Educational Park Planning in Berkeley, California, 1965-1968

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Abstract

Promoted as state-of-the-art desegregation devices, educational parks were large campus-like schools designed and sited to draw students from many neighborhoods. In the mid-1960s, the educational park movement featured prominently in debates about race and education in the United States, winning the support of numerous influential individuals and organizations, yet today the educational park movement is nearly forgotten, akin to a wave that swelled, crested, and crashed, leaving only a muddy wash. How could so many thoughtful and energetic people—1960s educational park advocates—work so hard yet achieve so little? This question can only be answered by reference to a wide-ranging 1960s debate about the appropriate role of the federal government in public education, a debate during which educational parks became emblematic of a federal government intent on remaking public schools to advance its own socially progressive ends. Whereas advocates for an expanded federal role in public education portrayed educational parks as cutting-edge alternatives to outdated and inequitable neighborhood schools, opponents of federalism in education presented the parks as staging areas for federal invasions of old-line school districts. In the end it was the latter vision—with its scenes of federal officials revising textbooks and drawing up lesson plans—that won the day, transforming educational parks into menacing symbols of federal overreach.
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<tr>
<td>BBE</td>
<td>Berkeley Board of Education</td>
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<td>BUSD</td>
<td>Berkeley Unified School District</td>
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<td>Cong. Rec.</td>
<td>Congressional Record</td>
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<td>ESEA</td>
<td>Elementary and Secondary Education Act</td>
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INTRODUCTION

On October 6, 1966, President Lyndon Johnson held his monthly press conference, commenting on matters both foreign (“the United States has agreed to attend the conference in Manila on October 24th and 25th. This will bring together the countries that are most directly helping the South Vietnamese to resist aggression and to build a free nation” [Miller Center, n.d.]), and domestic (“a good many things have a bearing on market fluctuations. I think the high interest rates, I think the attractiveness of other securities, I think some of the uncertainties that exist concerning how much money the Government itself will be spending next year” [Miller Center, n.d.]). Midway through a testy question-and-answer period, Johnson was asked about his administration’s recently-tabled Demonstration Cities Bill, specifically about the bill’s provisions for education:

Q. Mr. President, sir, Monday the House is scheduled to vote on the demonstration cities bill. Title II of that bill, which you are urging Members, I understand, to vote for, provides incentives or, rather, bribes to local communities to do away with their own school systems, to have open housing, and to create educational parks where there would be 25,000 or 35,000 children going to school. This would require busing of children long distances and would also bring about a system to correct racial imbalance. Now you are a former schoolteacher. I wonder if you would tell us why you think doing away with the local school systems, as has been admitted by educators in your administration would happen—I wonder why you think this would be better? (Miller Center, n.d.)

This thorny question, with its suggestion that the federal government was bribing cities to replace neighborhood schools with enormous educational parks, was one incident in a heated 1966 debate about educational parks, a new and essentially untried type of school. Dominated by opponents of educational parks, the debate was characterized not by reasoned discussion of the benefits or drawbacks of educational parks, but by bitter denunciations of the opposing camp’s motives and intentions. Between May and October of 1966, the educational park concept—an untried idea for promoting integration—served as catalyst for a rancorous debate about whether and how the federal government should involve itself in public education, with educational park proponents depicting park construction as a worthwhile use of federal funds, while educational park opponents presented the parks as stalking horses for federal meddling in public education.
The 1960s debate about educational parks, which peaked in 1966 but dragged on for another two years, is interesting for several reasons: first, because the educational park concept was an intriguing one (“25,000 to 35,000 children going to school”); second, because the debate over educational parks was more about federalism, the proper role of the federal government (not just in education but also in municipal planning) than it was about schooling. “There you have it. ‘The educational park of the future,’ ” wrote one opponent of educational parks in June, 1966, citing a speech delivered the month before by U.S. Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe II, before adding:

The use of government funds. . . not merely to plan but to construct super-schools to which even pre-kindergarteners will be transported to provide a “cultural mix.” This, remember, is the U.S. Commissioner of Education speaking. When federal aid to education was first proposed you remember that doubters expressed the fear that this would open the way for federal direction of America’s public education. The proponents vigorously denied this. All that was wanted, they swore, was to enlist the federal government helping in improving schools that would still be under “local control” (Jones, 1966, p. 4)

The framing seen here, with educational parks presented as invasive assertions of federalism, was adopted by many opponents of educational parks who typically presented the parks as a tool for (to quote one opponent) “federal indoctrination through all manner of curriculum control, faculty selection, textbook manipulation” (“No Strings Attached,” 1966, p. 3).

This thesis aims to identify arguments made for and against educational parks, in hopes of understanding both why the seemingly unstoppable educational park movement (the Johnson administration was on board!) failed to achieve its goals, and how the educational park concept became so freighted with meaning as to provoke on the one hand rapturous flights of fancy (“This complex would be for all learners—regardless of age. Like Las Vegas, it would be in use around the clock all year long” [Besvinick, 1968, p. 10]) and on the other hand paranoid visions of disaster (“The behemoth school system, the mass society carried to an extreme, is supposed to serve as a vast melting pot in which we will be taught that everybody is just like everybody else,

1 Associate Dean of Research Coordination at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Sidney Besvinick was a keynote speaker at an important 1968 conference on educational parks.
and belongs to everybody else” [Kirk, 1966, p. 4]). As should already be clear, educational parks were never only schools. For advocates they were futuristic learning centers educating a diverse student body (park critics had this right), while for opponents they were “vast, swarming skyscrapers where mass instruction can be facilitated and where both individuality and individualism will be as rare as a barber at a Castro cabinet meeting” (Rafferty, 1966, p. A20). Beyond the lionizing and the demonizing, what arguments were offered for and against educational parks? And what groups and individuals offered these arguments? Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the 1960s educational park debate concerns the plausibility of certain claims made by park opponents. Was it actually true that educational parks were an underhanded means of imposing federal control on local schools? Often couched in hyperbolic language (“Either we continue on the easy bad old freeway to the education beehive, or we roll up our sleeves and hack a rugged but rewarding path through the jungle of collectivism to the green and sunny uplands of local control” [Rafferty, 1968, p. 9]), this claim arose in a cultural climate where the federal government was widely seen as a progressive counterbalance to retrograde city and state authorities. Many educational park advocates did propose that parks be paid for with federal money. Was money all these backers wanted from the federal government, or were they looking for planning assistance and curricular materials as well? One educational park supporter claimed parks would contribute to the “social reconstruction” of cities (BUSD, 1968a, p. 32). Social reconstruction was of course exactly what opponents of the parks feared.

Although (or perhaps because) Berkeley never built an educational park, the city is an ideal case study for examining the educational park movement. Having become Superintendent of Berkeley schools in September, 1964, Neil V. Sullivan was by May, 1965, telling the Oakland Tribune, “I envision ‘educational parks’ built in, if you will, border areas between the various tight groups of the community so that we can achieve truly integrated schools. That way we can benefit all pupils. Everyone will gain” (“‘Truly Integrated’ Schools Envisioned for Berkeley,” May 20, 1965, E16). The arguments Sullivan and others in Berkeley advanced for educational parks made the city representative of other cities where plans were drawn up for one or more educational park(s). In 1965, Berkeley’s elementary schools were segregated, not by law but as a result of housing patterns, and educational parks were portrayed as high-quality, integrated replacements for neighborhood schools. “Great opportunity for instructional innovation exists in

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2 Russell Kirk was an influential newspaper columnist. For more on Kirk, see p. 50 below.
an educational park where centralized facilities and built-in flexibility for all activities would contribute to the effective and efficient use of personnel, and a variety of learning experiences for all students. Maximum racial and socio-economic integration is a major advantage of the park concept” (BUSD, 1968a, p. 35). Indicative of the types of arguments made for educational parks, this passage is found in a report that also reveals the degree to which educational park planners looked to the federal government for support. The report, funded under Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), describes a $57 million plan dependent on financing from federal sources (“Educational Park Plan at Berkeley,” August 2, 1968, p. A6). As it turns out, not just in Berkeley but also in most other cities where educational parks were planned, the federal government was seen as a vital partner. “Educational parks are expensive to build,” wrote one East Coast park advocate. “But the federal government is on the verge of major expenditures for school construction. It will come at the end of Vietnam if not sooner” (Pettigrew, 1967, p. 32).  

Berkeley’s aptness as an educational park planning case study reflects the city’s having been in the 1960s a proving ground for arguments on both sides of the educational park debate. If Neil V. Sullivan spoke for many educational park backers in describing the educational park concept as “The only serious proposal to date which offers promise of effecting a real solution to the de facto segregation problem” (Sullivan, 1967, p. 291), one anonymous Berkeley resident expressed the consensus view of educational park opponents in denouncing the parks as “de-humanized, de-personalized complex[es]” (Anonymous, 1967).  

It is sometimes said the Vietnam War was refought on the streets of Berkeley. However strained the comparison, the 1960s debate over educational parks was also restaged in Berkeley, with advocates presenting educational parks as desegregation devices meriting federal funding, while opponents associated the parks with self-serving political chicanery; e.g. “The words of Neil Sullivan of Berkeley and Harold Howe of Washington D.C. leave no doubt as to their intention to use educational parks as a prime method to achieve total integration. One looks in vain for any consideration of the child. . . & his RIGHT to a basic, sound education, free from the machinations of vote-hungry politicians” (Anonymous, 1967).

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3 Disappointment was a sine qua non of educational park advocacy.
4 This passage is from an unsigned note sent to the BUSD.
Patrick R. Potyondy, in a 2014 study of educational park planning in Columbus, Ohio, observes that: “Previous scholarship on educational parks is slim and has remained restricted to contemporary public policy examinations of the mid-1970s” (p. 38). Given the past prominence of the educational park concept, previous scholarship on educational parks is inadequate. While other studies have investigated educational park projects in individual cities, no study has linked such projects to a coordinated educational park movement active in many cities..

Premised on a belief that backers of educational parks participated in and lost a mid-sixties debate on the value and necessity of educational parks, my research aims to answer the following questions:

1. Who argued for educational parks?
2. What arguments were made for educational parks?
3. Who argued against educational parks?
4. What arguments were made against educational parks?
5. What social and cultural factors contributed to the emergence and demise of the educational park movement?
6. Why did the educational park movement fail to achieve its most important goals?
7. What did the educational park movement achieve?
CHAPTER ONE: THEORY AND METHODS

The mid-sixties campaign for educational parks can be conceptualized in many ways: as a branch of the civil rights movement; as an offshoot of mid-sixties astrofuturism; as a corollary of the 1960s architectural interest in parks of all kinds (industrial; business; medical). While all these notions of the educational park campaign have merit, this study considers educational park advocacy an autonomous social movement, arguing that such advocacy was not a second-order phenomenon—a branch, offshoot, or corollary of another movement—but a social movement in its own right.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of social movement theory, summarizing consensus views on how social movement activists identify and achieve goals. Moving from theory to method, the chapter then describes the mode of historical analysis called sociocultural history, discussing a number of methods used by sociocultural historians (including document analysis, archival research, and critical discourse analysis), and explaining why these methods are helpful in understanding the 1960s debate over educational parks. The chapter closes with a summary of the contributions and limitations of the study.

Social Movements

Dominique Clément, discussing the growth of “social movement organizations” (2013, p. 1) in post-war Canada, describes the organizations as “play[ing] multiple roles in implementing human rights law: campaigning for legislation and future reforms; drafting statutes; enforcement; educating the public; keeping the government accountable; acting as a liaison between human rights agencies and the community; and training staff and providing a pool of recruits for human rights agencies” (p. 1). Not only did groups and individuals affiliated with the 1960s educational park movement fill all these roles, marking the educational park movement as compatible with Clément’s conception of a generic social movement, they filled the roles in a manner consistent with that specific type of social movement Clément links with “human rights activism” (Clément et al, 2012, p. 4). Clément characterizes such activism as “guided by the principles of freedom, equality, and dignity. . . grounded on the presumption of the equal worth and dignity of all

5 “By astrofuturism,” writes De Witt Douglas Kilgore, “I mean the tradition of speculative fiction and science writing inaugurated by scientists and science popularizers during the space race of the 1950s. Although it draws upon a rich history of science-fiction, astrofuturism as a narrative genre is distinguished by its close connections to engineering projects funded by the government and the military” (Kilgore, 2003, p. 2).
human beings” (Clément et al, 2012, p. 3). The implications of educational park activists also being human rights activists are profound: in brief, because the educational park movement was guided by an interest in human rights (as opposed to a narrow concern for civil liberties), it was not satisfied that all schools be open to all students (the goal of opponents of de jure, i.e. legal, segregation), demanding in addition that all schools be of equal quality. Unlike many opponents of educational segregation, educational park activists fought for schools that offered not only equal accessibility but equal quality.6

“Social movements,” writes Jonathan Christiansen, “can be thought of as organized yet informal social entities that are engaged in extra-institutional conflict that is oriented towards a goal. These goals can be aimed at a specific and narrow policy or be more broadly aimed at cultural change” (2009, p. 2). That the educational park movement was organized is evident from many indices, including: (1) the number of conferences convened to discuss educational parks;7 (2) the existence of an unofficial “headquarters” for educational park advocacy (the Center for Urban Education in New York City, publisher of many books and pamphlets about educational parks8); (3) the emergence of a network of recognized experts on educational parks whose voices were heard not only at conferences but also at federal and municipal hearings.9 These indicators of shared effort notwithstanding, educational park advocacy was as informal as it was organized, with advocates expressing not a party line but their own ideas about the merits of educational parks, ideas at times outlandish enough as to draw censure from other backers of educational parks.10 Moreover, like all social movements, the educational park movement was adversarial and goal-oriented, advancing a program whose aims (both short and long-term) were anathema

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6 In distinguishing between civil liberties-oriented activism and human rights-oriented activism, Clément presents the former as concerned with negative freedom, the latter interested in positive freedom: “When civil liberties activists argue that people must be free from restraint to carry out their desires, these activists are articulating a conception of liberty based on negative freedom. Civil libertarians abhor unnecessary restrictions on individuals in their pursuit of the good life, such as limits on the press, religion, association, assembly or speech. In contrast, human rights activists have forwarded a more robust definition of freedom that includes positive freedom. An advocate for positive freedom seeks to ensure an individual’s capacity to formulate their desires and goals. Positive freedom... is premised on the individual’s ability to bring about what he or she desires” (Clément, 2012, p. 4).

7 Important conferences were held in New York City (April, 1965; November, 1965), Nashville, Tennessee (August, 1967), and Fort Lauderdale, Florida (April 17-19, 1968). In each case, proceedings were later published.


9 Key experts were Max Wolff, John Fischer, and Robert Dentler.

10 E.g. “I am very optimistic about the potential of educational parks, but there is too much quackery going on right now” (Leu, 1967, p. 19).
Organized yet informal, adversarial and aspirational, mid-sixties advocacy for educational parks is consistent with social theorists’ conceptualization of social movements.

Stephen Valocchi argues that social movement activism can be evaluated along many dimensions, including (1) a “talking/acting continuum such that social change is achieved through discourse or action,” (2) an “insider/outside continuum whereby activists direct their claims to those internal to the movement and the political system or outside those arenas,” (3) as “seek[ing] to extend power to narrow or broad constituencies,” (4) as seek[ing] reform or radical restructuring,” and (5) as “directed at changing laws and practices or changing culture and consciousness” (2010, p. 60). Returning to Clément’s discussion of social movement roles, one finds that each action performed by a social movement activist—”educating the public,” for instance—can be located in any of these dimensions, with (to develop our example) a reformist letter to the editor being aimed at a broad constituency in hopes of changing the culture. As this example hints, every action undertaken by a participant in the educational park movement offers an embarrassment of analytical riches, being compatible with numerous claims about its form, purpose, and audience. That said, Vallochi convincingly argues that social movement activism should be seen not only as activity designed to transform the world (for example, by convincing people to recycle), but also as activity intended to alter people’s understandings of the world, an alteration Vallochi views as a necessary precondition of “real world” transformation. Comparing “structural” and “cultural” conceptual frameworks, Vallochi writes: “The structural frameworks of resource mobilization and political opportunity stress actions, whether internal or external to mainstream politics, which affect policy and institutional practices. The cultural frameworks of collective identity, oppositional consciousness and new social movements stress discursive strategies, whether internally or externally directed which affect identity and attitudes” (2010, p. 70). Arguably it is cultural frameworks which take precedence, for people only take action when motivated to do so.

“Discursive strategies,” Vallochi adds, are realized through the “framing” of issues. “The concept of framing calls attention to the ideas, meanings, and cultural scripts used to define a problem, map the causes of the problem, and suggest ways to address the problem” (2010, p. 13).

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11 Educational park advocates inevitably came into conflict with backers of other school models (e.g. neighborhood schools; magnet schools), with disputes over educational policies (e.g. size of school population; classroom design) serving as proxies for disagreements over cultural changes (e.g. desegregation; busing).
In the context of social movement activism, the framing of an issue, Vallochi explains, involves three tasks: “A diagnostic dimension frames the problem; a prognostic dimension frames the solution; and a motivational dimension tells us why we should care and be moved to act” (2010, p. 25). In distinguishing the three dimensions of framing, Vallochi provides a useful model for analysis of the educational park movement, encouraging the raising of three questions: What problem did educational park activists identify? What solution did they propose? And how did they mobilize support? “Collective action frames,” write Robert Benford and David Snow, also describing a multipart model, “are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change” (2000, p. 615).

Sociocultural History

This study is an example of what Miguel A. Cabrera (2004) calls “sociocultural or new cultural history” (p.3), a historical approach in which, Cabrera explains, “historical analysis must pay attention not only to an individual’s real position, but also the way it is perceived, since both reality and its perception constitute an indivisible whole” (p. 8). In positing reality and its perception as an “indivisible whole,” sociocultural historians, in Cabrera’s words,

Rethink[ ] and redefin[e] the causal link among the different components of society.

Whereas for social history the connection between social structure and conscious action was one of single-minded determination of the latter by the former, for the new cultural history, the relation between the two is one of reciprocal or dialectic interaction. This new theoretical approach preserves intact the previous dichotomous split and continues to give causal primacy to social context, but it attributes an active function in the constitution of identity and in the configuration of practice and social relations to the subjective or cultural sphere. (p. 5)

Also stressing the indivisibility of matter and mind is Lawrence Kaufmann, who, explaining how “economic conditions, social structures, and class memberships” (2003, p. 108) drive political action, writes “all these factual dimensions have to be collectively interpreted in a certain way in order to become a driving force of social change” (2003, p. 108). Like Cabrera, then, Kaufmann prioritizes mind over matter in accounting for how people perceive reality, positing individuals
as encountering in their daily lives, not the world itself, but a mélange of “embodied experiences, implicit presuppositions, and common-sense knowledge” (2003, p. 108).

In practice, sociocultural historians attend to “the categories in and through which [objective reality is] perceived. . . the symbolic order” (Raphael Samuel in Cabrera, 2004, p. 4), striving to identify moments when “social relations. . . become explicit in the realm of representations” (Cabrera, 2004, p. 8). Distinguishing sociocultural history from other types of historical study, Cabrera describes the sociocultural historian’s method of political analysis. For the sociocultural historian, “political domination does not depend exclusively on social position, but also on the struggle to impose a certain definition of social properties, that is, on the credit accorded to the representations that individuals or groups offer of themselves and of others” (2004, p. 9). This example usefully highlights several key insights of sociocultural history, which Peter Meusburger, Tim Freytag, and Laura Suarsana summarize in this way:

All new knowledge starts as local knowledge. The diffusion of knowledge depends on the need to know and on the prior knowledge that potential recipients require in order to understand the new information. If new knowledge is immediately accepted as useful, beneficial, or true by many people, it may become universally accepted knowledge or an indisputable matter after a certain period of time. If such knowledge is valuated only as useful or true by people in particular environments with specific conditions, challenges, and traditions and is rejected by people who must cope with other challenges and need different competencies, it will remain local, situated, site-specific, or place-based knowledge. The second facet of this dichotomy is asymmetric power relations between center and periphery. Centers of state bureaucracies, centers of large social systems, centers of calculation as meant by Latour, imperialistic states, and dominant ethnic majorities often declare their own epistemic position—their knowledge, competence, technology, and interpretation of the world—to be objective, scientific, modern, progressive, or forward-looking. Simultaneously, they declare the epistemic position of their opponents, peripheries, colonies, or nondominant ethnic minorities to be traditional, outmoded, unscientific, or indigenous. (2016, p. 1)
If for Miguel A. Cabrera and other sociocultural historians political domination depends on “the credit accorded to the representations that individuals or groups offer of themselves and of others” (2004, p. 9), then victory—shorthand for political domination—in the 1960s debate about educational parks turned on which side advanced more credible representations of (1) the educational park concept, and (2) themselves and their opponents. Before June 1966, when a number of politicians and syndicated columnists began attacking the educational park concept, the term “educational park” meant nothing to the average American, the concept being just two years old and familiar to only a small number of academics and educational administrators. It was in June 1966 that the debate about educational parks—“the struggle to impose a certain definition” (Cabrera, 2004, p. 9) of the educational park concept—kicked off as a variety of documents pertaining to educational parks appeared in the scholarly, popular, and congressional press, the academic articles mostly supporting educational parks, the popular and congressional documents (with a few important exceptions) tending to denounce the educational park concept. In 1966 and 1967, a heated debate took place over the educational park concept, one which—given that no educational parks had been built—dealt in hypotheticals, as claims were made about what an educational park should or would look like, and what such a park could or would do for students and/or society, with park proponents claiming, for instance, that educational parks would offer all students a high-quality integrated education, while educational park opponents argued that parks would facilitate federal interference in public education.

Analysis of the 1960s debate about educational parks—identification of important players in the debate and compilation of key arguments made by both sides—involves, Cabrera might write, a study of the many documents in which educational parks “become explicit in the realm of representations” (2004, p. 9). Not every document mentioning educational parks includes a meaningful representation of an educational park. Some documents, even documents produced by supporters or opponents of educational parks, merely note, for example, that the educational park concept is a contentious topic, or one receiving a great deal of attention. It is another type of document, in which the educational park concept is either supported or opposed, that casts light on the 1960s debate over educational parks, for in studying these documents one realizes that the debate over educational parks was less about schools—what they should look like and how they

12 The term “educational park” dates to the early 20th century, but had a different meaning prior to publication of sociologist Max Wolff’s 1964 article “A Plan for Desegregation.”
13 I.e., the Congressional Record.
should operate—than about the federal government—what it should look like and how it should operate. Both supporters and opponents of educational parks recognized that the parks were so expensive they could only be built with federal backing, and this anticipated federal funding was at the heart of the debate over educational parks, with educational park backers arguing for federal involvement in educational park projects (the federal government being a force for good), and park opponents arguing against such involvement (the federal government being a force for evil). Had it been possible in the 1960s for cities to build educational parks without federal funds, the debate over educational parks would have been very different, but, unluckily—at least for park backers—this wasn’t the case, primarily because in many states segregationist officials were unwilling to publicly support, let alone fund, integrated schools.

In “the realm of representations,” the paradigmatic educational park, whether described by park proponent or park opponent, had one defining feature: it was large. For park proponents, largeness means one school can replace many small schools, allowing for (1) economies of scale in construction and operating costs that enable inclusion of expensive high-tech equipment and facilities, and (2) an expanded and so racially and socioeconomically diverse catchment area. The genius of the educational park concept, in proponents’ eyes, was that the expensive gadgetry meant that students in the expanded catchment area were attracted to the park, ensuring voluntary (as opposed to forced) integration. For opponents of parks, largeness also means one school can replace several schools, although this development is decried rather than celebrated, first because the replaced schools are neighborhood schools, second because the loss of neighborhood schools means loss of local control of schooling and imposition of distant (i.e. federal) control, and not just of school design and location, but also of curricular content and student body composition. Both backers and opponents of educational parks present the parks as large, but if backers link the parks’ largeness to an array of positive developments (cutting-edge equipment, innovative programming; voluntary integration), park opponents see the largeness as impacting education in many negative ways (end of neighborhood schools, federal control of public education; forced integration). As the educational park debate shows, the term “largeness,” if attached to a school, has many connotations, some positive, some negative. The educational park debate ultimately turned on which set of connotations resonated most strongly with the American public, and where people’s interests lay with regard to the debates.
Critical Discourse Analysis

The best analytical tool for exploring the educational park debate is critical discourse analysis (CDA), described (not defined\(^{14}\)) by Teun A. van Dijk as “deal[ing] primarily with the discourse dimensions of power abuse and the injustice and inequality that result from it” (1993, p. 252). Practitioners of CDA, van Dijk writes, “deal with properties of relations between social groups. That is, while focusing on social power, we ignore purely personal power, unless enacted as an individual realization of group power, that is, by individuals as group members. Social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge” (1993, p. 254). Because CDA focuses on relations between social groups it is particularly well suited to analysis of the emergence of the educational park movement and of the group opposed to it, a loose alliance of conservative journalists and politicians. “Power involves control,” van Dijk adds, “namely by (members of) one group over (those of) other groups. Such control may pertain to action and cognition: that is, a powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others, but also influence their minds” (1993, p. 254). Like sociocultural history, CDA, as Norman Fairclough explains, sees each individual’s reality as a meeting of matter and mind: “[CDA] is a realist approach which claims that there is a real world, including the social world, which exists irrespective of whether or how well we know and understand it. More specifically it is a ‘critical realist’ approach which means among other things a recognition that the natural and social worlds differ in that the latter but not the former depends upon human action for its existence and is ‘socially constructed’” (2010, p. 4). As an idea, the educational park concept only existed in people’s minds, a key reason why critical discourse analysis, which focuses on “persuasion, dissimulation, or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one’s own interests” (1993, p. 254), is useful in analyzing why certain representations of the educational park concept gained more traction than others. Summarizing the purpose and strategy of CDA, Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen write,

CDA’s locus of critique is the nexus of language/discourse/speech and social structure. It is in uncovering ways in which social structure impinges on discourse patterns, relations, and models (in the form of power relations, ideological effects, and so

\(^{14}\)“Rather than specify, inter alia, the criteria that are characteristic of work in CDA... we shall simply, and perhaps naively, summarize such criteria by saying that in our opinion CDA should deal primarily with the discourse dimensions of power abuse and the injustice and inequality that result from it” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 252).
forth), and in treating these relations as problematic, that researchers in CDA situate the
critical dimension of their work. (2000, p. 449)

As this hints, researchers in CDA are, like Miguel A. Cabrera and other social historians,
especially interested in representations, that is in how features of the world (including concepts)
are depicted in discourse. Where such researchers move beyond social historians is in exploring
the power relationships that determine whose representations are more influential. As van Dijk
explains, “More control over more properties of text and context, involving more people, is thus
generally (though not always) associated with more influence, and hence with hegemony” (1993,
p. 257).

Berkeley as a Case Study

Using Berkeley, California as a case study, my research aims to document the rise and
fall of the educational park movement, exploring its emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization,
decline, and legacy.15 In 1967, sociologist Max Wolff, doyen of educational park movement
advocates,16 identified Berkeley (together with Syracuse, New York) as a trail-blazer in
educational park planning: “The most developed plans for educational parks are found in
Berkeley, California and in Syracuse, New York. In both cities, the school board leadership is
firmly committed to such development and has contributed substantially to the body of research
and innovative ideas now burgeoning around the concept” (Wolff, 1967a, p. 18). Berkeley’s
usefulness as a case study for understanding the educational park movement reflects not only the
city’s role in the movement—a role recognized by Wolff and others17—but also Berkeley’s
school board having left a paper trail documenting its interest in educational park development.
Including but not limited to this paper trail, my data set is both broad and bounded: broad in
including a wide range of online, library-held, and archival18 materials on educational parks;

15 Building on the work of sociologist Herbert Blumer, Jonathan Christiansen identifies emergence, coalescence,
bureaucratization, and decline as the life-cycle of a social movement (p. 2).
16 A 1969 report by the Fresno (California) Unified School District calls Wolff “the foremost exponent of the
educational park concept” (Booth, p. 3).
17 “It is ironic that Berkeley, which in a sense needs an education park the least of all the school systems studied, is
in all likelihood the one most likely to have an education park in the future” (Thomas, 1969, p. 113).
18 In December, 2014, I visited the Amistad Research Center at Tulane University, where I examined documents
from the Berkeley Unified School District’s Human Relations Office. In July, 2015, I visited the Bancroft Library at
U.C. Berkeley to examine two collections of documents bearing on school desegregation in Berkeley. My practice
during both visits was to photograph relevant documents, and these photographs (over 400 from Tulane, two dozen
or so from Berkeley) were ultimately converted into searchable pdf files.
bounded in including a manageable number of documents. Although I had the good fortune to conduct archival research in New Orleans and Berkeley, most of my research was done online, where keyword searches in search engines (e.g. Google; RACER) and databases (e.g. ERIC; HeinOnline) led me to many helpful documents. I found that including a specific year as an additional search term (e.g., “educational parks” + “1966”) was a particularly sound strategy. Keyword searches turned up various types of documents, including newspaper and magazine articles, school board minutes, official reports, conference proceedings, speeches, and transcripts of congressional hearings and debates. While not all these documents were available online or through interlibrary loan, most were.

Discussing archival research, Michelle T. King observes “Out of sheer necessity, we narrow our searches by using topical or other indices or by selecting a series of chronological files to consult” (2012, p. 21). My archival research in New Orleans and Berkeley was aimed at understanding the role educational parks played (or were expected to play) in Berkeley’s push for total school desegregation. Of the archival documents I analyzed, the most important were written between 1965-1968 by employees of the Berkeley Unified School District, with two subsets of these—documents addressed to federal officials, and documents meant for the public at large—of highest importance. Document analysis, as Grace Davie and David Wyatt (2011) note, cannot ignore historical context: “Documents do not exist in a vacuum but are produced by individuals and groups who have aims and motives. . . They are fashioned for specific purposes, for an intended audience, and often paint a picture of the authors’ understanding of reality” (p. 152). School officials in Berkeley, aware of the huge cost of building even a single educational park, knew they had to convince both the federal government and the people of Berkeley that educational parks were the schools of the future. Documents arguing this case are central to my research.

Informed in part by Davie and Wyatt’s discussion of document analysis, my treatment of archival and other materials was also shaped by Charles Nelson and Robert H. Woods, Jr.’s (2011) description of content analysis. Particularly useful for researchers “interested in tracking

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19 Important keywords were “educational park,” “educational parks,” “school park,” “Berkeley desegregation,” “Neil V. Sullivan,” and “de facto segregation.” Funded by the Ontario Council of University Libraries, RACER provides interlibrary loan access to North American libraries. Established in 1964 by the U.S. Office of Education, ERIC (Educational Research Information Center) indexes articles from hundreds of education publications, often providing full-text pdfs of articles. Launched in 2000, HeinOnline allows full-text access to a wide selection of legal texts, including governmental and political documents.
specific data to identify and understand a direction of or changes in specific phenomena over time” (p. 110), content analysis as practiced by Nelson and Woods includes four distinct steps: selection of relevant texts; identification of message units; generation of categories into which message units will be placed; and placement of message units into categories” (pp. 113-114). This four-step process is well-suited to my project.

Limitations and Contributions of the Study

An important limitation to my study is shared by all case studies. In brief, while all instances of a condition or phenomenon have traits in common, each instance is unique, limiting the lessons to be drawn from studying that instance. A second limitation relates to the scarcity of extant documents on educational parks created by the Berkeley Unified School District. A third limitation relates to the survival of primary source materials, specifically those bearing on events in Berkeley. Studying educational park planning in Berkeley, I paid close attention to (1) minutes of the Berkeley school board; (2) official publications of the Berkeley Unified School District; and (3) the records of the BUSD’s Human Relations Office held at the Amistad Research Center at Tulane University. The last set of documents, 47 linear feet of reports, notes, correspondence, etc., covering the years 1961 to 1974, was donated in 1978 to the Amistad Research Center by Kathryne Favors, Director of the BUSD’s Intergroup Education Project. Amistad’s Human Relations archive offers a unique view on the decision-making processes of a school district embracing the challenge of becoming the first large district in the United States to fully integrate its schools. That said, Amistad’s Human Relations archive is problematic in that Kathryne Favors’s bequest includes no information about the origins of the archive, raising questions about its completeness. Does the archive contain all documents that passed through the BUSD’s Human Relations Office, or only documents saved by Favors? If the latter, then the Amistad documents only tell part of the story about the Human Relations Office’s work on integration. Moreover, the Human Relations Office, while to some extent the nerve center of the BUSD’s integration planning, was only one office in the BUSD working on desegregation. Other offices might have generated equally-interesting material.

20 While the BUSD likely generated more documents related to educational park planning than any other U.S. city, key planning areas (e.g. consultation with architects) are not, to my knowledge, discussed in surviving documents.
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The decision to use Berkeley as a case study for understanding mid-sixties educational park planning entails exploration of four research domains: 1960s astrofuturism, federalism in public education, the educational park movement, and integration efforts in Berkeley. Only recently charted with any precision, the first domain is brimming with glorifications of NASA and interpretations of Star Trek and Lost in Space; a heavily contested site, the second domain is littered with polemics about states’ rights and overreaching bureaucrats; essentially unmapped, the third domain is empty save for a few case studies of unsuccessful educational park projects, valuable as evidence of the challenges facing educational park activists; better charted, perhaps because more limited, the fourth domain is dominated by celebrations of Berkeley’s achievement of full integration. These domains can be envisioned as concentric circles centered on Berkeley: advocates of integration in Berkeley belonged to the educational park movement, a movement shaped by mid-sixties debates over federalism in education, which in turn reflected the tenets of 1960s astrofuturism. In reviewing academic writings related to these four domains, I will move from the general to the particular, the goal being to identify the various forces shaping events in Berkeley.

1960s Astrofuturism

Astrofuturism, writes De Witt Douglas Kilgore:

is speculation about the progress and final aims of technological and political power. It calls for the creation of technosciences, which will perfect humanity's control over itself and the natural world. This impulse has produced a strand of futurist thought that seeks an eternal extension of contemporary political and economic arrangements, albeit stripped of unpleasant resonances and rendered innocent. However, astrofuturism also carries within it an idealism, a liberal or Utopian commitment that seeks alternatives and solutions to the problems and conflicts characterizing contemporary American life. It can imagine space frontiers predicated on experimental arrangements and the production of relationships uncommon or unknown in the old world. (2003, p. 4)

Accounting for the emergence of astrofuturism in the 1950s (and its popularity in the 1960s), Kilgore argues that astrofuturist speculation, whether in fiction or films, allowed for exploration of contentious topics, most importantly race relations: “In the decades following the Second
World War, the predominantly white and male ranks of astrofuturists confronted a great crisis for which race became the most potent signifier. In response to criticisms inspired by the civil rights movement and the new left, their space frontiers promised to extend the reach of the human species and to heal its historic wounds. The space future thereby carries both the imperatives of an imperial past and the democratic hopes of its erstwhile subjects” (2003, p. 8). The crisis Kilgore refers to was national and psychological, caused by realization that the weight of history (“exploration, colonization, resource extraction” [2003, p. 9]) was too heavy for an earthbound optimist to bear, meaning anyone wanting to imagine an ideal world needed to cast their mind into outer space: “Devoted to breaking the limits placed on humanity by the surface of this planet, astrofuturism forecasts an escape from terrestrial history. Its roots lie in the nineteenth-century Euro-American preoccupation with imperial expansion and Utopian speculation, which it recasts in the elsewhere and elsewhen of outer space. Astrofuturism imagines the good or perfect society not simply spatially but in what might be called, to use Einstein's term, ‘spacetime’ ” (2003, p. 1). As Kilgore notes later in his book, although astrofuturism emerged in the 1950s, its heyday was the 1960s, when the expansion of the NASA space program, combined with the “political upheavals of the 1960s” (2003, p. 150), acclimated 1960s astrofuturists to the possibility of a radically different future, one unimaginable even for their 1950s predecessors:

Until the political upheavals of the 1960s, American science fictionists rarely imagined that the future might be one of social or economic movement. According to the astrofuturism articulated [in the 1950s]. . . the space future was not meant to change contemporary social, political, or economic systems, but to make them more efficient, faster, wealthier, and less vulnerable to attack from external forces. In other words, the conquest of space would reinforce a familiar status quo with new wealth and provide it with an eternal frontier for expansion. (2003, p. 150)

In contrast to 1950s articulations of astrofuturism, 1960s astrofuturism envisioned futuristic societies which were not only “more efficient, faster, wealthier, and less vulnerable to attack from external forces,” but which also had altered “social, political, or economic systems,” with the various changes interrelated in that the “new wealth” unlocked by technology enabled the social, political, and economic improvements.

Kilgore’s book is usefully read alongside Lawrence R. Samuel’s The End of Innocence: The 1964-1965 World’s Fair, which treats a real-world iteration of astrofuturism, the 1964 New
York World’s Fair, described by Samuel as taking place “at a key turning point in American history and during a period of remarkable cultural upheaval” (2010, p. xv). During the eighteen month run of the fair, Samuel writes,

a bevy of key events related to two major sources of conflict in the mid-1960s—civil rights and the Vietnam War—took place. While fairgoers munched on their Bel-Gen waffles and rode Avis’s Antique Car Ride at a top speed of six miles per hour, thousands were marching (and a few dying) in Mississippi to register black voters during the Freedom Summer of 1964. . . The Vietnam problem too was rapidly become a nightmare as global harmony, or at least [world’s fair organizer Robert Moses’s] version of it, ruled at the Fair. (2010, p. xvi)

Like astrofuturist science fiction writers, designers of the 1964 World’s Fair posited technology as ensuring a future that was brighter than the contested present: “[By] bypassing the uninviting near future for a more palatable far-distant one,” Samuel explains, “the Fair offered its millions of visitors hope and confidence that utopia or something like it was not entirely a lost cause” (2010, p. xvii). In nurturing visitors’ faith in utopia, the fair, Samuel notes, took full advantage of new technologies:

In between seeing color television for the first time at the RCA Pavilion and taking a ride in a brand-new car from Ford called the Mustang, one might have stopped by Bell Telephone’s pavilion to try something called the Picturephone that let you see (and, a little concerning, be seen by) the person you were speaking to. One’s next stop might be the IBM pavilion to see what the huge fuss was over this new business machine, the computer, followed by a visit to GE’s pavilion to watch a real demonstration of thermonuclear fusion in which a million amperes of “free energy” were released. (2010, p. xiii)

Among the fair’s exhibits was a “School of Tomorrow,” which seems in retrospect an expansionem ad absurdem of a prototypical educational park: “The Child of Tomorrow in the School of Tomorrow will not be taught; he will be plugged in. This is the conclusion drawn from a reading of a 128-page booklet on ‘Education in the Year 2000 A.D.,’ published by the World's Fair Hall of Education and offered for $1. Your child, says the publication, will not sit on an inefficient school bench, exposed to harmful atmospheric influences and noises. Instead, he will be enclosed in a ‘studysphere,’ which is an egg-shaped, plastic enclosed unit with ‘a complete retrieval system for information from any part of the world.’ [. . .] Dr. Leonard Price Stavisky, chairman of the International Fair Consultants, Inc., who planned the Hall of Education, sees the School of Tomorrow as covering an area of 50 city blocks, enrolling 60,000 and having ‘elaborate equipment’ whose cost is ‘enormous’ (Hechinger, 1964, p. 30). It’s a ‘chicken and egg’ problem whether the School of Tomorrow inspired the educational park concept or vice versa since some of the same people (e.g. Harold B. Gores) worked on both.
One of the fair’s more popular exhibits was the “Space Park,” where visitors could, Samuel writes, “check out a few rocket ships that had actually been in orbit—quite a thrill in these heady days of a race to the moon” (2010, p. xiii). “Space exploration,” Samuel observes, was in one form of another featured at thirteen different pavilions at the fair, reflecting many people’s desire to know more about what existed (or did not exist) beyond the earth’s atmosphere. . . In the Hall of Science’s Great Hall, the realistic “Rendezvous in Space” show took place, with three full-scale spaceship models (one “orbiting cylindrical space laboratory” and two supply “space taxis”) hovering 50 feet in the air. After the Capra-produced animated film, one of the taxis docked with the orbital lab to exchange crews and supplies, not unlike what could be seen in a Star Trek movie some twenty years later. (2010, p. 175)

The space program was a federal undertaking, and for this reason the 1964 World’s Fair was, among other things, an elaborate advertisement for federal activism. The relationship between astrofuturist ideas and federal activity is explored at length in Walter A. McDougall’s The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, which places NASA among Lyndon Johnson’s preferred devices for promoting his administration’s energetic style of governing:

Apollo never lacked for analogies, but to the Big Operators who made it, the moon program was less like the voyages of Columbus or even the privately built railroads than it was like the Panama Canal, the TVA, or the magnificent interstate highway system. Like these earlier mobilizations of men, machines, and mortar under federal direction, Apollo would open up new realms for the individual in stimulation of the economy and elevation of the human spirit. What was more, the space program grew on its own movers and shakers until it outgrew the space race itself and seemed a model for a society without limits, an ebullient and liberal technocracy—not Space Age communism, but Space Age America. (1985, p. 362)

For Lyndon Johnson and his officials, McDougall writes, “NASA’s destiny was to serve as a prototype for reallocation of national power for social and political goals” (1985, p. 383), with the Apollo program in particular “not an end, but a means that brought order out of the chaos of institutions and that could be applied to a host of social projects. [NASA director James Webb]
himself may never have chanted, ‘If we can send a man to the moon, why can’t we. . . ?’ But if others did, calling for Apollo-type assaults on everything from medical care to synthetic fuels, it was because the James Webbs had, by their talent and energy, made command innovation look easy—and ‘American’ ” (1985, p. 405). Therefore, if astrofuturists perceived new technologies as rocketing Americans towards a problem-free future, many space age Americans, McDougall explains, saw the federal government as the preeminent cultivator of new technologies, adopting Lyndon Johnson’s view that the space program was a model of the role government should play in society, and the role technology should play in government, an expression as well of new and apparently limitless power, as if handed down by some Promethean party boss in the form of command technology and federal management. For the War on Poverty, the Great Society, as much as Apollo or Vietnam, were Cold War phenomena, but they were not only that, far from it. There were born of a moral vision in which men of power and charity sought to use their gifts for the less gifted. It was possible to eradicate poverty, crime, ignorance, whip the Communists, and develop the Third World, or so thought LBJ. The power existed and needed only to be grasped. (1985, p. 406)

To the extent 1960s Americans were—whether they knew it or not—astrofuturists, they believed in both the promise of technology and the merits of federal activism, seeing the U.S. government as the only institution large enough to develop the epoch-making devices needed to transform the world. Moreover, because they were astrofuturists, such Americans—again whether they knew it or not—were believers in what Robert M. Collins calls “growth liberalism”: “the interpenetration of growth economics and liberal politics” (1994a, p. 25). Economic growth, Collins explains in “Growth Liberalism in the Sixties,” played a significant role in liberalism’s domestic program. First, it fueled the basic optimism that made the grandiose conception of the Great Society appear reasonable. ‘Hell,’ LBJ told his aides in April 1964, ‘we’ve barely begun to solve our problems. And we can do it all. We’ve got the wherewithal.’ Second, growth really did provide the wherewithal of which Johnson spoke. . . . The creators of the Great Society assumed that a portion of this growth could be redirected to support the most ambitious liberal program in U.S. history. (1994a, p. 23)
As does Collins, David Farber, in *The Age of Great Dreams: America in the 1960s*, explains Johnson’s ambitious domestic plans by reference to an expanding U.S. economy, arguing that Johnson, like other growth liberals, believed “the increased tax revenues produced by the rising GNP could and should be used by the federal government to enlarge its role in both foreign and domestic affairs. Liberalism, in the hands of President Johnson, became an understanding that the federal government had the responsibility, power, and ability to reduce inequality, protect historically oppressed minorities, champion American interests and values around the world, and balance the private sector’s singular focus on making money with a broad concern for the nation’s long-term good” (1994b, p. 104). Growth liberalism’s “basic optimism that made the grandiose conception of the Great Society appear reasonable” (Collins, 1994, p. 23), while broadly explainable by reference to the 1950s-60s economic boom, is more narrowly ascribable to the success of the U.S. space program. Resting on “the explosion of overall federal support for science, education and R & D” (McDougall, 1985, p. 383), NASA’s achievements demonstrated that, given sufficient funds, the federal government could solve difficult problems, including—President Lyndon Johnson boasted—problems related to education: “The Federal Government hadn’t passed any education bill. We didn’t have any Federal aid for education. . . So we started passing education bills, we made a national effort in elementary education, a national effort in higher education, where two million students were brought into our colleges. . . And I think that’s the great significance that the space program has had. I think it was the beginning of the revolution of the ‘60s” (in McDougall, 1994, p. 407).

Federalism in Public Education

Johnson’s “national efforts” in elementary and secondary education were, we learn in *Intergovernmentalizing the Classroom: Federal Involvement in Elementary and Secondary Education*, highly controversial, both in theory (mainly with states’ rights advocates because the efforts seemed incompatible with constitutional provisions barring federal involvement in public education), and in practice (mainly with segregationists because the efforts led to passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, whose funding formula meant “aid to education

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22 Published by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a body established in 1959 by Congress and the Eisenhower Administration to “bring together representatives of the federal, state, and local governments for the consideration of common problems” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. iii), *Intergovernmentalizing the Classroom* was the fifth of eleven books the Commission published under the blanket heading “The Federal Role in the Federal System.”
became linked with federal desegregation efforts, and racial controversy emerged as a central issue in the program” [Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 38]). “Racial controversy,” as *Intergovernmentalizing the Classroom* makes clear, always accompanied federal efforts to influence public education, whether during Reconstruction, when the Federal Bureau of Education was established in hopes of ending illiteracy among newly emancipated slaves, the 1950s, when the federal government tried (and often failed) to fund construction of integrated schools, or the 1960s, when passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) kicked off

a new era in federal aid to education, doubling the federal share of elementary and secondary education expenditures and establishing a new pattern of intergovernmental relationships in education. Programs to aid the educationally disadvantaged, provide instructional materials, promote educational innovation, support educational research, and assist state education agencies were all established by ESEA. (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 31)

ESEA was always controversial, not least because—in conjunction with the 1964 Civil Rights Act—it tied federal funding of schools to desegregation efforts. Immediately demonized by many Southern Congressmen, and soon by a number of their Northern colleagues, ESEA was attacked as a weapon the Johnson Administration intended to use to transform school systems, whether by forced busing or by construction of, for instance, educational parks. Each year when ESEA came to be reauthorized, changes were made that favored intransigent school districts, with each change weakening the federal role in education, typically by shifting powers to the states. These changes reflected mid-sixties developments in Congress: “In addition to growing opposition to HEW policies in the south, urban riots and an aborted Office of Education attempt to challenge de facto segregation in Chicago served to heighten racial concern among many northern Congressmen” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 40). Both a beneficiary and a victim of Lyndon Johnson’s education programs and ESEA in particular, the educational park movement emerged in response to federal promises to fund construction of integrated schools, disappearing when those promises proved hollow.
The Educational Park Movement

Little in the way of secondary material on the educational park movement exists, with relevant publications limited to a handful of descriptive case studies of specific educational park projects. Valuable for what they reveal about the local conditions conducive to educational park planning, these writings also offer vital clues as to why the educational park movement failed.

The earliest educational park case study, and the only one describing a positive outcome, focuses on Nova High School, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, identified in the article as “an initial unit of the South Florida Education Center, an educational complex imaginative in design and advanced in concept. Eventually the complex will house tax-supported schools encompassing kindergarten through junior college” (Kaufman & Bethune, 1964, p. 9). This case study is of interest not only because it describes the only fully-completed educational park project, but also because the project it describes was aimed only at providing educational quality, with no thought given to inclusiveness. “The newest and best of educational techniques and media are utilized at Nova. Among these are team teaching; closed-circuit television; overhead projectors in every room; reading laboratory; science and language laboratories; and large group, medium group, and small group instruction” (Kaufman & Bethune, 1964, p. 11). That the “space age” Nova complex was completed is significant because 1960s educational park proposals premised on the benefits of inclusiveness failed.

A second case study, “How the Campus Proposal Failed in Syracuse, New York,” details events in a multiracial city where in the late 1960s plans for an educational park were developed at great cost, only to be shelved when whites decided integration was too high a price to pay for superior schools:

In interviews, several high officials stated their feelings that racism was a strong motive among voters, but no influential person would admit he himself feared black children in the schools. There were numerous accusations that both education commissioners and common councilmen were motivated by anti-black bias. Direct evidence was of course never adduced. Several ethnics in interview were very explicit, however, in claiming that ethnic voters were worried over racial questions. “Nobody’s kidding us, integration is the

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23 “The only city that has an education park . . . is Fort Lauderdale, Florida” (Thomas, 1969, p. 98).
24 Nova was never intended to be a desegregation device because the area it serves is suburban and segregated. Thomas C. Thomas calls Nova “an example that is not applicable to major cities” (1969, p. 98).
main aim [. . .].” “Our people say they will move out of the City if this happens.”
(Birkhead, 1970, p. 73)

As Birkhead explains, racial antipathy was at the heart of Syracuse’s rejection of the educational park concept, to the point that integrationist backers of the concept voluntarily silenced themselves: “It was commonly held by both blacks and whites that prominent civil rights and black organizations were staying quietly in the background to let the white leadership find an acceptable solution to racial imbalance in elementary schools” (1970, p. 74). Describing circumstances very different from those holding in 1960s Fort Lauderdale, Guthrie’s article hints at the dangers inherent in emphasizing the inclusiveness of a proposed educational park.

A third case study, published in 2005 but discussing events in late-1960s Philadelphia, describes a situation much like that described by Guthrie Birkhead, in which parochialism and racism prevented construction of an educational park: “White political leadership in Philadelphia behaved in much the same manner as did their southern counterparts in so many cities. Several leaders whipped up racist hysteria against busing, and no white politician publicly supported school integration. Like many southern school boards, the Philadelphia school board avoided desegregating the schools even though it had actively contributed to the segregation of those schools by drawing boundary lines, assigning teachers, and allowing student transfers” (Phillips, p. 69). Phillips calls the educational park idea “the final rallying cry of [Philadelphia’s] school desegregation forces” (p. 65), indicating both who supported the parks and the type of argument these supporters offered. Unlike in Fort Lauderdale, where the Nova complex was presented as a technological leap forward, in Philadelphia educational parks were positioned as a desegregation device; as in Syracuse, this positioning was a mistake. “[T]he parks never materialized because, I think, people . . . were reluctant to make the hard decisions to actually assign children from these various backgrounds to those parks. So they killed it” (Michael Marcase in Phillips, 2005, p. 66).

A fourth case study of educational park planning discusses a failed plan in Columbus, Ohio. “In 1967, the Columbus Urban League proposed an expansive, plainly worded six-point educational plan that it hoped would foster equality of educational opportunity. . . . The League placed an educational park at the center, which, some educational policy professionals argued, offered a palliative to several issues facing American metropolitan areas in the late 1960s—most notably racial segregation and underperforming schools” (Potyondy, 2014, p. 29). Like the Syracuse and Philadelphia proposals, the Columbus plan failed not because the proposed park
was considered economically unfeasible, but because it was perceived as racially inclusive. In Potyondy’s words, “Several reasons account for the rejection of the educational park idea. Some sprang from the cultural conflicts surrounding local attitudes toward government, race, and the civil rights movement. Others derived from the policy elites themselves, who turned their backs on the long history of school centralization and state backing that had claimed to pursue ‘schooling for all’. . . For whites and the district, the push for educational equality of opportunity by CORE, the NAACP, the Urban League, and the Teenage Action Group (TAG) produced too much resentment and backlash from both the district and the white community” (p. 47). In Columbus, then, as in Syracuse and Philadelphia, the association of educational parks with integration made the educational park concept toxic for many whites. Only in Fort Lauderdale, where the Nova complex was not linked to desegregation, was the concept accepted.

Desegregation in Berkeley

Although there are no books or articles specifically on educational park planning in Berkeley, a number of texts explore issues bearing on Berkeley’s plans for educational parks, most importantly desegregation in California and de facto segregation.

The United States in the 1960s experienced unsettling change, as hitherto unquestioned beliefs and values were challenged, and as previously secure individuals and institutions were put on the defensive. Among the beliefs challenged were many related to race relations, and following from the challenging of these beliefs much of white America became fearful. In brief, the mid-sixties was for many U.S. cities—particularly in the North and West—a period of racial unrest, when assumptions about the stability of the socially-constructed racial hierarchy were called into question, mostly as a result of African-American demands for justice. Published in reaction to the 1964 Watts riots, the McConne Commission Report places the Watts riots in an expansive historical context, presenting them as the inevitable—if regrettable—result of African-American disillusionment: “In the past quarter century, the Negro population [in Los Angeles] has exploded. . . Much of the increase came through migration from Southern states and many

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25 Berkeley’s interest in educational parks is offhandedly mentioned in W.J. Rorbaugh’s Berkeley at War: “Among the innovations that [Neil V. Sullivan] proposed was an appalling plan to put thousands of Berkeley children into an educational park where six-year-olds and eighteen-year-olds would rub shoulders on a single sprawling campus with dozens of buildings” (1990, p. 66).
26 In 1964, African-American neighborhoods in seven Northern cities were impacted by rioting.
27 John McConne was a former director of the CIA.
arrived with the anticipation that this dynamic city would somehow spell the end of life’s endless problems. To those who have come with high hopes and great expectations and see the success of others so close at hand, failure brings a special measure of frustration and disillusionment” (in Daniels & Olin, 1972, p. 291). As this quote suggests, disillusionment was particularly acute in African-Americans who had left the South in hopes of a better life. Arriving in racially-divided Northern and Western cities, these migrants found their lives only marginally better: “What were the conditions that the migrants met in the ‘promised land’? There was the animosity of white workers, even though black men obtained mostly the heavy, laborious, unskilled jobs. . .White attitudes of racial animosity, which demanded the exclusion of blacks from white residential areas, was the basic factor responsible for the creation and expansion of the ghettos. During the early decades of the northward migration, it was not infrequent for Negroes who ‘invaded’ white areas to suffer personal beatings, and stoning or bombing of their homes” (Meier & Rudwick, 1970, p. 217).

Like housing, public education was an area where African-American migrants in the North and West experienced hardship. Segregated neighborhoods meant segregated schools, almost invariably divided by quality as well as race:

While the South was more segregated than the North, fully 72 per cent of black first graders in the urban North attended predominantly black schools. The report also confirmed one of the basic assumptions of the Stage I model: that black students performed poorly compared to white students. Using results, from a variety of achievement tests, Coleman28 reported that throughout all regions and all grade levels, black students ranged from two to six years behind white students in reading, verbal, and mathematics performance. Equally, black students were shown to have lower aspirations, lower self-esteem about academic ability, and a more fatalistic attitude about their ability to change their situation. (Armor, 1972, p. 94)

In the 1960s, scholars discussing Northern and Western school segregation emphasized two points. First, that segregation is de facto—a result of geography rather than laws. As Paul Auster explains (1965): “De-facto segregation in public schools refers to a situation in which schools are attended predominantly by one race, due to the racial composition of the

28 Published in 1966, Equality of Educational Opportunity, i.e. the Coleman Report, documented the failure of U.S. public schools to provide equal educational opportunities to minority students.
neighborhoods served by those schools” (p. 41). Second, *de facto* segregation is just as harmful to African-American students as *de jure* segregation: “In many communities what is critical is the mere establishment of the principle that the creation and maintenance of racially imbalanced schools can constitute a deprivation of educational opportunity and that the use of geographic criteria does not immunize the segregation from constitutional attack (Fiss, 1965, p. 615).

Although not legally mandated, and so not *prima facie* unconstitutional under Brown v. Board of Education, *de facto* segregated schools offered unequal education opportunities to students of different races, and *so might be* unconstitutional (under Brown v. Board). Faced with uncertainty about the constitutionality of *de facto* segregated schools, some districts with such schools—Pasadena, for instance—began pre-emptively desegregating schools in anticipation of their being ruled unconstitutional. Berkeley was another such district.

In 1968, Berkeley became the first city with over 100,000 residents to fully desegregate its public schools, an achievement that led U.S. Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II to proclaim in a telegram, “You have struck a blow for justice that will have an impact far beyond the limits of Berkeley” (in Halpern, 1968, p. 47). Since 1968, Berkeley’s desegregation efforts have drawn a great deal of scholarly attention, with the lion’s share of articles published in the late sixties, when Berkeley was seen as a model multiracial city. A 1969 article by Mike Milstein and Dean Hoch speaks to the Berkeley Unified School District’s prominence in this period: “In the short span of one decade the Berkeley district has changed from one which could be characterized as tranquil and nonprogressive to one which is capturing educational headlines because of its exciting innovativeness. Between 1958 and 1968 the district was shaken by the battle waged between pro- and anti-integration community groups. [The district] has emerged from this conflict as a leader among school districts pursuing integration” (p. 524). If in 1969 Milstein and Hoch call Berkeley a “leader” in the fight against segregated schooling, later authors identify the city as “the capital of school desegregation” (Wilson, 1980, p. 77), and as “a model progressive community” (Eget, 2011, p. 151). Long associated with school integration, Berkeley is a city that, in the words of a 2009 report by U.C. Berkeley’s Civil Rights Project, “has maintained its commitment to diverse schools, even as legal options and political considerations around school integration have shifted” (Chavez and Frankenberg, p. 1).

Milstein and Hoch note that integration of Berkeley’s schools was a tumultuous process, a long-running “battle” (524) featuring many factious skirmishes. Describing the most divisive
of these skirmishes, a 1964 attempt to recall the school board, Ira Michael Heyman ascribes the recall campaign to the board’s decision to integrate junior high schools: “Recall petitions began circulating three days after the Board meeting. . . The ensuing extraordinarily bitter campaign was punctuated with charges of ‘racist’ and ‘unwarranted social experimenting.’ The election was held on October 6, 1964, and the incumbents won reelection by a surprisingly large margin, a phenomenon as inexplicable to the victorious Board as to the chastened opposition” (Heyman, 1967. p. 29). Also chastened, the school board slowed its desegregation efforts, calling for a two-year “time out” before implementation of a plan to desegregate Berkeley’s elementary schools, time spent educating voters and unifying pupils at the newly-integrated junior high schools.

Looking back on the 1964-66 period, Carol Sibley, a school board member at the time, explains that the school board should have better prepared the city for desegregation: “An honest appraisal must affirm that successful integration requires years of preparation and cannot happen overnight by sending minority and majority children to school together, when they have been separated all their lives and do not know what to expect in their new relationship. Great efforts are needed to be able to anticipate problems that may develop and not only wisely prepare the new student body but to motivate and unify the staff” (Sibley, 1972, p. 61).

In explaining the Berkeley Unified School District’s backing of educational parks, the 1964-66 period is important because it shows that integration of Berkeley’s schools was divisive, and divisive in just the ways civil-rights activists would have anticipated. Writing late in 1964, Daniel Freudenthal, a member of the Berkeley school district staff, describes the impact of the then-recent recall election: “Berkeley again became a battleground between those who sought the future, economically and interracially, and those who would stand pat, come what may. . . The community remains divided, of course. Though the power is shifting, neither the majority nor the educational leadership can afford to disregard the persistent minority” (p. 187).

In Berkeley the “persistent minority” has always had influence beyond its numbers.29 In the mid- to late-sixties, the peak period for educational park planning in Berkeley, this group’s assertiveness meant that full integration of the city’s schools struck many people, including Neil V. Sullivan, Superintendent of Schools, as a goal only reachable following an arduous journey.

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29 Likely because the group’s views were shared by the editors of the Berkeley Gazette, the city’s most important newspaper. Highlighting this confluence of opinions, David Kirp writes: “The conservative Berkeley Gazette made the [1964] recall cause its own. ‘The board is destroying a city to test a theory,’ stated a typical story” (1982, p. 161).
As in other cities, educational parks were seen in Berkeley as a way to sweeten the integration pill in a divided community. Referring to the 1962-64 period, Freudenthal writes, “The changes made over a period of years were traumatic for all concerned” (1964, p. 187). In subsequent years, Neil V. Sullivan and his staff (including Daniel Freudenthal) worked to avoid additional damage to Berkeley’s social fabric. Expressing the educational park activist’s belief that quality education is conducive to integration, Freudenthal argues “The task now will be to consolidate the gains and eliminate the trauma as Berkeley attempts to become a model modern educational system for an interracial community” (Freudenthal, 1964, p. 187).
CHAPTER THREE: SPACE AGE SCHOOLS

During the mid-sixties, two rationales were advanced for building educational parks. The first rationale—offered without reference to race or integration—was to improve the quality of public education by constructing schools with state-of-the-art features. The second rationale was to further integration by building schools attractive to students of all races. Therefore, while one group of educational park backers saw cutting-edge educational parks as ends in themselves, another group considered the technologically-advanced parks a way to attract white families to integrated public schools.

Some educational park advocates focused only on the parks’ technological and instructional marvels: “The physical structures of the new education parks are to be designed to take advantage of new technology and new teaching methods. Movable walls, sound-proofing, special cubicles, and other design features permit the flexibility necessary for individualized learning, computer aided instruction, closed circuit TV, classes of various sizes, and team teaching” (Thomas, 1969, p. 94). Eyes fixed on the future, this group saw educational parks as a chance to rethink all aspects of schooling: “The new idea of the educational park has validity because it aims for better and higher education for all children,” claimed the New York City Board of Education, adding: “It attempts to create an educational structure which can break the shackles of the past and create new forms and procedures more relevant to education in an atomic age” (in Wolff, 1965, p. 14).

Other educational park backers saw the novelties on offer in educational parks not as ends in themselves, but as a means to an end, the end being integration. “Quality education for all is most likely to come through educational parks which bring together in one place all the students of a large area. Because of the economies of large scale operation, the educational park will make practical a multiplicity of teaching specialists and superb facilities. Involving students from a wide area attracted by the superior opportunities, such a plan will guarantee school integration even before housing is desegregated” (King, 1968, p. 206). Central to Dr. Martin Luther King’s support for educational parks is King’s belief that such parks, because attractively staffed and furnished (“a multiplicity of teaching specialists and superb facilities”), will attract a diverse student population (“students from a wide area”). Bayard Rustin, King’s colleague in the civil rights movement, makes a similar argument:

The most creative idea that has come out to me is. . . the educational park, that is, the university in effect for youngsters. And the reason I say this is, that if you will think of the
High School of Music and Art which is in the center of Harlem, white people fight to get their children in there. They don’t raise the question that this is a high—a criminal area. They fight to get them in for one simple reason. The High School of Music and Art is one of our truly superior schools. Now I think when the question of educational parks can be clearly seen... when we do come forth with a real answer to how we truly prepare people in the Twentieth Century and how we get democracy in the school together, and come forth with a superior thing, people will support it. (Rustin, 1964)

In arguing for educational parks, both King and Rustin describe the parks as offering students the best in educational equipment and practices. That said, King and Ruskin, unlike strictly tech-minded educational park supporters, are more interested in the function of education parks than in their form, focusing on the parks’ value as desegregation devices: “such a plan will guarantee school integration even before housing is desegregated” (King, 1968, p. 206).

The significance of integrationist backers of educational parks seeing the parks as a means rather than an end cannot be overstated, for in the 1960s it meant these backers’ support for the parks was contingent not only on integration not being achieved in the interim by other means, but—given the expense of constructing even a single educational park—on integration not appearing achievable by other means. In other words, whereas the goals of tech-minded backers of educational parks could only be achieved through construction of educational parks,30 the goals of integrationist supporters could be achieved in a number of ways (e.g. modification of attendance districts, open enrollment plans, busing, etc.). Why, then, did civil rights activists like Martin Luther King see educational parks as the most likely route to “quality education for all”?

At the heart of this group’s support for educational parks was a belief that the parks—with their fancy gadgets and advanced teaching methods—were the only school forms alluring enough to overcome white animosity towards African Americans. As sociologist Robert Dentler explained in 1964: “The concept of the education park attracts us because it contains at root the notion of ‘white bait.’ Tradition-oriented white citizens might be attracted to back education parks, where they oppose neighborhood school pairing, because the park package gleams so handsomely” (p. 22). With the idea of “white bait” in mind, one sees why features emphasized by tech-minded promoters of educational parks (computers, TVs, etc.) were also spotlighted by integrationist

30 Largely because the features they envisioned depended on economies of scale: “In terms of educational programs and administration, the education park provides an opportunity for economies of scale, specialization, concentration, and flexibility that are not possible at scattered, separated schools” (So, 1968, p. 5).
backers of the parks. Yet tech-minded and integrationist promoters of educational parks were pursuing very different agendas. In brief, given that integrationist backers of educational parks ultimately wanted integration, not educational parks, their support for educational parks was likely to dissipate in cities where educational integration (by other means) was imminent, not least because whereas design and construction of an educational park was a lengthy process, integration involving redistricting or busing could be implemented in a year or less.

Although it came to be dominated by proponents of integration, the educational park movement never lost its interest in advanced technology. Envisioning educational parks as pacemaker-like desegregation devices to revive ailing communities, the movement embraced a number of postwar beliefs about the transformation of society through cutting-edge technology. This, more than anything, marks the educational park movement as a product of its time. “The defeat of racist totalitarianism in Europe and Asia—achieved largely through American scientific and technological superiority—left American opinion leaders and the public at large with a sense that they were living in a very special place at the cusp of a very special time,” write Richard Paul and Steven Moss in *We Could not Fail: The First African Americans in the Space Program*, “That sense of America’s eminence was cultivated and enhanced in the years between the war’s end and the advent of what is now called the ‘Space Age’ “ (2015, p. 12). The space age itself, Paul and Moss observe, saw Americans go gaga for rocketry: “The allure of space thoroughly -seized American popular culture” (2015, p. 69), with references to astronauts and interstellar exploration “[spinning] from engineering to entertainment and from geopolitics to product” (2015, p. 69):

Don Knotts starred in *The Reluctant Astronaut*, where he played a rocket-ride operator at a city park whose father applies to NASA on his behalf. Among the better-known TV series of the era was *The Jetsons* (ABC, 1962–1963), a primetime cartoon that showed the futuristic life of George Jetson, his boy Elroy, daughter Judy, Jane, his wife, and Astro the dog. Other shows included *Lost in Space* (CBS, 1965–1968), about a family marooned on an unknown planet, and *Star Trek* (NBC, 1966–1969), which followed the USS Enterprise as it went boldly “where no man has gone before.” . . . Space exploration

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31 As Leonard Buder explained in the *New York Times*: “The concentration of pupils, teachers and resources, the contention runs, would enable each component of the park to offer richer programs and more services than any individual school could provide, thus attracting white middle-class families who might otherwise exit to the suburbs or to private schools” (1966, p. E7).
and NASA influenced American culture well beyond books, movies, and television. When NASA arrived in Houston, the town’s baseball team, the Colt .45s, changed their name to the Astros. Of course, the team renamed their new indoor stadium the Astrodome. Ticket girls, called “Spacettes” and dressed in space-themed uniforms, helped people to their seats. (2015, p. 70)

“The unifying emphasis behind this cultural amalgam was the idea of The Future,” explain Paul and Moss, turning their attention from rocketry to racial progress. “Humans were primed to land on a foreign planet for the first time in history. That recognition wrapped the Space Age in an envelope of possibility that extended beyond rockets to permeate every aspect of life, including race relations” (2015, p. 12).

As citizens of a nation “committed to building bigger, better, and faster machines,” (Paul & Moss, 2015, p. 12), Americans entered the 1960s enamored of machinery and convinced that technological solutions to social problems were not only possible but inevitable. “In its time, the term ‘Space Age’ meant so much more than advances in engineering,” explain Paul and Moss. “This new age of space was for many a panacea—a deus ex machina. Those who invoked it thought it could solve almost any problem” (2015, p. 71). The educational park concept, referred to by many advocates as a “device” to solve the problem of segregation, was a natural—almost foreordained—product of 1960s thinking. Bigger and better (if not faster) than other schools, educational parks were pedagogical equivalents of Saturn V rockets, not just in their immensity (“Nothing was bigger than a Saturn V rocket,” write Paul and Moss (2015, p. 69), but in their capacity to transport human beings to idyllic realms. “Outer space seemed clean and peaceful,” write Paul and Moss (p. 71), choosing adjectives many educational park proponents would have applied to the parks. “The powerful and beautifully designed machines that took humans there were brand new” (2015, p. 71) Brand new indeed!

Growth Liberalism

If the Space Age was dependent on an expansionary and idealized NASA (“America fell in love with a government agency that spent billions of dollars launching rockets and sending men to the moon” [Paul & Moss, 2015, p. 69]), NASA was itself dependent on what Robert C. Collins calls “growth liberalism”: “the interpenetration of growth economics and liberal politics” (1994, p. 25). Growth liberalism—“At its most robust in America’s grand public enterprises in
space, abroad, and at home in the years 1960-1968” (Collins, 1994, p. 25)—was embraced by both John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, guiding their actions during “the heady days of the New Frontier and the Great Society” (Collins, 1994, p. 25), whether the actions were glamorous (NASA space programs), disastrous (Vietnam), or prosaic (social programs like Medicaid or ESEA). In Collins’s words,

As with the adventure in space and the engagement in Vietnam, economic growth played a significant role in liberalism’s domestic program. First, it fueled the basic optimism that made the grandiose conception of the Great Society appear reasonable. “Hell,” LBJ told his aides in April 1964, “we’ve barely begun to solve our problems. And we can do it all. We’ve got the wherewithal. We’re the richest country in the world. We can do it if we believe it” (1994, p. 23)

“Second,” Collins adds, “growth really did provide the wherewithal of which Johnson spoke. . . The creators of the Great Society assumed that a portion of this growth could be redirected to support the most ambitious liberal program in U.S. history” (1994, p. 23).

The educational park concept was a product of growth liberalism in three ways. Already mentioned was the technological aura around the concept, with educational parks, depending on the context, posited as social, administrative, or desegregation devices. “Perhaps an educational park fits our fantasy of discovering a device, an Edison-like invention, that will compel change by the very vastness of the enterprise. The idea is perhaps gigantic and yet familiar enough an image to attract public interest and, eventually, acceptance” (Dentler, 1964, p. 25). The familiar giganticness of educational parks, their appearing in the mind’s eye as both recognizable and farfetched, arguably stems from their Space Age characteristics, most obviously the advanced technologies they incorporate (computers, etc.), but also from their overall design, reminiscent in some drawings of hermetically sealed space colonies:
The ascendancy in the United States of growth liberalism was marked by large annual increases in federal spending (Collins, 1994, p. 14), with a significant portion of this spending devoted toward either developing or acquiring new technologies. Innovative in both form and function, the educational park was yet another expensive device the federal government could promote—hinting at a second link between educational parks and growth liberalism.

“By 1960, the federal government had become a dynamic, intervening force in American life,” writes David Farber, continuing:

The radical growth in government capacity and actions underwritten by New Deal social welfare and regulatory reforms, coupled with the centralization of power in Washington, increased by World War II and the Cold War, opened the door to a radical reappraisal of the federal government’s role in protecting the basic rights and liberties of every American. By the late 1930s, federal courts committed to New Deal social and economic reforms reversed earlier decisions that had restricted federal intervention in state, local, and corporate affairs. (1994b, p. 71)

It wasn’t only the availability of money fueling the Johnson administration’s dynamism, but self-confidence as well. The administration clearly felt its ideas, not those of its opponents, were in line with both the future and public sentiment at large, representing advances on outdated and unfashionable beliefs. In brief, if Americans in general were in the mid-sixties feeling good about themselves and their country, Lyndon Johnson and his advisers were feeling even better, perceiving their “inclusive vision of consumer egalitarianism” (Farber, 1994b, p. 64) as vastly more reasonable and relevant than the “teachings of White Citizens Councils or xenophobic provincials” (Farber, 1994b, p. 64):
Liberalism, in the hands of President Johnson, became an understanding that the federal government had the responsibility, power, and ability to reduce inequality, protect historically oppressed minorities, champion American interests and values around the world, and balance the private sector’s singular focus on making money with a broad concern for the nation’s long-term good. (Farber, 1994b, p. 104)

As this passage suggests, the Johnson administration saw itself as, and indeed was, future-oriented, keeping its eye on “the nation’s long-term good” (Farber, 1994b, p. 104) in planning and implementing Great Society programs. Seeing itself not only as on the side of the angels, but as having a crystal ball with access to the future, the Johnson administration felt tremendously confident when taking an action. “[T]he War on Poverty, the Great Society, as much as Apollo or Vietnam, were Cold War phenomena, but they were not only that, far from it. There were born of a moral vision in which men of power and charity sought to use their gifts for the less gifted. It was possible to eradicate poverty, crime, ignorance, whip the Communists, and develop the Third World, or so thought LBJ” (Paul & Moss, 2015, p. 406).

Federalism and Progress

If growth liberalism, as manifested in increased federal spending on social programs, was supposed to result in a nation without poverty, crime, or ignorance, then educational parks, as federally-funded “integrational devices” (113 Cong Rec 24198 1967) were expected to “contribute substantially to the total social reconstruction” (Freudenthal, 1966a) of American cities. Again, the vision is one of technological wonder-working: “Technocratic methods first appeared in American government in the nineteenth century and became widespread in the military emergency during and after World War II. But technocratic ideology captured the country only after Sputnik, when a new willingness to view state management as a social good and not a necessary evil turned a quantitative change into a qualitative one” (McDougall, 1985, p. 436). Miracles of design and equipage, educational parks were a technocratic dream of pedagogical perfection, not so much because students at the parks learned about math and science (although this mattered), as because students learned about the world at large:

32 “Science and technology are making the problems of today irrelevant in the long run.” (Adlai Stevenson in Paul & Moss, 2015, p. 407.)
Education parks may stimulate diversity rather than uniformity: As in the city, denser population leads to greater variety in human relationships and greater diversity in the creation and flow of ideas. Cities, not villages, spawn civilizations; choice among alternatives and cultural riches occurs where ideas and persons mix freely in diverse relationship. Thus the educational complex, if properly used, could produce a higher culture within the school. (Lortie, 1967, p. 10)

Growth liberalism, writes Robert C. Collins, “imparted to the sixties an optimism and energy that loom large in both our social memory and our historical understanding of the era” (1994, p. 25). Convinced that poverty could be vanquished and the environment protected, growth liberals also believed that racial prejudice could be eliminated, if not immediately (racist adults were beyond salvation), then in a decade or two (children could be reached). Indeed, NASA itself, as Paul and Moss explain, was conceived of as both a symbol and a bastion of tolerance:

Speaking in Seattle in 1962, Vice President Johnson made a speech entitled “The New World of Space.” In it, he demonstrated his wholehearted embrace of the idea that the Space Age could solve anything. “Because the Space Age is here,” Johnson said, “we are recruiting the best talent regardless of race or religion, and, more importantly, senseless patterns of discrimination in employment are being broken up.” (2015, p. 72)

Many growth liberals, including Lyndon Johnson, considered racial prejudice passé, a vestige of a thankfully-vanished time. “The national and nationalist premises of postwar American elites seemed to offer African-Americans new opportunities for equality. . . the federal government—not state or local officials—was increasingly taking responsibility for guaranteeing one standard of basic social provision, justice and equality before the law” (Farber, 1994b, p. 65). In effect, with increased federal involvement in local affairs came increased dissemination of New Frontier and Great Society ideas about racial equality and social justice, ideas both shaped by and reflective of the Space Age. “The black press was able to use the futuristic imagery of the Space Age and turn it back on American society to force the question of whether the nation truly was launching into the future or whether it was still stuck in the past” (Paul & Moss, 2015, p. 237). In this framing, the past was segregated and the future integrated, with the federal government charged with moving society forward in time. “African-Americans understood that America’s global role, the increasingly powerful role of the federal government, and the formation of a
national cultural life gave them opportunities to expose the racist lie and demand that white America live up to its claims of democracy” (Farber, 1994b, p. 66).

Educational park backers saw the parks as vehicles for transporting students into a multiracial future, both in the sense that backers saw educational parks as integrational devices, and in the sense that backers perceived the parks as preparatory schools readying students for citizenship in a multicultural United States. As John H. Fischer, a prominent park proponent, explained in 1964:

> It is not the function of a school district merely to maintain the status quo, to become an apologist for things as they are. As they are, things rarely represent the best of all possible arrangements, and we can therefore safely assume that the prevailing situation can be improved. The social, political and economic structure of today’s world is increasingly a multi-racial structure. (“Seeks progress without protest,”1964, p. AA11)

Educational park supporters, like other growth liberals, saw segregation as not only conceptually retrograde (“backward thinking”), but temporally retrograde as well, viewing it as a feature more of the past than the present (let alone the future). A key theme in educational park advocacy was that the parks benefited white children as well as African American students, not just because the parks were filled with fancy gadgets, but also because the parks acclimated white students to the “multi-racial structure” of the evolving United States. Martin Luther King, Jr. emphasized this point during a 1966 Senate hearing:

> I would prefer the inconvenience of busing students from one school district to another to the inconvenience of having students grow up without the experience and the reality of being able to study and grow up together with children of other races in pluralistic society. I think this is a part of the learning process, and it is criminal for white kids, for instance, to grow up in a world that is two-thirds colored and go to school only with white children. They are being ill-trained. It is totally unrealistic and it is unfair to those children, and it is unfair also to Negro children not to give them an opportunity, in a Nation that is a pluralistic Nation, with many people of different backgrounds nationally and racially, not to be able to communicate with them. . . we must try to achieve racial balance in our schools as much as possible through some of the methods suggested by educators; the busing system, educational parks and other ideas. (King, 1966, p. 2983)
“While economic growth supported grand designs in Asia, it undergirded a massive liberal enterprise at home as well,” observes Robert C. Collins. “As with other matters, the effort began slowly and shakily under Kennedy, and emerged full-blown, perhaps overblown, under Johnson” (1994, p. 22). The educational park movement was very much a product of these feverish times, first, in its call for expensive schools only possible with federal funding, second, in its push for schools designed to replicate, and so prepare students for, a multiracial United States. Growth liberals saw racism as archaic, proposing and implementing programs specifically designed to foster racial harmony. One such program (proposed but not implemented) was for “a system of educational parks to be established within the inner city” (Howe, 1966a, p. 11). In advocating for a system of educational parks, U.S. Commissioner of Education Harold Howe, much to his own surprise, stumbled into a field of nettles.
CHAPTER FOUR: FEDERALISM IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

Arguments about educational parks— their design, purpose, and desirability— can only be understood given familiarity with debates about the appropriate role of the federal government in education. Educational parks were always acknowledged to be expensive, meaning federal funds were always seen as necessary for their construction.

Devolved by the Constitution to state and local governments, education in the United States has traditionally been perceived—and still is seen by strict constructionists—as a no-go area for the federal government:

Decentralization of education was consciously affirmed in the assignment of governmental roles under the Constitution. By virtue of the Tenth Amendment, public education was recognized to be a state and local function, along with most other areas of positive governmental activity such as public safety, health and morals. The founders’ explicit rejection of a national university denotes the totality of this decentralization. Hence, governmental involvement in education in the pre-Civil War era was almost wholly state and local activity. (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 12)

If in the post-Civil War era the federal government has been increasingly involved in public education, the reason relates to the failure of many state and local governments to adequately educate African-Americans, initially because emancipated slaves received no education at all, later because many Southern (and some Northern) cities and towns maintained segregated and unequal school systems. Studying 19th century efforts to assist African-American young people, we see repeated attempts by Northern congressmen to legislate federal involvement in schools, typically through the setting of national standards, but also through construction of schools, or provision of textbooks. In 1870, for instance

Rep. George Hoar (R-MA) introduced a bill “to establish a national system of education.” Specifically, the bill sought to require a national system of general public education, to be operated by the states in accordance with federal standards. States that failed to create such systems were subject to direct federal intervention to correct their deficiencies. In such delinquent states, national authority was provided for the appointment of a federal superintendent of state schools; for the building of schools; for the production of textbooks; and for institution of a direct tax upon inhabitants, to be distributed according to census data on illiteracy. (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 14).
Hoar’s bill failed, as did subsequent bills in the 19th century, including most importantly a bill repeatedly submitted during the 1880s (by Henry Blair of New Hampshire) aimed at initiating a “ten-year program of federal aid “to meet ‘emergency’ conditions in the south” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 15). Of this later bill, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations writes:

In a major departure from the past, federal assistance was to be in the form of direct cash grants, rather than land grants or proceeds, to be distributed according to state illiteracy rates. Also significant were the scope and number of grant requirements which conditioned state eligibility for federal aid. States were required to match the amount of federal assistance in their own spending on education” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 15).

Blair’s bill, like Hoar’s, failed due to congressional concern for “constitutionality, states’ rights [and] local prerogative” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 17). In brief, Southerners, but not only Southerners, didn’t want the federal government deciding who should be educated and how well: “To many, maintenance of local prerogative loomed far larger than educational improvement; to many more, independence from federal control was essential to that improvement” (1981, p. 17).

A relatively simple situation—Northerners tabling bills to allow federal involvement in Southern schools—became vastly more complicated following the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision. Not only did the federal government now have to enforce a contentious federal court decision, it also had to tailor its enforcement to match the evolving demands of the civil rights movement. “The goals of the petitioners in Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny,” writes Richard Young, “were to halt official discrimination and to insure that racial minorities received equal treatment” (1972, p. 84). As the petitioners knew, neither of these goals could be met without federal assistance, for if official discrimination could in many cases only be halted through the intervention of the justice department, equal treatment of minority students seemed to require provision of federal aid to African-American schools (of which there remained many in the South). Given this latter requirement, one would expect the Brown decision to open the floodgates for federal spending on public schools—but events took an unexpected turn.

Between 1954 and 1965, both states’ rights advocates and civil rights leaders opposed federal aid to schools, the former on traditional “local prerogative” grounds, the latter because
federal aid to segregated schools was seen as a perverse form of life-support for such schools: “Following the Supreme Court decision to outlaw school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the National Association of Colored People (NAACP) altered its position on federal aid. Previously, it had supported federal aid proposals that equitably apportioned aid between segregated schools. Now, it advocated that states conform to the Brown decision in order to qualify for aid” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 23).

Anti-Federalism and Education

Unsurprisingly, of the two groups opposed to federal spending on schools during the 1954-65 period, it was the states’ rights advocates who advanced a more developed case, mostly because they had been revising and expanding it for a century. Among states’ rights advocates, Senator Barry Goldwater, author of the 1960 bestseller The Conscience of a Conservative, had the highest-profile, due to both his book’s popularity and his importance in the Republican party. (Goldwater was the 1964 Republican presidential candidate.) To a large extent, The Conscience of a Conservative is a book-length polemic against government involvement in the day-to-day lives of Americans, including American schoolchildren. Having introduced the topic of federal “interference” (1960, p. 40) in education (“The intentions of the founding fathers in this matter are beyond any doubt: no powers regarding education were given to the federal government” (1960, p. 40), Goldwater offers four reasons why “federal aid to education is objectionable”:

The first is that federal intervention in education is unconstitutional [. . .]
The second objection is that the alleged need for federal funds has never been convincingly demonstrated [. . .]
The third objection is that it promotes the idea that federal school money is ‘free’ money, and thus gives the people a distorted picture of the cost of education [. . .]
The fourth objection is that federal aid to education inevitably means federal control of education [. . .] (1960, pp. 100-106)

It is this fourth objection that Goldwater voices most forcefully, with particular emphasis placed on the possibility of federal meddling in the curriculum:

For many years, advocates of federal aid denied that aid implies control, but in the light of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 they cannot very well maintain their position. Federal aid under the act is conditioned upon compliance by the States and local
educational institutions with various standards and specifications laid down by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. *There are no less than twelve direct controls of this kind in the act.* (1960, p. 107)

Fearful of being misunderstood, Goldwater notes that although he supports the National Defense Act and its prodding of schools to place more emphasis on science and technology, he opposes the means of encouragement: “when the federal government does the encouraging through the withholding and granting of funds, I do not see how it can be denied that the federal government is helping to determine the *content* of education; and influencing content is the last, not the first, stage of control” (1960, p. 106).

At the time he was writing *The Conscience of a Conservative*, Goldwater was in close contact with Russell Kirk, a right-wing columnist and soon-to-be opponent of educational parks. As a conservative website explains, “One of the little known aspects of recent American history is that Russell Kirk served as one of Barry Goldwater’s most important intellectual advisors, 1959-1964. The two talked frequently, met frequently, and strategized frequently” (Birzer, n.d.). Like Goldwater, Russell Kirk wrote books, publishing in 1957 the cartoonishly-titled *Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Conservatism*, a patronizing survey of various topics, including education.

Centralization of any sort is suspect to the conservative; and centralization of the educational establishment is one of the most dangerous forms of centralization. It is with marked hostility, then, that the conservative looks upon proposals for federal subsidies to the public schools. The man who pays the fiddler calls the tune, the conservative knows; and, besides, education is more vigorous when it is supported by local endeavor. . .

Private citizens, local communities, and the several states, the conservative knows, are the best judges of their own educational needs and interests. When he is approached with proposals for consolidation and unification, he shrewdly suspects that somewhere in the dim background of these proposals is someone’s Grand Design for employing the schools as a tool for turning society inside out. And the conservative has no intention of turning society inside out. He thinks that to abuse the schools for such a purpose would be to corrupt education. (Kirk, 1957, p. 91)

Russell Kirk has been quoted at length for three reasons, first, because he was an influential voice in 1960s conservatism, second, because he was a representative figure in the movement against federalism in education, and third, because he was in the mid-sixties a steadfast opponent
of the educational park concept ("an abstract and nonsensical scheme" [115 Cong. Rec. 27241 1969]). Accepting that Kirk’s opposition to federal involvement in education was motivated by political ideology (as opposed to, for instance, racism), his opposition invites a reasoned response. Is Kirk entirely wrong to argue that “local communities, the several states. . . are the best judges of their own educational needs and interests”? Is he wholly mistaken to claim that some reformers would use education “as a tool for turning society inside out”? To acknowledge that Kirk’s views raise difficult questions is not to endorse the views, but rather to recognize that Kirk’s opposition to educational federalism (and so to educational parks) cannot be dismissed out-of-hand. In brief, while many 1960s opponents of educational federalism were motivated by racism (“When the Negro today proclaims or demands his ‘equality’ he is talking of equality within the terms of Western civilization. And what, pray, has he contributed to it?” (James J. Kilpatrick in Hustwit, 2013, p. 121), Kirk seems driven by a genuine, if overblown, fear of government indoctrination: “They intend to break down all the old beliefs and loyalties, through the process of educating the young, and to supplant these old beliefs and loyalties with artificially cultivated attachment to collectivistic doctrines. Some of them would teach ‘the religion of democracy,’ to replace the religious convictions in which nearly all schools had their origins” (Kirk, 1957, p. 87).

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act

Relationships between school districts, states, and the federal government changed dramatically with passage of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act. “The act began a new era in federal aid to education, doubling the federal share of elementary and secondary education expenditures and establishing a new pattern of intergovernmental relationships in education. Programs to aid the educationally disadvantaged, provide instructional materials, promote educational innovation, support educational research, and assist state education agencies were all established by ESEA.” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 31) While significant in itself, ESEA is best studied alongside another piece of legislation, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which, in the words of a 1981 report on intergovernmental relations, “by settling the question of federal aid to segregated schools. . . neutralized the troublesome racial issue” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 33). Prohibiting federal aid to segregated schools, the Civil Rights Act preemptively guaranteed that ESEA funds would go only to desegregated schools—a long-standing demand of
civil rights leaders. In effect, whereas prior to 1965 the NAACP and other civil rights organizations opposed federal aid to schools (because some aid would go to segregated schools), following passage of ESEA these organizations supported such aid, leaving only states’ rights advocates to oppose federalism in education.

The impact of ESEA was felt at once. “It identified new federal interests in education. With authorizations of more than $1 billion in the first year, it was massive in size and scope” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 33). That said, it is important to note that, although ESEA was massive in size and scope, its cost and reach were not aberrational for 1960s federal programs, the 1960s having been—as one book title has it—the Age of Great Dreams. The 1960s, David Farber observes, was a period of “growth liberalism,” an ideology of governance based on “two interconnected premises”:

First, advocates believed that federal economic policy—tax cuts and credits, targeted spending, fiscal stimulus—could significantly contribute to a robust, growing gross national product (GNP). Second, the new-style liberals believed that the increased tax revenues produced by the rising GNP could and should be used by the federal government to enlarge its role in both foreign and domestic affairs. (1994b, p. 104).

Accounting for the emergence of growth liberalism in the United States, Farber links it to the development in the 1920s and 30s of a “new national culture. . . built on shared political understandings” (1994b, p. 50), understandings about (among other things) the need to protect (as the Supreme Court was beginning to do) “minorities, criminal defendants, and nonconformist opinion” (1994b, p. 63). Growth liberalism, then, expressed a newly-sprung belief that national values were superior to local values, and so should be affirmed and spread through expansion of federal programs. In this sense, ESEA, designed to bring equality to classrooms throughout the United States, is an exemplary product of growth liberalism, emerging as it did from consensus views about the equal worth of all students. Discussing the early 1960s, Farber writes, “many African-Americans looked at the new national culture with a sense of great hope. While white racists and fundamentalist Christians saw themselves as losers in the nationalization of American political, economic, and cultural life, African-Americans correctly perceived themselves as potential winners. . . the federal government—not state or local officials—was increasingly taking responsibility for guaranteeing one standard of basic social provision, justice and equality before the law. (1994b, p. 65)
With passage of ESEA a small window in time opened during which federal funding of educational parks was both permitted by Congress and supported by civil rights organizations. Unfortunately for some proponents of educational parks, including Neil V. Sullivan in Berkeley, the window was only open until May, 1967, when ESEA was amended “[to give] control of Titles III and V (supplemental centers and state agency grants) to the states” (Advisory Commission, 1981, p. 42). What this amendment meant was that beginning in October, 1967, an educational park could only be built in a state whose department of education supported educational parks—and there were few such states. In California, for instance, not only did State Superintendent for Public Instruction Max Rafferty oppose educational parks, he was in the mid-sixties among the most outspoken opponents of such parks, arguing, for instance, “We don’t need fewer and huger school buildings, even if we call ‘em parks” (1966, p. 20A). In this context it is interesting to note that in September, 1968 when Neil V. Sullivan left Berkeley to become Commissioner of Education of Massachusetts, he said “I see the action shifting from the local community to the state capitol. . . This is where the action is, and I want to be part of that action” (“Sullivan Confirms Resignation Story,” 1968, p. A13). Political victories in 1966 and 1967 by opponents of federalism in public education meant that by 1968 educational action—insofar as it involved federal funds—occurred mostly at the state level, putting on hold many plans for educational parks.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE EDUCATIONAL PARK MOVEMENT, 1964-70

To a great extent, the educational park movement was the brainchild of sociologist Max Wolff, director in the mid-sixties of “Operation Educational Park” at the Center for Urban Education in New York City. In September, 1963, Wolff, then a consultant to New York City’s Department of Education, sent a memorandum to Calvin Gross, the department’s superintendent, offering suggestions for how to fix a number of the “unique problems” of New York’s “massive school system” (1964, p. 43). Expressing particular unease about the city’s de facto segregated schools, Wolff suggested that segregated neighborhood schools could be replaced by a “complex of schools” serving an expanded catchment area: “many of the procedures and principles tested elsewhere in smaller communities have direct application to New York as well. In a smaller community, the planner would consider individual schools to be desegregated; here in New York the same procedures may be adopted if a complex of schools or an area is substituted for the individual school of the small city” (1964, p. 43). Wolff’s insight, noteworthy because no one seems to have hit upon it previously, lay in recognizing that small town common schools—desegregated in the sense that they educate all children in a community—provide a useful model for urban schools, which, if enlarged to serve an expanded zone, become large common schools educating a diverse student body. Wolff, having suggested as a short-term solution the technique (later adopted in Berkeley) of school pairing (“all the schools in one area to be converted to K-3 and paired as a unit with all the schools in another area, [which are] organized as a 4-6 grade unit” [1964, p. 44]), shares his “desired long-range goal”:

The educational park concept—as the long-range goal—is a natural development from the more immediate plans suggested; i.e. those areas that are designated as 4-6th grade areas can be viewed as the root areas for the growth of educational parks in each borough. (1964, p. 44)

Wolff’s 1963 memo to Calvin Gross is important for three reasons, first because it’s the earliest endorsement of the educational park as a “technique for desegregating” (1964, p. 43), second

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33 Wolff is thinking of Northern communities.
34 Wolff’s memo was controversial and Gross soon dissociated himself from its suggestions: “Superintendent Gross, in a letter made public yesterday, said there had been a misunderstanding over a memorandum sent to the board by Dr. Max Wolff, an educational consultant. The Superintendent said the memorandum had not been ignored, as some persons have charged, but that it had been treated simply as a set of suggestions. Dr. Gross said the board had declined to pay Dr. Wolff’s bill of $525 ‘because we at no time engaged Dr. Wolff’s services’” (Powledge 1963, p. A26).
because it reveals that educational parks were initially promoted as desegregation devices rather than quality schools. Third because it presents educational parks as transformational institutions impacting entire cities: “The educational park as a long-range goal requires close cooperation with other city-planning agencies over an extended period of time” (Wolff, 1964, p. 45).

Max Wolff’s importance to the educational park movement goes far beyond his providing the movement with an initial area of concern (de facto segregation) and program of action (build educational parks), for it was Wolff who, in his 1964 article “A Plan for Desegregation,” first linked educational parks with voluntary desegregation, promoting educational parks as a non-divisive integration devices. “The neighborhood school is a segregated school,” Wolff begins. “To desegregate such a school without desegregating the neighborhood as well requires the use of artificial means which hinder, or at least slow down, the process toward integration” (1964, p. 45). Something of a garden path sentence, this statement argues that some integration techniques impede integration, mainly because school populations are assembled in an “artificial” way, with proximity (the “natural” way to populate a school) ignored, sparking resentment both in students forced to travel and in students compelled to welcome “outsiders” into their school. If a district closes neighborhood schools without providing pedagogically superior alternatives, that district, Wolff argues, invites resistance, mostly because parents familiar with the neighborhood school model associate the model’s sudden disappearance with arbitrary social engineering. Integration, in Wolff’s view, only succeeds when groups want to be together, raising the question of how to make integration attractive to all groups. Wolff’s answer:

Instead of a preponderance of second-rate facilities in many neighborhood schools, the very finest and most modern equipment can be provided in special purpose areas of the educational center. Science laboratories, unattainable in local schools; libraries so often lacking or inadequate in neighborhood schools; language laboratories with extensive equipment can all be made available even to the beginning pupils. . . In addition, teaching personnel in special fields can be most efficiently employed in the best equipped art and

35 The educational park concept, Alfred N. Freeman notes, dates back to 1901, “when Preston Search in his book ‘An Ideal School’ listed and described several schools that were operating in a park/campus setting” (1974, p. 7). Preston Search was at the time Superintendent of Schools in Los Angeles.
36 Wolff’s plan was published alongside his 1963 memo to Calvin Gross in a 1964 issue of Equity & Excellence in Education.
37 Wolff uses the terms “educational center” and “educational park” interchangeably.
music rooms instead of working with the inadequate facilities found too often in the neighborhood school. (1964, p. 46)

This cornucopic passage hints at the reasoning behind the educational park movement. Whereas desegregation techniques like rezoning and school pairing coerce white parents into sending their children to multiracial schools, educational parks entice parents into doing so, providing such a wealth of “splendid equipment” (1964, p. 46) that white families embrace integration. As Wolff explains:

The board of education will find wide community acceptance if its proposals geared toward improvement of educational programs are of a broad and all-inclusive nature. These proposals should embody as well the principle of integration. In this way, integration which is an integral part of a sound educational system becomes but one rather than the only cause for change. (1964, p. 45)

Integration, Wolff argues, cannot be the only reason for children’s attending schools outside their neighborhoods, cannot be the “only cause for change.” Change must be for less public-spirited reasons as well—for instance, that children can attend schools with “stadiums, playing fields, tracks, swimming pools, and well-equipped gyms” (1964, p. 46). As will many later educational park proponents, Wolff goes overboard in cataloging the goodies available in educational parks, revealing in doing so his strong belief that whites needed to be induced to support integration. In this context, it’s important to recall that Wolff’s primary interest is desegregation, not gadgetry. If his prototypical educational park contains “the very finest and most modern equipment” (1964, p. 46), the equipment is but a means to an end.

In the mid- to late-sixties, Max Wolff was the foremost proponent of educational parks, serving for much of this period as director of Operation Educational Park at the Center for Urban Studies, while also publishing many articles and pamphlets on educational parks, including “The Educational Park” (1967), “Educational Park Development in the United States, 1967” (1967), “Educational Park Development in the United States, 1969” (1969), and “The Educational Park: A Guide to its Implementation” (1970). Wolff played a central role in organizing the educational park movement, acting as consultant to school boards and districts, speaking at conferences on educational park planning, and taking on the role in the media of voice of the educational park movement. Identified by one school district as “the foremost exponent of the educational park concept” (Booth et al, 1969, p. 3), Max Wolff, in writings and speeches, set the parameters for
the 1960s debate over educational parks, describing a prototypical educational park’s form and function, and explaining why educational parks were superior to other integration devices. Given Wolff’s prominence within the educational park movement, it is important to note that his claims about educational parks changed over time. Most significantly, if in 1964 Wolff is focused on the ways educational parks benefit students (arguing, for instance, “The educational park will serve all the children of the community who will have the opportunity, some for the first time, of meeting and working with pupils of varying backgrounds. The children will stimulate, motivate, and challenge each other” [1964, p. 47]), by 1970 he is primarily interested in how educational parks serve the community at large.

In 1970, Wolff (with editor Alan Rinzler) published “The Educational Park: A Guide to its Implementation,” a fifty-five page summarization of (what its preface calls) “an illustrated book on the Educational Park to be published in 1970” (Wolff & Rinzler, 1970, p. i). Because the illustrated book was never published, the summarization is our best source of information on how Wolff’s understanding of the educational park changed over time. “This pamphlet discusses one proposal which has been set forth in many communities across the country as a new way of approaching the basic issues which comprise our present crisis in public education” (1970, p. 2), Wolff and Rinzler write, continuing:

These crisis issues may be reduced to the following fundamental points:

1. The quality of education. What shall be the nature of our curriculum; what shall be its design, application, and intentions?

2. The administration of education. Who shall actually control the schools; what shall the relationship be between student and teacher, teacher and administration, administration and parent, school and community; how shall policies be formulated and effected, and by and for whom?

3. Intergroup relations. How does the school affect and/or actually precipitate the present confrontation between various groups in the community; to what extent must the school necessarily provide the forum, the arena, for contemporary social, political and cultural aspirations and conflicts? (1970, p. 2)

If in 1964 Wolff posits educational parks as primarily benefiting students, with increased social cohesion a welcome side-effect, in 1970 he magnifies their transformative power, describing the parks as a solution to “the basic issues which comprise our present crisis in public education,”
while enlarging their impact field to include such non-pedagogical areas as “intergroup relations” and “contemporary social, political and cultural aspirations and conflicts.” In brief, by 1970, Wolff had come to believe educational parks benefited not just students, or even communities, but the United States as a whole, mainly by offering young people a better education, but also by preventing social, political and cultural clashes: “Anyone living in America today must be painfully aware of the crises in his local school district and in other schools and systems, as the drama of school explosions across the country are reported in radio/TV/newspapers/magazines” (1970, p. 2).

As the 1960s ended, Wolff, notwithstanding his claim that “the Educational Park is not a panacea” (1970, p. 5), depicted educational parks as transformative devices which by reforming public education bring “real change in the shape of our communities, in the relations between our many different socioeconomic groups, in the kind of young citizens emerging to participate in, in fact, to become our society, with all its democratic dreams and aspirations “ (1970, p. 52). An educational park, Wolff writes, by “bringing together as equal partners the divergent groups of a community can be one public institution which unites these elements in common cause—the revival of basic urban environments, the achievement of a new high quality of education equally available to all, and the creation of a new kind of meeting ground, a center not only for learning but for the social and cultural life of the people as well” (1970, p. 53). Between 1964 and 1970, then, Wolff extended the number and scope of claims he made for educational parks, broadening the parks’ effects from the educational and psychological to the social and cultural. Was Wolff unique among educational backers in making extravagant claims for the parks? This question can only be answered by studying the educational park movement as a whole.

Diagnostic Framing

Like all social movements, the educational park movement posited society as flawed but improvable. The movement aimed to fix something. But what? And how? Diagnostic framing, in Benford and Snow’s formulation, is a two-stage process in which a problem is (1) identified, and (2) attributed (2000, p. 615). Although the educational park movement identified many problems confronting American society, the movement claimed that no problem was more important than urban educational segregation. In John H. Fischer’s words:
Among the necessary changes in school policy and practice none are more urgently needed now than those that will speed racial integration. . . the lack of progress now in most cities is due to conditions that are more resistant to analysis and far more difficult to correct. The most impressive fact in the situation is the steady increase in the number and proportion of Negroes in the central cities of our metropolitan areas and the even sharper rise in the proportion of Negro students in the public schools of those cities. (1967, p. 761)

President in 1967 of Columbia University’s Teachers College, Fischer was a member of an important camp within the educational park movement, academics whose research explored (to quote a 2009 obituary of Fischer) “the urban education sector” (“John Fischer,” 2009). Also belonging to this camp was Western Reserve University’s John Barden, who, like Fischer, saw urban school segregation as the most important issue facing the United States:

The neighborhood schools have already failed on the major social issue of the times, which is integration. De facto segregated schools are producing Negro children so sickened by second-class citizenship that no instruction in the segregated situation, however good, can cure them. Segregated schools are also producing white children plagued with diseases of mind and character that make them unfit for the American society. (Barden, 1964, p. 388)

During the 1960s, many journalists allied themselves with the educational park movement, none more closely then Leonard Buder of the New York Times who in the mid-sixties wrote a series of articles that not only discussed educational parks, but also presented them as a breakthrough.38 Like Fischer and Barden, Buder posits school integration as the nation’s most pressing urban issue:

The educational park is a natural development of an attempt to apply modern thinking to the most urgent problem of our cities—desegregation of our schools. In the wake of the solution of this crisis problem, all the advantages of economy and quality inherent in modern technology and rationalization are reaped. (Buder, 1965, p. E9)

Each of these passages (and others could be added) identifies urban educational segregation as—to quote John Barden—”the major social issue of the times” (1964, p. 388). In the 1960s urban

38 “The idea of the educational park is not new. . . But its urban concept as an antidote to de facto school segregation represents a new approach to an old problem” (Buder, 1966, p. E7).
school segregation differed from its rural analogue in two ways, first, urban school segregation was mostly a Northern and Western phenomenon,\(^\text{39}\) second, urban school segregation, in large part because a Northern and Western phenomenon, was *de facto* (resulting from circumstance) rather than *de jure* (resulting from law) segregation, caused, as Barden notes, by neighborhood settlement patterns. Primarily interested in improving urban schools, educational park activists took aim at *de facto* segregation, which, unlike *de jure* segregation, could not be attributed to discriminatory laws. So who (or what) did educational park advocates hold responsible for the problem they had diagnosed?

In March, 1967, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*, a comprehensive (two volume, 600 pages) study of “the factors that contribute to the perpetuation and intensification of school segregation” (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1967c, p. viii). Included as an appendix to Volume II was “Desegregation Techniques,” a paper prepared for the Commission by Neil V. Sullivan, Berkeley’s school superintendent, in which Sullivan not only makes a strong case for educational parks (“The only serious proposal to date which offers promise of effecting a real solution to the *de facto* segregation problem. . . is the ‘educational park’ concept” [1967c, p. 291]), but also discusses “underlying fears which motivate opponents of desegregation” (1967c, p. 293). The most common fears, Sullivan writes, are:

1. Fear of loss of neighborhood school: this fear serves as the rallying cry for opponents of integration in most communities. Efforts are made to place the neighborhood school as a concept along with the Declaration of Independence and the flag as great American traditions. Efforts to tamper with it are made to appear somehow not quite patriotic [. . .]

2. Fear of lowering of standards in erstwhile Caucasian schools: opponents of integration are fond of quoting standardized test scores in an effort to show that standards will be lowered in Caucasian schools if they are desegregated. Actually, these scores, in spite of their limitations, bear eloquent testimony to the failure of the ‘separate but equal’ argument. However, such evidence as is available does not support the argument that the performance of Caucasian students is harmed by desegregation. [. . .]

\(^{39}\) In 1960, eight of the ten largest U.S. cities (and fifteen of twenty) were in the North and West. (U.S Bureau of the Census, 1960).
3. Fear that contact with Negro children will be harmful to Caucasian children: since this is the most bigoted of the three fears listed here, it usually is the least expressed. However, it provides the latent motivation for many people who express their opposition to desegregation in more “acceptable” terms. Actually, this “fear” is aimed in the wrong direction. It has been the Negro rather than the Caucasian who has generally felt harmful results from interracial contacts over the hundreds of years in our country’s history. (1967c, p. 293)

Desegregation, Sullivan tells the Commission, is opposed not by African Americans but by whites, motivated by some combination of attachment to neighborhood schools, anxiety about educational standards, or animosity for African Americans. Sullivan’s belief that it is whites not African Americans impeding integration was shared by most educational park backers, including Kenneth B. Clark, first black president of the American Psychological Association:

There are more flagrant sources of opposition to any effective desegregation of American public schools. White Citizens groups in the South, Parents and Taxpayers groups in the North, and the control of boards of education by whites who identify either overtly or covertly with the more vehement opposition to change are examples of effective resistance. (Clark, 1967, p. 203)

Other members of the educational park movement similarly identify fearful whites as (in Robert A. Dentler’s words) “barriers to Northern school desegregation”:

[As] centers of educational innovation, the park complex could neutralize one of the major arguments against two-way busing, that is, that white children were being sent to inferior schools. (The Ripon Society of Nashville, 1972, p. 29)

Often the emotional climate in the various white communities becomes a major disadvantage of the pupil assignment plan. There can be a substantial white migration elsewhere if the whites feel they are no longer in control of the situation. This is the problem of tilt which is considered to occur when the Negro population reaches 35 to 40%. A tilt situation can undo all segregation plans. (Laing, 1969, p. 5)

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40 As a Republican public policy organization whose mission is to “promote the ideas and principles that have made America great and contributed to the GOP’s success” (“The Ripon Society Mission”), the Ripon Society is among the more interesting groups affiliated with the educational park movement.
[The] suburban child, too, deserves a quality integrated education if he is to be realistically prepared to live in a multiracial world; yet the greatest resistance to integration comes from the suburban areas. (Bair, 1969, p. 274)

What is particularly needed to improve our understanding of the relationship between attitudes and overt resistance to desegregation is an emphasis upon the psychological sources of segregationist feelings and beliefs, rather than—as in the past—upon the attitudes per se. To be able to explain why white parents resist racial change in the schools, it is necessary to know in what ways they experience such change as personally threatening when it involves their own children. (Katz 1967, p. 6)

A forthcoming study of the desegregation issue in New York City describes the opposition coalition as composed of white parents, real estate interests, and school officials, all of whom rallied around the neighborhood school concept. (Gittell, 1967, p. 68)

These passages indicate the degree to which the educational park movement attributed urban educational segregation to white resistance to integration. By no means did the movement see white attitudes as the only barrier to educational integration, but the movement, in explaining why—in Robert Dentler’s words—”little or no integration in public schools is taking place” (Dentler, 1966, p. 55), pointed first to white sentiments, observing, as Irvin Katz explains, that white parents perceive

a very wide range of possible threats in a proposed move to bring Negro and white children together in the same schools when they have been separated previously. For example, anxiety may refer to possible increases in cost and taxes; quality of formal education; physical safety and comfort (fear of aggression, fear for health condition, hazards of transportation); social practices (manners, language, etc.); sexual threats; status threat to parents vis-à-vis their in-group peers; threat to a categorical sense of superiority; and threat to long-run competitive advantages (jobs, housing, politics, etc.). (1967, p. 6)

41 Donald Laing and Medill Bair worked for school districts (Laing as the Buffalo’s Coordinator of Integration, Bair as Superintendent of the Hartford School District), while Irwin Katz and Marilyn Gittell were professors (Katz at the University of Michigan, Gittell at Queen’s College of the City University of New York).
Katz, even more so than Neil V. Sullivan, emphasizes the diversity of fears harbored by white opponents of integration, hinting in doing so at the difficulties the educational park movement faced in trying to build and mobilize white support for desegregation.

Prognostic Framing

“Prognostic framing,” write Benford and Snow, “involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out that plan. In short, it addresses the Leninesque question of what is to be done, as well as the problems of consensus and action mobilization” (2000, p. 616). The name of the educational park movement points to its solution to the problem of de facto educational segregation. But what strategies did the movement employ in building and mobilizing support for educational parks?

To rally people behind its program, the educational park movement had to do two things, first, provide a rationale for why educational parks were the best solution for urban educational segregation (acquire support), second, formulate a strategy leading to construction of educational parks (mobilize support). Because support acquisition necessarily precedes support mobilization, it should be discussed first.

As noted in an earlier chapter, the mid-sixties was a technology-obsessed era in the United States, during which many Americans followed Adlai Stevenson in believing “Science and technology are making the problems of today irrelevant in the long run” (in McDougall, 1985, p. 407). Making their case for educational parks, park backers appealed to Americans’ sense that technology was (to again quote Adlai Stevenson) “a magic wand that gives us what we desire” (in McDougall, 1985, p. 407), presenting the educational park concept as not just an effective but a rational solution to the problem of de facto segregation, arguing that the concept, like the Apollo rocket of McDougall’s description, was a product of “systems analysis. . . applied to ‘down-to-earth’ problems (1985, p. 413). “There is a logic to the educational park concept which spells hope,” Berkeley’s School Master Plan Committee wrote in 1968, continuing: “Through its size, students from diverse backgrounds can meet and work and play together in an environment rich in its varieties of modern media and professional expertise” (BUSD, 1968a, p. 70). “Educational parks,” argued Richard Nixon’s Urban Education Task Force in 1970, “are a logical next step for the areas which have successfully tried an integrated approach on a small scale” (The Emergency School Aid Act of 1970, p. 920). Proponents of educational parks
presented the parks as a logical response to urban school segregation, a reasoned response unshaped by brain-fogging emotions. The ingenuity of the educational park concept, for proponents, was that it openly acknowledged white opposition to desegregation, recognizing that many whites, fearful of desegregation, were asking ‘What’s in it for me?’

Schools unlike any seen before, the educational park movement answered, educational palaces filled with technological marvels and staffed by enthusiastic teachers. Eliciting support for educational parks, the educational park movement continually called attention to the parks’ state-of-the-art features, a strategic choice reflecting the movement’s understanding of the parks as extravagant bribes (what Robert Dentler called “white bait” [1964, p. 22]). If the educational park movement saw educational parks as the best solution to the urgent problem of urban school segregation, the reason relates to the parks offering something brand-new in terms of integration, namely ‘win-win’ integration attractive to everyone.

Tradition-oriented white citizens might be attracted to back education parks, where they oppose neighborhood school pairing, because the park package gleams so handsomely. (Dentler, 1964, p. 22)

The concentration of pupils, teachers and resources, the contention runs, would enable each component of the park to offer richer programs and more services than any individual school could provide, thus attracting white middle-class families who might other exit to the suburbs or to private schools. (Buder, 1966, p. E7)

Education parks. . . promise very substantial improvements in the quality of education for all children. If such a system of schools were built in a metropolitan area, whites who refused to send their children would have to reject better and higher status education in order to reject desegregation. (Cohen, 1967, p. 29)

School consultant Max Wolff, one of the earliest advocates of educational parks in the U.S., thinks they offer the best hope for “making the schools so first-class that a white middle-class parent will send his child to them in spite of all the ‘undesirables’ studying there.” (“The Park Way,” 1966, p. 48).
(Not even a bigot, Wolff suggests, is foolish enough to knowingly send his child to a second-class school.)

Seeing educational parks as white bait, the educational park movement understandably made the bait as attractive as possible. The typical park, the movement insisted, houses cutting-edge technologies operated by high-caliber teachers implementing innovative programs:

Instead of a preponderance of second-rate facilities in many neighborhood schools, the very finest and most modern equipment can be provided in special purpose areas of the educational center. Science laboratories, unattainable in local schools; libraries so often lacking or inadequate in neighborhood schools; language laboratories with extensive equipment can all be made available even to the beginning pupils. (Wolff, 1964, p. 46)

The auditorium will provide acoustically excellent facilities for music programs of all kinds. The little theatre will provide a setting for stage presentations and for more intimate audience situations with instrumentalists and vocalists. Moreover, the little-theatre will provide a setting for community dramatic groups. The communications center will provide not only access to taped lessons and instructional material, but access to its studio facility for community groups interested in developing their own programs of a dramatic or instructional nature. The possibility of linking home TV sets to the Education Park’s circuits will be explored. The competitive pool, gymnasium, field house and outdoor athletic fields should insure a great variety of constructive leisure time activity. (McCarthy, 1966, p. 4)42

Superior libraries could be maintained, with strong centralized and decentralized collections of books, tapes, discs, films, and a rich combination of services for every unit in the park. Such an institution could operate its own closed circuit television system more effectively, and with lower cable costs than a community-wide system, and with greater attention to the individual teacher’s requirements. A central bank of films and tapes could be available for transmission to any classroom, and the whole system controlled by a dialing mechanism that would enable every teacher to “order” at any time whatever item he wished his class to see. (Fischer, 1968, p. 12)

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42 Joseph F.X. McCarthy was a professor of education at Fordham University.
The point is clear. Because so modern and efficient, educational parks offer students new and expensive technologies and programs, making an educational park, in Bayard Rustin’s words, “a superior thing” (Rustin, 1964). Accepting that educational parks were in fact “white bait,” the bait on offer was enticing indeed. But even given possible economies of scale (resulting from consolidation of facilities), who was going to pay for all the “expensive, specialized equipment and facilities” (Besvinick, 1968, p. 12) found in an educational park?

The second stage of prognostic framing, following articulation of a proposed solution, is formation of “a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out that plan” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 616). If, as Dominique Clément argues (2013, p. 1), educating the public is part of any social movement’s modus operandi, the educational park movement placed public outreach at the center of its plan of attack. In brief, a baited trap is useless if animals can’t see or smell it, so educational park advocates made sure their visions of pedagogical pleasure-domes circulated in the mass media. “The concept of educational parks is relatively new in the field of education,” noted the Cleveland Plain Dealer in a story quoting Max Wolff. “Its advocates, like Dr. Wolff, say it transcends race mixing and stopgap measures to provide, for both whites and nonwhites, the best in educational advantages in a setting of complete interchange, culturally and socially” (Melnick, 1964, p. A6) “The educational advantages would be felt in many ways, exponents of the parks say,” reported the New York Times (in another article featuring Max Wolff). “There would be closer relations and administrative cohesion between the schools and a wide range of academic programs and special services that no one school could provide” (Buder, 1965, p. E9).

“The common idea in all educational parks is that they serve a larger number of students than the traditional neighborhood schools,” observed Newsweek in a 1966 report (again Max Wolff appears). “This means schools can be outfitted with specialized new equipment too expensive for smaller schools to buy” (“The Park Way,” 1966, p. 48). As these examples hint, educational park activists (Max Wolff in particular) were not shy about plugging the parks in the mass media, the goals being (1) to gain new members for the educational park movement, and (2) to encourage the movement’s existing members.

A key reason why the educational park movement worked to develop a broad and motivated support base was that such a base could exert significant pressure on state and federal departments of education, a priority for the movement given no city or school district could pay for a park on its own. The educational park movement saw federal funds as especially important,
first because many state departments of educational opposed desegregation, second because the federal government was seen as having deep and open pockets.

The park would allow the sharing of physical facilities on a rational basis, provide a wider range of special services—academic, remedial, counseling—than any single school, provide the maximum opportunity for effective decentralization, allow flexible use of teacher skills, and permit greater opportunity for creative innovation such as closed-circuit television, team teaching, language laboratories and automated equipment. There could also be fiscal gains over and above those resulting from improvements in operational efficiency, for much of the cost of the parks could be paid for by the Federal Government under Title 1 of the Urban Renewal Act of 1949. (Katz, 1967, p. 15)

Obtaining the necessary cooperation to build a metropolitan park will not be easy but the financial problems will be equally severe. A park accommodating 16,000 pupils can be expected to cost in the neighborhood of $50 million. The financial pressures on cities and suburban districts make it clear that Federal support on a very large scale will be required if school parks are to be built. (Fischer, 1968, p. 17)

Educational parks are expensive to build. But the federal government is on the verge of major expenditures for school construction. It will come at the end of Vietnam if not sooner. (Pettigrew, 1967, p. 32)43

To prove economically feasible, educational parks in the largest cities would have to be financed as part of a federal urban redevelopment program. (Dentler & Elsbery, 1967, p. 314)

We talk these days of educational parks, serving large areas of a city, to meet problems of de facto segregation. . . The suggestion that the federal government should help with the

43 Thomas Pettigrew, a professor of psychology at Harvard, had an expansive view of ‘white bait’ where cities rather than white families were targeted. Pettigrew, a 1968 article reports, “said the federal government, which would have to finance the ‘educational parks,’ could hold financing of the schools as a ‘bribe’ to encourage participation in the schools by suburban and city school systems” (“Central City School,” 1968, p. A11).
land and with the money to build these new campuses or to change existing campuses is altogether reasonable. (Kerr, 1991, p. 311)

The federal and state legislative enactments should encourage the development of integrated educational parks linked to research and development programs. (Wilson et al, 1969, p. 397)

The Ripon Society considers the educational park to be the most promising innovation yet developed for encouraging integration, because it provides an array of educational facilities in a central area with adequate transportation. Consequently, we propose in another part of this paper the construction of a number of federally financed pilot parks over the next few years. (McDonald et al, 1968, p. 34)

The educational park is likely to be the next great structure for education. Funds should come from the federal government, which must move from supporting the fringes of education to supporting the basics—the teachers and the facilities with which they work. (King, 1968, p. 206)

The park concept would involve a large commitment from the total resources of the region to be served, in addition to a substantial commitment of State and Federal resources. (Urban Education Task Force, 1970, p. 926)

Federal funds are available not only to study educational park possibilities but also for actual construction. Federal urban renewal funds can also be obtained for school construction. (Wolff, 1967b, p. 29)

Together these passages underscore the extent to which the educational park movement looked to the federal government for help in planning (and hopefully building) educational parks. This reliance on federal funds is tremendously important given that the movement’s opponents framed educational parks as (to quote one opponent) “Trojan horse[s] for rampant federal coercion” (113 Cong. Rec. 7811 1967). Discussing the interplay between a social movement and its allies and
opponents, specifically the way many solutions can be proposed for the same problem, Benford and Snow write:

prognostic framing takes place within a multi-organizational field. . . consisting of various SMOs [social movement organizations] constituting a movement industry, their opponents, targets of influence, media, and bystanders. Thus it is not surprising that an SMO’s prognostic framing activity typically includes refutations of the logic or efficacy of solutions advocated by opponents as well as a rationale for its own remedies. The former has been referred to as “counterframing”. . . The important point is that opposing framing activity can affect a movement’s framings, on the one hand, by putting movement activists on the defensive, at least temporarily, and, on the other hand, by frequently forcing it to develop and elaborate prognoses more clearly than otherwise might have been the case. (2000, p. 617)

Opponents of educational parks focused their attacks on the educational park movement’s calls for government funding of parks, characterizing the calls as duplicitous requests for the federal government to involve itself in all aspects of public education: personnel, curriculum, design and location of schools, etc. Even with these attacks underway and doing damage, the educational park movement repeated its calls for government funding, further arming opponents. Prognostic framing, Benford and Snow argue, is not just about formulating a strategy, but also about selling that strategy, i.e. explaining why it’s the best (or only) means of achieving a goal. In arguing that educational parks could only be built with federal funding, the educational park movement made a strategic error, ignoring other possible funding sources while giving its opponents in Congress veto power over educational park planning and construction. This error will be discussed in more detail below.

Motivational Framing

The motivational dimension of framing, writes Stephen Vallochi, “tells us why we should care and be moved to act” (2010, p. 25). In Benford and Snow’s words, “Motivational framing provides a ‘call to arms’ or rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” (2000, p. 617). To some extent motivational framing overlaps with diagnostic framing, for identification of a problem is itself a call to arms, compelling people to choose between ignoring and addressing the problem. In the case of the
educational park movement, overlap between diagnostic and motivational framing is extensive, for, as noted, the movement framed urban educational segregation as urgently, even explosively, problematic (“the most urgent problem of our cities,” in Leonard Buder’s words [1965, p. E9]), a framing designed to spark action. That said, the educational park movement engaged in some framing that was strictly motivational. The years 1964-68 saw African American uprisings in fourteen U.S. cities, seven of which became centers of educational park activism, suggesting that it was in cities where African Americans felt particularly isolated that the educational park movement had the easiest time motivating supporters. As shown by its centers of activity, the educational park movement was clearly a response to an ongoing urban racial crisis, its fervency reflecting members’ belief that educational parks were necessary to prevent racial warfare in the United States. The mood of the time is captured in a 1966 speech by Harold Howe II:

A revolution is brewing under our feet, and it is largely up to the schools to determine whether the energies of that revolution can be converted into a new and vigorous source of American progress, or whether their explosion will rip this Nation into two societies. We simply cannot wait until dramatic action becomes safe, for at this point it is much less dangerous to make a mistake than to do nothing. (Howe, 1966b, p. 6)

Perceiving the times as revolutionary, Howe renounces gradualism (“a mindless confidence that some morning, some year, a suddenly transformed electorate will spontaneously and joyously decide that this is the day to integrate America” [p. 3]), embracing radical (“we must run the risk of being invited to resign” [p. 14]) measures such as bussing, supplementary centers, and educational parks. Of these measures, Howe devotes the most attention to educational parks:

The St. Paul school system is considering a plan to combine a rapid-transit system with a cluster of four or five 300-acre educational parks that would bring youngsters from the ghetto, from other city schools, and from parochial and suburban schools into central locations for classes ranging from nursery school through junior college. Other cities looking seriously at the possibility of similar educational parks include East Orange, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and New York City. (1966b, p. 11)

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44 New York; Chicago; Philadelphia; Rochester; Buffalo; Baltimore; Washington D.C.
45 Delivered at a conference of school administrators in New York City.
46 Supplementary centers, Howe writes, “bring together young people from different sides of the tracks for a common denominator of learning” (1966b, p. 8).
While admitting that educational parks were not a “perfect instrument” (p. 12) for integrating schools, Howe argues that “We must simply bore ahead with the tools we have, and it won’t be pleasant, and it won’t be quiet, and it would be nicer if someone else would share the work” (p. 12). For Howe, as for other educational park backers, the value of educational parks sprung in large measure from their being educational, education being, in Howe and other’s view, the particular area in American life where racial progress was most possible:

There is no point in waiting for real estate salesmen to get the message from on high and ease our job by selling homes to anyone who wants them. There is no point in our waiting for American corporations to start hiring Negro men as readily as they do light-skinned, well-dressed Negro women. Neither American home salesmen nor American personnel managers have ever insisted that they have a major responsibility for building American democracy. They have never pretended to do anything but their jobs. American schoolmen, however, have quite properly taken a large share of the credit for establishing national unity and freedom of opportunity. (Howe, 1966b, p. 13)

The educational park movement’s call to arms was motivational in two respects, conveying both a warning that educational segregation was destroying the United States, and an affirmation that educators needed to act to avert the destruction. Only schools, the movement argued, could reach young people in time:

The young northern Negro of today’s city lives in a black society. . . . It is this young Negro who must be convinced that the United States is his home, not his prison, and that it is a country worth fighting for, not a cage to be fought out of. It may already be too late to change his mind. But it is not too late to provide his younger brothers and sisters with a healthier belief, nor too late to protect white children from the destructive stereotypes that most white adults inherited from their own segregated education. (Howe, 1966b, p. 7)

Other educational park activists shared Howe’s view that schools were the front-lines in a life-or-death struggle for America’s cities. Here, for instance, David Lewis, an educational consultant, credited education with breaking down figurative walls surrounding inner cities:

Much needs to be done, and done urgently. The ghettos in our major cities must be broken. The only way of doing this—and we have to be categorical about it—is by opening up options. For the basic definition of the ghetto is circumscription; and circumscription is clearly made every day more intolerable by the range of modern
communication systems. This is a time of rapidly developing international cultures; and education is intensifying an utterly contradictory situation. The content of education and the development of community technologies which will bring the finest minds and materials to the most deprived child, are in open and intolerable conflict with socioeconomic and locational circumscription. (Lewis, 1967, p. 564)

Also stressing the importance of schools in healing racial wounds is sociologist Robert A. Dentler, writing in the aftermath of riots in Chicago and Cleveland warned:

We are presently in the eye of a Northern storm of community conflict. The issue has been joined; it has become a one-sided question with but one set of social facts, all of which indicate that Negro racial segregation in schools is bad, and most that white segregation is bad, too. It has become a matter which must be dealt with if racial and cultural cleavages are to be resolved and if social inclusiveness within cultural pluralism is to be achieved. (Dentler, 1966, p. 46)

While all these quotes speak to the educational park movement’s belief that racial conflict was fragmenting the United States, and that educators had a key role to play in ending such conflict, another passage, from a letter written the same year by a BUSD official on an educational park fact-finding mission, sounds an even louder call to arms: “And so home and to work, with the realization that Berkeley is in the enviable position of moving before it’s too late. But time is short and planned action should begin now” (Freudenthal, 1966b).

In the context of social movement activism, development of a theoretical framework—whether diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational—is, Stephen Vallochi argues, “carried out either consciously or unconsciously utilizing some notion of ‘resonance,’ that is, utilizing ideas, cultural values or moral concerns that people can relate to and hopefully be moved by. Even as it resonates with aspects of the dominant culture, however, it pushes up against that culture and encourages us to challenge that culture in significant ways” (2010, p. 13). Educational park activists, in framing their project, envisioned it as a last-gasp effort to save America from itself. “The majority of American whites display no likelihood of becoming enthusiastic about school desegregation and the changes it demands in the immediate future,” Harold Howe conceded in his 1966 speech, adding: “it is futile to expect the years to erode those passions that today make the processes of desegregation unpopular” (Howe, 1966b, p. 3). Championed by people without illusions about the persistence of bigotry, the educational park was—as a theoretical construct—
an expression of hard-headed realism. As Leonard Buder wrote in the *New York Times*, “Since none of the other devices have provided satisfactory answers to big-city school integration, it now appears certain that educational parks will move into the forefront of civil rights strategy and educational experimentation” (1966, E7).
CHAPTER SIX: OPPOSITION TO EDUCATIONAL PARKS, 1966-67

When Harold Howe II died in 2002, his *New York Times* obituary remembered him in two ways, as a “Fighter Against Segregated Schools” (the obituary’s title), and as “chief federal educator in the Johnson administration [who] led the growing federal involvement in public schools” (“Harold Howe II”). The two identities, the *Times* noted, were interconnected: “[As Commissioner of Education], he started by setting minimum integration goals that school districts had to meet to qualify for some of the billions of dollars the [Civil Rights Act] made available” (“Harold Howe II”). For anyone hoping to understand the mid-sixties debate about educational parks, Harold Howe II is a central figure, not because he was the loudest or most enthusiastic backer of educational parks, but because he was the most powerful, and so the most threatening to park opponents.

Howe’s pivotal role in the educational park debate arrived almost by accident. On May 13, 1966, Howe gave a speech (“The City is a Teacher”) at the City Club of Chicago’s annual assembly, touching in a somewhat hammy tone (“The mingled majesty and mystery to be found in a view of the East River, of Capitol Hill, of Michigan Avenue or the Golden Gate remind us that despite the normal quotient of tedium and trial in each of our lives, life in an urban setting can be exciting” [1966a, p. 1]) on a range of topics including, most centrally, the link between failing neighborhood schools and city-wide blight. “I have come... to discuss the educational aspects of the poverty that flourishes in the inner city; to point out that no matter where you sit in the city’s classroom, you pay the tuition for the kind of education it dispenses” (1966a, p. 1).

Near the end of his speech, Howe mentioned educational parks, identifying them as possible replacements for struggling inner city schools:

We have recently been considering financial support for a comprehensive study of a system of educational parks to be established within the inner city. We visualize each of these centralized school complexes as educational centers that would provide classes ranging from pre-kindergarten through junior college. And we are particularly interested in finding one or two great American cities that are adventurous enough to join us in planning the educational park of the future. These entities will house 20,000 or more pupils, and will cut across all geographic, economic, and social boundaries to draw students. While such a park would deny the neighborhood school, it would express the
vitality, the imaginations and the cultural mix that every vigorous city exemplifies. (1966a, p. 11).

It is important to note that Howe’s aspirations for inner cities reach far beyond educational parks (“the ghetto school needs. . .such services as counseling and guidance; small classes; remedial instruction; the latest teaching methods and equipment” [1966a, p. 9]), meaning that although Howe’s speech promoted educational parks, the speech was in no way about educational parks—which is why responses to the speech were so surprising.

Opposition Emerges
The first response arrived June 18, 1966, just over a month later, in a syndicated column by Jenkin Lloyd Jones. Characterized as “moderately conservative” in a 2004 Washington Post obituary (“Jenkin Lloyd Jones”), Jones was in the mid-sixties a featured columnist in over 100 newspapers, making his an important voice in national conversations. “Last month, U.S. Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II made a little-noticed speech to the City Club of Chicago which deserves a lot of attention,” Jones’s column began, continuing:

For this powerful federal official, with billions of dollars at his command, is apparently dedicated to the destruction of the neighborhood schools and the bussing of children long distances from their homes.

[. . . ]
“The educational park of the future.” The use of government funds “if I have my way,” not merely to plan but to construct super-schools to which even pre-kindergarteners will be transported to provide a “cultural mix.” This, remember, is the U.S. commissioner of education speaking. When federal aid to education was first proposed doubters expressed the fear that this would open the way for federal direction of America’s public education. The proponents vigorously denied this. All that was wanted, they swore, was to enlist the federal government helping in improving schools that would still be under “local control.” (Jones, 1966, p. 4 )

Together, Harold Howe’s May 13 speech and Jenkin Lloyd Jones’s June 18 column set the terms for future debate over educational parks. On one side, Howe and other proponents of educational parks argued that segregated schools were such a serious problem that the federal government had to be part of the solution. On the opposing side Jones and other enemies of educational parks
claimed segregated schools were much less problematic than federal involvement in education.

Does Jones’s column accurately describe Howe’s views on desegregation and educational parks? Not entirely. For instance, while Jones’s column mentions bussing, Howe’s speech does not.

That said, Howe’s speech does take aim at neighborhoods schools, presenting them as inherently unequal, if only because a school’s resources are a reflection of its neighborhood, and “housing [reflects] income, and income [reflects] employment” (Howe, 1966a, p. 3). Moreover, as Jones notes, Howe’s May 13 speech not only admits that educational parks “deny the neighborhood school” (p. 11), but boasts that his department hopes to fund—in “one or two great American cities” (p. 11)—plans for future educational parks.

Denouncing Howe’s May 13 speech, Jenkin Lloyd Jones makes a third claim, the most important of all, one that later opponents of educational parks (likely following Jones) repeat, namely that Howe had plans to “direct” (p. 4) America’s public schools by funding only those school districts implementing desegregation.

Now, what is Howe up to? He would take money from all the taxpayers living in all school districts and use part of it for special construction bonuses for cities that adopted his plan. Such a special bonus, conferred upon the few made up of funds contributed by the many, is the same as a penalty against the many. This, then would be a form of punishment levied against all school districts that didn’t fall in with Commissioner Howe’s scheme. (p. 4)

In one sense, Jones describes Howe’s plan accurately: money spent in one city is not available for other cities. But is (as Jones claims later in his column) a decision to direct federal funds to one city rather than another an example of “federal direction of America’s public education” (p. 4)? This question is important because later opponents of educational parks take Jenkin Lloyd Jones’s lead in presenting federal funding preferences as unconstitutional “attempts to rush in where the Supreme Court feared to tread” (p. 4).

Jones’s column was the opening salvo in a four-month-long campaign to delegitimize the educational park concept, a campaign waged by a loose alliance of conservative journalists and right-wing politicians who tended to repeat the three claims advanced by Jones: that educational parks were meant to replace neighborhood schools; that educational parks would be paid for by the federal government; and that federal funding of educational parks was aimed at supplanting “local control” (p. 4) of public education.
The first to adopt Jenkin Lloyd Jones’s lines of attack was Representative Jack Edwards, Republican from Alabama. Speaking in the House on June 22, Edwards, after entering Jones June 18 column (which he called a “significant piece” [112 Cong. Rec. 3330 1966]) into the Congressional Record, lashed out at the department of education and its commissioner, Harold Howe II:

The Office of Education has expanded its control and its personnel and expenditures by huge proportions over the past few years. The question can justifiably be asked today whether this growth is accompanied by a greater concern on the part of the Office of Education for education matters or for social issues. The destruction of local school systems seems to be the aim of the U.S. Commissioner of Education. The neighborhood school system which has been the underlying factor in the great growth and prosperity of this Nation is about to go down the drain as we head toward the superschool system envisioned by the Commissioner of Education. Unfortunately, this is the price of Federal help. (112 Cong. Rec. 3330 1966)

The “superschools” Edwards mentions are, of course, educational parks, and Edwards clearly takes his cues from Jenkin Lloyd Jones in presenting them as undesirable replacements for neighborhood schools.

Four days later, on June 26, the Chicago Tribune ran an editorial, “End Neighborhood Schools?” chiding Representative Roman Pucinski (D. Illinois) for inserting, “with approval” Howe’s City Club speech into the Congressional Record. “The commissioner’s scheme, of course, would require the transportation of pupils for long distances from their homes to the educational parks. He offers to provide funds for planning such ventures in spite of the fact that Congress has specifically expressed disapproval of them” (“End Neighborhood Schools?” 1966, p. 22). Quoting the 1964 Civil Rights Act (specifically the section prohibiting “transportation of pupils from one school to another or one school district to another” to achieve racial balance [“End Neighborhood Schools?” 1966, p. 22]), the editorial portrays Howe as unconcerned with the illegality of his plans: “These provisions apparently mean nothing to Commissioner Howe and his associates in Washington. Nor is he concerned about the promises that federal aid to education would not mean federal direction of the schools. He is frankly offering federal tax

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47 Elected to Congress in 1964 on Barry Goldwater’s coattails.
funds to cities willing to abolish the neighborhood school and adopt school systems designed in Washington” (“End Neighborhood Schools?” 1966, p. 22).

At this point it’s worth asking again if Howe’s intentions are being misrepresented. Was Howe offering federal funds to cities willing to construct an educational park? Indeed, he was. Was he doing so in hopes of abolishing neighborhood schools? Again, yes. Was he promoting educational parks in hopes of seizing control of public education? Not really, although—again—money spent in one city is available to other cities. There’s no doubting Howe’s desire to steer funds to cities experimenting with educational parks. Whether or not this constitutes “directing” of schools is less clear.

The day after the Chicago Tribune editorial, the Spartanburg Herald (South Carolina) published an even more caustic editorial, making the same points (e.g. “They aim to destroy the American concept of education: to eliminate the neighborhood school, with its closeness to the individual and the family, and to substitute in its place a mass production, centralized system under the direct thumb of the federal government” (“No Strings Attached,” 1966, p. 4), but going further in raising alarm about the consequences of federal involvement in education:

Remember the years when there was a constant appeal for “federal aid to education”? The advocates, not only in Washington but in our own midst, urged that we should get the money where we can and educate the child where he is. They scoffed at the skeptics who foresaw federal control—federal dictation of standards, procedures and curricula, Oh, no, they said, federal aid does not mean federal control. Evidence is now growing that the dispensers of this federal aid indeed do have something other than “control” in mind.

[. . .]

Don’t worry, though. Commissioner Howe didn’t even hint at federal indoctrination through all manner of curricula control, faculty selection, textbook manipulation.

There are “no strings attached,” remember. (p. 4).

Publication of the Spartanburg Herald editorial was a key event in the debate over educational parks, for the editorial—unlike previous expressions of animosity towards Harold Howe and the educational park concept—attacks Howe through evocation of a Stalinesque strawman, claiming Howe was planning to use educational parks to seize complete control over public education: “curricula control, faculty selection, textbook manipulation.” Similar portraits depicting Harold
Howe as a dictator using educational parks to brainwash students turn up repeatedly in arguments against educational parks.

On August 2, for example, in a column entitled “‘Czar’ says integration must be total,” James J. Kilpatrick, an unapologetic segregationist,\(^4\) presents Howe (“the Yankee most hated in the South” [Kilpatrick, 1966, p. 4]) as a social engineer bribing some schools while blackmailing others, all the while using federal funds to integrate groups who neither wanted or needed to be together: “The one theme that runs through all his public statements,” Kilpatrick writes of Howe, “is that the leverage of federal aid must be exerted to achieve racial and economic balance in the schools” (p. 4). While Howe might not have challenged this claim—might even have worn it as a badge of honour—he would have disputed another assertion, namely that he valued integration not as a means of helping impoverished African-Americans, but as a way to punish affluent whites. Here is Kilpatrick:

Howe’s anger is directed at those “who live in a world of wall-to-wall carpeting, pleasant back yards, and summers at camp.” Such affluent families “forget that their neighbors in the central city have children who play in alleys and live six to a room.” By the judicious use of federal funds, the commissioner will compel them to remember. His thought is to contrive “new boundary lines” that ignore county and city limits. He would bring ghetto children to the suburbs and suburban children to the ghetto. Or he would develop “educational parks” of perhaps 20,000 students, where a proper “cultural mix” could be imposed. (p. 4).

If Kilpatrick is fearful of the educational park concept, the reason relates to his seeing the parks as yet-another Northern attempt to force desegregation on the South. (Kilpatrick writes that prior to Howe, Robert Kennedy was “the Yankee most hated in the South” (p. 4).) ‘Federalism,’ for Kilpatrick, is synonymous with ‘oppression,’ not just because the term connotes usurpation of local control, but also because in his view the federal government has particular animus for the South. “[Howe] has told Southern school administrators in coldly unequivocal terms what he expects of them. They will comply with his harsh and exacting ‘guidelines’ for school desegregation” (Kilpatrick, 1966, p. 4).

On August 7, five days after Kilpatrick’s piece appeared, Russell Kirk weighed in on the topic of educational parks. In a long article that presented Ronald Reagan’s recent victory in the

\(^4\) A recent biography of Kilpatrick is entitled *James J. Kilpatrick: Salesman for Segregation* (Hustwit, 2013).
1966 California gubernatorial election as evidence of a conservative revival in the United States, Kirk, having discerned in Americans a wariness of educational parks, identified the wariness as one more sign that conservatism was in ascendance:

In the nation, as in California, the pressure is for governmental retrenchment. . . Already disturbed by fumbling attempts of the Federal educational bureaucracy to require speedier integration—or remedying of racial imbalance—in Northern cities as well as in the South, the public takes a dim view of projects like that of Harold Howe 2d, United States Commissioner of Education, for “educational parks” of 20,000 students apiece, where the schools may be utilized for grandiose sociological experiments. (Kirk, 1966, p. 194)

Typical of states’ rights opponents of educational parks, Kirk associates the parks with a muddle-headed “Federal educational bureaucracy” (1966, p. 194) led by an out-of-touch Harold Howe. Kirk, however, sounds a new theme in describing educational parks as venues for “grandiose sociological experiments,” shorthand for high-minded attempts to reconstruct society. And indeed, later in his piece Kirk approvingly cites Malcolm Muggeridge’s description of liberalism as “the great destructive force of our time, much more so than Communism, Fascism, Nazism, or any of the lunatic creeds which make such immediate havoc” (in Kirk, 1966, p. 194). For Russell Kirk, as for many critics of educational parks, the most frightening aspect of the parks was their potentially being used to propagate beliefs popular with federal bureaucrats, beliefs Kirk maligns as “liberal breast-beating, sermonizing, and promises of the secular glory to come. . . utopian and salvational politics” (1966, p. 196). Following Kirk’s article we see development of the idea that educational parks will allow the federal government to disseminate a curriculum imbued with “liberal moralizing” (Kirk, 1966, p. 194).

On August 31, the battle over educational parks moved to the pages of the Washington Evening Star, where an editorial (“Mr. Howe’s Adventure”) embraced Kirk’s characterization of the parks as a misguided Harold Howe experiment:

In the minds of Howe and others, the educational parks are seen as a means of establishing racial and economic “balance,” of moving the children of low-income families, during their classroom hours, out of the ghetto. In all candor, however, what advantage, educational or otherwise, could accrue to the deprived child, desperately in need of personal attention, who became only one of 20,000 on a single campus?
Education is the process of doing something with an individual child, in the context of the teacher pupil relationship. It is not the process of dealing with great masses of children. From the viewpoint of sound education, the theory is not supported by a single demonstrable justification. (in 112 Cong. Rec. 21668 1966)

While repeating many of Kirk’s claims, this piece (which sums up the educational park concept as a “will-o’-the-wisp” [112 Cong. Rec. 21669 1966]) also sounds a theme increasingly heard in arguments against educational parks, that they are communistic in their disregard for individuals. This theme sounds in both a major and a minor key, the major key characterizing educational parks as monstrously large, the minor key construing them as hives of collectivist thought (the Spartanburg Herald hints at this line of attack when describing the educational park model as a “mass production, centralized system” (“No Strings Attached,” 1966, p. 4).

Beyond its content, the Washington Evening Star editorial is important because it inspires two September 1 statements in the House of Representatives, one by Joseph D. Waggoner of Louisiana (“Mr. Speaker, the Washington Star carried an excellent editorial in yesterday’s edition, headed ‘Mr. Howe’s Adventure,’ which in a few brief paragraphs completely demolished the latest assininity of the Office of Education” [112 Cong. Rec. 21668 1966]), the other by W.J. Bryan Dorn of South Carolina (“Mr. Howe’s guidelines and dictatorial orders are a blueprint for taking over our education system—‘lock stock and barrel’—by the Federal Government. . . Mr. Speaker, the following editorial appeared in the Evening Star on August 31, here in the Nation’s Capital. I commend it to the attention of those here in Washington who would arbitrarily run rough-shod over our dedicated local school officials” [112 Cong. Rec. 4648, 1966]).

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49 The editorial was read into the Congressional Record by Joseph Waggoner (D. Louisiana) who prefaced his reading with the comment “I think it would be appropriate to refer to Commissioner Howe’s ‘educational parks’ folly as his LSD experiment: the latest school debacle” (112 Cong. Rec. 21668, 1966).

50 This line of attack reached a crescendo in a 1970 House speech by Representative John Rarick (R.) of Louisiana: “The success of communism in perpetuating its system for tomorrow is by indoctrination of young people today which requires state full control over youth including separation from their parents. . .The individuals presently at the helm of the national education movement continually issue directives in order to diminish parental guidance and interference. More and more emphasis is placed on complete separation of the child from his home and parents, sought to be justified as in the best interest of the state. One type of school program which takes children to distant locations is the education park. There is such a plan for the Syracuse area. There is also one for the Buffalo area, called ‘Project 1990’, headed by Dr. Lamatle of SUNYAB. Education parks are large schools where thousands of children would be concentrated, for long periods of time, totally isolated from the community and family” (115 Cong. Rec. 39527, 1970).
Opposition Expands

The debate over educational parks heated up considerably on September 9, when the Washington Post published an “Inside Report” by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, called simply “Education Bombshell.” Reminiscent of the opening lines of a paperback thriller, the report begins: “In the highest reaches of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, planners have secretly put together an education bill for 1967 that would be certain to whip the white backlash into a frenzy” (1966, p. A23). This cloak-and-dagger opening hints at what’s to come, which purports to be an exposé of a Johnson administration plan to tie not just aid for education but other forms of federal aid as well to a city’s willingness to desegregate schools:

Even more interesting is a confidential suggestion by the task force that school grants be made a part of the metropolitan planning section of President Johnson’s “demonstration cities” bill now pending in Congress. This section would provide a 20 per cent boost in many varieties of Federal grants—highways and airports, for example—for cities that set up a metro planning agency meeting Federal specifications. (p. A23)

However arcane Evans’s and Novak’s “Inside Report” might be—with its discussions of “metro planning agencies” and “policy planning task forces”—the report speaks to a right-wing belief that the federal government was injecting integrationist views into policy areas where they didn’t belong, such as infrastructure planning:

This leads to the possibility that if a school district did not conform to Federal standards on racial balance, the metropolitan area could lose not only the extra school grants but the 20 per cent extra money for all other varieties. Moreover, the allocation of the extra school money for the integrated districts would be made not by the state Departments of Education but by the Commissioner of Education in Washington. And Howe has left no doubt about how he feels on this score. In sharp contrast to his predecessor as Commissioner, Francis Keppel, Howe has shown no hesitancy to involve Uncle Sam directly in the sensitive problem of de facto segregation. (p. A23)

Evans and Novak’s “education bombshell” neither mentions nor alludes to educational parks, referring only to “such politically explosive integration devices as school bussing” (p. A23). Yet educational parks quickly became the focus of controversy surrounding Johnson administration educational (and metropolitan) policies, not because opponents of educational parks arbitrarily
dragged them into the controversy, but because educational parks were in fact central to Harold Howe’s desegregation planning.

On September 14, Representative Paul A. Fino of New York, who soon emerged as Howe’s fiercest critic in Congress, held a press conference where he disclosed “a document that can only be described as ‘radical,’ an incredible document” (112 Cong. Rec. 22755 1966). The document in question was the “education bombshell” of Evans and Novak’s September 9 report, a Department of Education memorandum Fino described as “detailing the administration’s $6 billion ‘Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1967’” (112 Cong. Rec. 22755 1966). “The proposed legislation,” Fino continued, “would set up a multibillion dollar effort to force racial balance in the nation’s schools,” force being applied through such techniques as “construction of schools to serve mixed communities, redrawing school district lines, school busing programs, pupil exchanges between suburbs and slums, revision of textbooks to stress the contribution of minority groups, and so forth” (112 Cong. Rec. 22755 1966). What Fino here calls “schools to serve mixed communities” are actually educational parks. “Let me read to you how the planners condemn themselves out of their own mouths,” Fino says before quoting the memorandum:

Supplementary grants providing an additional 20% of the project cost would be made to projects which fit into metropolitan area plans. This increased federal share would provide an incentive for joint school planning in metropolitan areas. . . If enacted into law, that legislation could simply be amended to include school construction projects assisted under this proposed program in the definition of an eligible ‘metropolitan development project’ in the same manner as libraries assisted under the Library Services and Construction Act and hospitals assisted under the Public Health Service Act are covered in the pending legislation. The location and scope of educational parks should be an important component of any comprehensive metropolitan area-wide planning. (112 Cong. Rec. 22755 1966)

Fino is clearly reading the document described by Evans and Novak, and assuming Fino is reading the document truthfully (not a given, but probably true), the Johnson administration was sufficiently committed to the educational park concept to offer any city willing to build an educational park a sizable boost in its “metropolitan area-wide” planning grant. Also revealed as Fino reads the document is that Evans and Novak were right to claim Howe and the Department

51 The draft document was never published.
of Education had plans to wrestle funding decisions from the states. In Fino’s words: “Grants would be made by the Commissioner of Education (not allocated by State) to meet the extra costs of constructing new schools, including special education centers and educational parks and complexes located on the borders of ghettos under plans insuring interracial attendance of students” (112 Cong. Rec. 22754 1966). The proposed legislation, Fino adds, is “a Trojan Horse for rampant federal coercion . . . the most radical legislation ever drawn up in these United States” (112 Cong. Rec. 22755 1966). Denouncing the legislation, Fino, in a manner familiar from other conservative critiques of educational parks, presented it as a left-wing attempt at social reconstruction:

The immediate importance of the proposed 1967 legislation is that it lets the cat out of the bag concerning the Administration’s plans to use the “metropolitan planning” title of this year’s omnibus housing bill as a weapon to reshape both housing and education across the nation.

[. . .]

This is the “Great Society” in action. This is why the President wants a Democratic Congress. (112 Cong. Rec. 22755 1966)

Paul Fino doesn’t mention educational parks during his September 14 press conference. That said, following his presentation (“two bombshells,” Fino calls it [112 Cong Rec. 22755 1966], one-upping Evans and Novak), the educational park concept comes to symbolize, at least in the minds of conservatives, federal involvement in education. “[O]ne might expect to see Virginia education authorities instructed to prepare a plan of integration with the District [of Columbia], even if this should require central parks and elaborate bussing,” says Representative William M. Tuck, discussing the Equal Educational Opportunities Act’s potential impact on his own state, adding: “U.S. Education Commissioner Harold Howe doubtless will be there with his hand on the federal pipeline” (112 Cong. Rec. 4899 1966). “Rep. John. B. Anderson (R. Ill.) dragged out what he called a ‘draft bill’ that had reached the desk of Health, Education and Welfare Secretary John W. Gardner,” the Washington Post reported in a front-page story on October 1. “Anderson said it would provide federal funds for educational parks and metropolitan school planning that
would involve school busing” (Grant, 1966, p. A1). On October 5, Anderson, speaking in the House, returned to the topic of educational parks: “[Commissioner Howe] is going to dangle the carrot of the Federal grant before a school board that is financially hard pressed to help them make up their mind to adopt his philosophy for producing an egalitarian, homogenized society. How is he going to do it? I do not know. Perhaps he is going to set up giant educational parks, where 20,000 students will go to school from all over a metropolitan-wide district” (112 Cong. Rec. 25343, 1966). “The proposed bill, coupled with slight alterations in the Demonstration Cities program,” chided Representative John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, “could be used to virtually compel metropolitan areas that received federal funds to construct educational parks” (112 Cong. Rec. 25045, 1966). Particularly indicative of Republican views at this time are remarks made on October 6, by Donald Rumsfeld, then an Illinois congressman, who told the House:

> The Office of Education and the Administration appear to be moving from this position of an absence of compulsion toward compulsory integration. If we are to use words like “racial imbalance” then we must develop and formulate and say what is “racial imbalance” and does it hold for, simply, a single school district, or a larger political subdivision, such as a county, or a city, or a State—or the entire country. And who is to set these formulas? And to accomplish the goal of these formulas, namely, compulsory integration, one would have to almost go to the extent of establishing large educational parks, where everybody, from all over, comes and receives his education simply to achieve the homogenizing effect of large groups. (Rumsfeld, 1966)

Also speaking in Congress on October 6, and also characterizing educational parks as vehicles for federal intrusion into education, were Representative Glenn Andrews (R.) of Alabama, Senator Paul Fannin (R.) of Arizona, and Representative Richard Russell (D.) of Georgia.

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52 On September 30, Anderson quizzed Howe at a committee hearing, asking if the “‘equal educational opportunity act of 1967’ plans, which Republicans exposed two weeks ago as a 6 billion dollar scheme aimed at full government control of schools by Washington social planners, came from his office” (112 Cong. Rec. 25044, 1966).

53 “Mr. Howe and Secretary Gardner both assure America that they have no intention of requiring or compelling busing or of rezoning. . . Great central school parks may not be rezoning, but it is zone destruction. It is a disservice to the Intelligence of America to play the old shell game with them, using the vagueness of words in the English language to con or deceive them” (112 Cong. Rec. 25530 1966).

54 “It is unclear how this program would operate, how the funds would be used or what measures are contemplated to offset any so-called racial imbalance. Would there, for example, be involved in addition to educational parks, busing, the altering of geographical boundaries, and the erasing of traditional neighborhood lines?” (112 Cong. Rec. 25489 1966).

55 “For my part, there is great doubt as to the definition of what an ‘educational park’ is. . . I regret these vague definitions and provisions that are vesting so much greater authority in the Office of Education. They have reached
Clearly by October, 1966, educational parks were seen by many in Congress not as schools but as cleverly-designed devices facilitating federal meddling in public education. And it wasn’t only politicians who saw them this way:

Q. Mr. President, sir, Monday the House is scheduled to vote on the demonstration cities bill. Title II of that bill, which you are urging Members, I understand, to vote for, provides incentives or, rather, bribes to local communities to do away with their own school systems, to have open housing, and to create educational parks where there would be 25,000 or 35,000 children going to school. This would require busing of children long distances and would also bring about a system to correct racial imbalance. Now you are a former schoolteacher. I wonder if you would tell us why you think doing away with the local school systems, as has been admitted by educators in your administration would happen—I wonder why you think this would be better? (Miller Center, n.d.)

Lyndon Johnson’s answer is revealing, for rather than discussing the merits of educational parks, he challenged the reporter’s interpretation of the demonstration cities bill, denying educational park planning was central to the bill:

First, I would not concur with your legal analysis of the bill.

[. . .]

In order to try to get at the root cause of the problems of the cities, I asked a task force of bipartisan leaders of this Nation to make a careful study of this measure. Their recommendations are contained in the demonstration cities bill. Hearings have already been held. The Senate carefully and thoroughly debated the measure and passed it by an overwhelming majority. I do not think they gave to it either the interpretation that you place upon it or the fears that you express. (Miller Center, n.d.)

In downplaying his administration’s support for educational parks, Johnson followed a path already taken by both Harold Howe (who called the draft proposal quoted by Fino on September 14 a “conversation paper” with no “official status” (Grant, 1966, p. A1) and John Gardner, Secretary of HEW (who described the proposed legislation as just one of several drafts (112 Cong. Rec. 22754, 1966). By mid-October, 1966, right-wing attacks on the educational park

the stage where I can no longer support such bills though I am anxious to support a fair and definite bill for Federal assistance to schools” (112 Cong. Rec. 25493 1966).
concept were clearly having an effect, tarnishing the concept by associating it with federal meddling in state and municipal matters. One such attack was launched by Donald Rumsfeld, who on October 6 told the House that educational parks threatened

[the] neighborhood situation, where the local delicatessen, or drug store, or fruit stand, an owner or a local policeman know the families and the children and say “hello” to them when they walk by—and this tends to build a fabric or create a built-in resistance to any individual in that group doing something against others in the group. The ultimate result of the approach recommended by Commissioner Howe has to be either (a) massive busing from the suburbs to the city, or (b) gigantic educational parks of 20,000 students, because this is, basically, the only way you can achieve this homogenization of the schools. Both of these approaches would strike at the very thing described above, which is the single, strongest resistant to crime, juvenile delinquency, or anti-social behavior of any kind. (Rumsfeld, 1966)

As this Capraesque passage hints, by late 1966, educational parks had become in critics’ minds downright un-American. Given that this framing quickly became conventional wisdom, it’s unsurprising to find even supporters backing away from the educational park concept.
CHAPTER SEVEN: EDUCATIONAL PARK PLANNING IN BERKELEY, 1965-66

In late June, 1966, Daniel Freudenthal, coordinator of research and publications for the Berkeley Unified School District, travelled to Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Albany, and New York City—all cities where educational park planning had moved beyond the discussion to the design stage—to observe educational park planning in select Northeastern cities. Freudenthal’s trip was the first of three that summer sponsored by the BUSD. At the end of July, Thomas D. Wogaman, chairman of the district’s Educational Park Task Force, visited the New Jersey cities of Teaneck, Englewood, and East Orange, while in late September, Wogaman again served as district fact-finder, traveling to Syracuse, New York, to study the city’s “campus complex idea” (Wogaman, 1966a). Given that June, 1966, was when Jenkin Lloyd Jones heatedly denounced Harold Howe (“this powerful federal official, with billions of dollars at his command, is apparently dedicated to the destruction of the neighborhood schools” [1966, p. 4]), and that September, 1966, was when Congressman Paul Fino launched his feverish campaign against Howe’s “radical” (112 Cong. Rec. 22755, 1966) plan to fund educational park construction (“this multi-billion dollar scheme” [112 Cong. Rec. 22755, 1966]), the period between June and September, 1966, can be seen as the summer of educational parks, when the educational park movement was at its most energized and coherent, arousing similar energy and coherence in its adversaries. By studying educational park planning in Berkeley in the mid-sixties, looking at what planners did, and how their actions were framed for the public, one not only gets a sense of why many people embraced the educational park concept, but also comes to appreciate the many obstacles faced by the educational park movement.

Information about Freudenthal and Wogaman’s visits to northeastern cities comes from reports the men sent to Neil V. Sullivan in Berkeley. Each report has a header that lists reporter, city visited, date of report, “main themes” (e.g. “educational park, De Facto Segregation”; “De Facto Segregation, Planning Innovation”; “Educational Parks”), and the names of people contacted. The fact that the BUSD sent officials east to study educational park planning reveals both the district’s interest in educational parks and the existence in 1966 of an informal network of educational park planners. Also revealed by the fact-finding missions, specifically by fact-finders’ reports, are the BUSD’s curiosity about (1) possible educational park designs, and (2) potential strategies to build public support for educational parks. Freudenthal and Wogaman’s reports indicate that by late June, 1966, Neil V. Sullivan and his officials viewed educational
park development as both a long-term construction project and a short-term public relations exercise. In studying educational park planning in Berkeley, it is important to distinguish between these two aspects of the district’s educational park project.

The Educational Park Study Task Force

Educational park planning in Berkeley began sometime in 1965 with establishment of a BUSD task force charged with studying the educational park concept. Neil V. Sullivan took over as superintendent of schools on September 1, 1964, having previously been superintendent of the Prince Edward County Free School, a school for African Americans in Prince Edward County, Virginia, that had been organized by civil-rights activists in the wake of a segregationist decision to close rather than desegregate public schools. One of Sullivan’s first acts as Superintendent of Berkeley schools was to share with the school board a list of his “Goals and Objectives,” mostly related to administration, training, and community outreach, but also bearing on classroom and extracurricular activities. “The overall objective of my administration,” Sullivan told the school board, “will be the development of a school system worthy of imitation, one which meets the needs of each child in such a way that his abilities will be developed to their maximum, and one that will inspire him to make a maximum contribution to society. We shall continue striving to develop a program that recognizes both the intellectual and creative capacities of each student” (BBE, September 1, 1964, p. 2). To help meet his overall objective, Sullivan embraced twenty specific goals, none relating specifically to educational parks, but three identifying Sullivan as a likely candidate to join the educational park movement. Those relevant goals were:

3. Make greater use of school facilities six days a week, with such activities as the following:
   a. Open school libraries during evening hours for use as study centers under adult supervision.
   b. Open science labs, libraries and certain other facilities for extended programs on Saturdays.

14. Develop a program appropriate to a space age, in which all men are neighbors. As adults our children will share experiences with people of all types and backgrounds. Our

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schools should prepare them for this life by giving them contact, directly or indirectly, with children whose backgrounds represent other parts of the world. To this end we urge strengthening of those activities that are designed to improve intergroup relations in our schools and community.

[...]

17. Make continuous efforts to obtain grants and other outside financial support to supplement local funds. (BBE, September 1, 1964, pp. 3-4)

“We will work toward the improvement of our program in every discipline,” Sullivan adds. “We must educate our children not only for today but for what lies ahead. We can do this by constant industry and understanding, by intelligence and integrity, but most of all by a coherent dedication to improving the world in which we live” (BBE, September 1, 1964, p. 4).

Sullivan’s initial objectives as superintendent reveal an expansive understanding of public schools, in which schools are not just key institutions within a community (objective 3), but in which schools have a preparatory function far beyond the teaching of a common core (to adopt a later term) of curriculum-based skills, with schools readying students to interact “with people of all types and backgrounds” (objective 14). Sullivan’s list of goals is decidedly future-oriented, using New Frontier language (“a program appropriate to the space age;” “educate our children not only for today but for what lies ahead”) to evoke an increasingly multiracial United States, and it is this pointing towards the future, together with Sullivan’s desire to make Berkeley schools externally-funded community institutions (“make continuous efforts to obtain grants and other outside financial support”), that marks Sullivan as predisposed to back educational parks.

Which he soon does. In May, 1965, Sullivan, speaking to the Cragmont branch of the Berkeley P.T.A., shared another goal he had as superintendent: “I envision ‘educational parks’ built in, if you will, border areas between the various tight groups of the community so that we can achieve truly integrated schools. That way we will benefit all pupils. Everyone will gain” (“‘Truly Integrated’ Schools,” 1965, E16). Sullivan’s vision of “truly integrated” educational parks benefiting all Berkeley pupils would have been understood by other members of the educational park movement, who, like Sullivan, saw educational parks as providing a type of desegregation from which “everyone will gain”. Having shared with the Cragmont P.T.A. his vision of truly integrated educational parks, Sullivan, sensing skepticism in his audience, adds a disclaimer:
“All this is just in the study stage. We just want to give it a full explanation as we proceed along” (‘Truly Integrated’ Schools,” 1965, E16).

The study Sullivan mentioned to the Cragmont P.T.A. was more developed than his offhand comment suggests. This is indicated by a 1965 memo where Sullivan invites Kathyne Favors, director of the BUSD’s Intergroup Education Project (a project Sullivan alludes to on September 1, 1964 as he shares his goals with the school board), to join a task force studying the possible benefits of “an educational park or a series of such parks” (Sullivan, 1965a) in Berkeley. Having notified Favors that the BUSD “shall be engaging in a serious study of the subject, at the staff level and in the School Master Plan Committee” (1965a), Sullivan adds “I am enclosing a copy of the table of organization for this study and inviting you to become a participant” (1965a). Too expansive to include here, the table of organization hints at the scope of Sullivan’s educational park ambitions, detailing a dual project (“Program Development” and “Non-Program Aspects”) overseen by himself and involving a 12-15 member task force charged with three key responsibilities:

1. Development of alternatives
   - Boundaries
   - Levels included
   - Enrollments
   - Logistics
   - Costs.

2. Strategy of Implementation
   - Development of “Case For”
   - “Short Range” steps
   - Staff information & involvement
   - Public information & involvement

3. Development of library of information and bibliography on subject. (1965a)

Sullivan’s 1965 memo to Kathyne Favors indicates that Freudenthal and Wogaman’s 1966 visits to eastern cities were anything but ad hoc, being instead coordinated fact-finding missions aimed at learning how educational park planners in other cities envisioned and promoted their proposals. “[T]he general concept of ‘educational parks’ is coming in for increased study and

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57 A more precise date can’t be ascertained.
discussion in urban communities across the country,” Sullivan observes in his memo to Favors. “The increased interest in this subject on the part of educators has been triggered by the desire to improve the general curricular offerings of the schools and to improve the situation vis-à-vis de facto segregation. I regard the subjects as interrelated” (1965a). Sullivan, like other educational park backers, saw high-quality schools as essential to successful integration, with educational park development his preferred means of providing such schools. That said, while all members of the educational park movement shared Sullivan’s faith in the merits of educational parks, few were as well-positioned to act on that faith.

Fact-Finding Missions

“Dear Dr. Sullivan,” Freudenthal writes on June, 27, 1966. “Here I am, as you instructed, taking a look at the ‘Educational Park—Pittsburgh style’” (1966a). Pittsburgh was the first of eight northeastern cities Berkeley officials visited in summer and early fall of 1966, Neil V. Sullivan having instructed the officials to look at educational parks not just Pittsburgh style, but Philadelphia, Albany, New York City, Teaneck, Englewood, East Orange and Syracuse style as well. The purpose of the visits was two-fold, to learn about (1) educational park design, and (2) educational park advocacy. On February 22, 1966, four months before the BUSD’s fact-finding missions, Sullivan published a newspaper column (“The Twin Goals of Progress Discussed”58) setting out—if only by implication—a rationale for the missions:

When I came to Berkeley eighteen months ago, the Board of Education members and I had a mutual aim—a mutual basis for beginning. We set our sights on creating an administration-staff-community team that would develop high quality education simultaneously with integration.

[. . .]

How can we combine these two processes? By working toward Educational Parks, in my opinion. Most readers are familiar with the educational park concept which is being pioneered successfully in many eastern cities. (Sullivan, 1966a)

As his July 22 column reveals, Sullivan saw the educational park as an eastern phenomenon, a perception he acted on in sending officials to Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York State.

58 A clipping of the column is in the Human Relations archive at the Amistad Research Center, but the clipping does not indicate where the column was published (the publication date is handwritten). It was almost certainly published in the *Oakland Tribune*. 
“In the East,” Sullivan writes in his column, “[educational parks] have captured the enthusiasm of teachers, students, parents, and the entire community” (1966a). What Sullivan wants Daniel Freudenthal and Thomas Wogaman to bring back from the northeast is the information needed to spark in Berkeley a similar enthusiasm for educational parks.

Reporting to Sullivan, both Freudenthal and Wogaman downplay educational park design, attending more to promotional efforts aimed at fostering support for educational parks. This emphasis may reflect an early realization, by Sullivan or someone else, that many aspects of educational park design are dictated by local conditions, a realization confirmed in Wogaman’s and Freudenthal’s reports:

Syracuse has a regular program of retiring old buildings and replacing them after 50 or 60 years. Their Research and Planning Dept. has come up with an idea that, instead of replacing the buildings on a neighborhood basis, they gradually develop a group of elementary, multiple-school complexes on relatively large campuses. . . . According to their present thinking, each of these campus complexes is to have a common core. This common core will include auditorium, library, gymnasium, administrative and food preparation facilities, also a health center and facilities for special education classes. (Wogaman, 1966a)

The [East Orange] School Administration and Board have developed a proposal for an educational plaza to be located in the northern section of the city. They would use an existing stadium area and adjacent areas that could be condemned and redeveloped. The latter are currently devoted to a low-quality type of housing. The plaza would be only about 18 acres, but the Superintendent told me the architects had designed the proposed plan in such a way that they would get about 28 acres out of it. This they accomplish through strategic design of roof playgrounds and underground parking lots, etc. (Wogaman, 1966b)

These passages hint at Freudenthal’s and Wogaman’s habit of combining discussions of local policies and/or topography with descriptions of particular educational park proposals, ignoring for the most part details of park design. What this suggests is that Sullivan instructed his reporters to pay particular attention to how educational parks were promoted in eastern cities, the assumption being that public relations strategies were more transferable than architectural plans.
Freudenthal’s and Wogaman’s findings about eastern approaches to educational park promotion are best studied from an *ex post facto* position, focusing on practices the BUSD later adopted in promoting their own educational park proposal. In brief, while the BUSD borrowed little from eastern cities in the way of educational park design, it adopted a number of eastern promotional practices, most importantly (1) an emphasis on community outreach to popularize the educational park concept, (2) creation of targeted promotional materials (e.g. brochures) to build support for a particular educational park proposal, (3) presentation of educational parks as high quality schools first and integrated schools second, and (4) portrayal of educational parks as projects meriting federal support under Title III of ESEA.

On July 2, Daniel Freudenthal was in New York City “for two main purposes—(1) to meet Max Wolff concerning the proposed national education park project planning study under Title III of ESEA; and (2) to talk to other leaders in the push toward solutions to the problems of de facto segregation” (Freudenthal, 1966b). In his report to Neil V. Sullivan, Freudenthal, having described his meetings with Max Wolff and two other educational park backers (Dan Dodson and Mortimer Kreuter), continues:

At this point, therefore, let me note some of the pitfalls as we proceed toward total racial integration of our schools and redevelopment of our educational program, a modern sweep toward excellence.

1. Any study of educational parks should be undertaken with every element of our community represented, with special representation of the “low income community.” It should be developed jointly with every agency of government and community that has a stake in eliminating urban and educational blight. Staff involvement should be equally rooted in grass roots participation. All of this, from the beginning.

2. One direction to explore would be an educational park idea tied to housing development and resettlement of people—Black and White.

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59 The most important borrowings were the “middle school plan” adopted by Englewood and East Orange, New Jersey, in which a single educational park educated all middle school students in a city, and the feature of arranging “wings” around a core structure, as seen in Syracuse’s design: “Around the periphery of this common core, but connected to it by walk-ways, would be the five or six wings, each housing 600 to 900 students” (Wogaman, 1966a).

60 Director of New York University’s Center for Human Relations Studies.

61 Professor of Education, Stony Brook University.
3. Interstaff workshops might be feasible involving districts with similar problems. (Freudenthal, 1966b)

One important lesson Freudenthal takes from his visit to New York City, then, is that a broad “community representation” is essential in building support for an educational park, not just in the sense that “grassroots participation” should be encouraged in the planning process (point 1), but also with the understanding that “community” encompasses, in addition to residents of the city, organizations working on issues like housing, as well as other school districts. Meeting with educational park planners in New York City, then, Freudenthal gained a broader understanding of the term “consultation,” one in which the term encompasses meetings with a variety of groups and individuals: “the ‘low income community’. . . every agency of government and community that has a stake in eliminating urban and educational blight. Staff” (Freudenthal, 1966b). Writing from Pittsburgh on June 27, Freudenthal emphasized this point: “Berkeley has set a healthy precedent of community and staff involvement of its projects from their inception to completion. We need to broaden and strengthen that precedent as we move toward the total integration of our schools” (Freudenthal, 1966a).^62

Travelling in the east, Freudenthal and Wogaman also learned about the value of eye-catching promotional materials, not just in pushing for educational parks, but in promoting other desegregation devices. Educational park planners in East Orange, New Jersey, Wogaman tells Sullivan, “have rather detailed architectural drawings and have published an attractive brochure describing the whole project” (Wogaman, 1966b). “The school administration in Englewood,” Wogaman notes in another memo, “has developed a sizable number of brochures and pamphlets, memos, etc., explaining different aspects of their [intergroup education] program” (Wogaman, 1966c). Taking this on board, Sullivan and his staff, advocating for a Berkeley educational park, will create promotional materials such as a pamphlet (BUSD, 1968b) and a “prototype model” of a middle school park^63 (BUSD, 1968a, p. 1):

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^63 Last seen heading to New Jersey: “The Educational Park Exhibit is to be shown by the architect in Atlantic City” (BUSD, 1968d).
Meeting with northeastern educational park planners, Freudenthal and Wogaman also came to appreciate the importance of presenting educational parks as a ‘win-win’ integration device. Writing from Pittsburgh, Freudenthal noted “The primary objective of the educational park is the racial integration of the schools through a distinctively high quality education. Therefore, the education park site must be chosen so that its schools will serve communities of different racial and social backgrounds. It is hoped that in time education parks will provide a school and community environment so attractive that they will stimulate increasing voluntary racial integration, helping to break down residential segregation” (Freudenthal, 1966a). East Orange, too, Wogaman reported a month later, saw its educational park as a means of enticing white students to remain in the public system: “In developing ‘the case’ for the educational plaza, East Orange has emphasized the implications which it would have for the instructional program. These include increased specialization, better use of facilities, greater opportunities for innovation, etc. While the plan would achieve integration (which the Administration considers good), they appear to be mainly interested in the plaza as a means of developing a top-quality school system—one that would be so good that people would quit taking their children out of the public schools and placing them into private schools” (Wogaman, 1966b). Writing on September 29 from Syracuse, Wogaman reported that the city’s superintendent of schools “feels strongly that they must improve the educational process for everyone in the process of integration, if it is to go over. He is quoted as saying, ‘At the end of the bus ride, there must be a superior educational program for everyone’ ” (Wogaman, 1966a). An important lesson the BUSD drew from its 1966 fact-finding trips, then, was that educational parks were best promoted as schools
providing (to again quote Freudenthal’s letter from Pittsburgh) “a distinctively high quality education” (Freudenthal, 1966a).

A final lesson the BUSD gleaned from its meetings with eastern educational park planners was that federal funding—specifically, funding supplied under Title III of ESEA—was important to the success of an educational park project. “In the most tangible progress to date,” Wogaman writes from East Orange, “they have applied for, and received, a Title III grant under ESEA to develop a model middle school and to develop and implement the educational plaza idea” (Wogaman, 1966b). East Orange, Wogaman adds, “has an attractive proposal and, with the awarding of the Title III grant, they seem to be on the right track” (Wogaman, 1966b). Visiting East Orange, therefore, Wogaman learned that federal support for an educational park project, if not an essential ingredient in that project’s success, is a helpful addition, allowing the project to make “tangible progress” as it moves along “the right track.” Wogaman and Freudenthal would have drawn similar lessons from visits to Philadelphia (a city “Developing a planning arm for the school district under Title III, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, with an associate Superintendent in charge” [Freudenthal, 1966c]), New York City (where Max Wolff described a “proposed national education park project planning study under Title III of ESEA” [Freudenthal, 1966b]), and Syracuse (whose staff “has received a Title III grant from the federal government and have established the [educational park] study project with offices downtown” [Wogaman, 1966a]). All told, four of the eight cities visited by BUSD fact-finders were reported to have secured ESEA Title III grants to either study or design an educational park, helping explain why in July, 1966, the BUSD readied a “Proposal for a Planning Grant under Title III Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965” (BUSD, 1966a). The proposal’s title? “Development of an Educational Park System.”

Planning Grant Proposal (July, 1966)

In its extant form, the BUSD’s 1966 proposal for an educational park planning grant is a mimeographed copy of a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare grant application (P.L. 89-10, Title III). Part I of the application (“General Data”) includes such information as the

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64 The proposal is dated July, 1966, but another document—dated 12/19/66 and entitled “Working Outline: Title III Planning Grant for Educational Parks”—better anticipates Berkeley’s 1967 study of the educational park concept (Integrated Quality Education), indicating the July proposal was revised before submission. The December, 1966, outline, for instance, not only includes the title of the 1967 study (“Integrated Quality Education”), it also describes
name of the agency submitting the application ("Berkeley Unified School District"), the name of the person authorized to receive the grant ("Neil V. Sullivan"), the size of the group to be served by the proposed project (30,000), and the estimated cost of the proposed project ($76,500). Part II details the project’s purpose, personnel, facilities, services, materials, supplies, and budget. Listed in the proposal’s table of contents (but not physically present) are a number of “exhibits,” two bearing on the BUSD’s planned acquisition of land for a future educational park (the “Savo Island properties” [BUSD, 1966a]). The 1966 proposal, it should be borne in mind, is a request for funding to plan, not build, an educational park, explaining both the modest sum requested from the federal government ($51,500) and the absence of information about what a Berkeley educational park would look like. That we know today what Berkeley’s system of educational parks would have looked like reflects the subsequent success of the 1966 proposal.65

The 1966 document focuses not on a particular educational park proposed for Berkeley, but on educational parks in general, allowing for inferences about why the BUSD (1) was drawn to the educational park concept, and (2) considered Berkeley a good location for an educational park.66 Part II of the proposal, the application itself, opens:

The Berkeley Unified School District seeks to develop a model system of community educational centers (educational parks) for all students of the public schools. This it intends to do in the interest of 1) quality, innovative education for each child in every classroom, 2) racial integration system-wide to complete the process begun in 1958 and accomplished in the secondary schools in 1964, and 3) economy in plant and operation through the development of large, flexible facilities capable of applying the latest technology to classroom uses and student service at minimal cost. The ultimate cost of the total project, from plan to program, to site selection, acquisition and development, to facilities construction would total in the millions of dollars. The starting point for this thrust toward the model educational park must be the planning grant, for the ultimate

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65 In July, 1968, the BUSD published Integrated Quality Education: A Study of Educational Parks and Other Alternatives for Urban Needs, the fruits of the (revised, see footnote 64 above) 1966 proposal, which describes in detail the district’s plan to consolidate all educational activity in nine educational parks.

66 Recall that on May 18, 1966, Harold Howe revealed that his department was particularly interested in finding one or two great American cities that are adventurous enough to join us in planning the educational park of the future” (Howe, 1966a, p. 11). The July proposal may have been Berkeley’s response to Howe’s call.
success of this massive undertaking would depend upon an exemplary planning organization and process. (BUSD, 1966a)

Much of this is generic educational park advocacy as the passage posits educational parks as quality, integrated schools, with the first characteristic taking precedence over the second.67 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the 1966 proposal is how closely it adheres to two of the lessons Freudenthal and Wogaman drew from their fact-finding missions, specifically (1) the advice to emphasize the high quality of education obtainable in an educational park, and (2) the recommendation to look to the federal government for funding. In line with the first lesson, the proposal details the fancy equipment that will be available in a Berkeley educational park: “the ultimate in flexible walls, furniture, rooms, work space, living laboratories where learning and applications of learning go hand in hand; programmed learning, both closed and open circuit TV, gymnasium, special art, science, and auditorium facilities centralized in the interest of economy” (BUSD, 1966a). Such a list was by July, 1966 de rigeur in an educational park advocacy document, akin to the catalog of features (“Air conditioning! Radio! 4-speed shift!”) found in 1960s car ads. More interesting is the proposal’s discussion of federal funding, which segues from a breakdown of the $51,500 the BUSD is requesting from the federal government to a calculation of the many millions of dollars the district will need to actually build a park: “It is estimated that the project will require a total of $9,000,000. This will be on the basis of three million dollars per year for three years (BUSD, 1966a). Considering the BUSD’s budget for fiscal year 1967 was under $20 million, and that Max Rafferty, California’s Superintendent of Public Instruction, was an opponent of educational parks, the district had good reason to request federal funding for its educational park project.

The ESEA proposal also testifies to the BUSD’s commitment to public outreach, further evidence that lessons learned during the district’s fact-finding missions had been taken to heart. The planning process will feature school and community involvement and participation in the broadest sense from inception to end. It will build into all developmental plans the machinery for massive involvement and participation. It shall include:

1. The present Berkeley Board of Education’s lay-professional advisory committee of 138 members as an educational parks planning advisory committee. This committee

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67 The proposal is also a good example of an astrofuturistic planning document: “The children need the best in programs and teaching to break the knowledge and technological barrier in the age of massive atomic and space explosion” (BUSD, 1966a).
represents many segments of the community. Its efforts shall be augmented by representatives of the low income community and all government agencies at interest.

2. A staff task force comprised of small task groups, and headed by a steering committee of three, to make the basic studies of need, develop recommended programs in education, communications and community relations, and facilities for the proposed educational parks system.

3. A continual public information program using every medium.

4. A continuing series of public meetings and meetings in the neighborhoods to hammer out each phase of the plan. (BUSD, 1966a)

While unique in its details, the BUSD’s July, 1966, grant proposal adopts a northeastern model in framing educational parks as innovative desegregation devices for which a public appetite can be aroused using broad-based multimedia outreach techniques. If Daniel Freudenthal’s July 2 report from New York City advises Neil V. Sullivan that “Any study of educational parks should be undertaken with every element of the community represented, with special representation of the ‘low income community.’ It should be developed jointly with every agency of government and community that has a stake in eliminating urban and educational blight” (Freudenthal, 1966b), the July proposal includes “representatives of the low income community and all government agencies at interest” (BUSD, 1966a) in the list of key stakeholders to be consulted during the planning phase of Berkeley’s educational park project. The importance of the BUSD shaping its 1966 grant proposal to reflect lessons learned during meetings with northeastern educational park planners is that the shaping marks Neil V. Sullivan and his officials as members of an educational park movement, heightening both the significance of their planning efforts and the implications of their planning failures.

If the 1966 proposal describes “school and community involvement and participation in the broadest sense” (BUSD, 1966a) as essential to Berkeley’s educational park planning process, the proposal also notes that no group would be more involved in the process than “the present Berkeley Board of Education’s lay-professional advisory committee,” which will be retooled as “an educational parks planning committee” (BUSD, 1966a). Neil V. Sullivan knew the district’s lay-professional advisory committee—usually referred to as the Master Plan Committee—would play a vital role in the decision-making process around educational parks, either giving impetus to Sullivan’s educational parks push by coming out in favor of parks, or slowing the push by
withholding support. In cooperation with Berkeley’s school board, Sullivan had established the 138 member Master Plan Committee in May, 1965, as “an experiment in community involvement in public education reaching far beyond the traditionally accepted role of citizens committees created to advise boards of education” (BUSD, 1967b, p. i), the “major purpose” of the committee being to obtain “the cooperative development, by a representative committee of lay citizens and staff members, of suggested programs, both short and long-range, in several specified areas” (BUSD, 1967b, p. i). The Master Plan Committee was organized into five smaller committees, each with a separate focus: (I) instructional program; (II) special education and special services; (III) finance and business services; (IV) community environment, school buildings and facilities; (V) district relations. “[T]wo-thirds of the way through its work,” we read in a 1967 report of the Master Plan Committee, “Committee IV was asked to undertake study of the desirability of the District acquiring a large parcel of previously unavailable land for possible use as some form of educational park” (BUSD, 1967b, p. iv).

Meeting of the Educational Park Planning Committee (October, 1966)

On October 6, 1966, the same day a reporter challenged Lyndon Johnson on his support for educational parks (“I wonder why you think this would be better?”), 68 three officials from the Berkeley Unified School District—Harold J. Maves, assistant superintendent for instruction, Thomas D. Wogaman, administrative assistant to Neil V. Sullivan, and Arthur O. Bachelor, director of business services—met with members of district’s recently-formed educational park planning committee to “provide background information to the committee’s study of educational parks” (BUSD, 1966c). Maves’s, Wogaman’s, and Bachelor’s comments were documented, as were committee members’ questions, and together the comments and questions reveal a lot about how the educational park concept was presented and received in Berkeley.

The first to speak was Harold J. Maves. “Tonight we will discuss the educational park—what they are and why they are. . . I’d like to have you dream with me just a bit about what the educational program might be like in what I call a ‘total educational facility’ I’d like to cite the advantages of such a concentrated facility over the conventional scattering of schools” (BUSD, 1966c). Maves’s language is revealing, inviting listeners to imagine an ideal (i.e. dreamlike)

68 October 6, 1966 was a red-letter day for the educational park movement. Not only did Lyndon Johnson discuss educational parks at a press conference, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Fino, Glenn Andrews, Edward Gurney, Paul Fannin, Edward Kennedy, William Fitts Ryan, and Richard Russell all mentioned educational parks in Congress.
educational program which he then associates with the educational park concept. Explaining what and why educational parks are, Maves cites eight advantages educational parks have over conventional schools, initially focusing on integration (“Maximum integration would be the most important criterion for going in the direction of the educational park” [1966c]), and then discussing seven other advantages\(^{69}\) whose cumulative weight far exceeds that of integration. And indeed Maves, having identified “maximum integration” as the primary purpose of an educational park, never again mentions integration, focusing instead on the physical features and pedagogical practices found in educational parks, ultimately giving the impression that the “quality” part of a “quality integrated education” is the part that interests him most. Building his case for educational parks on the parks’ educational (as opposed to intergroup) benefits, Maves follows the conventional educational park advocacy script, baiting a trap by dreaming aloud about space age schools:

The library for a school of this size can provide a range of books and materials in sufficient quantity for an enriched program. It will feature an audio-visual center and an instructional resources facility for students and teacher use. Adjacent to the library will be student recourse centers provided with facilities for independent study. Students will be programmed\(^{70}\) to come to the center to use the programmed learning equipment and carrels equipped with headsets for specialized programs such as foreign language and music appreciation. (BUSD, 1966c)

Again, stock educational park advocacy.

Maves was followed by Thomas D. Wogaman, who reviewed his own and Daniel Freudenthal’s recent fact-finding visits to northeastern cities (“In Syracuse, New York, a city which I visited last week, they are planning a series of five educational parks” [BUSD, 1966c])\(^{71}\), then by Arthur O. Bachelor (discussing the district’s anticipated purchase of the Savo Island properties), then by a question-and-answer session, friendly in tone but marked by skepticism about the merits of educational parks (“We have heard positive arguments for educational parks.

\(^{69}\) “Greater individual attention;” “specialized teaching staff;” “opportunity for innovation;” “the instructional center with the library as the hub;” “a diagnostic center;” “space utilization;” “an extended day and year” (BUSD, 1966c).

\(^{70}\) Interesting word. Perhaps misheard by the note-taker?\n
\(^{71}\) Wogaman mentions integration once, when comparing Syracuse and Berkeley: “Syracuse and Berkeley are actively trying to solve their educational problems. Both cities are struggling toward elementary integration and both cities are moving ahead with the idea that the responsibility is not solely that of the inner city but also of its suburbs. That is not particularly relevant in Berkeley, but it is relevant to any metropolitan area in which the inner city is overwhelmingly Negro and surrounded by totally Caucasian suburbs” (BUSD, 1966c).
I would like to know some of the negative factors” [1966c]. The question-and-answer, with its pointed questions and hesitant answers, reveals a great deal about how the 1965-68 debate over educational parks played out in Berkeley, and probably in other cities as well. In brief, while a few questions were matter-of-fact (“What grade levels are being considered for an educational park?” “Has there been any thinking on what might be done with schools that will no longer be needed?”(BUSD, 1966c), most questions were more oppositional, exploring not how a Berkeley educational park might function, but whether such a park should be built at all. E.g.:

The University of California has had problems of students feeling lost in such a large school. Would this be a problem in the large educational park?

I wish to ask a question on curriculum. I am disquieted by the non-child or non-human dimensions of many of the examples of educational parks we have been given this evening. I wonder if educational parks necessarily mean programmed learning, teaching machines and other un-personalized methods of working.

I would like to know if this would really provide a better educational program because it is going to be expensive. (BUSD, 1966c)

These questions cast doubt on the educational park concept itself, challenging the claim that educational parks—carrels with headphones notwithstanding—provide a superior education.72 The Berkeley officials, to their credit, don’t shy away from discussing the “negative factors” of educational parks, offering conciliatory remarks (“I share your concerns”) while emphasizing that educational parks are only a possibility (“There is no commitment nor definite plan”). Wogaman’s compilation of negative factors related to educational parks hints at the officials’ impartial approach:

The reason we have emphasized the positive factors here is that we feel they warrant the study. The study itself would have to consider the negative aspects. Some of these have

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72 Another audience member’s question—an obvious one in retrospect—reintroduces the topic of integration: “Shouldn’t our study consider the effect any plan would have on further segregation of our schools?” The question is answered by Marc Monheimer, chair of the Master Plan Committee: “While Committee IV has the primary responsibility for the educational park study because of the importance of school buildings and facilities, each one of the committees has been given the task of studying educational parks in relation to its particular subject matter. Certainly Committee II, to the extent it is studying tracking and its relation to curriculum, will be directing its study to the effect of an educational park concept. The staff undoubtedly will consider the effects of a park on segregation, but we must also” (BUSD, 1966c).
been brought out tonight. One negative factor is the initial outlay of cash it would require when we already have millions of dollars invested in school plants. Something would have to be done, whether it would be selling some of the present plant or getting federal funds for developing a model school, or something of the kind. Once the educational park is put together, the operating costs, I am convinced, would be less. We would have to explore the question to see if that were true or not. Another negative factor is the danger that the individual child might be lost in the multitude. This would depend upon the type of program developed. I don’t think that danger is necessarily a feature of the educational park, but steps would have to be taken to be sure that didn’t happen. (BUSD, 1966c)

Wogaman here acknowledges that committee members are right to be skeptical, conceding that educational parks might be too large, impersonal, and expensive to work. Wogaman’s advice to the committee? Wait for the “study itself” which “would have to consider the negative aspects” (1966c). Given that the study Wogaman refers to will be conducted by a group of educational park sceptics (i.e., his current audience), Sullivan and his officials clearly faced a challenge in promoting educational parks in Berkeley. This challenge, paradoxically, would be made vastly more difficult by the city’s commitment to educational equality.

Elementary School Desegregation

On September 10, 1968, Berkeley became the first American city with a population of more than 100,000 to fully desegregate its school system. Newspaper articles marked Berkeley’s achievement (“An army of 8,900 black and white elementary school pupils etched their place in American history books yesterday” [Lieberman, 1968, A1]), with articles appearing not just in California but throughout the country (“Negro and white youngsters mixed in an atmosphere of excitement and some apprehension Tuesday as Berkeley became the largest public school system in the nation to integrate all schools” [Associated Press, 1968, 1]). Politicians praised Berkeley’s integration plan (e.g. “You have struck a blow for justice that will have an impact far beyond the limits of Berkeley” [Harold Howe II in Milstein and Hoch, 1968, p. 524]), as did many scholars (e.g. “Other school districts across the country have experimented with integration, but never before has a major community assured that all schools will approximate the racial composition of the total school student body” [Milstein and Hoch, 1968, p. 524]).
In 1968, Berkeley’s high school and intermediate schools were already desegregated, leaving only the city’s elementary schools to be integrated. School board minutes from the 1967-68 period reveal the pressure placed on the school board to follow through on its 1964 pledge to implement elementary desegregation.  

COMMUNICATIONS
The Secretary presented the following communications to the Board:

Copy of Resolution passed by entire Conference on Quality Education for South and West Berkeley, held March 18, 1967, at West Campus, Berkeley High School, setting forth certain “resolutions for immediate action.”
The entire text of the Resolution is as follows:

RESOLUTIONS

“Whereas the effects of Segregated Schools, Housing patterns, Employment principles have reduced the majority of minorities to the least common denominator in this country;
“Whereas extensive research has shown that the best method of achieving quality education and equality of opportunity for all students must take place in an integrated school setting;
“Whereas an integrated setting provides students of different backgrounds and cultures the opportunity to study and to learn respect for each other;
“Whereas this conference has reinforced the need for the Berkeley Unified School District to re-commit itself to the principles of quality education, we the affected parents present the following resolutions for immediate action.
BE IT RESOLVED:
“That parents and teachers work together to end de-facto segregation all Berkeley Schools.
“That all schools of Berkeley be integrated immediately.” (BBE, April 4, 1967, p. 19)

COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. Norman Seward, President [Berkeley Teachers Association].

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73 The 1964 plan that had integrated Berkeley’s intermediate schools included provisions for a simultaneous integration of the city’s elementary schools, but these provisions were “tabled” in May, 1964, “so that administrative energy and our available finances can be concentrated on a successful demonstration to the community of the educational values of full integration at the Junior High School level” (BBE, May 19, 1964, p. 12).
Mr. Seward read a letter from the Berkeley Teachers Association in support of total integration in the elementary schools and urged “untabling” of the 1964 desegregation plan.

[...]

Mrs. Mary Jane Johnson, President NAACP. Mrs. Johnson read to the Board a Resolution passed by the NAACP urging immediate integration of the elementary schools and urging the Board to give it the highest priority.

[...]

Mr. Carl C. Mack, Sr.. Community Representative.

Mr. Mack addressed the Board, urging implementation of an elementary school integration plan in September 1967. (BBE, April 18, 1967, p. 2)

COMMUNICATIONS

Enclosing resolution “passed unanimously at the April 13 Berkeley Teachers Association Legislation Council meeting.” which sets forth three points of a “recommended plan to desegregate the elementary schools” etc.

Stating, “This resolution should indicate to the Board that a large majority of the District’s organized certificated staff favor immediate total integration of the Berkeley schools.”

[...]

COMMUNICATIONS

Berkeley Branch NAACP Subject: “School Integration.”

Stating, “The Berkeley Branch NAACP hereby formally requests the Berkeley Board of Education to initiate steps toward total elimination of de facto segregation in Berkeley schools. The reactionary and ultra conservative climate involving open housing precludes the hope that mobility in housing accommodations will solve the school problem of segregated schools.” (BBE, May 2, 1967, pp. 16; 18)

These and other communications, as well no doubt as school board members’ own wishes, led the school board to unanimously adopt on May 16, 1967 a motion “concerning desegregation of the elementary schools”: 
The Board of Education reaffirms its commitment to desegregation of all Berkeley schools in September 1968 and directs the Administration to develop and present a plan or plans that will accomplish this goal. The Board directs that each plan be developed in the context of quality education and that full participation of Board, staff and community take place prior to action by the Board.

The Board regards the complete desegregation of its schools as such an important and significant undertaking that sufficient time must be devoted to the planning and preparation for the transition in order to assure success. Therefore, no elementary desegregation plan will be implemented in September of 1967.

We authorize the administrative staff to begin now, planning such items as teacher preparation, curriculum development, etc., and submit a plan or plans to us for discussion as early as possible but not later than October 1967 so that we may adopt the most effective plan as early as possible but no later than January or February of 1968 and spend the remaining time prior to September 1968 refining the plan and preparing for full implementation.

The Board, gratefully conscious of the intelligent interest of this community, invites the community to submit ideas and suggestions in the months immediately ahead so that the best possible plan may be developed. (BBE, May 16, 1967, p. 3)74

Passage of the May 16 motion initiated a process that culminated sixteen months later in full integration of Berkeley’s schools. Authorized by the school board to submit a desegregation plan “as early as possible but not later than October 1967,” Sullivan and his officials recognized an immediate problem, namely that the October, 1967 date undermined the work of the district’s Master Plan Committee. As Marc Monheimer, the committee’s chair, explained in a May 16th75 communication to the school board:

In connection with the recently adopted policy of the Berkeley Unified School District to aim for full integration of elementary schools by September, 1968, questions have

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74 The motion expanded and reaffirmed a less formal April 18 motion which stated: “In entering a period of intensive discussion and decision with respect to the many different possibilities for achieving integration in the Berkeley Schools, the Board wishes to affirm its general commitment to the principle of eliminating defacto segregation in the Berkeley School District, within the context of continued quality education, and aiming towards a date no later than September 1968” (BBE, April 18, 1967, p. 3).

75 The communication is dated May 1, suggesting that Monheimer had early access to the board’s May 16 motion.
arisen concerning the scope and timing of the Report of the Berkeley School Master Plan Committee. Although we are hopeful of presenting the complete School Master Plan Committee report in time to permit implementation of at least some of its recommendations as early as the 1968-1969 school year, it is unlikely that the Report will be available prior to November 1, 1967. Even if this deadline is met, the recommendations of the Committee only in part will be amenable to immediate implementation. Consistent with the original charge of the Board of Education to the Committee, our recommendations will not be limited to the immediate future and many of our recommendations will be in the form of policies for adoption after community debate and discussion.

[. . .]

I regret I cannot advise that the School Master Plan Committee will present specific alternative plans for immediate integration of Berkeley’s elementary schools. You may be assured, however, that the recommendations finally approved will complement and enhance any plan which may be adopted prior to submission of the Report. (BBE, May 16, 1967, p. 16)

Noting that “integration has been a crucial part of the study and discussion of members of the Committee” (BBE, May 16, 1967, p. 16), Monheimer adds that his committee’s forthcoming recommendations, if “adopted by the Board of Education and implemented by the administrative and certified staff” (BBE, May 16, 1967, p. 16), will have “a direct and immediate effect on achieving racially integrated elementary and secondary schools and providing quality education worthy of imitation” (BBE, May 16, 1967, p. 16). Neil V. Sullivan’s influence is evident in Monheimer’s communication,76 and the communication is best understood as Sullivan asking the school board for more time to formulate an integration plan. October is too early, Sullivan (through Monheimer) explains, because the master plan study is so wide ranging (“our recommendations will not be limited to the immediate future” [BBE, May 16, 1967, p. 16]). Given that a key purpose of the Master Plan Committee study was to make a case for educational parks in Berkeley, Monheimer’s May 16 communication to the school board represents a worried Sullivan’s attempt to insure that the educational park concept remains part of the desegregation

76 E.g. “quality education worthy of imitation;” c.f. Sullivan’s desire to develop “a school system worthy of imitation”(BBE, September 1, 1964, p. 2).
conversation in Berkeley. Sullivan knows that starting in November the school board is going to
discuss various plans for integration, and as things stand an educational park plan will not be part
of the discussion. “The recommendations of sub-committee IV concerning changes in the uses
and organization of school buildings and facilities deal directly with achieving full integration,”
Monheimer tells the school board on May 16 (BBE, p. 16), referring to draft recommendations of
the educational park planning committee. Much to the alarm of Sullivan and his officials, sub-
committee IV’s recommendations, like those of sub-committees I, II, III, and V, will—unless the
school board revises its schedule—arrive too late to be considered as a possible pathway to total
integration in Berkeley.
CHAPTER EIGHT: EDUCATIONAL PARK PLANNING IN BERKELEY, 1967-68

Spring and summer of 1967 saw Neil V. Sullivan fighting a rearguard action to save the BUSD’s educational park aspirations. During this period, Berkeley’s school board was pushed in two directions, with some in Berkeley (including Sullivan) asking for a decelerated integration schedule, while others in the city urged the board to retain the current timetable:

COMMUNICATION

“Please study the Master Plan Committee Report before you introduce any plans for major changes in the school system. Otherwise you’ll make a mockery of community participation in decision making for education. We plead with you also to allow the time necessary for proper planning. Let’s not give our integration attempts the chance to fail because of inadequate preparations” (BBE, May 16, 1967, p. 20)

COMMUNICATION

“The Emerson PTA met June 14, 1967. They are very interested in the problem of integration. They discussed the possibilities. They concluded that, at this late point in the school semester, the time is totally inadequate to decide on a meaningful recommendation to the Board.

“Specific concerns expressed at the meeting included the following: 1. Integration in the context of quality education; 2. Uniformity of standards for all schools; 3. That the Board give full consideration to the report of the Master Plan Committee”. (BBE, July 5, 1967, p. 24)

COMMUNICATION

“We commend the Board of Education on the adoption of the resolution of April 18, 1967 reaffirming the Board’s commitment to total integration of all the schools in Berkeley. We are pleased that a definite date, September 1968, has been set for the completion of this process which has wide community support. We hope, however, that the date of September 1968 for complete integration of the schools does not preclude the implementation by September 1967 of definite steps toward this goal.” (BBE, May 16, 1967, p. 22)
COMMUNICATION

“The Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance urges you to work with all due haste toward implementing your resolution on full integration by establishing a Fall 1967 target date for the beginning of the integration process. It is mandatory that responsible leaders like you do what is right instead of equivocating to any element in the community that is against democracy in education.” (BBE, June 6, 1967, p. 25)

Many more people urged haste than caution, validating the school board’s decision to begin the integration process in September, 1967. With the September date confirmed, Sullivan, aware the school board wouldn’t be considering an educational park integration plan, asked his officials to study the plans the board would be considering, the goal being to determine which plan was most likely to lead in the long term to an educational park system.

Assessments of Integration Plans
Presenting their initial findings in a July 21 memo, Sullivan’s Summer Study Task Force for Integration (previously the educational parks planning committee) informed Sullivan that a “middle school plan” was most compatible with educational parks:

Since July 5 our Committee has been evaluating desegregation plans for Berkeley Elementary Schools. These plans generally fall into three categories of grade level organization: K-3; 4-6; K-6; and K-4; 5-8; 9-12. Of these three categories we tend to favor the one which describes the Middle School concept. We would like you to examine the attached description of the Middle School Plan and to give us the benefits of your thinking as soon as possible. In the next few weeks we plan to write out similar descriptions of other, alternative plans for your consideration.

MIDDLE SCHOOL PLAN

Description—This plan envisions a 4-4-4 grade level division; K-4 grades will be housed in eleven full elementary buildings; 5-8 grades, in Garfield, West Campus, and Willard; 9-12, including continuation students will be accommodated at Berkeley High School and the present Washington School site.

[...]

Longterm Implications—Concentration of grade levels should favor any longterm plans for an educational park and makes pre-school expansion possible. (BUSD, 1967c)
The middle school plan was one of nineteen plans the Summer Study Task Force assessed in July and August, 1967. The nineteen plans, as the task force’s July 21 memo notes, fell into three general categories: K-3, 4-6 (students attend two elementary schools, ones kindergarten to grade 3, the other grades 4 to 6), K-6 (students attend one elementary school, kindergarten to grade 6), and K-4, 5-8, 9-12 (students attend one elementary school, kindergarten to grade 4, then a four-year middle school, then a four-year high school). All three arrangements, the task force argues, have strengths and weaknesses, meaning a given plan must be assessed in the light of specific instructional, political, and long term goals.

A document dated August 1, 1967, lacking a cover page but almost certainly produced by the Summer Study Task Force, assesses the K-3, 4-6 concept,\(^{77}\) focusing on one particular K-3, 4-6 plan. The plan, first proposed in 1964 as an adjunct to the intermediate school desegregation plan, divides Berkeley into four catchment “strips” running west to east (residential segregation meant African Americans mostly lived in the west of the city, whites mostly in the east), with each strip having a 4-6 school in the west and several K-3 schools in the east. Having discussed the instructional and political implications of the K-3, 4-6 plan, the task force touches on the plan’s long term implications:

> In the long run, the K-3, 4-6 plan might limit education park plans for boundary strips at the elementary level, unless the District would reorganize in future years. This procedure might diminish the stability of the educational experience for Berkeley’s children.

(BUSD, 1967d)

Neil V. Sullivan conceived of a child’s educational career as comprising three stages, with the first stage ending after grade 4. As a result, he saw the K-3, 4-6 concept as an inapt transitional arrangement to an educational park system, students leaving their first elementary school at an age unsuited to enrollment in a large educational park. In brief, Sullivan, envisioning educational parks as educating students in grades 5-8, couldn’t reconcile this vision with a grade organization where pupils changed schools after grade 3. Transition from a K-3, 4-6 system to an educational park system seemed to require two stages,\(^{78}\) the transition being unworkable “unless the District would reorganize in future years” (BUSD, 1967d).

\(^{77}\) The K-3, 4-6 plan was ultimately chosen by the school board.

\(^{78}\) A first stage transitioning from a K-3, 4-6 pattern to a K-4, 5-8, 9-12 pattern; a second stage transitioning to an educational park system.
An assessment of the K-6 concept appears in the Summer Study Task Group’s final report, “Integration of the Berkeley Elementary Schools: A Report to the Superintendent,” issued September, 1967, and meant to justify Sullivan’s choice of an integration plan to recommend to the school board.\textsuperscript{79} “The K-6 grade organization would require a minimum amount of change,” the task group notes, adding: “Because the K-6 plan would alter the existing class organization less than the other prototypes, the plan could be considered advantageous in its adaptability to subsequent long-range plans” (BUSD, 1967e, p. 22). In other words, since Sullivan’s educational park planning took for granted Berkeley’s (existing) K-6 grade organization, an integration plan retaining that structure made no difference in his planning; while a K-6 integration plan didn’t ease a transition to educational parks, nor did it hinder such a transition.

Of the three “categories of grade level organization” (BUSD, 1967c) assessed by the Summer Study Task Group, the K-4, 5-8, 9-12 structure was determined to be most compatible with a future educational park system, a finding that would not have surprised Neil V. Sullivan. In a February, 1966 newspaper column arguing for educational parks in Berkeley (“The Twin Goals of Progress Discussed”), Sullivan explains that in eastern cities with educational parks all preschool children (ages 2, 3, 4, 5) in the district attend one big Early Childhood center, 6, 7, 8, and 9 year olds attend the Primary Parks, 10, 11, 12, 13 year olds attend the Middle School, and 14, 15, 16, and 17 year olds attend a High School park. (Sullivan, 1966a)

Sullivan’s vision of an ideal grade organization for a district transitioning to an educational park system, then, was K-4, 5-8, 9-12, i.e. the middle school concept recommended by the Summer Study Task Force.\textsuperscript{80} If in July and August, 1967, Sullivan, realizing Berkeley was going to move on elementary integration before an educational park system could be designed (let alone funded or built), asked his staff to study all feasible integration plans as a means of identifying the plan most compatible with a future educational park system, evidence suggests he was to some extent engaging in theatre, having already described in his newspaper column (and presumably to his staff) the preferred grade arrangement in eastern cities with educational parks. Why the theatre?

\textsuperscript{79} Credited to the “Educational Park Study Staff,” the report was publicly available.

\textsuperscript{80} Sullivan, asked in January, 1968, “What, in your judgement, is the ‘ideal’ school arrangement for Berkeley?”, replied: “I share the enthusiasm of many teachers and of the School Master Plan Committee for the middle school idea—that is, a school combining the upper elementary grades with the lower secondary grades. . . if at some future point it is possible to establish middle school campuses, the program could be readily moved right on to those campuses” (BUSD, 1968c, p. VI-2). “Middle school campuses” were educational parks.
Most likely because Sullivan saw publication of a report linking the middle school concept and educational parks as raising the likelihood not only that the Berkeley school board would select the K-4, 5-8, 9-12 integration plan (because such an arrangement would ease a transition to an educational park system), but also that Berkeley would one day build educational parks (because easy to do in a district with a K-4, 5-8, 9-12 grade arrangement). Sullivan not only assumed that educational parks were coming to Berkeley, but that everyone in the city—including the school board—knew they were coming. As he saw it, the only question was how to ease their entry into the city.

While the spring and summer of 1967 saw events in Berkeley impacting on Sullivan’s educational park planning, still-more significant events were taking place in Washington D.C., where on May 25, 1967 Congress passed a law essentially stripping the BUSD of its capacity to build an educational park. Following passage of the Green Amendment81 which curtailed federal funding of public education (see pp. 117-118), the BUSD lost its enthusiasm for educational park planning, not because Sullivan and his officials no longer wanted to build an educational park, but because funding for such a park would have needed to come from the state of California, an unlikely prospect given Max Rafferty’s dislike of educational parks. Evidence of the BUSD’s loss of enthusiasm for educational park planning emerges when one compares two documents the district produced in the summer of 1967. Comparison of the documents reveals that in the period between July 21, 1967, when the Summer Staff Task Group assessed the middle school concept,82 and September, 1967, when the Summer Staff Task Group submitted its final report (“Integration of the Berkeley Elementary Schools”), the task group’s finding that a middle school plan “should favor any longterm plans for an educational park” (BUSD, 1967c) was removed from the final report.83 Indeed, between July and September 1967, the Summer Study Task Group’s draft report was edited to remove all references to educational parks, suggesting that Sullivan and his officials no longer believed an educational park would be built in Berkeley.

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81 Sponsored by Edith Green of Oregon.
82 See p.105 above.
83 The key change is found in the respective sections bearing on the K-4, 5-8, 9-12 pattern:
   “Longterm Implications: Concentration of grade levels should favor any longterm plans for an educational park and makes pre-school expansion possible” (BUSD, 1967c).

   “Further Considerations: “Total school integration would be accomplished at all levels, including early childhood education. Overcrowding in the present elementary schools would be eliminated by removing grades five and six while adding part of a preschool program” (BUSD, 1967e, p. 33).
Integration: A Plan for Berkeley

If “Integration of the Berkeley Elementary Schools,” the Summer Staff Task Group’s final report, offers clues that Sullivan and his staff were losing faith in their district’s capacity to build an educational park system, another BUSD document from 1967, Integration: A Plan for Berkeley, confirms suspicions. Published in the fall of 1967, after the school board’s decision to integrate elementary schools but before the board’s selection of an integration plan, Integration: A Plan for Berkeley is a visually appealing document, with a non-representational cover design, akin to an abstract painting, which includes a stylized title: integration: a plan for berkeley (all lower-case). The report’s twenty-nine pages include a number of photographs, most showing racially integrated groups. With its stylized cover, Integration calls to mind a certain type of 1960s jazz album cover:

Anything but accidental, these visual motifs link Integration with a milieu—the world of jazz—seen by many in the 1960s as at the vanguard of society in its acceptance of integration. As one historian of jazz writes: “Musical developments in jazz, particularly the rise of the avant-garde in the early 1960s, were intricately linked to broader social and political developments. As perhaps the longest-running site of an integrationist subculture in U.S. history, the social changes in the jazz scene since the 1920s serve as a good indication of the possibilities for racial parity, with the developments of the early 1960s being perhaps the most promising in this regard” (McMichael, 1998, p. 378). Through its use of jazz imagery, Integration posits educational segregation as no less outrageous than musical segregation.

Introducing his integration plan for Berkeley, Sullivan presents it as the consensus choice of many groups:
My recommendation to the Board of Education for an integration plan comes after much study and thought on the part of many people and after thorough consideration of reactions from townspeople and school staff. This recommendation is the product of an intense analysis of the best possible way to solve for Berkeley one of the critical problems facing American society. It has been shaped against a background of a wide and valuable public dialogue that has contributed greatly to the creation of the proposal outlined in this report. (BUSD, 1967a, p. 6)

Sullivan describes in great detail the process leading to selection of an integration plan—the appointment of two staff groups (one working in the area of organization, another studying the instructional program); the establishment of a lay-citizen advisory and review committee; the development of grade organization prototypes; the consultation with district staff, PTA units, and community groups; the formation of a Staff Advisory Council on Integration to select a plan; the selection of a plan. Central to the selection process, Sullivan explains, was study of the Summer Study Task Group report:

On September 11, the Task Groups presented their five alternative plans and possible educational programs to the staff in the afternoon and the community in the evening. Copies of the Task Group reports were distributed to all members of the certificated staff and to those groups and individuals who had submitted ideas or suggested plans. Copies of the Task reports were made available to the public at numerous locations in the School District.

Each school faculty met at least twice to consider and react to prototypes and were encouraged to submit alternatives. In an additional meeting, the staff was divided into small crosssection discussion groups. Each group contained staff members from a wide variety of assignments. They were encouraged to thoroughly examine the five prototypes and to offer alternatives if possible.

During this same period, the community was making its examination of the five prototype plans. PTA units throughout the city conducted public meetings on the plans. Various other groups held meetings. Two workshops—actually, public “town forum” type meetings—were held for community airing of reaction to the prototypes. (BUSD, 1967a, p. 7)

84 The group focused on organization was the Summer Study Task Group.
Although Sullivan mentions “Task Group reports,” only one Task Group report was distributed: “Integration of the Berkeley Elementary Schools,” i.e. the Summer Study Task Group report. This report is almost certainly what staff members, teachers, PTA units, etc. studied during the fall of 1967. As discussed above, the Summer Study Task Force report ignores the possibility of an educational park system in Berkeley, paying no attention to which grade organization pattern is most compatible with educational parks. Given this, it’s unsurprising that *Integration: A Plan for Berkeley*, a document influenced in important ways by the Summer Study Task Force report, likewise ignores educational parks, never mentioning them and recommending an integration plan that essentially shuts the door on educational park development in Berkeley. The BUSD’s September, 1967, abandonment of an educational park model is especially puzzling given that five months earlier, on May 8, 1967, the district opened an “Educational Parks and Alternatives Study Office” to house its ESEA-funded study of educational parks. So what happened between May and September, 1967 to sour the BUSD on the educational park concept?

Amendments to the ESEA

On May 9, 1967, one day after the BUSD opened its elementary parks study office, Neil V. Sullivan wrote a letter to Jeffrey Cohelan, Representative for California’s 7th Congressional district (Berkeley-Oakland) voicing concerns about the Quie Amendment, a proposed addition to the ESEA that would, in Sullivan’s words, “dramatically reduce the amount of Title I money that is distributed on the basis of the needs of disadvantaged students, and would offset this reduction by placing an increased amount to the distributed at the discretion of the chief school officer in each state” (113 Cong. Rec. 13097, 1967). Had it passed, the Quie Amendment would have converted individual ESEA grants, previously given directly to school districts, into a single block grant to be distributed according to the wishes of a state’s department of education. Such a

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85 “In the long run, the K-3, 4-6 plan might limit education park plans for boundary strips at the elementary level, unless the district would reorganize in future years. This procedure might diminish the stability of the educational experience for Berkeley’s children” (BUSD, 1967d).
86 Although disruptive of the BUSD’s educational park planning, the school board’s insistence on an accelerated integration schedule was seen as a manageable contingency. A June 6 memo announcing the opening of the BUSD’s Educational Parks and Alternatives Study Office reveals the district’s determination to carry on with educational park planning: “The main objective of our project is to study the feasibility and desirability of a series or system of community educational centers—educational parks and their alternatives—as related to Berkeley. In addition to this, we, as all of the other members of the school district’s staff and community have a more urgent objective. Namely that of eliminating de facto segregation in all of Berkeley’s schools by September 1968. This new objective has placed additional urgencies for some of the information we were to develop” (BUSD, 1967f).
87 Named for its sponsor, Representative Albert Quie of Minnesota.
change, as a May 27, 1967, editorial in Washington D.C.’s Afro-American newspaper explained, would have been disastrous for districts trying to help African American students:

State boards of education in the South are at the mercy of segregation-minded white voters and operate in fear. And in the North, and in California, they are influenced by the white backlash, which has turned too many white voters against minority citizens. . . It would be the height of folly for minority voters not to oppose a plan that would give anti-minority state governments, such as those in Florida, Georgia, Louisiana or Mississippi money to be spent on education without adequate strings attached. Yet that would be the precise effect of the Quie Amendment. ("Bury the Quie Amendment," 1967, p. 4).

Neil V. Sullivan was neither a minority voter nor a resident of a state with an anti-minority government.88 That said, he did live and work in California, whose Superintendent of Public Instruction, Max Rafferty, perceived educational parks as “beehive, concentration-camp schools” (144 Cong. Rec. 366, 1968) destructive of individuality. Sullivan, who knew passage of the Quie Amendment would mean the curtailment—if not the end—of federal funding for educational parks in California, told Cohelan that “many districts, including Berkeley, have ESEA programs well underway. If the funds are curtailed further, it will be necessary either to discontinue many highly desirable services for disadvantaged youngsters, or to take local funds from other aspects of the school program to make up for the loss” (113 Cong. Rec. 13097, 1967).

The Quie Amendment was defeated in the House on May 24, 1967. However, on May 25,89 the Green Amendment, a more targeted attack on ESEA, passed in the House by a vote of 230-185. Whereas the Quie Amendment would have converted all ESEA Title I, II, III, and V grants into block grants distributed by state governments, the Green Amendment targeted only Title III (Supplemental Educational Centers and Services) grants, turning them (but not other ESEA grants) over to state control. The Green Amendment’s primary target, the Congressional Quarterly noted at the time, was federal funding for “innovative education centers”: “Mrs. Green won support from Republicans and Southern Democrats for an amendment which transferred all Title III funds for innovative education centers to the block grant approaches” (CQ Almanac, 1967). As “innovative education centers” nonpareil, educational parks were likely what Edith

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88 Ronald Reagan was no Winthrop Rockefeller, but nor was he George Wallace.
89 The Green Amendment passed at 2:00 A.M. on May 25, following a twelve hour debate.
Green had in mind when tabling her amendment,\textsuperscript{90} and what Republicans and Southern Democrats were thinking of when voting “yes.” The Green Amendment, the \textit{Congressional Quarterly} observed, determined how ESEA Title III grants would be allocated for fiscal years 1969 and 1970: “In the final provisions of the bill, 75 percent of the Title III funds were to go to the states in fiscal 1969, and all the funds were to be channeled through the state education departments beginning in fiscal 1970” (CQ Almanac, 1967). By 1970, then, any school district seeking outside help to plan or build an educational park would need to turn to a state education department.

Continuing Activities of the Educational Park Study Task Group

Given Max Rafferty’s dislike of educational parks, passage of the Green Amendment made it difficult if not impossible for the BUSD to secure the long-range funding needed to build an educational park system.\textsuperscript{91} Neil V. Sullivan’s May, 1967 letter to Jeffrey Cohelan indicates that Sullivan was aware that his options as superintendent of Berkeley schools were shaped by decisions made in Congress: “I feel that, assuming adequate safeguards to promote integration, the federal government must play an even greater part in general school finance if schools are to meet their important challenge” (113 Cong. Rec. 13097, 1967). Sensitive to the implications for his district of the unsuccessful Quie Amendment, Sullivan certainly knew what passage of the Green Amendment meant for Berkeley schools. That said, even if Sullivan and his officials knew in the summer and fall of 1967 that passage of the Green Amendment undermined plans for an educational park system in Berkeley, the BUSD still had a federally-funded task group studying educational parks, and this task group (the investigatory equivalent of a salvage operation) had to produce a report. Toward this end, on October 2, 1967, Arthur Dambacher, chairman of the task group in question, sent a memo (“Continuing Activities”) to reassure task group members they hadn’t been forgotten:

\begin{quote}
We wish to reassure you that we have not forgotten that the important group exists and has a continuing function to perform. Now that our total involvement in the Integration
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{90} Asked in February, 1968, about possible remedies to \textit{de facto} school segregation, Edith Green replied: “I think that, instead of educational parks, I’d like to see neighborhood schools become real community centers where a child could spend many more hours of his day... It is community we are trying to build, in the Latin meaning of the word \textit{communitas}, which carries a sense of one’s dependence on his community. Twenty thousand children in one so-called educational park seems to me to inhibit \textit{communitas}” (\textit{Edith Green}, 1968, p. 309).

\textsuperscript{91} In 1968, Max Rafferty ran unsuccessfully for the US Senate; in 1970, he was defeated by Democrat Wilson Riles in an election for California Superintendent of Public Instruction.
1968 Study has terminated, we are anxious to resume our pursuit of the Educational Park Study. We have, therefore, called a meeting for Thursday, October 19, at 7:30 P.M. in the Educational Parks Study Office at 2556 Grove Street. This will be a nonstructured meeting without an advance agenda. We should, however, like you to offer your advice on the future direction of our study. (Dambacher, 1967)

Notes from the October 19, 1967, meeting reveal a task group (and a school district) struggling to adapt to changed circumstances:

The meeting was called to order at 7:30 p.m. by Arthur D. Dambacher, who introduced its purpose as a reorientation for the members to the on-going activities of the Study. That, after rather strenuously studying the Alternative aspects to an educational park, we would continue with the feasibility study and consider other educational park prototypes for Berkeley.

[...]

The concerns and problems related to the transition from the recommended-intermediate\(^{92}\) school plan to the middle school plan, together with the implications for facilities were noted. (BUSD, 1967g)

What these notes indicate is that some members of the educational parks study task force were troubled by the prospect of a two-stage transition to an educational park system, during which the district would first adopt a middle school model (a reorganization rejected in July), after which it would move to an educational park system, with grade 5-8 middle schools becoming educational parks. In any case, while the task force is still engaged in educational park planning, the planning is no longer seen as urgent: “The change from a working committee, to a ‘sounding board’ advisory committee was discussed, and the members present concurred” (BUSD, 1967g).

On November 14, the educational parks task group met again, with some members expressing “concern for time, money, and workload for educational park planning in addition to the necessary effort to implement the Integration Plan 1968. It was pointed out that park plans should be definite enough for the federal government to justify further study, that educational park plans because of Integration 1968, must be long-range” (BUSD, 1967h). As these concerns indicate, by November, 1967, the educational parks task group recognized (1) that “Integration Plan 1968” was the district’s primary responsibility, and (2) that following implementation of

\(^{92}\) The word “intermediate” here is either a mistake (it should read “elementary”) or a synonym for “medium-term.”
Integration Plan 1968, Berkeley would be a unique city, where normal rules of educational park planning no longer applied. In a sense, the educational park study was becoming an end in itself as committee members, aware their recommendations would never be implemented, came to feel the substance of those recommendations no longer mattered. “Dan Freudenthal noted that the Educational Park Study ending in June 1968, did not need a definitive plan for a Berkeley Educational Park, only a basic progress report stating our direction as a means for further planning” (BUSD, 1967h).

On October 17, a date falling between the first and second of the meetings described above, the Master Plan Committee presented its final report to an audience at Berkeley High School. Two volumes and 581 pages long, the work of 138 people who invested “in excess of 20,000 [hours] over the two and one-half years life of the Committee” (BUSD, 1967b, p. ii), the report was meant to establish “guidelines for the District to follow over 25 or 30 years” (BUSD, 1967b, p. i). When completed in October, 1967, the report included the full findings of four of five master plan committees, with many findings of Committee IV (Community Environment, School Buildings and Facilities) withheld for publication in a separate report.93 Publication of Berkeley’s Master Plan Committee report was both a tragedy and a farce, the BUSD having by October, 1967, moved in a direction unanticipated in the report. Simultaneously acknowledging and denying this fact, Marc Monheimer, the Master Plan Committee’s chair, entreated people to read his committee’s report: “We believe the overview of the Berkeley Unified School District which is represented in the Report of the Master Plan Committee can and should be of extreme value to the District and to those who so often look to the District for leadership. We trust the efforts of this Committee will not have been wasted” (BUSD, 1967b, p. iv). Monheimer’s trust was misplaced. Especially wasted was time committee members devoted to studying educational parks, not only members of Committee IV, whose assignment obliged them to study educational parks, but members of many other committees and subcommittees as well:

The concept of educational parks as a solution to disparities in opportunity and achievement between different cultural groups is attractive from the point of view of making all specialized staff available in a single location. This would make possible a

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broader range of curriculum and activities and allow greater interaction between different kinds of students (Committee II: Special Education. In BUSD, 1967b, p. II-6)

An educational park may present opportunities for presenting a high quality program with more efficient use of staff and resources. However, implementation of a full creative arts program should not await the arrival of either flexible scheduling or an educational park. (Subcommittee on Creative Arts. In BUSD, 1967i, p. I-73)

In the course of our studies, we considered the implications of an educational park on the science curriculum. We concluded that the logistics and application of the inquiry method of science instruction would probably be facilitated by an educational park setting. However, an excellent science program is not at all contingent on an educational park organization, and should not be used as a justification for this innovation. (Subcommittee on Science. In BUSD, 1967i, p. I-176)

We can see advantages from the centralization of facilities, services, and specialists. However, educational parks require counseling and teaching personnel, instructional material centers and learning laboratories to serve extremely large numbers of students. Therefore, a concerted effort must be made to ensure an educational environment in which individual needs can be met. We wish to emphasize that, unless the integrity of the small group and, indeed, the individual is maintained, education for the gifted would actually receive a setback in an educational park. (Subcommittee on Gifted Children. In BUSD, 1967i, p. II-47)

The educational park would be an excellent medium to incorporate many of the aforementioned programs. Availability of all of the school districts’ specialists in a single location seems to offer more efficient use of personnel and plant, thereby offering a broader curriculum and greater variety of experiences for the children involved. A more expanded and comprehensive educational plan should be a positive result. (Subcommittee on Services for Blind Children. In BUSD, 1967i, p. II-76)
As these passages suggest, educational parks feature prominently in the Master Plan Committee report, testimony both to how ‘with it’ the committee was when began its work, and to how out of touch the committee was when its report was issued. Yet *Integrated Quality Education*, the stand-alone report of Committee IV, had even less impact on BUSD planning and policy.

*Integrated Quality Education*

Released to some fanfare in August, 1968, *Integrated Quality Education* described in detail a comprehensive Berkeley educational park system, envisioning, as the *Oakland Tribune* explained, “a total of nine huge parks contained on some of the existing 22 sites. . . Four primary school parks, serving 6,800 children from age 3 through grade 3. . . Two ‘middle school’ parks, for grades four through eight, would house 6,400 students on expanded sites. . . . The present Berkeley High School site, expanded to include the Washington Elementary School area would serve 4,750 students in grades nine through 12. It would be divided into two units” ("A Bold New School Plan,” 1968, p. 21). That *Integrated Quality Education* describes middle school parks serving grades 4-8 shows that the report’s authors had adapted to changing conditions in Berkeley, abandoning the idea of reorganizing the district to a K-4, 5-8, 9-12 pattern to ease transition to an educational park system. But this is the authors’ only concession to reality. The proposed “Crescent Plan,” the *Tribune* adds, “carries a price tag of nearly $57 million” ("A Bold New Plan,” 1968, p. 21), a figure almost three times the annual budget of the BUSD. Did Sullivan believe the Crescent Plan would be implemented? Did anyone on his staff? Sullivan’s own lack of belief is evident in his decision, announced on September 11, 1968, to resign as head of Berkeley schools, a decision so unexpected as to elicit bewildered scorn from Carol Sibley, the school board’s president:

The whole community, including your School Board President, was shocked and disturbed by the sudden news of Dr. Sullivan’s resignation as Superintendent of the Berkeley Unified School District, on the very day after the successful, long planned for and long awaited opening of our completely integrated schools, a goal in which Superintendent Sullivan had played a dynamic and vital role.

[. . .]

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95 “Called the Crescent Plan because the proposed sites are located on a curving line through the center of the city” ("A Bold New Plan, Oakland Tribune, August 2, p. 21).
When Dr. Sullivan personally called me Wednesday morning and told me he was announcing that morning his acceptance of the position of Commissioner of Education for the State of Massachusetts and would be leaving Berkeley with very real regret by February 1, 1969, I was literally dumbfounded. I had known we could probably not keep a man of his national reputation for too many years, but I was naive enough to believe that the four year contract he had signed with us only last November at a large and deserved increase in salary would prevent his leaving too suddenly and without more notice to his Board. (BBE, September 17, 1968, p. 2)

As Education Commissioner in Massachusetts, Neil V. Sullivan continued his educational park advocacy, suggesting Sullivan’s resignation was in part linked to his realization that Berkeley was not about to break ground on an educational park. Just possibly Sullivan delayed his (very abrupt) resignation to gauge the school board’s response to *Quality Integrated Education*, hoping for a response so enthusiastic as to revive educational park planning in Berkeley. If so, Sullivan was disappointed, for although many journalists were excited by the Crescent Plan, school board members, judging from board minutes from the fall of 1968, were not. And this despite the Crescent Plan’s many inducements. If many 1960s educational park designs had an aura of science fiction about them, the park in *Quality Integrated Education* was truly futuristic.

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96 As late as 1971, Sullivan was advocating for educational parks: “The educational park concept is promising both as an avenue of attack on de facto segregation and as a means of making significant improvements in our educational programs” (Sullivan, 1971b, p. 100).
Written descriptions, too, highlight the space age qualities of Berkeley’s planned educational park:

There would be one resource center for each of the Park’s two schools, or two resource centers within a Park. . . Each would house library and audio-visual aid material and media, individual- and group-study spaces, and special study and listening carrels. In addition, the resource centers would contain special teaching facilities including the student center, multipurpose laboratories, e.g., science, domestic and fine arts with storage and preparation areas, and a subdividable lecture center which would seat 400 students.

[. . .]

There would be a gymnasium, dressing rooms, swimming pool, and paved and turfed playing areas. The gymnasium would double as the Park’s auditorium, serving all the schools. It would have a stage and related equipment, and a music facility with rehearsal rooms and instrument storage space. (BUSD, 1968a, p. 57)

Publication of Integrated Quality Education ensured the educational park concept in Berkeley went out with a bang not a whimper, with the concept garnering more attention in one day than in the previous three years. This raises an interesting question: What if Integrated Quality Education had appeared a year earlier, in August, 1967, when Sullivan and his officials were choosing an integration plan to recommend to the school board? Although Integrated Quality Education focuses on the “quality” features of a Berkeley educational park system, it does attend to “integrated” aspects as well, arguing “Maximum racial and socio-economic integration is a major advantage of the park concept. Students would be drawn from a wide geographic area, which would represent a cross section of the community population” (BUSD, 1968a, p. 35) and concluding “There is a logic to the educational park concept which spells hope. Through its size, students from diverse backgrounds can Meet and work and play together in an environment rich in its varieties of modern media and professional expertise” (BUSD, 1968a, p. 70). Given that the Crescent Plan results in total integration, might the school board have chosen it over the K-3, 4-6 plan? Probably not, because quality and integration notwithstanding, the Crescent Plan’s $57 million price tag would have raised eyebrows, as would the extended time frame.97

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97 “The school superintendent, Neil V. Sullivan, indicated the first park may be built within the next five years” (“Educational Park Plan at Berkeley,” 1968, p. 6).
Speaking to reporters at the release of *Integrated Quality Education*, Neil V. Sullivan addressed the issue of cost, explaining that “construction would be partly financed by sale of valuable land on which Berkeley’s 22 neighborhood schools now stand. Other money would come from state and federal sources” (“Educational Park Plan at Berkeley,” 1968, p. 6). Had anything changed between May, 1967, when the Green Amendment passed, and August 1968, when *Integrated Quality Education* was released, to indicate federal funding might be available for a Berkeley educational park? On June 4, 1968, Max Rafferty, State Superintendent of Public Instruction and staunch foe of educational parks, defeated incumbent Senator Thomas Kuchel in the Republican Senatorial primary, raising the possibility of Rafferty leaving his post in as State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Did the prospect of someone new in charge of California’s schools rekindle Sullivan’s hopes of federal funding for educational parks?98

As for the extended timeframe, the Crescent Plan was the work of planners who saw full integration of Berkeley’s schools as a medium- or long-term goal, one that could wait five or ten years. Their mistake was to assume everyone in Berkeley shared this view. Given that as early as December, 1965, the Longfellow PTA, an important African American community group, was pleading with the school board to move on elementary integration,99 August, 1967, was probably too late to propose a five or ten year integration plan.

Berkeley’s failure to build an educational park reflected both local circumstances and national conditions. That said, it was events in Congress, most obviously the May, 1967, passage of the Green Amendment, that most hindered the BUSD’s educational park planning. Without a reliable source of funding for its educational park plans, the district lost heart, resigning itself to a reorganization unsuited to a future educational park system. Given what the BUSD achieved in 1968, it might seem odd to lament what wasn’t accomplished. Nonetheless, total integration of a city’s schools, no matter how dramatic or unprecedented an achievement, is less impressive than construction of a “new environment which would coordinate the personal and the impersonal to embrace all aspects of living” (BUSD, 1968a, p. 70).

98 In November, 1968, Rafferty lost the general election to Democrat Alan Cranston.
99 “We are not asking that you give our children any more than what’s entitled to them... Education is important in every respect to be able to survive in this day and age, and our children need this opportunity to be able to prove and use it. Take our feelings to heart and see if today’s children can be tomorrow leaders” (BBE, December 7, 1965, p. 12).
CHAPTER NINE: THE DECLINE OF THE EDUCATIONAL PARK MOVEMENT

Speaking in the House of Representatives on October 6, 1966, Richard Russell (D. Georgia), characterized the educational park concept as a hodge-podge of contradictory ideas:

We have had applications approved for educational parks. Some are in operation. But they vary greatly in their composition and in the work they do. It would be of great benefit to everyone concerned with education, particularly at the level of the trustees of the local school districts, who nearly always are public-spirited citizens who give much of their time and energy to try to improve their educational systems, if we more clearly defined what was contemplated in a bill of this nature. (112 Cong. Rec. 25493 1966)

Russell’s invoking of confused school trustees suggests that late in 1966 the average American had no real idea of what an educational park looked like or was intended to do. If not exactly a tabula rasa, the educational park concept was at this time sufficiently empty to hold any number of representations, making the concept a paradigmatic site for what Miguel A. Cabrera calls “the struggle to impose a certain definition” (2004, p. 9). “What is an educational park?” This is the question Richard Russell was pondering in October 1966—not in a detached, philosophical way, but impatiently, demanding an answer if only to allow for an informed decision about whether to support educational park funding. “Being now placed in the position where a vote in favor of the bill is a vote not only supporting the perverted guidelines already promulgated but any future vagaries of the Commissioner of Education I have no alternative but to vote against it” (Russell in 112 Cong. Rec. 25493 1966). Embracing the role of representative for public-spirited school trustees, Russell voices frustration at being asked to support a concept which is simultaneously blurry (“future vagaries”) and sharp edged (“perverted guidelines”). Vexed by his own lack of knowledge about the “composition” and “work” of educational parks (112 Cong. Rec. 25493 1966), Russell implies that educational park proponents, like religious proselytizers, promise a blissful future while enacting a painful present.

The educational park movement failed for a number of reasons: educational parks were difficult to site and expensive to build; the parks were long-term projects while other integration devices brought immediate results; educational parks meant the end of neighborhood schools and their associated sense of community. Yet if pragmatists had many reasons to oppose educational parks, the educational park movement did not fail because park advocates were out-reasoned and out-argued by their opponents. As Richard Russell’s complaints indicate, the educational park
movement failed because it was unable (to adopt Cabrera’s language) “to impose a particular image of the world” (2004, p. 9). In the mid-sixties, the educational park movement was united in seeing educational parks as “quality integrated schools;” the movement knew what image it wanted to impose.\footnote{The phrase “quality integrated education” is ubiquitous in educational park advocacy documents. E.g.:}

The problem for the movement was that over a two-year period (1964-66) it failed, as Teun van Dijk might write, “to change the mind of others in [its] own interests” (1993, p. 254, italics in original).

The 1960s debate over educational parks was marked by fear-mongering and hysteria, transpiring outside an arena governed by logic and rationality. While park opponents certainly fueled the fires of alarmism, the immoderation is best explained by reference to the intervention of Harold Howe II, for it was Howe who, speaking on May 13, 1966, first presented educational parks as unwanted schools imposed on unwelcoming cities, characterizing them not as quality integrated schools but as integrated schools where quality is an afterthought: “These entities will have 20,000 or more pupils, and will cut across all geographic, economic, and social boundaries to draw students. While such a park would deny the neighborhood school, it would express the vitality, the imagination, and the cultural mix that every vigorous city exemplifies” (1966a, p. 11). Although Howe here presents educational parks as quality schools of a kind, it’s a different kind of quality than that promised by the educational park movement as a whole. Nowhere does Howe mention new technologies or innovative teaching methods, the “bait” the movement was laying for whites. In spotlighting only the integrated nature of educational parks, Howe, whether intentionally or accidentally, alarmed various groups (neighborhood schoolers; racial separatists; anti-federalists) who quickly seized on his representation of an educational park and circulated it widely, erasing in the process the educational park movement’s more nuanced representation. In

\footnote{The phrase “quality integrated education” is ubiquitous in educational park advocacy documents. E.g.:}

“The concept of the educational park, an innovation in the organization of schools clustering them to make maximum use of commonly shared educational facilities, was developed about five years ago in response to the nation-wide search for high quality, integrated education” (Wolff, 1967a, p. 1).

“The over-all goal is quality integrated education This ultimately will mean the development of educational parks in the cities, the integration of suburban school districts and the elimination of the last vestiges of the dual school system in the South” (“The Park Way,” 1966, p. 48).

“The education park concept may well be one path to the achievement of quality integrated education” (New York City Board of Education, 1965, p. 13).
effect, Harold Howe was to the educational park movement what Jackson Pollock was to modern art: like Pollock, Howe took a blank canvas and filled it with a multitude of colors, terrifying as a result conservative-minded people.

Opponents of educational parks soon began repeating Howe’s characterization of educational parks. In fact, opponents’ preferred tactic, in attacking the educational park concept, was to derisively quote Howe’s May 13 speech:

Well, there you have it. “The educational park of the future.” The use of government funds “if I have my way,” not merely to plan but to construct super-schools to which even pre-kindergardeners will be transported to provide a “cultural mix.” This, remember, is the U.S. Commissioner of Education speaking. (Jones, 1966, p. A4)

Although Harold Howe II’s critics sometimes distorted the Commissioner’s remarks, critics for the most part gave Howe and his staff free rein to (in Paul A. Fino’s inelegant words) “condemn themselves out of their own mouth” (112 Cong. Rec. 22755, 1966). Given that a straight line can be drawn between Howe’s May 13, 1966, speech and the Green Amendment of May, 1967, the speech was a disaster for the educational park movement, representing the moment when the movement lost control of its message. In Berkeley and elsewhere, the Green Amendment made long-term educational park planning impossible, an ironic twist given Harold Howe II’s interest in “planning the educational park of the future” (1966a, p. 12). Had Howe shown less interest in planning educational parks, more parks would almost certainly have been planned and built.

“An Old Idea that Fizzled.”

On April 8, 1972, three weeks after Richard Nixon delivered an important message on education to Congress, the Washington Post published an article, “‘Educational Parks’: An Old Idea that Fizzled,” offering various answers to the question “what squelched the enthusiasm for the educational park idea” (Von Eckardt, 1972, p. A14). The article’s timing was not accidental for Nixon’s March 17 message on education (“Busing and Equality of Educational Opportunity”) included, among seven remedies on education (“Busing and Equality of Educational Opportunity”) included, among seven remedies to the “denial of equal opportunity” (Nixon, 1972, p. 9), “the use of magnet schools or educational parks to promote integration” (Nixon, 1972, p. 9). It was, as Wolf Von Eckardt, author of the Washington Post piece noted, “surprising” (p. A14) to find Nixon mentioning educational parks because the educational park concept, as Von Eckardt also noted, had by 1972 “sank in the morass of ideological confusion, the cost/benefit syndrome, and
the political inertia that seems to frustrate all our attempts to attack the urban dilemma” (p. A14). The mystery of Nixon’s willingness to fund educational parks is quickly solved, not surprisingly by reference to Nixon’s cynicism and opportunism. Advocating for educational parks, Nixon in his March 17 speech also proposes placing severe limits on busing of students for desegregation, arguing: “What is objectionable is an arbitrary Federal requirement—whether administrative or judicial—that the community must undertake massive additional busing as a matter of Federal law” (1973, p. 10). As Nixon knew, transportation was a key part of the educational park puzzle, precisely because educational parks were designed to replace neighborhood schools, meaning an educational park system without busing was a non-starter. If Nixon’s offer to fund educational parks was a cynical ruse, the ruse had no real target, educational park advocates being in 1972 few and far between. So why did the educational park idea “fizzle”? Von Eckardt’s answer to this question is a good point of departure for exploration of the obstacle-filled terrain traversed by the educational park movement. The “theory” of the educational park, writes Von Eckardt: is, of course, that you achieve integration if you send thousands of children, who would otherwise attend segregated neighborhood schools in both the white suburbs and the black inner city, to one big campus. (p. A14)

The balance of Von Eckardt’s article challenges this theory, not by attacking its logic but rather by describing three failed attempts at educational park planning, in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York City. In all three cities, Von Eckardt explains, the educational park idea was embraced and then abandoned, either because the planned park was deemed ineffective for desegregation (Philadelphia), impractical to construct (Baltimore), or politically divisive (New York City). But, Von Eckardt adds, it was not “case histories” alone (p. A14) that destroyed enthusiasm for the educational park idea, “There is also a growing skepticism about bigness. The economies of scale, to begin with, are dubious in this case” (p. A14). While Von Eckardt’s review of important case histories reveals his familiarity with the history of the educational park movement, it is his

101 In Von Eckardt’s words: “And how, at any rate, are the children to get there without buses?” (p. A14).
102 That Nixon’s March 17 address mentioned educational parks is best explained by reference to his Commissioner of Education, Sidney Marland, one-time Superintendent of Pittsburgh schools and long-time educational park advocate. In 1967, Marland published “The Education Park Concept in Pittsburgh,” which argued that the education park “for reasons of its freshness, innovative tone, and architectural appeal, seems to be a place where teaching and learning will be livelier, better, more relevant to the world of the year 2000. The park suggests that its existence will trigger new and better curricular arrangements for young people simply because the park itself is new, and the environment for teaching will foster a spirit of vitality, a respect for and excitement about learning” (Marland, 1967, p. 329).
discussion of “bigness” that marks him as conversant with educational park theory, for the word “bigness,” as Von Eckardt notes, is the abracadabra of educational park advocacy: “The idea that in one big school you can concentrate the best teachers, the best libraries and other facilities, and the best new teaching methods is seductive” (p. A14). Von Eckardt is not interested in attacking the educational park concept, instead wanting to explain why educational park projects rarely got past the planning stage. Citing an influential study of educational park planning, he argues that if in some cities “technical engineering problems” (p. A14) prevented park construction, and if in other cities “social and political [problems]” (p. A14) derailed park projects, “the main reason for skepticism about the [educational park] proposal is contained in the CORDE report, whose chief author, Cyril C. Sargent, seems still sympathetic to it” (p. A14):

“The education park,” the report says, “can be nothing more than an interesting idea if it serves an area undergoing unplanned and undirected population changes. Similarly, the park or parks can be rendered impotent as far as integration is concerned if planned for a city becoming predominantly non-white and having no discernible or effective public policy to maintain diversity.” (Von Eckardt, 1972, p. A14)

“Without such a policy—and what American city really has one?—” Von Eckardt adds, meaning a policy aimed at ending white flight to the suburbs, “educational parks will more often than not result in segregation on a mammoth scale” (p. A14).

Von Eckardt’s article points us, if indirectly, at the best explanation for the failure of the educational park movement. In tying the fizzling of the educational park idea to the absence of a “discernible or effective public policy to maintain diversity” (A14), Von Eckardt joins numerous educational park advocates in arguing that educational park projects, if they are to succeed, must be government projects, supported if not directly funded by federal, state, or municipal agencies implementing policies conducive to educational park construction and operation. What “public policy to maintain diversity” does Von Eckardt have in mind? One policy is busing—“large scale transportation” of students (p. A14). Again citing CORDE’s 1968 report, Von Eckardt writes that for an educational park project to succeed there has to be “as much large-scale transportation and awkward gerrymandering of school districts to integrate school parks as would be required to integrate neighborhood schools” (p. A14). For Von Eckardt, then, as for CORDE, a successful

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103 A Report on the Education Park (1968) was published by the Community Research and Development (CORDE) Corporation.
educational park project would have two salient features: (1) the federal government would support it; and (2) federal support for the project would be demonstrated through federal backing of a busing plan (and, less importantly, rezoned school districts). Von Eckardt’s vision of federal support for educational parks—in which support was manifest in backing of busing and/or rezoning plans—was one of four visions of federal support for educational parks put forth during the 1960s, with other visions offered by the educational park movement, opponents of educational parks, and U.S. Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II. In a sense, it wasn’t so much ideas about the form or purpose of educational parks that mattered during the 1960s educational park debate as ideas about whether and/or how the federal government should back educational parks. If members of the educational park movement envisioned with joy the federal government funding educational park planning and construction, and if opponents of educational parks imagined with horror the federal government directing educational park activity and curricula, neither conceptualization (let alone Von Eckardt’s bus-centric notion) had the impact of Harold Howe II’s well-meant but ill-conceived dream of the federal government “funding one or two great American cities that are adventurous enough to join us in planning the educational park of the future” (1966a, p. 11). Howe’s benign dream, once seized on and distorted by educational park opponents, became a nightmare in which the federal government took complete control of public education. Offhandedly sharing his idea of how the federal government might support educational parks, Harold Howe II inadvertently armed powerful groups predisposed to dislike such parks, groups who, distorting Howe’s dream—twisting it into a fantasy of federal tyranny—undermined public and political support for educational parks.

The End of Educational Park Planning in Berkeley

Neil V. Sullivan’s resignation as superintendent of Berkeley schools took effect on February 1, 1969. On March 1, Richard Foster, previously superintendent of the San Ramon, California, school district became superintendent of the BUSD. Three and a half months later, on June 17, 1969, William Porter, chair of the Citizens Committee for the Study of the Report on Educational Parks and Alternatives,104 presented to the school board his committee’s assessment of Integrated Quality Education to the school board, focusing his remarks “on those sections in [Integrated Quality Education] with which the Committee concurred, pointing out certain areas

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104 This study of a study anticipates the 1970s paralysis of the BUSD.
of concern dealing with educational and economic feasibility, [and] limitations in the proposals as presented” (BBE, June 17, 1969, p. 14). The minutes of the June 17 school board meeting reveal that by the middle of 1969 the educational park concept was as passé in Berkeley as mop-top Beatles wigs:

Superintendent Foster requested, since he had not been with the District when the concept of Educational Parks and Alternatives was initiated, that he be given an opportunity to meet with Mr. Porter’s Committee so that he might get the full historical background on what has been developing in this regard. (BBE, June 17, 1969, p. 14)

This reference is the last mention of educational parks in extant minutes of the Berkeley school board.105 Aware in the summer of 1967 that federal funding for an educational park system would need to pass through Max Rafferty’s hands to reach Berkeley, Neil V. Sullivan and his staff accepted the inevitable: transition to a school system which, to quote Integration: A Plan for Berkeley, “contains no inherent improvement over the present system other than integration itself” (BUSD, 1967a, p. 16). Did Neil V. Sullivan see no value in “integration itself”? Of course Sullivan valued integration, but an integrated school, unlike a quality integrated school, might be either good or bad, state-of-the-art or run-of-the-mill.

Much remains to be written about the shortcomings of school integration in Berkeley, shortcomings which have resulted in a de facto segregated Berkeley High School, where decades after full integration of Berkeley’s schools, “The average white BHS student boasts a 3.2 grade point average while his black peer posts a 2.1. White BHS kids average in the top 85 percent of students nationwide, while their black classmates average in the below 40 percent. Most of the white students go on to four-year colleges, while most black students fail or drop out” (Rebensdorf, 2000). Given Berkeley’s continuing struggle to lift the achievement levels of African-American students, it’s hard not to wonder if an educational park system would have made a difference. Speaking at a July, 1966, school board meeting, Neil V. Sullivan discussed the concept of middle schools through educational parks, emphasizing that educational parks are a means for providing quality education where small schools breed educational neglect. Dr. Sullivan pointed out that Berkeley High School is already really an educational park. (BBE, July 12, 1966, p. 7)

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As the only high school in Berkeley, Berkeley High School is fully integrated, being in the year 2000 “the most racially diverse high school in the nation. At 38 percent African-American, 31 percent white, 14 percent Hispanic, 8 percent Asian and 8 percent multiracial, BHS has actively worked against the national trend of resegregation.” (Rebensdorf, 2000). Yet while Berkeley High as a whole is integrated, its classrooms—due to tracking and other factors—are not.106 This suggests that absent aggressive measures to prevent segregated classrooms, any educational park built in Berkeley would have become similarly segregated.

106 “[R]acial separation is not limited to the clustering that occurs outside the school. It shows up in classrooms and clubs throughout the school, and these forms are not voluntary. Rather, they are products of the school’s structure and organization. Although the separations created by tracking—the practice of sorting students into courses based on some measure or estimate of their academic ability—are less visible, their impact on student outcomes is far more profound. Despite its obvious divergence from Berkeley’s long-term commitment to racial integration, racial separation in all its forms, like racial disparities in academic achievement, is a social phenomenon that had come to be accepted as normal at BHS” (Noguera and Wing, 2006).
CONCLUSION: MAGNETIC SCHOOLS

As school forms offering “richer programs and more services than any individual school could provide,” educational parks were aimed at “attracting white middle class families who might otherwise exit to the suburbs or to private schools” (Buder, 1966, p. E7). Leonard Buder was by no means alone in emphasizing the attractiveness of educational parks, e.g.:

Involving students from a wide area attracted by the superior opportunities, such a park will guarantee school integration even before housing is desegregated. (King, 1968, p. 206)

Tradition-oriented white citizens will be attracted to back education parks, where they oppose neighborhood school pairing, because the park package gleams so handsomely. (Dentler, 1964, p. 22)

It is hoped that in time education parks will provide a school and community environment so attractive that they will stimulate increasing voluntary racial integration. (Freudenthal, 1966a)

As these passages hint, educational parks were envisioned by many members of the educational park movement as nothing if not attractive, meaning both that educational parks would definitely be attractive, and (punningly) that absent their attractiveness, educational parks had no value.

Another school form designed to attract is the magnet school. “The magnet school concept was developed as a means of ensuring equal opportunity through a racially/ethnically mixed student body,” writes Rolf K. Blank. “By enrolling students according to their interests in a curricular theme, magnets can voluntarily bring together students from different racial/ethnic groups and different levels of academic ability” (1983, p. 4). During the 1970s, as the educational park concept fell into obscurity, the magnet school concept came into its own, to the point that by 1982 “some 138 districts operated a total of 1,109 magnet schools” (Dentler, 1990, p. 62). Yet if in the 1970s (to say nothing of subsequent decades) the magnet school concept eclipsed the educational park concept, the eclipsing was akin to a moon’s eclipsing of its originative planet, the magnet school concept having emerged directly from the

107 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, in 2010 there were 2,722 magnet schools in the United States, enrolling over two million students. (Peters-Lambert, 2015, p. 79)
educational park concept, sharing many of the earlier concept’s attributes and first catching on in many cities where educational parks had been, or were being, planned.

The familial relationship between the educational park concept and the magnet school concept becomes clear when one looks at events in Pittsburgh in the late 1960s. While consensus holds that the first magnet school opened in Tacoma, Washington in 1968, the Tacoma school district, one official explained in 1981, borrowed rather than invented the magnet school concept:

> We knew we had to do something, but we also wanted alternatives to the coercive methods of integration, such as forced busing, that we saw being talked about elsewhere. That’s when we stumbled on an article about someone in Pittsburgh advocating the establishment of a school that would do something so well that students would want to enroll. They called it a “magnet school.” I’d never heard the term, but suddenly we envisioned McCarver as a school of excellence—good enough to pull in white students from the more affluent neighborhoods. (In Rossell, 2005, p. 47)

Revealing the similarity of the educational park and magnet school concepts (both school types were intended to be “good enough to pull in white students from the more affluent neighborhoods”), this passage also hints at a birthplace for the latter concept: Pittsburgh. And indeed, in 1967 Pittsburgh had plans to build five “Great High Schools” whose greatness would reflect not only their size but also their high quality. As Nicholas Wheeler Robinson explained in a 1968 article: “On the present timetable the first of five Great High Schools will open in 1972 at a cost of more than $30 million. Its object is to provide high quality education for about 5,000 students, where the ‘best minds of the world can, and will, be gathered and made available to any student in any school, even in the most deprived sector of the city.’ Its great size will permit an immense variety of courses and will call for special social and administrative organization within the schools” (p. 29). Dubbed “magnet schools” by Tacoma officials (who learned the term in an article about “someone in Pittsburgh”), Pittsburgh’s proposed Great High Schools were, as Nicholas Wheeler Robinson noted in 1968, paradigmatic educational parks. “The Great High Schools developed from a farsighted and original interpretation of the Education Park. When the idea of Education Park was first considered shortly after Dr. Marland came to Pittsburgh in 1963, relatively small sites were proposed with facilities for elementary and secondary education—the high schools to have 1500 students” (p. 28). That Tacoma officials (and officials in other cities) saw

108 “The year was 1968. . . That fall McCarver Elementary in Tacoma, Washington, hung out its shingle inviting students from anywhere in the city to enroll, breaking the link between school assignment and residential location and becoming the nation’s first ‘magnet’ school” (Rossell, 2005, p. 44).
educational parks as “magnet schools” first and (for instance) “school complexes” second or not at all indicates that it was the parks’ magnetism that struck a nerve with educators, magnetism educators in Tacoma and elsewhere came to ascribe not to the park’s size and related technological gadgetry but to their specialized programming:

What are magnet schools? The federal courts have defined magnet schools as those having a “distinctive program of study” that will attract a voluntary cross section of students from all racial groups. Federal regulations define magnet schools as those with a “special curriculum capable of attracting substantial numbers of students of different racial backgrounds.” Educators have defined them as schools offering a “variety of educational offerings” that will result in voluntary integration of the students enrolled. In all these definitions four criteria stand out:

1. Magnet schools must offer an educational program that is different, special, distinctive or otherwise distinguishable from the regular curriculum in nonmagnet schools.
2. The special curriculum must be attractive to students of all races, not just whites or blacks or Hispanics or other minority groups.
3. Magnet schools must be racially mixed and must have the effect of eliminating segregation of the races among the students.
4. Magnet schools should be open to all students of all races on a voluntary basis, and any admission criteria that are imposed must not have the effect of discriminating on the basis of race. (McMillan, 1980, p. 8)

Of these four criteria, only one relates to what a magnet school offers: an educational program that is “different,” “special,” or “distinctive.” An educational park, by way of contrast, offers many things: cutting-edge equipment; concert halls and gymasia; innovative teaching methods. What this suggests is that, in effect, a magnet school is an educational park with the expensive features removed—perhaps explaining why magnet schools, rather than educational parks, sprouted like mushrooms in the austere 1970s.

The emergence and success of the magnet school concept owes everything to the educational park movement, which first developed and disseminated the idea that integration can be achieved by endowing schools with features attractive enough to lure white families. Does this mean the educational park movement achieved a measure of success? Not really. “Magnet schools have almost always been used to avoid or somehow deflect court-ordered desegregation efforts,” argues Charles B. McMillan. “There are exceptions; some magnet schools have been developed because of a sincere desire by school
officials to integrate the schools and enrich the educational options for all children, but they are few and far between. In the main, the magnet school movement has emerged as a direct and sometimes creative response to court-ordered desegregation (1980, p. 18). Also presenting the magnet school concept as a mixed blessing is Robert A. Dentler\textsuperscript{109} who writes: “Magnet plans can have great desegregative impact if they were intended to have it and if the school board and administration make a strong effort to carry through on this intention. Magnet policies can be adopted alternatively as a ‘shell game’ in order to create the appearance of desegregation; to introduce a stall or a stop in the course of litigation; to set up havens for selective subgroups of parents and students; to advance elites objectives espoused by some school board members and parent constituents; or to admit minority students but then fail them or counsel them out or remand them to inferior schools, thus providing a new source of discrimination” (1990, p. 75). In brief, while we may never know whether the educational park concept would have fulfilled its promise, we know the magnet school idea often does not. Thus, even the educational park movement’s most notable achievement—making voluntary integration appear a credible proposition—is a bittersweet legacy.

\textsuperscript{109} Dentler’s evolution from an expert on educational parks into an authority on magnet schools is more evidence that the two school forms are closely related.
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