p.51). During this time, the Catalan nationalist movement was reduced to operating in near silence, allowing for only its most radical elements to make waves (p.51). The autocratic regime of de Rivera, however, was itself relatively brief – lasting only until 1930 – and was soon followed by the collapse of the Spanish monarchy (Strubell, 2011, p.130). This brought about a second Spanish Republic, wherein Catalonia’s Generalitat was re-constituted, followed by a Statute of Autonomy in 1932 (Strubell, 2011, p.130; Balcells, 1996, p.101). Perhaps ironically, Catalanian autonomy proved to be “a bridge too far for the Spanish far right” and ultimately helped “trigger Franco’s military coup” in 1938 and the subsequent Spanish Civil War – the culmination of which was a quasi-fascist regime that, itself, sought to repress Catalanian identity and culture (Greer, 2007, p.18). This regime would last until Franco’s death in 1975, by
which point Spain had become an “intensely centralized dictatorship with a particular animus
toward expressions of national identity and autonomy in Catalonia and the Basque Country”
(p.93). Nevertheless, the Spanish people remained “much more modern and open-minded than
[their] political regime” and were receptive to the adoption of a democratic system following the
regime’s demise (Elcano Royal Institute, 2004, p.4).

7.2: From Dictation to Democracy: Spanish Transition to Democracy, 1975-Onward

During Franco’s reign, little time was wasted in enacting socio-political, economic, and
cultural changes in Spain. Under Franco’s leadership, Spain went from being “an essentially
agricultural country with limited nationwide communications and a degree of illiteracy beyond
European parameters” to being “an emergent mass culture and consumer society of
predominantly middle-class citizens” (Palacio, 2005, p.599). While Franco was transitioning
Spain from an agricultural-based to a consumer-based society, he was also consolidating efforts
towards purging academic and cultural institutions throughout all of Spain – not just Catalonia
and the Basque Country. The result of this purge saw many of the country’s scientists and artists
flee in exile. Policies and institutions introduced by the Franco regime – such as the Press Act of
1938, the Radio Nacional in 1937, and the Televisión Española in 1956 – served the dual purpose
of controlling and censoring cultural and media output (Elcano Royal Institute, 2004, p.4). These
policies tended to favour traditional styles of art while promoting Spanish nationalism and
Catholicism in equal measures – primarily at the expense of longstanding nationalisms such as
Catalan’s. Moreover, the Franco regime employed “evasion culture” – that is to say, it pushed
modes and forms of popular culture (e.g. “football, bullfighting, film, radio, popular fiction, and
gossip magazines”) on its citizens as form of distraction – as a means of fostering social
integration within its population while maintaining a level of “political unawareness” (p.4). In this respect, particularly during the latter years of Franco’s reign, Spain became possibly the “first dictatorship in the world where its citizens’ lack of freedom ran parallel to the initial creation of a mass-consumer society” (Palacio, 2005, p.599).

Despite the Franco regime’s best efforts to control culture within Spain and eliminate the cultural identities of regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, these cultural identities not only survived well beyond even Franco’s death, they have also grown and evolved to a point where they have had significant impact on evoking change in Spanish society (McRoberts, 2001, p.45). For instance, Catalan’s cultural nationalism is largely attributed to having helped the Catalonians resist the totalitarian tendencies of the Spanish nationalism espoused by Franco (Crameri, 2008, p.4). Moreover, in an ironic twist, cultural repression served to strengthen the Catalan identity and unite otherwise disparate regimes within Catalan society into a unified front (Keating, 2001a, p.147). With this being said, cultural repression was, obviously, not without its negative effects: an entire generation of Catalans grew up only able to speak their language in the privacy of their homes, and unable to read or write the language (p.147). Additionally, Spain’s economic expansion under the Franco regime led to significant emigration within the country and its regions – the result of which was that, by the 1960s, as much as 40 percent of Catalonia’s population had been born outside of Catalonia. These emigrants brought with them a level of cultural, linguistic, and socio-economic dilution to Catalonia that, if nothing else, served to challenge the Catalan nationalist movement (p.147). As a result, by the time the Franco regime finally came to an end, there was still a “general sense of Catalanism” in the region, albeit one that was perhaps best described as “non-specific, but very heartfelt” (Crameri, 2014, p.5).
7.2.1: Democracy for All, Autonomy for Some: The Spanish Constitution Act 1978

In the years immediately following Franco’s death, the Catalans were among the leading cultural groups advocating for democracy in Spain and independence for themselves and other nationalities (McRoberts, 2001, p.45; Stepan, 1998, p.232-233). The fact that Catalonia had largely stood pat and remained opposed to the Franco regime’s efforts to eliminate their culture had not gone unnoticed by the rest of Spain – nor did the fact that the Catalans had mobilized, in mass, following his death to demonstrate their resolve in acquiring a new Catalan administration with autonomous powers vis-à-vis the Spanish government (Balcells, 1996, pp.167-169). The Assembly of Catalonia, founded in 1971 and whose membership consisted of a wide range of representatives from Catalonia’s political, social, and professional sectors, strongly voiced the need for “democracy, left-wing policies and autonomy”; its mobilizing actions would prove instrumental in ushering in Spain’s “first democratic parliamentary election” in 1977 (Guibernau, 2014, p.11). For its part, Spain’s government – which had been appointed in 1976 by Spain’s monarch, King Juan Carlos, for the explicit purpose of transitioning the country into a democracy and which would later be democratically elected in the 1977 election – under the leadership of Adolfo Suárez, was more than willing to accommodate the Catalan movement’s democratic ambitions, even going so far as to help re-establish Catalonia’s Generalitat which had been abolished in the 1930s when Franco came to power (Keating, 2001a, p.148). Through these new democratic channels, Catalonia’s first elected Generalitat, under the Convergència i Unió (the Convergence and Union) coalition party – a coalition between two moderately nationalist parties – came to power in 1980 and remained there until 2003 (Planas, 2010, p.10).

The next step in Spain’s transition to democracy came with the introduction of its constitution in 1978 – a document that came into being through a consensus reached by all of the political parties involved in the election of 1977 (Guibernau, 2014, p.12). Unlike in the cases of
Spain’s previous constitutions – which had all been written by the victors of civil conflicts and, consequently, were seen as illegitimate to the losers of those conflicts – the new government wanted all parties, even opponents, to take part in the drafting of the new constitution as a means of ensuring virtually every social interest had a say in the matter (Greer, 2007, pp.107-108). The Spanish Constitution Act 1978 acknowledged the importance of its nations and their cultural diversity for the unity of Spain, recognizing and guaranteeing “the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all” (Spanish Constitution, 1978, article 2). To this end, the Constitution Act establishes that Spain was to be organized “territorially into municipalities, provinces, and the Self-governing Communities that may be constituted” therein (article 137), including Catalonia and the Basque Country, among others. Self-governing Communities were broadly defined as “bordering provinces with common historic cultural and economic characteristics, insular territories and provinces with a historic regional status” (article 143). Any other community wishing to acquire powers of self-government were required to go through an application process that involved acquiring the consent of “all the Provincial Councils concerned […] and two thirds of the municipalities whose population represents at least the majority of the electorate of each province or island” within six months of submitting an application; failure to do so would require the community wait five years before being allowed to reapply (article 143). This latter clause was introduced as a sort of compromise to concerns expressed by existing regions/communities – such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia – who thought it somewhat insulting, not to mention politically dangerous, to place other, smaller communities on an equal level with them. Similarly, the military also expressed concerns that the recognition of too many cultural and national communities could compromise the safety of Spain (Greer, 2007, pp.108-109). Consequently, the
Spanish government was somewhat less giving in their approach to autonomy and the devolution of powers than what had originally been intended (p.108).

The Self-governing Communities were granted competences over 22 specific matters as they specifically related to their region, including (but not exclusive to): the organization of their self-government institutions; municipal boundaries and town planning; public works, transportation, agriculture, forestry, and environmental protection; hunting and fishing industries; the promotion of economic development within the broader context of national economic policy; manual skills development; health and hygiene; social assistance; and the coordination of local police forces (Spanish Constitution, 1978, article 148). The Self-governing Communities were also provided a broad purview of cultural functions: the facilitation of local fairs; the conservation of museums, libraries and music; the preservation of monuments; the promotion of culture and research, and the teaching of language; and the promotion of tourism, sports, and leisure (article 148). By contrast, the State reserved exclusive rights to 33 matters it felt were beyond the purview of its Self-governing communities – including, but not limited to: ensuring the basic conditions for guaranteeing the equality and rights of all Spaniards; nationality and matters related to immigration and emigration; defence and armed forces; legislation as it relates to commerce, crime, penitentiaries, labour, civic law, copyright, industrial property, customs; and the country’s monetary system (article 149). Built into the constitution was a clause to allow for the devolution of (some of) these powers and responsibilities to the Self-governing Communities following a five-year probationary period (article 148).

Of particular interest to this thesis, questions of culture and cultural identity figured prominently in the structure and division of powers outlined in the Constitution Act 1978. From the very onset of the Act, the importance of culture to Spain is made salient in the constitution’s preamble, wherein the government indicates that, through its sovereignty, it will:
Protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their culture and traditions, languages and institutions; [and] promote the progress of culture and of the economy to ensure a dignified quality of life for all (Spanish Constitution, 1978, preamble).

To ensure these human rights were respected, and “without prejudice to the competences that may be assumed by the Self-governing Communities,” the State took as its responsibility the promotion of culture – something it considered not only a duty, but “an essential function” (Spanish Constitution, 1978, article 149). With this in mind, the State indicates that it would be responsible for the facilitation of cultural communication – both among and in cooperation with the Self-governing Communities (article 149). Additionally, the State reserved the right to protect Spain’s “cultural and artistic heritage and national monuments against exportation and spoliation” (article 149). This right included protection of “museums, libraries, and archives belonging to the State” (article 149). To this end, the State guaranteed the preservation and promotion of the “historical, cultural, and artistic heritage of the people of Spain and the property of which it consists,” regardless of the legal status or ownership of said property, and with the caveat that “any offences against this heritage” would be criminally punished (article 46).

Where Catalonia is concerned, perhaps the most important cultural aspect that the Spanish Constitution Act 1978 recognizes and addresses is language. In section three of the Act, Castilian is recognized as the official Spanish language of the State (Spanish Constitution, 1978, article 3). Additionally, the constitution recognizes other Spanish languages as being official within the boundaries of their respective Self-governing Communities and in accordance with their Statutes of Autonomy. In view of preserving the linguistic “richness” and “heritage” of Spain’s various communities, these languages were “accorded special respect and protection” (article 3). For Catalonia, this meant that the Catalan language was, at least within Catalonia, constitutionally recognized and protected. Despite this special respect, many commentators have critiqued the
constitution’s vagueness on the issue of language protection – going so far as to suggest that “special respect” is practically meaningless, particularly when other elements of the constitution already afford Self-governing Communities measures to protect their languages without the need for further state intervention (Crameri, 2008, pp.50-51). Moreover, while the constitution offers special respect and protection to the languages of its cultural communities, it does not specifically reference or identify any of these languages; it was effectively left to the discretion of the Self-governing Communities to officially recognize their own languages. In this respect, the constitutional rights afforded to the various languages by the Spanish government were largely seen as symbolic – rather than meaningful – gestures.

Underscoring this constitutional recognition of culture was the broader acknowledgement that the “Spanish Nation” desired to establish “justice, liberty, and security” (through the constitution) as a means of promoting the “wellbeing of all its members” (Spanish Constitution, 1978, preamble). State powers and national sovereignty are recognized in the constitution as belonging to and emanating from the Spanish people (article 1). Given the approach the previous governmental regime took to eradicating the national cultures of Spain’s various regions and peoples, it is probably fair to assume that the emphasis placed on preserving culture in the Constitution Act 1978 was meant to serve as a form of assurance that the democratically elected government had no intentions of repeating the past. In fact, the Act has been noted for its implicit questioning of “the radically conservative and centralist character of the brand of Spanish nationalism promoted by the Franco regime” (Guibernau, 2014, p.12). In this respect, the Constitution Act 1978 establishes a state of worth for and natural relations between the Spanish government and its cultural communities: it provides an extension of civic rights to cultural communities, as they relate to culture, that were largely perceived to have been absent. Moreover, the Act also serves to establish a rapport of grandeur insofar as it makes issues of culture and
cultural identity – issues that had long been a source of conflict within Spain – a public/constitutional matter. As such, when issues of culture emerge in Spain, they are invariably constitutional issues that necessarily require public discourse and intervention. Moreover, the Act provides an operationalization of relations between cultures by offering incentives to virtually every facet of Spanish society as a means of developing a rapport between the Spanish government and its cultural communities that had previously been lacking.

As Guibernau (2014) notes, there were even efforts made to establish a constitutional consensus with otherwise contentious factions: both the Francoist reformists – that is to say, holdovers of the Franco regime who had, even before his death, acknowledged limitations to his system and advocated for reforms (Palomares, 2004, pp.2-5) – and anti-Francoists – those who, as their name implies, outright opposed the Franco regime and its policies – were made part of the deliberative process surrounding the constitution. The desire to reach a consensus – to gain the general support of the various parties involved in the ratification of the constitution – is ironically credited with having created vagueness, discrepancies, and inconsistencies in the constitution (Guibernau, 2014, p.12). Moreover, the fact that the Constitution addresses many of Spain’s major concerns in either a vague or symbolic fashion implies a desire to inform the public that the government is, at the very least, cognisant of these issues and has some intention to see them resolved. How these issues were to be resolved, however, seems less important to the government than the actual act of acknowledging them. In other words, the Spanish Constitution arguably serves, in equal measures, as an informative symbol to signal Spain’s transition to a democracy – one that checks off most of the major issues and concerns expressed by Spain’s various interests – and a definitive form of legislation that confers rights and responsibilities to Spaniards and Self-governing Communities. It is also, in the context of this last point – of conferring responsibilities – that the Constitution Act also serves as a rapport of grandeur: it effectively establishes a hierarchy
between the Spanish government and the Self-governing Communities in a way that is evocative of a parent to their children.

7.3: Autonomously Yours: Statute of Autonomy 1979

Overall, the Spanish Constitution Act 1978 served as a mechanism to decentralize and devolve many of the country’s governmental responsibilities to its cultural and national communities. Broadly, it served the dual purpose of recognizing and preserving those same cultures – a luxury that had not previously been afforded to them in any great measure. While the Constitution Act places a strong emphasis on promoting and protecting the cultures and nationalisms of the country’s Self-governing Communities and regions, there is a questionable absence of precision or, for that matter, explicit reference, by name, to any specific community or region. Moreover, while Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia were all conferred immediate and full autonomy through the Constitution Act, other communities were not so lucky – with many of them having to “undergo [the] 5-year period of ‘restricted autonomy’” before being granted full autonomous provisions (Guibernau, 2014, p.12). Problematic for some regions was the fact that once a new and/or artificially created community was granted self-governing autonomy, the constitution makes no effort to distinguish them from pre-existing communities with long histories and strong senses of cultural identity (p.12). Moreover, while the constitution offered much in the way of devolved autonomy – from a top-down perspective – it did not offer Self-governing Communities much input in state politics; it was, as some commentators have put it, “minimally demos-constraining” insofar as it allowed communities only a minimal measure of power “to restrain the central government” (Greer, 2007, pp.109-110).

To address some of the Constitution Act’s oversights and provide more nuance to various elements of the Self-governing Communities’ autonomy – albeit largely within the (admittedly
vague) structure and confines established by the Constitution Act – the communities, themselves, developed Statutes of Autonomy (Crameri, 2008, p.51). In some cases, the Statutes also served as corrective measures for the constitution: in the case of Catalonia, for instance, its statute, among other things, officially recognizes the Catalan language as its official language – something many commentators felt should have been specifically accomplished in the constitution (Strubell, 1999, p.20). In recognizing the Catalan language as official, the Generalitat arguably established a firm superior common principle where Catalan culture and identity were concerned: it recognized the Catalan language as a unifying element of the Catalan identity. With that said, the Catalonian Statute of Autonomy was almost unanimously approved through a referendum by the Catalan people in 1979, with more 88 percent of voters voting in favour of the Statute – though with a “disappointing” turnout of only 59.6 percent of the population (Balcells, 1996, p.174) – and subsequently ratified by the Spanish Senate and King, making it the first Statute of Autonomy to become law in Spain (McRoberts, 2001, p.59).

From legal and cultural perspectives, the Statute of Autonomy offers more precision with respects to Catalonia’s autonomous powers and national identity than does the Constitution. In its preamble, the Statute indicates that its development represents “part of the process of recovering [Catalonia’s] democratic freedom” – a process that also involved the recovery of Catalonia’s self-government institutions (e.g. the Generalitat) (Catalonian Generalitat, 1979, p.1). Using the rights conferred to it through the Constitution and “guaranteed to the nationalities and regions making up Spain,” Catalonia established the Statute to declare “its wish to be constituted as an autonomous community” (p.1). As such, the Statute serves as an “expression of the collective identity of Catalonia” and as an outline that defines its institutions and relations with the Spanish State and the other Self-governing communities therein (p.1). In its first few articles, Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy wastes little time in constituting Catalonia as an autonomous community, establishing
the Catalonia Generalitat as the institution “into which Catalan self-government is politically organized,” and identifying Catalan – along with Spanish (or Castilian), by virtue of the Spanish Constitution – as an official language of Catalonia (articles 1-3). To this end, the Statute indicates the Generalitat’s intentions to ensure the use of both languages – Catalan and Castilian – in both “normal and official” settings. To do so, the Generalitat would take necessary measures to provide citizens with sufficient knowledge of both languages and ensure that each language was treated equally. Additionally, the Aranese language, while not officially recognized, would be “taught” and be treated with a “particular respect and protection” (article 3). In addition to the importance conferred to language, the Statute provides a broad overview of the Catalan Generalitat’s responsibilities as they relate to culture – though, for the most part, these responsibilities align with those presented in the Constitution Act, with only minor variations in terms of the specific cultural institutions it oversees and services it offers. In this way, the Statute effectively served as a renegotiation of the rapport of grandeur between the Catalan and Spanish cultures and languages, wherein both were recognized as official, but where Catalan was preferred in the context of Catalonia.

Where significant deviations occur in the Statute’s account of Catalonia’s cultural responsibilities vis-à-vis the Constitution Act is in: a) its recognition of responsibilities over “foundations and associations involved with teaching, culture, art, benefits and care, and others that principally exercise their functions in Catalonia” (Catalonian Generalitat, 1979, article 12); and b) as a means of managing and providing “its own services corresponding to matters over which it has exclusive power,” and in consideration of the fact that Catalan “is part of the heritage of other territories and communities,” the Catalan Generalitat reserved the right to ask the Spanish Parliament to approve its treaties or agreements as they relate to the establishment of cultural relations with other states (article 27). In this respect, the Statute of Autonomy establishes (or,
rather, acknowledges) that, far from being autonomous, Catalonia still relies on the Spanish government for certain measures – including those related to culture. The Statute even outlines an additional provision that acknowledges Catalonia’s compliance with the State’s recognition of cultural services “as a duty and essential attribution” and its willingness to work within the State’s co-operative framework when communicating on cultural matters with other autonomous states (provision 5). In other words and in many respects, outside of some specificities as they relate to language, the Statute largely served to “codify the powers already fairly clearly offered in the Constitution” (Greer, 2007, p.111).

Whether it was intentional or not, the Catalonian Statute of Autonomy serves as an affirmation of the natural relations between Catalonia and Spain: it is an acquiescence to the guidelines and power dynamics established by the Spanish government in the Constitution. In this respect, the Statute proved somewhat divisive for the Catalonian people: while Catalan socialists were “unqualified in their satisfaction” with the Statute, Catalan nationalists were more nuanced in their appraisal – noting that it was not the Statute they “would have drawn up, but it is a good statute” (McRoberts, 2001, p.59). Ultimately, however, when compared to the repressive policies of the Franco regime, the Statute (and Constitution) was predominantly heralded as a significant reversal of fortunes for the Catalan people. As such, even with reservations regarding the ambiguous terms and major contradictions found in the Constitution and Statute of Autonomy, Catalonians were almost unanimously supportive of these documents as they granted Catalonia measures of autonomy and cultural protection that would have been unheard of when Spain was still a dictatorship (pp.59-60).
7.4: Reconstructing a Culture: Catalan Cultural Policies of the 1980s and 1990s

The years that followed the ratifications of the Constitution Act and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy were notable for being a period of “freedom of expression and artistic creation, public activity in the artistic and cultural fields” – a period that provided “full recognition of Spain’s linguistic and cultural diversity” (Planas, 2010, pp.9-10). These years proved to be particularly complex for Catalan cultural policy: while questions of culture and language were “key factors” in discussions related to the (re)construction of the Catalan nation, the Generalitat now had to account for the “demands and needs of a much more heterogeneous population” than it had before the Franco regime (p.10). This included greater needs and demands in the realm of culture. Facilitating the process of addressing these needs – though only to a small degree, initially – was the introduction of the Catalan Department of Culture (Departament de Cultura), established following the creation of the Generalitat. While the Department of Culture’s introduction was meant to address and alleviate many of Catalonia’s cultural responsibilities/concerns, as was the case with the Generalitat, itself, the department was still in its infancy in the early 1980s and its abilities to address cultural needs was largely stunted by the central government’s slowness in transferring funding and responsibilities to them (Cramerí, 2008, p.35). Moreover, the Department’s focus, in its early years, was largely centred on establishing a cultural infrastructure in the form of services and cultural centres rather than on questions of promotion and access. Consequently, much criticism was levelled at the Department for its less than inclusive approach to cultural promotion and participation, particularly where non-native Catalanians were concerned (Planas, 2010, p.10). Further complicating matters was the fact that, over the course of the previous 40 years, Castilian had become the most prominently used language in Catalonia – surpassing the Catalan language as the language of choice of Catalan
citizens (p.10). This meant that considerable legwork would be required if the Generalitat had any hope of legitimately re-establishing the Catalan language as the preeminent language in Catalonia.

Simply put, the damage that had been inflicted on the Catalan culture throughout the Franco regime had left a profound mark on the nation. By the time Catalonia was ready and able to rebuild its nation, it was arguably starting behind the proverbial eight ball, with many of its people – as mentioned – having grown up with a relatively limited and somewhat secretive practice of their cultural heritage and language (Crameri, 2008, pp.21-22). It was, therefore, with cultural restoration in mind that many of Catalonia’s cultural policies evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s – with language, in particular, taking a prominent role in its restoration process. In fact, few policies have had as significant an impact on Catalonia’s politics, society, and culture as have its language policies (Catalonian Generalitat, 2014, p.7). It is with language in mind that the Department of Culture arguably had its most significant contribution of the 1980s to Catalan culture via the creation of a Linguistic Normalization Act – though a contribution that took the notion of “culture as identity” and flipped it on its head to support only the elements of culture that best supported the Catalan national identity (Crameri, 2008, pp.35-36).


During the periods in which Catalonia was dominated by outside forces, as a means of preserving the continuity of the Catalan culture, the Catalan people “wove” it into the fabric of their identity, using only the most “fundamental [of] threads” (Planas, 2010, p.5). The most obvious and enduring of these threads has been and continues to be the Catalan language (p.5). Although language has been a staple of many cultures’ claims to nationhood, it has arguably been more credible in the case of Catalonia than it has for others. Regions such as Scotland and Wales may lay claims to a linguistic distinction to their nationalism, these claims have been largely
mitigated by the fact that their respective languages have all but disappeared; even with efforts to revive their languages, claims to their cultural importance have been seen as tenuous at best (McRoberts, 2001, p.139). In the case of Catalonia, however, the language has not only remained relevant in Catalan society, but is sufficiently similar to Spain’s official language – Castilian – that it can easily be picked up by non-native Catalonians (p.139). Thus, it has been somewhat easier for Catalonia to preserve and restore its language relative to other national minorities in similar situations. Nevertheless, a desire to preserve and promote the Catalan language has figured prominently in Catalonia’s cultural policies – and nationalist discourse – since Spanish democratization – to the point of becoming a superior common principle in Catalonia’s cultural policy discourse. In fact, once it was reinstated, the Generalitat’s first order of business was to “undo” the damage inflicted on Catalan culture and nationalism over the course of the previous 40 years (pp.139-140). The challenge, however, was to undo the assimilation of the Catalan culture and language without encroaching on the linguistic rights of those who speak Castilian (Catalonian Generalitat, 2014, p.13) – a prospect that, at times, has been easier said than done.

Initially, many of Catalonia’s nationalists sought to have the Catalan language recognized as the sole official language of Catalonia in order to redress the inferior status that the Catalan language had been conscribed. This became a prominent topic of debate during the development of the Statute of Autonomy – though the Constitution made the prospect of Catalan being the only official language in Catalonia a relative impossibility (McRoberts, 2001, pp.140-141). Moreover, the social changes incurred as a result of demographic shifts in Catalonia during the Franco regime also made it virtually impossible for the Generalitat to simply restore Catalan language rights, provide people with opportunities to speak it, and then expect them to actually take advantage of those opportunities; some form of incentive (or coercion) would need to be introduced to encourage both native Catalans and the large segment of the population who neither
spoke Catalan nor had any heritage connections to the culture to take interest in and learn the language (Crameri, 2008, pp.22-23). As such, even if the Catalan language was recognized, along with Castilian, as an official language of Catalonia, there was no guarantee that the citizens of Catalonia would even speak the language when given the choice. Consequently, actions were put in place by the Generalitat – including the introduction of a directorate for language policy – to encourage the use of Catalan in schools and in public sector organizations.

However, far from motivating the residents of Catalonia to use Catalan, these actions left many non-Catalan speaking citizens concerned and willing to mobilize to ensure that their right to speak Castilian was respected (McRoberts, 2001, pp.141-142). In response, public education campaigns were implemented by the Generalitat to help legitimize and encourage the use of Catalan between Catalan- and Castilian-speakers. The rationale was that, even if someone was not a native or fluent speaker of Catalan, speaking Catalan “poorly is better than not [...] speak[ing] it at all” (p.143). In other words, the Generalitat sought to normalize the use of Catalan through bilingualism (p.143). And it is with bilingualism and normalization in mind that the Generalitat introduced its Linguistic Normalization Act.

The Linguistic Normalization Act came into force in 1983 as a means of supporting and encouraging the use of the Catalan language in official, educational, and social communications. Within the Act, education, public administration, and mass media were identified as “pillars” of Catalanian language policy – pillars that remain significant to this day (Catalonian Generalitat, 2014, p.7). Through the targeting of these pillars, the Act sought to increase knowledge of Catalan and normalize its use in Catalonia by making it a more prominent fixture of official channels and communications (McRoberts, 2001, pp.143-144). While the Act was largely built on the premise of bilingualism – in no small part because bilingualism in Self-governing Communities was mandated by the Spanish Constitution – it privileged the Catalan language as
the nation’s language of choice. In particular, the Act recognized Catalan as “Catalonia’s own language” and, as such, the language of the Catalanon Generalitat, Catalonia’s local and territorial administrations, and Catalonia’s public corporations (Catalan Generalitat, 1983, article 5.1, as ctd. by Crameri, 2008, p.52). Moreover, as the language of the Generalitat, Catalan also, by default, became the language of education and of public media (articles 14.1 & 21). In this respect, the “main trust” of the Act was to provide the Catalan language with the necessary measures to become the “dominant language in certain institutional settings” (Crameri, 2008, p.52) – even though the Act was careful not to prioritize Catalan too much in the context of official settings (Catalonian Generalitat, 2014, p.15).

Compared to similar language acts introduced by other national minorities – such as Bill 101 in Québec – the Linguistic Normalization Act was seen as relatively tame and innocuous, a by-product of abiding by the Constitution’s decree that Castilian is Spain’s official language (McRoberts, 2001, p.145). But more than just constitutional constraints, the Generalitat had to tread lightly when developing the Act for two reasons: the first was to “avoid creating popular enmity” that could compromise the “Catalanist consensus”; the second was to avoid offending Catalonia’s elites by imposing language laws on their organizations without their consent (Greer, 2007, p.175). As such, while the Catalan language was favoured by the Generalitat, Castilian remained prominent enough for Catalonia to, for all intents and purposes, became a bilingual nation. In other words, far from simply establishing the Catalan language as a common principle, the Normalization Act also emphasised a rapport of grandeur that would see the Catalan language placed on an equal footing with that of its Spanish counterpart – and, in some cases (i.e. in government operations), prioritized over it. In doing so, the Generalitat arguably sent a message to its people and to the Spanish government: while it was more than willing to abide by the rules
established by the Constitution, it would still push the boundaries of what was acceptable promotion of the Catalan language – though, to some Catalonians, this was still not enough.

Overall, linguistic normalization proved to be a “qualified” success: it raised the profile of the Catalan language while respecting Castilian as an official language (Greer, 2007, p.176). By the 1990s, thanks in no small part to the Normalization Act, the Catalan language had not only regained much of the prominence it had experienced prior to the Franco regime, it had even overtaken Castilian in many circles of Catalan society. Seeing this as a positive sign, and not wanting to merely rest on its laurels, the Generalitat began pursuing more comprehensive language laws as a means of furthering the progress and promotion of the Catalan language in Catalonia (p.176). To this end, the Catalan Language Act of 1998 was introduced to replace the Linguistic Normalization Act (Catalonian Generalitat, 1998, p.5) – though its implementation came with its fair share of controversy and conflicts. Some factions in Catalan and Spanish society had felt that the achievement of “normality” for the Catalan language was as far as the Generalitat’s linguistic responsibilities should extend; other factions welcomed a new language act as they felt the previous one did not go far enough in supporting and promoting the Catalan language (Crameri, 2008, p.54). Despite these polarized views, the Language Act was introduced in 1998, laying out the foundations for a clearer definition of Catalonia’s language law, with better policy instruments to enforce it (Catalonian Generalitat, 2014, p.9).

At its onset, the Catalan Language Act reaffirms the importance of the Catalan language in the “national formation and character” of Catalonia: the language serves as a “basic instrument for communication, integration, and social cohesion” and is a “privileged link between Catalonia and the other Catalan-speaking areas” of the world (Catalonian Generalitat, 1998, p.7). In large part, the Act serves as a corrective measure for addressing many of the legal, socio-economic, and technological changes that had taken place in Catalonia, Spain, and the rest of the world.
throughout the 1980s and 1990s – changes that fell beyond the purview of the Linguistic Normalization Act. Among these changes were the evolution of the technological fields and the advent of new technologies; the growth of free trade in cultural and commercial fields; the increased proficiency of Catalan in the use of Catalan; and the emergence of legal precedencies and protections for minority cultures established by the European parliament and community (pp.8-9). On top of recognizing the importance and place of the Catalan language to Catalonia’s culture and identity (articles 1-7, pp.12-14), the Act officially establishes Catalan as the language of use by government officials, with Castilian being used only “on request” by citizens (article 9, p.15) – taking its observance of Catalan over Castilian a step further than the Normalization Act. While the Generalitat still recognizes Castilian as an official language of Catalonia, there is a sense from the Language Act that this recognition was merely a formality. Educationally, Catalan is established as the “vehicle of teaching and learning in non-university education” (article 21, p.20). Moreover, an oral and written knowledge of Catalan is established as a requisite, along with Castilian, to graduate secondary school (article 21, pp.20-21). In this respect, the Language Act serves to update Catalonia’s superior common (language) principle, and renegotiates the natural relations between the region and the Spanish government through a reinterpretation of the rapport of grandeur that existed between the Catalan and Spanish cultures.

In terms of the media and cultural industries, the Language Act introduces provisions, similar to those found in Canadian content laws (e.g. CRTC, 2015), that require broadcasters of radio and television to allocate a percentage of their airtime to content produced by Catalonians and in the Catalan language: licensed television media broadcasters must “guarantee that at least fifty per cent of viewing time of all kinds of programmes produced by themselves and other tele-services are provided in the Catalan language” (Catalonian Generalitat, 1998, article 26, pp.22-23), while radio broadcasting companies must “guarantee that music programmes have an
adequate presence of songs produced by Catalan artists and at least twenty-five per cent are songs performed in the Catalan language or in Aranese” (article 26, p.23). To ensure these quotas are met, the Generalitat indicates that it will “aid, encourage and promote” the production and dissemination of cultural industries products in Catalan – including literary and scientific output; books and magazines; films, music, sound recordings, and audio-visual material; live performances; and all other public cultural activities – through the application of “objective criteria, without discrimination and within […] budgetary provisions” (article 28, pp.23-24). In this sense, the Language Act establishes a state of worth for the Catalan language and presents artists who produce and perform in the language as harmonious figures.

7.4.2: Seeing is Believing: The Catalan Radio & Television Corporation, & the 2005 Audiovisuals Act

As Catalonia was solidifying its language through the Normalization Act – and later, the Language Act – it was also addressing its cultural production by way of the multimedia sector. The Catalan Radio and Television Corporation – or, as it is known in Catalan, Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals (CCMA) – was first introduced in 1983, primarily as a means of ensuring linguistic and cultural normalization in Catalonia’s audiovisual sector (CCMA, 2016, par.2). The CCMA’s inception has been recognized as one of the “most important landmarks” in Catalonia’s recent history, and its influence over Catalan’s audiovisual sector has been instrumental in setting the “impulse and the development of the Catalan audiovisual industry” (Catalonian Generalitat, 2007, p.1).

The historical importance of the CCMA, it should be noted, comes from its relatively novel place in Spanish broadcasting: it is, in large part, a by-product of, and (at times) form of resistance to, Spain’s legal framework for the audiovisual sector in the post-Franco era. This framework initially saw broadcasting as primarily a public good that should be owned and
regulated by the state (Bayona, 2007, p.17). Private intervention into the audiovisual sector was regulated by a licensing system that effectively created a state monopoly on broadcasting, with a similar system being devolved to the country’s autonomous regions. It is only in recent years – in part due to technological advancements that have necessitated reconsideration of this system, and in part due to the constitutional debate the system has created regarding the rights to information and communication – that the Spanish government has opted to reconsider its monopolistic approach to audiovisual and broadcasting policy (pp.17-18). This reconsideration has opened the door for Spain’s autonomous regions, such as Catalonia, to develop their own policies and agencies to address their distinct social and cultural needs – though it should be noted that these policies have not always been with the direct support of the Spanish government (p.18). It is, in part, in the context of circumventing the Spanish broadcasting framework that the CCMA first came into being.

With this in mind, the CCMA operates as an arm’s length public organization, responsible to the Generalitat, but with the autonomy to function in a similar capacity to private sector organizations (Catalonian Generalitat, 2007, p.3). The CCMA’s mandate has been largely to ensure the free access and dissemination of audiovisual content in the Catalan language (p.11). To this end, the CCMA is also responsible for funding (and monitoring) the development and production of Catalan-language film, television, and animated programs (pp.11-12). In other words, similar to the CBC in Canada or the BBC in the UK, the CCMA operates as a crown corporation responsible for providing citizens with access to Catalan content – in the Catalan language – that might otherwise be inaccessible or unavailable. In this respect, the CCMA serves to ensure that there are no gaps in the Catalan audiovisual content available to citizens.

Serving as both a complement to the CCMA and, at times, a challenge to the Spanish government’s broadcasting monopoly are Catalan Film & TV (CF&TV) and the Catalan
Audiovisual Council (CAC). The former, introduced in 1986, serves as a vehicle for showcasing Catalan audiovisual culture on an international stage; its mandate has largely been to promote Catalan film and television at international festivals and events (CF&TV, 2016, par.1). The latter was introduced by the Generalitat in 1996 as a regulatory agency responsible for ensuring Catalan content is presented on Catalan airwaves (CAC, 2000/2012, p.1). More specifically, functioning as an advisory body to the Generalitat “and as an agency guaranteeing the impartiality and transparency of Audiovisual broadcasting,” the CAC was introduced with the vision that it would become a “prestigious, publicly-recognized body endowing Catalan society with the means to make radio and television true sources of information, education, and entertainment suited to [Catalonia’s] needs” (p.1). To this end, the CAC serves to broadly regulate Catalan content and impose penalties when audiovisual content providers and programmers – both in the public and private sectors – fail to observe and comply with the language regulations established in the Statute of Autonomy. Similarly, the CAC also ensures domestic compliance with European regulations and international treaties regarding content (pp.1-2). In both cases, the CAC is given a relatively broad degree of discretion in terms of ensuring compliance to these laws and applying remedies for any broadcasting digressions (pp.6-7). In addition to its regulatory roles, the CAC also serves to promote linguistic and cultural pluralism – particularly as it relates to the promotion of the Catalan language and culture, as well as that of the Aranese (p.6).

It is with language and cultural promotion in mind that, more recently, Catalonia has seemingly doubled down on affirming its cultural identity through its cultural policies, particularly as they relate to the audiovisual sectors. These efforts have come, in large part, as a response to contemporary social changes emanating from immigration and globalization (Villarroya, 2012, p.31). Fuelling this affirmative thrust was the election, in the early 2000s, of a tripartite
government coalition – which included a nationalist-party that was, incidentally, given responsibility over Catalan’s culture and media departments (p.37). Arguably, among the most important pieces of cultural policy introduced in this period was Catalonia’s Audiovisuals Act. Introduced in 2005, the Audiovisual Act establishes that audiovisual producers and distributors operating in Catalonia should primarily offer products and services in Catalan (p.39). As with the Language Act, the Audiovisual Act establishes quotas for television providers with respects to the amount of Catalan (or Castilian) content they must broadcast: “service providers shall reserve at least 51% of their annual broadcasting time for European audiovisual products in any of the official languages of Catalonia, and at least 50% of these products shall be in Catalan” (p.39).

In addition to its language requirements, the Audiovisual Act also functions to provide legislative recognition to private operators (and the private sector, more broadly) to broadcast freely outside of the purview of being a “licence-holder(s) for an activity owned by the state” (Bayona, 2007, p.18). In other words, private operators are granted a greater measure of autonomy with respects to what they broadcast than they were in the past; they are no longer required to serve the purposes of the government. In this respect, the Act helps to circumvent the aforementioned monopoly the Spanish government holds over broadcasting (pp.19-20). In offering this recognition, the Act effectively differentiates public and private sector operators and their respective roles relative to content dissemination (p.18). Moreover, the Act establishes protective measures and regulations to ensure the “veracity of information” delivered by audiovisual producers, the pluralism in audiovisual communication, and the rights of individuals and copyright holders (p.18). To this end, the Act also establishes “a system of public intervention” that helps recognize and regulate the audiovisual sector (pp.18-19) – a system in which, incidentally, the CAC (2016) both falls under and is regulated by (par.1). This system
effectively serves as a repertoire of devices to ensure that the superior common principle of Catalonia’s cultural policy is adhered to.

With so much regulation and policy in place to govern the audiovisual sectors, it almost goes without saying that these sectors are seen as important cultural industries in Catalonia and, more broadly, Spain. And with good reason. According to the Catalan Institute for the Cultural Industries (ICIC) – a government body introduced in 2001 as a purveyor of Catalonia’s cultural industries (Crameri, 2008, p.105) – Catalonia’s audiovisual sector has emerged, in recent years, as one of the most important sectors in all of Spain’s cultural industries – with Catalonia’s animation sector, in particular, emerging as a leader whose contributions have gained international recognition (ICIC, 2011, p.3). This success has been taken as a sign that Catalonia’s audiovisual industries have potential to foster opportunities for “internationalisation” and greater cultural penetration into foreign markets (p.3). In effect, the audiovisual sector has provided Catalonia with a test model for validating its cultural policy approach – and, to a certain degree, it has succeeded. Serving as evidence to this effect, in 2010 alone, the audiovisual and multimedia sectors accounted for 29 percent of Spain’s GDP as it relates to the cultural industries – second only to books and media in terms of overall GDP contribution (p.6). Given the audiovisual sectors’ importance to Catalonia’s economy (and, by extension, Spain’s economy), the ICIC’s approach to supporting the sector has been twofold: on the one hand, it has sought to strengthen “the distribution sector based in Catalonia” and, on the other hand, assist “the exhibition sector with technological modernization” (p.10).

Overall, Catalonia’s approach to and emphasis on the audiovisual sector reflects recognition, by the Catalanian Generalitat, of its importance to the dissemination of culture and language (Crameri, 2008, p.109). More importantly, however, the audiovisual sector has served as a space of resistance for the Generalitat vis-à-vis its Spanish counterparts. The fact that Catalonia
introduced institutions such as the CCMA and CAC (and policies such as the Audiovisual Act) in spite of the impediments imposed by the Spanish government (pp.109-110) suggests a willingness to challenge Spain’s authority in an overt fashion. Rather than simply acquiesce to the realities imposed by the state’s monopolistic hold over the audiovisual and broadcasting sectors, the Generalitat introduced policies that were arguably provocative in their unapologetic use and promotion of the Catalan language. It is a form of implicit protest that is borne of and, arguably, underscores the cultural fears of the more nationalist-inclined Catalonians: without some measure of market intervention and control, the Catalan people, if given the choice, would more readily choose to consume Spanish or foreign culture (i.e. English) than they would their own culture (Cameri, 2008, p.129). As such, inspiring the production and consumption of Catalan culture – in no small part through market interventions – ensured that Catalonians, at the very least, had the option to consume Catalan-language culture at their leisure.


All told, by 1980, Catalan had not only gained constitutional recognition as an autonomous state within Spain, it had also re-established its Generalitat and elected a moderately nationalist party as its representation (Greer, 2007, p.93). On top of this, Catalonia also had a Ministry of Culture serving to uphold and implement the Generalitat’s cultural, linguistic, educational, and media-related ambitions (Planas, 2010, p.10). By the late 1990s, Catalonia even had a comprehensive language policy to protect and preserve its most enduring cultural trait. However, these achievements were seen, by many Catalans, as only half measures. The 1979 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, in particular, fell considerably short of the expectations of Catalonians. For many Catalan nationalists, the Statute represented a failed exercise in achieving Catalonia’s full measure of autonomy as allowed by the Spanish Constitution (McRoberts, 2001, p.59). Gradually,
throughout the years, criticism of this system of autonomy grew, with many commentators noting the ways in which the Constitution allows the Spanish government to encroach “on regional responsibilities” through the ever-expansive use “of cross-cutting powers such as clauses of general interest, equality among citizens, or management of the economy” (Colino, 2009, pp.266-267). By the early 2000s, a desire to reform the Statute – as a sort of backdoor to reforming the Constitution, itself – had become evident in Catalan political and academic circles. Reports by prominent and influential think-tanks had revealed a number of systemic problems related to Catalonia’s autonomy as it stood: the uniqueness of Catalonia was insufficiently recognized in Spain; regional governments were unable to set coherent policies, their executive functions were “unduly” restricted by the central government, they lacked the capacity to self-organize, and their legislative powers were being encroached upon; an unwillingness on the part of the Spanish government and the judiciary to further decentralize powers to regional governments and/or autonomous communities; a lack of participation on the part of autonomous communities in national (as in Spanish) and international policy making; and insufficient and unstable funding from the central government (Colino, 2009, p.267). All told, from the point of view of Catalonians, there were sufficient grounds to merit changes.

Changes officially came in 2006, in the form of an updated Catalan Statute of Autonomy. While other factors have certainly played a role in the matter, the updated Statute represented a “pivotal moment in the recent growth in support for independence” – in no small part because its ratification was met with considerable opposition from the Spanish executive (Crameri, 2014, p.37). At the time, the Catalonians had recently elected, as their Generalitat, the aforementioned tripartite governing coalition – which consisted of a socialist party, a radical nationalist party, and a Left-greens party – who, in juxtaposition to the centralist-perceived Spanish government, sought stronger guarantees of autonomy for Catalonia (Keating & Wilson,
2009, p.541). Complementing these desires was an overarching sense throughout most of Spain’s autonomous communities that their Statutes of Autonomy were in need of modernization and revision in order to account for the “evolution of government in Spain and Europe” over the course of the previous quarter-century (p.541). Moreover, regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country were becoming frustrated with a perceived increase in Spanish nationalism in conjunction with an air if “hostility to further regional autonomy” that characterized the Spanish government’s centrist regime (Crameri, 2014, p.39). An opportunity to introduce changes to the Statutes of Autonomy came following the 2004 Spanish election, when a new government came to power – one that was open to exploring constitutional changes. Seizing the opportunity, Catalonia wasted little time in developing a draft for a new statute. What followed was a series of negotiations between the Catalonian and Spanish administrations, culminating in what many have argued is a “watered-down” version of the originally draft statute developed by the Generalitat. The final draft was criticized for having replaced definitive references to Catalonia as a nation with a “vaguer statement” that was not, in itself, legally enforceable; key clauses related to finance and language were also removed (pp.39-40). Nevertheless, the Statute was ratified by the people of Catalonia in a referendum that was, if nothing else, disappointing for all: while the Statute passed with a vote of 73.9 percent in favour, the voter turnout was less than 50 percent (BBC News, 2006, par.1).

Despite being a weaker document than what had originally been intended by the Generalitat, the updated Catalanian Statute of Autonomy did introduce “substantial new powers for Catalonia” relative to the old Statute (Crameri, 2014, pp.39-40). Where the updated Statute differs most significantly from its previous iteration is in its re-contextualization of the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. While in the original Statute, emphasis was placed on recognizing Catalonia as an autonomous community (Catalonian Generalitat, 1979, article 2), in
the updated version a stronger emphasis is placed on the Generalitat as the “institutional system” in which Catalonia’s government is organized and able to self-govern its people (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, article 2) and on recognizing the people of Catalonia as a nation replete with national symbols – including its flag, holiday, and anthem (article 8). The Generalitat’s relationship to the Spanish government is defined in the updated Statute as being one based on a “mutual institutional loyalty” regulated by “the general principle according to which the Generalitat is State, by the principle of autonomy, by that of bilateralism and by that of multilateralism” (article 3). Moreover, the Statute recognizes the historical and cultural precedence of Catalonia’s right to self-govern, noting that the Generalitat, itself, is “unique” in its application (and preservation of) civil law, language, culture, education, and the institutional system in which it resides (article 5). With this in mind, an emphasis is also placed on giving the Catalan language preferential treatment in its use by public administration bodies, in public media, and in the education system (article 6). In this respect, the updated Statute serves as a more nuanced recognition of the place and purpose of Catalonia’s culture and autonomy, and the institutions that service them.

From a cultural perspective, the updated Statute of Autonomy offers greater recognition of Catalan culture – both within and without the borders of Catalonia. In matters related to culture, the Statute indicates that the Generalitat has exclusive power over: virtually all artistic and cultural activities carried out in Catalonia – including the production, dissemination, regulation, and/or protection of cultural products produced in or imported to Catalonia; the regulation, inspection, and protection of activities, institutions, and objects related to cultural heritage; the creation, management, and protection of archives, libraries, museums, and other cultural heritage sites not owned by the State; and the promotion and dissemination of Catalan culture both nationally and internationally (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, article 127). The Statute also highlights the
Generalitat’s intentions to develop and promote “communication, cultural exchange, and cooperation” with communities with which Catalonia shares historical, linguistic, and/or cultural links (article 12). The Statute also grants the Generalitat authority to establish and foster social, economic, and cultural links with Catalan diaspora. To this end, the Generalitat is permitted to establish cooperative agreements with private and public institutions in other countries and territories, and, where needed, may request that the Spanish State sign international treaties on its behalf (article 13). In this respect, the Statute expands Catalonia’s repertoire of subjects to include international audiences. Additionally, the Statute recognizes Aran as a self-governing community within the Catalan territory; acknowledges it’s cultural, historical, geographical, and linguistic identity; and offers to respect and protect the uniqueness of the Aran people and culture, “subject to specific protection under a special legal system” (article 11). In other words, the Statute also elaborates a rapport of grandeur between the Generalitat and the Aran community insofar as it establishes the state of worth of the Aran culture and its status relative to the rest of Catalonia.

While initial reception of the new Statute of autonomy proved underwhelming – to say the least – its ratification had a number of significant consequences that reverberated throughout Spain and Catalonia (Crameri, 2014, p.40). Among the most prominent of these consequences was a “heightened” sense of anti-Catalonianism from the Spanish government, the Spanish right-wing media, and the Spanish public in general (p.40). Similarly, in Catalonia, the ratification of the Statute produced “a sense of apathy and frustration” among the Catalan people (p.40). Catalanians had begun to grow tired of seeing so much political manoeuvering on the part of its Generalitat without seeing any significant results – a sentiment reflected in the Statute referendum’s low voter turnout and reflective of an overall dissatisfaction with the general political process in Spain (p.40). Adding to this sense of dissatisfaction was the fact that, immediately following the ratification of the updated Statute, the Spanish High Court of Justice challenged the Statute on the
grounds of it not being constitutionally compliant. Many Catalonians felt outraged that a Statute, which had gone through the proper legal channels as outlined in the Spanish Constitution, was being challenged in such a deliberate fashion (Guibernau, 2014, p.16). Following four years of deliberation, the Spanish High Court finally ruled to repeal or amend a number of points from the Statute, many of which specifically related to Catalan culture and nationalism: while the High Court accepted the use of the term “nation” in describing Catalonia, the term’s use in relation to Catalonia was deemed to have no legal value in Spain because it could be construed as politically confusing vis-à-vis the Spanish nation:

It cannot be concealed that the use of such conceptually compromised terms as those of Nation and People or the reference to historical rights in the context of the invocation of foundations on which to establish the Legal System as a whole or some of its sectors may give rise to ambiguities and controversies in the political sphere (Spanish High Court of Justice, 2010, par.30).

Similar reservations were made with respects to Catalonia’s use of the term “national symbols,” which the High Court felt could also be confusing vis-à-vis Spain’s national symbols (Guibernau, 2014, p.16). Moreover, the Court found that the Generalitat’s preferential treatment of the Catalan language – particularly in its application in public administration – was unconstitutional, and that the “duty to be competent in Catalan in Catalonia” should not be equivocated, in any legal respects, to citizens’ responsibilities to be competent in Castilian (p.16).

If the revised Statute of Autonomy was met with a degree of apathy on the part of Catalonians, the same cannot be said for the High Court’s repeals and amendments. These actions sparked a furor in the Catalan people that quickly escalated from outrage to a potential secessionist movement: within six months of the High Court’s ruling, Catalan civil society had successfully led demonstrations advocating for Catalan nationalist; within a year, when polled, almost 43 percent of the Catalan people had indicated they would vote “yes” in a referendum on independence (Guibernau, 2014, p.18). More recent polls have indicated that more than 72 percent
of Catalans feel “frustrated” with Catalonia’s current level of autonomy and would like to see it obtain more (p.18). Simply put, it would be an understatement to say that the High Court’s decision was anything but a “pivotal moment in the recent growth in support for independence” in Catalonia (Crameri, 2014, p.37). With that said, while Catalonians have long expressed desires to see their region gain greater autonomy, an appetite to actually secede from Spain has never really been on display (p.128). If anything, evidence would suggest that the question of succession has served to fragment, rather than unite, Catalan society (p.143). The fact, then, that the High Court’s ruling would strike a chord with the majority of the Catalan public speaks more to a sense of being wronged by the Court’s decision than it does to any particular desire to separate. Nevertheless, a sufficient contingent of the Catalan people has expressed a desire to see Catalonia separate from Spain to warrant it being described as a “crisis” – one which could have conceivably been avoided had the Spanish government of the 1970s and 1980s “recognized that Catalan nationalism was as much about sentiment as politics” and made concessions accordingly (p.149). Instead, Catalonia has sought to reinforce and have recognized its cultural identity and nationalism by means of resistance to the cultural overtures of the Spanish government. This fact has been reflected in Catalonia’s policies – both cultural and otherwise – where an evident line in the sand has been drawn as far as Catalan culture and identity are concerned.

**7.6: Culture After Autonomy: Catalanian Cultural Policy in Recent Years**

If questions of (linguistic) identity and autonomy have been focal points of Catalonia’s cultural policy since the end of the Franco regime, this focus has certainly not come at the expense of economic opportunity. Similar to SODEC and *Creative Scotland*, Catalonia has introduced policies and programs aimed at both addressing its cultural needs while also promoting economic growth. Beginning towards the end of the 1990s, a growing concern in
Catalonia was that the region was losing a considerable amount of its market share with respects to some of the newer cultural industries. While publishing remained a prominent contributor to Catalonia’s economy, there was a sense that more could be done to support newer cultural industries, such as the audiovisual and media sectors, in their production and dissemination processes (Crameri, 2008, p.105) – industries that were becoming the dominant drivers of culture in the developed world. Feelings were that, without proper government intervention, these cultural industries would fall too far behind competing markets to remain domestically and internationally competitive. Drawing on the experiences of those directly involved with the CCMA, the Generalitat set about establishing policies and programs that would address the growing concerns regarding cultural production (p.105). Among the most prominent examples of policies and programs to emerge in response to these concerns include the introduction of the aforementioned Catalan Institute for the Cultural Companies (ICIC) in 2001 – rebranded as the Catalan Institute of Cultural Enterprises (ICEC) in 2012 (ICIC, 2012, p.3); the Ramon Llull Institute (IRL) in 2002 – whose remit has been to coordinate policies between Catalonia and other countries where Catalan is spoken as a means of promoting Catalan culture (CoNCA, 2015, p.13); and, more recently, the Catalan National Council for Culture and the Arts in 2008 (CoNCA) – whose mandate has been largely to serve as a non-partisan watchdog of the cultural sectors in Catalonia.

7.6.1: Catalan!Arts; Creative Catalan: The ICIC & Its Role in the Cultural Industries

In the case of the former, the ICIC – or ICEC – was introduced by the Generalitat as a means of promoting the production of Catalan culture via the cultural industries (Planas, 2010, p.10). The ICIC served as one of the Generalitat’s first forays into better understanding the state of its cultural industries and, beyond that, providing support to help address their deficiencies and
strengthen their causes. While the ICIC’s “remit is a broad one” insofar as it is responsible for virtually every facet of Catalonia’s cultural industries, its focus has primarily been on the audiovisual and broadcasting sectors (Crameri, 2008, p.106). This focus is relatively unsurprising given that the audiovisual sector has significantly grown in the years since ICIC’s inception, to the point where it has become Catalonia’s most important cultural industry in terms of gross added value (Planas, 2010, pp.36-37). Responding directly to the Catalanian Department of Culture, the ICIC’s role in the promotion and production of cultural goods and services is seen as relatively unique insofar as its primary focus deals with influencing and possibly even shaping the “conditions for cultural production” – a role which has not only placed the Generalitat in a position to control the production of “popular creation,” but has seemingly ignored the other side of the industrial equation in the process: distribution (Crameri, 2008, p.107). Rather, distribution was largely left to the whims of the market – an approach many commentators have deemed questionable given the symbolic value of Catalonia’s need/desire to promote and protect its cultural identity and language (p.108). Yet, if people were concerned with ICIC’s production-based approach to the cultural industries, it was arguably in the sense that if these industries need government help in producing cultural commodities, then it stands to reason that the government’s interventions are creating an artificial market that cannot be sustained – a market with more products than customers willing to consume them. In other words, ignoring distribution to focus on production does not get to the heart of the problem: it does not matter how much of a cultural commodity is available if no one is consuming it.

With that being said, recent developments would suggest the ICIC has begun to take a more level approach to the cultural industries – one centred on an investment formula that values cultural dissemination more prominently than in the past. In fact, ICIC’s rebranding to ICEC underscores a recognition that the cultural industries are evolving – in large part, because of
technological advents, coupled with greater access to a wealth of new forms of culture as a result of globalization – which has necessitated the introduction of a new approach to the cultural industries. To address these changes, ICEC seeks to apply, as its name implies, a more entrepreneurial approach to Catalonia’s cultural production and consumption (ICIC, 2012, p.3). This approach, ICEC contends, will help ensure companies in the cultural industries are able to “look towards the future, promoting innovation and paving the way towards internationalisation, which is to become a strategic element for the competitiveness of cultural and creative enterprises in Catalonia” (p.3). In other words, much like Creative Scotland, ICEC endeavours to support Catalonia’s cultural industries in ways that will enable them to compete on an international level. To this end, ICEC identifies five strategic objectives that it seeks to address through its activities and funding:

1) To promote cultural productions and contribute to the development of cultural enterprises; 2) To modernise and adapt Catalan cultural enterprises to new business models and Markets; 3) To provide Catalan cultural industries with more tools to cover their financial needs and improve competitiveness; 4) To promote Catalan cultural creations outside of Catalonia; 5) To preserve and disseminate our film heritage, ensuring its accessibility to the public (ICIC, 2012, p.5).

These objectives broadly serve as guiding-posts for many of ICEC’s activities in the cultural industries – though it is fair to say that the first two objectives, notwithstanding ICEC’s evolving approach to the cultural industries, remain focal points of its remit. Taking, for instance, ICEC’s approach to both the performing and visual arts sectors, its first two objectives for each is to develop and consolidate Catalan companies in the respective fields and promote production; dissemination, in both cases, is listed after production and is attached to the broader ambition of promoting and/or creating awareness of the field, itself (ICIC, 2012, pp.6 & 8). A similar prioritization is presented for the audiovisual (p.10) and music industries (p.16). In terms of the
cultural industries, then, these specific fields serve as harmonious figures around which worth is measured and compared.

Nevertheless, given the criticisms previously leveled at it, the fact that ICEC has taken strides to more actively encourage and promote the dissemination of culture demonstrates a willingness to change or evolve as the need requires. The fact that dissemination is largely associated with promotion and public awareness suggests, on the one hand, a desire to transmit knowledge to the public with the aspiration that such knowledge will lead to greater levels of cultural understanding and appreciation – to greater levels of worth. On the other hand, the association made between dissemination and promotion serves as a form of demonstration, on the part of the Generalitat and ICEC, to inform public opinion vis-à-vis the government’s actions in relation to the cultural industries – to suggest that efforts are being taken to redress lacuna in its previous approach(es) to the cultural industries.

With that said, it is interesting to note that ICEC’s budget largely favours the audiovisual industries over that of any other cultural industry sector – a favouritism that ICEC has historically been criticized for, including by other Catalonian cultural institutions (i.e. CoNCA, 2015, p.13). In 2011, ICEC allocated a significant portion of its €53 million budget to the audiovisual sector and subsectors – with close to €12 million (plus an additional €3.5 million in loans) going towards supporting and developing the audiovisual sector (ICIC, 2012, p.10), with an additional €3.15 million going towards Catalonia’s film industry (p.12), €7.18 million to the music industry (p.16), and €0.43 to the video game industry (p.20). By comparison, performing and visual arts received roughly €7 million (pp.6-8) and the book industry received €3.39 billion in support (p.14). This breakdown suggests that, if nothing else, ICEC’s investment formula prioritizes certain forms of cultural production – namely audiovisual and multimedia. Given the economic prominence of the audiovisual sector in Catalonia vis-à-vis other cultural industry sectors (ICIC,
2011), ICEC’s budgetary allocation suggests that, far from simply seeking to promote the production (and dissemination) of cultural products that represent Catalan culture and that are offered in the Catalan language, there is an inherent intent to profit – to obtain a return on value. Not only is this evidenced in the fact that €3.5 million of the funding ICEC allocates to the audiovisual sector comes in the form of loans, but it is also on display in its budgetary allocation to business development: €8.52 million in funding and €13.5 million in loans (ICIC, 2012, p.18). This funding scheme suggests that ICEC is strategically funding Catalonia’s cultural industries in ways that favour the stronger industries while also making a substantial amount of that funding contingent on some level of tangible or economic success. It stands to reason that the audiovisual industries, for instance, are more adept at recuperating and repaying the loans they receive from the government than might be the visual arts industries. As such, it is relatively safe to say that, by more prominently supporting industries that are “safe bets,” ICEC is assuring that it will receive a return on its investment. However, in doing so, the ICEC potentially creates a catch 22 for its weaker cultural industries: often these industries require government support just to survive, never mind to profit; if the level of support offered by the ICEC is contingent on the profitability of an industry, then all any of the weaker industries can truly hope for is enough support to survive.

It is, thus, with many of its weaker industries in mind that ICEC created the Creative Catalonia (originally Catalan!Arts) initiative in 2005. As part of its approach to promoting Catalonia’s culture, both within and without the region, ICEC introduced the Catalan!Arts branding initiative with the goal of making Catalonia’s cultural companies more visible by unifying them under a singly brand/image (Planas, 2010, p.21). Similarly titled sub-brands – notably Catalan!Music Catalan!Books, Catalan!Circus, Catalan!Dance, and Catalan!Theatre – were also created to target and make internationally-visible specific cultural industries (ICIC,
Since its inception, and perhaps taking a cue from *Creative Scotland*, the *Catalan!Arts* initiative has been reframed as *Creative Catalonia*, bringing the various Catalan! brands under a more unified umbrella: namely the Market Development Department of the ICEC (ICEC, 2016, par.1). Under the auspices of the Market Development Department, *Creative Catalonia* endeavours to support “the production of professional projects and their promotion abroad” by both facilitating access to international markets – through its offices strategically located throughout Europe – and strengthening the presence of Catalan companies at international fairs and events (par.2-3). Beyond this remit, *Creative Catalonia* also: provides market research and consultancy to projects dealing with cultural exportation and internationalization; nurtures “professional networking in Catalonia and abroad”; creates promotional and marketing tools; and provides support to Catalonia’s cultural industries to ensure their presence in international media (par.4). In this respect, *Creative Catalonia* serves as a test model for promoting the Catalan culture internationally.

Conspicuous by its absence in *Creative Catalonia’s* remit, however, is the audiovisual sector. This absence points to a recognition or acknowledgement that ICEC’s historic emphasis on the audiovisual industries – over that of other industries – has left a gap in its approach to other cultural sectors. While *Creative Catalonia* addresses this gap, it also underscores the fact that the audiovisual industries, for all intents and purposes, are treated differently in Catalonia than the other cultural industries – they are conferred a state of worth beyond that of other cultural industries. This fact is accentuated by the existence of the aforementioned CF&TV, an organization whose role is relatively the same as Creative Catalonia – albeit with a focus exclusively on the audiovisual industries (CF&TV, 2016b, par.1). This preferential treatment reflects a growing trend in global cultural production towards multimedia and digital commodities over more traditional forms of cultural production. More specifically, however, it is
an approach that is reflective of the fact that, while Catalonia has identified and prioritized culture as playing “an increasingly strategic role in the territorial development that seeks to integrate [the] knowledge economy with social cohesion, governance, and sustainability,” its policies are not always able to “respond to the often irreconcilable dilemmas and expectations that this new world order presents” (Barbieri, 2012, p.13). Rather than try to reconcile these dilemmas, ICEC has arguably taken a more pragmatic approach to culture: instead of “if you build it, they will come,” ICEC seems to have adopted the mantra of “if you build what they want, they will come.” With popular culture – often in the form of audiovisual content – being a dominant force in contemporary cultural industries, the overall approach to ICEC suggests an acquiescence to this new world order; rather than fight the system it finds itself in, ICEC seems content to work within it to address Catalonia’s cultural needs.

If ICEC’s approaches to the cultural industries seems particularly targeted to the sectors that have been most profitable in recent decades, the reason has, undoubtedly, a lot to do with the overall funding and importance the Catalanian Generalitat has placed on culture in recent years. In its 2015 report, the Catalan National Council for Culture and the Arts (CoNCA) found that the “institutional importance” conferred to culture was on a steady decline (CoNCA, 2015, p.7). Moreover, CoNCA found that decreases in cultural funding, coupled with “some measures taken in recent years,” had endangered “the continuity and survival” of a number of cultural projects in Catalonia (p.7). Adding to these concerns, CoNCA found that the relative uncertainty plaguing “all economic sectors of society” had resulted in cultural consumption – of all forms of culture – becoming a luxury (p.7). This was most notably the case with younger generations whose limited incomes posed an intermediate threat to the cultural system and its offerings – many of which had become inaccessible by virtue of being unaffordable (p.7). It is with this in mind that CoNCA identifies digital platforms as offering “a great opportunity to move towards greater
democratization and universal access to culture” (p.8). In other words, there is an inherent necessity in ICEC’s strategy to target audiovisual sectors – one that is borne of both economic and access considerations.

7.6.2: Beyond Industry: The Catalan National Council for Culture & the Arts (CoNCA)

For its part, CoNCA is a non-partisan governmental organization that was created in 2008 in response to demands made to the Generalitat, by the cultural sector, to “renew and expand” its cultural policies and support in favour of cultural creation (CoNCA, 2016a, par.1). This was coupled with a growing concern that cultural policy – particularly as it related to dissemination (i.e. the ICIC) – was being used for political purposes rather than for the betterment of Catalan culture (CoNCA, 2009, p.5). At the time of its creation, CoNCA was notable for being “the first mixed cultural policy system in southern Europe,” combining both an arm’s length administrative organization with a cultural department (Barbieri, 2012, p.13). CoNCA emerged at a time when the Generalitat sought to “decentralise the creative and exhibition sectors” by means of developing a more regionalized cultural infrastructure in Catalonia (Planas, 2010, p.11). To this end, CoNCA has sought to encourage universal access to culture by means of a “cross-cutting and inter-disciplinary perspective” – a superior common principle, if you will – that recognizes the diversity of Catalonia’s population (p.5). Additionally, CoNCA (2016b) functions as an advisory agency to the Generalitat on issues relating to cultural policy as a matter of ensuring “support for artistic creation and its promotion, and to make its assessment” (par.1). The aims of CoNCA are:

[T]o ensure the development of cultural activity, to assist in the management of cultural policy in terms of artistic creation, to participate in policies regarding support and promotion of artistic and cultural creation, and to organize a cultural audit system of public equipment and grants while taking into account the promotion of culture and social returns (CoNCA, 2016b, par.2).
In addition to these aims, CoNCA (2009) produces annual reports on the state of affairs of Catalan’s culture and cultural sector – including its regulations and regulatory bodies; plays a deciding role in determining the allocation of support to creators and organizations; and creates opportunity to collaborate with cultural organizations and institutions from other Catalan-speaking territories “with a shared culture” (p.5). CoNCA’s operations are, thusly, divided into two streams: a commission for cultural strategies and a commission for supporting the arts (p.17).

If CoNCA’s aims seem to broadly overlap with those of ICEC, it is in large part because CoNCA essentially reproduced the ICEC model of cultural policy (CoNCA, 2015, p.13). A similar argument can be made for its overlap with the IRL, for that matter – an organization whose underlying purpose, not unlike some of CoNCA’s aims, is to promote the use of the Catalan language abroad, through 1) the study of the language at academic institutions, 2) the translation of Catalan literature and thought, and 3) the dissemination of Catalan language culture at international events (IRL, 2016). This reproduction of ICEC and IRL’s remits is, in large part, the result of what turned out to be a relatively tumultuous inception for CoNCA, marred by legislative delays that resulted in ICEC’s funding and responsibilities increasing at the expense of what funding CoNCA would have received had its remit been fully actualized (CoNCA, 2015, pp.13-14). It is somewhat ironic, then, that CoNCA’s roles and responsibilities have overlapped with ICEC’s given that ICEC largely serves as a centralized institute for cultural policies related to the cultural industries while CoNCA was meant to usher in a sort of paradigm shift towards decentralization (pp.13-14).

Consequently, even in 2015, CoNCA, itself, is calling for revisions to its mandate and overall function as a means of taking advantage of the platform and opportunities that a non-partisan body can offer (CoNCA, 2015, pp.14-15). The argument CoNCA offers is that systemic reforms are needed in Catalonia to “place culture as a fundamental national issue” (p.15). In
doing so, the various stakeholders involved in cultural policymaking can more easily “reach a consensus on the main lines of action” which would, in turn, remove culture’s dependency on politics (p.15). In this respect, and beyond its overlapping responsibilities relative to other cultural agencies, CoNCA arguably serves as a space for challenging the public good; it offers a critique of the current system while also providing a check – via its state of the union reports – to other cultural institutions. On the one hand, CoNCA challenges the public good in its endeavour to see changes to ways in which cultural policy is delivered in Catalonia. However, CoNCA goes one step further and serves, through its reports, as an implicit (and sometimes explicit) act of protestation. In particular, CoNCA’s reports have measuredly protested the conditions under which culture has become a political tool in Catalonia – a notion arguably made more salient by the fact that CoNCA, even as an arm’s length, non-partisan organization, is still a product of the very government and system it is challenging. On the other hand, CoNCA serves to provide a space for brainstorming and collective dialogue; it provides recommendations for how to address and overcome many of the issues it finds present in Catalonia’s cultural sector. Far from simply being a source for contestation, CoNCA offers Catalonia provisions for resolving its cultural issues. In this respect, CoNCA offers an alternative approach – an alternative common principle and investment formula – to the one advocated by the ICEC.

7.7: Autonomy & the Catalanian Culture Moving Forward

Perhaps more so than either Québec or Scotland, Catalonia’s cultural policy serves as a field of resistance to the isomorphic pressures of its country and those abroad. Catalonia’s case serves as an example of how local and/or regional autonomy is almost always subject to a dominant nation-state – and, if not a dominant nation-state, then almost certainly the imposition of an imperialist or colonialist regime (Zolberg, 2003, p.297). Marked by its experience of
cultural suppression at the hands of a dictator – an experience that was recent enough for the scars to still be fresh in the minds of many of the region’s citizens – Catalonia’s policies reflect an urgency to solidify the Catalan culture and identity in ways that will, arguably, ensure that what happened during the Franco regime cannot be repeated. Since Spain’s democratization in the 1970s, this urgency to protect Catalan culture has been manifested through Catalonia’s and, to a certain degree, Spain’s culturally significant policies. Beginning with Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy – which assures Catalonia a measure of self-governing power – and its language (normalization) policies – that have sought to reintegrate the Catalan language into everyday parlance – there has been an evident desire to provide a legal/constitutional infrastructure to Catalan culture as a means of ensuring its long term maintenance and survival. These policies are also notable for the ways in which they challenge Spanish sovereignty – a point it would be difficult to contest was unintentional on the part of the Catalonian Generalitat. Nevertheless, these policies have assured Catalonia a measure of cultural security, even if a growing number of Catalonians feel that it is insufficient (i.e. Crameri, 2014; Bel, 2015).

And yet, even with constitutional assurances, Catalonia’s cultural policies arguably evidence the efforts of a government unsure of how to proceed with the redevelopment of a culture that was, up until the 1970s, ravished by policies that were knowingly and actively designed to assure its destruction. The result has arguably been a culture stuck in a strange sort of developmental check: on the one hand, elements of the culture that have been there for hundreds of years (i.e. language) remain prominent fixtures of the Catalan culture; on the other hand, there was a significant break (albeit brief in the overall historical context of the culture) in the culture’s progression – one that was sufficient enough to have effectively compromised the salience of Catalan being a strong, unified culture the way one might argue the Québécois and Scottish are. It is a situation that offered unique opportunities and challenges vis-à-vis the creation and
promotion of culture and the cultural policies that regulate them. It provided opportunity in the sense that Catalonia entered the post-Franco era with a relatively blank slate where culture was concerned. While remnants of the (old) Catalan culture – such as its language – remained, how the Generalitat ultimately opted to weave these cultural strands into a cogent and coherent cultural (identity) tapestry was largely a process of its own choosing. It was, to use a saying popularized in pop culture, an opportunity to “reboot” the Catalan culture, taking the “essential” elements and building something for a new audience. For the most part, the Generalitat’s approach to cultural policy has arguably focused on identity (re)formation and distinction – primarily through an emphasis on linguistic differences in culture between Catalonia and Spain. Even Catalonia’s more recent cultural policies and institutions – namely the ICEC (and its subdivision, Creative Catalonia) and IRL – have dealt with questions of (Catalan) identity – albeit on a much larger scale. These institutions have sought to create an image of Catalonia, on an international level, that is both appealing and marketable to Catalonians and foreigners alike.

Creative Catalonia, in particular, has been devised to create a brand (and brand awareness) for Catalonia’s broader – and often less mainstream – cultural industries. In doing so, Creative Catalonia arguably negotiates not just Catalonia’s cultural identity, but also its space in an increasingly globalized world. Effectively, Creative Catalonia is establishing Catalonia’s cultural place internationally – outlining the boundaries of what is and is not Catalan culture, while also trying to penetrate into others’ cultural spaces with the ambition of expanding its boundaries. While this form of “identity marketing” is not new in the context of a national minority – let alone a cultural majority – and has already been evidenced in this thesis in the previous cases, it is unique in the context of Catalonia insofar as it arguably represents a form of identity experimentation/formulation – of trying on “new hats” to see which fits best. The fact that Catalonia’s primary purveyor of the cultural industries, ICIC, was rebranded ICEC, and its
branding initiative, Catalan!Arts, was rebranded Creative Catalonia – in both cases with no
ostensible differences in their form or remit outside of their names – suggests a trial and error
approach to marketing Catalonia’s culture, without any actual trial. It is in this respect, that
Catalonia’s cultural situation represents a challenge to the Generalitat: it is a culture that is, at
once, in its formative stages and yet older than most other cultures. As a result, there is
tentativeness to Catalan’s approach to cultural development: large, proactive, and modernized
ambitions mitigated by a seeming unwillingness to rock the boat too thoroughly. The end result,
as CoNCA (2015) implies, is a boat without a rudder – a fact exemplified by the overabundance
and repetitive nature of many of Catalonia’s government institutions.

The fact that there is so much overlap in Catalonia’s cultural policies and institutions
reveals that, while the Generalitat recognizes its system’s deficiencies, it has been incapable or
unwilling to fully address them. For good or bad, the Generalitat has seemingly latched on to the
Catalan language as the definitive element of its culture – and most, if not all, of its cultural
policies address the proliferation of Catalan culture in some capacity. Even the efforts of ICEC –
and as exemplified by the criticisms levelled at it in its support of cultural production (Crameri,
2008; CoNCA, 2015) – suggest that Catalonia has sought to saturate the market – both locally
and abroad – with Catalan-language cultural products as a means of proliferation, a sort of “more
is better” approach. It is an approach that, nevertheless, also suggests a progressive and modern
perspective on recreating one’s sense of identity – one that welcomes the changing nature of
cultural consumption rather than fixating on the domestic world principles of heritage and
history. It suggests that Catalonia approaches cultural productions and commodities as simple
vehicles for the reproduction of culture and identity; the significance or symbolism of what is
actually being consumed is secondary to the act of consuming it in the Catalan language. For a
national minority whose cultural identity is largely centralized around language, the cultural
industries provide the means to disseminate culture in that language while also challenging the cultural majority whose cultural-linguistic rights are constitutionally deemed superior. However, there is an inherent danger in controlling for language without controlling, necessarily, for content or message: it provides an opportunity for the cultural industries to have a prominent role in shaping Catalan culture beyond language.

The very existence of ICEC reveals that the cultural industries play a prominent role in Catalonia’s cultural development. Yet without a clear directive – or, more specifically, a streamlined directive from one source – it seems as though the Catalan cultural industries have a relatively free reign to produce whatever they want provided it is in Catalan. The targeted nature of ICEC’s support – notably with respects to the audiovisual sector – suggests a similar conclusion: ICEC’s targeting the more prolific and profitable industries; not necessarily the most meaningful industries where Catalan culture is concerned. The fact that heritage and more traditional forms of culture have taken a backseat in Catalonia’s approach to cultural policy suggests that their contributions to Catalan culture are, if not irrelevant, then ineffective in their ability to grow the Catalan language and culture. This approach, as mentioned, can be interpreted as a sign of urgency – to build up the foundation of Catalan culture (i.e. its language) at all costs, with the implication being that once that culture is firmly in place, efforts can be made to look back and reintegrate heritage and tradition. But it is an approach that raises more questions than answers. Fundamentally, does Catalan culture still exist beyond its language? To what extent does any culture exist beyond its language?

As globalization erodes the socio-economic and cultural boundaries between countries and nations, it seems as though cultural difference is being reduced to its most basic features. In the case of Catalonia, that feature is its language, and judging by its cultural policies, it would seem the Generalitat has recognized this fact and is doubling down to ensure that its language
continues to exist. In doing so, however, the Generalitat must invariably grapple with the potential trade-off of one fundamental cultural trait in exchange for others. It is a trade-off that seemingly all cultures must make at some point – but one that is most saliently felt by cultural minorities who contend with being others within the context of their own countries.

7.7.1: A Type Analysis of Catalonia’s Cultural Policy

Much in the same vein as Québec and Scotland’s cultural policies engender superior common principles that valorize their respective collective/national cultures and identities, so too does Catalonia’s policies emphasise the value of its peoples’ collective identity – particularly as it relates to human dignity. In Catalonia, worth is measured in terms of cultural access and cohesion: individuals who have access to and are able to participate in cultural life are deemed to have worth. In fact, the questions/concerns of cultural access and availability figure prominently in Catalonia’s cultural policy – undoubtedly a by-product of the culture and language’s near-extinction at the hands of the Franco regime. An added level of worthiness comes from the ability to actually convene in the Catalan language, and its overall use is used variably as a form of evidence in the Catalan Generalitat’s appraisal of its cultural policies’ success and in its judgement in introducing new policies. While artists and creators serve as harmonious figures in Catalonia – much as they do in Québec and Scotland – it is largely in their capacity as ambassadors of the Catalan culture and language – as individuals who have the ability to advance and promote and grow the Catalan language outside of the region, in international markets. In fact, where Catalan’s cultural policy is concerned, language seemingly supersedes all other considerations of cultural identity. It is, in large part, with the promotion and proliferation of Catalan cultural products produced in the Catalan language that Catalonia has preferred cultural
industries – such as the audiovisual industry – that disseminate easily and (relatively) economically.

While Catalonia is receptive of cultural diversity – a fact outlined both in its investment formula and in its mode of expressing judgement – the region’s rapport of grandeur leaves little doubt that the Catalan culture (and language) is its preferred and preeminent culture (with the Aranese given a nod as a significant albeit smaller/less important cultural community residing in Catalonia). Catalonia’s policies have even gone so far as to challenge the natural order between the region and its country, Spain, in order to prioritize the Catalan language over Spain’s official language. This prioritization, perhaps more so than either Québec or Scotland, highlights the apprehension the Catalonians feel with respects to its culture (and language) falling into a state of decline or unworthiness. As such, much of Catalonia’s cultural policy has arguably been built around insulating the Catalan language from the possibility of decline, with its investment formula targeting and supporting a cultural democracy approach that prioritizes newer forms of culture (i.e. audiovisual and multimedia) provided that they are produced in Catalan. In any case, there are certainly parallels that can be drawn between Catalonia’s common world of cultural policy and that of Québec and Scotland. An emphasis on promoting culture and language (and encouraging cultural engagement) through cultural policies that favour the cultural industries – and, in particular, the multimedia sector – is common in all three cases and arguably serves as the backbone for cultural development and isomorphic resistance to the national majority (Table 6).

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<tr>
<th>Analytical Categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Case Examples</th>
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<tr>
<td>Superior common</td>
<td>The superior common principle underlying the cultural policy of national minorities is the</td>
<td>“Culture, besides being a strategic sector that makes a fundamental contribution to society’s economic development, also contributes to increasing a</td>
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<td>Principle</td>
<td>Valuation and promotion of a distinct, unifying (national minority) culture or identity.</td>
<td>Group’s social and symbolic capital. Culture, a public good, must be seen as a common public good and a preferential one. Culture, besides the economic function, fulfils an essentially social function” (CoNCA, 2011, p.14).</td>
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<td>State of worth</td>
<td>The state of worth is measured in terms of cultural cohesion, integration, convergence, assimilation, and propagation: an individual who can identify as a cultural citizen – one who is active and integrated into the national culture – is worthy. Often individuals or industries that produce (national) culture are singled out or conferred a privileged status in the cultural policy.</td>
<td>“Cultural initiatives that promote greater social cohesion must be stimulated, in an authentic democratisation of access to culture that will help to reduce the inequality still existing in the use of cultural goods and the promotion of the values of cultural diversity in Catalonia” (CoNCA, 2011, p.16). “The priority objective of cultural policies in Catalonia […] ought to consist of promoting and fostering – implementing operating formulations and initiatives that focus on communities’ creative capacity – the management of cultural diversity and the proactive participation of citizens beyond their consideration as cultural consumers” (CoNCA, 2011, pp.14-15).</td>
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<td>Human dignity</td>
<td>Human dignity is recognized and/or established through: 7) The cultivation/development of aptitudes in creativity; 8) Cultural participation and action; and 9) The recognition and preservation of heritage and tradition.</td>
<td>“Catalonia is a community of free persons for free persons, in which each individual may live and express diverse identities, with a firm commitment to community based on respect for individual dignity. […] The Catalan people continues today to proclaim liberty, justice and equality as higher values of its collective life, and manifests its desire to advance in a way which will ensure a dignified quality of life for all those who live and work in Catalonia” (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, preamble).</td>
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<td>Repertoires of subjects</td>
<td>A repertoire of subjects in cultural policy principally consists of artists and amateurs, citizens, (cultural) industries and institutions, creators/producers, and, in certain contexts diaspora and international markets.</td>
<td>“The powers of the Generalitat emanate from the people of Catalonia and are exercised according to this Estatut and the Constitution” (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, article 2).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repertoires of objects and devices</td>
<td>The objects and devices of cultural policy primarily consist of cultural products and artefacts, cultural and heritage sites, symbols, language(s), and educational materials and policies.</td>
<td>“The media [is] an essential tool to bring the population into contact with culture; to expand the market for Catalan products; and to promote cultural consumption” (Planas, 2010, p.11).</td>
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<td>Investment formula</td>
<td>The investment formula of a cultural policy operates on at least one of three fronts, and tends to function in relation to the establishment of cultural priorities – often understood in the form of a trade-off or sacrifice: 7) The trade-off between cultural pluralism and homogeneity; 8) The trade-off between the democratization of culture and cultural democracy; and/or 9) The trade-off between cohesion/harmony with the national majority and expressions of cultural/national identity and</td>
<td>“1) To promote cultural productions and contribute to the development of cultural enterprises; 2) To modernise and adapt Catalan cultural enterprises to new business models and Markets; 3) To provide Catalan cultural industries with more tools to cover their financial needs and improve competitive-ness; 4) To promote Catalan cultural creations outside of Catalonia; 5) To preserve and disseminate our film heritage, ensuring its accessibility to the public” (ICIC, 2012, p.5).</td>
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<td><strong>Rapport of grandeur/Worth</strong></td>
<td>The rapport of grandeur or worth of a cultural policy operationalizes the relationship between different cultural groups, nationally-recognized cultures (i.e. national minorities, national majorities, cultural minorities), and/or institutions/organizations (i.e. government and cultural industries). These rapports tend to manifest hierarchically, wherein one culture (or institution) is given preferential or preeminent treatment relative to other cultures.</td>
<td>“The citizens of Catalonia and their political institutions recognise Aran as an Occitan entity, with cultural, historical, geographical and linguistic identity as defended by the Aranese people over the centuries. This Estatut recognises, protects and respects this uniqueness and recognises Aran as a unique territorial entity within Catalonia, subject to specific protection under a special legal system” (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, article 11).</td>
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<td><strong>Natural relations between beings</strong></td>
<td>The natural relations between beings are presented in cultural policy as the power dynamics that exist between levels of government and levels/statuses of cultures (i.e. majority and minority culture; national and regional culture). Often, natural relations will be presented as cultural guidelines or rules of engagement between national majorities and minorities (e.g. the division of policy responsibilities between the federal and regional/territorial governments).</td>
<td>“The public authorities of Catalonia shall promote the full exercise of the freedoms and rights recognised by this Estatut, the Constitution, the European Union, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and those other international treaties and conventions which Spain has signed that recognise and guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms” (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, article 4).</td>
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<td><strong>Harmonious figures of the natural order</strong></td>
<td>The harmonious figure of the natural order of cultural policy is often presented as culturally-active citizens or artists/producers. Cultural producers, in particular – such as artists and industries – are revered for their ability to evoke, through their productions (and the dissemination thereof), the realities of the superior common principle – as do, in certain contexts, cultural and symbolic figures.</td>
<td>“Catalan culture has continued to maintain a steady presence and international recognition thanks to the activity of artists and creators” (CoNCA, 2011, p.13).</td>
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<td><strong>Test model</strong></td>
<td>Public opinion/reception, internationalisation, cultural visibility, and global recognition are used as test model(s) in cultural policy. In certain cases, public action, elections, and referendums can also be seen as test models.</td>
<td>“[T]he recognition of cultural diversity is now an essential aspect of cultural policy programmes at regional level and at municipal level in particular. Culture has become another aspect of the social integration of immigrants. Policies for the recognition of cultural diversity have been accompanied by actions to promote national identity and the Catalan language. As a result, the government has considered that language is synonymous with cohesion” (Planas, 2010, p.30).</td>
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<td><strong>Mode of expressing judgement</strong></td>
<td>Judgement is based on the perceived social and economic benefits derived from any particular cultural policy objective or priority. In other words judgement is expressed in terms of what it brings to the national minority’s culture.</td>
<td>Growth and normalized use of the Catalan language: “…the fourteen years [the linguistic normalization act] has been in force have made possible the spread of knowledge of the language among most of the population […] which has led to a process of normal linguistic use” (Catalonian Generalitat 1998, p.9)</td>
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<td><strong>Form of evidence</strong></td>
<td>In the context of cultural policy, evidence of the modality of the world’s knowledge is often presented in the forms of economic and social value and through the growth of culture – often tangibly measured through cultural integration, production, consumption, and exportation.</td>
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<td><strong>State of unworthiness and decline</strong></td>
<td>A state of unworthiness is manifested as a decline in cultural participation, integration, and expression. This decline is often presented Decline/loss of the Catalan language and identity.</td>
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as erosion of the national culture and language and/or through assimilation into the national majority’s culture.
Conclusion: Towards a Common World of National Minority Cultural Policy

Historically, public art and cultural have been linked to, and employed in the context of, nationally defining moments – often expressed symbolically in the form of monuments or commemorations (Pollock & Paddison, 2010, pp.335-336). This use of public art enables the state to “manipulate popular values to transform everyday ‘legends of people’ into ‘myths of state’” (Papadakis, 1998, p.150) – and, in effect, create an ideational narrative that connects the nation to people who the public can identify with. Thus, from a state perspective, culture can be linked to national identity insofar as it serves to link the nation’s people to (the triumphs of) its historical and cultural past. However, in recent decades, and in part through the instrumentalization of cultural policy, culture and art have been used not only to support and promote a sense of national identity, but, in certain contexts, to foster a sense of identity that is separate or unique from that of the sovereign state. As culture is “full of symbolic meanings that can provide binding ties to a community,” its utility as a tool for identity construction is often predicated on the ways in which it can be framed to fit the (political) aspirations of specific political or cultural groups (i.e. national minorities, nationalist movements, governments, etc.) (Béland & Lecours, 2005, p.678). Terms such as “cultural identity” and “national identity” are often brandished as a means of establishing “respectability and brand identification for a variety of contending politico-economic projects in the cultural domain” (Schlesinger, 1987, p.219). As such, it can be said that cultural policy – far from the exclusivity of cultural or economic interests – can and often does serve political objectives when applied in the context of identity.

In fact – and as exemplified in this thesis – fostering a sense of national identity has been a crucial component to a number of nations or national minorities with subnational governments – particularly those that are seeking recognition as distinct societies and/or a measure of
independence from the sovereign state in which they belong. In many respects, a national identity functions as a unifying feature, one that establishes and underlines an “us” and “them” dichotomy between the people belonging or residing in a specific geographic region or space and those residing outside of it. The significance of a national identity, albeit subtle, can have a profound impact on public perception, and can shape the ways and degree in which governments can exert power and mobilize their policy agendas. Governments who can foster a strong sense of nationalism can arguably exercise a greater measure of discretionary power when devising and implementing policies. Because culture figures prominently in the development of identity, so too does cultural policy figure in the development and maintenance of a national identity. After all, nationalism is, in effect, the (symbolic) act of “striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that” (Gellner, 1983, p.43). Thus, in the context of this approach, governments will often draw upon cultural policy to, on the one hand, develop a sense of national identity – as culture and identity are intrinsically linked – and, on the other hand, instrumentally support other policy fields.

It is with identity and instrumentality in mind – and outside of the more conventional perspectives to cultural policy – that a new approach to cultural policy has emerged, one that draws on the cultural (re: sometimes creative) industries and which, in its own right, represents a sort of paradigm shift in cultural policy discourse. Broadly speaking, the cultural industries are often market-oriented industries through which culture is mass produced and automated (Manovich, 2001, p.125). These industries are primarily aesthetic in nature, often associated with the “arts,” and include professions (and productions) such as painting, sculpture, and literature – though, in recent decades, the media industries have taken a prominent role in what is understood to be the “cultural industries” (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011, p.1). It is through these industries that culture is tailored for mass consumption and, in many respects, the means and methods of
consumption are shaped. The cultural products or commodities created through or by the cultural industries are governed by their ability to realize value – often expressed in economic terms (Adorno, 1991, pp.98-99). It is, in no small part, through the cultural industries, and the markets they produce and cater to, that virtually every cultural need an individual or group might have are met – including those of governments (Galloway & Dunlop, 2007, p.19).

The notion of cultural industries – a notion that has historically existed alongside cultural policy – has gained traction in cultural policy circles in recent decades, making of cultural policy an area increasingly approached in economic terms (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p.3). The emergence of cultural industries policy, following the Second World War, is built on the notion that, far from being the exclusive purview of cultural ideals, arts and culture are at the mercy of supply and demand economics (Ménard, 2004, p.13). In this context, the cultural industries can be seen as an approach to cultural policy, in both academic and practical policymaking terms, that seeks to “legitimize culture in the eyes of the hard-headed economic policymakers” (Throsby, 2010, p.7). The economic dimension of cultural industries policy has made it an irresistible approach for cultural policy development in recent years, as it offers governments a way to assuage critiques that government support of arts and culture is little more than lobbying-fuelled handouts, at the taxpayers’ expense, for what should otherwise be a viable and self-supporting sector (Throsby, 2010, p.7). The cultural industries – whether seen as a degradation of culture or a refutation of the romantic antagonism between economics and culture – is, nonetheless, an important notion that is part of the practical intellectual superstructure of cultural policymaking.

**Cultural Transition: From Cultural Policy to Cultural Industries**

The shift in cultural policy towards cultural industries approaches has, arguably, been most prominently exemplified – at least in the cultural policy literature – in the overtly tangible
and easily quantifiable creative cities movement/creative class theory. This movement posits that
the gentrification of old industrial and commercial sectors of cityscapes – into designer
boutiques, hangouts, and hubs for highly technical and specialized industries – is a creative and
economically sound way of attracting young and rich socialites and professionals with disposable
income to a city (Cunningham, 2014, pp.154-155). These young professionals – often referred to
as the “creative class” – theoretically represent a veritable socio-economic boon for a region
(McGuigan, 2009). This class, whose identity is intricately linked to economic circumstances,
represents a powerful social and economic pillar through which “virtually every aspect of our
lives” is influenced (Florida, 2012, p.37). Consequently, by virtue of instrumentally applying
cultural policy towards gentrification of older industrial neighbourhoods, governments are able to
explicitly effect economic change and implicitly effect social and cultural change through the
creative class.

Notwithstanding the creative class theory espoused by, arguably, some of the field’s more
cavalier voices, cultural industries policy and approaches – as the name implies – have been
deeply rooted in questions and considerations of culture and economics. Fundamentally, the
cultural industries are predicated on culture insofar as they often serve as the means through
which culture is mass produced and disseminated (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005, pp.2-3). As
culture and art are both tangible and intangible constructs of individuals and/or institutions
operating “within the general economy,” they are inescapably subject to the market and, more
broadly, the material world (Heilbrun & Gray, 2001, p.3) – a world in which the cultural
industries operate. Moreover, culture is enmeshed in the very identity of the cultural industries:
the term “cultural industries” and its associative concepts were largely established, by prominent
Frankfurt school theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, as a means of critiquing what
they saw as the false sense of democratic security inferred by the associative term “mass culture,”
and as a means of drawing attention to the fact that the industries in question were essentially commodifying culture through mass production (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005, p.3).

Despite the critiques offered by the likes of Adorno and Horkheimer, culture – and the development and dissemination thereof – often falls under the domain of the cultural industries – and it is through the industries’ direction that the means in which culture is consumed are proffered. In effect, through their relative control of the production and consumption of culture, the cultural industries possess a veritable lion’s share of power when it comes to questions and considerations of culture – at least where economic factors are concerned. It is in the hopes of tapping into its economic potential that governments have taken a keen interest in the cultural industries. The application of the cultural industries concept – at least in policy terms – has been in the context of creativity and [economic] innovation (Throsby, 2010), with an eye towards shifting cultural policy’s outlook away from heritage and the cultural past, towards the future and the culture of tomorrow.

Where the cultural industries have been the most appealing to governments is in their tendency to grow in proportion to the demand for new and innovative cultural products – products which have, in the last few decades, progressively come more and more in the form of technological advancements. As the demand for new cultural products increases, so too do the levels of employment in the cultural industries – which often proves to be a boon for the greater economy (Throsby, 2010, p.98). It is, in no small part, because of the inherent economic benefits offered by the cultural industries that many governments believe that the “creativity” of the cultural industries can be translated onto the rest of their economy – that creativity is an “essential ingredient” for economic success (Galloway & Dunlop, 2007, p.28). With this in mind, cultural policy – in the context of the cultural industries – is often employed as a means of regulating the cultural industries by influencing their barriers, survival chances, and potential
adoption of ideas, values, styles, and genres (DiMaggio, 1983, p.242). Beyond regulatory purposes, cultural policy can and has been employed by governments as a means of providing incentives to attract the cultural industries to their specific regions or states (Tremblay & Rousseau, 2005, p.308). Often, the underlying objective for governments in this context – much as what is outlined in the creative class theory – is to draw in creative individuals and industries to jumpstart the local/regional economy. Although the cultural industries have long been defined and presented in academic literature as ubiquitously creative and globally reaching in their scope, they are “very much rooted in particular places” (O’Connor & Gu, 2010, p.125). This rootedness is often evidenced through localized economic clusters of industries focused on specific cultural products or commodities (p.125). It is with respects to creating these clusters, in particular, that governments have introduced certain cultural policies to draw in the cultural industries to their specific regions.

Government interest in developing cultural industry clusters points to the fact that, over the course of the last three decades, the notion that the market or cultural industries are the most efficient and effective vehicle through which to generate and proliferate culture has grown within public policy discourse to the point where it has almost gained “supremacy” (Hesmondhalgh, 2010, p.37). Thus, governments have sought to produce policies that target the cultural industries – not so much to stop them, but to attract and use them for their own devices (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005). To this end, many governments and sub-state governments (or governments of national minorities) have sought to promote and use the cultural industries as an implicit way of bringing forward their ideas of cultural identity and/or nationalism. Initiatives such as the “Société de développement des entreprises culturelles” (SODEC) seek to support the cultural industries as a means of promoting the production and distribution of Québec culture and identity in response to the pressures of globalization and the influence of outside cultures (Gouvernement
du Québec, 2013b). In a similar vein, the Catalanian government (Generalitat) introduced “Catalan!Arts,” an initiative of the Catalan Institute for the Cultural Companies whose purpose is to “promot[e] and foster the development of the Catalan cultural industries” (Government of Catalonia, 2013) – which has since been rechristened “Creative Catalonia”; and the Scottish government funds the “Creative Scotland” initiative, an agency whose mandate specifically supports the development of the arts, screen, and creative industries (Creative Scotland, 2013; Hibberd, 2009).

However, it is arguably through their ability to meet the cultural demands of individuals and groups that the cultural industries have gained a foothold in the development and discourse of nationalism in state and national minority politics. After all, the cultural industries hold a veritable monopoly on the production of culture. In their capacity as monopoliser, the cultural industries are able to mass produce and legitimately homogenize culture by setting the standard of what society comes to expect from its cultural productions (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, pp.94-95). It is through the “filter” of the cultural industries that the world is seen – and this filter can have pronounced effects on the way individuals are socialized into society (pp.99-100). In short, the cultural industries inform and influence the choices people make in their personal, social, and professional lives. In this respect, the cultural industries play a strong role in shaping an individual’s identity and sense of self (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p.3). It is perhaps ironic, then, that many of the aforementioned national minorities have drawn upon the cultural industries in their endeavour to promote their cultural identities – for, in doing so, these minorities have arguably opened the door for those very industries to shape the nature of their cultural identities. This invariably raises questions regarding the extent – if any – the cultural industries’ narrative has come to characterize national identity and the public policies in place to support it. Moreover, the potential participation of the cultural industries in the development of a national identity
implicitly characterizes identity as a commodity (Spivak, 2012, pp.175-176) – one which can arguably be bought or sold to the highest bidders.

**Identity Creation: The Cultural Industries & National Minorities**

It has been argued that through the cultural industries, mass culture is essentially coming to replace or homogenize subcultures, in the process minimizing the number of choices available to an individual. The logic follows that, for this to happen, the social situations – within and through which culture is consumed – must become (or are becoming) progressively standardized – to the point where individuals have become “dependent upon the market, on organization, and on technology” because it is impossible to bypass them in the cycle of cultural production and consumption (Bauman, 1972, as ctd. by Munro, 2001, p.3). Inherent in this discourse is the question of need: as mass culture consumes subcultures – as the number of corporate entities that mass produce culture becomes smaller and more refined – the choices available to an individual to fulfill their needs decreases. However, choice is also linked to the concepts of identity: it is through one’s ability to choose that they are, at least in part, able to self-actualize. Thus, the cultural industries present themselves as a choice – one which appeals to the identity needs of individuals and groups (Munro, 2001, pp.3-5) – and, to an increasing degree, governments.

Governments’ growing use of the cultural industries as a vehicle for developing cultural identity (and/or nationalist sentiment), thus, represents a form of paradigm shift – away from conventional heritage institutions, towards commercial institutions. This shift, however, is not without its own set of problematics. Perhaps the most obvious of these problems is the fact that, in employing the cultural industries in the development of a cultural or national identity, governments are opening the door to a form of commodified identity – one that is as much a product of the cultural industries as it is the policies that govern those industries. The notion of
national identity, thus, becomes a commodity that can be bought and sold, much in the same way as any other product can be, with nary a thought to the implications this status has on the very notion of identity. In this context, much like the logos and brandings of businesses and global corporations (Klein, 2009), cultural and national identities are, themselves, brands that can be designed and fit in accordance with the latest fads and an eye towards cultivating a stronger “market share.” More than simply a share of the market, however, the brand that is cultural or national identity serves as a tool for distinguishing the product of one cultural identity from that of another. The significance of this distinction has not been lost on governments and cultures.

Consequently, the role of cultural policy in cultural matters takes on new significations – particularly where national minorities are concerned. In effect, by virtue of employing the cultural industries in the development and sustenance of their cultural identities, minority cultures are seeking to establish difference between their culture and the cultural majority while also preserving their culture in the face of global, homogenizing pressures. In doing so, however, national minorities are challenging the pre-established hegemonic institutions of culture. The very act of drawing upon the cultural industries in matters of national culture – never mind for the purposes of identity formulation – represents a sort of shift in cultural policy discourse and practice. Historically, questions of national identity have fallen under the purview of heritage institutions – institutions directly under the edict of cultural policy and whose legitimacy, ironically, has often been contested vis-à-vis the policies that govern them (Lemasson, 2015, pp.1-2). However, with growing emphasis being placed on the cultural industries to develop and disseminate culture, the role of heritage in the development of culture and identity is no longer as prevalent as it once was.

This has arguably left a profound gap in cultural policy research, as the overall promotion and development of nationalism is often attributed to government departments and ministries
focused on heritage. For instance, Canadian Heritage seeks to promote a “strong sense of pride and belonging” by delivering policies that “enable Canadians to create, share, and participate in [Canada’s] rich cultural and civic life” (Canadian Heritage, 2014, par.3). However, with a growing emphasis on the cultural industries as vehicles for cultural identity and nationalism, the place of heritage institutions is, arguably, no longer as prevalent as it once was – though that has not stopped it from being the primary focus of much cultural policy research where questions of identity are concerned. As such, there has been an absence in the research that examines the role of the cultural industries in relation to cultural identity and nationalism. Moreover, as national minorities already contend with institutional and hegemonic pressures, they occupy a unique position vis-à-vis this shift in the focus of cultural policy – as, arguably, evidenced by the policies supporting initiatives/institutions such as SODEC, Creative Scotland, and the ICEC, for instance – and make for ideal research subjects.

Thus, it is in the context of the cultural industries’ role in the development and maintenance of cultural identity and nationalism, particularly with respects to national minorities, that this thesis explored the paradigm shift occurring in cultural policy. More specifically, this thesis primarily looked at the cultural policies of national minorities notable for having (or having had) significant nationalist/secessionist movements to see if there were any commonalities in their understandings or approaches to culture and identity. In doing so, this thesis explored to what extent the cultural policies deployed by national minorities evidence a certain form or method that would interest or entice the cultural industries to migrate to their regions, and possibly accept an implicit role in the fostering of cultural identities and nationalism. Moreover, this thesis explored the notion that these policies are employed with the goal of courting and supporting specific or particular cultural industries within the multimedia sector – industries that are, arguably, more popular or easily moderated by government intervention. What this thesis
found was that not only are there grounds to say that the cultural policies of national minorities share commonalities in their approaches and appreciations of culture (and their application of the cultural industries), but that there is sufficient evidence to suggest an understanding of their policies as a common world or polity, to use the vernacular of Boltanski and Thévenot (1991).

**A Common World for Uncommon Cultures**

When Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) developed their economies of worth framework, they did so with an eye towards explaining how day-to-day conflicts – primarily in office environments – were resolved without resulting in violence. Their framework introduces an elaborate series of common worlds – of cités or polities – in which human actions and reactions are understood and justified. It is through these common worlds and the ways in which they interact that virtually every aspect of human action and interaction can be explained. However, the worlds developed by Boltanski and Thévenot, as thorough as they were, left a sufficient gap and room for interpretation so that other researchers might expand on what they began. It is this thesis’ contention that the cultural policies of national minorities exhibit certain commonalities that approximate a common world in the mould of Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework. As evidenced throughout this thesis, there are elements in Québec, Scotland, and Catalonia’s approaches to culture and cultural policy that are evocative of not just a common world of cultural policy, but a common world of cultural policy that is unique to national minorities – that is to say, a common world of national minority cultural policy. While the analytical categories of the common world approach can certainly be applied to all policies – cultural or otherwise – and, more broadly, to all cultures or regions, regardless of any nationalist agenda, what sets the policies of national minorities apart is the distinctive way in which minorities approach and
appreciate cultural development and production in view of elaborating and concretizing their cultural identities.

This distinction is evidenced when the common world of national minority cultural policy is compared to the more established type analysis of Gattinger and Saint-Pierre (2012) – which establishes a categorical model of the approaches to cultural policies using Canada’s provinces as comparative cases. In their model, Gattinger and Saint-Pierre (2012) draw on the cultural policy histories of France, the UK, and the United States to establish a spectrum of cultural policy approaches, from more state intervention (France) to less (United States). On one end of the spectrum are the cultural policy approaches that approximate those of France – namely, policy approaches that emphasise national pride and identity; preservation of a country’s distinct culture; promotion of creative and expressive freedom; and greater access to culture via its democratization (pp.580-581). In the middle of the spectrum are cultural policy approaches inspired by the UK model – which is to say, policies that approach culture and the arts as being the purview of the private and personal spheres; government intervention is limited and contingent on ensuring citizens have access to culture that has intrinsic value (p.582). On the other end of the spectrum are cultural policy approaches that mimic the United States’ relatively hands-off approach to culture, with the market serving as culture’s primary driver and regulator (pp.583-585). In between the French- and UK-style approaches, Gattinger and Saint-Pierre (2012) leave room for hybrid approaches to cultural policy – though they suggest that most of these hybrid approaches promote some level of freedom of expression, heritage, and the democratization of culture (p.586).

While, on the surface, it would seem simple enough to categorize the cultural policies of national minorities into one of the three classic styles of cultural policy elaborated by Gattinger and Saint-Pierre (2012) – or, even, to present them as hybridized approaches – this thesis
Beauregard contends that there is sufficient evidence to make a case for national minority cultural policy to be a policy style/category all its own. In fact, there is a strong argument to be made that Gattinger and Saint-Pierre’s categories of cultural policy – French, UK, and United States – each represent a common world of cultural policy. Similar to the economies of worth analytical categories, Gattinger and Saint-Pierre (2012) outline a number of categorical variables to consider when analysing cultural policy. Among the most prominent of these variables are the role of the state in cultural affairs, the state’s conception(s) of culture and cultural policy, the state’s justifications for cultural intervention, and the objectives of said interventions (pp.576-577). A certain overlap exists between Gattinger and Saint-Pierre’s (2012) model and the common world model espoused by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) (and actualized in this thesis with respects to the cultural policies of national minorities) – particularly in terms of Gattinger and Saint-Pierre’s categories for the role of the state (which roughly correlates to this thesis’ natural relations between beings), justification (superior common principle), and policy objectives (investment formula) – that allows for a measure of comparison and contrasting. For instance, when looking at Gattinger and Saint-Pierre’s (2012) categorical analysis of Québec (pp.588-589), there is a definitive overlap in their categorization of the province’s cultural responsibilities (i.e. culture is a responsibility of the provincial government and its approach favours Québec’s national identity).

Where a significant deviation occurs between Gattinger and Saint-Pierre’s typology and the one presented in this thesis is with respects to the interpretation of justification and objectives. In particular, the cases studied in this thesis evidenced a unique approach to the democratization of culture: an approach that draws heavily on the cultural industries. In all three cases – Québec, Scotland, and Catalonia – there is a strong emphasis in their recent cultural policy initiatives to promote, educate, and grow their respective cultures through an application of the cultural industries and newer forms of cultural production and dissemination. A state of worth, in these
cases, is attributed to cultural integration and propagation, with artists and cultural producers (i.e. cultural industries) being revered for their ability to facilitate the process of cultural integration—in large part through the consumption of their cultural productions. It is an approach to cultural policy that draws from both the cultural democracy and democratization of culture approaches in that it promotes its popular, market-driven national culture in a way that advocates socializing and educating its citizens and subjects towards a greater understanding and appreciation of said culture. In other words, it is an approach that treats national (popular) culture as high culture. It is an approach that suggests, so long as the culture is representative of the national minority— that it is produced by members of the minority; that it promotes their cultural values; and that it is produced in the language or (symbolic) vernacular of the minority—it is worthy of public (i.e. government) praise and support: it is justified.

While the approach to cultural policy utilized by the national minorities covered in this thesis can be argued to be a hybrid approach to cultural policy, the argument, itself, belays the challenges faced by national minorities in an ever-increasingly globalized world. The parallels between the three cases—all of which are national minorities who have dealt with significant cultural adversity, and all of which have, at various times, had prominent social/cultural movements advocate for secession from their respective countries—coupled with the similarities (and overlaps) in their approaches to culture, all seems a little too on the nose to be a coincidence. Given the relative similarities of their socio-historical contexts, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the national minorities’ approaches to culture (and cultural policy) are products of their environment—that is to say, that they have evolved as a result of the context of being a majority in their respective sub-states, but a minority in their countries. Simply put, there are too many commonalities and overlaps between the three cases to dismiss them as hybrid approaches.
Rather, when presented side-by-side within the economies of worth framework, the commonalities between these cases becomes much more apparent (see Table 7):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical Categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Case Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Québec (Pre-1992)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Superior common principle</td>
<td>The superior common principle underlying the cultural policy of national minorities is the valuation and promotion of a distinct, unifying (national minority) culture or identity.</td>
<td>Cultural and linguistic survival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of worth</td>
<td>The state of worth is measured in terms of cultural integration, convergence, assimilation, and propagation: an individual who can identify as a cultural citizen – one who is active and integrated into the national culture – is worthy. Often individuals or industries that produce (national) culture are singled out or conferred a privileged status in the cultural policy.</td>
<td>Collective (cultural) identity is expressed (and translated) through culture; culture is a source of national pride.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human dignity</td>
<td>Human dignity is recognized and/or established through: 1) The cultivation/development of aptitudes in creativity; 2) Cultural participation and action, and cultural; and 3) The recognition and preservation of heritage and tradition.</td>
<td>Recognition of cultural heritage and language is fundamental elements of identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repertoires of subjects</td>
<td>A repertoire of subjects in cultural policy principally consists of artists and</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: The World of National Minority Cultural Policy – Case Examples
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repertoires of objects and devices</th>
<th>The objects and devices of cultural policy primarily consist of cultural products and artefacts, cultural and heritage sites, symbols, language(s), and educational materials and policies.</th>
<th>Language, cultural/heritage productions and artefacts, education</th>
<th>Language, cultural/heritage productions and artefacts, education, cultural policies-as-symbols, cultural institutions, cultural industries</th>
<th>Language, cultural/heritage productions and artefacts, education, cultural policies-as-symbols, cultural institutions, cultural industries</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Investment formula</td>
<td>The investment formula of a cultural policy operates on at least one of three fronts, and tends to function in relation to the establishment of cultural priorities – often understood in the form of a trade-off or sacrifice: 1) The trade-off between cultural pluralism and homogeneity; 2) The trade-off between the democratization of culture and cultural democracy; and/or 3) The trade-off between cohesion/harmony with the national majority and expressions of cultural/national identity and independence.</td>
<td>Developing a greater acknowledgement and push for cultural (and linguistic) recognition – sometimes at the expense of cultural diversity and social harmony with the national majority.</td>
<td>Developing a greater acknowledgement and push for cultural (and linguistic) recognition through cultural development, artistic commercialization, and production.</td>
<td>Developing a greater acknowledgement and push for cultural (and linguistic) recognition through cultural development, artistic commercialization, and production, and support of the cultural industries – though sometimes at the expense of social harmony with the national majority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapport of grandeur/ Worth</td>
<td>The rapport of grandeur or worth of a cultural policy operationalizes the relationship between different cultural groups, nationally-recognized cultures (i.e. national minorities, national majorities, cultural minorities), and/or institutions/organizations.</td>
<td>The language (and culture) of the national minority is established as a preeminent aspect of culture and is given a preferential treatment relative to the languages of other cultures.</td>
<td>The language (and culture) of the national minority is established as a preeminent aspect of culture and is given a preferential treatment over those of other cultures, but is not used as a measure of worth.</td>
<td>The language (and culture) of the national minority is established as a preeminent aspect of culture and is given a preferential treatment relative to the languages of other cultures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Natural relations between beings**

The natural relations between beings are presented in cultural policy as the power dynamics that exist between levels of government and levels/statuses of cultures (i.e. majority and minority culture; national and regional culture). Often, natural relations will be presented as cultural guidelines or rules of engagement between national majorities and minorities (e.g. the division of policy responsibilities between the federal and regional/territorial governments).

- The national minority is constitutionally recognized as such by the national majority and a clear delineation of cultural responsibilities is established.
- The national minority is constitutionally recognized as such by the national majority and a clear delineation of cultural responsibilities is established – though this delineation has variably been challenged.

**Harmonious figures of the natural order**

The harmonious figure of the natural order of cultural policy is often presented as culturally-active citizens or artists/producers. Cultural producers, in particular – such as artists and industries – are revered for their ability to evoke, through their productions (and the dissemination thereof), the realities of the superior common principle – as do, in certain contexts, cultural and symbolic figures.

- Cultural producers whose works evoke a sense of national/cultural pride.
- Cultural producers whose works evoke a sense of national/cultural pride and/or has been recognized internationally.
- Artists and creators whose works promote and grow the national minority’s culture.
- Artists and creators whose works have helped grow the national minority’s culture internationally.

**Test model**

Public opinion/reception, internationalisation, cultural visibility, and global recognition are used as test model(s) in cultural policy. In

- International recognition, citizen participation, and greater social integration.
- International recognition, citizen participation, and greater social integration.
- Development of international relations; greater international recognition and reception of its culture.
- International recognition and reception of its artists and creators, specifically, and its culture and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of expressing judgement</th>
<th>In certain cases, public action, elections, and referendums can also be seen as test models.</th>
<th>Priority is placed on cultural and linguistic preservation derived from a particular cultural policy objective or priority. In other words, judgement is expressed in terms of what it brings to the national minority’s culture.</th>
<th>Priority is placed on cultural growth through an application of the cultural industries.</th>
<th>Priority is placed on cultural and linguistic preservation and growth through an application of the cultural industries.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form of evidence</td>
<td>In the context of cultural policy, evidence of the modality of the world’s knowledge is often presented in the forms of economic and social value and through the growth of culture – often tangibly measured through cultural integration, participation, and economic growth as a result of cultural development.</td>
<td>Evidence is found in or measured through cultural participation, linguistic integration, and economic growth as a result of cultural development.</td>
<td>Evidence is found in or measured through cultural participation, linguistic integration, and economic growth as a result of cultural development.</td>
<td>Evidence is found in or measured through cultural participation, linguistic integration, and economic growth as a result of cultural development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of unworthiness and decline</td>
<td>A state of unworthiness is manifested as a decline in cultural participation, integration, and expression. This decline is often presented as erosion of the national culture and language and/or through assimilation into the national majority’s culture.</td>
<td>Cultural and linguistic decline and assimilation.</td>
<td>Cultural and linguistic decline and assimilation.</td>
<td>Cultural and linguistic decline and assimilation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all three cases, there is a strong impetus towards promoting and growing the respective cultures of each national minority – often as a means of ensuring the continuation of the culture in question. In each case, a strong emphasis has been placed on encouraging citizens to engage with culture and participate in cultural activities – the intent of which, more often than not, has been to foster a degree of cultural cohesion or acclamation within its society – or, in other words,
a degree of socialization. Value or worth is almost unanimously attributed to a person’s integration and activeness within the cultural community precisely because it signals that the person has properly acclimate to the nation’s culture and has, to a certain degree, adopted the nation’s identity. In Québec and Catalonia, in particular, an added layer of worth is attributed to the practice of language, French in Québec and Catalan in Catalonia – to the point where the policies promoting these languages (e.g. Québec’s Bill 101 and Catalonia’s Language Act) have been a point of contention for their respective state governments because they challenge (and sometimes implicitly cross) the country’s constitutional edicts where culture and language are concerned. In this respect, each national minority’s encouragement of cultural participation can be seen as both a form of cultural preservation and of resistance.

The fact that all three national minorities have, at various points in their histories, experienced periods of cultural decline or deterioration – or, at the very least, the threat of cultural deterioration – should not go understated. Concerns related to cultural survival and preservation have figured prominently into each nation’s approach to cultural protection and has informed much of their cultural policy discourse in recent decades – albeit in ways that arguably set these national minorities apart from their majority counterparts. What is unique about their respective approaches to cultural protection has been their openness to and reliance on cultural industries – industries notorious, at times, for their homogenizing effects on culture (re: Hesmondhalgh, 2007) – as vehicles for cultural survival. These approaches to cultural policy, especially in recent years, have favoured the cultural industries for their ability to both produce and distribute cultural commodities. More specifically, the cultural industries have served as a means of ensuring that the culture – and cultural products – of the national minorities is readily available to citizens – and often in the culture’s official language(s), no less – for the expressed purposes of consumption. Yet, this favouritism has been conditional: there is an inherent
expectation that the cultural industries will serve as vehicles for cultural nationalism and propagation. There is a not-so-implicit expectation that in supporting the cultural industries – or, more specifically, supporting specific or targeted cultural industries – that these industries will, in turn, support the national culture by means of disseminating it both within the nation’s state and internationally. What this approach evidences, perhaps more than anything else, is to what extent subnational governments are willing to explore new avenues in cultural policy in their bids to promote and secure the continuance of their respective cultures and identities.

However, in relying on the cultural industries, these national minorities have opened themselves up to the potential for outside cultures (and cultural products) to enter their domains. After all, the cultural industries are not a closed system; they do not operate one way. That is to say, that if cultural products are exiting the nation-state through the cultural industries, then there is a very good chance that culture is entering the nation-state through those same channels. However, evidence would suggest that, far from closing their nations’ doors to outside forces or introducing policies that would intentionally impede cultural diversity within their borders, the subnational governments of these national minorities have taken a relatively proactive approach to culture by embracing internationalization and the accommodation of different cultures – albeit, in some cases, (re: Québec) with the caveat that cultural accommodation does not compromise the national minority’s culture (re: MCC, 2013b). What is important to take away from this development, however, is not so much the national minorities’ willingness to open themselves up to or accommodate other cultures, but that their choice in culture vehicles – the cultural industries – are perhaps not as homogenizing as some authors would suggest. In fact, some of the more recent cultural policy literature would suggest that the use of the cultural industries to promote a national identity is not farfetched in the least.
Consider, for instance, that where particularly fertile ground in cultural industries research can be found, at least in the context of cultural identity and nationalism, is with the multimedia sector. The multimedia sector is considered among the most “future-oriented” of the cultural industries – one that is intricately linked with the processes of globalisation, yet has also been the focus of particular socio-economic, regional policies – such as those that promote clustering (Fuchs, 2002, pp.305-306). This is perhaps ironic given that the “regionalization and globalization theses are frequently discussed as contradicting one another” (p.307). It is also ironic given that clustering has been seen to have the potential to deeply erode or transform local culture(s) (Bailey, Miles, & Stark, 2004, p.48). Contemporary globalization, it should be noted, is often “associated with a transformation of state power as the roles and functions of states are re-articulated, reconstituted and re-embedded at the intersection of globalizing and regionalizing networks and systems” (Held & McGrew, 1998, p.235). This transformation is often expressed in terms of a transfer in power upwards, from the nation-state to international or supranational institutions, on the one hand; and a transfer of power downwards, to regional or local jurisdictions, on the other (Doern, Pal, & Tomlin, 1996, p.1).

Thus, it is precisely because the multimedia sector intersects with both regionalizing and globalizing processes that it offers a ripe vantage to approach considerations of cultural identity in the context of the cultural industries. Incidentally, many of the policies attached to multimedia clustering can be traced to the specific regions inhabited by the national minorities covered in this thesis (e.g. Québec, Scotland, and, most notably, Catalonia). It is, also incidentally, through modernized industries (such as multimedia) that cultural identity and nationalism are often generated and maintained. The modern, industrialized society requires “a state that can produce and be maintained by one common, literate and accessible culture” (O’Leary, 1998, p.46) – and the multimedia sector offers the means through which to generate said culture. Tapping into the
cultural industries – via the multimedia sector – offers many national minorities the ability to do just that: maintain their culture and distinct society. And it is precisely this approach that is arguably being taken by the subnational governments of the national minorities presented in this thesis – an approach that both affirms the significance of the cultural industries in the development of a cultural identity and underlines the degree to which national minorities are willing to explore less conventional approaches to cultural preservation and proliferation.

But, more importantly, the application of the cultural industries as a vehicle for national identity arguably establishes a new power dynamic between the nation, its citizens, and the industries, themselves. By allowing the cultural industries to promote and disseminate their culture, the subnational governments of national minorities are providing the industries with a measure of control and influence over the message being conveyed; they are effectively giving the cultural industries a say in how the nation’s cultural identity (and citizenship) is understood. While this level of influence on the part of the cultural industries may seem problematic to some, the nature of Québec, Scotland, and Catalonia’s cultural policies in recent years would suggest that not only are these governments aware of this influence, they have actually embraced it to a certain extent. The reverence bestowed upon artists, creators, and, more importantly, the industries in the national minorities’ cultural policies – that is to say, their recognition as harmonious figures who have the ability to promote social cohesion and drive economic growth through their production and dissemination of cultural products – suggests that national minorities are willing to defer some control of their cultural identity to the cultural industries, provided those industries work towards preserving and growing the identity. Similarly, the worth conferred to the act of creation by these national minorities suggests that cultural production is valued as much for its cultural contributions as it is for its economic contributions. This is perhaps most saliently observed in Catalonia where its Generalitat’s support of the cultural
industries has been targeted at multimedia and audiovisual sectors – both for their ability to reach a broader audience and for the positive economic impact they have evidenced thus far. In other words, the governments of national minorities can be as opportunistic as cultural industries are often portrayed to be when it comes to culture and identity. In effect, it is an acquiescence to the fact that, fundamentally, the cultural industries exercise a measure of control over one’s cultural – and, by extension, national – identity, regardless of a government’s best intentions; working with or through the cultural industries allows governments to, at the very least, direct the industries’ control in ways that better reflect the governments’ ambitions vis-à-vis their national identities.

In this respect, there is something distinctly noble in the way national minorities have approached and drawn on the cultural industries to promote and grow their national identities. Fundamentally, the concept of the cultural industries is about cultural (re)production and dissemination – it is about the proliferation of culture. While the concept began as a critique of the mass production and commodification of art and culture – with the argument being that the process diminishes or cheapens both the cultural commodity, itself, and the actual act of consuming it – the cultural industries, when applied to nationalism and cultural identity, arguably have the effect of increasing their value. There is an implicit worth, found in the policies of the three national minorities studied in this thesis, attached to the growth of the nation and its culture; if the idea is to grow or increase the size of the nation, having its cultural offerings made more readily available for people to consume (via the cultural industries) is arguably a good thing. Growing the market and, in some cases, saturating it with cultural commodities that support and promote a national identity ensures that, at the very least, the citizens of a national minority will not be wanting for cultural products representative and/or in the language of their culture. The fact that national minorities have realized this, and have embraced the opportunities and
possibilities offered by the cultural industries, suggests a willingness/openness to grow and see
their cultural identities evolve – even if that occurs in an economized context.

Nevertheless, there is also an inherent gamble with drawing on the cultural industries as a
source of identity dissemination: the industries are market-driven and based, if only illusioned, on
the idea of choice. The question, then, is what happens if people choose not to consume, choose
not to take part in the cultural offerings of a nation, and, ultimately, choose not to become part of
that nation? How does the nation grow and further prosper if no one consumes its culture? It is a
gamble that national minorities are seemingly willing to take because there is, really, no other
choice. The cultural industries have, for better or worse, become a fundamental part of cultural
policy discourse; and, with globalization and internationalization serving to further the industries’
cultural policy influence, the likelihood of this dynamic changing anytime soon is, to say the
least, highly remote. In other words, it is almost better for a government to embrace the cultural
industries in its cultural policies than try to fight its current. But, in some ways, the ways in
which national minorities have assertively embraced the cultural industries into their cultural
policy narratives arguably speaks to a degree of confidence in their national cultures – or,
possibly, a degree of desperation. In the cases of Québec and Scotland, their embracement of the
cultural industries betrays a certain cultural swagger, harkening to Lapalme’s (1988) assertion
that “la survivance” has become political rhetoric in cultural policy discourse – used to elicit
reaction more than to signal any legitimate or immediate concern for the culture’s continuance. In
the case of Catalonia, however, the Generalitat’s approach to the cultural industries suggests a
more urgent concern for its culture – a concern that has, arguably, been flavoured by the culture’s
near-eradication less than half a century ago. In either case – confidence or concern – there is an
implicit acknowledgement that, where cultural security and growth are concerned, the cultural
industries represent a nation’s one best chance at both.
The Valuation of Culture as a Mode of Socialization: Key Components of National Minority Cultural Policy

Yet there is more to the cultural policy-type of national minorities than simply relying on the cultural industries. While, true, there is a strong impetus in the cultural policies of national minorities towards growing the cultural industries – in large part, for the purposes of cultural development and internationalization of their culture – this impetus is but one characteristic of the overall policy type. In fact, the emphasis placed on the cultural industries underscores a greater desire for the proliferation of its culture in ways that evokes a form of socialization or governmentality. The valuation of cultural production intimates a relationship of power between those who control production and those who consume it (Foucault, 1978/1994). Complementing this industrial push has been a desire to educate citizens on the culture, itself – to provide them with a readily accessible knowledge and understanding of the culture and its heritage. Recall that knowledge, in the context of governmentality, serves as a mechanism through which governments can establish a measure of control and influence over their societies, with institutions and procedures – such as the cultural industries and cultural policy – serving as the basis through which that influence is exercised (Foucault, 1978/1994, p.244; O’Brien, 2014, p.29). By focusing on the cultural industries (and the production and proliferation of nationally-relevant cultural productions), the subnational governments of national minorities are effectively establishing a definitive vocabulary and procedures for the production of truth (Dean, 2010, p.33) – a vocabulary predicated on creativity and cultural production as sources of national identity.

It is interesting to note, then, that many of the national minorities’ cultural policies geared towards the promotion of the cultural industries do so with an eye towards not just creating new cultural commodities (and knowledge), but towards renewing value and interest in classic staples of the nation’s culture and heritage, and, in some cases (e.g. the city of Québec’s tourism
campaign), reinterpreting them in ways that are more exotic, alluring, and accessible to both citizens and to international markets – in ways that, arguably, commodify them. In this respect, the cultural industries serve as a characteristic form of cultural visibility for national minorities – it is through the industries that the ways of “seeing or and perceiving” culture are established and reproduced (Dean, 2010, p.33). In other words, while heritage may figure less prominently in the immediacy of national minority cultural policy, the industries have helped galvanize them in ways that allows for a certain re-appropriation or reimagining of heritage that makes it more accessible and relatable to cultural citizens with an appetite for less contemporary forms of art and culture. In this respect, the cultural policies of national minorities exhibit a discursive temporality: there is an acute awareness and appreciation of the culture of the past, juxtaposed by approaches to culture that seek to ensure the culture continues (and evolves) into the future.

Similarly, the reverence attributed to artists and creators, in the cultural policies of national minorities, as harmonious figures whose cultural productions represent and inspire citizens (or subjects) – both nationally and internationally – serves as a form of procedural exemplar of how a government expects its citizens to act relative to its national identity. While certainly establishing a form of social hierarchy in terms of how a government favours its citizens vis-à-vis their contributions to the growth and development of culture and identity, the favouring of creative types in the common world of national minority cultural policy also serves the purpose of demonstrating and promoting the cultural offerings of the nation – and of, arguably, demonstrating how its cultural identity is to be expressed. In this respect, artists and producers serve as, in the vernacular of Foucault (1980a/1999), technologies of self that permit a sort of cultural manipulation or socialization of a nation’s citizens. In other words, artists and cultural producers serve as examples of the specific ways a government expects its citizens to act (Dean, 2010, p.33) – or, more specifically, the ways they want their cultural/national identity to be
interpreted and conveyed. In this context, artists also serve a purpose in the way they implicitly characterize being a subject; their productions facilitate cultural integration and provide governments with a greater degree of agency in developing and shaping citizens.

When all of these factors are considered in the context of the machinations of governmentality, then, the common world of national minority cultural policy begins to take on a new, more definitive form (Table 8):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Analytics of Government</strong></th>
<th><strong>Characteristics of the Common World</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic Forms of Visibility</td>
<td>The cultural industries serve as vehicles for the development and growth of cultural/national identities; it is through the industries that social perceptions are formed and influenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinctive Ways of Thinking and Questioning</td>
<td>Cultures identities are cultivated and grown through the production and dissemination of new works or forms of culture and art in conjunction with a reappraisal/reinvigoration of (classic) cultural heritage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Ways of Acting, Intervening, and Directing</td>
<td>Artists and cultural producers serve as symbolic and literal ambassadors of cultural identity both nationally and internationally; they serve as exemplars of the national culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic Ways of Forming Subjects, Selves, Persons, Actors, or Agents</td>
<td>Subjects are formed through cultural integration by way of valuing culture and art as drivers of economic development and social cohesion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, Dean’s (2010) analytics of government allow for a deeper level of analysis of the common world of national minority cultural policy. When considered in the light of governmentality, the rationale of national minorities’ cultural policy takes on a new, arguably more strategic, significance. There is much more agency and intent in the application of cultural policies that emphasise the cultural industries as drivers of cultural and economic development and that position artists and creators as epitomes of cultural citizenship and national identity.

The fact that the cultural policy approaches of national minorities demonstrate such a targeted intent suggests, to a certain degree, an understanding and appreciation of the realities of
cultural production and consumption – and, for that matter, the realities of growing and promoting a national identity – in an increasingly globalized world. No longer are cultures able to rely solely on their canons of cultural heritage – their works of high culture, heritage sites, and artefacts – as a means of promoting and sustaining their national/cultural identity. More and more, the need to embrace new forms of culture and adopt new modes of producing and disseminating culture are needed for a cultural identity to not just survive, but strive. While the distillation of the common world of national minority cultural policy may seem simplistic or overly reductionist in nature, it nevertheless highlights the significance of (cultural) policy adaptiveness on display in the cultural policy approaches of national minorities – an adaptiveness that is, arguably, needed in a contemporary globalized world.

The challenge remains, however, for national minorities to avoid the pratfalls of emphasising certain elements or contexts of their cultural identities that would stereotype or caricaturize their cultures. The fact that their approaches to cultural policy preference the cultural industries suggests not only an awareness of this challenge, but a willingness to sidestep it and, in some cases (re: Scotland), attempt to disarm it (and re-educate citizens and international markets on the reality/truth of their national/cultural identity). The application of the cultural industries, thus, serves as a means for national minorities to strategically promote their nation’s culture in ways that draw on new forms of culture while potentially distancing themselves from negative preconceptions or antiquated perceptions/stereotypes of their cultural identity. In other words, the cultural industries have provided national minorities with a new way of inventing or branding themselves to the world.
Next Steps: The Common World(s) of (National Minority) Cultural Policy?

But what does all of this mean for national or cultural minorities beyond those covered in this thesis? At the very least, these findings suggest that there is room for additional research into the cultural policies of national minorities as they relate to nationalism and identity. There are certainly grounds to suggest that the findings of this thesis, as they relate to national minorities, can be applied to other cases. The similarities found in the cultural policies of the national minorities researched are arguably too common to be coincidence; they imply a level of structure akin to an ideal-type or, to use the vernacular of Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), a common world. The common world framework, itself, provides a way of comparatively analyzing cultural policies that arguably offers its users a nuanced understanding of the justifications and compromises that occur in any given national minority’s policies. The breadth of analysis offered through the distillation of cultural policies into no less than thirteen (13) interconnected analytical categories/characteristics allows for a broad range of comparison between the policies of multiple governments in a way that allows both their commonalities and differences to show while still remaining faithful to the ideal-type. More importantly, however, the common world framework provides an understanding of the culture behind cultural policy: it provides a basis for understanding and exploring the world in which cultural policy is produced. The development of cultural policy does not occur in a vacuum; there are factors in play that shape and influence the policy’s form and outcomes. The common world approach captures these factors in ways that has arguably not been seen to any great length in cultural policy analysis. In this respect, the common world approach hopefully offers a new tool to cultural policy researchers moving forward.

A next step in the process of exploring this new common world framework would be to apply it to new and different contexts. Further analysis of other national minorities – such as the Flemish in Flanders, Belgium or the Basques in the Basque Country, Spain, for instance – would
be a good starting point. Seeing to what extent the framework can be applied to other national minorities (and their cultural policies) would further solidify its validity and reliability as a research tool. A further step would be to apply the framework in comparison to the policies of national majorities. As previously stated, the cultural policy approaches of countries such as France, the UK, and the United States have served as cultural policy archetypes; seeing to what extent their cultural policies fit the mould of the common world framework established in this thesis would add a certain rigour to its findings. Similarly, applying the framework to other policy fields would be a novel way of exploring to what extent the policies (in general) of national minorities exhibit a certain flavour or approach; the fact that all of the national minorities covered in this thesis, by virtue of the natural order between them and their federal governments, have clearly established responsibilities for certain – but not all – policy fields leaves open the possibility that similar commonalities to the ones found in this thesis could be found in the non-cultural policies of national minorities. Finally, with internationalization taking a progressively more prominent role in the affairs of all nations, to what extent international and global (cultural) policies exhibit similar types to those found in this thesis would be an interesting avenue for further research.
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Beauregard 457


Beauregard 460


Ministère de la Culture et des Communications (MCC). (2012). Agenda 21C: Culture Today Tomorrow: Québec’s Agenda 21 for Culture. Québec: Gouvernement du Québec


Ministère de la Culture et des Communications (MCC). (2013b). Notre culture, au cœur du développement durable. Québec : Gouvernement du Québec


Spanish Constitution Act 1978. Madrid: La Moncloa


# Appendix

## Appendix A – List of Policies and Policy Documents Analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Name</th>
<th>Country/Region:</th>
<th>Year of Publication:</th>
<th>Main Objective(s):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Constitution Act 1978</td>
<td>Catalonia/Spain</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>• The Spanish Constitution Act sets out the parameters under which cultural communities – such as Catalonia – are recognized as such.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonian Statute of Autonomy</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>1979 &amp; 2006</td>
<td>• The Statute of Autonomy outlines the role of the Catalonian government following the democratization of Spain in the mid-1970s. • The 2006 version serves as an update and amendment of the 1979 version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonian Language Act</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>• The Language Act provides linguistic recognition for Catalonia’s official language – Catalan – and outlines the Catalonian government’s responsibilities with respects to preserving and promoting it. • The Act also provides recognition of Spain’s official language – Castilian – and the province of Aran’s cultural language – Aranese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoNCA 2009 Report</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>• Report outlining the status of Catalonia’s cultural sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Policy Catalonia 2010: According to the Council of Europe/ERICarts Methodology for Reports on Cultural Policies.</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>• An overview of Catalonia’s cultural policies developed for the purposes of the Council of Europe and ERICarts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual report on the state of Culture and the Arts in Catalonia 2011</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>• Report outlining the status of Catalonia’s cultural and arts sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan Institute for the Cultural Companies</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>2011; 2012</td>
<td>• Reports outlining the status of Catalonia’s cultural industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Catalan Institute for the Cultural</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>• This report provides an overview of the role and function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>Companies: Report of the Catalan Institute for the Cultural Companies</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Years of Language Policy: Commenoration 30th anniversary approval Act 7/1983 18 April language normalisation</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State of Culture and the Arts 03_2015: Rethinking Cultural Policies – Challenges and Reflections</td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill 63: An Act to Promote the French Language in Québec</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Language Act, 1974 (Bill 22)</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pour l’évolution de la politique culturelle: Document de travail – Mai 1976</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La politique québécoise du développement culturel : Volume 1 – Perspectives d’ensemble : de quelle culture s’agit-il?</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Act Respecting the Cinema</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Une politique de la culture et des arts: Proposition présentée à madame</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lise Frulla-Hébert ministre des Affaires culturelles du Québec par le Groupe-conseil sous la présidence de monsieur Roland Arpin</td>
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</table>
| La politique culturelle du Québec: Notre culture, notre avenir | Québec | 1992 | • Provides an affirmation of the province of Québec’s cultural identity.  
• Outlines how the government sought to support the creators and promote citizen engagement and participation. |
| Le réseau muséal Québécois : Sommaire de l’énoncé d’orientation : S’ouvrir sur le monde | Québec | 1994 | • An overview of Québec’s museum network. |
| Société de développement des entreprises culturelles (SODEC) | Québec | 1994 | • Provides an overview of the purpose and intent of SODEC.  
• Outlines the role of SODEC in relation to social and economic purposes. |
| Remettre l’Art au monde (Politique de diffusion des arts de la scène) | Québec | 1996 | • The goal of this policy is to bring the public closer to the arts.  
• The policy document outlines the government’s role in the diffusion of arts to citizens. |
<p>| Agenda 21C: Culture Today Tomorrow: Québec's Agenda 21 for Culture. | Québec | 2012 | • A document outlining Québec’s cultural ambitions for the future, establishing 21 guidelines for how the province will proceed with its cultural policies moving forward. |
| The Québec Cultural Property Act | Québec | 2012 | • An act establishing what is recognized as cultural property. |
| Mission and Values of the Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec (CALQ) | Québec | 2013 | • A document outlining the Mission and Values of the CALQ. |
| Plan Stratégique 2013-2016. | Québec | 2013 | • SODEC’s strategic plan for cultural industries in Québec for the three year period of 2013 to 2016. |
| Notre culture, au cœur du développement durable | Québec | 2013 | • A report on the state of cultural development in the province of Québec. |
| Bill 60: Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests | Québec | 2013 | • A document outlining the proposed (and rejected) Bill 60 on reasonable accommodation. |
| An Act Respecting the Montréal Museum of Fine Arts | Québec | 2015 | • An act, as its title suggests, recognizes and respects the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine Arts.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>An Act respecting the Société de développement des entreprises culturelles.</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinema Act</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>• An updated version of the Cinema Act – an act which recognizes and regulates the cinema industry in Québec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland Act</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>1978, 1998</td>
<td>• This policy establishes and outlines the devolution process of Scotland’s parliament following the devolution referendum of 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating Our Future… Minding Our Past</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>• The Scottish Executive’s response to the National Cultural Strategy’s report of consultation. The document provides grounds for how the executive planned to move forward with its cultural policy initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Policy Statement.</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>• A statement by the Scottish Executive which, as its name implies, establishes and iterates its cultural policy ambitions for the upcoming years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Culture (Scotland) Bill: Consultation Document</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>• An outline of how Scotland intended to proceed with the development of its cultural policy. The draft outlines the Scottish Executives intent to introduce Creative Scotland as means of streamlining its cultural policy approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Screen (Corporate Brochure).</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>• A report outlining the role and responsibility of Scottish Screen prior to its merger with the Scottish Arts Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Creative Industries Framework Agreement</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>• An agreement that establishes how support for the creative and cultural industries will be delivered. Identifies recommendations on how to deliver support while also providing gaps in the current support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland
Scotland 2013
- A document outlining the Scottish Executives intentions and expectations for what would happen should Scotland vote in favour secession in its 2014 referendum.

Scotland 2014
- Creative Scotland’s 10 year strategic plan outlining its ambitions and approaches for the cultural sector in Scotland.

Creative Scotland On Screen: Film Strategy 2014-17
Scotland 2014
- A document outlining Creative Scotland’s cultural policy approach to growing and developing the Scottish screen industry.

Appendix B – National Minority Cultural Policy Framework – Case Example Quotes

The World of National Minority Cultural Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical Categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Case Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superior common principle</td>
<td>The superior common principle underlying the cultural policy of national minorities is the valuation and promotion of a distinct, unifying (national minority) culture or identity.</td>
<td>Québec (Pre-1992) La Survivance française (French Survival) à la Vie française (Lapalme, 1988): the establishment of French (Canadian) culture and language as fundamental forces in Québec society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
State of worth

The state of worth is measured in terms of cultural integration, convergence, assimilation, and propagation: an individual who can identify as a cultural citizen – one who is active and integrated into the national culture – is worthy. Often individuals or industries that produce (national) culture are singled out or conferred a privileged status in the cultural policy.

“[C]’est essentiellement par la culture qu’une collectivité s’exprime, traduit sa mentalité, en d’autres termes s’identifie à ses propres yeux, se reconnaît, a la fierté de l’être moral qu’elle édifie” (as ctd by L’Allier, 1976, p.18).

"Si la progression artistique et culturelle de la société québécoise atteint des niveaux remarquables, on le doit principalement aux efforts et à la passion qui animent nos créateurs et nos artistes" (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.vii).

"Creativity and the arts is the mirror by which we see ourselves, understanding who we are and who we might be. They make us appreciate our weaknesses, face our fears and, most importantly, appreciate the humanity in us all” (Searle, as ctd. by Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.16).

"Cultural initiatives that promote greater social cohesion must be stimulated, in an authentic democratisation of access to culture that will help to reduce the inequality still existing in the use of cultural goods and the promotion of the values of cultural diversity in Catalonia” (CoNCA, 2011, p.16).

“The priority objective of cultural policies in Catalonia […] ought to consist of promoting and fostering – implementing operating formulations and initiatives that focus on communities’ creative capacity – the management of cultural diversity and the proactive participation of citizens beyond their consideration as cultural consumers” (CoNCA,
| Repertoires of subjects | A repertoire of subjects in cultural policy principally consists of artists and amateurs, citizens, (cultural) industries and institutions, creators/producers, and, in certain contexts diaspora and international markets. | "Ce sont les Québécois qui font et feront leur culture. Ce n'est pas le gouvernement du Québec. Mais le gouvernement n'étant pas un rassemblement hétéroclite | "En adoptant sa politique culturelle, le gouvernement témoigne de son désir profond de doter les Québécois et les Québécoises d'un cadre de développement | "We want to ensure our funding benefits the widest possible range of people in Scotland and beyond. That will mean encouraging the people and "The powers of the Generalitat emanate from the people of Catalonia and are exercised according to this Estatut and the Constitution" | "Catalonia is a community of free persons for free persons, in which each individual may live and express diverse identities, with a firm commitment to community based on respect for individual dignity. […] The Catalan people continues today to proclaim liberty, justice and equality as higher values of its collective life, and manifests its desire to advance in a way which will ensure a dignified quality of life for all those who live and work in Catalonia” (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, preamble). | 2011, pp.14-15. |
| Human dignity | Human dignity is recognized and/or established through: 4) The cultivation/development of aptitudes in creativity; 5) Cultural participation and action, and cultural; and 6) The recognition and preservation of heritage and tradition. | “Cette politique ne peut puiser qua des sources anciennes et nouvelles. Elle reflète la réalité d'un peuple enraciné ici depuis des siècles et qui a défendu avec acharnement son identité. Elle témoigne de l'apport des autochtones, les plus vieux habitants de ce pays, de l'influence des Britanniques et des autres minorités implantées sur notre sol. (Ministre d'état au développement culturel, 1978, p.1). | "[L]a culture est un bien essentiel et la dimension culturelle est nécessaire à la vie en société, au même titre que les dimensions Sociale et économique" (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.15). | "Organisations and individuals that we support work collaboratively and imaginatively to increase opportunities for people to engage and participate. They explore new ways and platforms for people to access artistic and creative work and help audiences to engage with a diversity of experiences. This will include providing explanations, interpretations and translations where appropriate" (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.19). | "We want to ensure our funding benefits the widest possible range of people in Scotland and beyond. That will mean encouraging the people and "The powers of the Generalitat emanate from the people of Catalonia and are exercised according to this Estatut and the Constitution” | 2011, pp.14-15. |
| Repertoires of objects and devices | The objects and devices of cultural policy primarily consist of cultural products and artefacts, cultural and heritage sites, symbols, language(s), and educational materials and policies. | “WHEREAS the French language, the distinctive language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking, is the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity” (Bill 101, 1977 [2016], preamble). | “L'accès au monde de la culture et des arts suppose une familiarisation avec les œuvres et l'univers culturel; tout objectif de démocratisation de la culture se tourne donc forcément vers l'école, qui doit jouer un rôle fondamental pour ouvrir la voie aux valeurs culturelles” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.11). | “Scotland is custodian of a significant part of the Western world’s heritage in its libraries, archives, historic buildings, galleries and museums. We recognise that the creative industries and digital media offer significant opportunities for growth in the cultural sector in the next ten years and we recommend supporting this trend vigorously. The Commission is also clear that...” (Planas, 2010, p.11). | “The media [is] an essential tool to bring the population into contact with culture; to expand the market for Catalan products; and to promote cultural consumption” (Plana, 2010, p.11). | "d'administrations, il doit participer à cette tâche de tous les citoyens” (Ministre d'état au développement culturel, 1978, p.9). | culturel qui leur permette de s'épanouir, peu importe le sens futur de l'histoire” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.viii). | organisations that we fund to think carefully about how they connect with hard-to-reach people in remote rural locations or communities who do not have easy access to the arts, screen or creative industries because of economic disadvantage, disability or social circumstance” (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.42). | (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, article 2). |
| Investment formula | The investment formula of a cultural policy operates on at least one of three fronts, and tends to function in relation to the establishment of cultural priorities—often understood in the form of a trade-off or sacrifice: 4) The trade-off between cultural pluralism and homogeneity; 5) The trade-off between the democratization of culture and cultural democracy; and/or 6) The trade-off between cohesion/harmony with the national majority and expressions of cultural/national identity and independence. | “Thinking of the future, the Government of Québec proposes a constitutional formula which would replace the present federal system and at the same time respect the legitimate feelings of Quebecers towards Canada” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1979, p.47). | “L’envergure des interventions du ministère des Affaires culturelles s’accroît et déborde vite des tâches inscrites dans son mandat original. La commercialisation des arts, le développement des industries culturelles, l’urbanisme et l’aménagement du territoire, ou encore l’adaptation aux nouvelles technologies de reproduction des œuvres sont autant de nouvelles activités qui sollicitent son appui. Elles exigent des formes inédites d’intervention et de nouvelles compétences en matière de gestion culturelle” (Gouvernement du Québec, 1992, p.5). | “Artistic and creative forms are increasingly developing links and overlaps, driven by new knowledge and connections through digital opportunities, convergence, cross-platform or 360 approaches to creativity. In future these will only increase in prevalence. While we have an important role in supporting the preservation of traditions, we are also interested in understanding and supporting the development of future ways of working. As such we will make space for crossover between forms within our strategies” (Creative Scotland, “1) To promote cultural productions and contribute to the development of cultural enterprises; 2) To modernise and adapt Catalan cultural enterprises to new business models and Markets; 3) To provide Catalan cultural industries with more tools to cover their financial needs and improve competitiveness; 4) To promote Catalan cultural creations outside of Catalonia; 5) To preserve and disseminate our film heritage, ensuring its accessibility to the public” (ICIC, 2012, p.5). |
Rapport of grandeur or worth

The rapport of grandeur or worth of a cultural policy operationalizes the relationship between different cultural groups, nationally-recognized cultures (i.e. national minorities, national majorities, cultural minorities), and/or institutions/organizations (i.e. government and cultural industries). These rapports tend to manifest hierarchically, wherein one culture (or institution) is given preferential or preeminent treatment relative to other cultures.

"[Bill 63] ensure[s] that the English-speaking children of Québec acquire a working knowledge of the French language and that persons who settle in Québec may acquire the knowledge of the French language and have their children instructed in such language" (Assemblée nationale du Québec, 1969, par.2).

"The primacy of the French language is a core principal within Québec society. French is the official language of Québec and is vital to its culture and social fabric. All sectors of society share the responsibility of making French the normal common language of public life. This goal is pursued in a spirit of openness respectful of Québec’s English and cultural communities as well as the First Nations and Inuit, all of whom are full-fledged members of our society" (MCC, 2012, p.9)

"We believe that participation and engagement with the arts can help promote equality and contribute to wellbeing. People from diverse communities, backgrounds and of all ages can discover significant life opportunities through access to the arts. Equalities are about supporting a diverse culture in Scotland, enabling all artistic and creative voices to be heard and working to maximise opportunities to engage with, and participate in, arts throughout the country. We will work to foster understanding and establish positive attitudes between people from different cultural backgrounds. We will also fulfil our statutory requirements to support and promote the value of"

"The citizens of Catalonia and their political institutions recognise Aran as an Occitan entity, with cultural, historical, geographical and linguistic identity as defended by the Aranese people over the centuries. This Estatut recognises, protects and respects this uniqueness and recognises Aran as a unique territorial entity within Catalonia, subject to specific protection under a special legal system” (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, article 11).
The natural relations between beings are presented in cultural policy as the power dynamics that exist between levels of government and levels/statuses of cultures (i.e. majority and minority culture; national and regional culture). Often, natural relations will be presented as cultural guidelines or rules of engagement between national majorities and minorities (e.g. the division of policy responsibilities between the federal and regional/territorial governments).

"The Québec government wants to propose to the rest of Canada that the two communities remain in association, not only in a customs union or a common market but in a monetary union as well" (Gouvernement du Québec, 1979, pp.53-54).

"It must be understood that for French-Canadian Quebeckers, the combination of their majority status in Québec and their minority status in Canada and North America is not easy. It is a difficult apprenticeship that began in the 1960s and, which, obviously, is ongoing. However, this duality is another invariant with which Québec society will always have to contend" (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008, p.187).

"The primary matters to be retained to the United Kingdom Parliament would be defence, foreign affairs, central economic and fiscal responsibilities, social security policy, immigration and nationality issues. The Scottish Parliament will therefore have powers in relation to the economy and business, health, education, leisure and social welfare and the legal system and regulation" (SCC, 1995, p.4).

"The public authorities of Catalonia shall promote the full exercise of the freedoms and rights recognised by this Estatut, the Constitution, the European Union, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and those other international treaties and conventions which Spain has signed that recognise and guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms" (Catalonian Generalitat, 2006, article 4).

The harmonious figure of the natural order of cultural policy is often presented as culturally-active citizens or artists/producers. Cultural producers, in particular – such as artists and industries – are revered for their ability to evoke, through their personal talents, passion, integrity, curiosity and creativity, the lifeblood of the arts, screen and creative industries. Artists and creative individuals are the lifeblood of the arts, screen and creative industries. Personal talents, passion, integrity, curiosity and "Catalan culture has continued to maintain a steady presence and international recognition thanks to the activity of artists and creators"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test model</th>
<th>Public opinion/reception, internationalisation, cultural visibility, and global recognition are used as test model(s) in cultural policy. In certain cases, public action, elections, and, referendums can also be seen as test models.</th>
<th>hard work underpin our shared creative system at every level” (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.41).</th>
<th>(CoNCA, 2011, p.13).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mode of expressing judgement</td>
<td>Judgement is based on the perceived social and economic benefits derived from any</td>
<td>“Une souveraineté culturelle qui ne s'appuie pas sur les</td>
<td>“The five ambitions for the arts, screen and creative</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Le ministère de la Culture aura un mandat axé sur les</td>
<td>recognition of cultural diversity is</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;International dialogue and benchmarking at the levels of policy, strategy and performance will bring rewards in stimulating innovation, dialogue and recognition from beyond the sectors” (Creative Scotland, 2014b, p.21).</td>
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particular cultural policy objective or priority. In other words judgement is expressed in terms of what it brings to the national minority’s culture.

une forte assise économique est illusoire. Un progrès économique axé sur la seule productivité technique devient vite inhumain. Les schémas régionaux de développement obéissent à des impératifs sociaux et culturels aussi bien qu’économiques. Pour s’actualiser et rayonner, une culture a besoin du support des industries culturelles.” (Ministre d’état au développement culturel, 1978, p.3).


industries over the next ten years are: Excellence and experimentatio n across the arts, screen and creative industries is recognised and valued; Everyone can access and enjoy artistic and creative experiences; Places and quality of life are transformed through imagination, ambition and an understanding of the potential of creativity; Ideas are brought to life by a diverse, skilled and connected leadership and workforce; Scotland is a distinctive creative nation connected to the world” (Creative Scotland, 2014a, p.9).

"La culture et les communications contribuent grandement au développement économique du Québec” (SODEC, 2013, p.10).

“Over 500,000 admissions to Cultural Cinema Hubs each year; 16 million admissions each year to Scotland’s cinemas; Cineworld Glasgow is the tallest cinema in the world Growth and normalized use of the Catalan language: “…the fourteen years [the linguistic normalization act] has been in force have made possible the spread of knowledge of the language..."
expressed in terms of quotas, benchmarks and economic impacts.

and the busiest, by customer base, in the UK” (Scottish Screen, 2009, p.5).

among most of the population […] which has led to a process of normal linguistic use” (Catalonian Generalitat 1998, p.9)

State of unworthiness and decline

A state of unworthiness is manifested as a decline in cultural participation, integration, and expression. This decline is often presented as erosion of the national culture and language and/or through assimilation into the national majority’s culture.

“It is but a question of time and mode; it is but to determine whether the small number of French who now inhabit Lower Canada shall be made English, under a Government which can protect them, or whether the process shall be delayed until a much larger number shall have to undergo, at the rude hands of its uncontrolled rivals, the extinction of a nationality strengthened and embittered by continuance” (Lord Durham, 1839, p.130).

“Toutefois, les Québécois doivent demeurer vigilants devant l’omniprésence et l’attrait qu’exercent sur eux les produits anglophones de masse” (SODEC, 2013, p.10).

Decline/loss of the Catalan language and identity.