Beyond Protection: Responding to the Problem of Trafficking in Aboriginal Women and Girls in Canada through the Lens of Paul Ricoeur’s Ethics of Human Capability and Mutual Recognition

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To my community, friends and family
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Introduction

1 Thesis and Aims of the Dissertation

Mutual recognition is a notion shaping contemporary discourse on Indigenous – Settler relations in Canada.\(^1\) Twenty years after Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) produced their landmark report, which named mutual recognition as the first ethical principle required for a new relationship, Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) called all Canadians to recommit to a relationship marked by mutual recognition:\(^2\)

There is an emerging and compelling desire to put the events of the past behind us so that we can work towards a stronger and healthier future. The truth telling and reconciliation process as part of an overall holistic and comprehensive response to the Indian Residential School legacy is a sincere indication and acknowledgement of the injustices and harms experienced by Aboriginal people and the need for continued healing. This is a profound commitment to establishing new relationships embedded in mutual recognition and respect that will forge a brighter future. The truth of our common experiences will help set our spirits free and pave the way to reconciliation.\(^3\)

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The promotion of mutual recognition as a value and goal for relationships is well documented. Indeed, feminist theologians stand out in their endorsement of mutuality as a basic Christian social norm that informs and motivates social action. Moreover, contemporary Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars throughout a wide range of fields, such as biblical theology, political science, and postcolonial studies, join with feminist theologians to grapple with an intelligible articulation of mutuality as a lived social praxis. However, while mutuality is not a new concept, living it is a challenge, and a gap remains in the literature that provides a good theory about how mutuality is actually lived.

My thesis is that Paul Ricœur’s (1913-2005) ethical thought makes a contribution that helps respond to the call for mutual recognition as a fundamental element of Indigenous - Settler relations in Canada. He offers to settlers a helpful approach for addressing the discrepancy to live mutual recognition, i.e., an adherence to it in principle and a demonstrated failure to live it with Aboriginal peoples.

One area that provides evidence of such failure is the disproportional occurrence

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5 I use Paul Ricœur’s understanding of praxis in this thesis, i.e., that it is a comprehensive notion that reconciles the apparent oppositions between teleological (values, formal norms) and deontological (duties, material norms) structures in Christian ethics. This means that praxis itself is a relationship of mutuality between norms and action. I will discuss some contributions from the fields mentioned in Chapter 2. I will discuss praxis in Chapter 3.

of violence against Aboriginal women and girls in Canada, including human trafficking. Feminist scholars who write about the problem of human trafficking caution that to address this social injustice through benevolent protection risks repeating relationships of domination similar to those in trafficking relationships. In light of the Indigenous – settler reality in Canada, which I discuss below, this means that protectionist solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls repeat the domination they seek to help abolish. Like the RCAP and TRC, a feminist analysis of the notion of protection also promotes mutuality as an alternative model for social action and is the one that I will investigate in this thesis.

The first aim of my thesis is to help settler-Canadians to distinguish between protection and mutuality as models for social action and to differentiate their role in each. A second aim is to better understand mutuality and to ask how it offers a better alternative. A third aim is to respond to the question, “How is mutuality a lived praxis?” The point of addressing these three aims is to assist settler-Canadians in their own comprehension of mutuality, i.e., what do settler-Canadians mean when they speak of mutuality? Further, I would like to help develop a view of a relationship of mutual recognition between Aboriginal peoples and settler Canadians. Finally, my hope is to


indicate how mutual recognition in Canada might serve to assist practical action to help end the problem of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls.

2 Methodology

In view of my thesis, its context and the above aims, I will examine Paul Ricœur’s ethical thought on human capability and mutual recognition and consider the contribution that his philosophical and theological thinking contributes to my topic. My methodological approach contextualizes Ricœur’s work in a contemporary historical situation and the analytical approach that I use is dialectical and hermeneutical. I find this 3-pronged approach helpful for assisting settler-Canadians who, like me, are committed to a journey of decolonization, are interested in transformed action, both at personal and policy levels, and are committed to the work of ending human trafficking.

First, the thesis is historical by means of its context. The topic concerns an actual event in human history, i.e., the contemporary global reality of human trafficking and an element of its specific occurrence in Canada. Further, the explicit occurrence of trafficking of which I speak is uniquely impacted by a settler colonial reality. In other words, this thesis relates to a concrete reality that has a unique intersection of causes and therefore requires some elaboration of its historical context, both global and local (Canada.)

Second, the dialectical methodology used in my thesis is grounded in Ricœur’s mediated self, which claims that a person does not have access to self-knowledge though isolated introspection. In other words, I cannot know myself by myself. The basic unit of a mediated self is relationship. This approach is helpful for understanding the importance of the dialectic, not only of sameness and difference within individual self-
identity, but also capability and vulnerability within the ethical self, and finally for articulating the experience of mutual recognition.

Third, my approach is hermeneutical. Therefore, the thesis begins and ends with a discussion on solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. However, better solutions cannot be jumped to without bringing something new to bear, something that offers another angle or perspective. As Ricœur would say, “to know more is to understand better.” So, after critiquing present solutions, instead of leaping to new solutions that don’t go to the root of the problem, I take what Ricœur calls a “detour.” I divert from the discussion on solutions to follow the thread of Ricœur’s mediated self through to his understanding of mutual recognition. This diversion does not skirt around the problem, but helps me to go deeper and to arrive at a transformed understanding of the role of settler Canadians in the context of my thesis. I understand this hermeneutical approach as a spiral methodology, rather than a linear fait accompli. Therefore, the transformation articulated in the last chapter is not the last word.

Further, my thesis is analytical through my scrutiny of the notions: human trafficking, protection, capability, and mutuality. The literature on human trafficking reveals Canada’s implication and efforts to protect persons who are vulnerable to the exploitation of trafficking. Also revealed is a significant gap in Canada’s response, i.e., the lack of attention to the root-causes of the disproportionate incidence of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls. The analysis of protection, assisted by the work of Iris Marion Young (1949-2006,) reveals the notion to be problematic and suggests mutuality as a better model for social action.

Examination of mutuality exposes the question within social action of the place
of otherness, or difference. Therefore, mutuality brings to the notion of equality sought by social justice, a demand for recognition of each one’s unique dignity. In the context of trafficking in Canada this means that while the literature recognizes the disparity of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls and its unique set of causes, solutions do not adequately reflect this awareness. Aboriginal understandings of human trafficking are not included, Aboriginal ways of addressing exploitation are not considered, nor are solutions aimed at addressing the specific root-cause that has been identified as ongoing colonialism.

Analysis of Ricœur’s work on the mediated self, human capability, and mutual recognition demonstrates: 1) his ethical concern for the problem of domination of power, such as colonialism; 2) his suspicion of the protectionism within solutions to social injustice; and 3) his unique contribution to the discourse on mutual recognition for consideration in a settler colonial context.

3 Colonialism: The “Settler Problem”

While attending a recent speaking event, I heard author Dr. Nadia Ferrara use the term intergenerational colonialism as a reality suffered by both Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians, albeit differently.10 She elaborated the implication of this concept to mean that Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians both need to know who they are and

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what it is that harms the other.\textsuperscript{11} If one group suffers denial of history, it perpetuates intergenerational colonialism for both. It is in this light that from the outset, it is important to clarify that I write primarily about the “settler problem”\textsuperscript{12} of domination in Canada and for settler-Canadians who, like myself, benefit from the contemporary Canadian reality that has emerged from its western European colonial beginnings. Paulette Regan agrees with Roger Epp when she writes about the need in Canada for settlers to examine themselves. It is in this vein that I write for those who desire to be released from the affliction of historically inherited attitudes that create ongoing impacts of settler domination over Aboriginal peoples. To restate my thesis differently: If a relationship of mutual recognition between Indigenous and settler-Canadians is fundamental, what does it look like in practice, how might it transform the self-understanding of settler-Canadians and their role in the struggle to end trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls?

4 Indigenous - Settler Relations in Canada

In this dissertation I use the terms Indigenous, Aboriginal, and settler-Canadian, terms that are common to the literature on the topic of Indigenous – Settler relations. The terms Aboriginal and Indigenous are often used interchangeably in the Canadian

\textsuperscript{11} Claudette Commanda, 2013. “Niigaan: In Conversation”, http://niigaan.ca/tag/claudette-commanda/ (accessed March 9, 2016). This is also the view expressed by Professor Claudette Commanda (Kitigan Zibi Anishinaabe), who encourages settler-Canadians to know their history and to love themselves.

\textsuperscript{12} Roger Epp, "We Are All Treaty People: History, Reconciliation, and the 'Settler Problem," in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, ed. Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier(Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2003), 228; Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 34.
context to collectively identify First Nations, Inuit, and Metis.\textsuperscript{13} The term settler, or settler-Canadian is used in the literature to collectively identify Canadians who are not Aboriginal. However, in the context of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians, it is helpful to understand the term settler within the field of Settler Colonial Studies. Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini, who are leading scholars in the field, provide the definition used in this thesis:

Settler colonialism is a global and transnational phenomenon, and as much a thing of the past as a thing of the present. There is no such thing as neo-settler colonialism or post-settler colonialism because settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends. Not all migrants are settlers; as Patrick Wolfe has noted, settlers come to stay. They are founders of political orders who carry with them a distinct sovereign capacity. And settler colonialism is not colonialism: settlers want Indigenous people to vanish (but can make use of their labour before they are made to disappear). Sometimes settler colonial forms operate within colonial ones, sometimes they subvert them, sometimes they replace them. But even if colonialism and settler colonialism interpenetrate and overlap, they remain separate as they co-define each other.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} Government of Canada, *The Constitution Act*, 1982. In Part II, Section 35.2 of the Constitution Act, “Aboriginal” is defined as Indian, Inuit, and Métis peoples. The Indian Act of 1876 refers to Indian (First Nations) peoples, although since 1939 its legislation has also applied to Inuit. In my research, I will use the generic terms Aboriginal and Indigenous interchangeably to include all First Peoples in Canada. The term Indian is still sometimes used in legal documentation. It must be noted that these are generic social constructs that have been imposed on peoples of approximately 614 nations. Refer to: Aboriginal and Northern Development Canada, "First Nations People of Canada" [http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100013791/1100100013795](http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100013791/1100100013795) (accessed January 21, 2016). Today, most First Peoples in Canada self-identify in terms common to their own languages. For example, Tsilhqot’in, Anishinaabe, or Inuit. The term Métis is evolving. Since 2003, the Métis Nation of Alberta has used the following definition: “a person who self-identifies as a Métis, is distinct from other aboriginal peoples, is of historic Métis Nation ancestry, and is accepted by the Métis Nation.” On April 17, 2014, Metis people were granted status as Aboriginal by Canada. Refer to: The Métis Nation of Alberta, "Definition of Métis " [http://www.albertametis.com/MNAHome/MNA-Membership-Definition.aspx](http://www.albertametis.com/MNAHome/MNA-Membership-Definition.aspx) (accessed January 18, 2016).

Settler Colonial Studies is a field of inquiry that has entered interdisciplinary research in North America. Colonialism is a complex notion that incorporates definitions of colonizers and settler(s) in relation to Indigenous persons and nations.

According to the research, colonialism is defined in two ways: binary and ternary. In order to understand these models, John Mack Faragher deems it important to distinguish the terms colonization, colonialism, and colony:

If “colonization” denotes the acquisition of foreign territory by a metropole, and “colony” the political organization, “colonialism” refers to the relations of dominance and subordination within colonial society.

Faragher’s distinctions hint at the basic difference between binary and ternary models of colonialism: the binary model refers to colonialism as exploitation by imperial states of land, resources, and labour of Indigenous populations in the colonies, and ternary refers to the type of colonialism that involves a third group: European settler colonies. This third group gives rise to the term settlers and settler colonialism.

Settlers are those who live in the exploited territory, establish settlements, and interact with the Indigenous populations. As settlers, they put down roots in the

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15 John Mack Faragher, "Commentary: Settler Colonial Studies and the North American Frontier," *Settler Colonial Studies* 4, no. 2 (2014). The author provides a summary of the development of the field of settler colonial studies from its inception as historical studies in colonialism in Australia and North America in the 19th century to today’s growing complexity of discourses in settler colonial studies. Faragher proposes that settler colonialism offers a needed perspective on North American histories and argues for the need to broaden the definition of settler colonialism from a binary to ternary model. See his bibliography for further reading in the field of settler colonial studies.

16 Aníbal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America," *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 3 (2000). This Latin American author represents postcolonial scholars who have also introduced “coloniality” to settler colonial discourse. Coloniality describes a basic hegemonic element that extends colonialism into contemporary global structures. Quijano contends that present global powers continue to impose and operate from the same Eurocentric power structures that began as colonialism. In this way, global power structures involve coloniality because they function as colonialism on a worldwide scale.

17 Faragher, “Commentary,” 181.
exploited territory and in the process become both colonizer and colonized. This happens simultaneously when settlers replace the colonizing power as dominators and protectors of the Indigenous population through the former’s government structures. But, as settlers settle they also struggle with colonial domination over their own interests as they become more and more established in their new home. However, it is not the relationship between settlers and imperial powers that interests me in this thesis. Rather, my concern is the relationship between settler-Canadians and Indigenous peoples. According to Cavanagh and Veracini’s definition, settlers are those who belong to the politically dominant group, i.e., those who have political power and use it to maintain systems that favour them and disenfranchise others, whose interests they claim to protect, such as Indigenous peoples, the economically poor, and refugees.\(^{18}\)

5 Protection

In order to understand why this thesis is titled *Beyond Protection*, it is important to define protection. In Canada, there is a precarious history of protection of Aboriginal rights, beginning with the Royal Proclamation of 1763 by Britain, and assumed by the Canadian State with its most recent enshrinement in Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution and section 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.\(^{19}\) These

\(^{18}\) Settler colonialism recognizes that all settlers do not enjoy the same degree of privilege, and that not all settlers come to a country like Canada for the same reasons. However, in the Canadian context it is important to acknowledge from the outset that Indigenous peoples are doubly disenfranchised. This is because they have little recognized political agency as First Peoples of the land, and they did not seek to belong to the nation of Canada. In other words, the disenfranchisement of Indigenous peoples cannot be compared to that of present day refugees or any other group suffering exclusion from political power.

legal documents concern the protection of the self-interest of Aboriginal nations, cultures, rights, and lands. Protection in this sense is not being contested in this thesis. However, between the two documents just cited, the Indian Act was implemented in 1876, amended in 1951, and followed by the White Paper.\(^{20}\) The main purpose of the Indian Act was to entrench in law control over the lives of Aboriginal Peoples and to implement assimilation policies that would lead to their absorption into Canada.\(^{21}\) For example, analysis of the Indian Act reveals that:

> [D]espite the diversity of experiences and relationships between Aboriginal peoples and settlers across the country, including strong military and economic alliances in certain regions, Confederation established a very different relationship between these two groups by disregarding the interests and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples and uniformly making them legally wards of the state. Systems of control that had been established in prior legislation were now newly defined under one act, the Indian Act of 1867. This act effectively treated Aboriginal people as children—a homogenizing and paternalistic relationship.\(^{22}\)

It is the kind of abuse of power cited above that defines the notion of protection being used in this thesis. The meaning of protection that emerges from the settler domination evidenced in the Indian Act that gives reason to Aboriginal women to rise up and say that they are capable, that they don’t need to be saved, overpowered, or


\(^{21}\) It is the Indian Act that gave rise to policies such as Indian Residential Schools and the 60’s Scoop, i.e., the apprehension of Aboriginal children from their families and communities and placing them with non-Aboriginal families.

controlled, nor are they helplessly dependent.”  In other words, Aboriginal women know who Aboriginal women are. They know what they need and what is available within their nations and cultural systems to provide needed services. For too long Canadians and Canadian society have analyzed Aboriginal women and decided without their input how they best need to be protected from social injustice. On this topic, Ricœurian scholar Morny Joy writes:

Perhaps real recognition and justice for the First Nation peoples of Canada will only arrive when [ ] a critical history is implemented for all Canadians and those terms of the Indian Act that have deemed them [First Nations] as protected by the state will finally be repealed.

Joy points to the contribution of Ricœur’s view of mutual recognition and to the need for Canadians to address their understanding of protection that sanctions an attitude that Indigenous women (or Indigenous peoples in general) are “ours” to protect. This is a critique that is also supported in the literature by Glen Coulthard (Yellowknives Dene).

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24 Kim Anderson, A Recognition of Being: Reconstructing Native Womanhood (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2008); Andrea Smith, Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (Cambridge: South End Press, 2005). Anderson (Cree/Metis) writes that pathways forward for healing of violence against Aboriginal women are through resistance, reclamation, and reconstruction of their own identity, for social, and political action. Smith (Cherokee) also insists on putting Aboriginal women at the centre of the analysis of sexual violence and policy-making. These two scholars are representative of other Aboriginal scholars who promote Aboriginal self-determination and capacity rebuilding as the way forward, in lieu of the imposition of policies and solutions by Canadian settlers and society.

who brings an Indigenous perspective.\textsuperscript{26}

6 Outline of Chapters

In order to defend my thesis I will take four steps before arriving at the concluding chapter. Chapter 1 will situate the context of this study. It will do so by locating the problem of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada within a broader global reality, before identifying present solutions in Canada and pinpointing the need for an alternative approach to solutions in the context of this thesis. The position taken in Chapter 1 reflects the need to attend to contemporary critiques that question current solutions that are based on protection. Without deeper reflection on protection, present solutions are at risk of repeating the domination that occurs in trafficking, rather than helping to actually address the root of this form of exploitation.

Chapter 2 will take us to an analysis of power and protection. The conceptual examination of these notions helps to understand how domination can be couched in benevolence. An analysis of protection as a benevolent form of domination opens us to the possibility of mutuality as a better model for social justice in settler colonial situations. I will explore meanings of mutuality (theological, postcolonial, and political) and identify a gap that these perspectives attempt to resolve, i.e., relationships of equality that also respect otherness. This chapter includes an important critique of Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition by Glen Coulthard. Coulthard’s critique will open to dialogue with Ricœur. Chapter 3 concerns the contribution of Ricœur’s mediated

\textsuperscript{26} Coulthard, Red Skin White Masks, 178. In his book, Coulthard proposes a thesis to counter the impact of colonization on gender discrimination that also occurs within Indigenous communities. To be free from the attitude to “protect our women” is an act of decolonization for Indigenous peoples. Coulthard’s critique will be discussed in Chapter 2.
self for ethics. The ethical self is seminal to his perspective on social justice, which he links to care-action as the basic anthropological unit of human being.

The capable self as the person of care-action is discussed in Chapter 4. A capable person who is fully self-recognizing is the one able to live mutual recognition. However, it is not possible to write about Ricœur’s understanding of capability without mentioning Amartya Sen, founder of the Capability Approach to development ethics. Ricœur expresses his indebtedness to Sen before discussing his own anthropological and ethical perspectives, which build on and contribute to the capability discourse initiated by Sen. However, an analysis of human capability that ends at an ethics of mutuality is not enough for Ricœur. For this reason, Chapter 4 brings in the theological implications of Ricœur’s ethics of mutual recognition, which takes him beyond ethics to the hyperethical.

By his own admission, Ricœur writes that philosophy has its limits and that a poetic language, such as Christian biblical theology is needed to express the unexplainable, hoped for, yet actual experiences of mutual recognition. The summoned self of Christian theological tradition gives a language that takes us beyond an ethics of mutual recognition to the hyperethical dimension of recognition, which Ricœur calls festive. However, he does not develop this element in *The Course of Recognition*. Marianne Moyaert helps me to articulate Ricœur’s hyperethical contribution to the topic of this thesis when she writes about festive recognition as cosmic.

In Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, I will return anew to questions raised in this thesis and discuss the implications for solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. To do so, I will discuss mutual recognition in relation to a current
project for prevention of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Anishinaabek communities in the Manitoulin North Shore region of Ontario, Canada. This concrete action will help me to make a final assessment of the significance of Ricœur’s contribution to solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls that reach beyond protection.

Chapter 1

An Overview of Trafficking in Aboriginal Women and Girls in Canada

1 Introduction

“I Am Not for Sale.”28 Thus reads the caption on a poster produced by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the aim of which is raising awareness in Canada about the reality of human trafficking. A similar message appears in educational materials produced in Ottawa, Canada’s capital city, by the grassroots group PACT-Ottawa.29 A caption on their pamphlet reads “…Because It’s Happening Here. Human Trafficking in Ottawa.” My thesis concerns the contribution of Paul Ricœur’s ethics of mutual recognition to solutions to the problem of trafficking30 in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. However, efforts to understand the Canadian context cannot be abstracted from its global reality. For this reason, I will begin this chapter with a review


29 PACT-Ottawa, "PACT-Ottawa: Persons against the Crime of Trafficking in Humans" www.pact-ottawa.org (accessed November 17, 2015). Through Project ImPACT, PACT-Ottawa conducted a local safety audit to determine how human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation was happening to women and girls in Ottawa. The study required collaboration at various levels between many local organization and individuals, including the Ottawa Coalition to End Human Trafficking, of which the RCMP is one member. See, Ottawa Coalition to End Human Trafficking, http://www.endhumantrafficking.ca/ (accessed November 17, 2015).

30 United Nations, "Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime", United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx (accessed January 30, 2016). In this thesis I will work from the internationally accepted definition of human trafficking, which will be discussed in this chapter. In the literature and in everyday speech, trafficking in persons, human trafficking, and modern day slavery are used interchangeably. Human smuggling, however, is distinct from human trafficking. It is an illegal immigration transaction in which the relationship between smuggler and smuggled person terminates upon arrival at the destination. Human trafficking, on the other hand, involves a trafficker’s ongoing control over a person. Nevertheless, the distinction is complex, and there are instances in which human smuggling becomes human trafficking.
of the research, which reveals that every country is implicated in this serious human rights abuse.31

The first aim of this chapter is to set the stage and to understand how global efforts to address human trafficking are assisted by an internationally accepted definition provided by the United Nations (UN). We will observe that the definition provided by the UN serves only as a guideline to assist individual States, like Canada, who have committed to its implementation. One of the key measures within the UN definition of human trafficking is exploitation of power. The core of this thesis concerns the problem that exploitation of power can also have for solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada.

A second aim of this chapter is to examine how Canada’s response to human trafficking addresses exploitation. I will look at three topics. First to be examined is Canada’s role and response within the global reality of human trafficking. This involves understanding that Canada is a place of origin, transit, and destination for human trafficking, making it part of global human trafficking networks.32 In other words, Canada is a source country where Canadian citizens are trafficked within or beyond its borders, a destination country for foreign nationals who are trafficked into Canada, and a transit country for those being moved through Canada on their way to other countries, usually the United States. The focus of this thesis is on Canada as a source country for

31 United States Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Reports 2001-2015" http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tipprrt/ (accessed January 30, 2016). Every June, since 2001, the United States Department of State produces a country-by-country report on trafficking in persons that assesses the state of human trafficking around the globe. In collaboration with Canadian government and non-governmental organizations, Canada’s implication is evaluated in this annual report.

32 United States Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Reports 2001-2015".
trafficking within its own borders. This concept is known as domestic human trafficking.

The third and final aim of this chapter is to introduce the reality that Aboriginal women and girls are overrepresented in the documentation on sex trafficking and at elevated risk for being trafficked within Canada. The literature reveals that this situation is connected to the ongoing relationship of power domination of settler-Canadian society over Aboriginal peoples. In the literature, this power dynamic is called settler colonialism and intersects with racism and sexism. The definition of settler colonialism was defined in the Introduction to this thesis. Economic disparity is also connected to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. However, the salient information revealed in the research on human trafficking in Canada suggests that Aboriginal women and girls are targeted because they are Aboriginal women and girls.

The conclusion of this chapter will synthesize the findings of these three aims. It will also uncover a question that arises from the research regarding the notion of protection from exploitation, particularly as it concerns Canada’s response to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls. We can already anticipate the problem that occurs when responses to protect persons from exploitation are developed within a social and political reality that is already marked by domination, in this case settler colonialism. In light of the risk of exploitation within solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada, this provides a context for the chapters that follow. In particular, the context outlined in this chapter will lead us to the next, where I will analyze protection as a model for solutions to social injustice, such as trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls

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33 Settler colonialism, as defined in the Introduction privileges those in mainstream society who have political agency and hold the decision-making power in society.
in Canada.

1.1 The Global Problem of Trafficking in Persons

Today it is estimated that there are between 27-35 million slaves in the world, with as many as 800,000 added to this number annually.34 Since the inception of the United Nations after World War II several attempts have been made to address the problem of modern day slavery using various international mechanisms. For example, in Article 4 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it states: “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms;” and in Article 35 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, State parties are obligated to “take all appropriate (. . .) measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form.”35

1.1.1 Definition of Human Trafficking

The most recent international instrument to address the crime of modern day slavery is the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against

34 Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the New Global Economy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2000), 8-9; Guardian News and Media Limited, "Modern Slavery Affects More Than 35 Million People, Report Finds" http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/17/modern-slavery-35-million-people-walk-free-foundation-report (accessed April 7, 2016). Kevin Bales distinguishes between human trafficking and slavery. However, in the main corpus of literature on human trafficking, there is no distinction between human trafficking and slavery. Bales makes his distinction based on the difference between the treatment of trafficked persons today as disposable objects, and slaves of former times as indispensable for the economic security of their owners. Both instances are self-interested in favour of the dominators. But, today, trafficked persons, especially when trafficked for sexual exploitation, are regularly discarded by their traffickers and replaced by another. In the past, slave owners provided for their slaves in order to benefit from their work.

Transnational Organized Crime. Today there are 166 State signatories, including Canada. This UN document is more commonly known by its short name, the Palermo Protocol. It provides the international community with three significant tools: 1) a common legal definition of human trafficking in which to ground local responses and global collaboration; 2) obligatory measures; and 3) optional measures. Section 3a of the Palermo Protocol defines human trafficking as:

… the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

There are diverse forms of human trafficking, but according to the definition above, each form includes three common elements: movement, means and purpose. In other words, according to this international definition, human trafficking involves the displacement of persons across or within borders, using various methods, i.e., force, coercion, abuse of authority etc., and has one sole purpose: exploitation. The UN definition of human trafficking is summarized in Figure 1.

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37 United Nations, "Palermo Protocol". The definition is found in article 3a. Canada was instrumental in writing the Protocol and was one of the first State parties to sign when it opened to signatories in December 2000. Canada ratified (formally approved its acceptance) the Protocol in May 2002.
Figure 1: Summary of the UN Definition of Trafficking in Persons

Although the UN definition of human trafficking is placed as a supplement to a UN convention on organized crime, the implication is that its scope for solutions reaches beyond prosecution. In the next section, I discuss how solutions based on the Palermo Protocol must address more than its criminal aspect. This is implied by its three-pronged approach (prosecution, protection, prevention).  

In order to address important elements beyond criminal prosecution, the Palermo Protocol provides State signatories with obligations and optional measures. The

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38 Elizabeth M. Wheaton, Edward J. Schauer, and Thomas V. Galli, "Economics of Human Trafficking," International Migration 48, no. 4 (2010): p. 132-136. The authors argue that the economics of human trafficking negatively affects the sustainability of a global economy. They assert that most efforts to end human trafficking are aimed at decreasing the demand for human trafficking (for sexual or labour exploitation.) These efforts are made manifest through increased punishment for traffickers and enhancing public education about the horrors of human trafficking. The authors consider these approaches important, but by themselves not sufficient. Better methods would address the fundamental human rights abuses, which increase the resource of vulnerable populations. This is done by such efforts as listed in Kevin Bales, Ending Slavery: How We Free Today's Slaves (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2007), 19. The author claims that ending human trafficking requires coordinated efforts beyond merely prosecuting criminals. He challenges peoples and governments to: “end world poverty, eradicate corruption, keep people from being greedy, slow the population explosion, halt the environmental destruction and armed conflicts that impoverish countries, convince big lenders to cancel international debts, and get governments to keep promises they make every time they pass a law.”
obligations are: 1) to criminalize trafficking; 2) to ensure means for persons who are trafficked to seek compensation; and 3) to establish policies and programs both to prevent trafficking and to protect persons against re-victimization. The optional measures are to provide persons who have been trafficked with: 1) protection of their privacy; 2) information; 3) legal counsel and court support; 4) assistance to recover, i.e., housing, health; and 5) physical safety. Although each of the three aspects of the Palermo Protocol (definition, obligations, optional measures) demand further investigation, the present study is limited to understanding the definition of human trafficking in light of its purpose, i.e., exploitation. To address exploitation concerns the obligation to protect persons who are trafficked from re-victimization. I will return to the notion of exploitation in our discussion below on Canada’s role and response, where exploitation is the primary feature of human trafficking that is addressed in the Criminal Code of Canada (CCC). First, I discuss the exploitation of human trafficking and its links to the global economy.

1.1.2 Global Economics and Slavery

By nature of its placement within the UN Conference Against Organized Crime, the definition of human trafficking refers to the exploitation of human beings as a criminal activity involving the abuse of power. However, current interdisciplinary research on the issue identifies human trafficking as a complex system that intersects with the discourse on global economics. In this body of literature, trafficking in

39 Beate and Mariska N.J. van der Linden Andrees, "Designing Trafficking Research from a Labour Market Perspective: The ILO Experience," International Migration 43, no. 1-2 (2005); Bales, Disposable People; Wheaton, "Economics of Human Trafficking." These authors are representative of those writing on human trafficking and global economics.
persons is widely recognized as a human rights abuse that is driven by economic greed and is referred to by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as the “underside of globalization.” Present global economic structures seek to ensure progress, prosperity, and profit. However, many people do not benefit from globalization and are left severely impoverished by the imposition of economic structures that support and even require slavery in order to achieve the greatest economic gain.

In addition to the annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* produced by the United States Department of State and the United Nations *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, research shows that the correlation between global economics and human trafficking not only violates the human rights and well-being of the women, children, and men who are forced into a life of slavery, but that these forces also severely compromise their human autonomy and the capacity to live as agents of their own lives. In other words, the literature points to the problem of human trafficking as not only an activity of criminal organizations, but that the relationship of exploitation is embedded in global economic structures that require the exploitation of human

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40 Director General of the International Labour Organization International Labour Office, and International Labour Conference, *Stopping Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-up to the Ilo Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work* (International Labour Organization, 2001), p. 47. Since at least 2001, the International Labour Organization has been using the term “underside of globalization” when referring to human trafficking. This term points to the negative impact that economic globalization has for those whose labour is exploited in order to meet the increasing demand for profit.


trafficking in order to satisfy demand and compete for profit. Whether human trafficking is an organized criminal activity connected with the global economy, or is operating for the benefit of individuals, its consistent relationship of exploitation of power demands scrutiny. This thesis undergoes the careful analysis that is needed to ensure that exploitation of power does not also infect solutions, particularly concerning trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada.

1.1.3 Relationships of Exploitation

According to the definition detailed in the Palermo Protocol, human trafficking is a relationship of exploitation. Experts in the field are clear that the exploitation of human trafficking is criminal and its purpose is connected to economic gain. To understand human trafficking in its global reality requires an examination of this manner of exploiting people.

Kevin Bales claims that most enslaved persons today are not exploited for sexual exploitation. They are held in debt bondage in countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, as well as throughout Southeast Asia, West and North Africa, and South America. Bonded labour, or debt bondage, is probably the least known form of slavery today, yet Bales contends it to be the most widely used method of exploiting

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43 Bales, *Ending Slavery*; Wheaton, "Economics of Human Trafficking."

44 Bales, *Disposable People*. Sociologist, Kevin Bales, is a leading expert in the subject of modern day slavery.

45 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Global Report on Trafficking in Persons. Executive Summary" https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Executive_summary_english.pdf (accessed January 30, 2016). The UN cautions that “the term trafficking in persons can be misleading: it places emphasis on the transaction aspects of a crime that is more accurately described as enslavement. Exploitation of people, day after day. For years on end.”
Conversely, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports that most trafficked persons are sexually enslaved. However, the UN Gift Report also admits that:

… sexual exploitation is by far the most commonly identified form of human trafficking (79%), followed by forced labour (18%). This may be the result of statistical bias. By and large the exploitation of women tends to be visible, in city centres, or along highways. Because it is more frequently reported, sexual exploitation has become the most documented type of trafficking, in aggregate statistics. In comparison, other forms of exploitation are under-reported: forced or bonded labour; domestic servitude and forced marriage; organ removal; and the exploitation of children in begging, the sex trade, and warfare.

This means that although the sex trafficking of women is the most highly reported and documented form of human trafficking in the world today, caution is needed. This is because human trafficking is complex, often hidden, and takes various forms, many of which go unreported.

The reporting of human trafficking is sparse and infrequent, which makes statistics highly unreliable. Despite the lack of accurate statistics, human trafficking is widely understood as an illegal business transaction in which greed, demand, and

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46 Bales, *Disposable People*, p. 19. Bales defines debt bondage or bonded labour as a form of slavery that involves ownership of a person who pledges himself or herself to pay off a loan. Exploitation occurs when no conditions are set for the nature of the labour or time limit for paying off the loan. A situation is created in which the person’s labour is unable to pay the debt, which can be passed down to other family members for generations.


consumption motivate and are motivated by profit-oriented policies that do not benefit
all people. Bales asserts that unjust economic power differentials link the global supply
and demand factors of human slavery to poverty and greed, wherein the rich exploit the
impoverished and most marginalized. He claims that while racism was formerly
understood as the primary cause, it is not as significant in the analysis of contemporary
forms of slavery.\textsuperscript{50} His socio-economic analysis is highly acclaimed internationally and
is cited in virtually all of contemporary scholarship pertaining to the problem of human
trafficking.

Bales identifies economic globalization, not racism, as the principle cause
creating the conditions of global slavery. However, in the contemporary Canadian
context of trafficking of Aboriginal women and girls, economic factors intersect with
racism, sexism, and colonialism as root causes of the problem. Thus, scholars and
activists support the claim that addressing the ongoing impacts of colonialism is
therefore fundamental to solutions to end trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in
Canada.\textsuperscript{51} Government working groups, reports, and studies also point to colonialism as

\textsuperscript{50} Bales, \textit{Disposable People}, 12-31; Eileen Kerwin Jones, "Sex in the City: Human Trafficking and the Sexual Exploitation of Women and Children," \textit{Counselling and Spirituality} 25, no. 1 (Spring 2006); Benjamin Perrin, \textit{Invisible Chains: Canada's Underground World of Human Trafficking} (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2010), 6-9, 96. Bales divides slavery into the “new” and the “old,” stating that older forms were rooted in racism and that the new slavery is rooted in economics. Perrin concurs, but also acknowledges the overlapping of economics with racism when trafficking pertains to Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. The feminist economic analysis of Eileen Kerwin Jones in her article, describes the multifaceted nature of human trafficking that involves the overlapping causes of economics, racism, and gender inequality.

a root cause of violence against Aboriginal women and girls in Canada, including human trafficking.\textsuperscript{52} I will return to this point concerning the principle causes of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls following our next discussion, which concerns human trafficking in Canada more generally.

1.2 Human Trafficking in Canada

Current research shows that every country is implicated in human trafficking, making Canada no exception. Since 2008, there have been 655 accusations of human trafficking in Canada.\textsuperscript{53} These accusations posit a much higher number of trafficked persons, since a trafficker does not usually exploit only one person. For example, in the Domotor Case, 19 men were trafficked from Hungary and exploited in construction work in Hamilton, Ontario; in the Moazami Case in Vancouver, British Columbia, a trafficker exploited 4 young girls in a prostitution ring; and in the Thai Workers Case, Thai workers were brought to Leamington, Ontario, and exploited in agricultural work.\textsuperscript{54}

Project imPACT’s 2014 study revealed that a minimum of 140 women and girls, identified as having been trafficked, were living in Ottawa and the national capital

\textit{Peoples for Human Rights} 10, no. (2006). These scholars are representative of a larger body of literature on the impact of colonialism on trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada.


\textsuperscript{53} United States Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Reports 2001-2015".

\textsuperscript{54} PACT-Ottawa, "PACT-Ottawa: Persons against the Crime of Trafficking in Humans". Read about each of these stories on PACT-Ottawa website: www.pact-ottawa.org.
region at the time.\textsuperscript{55} This is a significant preliminary finding considering that the study also revealed that human trafficking is largely unreported and difficult to uncover because it often takes place in private locations such as homes, especially when it involves underage girls.

A review of the Canadian literature on human trafficking distinguishes two modes: the trafficking of foreign nationals into Canada and the domestic trafficking of Canadian citizens within or beyond the borders of Canada.\textsuperscript{56} Of the approximately 600,000 – 800,000 persons trafficked per year,\textsuperscript{57} it has been estimated that 600-800 people are trafficked into Canada each year and 1500-2200 people are trafficked through Canada on their way to the United States.\textsuperscript{58} Globally, Canada is considered to be on the demand rather than the supply side of the trafficking equation. This is based on the fact

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\textsuperscript{57} United States Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Reports 2001-2015".

that Canadian citizens have a high demand for consumer items that are often produced through the labour of human trafficking, including domestic servitude; sweat shop labour; forced or bonded labour in farming, construction, mining, jewelry making, carpet weaving, brick making; as well as pornography, forced prostitution, and sex tourism.\(^59\)

Research experts and activists concur that those in the global north do not go through one day without using a variety of household products potentially involving slave labour at some stage in their production.\(^60\) For example, during a recent trip to India I met with a number of women from families enslaved in bonded labour in the tea gardens in India’s northeast.\(^61\) Friends of mine who have visited the Dominican Republic have had the same awakening about the production of sugar. It is also well known that chocolate is a product often produced by slaves, many of whom are children.\(^62\) Tea, sugar, chocolate, are all in high demand in Canada.\(^63\) Within Canada human trafficking also

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\(^59\) United States Department of State, * Trafficking in Persons Report* (2015), 23. The 2015 report includes a more complete list of known industries and products that are at risk of involving in human trafficking at some point in the supply chain.


\(^61\) While visiting the Jesuit priests in Matigara in the Darjeeling District of West Bengal, India, I was introduced to a group of women whose families worked in the tea gardens in the region. Conditions are slowly improving for families who have been providing slave labour in the gardens for generations. Part of the solutions are improved housing conditions, medical care, and enough money for food. But this is not enough. Religious congregations, such as the Jesuits, also provide free quality education for the children of the tea garden workers to increase their opportunity for a better future.

\(^62\) "Slave Free Chocolate", http://www.slavefreecocoa.org/ (accessed January 30, 2016). This website provides one example of the extent of research being done on slavery and chocolate.

happens. As indicated, there have been reported instances of trafficking in Canada for purposes of domestic labour, agricultural, factory, restaurant, and construction work.\(^6^4\) Popularization of sex trafficking through the media makes it falsely stand out as the singular mode of human trafficking in Canada. This is bolstered by the fact that while seldom identified, sex trafficking remains the most commonly reported form of human trafficking. For example, one of the more publicized sex trafficking cases in Ottawa involved a teenaged trafficker who exploited other teens.\(^6^5\) Also, studies such as Project imPACT may only focus on sex trafficking. In the report by Project imPACT, of the 140 women and girls identified as trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation in Ottawa, the average age was 14. Many Canadians are unaware of the extent of the global atrocity of human trafficking, let alone its occurrence in their own country or city. They are equally unaware of their implication in it or their capacity to help stop it.

1.2.1 Canada’s Role and Response

Canada signed the Palermo Protocol on December 14, 2000 and ratified it on May 13, 2002.\(^6^6\) I have discussed its three elements: a definition of human trafficking,
obligations, and optional measures. In 2002, the Canadian Government began to entrench in law its commitment to address human trafficking. On June 28 of that year, a specific offence for human trafficking came into force in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The trafficking offence is found in section 118 and provides for very severe penalties: fines of up to $1 million and imprisonment up to life. Realizing that more than prosecution was needed in order to help trafficked persons, the Federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration added new measures to IRPA. Therefore, since May 2006, Canada has a Temporary Residency Permit (TRP) for foreign nationals trafficked into Canada. This was a positive step in principle. However, in practice it falls short of real protection. An example of TRP’s weakness is that at the outset a trafficked person had to find the funds to pay for the 120-day residency permit. Another problem was that the TRP did not give the option of obtaining an open work permit so that a person exiting their trafficking situation could apply for legitimate work. This meant that in 2006, a person trafficked into Canada often had little option but to return to the exploitative work s/he was trying to exit. This made the apparent solution another form of exploitation. Nor did the TRP provide the humanitarian aid that a person who has been trafficked requires, such as shelter, legal aid, or health care. Until 2009, only 17 persons who were trafficked into Canada benefited from a TRP.67

In June 2007, the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration improved the TRP measures by removing several initial obstacles. A temporary residency permit was extended to 180 days. This allowed persons who have been

trafficked to obtain an open work permit. These newest measures also waived the fees for the TRP and the open work permit. Urgent and essential healthcare under the Interim Federal Health program were also provided through the new measures.\footnote{Note that restrictions to the supplemental services provided by the Interim Federal Health Program that came into effect on June 30, 2012 impact persons who are foreign nationals and who are trafficked. The restrictions include dental care, which is essential for the overall health a woman trafficked into the sex trade.}

The accessibility of the TRP to persons who are trafficked into Canada is reflected in the 2011 \textit{Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration}, which states that from 2007 to 2011, 55 TRPs were issued to 47 persons believed to have been trafficked into Canada.\footnote{Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2011." These numbers represent some renewals of TRPs for several persons.} Still lacking is access to other protective services, such as housing, job training, legal aid, long-term psychological counseling, and education. Most trafficked persons want to stay in the country where they receive help. Canada’s assumption that most trafficked persons will choose to go back to their country of origin continues to be an obstacle.\footnote{Canadian Council for Refugees, "National Networking Meeting on Trafficking," (2013). http://ccrweb.ca/files/trafficking-forum-report-2012.pdf (accessed January 30, 2016). This assumption has been further ensconced in Canada’s newest policy: Omnibus Crime Bill C-10 and Private Members Bill C-310, each claiming to “protect” the rights of trafficked persons. The Omnibus Crime Bill proposes to give full authority to the personal discretion of immigration officials to refuse entry into Canada to those persons who might be exploited should they enter the country. Further, the Bill proposes nothing to protect trafficked persons already in Canada. Bill C-310 proposes to prosecute Canadian citizens in Canada for trafficking crimes committed abroad. However, this Bill does not address a gap already identified in the Canadian Criminal Code, i.e., consideration of the person committing the crime as having been a trafficked person him or herself.}

The Canadian Government’s response to the problem of human trafficking in 2002 through IRPA was a critical, albeit partial solution. This is because not every
person who is trafficked is a refugee\textsuperscript{71} and not all refugees are trafficked persons.

Canada still needed to address the problem of domestic trafficking, that is to say, the trafficking of Canadian citizens within Canada. Until November 2005, a large number of Criminal Code offences could apply to trafficking in persons, such as: kidnapping, extortion, forcible confinement, conspiracy, and controlling or living off the avails of prostitution, as well as organized crime offences. But, until 2005 human trafficking itself was not an offence in Canada.

### 1.2.2 Domestic Trafficking in Canada

In August 2008, it came to the attention of law enforcement personnel that Laura Emerson, along with her boyfriend and co-accused Gordon John Kingsley, had abducted three teenaged girls near a shelter for young women in Ottawa, Canada. The teenagers were minors\textsuperscript{72} at the time. They were taken to an apartment in Gatineau, Québec, where they were held as sex slaves for several months. The young women were drugged, confined inside the apartment against their will, and forced into prostitution. One girl was severely beaten when she tried to escape. In April 2009, Laura Emerson was convicted on several charges, including human trafficking. Gordon John Kingsbury was

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{71} Canadian Council for Refugees, "Refugees and Immigrants: A Glossary" http://ccrweb.ca/en/glossary (accessed June 5, 2012). The definition I use for refugee is taken from the definition of a Convention Refugee: "a person who meets the refugee definition in the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This definition is used in Canadian law and is widely accepted internationally. To meet the definition, a person must be outside their country of origin and have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."

\textsuperscript{72} Age of Consent, "What Are the Highest and Lowest Ages of Consent? " https://www.ageofconsent.net/highest-and-lowest (accessed February 12, 2016). Internationally, the age of sexual consent varies from 11 years old (Nigeria) to 21 years of age (Bahrain). In Canada, age of consent was raised from 14 to 16 years of age in 2008. In the United States, age of consent is determined by each State. It varies between 16 and 18 years of age.
\end{footnotesize}
convicted of living off the avails of a prostitution network and sexually assaulting one of the victims.\textsuperscript{73}

In late May 2012, the Byron/Edwards human trafficking case came to trial in an Ottawa court. Jamie Byron was the suspected leader of a human trafficking ring. He was arrested in Montreal in October 2011, and along with his associate, Katherine Edwards, who had been arrested in Ottawa a month earlier, was convicted of a series of charges under the Criminal Code, including human trafficking. They held a 17 year-old girl at a downtown Ottawa hotel and starved her until she agreed to work as a prostitute. Byron was convicted of human trafficking in 2014 and sentenced to 6 years in prison. Edwards was convicted and sentenced with lesser charges. Prior to 2005, no one in Canada could have been charged with human trafficking.

In May of 2004, the Honourable Irwin Cotler, a former Federal Minister of Justice, inscribed into the Canadian Criminal Code the crime of human trafficking. He introduced into Parliament Bill C-49\textsuperscript{74}, which was entitled, an Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Trafficking in Persons). After due procedure, a human trafficking offense came into force in the Criminal Code of Canada on November 25, 2005. It is found in sections 279.01 - 279.04. Canada’s law criminalizing trafficking in persons

\textsuperscript{73} Laura Payton, 2009. "Ottawa Woman Gets Seven Years in Teen-Luring Case," Ottawa Citizen, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Ottawa+woman+gets+seven+years+teen+luring+case/1483290/story.html (accessed January 30, 2016). On its website, PACT-Ottawa noted that a correction in \textit{The Ottawa Citizen} dated 16 April 2009 gives Laura Emerson’s correct sentence: "seven years in prison, in addition to double the eight months and 10 days she had served in pre-trial custody." See PACT-Ottawa website, Emerson/Kingsbury case.

\textsuperscript{74} A bill in Canadian parliament is a proposed law that the Government or an individual Member of Parliament (House of Commons or Senate) puts forward for approval from the legislature. A bill must pass three readings in both the House of Commons and the Senate before it receives Royal Assent, which is approval for the bill to become an Act of Parliament.
created four trafficking-specific Criminal Code offences: trafficking in persons (section 279.01), material benefit (section 279.02), and withholding or destroying documents (section 279.03). Section 279.04 defines exploitation.  

The Criminal Code sections on human trafficking complement the existing IRPA trafficking offence, as well as the already existing trafficking-related Criminal Code provisions mentioned at the end of the previous section. Together, these offences enable law enforcement to prosecute those who traffic foreign nationals into Canada and those responsible for domestic trafficking.

To recognize in Canadian law that domestic trafficking occurs means that a conviction for human trafficking does not require movement across borders. In Canada, exploitation is the key element of the offence. As indicated earlier, the Palermo Protocol offers guidelines to State signatories. By removing the criteria of movement across borders, Canada makes possible protection of Canadian citizens who are trafficked within its borders, including Aboriginal women and girls. However, the focus on exploitation without a clear definition makes the law ambiguous and unhelpful to law enforcement, to human trafficking experts, and most significantly, to those who have to

75 Justice Canada, 2005. "An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Trafficking in Persons)," http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/AnnualStatutes/2005_43/FullText.html (accessed January 30, 2016). Exploitation is broadly defined as causing: “someone to provide, or offer to provide, labour or a service by engaging in conduct that, in all the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to cause the other person to believe that their safety or the safety of a person known to them would be threatened if they failed to provide, or offer to provide, the labour or service, cause a person, by means of deception or the use or threat of force or of any other form of coercion, to have an organ or tissue removed.”

prove they have been exploited. The focus on exploitation also raises the question as to whether Canadian law is attempting to address too wide a scope through its law on human trafficking.

In addition to making human trafficking an offense in IRPA and the Criminal Code, Canada formed a federal Interdepartmental Working Group on Trafficking in Persons (IWGTIP). This group has the mandate to coordinate the Federal Government’s national efforts to combat human trafficking and to develop a federal strategy. The IWGTIP was replaced by the Human Trafficking (HT) Taskforce in June 2012 and is now headed by Public Safety Canada.

The twenty-first century has seen Canada engaging with the international community in collaborative efforts to address the problem of human trafficking. Canada’s work to improve its response within its own borders continues to evolve. For example, the Canadian Government launched a National Action Plan to Combat Human

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77 Joy Smith, 2012. "Human Trafficking Bill C-310," https://vimeo.com/32806544 (accessed January 30, 2016). Member of Parliament, Joy Smith proposes the following amendment to the Criminal Code regarding the definition of exploitation: In determining what constitutes exploitation under subsection (1), the Court may consider, among other factors, whether the accused (a) used or threatened to use violence; (b) used or threatened to use force; (c) used or threatened another form of coercion; or (d) used fraudulent misrepresentation or other fraudulent means.

78 Wahkotowin: A Knowledge Exchange Forum on Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Exploitation of Aboriginal Peoples, (Ottawa: 2012). According to panelist Anette Sikka, the lines are blurry between sex trafficking and the wider scope of sexual exploitation. She believes that we are actually dealing with different issues and that we are trying to merge them all into the law on human trafficking. She believes that different solutions are needed. Her suggestion is to take a step back and look at what is meant by human trafficking in Canada. Sikka’s position was highly contested among Aboriginal experts at the forum. But Sikka’s point is that it does not really matter what sex trafficking is called, as long as those who need help get it.

**Trafficking** in June 2012.\(^{80}\) As Canada increases its efforts to address trafficking of foreign nationals and Canadian citizens alike,\(^{81}\) the need for attention to the disproportional occurrence of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls comes to light. We can foresee that our discussion in the next section will underline the need to understand why this over-representation occurs. Comprehending the causes of this disparity are essential for effective solutions.

**1.2.3 Trafficking in Aboriginal Women and Girls**

Now I move to the situation of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. We are about to discover that in the literature on human trafficking in Canada, ongoing colonialism is cited as a primary contributing factor to the increased vulnerability of Aboriginal women and girls.\(^{82}\) This implies that without addressing the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and settler-Canadians, solutions also risk being

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\(^{81}\) United States Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report* (2013), 122. This reports of Canada: “In addition to ongoing investigations, as of February 2013, there were at least 77 ongoing federal human trafficking prosecutions, 72 of which were domestic sex trafficking cases. It is unclear how many of these prosecutions were initiated during the reporting period. These cases involved at least 130 defendants and 119 victims, compared with 57 ongoing trafficking prosecutions during the previous reporting period, involving 94 defendants and 158 victims. The government reported 27 total trafficking convictions during the last year, compared with at least 12 convictions during the previous year. The 27 convictions included two convictions for forced labor under trafficking-specific laws, in contrast to three convictions for forced labor under trafficking-specific laws obtained during the preceding reporting period. Prosecutors convicted at least 25 trafficking offenders under other sections of the criminal code in 2012, including provisions against conspiracy to commit human trafficking, living on the proceeds of prostitution, and forcible confinement; this is a notable increase compared with six such convictions obtained during the preceding reporting period.”

\(^{82}\) I continue to use the definition of settler colonialism by Cavanagh and Veracini and cited in the Introduction to this thesis.
tainted by a relationship of power domination. We can anticipate finding that the ongoing colonial relationship, which I have defined previously as settler colonialism, is a primary cause and a key obstacle to solutions.

The literature on trafficking in Canada indicates that Aboriginal women and girls are disproportionably vulnerable to being trafficked. For example, the recent *Trafficking in Persons Report* reads: “Canadian women and girls are exploited in sex trafficking across the country, and women and girls from Aboriginal communities…are especially vulnerable.” This is not a new finding, nor is trafficking a new experience for Aboriginal women and girls. There are documented references to the sexual exploitation of Aboriginal women and girls dating back to the 19th century. Moreover, all the recent literature on trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls links this disproportion to Canada’s history of colonization.


85 James Gray, *Red Lights on the Prairies* (Saskatchewan, Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1986), 12-13; Barbara Eileen Kelcey, *Alone in Silence: European Women in the Canadian North before 1940* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), 98. Gray documents prostitution (forced and perhaps chosen) in the Canadian prairies in the 1900’s. He studies the links between alcohol, prostitution, gambling, and the prohibition movement in Canada. While he documents sexual exploitation of Aboriginal women, he does not make the same connections being made in the literature today about devastating impacts that European settlement in Canada had for Aboriginal lives, societies, and ways of life.

Much of the literature on human trafficking in Canada has appeared since 2005 when trafficking was included as an offense in the Criminal Code. Almost 10 years later, in their 2014 literature review on trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls, the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) recommended that Canada remove its focus from producing reports that continue to rediscover the same over-representation of Aboriginal women and girls, to actually addressing the root causes of human trafficking that are revealed in the research. The literature review states:

Perhaps it is time to reframe the discussion on sex trafficking in Canada and greatly increase the emphasis on exploring Aboriginal overrepresentation, exiting, and prevention as opposed to repeatedly ‘discovering’ high Aboriginal representation in research on Canada’s domestic sex trafficking and sexual exploitation. Some of this would be addressed through pursuing a national research agenda that would present a comprehensive picture of Aboriginal representation in Canada’s domestic sex trafficking. Partly it would depend on recognition in the ranks of policy development and implementation that Aboriginal contexts should be a priority. It is not our contention to displace others who are suffering in sexual exploitation and trafficking in Canada. However, from our research, and that of others, findings show that Aboriginal women and girls are drastically overrepresented in sex trafficking to the point where they seem to be the dominant representatives in some regions of Canada, and not far behind that in other places. With Aboriginal women and girls making up such a small segment of Canada’s population, this overrepresentation is that address the prevention of violence, sexual exploitation, and sex trafficking of children and youth, through providing access to justice for Aboriginal children and youth, prosecuting perpetrators, and ensuring that victims can are not criminalized or have their personal autonomy restricted. The 582 missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada include only those who have been reported. Funding was discontinued to NWAC for Sisters in Spirit, although the work was not complete. The volunteer organization, Families of Sisters in Spirit continues the educational work and collects stories of missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada. Amnesty International cites the RCMP’s 2015 report stating that numbers of women missing or murdered has reached over 1000. According to Amnesty International, most disappearances have occurred between 1990 and 2010. (*the latest reports on missing and murdered Aboriginal women amount to 1181 girls and women--http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/mmaw-faadp-eng.pdf)

unacceptable and requires immediate attention.  

Further, the research in Canada on human trafficking recognizes that the over-representation of Aboriginal women and girls in sex trafficking is caused by the inter-generational impacts of colonialism. For example, the domination of power continues to disadvantage the economic conditions of contemporary Aboriginal women. According to Cree researcher, Erin Wolski, this structural disadvantage places Aboriginal women and girls among the most vulnerable in the country to the violence of human trafficking.

Irene Goodwin, a former President of NWAC, concurs with Wolski. Goodwin adds that trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls occurs in Canada right across the country and it is often entangled with drugs and gangs. NWAC’s Health Department also makes a human trafficking connection with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder, sexual exploitation, and gang activity.

Diane Redsky, the project director for the Canadian Women's Native Women's Association of Canada, Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking, 42.


Wahkotowin: A Knowledge Exchange Forum on Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Exploitation of Aboriginal Peoples, (Ottawa: March 5, 2012). Irene Goodwin, former director of NWAC’s 2012 Evidence to Action program addressed participants. The First Peoples Group and the Office of the Federal Interlocutor (OFI) organized the knowledge exchange forum. OFI is the focal point in the department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (now INAC – Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada) for work on trafficking in Aboriginal persons in Canada. The goal of the forum was to address the gap in knowledge and understanding regarding the experience of Aboriginal people who are trafficked and/or experience sexual exploitation. It brought together an Aboriginal experiential man and woman, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal politicians, government bureaucrats, policy-makers, NGOs and academics. The goal of the day was to share knowledge in order to better inform policy on trafficking and sexual exploitation of Aboriginal persons.

Mark Totten and NWAC, Investigating the Linkages between FASD, Gangs, Sexual Exploitation and Women Abuse in the Canadian Aboriginal Population: A Preliminary Study (Native Women's Association of Canada, 2009). FASD is the acronym for Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder.
Foundation National Taskforce on Human Trafficking, led their most recent research on trafficking in women and girls in Canada.\(^2\) In an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Redsky affirms the research finding concerning the particular vulnerability of Aboriginal women and girls:

“What we were able to capture by going across the country is recognizing that there are some trends, depending on where you are in the country,” says Redsky. Redsky said the taskforce has found that aboriginal women and girls represent a high proportion of women who are being trafficked. In Manitoba, those who work with the exploited women estimate that at least 90 per cent are aboriginal.\(^3\)

In the same CBC interview, Kayla Hobson explains why Aboriginal women and girls are such easy prey for traffickers and exploiters:

“A lot of us grew up with poverty and not having all of those nice things,” says Kayla Hobson, a 26-year-old mother of two. “Not having that support system and role models encouraging us to do good,” she adds. Hobson says she sold drugs when she was younger. For her it was glamorous, but she says it was also a necessity. She says the drug trade and sex trade go hand-in-hand. Many people she knows grew up thinking that is normal.\(^4\)

Finally, Dana Connolly adds evidence from her personal experience: "When you are hungry, you will do anything you have to, to eat. If you have a child that you have to feed... you are going to do anything to get that child fed."\(^5\)

Social conditioning through entertainment and the use of images in media also serves to increase the vulnerability of Aboriginal women and girls, as it continues to

\(^2\) Canadian Women's Foundation, *From Heartbreaking to Groundbreaking: Stories and Strategies to End Sex Trafficking in Canada* (2014); Canadian Women's Foundation, *No More.*

Diane Redsky continues her work as Executive Director, Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre in Winnipeg.


\(^4\) Taylor, "Human Trafficking: Why Aboriginal Women Are Targeted."

\(^5\) Taylor, "Human Trafficking: Why Aboriginal Women Are Targeted."
objectify them and portray them as easy targets for sexual exploitation. For example, when the “Indian princess” outfit in Figure 2 below was part of Victoria Secret’s fashion show, Indigenous women demanded an apology from the company for perpetuating and imposing both a false image and a negative stereotype of them, as well as for desecrating an important cultural symbol (the headdress.)  

![Image of Victoria's Secret model wearing an outfit that was criticized for cultural appropriation.](image)

**Figure 2: Social Conditioning through Entertainment and Media**

Métis scholar, Emma LaRocque, has written extensively on the harm imposed on Aboriginal women through dehumanizing use of words, symbols, and images that create and maintain unfounded attitudes about Aboriginal peoples in Canada.  

For example, she writes:

> In this war on words, Whites explore, Indians wander; Whites have battles or victories, Indians massacre and murder; Whites scout, Indians lurk; Whites go

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westward, Indians go bloodthirsty; Whites defend themselves, Indians “reek revenge”; Whites appear as officials who simply assume authority, Indians are “haughty”, “insolent”, “saucy,” or “impudent” (when they assume equality); Whites have faiths, and so they pray; Indians have superstitions, and so they conjure; Whites may be peasant, Indian are primitive; Whites may be “brutes,” but Indians remain savage and barbaric in their “heathen” lands.98

The international community recognizes the ongoing colonial relationship in Canada between Aboriginal peoples and settler-Canadians. For example, on February 2009, the Canadian Government was directed by the United Nations Human Rights Council to do more to improve conditions for Aboriginal Canadians by addressing violence against women, poverty, and racism.99

In a July 2014 report by James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Canada was reprimanded for its continued mistreatment of Indigenous peoples, especially concerning violence against Aboriginal women.100 The concerns cited in the United Nations reports indicate the same overlapping social and economic concerns that have been identified in the literature as causes for creating the conditions for the extreme vulnerability of Aboriginal women and girls to trafficking in

98 LaRocque, When the Other Is Me, 50. Kim Anderson also writes about the impacts of imposed negative identities on Aboriginal women. See, Anderson, A Recognition of Being, 99-112.


100 Anaya, The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, 11.
Canada.  Unlike settler-Canadian women, Indigenous women must cope with the impacts of settler colonialism through a history of residential schools, lower rates of education, elevated levels of poverty, systemic racism, betrayal of social and government systems, over-representation in the criminal justice system, and higher rates of violence, murder, and disappearance. Clearly, many Aboriginal women in Canada live in conditions that increase their vulnerability to human trafficking.

Witnesses in a government study on human trafficking in Canada agreed that addressing the poverty of Aboriginal women is “intrinsic to addressing trafficking in persons.” The same study identified racism as the underlying cause of their socio-economic condition. The term “racialized, sexualized violence,” coined by NWAC is used in the feminist literature on the topic. Aboriginal women and girls in Canada who are forced into all forms of sexual exploitation are exploited because they are Aboriginal women. The inter-generational impacts of colonialism shape Indigenous-Settler relations in Canada and the relationship itself is a deep systemic problem that is

101 Perrin, Invisible Chains; Standing Committee on the Status of Women, Turning Outrage into Action; Wolski, "Sexual Trafficking of Indigenous Women and Girls in Canada."

102 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), "Report on Canada." CEDAW recommends that Canada address its grave violations of the rights of Aboriginal women in areas such as the missing and murdered Indigenous women, poverty, and racism. Colonialism is listed as a root cause and is explicitly dealt with in Section C of the recommendation. Human trafficking is mentioned throughout the report as one way that Canada is failing Aboriginal women.

103 Standing Committee on the Status of Women, Turning Outrage into Action, 10.


being linked to violence against Aboriginal women, including human trafficking.

1.2.3.1 Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW)

Since Amnesty International’s 2004 report, the plight of missing and murdered Indigenous women in Canada has been brought to the fore in the literature.\(^{106}\) It is important to note that although the Canadian Government is presently conducting a National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW), the research indicates that it is premature to understand the extent of the connection between human trafficking and MMIW. It is most likely that at least some of the MMIW have been trafficked, as there is ample anecdotal evidence to attest to trafficking as part of this reality. However, presently scientific evidence remains too scant to understand the scope of relationship between MMIW and human trafficking.\(^{107}\)

1.2.4 Canada’s National Action Plan

In 2012, Canada adopted a *National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking* (NAP).\(^{108}\) The structure of NAP covers four areas: prosecution, protection, prevention, and partnerships. Despite research findings that at least 90% of trafficked persons in


\(^{107}\) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), "Report on Canada." The report critiques the lack of research on the connection between human trafficking and the spectrum of sexual violence against women, including Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women.

Canada are Canadian, NAP is primarily directed at helping foreign nationals who are trafficked into Canada. However, mention is made of the particular vulnerability to trafficking in Aboriginal women and youth, and some NAP’s content and action items, which are highlighted below, concern them. For example:

There are still many gaps in our knowledge about how human trafficking plays out in Canada, including in Aboriginal communities. Indeed, much of the information in this area is anecdotal. To address the particular context out of which the exploitation of Aboriginal men, women, boys, and girls arises, the Government of Canada will raise awareness about trafficking that focuses on prevention, and provide culturally and historically informed training to enforcement officials on the circumstances that may contribute to human trafficking within Aboriginal communities.

And,

Enhance engagement and collaboration with civil society, including Aboriginal organizations, and all levels of government to support knowledge exchange, strengthen partnerships and inform policy responses.

In Annex B of NAP, Selective Anti-Human Trafficking Efforts to Date, three efforts mentioned also make reference to Aboriginal women and girls. They are:

- In response to the ongoing vulnerability of Aboriginal and immigrant women to human traffickers, Status of Women Canada collaborated with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to deliver training on human trafficking to officials in law enforcement, the justice system, and border and immigration services.
- Funding the Manitoba Chiefs to raise awareness and develop recommendations on the issue of human trafficking and sexual exploitation among First Nations communities.

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• Supporting three foundational Public Health Agency of Canada health promotion programs that target vulnerable children and their families to produce positive health outcomes (e.g., Aboriginal Head Start in Urban and Northern Communities; Community Action Program for Children; Canada Prenatal Nutrition Program).

My reading of Canada’s NAP, as it relates to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls, reveals that Aboriginal women and girls are again named as a vulnerable group. The first action item in the NAP addresses the problem as it relates to Aboriginal women and youth.113 However, from my reading, the NAP views trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls as an Aboriginal problem in which women and youth are portrayed as victims, and the perpetrators as criminals (mainly male gang members.) Ongoing colonialism is not named as an action item to be addressed. The one action item related to prevention of trafficking in Aboriginal women and youth is to provide information, with no mention as to whom this information is to be directed. However, this item includes information on “circumstances that result in the trafficking of Aboriginal women and youth.”114 This action item is the one most closely aligned with the research, which calls Canada to address the settler colonial relationship.

The action item relating to prosecution of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls calls for the training of criminal justice and law enforcement personnel. The training of these officials involves participation in an Aboriginal Gang Reduction Strategy Course.115 The action item through partnerships consists of Government hosting

of a knowledge exchange and producing a report.\textsuperscript{116} The report was produced, but never publicly released. For the purposes of this thesis, I obtained a copy from a journalist who requested it through Canada’s Access to Information Act.\textsuperscript{117} Throughout this unreleased report, colonialism is highlighted as a root cause needing attention. For example, “they [Aboriginal women and girls] have become disadvantaged in Canadian society through a process of colonization,\textsuperscript{118} and it was “very clear [to some agencies] that they [service agencies] take into consideration the “unique vulnerabilities” of Aboriginal women and girls and the historical effects that colonization has had on their lives when providing funding for service delivery,”\textsuperscript{119} and again, “A subject matter expert also shared that human trafficking and violence are produced by the legacy of abuse and oppression that arose from the residential school experience and other policies and processes of colonization.”\textsuperscript{120} Although the report commissioned by Public Safety Canada (authors of NAP) is consistent with the research, Canada’s NAP fails to address the ongoing colonial relationship between Aboriginal peoples and settler-Canadians as a root cause of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls.

1.3 Conclusion of Chapter 1

This chapter had three aims. They were to: set the stage for the thesis and to understand the definition of human trafficking; to appreciate how Canada understands


\textsuperscript{117} Boyer, \textit{Trafficking in Aboriginal Women and Girls}.

\textsuperscript{118} Boyer, \textit{Trafficking in Aboriginal Women and Girls}, 5.

\textsuperscript{119} Boyer, \textit{Trafficking in Aboriginal Women and Girls}, 15.

\textsuperscript{120} Boyer, \textit{Trafficking in Aboriginal Women and Girls}, 20.
and addresses human trafficking within its borders; and finally to identify a gap in Canada’s efforts, one that leaves Aboriginal women and girls disproportionately vulnerable to human trafficking. Setting the stage for this thesis revealed that to address the purpose of human trafficking, i.e., exploitation, is key to Canadian criminal law. Further, the literature provides evidence that addressing the criminal activity of human trafficking and restructuring global economics are two essential elements for putting an end to the exploitation of trafficking. The criminal activity of human trafficking is the first obligatory measure to be addressed by State signatories to the Palermo Protocol. The impact of the global economy on human trafficking is an important finding in the literature and contemporary research based on this finding owes much to the seminal work of Kevin Bales on slavery and the global economy. However, global economics is one power structure in need of transformation because it tolerates the criminal activity of human trafficking that benefits some persons or groups through the exploitation of others.

The research on human trafficking in Canada, including international studies that analyze the global reality, highlights Aboriginal women and girls as a group particularly vulnerable to domestic sex trafficking, i.e., trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation within Canada. This same body of literature calls on Canada to address ongoing colonial domination as part of solutions to this form of exploitation. However, Canada’s 2012 National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking does not address this primary cause. Canada’s efforts to address trafficking within its borders are primarily aimed at assisting foreign nationals. This dismisses much of the preliminary research about trafficking in Canada, which indicates that at least 90% of persons trafficked in
Canada are Canadian citizens. The settler colonial relationship, so prominent in the literature on the topic, is not mentioned in Canada’s Action Plan. Rather, the action items concerning trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls are limited to efforts by the Canadian Government to research and provide information to Aboriginal peoples about human trafficking; to train law enforcement officers in gang violence; and to create partnerships between government agencies to provide these deliverables. Throughout the National Action Plan, Aboriginal women and girls are viewed as victims of the crime of trafficking and the perpetrators are Aboriginal gang members. While Aboriginal gang activity is connected with human trafficking, it is not the only source, nor are all gangs Aboriginal. The literature indicates that gang activity itself is an impact of settler colonialism.

While the first 10 years of Canada’s efforts to address human trafficking have come a long way, a significant gap remains when it comes to addressing domestic trafficking. This gap includes the lack of attention being paid to the research findings that point to the existing relationship between Aboriginal peoples and settler-Canadians as a cause of the disproportional vulnerability of Aboriginal women and girls to trafficking. To address the ongoing colonial relationship, which has been defined in this thesis as settler colonialism, is fundamental to helping alleviate the intersection of vulnerabilities that create the overrepresentation of Aboriginal women and girls in sex trafficking, i.e., settler colonialism as the intersection of poverty, racism, and sexism. Further, in recognizing settler colonialism as a cause of this exploitation, the literature points to the need to refocus and reframe the discussion on trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. To do so exposes the problem from the perspective that an
ongoing relationship of power domination is at the core. In other words, the research calls settler-Canadians to examine themselves in their relationship with Aboriginal peoples and to view their (settlers’) place of power in the relationship as a root cause of the problem. This call implies that solutions are shaped by this same relationship and must also be examined. Therefore, the next chapter will focus on a critique of protection that demonstrates how power structures also function in solutions to social injustice. The analysis of protection that will be discussed in Chapter 2 will propose mutuality as a better model for addressing social justice within colonial contexts such as Canada’s.
Chapter 2

Examining Questions of Power, Protection, and Mutuality

2 Introduction

To address exploitation is central to Canada’s solutions to human trafficking. Exploitation is defined in Canada’s Criminal Code in section 279.04 as a relationship of power domination. Settler colonialism in Canada has been identified as a relationship of such domination over Indigenous peoples. In Chapter 1, a link was made between the disproportion of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls and Canada’s failure to address the ongoing impacts of colonialism. This connection raises the concern that if the domination of settler colonialism isn’t addressed, exploitation can also be present in solutions based on protection. Chapter 2 picks up this point by looking at the problematic of power exploitation within anti-trafficking efforts. I will question how exploitation can be couched in solutions of benevolent protection. We can anticipate that mutuality will be proposed as a better model upon which to base solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. Following the suggestion that mutuality is a better model, I will explore some of its meanings (theological, postcolonial, and political) and identify the common challenge that each of these perspectives attempt to resolve, i.e., the demand within mutuality for equal respect of difference.

Chapter 2 has six steps. First, I will continue the discussion begun in Chapter 1 by examining why anti-trafficking campaigns need to be critiqued. Nandita Sharma represents those who critique social justice efforts, including those of faith-based groups that address human trafficking. Amy Allen will help create a map of the feminist
discourse on power. Iris Marion Young will provide an analysis of protection as a relationship of power. She argues that protection is a veiled expression of power domination. She expands on Judith Stiehm’s insight that protection is a basic element of domination, which through a western, white feminist lens is associated with patriarchal power. Young defines and elaborates her logic of masculinist protection for use as interpretive tool within situations of American governmental and military protectionism. Moreover, her work is particularly useful in this thesis because her research supports the problem being addressed in this thesis. It does so by listening to the insights of Indigenous feminists and activists who make similar linkages between domination, protectionism, colonialism, and exploitation.

This brings me to the second step, which begins the discussion on mutuality as an alternative to protection within situations of social injustice. Here I will examine mutuality from perspective of feminist theologies. The work of Dawn Nothwehr on mutuality as a Christian social norm is particularly helpful in this section as she brings forward the theological importance of mutuality, which connects with the main argument of this thesis. The third step picks up a gap identified by Nothwehr regarding the praxis of mutuality. Simon Mainwaring who turns to mutuality from the view of postcolonial liberation furthers this question in the fourth step. He opens the discussion


122 Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection."


to the difficulty for a praxis of mutuality to actually deal with equality and difference. The fifth step of this chapter will focus on mutuality from the perspective of Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition in Canada. Glen Coulthard’s critique of Taylor’s politics of recognition challenges mutuality as a good model within colonial realities such as Canada’s. These threads support the need to investigate the problem of mutuality and help shape a working definition of mutuality. Together, these six steps propel me forward to continue by exploring Paul Ricœur’s contribution to the discourse on mutual recognition; a discussion we can anticipate in Chapters 3 and 4.

2.1 Feminist Critique of Anti-Trafficking Work

Indian feminist scholar and activist Nandita Sharma critiques anti-trafficking campaigns. Her intention is to direct well-intentioned persons, governmental, non-governmental, and faith-based groups to their own self-critique when responding to the problem of human trafficking. She challenges corrective efforts that ultimately reinforce existing social structures and policies with the impact of further marginalizing or criminalizing victims. She addresses the context of trafficking across borders. Her concern is associated with economically impoverished persons whose agency to determine their own lives has been stripped from them as a result of current global economic systems. These persons, usually women and children, have no choice other than to seek relocation within the same global systems that render them vulnerable. The problem is that the current global economy offers them limited or no options, even to

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relocate. The result is that they are vulnerable to being trafficked as their only option for escape. In these situations, when a trafficker approaches with a job offer in another country, it is an attractive means of survival.

Sharma’s antidote to anti-trafficking campaigns is to look at the deeper causes. In the global context in which she works, her contribution is to critique and work for transformation of restrictive systems that do not address the root causes of displacement and migration. She also points to the need to transform the violence that existing systems impose on those most affected. Sharma’s insight, to go to the root of the problem, in this case the impacts of economic globalization on women and children, and to place those affected at the centre of solutions, is reiterated by Jyoti Sanghera’s caution to “stop and engage in a systemic stocktaking of both the theory and the practice.”126

By placing at the centre the questions that most concern those affected, Sharma and Sanghera help us to see that a critique of power and protection within the Canadian context is a way to approach the question, “Why does human trafficking in Canada disproportionately affect Aboriginal women and girls, and what can be done about it?” Therefore, I bring to the discussion on anti-human trafficking campaigns the problem of settler colonial power within Canada and a concern about exploitation of power within solutions that strive to protect Aboriginal women and girls who are trafficked.

Two western feminist theories of power have been used independently of each other to get to the root causes and to critique and determine the adequacy of solutions to social injustice. Domination theorists and empowerment theorists represent these two

126 Sanghera, "Trafficking and Prostitution Reconsidered," 22.
approaches. Amy Allen claims that a more adequate feminist theory of power needs to consider the contribution of both approaches.\textsuperscript{127} Her view is that to avoid the re-imposition of structures of power domination both the critique of domination and recognition of the agency of those affected must be included. Allen’s work contributes a helpful bridge between the oppositions within western feminist theories of power.

\subsection*{2.1.1 Mapping Feminist Views of Power}

Amy Allen claims that an adequate feminist theory of power is missing from the literature.\textsuperscript{128} Her analysis acknowledges that the notion of power is the thread that connects multiple feminisms, but that few feminists have attempted to construct an adequate theory of power.\textsuperscript{129} In order to construct such a theory, Allen maintains that the question feminists need to ask is, “What interests feminists when we are interested in power?”\textsuperscript{130} She identifies two main feminist leanings regarding power.\textsuperscript{131}

\begin{thebibliography}{131}
\bibitem{Note127} Allen, \textit{The Power of Feminist Theory}, 7-29; Amy Allen, "Feminist Perspectives on Power," \textit{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy} (2005, 2011). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-power/ (accessed February 10, 2016). In the first chapter of \textit{The Power of Feminist Theory}, “Feminist Conceptions of Power: A Critical Assessment,” Allen outlines the oppositional problem she sees within the feminist research on power. She concludes that empowerment and domination feminists are actually addressing the same, not different questions when they theorize about power. Therefore, her view is that each theory is one-sided and incomplete in itself. Allen’s thesis is that a more comprehensive theory of power is needed; one that can hold the interplay between both sides. She herself looks to the work of Judith Butler and Michel Foucault for help with a more comprehensive theory. A summary of this point can be accessed in her article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, cited in this note.
\bibitem{Note128} Allen, \textit{The Power of Feminist Theory}; Allen, "Feminist Perspectives on Power."
\bibitem{Note129} Allen, "Feminist Perspectives on Power." In her opening paragraph, Allen places herself with Nancy Hartsock, Anna Yeatman, and Iris Marion Young, as the few feminists who have attempted to shape theories of power.
\bibitem{Note130} Amy Allen, "Rethinking Power," \textit{Hypatia} 13, no. 1 (1988): 32.
\bibitem{Note131} Margaret Walters, \textit{Feminism: A Very Short Introduction} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Despite at least three waves of feminism (some would say four or five) and its multiple forms (i.e., phenomenological, analytic, socialist, liberal, radical, intersectional, womanist, ecological, theological etc.), feminists generally respond to the question of power in one of two opposing ways: critiques of domination or theories of empowerment. Some of the ways that feminisms are characterized as waves are:

\end{thebibliography}
On the one hand, some feminists, such as Catherine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, and Carole Pateman, understand power as domination. They seek to deconstruct, what they believe to be, power’s unredeemable patriarchal structure. Power is understood in this view as power-over and is modeled on patriarchal relationships of the domination of men over women. On the other hand, Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick, and Virginia Held, represent feminists who understand power as the capability of women to resist male domination. This view concerns women’s empowerment, agency, and autonomy. Allen categorizes these opposing groups within feminism as domination theorists and empowerment theorists. Figure 3 below maps some of the general oppositions and weaknesses that Allen highlights within the internal debate on power among feminists.132

1) first wave feminism is associated with women’s suffrage movements in the 19th and early 20th centuries; 2) second wave feminism is associated with the sexual liberation and the struggle for gender equality that began in the 1960’s; 3) third wave feminism emerged in the 1990’s from second wave, and it challenges the normativity of western, white feminist views of liberation. Standpoint feminism can be considered a fourth wave. It asserts that feminisms must address global and culturally specific issues and also raises awareness to the intersectionality of various modes of domination, such as racism, classism, sexism, and colonialism.

132 Allen, "Rethinking Power."
### Concept of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domination Theorists</th>
<th>Empowerment Theorists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power is power-over. Power-over is dominance.</td>
<td>Power is empowerment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance is a gendered structure, i.e., male-over female.</td>
<td>Empowerment is resistance to male dominance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Implications of Power

| Domination serves men’s power-over of women. The relationship between men/women is one of power/powerlessness. | Empowerment promotes women’s unique identity and agency. |

### Goal of the critique of Power.

| To deconstruct systems of domination.                       | To reclaim women’s power and control of their lives.      |

### Problems

| Reductionist: women are always and only victims; power-over is only malevolent; men are blind to women’s agency. | Essentialist: women are perceived and categorized according to their differences from men, i.e., women have a natural capacity for mothering and peacemaking. |

| Contradictory: solutions to sexual violence give power and trust to male dominated state justice systems to regulate abuse of power on behalf of women. | Too hopeful: imposed, patriarchal structures of domination are not adequately critiqued. |

| Blind: ignore human capability, i.e., that both women and men can be powerful and powerless. | Blind: ignore human capability, i.e., that both women and men can be powerful and powerless. |

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**Figure 3: Mapping Power**
Allen demonstrates in her article, “Rethinking Power,” how the two views function in the internal debate within western, white feminisms. On the one hand, domination theorists critique empowerment theorists for their lack of recognition of the powerlessness of women within patriarchal structures and for their lack of attention to the structures within which they practice. On the other hand, empowerment theorists take issue with the blindness of domination theorists for their lack of attention to the capability that women actually have. This points to the weakness of domination theories to address the agency of women.

Allen also reveals how western, white feminist theories of domination and empowerment have been self-serving and not sufficiently responsive to the voices of women of colour. Black, Asian, and Indigenous feminists challenge the narrowness of the western, white feminist critiques of patriarchy. Western, white feminist critiques of power fail to be self-critical. They are structured according to the same oppositional dynamics they seek to address. This means that within both models presented above, the assumption is opposition and domination of men over women. The experience of gender inequity from the perspective of women of colour is an experience of the imposition of the power by white women. When this happens, white women assume the role that the male dominator holds in the patriarchal model. A similar dynamic operates within classism (the rich are opposed and superior to the poor) and racism (white people are opposed and superior to those of colour). Indigenous women are particularly at risk of experiencing all these oppositions because they are disproportionately poor, and are women of colour.

Feminists of colour criticize western, white feminists from both domination and empowerment theoretical perspectives for their lack of solidarity. Thus, Indigenous women and other women of colour challenge western, white feminists to undergo their own self-critique. They challenge the ability of western, white feminisms not only to widen their embrace of difference and to be transformed by otherness, but also to recognize the equal contributions of other feminisms as fully adequate theories in their own right. Thus, in response to the challenge of feminists of colour, Allen’s question, “What interests feminists when we are interested in power,” claims that solidarity must be included.\(^\text{134}\)

Allen assists an understanding of the internal oppositional structure that western, white feminisms fail to adequately address. She also points to the challenge that feminists of colour contribute to understanding the limitations of western, white feminist theories of power. However, Allen’s theory of bridging domination and empowerment theories does not sufficiently account for the arguments put forward by feminists of colour and remains embedded in normative forms of white, western feminism.

To form a theory of power by adding solidarity as a third element alongside the critiques of domination and empowerment does not meet the rigorous challenge of Indigenous feminists. Andrea Smith (Cherokee) demands that white feminisms and all western scholarship undergo closer self-examination and critique the oppositional

\(^{134}\text{Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory, 87-117. Solidarity is Allen’s contribution to a more robust feminist theory of power, which she defines as the integration of a critique of domination, empowerment, and solidarity (23.) This happens when in the dialogue between theorists of domination and empowerment, what are perceived as opposites, can be respected and integrated.}\)
structures that are deemed inevitable. Recognizing the plight of Indigenous women and standing in solidarity with them must be accompanied by the self-critique required to transform present oppositional structures that perpetuate the disproportional occurrence of violence against Indigenous women. For Smith, oppositional structures, whether they are between races, classes, or between colonizers and colonized, are all rooted in a western oppositional worldview that stems from the positioning of men over and against women.

Allen provides a balanced theory that seeks to bring into dialogue the contributions that remain oppositions within western feminisms, and adds solidarity. However, my reading of her theory makes it inclusive, not transformative. Allen advocates for a soft feminist theory of power. By this, I mean that her theory distinguishes and connects empowerment and domination, without critiquing the fundamental opposition present in both. According to my reading of her view, power-over can be both benevolent and malevolent. To analyze protection from this perspective would place it within a benevolent form of power-over.

2.1.2 Logic of Masculinist Protection

Iris Marion Young takes up the problem of malevolent and benevolent protection. She helps us to understand the view that power-over can never be

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135 Andrea Smith, "Against the Law: Indigenous Feminism and the Nation-State," *Affinities: A Journal of Radical Theory, Culture, and Action* 5, no. 1 Special Issue on Anarch@Indigenism (2011): 59. Like, Allen, Smith agrees with solidarity that means to act in concert. But, for Smith this means to work against existing structures, not within them.


benevolent. According to her, no form of power-over is a good model for providing protection. But, how can protection be understood other than within the oppositional relationship between protector and protected? Young claims that while protection appears to function in opposition to domination, in practice it is a less self-conscious manner of power-over. This means that, according to Young, protection operates within the very structures of domination that it seeks to confront. Since protection is being considered as a softer, more acceptable form of domination and is exhibited through what often appear to be helping, caring relationships such as pastoral care, parenting, and social justice activism, it needs further critique. Figure 4 illustrates Young’s view of malevolent and benevolent power as two distinct forms of power-over:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Domination</th>
<th>Protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bad man, conqueror, ruler,</td>
<td>Good man, chivalry,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Exploitation for one’s own benefit</td>
<td>Security of loved ones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form</td>
<td>Male dominated institutions</td>
<td>Pastoral power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>Male superiority, female inferiority</td>
<td>Fear, competition, danger from the outside other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating principles</td>
<td>Inclusion/exclusion, overpowering force/blind obedience</td>
<td>Risk, self-sacrifice and love/admiration, adoration, and gratitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>Master/slave, male/female, parent/child</td>
<td>Protector and decision maker/protected, conceder to authority; defender/dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumption of patriarchal right</td>
<td>Arises from male gender</td>
<td>Arises from male quality to ensure safety/security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4: Malevolent and Benevolent Power**

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As illustrated above, Young makes a case for domination and protection as two forms of power-over. The distinction she highlights is that domination is more overtly unequal, whereas protection is masked by virtue and love, and therefore relationships of care always carry a patriarchal meaning in all aspects, i.e., its roles and associations. The meaning of protection that she exposes implicitly requires the protector to risk and sacrifice to gain security for loved ones, while the protected one’s freedom, autonomy, and resistance must be sacrificed. This is not beneficial for either. Young’s solution to the relational domination within protection echoes Stiehm’s. That is, protection is better modeled by horizontal relationships between, what she calls, defenders.

A defender-defender model of protection, according to Young, provides security without subordination or the outside authority of a protector. But, how does she view the shift in protection from a protector to a defender model? First, Young claims that defenders must be recognized as equal, where each person is seen as equally prone to experience their vulnerability to violence, as they are to impose it on others. This means that each person in their role of defender experiences protection and is responsible for what Young calls, collective self-defense.

Although Young’s defender-defender model implies vulnerability she does not elaborate on it. In the Introduction to a book dedicated to her memory, editors Ann

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Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection," 22.
Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection," 22.
Ferguson and Mechthild Nagel write, “Young acknowledges that genuinely greeting differently situated others before deliberation is risky because it is a vulnerable engagement that requires one to trust the other.” However, it is Desirée Melton who challenges Young’s view of vulnerability as not going far enough. Melton suggests that “dispositional vulnerability” is a key aspect for cultivating equal relationships within situations of racial inequality. Dispositional vulnerability is “an awareness of self dependence on others for understanding and respect, and an awareness, in turn, of the other’s dependence for understanding and respect.”

Young writes about how she views the shift from a protector-protected to a defender-defender model of protection. She understands capability, not as an exception, but as a norm enabling each one to support and care for others, and to be supported by and cared for by others. One’s capacity to be a defender is not associated with superiority or self-sufficiency, nor is it diminished because of one’s need for social support. In fact, Young claims that in a defender-defender model of protection, the need for care and support implies one’s capacity to choose, to hold others accountable, and to critique the care provided. No one person, nor one system can promise to provide complete and total security. To claim to do so is an illusion, since protection needs to be created together and with the support of institutions. Young claims that a horizontal

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defender-defender relationship needs to replace the vertical relationship between a protector and the protected. In her view, persons are more secure in a society that is structured on equal relationships between defenders who are aware that they are all vulnerable to violence, all capable of perpetrating violence, and all responsible defenders of each other against the violence enacted by society.

In relation to our context of settler colonialism, Young likens her logic of masculinist protection to colonialism. She writes:

The stance of the male protector, I have argued, is one of loving self-sacrifice, with those in the feminine position as the objects of love and guardianship. Chivalrous forms of masculinism express and enact concern for the well-being of women, but they do so within a structure of superiority and subordination. The male protector confronts evil aggressors in the name of the right and the good, while those under his protection submit to his order and serve as handmaids to his efforts. Colonialist ideologies have often expressed a similar logic. The knights of civilization aim to bring enlightened understanding to the further regions of the world still living in cruel and irrational traditions that keep them from developing the economic and political structures that will bring them a good life.146

Aware of and accepting of the critiques of colonialism by Indigenous scholars, Young’s citation above admits the shortcomings of western scholarship, including white feminist critiques, that dominates academia. She writes,

Sometimes feminists may identify with the stance of the masculine protector in relation to vulnerable and victimized women. The protector-protected relation is no more egalitarian, however, when between women than between men and women.147

This is the case in Canada when government and non-governmental efforts to end human trafficking focus exclusively on trying to do for, or protect by acting on behalf of

146 Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection," 19.

147 Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection," 20.
Aboriginal women and girls, rather than placing them in the center of their own solutions. Better solutions are those that address the benevolence within settler colonialism as a root that can perpetuate the problem of domination.

Young claims that effective solutions to inequality are not protective, but structural. For her, protective intervention is justified only temporarily in situations where actual rescue is possible. But, in general, she believes that protection is a form of domination that is linked to western hegemony, and its effects usually do more harm than good. This is because protection places those affected by injustice in a further place of subordination.

2.2 Mutuality Not Protection

Protection is a questionable notion. In the first part of this chapter, the concept was critiqued and revealed the problem that its structure of benevolence poses to relationships of social justice. To address the problem of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada, protection is dubious in view of the relational context of domination in which solutions are currently being shaped. To address the colonial reality in Canada will positively impact the way Canadians address all issues of injustice, especially those that disproportionately affect Aboriginal women and girls.148 This is the view that underlies the calls for mutual recognition by Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars in Canada, as well as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Reports by

the United Nations, and Canada’s more recent Truth and Reconciliation Commission.\textsuperscript{149}

In the report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, mutual recognition is characterized by equality, co-existence, and self-determination. These qualities are in keeping with a western view of mutual recognition, such as the one ascribed to by Charles Taylor, whose work on the topic appears in this chapter.\textsuperscript{150} However, Indigenous scholars, such as Glen Coulthard, reject Taylor’s notion of mutual recognition, for reasons that will be explored.\textsuperscript{151} Can the western notion and its Indigenous critique together shape a new understanding of mutuality that will be helpful in the context of this thesis? I will respond to this question in the final conclusion of this thesis.

In this second part of Chapter 2, I begin exploring some of the contributions to the discourse on mutuality. Contemporary western usage of the term mutual recognition can be found in several bodies of literature.\textsuperscript{152} However, I have selected three areas of research for use in this chapter. They are a selection of feminist theologies, a


\textsuperscript{150} Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition."

\textsuperscript{151} Coulthard, \textit{Red Skin White Masks}. Coulthard rejects the western notion of mutual recognition, which he understands as bestowal of recognition from outside powers.

\textsuperscript{152} The terms mutual recognition and mutuality are used interchangeably in the literature, and in this thesis. In addition to the two discourses addressed in (feminist theology, and politics of recognition), mutual recognition is a principle used in national and international agreements for the purposes of trade, business, education, medical science, and border protection. In these cases, mutual recognition is a regulatory principle, meant to protect the mutual interests of the parties involved.
postcolonial critique, and politics of recognition in Canada. I have chosen these areas of study because of their shared concern for mutuality, for their ability to dialogue with each other on the topic, and their shared concern for ethics.

Feminist theology responds to the need for better critique of the autonomous self in Christian ethics, and suggests relationship as the basic structure of the ethical self. However, my reading of the focus of feminist theology on reciprocity as the principle for a self-in-relation approach lacks adequate appreciation of unique or different selves. The influence of the feminist theologies that I explore provides a view of mutuality as a formal norm for Christian social ethics. But, as Dawn Nothwehr attests, the contribution of her detailed study on mutuality as a Christian social norm “has only begun to explore the wealth of ethical understanding that lies in the formal study of mutuality,” and, “Clearly to understand mutuality and its implications presents a potential lifetime scholarly agenda.” Specifically, she points to the need for further work in exploring

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154 Reciprocity is a relationship of equality, and therefore is based on a horizontal relationship of sameness. For example, all persons share equal rights. But, equality is insufficient to account for the uniqueness of persons. For example, not all persons in a family share the same context, abilities, or opportunities. If each one received the same, some might have too much and others not what they need. A good example of this is depicted in two images of three boys watching outdoor hockey game. In the first, we see that they are all the same height as they stand, looking over the boards. The second image is taken from behind. In it we see that in order to achieve sameness of height, one is standing on a big box, the second on a smaller box, and the third on no box at all. All appear to be equal in height, but only because each one receives what he needs to actually see the game.

the practical relationship between a formal norm (virtue) and a material norm (duty).

This thesis furthers this work.

Like the work of the feminist theologians to be discussed, the postcolonial critique that that is also highlighted in this thesis values the “potential of reciprocity.” However, as we will observe, this view is marked by the notions such as, *third space* and *hybridity*, which favour negotiation and merging over equal respect for difference.

Politics of recognition and its critique from an Indigenous perspective also pick up the issues of equality and respect for difference. Glen Coulthard’s critique claims that the Charles Taylor’s model of politics of recognition is not mutual. Politics of recognition is chastised for not adequately critiquing the colonial structures of domination that negatively impact Indigenous peoples. Feminist theology, postcolonial critique, Taylor’s politics of recognition, and Coulthard’s critique of it, are the views that will contribute to shaping the working definition of mutual recognition that will appear at the conclusion to this chapter.

2.2.1 Mutuality: A View from Feminist Theology

In 2005, Dawn M. Nothwehr published her doctoral dissertation on mutuality. She wove together the threads of contemporary western feminist theologies, classical, and 20th century Christian scholarship to propose mutuality as a formal norm for

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156 Nothwehr, *Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics*, 207-218. Nothwehr refers to Gula’s discussion of the distinction between a formal norm (virtue) and a material norm (behavioural standards). Although Nothwehr’s concern is to highlight the value of formal norms for Christian ethics, she reveals in this section that the conviction of Gula, Fuchs, Cahill, and O’Connell is that the goal of the formal norm and the obligation of the material norm must work together.

Christian social ethics.\textsuperscript{158} Her analysis reveals important aspects of contemporary western understandings of mutuality. I highlight three: self-in-relation, power-with, and normative value. According to my reading, Nothwehr’s findings correspond to Young’s defender-defender model of power, which I examined in the previous section. The three characteristics of mutuality found in Nothwehr’s view, can also be understood as principles in Young’s defender-defender alternative to benevolent domination. Nothwehr’s theological understanding of mutuality bolsters our understanding of Young’s defender-defender relationship of power by explaining it in terms of self-in-relation, power-with, and a Christian social norm.

\textbf{2.2.1.1 Self-In-Relation}

Nothwehr uses the following as her working definition of mutuality:

\begin{quote}
Mutuality, as it is used in the self-in-relation approach, is a dynamic situation within relationship in which one is simultaneously open to the influence of the other or others, influencing the other or others, and aware of influencing the other or others. Both receptivity and active initiative are required, as are recognition and appreciation of the others’ wholeness and particular experience.\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}

This definition is important because it grounds mutuality in a fundamental understanding of relationship as the basic unit of the self, characterized by the reciprocity of the active and passive influence of each, and acknowledges each person as unique and whole in themselves.\textsuperscript{160} Most importantly, the dynamism of mutuality indicates that the energy

\textsuperscript{158} Nothwehr, \textit{Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics}.


\textsuperscript{160} Huff, "The Interdependent Self: An Integrated Concept from Feminist Theology and Feminist Psychology," 161. In this discourse, Huff equates the psychological term “attachment” with interdependence or the self-in-relation. The self-in-relation approach responds to the need for
within the relationship is the foundational unit of the self.\footnote{Isabel Carter Heyward, "The Power of God-with-Us," \textit{The Christian Century} March, no. (1990): 275.} In other words, one exists and becomes a person in relationship, not in isolation or opposition to others. Feminist theologian, Elizabeth Johnson, shares this view when she writes that persons are mutual relations, radically equal full persons, and living community in diversity.\footnote{Elizabeth A. Johnson, \textit{She Who Is, the Mystery of God in Feminist Discourse} (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1992; reprint, 2000), 216-222.}

In the mid-1980’s, a feminist self-in-relation approach to mutuality responded to a need within pastoral and psychotherapeutic settings to understand the essential importance of relational experience to identity formation.\footnote{Nothwehr, \textit{Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics}. Nothwehr provides an excellent analysis and comparative study of mutuality as a formal ethical norm from a feminist perspective. She includes feminist views of mutuality as seen by leading feminist scholars such as, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Carter Heyward, Beverly Wildung Harrison, and Elizabeth A. Johnson.} This is an alternative view to traditional psychological and theological approaches that favour identity formation as a process of separation-individuation.\footnote{Huff, "The Interdependent Self: An Integrated Concept from Feminist Theology and Feminist Psychology," 161. Huff names Erik Erikson as an example of a traditional psychological theorist who promoted identity formation through separation-individuation from significant others, such as one’s mother/care-giver. Mutuality, understood as relational trust, is gained through individuation, when one sees oneself in terms of the other, not by one’s ability to sustain meaningful relationships. For example, I am the child, because I am not the mother and vice versa. One cannot become an adult unless she}
characterizes relationship-differentiation. This means that one’s individual identity formation happens in terms of reciprocal relationships, not by attaining autonomy from others. One discovers one’s uniqueness in the relationship itself, not by separating from it.

Nothwehr agrees with the self-in-relation approach to mutuality. However, supported by the work of feminist theologians Ruether, Harrison, Heyward, and Johnson, who each have something to say about mutuality as an alternative power to domination, she assigns to her working definition a revised meaning:

Mutuality is the sharing of “power-with” by and among all parties in a way that recognizes the wholeness and particular experience of each participant toward the end of optimum flourishing for all.165

With the help of these prominent feminist theologians, Nothwehr’s analysis reveals that her working definition of mutuality lacked complexity in at least two ways. First, mutuality is about power. It critiques power-over and offers an alternative form of power based on reciprocity. This means that mutuality manifests itself as a unit of shared power that she calls power-with. She also discovers that in contemporary feminist theologies, mutuality concerns four interconnected modes of power-with. Second, Nothwehr retrieves mutuality’s status as a formal norm for Christianity. These two aspects of mutuality are discussed below.

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2.2.1.2 Power-With

Mutuality as power-with is a complex notion in feminist theologies. Nothwehr discovers a consensus among the theologians mentioned above regarding four interrelated modes of power-with. They are: cosmic, gender, generative, and social. She defines each form as a mode of “power-with” by and among. Social mutuality is the focus of this thesis.

Nothwehr’s definition complexifies Christian social ethics to involve the broader contexts of mutual interrelationships among and between Creator, cosmos, all life forms on Earth, and human beings. Figure 5 illustrates the four modes described by Nothwehr and their interrelationship with each other. The point is that the understanding of social mutuality between persons cannot be separated from mutuality in its other forms. In other words, its social mode involves persons sharing a human-human experience of mutuality.

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166 In Chapter 3 I will discuss the distinction between power-with and power-in-common.


168 Nothwehr, *Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics*, 96. According to Nothwehr, cosmic mutuality concerns “Creator, human beings, all earth elements, and the entire cosmos in a way that recognizes their interdependence and reverences all.” Gender mutuality involves “women and men in a way that recognizes the full participation of each in the *imago Dei*, embodied in daily life and through egalitarian relationships.” Generative mutuality implies “the Divine, human persons, and all creation in the on-going co-creation and redemption of the world.” Social mutuality is “the sharing of ‘power-with’ by and among members of society in a way that recognizes the fundamental dignity of each and the obligation to attain and maintain for each what is necessary to sustain that dignity.”
Figure 5: Four Modes of Mutuality

In the figure above, social mutuality is a “detail” of other modes of mutuality.¹⁶⁹ This means that to understand the self-in-relation in a uniquely human sense must also be understood in relation to thinking about all life forms in Earth community, the cosmos, and God. For example, how settler-Canadians understand themselves in relation with Indigenous peoples reflects how they understand themselves as the human expression of mutuality in its other modes. However, in Nothwehr’s Christian feminist view, mutuality is not merely descriptive of a vision that expresses the foundational mutuality that shapes its human experience. Mutuality as a formal Christian norm for social ethics is also an obligation (material norm) and motivation (formal norm) for a way of life. Persons have a responsibility to authentically live mutuality in its distinctly human mode. I look now at mutuality, as it is understood as a formal Christian norm.

¹⁶⁹ Marie McCarthy SP, "Tending the Gifts in the Dark Places," LCWR Occasional Papers Winter, no. (2015): 5-6. Using the example of a photo of the detail of the wing of an angel in a larger painting, which is itself a detail of a larger whole painted on the ceiling of the Sistine chapel, McCarthy describes the interconnection between humans and all life. She is describing the relationships between wholes and particles, the importance of the wholeness of each unique part, yet the interdependence of each upon the whole, and vice versa.
2.2.1.3 A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics

Nothwehr’s study reveals that feminist theologians are not the first to attend to mutuality. It has been a value and concern throughout the history of Christianity, but it has never attained the status of a formal norm, as have other virtues such as justice and love.\textsuperscript{170} Nothwehr claims that if Christians are concerned about love and justice, mutuality as a formal norm offers a necessary critique of domination and an antidote for unloving, unjust, relational power.

Some feminist theologians are critics of domination and they are the retrievers of mutuality from its foundations in western Christian traditions. Feminist theologies also raise the status of mutuality to that of a Christian formal norm for social ethics, alongside love and justice. Feminist theologies critique Christianity for not adequately addressing mutuality, especially in its four modes mentioned above:

The four interrelating forms of mutuality address areas of relationship that were degraded, misunderstood, or entirely ignored because they required serious consideration of “things female” or qualities considered “feminine” in a theological system biased against women.\textsuperscript{171}

But, feminist theologians also acknowledge that mutuality has not been completely overlooked in Christian traditions. Nothwehr demonstrates this by analyzing its roots in western medieval, classical, and modern theological traditions.\textsuperscript{172}


\textsuperscript{171} Nothwehr, \textit{Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics}, 96.

words, her analysis of mutuality reveals that the problem of domination has been a concern throughout the ages and mutuality has been its corrective.

Social mutuality is distinct from the other modes of power-with by introducing the language of obligation and ethical normativity. In keeping with her basic definition, Nothwehr defines social mutuality as

the sharing of “power-with” by and among members of society in a way that recognizes the fundamental dignity of each and the obligation to attain and maintain for each what is necessary to sustain that dignity. 173

Social mutuality therefore is a goal that inspires human persons to act to “attain and maintain for each what is necessary.” As a formal norm mutuality is a motivation for Harrison’s “radical activity of love” 174 and Cotroneo’s “mutual practices of reconciliation.” 175 Elizabeth Johnson describes the aspirational aspect of mutuality in her Trinitarian theology when she writes that it is an:

eschatological dream of a new heaven and a new earth where justice dwells (and) takes hold … with no group dominating and none being subordinated, but all participating according to their gifts and being equally, mutually valued in a movement of transcending liberation, peace, and joy. 176

These examples describe Nothwehr’s understanding of mutuality as a formal Christian norm for social ethics, which for her describes the Reign of God and is foundation for all


174 Beverly Wildung Harrison, "The Power of Anger in the Works of Love: Christian Ethics for Women and Other Strangers," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 36, no. Supplement (1981): 52. For Harrison, Jesus witnesses to a Christian ethic of mutuality, not through sacrifice, but through his “radical activity of love.” For Harrison, this is akin to social activism.


176 Johnson, She Who Is, 32.
relationships.\textsuperscript{177}

On the basis of a consensus among contemporary theologians, represented by Cahill, Fuchs, and O’Connell, Nothwehr’s research helps her define the concept of a Christian formal norm as that which describes the good and desirable for healthy relationships.\textsuperscript{178} This means that a Christian formal norm is an absolute that motivates and describes what Christians value and what they strive to live. A formal norm does not outline concrete steps for how Christians are to achieve mutuality.

Nothwehr wonders, “How might mutuality be dealt with, if at all, as a material norm?” In other words, although mutuality is very well defined as a formal Christian social norm, how is it actually practiced by Christians? I now take up this practical point with the help of Simon Mainwaring, whose own investigation begins where Nothwehr leaves off, i.e., recognizing self-in-relation, reciprocity, power-with, and the normative value that feminist theologies assign to mutuality today. Mainwaring’s interest however, is to discover a Christian praxis of mutuality.

2.3 Mutuality: Christian Praxis

The definition of praxis used in this thesis is taken from the work of Paul Ricœur, who distinguishes praxis from practice.\textsuperscript{179} He asserts that practice represents one of “four levels on a scale of praxis.”\textsuperscript{180} Praxis in this sense is a comprehensive

\textsuperscript{177} Nothwehr, Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics, 208.

\textsuperscript{178} Nothwehr, Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics, 216.

\textsuperscript{179} Paul Ricœur, "The Teleological and Deontological Structures of Action: Aristotle and/or Kant?," Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 21, no. (1987).

\textsuperscript{180} Ricœur, "The Teleological and Deontological Structures of Action ": 99-106. The four levels that Ricœur refers to as rejoinders of teleological and deontological ethics are: practices, plans of life, narrative
notion that works with, or reconciles, the apparent oppositions between teleological (values, formal norms) and deontological (duties, material norms) structures in Christian ethics.\textsuperscript{181}

Biblical scholar, Simon Mainwaring is interested in how the formal norm of mutuality is joined to the action of biblical interpretation.\textsuperscript{182} He hopes to find this connection by looking more deeply at feminist theologies. As we will see below in the discussion on deeds of power, Mainwaring finds that feminist theologies provide excellent critiques of power and offer conceptual definitions of mutuality. But, he is disappointed to discover that a theory for the achievement of mutuality remains ambiguous. However, he does find in Carter Heyward’s theology of mutuality a praxis-oriented direction for examining the heart of mutuality, i.e., the ambiguous dynamic of unity of a life, and the good life. How do these levels join virtue and deontological ethics? To take the case of practices, on page 100 of his article, Ricœur uses farming as an example of a practice. Practices are a complex pattern of actions that connect and can only be understood together. One action without the others makes no sense. He writes: “The farmer’s job entails subordinate actions, such as ploughing, sowing, reaping, and so on. Ploughing in turn includes riding the machine, and so on down to the ‘basic actions’. Practical theologian Jean-Guy Nadeau, also uses this definition. See: Jean-Guy Nadeau, "La Pratique Comme Lieu De la Théologie Pratique," Laval théologique et philosophique 60, no. 2 (2004). For a comprehensive historical understanding of praxis within practical theology see: Mario Midali, Practical Theology: Historical Development of Its Foundational and Scientific Character, Biblioteca Di Scienze Religiose, vol. 156 (Rome: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 2000), 221-230. The understanding of praxis that underlies this dissertation belongs to a history of practical theology. Midali gives us a general definition of contemporary ecclesial praxis that involves reconciling dualisms formally perceived between theory and practice, interpersonal relationships, and interdisciplinary critique. The reconciling of these apparent opposites though leads to the reconstruction of collaborative and blended methods and practices. In Mainwaring, \textit{Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health}, 12. The author provides us with his definition of the praxis of mutuality: “the praxis of mutuality is one that operates transiently within relational dynamics. That is, what I argue to be the transformational impact of the praxis of mutuality in its operation with other postcolonial praxes, is that it occurs as a momentary reimagining of power structures, not as their overcoming.” Like Ricœur and Midali, Mainwaring’s definition of praxis is understood as an alternative to oppositional thinking in which opposites must be overcome. Praxis itself seeks a relationship of mutuality between what appear to be opposites, i.e., theory and practice.

\textsuperscript{181} Ricœur, "The Teleological and Deontological Structures of Action ".

\textsuperscript{182} Mainwaring, \textit{Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health}.
shared power. He notes Heyward’s insight that to live mutuality as shared power is not apparent and therefore requires negotiation.

Mainwaring’s argument for the need to discover an explanatory tool for living mutuality is evident when he writes that,

absent from these explorations [feminist theologies] is the strategic element that a praxis-oriented approach to mutuality requires. In the end, the work of these thinkers still leaves the explanatory power of the concept of mutuality at a loss, and is still more aspirational than it is descriptive of how power is reimagined.

Building on his insight for the need of a praxis of mutuality, Mainwaring constructs the following definition:

Mutuality is a postcolonial praxis that resists and potentially transforms hegemonic relational dynamics via the renegotiation of perceptions of identity, representations of agency, and instances of dialogical exchange. This praxis serves as a reminder that those whom Gayatri Spivak has called the othered agents of colonial power are also persons who have legitimate identity, agency, and dialogical potential.

For Mainwaring, mutuality is a Christian alternative to relationships of domination. His primary concern is the problem that domination presents in the interpretation of scripture for those who experience mental health issues. However, his work is helpful for our topic because he is also seeking a critical understanding of mutuality as praxis of liberation from benevolent relationships of domination.

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183 Mainwaring, Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health, 11.
184 Mainwaring, Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health, 5.
186 Mainwaring, Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health, 59.
2.3.1 A Critical View of Mutuality as Liberation

Mainwaring’s postcolonial biblical critique incorporates difference into the mutuality paradigm.\textsuperscript{187} We have seen above that feminist theologies lean toward sameness and emphasize equality and reciprocity as an approach to mutuality. Mainwaring takes the view that persons who are dominated want liberation, but they do not seek sameness or equality with their mainstream oppressors. In the case of colonialism, the colonized do not view merging with hegemonic structures as the way to their freedom as fully human and capable agents. The main point that I take from Mainwaring’s view is that if mutuality is to happen between the colonized and colonizer, liberation from difference is not helpful. Rather, for mutuality to be experienced, otherness must be an integral part of the process. Difference can assist in a process of mutuality as a way of critique and transformation; in mutuality, difference can be something to embrace, at least momentarily.\textsuperscript{188} It does not have to be conquered and overcome.

If the goal of mutuality is not to conquer difference, what might it look like and how might it function in practice? Mainwaring believes that a non-oppositional view of otherness encourages persons and groups who have been dominated to stay in the struggles, conversations, dialogues, realities, and tensions of life, without seeing themselves or their situations as the problem needing to be conquered or resolved. Instead, of conquering otherness, what needs critique are the dominant voices and one-

\textsuperscript{187} Mainwaring, \textit{Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health}, 47-48.

\textsuperscript{188} Mainwaring, \textit{Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health}, 12.
sided systems that categorize and decide who is other. Mainwaring believes that mutuality involves recognizing the other not as a fundamentally separate person, but as another with whom one is in relationship. Mutuality understood as such is marked by a simultaneous blend of sameness and difference. He writes:

The self and other are faced with a somewhat messier relational reality than the dichotomous liberation paradigm suggests; with this emphasis on the ambiguity of mutuality, relational dynamics look less and less like two sides of a dichotomous exclusion and more and more like the negotiation of shared relational dynamics.

Mainwaring’s critical vision of mutuality as liberation from the pressure of conquering difference involves an approach to otherness that is valued and non-oppositional. He turns away from the view that understands otherness as the problem to be solved. He calls for critique of the power structures of domination that categorize otherness or difference as hierarchical oppositions. In this view, domination requires that for liberation to happen oppositions must be overcome. However, Mainwaring’s vision of mutuality as a blend of sameness and otherness needs a strategy to concretely explain how it is lived. Still needed is a way to understand mutuality as a praxis. Mainwaring turns to feminist theology for insight into how his theory might be lived.

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189 Mainwaring’s concern for a model of mutuality that addresses otherness in a non-hierarchical way is influenced by Nancy Eisland’s theology of disability. See, Nancy Eisland, *The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 116. Mainwaring concurs with her when he writes: “She argues that mutuality evades binaristic oppressor/oppressed paradigm and invites theological reflection and with it, praxis, beyond the categorizing and essentializing of the disabled body as if it were an ontological category of its own, and into an ambiguous space.”

190 Mainwaring, *Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health*, 47.

2.3.2 Deeds of Power

Mainwaring hopes to find a theory for the praxis of mutuality in Carter Heyward’s theology. He looks to her because he finds strength in her double focus on analysis of power and attention to praxis. More than a vision for which to strive, mutuality in Heyward’s view is also lived through the negotiation of shared power.

As mentioned above, relational power marked by power-with is a key concept in a feminist view of mutuality. Power-with transforms the oppositional view of power-over, as found in structures of domination. Rosemary Radford Ruether writes an inspirational piece on mutuality as an alternative to an oppositional view of power:

All of us, both men and women, oppressor and oppressed, need to be converted, in somewhat different ways, to that whole humanity which has been denied to us by systems of alienation and social oppression. This fuller humanity demands not only a conversion of the self into its fuller possibilities, but a conversion of society, a transformation of those social structures that set people in opposition to each other. We seek a new social order, a new order of human-nature relations, that both mandates and incarnates mutuality.

Heyward’s focus on mutuality as praxis introduces the reality that in order to live a vision of power-with, such as Ruether’s above, involves both ambiguity and dynamism. This means that mutuality involves relational power that is both

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193 Mainwaring, Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health, 50. Heyward arrives at her practical understanding of mutuality through a biblical analysis of the Markan use of deeds of power (Mark 6:2b), as practiced by Jesus in dynamic relationships with and among others. Her findings enable her to support Jesus’s practice of mutuality, which serves as a critique of hierarchical power that encourages the practice of socially sanctioned conferral by some upon others, which is power-over.

unpredictable and creative. Unpredictability opens each person to the other, and to one’s proper lack of control over others and situations. Dynamism involves action and the ability of each person to influence others and to contribute to creating the world in which they live. Therefore, Heyward’s view of mutuality as *praxis* comes to life in her notion of *deeds of power*, which involves the integration of the active (dynamic) and passive (ambiguous) aspects of mutuality just explained.

Mainwaring concurs with Heyward’s understanding of mutuality as *praxis* when he writes:

> Overall then, with Heyward’s descriptions of the *praxis* of mutuality as [deeds of power], the reciprocal negotiation of power between persons, and with the fluid and ambiguous impacts of such relational dynamics, this particular framing of the *praxis* of mutuality offers much to the theological imagination for reading biblical texts and rethinking relational contexts. To see power as inherent in relational dynamics is to see it in a Foucauldian sense: always up for grabs. Furthermore, Heyward’s notion of power as relation adds to the consideration of the relational encounters of biblical characters and subsequently to how these textual encounters might speak to contextual relational dynamics … Indeed, Heyward’s theology of relating points to the potentially transformative aspect of the *praxis* of mutuality.\(^{195}\)

Heyward’s notion, deeds of power, is helpful for understanding *praxis* of mutuality as the integration of power in a relationship that is both ambiguous and dynamic. However, still lacking is a way to understand how this negotiation of power moves from its theory to practice. For this, Mainwaring turns to Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial\(^ {196}\) *praxis* of third

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\(^{195}\) Mainwaring, *Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health*, 50.

space.¹⁹⁷

### 2.3.3 Third Space

Bhabha’s understanding of third space provides a structure for mutuality as *praxis*. Like Heyward, he writes about mutuality as a relationship of power negotiation. However, Bhabha articulates his understanding in terms of the struggle with hybridity. Mutuality is a hybrid relationship that is created through the blending of identities of the colonized (passive) and colonizer (active).¹⁹⁸ The third space is a vehicle for resistance and transformation in which a hybrid relationship is created from the identities of dominator and dominated. “The new mutation replaces the established pattern with a ‘mutual and mutable’ representation of cultural difference that is positioned *in between* the coloniser and colonised.”¹⁹⁹ In other words, in postcolonial times, the colonized and colonizer cannot exist without each other.

Bhabha’s view of mutuality is criticized by Mainwaring²⁰⁰ for his third space view of mutuality. In particular, he is chided for situating the third space within existing structures of domination. This means that, although hybridity happens in the third space, and are re-imaging life after colonialism. The latter is represented by the work of postcolonial scripture scholars, such as Moore, Segovia, and Sugirtharajah, who understand the term *post-colonial* to refer to a discourse of relational dynamics rooted in ongoing power struggles within contexts of unresolved colonial domination. Western universalism, resistance, assimilation, and marginalization are among the characteristics marking these struggles.

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¹⁹⁸ Bhabha, "The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha," 80-82.


²⁰⁰ Glen Coulthard also criticizes Bhabha for the same reason as Mainwaring, i.e., lack of critique of structures of domination.
it happens without questioning the systems that assign power to the dominator. In other words, the gap in the terms of shared power remains constrained within the limits of oppositional thinking. On the one hand, the active role of the colonized is always one of resistance to domination. The third space does not question the terms of power and fails to recognize the active contribution of the colonized their own right. The colonized actively resist impositions but do not actively contribute to restructuring of the relationship of domination that permits the imposition to happen. On the other hand, the colonizers do not question their role as dominator and protector; rather, their transformation comes about in response to the resistance of the dominated. In the third space, dominated and dominator are both transformed, but only within their respective and oppositional roles. Each remains entrenched in their difference as dominator and dominated. For example, resistance of the colonized can help the colonizer to view the disproportional occurrence of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls. However, without transforming the structures of domination within which this injustice occurs, the response of colonizers to fix the problem for the colonized perpetuates the domination.

The focus on transformation of difference in Bhabha’s third space happens through resistance of the colonized. However, resistance only changes the terms of reference within colonial structures. It does not critique the authority of the structures of power-over. Because of this, Bhabha’s third space is highly contested for providing a narrow scope for transformation.\textsuperscript{201} This is because when mutuality is understood as

\textsuperscript{201} Mainwaring, \textit{Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health}, 53-54. To explain, Mainwaring cites Bhabha’s example of a Christian missionary trying to convert a group of villagers. They resist conversion by demanding a vegetarian Bible. This demand demonstrates a creative way to change the terms of colonial discourse, but it remains passive, as it does not serve to critique colonial authority.
third space hybridity, it occurs within the constraints of existing structures, and does not transform the structures themselves. This understanding of transformation limits the exercise of agency within the constraints of the structure of colonial power. This implies that the role of the colonized remains active. The resistance of the colonized on the other hand, is a kind of passive resistance, since the structures of colonialism continue to define them. These critiques point to Bhabha’s oversight of the capability of the colonized to contribute their proper discourse. This weakness impacts the expanse of the imaginative and transformative capacities of Bhabha’s notion of third space. The third space as a place of mutuality may transform some of the details of praxis, but it does not transform the structure of hierarchical power.

Despite the above critique, Mainwaring notes that Bhabha’s contribution does invite otherness into the dialogue on mutuality. It also provides for further dialogue about whether it is realistic to think critically and hopefully about praxes of mutuality from western perspectives. Given the ambiguity of mutuality, which was mentioned above, Mainwaring signals two strategic contributions of Bhabha’s third space and notion of hybridity. They are: 1) that sometimes in the lived reality of mutuality, resistance within existing structures is a better response than direct opposition to them, and 2) that third space as a postcolonial praxis of mutuality offers hope beyond resistant survival within the constraints of hegemonic relational dynamics. In other words, Mainwaring finds in Bhabha’s third space, an interesting model for the praxis of mutuality that 1) offers active resistance to existing structures as an alternative to

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202 Mainwaring, Mark, Mutuality, and Mental Health, 59.
passivity, and 2) operates as a transformative force, even if it operates within the boundaries of colonial power. These points serve as an invitation to further the critique and to move toward a more expansive, hopeful, and transformative praxes of mutuality. Is it possible to understand mutuality as an alternative, or must it be contained within the boundaries of power domination? To further the dialogue on mutuality, I turn to Taylor’s politics of recognition and its critique.

2.4 Mutuality: Politics of Recognition

It is not possible to elaborate on recognition, especially in a Canadian context, without signaling the work of McGill University’s internationally renowned, professor emeritus, Charles Taylor. Nor can the work of Glen Coulthard go unnoticed in the context of this thesis.203 Coulthard is Taylor’s main critic regarding the usefulness of the current politics of recognition within colonial contexts such as Canada.

2.4.1 Charles Taylor: Politics of Recognition

Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition has been established as a commonly used model in Canada and elsewhere, to broaden accommodation of difference within western pluralist and colonial societies.204 Taylor is concerned about collective difference, particularly in political structures that seek mutuality. He questions how in increasingly multicultural global realities, liberal democracies like Canada’s can be

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hospitable to different cultures. His foremost concern stems from the longstanding conflict between Canada and Quebec regarding state recognition of distinct societies within the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights. However, Taylor also makes reference to Canada’s First Peoples and the problems they continue to face as colonized subjects.

In “The Politics of Recognition,” Taylor grapples with the capacity of Canada as a liberal democracy to be hospitable to difference. Collective rights of specific groups is recognized as the original contribution of Taylor’s politics of recognition. His view of the rights of collectivities highlights and addresses the conflict within a liberal democracy that is characterized by equal dignity, authenticity, dialogical identity, with the goal to arrive at a politics of recognition based on equal respect for cultural difference.

2.4.2 Equal Dignity - Sameness

Taylor traces the roots of Canada’s current liberal politics of recognition to western philosophy’s development of the concepts dignity and authenticity. These two notions stem from the critique and collapse of western European social hierarchies, such as monarchies. In western hierarchies, recognition is based on inequality. For example, rights are conferred on those of a certain social status, and more status is usually

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207 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition." Each section is devoted to one of five points: the history of the notion of recognition in western philosophy, recognition in the public sphere, politics of equal dignity, politics of cultural difference, and multiculturalism. The author’s points lead reader’s to what is seen as his greatest contribution to politics of recognition – recognition of collectives.
awarded to men within the upper class. Taylor gives an example of such inequality when he refers to the titles within social systems that honour the elite by calling them “Lords” and “Ladies” and places their dignity over that of others. However, the fatal flaw of social hierarchies is not recognition of difference, rather it is the problem of bestowal of dignity based on the preference for some over others. The collapse of western hierarchies ushered in liberal democracy which directly faced the problem of recognition based on preference that gave some power over others. The contemporary dialogue on politics of recognition is based on recognition of equal dignity. However, equal dignity brought with it another issue – authenticity.

2.4.3 Authenticity - Difference

Equal dignity demands respect for each one’s identity as an individual.\(^{208}\) This brings with it a sense of value for each person as a unique and authentic subject unto themselves. Taylor traces the emergence of authenticity to the late 18th century when the idea of individual identity was introduced into western thinking. This means that persons, whose identities were previously determined largely by societal structures, no longer understood themselves only in terms of their assigned role within social hierarchies. A new inner meaning is introduced into recognition. Self-recognition spoken by an inner voice of authenticity that contributes to one’s self-determination.\(^{209}\)

Authenticity is also accompanied by an intuitive moral sensibility. Morality is no longer limited to its external determinants, i.e., by measuring the consequences of one's

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\(^{208}\) Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 27.

actions. Rather, morality is also rooted in one's own inner, intuitive sense of right and wrong. Being authentic means discovering, creating, and being one's unique self, which becomes an obligation and a matter of ethical significance.

2.4.4 Dialogical Identity

Authenticity introduces the dialogical aspect of identity. Persons know themselves as both externally shaped by society and self-determined. This means that with the shift from hierarchies to democracies an opening is provided for a “way of being (that) cannot be socially derived, but must be inwardly generated.”\textsuperscript{210} In western thinking, recognition underwent a shift from its exclusive focus on the bestowal of social recognition that is based on an inequality that conferred honour on some, to include the inward self-determination of each individual.\textsuperscript{211}

Recognition became a dialogue between external socially sanctioned recognition and an individual’s own self-determination. In Taylor’s words, the transition from social hierarchies to liberal democracies highlighted a basic western claim that “we need relationships to fulfill, but not to define, ourselves.”\textsuperscript{212} In other words, persons are not only passive identities who are externally defined by others. They are also agents who shape their individual sense of self.\textsuperscript{213} This dialogue between external and inward

\textsuperscript{210} Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 32.

\textsuperscript{211} Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 28-32. Taylor traces the shift from external bestowal of recognition of society to the inward recognition of individuals to philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of authenticity and Saint Augustine’s notion of inwardness.

\textsuperscript{212} Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 33.

\textsuperscript{213} Agency is the key concern in feminist thinking about empowerment. It is linked to reciprocal relationships of power-with. While Taylor seeks to balance agency with passivity, the focus of agency in feminism often serves to critique passivity.
recognition underlines western philosophy’s basic assumption about the passive/active
dialogical feature of human being. Taylor claims that liberal democracies elevated
recognition from its external status of honour for some, to its current position as, which
Taylor calls, “a vital human need.”\textsuperscript{214}

The shift in focus from external social recognition to a combination of external
and inward self-recognition is problematic in at least two ways. They are: 1) at a
personal level, recognition fails to address the lack of access for many to what is
required for authentic self-recognition, i.e., to make choices about who they are; and 2),
at a public level, equal recognition introduces the tension between equal dignity
(sameness) and the authenticity (difference) of each one. In his article, “The Politics of
Recognition,” Taylor limits his discussion to the second problem by addressing the
dialectic between equal dignity and recognition of cultural difference. I will revisit the
first problem below in Glen Coulthard’s critique of Taylor, which analyzes the lack of
attention to the personal level of recognition, and its subsequent lack of consideration to
the link between personal and public levels of recognition.

\textbf{2.4.5 Politics of Recognition: Equal Dignity and Cultural Difference}

Western philosophy’s antidote to recognition that is based on inequality (social
hierarchies) changes the terms of recognition and creates a conflict between the
recognition of sameness (equal dignity) and that of difference (authenticity). This
conflict can be negotiated between multicultural groups who want inclusion within
existing structures. But, how does Canada negotiate recognition of equal dignity and

authenticity with groups who are not seeking to be included in existing structures, but who demand active involvement in establishing a new relationship? The problem of colonialism, which Taylor identifies as multicultural, Coulthard claims is multinational.

Colonialism is not a multicultural, but a multinational problem. The relationship between Indigenous and Settler-Canadians requires more than a change in terms of cultural recognition; it requires structural transformation. This is because recognition in a colonial context is not a problem of a subaltern group seeking inclusion or accommodation of their cultural difference within the dominant structure. It is an issue of mutual respect between independent parties.215

Recognition that calls itself mutual while being couched in inclusion and accommodation of difference is Coulthard’s contention with Taylor’s view. Coulthard’s point is that Taylor’s politics of recognition lacks effectiveness to transform colonial situations. This is due to a) a lack of attention to personal recognition and its link to the political, and b) Taylor’s lack of attention to the need for struggle against the dominator for self-recognition. These two points will be discussed next.

2.5 Glen Coulthard: Indigenous Peoples and Politics of Recognition

In his paper, Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the ’Politics of Recognition’ in Canada, Glen Coulthard challenges the adequacy of Taylor’s politics of

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215 Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 248. Alfred writes, “Whether multiculturalism communicates itself in English-French or English-Spanish, it is still only an accommodation of the ethnic power of colonial Euroamericans and their more recent immigrant allies. True justice leading to eventual peaceful coexistence between Settlers and Onkwehonwe [original people] will require a shift away from the objective of bilingual (to use the colonial terminology) monocultural assimilation to what we might call a multilingual bicultured coexistence. In that way, a just political relation may evolve as nation-to-nation between what has become a culturally and linguistically diverse Settler society and indigenous peoples who will continue to exist as linguistically and culturally distinct communities.”
recognition to address the ongoing colonial relationship of the Canadian state over Indigenous peoples. In this context, Coulthard uses Richard Day’s definition of politics of recognition:

I take politics of recognition to refer to the now expansive range of recognition-based models of liberal pluralism that seek to reconcile Indigenous claims to nationhood with Crown sovereignty via the accommodation of Indigenous identities in some form of renewed relationship with the Canadian state.

Coulthard critiques western politics of recognition for replicating colonial structures of domination. It does so by the duplication of non-reciprocation in two interrelated ways. First, on the structural or objective level where there is a past and ongoing history of dominance of the Canadian state over Indigenous peoples through laws, policies, and programs. Second, at the human interactional level where attitudes of domination function in actual relationships. For example, the colonial attitude that Indigenous persons are not as intellectual as other Canadians and need less rigorous educational programs leads a relationship based on their internalization of self-diminishment and paternalistic behaviour toward them.

2.5.1 Self-recognition and Political Recognition

Coulthard’s concern is about the way structures and attitudes of domination mutually influence each other to become the normative determinants for Indigenous self-identity. In Coulthard’s words:

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216 Coulthard, "Subjects of Empire," 443-452. Coulthard acknowledges the significant contribution Taylor’s politics of recognition makes to western politics, but he critiques Taylor’s view of recognition for use within colonial situations. To support his argument, Coulthard draws principally on the work of psychiatrist, philosopher Frantz Fanon (1925-1961). Taylor dialogues with the work of Fanon, but Coulthard charges Taylor of misinterpreting Fanon’s points regarding colonialism.

the reproduction of a colonial structure of dominance like Canada’s rests on its ability to entice Indigenous peoples to come to identify, either implicitly or explicitly, with the profoundly asymmetrical and non-reciprocal forms of recognition either imposed on or granted to them by the colonial-state and society.\textsuperscript{218}

He believes that the problem of non-reciprocal recognition in Canada must be addressed at two levels: 1) social structures, and 2) individual and collective identity formation.

This is because:

Instead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on the Hegelian ideal of reciprocity, the contemporary politics of recognition promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonial power that Indigenous demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend.\textsuperscript{219}

A more reciprocal form of recognition, from an Indigenous perspective, addresses simultaneously the aspects of politics and personal identity. To do so, Coulthard promotes self-recognition for Indigenous peoples at personal and collective levels that lead to a transformative praxis. This involves turning away from the colonial state and society.\textsuperscript{220} He calls this turning away, decolonial praxis.\textsuperscript{221} Although Coulthard does not define what he means by praxis, he is strongly influenced by Frantz Fanon’s development of revolutionary praxis, which is described as:

That people change at the same time that they change the world is a basic fact of revolutionary praxis. In the very moment of lashing out against an insuperable oppression the individual undergoes a radical alteration. Frantz Fanon took this observation a step further in arguing that at the very center of the individual participating in social change is not only a “remodeling” of the consciousness we have of ourselves, or the ruling class and its world, “at last within reach”—there

\textsuperscript{218} Coulthard, "Subjects of Empire," 439.


\textsuperscript{220} Coulthard, \textit{Red Skin White Masks}, 48.

\textsuperscript{221} Coulthard, "Subjects of Empire," 449.
is also a “renewal” of the “symbols, the myths, the beliefs, the emotional responsiveness of the people,” in short, the “reassertion” of our “capacity to progress.” This intersection of thought and practice is the critical focus of Fanon’s dialectical conception of revolutionary *praxis*. A common theme in his theoretical work, a theme fiercely developed by Fanon scholar Lewis Gordon, is that of human consciousness as an open-ended question, as a lived experience of the body in movement, in antagonism with the inhuman institutions of society. This consideration stimulates the question: how and why does revolutionary thought arise in the process of battle for a new humanity?  

The above definition of *praxis* is comprehensive because it refers to a theory of transformation that is a lived practice. We are reminded of Paul Ricœur’s comprehensive notion of *praxis*, and can anticipate how Coulthard opens the dialogue with Ricœur.

### 2.5.2 Struggle as Praxis for Self-Recognition

Coulthard’s understanding of self-recognition of persons and collectives who have been colonized involves, not mediation, but rather a turning away from the dominator-other and renouncing previously non-reciprocal terms of recognition. Turning away from the oppressor consists of actively creating “the terms and values by which they (the colonized) are to be recognized.” Coulthard argues for the self-recognition of the colonized in which they address the internalization of domination on their own terms. Transformative *praxis*, in this view, is not limited to external actions, but emerges from identifying with one’s own sources of recognition.

Coulthard critiques the interrelational aspect of identity formation and freedom within the colonial relationship. In doing so, he directs our attention to the problem of

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223 Coulthard, "Subjects of Empire," 450.

recognition being “ultimately granted”\textsuperscript{225} or “accorded”\textsuperscript{226} by the dominant group to the subaltern group. This dynamic fails to address “the breadth of power at play in colonial relationships.”\textsuperscript{227} According to Coulthard, Taylor recognizes the necessity for struggle in order for a subject to deal with the complexity of ‘psycho-existential’ impacts of domination.\textsuperscript{228} However, Coulthard objects to Taylor’s antidote, which is in support of accommodation as a means of mutual recognition.

From Taylor’s perspective, staying in the struggle achieves liberation for the colonized when they “purge themselves”\textsuperscript{229} of the belittling images imposed on them by colonizers and subsequently join mainstream society as equals. Coulthard accuses Taylor of moving too quickly from the need for the colonized to struggle with the internalization of colonial power, to accommodation by the dominators as a solution. My reading of Coulthard reveals two points. First, he objects to Taylor’s short-cut to liberation for the colonized. Coulthard clearly points to the reality that in Taylor’s model the structures of domination are not being questioned by the dominant. Rather, Coulthard uncovers the questionable assumption within Taylor’s notion of accommodation that the dominant structures of settler colonial society are not part of the

\textsuperscript{225} Taylor, \textit{Reconciling the Solitudes}, 148.

\textsuperscript{226} Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 41.

\textsuperscript{227} Coulthard, "Subjects of Empire," 443.

\textsuperscript{228} Frantz Fanon, \textit{Black Skin, White Masks}, trans., Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 12. Fanon’s term ‘psycho-existential’ refers to the internalized impacts of domination on a colonized subject. In the field of settler colonialism, the internalization of colonialism is more complex, and can also involve settlers as colonizers and colonized, as colonizer perpetrators and colonizer allies. See, Regan, \textit{Unsettling the Settler Within}; Veracini, \textit{Settler Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview}.

\textsuperscript{229} Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 65.
problem of domination. Second, Coulthard’s critique implies the point that I pick up in this thesis. Namely, that while the colonized do their work of self-recognition, which involves ‘resistance and resurgence,’ the implication is that the settler-colonizers do their work or self-recognition. The work of self-recognition for settlers however will be different.

Is self-recognition of the colonized enough for transformation of structures and relationships of mutual recognition? Without being explicit, Coulthard suggests that more is needed. He aligns himself with feminist and anti-racist, bell hooks. He concurs with hooks’ insight that instead of looking predominantly to the other for recognition, self-recognition should be ‘recognizing ourselves and [then seeking to] make contact with all who would engage us in a constructive manner’. In this way Coulthard provides an opening for discussion on a more mutual recognition in Canada than what is offered in a western politics of recognition, which seeks inclusion and accommodation within existing structures.

The self-critique and transformation of colonizers is different from the work of resistance and resurgence required by the colonized. Transformation of the Indigenous – Settler relationship can happen when Canadians rouse themselves to recognize the need to be purged of their role as dominators. From a western perspective, self-critique and transformation cannot be done in isolation. Both are part of a process that requires the

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other. The fundamental assumption here is that self-critique and transformation cannot happen through an isolated monologue of self-assertion and determination, but must take place through meaningful relationships with others. In other words, dominators cannot will themselves to change in isolation. In the context of this thesis, settler-Canadians are called to critique their interventions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls that are being critiqued as benevolent and well intentioned, but actually serve to maintain structures and attitudes of domination.

### 2.6 A Working Definition of Mutuality

In the first half of this chapter, I established the need to critique well-intentioned solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. I determined that the critique of power within solutions of benevolent protection points to mutuality as an alternative approach. However, mutuality also needs to be well understood and critiqued within the context of Canada’s settler colonial reality. Canadian scholars write about the need for settlers to address the ‘settler problem’ of power domination in Canada in order for them to be able to enter a new relationship with Indigenous peoples, one that is shaped by mutuality and respect.233 This part of the chapter supports the statement of the problem of this thesis, which concerns the benefit of mutuality over benevolent protectionism.

The research examined in the second half of this chapter begins to look at what is meant by mutuality. It offers three important threads that can be woven together to shape a working definition of mutual recognition. A first thread is Nothwehr’s analysis, which demonstrates a consensus among feminist theologies that mutuality is based on self-in-

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233 Epp, "We Are All Treaty People."; Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within.
relation as the basic unit of human identity. Self-inrelation is marked by power-with, of which social mutuality presents its ethical mode lived through human persons. Mutuality in its uniquely human social mode is described as a formal norm, which serves to motivate, offer vision and instruction, as well as provide a measure to account for ethical action. From a western, feminist theological perspective, a working definition must include the elements of: self-in-relation, power-with, a norm for ethical motivation, action, and accountability. In brief, mutuality as a formal Christian social norm stems from the relational core of human identity and is expressed through a norm that motivates Christians to live from the foundation of who they are. In Nothwehr’s research reciprocity and mutuality are often used by interchangeably by feminist theologians. She points to the need for future research to better understand mutuality as praxis, i.e., a mutual interplay between theory and practice.

A second thread is found in Simon Mainwaring inquiry into mutuality as praxis. Building on mutuality as a Christian social norm describing the self-in-relation, his analysis highlights the need to transform the hegemonic structures that remain within structures of power-with. He points to the need for a third space to hold the ambiguity (ungraspable, unpredictable) of the dynamic interconnection between unique selves-in-relation who share power and coexist in mutuality. However, Mainwaring identifies the struggle to find a praxis that is truly mutual, i.e., a praxis that transforms both colonized and colonizers. Mainwaring adds to Nothwehr’s contribution (mutuality as a formal norm for Christian social ethics that describes self-in-relation and power-with as reciprocal) his attentiveness to difference, and the possibility of its negotiation in a third space.
A third thread is found in the discussion between Taylor and Coulthard concerning the political practice of mutual recognition. We discover that Taylor’s view of conferral of recognition upon the subaltern by the dominant promotes greater inclusivity within existing structures. Coulthard points out that bestowal of recognition falls short of real mutuality as it reveals a softer form of non-reciprocal domination. Coulthard’s critique of the politics of recognition within colonial contexts asserts that it fails to address the need for self-determination and transformed praxis for Indigenous peoples. Coulthard’s analysis demonstrates that Taylor lacks self-critique of the existing structures of domination and dependence. Coulthard’s reading of Taylor indicates the weakness of the transformative value of Taylor’s politics of recognition. Taylor’s model of accommodation of difference within existing structures, opposes Coulthard’s belief that it is by turning away from the dominator that self-recognition of the colonized can be achieved. The contribution that Coulthard makes to our discussion on mutuality is the link he makes between self-recognition and transformed praxis for both colonized and colonizer.

The three threads discussed in the second part of this chapter help to shape a working definition of mutuality that will assist the unfolding of the remainder of this thesis. Needed in a definition of mutuality are the elements of: self-in-relation and the basic unit of identity; power-with as the ethical expression; respect for difference within equal dignity; self-recognition; and transformed praxis. Incorporating these elements our working definition of mutuality in the context of this thesis is:

A praxis that is both a theoretical social norm and a practice of relational transformation that involves self-recognizing persons-in-relation who share power-with and among themselves while also respecting difference.
Coloniality is the inheritance of Indigenous peoples and Settler-Canadians alike. Each must do their own work of self-recognition in order to create a new relationship based on actual experiences of mutual recognition. My thesis contributes to the discourse by bringing self-recognition and transformation of the ‘settler problem’ to bear on solutions to the problem of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. In order to do so, I now look at Paul Ricœur’s understanding of mutual recognition. However, Ricœur’s view of mutuality emerged from his life of research. For this reason, I begin with his view of the mediated self.
Chapter 3

Paul Ricœur: The Mediated Self as a Foundation for Mutuality

3 Introduction

There is need for a good theory of mutuality in Canadian social policy. Mutuality as an approach to social justice takes us beyond current models based on protection. The example taken in this thesis ties the disproportionate instance of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls to the root of unjust relationships and inequalities that exist between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians. By signaling the disparate occurrence of human trafficking, our research indicates that mutual recognition offers hope for solutions beyond protection, upon which current solutions are often based.

Our analysis of protection reveals it as a model of domination that can serve to repeat relationships of power-over, such as colonialism. For this reason, it is important that settler-Canadians be helped to better understand what they mean by mutuality and how a good theory might help transform their current position and imposition as dominators, protectors and problem solvers for Indigenous peoples. Mutuality is a promising alternative in the current context of relationship between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians which continues to be one-sided and often couched in masculinist protection (Young, 2003). Experience and research demonstrate that the present relationship between Indigenous and Settler peoples disproportionately favours settler-

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This thesis joins the feminist claims presented in Chapter 2 by Young (masculinist protection) and in Chapter 1 by Sharma (restrictive anti-trafficking campaigns) with the situation of trafficking in Aboriginal woman and girls in Canada. From the outset, I have chosen to bring a feminist stance in dialogue with Paul Ricœur. I do so in order to contribute to the discussion on mutual recognition from a balanced feminist perspective. Feminist scholars help uncover the extent to which the current colonial paradigm repeats domination and restricts solutions to trafficking by claiming to protect Aboriginal women and girls. Western feminism is not exempt from this charge. My thesis is that better responses are based on mutuality. Our research has revealed that feminist theologians are prominent in the contemporary discussion on mutuality as a Christian norm, however I have not discovered a feminist theory of mutual recognition as comprehensive as I have found Ricœur’s.

When solutions to social injustice do not witness mutuality, as it is defined in Chapter 2, so that each enjoys equal rights and respect for their human dignity, the violence of domination occurs. A corrective to the problem of domination includes self-recognition by those who are subjugated. Coulthard, in the previous Chapter points this

235 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, "TRC Findings". The June 2015 report highlights Indian Residential Schools (IRS) as one of the colonial policies in Canada that was a source of the inequality between peoples. The generational impacts of policies, such as IRS, that privileged western systems of education and governance, continue to favour the ways of western settler society. See: Joy, "Paul Ricœur and the Duty to Remember," 186. Joy writes: “Perhaps real recognition and justice for the First Nation peoples of Canada will only arrive when such a critical history is implemented for all Canadians and those terms of the Indian Act that have deemed them as protected by the state will finally be repealed.” In her footnote that follows, Joy exercises the same caution I do here. That is, to warn that protection must be understood very precisely in this situation, so as not to diminish or refute the importance of protection under the Crown, which is fundamental for recognizing the sovereignty of indigenous peoples in Canada.
out. However, self-recognition, if understood as an isolating and egotistical endeavor, would risk becoming another way to claim self-importance and repeat domination of one over another. Conversely, to understand self-recognition as relational so that it involves other perspectives can provide the ethical distance needed for self-critique and transformation. Self-recognition as an aspect of the practice of mutual recognition can offer to each self both the subjectivity and objectivity needed for positive self-critique, self-transformation, and a renewed praxis of mutuality. This means that self-recognition by dominators is also required for mutuality to be possible.

In the preceding chapter, I discussed mutuality as 1) a formal norm for Christian social ethics (Nothwehr), and 2) as the main issue at stake in a politics of recognition (Taylor). The discussion on mutuality followed the need for a corrective to that which Young calls masculinist protection. However, post-colonial critiques by Indigenous (Coulthard) and non-Indigenous (Mainwaring) scholars point to two theoretical gaps in present ethical and political theories of mutuality. They are: 1) the role of self-recognition (Coulthard) and 2) transformed praxis (Coulthard, Mainwaring). The next two chapters will draw on the work of Paul Ricœur to develop a theory of mutual recognition that attends to these lacunae. The present chapter establishes the critical foundations of the mediated self for relationships of mutuality. The next chapter will build on this groundwork to show how self-recognition, understood as human capability, helps to develop a practical ethics of mutual recognition. Taken together, these two

236 Paul Ricœur, "Approaching the Human Person," Ethical Perspectives 6, no. 1 (1999): 46. Ricœur’s model of self-recognition is not egotistical, isolating, or self-enclosing, but relational. This is because his understanding of recognizing oneself does not happen apart from others; self-recognition requires dependence on one’s relationship with others.
chapters will provide the framework for an alternative ethical praxis; specifically, a Christian theological contribution to mutuality as a response, beyond protection, to the problem of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada.

3.1 Mutuality

In this present chapter I will turn to the work of Paul Ricœur to develop a fuller understanding of mutuality in light of the challenges articulated in previous chapters. I will discuss why I turn to the work of Ricœur to assist with a better understanding of mutuality; how his narrative hermeneutics can lead to deeper and more critical understanding of self-identity; and how self-understanding is related to an ethics of mutuality.

The topics just mentioned will be addressed in the five sections that follow. In Section 1, I list 4 elements that are needed in an adequate theory of mutuality. They are: 1) self-recognition, 2) persons-in-relation, 3) power-with, and 4) transformed praxis. I then discuss 5 reasons why Ricœur’s work helps to understand these elements. They are: the dialectical self, the mediated self, persons-in-relation, power-in-common, and narrative. This discussion reveals that Ricœur’s mediated self has particular importance for all the others. And so, in Section 2 I build the discussion by signaling which elements of Ricœur’s philosophical itinerary unfold his notion of the mediated self.

The concept of interpretation, discussed in Section 3, is essential for understanding the mediated self. Ricœur sees language as the ground with which to further our thinking about three dialectics that occur in language: explanation and understanding, experience and interpretation, and structure and meaning. His choice of narrative as the best model for understanding how both aspects of each dialectic function
in relation with each other, leads him to also consider narrative as a good framework for understanding the self as mediated.

And so, in Section 4, with Alain Thomasset as our guide, four characteristics of Ricœur’s narrative theory are identified that are crucial for mediated self-identity. They are: event and meaning, intended meaning and interpretation, meaning and reference, and interpretation and appropriation. Each of these dialectics takes us further into the heart of narrative, which for Ricœur is action. Finally, in Section 5 the foundation of Ricœur’s ethical theory of mutuality is revealed as the thread of action theory exposes the core of ethical identity: care-action.

3.1.1 Four Elements for a Good Theory of Mutuality

If we understand mutuality as it has been defined in Chapter 3, i.e., as a transformative *praxis* involving self-recognizing persons-in-relation, who share power-with and among themselves while also respecting difference; and if this kind of mutual recognition is important to both Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians, then each must participate in the work of self-recognition on their own terms. However, if mutuality is central to identity formation, as the feminist perspective in this thesis reminds us, self-recognition cannot be achieved in isolation; rather, it requires relationship with others not separation from them. Further, if mutuality is about shared power as an alternative to power-over, then as the literature suggests, those who will not share power, i.e., certain privileged individuals and dominant society, are the ones in utmost need of transformation. Our definition of mutuality therefore, reveals four important practical elements for a good theory: 1) self-recognition, 2) persons-in-relation, 3) power-with, and 4) transformed *praxis*. An adequate theory helps us to
understand the foundational interconnection between these four aspects. I now address 5 reasons why Paul Ricœur is helpful for assisting us in making these connections.

### 3.1.2 Why Paul Ricœur?

Paul Ricœur has something to say about all four of the elements that I have identified for an adequate theory of mutuality. His work on mutual recognition brings them together, through the notion of the mediated self and its narrative framework. The mediated, or narrative self, has a foundational role to play in the development of Ricœur’s ethical thinking, which culminates in his last work on mutual recognition. This implies that Ricœur helpful to address the concerns raised in the previous chapter about the ability of mutuality to adequately address relationships of domination within settler colonial contexts, such as Canada’s.

The mediated self and its narrative structure have implications for understanding self-identity, viewing power, living in relationship, and experiencing transformation, all of which connect to our definition of mutuality, and the concern for social justice in the context of Indigenous – Settler relations in Canada. The mediated self is key to Ricœur’s understanding of mutual recognition as a response to western dualistic models of self-understanding that are characterized by direct self-knowledge, autonomy, and the social problem of domination. Ricœur’s notion of the mediated self offers a dialectical alternative for understanding dualisms. In doing so, a narrative structure of identity helps us understand the self as interdependent and inter-independent.²³⁷ Ricœur bridges a self-

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²³⁷ Cynthia D. McCauley, Wilfred H. Drath, Charles J. Palus, Patricia M.G. O'Connor, Becca A. Baker, "The Use of Constructive-Developmental Theory to Advance the Understanding of Leadership," *The Leadership Quarterly* 17, no. (2006). These authors use the term inter-independent in a similar way to
in-relation approach to identity, which was discussed in the previous chapter, with the autonomous, separate self that is promoted by the western dualistic (either-or) legacy of Cartesian thought.

In this section I will introduce the mediated self as Ricœur’s alternative to the oppositional, separate self of dualistic thinking, a view of identity that continues to influence western thought in general, and the relationship between Indigenous peoples and Settler-Canadians, in particular. In what follows, I will discuss important developmental aspects of Ricœur’s philosophical itinerary that are foundational to his theory of mutual recognition. In doing so, we are invited to keep in mind the definition of mutuality, which includes the elements of self-recognition, persons-in-relation, power-with, and transformed praxis.

3.1.2.1 The Dialectical Self

Ricœur is a both-and thinker. This means that he offers a way to help shift self-understanding from the western Cartesian way of the one-sided, autonomous self, marked by direct knowledge, either-or dualisms, and the problem of domination. Since Ricœur is trying to avoid a model of direct self-understanding, without dismissing the important contribution of individual, unique, self-determining identity, he chooses mediation as the distinctive quality of the self. However, I cannot leap to speaking about the mediated self without first introducing Ricœur’s notion of the voluntary and

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Ricœur’s use of the mediated self. I will discuss the connection below in the section on Persons-In-Relation.

involuntary self. This two-sided approach begins his contribution to an alternative to western autonomous identity, based on either-or dualisms. The dialectic voluntary/involuntary operates within self and group identities at individual and social levels.

The self cannot grasp an understanding of itself through direct knowledge. Self-understanding for Ricœur involves a relationship between the involuntary and voluntary aspects of identity. The involuntary self comprises an imposed aspect of identity, which places contextual limits upon the self, such as historical, biological, and social determinants. Also included, is a voluntary feature of identity, which allows one to choose and participate in one’s own self-determination. These two aspects represent the self’s experience of itself as a tension between limitation and freedom. However, Ricœur views the tension as complimentary, not oppositional. This means that the voluntary/involuntary self is a creative tension to work with as one journeys to become oneself, rather than an opposition to avoid or overcome.

The dialectical self addresses Ricœur’s conviction that the self can never be directly known to itself in a definitive way. It also implies that relationship, not autonomy is the basic structure of self-identity. However, to know that there is a dialectic between the voluntary and involuntary aspects of the self does not account for how one works with that tension to actually make decisions to be oneself. To shape one’s identity within the limits imposed upon the self, requires more than a dialectical self-understanding. The fullness of Ricœur’s alternative to dualistic self-understanding is

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239 Here the notion of the voluntary/involuntary self is introduced, but it will be explained below in relation to Ricœur’s initial exploration of phenomenology of the will in the section, *Ricœur’s Philosophical Itinerary*. 
furthered by his notion of the mediated self.

3.1.2.2 The Mediated Self: Critical and Transformative

The voluntary/involuntary self gives us a model through which to view identity as both limited and becoming. By enlarging this dialectical view to further examine what is between the two, the mediated self suggests that a dynamic joins and separates the limitations and creative possibilities of the self. Mediation inserts a third element into Ricœur’s view of the self. This is how he accounts for persons actually understanding themselves, making choices, and living real lives. In the space between the voluntary and involuntary aspects of the self, is an opening for self-critique and creativity, the combination of which can lead to transformation of self-identity and transformed praxis. But, I am getting ahead of myself here.

For now, it is important to introduce the critical and transformative value that mediation adds to the dialectical self. In Ricœur’s view, transformed self-understanding happens through mediation and is fundamental to addressing the violence of one-sided relationships marked by domination. In the next section, I follow the thread of the dialectical self all the way through to its ethical implications and contribution to transformed action. Before doing so, I look further at the critical and transformative value of identity in relation to a similar dialectic between persons: interdependence (involuntary) and inter-independence (voluntary).

3.1.2.3 Persons-In-Relation: Interdependence and Inter-Independence

Ricœur’s mediated self concerns a critical dynamic of transformation. This involves connection and distinction between the voluntary and involuntary aspects of the self. Critical, transformative mediation is also an approach that understands persons-in-
relation as a basic unit of self-identity. But, unlike methods that consider separation of one from the other as unhelpful for identity formation, a mediated self favours both dependence upon others and independence from them. This dynamic is currently termed by some as the inter-independent self.\textsuperscript{240} In my opinion, the dialectic between interconnection of self and other, and maintaining each one’s distinctiveness, strengthens the value of mediated self-understanding. Self-identity as mediated concerns one’s connection to and reliance upon others, as well as one’s difference from them. This means that a mediated self opposes neither a Cartesian autonomous self nor a feminist self-in-relation approach to identity; rather, it works with both, while not fully embracing either.

My reading of Ricœur reveals that his mediated view can broaden self-understanding and its relational endeavour to live mutuality. The inter-independent self is closely aligned with Ricœur’s view that “a just distance is maintained at the heart of mutuality, a just distance that integrates respect into intimacy.”\textsuperscript{241} I understand this to mean that reciprocal correlation with each other and respectful separation, which recognizes the dignity of each one, are both important and related aspects of identity. The mediated self suggests that an inter-independent self understands him/herself as unique, self-determining, and fundamentally relational. The definition of inter-independency used here is taken from developmental psychology, but has implications for understanding why one would follow the thread of a mediated self for understanding

\textsuperscript{240} McCauley, “The Use of Constructive-Developmental Theory,” 638.

mutuality:

…at once independent (capable of being created by the person) and dependent for its form on life's contingencies. Thus the self is experienced as a work in progress. Self-exploration and on-going development of self and others is a central concern. Conflict is experienced as inevitable and an opportunity to engage in mutual transformation with others. The world is viewed less in terms of dichotomies or polarities and more in terms of dynamic, mutually-transforming systems.\textsuperscript{242}

When tension between self and other is viewed as dialectical, critical and objective, rather than as irresolvable conflict, then each can view themselves and the other as a work in progress. This extends the value of mediation to include the self-transformation being sought in a good definition of mutuality.

Mutuality cannot be lived between persons who understand themselves as only interdependent or completely independent. The importance of Ricœur’s mediation model is that it uproots self-other relations from the oppositional either-or constraints of domination, in which one is viewed as independent and the other as dependent. It also offers something beyond an understanding of mutuality as reciprocity or interdependency, which in my view remains limited. A mediated self opens us to the possibility of self-other relations between inter-independent selves who live together in a relational dynamic between dependency upon the other and independency from the other. A mediated self is shaped in that critical relational space within the self between the involuntary (dependent) and voluntary (independent). Likewise, self-other relations are shaped in the relational space between two inter-independent selves.

\subsection*{3.1.2.4 Power-in-Common}

Mediated self-understanding is critical, transformative, and involves persons-in-

\textsuperscript{242} McCauley, "The Use of Constructive-Developmental Theory," 638, 640, 646.
relation, as defined by the inter-independent self. Ricœur’s mediated self also favours power-in-common as an alternative to the imposition of power in dualistic models, marked by domination of one over the other. Ricœur’s mediated self offers a distinct understanding of shared power. His view of relationality does not involve competition between selves who view each other through the lens of either-or oppositions. Rather, he adheres to a model of relationship that involves working through the tensions within the self and between inter-independent selves that involves a process of becoming. Power-in-common, therefore, opens persons to self-transformation and relational transformation.

Mediated self-understanding has promising implications for transforming western one-sided ways that favour direct self-understanding. The mediated self is an approach that can help settler-Canadians renew their self-understanding in a way that respects themselves as individuals and a society, as well as respecting Indigenous individuals and collectives, with their separate worldviews and experiences. This perspective does not reject, but recognizes a shared legacy of colonialism, while also

243 Paul Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, trans., Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 194-95. Power-in-common and power-with are two complimentary notions of shared power. Ricœur’s term power-in-common refers to the ability for persons to come together in a joint action that could not be accomplished by either one independently of the other. Power-in-common is distinguished from the feminist notion power-with, which is an aspect of Nothwehr’s understanding of balance of power. See: Nothwehr, *Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics*, 7. Within the notion, balance of power, Nothwehr assumes the feminist notion of power-with in which “one’s ability to move, effect, make a difference” is “shared, reciprocal and constrained by the limits that respectful interrelationship imposes.” She draws her understanding of power-with from Harrison and Heyward in, Beverly Wildung Harrison, "The Politics of Energy Policy," in *Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics*, ed. Carol S. Robb (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 175; Isabel Carter Heyward, *Touching Our Strength: The Erotic and the Love of God* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989), 191. My reading of Ricœur and Nothwehr detects a slight distinction between Ricœur’s notion, power-in-common, and the feminist understanding of power-with. It seems to me that Ricœur’s understanding of power-in-common puts the emphasis on the power that persons create together and share. Whereas the feminist notion, power-with, implies the individual capacity, or power-to that each one offers. In my view, both aspects, are important in a good model of shared power: the unique ability that each one brings to the relationship and the power-in-common that is shaped together and can be claimed by neither as their own.
acknowledging a common humanity, and mutual desire for transformation. Mediation contributes to a view of power-in-common that respects both Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians as having contributions to make to a new relationship, while accepting that each has their own work of transformation to pursue. A final reason remains for answering the question, “Why Ricœur?” That is, the narrative framework he provides for drawing together these important elements of the mediated self, which I deem foundational for an ethics of mutual recognition.

3.1.2.5 Narrative Hermeneutics

Ricœur chooses narrative as his preferred framework for understanding the mediated self. This is because he needs a model that respects the relational self as the basic unit of self-identity in a way that incorporates uniqueness and interconnection between selves as an alternative to the self as separate and opposite from others, which is the model supported by western dualistic thinking. Narrative is also a good model for self-critique and transformation. Further, the voluntary and involuntary; the mediated self; and narrative hermeneutics make Ricœur a good choice for better understanding mutuality in dialogue with feminist concerns of domination. Ricœur brings substance to the dialogue through his narrative model of the mediated self, which incorporates the four elements of our definition: self-recognition, relationality, power-with/power-in-common, and transformed praxis.

Feminist theologian, Rosemary Carbine credits Ricœur’s understanding of narrative in her work in public theology. She is convinced that a “feminist theology of narrative as a form of political action can then make an important contribution to
Rethinking ruling patriarchal norms of personhood.”  

In other words, Carbine sees narrative as essential for understanding the self as relational and not autonomous, separate from, or over others. She writes, “We re-create and re-construct our personal identities in narratives by negotiating our “entanglement” in the stories of others.”

Ricœur’s narrative understanding of self-identity assists in the negotiation of entanglement, which for him depicts how deeply interconnected yet uniquely distinct each one’s individual life story is in relation to those of others. He writes, “the action of each person (and of that person’s history) is entangled not only with the physical course of things but with the social course of human activity. How, in particular, are we to distinguish in a group action what belongs to each of the social actors?”

Carbine picks up on how Ricœur’s understanding of the mediated self, understood through the structures of narrative, necessarily leads to ethics because relationships both shape us and are shaped by us. This trajectory of the narrative self promises participation in a shared life that is not turned in on the individual self, nor so enmeshed in the lives of others that one cannot know or act for oneself. For settlers in Canada, the mediated self can offer a way beyond the enmeshment of social structures and identities in the colonial paradigm that continues to place them in a relation of power-over indigenous peoples. I now follow Paul Ricœur’s philosophical itinerary to uncover the foundation of his ethical theory of mutual recognition, as an alternative to...


246 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 107.
relationships of domination.

3.2 Ricœur’s Philosophical Itinerary

In this section I build the discussion by signaling which elements of Ricœur’s philosophical itinerary unfold his notion of the mediated self. His ethical understanding of mutuality can be traced through his philosophical itinerary that grounds it in a narrative understanding of the self as mediated. In keeping with our definition of mutuality and its elements of: 1) self-recognition, 2) relationship with others, 4) power-in-common, and 3) transformed praxis, note that narrative allows us to follow Ricœur’s thinking about self from his initial phenomenological work on the will, through epistemology and ontology, to its ethical significance.

3.2.1 Phenomenology: Involuntary/Voluntary Self

Ricœur’s first major works on the phenomenology of the will are a first articulation of the dialectical thread that continued to develop throughout his prolific writings. Only by working through the tension between the two poles of the voluntary (active) and the involuntary (passive) aspects of identity can one understand oneself. This is always a struggle, but for Ricœur, it is not only a struggle. He views self-understanding as a mutually enhancing tension within the self, not an irresolvable conflict. On the one hand, the involuntary self is limited by need, desire, historical,

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social, genetic, etc. determinants, but these limits also provide possibilities for the self to know itself. The limits of the involuntary self indicate to its voluntary aspect all the potential ways one might achieve self-understanding. On the other hand, the voluntary self has the capacity to determine how it will express and live its own uniqueness by choosing from all the possibilities actually available. The capacity of the voluntary self involves the freedom to choose which possibilities will be explored and developed.

How do the aspects, voluntary and involuntary work together within the self? In my case, I am a woman, born in the twentieth century, into a middle-class Roman Catholic family, in Canada, in a globalized world. My social, historical, geographical, ethnic etc. contexts, as well as my genetic make-up, have not only determined my limitations, but they have also provided the scope of possibilities that lie open before me. My voluntary self chooses which from among these possibilities to act upon, according to my reality, needs, motivations, intentions, and desires. In this way, the dialectic involuntary/voluntary works together to contribute to self-understanding as two-dimensional. A two-dimensional self is a good way for understanding identity as a non-oppositional dualism, but it is not a good model for understanding how a self actually comes to understand itself.

3.2.2 Epistemology: Reflexivity

Ricœur did not arrive at a method for explaining the voluntary and involuntary dimensions of the self on his own. His dialectical thought was primarily influenced by two key figures. First, Roland Dalbiez (1893-1976), Ricœur’s first philosophy professor who taught young Ricœur to respect his own intuition and encouraged him to continue questioning his discomfort with the approach of French reflexive philosophy that
reduced concepts to rational ideas and was deprived of any sense of realism. Second, Ricœur was introduced, by Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) to a method called, secondary reflection. Secondary reflection is a way of rationally understanding what is first known through practical experience. Ricœur learned from Marcel the skill of inserting that which is already known through experience into a second, reasoned reflection on concepts. This method allowed Ricœur the scope he needed to embrace the contributions of both rationalism and empiricism in his phenomenological analysis of the will. But this did not satisfy Ricœur’s quest for understanding how experience and knowing are joined; a connection he believed was accessible through an ontological understanding of the self.

The dilemma that concerns Ricœur, at this point, is how one can actually know oneself in an intelligible way through experience. For him, it is the ontological self that mediates rational and experiential knowledge. I take an example in my own life. I know myself as a spiritual companion to others. I know this because I have the experience of accompanying another on her journey of healing from the trauma of trafficking. When I reflect on my experience, I note that it matches my training and what I know generally about the concept of spiritual accompaniment. The particular experience of accompaniment and my conceptual understanding of it work together to provide the

248 Bernard P. Dauenhauer, *Paul Ricœur: The Promise and Risk of Politics* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 5. French reflexive philosophy, in the tradition of Descartes, claims that the act of thinking turns back on itself to grasp the subject or “I” of thinking. This would allow persons to understand themselves directly. Ricœur could not accept the directness of self-knowledge.

249 Paul Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction, Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc De Launay*, trans., Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 9. Here, Ricœur describes the influence of Marcel’s unconventional philosophical method of reflection. Primary reflection is objective, scientific and reductionist. A secondary reflection concerns mystery of being, its overall unity and the deeper, personal insights that can be brought to reflection.
meaning that allows me to understand myself as companion. Both the experience and some rational knowledge about it come together to shape my self-understanding. I cannot will myself to be spiritual companion to another, even if I know a lot about it. Neither can I understand myself as spiritual companion only through experience. Both objective knowledge of the concept and subjective understanding through experience are required to know myself as a spiritual companion. Ricœur turns to ontology in his search for an intelligible process of self-understanding that joins rational knowledge and experience.

3.2.3 Ontology: Actual Being

How is self-understanding shaped through the combination of experience and rational knowledge? In other words, how does one come to understand oneself if neither experience nor rational knowledge are enough on their own? Ricœur’s work on the will opened the question of the ontological existence of the self. He saw a gap that needed to be bridged between how one perceives oneself and the lived reality of one’s life. For example, the structures of mind and rational knowing allow for the theoretical possibility of making a choice, but do not account for actually making a choice.

A path to understanding this dilemma between knowing and being, revealed itself to Ricœur through the problem of evil. Phenomenology of the voluntary and involuntary will explains only the poles in the self between one’s limitations and the possibilities for becoming oneself. To satisfy his ultimate concern for a fullness of self-

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understanding that involves how choices come into being, Ricœur seeks a way to account for actually making a choice, such as a bad choice or being violent.\textsuperscript{251}

In order to understand how violence and human frailty move from possibility to actual being, Ricœur looked to the way people had confirmed the existence of violence (evil) in the world and how they tried to understand its meaning through the use of symbolism. He discovered that the experience of evil is first expressed in the obscure language of symbol. Upon second reflection it is explained in myth. A third degree of reflection provides a rational explanation. Using the example of the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on original sin, Ricœur explains this three-fold thinking. Some Christians might assume that the teaching on original sin originates in an analysis of the myth of the Fall, recounted in Genesis. This is a naïve idea to claim that our understanding of sin begins with its doctrinal teaching based on scripture, not on experience. However, behind the teaching is the myth, used to explain what was already expressed through the language of symbol, such as a stain or a tortuous road.\textsuperscript{252} The myth embellishes the symbol with a creative explanation of its meaning. Church doctrine is a third articulation. Doctrine appears as a rational interpretation of the myth. However, more foundational than symbols, myth, or doctrine is the experience of violence/evil.

\textsuperscript{251} Thomasset, \textit{Une Poétique de la Morale}, 55. Thomasset describes here Ricœur’s concept of the voluntary and involuntary self. The involuntary self involves those aspects of the self that are given. They define the self and limit it. The voluntary self makes its choices according to the limits of the involuntary. And the involuntary self is realized through the choices of the voluntary. In other words, the involuntary self and the voluntary self receive and create each other.

\textsuperscript{252} Thomasset, \textit{Une Poétique de la Morale}, 104.
Ricœur writes, “The symbol gives rise to thought.” But, he could have prefaced this idiom with, “experience gives rise to symbol.” Actual human experience underlies the explanations of sin that are found in Christian symbols, myths, and Church doctrine. But, direct explanations of experience are not what Ricœur is after. Further investigation into interpretation is needed to account for the relationships between the objective explanation of experience and a subjective understanding it.

3.3 Interpretation

As described above, interpretation becomes a key concept in Ricœur’s understanding of the mediated self in the process of self-understanding. It opens for him a way for describing his understanding of the self in a mutual relationship of knowing and being. As introduced above, interpretation is the way one expresses his/her self-understanding. This leads to new interpretations of the self. The question of being, or the ontology of the self, which was left hanging at the conclusion of his two major works on the philosophy of the will, led Ricœur to question how a self actually interprets his/her own identity. More precisely, his concern is about understanding the fundamental relationship between knowing and being within human identity.

3.3.1 Knowing: Explanation and Understanding

Ricœur’s theory of interpretation is strongly influenced by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), who both questioned the opposition between explanation and understanding. They took up the questions that were left hanging from the work of the Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Wilhelm

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253 Ricœur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, 237, 357-367. Ricœur calls this maxim, “the guiding star” of the topic of this book, which is an investigation into the relationship between philosophy and mythology.
Dilthey (1833-1911). Schleiermacher continues to be a leading historical figure in the modern epistemological critique of the interpretation of texts. Although his project sought to find universal rules for bringing together various methods of interpretation, he could not escape the dualism of the Romanticist tradition. This means, he was not able to bridge the opposition between the meaning of a text according to its grammatical structure and the meaning attached to the intention of the author. Schleiermacher’s work leaned heavily on explanation as a research method based on the empirical sciences. For example, his theory of interpretation is based on explanation of the structure of a text. He claimed that another research method was required to investigate what it means to understand.

Dilthey took up the challenge of understanding meaning. He sought to balance the unresolved dualism between empirical research methods (scientific, structural) and the human sciences (meaning). His primary focus was to understand the epistemological structures of the mind. In doing so, he looked to the psychology of epistemology. According to Dilthey, it is the intention of the author that needs to be interpreted in order to understand the primary meaning of a text. This belief led him to make his renowned distinction between explanation and understanding. Dilthey favoured the primacy of the latter. He claimed that interpretation is not primarily based on that

254 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 120.

255 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 121.


257 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 121.
which can be measured and explained through the empirical sciences. The sciences of
the mind, especially psychology, play an even more important role in interpretation. For
Dilthey, knowing the author’s intention was the pre-requisite to the explanatory structure
of the text. According to him, the text serves the intention of the author. It is a
depository for the expression of the author’s aim. The author’s intention, therefore, is the
primary meaning of the text.

Dilthey’s distinction between explanation and understanding undermined the
importance of the meaning revealed through the structure of a text itself
(Schleiermacher.) His preference for psychologizing interpretation leaves a new
expression of the same dualism that Schleiermacher sought unsuccessfully to resolve.
Explanation and understanding is the unresolved dialectic that Ricœur seeks to reconcile
in his own contribution to interpretation. He looks to Martin Heidegger to help him
explain the significance of this dialectical correlation.

3.3.2 Being: Experience and Interpretation

Heidegger takes interpretation out of the objective realm of epistemology
(explanation and understanding) and into the realm of being. Heidegger claims that in
order to ask epistemological questions, such as, “How do we know?” we must first
recognize the subject asking the question. Heidegger claims that because knowing is
only one aspect of being in the world, it is more fundamental to understanding that we
interpret what it means to be a being-in-the-world. The importance of Heidegger’s
thought for Ricœur is the shift he makes from interpretation as a search for an objective
meaning already embedded in universal structures of knowing, to interpretation as the
unfolding of meaning that is tied to being in history.
Ricœur is greatly influenced by Heidegger’s effort to move interpretation toward ontology. Like Heidegger, he believes that interpretation of meaning does not happen simply through the structure of a text or the intention of the author. Interpretation of meaning is rooted in a fundamental ontological understanding of the self. Ricœur aligns himself with Heidegger’s claim that we know ourselves first as subjects living in a world to which we belong. It is a secondary effort to try to grasp the world objectively in order to understand ourselves in fuller way. Ricœur distances himself from Heidegger when he agrees with Hans Georg Gadamer’s critique of Heidegger’s theory that it fails to effectively appeal to a mediated self. Unlike Heidegger who chooses the short way of access to the self through analyzing the concept of Dasein, Ricœur chooses the long way to self-knowledge, first through the detour of language.

### 3.3.3 Linguistics: Structure and Meaning

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), the Swiss linguist, had identified two mutually interdependent categories of language: 1) the universality of words and 2) the event specific use of speech. While he understood that the structure and use of language intertwine in a mutual relationship of meaning, Saussure’s work did not go in this direction. Ricœur recognized the insight of Saussure, as well as the achievements he

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258 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 123.

259 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 56. The notion of “detour” is a common expression used by Ricœur in his hermeneutical theory. Contrary to Heidegger who takes the “short way” to an ontological understanding of the self through the analysis of Dasein or self as being- in- the- world, Ricœur takes the “long way” or “detour” through the interpretation of signs that are mediated through symbols, metaphors and texts, in order to arrive at self-knowledge. At heart, Ricœur always remains committed to an anthropological phenomenology, but his understanding of human beings and cultures was never one-sided. His ontological anthropology includes an epistemological dimension, as this paper demonstrates.

made toward the recognition of structural linguistics as a scientific way to approach language. But, Saussure’s theory could not account for the relationship and distinction he had made between the structure and the use of language. His work focused exclusively on the structural analysis of language and the meaning of its inner operations. Linguistic signs were codes to be deciphered in order to find the meaning hidden in the relationships within language systems. His structural methods for analyzing discourse, whether spoken or written, failed to offer a scientific way to account for the message of language when it is used in specific situations.261

Ricœur sought to reconcile the apparent poles of structural meaning and the message of language. He searched for a way to hold and work with the tension between the meanings embedded in the universal dimension of language systems, and the specific message of language when used, whether spoken or written. He hoped that the intertwining of the structure and use of language might be a good way to effectively explain and understand the distinction and interconnection between the epistemological and ontological aspects of self-understanding.

Ricœur’s challenge was to find a way of accounting for the measurable or enduring quality of the message of language when used and its interconnectedness with language as structure. He needed to find a method of interpretation that was based on the intertwining of the subjective and objective aspects of language. This was motivated by his insight that the content of language has an enduring quality that can be measured

261 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 125. Thomasset notes that Ricœur recognizes the contribution to hermeneutics of the explanatory role that Saussure works out through structural analysis, but claims that the interpretive value of structures do not go far enough for understanding the use of language in actual situations.
through repetition, translation, and interpretation.\textsuperscript{262}

Ricœur’s interest in understanding the meaning of the content of language takes him beyond scientific or structural meanings of language. It also reaches beyond the limitations provided by intended meanings of an author/speaker. Ricœur helps us to think about a further understanding of meaning when he writes, "Hermeneutics begins where dialogue ends."\textsuperscript{263} This suggests that there is more to meaning than what meets one’s first grasp of language, and the intention of a speaker or author. The meaning in language is extended to the reader/listener’s self-understanding.

\subsection*{3.3.4 Narrative Hermeneutics}

Ricœur furthered Saussure’s insight about the distinction and interrelation between the universal meanings found within structural linguistics and the message of language when used in specific situations. Building on Saussure, Ricœur looks to hermeneutics to find a scientific way to account for the structure of language and its message when it is used in specific situations. Ricœur also believed that the written text, narrative in particular, is the most effective model for demonstrating the interpretative or hermeneutical nature of self-understanding. Hermeneutics is a movement of thinking that seeks a fundamental understanding of self through the mediation of language, in particular through the narrative interpretation of texts.

Hermeneutics is the way a self participates with a text through literary investigations. A hermeneutical relationship with a text leads to new interpretations of

\textsuperscript{262} Ricœur, \textit{Interpretation Theory}, 1-22.

\textsuperscript{263} Ricœur, \textit{Interpretation Theory}, 32.
the self. In other words, the goal of hermeneutics is the transformation of self-understanding. For Ricœur, a self’s understanding of his/her own identity involves the relationship between knowing and being within human identity. Ricœur’s narrative hermeneutics involves the movement between three worlds: the world of the author, the world of the text, and the world of the reader.\footnote{Ricœur, \textit{Interpretation Theory}, 37; Thomasset, \textit{Une Poétique de la Morale}, 129.} The world of the text is the mediator between the two other worlds. Ricœur’s theory does not seek to understand the author’s intention for writing a text, although he is aware that the author sets limits for interpretation. Ricœur assumes that the author’s view represents one valid, but selective interpretation of the world, which is then deposited into the text. Once embedded in the text, the author’s interpretation limits and opens possibilities for a surplus of meaning.\footnote{Ricœur, \textit{Interpretation Theory}. The topic of this book concerns the question of discourse and the surplus of meaning. Ricœur understands surplus of meaning as a notion that is durable and fragile. This means that once an author’s intended meaning is inscribed in a text, the text opens up to all the possibilities for diverse interpretations of multiple readers. The author sets the limits for interpretation, but remains always at risk of being misunderstood. This means that each interpretation must be faithful to the initial text, but diverse meanings are valid as the original.} This means that the real task of hermeneutics, according to Ricœur, is the reader’s interpretation and self-transformation.

With the help of linguistics and literary analysis, every era of readers can be faithful to the original text and explore many new and relevant meanings that can be added to previous interpretations. Ricœur calls the hermeneutical movement between the worlds of the author, text, and reader: Mimesis I, Mimesis II and Mimesis III or pre-figuration, configuration, and refiguration.\footnote{Paul Ricœur, \textit{Time and Narrative I}, trans., Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 52-90; Alain Thomasset, \textit{Une Poétique De la Morale}, 137-143.} This represents a three-fold process of
understanding narrative that begins with the reader who stands in front of the text. Situation, context and experience shape a reader’s first understanding of the text. Interpretation reaches a kind of completion when each reader discovers meaning in a text for today.

A reader stands in front of a text in his or her in a (pre-configured) context. The text acts like a filter through which a reader’s first understanding of him/herself passes. For example, I read the Annunciation story in the Gospel of Luke, through my lens as a Christian, middle-aged, economically privileged, white woman living in Canada two thousand years after the text was written, and whose life’s work concern is social justice. Everything about my situation serves as the lens through which I first approach the story. As I read the story, I am surely taking it in very differently than a Muslim man in Nairobi, Kenya, or a young Hindu girl in Hyderabad, India. Each one’s context serves as the first lens through which the text is being read. Context shapes the first way one understands the story and makes each one’s first understanding unique, but limited.

Configuration is the second hermeneutical movement that happens when a reader’s first understanding is enriched by the text. This serves a critique of the self. Configuration happens when a reader steps away from their first contextually informed understanding of the text and looks more objectively at the story from another perspective. For example, let us consider Mary as the Lord’s handmaiden (consenting servant or slave) in the Annunciation story and look at how a feminist literary analysis of consent offers an alternative to the traditional image of God as a transcendent, all-
powerful protector, and removed from the human realities of women.\textsuperscript{267} According to the feminist interpretation of Jane Schaberg (1938-2012), Mary’s consenting “yes” to God demonstrates, not powerless resignation, but her agency, autonomy, wisdom, and freedom from human masters.\textsuperscript{268} Mary lived in a culture in which women were dependent on men for their wellbeing. Schaberg suggests that built into Luke’s Annunciation story is an alternate reading to traditional interpretations that support the image of God as an all-powerful protector who guards Mary’s virginity. Schaberg’s feminist interpretation is based on her analysis of Mary as a consenting doulē (handmaid or slave).\textsuperscript{269} The element of consent appears in none of the ten other annunciation scenes in the Hebrew Bible, nor in the annunciation to Joseph in Matthew 1, or to Zechariah in Luke 1. However, in the Annunciation story in Luke, Mary as doulē gives her consent: “let it happen to me according to your word.” This transforms the meaning of the text. Protection is not imposed on Mary by God, she consents and then receives God’s protection. In Schaberg’s opinion, Mary accepts and is affirmed by God in an actual situation of irregular pregnancy. This image of God stands outside of and not in conformity with an imposed social order in which women’s virginity must be preserved for men. Instead, the angel in the story affirms God’s creative presence dwelling within Mary. This liberating, creative God is the One who gives life to Jesus,

\textsuperscript{267} Jane Schaberg, \textit{The Illegitimacy of Jesus: A Feminist Interpretation of the Infancy Narratives}, Biblical Seminar Series, vol. 28 (Sheffield Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 135-138. I use Schaberg’s analysis of the story in Luke 1 as a means of expanding the traditional understandings that based on a model of masculinist protection, i.e., God as all-powerful protector and women only as docile and in need of protection by men. Instead, Schaberg demonstrates that within the biblical text itself is another interpretation: that of women’s agency.

\textsuperscript{268} Schaberg, \textit{The Illegitimacy of Jesus}, 138.

\textsuperscript{269} Schaberg, 127-128.
and gifts Mary’s being with song.\textsuperscript{270}

During the configuration, Schaberg’s literary analysis offers a new perspective; one that has implications for the reader’s possible refiguration of self-understanding. In this case, a reader like myself, might connect with the story in a new way and as a result understand myself anew, as I understand the story from another perspective. Refiguration is the self-transformative moment in the hermeneutical process. Self-transformation does not happen in a void; it must be assisted by the text and critique of new perspectives.

Narrative hermeneutics is a process of understanding interpreting itself. It operates within its own structures (limits), while also providing for transformation of new self-understandings (refiguration). Transformed self-understandings are discovered through a critical filter of investigation (configuration).\textsuperscript{271} Ricœur’s mediated self is explained well through a narrative hermeneutics. It provides an intelligible way for Ricœur to account for the structured and becoming aspects of mediated self-understanding.

3.4 Narrative Theory

In this section, I identify four characteristics of Ricœur’s narrative theory that are crucial for mediated self-identity. They are: event and meaning, intended meaning and interpretation, meaning and reference, and interpretation and appropriation. I will draw substantially on the work of Alain Thomasset, whose doctoral dissertation in 1996

\textsuperscript{270} Luke 1: 46-55

\textsuperscript{271} Paul Van Tongeren, "The Relation of Narrativity and Hermeneutics to an Adequate Practical Ethic," \textit{Ethical Perspectives} 1, no. 2 (1994): 59.
assembled the ethical implications of Ricœur’s narrative thought. Thomasset takes the contribution that Ricœur makes through narrative hermeneutics to biblical interpretation, and broadens the dialogue with Christian ethics. For this, Thomasset follows Ricœur’s career up to and including his anthropology of the capable self in, *Oneself as Another*. However, note that I will not follow Thomasset all the way to mutual recognition. According to my research, Thomasset’s recent exploration of Ricœur’s work on recognition is brief and not helpful for our purposes.

Thomasset describes the characteristics of Ricœur’s narrative theory as one that: 1) helps us understand discourse as the event of language; 2) helps us understand discourse as a structured work; 3) demonstrates the way in which a world is projected in front of the text; 4) shows the way in which a text mediates self-understanding. As Thomasset also points out, the third and fourth characteristics are particularly important for ethics. These last two aspects provide us with a way of understanding the connection between narrative and ethics, and demonstrate how self-understanding is required for understanding ethical action. Let us now look briefly at each of the four characteristics.

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272 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 169-296. Chapters 7-9 relate most directly to ethics, but the preceding chapters underlie the development of Ricœur’s ethical thought.

273 Alain Thomasset, "De la Poétique de L’amour à la Dialectique Homme-Femme: Paul Ricœur et Gaston Fessard sur la Question de la Reconnaissance Structurelle," *Revue d’Éthique et de Théologie Morale* 281 (September 2014). Thomasset’s presentation of a dialogue between Ricœur and Fessard seeks an image to put flesh on Ricœur’s understanding of mutuality. According to my reading, Thomasset’s choice for Gaston Fessard’s anthropological model of man–woman as a good model of non-domination and correlation of mutuality, does not satisfy our concern for addressing the problem of masculinist protection in a western dominated context.

274 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 123-129.
3.4.1 Event and Meaning

The first element of Ricœur’s narrative theory helps us understand that in all discourse there is dialectic between event and meaning. In oral discourse, meaning is limited to those who participate. While speaking, interlocutors are able to dialogue and question. The speaker can clarify and help the hearer to understand the intended meaning. On the one hand, oral dialogue is a good model to demonstrate how to arrive at understanding the original intention of another. On the other hand, the fleeting quality of oral discourse is not a good model for demonstrating how to arrive at self-understanding.

The event of written discourse is the relationship between the author’s context and his/her choice of expression. No author writes in a vacuum. Nor does any writer identify completely and only with his/her context. Rather, the choice of words used by an author and deposited into a text involves an interplay between contextual determinants and a subjective identity that enables the author to choose what, why and how s/he wants to express.

The event of discourse, embedded in the written form of a narrative, endures in structure. Through repetition, interpretation and re-interpretation, it also endures in meaning. Written texts do not allow readers the possibility of face-to-face interaction with an author. The concept of distanciation makes it difficult to interpret the author’s meaning of text because the world of the author and the event of narration are distanced by time and place from the world of most readers.\(^{275}\) The speculative quality that is

\(^{275}\) Ricœur, *Interpretation Theory*, 43-44.
attached to an author’s intention may make it seem like a text is more limited in meaning than oral discourse. But, Ricœur believes that, despite its limitations, a text offers far more scope than oral discourse.

Once an event is embedded in the structure of a text it is distanced from the author’s interpretation and it opens itself to a surplus of meaning. The text takes on a life of its own as it provides an opening for the possibility of many new interpretations. However, a text is not only open, it is also limited. The text itself determines the number and kind of interpretations possible. This requires faithfulness on the part of the reader and respect for the constraints of the text. For example, texts must be analyzed in ways that respect the historical context, literary structure, and themes. The reader must always adhere to an accuracy of what the text actually says as he or she seeks to discover its meaning. The world of the text is not open to every interpretation. An interpretation must not be construed to prove a point, to explain unrelated themes or to argue about issues today that were not part of the historical reality of the world of the text. Openness and limitation work together to support all faithful interpretations. The meaning of a text endures through a relationship of interpretation and reinterpretation making each valid interpretation as authoritative as the author’s.

3.4.2 Intended Meaning and Interpretation

The second element I consider in Ricœur’s theory of text demonstrates a dialectic within meaning. A relationship is revealed between the subjectivity of an author’s intention and the objectivity of the text as a work. Just as a piece of art is the

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objective result of an artist’s work, narrative belongs to a literary genre that identifies it as the objective result of an author’s careful arrangement of sentences. Ricœur shows that the meaning pole of the dialectic between event and meaning contains two mutually interdependent dimensions: 1) the meaning intended by the author; and 2) the meaning that can be discovered in the world of the text, through the science of literary analysis. This insight helps Ricœur to show that all understanding must pass through the filter of objective analysis. By this he affirms that there are multiple, possible meanings to a text, but that all valid meanings must be faithful to its structure. He then looks to the dialectic within the structure of narrative.

3.4.3 Meaning and Reference

A third characteristic concerns the narrative dimension of a theory of text. This element is essential for understanding the link between ethics and narrative. Like mathematical philosopher, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), Ricœur distinguishes between the structure of meaning and reference, in order to show that there is a structured meaning beyond the literary analysis of a text. Ricœur illustrates that a text also points beyond itself and refers to a meaning outside of its structural sense. Thomasset clarifies Ricœur’s point by explaining that in oral discourse, both the speaker and hearer understand how to have a conversation and they both have an understanding of what a particular conversation is referring to, even if sometimes they need to question for clarification. On the other hand, in written discourse a reader can find meaning based on

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277 Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative II, trans., Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 32. Ricœur holds firm to his belief that “to explain more is to understand better.” This means that an interpretation that has been arrived at through objective analysis and explained from one or more perspectives is always a more valid interpretation than an interpretation that is based solely upon a reader’s personal experience or first understanding of a text.
its structural components, but the referent remains embedded in the text. This means that the search for the meaning that is being proposed by the world of the text involves the reader’s imagination.

The text is the tool that the author has used to refer to the meaning of something outside of the text. For example, I use written language to refer to the events of the day when I write in my journal. An analysis of the composition can tell a reader about the literary structure and the literal meaning of the sentences, but only the reader’s imagination can understand what I am referring to when I write about what it means to write a thesis, for example.

When persons read, different meanings are understood at the same time. Ricœur claims that narrative gathers into a unity, a whole series of diverse and unrelated parts. Narrative is a creative work that uses all components of its genre to point beyond the literal meaning of sentences. Narrative expresses in an imaginative way the author’s interpretation of what is being referred to. It then beckons each reader to engage in the operations of his or her imagination in order to understand the reality being referred to. As will be explained later, narrative makes possible Ricœur’s explanation of the dialectical structure of action as a harmony between the identifiable and the repeatable, and the creative.

Thus far, Ricœur has shown that when discourse is written, it takes on a life of its own. Detached from its original event of discourse and from the author’s intention, a text can be read, analyzed and interpreted in an objective way by multiple readers in

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278 Ricœur, *Interpretation Theory*, 50, 88. Metaphor brings together two unrelated semantic fields to create a new meaning. Narratives gather together into a unity many unrelated elements to create a meaning of the whole.
many diverse contexts. Ricœur has been successful in demonstrating that meaning has an objective structure that can be analyzed, but interpretation based on such analysis remains incomplete for him.

3.4.4 Interpretation and Appropriation

The fourth characteristic of Ricœur’s theory is also essential for the ethical trajectory of my thesis. It reveals how Ricœur returns to subjective meaning in a way that accounts for the mediated subjectivity of the reader. He achieves this through his concept of appropriation. In Ricœur’s theory, interpretation is completed when the hermeneutical spiral of understanding allows the reader to understand him/herself better, differently, or begins to understand the self for the first time.279

For Ricœur, the meaning of a text must pass through the structural analysis that has been shown above. But, the completion of the understanding of meaning is reached when the world of the text comes into relationship with the world of the reader. Appropriation of meaning by the reader is the real goal of Ricœur’s narrative theory. It occurs when one is awakened to a fusion of horizons of the world of the text and the world of the reader.280 This happens when the reader can say, “I’m connected to this text!” The concept fusion of horizons, borrowed from Gadamer, is a heuristic tool for understanding that the worlds of text and reader are actually not isolated from each other. But that transformation of the self and new meanings of the text happen when the

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279 Thomasset, Une Poétique de la Morale, 128.

280 Jean Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer trans., Kathryn Plant (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 95-96. The author writes, “But, Gadamer wonders, is there some such thing as a horizon of the past which is radically cut off from the horizon of the present?” Grondin explains very well that Gadamer’s image is an explanatory tool to assist readers to awaken to actual connection, not the live in the illusion of separation.
reader is awakened to this connection. It is also important to note that, fusion of horizons operates differently in narrative hermeneutics than it does in human action, since when appropriating a text only the reader is transformed. Appropriation opens the reader to new possibilities for being. The reader grasps what s/he has seen from a new vantage point when s/he acts on the text. Transformation of the reader, expressed through actions or words completes the hermeneutical circle and beckons the spiral of interpretation to being again.

Through his long detour into narrative theory, Ricœur is able to arrive at a hermeneutical model that returns to the subjectivity of the self in a unique way. The movement is three-fold starting with a reader’s first understanding of a text, entering into an objective analysis of the text, and leading the reader to a transformed understanding of him or herself. The situation, world and intention of the author set the limits for interpretation. However, these remain behind the text and are not the focus or goal of interpretation. This makes the text itself an object to be studied and re-interpreted many times over. The horizons of the world of the text and the context of the reader meet in the process and fuse, creating new interpretive possibilities. The reader is transformed as he or she takes in the new meanings proposed by the text. Through the act of appropriation, the reader experiences a transformation in his or her own self-

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281 Karlijn Demasure, *Verwaald Tussen Liefde, Macht En Schuld. Een Hermeneutisch Model Begeleiding Van Dader En Slachtoffer Bij Seksueel Misbruik Van Kinderen*, Annua Nuntia Lovaniensia, vol. 49 (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 169. Demasure explains that the hermeneutical project requires a fusion of horizons in order to arrive at transformation. For example, I must place myself in a historical horizon if I want to know something about it. In fact, a real fusion of horizons means that historical horizons are never closed. In the hermeneutical process we move in and out of past horizons as they help us understand our present.
According to Ricœur, narrative best demonstrates the three-fold hermeneutical spiral that is completed by transformation in the reader’s self-understanding. It must be noted that the completion of the hermeneutical spiral is not absolute. Each rotation also opens one to new avenues of exploration. As demonstrated above, narrative provides a good structure for gathering many diverse elements into a whole. The creativity of narrative lies in its ability to reach beyond itself to produce new meanings. Ricœur accomplishes his task of describing the subjectivity of creative meanings in an intelligible way.

Ricœur’s concern always remains an anthropological one probing the important question about what it means to be human. He demonstrates that narrative is a good model for articulating human self-understanding as mediated. But Ricœur still needs to find a way to describe human being in a coherent way. He discovers that by applying narrative to action his anthropological project can move forward.

3.5 Action Theory

In this section the foundation for an ethical theory of mutuality is revealed as I unravel the thread of action theory to expose the strands of human identity, narrative identity, and its core, ethical identity. These lead to care-action. Ricœur first recognizes that action always underlies a narrative as its unobservable and unifying core. However, he does not find the fullness of the meaning of action in the description of the events in narrative. Rather, action is the invisible dynamic of plot that creates a story by bringing together the characters, themes, and events in a relationship that gives meaning to the story. Without this kind of action, the self-expression of the author and a story’s multiple
meanings to readers, cannot find their way into the world.\textsuperscript{282}

Thomasset points out that Ricœur’s ethical thought operates in a similar way to the plot of action in a narrative. He gives two important reasons for using narrative to articulate human action in an intelligible way. First, the four characteristics of text can be applied to action as an object; and second, narrative is a good model for describing the meaning of human action. Just as his theory of text operates between the dialectics of explanation and understanding, Ricœur’s theory of action operates between the dialectic of the objective and subjective aspects of motive (explanation) and cause (understanding).\textsuperscript{283}

The same kinds of questions that directed Ricœur’s investigation of mediated self-understanding to narrative theory, prompt the analogical development of a theory of action for ethics. In other words, can ethics recognize in an intelligible way the event of action, while also acknowledging the possibility that the same action may have multiple meanings? The thread I follow in this chapter leads to Ricœur’s discovery that the dialectic finds a home\textsuperscript{284} in the ethical identity of the capable person, which will be a topic in the next chapter.


\textsuperscript{283} Thomasset, \textit{Une Poétique de la Morale}, 130.

\textsuperscript{284} John Van den Hengel, \textit{The Home of Meaning: The Hermeneutics of the Subject of Paul Ricœur} (Lantham The University Press of America, 1982). I borrow the notion of identity as a home of meaning from the work of Van den Hengel.
3.5.1 Action as Text

Ricœur looks directly at the problem of the meaning of action. Here he is influenced by the work of Max Weber (1864-1920) who categorized various types of meaningful action. Like Weber, Ricœur asserts that action can be objectified and suspended from its original situation so that it can be read and analyzed just like a text.

In order to demonstrate this, Ricœur applies the four characteristics of his narrative theory to action. His theory shows: 1) that any action, like a text, can be objectified and separated from its agent. This happens through the unintended consequences of action that carry their own meanings and through the endurable qualities of action that make it recognizable and repeatable by others, 2) that action, like a text is a structured work.

This means that just as a text gathers together characters, themes, and events through the unifying structure of sentences to create a narrative, actions too have patterns that create a unity when intention, goals, motive, agent, doing and initiative are gathered together in ways that can be recognized and understood as a whole. The joining of all these structural elements implies that an action is not limited to its objective form as an event. An unobservable something makes action happen. For example, a hockey game is an identifiable event involving players, puck and ice. But, it is also comprised of a complex pattern of invisible concepts, such as those just mentioned (intention, goals, motives, and initiative). Together, the identifiable and the unobservable assign meaning to the activity of pushing a puck around on ice, 3) that meaningful action goes beyond itself and

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projects a world in front of it. This means that the immediate sense of an action can have far-reaching importance. For example, instituting Canada’s anti-trafficking law in 2005 did not just respond to one situation. It continues to have meaning and to find new meanings to better respond today, and 4) that meaningful action opens one to new self-understandings when its horizon fuses with the horizons of the world of experience of anyone who comes to know about it. For example, significant actions in history, like the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade in the early nineteenth century, continues not only to be a source of information, but also helps transform the self-understanding of those engaged in anti-human trafficking efforts in colonial contexts today.

These four elements of Ricœur’s theory of action help us to understand four things about meaningful action. They are: 1) action is observable and can be seen independently of its actor, but 2) meaningful action is not limited to what can be identified. This means that observable action also has underlying, organizing elements that are invisible, but necessary for action to be meaningful, 3) meaningful action can be repeated and reinterpreted according to new contexts, and so carries a multiplicity of meanings, and 4) the fullness of meaningful action is reached when persons experience transformed self-understanding. Just as the fullness of meaning of a narrative is a reader’s transformed self-understanding, Ricœur’s view of action theory places the fullness of meaning in the self-transformation of the actor. Therefore it involves a “What?- Why? - Who?” relationship of meaning that gives primacy to the “Who,” or the agent of action, as the mediating dynamic between the pair, “What? - Why?
In *Oneself as Another*, Ricœur devotes two chapters to action theory. He does so to deal with a gap he identifies when action theory is solely understood through an analytical framework. The weakness that concerns Ricœur is the lack of attention to the “Who?” of action. Linguistics leans toward the “What? - Why?” relationship of action and away from the actor or the “Who?” of action. Ricœur anticipates that the move from narrative to action theory by means of analogy will help incorporate the “Who?”

### 3.5.2 Human Identity

Action can be read as a text, objectified, analyzed and appropriated by its many “readers.” The question of the “Who?” of action must be explained. Ricœur’s whole project has been a quest for an ontology that describes how human action is the axis for understanding human-being-in-the-world. So far, he has found an intelligible model for describing action. But, the objectification of action applies to the “What?” of action. The cause of an action and the consequence of an action can be analyzed and separated from each other when the focus of action is on the “What?” But, Ricœur’s ontological concern is about human action, and that involves intentionality. The fullness

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287 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 56-112. In Studies 3-4, Ricœur works out his theory of action, which deals with the relationship between the structural meaning of action as an objective event (agentless) and its subjective meaning when a particular action is attached to its agent.


289 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 130.
of the ethical dimension of human identity is linked not just to the “What?” question of action, but also to “Why?” Narrative recounts the story of its characters by answering questions like, “Who did what and why?” Therefore, a more complete theory of human action must include an intelligible way of accounting for the relationship between the “What? - Why?” pair and the “Who?” Since human action is always attached to a person or persons who perform the action, identity takes a place of precedence in Ricœur’s overall ethical thought. Ricœur turns again to narrative as his method for understanding the fullness of identity.

3.5.3 Narrative Identity

An important feature of narrative for understanding human identity is its mediating relationship between the dialectic of history and fiction. Fiction is a creative expression of history and history provides the concrete data from which a selection of elements is chosen for the construction of a particular narrative. On the one hand, the composition of every fictional narrative draws on real events from history so that its readers will be able to identify with the story in some way. This means that all fiction is connected in some way to an historical event to which an author and readers can relate. Historical fiction recounts an imaginative story while also using actual historical characters and recorded events. On the other hand, every historical narrative is

290 Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative, trans., Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). In this volume Ricœur deals with the dialectic, time and narrative. In, Thomasset, Une Poétique de la Morale, 144-148, the author summarizes Ricœur’s understanding of the relationship between time and narrative in identity, i.e., history as a dialectical relationship between cosmic time and human time, and narrative identity as one’s particular story within the expansive human story that unfolds infinitely back into the past and forward into the future. In Paul Ricœur, "Narrated Time " Philosophy Today 29, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 263., he writes: “On a cosmic scale, our life is insignificant, yet this brief period when we appear in the world is the time in which all meaningful questions arise.” Narrative humanizes cosmic time.
fictional in the sense that the author has selected some events over others and arranged them in a particular way to form a whole. This mediating place of narrative between episodes embedded in history and the creative refiguring of them produces what Ricœur calls a narrative identity of its characters. This means that just as the poles of history and imagination work together to create the world of the narrative, they also create the narrative identity of the characters. Ricœur asserts that narrative identity is a good model for understanding the ontological aspects of self.

Ricœur’s narrative understanding of the self operates within a three-fold dialectical structure. The first dialectic, the self as mediated, has been explained above. This dimension concerns how the self comes to know itself as limited and becoming. Ricœur never departs from his assertion that the self cannot know itself directly. As already demonstrated, narrative hermeneutics is a good model for understanding the self as mediated. Action theory has shown us that the self that comes to know itself through narrative can come to self-understanding in an analogical way through action. Since the ontological dimension of human action is connected to the “Who?” of action, and this needs further discussion, I will now turn to the second and third dialectics of Ricœur’s theory of human identity. These correlations relate to the self that comes to know itself through human action. The second dialectic, which I discuss next operates between *idem*, or sameness and *ipseity*, or self-hood. The third dialectic,  

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291 John Van den Hengel, "Oneself as Another' and Practical Theology," *Theological Studies* 55, no. (1994): 466-469. The author describes Ricœur’s three-fold dialectic of the self to include: 1) Self as mediated, i.e., the self that is understood through a dialectic of explanation and understanding, 2) Sameness and “Ipseity”: the self that is understood through a dialectic of sameness (the constancy rooted in human character) and ipseity (becoming, rooted in commissives), 3) Self and Other: the self that is understood through the dialectic between self and other in its various guises: with one’s own body, intersubjective otherness, and transcendent otherness of conscience.
between self and other will be discussed in the next section, under the heading, ethical identity.

3.5.3.1 Idem and Ipseity

The dialectic, *idem* and *ipseity*, is characterized by the relationship between the aspects of the self that make it recognizable throughout a lifetime as the same self, and the evolving or projected self that is constituted by commitments and promises. I highlight two reasons why Ricoeur claims that narrative identity is a good model for explaining this dialectic: first, because narrative identity can account for the recognizable and the evolving aspects of the self; and second because narrative identity can describe the self’s individual and social aspects.

The concept of sameness (*idem*) in human identity is the dimension of the self that is fixed, but in an adjustable way. Just as narrative identity accounts for the recognizable traits of characters in a plot, it can be a good model for explaining the sameness or character of the self. The traits of a self that are embedded in one’s character, whether they are inherited or acquired, are the qualities that make a person recognizable as the same self over the span of a lifetime. But, sameness is not stagnant or unchanging. The sameness of the self is also constructed over time. The sound of someone’s voice or the colour of his/her hair continues and changes so slowly that it is recognized as part of one’s sameness throughout a lifetime. But a suddenly acquired limp or a new skill can also be added to the recognizable character of a self. Further, sameness includes traits such as the calmness of one’s character, another’s inquisitive nature, or yet another’s impatient temperament. The supple continuity of physical appearance, temperament, and skills all contribute to making one identifiable and
recognizable as the same self as it endures over time.

3.5.3.2 Permanence of the Self

*Ipseity* is the becoming dimension of the self and so is not observable. Rather, it is comprised most notably by the ethical commitment of the self to the other. This means that *ipseity* is the aspect of the self to which one attests and in which others put their trust. In *Oneself as Another*, Ricœur describes *ipseity* as the self-constancy of each person that is a manner of conducting himself or herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable for my actions before another.\(^{292}\) *Ipseity* requires the commitment to be loyal to the promises one has made when the initial desire and enthusiasm has dwindled. But how does Ricœur find a way to account for the permanence of the observable sameness and *ipseity* of a person in order to make his model of the human identity intelligible?

Ricœur distinguishes and joins two models of permanence to ground both sameness and *ipseity* in time. They are continuity and constancy. Human time best explains the permanence of constancy and cosmic time, that of continuity. Human beings are part of both, i.e., the lived moments in particular time and the continuous unfolding of cosmic time. The present moment connects the past that has unfolded before and the future that is yet to unfold. In reference to cosmic time, human time, which stands between past and future, is insignificant. However trivial, the present is the only time in which persons actually live and so it holds great importance. Because of this, tools are created to help measure the time to which persons belong, in relation to

\(^{292}\) Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 163.
time’s cosmic sense. Ricœur writes that a calendar for measuring human time
“cosmologizes lived time [and] humanizes cosmic time. And it does this by making a
noteworthy present coincide with an anonymous instant in the axial moment of the
calendar.”

The same dialectic of permanence that joins human time (constancy) and cosmic
time (continuity) also lives within human identity. Continuity refers to the kind of
stability that belongs to one’s character or sameness overtime. This kind of permanence
claims its validity in the durability of character that is found in the observable traits that
allow a self to be continually recognized as the same self over time. This makes it
possible for me to recognize someone I have not seen for years as the same person I
previously knew.

The concept of ipseity provides a greater challenge to permanence because of its
changing quality. Ipseity gives a specificity to an individual. It also demands that one
account for the durability of the unmastered and yet unseen parts of the self. Ricœur
grounds his notion of permanence based on constancy in the notion of the promise. As
he explains, the permanence of the promise is very different from the durability of the
sameness of one’s character. A promise is based on the self-constancy of keeping one’s
word in faithfulness to the promise that has been given.

293 Paul Ricœur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*, trans., Kathleen Blamey and John B.
Thompson (New York: Continuum, 2008), 214.

294 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 160.

295 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 123.
In the promise, there is a mutual overlap of *idem* and *ipse*.\(^{296}\) In typical Ricœurian fashion, there is also overlap of the two models of permanence (continuity and constancy). These are distinct, but also work together in a dialogical way. A promise can only be measured through the kept word that one makes to the other. To promise constancy is made possible in reference to the continuity of one’s character and vice versa.

The continuity of character and the constancy of *ipseity* are different and they are intertwined more closely than one may think. For example, a self can have many recognizable character traits that make it possible for him/her to promise to be a friend. But, to measure the lived reality of that promise requires more. Ricœur himself writes, "The continuity of character is one thing, the constancy of friendship is another."\(^ {297}\) This distinction/connection between the continuity of one’s character and the constancy of one’s promise to maintain oneself is important for ethics. It is so because even though an individual has many recognizable character traits from which to act, s/he must choose the ones upon which to stand firm.

### 3.5.3.3 Individual Person and the Social Self

As mentioned earlier, narrative is also a good model for explaining the dialectic between the individual and social aspects of the self. In our discussion about the dialectical movement between character and *ipseity*, it became clear that human identity is defined as much by relationship to the other (promise) as it is by its own selfsame character. The promise puts the self in relationship with one to whom a commitment is

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\(^{296}\) Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 118.

\(^{297}\) Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 123.
made. This points to the social or ethical dimension of human identity. Within the ethical dimension, the promising self is committed by a word or action that involves the responsibility to maintain oneself before the other.

Ricœur also claims that narrative is a good model for mediating the aspects of sameness and *ipseity* in the identity of a community. This operates in a similar way to that which has been described above. Ricœur believes that the best example for understanding the narrative identity of a community is found in the story of the Hebrew people of the Bible. Narrative in the Hebrew Bible expresses the sameness and the *ipseity* of a people.

Thomasset helps us to understand Ricœur’s point that it is in telling their stories that the Hebrew people became and continue to be an historical community. The ways in which they tell their story and through the choice of events recounted also expresses something about their character as a community. The dialectic between sameness and *ipseity* is mediated by the biblical narrative as it is received by them and as it continually creates them anew. Although Thomasset does not describe the idea of permanence with regards to the narrative identity of a community, I make the connection that the permanence of a community is measured by the traits that make it a recognizable community, such as the Hebrew people of the Bible. The second form permanence is found in the constancy (and struggle to be constant) of the community to be faithful to the promises they have made as a people. From these two aspects of permanence the ethical dimension of social identity emerges. Ethical identity allows the self to make the

298 Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 151
decision to maintain itself, i.e., to be counted upon by the other over time. When a promise is made to maintain the self over time, whether that self is individual or communal, it is always ethical because it involves commitment to the other. A promise is intersubjective as it is always made to another. As I unfold Ricœur’s ethical thought, I now move to the dialectic self/other.

3.5.4 Ethical Identity

The dialectic self/other notably contains the most interesting implications for ethics. Ricœur’s view of the relationship between self and other contains three others: 1) my body, 2) the intersubjective other, and 3) conscience. The first other, my body, mediates between self and the world. The second other, the intersubjective other, is the self who knows itself in the ethical response it gives to and receives from the other. The third other, conscience, is the self that attests to "its own most power of being before measuring and in order to measure the inadequation of its action to its most profound being." The meaning of the second and third “others” will be discussed below.

Supported by the insights of feminist scholars, I have described the basic unit of the self as relationship. Narrative is a good model for explaining the ethical identity of this intersubjective self. This is because narrative not only brings together the aspects of personal identity, i.e., sameness and ipseity, it is also a good model for understanding the relationship between self and other.

Above I discussed how narrative identity best describes the dialectic of sameness

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and *ipseity* in its individual and social aspects. Through sameness and through the promise these two aspects of the self can work together to ensure the stability of self. But, the moment that a promise is made, the self steps out of the world of possibilities and into the concrete reality of its commitment. Through the permanence of the promise, the self takes responsibility for all its future actions related to the promise and becomes accountable to the other. At the same time, the promise brings a certain instability to the self. For example, as one commits to friendship, the self is opened to all the wonderful possibilities brought by this promise. But, s/he is also opened to misunderstanding and to being misunderstood; to inflicting violence and to being hurt; and to the possibility of making mistakes. To promise self-constancy therefore, is to put oneself in a fragile place. The same strength of human identity that has enabled the self to make a promise also renders it vulnerable in its availability to the other who must now receive it or not.\(^300\)

The third other, the attesting self is also strongly linked to the ethical aspect of self. Attestation is concerned with the other as the inner conscience who witnesses with confidence to the self.\(^301\) Ricœur’s concept of attestation joins epistemology and ontology in his quest for an inclusive explanation of what it means to be human.\(^302\) Attestation is the mode of being of *ipseity* that allows the self to believe in and witness to its own existence:

\(^{300}\) Thomasset, *Une Poétique de la Morale*, 183.

\(^{301}\) Van den Hengel, "Oneself as Another' and Practical Theology," 462-463.

\(^{302}\) Van den Hengel, "Oneself as Another' and Practical Theology," 470-471.
In attestation the self expresses the assurance that, in spite of suspicion, meaning and the self are possible. Truth here is not necessarily verifiable truth. Attestation is the self as Care. The self exists in other words, as an attestation of the truthfulness of being.\textsuperscript{303}

The intelligibility of human being is attested to through the self’s witnessing to its own capabilities and commitment to the other through care (\textit{Sorge}). Continuing to build on action theory, Ricœur reffigures Heidegger’s concept of care, which I explain below. Care is part of Ricœur’s framework of recognition because of its link to human capability.

Construing Heidegger's care in terms of action and thereby finding care-action to be at the heart of every narrative provided Ricœur with the basic resources for articulating the main themes of his mature anthropology. Among these themes are: (a) discourse and action, (b) selves as agents, (c) the temporality of action, (d) narrativity, identity, and time, (e) memory and history, (f) ethics, and (g) politics. Each of these themes deals with a fundamental feature of the constitutive capabilities of the capable human being.\textsuperscript{304}

Care-action becomes Ricœur’s way of understanding the relationship that actualizes the distinction/complementarity between knowing and being, through the self’s efforts and failures to know itself through participation. This form of self-understanding through participation is care-action. It has implications for transforming the one-sided relationships of domination, marked by masculinist protection.

\textbf{3.5.5 The Self as Care-Action}

Ricœur understands care-action to be the fundamental way human beings are in

\textsuperscript{303} Van den Hengel, "Oneself as Another' and Practical Theology," 471.

\textsuperscript{304} Dauenhauer, "Paul Ricœur." 6/23.
He takes from Heidegger’s *Sorge* an understanding of care that involves the self’s awareness of its being-in-the-world of things and persons, and a basic concern for all of it:

Only a being that is a self is *in* the world; correlatively, the world in which this being is, is not the sum of beings composing the universe of subsisting things or things ready-to-hand. The being of the self presupposes the totality of a world that is the horizon of its thinking, acting, feeling – in short, of its *care*.306

But, Ricœur’s interpretation of care is more practical than Heidegger’s theoretical understanding of *Sorge* as care-concern. This is because Ricœur interjects action into his understanding of care. Without action, care would remain a purely intellectual enterprise.

Ricœur’s understanding of care-action unites Heidegger’s understanding of *Sorge* with *praxis* in Aristotle.307 This linkage allows Ricœur to view the ontological idea of care as lived.308 It also provides us with an understanding of the element of *praxis*, an element of our definition of mutuality upon which I have not yet touched.

When asked about his view of Heidegger’s statement, “Science does not think,” Ricœur responds in a way that helps us understand how he understands care as action:

But this is provided thinking is restricted to the capacity of that being in the world that I am, as a concerned being, to grasp hold of itself in its self-understanding; the science of nature is not, in fact, this type of thinking. It could never think its object in the mode of human concern or, to use my terms, in the

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306 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 310.

307 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 311.

308 Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 74-75.
mode of action.\textsuperscript{309}

Ricœur, like Heidegger believes that science is a mode of mathematical thinking belonging to the structures of the intellect, and not to a form of human concern (care). In other words, human-being-in-the-world involves a basic ontological understanding of \textit{Sorge}.\textsuperscript{310} But, Ricœur goes further than Heidegger’s theoretical understanding of \textit{Sorge} as the way of being human in the world.

Ricœur believes that care occurs at the intersection of actual experience, thinking, and acting. Care-action is therefore a practical mode of attesting to one’s human self-understanding as capable. A self who knows him/herself as care-action is a capable self. Ricœur begins to develop his understanding of the capable self in \textit{Oneself as Another}, and sees it through to its fullness as mutuality in \textit{The Course of Recognition}. His understanding of an ethics of mutual recognition is the topic of the next chapter.

\textbf{3.6 Conclusion of Chapter 3}

To this point in the thesis, it has been determined that mutuality is valued in several bodies of literature, including as a formal norm in Christian social ethics. I also presented a common concern across a broad spectrum of scholarship regarding the need for a \textit{praxis} of mutuality (Young, Nothwehr, Taylor, Coulthard, and Bhabha). That being called for is an explanatory moment for mutuality. Some attempts have been made, but those that have been examined (politics of recognition, and hybridity) fall short for the

\textsuperscript{309} Ricœur, \textit{Critique and Conviction}, 74.

\textsuperscript{310} Ricœur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, 310-314. The German root, \textit{Sorge}, is translated as Care. Ricœur’s understanding of the concept means more than Heidegger’s theoretical concept referring to concern for things and for people. Care for Ricœur involves a unity of human being, an inclusivity that joins everything that concerns human thinking, feeling, and acting.
In this chapter I looked at the work of Paul Ricoeur to help develop a fuller understanding of mutuality in light of the challenges articulated in previous chapters. To this end, I discussed why the work of Paul Ricoeur might assist with a better understanding of mutuality and how his narrative hermeneutics leads to deeper and more critical understanding of self-identity. Further, I unfolded his notion of mediated self-identity all the way through its narrative structure to the core: care-action. We can now anticipate that care-action is the basic unit of identity that will influence Ricoeur’s ethics of mutuality.

Our arrival at care-action involved establishing the critical foundations of the mediated self for relationships of mutuality. I discussed four central topics: 1) the need to develop a better understanding of mutuality in light of the challenges articulated in previous chapters; 2) why turn to the work of Paul Ricoeur to assist a better western understanding of mutuality; 3) how narrative hermeneutics can lead to deeper and more critical understanding of self-identity; 4) and how the notion of self-identity can lead to an understanding of ethical action.

These topics were addressed in the five sections above. In the first section, I restated our definition of mutuality and named four elements for a good theory. In doing so, I suggested that mutuality is a good alternative to protection when addressing trafficking, especially when relationships are already one-sided, such as those between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians. I indicated that mutuality is a promising framework for social justice in this context because it promises to transform the relational roots of one-sided, restrictive solutions that are based on underlying colonial
attitudes that build and maintain frameworks of domination.

I also discussed why the work of Paul Ricœur is a good choice for better understanding mutuality. I suggested that Ricœur’s notion of the mediated self, with its narrative structure, and foundational role for an ethics of mutual recognition joins all four of the elements of our working definition of mutuality: self-recognition, persons-in-relation, power-in-common, and transformed praxis. Since Ricœur’s view of mutual recognition involves the value of relationship as the basic unit of identity, and this is compatible with the feminist views that have been discussed, it makes him a good choice for this thesis. In line with feminist views, he also understands experience as foundational to the work of identity formation. However, Ricœur is not as absolute about the value of the experience of interdependence as is the feminist view self-in-relation. His mediated, or self-through-relation approach, values intimacy with the other and separation from the other as important interrelated aspects of the dialectic within identity. Because of this I suggested that, like a current stream in developmental psychology, Ricœur’s view of mutuality involves interdependence and inter-independence.

Inter-independence is a point of contention with western feminists who stress the importance mutuality as reciprocity, which emphasizes sameness or equality. In the next chapter, my reading of Ricœur suggests that reciprocity on its own does not enter fully enough into the dialogue on mutual recognition, which must also recognize difference. Reciprocity privileges sameness over otherness in an effort to balance real inequalities. This is what I see in present solutions to Canada’s problem of human trafficking. Reciprocity is necessary for justice and equality of human rights. However, recognition
of difference is also needed to allow for the dignity of each one.

In the second section, I introduced Ricœur’s philosophical itinerary that takes him through phenomenology, epistemology, and ontology. Along the way, he discovers that self-understanding does not belong by itself to either the operations of the will, structures of the intellect, or human existence. Rather, self-understanding requires a relationship among all three. In doing so, I signaled the mediated self as his response to the western, autonomous self inherited from dualistic thinking, and the pivotal point between a dialectical, involuntary/voluntary self. The Cartesian legacy of a dualistic self proposed the ultimate achievement of an autonomous self through direct and pure self-knowledge. The both-and thinking, characteristic of Ricœur’s mediated self, offers an alternative. It does so by its ability to hold and work through the tensions between the limitations of the involuntary self and the freedom of each one to create their unique self. Ricœur is a realist, and so his mediated self offers a practical, organic approach to a western renewal of self-understanding.

The mediated self presents the problem of finding a structure for understanding how a self holds and negotiates the tensions that mark dialectical self-understanding. In the third section, interpretation was discussed as the key element in the dynamic of self-understanding. This led Ricœur to privilege a framework of narrative interpretation as the best model for understanding the mediated self.

In the fourth section, I followed Ricœur as he continues to addresses four dialectical tensions within a narrative theory of text. This helps him demonstrate that the core of narrative is action. The final section brings us to action and its core – the ethical person, as care-action. We have now arrived at the core of Ricœur’s theory of mutual
recognition and can now look at how he explains a *praxis* of care-action. Will it provide us with a good alternative to relationships of care that are essentially based on masculinist protection?
Chapter 4

Paul Ricœur’s Ethics of Human Capability and Mutual Recognition

4 Introduction

In this chapter, I continue the discussion that brought us to care-action as the basic unit of identity that influences Ricœur’s ethics of mutuality. In order to do so, I will look at two aspects of care-action. They are: human capability and its critical aspect of vulnerability, and mutual recognition with Christian forgiveness as a structure to imagine its achievement. In the section on human capability, I will begin the discussion by situating Ricœur’s work on the capable self within the broader discourse on capability. This will be followed by discussion on Ricœur’s understanding of capability and its contribution to the discourse, which is the anthropological foundation of the capable self for ethics.

In the section on mutual recognition, I will explore the contribution of Ricœur’s understanding of mutuality as the mediation or reconciliation between two capable selves. Capability extends to mutuality in its mode of imputability. The correlation between mutuality and imputability, invites capable persons to also embrace vulnerability in the achievement of mutual recognition. In addition, I will discuss the contribution of Ricœur’s understanding of the structure of Christian forgiveness as a

311 David M. Kaplan, "Paul Ricœur and Development Ethics," in A Passion for the Possible. Thinking with Paul Ricœur, ed. Brian Treanor and Henry Isaac Venema, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 118-127. In the section, “How Ricœur Contributes to Development Ethics,” Kaplan mentions three areas in which Ricœur contributes to capability: 1) his view of vulnerability, 2) imagination (of which forgiveness is one model for imagining better relations among nations, peoples etc.), and 3) the paradox of political power. This chapter will develop the first two: the important link between capability and vulnerability, and how forgiveness is a model for imagining actual mutuality, through the categories of moral, political, and aesthetical.
A way to understand the distinction between mutuality and reciprocity. Four main points will be discussed: the structure of the spirit of forgiveness, with the problems posed by distance and equality; the spirit of forgiveness and its return to human capability in its imputable mode; the spirit of forgiveness in its hyperethical mode; and finally some implications of Christian forgiveness as an imaginary for mutuality. These points will shape a response at the end of this chapter to the question of how the theological implications of Ricœur’s ethics of mutuality impel us beyond care-action, and lead beyond protection to festive recognition.

The section on theological implications prepares us for the conclusion of this thesis in Chapter 5, where I will revisit the working definition of mutuality from Chapter 2, and question how Ricœur’s contribution helps us get beyond the gap in the literature associated with mutuality, i.e., a praxis of social justice that involves equality and respect for difference. Then the practicality of Ricœur’s contribution to mutuality can be evaluated as a model for social justice and the question of the role settler-Canadians can be posed. In order to do so, I will analyze Project Northern Outreach (PNO), which will be presented in the last section of this chapter as one experience of festive recognition.

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312 Ricœur, "Love and Justice," 325. Ricœur uses the term hyperethical to describe the biblical notion commandment, a notion that expresses the transcendence of obligations and imperatives of ethical codes, whether religious, legal, or social. It denotes a dynamic that operates on complete freedom of the self from itself as same and total openness to the other.

313 Project Northern Outreach is a current effort of collaboration between PACT-Ottawa, a circle of 12 Anishinaabek grandmothers, and Public Safety Canada. The project takes place in the region between Manitoulin/North Shore to Sault Ste. Marie, although the impacts are reaching North Bay, Ontario and into Quebec, and Michigan, USA. The final report will be released in July 2016, and will be accessible on PACT-Ottawa’s website: www.pact-ottawa.org.
4.1 Capability

Human capability is a foundational anthropological, a political-economic, and an ethical notion. Paul Ricœur makes capability an integral part of his anthropological and ethical thinking about recognition, which culminates in mutuality. However, in the literature, capability is a theory (also known as the capability or capabilities approach) of development ethics.

Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum are the foremost scholars associated with the capability approach.\textsuperscript{314} I will briefly present some basic aspects of the theory below, followed by Ricœur’s view of capability. Ricœur refers to Sen’s early work\textsuperscript{315} on the capability approach, which preceded Sen’s collaborations with Martha Nussbaum, and the subsequent development of her own theory.\textsuperscript{316}

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\textsuperscript{314} Martha C. Nussbaum, \textit{Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). Both Sen and Nussbaum focus much of their work within developing world contexts, specifically in India. Nussbaum understands the term, \textit{developing}, in a wider sense than its popular usage. She understands all countries and nations to be developing since all have need for improvement of human well-being.

\textsuperscript{315} Amartya Sen, \textit{Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Amartya Sen, \textit{Commodities and Capabilities} (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985). These early contributions of Sen are the texts that influenced Paul Ricœur. The early feminist philosopher, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), influences the work of Amartya Sen. Wollstonecraft claimed that women were equal to men and that their apparent inequality was due to a lack of education. Sen’s work has influenced the comparative approach taken by the United Nations in the creation of the Human Development Index that is used to report annually on the state of human development in the world. Ricœur refers to these works of Sen in Ricœur, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, 141.

\textsuperscript{316} Martha C. Nussbaum, and Amartya Sen, ed. \textit{The Quality of Life}, Wider Studies in Development Economics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). In 2003 Nussbaum and Sen founded the Human Development and Capability Association, https://hd-ca.org/ (accessed February 16 2016). Although Sen and Martha Nussbaum worked closely together on the capability approach, Nussbaum has taken the work beyond its comparative contributions. She proposes ten universal or central capabilities that are needed for functionings to be possible. Her 10 central capabilities are: Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, Imagination and Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; Control Over One’s Environment. Functionings are the concrete “beings and doings” which facilitate the realization of one’s capabilities. For example, one’s capacity for bodily health can only be realized when adequate functionings such as proper nourishment and safe shelter are actually available.
4.1.1 The Capability Approach

Amartya Sen understands capability as an evaluative measure for the health of political economies. Vulnerability is an absence or deprivation of capabilities.\(^{317}\) The aim of the capability approach is to reduce vulnerability as much as possible. Sen grounds the capability approach in the fields of development economics, social theory, and philosophy. He first developed capability as an evaluative framework in the 1980’s. It grew in response to his personal experience growing up in Bangladesh, where he witnessed the extremes between wealth and comfort, on the one hand, and poverty and famine, on the other. In times of famine, he observed that the real problem was not about food as a value or human right, nor was it about lack of food distribution; rather, the issue was that the economically poor did not have what they needed (money) to actually access their right to food. In times of famine, the poor were dying, and the rich were not, and not because of lack of food, but for lack of opportunities to gain access to it. Sen’s concern centers on the opposition and limitations of both the utilitarian (ends) and resource driven (means) political economies that use a country’s income, their Gross

\(^{317}\) Kaplan, "Paul Ricœur and Development Ethics," 118-127; Paul Ricœur, "Autonomy and Vulnerability," in Reflections on the Just (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 2007), 37, 39, 40, 72-90; Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, 123, 126, 127, 129, 159, 173. Sen’s vision for developing capabilities is meant to counteract the problem of vulnerability, which he views as the causes of economic deprivation, such as famine; freedom from such vulnerability is the goal. Ricœur’s view of vulnerability is two-fold. It is linked to social contexts and to ipseity. Regarding vulnerability caused by unjust social contexts, he agrees with Sen that these must be remedied. However, vulnerability is also an aspect of the human condition. Ricœur contributes the pair, autonomy and vulnerability. For Ricœur these are always linked because persons are not only capable or autonomous; rather they are connected to others, acted upon by others, and always in the process of becoming. In its anthropological sense, vulnerability is something to embrace and not avoided because it keeps persons open to others and to their own process of transformation. Kaplan writes that Ricœur’s contribution to development ethics is this two-sided approach to vulnerability. On the one hand, vulnerability is something to remedy when one’s fragility is exploited for the benefit of another. On the other hand, the value of persons lies not in overcoming vulnerability and achieving autonomy. There is human value also in the connection of persons to each other and their openness to emerging personhood.
Domestic Product (GDP), as the measure for economic well-being.\(^{318}\) He believes that in order to evaluate healthy economies, it is not enough to measure the provision of goods for the greatest number, or to ensure equal distribution of resources. In fact, the combination of both is not enough either. Sen’s development approach to economy injects a third order of evaluation. He uses human well-being\(^ {319}\) as the ethical marker of a healthy political economy.

Sen’s approach to human well-being uses the tools of capabilities and functionings. At the foundation are capabilities (what people value and the quality of life
that they actually have access to) and functionings (the active achievement of those capabilities.) Capabilities are “answers to the question, “What is this person able to do and to be? In other words, capabilities are, “substantial freedoms,” a set of (usually interrelated) opportunities to choose and to act.”320 Functionings are the concrete “beings and doings”321 which facilitate the realization of one’s capabilities. This is also referred to in the literature as human flourishing. For example, one’s capability for bodily health can only flourish when adequate opportunities such as proper nourishment, potable water, and safe shelter are actually available. By signaling capabilities and functionings as more accurate metrics than GDP, Sen’s point is not to promote a new political economic theory. Rather, he advocates for the proper evaluation of information by a nation for determining the health of its political economy. He considers actual human well-being to be a more suitable measure for such evaluation, which makes the capability approach his preferred economic framework. Sen’s theory is based on the right to capabilities.

Sen’s earliest works on human development ethics intrigues Paul Ricœur.322 Specifically, he is captivated by Sen’s pairing of capabilities and rights in his critique of political economic theories.323 The linking of capabilities and rights gives to Ricœur

320 Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities*, 20; Sen, *Commodities and Capabilities*.

321 Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities*, 33-34; Sen, *Commodities and Capabilities*.


323 This refers to Sen’s response to the opposition between ends (utilitarian) and means (resource distribution) theories. Sen’s theory remains utilitarian, but he shifts the evaluative metric from its primary measure of well-being as a nation’s GDP, to a measure that values the capabilities of persons in the realities of day-to-day life, like education and health. His economic approach engages with the lives of real people, particularly the economically poor in developing countries and those suffering from famine.
“reinforcement for a concept of human action as rooted in a fundamental anthropology.”\textsuperscript{324} The pair capabilities and rights helps Ricœur to deepen his understanding of the distinction between the anthropological roots of a capable self and capability as ethical action. In Sen’s version of capability the ethical measure for a healthy economy is based on the capabilities that persons really value in their day-to-day lives and can actually achieve. This involves overcoming vulnerability. Ricœur distinguishes himself from Sen by including vulnerability as the key that opens the door from the anthropological to the ethical aspects of a capable self. I now discuss Ricœur’s understanding of capability as anthropological and ethical.

4.1.2 Ricœur: The Capable Self

In Ricœur’s view, human capability is the foundational anthropological condition of human being. It may seem confusing to now speak of a foundation of the self, when I have already stressed that Ricœur is not in favour of direct self-understanding or a sure foundation to human being. However, I have also discussed that Ricœur is equally suspicious of a self that is groundless and has no structure within which to create itself. Further, I have emphasized that Ricœur’s dialectical understanding of the self is indirect, always relational, and therefore fragile. My reading of his view of capability as the foundation of the self, places his contribution to the discourse directly with the subjective nature of capability, and less directly with the objective outcomes of a capable self. By this I mean that his focus is not on providing the material opportunities for capability, or on the measurable outcomes of a capable person, such as one’s

\textsuperscript{324} Ricœur, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, 146.
capability to flourish healthily, whether physical, intellectual, emotional, or spiritual. Ricœur’s concern relates more to the process of becoming capable of such outcomes and therefore centers on the underlying need within the overall capability process for understanding of ethical relationships and participation in one’s own life.

For Ricœur, the capable self reaches its highest ethico-moral significance through its mode of imputation. However, foundational to a person’s capability to be imputable, or accountable to others, is self-recognition of the anthropological aspects of capability, such as speaking, acting, and narrating. Human capability first involves attesting with confident assurance (and lack thereof) to basic capabilities, such as the awareness of oneself as a unique person, who is an agent of his/her own action, and understands him/herself as connected to others. I now discuss three basic anthropological capabilities attested to by a self-recognizing person: I can speak; I can act; and I can narrate. These three capabilities provide the foundation for a fourth: I can be imputable, which will be the culminating point of this discussion on the capable self.

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326 The use of words is important. Agent can have a derogatory meaning to many Aboriginal people in Canada, given the historical role of the “Indian agent” in destroying Aboriginal societies through the removal of children to residential schools, or enforcement of Government imposed laws. In this thesis, the word is used in its ethical sense, i.e., relating to agency. An agent is a person who, marked by confidence and self-esteem is capable of initiating his/her proper actions.

327 Ricœur, Oneself as Another; Paul Ricœur, "Becoming Capable, Being Recognized," in Reception of the Kluge Prize Awarded to Paul Ricœur (Library of Congress, Washington: 2005); Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 89-109. Ricœur discusses his phenomenology of the capable self.
I can speak involves the capability to self-identify and affirm oneself as a capable person. This mode of capability involves being able to recognize oneself in one’s actions and to announce one’s awareness of being able to distinguish oneself from others. I can speak links identity with action in a reflective way, similar to the kind of self-recognition that occurs when one’s image is reflected in a mirror. I can speak refers to the ability to see oneself in one’s proper actions and to claim them as one’s own. The capacity to speak allows one to express with words and other actions, “This is me!”

I can act builds on the first capability and allows one to take responsibility for oneself as the cause of one’s proper actions. In this mode the self recognizes his/her capacity to cause things happen. One is aware of his/her capacity to initiate inner and outer changes at both personal and social levels. I can act is one’s acknowledgement of one’s own agency and refers to a person’s awareness of him/herself as an agent, i.e., the initiator of his/her actions.

I can narrate involves recognition of one’s capability to make connections and to understand one’s identity in a narrative way. To be able to narrate one’s life entails an understanding of oneself in human time. When Riceur refers to human time, he understands it as a blend of historical events and narrative interpretation. Human time means the actual individual and collective historical time to which meaning is assigned through the narrating of it. In a similar way, I can narrate concerns the capacity for a

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328 Riceur, The Course of Recognition, 96.

329 Riceur, Time and Narrative, 52. For example, Riceur writes, “to the extent that it [human time] is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full significance when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.” Human time is a dialectic between the framework of historical time and the creativity of narrative time. See also, James Champion, "Review Article Poetics of Human Time. Paul Ricoeur's Time and Narrative, Volume 3," Journal of Literature and Theology 3, no. 3 (November 1989).
self to recognize his/her identity as a blend of both the fixed and flexible aspects of *idem* and *ipse* identity. This means that one recognizes how the dialogue within personal identity, between sameness and selfhood, assists in the recognition of oneself as an identifiable person, who is also an ongoing process of becoming.

As discussed in the previous chapter, *idem* and *ipseity* work together to shape one’s narrative identity as both limited and becoming. The fixed aspect of identity limits and offers the scope of actual choice for one’s becoming. To recognize one’s limitations in the process of becoming means that the capacity to narrate one’s life story also involves vulnerability, which is the fragility of the self’s capacity to narrate authentically. Ricœur reminds that, “In the test of confronting others, whether individual or a collectivity, narrative identity reveals it fragility.” A person’s capacity to narrate includes vulnerability because of the many limits that are imposed upon a self, such as the inherited historical and social narratives into which one is immersed upon birth. This creates an inner tension within each person as they narrate him/herself. For this reason, Ricœur is also aware how the vulnerability of individual and collective memories that are passed on through stories can compete and cause conflict as persons and groups recount and live out diverse narrative identities:

> If we take into account the encounter between competitive memories related to the same traumatic events, we are confronted with a situation of conflict preventing any attempt to reconcile antagonistic groups of any kind. Collective memories are threatened with being swallowed by what Freud called the impulse to repeat instead of remembering. Psychoanalysis assigns to hidden resistances this pathology of memory which has its cultural and political expression in the claim of traditional accounts of past sufferings to shape collective memory in terms of war between narrative identities. Such misuse of our capability to tell

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should not be ignored when we come to the topic of capabilities and rights. Narrative identities may claim recognition according to their differences but this claim calls for a kind of therapy as regards the so-called impulse to repeat and to hate foreign traditions built on narrative identities held as adversary.\footnote{Ricœur refers to the need for a therapy or healing, as individuals and collectives capable of narrating, recount their life stories with and among each other. Memories are about the past, but remembering (and forgetting) can both be repetitive without the integration of self-recognition as imputability. Ricœur’s point in relation to this thesis is that for settler-Canadians to remain in oblivion and choose to repeatedly forget history is a denial of their vulnerability, as well as a choice to remain out of reach of their own capability. This impoverishes the opportunity for mutuality with Indigenous peoples.

Ricœur’s insight about the presence of oblivion as an aspect of the fragility of a narrative self, points to the need for reappropriation into one’s life narrative that which has been denied. Reappropriation involves the imputable self and is the critical moment in self-recognition. The imputable self assists with critical remembering, which replaces repetition. It also evokes mourning in lieu of forgetting.\footnote{Ricœur calls critical remembering a work of reappropriation because it allows for the integration of events that up until now have been denied to the self or by the self. When memories of the same events clash, such as those in colonization processes, the task is to remember critically, not to repeat; and to mourn, not to forget. For dominators,}

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\footnote{Ricœur, "Memory, History, Oblivion," 8.}
the integration of remembering and mourning involves arousing the capacity to “bear the consequences of (his/her) acts, in particular of those taken as faults, wrongs, in which another is reputed to have been the victim.”

Integration is the antidote for the problem of repeating the same one-sided memories and repeatedly forgetting to include other perspectives. A capable self culminates in his/her capacity for imputation, which involves self-recognition of one’s incapacity to live up to the commitments and promises because of a lack of integration. The imputable self is able to connect him/herself to his/her actions, to be accountable for them before another(s), to bear the consequences of his/her actions, to suffer the costs, and to integrate new perspectives into the bigger life story of which one is part. It is on this note that I continue our conversation with the fourth capacity of a capable self: I can be imputable.

4.1.3 Ricœur: The Imputable Self

The capable self, characterized by its narrative capability, has opened our discussion to the imputable self, which also has a vulnerable aspect. I can be imputable is the feature of capability that also allows one to recognize his/her openness to the critique of another, to be accountable for one’s unfulfilled promises, and to bear the consequences of one’s false actions. Imputability includes the capacity of a capable self to be vulnerable and to suffer. Suffering is the openness of the self to be acted upon by the other. It is the ability to live with the unknown and to let go of one’s need to

334 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 105.

335 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 104-109; Ricœur, "Capabilities and Rights," 20. False actions are those that do not witness to one’s capable self, but rather announce one’s lack of integrity.
control. This passive aspect of self-recognition is what permits Ricœur to fully transition from self-recognition to mutual recognition, which we can anticipate as the topic of the next section of this chapter.

Imputability is not the only mode of capability that involves vulnerability. The first three modalities of capability, discussed above, also involve the fragility of the self and passivity, since one always speaks to another, acts and interacts with others, who can receive or reject one’s efforts. However, the capable/vulnerable self as speaking, acting, and narrating allows one to make connections between oneself, one’s actions, and one’s ability to affect others, but do not involve the taking of responsibility for oneself in a strong ethical sense.

Imputability opens one to the fullest expression of the capable self, which is the ethical self. This means that the capable self as imputable is able to recognize him/herself as more than capable of speaking, acting, and narrating. Self-recognition for Ricœur is never about isolation of the self or the achievement of egotistical self-realization. The self is always a self in relation with and for others. The vulnerable aspect of the imputable self involves the self’s ability to take responsibility for his/her false action, to open to the critique of others, and to be accountable for his/her actions and inactions that have been harmful to others. In short, the imputable self is capable of being narrated from the perspective of the other. This is already a step toward mutuality.

Imputability is the culmination of the capacities recognized by the capable self. Ricœur writes:

Thus, with imputability the notion of a capable subject reaches its highest meaning, and the form of self-designation it implies includes and in a way recapitulates the preceding forms (speaking, acting, and narrating) of self-
However, the capable person in its fullest sense is not only a self-interested person. The speaking, acting, narrating, imputable self assumes a set of “ethico-moral predicates connected either to the idea of the good or with that of obligation, which allows us to judge and evaluate the actions considered good or bad, permitted or prohibited." By bringing the capable self to its highest point of self-recognition, imputability also extends the self to its mode as an ethical self of care-action. The capable self can be other-centered. Imputability allows the capable self to recognize his/her ethical identity as a person of care-action. Figure 6 below is a summary of the discussion on the capable self, which has opened to the fullness of its ethical meaning.

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337 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 105-106.
Ricœur’s Basic Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am capable of speaking</td>
<td>I affirm myself as capable of making myself known. I can recognize that I am a self and I see myself reflected in my actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am capable of acting</td>
<td>I can make things happen. I am capable of creating action and change. I am capable of ascribing action to myself as an agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am capable of narrating</td>
<td>I can make connections and understand my actions as part of many interactions in an historical and ongoing life story that shapes me, as I participate in shaping it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am capable of imputation</td>
<td>I can accept the critique of others and bear the consequences of my actions. I recognize that my responsibility as a capable self extends beyond myself and therefore, I can experience mutuality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6: Ricœur’s Basic Capabilities**

The figure above summarizes how imputability joins the capable self in its anthropological and ethico-moral meanings. Imputability is the link between self-recognition and mutuality. This linkage brings us to discourses on social justice. By injecting ethical concerns into his economic thought, Sen provides Ricœur with the insight to think through to the fullness of capability as a pair involving ethical (rights and obligations) and self-recognizing (capabilities).\(^{338}\)

Ricœur recognizes his subjective contribution to capability (I can), which supports and is supported by Sen’s capability approach to economics, when he writes:

\(^{338}\) Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 135, 141-145. The insight of Sen that inspires Ricœur is the pairing of “capabilities and rights.”
“It is at this level of the anthropological base of the power to act, of agency, that the evaluation of our capacities, subterraneanly linked to the idea of living well, operates.”\(^{339}\) In other words, if the power to act (agency) is anthropological, evaluation of one’s capacity to act must also be measured at this level. Sen’s approach provides an evaluative tool for measuring capability as the actual freedoms that people have to make choices and live as capable persons. Sen’s ethical approach to economics is concerned with evaluating whether opportunities exist so that persons can make choices about the lives they desire. He is not concerned with normative theories of choice that evaluate the choices persons actually make or not.\(^{340}\) Ricœur’s basic capabilities, summarized in Figure 6 above, concern more directly how persons actually make the choices they want.

Ricœur’s understanding of capability links the ethical with the anthropological. His question is, “How do agents actually choose what they desire?” Sen asks necessary questions about the ethical evaluation of a state’s economic structures regarding the opportunities provided for persons to actually choose to live capable lives. His approach involves ensuring that each person has opportunities to choose a life according to what s/he values and desires. Ricœur asks, “How does a capable person choose, given the right conditions?” He notes that the ethical aspect of the capable self (imputability) links

\(^{339}\) Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 149.

\(^{340}\) Amartya Sen, "Maximization and the Act of Choice," *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society* 65, no. 4 (1997). http://www.jstor.org/stable/2171939 (accessed March 10, 2016); Sen, *The Idea of Justice*, 18-19, 229-230. Sen is interested in how economies maximize options for actual choice behaviour. He understands freedom to choose as a value because it provides opportunities and a process of choice. His interest in the act of choice does not address its meaning in normative theory, i.e., how persons make choices. Rather, for Sen choice lies in distinguishing between opportunity as a narrow “culmination outcome” or a broad “comprehensive outcome.” In other words, Sen is interested in the process of choice as it relates to how a person has achieved the life they live, i.e., one’s life is imposed, very little choice, and therefore something that the person has ended up with (culmination outcome), or one’s life is chosen from among various alternatives (comprehensive outcome.)
to the “idea (that) a right to capabilities is valuable as a criterion of social justice in competing political programs and ideas.” This means that the capable self as imputable lives with different others who also have rights to capabilities, and so all persons must work through their choices for a good life with others who are doing likewise. In this way, imputability creates a bridge that extends from the self who recognizes him/herself as capable (anthropology) to social justice (ethics), and therefore to the working out of mutual recognition between persons.

I will now turn our discussion to mutual recognition, which will begin with a description of two aspects of mutuality, identified by Ricœur: struggle for recognition and states of peace. With the space between these two as our destination, our discussion will take us from mutual recognition as a struggle, to states of peace as its dialectical alternative, and to the tension between as a space of symbolic mediation. The space between is an important bridge that links and separates mutuality in its two modes. We can already anticipate that this discussion will lead us further. Symbolic mediation will point to Christian forgiveness as way to imagine the achievement of mutuality.

4.2 Mutual Recognition

Ricœur asserts, “A just distance is maintained at the heart of mutuality, a just distance that integrates respect into intimacy.” This marks the culmination of a journey of recognition. Gonçalo Marcelo notes that Ricœur took on the project of mutual recognition in his last book because our philosopher wanted his readers to understand

341 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 149.
343 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 263.
what they meant when speaking about recognition. This same hope for understanding what Canadian settlers mean when they speak of mutual recognition has motivated this thesis.

Ricœur distinguishes mutuality from reciprocity. Ricœur’s view of mutuality joins him and sets him apart from others whose meanings of mutuality have been examined in this thesis. In the literature examined, mutuality is commonly linked to reciprocity. Ricœur agrees with those who see mutuality as reciprocity, which is a struggle for justice and equality. But, he is dubious that mutuality is only a struggle and that it is simply about equality. He begins to investigate his suspicion by probing further into mutuality as a struggle for reciprocity. In the process, he discovers that mutuality, or mutual recognition, is related to but distinct from reciprocity in two ways: its ability to hold difference and its capacity for states of peace.

4.2.1 Mutual Recognition: Struggle for Reciprocity

When Ricœur launches his investigation into reciprocity, he is working with the concept of *Anerkennung* (struggle for recognition) as understood by Hegel during the Jena period. This view of mutuality as a reciprocal struggle for recognition was Hegel’s response to Hobbes’s challenge that the state of nature is a “war of all against

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345 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 152.

all." Hobbes believed that without the rule of political authority, persons are not capable of mutuality. Instead, they resort to their natural state, which according to him is an individualistic self-determinism. In the absence of authority, persons behave and decide freely, as they please. Since each one is trying to survive and acting only for his or herself, self-preservation and fear that others will overpower motivate self-interest.

According to Hobbes’s state of nature in Leviathan, persons are basically competitive, distrustful, and self-interested. They must submit to political authority in order to live in peace and enjoy lives based on mutually agreed upon values and rights. Hegel agrees that persons struggle, but not against each other. He does not agree with Hobbes’s idea that persons need political authority to ensure peaceful and mutual relations. Rather, for him, persons are fundamentally relational, not competitive, and when they struggle, it is to be recognized by each other, i.e., struggle for mutuality.

Ricœur’s understanding of recognition is rooted in a conviction that persons are fundamentally relational and generous, not self-interested and competitive, although they are also at risk of being ungenerous, “even the destruction, of the capacity for acting, of being-able-to-act, experienced as a violation of self-integrity.” Although mutuality and reciprocity are used interchangeably in the literature discussing

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349 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 190. Persons are relational, but also vulnerable to harming and being harmed through their relationships with each other.
relationality, Ricœur makes a distinction between the two. His short, but rich definition above describes “the heart of mutuality” as the maintenance of relational space between the horizontal rapport that joins persons by their common humanity, equality, or sameness (intimacy), and the vertical relation that separates persons by their unique differences (distance.)

Mutuality, when understood as reciprocity is helpful when addressing ethical relationships of equality between persons. However, as I will discuss, horizontal relationships of sameness are inadequate for also addressing the demand (which appears within reciprocity) to equally respect each one’s dignity. Equality demands respect for the uniqueness of each. This means that capable persons, who have a sense of their own ability to distinguish themselves from others, can respect the need for adequate relational space so that each other can also recognize him/herself. States of peace are what Ricœur calls positive experiences of mutuality, when distance and intimacy are held in creative tension and where mutuality is actually achieved. Mutual recognition, for Ricœur, is not only a struggle; it is also a lived experience that is realized in persons’ lives. This makes the achievement of mutual recognition worth the struggle.

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350 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 152. Ricœur waits until now to distinguish between reciprocity and mutual recognition.

351 Marcelo, "Paul Ricœur and the Utopia of Mutual Recognition," 118. Marcelo writes that in a handwritten note penned by Ricœur, our philosopher refers to his expectation of states of peace as “clearings” for recognition that are created through the struggle. For Ricœur, mutual recognition is about clearing a relational space for holding and working with complexity; a space within which equality does not need to compromise respect for difference.

4.2.2 Mutual Recognition as States of Peace

Mutuality as reciprocity is a struggle for equal recognition, but Ricœur is unconvinced that it is only a struggle. He believes that actual experiences of mutuality as states of peace are the motivating alternative to struggles for recognition. This claim is based on his conviction that the very struggle for mutual recognition not only demands states of peace, but also provides evidence that persons have already had positive experiences of mutuality. Reimaging mutuality convinces persons that the struggle is hopeful and not in vain. On this point, Ricœur writes, “The certitude that accompanies states of peace offers instead a confirmation that the moral motivation for struggles for recognition is not illusory.”\(^{353}\) With the addition of states of peace to the mutuality equation, Ricœur sets up a dialectical relationship between mutuality as a struggle for recognition and mutuality as achieved states of peace. Symbolic mediation, a discussion that we can anticipate below, helps to understand the relationship.

If justice and equality characterize struggles for reciprocal recognition, *agape* is the concept, that for Ricœur, best expresses the unconditional, non-judging, self-less, and enduring qualities of mutuality as experienced in states of peace. He chooses *agape* over other states of peace, such as affection in friendship and erotic love.\(^{354}\) Unlike friendship, which can be likened to the horizontal dynamic of justice that comes with expectations for equality, *agape* does not expect that each one alternate in the role of

\(^{353}\) Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 218.

giver and receiver. And, although erotic love can be characterized by self-transcendence and unconditionality, agape does not share its private exclusivity. Ricœur writes of agape, “The most important feature for our investigation lies in the lack of concern about any gift in return in the effusion of the gift in the realm of agape. This is a corollary to the absence of any reference to the idea of equivalence for agape.”\textsuperscript{355} However, he follows by clarifying that agape itself does not unequivocally oppose justice; rather, it is concerned with a logic of equivalence that “neither measures nor calculates.”\textsuperscript{356} This is because agape is concerned with “moving beyond comparison” and caring for “the person one sees” rather than attending to the self.\textsuperscript{357}

The question that most concerns Ricœur about agape as an aspect of mutuality is whether it is simply a theoretical, ethical concept, or if the generosity of agape is also a real experience, actually lived by persons. To approach this question he turns to “how agape speaks.”\textsuperscript{358} By virtue of the fact that love is a notion that persons have embedded in the language of praise, hymns, imperatives, and hopes, Ricœur stands by his conviction that language provides symbolic evidence of real lived experiences of agape. He believes that the hymn to unconditional love in 1 Corinthians 13 is the source most capable of standing the test of his question.\textsuperscript{359} This is because, just as the language of

\textsuperscript{355} Ricœur, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, 221.

\textsuperscript{356} Ricœur, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, 221.

\textsuperscript{357} Ricœur, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, 221.

\textsuperscript{358} Ricœur, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, 222.

justice best argues for equal recognition, the language of agape best praises mutuality as unconditional and generous love. Ricœur has identified two modes of mutuality: as reciprocity it uses the conditional language of prose, best suited to justice, and as a state of peace uses unconditional, poetic language, best suited to agape. The challenge now is the question of a bridge to mediate a fullness of the meaning of mutuality proposed by Ricœur; needed is a language that can serve as a conduit that directs the two-way traffic between the conditionality of the struggle for mutuality and the unconditionality of states of peace - agape.

In Ricœur’s view, the fullness of mutual recognition requires symbolic mediation in the space between mutuality as states of peace and the struggle for recognition. This is because for Ricœur, mutuality cannot be achieved or grasped in a definitive way. Mutuality cannot be described through cognitive explanation, rather it belongs to the language of symbolic mediation, i.e., poetics.

In an earlier work, Ricœur studies symbolic mediation in the dialectic between love and justice. In this case, the Christian commandment to love is explored as a gesture of symbolic mediation it is not an obligation (justice), nor is it optional (unconditional love.) Rather, the commandment symbolically mediates the interaction between the languages of justice and love. As Ricœur investigates the pair love and justice, he re-discovers the significance of the space between. The between space takes Ricœur to the language of symbolic mediation, as he seeks to understand the

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360 Ricœur, "Love and Justice," 317-321; Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 223.

boundlessness of states of peace (unconditional love) in relation to the ethical imperatives and obligations required by the struggle for equal recognition.

Ricœur uses the symbolic mediation of the gift exchange in his quest for an explanatory structure to bridge the fullness of mutuality, i.e., struggle for recognition and states of peace. To do so, he searches for a language that is capable of welcoming all that is required by the experience at the heart of mutuality: integrating respect (difference) into intimacy (sameness.) The experience I am seeking to understand occurs in the space between the ethical (struggle for recognition) and the unconditional or hyperethical (agape as a state of peace.) Ricœur already uses the gift exchange as symbolic mediation in his thinking on Christian forgiveness.362 For this reason, and in order to assist our understanding of how the gift exchange mediates the space between struggle for recognition and agape in mutuality, I first discuss the gift in relation to forgiveness.

4.2.3 Symbolic Mediation: The Gift Given, the Gift in Return

Marcel Mauss studied the anthropology of reciprocity and the exchange of gifts in traditional societies.363 His study of the potlatch of the Maori in New Zealand and the attention he gave to an interpretation of their understanding of the power and meaning of the gift particularly inspired Ricœur.364 In opposition to the logic of the market economy


364 Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 480. Ricœur notes the connection in several languages between forgiveness and gift, beginning with his own French language: don and pardon.
where property is transferred like an object from one owner to the next, Mauss’s logic of the gift exchange mysteriously creates a bond between giver and receiver that impels the receiver to give in return: give – receive – give in return. In Mauss’s view, the force that propels the gift in return is located in the gift itself – *hau*.

The transcendent, mysterious and unintelligible meaning of the power of *hau* is opposed by those who prefer to scientifically explain the impulse to give in return, through rules such as those of symbolic consciousness. Ricœur chooses not to completely oppose either approach and to see “both Mauss and Lévi-Strauss as being correct, Mauss as regards the transcendence of the *hau* and Lévi-Strauss as regards the logical explanation of the reciprocity of the exchange.” But, it is Marcel Hénaff who really helps Ricœur to understand the fullness of the gift as symbolic of a relationship of mutual recognition. This is because both models of gift exchange, i.e., the one based

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365 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 231. Ricœur writes, “… (I)n the market-place, there is no obligation to give in return, because there is no requirement for reciprocity. Payment ends the mutual obligations between those involved in a commercial exchange. The market-place, we could say, is reciprocity without mutuality.”

366 Mauss, *The Gift*, 8-9. Mauss describes the bond that the *hau* (gift) in Maori tradition creates between giver and receiver. The gift itself holds a power that attaches the two persons and obligates a gift in return.

367 Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss*, trans., Felicity Baker (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 45-67; Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 226. Ricœur names Claude Lévi-Strauss as Mauss’s critic on this point. Strauss’s approach to the gift is scientific explanation of the gift as a symbol of social relations and responsibilities. For Lévi-Strauss, the gift holds no hidden meaning; it is symbolic of a social structure. This is what is meant when Ricœur writes that Lévi-Strauss explains gift-giving in terms of symbolic consciousness. For Lévi-Strauss, gift-giving can be explained by rules, i.e., there is no unconscious or hidden force that provides meaning to the exchange of gifts. Gift-giving can be simply explained by a logic of rules for social reciprocity. Ricœur also reminds us that Lévi-Strauss is critiqued for his complete dismissal of the transcendent meaning of the gift, in favour of a purely scientific explanation.


369 Hénaff, *Le Prix De la Vérité: Le Don, L'argent, la Philosophie*. 
on the transcendent meaning of hau, and the other described through logical explanation, the giving and giving in return, are characterized by an exchange of roles between the giver and the recipient. Neither method arrives at mutuality, since only one person is active and the other merely passive. Hénaff offers Ricœur the notion that the gift and the gift in return symbolically establish a relationship where each person is in the center; each one is giver and recipient in a “shared operation.”

Ricœur writes,

The initial enigma of a force supposed to reside in the object itself is dissipated if we take the thing given and returned as the pledge of and substitute for this process of recognition. It is the pledge of the giver’s commitment through the gift and a substitute for the trust that this gesture will be reciprocated. Hence it will be the quality of the relation of recognition…that confers its importance on everything we call presents. I would add that we can take this relationship of mutuality as a kind of recognition that does not recognize itself to the extent that it is more invested in the gesture than in the words that accompany it. It can only do so by symbolizing itself in the gift.

Mauss’s understanding of the gift exchange is a logic characterized by: give – give in return, with the transcendent power of the gift as its animating dynamic. Mauss’s features of gift in return and transcendence help Ricœur to think through his understanding of mutuality as more than a relationship of reciprocity based on the conditions of giving and receiving, i.e., gift-giving is more than an obligation of persons to each other.

Hénaff’s insight into the intersubjective quality of the relationship symbolized by the gift and the gift in return helps Ricœur to go even further. He is helped to understand how the gift can mediate a relationship of mutuality beyond one based on reciprocity.

370 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 236.

371 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 236.
(obligation based on equality.) Hénaff helps Ricœur to understand that the gift symbolizes a relationship marked by a shared operation in which each one is simultaneously active and passive, i.e., give/receive – receive/give in return. In Hénaff’s model, each one is at the center, simultaneously living their role as both giver and receiver. The gift exchange explained in this way opens Ricœur to a more mutual understanding of exchange than reciprocity as the substitution of roles between giver and receiver. Hénaff places the energy of mutuality in the actual relationship between persons. This means that the dynamic of mutuality is not located outside the relationship (Mauss’s transcendent power in the gift exchanged), nor is mutuality projected from symbolic consciousness (Lévi-Strauss’s scientific explanation of the meaning of the gift exchange.) With Hénaff’s assistance, Ricœur will not reject either explanation and will choose a combination of both.

Using a model of gift exchange informed by Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, and Hénaff, Ricœur takes on the challenge “first to recover the reciprocal dimension of the gift in contrast to an initial characterization of it as vertical. It is then a matter of restoring, at the heart of the relation of the exchange, the difference in altitude that distinguishes forgiving from giving…” In other words, Ricœur is looking for the mediating dynamic that bridges the vertical relation between the impossibility of forgiving an unjustifiable action, while also recognizing the horizontal relationship between the request for and the offer of forgiveness that takes place in the field between persons.

Regarding the vertical relation between forgiveness and fault, juridical and

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political institutions provide necessary ethical structures of justice that mediate the
distance through operations of accusation and punishment. However, these structures
concern the breach of laws and do not have as a purpose the healing of persons. Nor do they tend to mending broken relationships. Lacking is a dynamic of forgiveness that can hold and creatively attend to the tension between addressing bad action and healing broken persons. The *spirit of forgiveness* is where Ricœur locates Christianity’s greatest contribution to imagining a bridge between the impossible gap created by the unforgiveable and unjustifiable action, while also recognizing the relationship between persons who request and offer forgiveness. I now turn to Christian forgiveness, and its structure as vertical, horizontal, ethical, and hyperethical. I appeal to forgiveness in this thesis as an imaginary for understanding the fullness of mutuality.

### 4.3 Christian Forgiveness

One of the foremost Christian sources for forgiveness is the ethical imperative to the ministry of forgiveness and the doctrine of Christ as reconciler of a new creation, as found in 2 Cor. 5: 17-20. However, Ricœur believes that the Christian source most capable of bridging the gap between forgiveness and fault, is the superabundance of radical, never-ending love that is expressed in 1 Cor. 13: 1-13.\(^{373}\) Recall that this will be the same biblical source that Ricœur will draw in his later work on mutuality as a state of peace, i.e., *agape*. The unconditional character of this love is evidenced by the fact that it extends even to enemies (Matt. 5:43-48; Luke 6:27-28.) But, this is no naïve self-

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\(^{373}\) Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 25. Ricœur writes that Christianity adds nothing to morality or ethics. By this Ricœur means that the western world shares a morality about what is right or wrong, good or bad. All social structures for living together, whether religious or not, seek to live by this common morality. What Christianity brings is new perspective, not another morality.
effacement. Ricœur calls the love offered to opponents a difficult forgiveness.³⁷⁴

Difficult forgiveness requires human capability, not only to connect the appropriate person to the bad action, but also to distinguish between the bad action and agent. To be able to connect and separate a bad action from a guilty person, helps to clarify what is really at stake in forgiveness, and which responses appropriately belong to whom in the forgiveness equation. How impossible this process of connection and disentanglement must be in situations of drastic proportions, such as murder. Ricœur is right to call forgiveness difficult.

Forgiveness is difficult and complex because it requires persons to hold, not erase, the separation caused by the fault. The reality that one is at fault and the other has been wounded remains. However, both recognize that the one at fault is not only incapable of good action, but is also capable of better. This is based on the reality that both persons are connected in terms of their capability and risk of not acting from their capable self. Ricœur describes this paradox of separation and connection within forgiveness can be described as: “the enigma of the fault held to paralyze the power to act of the “capable being” that we are; and it is in reply, the enigma of the possible lifting of the existential incapacity...”³⁷⁵ With the language of capacity and incapacity just cited, we can anticipate that Ricœur’s understanding of forgiveness will lead us back to human capability and the “heart of self-hood,” which is imputability.³⁷⁶ A Christian understanding of forgiveness offers the refusal to erase the fault and to collapse into

³⁷⁴ Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness."
sameness the harm suffered by one person and the guilt of the other. At the same time, forgiveness recognizes the human capability of each in the request for forgiveness and its offer.

Ricœur brings to bear on mutuality his essay, *Difficult Forgiveness*, which appeared as the Epilogue to his book, *Memory, History, Forgetting*. In his last book, *The Course of Recognition*, Ricœur took on the topic of mutual recognition. In a real way, mutuality is the culmination, not only of his view of recognition, but also of his life of intellectual inquiry. Mutuality was not only the topic of his last book, but as Charles Reagan remarks, *The Course of Recognition* was the sole work by Ricœur that did not point a way forward, did not conclude by announcing the thread for his next line of inquiry.\(^{377}\) If we follow the succession of Ricœur’s work, the topic of Christian forgiveness precedes and is assumed in his last work, which was on the topic of mutuality. I assume that his thinking about Christian forgiveness sparked Ricœur’s imagination about the structure of and possibility for actually achieving mutual recognition.

With this introduction to Christian forgiveness, I will now discuss four main points to help us address the gap between the capacity for legal and political structures to attend to breach of laws (action), and the incapacity of these structures to address the brokenness of persons (agents) involved. The four points are: the structure of the spirit of forgiveness, with the problems posed by distance and equality; the spirit of forgiveness and its return to human capability in its imputable mode; the spirit of

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forgiveness in its hyperethical mode; and finally some implications of Christian forgiveness as an imaginary for mutuality.

To address the first point, I will discuss two relationships within forgiveness: the vertical or vertical relationship of juridical structures that deal with the impossibility of forgiveness and the unjustifiable fault, and the horizontal relationship between the persons affected who a) avow fault and request (or not) forgiveness, and b) accuse and offer (or not) forgiveness. The horizontal or horizontal aspect of the structure of forgiveness will lead us to consider our second point, which comes as a question: if forgiveness is not possible through the judicial or political structures, is it a human capacity, perhaps at a more intimate level of relationship between persons? On this topic, Ricœur brings Hannah Arendt into the conversation to assist his response. The discussion takes us to a third point, which concerns the hyperethical aspect of forgiveness. This feature takes us to the core of forgiveness as a shared operation.\textsuperscript{378} Our last point will elaborate some of the implications of Christian forgiveness as an imaginary for mutuality.

The section on theological implications prepares us for the conclusion of this thesis where I will revisit and evaluate the results of Ricœur’s contribution to help us beyond the impasse in the literature associated with mutuality.

\textsuperscript{378} Ricœur, \textit{The Course of Recognition}, 236. Ricœur borrows the understanding of mutual recognition as a shared operation from Hénaff.
4.3.1 The Structure of the Spirit of Forgiveness: Vertical and Horizontal

Paul Ricoeur devoted his academic career to the pursuit of reconciling apparent opposites. In this thesis I have drawn special attention to how the mediated self bridges what appear to be irreconcilable differences between the voluntary and involuntary, between *idem* and *ipseity*. Now our discussion has moved beyond the dialectical self to relationships of intersubjectivity. Christian forgiveness will be employed as a way to imagine the achievement of mutuality between persons.

When considering the problem of forgiveness, Ricoeur first views its extremes, i.e., the impossibility of forgiveness, on the one hand, and unjustifiable fault, on the other. This is a relationship of “vertical disparity,” which has not yet reached moral judgment. In other words, before the experiences of guilt and the impossibility of forgiveness are expressed in the languages of avowal (admittance of fault, failure, and struggle) and hymn (celebrating love and joy), there are human experiences attached to bad action. On the one hand, fault is experienced as a radical failure to live up to one’s human capability. Declaration of one’s faults and failures, expressed in the language of

379 Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, 459. Ricoeur uses the pair horizontal and vertical to describe the double structure of forgiveness. He writes of forgiveness, “The problem then is to recover, at the heart of the horizontal relation of exchange, the vertical asymmetry inherent in the initial equation of forgiveness.” The term horizontal relates to relationships of equality marked justice. Horizontal relationships characterize the ethical, juridical, and political. We can imagine the symbol of justice, the horizontal balance scale that seeks to ensure fair and equal distribution of law. The vertical plane, on the other hand, breaks into the horizontal relationship of equality to ensure that the injustice caused by fault is not forgotten and that the guilt and the wound are not collapsed into sameness. This means that the vertical relationship guards the distance between the guilty one who asks forgiveness and the one who is wounded and offers forgiveness. Ricoeur also calls the vertical relationship one of height (the wounded one, forgiveness and the magnanimity of its offer) and depth (the accused, the avowal of fault and the absurdity of forgiveness.) I will be consistent with the use of the terms horizontal and vertical, while acknowledging that in contemporary postcolonial discourse, the terms used are bilateral (horizontal) and unilateral (vertical.)

admission of guilt, demonstrates not only one’s awareness of the connection between oneself and one’s action, but also its harmful effects on another. Admission of guilt provides evidence of one’s imputability, i.e., ability to feel and assume accusation. On the other hand, forgiveness is first experienced by the one wounded as impossible because of the negative impacts of another’s bad action. The height of forgiveness is an experience of generosity, not obligation. It occurs when one can see bad action as connected to and separate from the agent committing it.

The “vertical disparity, between depth of fault and the height of forgiveness … is constitutive of the equation of forgiveness: below, the avowal of fault; above, the hymn to forgiveness.” How these oppositions are bridged is the work that takes place in ethical space located between forgiveness and avowal, where “the impossibility of forgiveness replying to the unpardonable nature of moral evil” is located. Figure 7 below illustrates the vertical equation just described, and the abyss between.

Figure 7: Vertical Equation of Forgiveness

The mediating space between avowal and forgiveness is where Ricœur locates juridical, political, and social institutions that deal with the moral tension created by

Juridical institutions ensure that justice to the breach of law is done; but justice cannot be substituted forgiveness, nor can forgiveness take the place of justice: “To forgive [without justice] would be to ratify impunity, which would be a grave injustice committed at the expense of the law and, even more so, of the victims.” This means that the spirit of forgiveness does not reside in juridical institutions, but neither does it oppose justice. Structures for dealing with justice are not primarily concerned with forgiveness, rather they deal with accusation of guilt and assignment of punishment for criminal acts. Justice systems carry traces of the spirit of forgiveness in the consideration that courts give to the stories of the accused, in the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Political guilt is distinguished from criminal guilt, although they both concern similar crimes. The difference between the two lies in the reality that criminal guilt concerns the violent action for which individuals can be punished, and political guilt involves collectives. Ricœur rejects the notion of a criminal people, although he agrees that there is an undeniable mutual relationship between the influence of political bodies on individual actions and vice versa. A contemporary Canadian example of political guilt is the wrong that Canadian governments and the Canadians people

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385 Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 473. Ricœur does not deny the problem of confusion of disproportionality that can exist between punishments and offenses.
committed against Indigenous peoples through the residential school policy. Individuals in the schools committed specific actions for which they have been/are/should be held criminally responsible, but it is Canadian governments that created and imposed policies, with the assistance of Christian churches.\textsuperscript{388} The residential school policy is now recognized as cultural genocide.\textsuperscript{389} However, Ricœur holds that collectives are not capable of assuming criminal responsibility, nor can they offer forgiveness.\textsuperscript{390} What he means by this is that persons who have benefited, even unknowingly, from state policies that privilege them over others, are in some way responsible and must be held accountable. This is not the same as criminal guilt, but equally important to address, since public policy impacts individual’s attitudes and actions, and vice versa. Public guilt, according to Ricœur, is best dealt with by doing whatever it takes to help each group participate in the process of political forgiveness. According to my reading of Ricœur, Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission could be considered as a step in

\textsuperscript{388} Prime Minister of Canada. The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, \textit{Statement of Apology to Former Students of Residential Schools} June 2008; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, "TRC Findings".


\textsuperscript{390} Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 476. My reading of what Ricœur is saying about public guilt is seen through the lens of Canada’s recent Truth and Reconciliation Process. Canadians have seen representatives of governments and churches express public guilt for past wrongs (and sometimes present.) These declarations and apologies have been witnessed by representatives of those injured, most notably in this case, some of the survivors of residential schools and their families. However, what does it really mean for a representative to declare a group’s guilt or to be witness and receive an apology on behalf of a group? In my experience, I cannot say that every person belonging to the guilty group created or implement bad policies. Most did not even know about them. However, they do experience, as a group and at very personal levels, the privilege that is consequential to policies that favour them. At the same time, those upon whom the policies were imposed, suffer discrimination in very personal and collective ways because they belong to the targeted group.
a larger process of addressing political guilt. This is because traces of the spirit of forgiveness are present in the awakening of political will on the part of those in Canada who enjoy privilege, and can also be found in

the form of moderation in the exercise of power, of self-limitation in the use of violence, even of clemency with respect to the vanquished: parcere victis! — clemency, magnanimity, the shadow of forgiveness…

For Ricœur, it is through moral responsibility that persons reach the core of guilt and forgiveness. This is the place of personal responsibility and relationships, where persons actually experience the spirit of forgiveness in a practical way. Fault is shifted from the “vertical sphere of guilt and punishment into the sphere of exchange.” In other words, the intersubjectivity of guilt and forgiveness is not only a vertical relation that separates the one at fault and the one who has been wounded. It also concerns two gestures that belong to the reciprocal (horizontal) relationship, i.e., one requests forgiveness and the other offers pardon. However, Ricœur warns that

…if forgiveness’s entrance into the circle of exchange signals taking into account the horizontal relation between the request for and the offer of forgiveness, the vertical character of the relation between the height and depth, between the unconditionality and conditionality, continue to go unnoticed.

In other words, dealing with forgiveness in the reciprocal sphere of moral guilt opens the possibility for human exchange, but reciprocity, risks forgetting the

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391 Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 475-476. In the Canadian context, we can admit that the many peaceful ways in which Indigenous groups resist harmful Canadian policies are traces of a spirit of forgiveness. One example is the recent resurgence of persistent, but peaceful advocacy by Indigenous groups, related to missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada, which has given rise to a recent positive response by the present Liberal government led by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.


seriousness of the distance created by the fault. The risk is to too easily collapses the request for and the offer of forgiveness into a sameness that unjustly equalizes fault and forgiveness, the accused and one injured. On the problem of equalizing guilt and forgiveness, accuser and accused, Ricœur writes, “It is this misunderstanding that, in my opinion, results in the overhasty assimilation of forgiveness to an exchange defined by reciprocity alone.” The dynamic of forgiveness as reciprocal obliges each one to either request or to offer forgiveness in order to balance the inequality. This risks overlooking the difference created by fault.

Juridical and political institutions are focused on restoring the horizontal relationship of justice. The focus of these institutional structures is to deal with the breach of laws that violate human rights. Legal and political structures do not extend to the fullness of reconciliation, which also concerns the broken relationship between persons. This is why Ricœur distinguishes forgiveness from reconciliation in the epilogue to Memory, History, Forgetting. However, since punishment is directed at persons, the spirit of forgiveness breaks into these institutions, but only in traces. Hints of the spirit of forgiveness are found in the consideration given to the life story of a criminal, and to the moderation in the use of power. Moral guilt, on the other hand, brings us to the horizontal sphere of exchange between persons where forgiveness is actually experienced in the real relationships of persons’ lives. But, an equalizing relationship of reciprocity is at risk of giving too much consideration to the one requesting forgiveness, by overlooking their fault. What kind of mediating force can


395 Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 457-506.
maintain the necessary distance between accusation and guilt, while also recognizing the human relationship between the one requesting (or not) and the one offering (or not) forgiveness?

4.3.2 The Spirit of Forgiveness as Human Capability

In the first part of this chapter, I discussed imputability as Ricœur’s anthropological and ethical contribution to the capability discourse, which brought us to our present discussion on mutuality. This brings me closer to understanding the spirit of forgiveness, where Ricœur makes his unique contribution to mutuality. It has been revealed above that the spirit of forgiveness reaches through human capability in its mode of imputability, and extends to mutuality. Now Ricœur directs readers to return to human capability, where the spirit of forgiveness points beyond the explicable. For him, horizontal relationships marked by justice do not satisfy forgiveness, as they deal only with breach of laws. But, action is attached to persons, and although criminal action transgresses laws, it is persons who are hurt and punished. Therefore, a fuller understanding of forgiveness must also attend to the relationship between those who effect action and those who are affected by it.

I have discussed how Ricœur looks to the seminal work of Marcel Mauss on the gift and how the dynamic between the gift and gift in return sheds light on an aspect of forgiveness that reaches beyond the persons involved in the exchange. Our discussion on Mauss highlighted the importance of the structure and transcendent element of the logic of the gift exchange. This pointed to the gift as a space between, in the relationship, gift

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given – gift in return. However, neither Mauss’s purely transcendent interpretation of the gift, nor its purely scientific alternative (Lévi-Strauss) satisfy the respect for difference so crucial for mutuality. Rather, in both models, the gift in return involves a reciprocal exchange, a substitution, of roles among persons. This is not the fullness of mutuality.

Hénaff clinches an important aspect of mutuality for Ricœur with the insight that together, the gift and the gift in return symbolize a relationship of mutuality through participation of each person in a shared operation. This overcomes the substitution of one for the other in the gift exchange, as both are simultaneously giver and receiver.

Now, it is Hannah Arendt who assists Ricœur to take the last step in his view of the spirit of forgiveness. She inadvertently helps him to see forgiveness as a human endeavour - and beyond. Arendt herself sees forgiveness as a human faculty, but her view challenges Ricœur to think otherwise. Her analysis of forgiveness, asserts that a “faculty of forgiveness” responds to a “faculty to keep and make promises.” Forgiving (unbinding) responds to the failure of promising (binding.) Arendt sees forgiving and promising as aspects of each person. The horizontal relationship of forgiveness, marked

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399 Charles E. Reagan, "Binding and Loosing," in Reading Ricœur, ed. David M. Kaplan(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 244-245; Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 487. Ricœur pairs promising with memory, not forgiveness. This is because memory (and forgetting) and promising are each situated in time and describe human faculties. Arendt’s pair, forgiveness and promising, belong to two different languages (philosophical and religious.) He prefers forgiveness and repentance because this pair belongs to the religious dimension (unconditional) of the spirit of forgiveness, which reaches beyond human efforts to institutionalize. For Ricœur’s understanding of promising paired with memory: Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 109-134.
400 Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 487. Arendt’s “faculty to keep and make promises” is opposed to the weaknesses of irreversibility (the inability of persons to change what they have done), and unpredictability (the inability of persons to always be reliable.)
by one binding and the other unbinding is similar to reciprocity of friendship.\textsuperscript{401}

Ricœur notes, however, that Arendt is inconsistent in her analysis of the pair promising and forgiving. On the one hand, Arendt sees promising as a public activity that binds one to his/her future actions. Public institutions support persons in their effort to bind themselves to their promises. This happens, for example, through oaths, treaties, accords, declarations, contracts, etc.

On the other hand, Arendt views the unbinding activity of forgiveness as antipolitical. Ricœur uses the term antipolitical in his agreement with Arendt’s position that the unbinding activity of forgiveness is not supported by public institutions in the same way that the binding of promise is. Rather, the power to unbind is connected to the vertical relationship of unconditional love, which is rarely experienced and impossible to concretize through public institutions. Although Arendt writes about forgiving as antipolitical and promising as political, Ricœur points out that her analysis of the dialectic remains within the sphere of human plurality (political.)\textsuperscript{402} Figures 8 and 9 below illustrate the distinction that Ricœur is making.

\textsuperscript{401} Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 488.

\textsuperscript{402} Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 488-489. Ricœur reminds us in his discussion on Arendt that in her whole project “human plurality is primary” (486-487.) This means that human capabilities and weaknesses depend on the political, i.e., human power to act is visible publically in relationship. However, he notes that she is not consistent with this view when it comes to forgiveness because she understands forgiveness as antipolitical, i.e., there is no politics of forgiveness, it cannot be institutionalized because it belongs to the transcendent realm of love. But, her analysis of forgiveness remains political by her choice of reciprocal love exchanged between friends, not love’s transcendent aspect - unconditionality.
Ricœur has a problem with considering forgiveness as a political or public endeavour. He expresses his concern and notes Arendt’s inconsistency when he writes, “This discordance between the levels on which forgiveness and promising operate is of great interest to us. It is simply masked by the symmetry between the two “weaknesses” that human affairs owe to the temporal condition, irreversibility and unpredictability.”

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In other words, Ricœur notices that there is symmetry between promising and the human incapacities to reverse bad actions or to always live up to one’s promises. But, the response of forgiveness to these weaknesses of promising is not a symmetrical relation – forgiveness belongs to the vertical sphere of unconditional love.

Ricœur notes that Arendt hints again at something more than human about forgiveness, in her notion “fact of natality.” He explains that by using this notion, Arendt asserts that action is a sign that persons, although they do die, are born to live, to begin anew. This positive view of action, which focuses on newness and transformation, makes forgiveness look like a miracle. Arendt’s reference to the miracle of forgiveness bolsters Ricœur’s concern whether forgiveness occurs within the space of visibility of the public sphere. Further, Ricœur writes,

The evocation of the miracle of action, at the origin of the miracle of forgiveness, seriously calls into question the entire analysis of the faculty of forgiveness. How can the mastery of time be joined to the miracle of natality? It is precisely this question that sets our entire enterprise into motion again and invites us to pursue the odyssey of forgiveness to the center of selfhood.

Arendt’s pair, forgiving and promising, oppose binding and unbinding under the conditions of reciprocal friendship. These, along with her notion of natality, cause Ricœur to wonder if the core of forgiveness can be limited to a return to selfhood.

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4.3.3 The Spirit of Forgiveness as Hyperethical

Traces of the spirit of forgiveness are detected in ethical structures, but the reality transcends human structures. According to Ricœur, theories of forgiveness that are based on accusation and punishment are ways to settle the consequences of bad action. But, they do not adequately take persons into account, and therefore do not effectively achieve forgiveness. His view of capability has shown us that capable persons recognize the connection between themselves as agents and their action. A capable person can be held accountable for their unjustifiable action. But Ricœur also writes that, “it [forgiveness] should release the agent from his [or her] act.”

This means that action can witness and can fail to witness to the capable self. A person is always at risk of failing to live up to the promises s/he makes to be capable. Since action can witness to the capable self, and can serve as an unstable measure of capability, persons also need to be unbound from their action so that it is not used as an enduring measure of selfhood. The forgiveness paradigm, according to Ricœur, lacks “any reflection on the very act of unbinding.”

Unlike Arendt, who views unbinding as a purely human activity characterized by the pair “forgiveness and promising,” Ricœur claims that unbinding belongs to the spirit of forgiveness as hyperethical. It transcends human ethico-moral structures. He

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410 Reagan, "Binding and Loosing," 244-245.
believes that forgiveness as a human faculty, as Arendt sees it, unjustly transfers the burden of guilt onto the person injured, by requiring him/her to reciprocate with forgiveness in response to the other’s promise to do better. Ricœur notes that Arendt supports her view with biblical references that uphold the human power to forgive as a condition for divine forgiveness.\footnote{Fiasse, "The Golden Rule and Forgiveness," 86; Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 487. The Christian biblical texts that shape the theology behind Arendt’s understanding that forgiveness as a human faculty are Matthew 6:14-15, 18:35, Luke 17:3.}

Alternatively, Ricœur believes that if forgiveness is unbinding, it consists of the pair “forgiveness and repentance.”\footnote{Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 490.} His understanding of this pair moves forgiveness into the height of unconditional love and therefore involves no obligation for the reciprocity demanded by Arendt’s model. The pair forgiveness and repentance operates not as “transaction [rather,] … this paradox suggests the idea of an entirely unique kind of circle by reason of which the existential response to forgiveness is implied, as it were, in the gift itself, while the antecedence of the gift is recognized at the very heart of the inaugural gesture of repentance.”\footnote{Ricœur, "Epilogue: Difficult Forgiveness," 490-491.} The unconditionality of forgiveness suggested by Ricœur implies human participation in a transcendent dynamic that impels the shared operation of mutuality that is initiated by vulnerability/repentance. How does he understand this dynamic?

Forgiveness and repentance involve the unique participation of each person in a shared operation that transcends the obligations of reciprocity. I understand Ricœur to suggest that forgiveness is transcendent in two ways; first, because repentance is a risk
for the one asking, and second, because the superabundance of forgiveness is a wager
for the one offering. On the one hand, repentance requires the avowed to embrace
his/her vulnerability. As such the repentant opens his/herself to being refused
forgiveness by the other. Forgiveness requires the repentant to accept his/her
vulnerability and to accept the reality that s/he cannot expect to be forgiven. Repentance
is an experience of being vulnerable in front of the other. On the other hand, the one
offering forgiveness is also at risk, since forgiveness is given to one who is always in
jeopardy of performing another bad action. The one forgiving risks being injured once
again. To offer forgiveness places the giver in a place of utter vulnerability as well. The
transcendence of the spirit of forgiveness guarantees neither person an assured outcome.
This makes both persons vulnerable and capable (capable of asking forgiveness and
offering forgiveness.)

The traces of the spirit of forgiveness that Ricœur saw in juridical and political
structures suggest the ungraspable aspects now being discussed in this shared operation
of unconditionality. However, it must be noted that for Ricœur, the spirit of forgiveness,
as a shared operation of mutuality, impelled by vulnerability, cannot be institutionalized,
but neither can it bypass institutional structures. Accusation and punishment are always
required and keep the distance between impossible forgiveness and unjustifiable fault.
However, traces of the spirit of forgiveness within juridical and political structures also
suggest the possibility of openness to the other.
The question of openness to the other as a constitutive element of the ethical self is left hanging in *Oneself as Another*. Difficult Forgiveness, also leaves open a question of the self in relation to the other. This time it is the problem of unbinding the other from his/her bad action. Are not these questions of binding and unbinding, two ways of arriving at the same query, i.e., that of the imputable self’s openness to the other?

At nexus of the conditionality of justice and the unconditionality of the spirit of forgiveness, I return to the capable self in its mode of imputability. The return to imputability takes us back the capable self who recognizes and assumes his/her greatest sense of responsibility. However, imputability is not only the place where the self recognizes the fullness of its capability as an ethical self. Upon return, I pick up the thread of vulnerability. The imputable self, who is capable of admitting fault and assuming the consequences of his/her bad action, is also vulnerable.

Ricœur understands vulnerability as the place where the self loses his/her sense of self-same possession. Loss of self is experienced as release from the kind of self-

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414 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 297-356. The tenth study, titled, “What Ontology in View?” primarily concerns the dialectic between selfhood and otherness. Specifically, how this relates to oneself in relationship with another. In the end, this chapter opens Ricœur to the language of theology, which he uses in the last two lectures that were not included in this book. The first of these lectures remains unpublished, while the second can be found in, Ricœur, "The Summoned Subject."


417 Ricœur, "Pastoral Praxeology, Hermeneutics, and Identity," in *Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative and Imagination*, ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 313-314. Ricœur picks up the theological theme of loss of self and relates it to his understanding of vulnerability. This means that the self is capable, but not autonomous. Loss of self for Ricœur connects to his understanding of the Buddhist concept of self-renouncement: “The Buddhist through meditation, enters a liberated field of selfhood, freed of avarice, of the search for guarantees” (313.)
understanding that protects or clings to one’s sameness. In other words, loss of self-same is an experience of openness to being transformed by the other, the other’s woundedness, the other’s interests, and by the perspectives that the other has of the self.

The question of unbinding an agent from his/her action leads Ricœur to shift from the theoretical language of philosophy, a language that seeks to grasp knowledge, to the poetic language of theology, a language of naming the impossible, ungraspable divine, hyperethical reality of God. Philosophy has helped us to understand how the imputable self takes responsibility for action. But, the capable self does not always act according to his/her self-integrity. Action does not always speak of the capable self; it can also speak of one’s lack of capability. How does theology contribute to an anthropological/ethical understanding of the self as participation in a shared operation of mutual vulnerability? In this chapter, I discussed Ricœur’s view of care-action in its aspects of human capability and mutual recognition, mediated by the imputable self, and imagined as forgiveness. I did so because the spirit of forgiveness imagines a shared operation of mutuality, and expresses that reality in the imaginary mode, i.e., re-imagines an event of mutuality. What kind of person can re-imagine lived mutuality.

4.3.4 Theological Implications for Mutuality

Behind the imputable self of care-action, i.e., the one who is fully self-recognizing and capable of mutuality, is found Ricœur’s theological thinking about

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418 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 355; Mark Wallace, ed. Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative and Imagination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 14-15. Ricœur admits that philosophy can only go so far in its ability to explain and grasp concepts and theories. Religious language is needed to speak about realities that are known otherwise. Ricœur always remains clear that although theology and philosophy can dialogue, they must be able to speak on their own terms. This idea is important for our discussion on mutuality.
the biblical figure of the summoned self.\textsuperscript{420} I will return to this figure below. First I will recall that our discussion on care-action has provided us with an explanatory structure for the imputable self, but it has brought us to the “problem” of how a person in his/her most capable mode, can be open to the other. In other words, how is a fully capable self also able to forfeit his/her self in order to assume unconditional interest in the others needs and perspectives? Or is care-action a noble form of self-interest? If this were the case, wouldn’t capability reduce care-action to the benevolent protection to which this thesis is seeking an alternative? In short, is a capable person able to experience unreserved interest for the other, and thus respect difference as required by Ricœur’s understanding of the heart of mutuality? Ricœur articulates his struggle with the ethical problem of other-interest when he writes in \textit{Oneself as Another}:

\begin{quote}
Suffering is not defined solely by physical pain, nor even by mental pain, but by the reduction, even the destruction, of the capacity for acting, of being-able-to-act, experienced as violation of self-integrity. Here initiative, precisely in terms of being-able-to-act, seems to belong exclusively to the self who gives his sympathy, his compassion, these terms being taken in the strong sense of the wish to share someone else’s pain. Confronting this charity, this benevolence, the other appears to be reduced to the sole condition of receiving. In a sense, this is actually the case. And it is in this manner that suffering-with gives itself, in a
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{420} Wallace, ed. \textit{Figuring the Sacred}, 14, 25, 28, 262-275. In this book, Wallace edits Ricœur’s work. He note on p. 25 of the Introduction that Ricœur’s thinking about the biblical faith of Christianity “adds nothing to the predicates “good” and “obligatory” as these are applied to action…biblical faith places a new perspective, in which love is tied to the “naming of God…I propose of the ethical and moral determinants of action…a meditation grafted onto the poetics of \textit{agape}.” Our discussion will demonstrate that Ricœur’s thinking about the summoned self belongs to a biblical tradition that interrupts the language of ethical obligation to law with the poetic language of relationship.
first approximation, as the opposite of the assignment of responsibility by the voice of the other.\textsuperscript{421}

This citation provides evidence that Ricœur struggles, as so many do, with the ethical notion of benevolent care. To leave mutuality at the level of care-action, characterized as the basic unit of human being (anthropological), and marked by imputability (ethical), is not enough for him.\textsuperscript{422} Imputability as the rejoinder of the self as capable and vulnerable (anthropological otherness), and as mediator of self-recognition and mutuality (ethical otherness), brings us to the theological thinking that underpins Ricœur’s questions about the capable self and an ethics of mutual recognition.

\textbf{4.3.4.1 The Summoned Self}

The summoned self belongs to a biblical faith, which is important for Ricœur because the Bible provides a narrative tradition and history of interpretation for those who adhere to it. The summoned subject is the figure in the prophetic literature who is called and who responds to God’s beckoning. The biblical faith through the “paroxysmic homology” of the Hebrew Bible provides evidence of the human awareness of participating in an aspect of reality that reaches beyond that which persons can know and grasp, whether that is time, identities, situations, cultures, or contexts.\textsuperscript{423} According to my reading, the term paroxysmic homology refers to the repetition of the de-

\textsuperscript{421} Ricœur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, 190. Throughout the chapter, “The Self and the Ethical Aim,” Ricœur leaves traces of the problem relating to the significance of the other for one’s self-understanding, which then opens the question being raised now: does the self always place expectations on the other for the self’s own purposes?

\textsuperscript{422} Ricœur, \textit{Oneself as Another}, 297-356. At the end of the Tenth Study, Ricœur points to the inability for philosophical language to speak about the otherness of conscience and the need for a language such as theology. Something he picks up in his article, Ricœur, "The Summoned Subject."

\textsuperscript{423} Ricœur, "The Summoned Subject," 263. Paroxysmic homology provokes sameness without meaning to.
centering effect that otherness (God, the Divine, the Totally Other, that which is beyond human control) has when it breaks into human experience.

Just as prophetic biblical literature is one example of a poetic genre that belongs to and breaks with the flow of an overarching biblical narrative, so too unexplainable events disorient and disrupt the unity of each one’s life story. Interruptions impel persons to pursue unexpected, even unwelcome directions that provide new meanings, even by becoming immensely fulfilling. Prophetic narratives are not only symbolic of the individual experience of the summoned self (Christian vocation), but they also imagine the unexplainable aspects of life that touch all human persons.

In Ricœur’s view, the fullness of the self cannot omit its theological impetus.424 Dan Stiver explains the theological underpinnings of Ricœur’s thought, and the shift he makes from philosophy to theology in his Gifford Lectures, as a rejection of “the dualistic and individualistic self of modernity, cut off from its rootedness in the world.”425 Ricœur’s transition to theology, according to Stiver, is congruent with “a recovery of a more biblical, Hebraic sense of the self as inherently embodied, interpersonal, and social.”426 The summoned self is a Christian, biblical motivation for understanding the human capacity for mutuality, i.e., that capable persons don’t only


425 Stiver, *Theology after Ricœur*, 185.

426 Stiver, *Theology after Ricœur*, 185.
image a God who they think they know, rather, “God is our relational capacity toward others and to God.”

As one of the last two lectures that complete his contribution to the illustrious Gifford Lecture series, *The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic Tradition*, helps us to reflect on mutuality from a Christian perspective. The summoned subject is the self who understands him/herself from the perspective of the Judeo-Christians tradition. It is important to note the quality of relationship that Ricœur maintains between philosophy and theology. Stiver calls it a transition, but Mark I. Wallace makes the point that philosophical thought did not take Ricœur to theology as the culmination of his intellectual journey. Rather, his shift to theological language helped him to understand that while he grappled with philosophical themes faithfully using the language of philosophy, his biblical faith was the motivating impulse for such inquiries. For a Christian to allow him/herself “to be appropriated by the figurative possibilities imagined by the biblical texts [facilitates] the task of becoming a full self...” Therefore, the Christian biblical tradition into which Ricœur was thrust

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427 Stiver, *Theology after Ricœur*, 186.

428 Wallace, "From Phenomenology to Scripture? Paul Ricœur's Hermeneutical Philosophy of Religion." The author explains well the distinction between the summoned self of Levinas and Ricœur. Both ask the same question regarding the ethical relationship of self to other, but respond differently. Levinas’s understanding of the summoned self involves a pre-ethical response to the voice summoning one to be “hostage to the other.” His emphasis on the role of the other in determining the self, differs from Ricœur’s understanding that the summoned self is both totally vulnerable to the other and fully capable of responding.


upon birth, provides his context and preferred forum for fully understanding the capable self.

Ricœur arrives at his understanding of the summoned self through an investigation into a series of three seemingly unrelated figures of the self that are found in the Christian tradition. However, each of the figures has in common “the self…constituted and defined by its position as a respondent to propositions of meaning issuing from the symbolic network [of the Christian biblical tradition.]

The first figure, the prophetic call, roots the Christian biblical tradition of summoned self in the Hebrew Bible. The second figure, the Christic self brings the summoned self into Christianity; and the third figure, deepens the Christian tradition of summoned self as Inner Teacher.

That which is important for our purposes is that the prophetic call of the Hebrew Bible establishes a paradigm that the Christian community also adopts to interpret and reinterpret itself. The pair “call and commission” marks the summoned self of prophetic literature. The call isolates the prophet by distinguishing his/her uniqueness and calling him/her apart from the community; while the commission attaches the prophet to the community. The summoned self is decentered, uprooted from life as s/he knows it, and distinguished or isolated from the community; while also being firmly established as a self and bound to the community.

For Ricœur, the paradigm of the summoned self embedded in the texts of the prophetic tradition makes it possible for the Christian community to interpret and

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431 Ricœur, "The Summoned Subject," 262.
reinterpret itself as a living, transforming community. Christians can be faithful to the Bible while also tapping its vast capacity for renewal. Ricœur sees the summoned self renewed in the figures of the Christic self and Inner Teacher. The summoned self is reinterpreted through the pascal mystery of the Christic self who interrupts the power and glory of a majestic God with Christ as a fully dependent and suffering servant. The pattern of the summoned self that joined and separated prophet and community is repeated in the fully capable and totally dependent Jesus who is both separate from and bound to humanity.

The paradigm appears again in the Christian tradition through the figure of Inner Teacher. This time the pair disciple and teacher remain separate, but also joined within each person, through the inner learning of contemplation. Of this Ricœur writes, “In fact, contemplation remains a kind of teaching because the discovery of truth is the reading within oneself of innate ideas and therefore of something always already there, but still requiring an inward discovery.”

Ricœur also discusses the figure of testimony of conscience. The pair referred to here is conscience and Christian proclamation. Conscience is a notion he has already discussed in *Oneself as Another*, and it remains for him an anthropological structure that belongs to all. This means that Christians are not unique in possessing a form of self-knowledge tempered by ideas of right and wrong, good and bad. However, that which Christianity contributes to conscience is a way to confront the limitations of juridical

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433 Ricœur, "The Summoned Subject," 270.

434 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 203-239; Ricœur, "The Summoned Subject," 272.
purely moralistic frameworks that “confine the phenomenon of conscience on the plane of morality.” For Ricœur, “In the conscience, care of oneself, attention to the world, and hearing God intersect.” Such an understanding of conscience offers a way of understanding the distinction and connection between law and commandment, which is required for a practical response of the summoned self.

4.3.4.2 A Practical Response

Franz Rosenweig helps Ricœur to distinguish between a juridical law and a Christian biblical understanding of the commandment to love. Essentially, the two notions, law and commandment, carry the same imperative – to love. Both the ethical obligation and the new commandment to love can be found in the Christian scriptures. However, the legalistic language of law such as, “You shall love,” is a very different form of expression than that of a biblical command such as, “Love me!” The distinction lies between the law that obligates action, and the commandment that addresses a subject through its invitation to action. The invitation and its response “springs from the bond of love between God and the individual…” Below is a practical, everyday example that helped me to understand this distinction.

In the faith community to which I belong, we have a choir who lead the congregation in song. One of the choir members directs the congregation by

437 Ricœur, "Love and Justice," 319; Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 222.
438 In Romans 13, the language of prose is used to remind Christians about their obligation to love, while in Corinthians 13 poetic language sings of the new commandment to love.
facing the crowd and inviting everyone to sing. She does this through hand and arm movements, as well as welcoming facial expressions. Her bodily gestures are so invitational that one cannot resist the summons to sing. Recently, I reflected on the irresistible character of this invitation and wondered if mutuality might be motivated by some similar allure.

The example above is helpful for understanding the distinction between an invitation to join in and participate, and the obligation to obey. Commandment belongs to any language that compels one to participate in a way that issues from the relationship itself and bypasses any expectation or need to comply. Rosenweig helps Ricœur to see that the biblical command touches the conditionality of norms and laws to love, while also understanding love as an invitation. The ethical self is capable of taking responsibility before the law, the summoned self responds to a person. But, what kind of response?

4.3.4.3 Loss of Self and Openness to Other

In 2003, in an interview with Sorin Antohi, Ricœur talks about the notion of loss as an essential component to life and to forgiveness.440 He writes that in processes of forgiveness by “exchanging roles: each party abandons its claim to be the only one occupying its terrain.”441 This means that love, suffering, forgiveness, etc., are shared or mutual experiences in which each experiences their own and the other’s generosity and vulnerability. Antohi and Ricœur also discuss the shared operation of forgiveness as a work of mourning that concerns learning to live with loss, whether that loss is of someone, something, or some aspect of oneself. Forgiveness is one experience of mutuality that concerns each one learning to live with his/her own loss, while also


recognizing that the other is also living with loss. Each one’s experience of loss is unique, yet the reality of loss is shared. The one at fault must accept the failure to be his/her capable self and the other must accept the loss caused by the impact of the fault.

The imputable self is the bridge between the capable self and the ethical self because of its link to self-recognition and to intersubjectivity. Upon return, it was revealed that the imputable self is also the place where the self is most vulnerable. Return to this two-way conduit that places the self between anthropology and ethics now leads to theology where the loss of the self can be expressed in theological terms. 442

According to Ricœur, the fullness of the capable self as moral agent is the self who is decentered, freed of itself, widely open to the other, and brimming with generosity. When Ricœur writes about loss of the self, he does not mean that one’s sense of self disappears or is fused with another. Rather, he suggests that a fully capable self is transcends itself and its own interests. The theological implications of the capable/vulnerable self reach beyond care-action to a self who is practical (non-moralizing), and other-interested. It is participation in generosity (even to enemies) that brings Ricœur’s understanding of mutuality even beyond other-interest. At the core, Ricœur believes that mutuality is motivated by “open-ended interest in exchange.” 443 This means that mutuality can be possible even when parties are both suspicious and distrustful of each other because of their openness to the actual interexchange in which

442 Ricœur, "Pastoral Praxeology," 313. Ricœur writes about the experience of Buddhist meditation as one means of accessing the liberated self he writes about as “the self that renounces all guarantees.”

they already participate (God.) Without the summoned subject, the imputable self of care-action would be incomplete.

The summoned subject of prophetic literature is not limited to the self who is called by God and then responds. The experience of the call and response of the prophetic self happens in a relational space where God’s call and the prophet’s response are aspects of one shared operation. Ricœur’s notion of festive recognition, which I understand as his theological, and unique contribution to mutual recognition, can be understood in a similar way.

4.3.4.4 Festive Recognition

The festive aspect of recognition takes us beyond an ethics of care-action, in which capable/vulnerable selves respond to each other. My reading of Ricœur’s trajectory of recognition lands him in the interface between philosophy and theology, where their differences are recognized and respected in a way that inspires and arouses awe at the contribution of each. Ricœur calls the festive aspect of recognition, gratitude. It is festive because it is a shared experience in which both participate, but that also touches something ungraspable to each one.

Without directly naming it in The Course, Ricœur’s inclusion of festive recognition offers to his readers an eschatological image for new relational possibilities. Festive recognition takes Ricœur (and his readers) through and beyond his anthropological and ethical theory of mutuality, beyond an imaginary for mutuality (Christian forgiveness), to the hyperethical mode of mutuality that is connected to what persons actually live. This is where actual experience connects with eschatological hope.

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444 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 238-246.
Ricœur demonstrates that mutuality cannot be fully achieved without its eschatological dimension. However, he also suggests that mutuality is not only a hope or possibility. Festive recognition allows persons to hope for mutuality because it is real.

Ricœur’s theological perspective on mutuality is hyperethical, yet it remains practical. Mutuality as practical joins theory to reality, action to transformation, and struggle for recognition to the actual achievement of mutuality as states of peace. Persons share the experience of mutuality as an ungraspable experience of festive recognition, which is a shared operation of gratitude that simultaneously involves each one’s fullness of capability, which also involves loss of self, as it has been explained above (release of entrenchment in self-same.) Because of the domination present in benevolent protectionism, it cannot offer such an experience of mutuality.

At the beginning of this section on theological implications, I mentioned Ricœur’s concern about the problem of benevolent care as domination. He expresses this concern again in The Course with respect to the efforts of non-profits and charities working for social justice. He believes there is need for more mutual approaches that are non-moralizing and marked by what he calls, festive recognition. On this topic he writes,

I want to dwell on the festive character, in order to set it apart from the moralizing reduction we see already sprouting from the Stoic praise of “good deeds” turned into duties, a reduction that takes on the breadth we recognize in organized charities and caretaking institutions which legitimately aim to fill the

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gaps left by distributive and redistributive justice. This is not to condemn those nonprofit enterprises and institutions, whose social necessity is evident, and which clearly need to be attached to a broader conception of justice. The problem has to do with what there is about the festive that escapes such moralization. Its exceptional character seems to plead against it. It is the same with the festive in the practice of gift giving as it is with the solemnity in the gestures of forgiveness, or rather the request for pardon…

Recognition in its festive aspect makes it more than ethical. Marcelo describes Ricœur’s understanding of festive recognition when he writes that it is a “symbol of a transcultural experience of real recognition.” Experiences of festivity are effected in the form of “clearings” that are able to expand the experience of mutuality and make the struggle for recognition worth the effort. Christopher Lauer writes that Ricœur’s emphasis on festive recognition picks up on Hegel’s identification of the importance of festive giving as hope for and participation in “solutions to, intractable struggles for recognition.”

Ricœur places festive recognition in a “space of hope” that unbinds, illuminates, and immerses persons in an energy that motivates toward a state of peace. This chapter refers to Christian forgiveness as an experience of this, marked by the characteristics of the symbolic, the imagined, unconditional, and as a state of peace.

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446 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 244-245.
447 Marcelo, "Paul Ricœur and the Utopia of Mutual Recognition," 120.
448 Marcelo, "Paul Ricœur and the Utopia of Mutual Recognition," 118.
450 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 245. Ricœur writes, “Such gestures [gesture of forgiveness and request for pardon], I said, cannot become an institution, yet by bringing to light the limits of the justice of equivalence, and opening a space for hope…they unleash an irradiating and irrigating wave, that secretly and indirectly, contributes to the advance of history toward states of peace.”
451 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*. Christian forgiveness as symbolic (16, 20, 22-24, 47, 49), imagined (2, 3, 16, 26, 29, 30, 44, 54), unconditional (20-23, 27, 38, 39, 42, 43), and as a state of peace (22, 23, 27.)
Ricœur brings these aspects to the fore and, according to my reading, signals festive recognition as the aspect of mutuality that surpasses all human attempts at theorizing, achieving, or grasping mutuality. He likens festive recognition to poetic forms of language, such as hymns, which reach beyond normative modes of speech that seek to grasp the meaning of situations or events. Just as poetic language allows one to express in ways beyond the exacting limits of descriptive language, festive recognition opens persons to the indescribable, yet real experience of mutuality.

In *The Course*, Ricœur writes about his understanding of the festive as poetic with emphasis on the optative (space of hope). This positions his theological accent on the possibilities of a new humanity, which also connects with the earlier comments about the responding, or capable, aspect of the summoned self. Despite the fact that the summons disturbs and breaks into the ordinary life of the one called, and just as the invitation by the prophet interrupts the ordinary life of the community, it also invites persons into the horizon of hope beyond the struggle. This touches on hope in human capability. However, Ricœur in *The Course* does not so formally pick up the cosmic experience of vulnerability.

According to Marianne Moyaert, Ricœur’s understanding of the festive actually brings to bear this less emphasized theological dimension, a view which I believe is

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452 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 245. “The festive aspect…is like the hymn on the verbal plane, or, more generally, all those uses of language I like to place under the grammatical patronage of the optative, which is neither a descriptive nor a normative mode of speech.”

453 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 245. Ricœur writes, “… by bringing to light the limits of the justice of equivalence, and opening a space of hope, … they [gestures of recognition] unleash an irradiating and irrigating wave, that secretly and indirectly, contributes to the advance of history toward states of peace.”
important for settler-Canadians. The cosmic dimension of the vulnerability of humanity
sets Ricœur’s thinking apart from ethical theories that “in the moral struggle look only to
l’homme capable.” Festive recognition is also a real experience of the anthropological
fragility of humanity that is expressed through the gratuitousness of biblical agape.
Although Ricœur writes about the interruptive and the transcendent aspects of the
festive, Moyaert claims that his appeal to hope needs to be embellished from a
theological perspective of fragility that “places persons in the cosmic dimension of
existence.” I find this perspective interesting in light of the settler reality in Canada. It
is interesting because Ricœur gives settler-Canadians an entry point into hope that rests,
not on moral capability, but on the human anthropological inability to be capable. In
other words, settler-Canadians cannot fix their broken relationship with Aboriginal
peoples. However, the hope that lies in the festive aspect of recognition is twofold. It lies
in the hope beyond the struggle (based on real experiences of peace, no matter how few)
and it lies in the hope that human fragility brings – there is a cosmic dimension of life
beyond human ethical theories and actions that gifts persons with mutuality.

How can these reflections on Paul Ricœur be brought to bear on the impasse
identified at the beginning of this thesis, i.e., how settler-Canadians can understand
mutuality? Without an adequate understanding of mutuality, concrete problems, such as

454 Marianne Moyaert, "The Struggle for Recognition: A Festive Perspective," Philosophy and Theology

455 Moyaert, "The Struggle for Recognition: A Festive Perspective," 117. Moyaert’s thesis is that feasts
(festive) “place people in a larger context that transcends them [God], thereby revealing their finitude,
smallness, and fragility.”

protectionist solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada, cannot be resolved.

4.4 Beyond Protection: An Experience of Festive Recognition

In the Introduction to this chapter, I indicated that PACT-Ottawa’s Project Northern Outreach (PNO) would be presented as one potential instance of festive recognition within the context of solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. This section provides that presentation so that we can return to it for mutuality assessment as part of the concluding chapter.

Following the presentation of PNO, we can anticipate the concluding chapter. First, Chapter 5 will summarize how our reflections on Ricœur have helped to elucidate the problem within existing understandings of mutuality that either remain on the horizontal or reciprocal level, or fail to escape structures of settler domination. Second, our concluding remarks will demonstrate how, just as Sen’s understanding of capability expanded the evaluative criteria for healthy economies, Ricœur’s unique contribution to mutuality is festive recognition. This aspect of recognition allows us to see political and social recognition in a new light. Finally, at a concrete level, I will evaluate how Project Northern Outreach is an experience of festive recognition that addresses the actual challenge of mutuality and provides hope for a praxis of mutuality that reaches beyond solutions of settler protection(ism) of Aboriginal women and girls from the crime of human trafficking.

PACT-Ottawa’s most recent effort to address the problem of human trafficking is Project Northern Outreach (PNO.) PNO is founded on two events: first, a conversation
between Grandmother Isabelle and myself during the summer of 2014, and second, the 2014 findings of PACT’s Project ImPACT, which documented that 15% of women and girls in the study done in Ottawa are Aboriginal. Concerning the conversation, Grandmother Isabelle shared with me the need in Northern Aboriginal communities in Canada for community awareness raising and other actions to prevent human trafficking. “We are losing too many of our youth to this. We want to help the ones we have left,” she told me. Grandmother Isabelle bases her concern on the evidence she sees, and hears through stories shared during the healing work she does in Northern Anishinaabek communities. Concerning the second, I note again the finding of Project imPACT that indicates, while Aboriginal persons represent 4% of the Canadian population, Aboriginal women and girls represent 15% of those who were part of the study. The preliminary findings in Ottawa are supported by other recent studies that document even higher occurrences of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls. In other words, the research

457 The conversation occurred in Hyderabad, India where both Grandmother Isabelle Meawasige, from Serpent River First Nation, Ontario, Canada, and the author of this thesis, from Ottawa, Canada were co-panelists at Women’s Worlds Congress 2014.

458 Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, "Anishinaabemowin". Anishinaabek/Chippewa, Odawa, Potawatomi, Algonquin, Delaware and Mississaugaa tribal nations use Anishinaabe (Anishinaabek, plural) to self identify as individuals or collectives.


460 Native Women's Association of Canada, "Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of Aboriginal Women and Girls: Literature Review and Key Informant Interviews."
findings correlate with the experience and anecdotal evidence shared by Grandmother Isabelle.

Now in its implementation stage, PNO first went through an arduous proposal-writing phase in order to access the funds needed for its realization. The proposal writing adventure was collaborative effort that was not without struggle. Government funding comes with its own set of criteria before any project is considered. In December 2015, Public Safety Canada entered into collaboration with PACT-Ottawa and a circle 12 Anishinaabek grandmothers. Public Safety Canada provides the funds, PACT-Ottawa is the mediator, bringing educational expertise, demonstrated experience working with Public Safety, as well as grassroots involvement with trafficked persons and those working with them. The Anishinaabek grandmothers bring an array of professional expertise in their communities and concrete knowledge of how trafficking is happening in their communities, as well as understanding how to work together and approach solutions in culturally competent ways. Is PNO an experience of festive recognition? I will return to this question in the concluding chapter.

4.5 Conclusion to Chapter 4

In this chapter, I discussed care-action as the basic unit of identity that influences Ricœur’s ethics of mutuality, human capability/vulnerability, and mutual recognition with Christian forgiveness as a structure to imagine its achievement.\textsuperscript{461} In the section on

\textsuperscript{461} Kaplan, "Paul Ricœur and Development Ethics," 118-127. In the section, “How Ricœur Contributes to Development Ethics,” Kaplan mentions three areas in which Ricœur contributes to capability: 1) his view of vulnerability, 2) imagination (of which forgiveness is one model for imagining better relations among nations, peoples etc.), and 3) the paradox of political power. This chapter will develop the first two: the important link between capability and vulnerability, and how forgiveness is a model for imagining actual mutuality, through the categories of moral, political, and aesthetical.
human capability, I discussed Ricœur’s contribution as the anthropological foundation of the capable self for ethics.

In the section on mutual recognition, I uncovered Ricœur’s contribution as the extension of capability to mutuality in its mode of imputability. This revealed how the correlation between mutuality and imputability, impels persons to embrace their vulnerability in the achievement of a fullness of mutuality.

In addition, Ricœur’s understanding of the structure of Christian forgiveness was presented as a way to imagine mutuality and to distinguish it from reciprocity. Four main points were discussed: the simultaneous vertical and horizontal structure of the spirit of forgiveness that holds the challenges posed by difference and equality; the spirit of forgiveness and its return to human capability in its imputable mode; the spirit of forgiveness in its hyperethical\textsuperscript{462} mode; and finally some implications of Christian forgiveness as a way to imagine mutuality.

The implications of Christian forgiveness as an imaginary for mutuality recognition point shape our understanding of festive recognition as the theological contribution that takes Ricœur beyond an ethics of mutuality, beyond care-action, and thus beyond protection. Essential to the contribution of festivity to recognition is Ricœur’s shift from understanding mutuality as a reciprocal gift exchange to its perception and reality as a shared operation. I suggested at the end of this chapter that PACT-Ottawa’s Project Northern Outreach is one instance of festive recognition within

\textsuperscript{462} Ricœur, "Love and Justice," 325. Ricœur uses the term hyperethical to describe the biblical notion commandment, a notion that expresses the transcendence of obligations and imperatives of ethical codes, whether religious, legal, or social. It denotes a dynamic that operates on complete freedom of the self from itself as same and total openness to the other.
the context of solutions to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. Our concluding remarks will assess this case after revisiting the gap that Ricœur addresses in the literature on mutuality and how he helps us get beyond the in a *praxis* of social justice that involves mutuality that allows for both equality and respect for difference. I can then evaluate the practicality of Ricœur’s contribution of festive recognition to mutuality as a model for social justice and question the role settler-Canadians. In order to access Ricœur’s understanding of and contribution to mutuality, I will analyze Project Northern Outreach (PNO), which has just been presented.\textsuperscript{463}

\textsuperscript{463} Project Northern Outreach is a current effort of collaboration between PACT-Ottawa, a circle of 12 Anishinaabek grandmothers, and Public Safety Canada. The project takes place in the region between Manitoulin/North Shore to Sault Ste. Marie, although the impacts are reaching North Bay, Ontario and into Quebec, and Michigan, USA. The final report will be released in July 2016, and will be accessible on PACT-Ottawa’s website: www.pact-ottawa.org.
Chapter 5

5 Conclusion

Introduction

On March 4, 2016, a group of 12 Anishinaabek grandmothers gifted PACT-Ottawa with a carved, white willow, talking stick. It was a gesture of recognition that symbolized and actualized the experience of mutuality being lived between the Nookmisak and PACT-Ottawa in Project Northern Outreach (PNO). The purpose of the talking stick is to help support the work of the grandmothers’ circle, which is the core of PNO. I was presented with the talking stick and asked to be its keeper. This honour and responsibility involves recognition that the keeper of the stick is a bridge between PACT-Ottawa and the grandmothers. As the keeper of the talking stick, I have the responsibility to care for it, use it, and bring it each time the grandmothers gather for PNO. The talking stick is passed around the sharing circle at each meeting of the grandmothers. The gift of the talking stick to PACT-Ottawa is a gesture of festive recognition. It is festive because of its hopeful dimension, i.e., that the ethical struggle between PACT-Ottawa and the Nookmisak in their work together to help end trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada is worth it; and the gesture is an actual experience of the hyperethical dimension of reality of which we are all part. Festive recognition in this double sense is the theological contribution of Paul Ricoeur’s thinking to mutual recognition. It has emerged from following the threads that make up this thesis. His understanding reveals that festive gestures of recognition are symbolic of the value of struggle in relationships and of the important role of mediation (space between, shared operation, bridge) in living actual moments of peace (mutuality, forgiveness, unconditional love.) Festive recognition imagines the possibility of peace because these hyperethical moments have occurred before, and it is an actual experience of the hyperethical (state of peace.) Gestures of festivity lead to experiences beyond any hope or imagining and they reach further into human experience than is possible to adequately describe in a definitive way. Moyaert’s

464 Ontario Federation of Friendship Centres, "I Am a Kind Man" http://www.iamakindman.ca/IAKM/YouthSite/the-healing-circle.html (accessed March 30, 2016). In the Anishinaabe clan system of governance, a talking stick or feather is used to facilitate talking, sharing, or healing circles, and is used in decision-making. The stick or feather is passed around the circle and the person holding it has the opportunity and responsibility to speak their truth. “Using a talking stick or feather in a healing circle can help the person focus him or herself to have a deeper awareness into their inner world, or inner feelings. As each person has the opportunity to speak, the object gets passed to the next person. It doesn’t have to be in any certain order.”

465 Project Northern Outreach is collaboration between a group of 12 Nookmisak (Ojibwe-Anishinaabek grandmothers) and PACT-Ottawa (Persons Against the Crime of Trafficking in humans.) The project was discussed in Chapter 4.
use of the term cosmic recognition describes this real, yet ungraspable dimension of mutuality. Her understanding of cosmic suggests that mutuality is not only something that persons do; it is something in which they already participate. Festive recognition involves this hyperethical, unconditional experience of the vast, unexplainable God-energy that impels the gift and the gift in return because it casts persons into the irresistible dimension of the experience of mutual recognition in which all already participate, yet no one can fully grasp or sufficiently explain.

5.1 Beyond Protection: A Challenge to the Settler Problem of Domination

With the Nookmisak talking stick in hand, I return anew to the topic of this thesis: Beyond Protection: The Contribution of Paul Ricœur’s Ethics of Human Capability and Mutual Recognition to Solutions to Trafficking in Aboriginal Women and Girls in Canada. I began with a review of the literature on human trafficking. I did so in order to understand how Canada is implicated. The research revealed that Canada is not immune to this global reality; in fact, it is involved in human trafficking, while also working to alleviate it. When Canada’s response was examined, a current gap was identified in Canada’s National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking (NAP.) The lacuna is that while agreement exists among Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars, governments, non-governmental organizations, and activists, that colonialism is a root cause of the exploitation of trafficking in Canada, it is not addressed in any of NAP’s recommendations.

My thesis is that Paul Ricœur makes a contribution that helps to address the ongoing relationship of colonialism, which have been identified as fundamental for solutions to end trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. Attention to

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466 Moyaert, ”The Struggle for Recognition: A Festive Perspective.” Cosmic recognition refers to the hyperethical element of recognition, which Ricœur calls states of peace. These are moments that break into the struggle for recognition and remind persons that they already participate in an unexplainable dimension of life that is known through shared experiences of unconditional love, trust, peace, etc.
Ricœur’s ethical thinking is a way to respond to the call for mutual recognition as a fundamental element of Indigenous - Settler relations. This characteristic was demanded by Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP: 1991-1996) and echoed by the recent Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC: 2008-2015.)

I have directed this study primarily at helping settler-Canadians to better understand mutual recognition and the impact that their historical and present domination over Indigenous peoples has in relation to the current disproportion of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls. The settler problem of domination over Indigenous peoples is defined in this thesis by the literature on settler colonialism.  

Settler-Canadians are those who participate in dominant society and whose political agency functions within systems that privilege and benefit them, to the detriment of Indigenous peoples. Settler colonialism is connected to the past and is part of the present reality. However, the term settler-Canadian does not include those individuals and groups in Canada who are non-Indigenous and marginalized, who have little political agency, such as the economically poor or refugees. This is because these groups of Canadians are disenfranchised due to race, economic position, gender, religion, etc. However, I also noted that, within the Canadian context the experience of other disenfranchised groups should not be conflated with that of Indigenous peoples who experience marginalization because of the ongoing reality of settler colonialism in their homelands.

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467 Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini, "Settler Colonial Studies Blog"; Veracini, Settler Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview, 1-15. I choose Cavanagh and Veracini’s definition of settlers as the one used in this thesis. Their definition helped to delineate who is being referred to when the term settler-Canadian appears. In the Introduction to this thesis, I cited the definition that appears on their blog because it concisely summarizes Veracini’s discussion in the book also cited in this footnote.
The disparities created by settler colonialism are widely acknowledged in Indigenous communities, by activists, and are recognized in the literature. The literature, such as studies commissioned by the United Nations, places a demand on Canada to address the spectrum of sexual violence against Aboriginal women and girls, including its form as human trafficking. Ongoing colonialism is also widely acknowledged as a root cause of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canadian research studies, such as the one commissioned by Public Safety Canada in 2014, yet unreleased by the Canadian Government at the time. The literature implies the need for settler-Canadians to be more reflective about these findings, and to examine their protectionist attitudes and lack of attention to colonialism as a root cause of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls.

Given the calls for mutual recognition between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians (RCAP, TRC) and the discrepancy between the findings in the literature on human trafficking (colonialism as a root cause when it pertains to Aboriginal women and girls) and actual practice (persistent protectionism, lack of attention to domination,) I set out with three aims for this thesis. They are: 1) to help settler-Canadians distinguish between protection and mutual recognition as models for social action; 2) to better understand mutual recognition and to ask how it offers a better alternative than protection; and 3) to answer the question, “How is mutual recognition a lived praxis when addressing trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada?” My underlying concern was to question whether well-meaning settler-Canadians have the tools to critique existing attitudes and practices that sanction bestowal of benevolent protection as a way of addressing trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls. Further, I questioned
whether mutual recognition between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians, and not benevolent protection, might be a better approach to help alleviate the disproportion of trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada. I now conclude by tracing some of the insights gathered during the trajectory of this thesis. I do so to help assess, in the last section below, the achievement of these aims in a response to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls in Canada that appeals to Ricœur’s approach to mutual recognition.

5.2 Benevolent Protection

My thesis always remained focused on helping settler-Canadians to understand what they mean by mutual recognition, which was mentioned as a call issued to all Canadians by the RCAP and again by the recent TRC. Further to unveiling an understanding of mutual recognition for settler-Canadians, I chose trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls as a concrete situation of social injustice in which mutual recognition between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians can be assessed as constructive (or not) in the work to help end it. To investigate my thesis, with its aims and hopes, and evaluation, I continued by further examining mutuality from Christian ethical and Canadian political perspectives. This helped to formulate an initial definition of mutuality.

The problematic of benevolent protection (also termed in the literature as paternalistic, patriarchal, and masculinist) when dealing with human trafficking was made explicit by the work of Indian scholars Sharma and Sanghera. In the Canadian context, Coulthard and Joy raised the same problem within protection. Coulthard from an Indigenous perspective in the Canadian political context of settler colonialism, and Joy from a feminist perspective concerning trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls.
The common issue raised by these scholars is the problem of domination within protection. I examined this problematic with the help of Young, who analyzes the notion of masculinist protection. Young’s approach is from an American political perspective and suggests mutuality as an alternative to the problem of domination of power within protective solutions by military operations overseas. Young’s recommendation for a defender-defender model of mutuality within the context of protection supported the need for settlers in Canada to understand mutual recognition.

5.3 Definition of Mutual Recognition

According to the research reviewed in the thesis, I proposed the following working definition of mutuality in Chapter 2:

A *praxis* that is both a theoretical social norm and a practice of relational transformation that involves self-recognizing persons-in-relation who share power-in-common while also respecting difference.

This definition was informed by a reading of mutuality that focused particularly on its meaning in Christian ethical thought (feminist theologies of mutuality, postcolonial biblical theology,) and Canadian political discourse (politics of recognition.) The work of Nothwehr provided an analysis of four feminist theologies of mutuality (Harrison, Heyward, Johnson, and Radford Reuther.) Nothwehr perceived that feminist theologians have retrieved mutuality from a forgotten place in the Christian ethical tradition. The Christian feminists that she examined worked on reclaiming mutuality, but in light of more contemporary discourses, such as the self-in-relation approach of feminist psychology, and an understanding of power as shared with persons-in-relation. These characteristics helped to shape a feminist understanding of mutuality as a formal Christian social norm that is marked by a relationship of mutuality as reciprocity.
(equality) between persons-in-relation who share power-with each other. One of the
gaps pointed out by Nothwehr concerns the necessity to link mutuality as a formal social
norm (value, virtue) with its practice as a material norm (obligation, duty). In other
words, she reclaimed and solidified the place of mutuality in the Christian ethical
tradition, and she recommended additional research to address the intersection of
mutuality as a Christian vision with its practical, lived aspect as a human right and
responsibility.

Mutuality as an integrated praxis, as suggested by Nothwehr, involves the
structural, or theoretical basis of motivational values, and the actual practice of moral
obligations based on power-with-each other. Praxis was defined in this thesis according
to the work of Paul Ricœur who understands it as a comprehensive notion that reconciles
the apparent oppositions between motivational teleological values (formal norms,) and
the actual practice of deontological duties (material norms) based on power in common.
This means that praxis is a relationship of mutuality between vision and action. But,
each of these aspects are also comprised of complex relationships.

I built on Nothwehr’s work of establishing mutuality as a formal Christian social
norm and took up her recommendation that mutuality needs more integration to be lived.
I further examined the concept through the postcolonial biblical critique of Mainwaring,
in which he claims, like Nothwehr, that mutuality needs to be an integration of
motivational aspirations and action. However, his understanding did not help me to find
integration, as much as it helped me to question mutuality as a praxis of reciprocity, a
relationship of equality that was privileged in feminist approaches.
Mainwaring questions reciprocity (equality) as a model for liberation from the differences that cause injustice. He points out that in postcolonial biblical studies freedom from difference is not necessarily viewed as liberation. This is because from within the liberation experience of those who are colonized, neither equality with dominators is being sought, nor freedom from self. Mainwaring’s distinction between reciprocity (equality, sameness) and mutuality (respect for difference) within postcolonial biblical interpretation helped me to cross the bridge into politics of recognition in the Canadian context. This is because politics of recognition carries the same concern found in the theological discourses examined; that is, how to navigate the relationship between equality and respect for difference as an aspiration and a lived experience.

I examined Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition and its critique by Glen Coulthard. Taylor’s politics of recognition addresses the concern for equality and respect for difference through the issue of multiculturalism. He transfers some of his insights to Canada’s colonial reality. Coulthard charges Taylor with an uncritical analysis of relationships of domination in current structures of political recognition, particularly in the context of settler colonialism. Coulthard’s view is that Taylor does not question existing political structures and endorses mutuality as an inclusive relationship, one that is not marked by shared power, but by the bestowal of recognition upon the dominated by those with power. The lack of structural critique in politics of recognition that is pointed out by Coulthard guides me to the work of Paul Ricœur.

I put Ricœur and Coulthard into conversation because they each address the topic of mutual recognition by linking self-recognition to transformative praxis. For this
reason, they appeared to me to be potential dialogue partners. While the literature on mutuality under review identified a gap that needed to be bridged between equality and respect for difference, only Coulthard proposed self-recognition for Indigenous peoples and transformative praxis for Indigenous peoples. Since these concepts are also part of Ricœur’s understanding of mutual recognition, I wondered if he might assist settler-Canadians with their self-understanding and provide them with a language about mutual recognition to contribute in meaningful discussions with Indigenous peoples.

Coulthard works from an approach that appreciates and believes in the capability of Indigenous peoples, who must transform themselves in relationship with their colonizers. He does so in a way that no other theorist examined in this thesis does as clearly and directly. Coulthard’s critique and opposition to the current politics of recognition in Canada revealed a need for settlers to address their problem of bestowal of recognition. My reading of Coulthard’s analysis, links the concepts bestowal of recognition and benevolent protection, both of which overlook the agency of those upon whom protection is bestowed. As an antidote for the problem of bestowal of recognition, Coulthard suggested self-recognition of Indigenous peoples that leads to their transformed praxis, which prepares them for relationships of mutual recognition.

Coulthard’s appeal to self-recognition and transformed praxis challenged me in my reading of Ricœur’s understanding of recognition, which involves self-recognition as self-critique, capability, self-transformation, and mutual recognition. I wondered if Ricœur’s concern about domination of power, and his working through it with self-recognition as the notion mediating a praxis of mutual recognition, might help settler-Canadians to critique and rethink their own understanding of mutual recognition. Ricœur
identified the impasse in the literature pointing to the need for a practical theory of recognition, the fullness of which is mutual recognition between persons or groups. Ricœur’s own succinct description of the core of mutual recognition is inscribed on the last page of *The Course of Recognition*, where he writes, “A just distance is maintained at the heart of mutuality, a just distance that integrates respect into intimacy.”

I chose Paul Ricœur to help settler-Canadians because his analysis of recognition offers important distinctions between the terms reciprocity, mutuality, and mutual recognition. These terms in the literature under examination are often conflated. To help settler-Canadians understand what they mean, I chose Ricœur’s term mutual recognition as the one most helpful for the context of this thesis. This is because he demonstrates that reciprocity is an ethical term relating to any language of justice (juridical, political, and ethical) when working through issues of social inequality.

According to Ricœur, reciprocity contains only traces of mutuality. However, in most of the literature examined, mutuality is either used interchangeably with reciprocity (Nothwehr’s analysis of feminist theologies), or it challenges the discourse to include within reciprocity respect for difference (Mainwaring’s post-colonial biblical study.) Ricœur prefers to distinguish between mutuality and reciprocity and to bring them together in his notion mutual recognition.

How does Ricœur’s understanding of mutual recognition shed light on how to distinguish and join mutuality and reciprocity? I found that his use of the term mutual recognition helps to illuminate some of the confusion that may occur if reciprocity and mutuality are used interchangeably or in opposition. Mutual recognition bridges the notions of equality (reciprocity) and difference (mutual respect.) Most markedly, Ricœur
contributes a view that introduces states of peace into a dialogue that remains entrenched in a one-sided struggle for recognition.

The notion states of peace lifts the recognition discourse from a discussion that is one-sided and marked by an impossible infinity of struggle for recognition. It does so by providing a language for the in-breaking of experiences of mutual recognition where equality is recognized and difference is respected. Ricœur pairs the concepts of struggle for recognition, which is the focus in much of the literature that has been examined, and recognition as states of peace. This dialectical view of mutual recognition also requires persons to be self-recognizing. In this way, Ricœur distinguishes aspects of recognition (self and mutual) and links them as integral moments on a journey of recognition.

For Ricœur, both struggle for recognition and states of peace are needed to attain the fullness of recognition, which is its mutual aspect. However, as the culminating aspect of recognition, mutual recognition cannot be understood as enduring. It requires each person to engage in a life journey of self-recognition; a path that involves a struggle for each one to recognize and be recognized according to his/her proper terms of identity, while also opening to transformation of self-identity through perspectives of the other. These aspects of struggle for recognition by themselves cannot reach the fullness of recognition. Mutual recognition needs states of peace, which are the rare, but real lived moments that are mutually experienced, but remain glimpses of non-imposing intimacy between persons. Since these moments of actual mutual recognition are not permanent achievements, a fullness of mutual recognition involves an element of hope. This makes mutual recognition a hoped for, yet real experience of shared peace, trust, unconditional love, forgiveness, etc.
I examined a theoretical trajectory that led from the mediated self to Ricœur’s last work, *The Course of Recognition*. In doing so, I discovered that Ricœur’s approach to mutual recognition makes an anthropological and ethical contribution to the capability discourse initiated by Sen. However, that which most interested me in this thesis was how Ricœur’s anthropological and ethical contributions lead to the hyperethical. This dimension provides an opening to the theological that makes a unique contribution within the context I am examining. In fact, he demonstrates that without a theological dimension, the fullness of mutuality cannot be achieved. The theological contribution of Ricœur moves mutual recognition beyond its ethical dimension to the hyperethical within Christian tradition.

5.4 **Synthesis of Ricœur’s Approach to Mutual Recognition**

In Chapters 3 and 4, I followed Ricœur’s thinking from the mediated self through to festive recognition. I suggest that festive recognition is his most significant theological contribution to mutuality in the context of this thesis. Festive recognition unfolds from Ricœur’s both-and thinking through the mediated self, gift-giving as a shared operation, the hyperethical dimension of prophetic self, and is imagined by Christian forgiveness. These are the stepping stones that helped me to follow Ricœur to festive recognition.

The contribution of Ricœur’s mediated self is seminal to his perspective that social justice as care-action is the basic anthropological unit of human being. Ricœur is well known for his mediated way of thinking through which he chooses to appreciate the contributions of opposing views. This way of thinking can be termed, both-and. To some it may seem non-committal, but I view his both-and thinking as a practical way to
provide a space between for holding and working through differing perspectives. Both-and thinking is a way to view reality as something to work with, not to overcome. It points to individual persons and groups as both limited and free; determined and becoming; capable (active) and vulnerable (passive.)

The mediated self is Ricœur’s way to address the failure of the either-or dualisms that shape a notion of the autonomous self that is not relational in its claim to direct self-knowledge. Both-and thinking about the self is helpful for settler Canadians who are conscious of wanting to build a better relationship with Indigenous peoples. The mediated self is a helpful tool that assists settlers with their own self-critique and transformation in a way that avoids self-loathing and cultural appropriation of the other. By this I mean that the mediated self can help settlers to listen to other perspectives, especially about themselves, and to be transformed while remaining grounded in the historical worldview and cultural reality that shaped them. In other words the mediated self can help settlers learn from the other without becoming the other.

In my experience, when settler-Canadians first begin to hear about how they are implicated in a colonial past and in the present reality of settler colonialism, their responses are often defensive, or they feel morally paralyzed and slip into self-loathing. These feelings are caused by hearing perspectives previously unheard, especially from those who have been harmed by settler imposition. However, my thesis has demonstrated that if Ricœur’s trajectory toward mutual recognition is followed, he is someone who provides tools for holding differing, even opposing views, within the self. He offers a way of self-understanding for settler-Canadians that does not require them to reject or overcome who they are, nor does it require them to impose themselves onto
other persons. Rather, the both-and thinking proposed by Ricœur involves developing the capacity to be challenged by new perspectives, to engage in self-recognition, and open to self-transformation that emerges from one’s self as same, and is creatively informed by other perspectives.

The both-and interplay between self and other was investigated through the notion of shared operation, an aspect of Hénaff’s view of gift-giving that helped Ricœur. It did so in the sense that persons do not take turns back and forth being self (giver) or other (receiver) in the shared operation, but each one is simultaneously an active self/passive other in the experience of mutual recognition. Ricœur’s fascination with Marcel Mauss’s work on the gift exchange gave rise to his further investigation into Hénaff’s insight that gift-giving is a shared operation, and not an exchange of roles, i.e., one is either the giver or the receiver. Recall Ricœur’s words, “The one is not the other. We exchange gifts, but not places.” The shared operation of gift-giving/receiving solidifies Ricœur’s thinking about the significance of the space between the one who is giver/receiver, and the one who is receiver/giver. In the shared operation of giving/receiving, each one is simultaneously giver and receiver, albeit differently. The generosity of giving obligates nothing in return. However, the experience of gift-giving impels a receiver to give again. This is something that cannot be imposed or expected.

According to Ricœur, to see forgiveness as gift means considering the request for pardon as a gift. Repentance is a gift in the sense that it is all that the repentant one has to offer to the one whom has been harmed. “Please forgive me.” Like in the act of gift-giving, the repentant cannot demand or expect a response. The injured one is not obligated to respond in any way. This is why I looked at Christian forgiveness as a way
to imagine the hyperethical aspect of mutuality that is involved in the shared operation of gift-giving/receiving.

In *The Course of Recognition*, Ricœur describes the shared operation as festive. The achievement of the fullness of mutual recognition is an experience of festivity. Feasts are something for which persons take initiative as they prepare and send invitations. Guests also prepare themselves to come to and enjoy the feast. These aspects of the festive involve the efforts of ethical selves in relation. However, once the feast is prepared, the actual shared experience of host and guest can reach beyond their hopes and expectations. This is because the feast provides a space for mutual recognition as a state of peace, such as experiences of celebration and gratitude, which cannot be expected. These are experiences that are indescribable and not initiated by persons. Festive recognition may be hoped for, but is known only through feelings and experience. This ungraspable dimension of mutual recognition was indicated in the notion of biblical *agape* and in the prophetic call of the summoned self, which are two places where Ricœur draws some understanding of the festive.

### 5.5 Festive Recognition: A Theological Contribution of Ricœur

By including mutuality as states of peace in his analysis of recognition, Ricœur opens the space of encounter beyond the “bad infinity” of struggle for recognition. States of peace break into the struggle for recognition present in ordinary life and serve as actual experiences, however temporary, upon which persons can also ground their hope.

Ricœur’s contribution of festive recognition to the recognition discourse can be perceived in a similar light as the impact that Sen’s capability approach has for
determining the health of economies. This means that just as opportunities to exercise one’s capabilities need to be included in the rubric for assessing healthy economies, states of peace need to be included for assessing the fullness of mutual recognition, which, according to Ricœur cannot be adequately understood or evaluated without inclusion of its hyperethical, theological aspect.

In the examination of mutual recognition, this thesis uncovered that theology has a transformative element to the discourse on ethics. A Christian ethics of mutual recognition uses one among other ethical languages (juridical, political) that each grapple with the struggle for recognition (reciprocity, justice). However, Christian theology brings more than an ethical understanding to the discourse. According to our examination of Ricœur’s thinking about mutual recognition, festive recognition adds a dimension that is non-moralizing, but is hyperethical.

The language that makes the most sense to Ricœur for describing the hyperethical aspect of mutual recognition is the poetic language of the bible. Poetic language in general seeks to express that which is unexplainable. However, Ricœur chooses its form in biblical literature because, for him, the bible contains the poetic literature that most adequately demonstrates the continuity over time with which persons experience and participate in realities beyond human efforts. For example, I looked at Ricœur’s understanding of the summoned self, which is rooted in the Hebrew tradition. This notion is carried over into Christian interpretations and connected with understandings of biblical agape as a way to imagine the indescribable, yet real experience of mutuality as a state of peace.
Mutual recognition as a state of peace is more than a hope that the struggle for recognition is worth it. This is because biblical *agape* is connected to the experience of love that is not planned, not chosen, not controlled or initiated by persons. The biblical command to love, as Ricœur understands it, following Rosenweig’s interpretation, is not an obligation. Rather, it is an impelled response drawn from the very heart of the relationship itself. The summoned self in the prophetic biblical tradition responds in this way to the call that does not impose or even expect a response; rather, the call draws the one summoned beyond their own hopes, expectations or knowledge of self.

I examined the prophetic call as symbolic of what actually happens in the heart of the shared operation of mutual recognition, and discovered the gift of self at the core of Ricœur’s understanding of mutuality. The gift of self happens in the shared space of experience where intimacy is integrated with respect for difference, and where each one remains a self and is transformed by the other. The space between, which Ricœur has been guarding since his thinking about the mediated self, is at the heart of mutual recognition. This is where festive recognition can occur.

Just as the dialectic self cannot be known to itself directly, mutual recognition is experiential and not definitive. Ricœur’s understanding of mutual recognition is not a theory to be grasped, but is a process to be lived. Mutual recognition is assisted by theoretical elements, but its fullness is known when this is integrated with desire, hope, and experience. Festive recognition can be perceived as Ricœur’s hyperethical contribution to an ethics of mutual recognition. In the context of this thesis, to follow the thread of recognition through to the dimension of mutual recognition as festive has opened a path for understanding what is meant by beyond protection.
5.6 Beyond Protection: Assessing a Concrete Praxis of Festive Recognition

To understand mutual recognition, this thesis followed one path within contemporary western thinking. The investigation undertaken intersected along the way with other interlocutors, but it was the foundation of Ricœur’s mediated self that guided the thesis. The path of this thesis, guided by the mediated self, assists settler-Canadians to understand that self-understanding is not self-evident. Mature self-understanding is not something to be achieved definitively, but is always in process of being created, and so forever remains out of reach. My choice of Ricœur has been a good one because he offers a way to think beyond mutual recognition as something that can be accomplished in a definitive way. Ricœur’s thinking supports a view that scientific, ethical theories cannot reach into the heart of mutual recognition on their own. This is because persons can ethically understand how to behave and engage in the struggle for mutual recognition, but only with the integration of its hyperethical dimension as a state of peace can mutual recognition be hoped for and actually lived.

There is not one way to approach or to understand an ethics of mutual recognition. Political, juridical, and theological discourses are examples of the variety of discussions in which Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars each have something to contribute. The fullness of mutual recognition cannot be achieved definitively, nor can one perception determine its fullness. This last point brings us to a question that appeared in Chapter 2, “Can the western notion and its Indigenous critique by Coulthard together shape a new understanding of mutuality that will be helpful in the context of this thesis?” In other words, if we accept that Ricœur can help settler-Canadians to understand mutual recognition from a western worldview perspective, can they expect to
experience it with those who understand mutual recognition from other perspectives, namely with Indigenous peoples?

In response to the above question, my reading of Ricœur's view of mutuality allows settler-Canadians to bring an in-depth understanding of their perspective to the discourse. Although I have brought an Indigenous critique of a Canadian politics of recognition into the content of this thesis, I have not examined an Indigenous perspective on mutuality. In fact, I have not asked the question whether mutual recognition has roots in any Indigenous language or worldview. The purpose of this thesis has been “to speak to my own people,” who are settler-Canadians. However, as stated in the Introduction to this thesis, both Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians have been affected by the power matrix of coloniality, and both are called in the contemporary Canadian context to a relationship of mutual recognition (RCAP and TRC.)

Glen Coulthard places himself, as an Indigenous scholar, in the discourse on recognition, and identifies the need for Indigenous peoples in Canada to undergo their own process of self-recognition and transformative praxis. To have his perspective in the literature means that mutual recognition is at least important to some Indigenous peoples in the contemporary Canadian context. However, the effectiveness of mutual recognition cannot be assessed in a one-sided way. It requires each one to do their own work in order to participate in a shared operation between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians. This thesis serves to help settler-Canadians to bring a view of their understanding of mutual recognition as they enter that shared space. I offer one study and one experience that can assist settler-Canadians in their own evaluation of mutual
recognition as a beneficial alternative to the benevolent protection that is embedded in Canada’s present situation of settler colonialism. The need for this alternative is recognized in the literature that has been reviewed, but it is not addressed in Canada’s National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking.

Figure 10 below serves two purposes. First, it illustrates that the understanding of mutual recognition shaped by this study supports the working definition in Chapter 2, i.e., mutual recognition is not a theoretical concept that is first known then practiced but is a lived praxis that involves a complexity of relationships, i.e., ontological, ethical, theological, that are always in process. This is a view that can be helpful for settler-Canadians as they respond to the call to be in mutual relationship with Indigenous peoples. Second, using Project Northern Outreach (PNO) as an example, the figure serves as a visual tool for the assessment of an understanding of mutual recognition that draws together the threads in this thesis:

Mutual recognition is a praxis that is both a theoretical social norm and a practice of relational transformation that involves self-recognizing persons-in-relation who share power-in-common while also respecting difference. Mutual recognition is hoped for and achieved through experiences of festive recognition. Experiences of festive recognition are found in the shared operation of struggle for recognition between capable/vulnerable selves because the struggle is worth it. The struggle is worth it because the shared operation marked by states of peace is an actual experience of the inherent participation of persons in a cosmic dimension of reality, which already imbuces and embraces each one and all.

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468 See Section 2.6 where three threads for understanding mutuality are woven together to shape the working definition of mutual recognition as praxis that is used in this thesis.
### Characteristics of a Praxis of Mutual Recognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Project Northern Outreach (PNO) Partners Involved</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Anishinaabek Grandmothers, PACT-Ottawa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-recognition</td>
<td>Each partner contributes and is recognized by others according to the terms they bring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons-in-relation</td>
<td>Each partner learns and is transformed in and through relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-in-common</td>
<td>Information, decisions, and roles are shared, each one has political agency in decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for Difference</td>
<td>Deliverables are achieved in culturally competent and appropriate ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festive Recognition</td>
<td>Partners enter willingly into the relationship and take ethical responsibility to give and receive. For unseen, ungraspable reasons, PNO exceeds its hopes and deliverables. This is symbolized and lived through the gestures involved in the giving/receiving – receiving/giving of the gift of the talking stick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PNO comes to a close; the relationship between the Grandmothers and PACT-Ottawa continues and is transformed. Nookmisak Nangdowenigewad (Grandmothers Taking Care) begins.</td>
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**Figure 10: A Praxis of Mutual Recognition**

Project Northern Outreach contributes to Canada’s response to trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls. It does so because it meets the characteristics of a relationship of mutual recognition, and addresses the existing relationship of settler colonialism, something that Canada’s National Action Plan (NAP) has yet to do. While NAP recognizes the disparity created by ongoing colonialism, it does little to address the
existing Indigenous - Settler relationship, which as the literature indicates is an important root cause. Rather, examination of the Federal Government's response thus far reveals continued implementation of initiatives for Aboriginal peoples. While recognizing that there is a relational problem, Canada's NAP avoids addressing the most-highly cited root cause, which is the impacts of the ongoing relationship of settler domination. By failing to address the matrix of settler power domination over Aboriginal peoples in Canada (racism, sexism, economic disparity, bestowal of recognition), protectionism remains the predominant model upon which solutions are based. Is this perhaps why the report commissioned by Public Safety Canada was not released?

In an effort to address trafficking in the context of the relational gap between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians, Project Northern Outreach (PNO) is modeled on mutual recognition between PACT-Ottawa and 12 Nookmisak. This is in line with the Christian ethical understanding of mutual recognition that has been explored in this thesis, and it also reflects Ricœur’s hyperethical concern about the need for actual experiences of mutual recognition within the context of social justice efforts:

I want to dwell on the festive character, in order to set it apart from the moralizing reduction we see already sprouting from the Stoic praise of “good deeds” turned into duties, a reduction that takes on the breadth we recognize in organized charities and caretaking institutions which legitimately aim to fill the gaps left by distributive and redistributive justice. This is not to condemn those nonprofit enterprises and institutions, whose social necessity is evident, and which clearly need to be attached to a broader conception of justice. The problem has to do with what there is about the festive that escapes such moralization…

However, Ricœur’s less explored, but nonetheless foundational, hyperethical (cosmic) dimension of festive recognition, which is picked up by Moyaert, is actually being lived

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469 Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 244-245.
in PNO. The gestures of giving/receiving and receiving/giving the talking stick hold the hoped for (struggle) and the real (festive) dimensions of mutual recognition. The change of name of the initiative from Project Northern Outreach to Nookmisak Nangdowenjgewad (Grandmothers Taking Care) also expresses a shift toward greater integration of both dimensions of mutual recognition. These experiences are attested to in words of Grandmother Isabelle when commenting on the shared vision to address human trafficking in Aboriginal women and girls, “Sheila, we’re living it!”

Figure 11:
Presentation of Nookmisak Talking Stick: Balance of Fire Woman (Alison Recollet) and Sheila Smith. March 4, 2016.
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Criminal Code of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>HT</td>
<td>Human Trafficking</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRPA</td>
<td>Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWAC</td>
<td>Native Women’s Association of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACT-Ottawa</td>
<td>Persons Against the Crime of Trafficking in humans, Ottawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNO</td>
<td>Project Northern Outreach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAP</td>
<td>Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Trafficking in Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRP</td>
<td>Temporary Residency Permit</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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