Major Research Paper

The Harper Administration’s Securitization of Iran

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July 1, 2016
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Abstract

Despite Iran’s hostile relations with the West since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Canada had often played the role of an honest broker and maintained relations with Iran, contrary to the US. Although the Canadian Government has always viewed the Islamic Regime as hostile, it was interested in pursuing diplomacy and other means to pressure Iran in areas such as human rights violations. This approach to dealing with Iran was altered and moved towards securitization after 2006, with the election of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. This paper will examine the securitization theory and apply it to the Harper administration’s approach to Iran, leading up to the final securitized moment of the closure of the Canadian embassy in Tehran and the expulsion of Iranian diplomats from Ottawa in 2012. This paper will then analyze the reasons that the Canadian Government provided for pursuing this decision.

Ultimately, the research will present the argument that Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s identification of Iran as the biggest threat to global peace and security was an exaggeration of the real level of threat that Iran actually posed. This inflated level of threat may have had many causes, but chief among them was the Prime Minister’s personal convictions and relations with Israel and his foreign affairs policy approach which discouraged him from communicating with states or entities that were categorized as bad. Although this decision did not have any devastating effects on Canada, given that relations with Iran were always limited, it also did not achieve any desirable outcomes. In addition, various components of this securitizing move, such as listing Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, have rendered any decision by future governments to reinstall relations with Iran difficult.
Introduction

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s relationship has been tense with other states in the region and across the world. The relationship between the West and Iran hit particular difficulty after the US embassy take over, at which point the US ended its diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic. After aiding one of their closest allies in the hostage crisis, the Canadian government nevertheless maintained its diplomatic relations with Iran, despite periods of high and low tensions. However, as the concern over Iran’s nuclear development program heightened in the 2000s, with hostility increased towards the West and Israel during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and with the election of Prime Minister Harper in 2006, the ties between Iran and Canada began to take on new strains. This paper will seek to examine how the Harper administration securitized Iran and whether this was an optimal course of action for Canada. Given this goal, the focus of this paper will be on the relationship between Iran and Canada from 2006, running through to the termination of diplomatic relations which was symbolized by the closure of the embassies in 2012. Ultimately, this paper will establish that although Iran did pose some threats, the claim that Iran was the biggest threat to international peace and security was inflated through the process of securitization.

Securitization within this paper will follow the theory originating from the Copenhagen School which identifies securitization as a constructed process where a particular actor or object is moved from the normal realm to a security realm through speech-acts. Based on this theory, successful securitization enables one to treat the object or actor in any way possible because they are seen as a security threat; therefore rules of everyday behaviour do not apply. In this specific case, the closure of the embassy by the Government of Canada will be treated as a symbol of the
outcome of the Government’s securitization. This is a relevant area of research within Canada’s foreign policy context and further serves as a case study example within global politics.

This case study is unique in that the Government of Canada specifically identified Iran as “the biggest threat to world peace and security” during a time when many other countries or non-state actors in the Middle East region were seen globally as being significant security threats. This stance was made further hostile by the Canadian Government’s decision to list Iran as a state sponsor of terror through the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act. As such, it is important to analyze the context and events that occurred in order to understand why this decision was pursued. Furthermore, this research is an interesting case study as it shows a shift away from the more traditional Canadian approach of leaning towards diplomacy.

Through the discussion below, this paper will aim to identify a discrepancy between the threat that Canada associated with Iran and the reality of the threat of the Islamic Regime. This conflict of perception will highlight the importance of this case study as it will reveal that Iran was not in fact the severe threat that the government portrayed, but rather a deliberate securitizing process was used to construct an extreme level of threat. Through this analysis some indications will be revealed as to why the Harper administration might have pursued this path at this particular time in history, especially as it relates to the relationship of Israel and Canada, in addition to the administration’s specific views of disengaging with problematic states. As will be noted, this approach was different from Canada’s allies at this particular time. Furthermore, despite promises to reengage with Iran, Canada has not yet fulfilled this target.
Research Design and Methodology

The time frame for this research dates from 2006 until the end of diplomatic relations as symbolized by Canada’s decisions to close the embassies in 2012. This specific time frame is significant because the Harper Conservative government came into power in 2006 and it was this government that chose to end relations with Iran in 2012. As this paper will explore, the view of Iran within the Canadian Government took on a heightened level of security during this period.

I will pursue a qualitative research method for this paper with an explanatory and naturalistic approach to the available information. The naturalistic approach is essential as this case study provides context of events that are important to understand the relationship that existed between Canada and Iran, and how or why it ended. Given that this paper will be examining international politics, and the behavior and decision-making process of a country, it involves the issue of perception. ¹ As the decision-making process and mind-set of state leaders and other officials can never fully be known, the use of perceptions to evaluate events is necessary, despite the fact that it may not always be fully objective. In this paper, the events and various official statements during the outlined time frame will be analyzed within the securitization theory’s framework. Finally, the paper will utilize an explanatory approach in order to analyze the reasons identified by Canada for ending its relations with Iran in 2012, with the aim of comparing this to the contextual reality. Subsequently, the ultimate goal is to identify how Iran was securitized and then to examine the justifications for this securitization in order to show that the level of threat was inflated.

Research will be conducted on defining the securitization theory in order to enable application to this specific case study. The securitization theory was particularly selected because by way of its application through speech-act, it is in fact a political move\(^2\); therefore anything that falls into the realm of securitization has to be legitimized as it can also be criticized. Consequently, this lens creates a way to examine how various issues are brought into the political realm by given actors in order to achieve specific goals, while also providing an opportunity to evaluate these decisions. As explained in more detail below, the process of securitization is a social construction process through which an object is represented as a threat and thereby treated in a particular way; outside of norms.

Prior to examining Canada’s relations with Iran, it will be necessary to briefly touch on the relationship between Iran and the West, along with its regional neighbours. As a result, this paper will briefly touch on the macrosecuritization theory and how this broader framing of Iran affected Canada’s approach. This will be achieved through an examination of articles discussing the various tensions and issues at stake that largely isolated Iran from the international world.

In following, I will be identifying Canada’s approach to Iran during the outlined time frame to establish the securitization process with the use of multiple sources of evidence. I will be examining government publications, acts and legislations that affected Iran, and the reasons for which they were adopted. In addition, speeches, press releases, and other forms of communication by former Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the relevant Ministers of Foreign Affairs will be examined as examples of speech-acts. A few specific events that occurred during this time period that may have affected the relations and the securitization process will also be

examined with the use of news articles. These events are important because they show the
government’s view of Iran and are the backdrop in the decision to end relations with Iran. An
examination of the combination of these resources will reveal the securitization process through
speech-acts and other specific mechanism utilized.

Finally I will be examining the reasons that Canada gave for shutting down the embassies
to establish the validity of the claims made by the government. This consideration is important as
it will allow for an exploration of whether or not the decision made by Canada on to how to
move forward with Iran was optimal. The use of “optimal” here is meant to infer whether the
decision was advantageous to Canada and whether it motivated or pushed Iran towards the
direction that the Government of Canada claimed it wanted; regime change.

**Defining Securitization**

Securitization is a deliberate political move used to frame a particular object, identified as
the referent object, as a security issue. This process enables the securitizing actor to go beyond
the regular rules of society in treating that subject, and instead uses any means it deems
necessary.3 In this way, securitization is a social construction that brings a certain level of power
to one actor over another and this power stretches the bounds of the relations outside of the
norm. In addition, security issues are not seen as objective issues but rather social and political
processes.4 Such a process is achieved by an actor who engages with an audience through speech
acts in order to establish the existence of a security threat against a referent object.5 It is the

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4 Williams, Michael C., 2003, p. 513.

establishment of this very threat - an existential threat - which justifies the use of measures outside of normal politics. What this theory therefore claims is that security is about survival and that issues can be moved to the realm of security deliberately and in order to accomplish specific goals. In other words, the perception of an existential threat does not mean such a level of threat exists in reality, but rather that the threat was achieved through a specific social and political process.

According to the theory, the process of securitization is achieved by saying the word ‘security’ along with the particular issue. The utterance of the word identifies an issue as falling within emergency conditions and allows for extraordinary measures to be used to deter or erase the threat. Thus the act of saying security is a performative act that achieves something similar to the performative act of saying ‘promise’. This process is achieved through speech-acts that frame the security story, thereby moving the object or issue outside of normal politics to security politics. The link to an existential threat is a necessity within this process as it leads to the justification of other actions, such as treating the issue with urgency and priority, using the highest level of power to make extraordinary moves, and the ability to side-step normal rules in society. The process of securitization is thus moving an issue or object along a continuum, from non politicised to politicized (and in the realm of public debate) to securitized.

The process of securitization involves a securitizing actor; someone who engages in the speech-acts; and an audience that accepts the securitization move. Although this process of securitization may appear very open and applicable against an indefinite number of issues or

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6 Ibid, p. 36.
7 Ibid, p. 21.
8 Ibid, p. 35.
actors, securitization theorists argue that the success of securitization depends on the context, and is characterized by three ‘felicity conditions’.  

Conventional Order of Securitization

The first of these conditions is that the securitization process follow the conventional order of securitization. (i.e. presenting a link to an existential threat and thereby legitimizing the use of extraordinary measures against the threat. 

Securitizing Actor with Authority

Second, the securitizing actor must be in a position of authority that provides him/her with enough social and political power to convince an audience of the securitizing move. Thus a successful securitizing act is related to the social and institutional position of the speaker, which relates to the form of power beyond the mere speech-acts.

Historical Relevance

Finally, a securitizing move will be more likely to be accepted by an audience, and therefore successful, if it has historically been viewed as threatening or harmful, or if it has a history of hostile sentiments. As a result, although any object can theoretically be securitized, there are limitations to its success given the relevant context.

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12 Ibid.
14 Waever, Ole, 2000, p. 252.
In the discussions below, the Canadian securitization of Iran will be discussed, where the securitizing actors are primarily former Prime Minister Stephen Harper and several former Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In this case, securitization was achieved through numerous speech-acts and certain specific events that helped portray the Islamic Republic as a security threat. The framing of Iran as an existential threat, not specifically to Canada but rather as a threat to the international community, was done through linking the Islamic Regime to several different issues. The majority of the given audience here was arguably the Canadian public, but also, to a certain extent, the international audience. This will be made apparent when discussing several of the speeches that were made at the UN. This paper, however, will not emphasize the audience in the securitizing process as speech-acts will be understood primarily in an illocutionary sense; meaning the act in saying a specific thing\textsuperscript{15} as opposed to discussing the consequences of this act and how it may have been viewed or understood by the audience. As a result, the focus of this paper will be on the securitizing process and speech-acts made by government officials and certain events that intensified this process, without specific examination of how the construction of the threat was perceived by the domestic or international audience. This position was largely taken due to the lack of resources available to identify specifically how the domestic or international audience reacted to this securitization process.

Another factor that can lead to the success of a securitizing move is to link the threat of the referent object to universalist ideologies or values, as such a link enables the securitization process to appeal to a larger audience.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, specific watchwords such as \textit{human rights} or \textit{democracy}, can be used in speech acts, particularly by Western actors, because they also


connect with a wider set of audience due to their ability to relay information about a specific set of values or convey a particular feeling.\textsuperscript{17} For example, if an actor refers to terrorism, it is not necessary to delve into a lengthy explanation of what terrorism is, despite the fact that various experts may define it in different ways and degrees. The public at large has a particular understanding of what terrorism is in our current world, therefore the association of the word terrorism with any object has an automatic inference. As the discussion in this paper will demonstrate, universalist values and watchwords were frequently used by Canadian Government officials to frame the securitization of Iran.

Finally, security issues and practices are not rigidly defined, but rather they vary from one locale and/or time period to another.\textsuperscript{18} Concepts such as democracy and human rights are important in our current world, but they were not important or rather did not even always exist. Similarly, the idea of terrorism has taken on a new image in the post 9/11 era, and therefore reference to terrorism today may have a different consequence and reaction compared to what it would have had a few decades ago. In examining this particular case study, we will see reference to very specific threats as they relate to our current history. Furthermore, unlike other approaches in international relations which seek to examine relations or acts between states, securitization is not specific to any international relations theory, but rather it can be utilized or criticized alongside any theory. Thus, this analytical case study of the securitization process of Iran by the Harper administration can be achieved without delving into the realm of specific international relations theories.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Stritzel, Holger, 2011, p. 346.
Iran and the West - Macrosecuritization

The Canadian securitization of Iran took place within a larger context of macrosecuritization of Iran by the West, dominated by the US and Israel. In brief, macrosecuritization occurs when there is an aggregation of multiple securitization, whether or not this is a coordinated move by the securitizing actors.\textsuperscript{19} In other words, it is the process of securitization by multiple actors which reinforces the securitized status of the referent object or actor. This aggregation can move up above a state-level issue to an ideological level where numerous aspects of an object or state are seen as an existential threat.\textsuperscript{20} In the case of Iran, this is very much true. Though certain aspects of the regime have been securitized on a state-level such as its pursuit of nuclear ambitions, it is largely the very ideologies of the Islamic Regime that are considered as an existential threat by the West.

The start of this hostile relationship can be traced back to the Islamic Revolution under the leadership of Khomeini in 1979. Despite the promises of independence, freedom and prosperity for all, the real outcome of this revolution was quickly realized by the West who saw the Islamic Regime as a hostile one. Similarly, many of the revolutionary youth in Iran began to question this change in the government of Iran. The hostile view of the regime was soon confirmed by the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran and the holding of hostages later that year in exchange for the Shah’s return to Iran from his refuge in the US to face trial for the crimes he was accused of.\textsuperscript{21} Supreme Leader Khomeini cited, “Those who support great powers like Britain, which has given asylum to Bakhtiar, and the United States, which has given refuge

\textsuperscript{19} Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole, 2009, p. 257.
to that corrupt germ, will be confronted in a different manner by us if they continue.”

Such rhetoric was accompanied by other visuals including flag-burning and death-to-America chanting videos that flooded the media. The sentiments from these actions lived on in the minds of Americans and many others in the West, and perhaps rightly so, as clerics of the Regime continued to make similar remarks in the years to come. In response to this situation, US President Jimmy Carter labeled the hostages as victims of terrorism and anarchy; a label that has been tagged onto Iran ever since. Internationally, this event is remembered as Iran’s violation of international law in granting diplomatic immunity. Within Iran, these acts were viewed differently by various members of the population, ranging from a strengthening in the belief of the Islamic Regime to fear of the new theocracy and decisions to flee Iran. In the US, the hostage crisis led to the end of diplomatic relations between the two states and the first series of legal economic sanctions against Iran, which still continue and have expanded to date.

With the tragic occurrence of 9/11, relations grew more hostile again as Iran was labeled as an evil regime in the region. During a State of the Union Address in early 2002, President George W. Bush famously referred to Iran, alongside Iraq and North Korea, as the axis of evil given their export of terror and repression of their people. In addition, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear ambitions, largely painted as being solely for the purpose of building weapons and thus subjecting it to numerous rounds of sanctions by the UN and individual countries; the disastrous presidential term of Ahmadinejad; the steady decline in the economic situation; the extreme hostility in international relations; growth of factional division within the Islamic Regime; and the worsening of freedoms and liberties for the people of Iran only amplified the already

22 Ibid.
deteriorated relations. The hostile view of Iran was increased during this period and Iran was increasingly isolated not only in its region, but also internationally in social, political, and economic aspects.

Within this West-Iran dynamic, it is important to acknowledge that the Islamic Regime has had a deep-rooted distrust of Western powers, particularly the US and the various regional states that have often cooperated or benefited from alliances with the US, such as its neighbouring Gulf states. What this therefore entails is a counter securitization move by Iran given a long history of mistrust of the US and UK, and by extension, the rest of the West.

Given this background, a securitization of Iran by Canada was not a difficult course of action and the context was set for it to succeed. In fact, Canada’s relations with Iran were already hostile since the Islamic Revolution and therefore the process of securitization by the Harper administration did not begin on a clean slate. More specifically, given the structural similarities in the institutions and values of Canada and other liberal-democratic countries in the West, very little stood in the way of enabling the Harper administration to further construct the Iranian threat and thereby move to an accepted state of securitization. The use of numerous universalist values and language common in liberal democracies were used to further strengthen the securitizing move.25 For example, the use of language such as human rights and terrorism have very specific connotations in the world, particularly in the West. The use of these universalist concepts linked to a specific object or actor will automatically bring a certain definition and understanding, given that these issues are embedded in the social fabric. Thus, the use of such language is very

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effective in linking the securitizing move in one situation, as with Canada, to that of others; thereby strengthening the success of this move.

Despite the visual and descriptive memory of Iran based on past events, I will argue in this paper that the actual level of threat that Iran has posed, particularly to Canada, was inflated by the Harper administration and that the rhetoric from individuals in the Islamic Regime should not be taken at face value. What is especially worth examining in the securitization of Iran by Canada is that the Harper administration moved forward with securitization at a very significant time. Canadian allies like the US and the UK had previously made this move at particularly hostile times in history (i.e. the hostage situation in Tehran in 1979). As stated earlier, during these very tense times, Canada maintained its relations with Iran and committed to its often assumed diplomatic stance, while also explicitly displaying that it was not on Iran’s side. Fast-track a few decades forward at a time when those very allies were working towards cooperation with Iran, Canada sees the Harper administration choosing to move in a different direction.

It is important here to keep in mind that the eventual Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement that was reached with Iran to curb its nuclear activities does not mean a warming of relations between Iran and the US. The US and other P5+1 states (China, Russia, France and the UK) made efforts to negotiate with Iran due to a calculated move to benefit all parties involved, and thereby decreased regional and global risks. In fact, despite the move towards negotiations with Iran being labelled as a bold move by President Obama, the US continues to securitize Iran, as evidenced through the lack of an embassy, lack of trade, and
continuous American sanctions that prohibit investment in Iran. At the same time, the US continues to have relations with Arab Gulf states, thereby showing that its policies in the region have not shifted favourably towards Iran. Nonetheless, the approach taken by Canada differed by that of its closest ally. Such a move may have been optimal or inevitable had this decision been made following a specific significant event that tarnished the Canadian-Iranian relationship in a dramatic way, however this was not the case. In actuality, many negative events have sporadically taken place throughout the years to tarnish the relations between Canada and Iran, but none have been so drastic during the examined period to end relations. Canada did not join its allies in their strategic move, but instead chose to move towards the securitization of Iran by closing all ties. Given the various other security issues in the Middle East region and the strategies of its allies, the singling out of Iran for securitization by the Harper administration is a questionable move worthy of further analysis.

The Iranian Level of Threat

Prior to an examination of how Canada portrayed Iran during the Harper administration, it is important to identify the actual level of threat that Iran posed between 2006 to 2012 (i.e. the reference point to which the securitized version of the Islamic Regime could be compared to). The Islamic Regime was indeed a hostile regime and it did have a very negative opinion of the West, which it expressed quite clearly and very often. It is however also important to point out that the hostility to the West was largely directly attributed to the US, rather than Canada, as the former has historically been viewed as meddlesome in the affairs of Iran and other countries in

26 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “Obama’s Former Middle East Advisor: We Should Have Bombed Assad.” The Atlantic, April 20, 2016.
27 Ibid.
the region. Although the Islamic Regime took this grievance to extreme levels, many moderate Iranians may have had the same feelings of mistrust due to Western meddling in the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953.\textsuperscript{28} In addition, the Islamic Regime has been particularly bitter due to the American backing of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war.\textsuperscript{29} Thus it is possible to understand the nature of some of the historical grievances against the West, even if the reactionary consequences cannot be justified.

As it relates to the claims of Iran’s terrorist threat, or funding of terrorism, and the much-feared development of weapons-grade nuclear capabilities, some realities must be highlighted. In the wake of 9/11, when much of the anti-terrorism discourse came to the spotlight, and Iran was identified as being on the axis of evil, there was no link established to Iran. Conversely, funding for these acts, training of personnel, or the individuals implicated in these acts, have been linked to other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan; and yet, these states have not been subjected to the same international sanctions and condemnations that Iran has experienced, and instead continue to benefit from relations with Western countries. Since that time, no other terrorist attacks in the West, i.e. in North America or Europe, had links with Iran.

The Islamic Regime does however contribute to organizations, such as Hezbollah, that are identified as terrorist organizations. Although, even as Hezbollah is popularly referred to as Iran’s shiia proxy, it has grown increasingly autonomous over the years despite the fact that Iran continues to provide it with significant support.\textsuperscript{30} In addition, some points of contention reveal

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item 29 Harris, Shane and Aid, Matthew M. “Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran.” \textit{Foreign Policy}, August 26, 2013.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
that Hezbollah has a leadership of its own and is not orchestrated by Iran. Similarly many have criticized Iran’s funding of Hamas, but again, Iran’s funding is limited and there are major points of disagreement between the Islamic Regime and Hamas which have led to a distancing in their relations. Furthermore, although other regional states that have supported Hamas have decreased their funding, they did not at the time face the same condemnation that Iran now faces due to its support and funding of Hamas.

In general, a logical examination of Iran’s actions and funding of external actors will reveal that the Regime’s outreach is very limited. Indeed, Iran has very few allies in the region and in the broader international world and it has not displayed an expansionist vision. It has used its proxy’s on occasion, but generally, much of the actions it has committed have been defensive rather than offensive moves. The bottom line for the regime seems to be control of its own territory and the continued strength of the Islamic Regime, and elimination of external influence within the state.

This same logical argument can be used to examine the Iranian threat to Israel. Despite the hundreds of provocative and unacceptable statements made by Iranian officials, particularly the Supreme Leader, Iran’s actions to date have not revealed an existential threat to Israel. Furthermore, given the military capabilities of Israel and the strong Western support that it enjoys, any direct attack on Israel by Iran would result in the collapse of the Islamic Regime. The actions of the Regime to date however have not displayed any intention of irrational behaviour and instead have shown that the Regime acts in a manner to contain its power within the state and maintain its existence. Therefore, despite the anti-Israeli rhetoric, a logical examination of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{31}}\text{Ibid.}\]
actions thus far, and the analysis of possible outcomes of an attack, reveal that Iran is not in reality an existential threat to Israel.

This brings us to the issue of the nuclear capability of Iran. There are several versions of this story. The first version is the one portrayed by the West and by popular media outlets that insist Iran was seeking weapons-grade nuclear capability, arguing that once achieved, Iran will be a threat to the international community. On the opposing end is the story illustrated by Iran that argues nuclear ambitions are not for weapons but are rather for peaceful scientific expansions to be used as an energy source.\(^3\) There also exist several credible claims that lie in between these two extremes. I will point out two of these arguments, which are interrelated. The first is that given Iran’s geographical and political situation, it felt threatened by its regional neighbours and therefore desired nuclear capability in order to have a credible means of deterrence. This argument is further enhanced by the reality that others in the region, i.e. Israel and Pakistan, both possess nuclear weapons. The second credible argument is that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons with the intention to increase its own security and perhaps its level of power and influence in the region and on an international platform, rather than actually use them.\(^3\) Given Iran’s decreased power and influence in the Middle East, and its continued state of loneliness given its ethnic, religious, political and strategic differences with its neighbours,\(^3\) nuclear capability could ensure Iran has a voice in regional and perhaps international matters. Thus nuclear capability, if it was indeed being pursued in the interest of weapons-grade, was for the purposes of gaining influence.

\(^{32}\) Chapple, Irene and Thompson, Mark. “Hassan Rouhani: Iran will continue program for peaceful purposes.” CNN, January 23, 2014.

\(^{33}\) Waltz, Kenneth N. “Why Iran should get the bomb.” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2012.

\(^{34}\) Juneau, Thomas, 2014, p. 92.
Finally, we must assess the Islamic Regime’s threat to the population of Iran. Arguably, this is one of the most problematic aspects of the Islamic Regime. The people of Iran are subject to gross violations of human rights and unfair laws, furthered by arbitrary sentences. This issue is further impacted by the level of bribery and corruption within all institutions. Many ethnic and religious minorities are subject to even more hardships. Therefore the international community should indeed continue to condemn Iran on its treatment of its people and stand behind activists of all types in Iran who take great risks to voice their opposition to the Islamic Regime.

What this reveals is that Iran was not the greatest threat to international peace and security, as the Harper administration identified. Instead, Iran can be characterized as a regime that although hostile, was rational and interested in its self-preservation and sought means to increase its own security in the region. Given this fact, while some actions of the Islamic Regime have been threatening, such as its support of proxies in the region, there was opportunity for Canada to explore other means, such as diplomacy, to work with the Regime. The biggest threat that the Islamic Regime posed was to its own people with consideration to the violations of rights and freedoms.

Canada’s view of the Islamic Regime

Three felicity conditions were identified in order to achieve securitization. In the case of Iran’s securitization, the first two conditions were easily met. First, given the historical relationship between Iran since the Islamic Revolution and the rest of the world, particularly the Western world as detailed in the previous section, there clearly already existed a very hostile relationship and Iran was always seen as a threat, to varying degrees. Specifically in Canada,

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36 Ibid.
although the level of hostility may have been lower than that of our southern neighbor, Canada always discerned which side it was on. The condition to have the necessary background for a successful securitization clearly existed in the case of securitizing Iran. Second, as the chief securitizing actor was former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and by extension, government ministers, the condition of having a securitizing actor with sufficient authority and credibility was also easily met. Therefore what remains to be examined is the third felicity condition of whether the process of securitization followed the conventional order, i.e. establishing the link to a threat through the use of the word ‘security’ and other speech-acts and using extraordinary means once the threat was established. This condition was met through numerous speeches and statements by the Prime Minister and other ministers, all falling in similar lines of: “The Iranian regime continues to threaten global security and ignore its international obligations… Canada will work with its allies to encourage effective responses to the threat that Iran poses to international peace and security,”\(^37\) and “Iran’s actions and aggressive statements are an affront to the efforts of Canada and like-minded countries to ensure peace and security worldwide… No state can threaten international peace and security without consequences”\(^38\)

The securitization of Iran was framed around three key threats: the threat to Israel; the threat to the people of Iran, which was mainly comprised of violations of rights and freedoms; and most significantly, the threat to international peace and security, which included Iran’s nuclear ambitions and support of terrorist organizations. Ultimately, what this exploration will reveal is that although Canada was always hostile to Iran, the relationship was securitized and terminated since the Islamic Regime was seen as inherently evil by the Harper administration. As


a result any form of relations with Iran could only take place upon the formation of a new regime. This was a different view from what others may have argued for, perhaps believed by our allies such as the Obama administration, that gradual negotiation would reduce hostility and the possibility of military operations and that cooperation would allow Iran to integrate into the international realm and thereby result in gradual improvements in the Regime. The administration however was insistent on presenting a new foreign policy approach for Canada, as statements discussed below will reveal.

The Threat to Israel

The first key threat that is revealed throughout the speeches and statements of government officials is the threat that Iran poses to Israel. This coincides with an increase in closeness and defence of Israel, at a higher level than Canada has had previously. Prime Minister Stephen Harper made numerous statements during his every year of administration condemning anti-Israeli statements by Iranian officials, which often resembled the following:

“On behalf of the Government of Canada, I want to condemn, in the strongest terms, this latest example of anti-Israeli and racist statements from the President of Iran. In addition, the conference hosted by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with the sole purpose of denying the Holocaust is an offence to all Canadians.”

There is no denying that Iranian officials do in fact make threatening statements against Israel and that such statements and behavior is unacceptable. However what lacks here is an analysis of whether these are merely statements or if there is any threat of action implicit behind these statements.

39 Harper, Stephen. “Statement by the Prime Minister on statements from the President of Iran.” Ottawa, December 12, 2006.
This Iranian threat to Israel is reinforced by the numerous speeches that identify the threat to Israel as being created in the international community and even being endorsed by the UN.

“And I know, by the way, because I have the bruises to show for it, that whether it is at the United Nations, or any other international forum, the easy thing to do is simply to just get along and go along with this anti-Israeli rhetoric, to pretend it is just being even-handed, and to excuse oneself with the label of ‘honest broker.’ There are, after all, a lot more votes, a lot more, in being anti-Israeli than in taking a stand. But, as long as I am Prime Minister, whether it is at the UN or the Francophonie or anywhere else, Canada will take that stand, whatever the cost.”

These statements reveal Canada’s intention during these years to be the champion of the Israeli cause, through a close relationship between Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and to move away from the international community that often criticized many of Israel’s actions such as its occupation and military acts through forums such as the UN. Canada, as the strongest supporter of Israel, was as such especially concerned about the threatening language that Iranian officials regularly invoked against Israel. What’s problematic here is that Canada often refers to the hypocrisy in the UN while appearing to be ignorant of its own hypocrisy in this context, such as; fully supporting Israel and praising its democratic institutions while failing to acknowledge the violations in international law in occupied territories and mistreatment of Palestinians, and most notably; the occupation of Palestinian territory and the displacement of people and the expropriation of resources as well as discriminatory state policies that severely impact the lives of Palestinians.⁴¹

To establish the legitimacy of this strong support, Canadian officials use watchwords such as *freedom* and *democracy* to link the societal values of Canada and Israel and justify their state-level friendship.

“Let me state at the outset, and for the record, that Israel has no greater friend in the world than Canada… You see, for us it’s all about values. Canada and Israel—like the United States—share the same values. We respect freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Dignity for the people we serve. We have a history of defending the vulnerable, challenging the aggressor and confronting evil.”

These references to friendship and shared values are strengthened by heartwarming imagery and a linkage to what is fair and just.

“Some 20 years ago, I had a summer job at the very ministry of foreign affairs that I am pleased to lead now….Once, I was told, simply, that it was raining in Metula. Most of you in the audience probably know that when one says it’s raining in Metula, one means that there are rockets being indiscriminately launched into one of Israel’s most northern towns…Naïve as I was then, I asked the official: What do we do next? What should Canada do? His response was something that will stay with me for the rest of my life. He said, “John, on this issue, it’s difficult to tell the white hats from the black hats.” I sat there, doodling. White hat, black hat. Israel, Hezbollah. Liberal democracy, terrorist organization. Canada’s best friend, our worst enemy.”

As stated before the use of concepts such as freedom and democracy are very effective in securitization because they have widely understood meanings associated with them. By referring to the shared democratic system in Israel and Canada, there is no need to go into detail to explain what this value is because the audience understands the value of democracy. What these statements however fail to identify is the actual underlying reasons, for this close relationship since there are many states across the world that have democratic institutions and protect human rights, but are not directly labeled as Canada’s best friend.

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43 Ibid.
The numerous speeches on this topic also reveal the Harper administration’s intention of creating a new foreign policy approach for Canada. Throughout speeches referring to Canada’s support of Israel, it is stated that Canada does not simply want to be an “honest broker” nor will it “go along to get along”. In the words of former Minister Baird:

“Some decided it would be better to paint Canada as a so-called honest broker. I call it being afraid to take a clear position… even when that’s what’s needed. So I’m proud to say Canada no longer simply “goes along to get along” in the conduct of its foreign policy. We will stand for what is principled and just, regardless of whether it is popular, convenient or expedient.”

These statements can be seen as a critique to the previous years of Canadian foreign policy where the approach was generally to support our allies, while maintaining a stance seen internationally as “the peace keeper.” Instead, the Harper administration aimed to deliver the message that this character of Canada has changed, and that it will not follow its allies or the UN. The close level of friendship with Israel and unconditional support of the state however does not have a justification and should certainly not involve a failure to acknowledge Israel’s violations of international law. The friendship can in fact be seen in a negative sense as it led the Harper administration to make certain decisions specifically in the interest of Israel, such as cutting ties with Iran and a stance against the UN, without any particular advantages to Canada.

**The Threat to the People of Iran**

The second area of threat identified in Iran is the threat that the regime poses to its people, including issues such as violations of human rights, restrictions on freedoms, and the failure to protect minority groups. These statements were particularly frequent after the protests of the Green Movement in 2009:

“Iran’s continued blatant disregard for the rights of its citizens must end. Canada calls on the Iranian regime to uphold its human rights commitments by allowing

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freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly; protecting religious minorities; respecting the human rights of prisoners and detainees; and ensuring equal treatment of women and girls…. Canada strongly urges the Iranian regime to respect diverse social and political groups and their freedom of expression, and to engage these groups in a constructive dialogue that will serve to strengthen the rich fabric of the Iranian nation.46

There is a lot of merit in these statements as Iran does in fact violate many rights of its population, sometimes through its very problematic laws, and other times through arbitrary enforcement and judgments. Historical analysis also reveals that the abuse of rights tends to increase as activists increase their opposition to the government or when there are times of high factional politics within the government. These issues were even more in the world’s view after the 2009 presidential elections that led to the Green Movement. Here again the use of watchwords such as human rights and freedom of press can easily convey a message to the audience without the need for further explanation.

Watchwords were used once more in various statements to accurately condemn Iran’s failure to protect minority groups, specifically through arbitrary arrests and sentencing of religious minorities.

“I note with regret reports that Iranian authorities have decided to continue the imprisonment of seven Bahá’í community leaders, while reducing their sentences from 20 to 10 years. Canada maintains that these individuals appear to have been imprisoned because of their religious beliefs and that therefore they should be released unconditionally and reunited with their families as soon as possible. Canada remains deeply concerned by the ongoing failure of Iranian authorities to meet their domestic and international legal obligations with respect to the rights of both Iranian and dual-nationality citizens. The use of televised confessions of questionable authenticity is one example of Iran’s attempts to intimidate its citizens, degrade individuals and prejudge the outcome of cases….Canada is a vigorous defender of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”47

Such statements condemning the justice system of Iran occurred often and for various reasons. Condemnation of Iran, aside from the protection of minority groups such as the Baha’i minority religion population, extends to the protection of women, particularly in cases of forced confessions, and sentencing based and numerous statements on the protection of journalists and activists.

“We are deeply concerned by reports of this severe sentence against Mr. Derakhshan….Mr. Derakhshan’s situation is complicated by his dual nationality, which is not recognized by the Iranian authorities. Iran must release him and other dual nationals who have been unjustly detained. Canada is using diplomatic and all other available channels to gain access to Mr. Derakhshan and to ensure that his legal rights are respected. We continue to strongly urge Iran to fully respect all of its human rights obligations, including freedom of expression, both in law and in practice.”

The statements of violations of the Islamic Regime are accompanied by sentiments of support for the people of Iran and their opposition to their government: “Canada continues to believe that these outrageous comments by the President of Iran do not reflect the traditions and values of the Iranian people.” Such sentiments of support for the people of Iran and their right to freedoms are furthered by referring to the success of Iranian-Canadians.

“There are many people of Iranian heritage who call Canada home, and who contribute to the success and prosperity of our country. We have the greatest respect for the Iranian culture and for the achievements of the Iranian people. It is of utmost importance to Canada that the Iranian people be allowed the rights and freedoms that Canadians hold dear.”

Such statements convey the message that the Government of Canada was standing with the people of Iran, while slowly disengaging with the Government of Iran. The goal was to securitize the current government, while appearing to stand by the side of the people in order to push for a change in government in Iran. Although the threat to the people of Iran was real at the time and

49 Harper, Stephen. “Prime Minister’s statement following remarks by President of Iran.” Ottawa, April 15, 2006.
50 Cannon, Lawrence. “Address by Minister Canon at Media Availability with Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi.” Ottawa, April 27, 2010.
continues to be so today, the specific references to Iran’s human right’s situation still falls within the bounds of securitization because Canada did not make the same types of references to the numerous other regimes that violate the rights and freedoms of their population. Furthermore, although Iran posed a threat to its population, this threat did not directly effect Canada and therefore did not require an end to relations. In fact, in situations such as that of Iranian-Canadian journalists and other activists in jail in Iran, it would have been beneficial for Canada to maintain diplomatic ties as a way of allowing for direct communication with Iran.

The Threat to International Peace and Security

The most significant threat linked to Iran was its identification as the biggest threat to global peace and security. This label of Iran is significant given that it was used repeatedly during a time when the world faced major security concerns such as Al Qaida and the Taliban. Iran’s threat to global peace and security is aimed to be established through the referral of Iran’s nuclear program to build weapons, which was a common opinion in the international community, and a vague reference of the Islamic Regime as inherently evil through links to terrorism and other activities.

Alongside the international community, Canadian officials ensured to condemn all advancement in the nuclear program of Iran and to identify the program as a threat to security.

“Canada is deeply troubled by the recent revelation that Iran has been building a covert uranium enrichment facility for several years. This is especially worrisome considering the continuous repugnant statements by the President of Iran. Canada is unequivocal in stating that a regime that abuses its own people, crushes democratic desires and shows little regard for its neighbours is a threat to the world community should it acquire nuclear weapons. We condemn Iran’s continued refusal to meet its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and
International Atomic Energy Association requirements. Iran’s actions threaten regional stability and international peace and security.”

As these statements reveal, Iran’s nuclear program is identified as a regional and global threat. Similarly, Iran’s lack of democracy and human rights is simultaneously identified as another cause for regional and global instability.

“Iran’s past history of deliberately concealing aspects of its nuclear program makes this latest move even more worrying. Through its actions, Iran continues to test the resolve of the international community. It is time for Iran to end its defiance of the international community, suspend its enrichment activity and take immediate steps toward transparency and compliance by halting the construction of new enrichment sites, and fully cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency… In addition to our unease with the Iranian nuclear program, Canada will continue to voice our very serious concerns with the Iranian regime’s stifling of democracy, its deplorable human rights practices, and its negative implications for both regional and global stability.”

Similarly:

“For almost 20 years, Iran has concealed its nuclear program and has violated its international obligations on non-proliferation. Nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat to humankind. Iran continues to keep that threat alive. Today, alongside our like-minded allies, Canada is implementing additional sanctions against Iran. Iran’s continued disregard for successive UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions calling on it to comply with international nuclear obligations and suspend its enrichment activities is unacceptable. Iran’s actions and aggressive statements are an affront to the efforts of Canada and like-minded countries to ensure peace and security worldwide.”

The Iranian nuclear program as a regional and international threat is one that was easy to conceive as it was being echoed by numerous other countries and international organizations. However, the Harper administration took the Iranian threat further by also identifying it as the biggest threat to peace and security given its connection to terrorism through its support and funding of terrorist organizations. The use of words and phrases such as terrorist and biggest

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51 Harper, Stephen. “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada expressing concern over Iran’s nuclear activities.” Ottawa, September 25, 2009.
52 Harper, Stephen. “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada regarding Iran’s decision to further enrich uranium.” Ottawa, February 10, 2010.
threat to peace and security are significant as they are institutionalized threats and thereby convey and immediate message without elaborate and detailed justifications. By using such terms to paint Iran, the country was automatically seen as a threat because the idea of terrorism as a threat is fully engrained in our domestic and the international community. Institutionalized terms raise the logic of danger and fear, and so given the common understanding and associations made with them there is no need for explaining the situation to create a threat each time. What is lacking in all these statements is why specifically only Iran is identified as the biggest threat as well as how its lack of democracy, although certainly important to its own population, has an effect on international peace and security.

In addition to the ongoing securitizing moves made through direct statements by the former prime minister and other government officials, three significant events took place during the time frame of 2006 to 2012 that contributed to the ultimate successful securitization.

The first event was the UN Human Rights Council meeting in 2006 when Iran sent Saeed Mortezavi as one of its delegated representatives. Saeed Mortezavi, Tehran’s General Prosecutor, often referred to as ‘the butcher of the press’, has been identified as being involved in a brutal crack-down against journalists and other political dissidents in Iran through arbitrary sentences and imprisonments, with several cases linked to torture. This delegate was particularly offensive to Canada because three years prior Mortezavi had ordered the imprisonment and interrogation of Zahra Kazemi, an Iranian-Canadian photographer, who had

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56 Ghaemi, Hadi. “For Iran, the Man is the Message.” Human Rights Watch, June 28, 2006.
later died as a result of torture injuries while in custody. Numerous critiques were received against this move, calling it a mockery of human rights standards, and questioning the legitimacy of this UN body. Given the very public attention that was given to Zahra Kazemi’s death, Canada’s reaction was greater than other states. Responding to this provocation by the Islamic Regime, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter MacKay commented:

“The presence of Mr. Mortazavi in Iran’s delegation demonstrates the Government of Iran’s complete contempt for internationally recognized principles of human rights….By including Mr. Mortazavi in its delegation, Iran is trying to discredit the Council and deflect attention from the Council’s goal of ensuring greater respect for human rights. Two official Iranian government investigations found that Prosecutor General Mortazavi ordered the illegal arrest and detention of Canadian journalist Zahra Kazemi, which led to her torture and death. He then falsified documents to cover up his involvement in her case. Mr. Mortazavi has also been involved in the harsh clampdown on the Iranian press and the arrests of many Iranian journalists.”

Regardless of whether this move was a direct provocation against Canada, a move against the UN body in general, or simply the result of factional fighting or disorganization within the Islamic Regime, its effect was significant. In an already hostile relationship, the Ahmadinejad administration provided another easy reference to the regime’s evilness.

The second event took place at the UN Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva in 2007. Canada once again raised its concerns over Iran violating the human rights of its citizens, and Iran countered this claim by critiquing Canada’s own human rights record, particularly referring to the treatment of its Indigenous population. This was indeed a valid critique to be raised against Canada, one that has been made by the Canadian population against many administrations and particularly against the Harper administration. In fact, one of the many

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issues that the Liberal party raised during their campaign in 2015 was specifically to examine and find a solution to the violence against indigenous women and girls, by launching an official Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls,\(^62\) which has continually been identified as a national human rights crisis.\(^63\)

However, having this critique raised in 2007 by a country such as Iran that has and continues to commit grave human rights violations against its own citizens, particularly minorities, political dissidents, and women, was quite a hypocritical move. Of course, hypocrisy is not a tendency that is in any way irregular among nations and politicians. However, given the already hostile relations between the two countries and Harper’s often critical view of the UN, this incident was not well received by the Canadian Government. Given the events from the past year at the UN, this move by Iran could easily be seen as a political move to provoke Canada. In addition, it was a justification to dismiss the UN, as revealed in Minister of Justice Mackay’s statement that the government is focused on action rather than on meetings and studies.\(^64\)

The third series of events was the instalment of sanctions against Iran, in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions. The Government of Canada passed the *Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Iran* which included sanctions against Iran targeted to its nuclear proliferation and its failure to meet the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency.\(^65\) The sanctions passed in Canadian law in compliance with the UN also included travel restrictions, and therefore also involved the *Immigration and the Refugee*


\(^{64}\) Blanchfield, Mike. “Cuba, Iran criticize Canada’s human rights record as UN panel calls for review of violence on aboriginal women.” *National Post*, September 19, 2013.

\(^{65}\) “Canadian Sanctions Related to Iran.” *Global Affairs Canada.*
Protection Act. Specifically, the purpose of these sanctions was to enforce “regulations impose an embargo on certain goods and services that could contribute to Iran's activities linked to enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. They also address an assets freeze and a travel notification requirement.” The implementation of these sanctions mirrored similar actions taken on by numerous allies, in a coordinated effort to stop Iran’s pursuit of nuclear proliferation.

Beyond the UN mandate, Canada implemented additional sanctions against Iran in 2010 under the Special Economic Measures Act due to the stated reason that “Iran’s failure to meet its international obligations amounted to a grave breach of international peace and security that had resulted or was likely to result in a serious international crisis.” The scope of these sanctions was strengthened through additional amendments in the subsequent years. The goal of these sanctions was to push Iran to a tight economic situation and thereby encourage the regime to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

The final significant event that coincided with the final securitizing act of cutting relations with Iran was the Government’s decision to list Iran, along with Syria, as state sponsors of terrorism. On September 7, 2012, Foreign Minister John Baird along with the minister of public safety announced that in line with Canada’s commitment to fight global terrorism and hold all perpetuators accountable in order to recognize victims seeking justice, Iran and Syria were added to the list of states that support terrorism under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism

66 Ibid.
68 “Canadian Sanctions Related to Iran.” Global Affairs Canada.
69 Ibid.
The Act enables victims of terrorist acts that occurred after 1985 to pursue perpetuators of such acts, including entities and states that financially support these crimes, in order to seek damages in a Canadian court. Once a state is listed on as a supporter of terrorism under this Act, it loses its immunity from civil litigation in Canadian jurisdiction, given the modification made to the State Immunity Act. This decision was significant in that it provided legislation to back-up the Iranian threat. Iran’s legislative status as a state sponsor of terrorism also has future implications in that it renders all attempts to restart relations with Iran very difficult given its political implications. Thus not only were relations with Iran terminated, but by engraving this decision in legislation, the Harper administration set up a difficult path for any future government that may be interested to restart relations with Iran. The securitizing move therefore had a long-term effect, beyond the appointment of Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

Through the above analysis, we can see a particular framing of Iran as a threatening state in the Harper administration’s view in the three broad concern areas of threat to Israel, threat to the people of Iran, and threat to international peace and security. Some of the events that took place during the examined time period, whether they were calculated Iranian moves or otherwise, only helped to further the success of framing Iran as threatening. What is important here however is to compare this image of Iran that was presented, against the real level of threat that Iran actually posed to Canada, and by extension the international community. Furthermore, given numerous statements about dislike over Canada’s previous role as an honest-broker, we

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71 Justice For Victims of Terrorism Act S.C. 2012, c. 1, s.2.
72 Ibid.
can see the administration’s intention to make a firm stance and disengage with states that they view as rogue or evil in order to present a new Canadian approach and image.

**Analysis**

In this section, I will be evaluating the seven official reasons that the Government of Canada gave for ending its diplomatic relations with Iran, as outlined in a statement by former Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird on September 7, 2012. What these justifications reveal is that Canada used multiple areas where Iran was seen as a threat, perhaps directly to Canada, but more likely against Canada’s allies and the international community as a whole. In addition, the justifications appeal to the idea of protecting the population within Iran by referring to common liberal-democratic values such as democracy and human rights. The goal of this discussion is to reveal that the concerns raised by Canada were out of proportion in some cases, and hypocritical in other cases. A main theme that will emerge by the end of this discussion is that what the decision may have ultimately come down to is the fact that the Government of Canada ultimately viewed the Islamic Regime as inherently bad and therefore not a country that it could work with in any way.

I. **“It is among the world’s worst violators of human rights.”**

Human rights concerns in Iran have been raised by the Canadian Government for many years, prior to the Harper administration. The claims are indeed true. For example, according to Human Rights Watch, second to only China, Iran had the highest ranking for public executions

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in 2014 and it has one of the highest rates in imprisoning journalists and social media activists.\textsuperscript{75} In fact, many of the values of rule of law and justice are routinely violated through accounts of torture, unfair judicial trials, discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities and women, as well limitation or at times complete ban on freedom of expression and association.\textsuperscript{76} Thus pointing at the continuous violations that Iran makes against its population is necessary. In fact, Iran requires increased pressures from the international community to address its human rights conditions. As a UN reports reveals, the human rights situation has not gotten much better even under the current administration.\textsuperscript{77}

What is troubling about this issue as a justification for ending ties with Iran is that many other countries, such as Iran’s Gulf neighbours, can and should be criticized for committing the same human rights violations. According to Human Rights Watch, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, human rights violations such as torture, corrupt judicial trials, the persecution of religious minorities and the denial of women’s rights have been increasing in Qatar, UAE, Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{78} Amnesty International reports the same violations taking place in Saudi Arabia as they do in Iran such as arrests and imprisonment of government critics, restrictions on freedom of expression and association, torture, discrimination against minorities and women, and corrupt judicial trials.\textsuperscript{79} Despite such reports by these accredited organizations and many others, such as the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, Canadian officials made numerous references to Iran’s human rights situation without ever addressing the abuses that occurred in its

\textsuperscript{75} “Iran.” Human Rights Watch.
\textsuperscript{76} “Iran 2015/2016 Annual Report.” Amnesty International.
neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia with equally terrible human rights track records. Similarly, Canadian Government officials have made visits to Bahrain for economic and trade purposes while remaining silent on the numerous human rights violations committed by the regime, such as the imprisonment of political prisoners.80

In a similar vain, despite numerous reports of gross violations of international laws by Israel resulting in war crimes, such as indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilian populations and infrastructure, 81 Canadian officials never officially acknowledged these violations. In this specific case, rather than raising concerns over these actions through the UN, as many other actors and states have done, the Harper administration has directly criticised the UN:

“Now of course friends, criticism of Israeli government policy is not in and of itself necessarily anti-Semitic. But what else can we call criticism that selectively condemns only the Jewish state and effectively denies its right to exist, to defend itself while systematically ignoring or excusing the violence and oppression all around it? What else can we call it when Israel is routinely singled out, targeted at the United Nations, and when Israel remains the only country to be the subject of a permanent agenda item at the regular sessions of its Human Rights Council?”82

Thus what is troubling about this explanation of ending ties with Iran is that it is hollow, since if this justification is enough to disengage from Iran, similar actions should have been taken against many other states. Canada’s focus on the human rights status in Iran is therefore more about pointing to one country for condemnation rather than upholding international human rights laws.83 It is this specific treatment of Iran that reveals the intention to securitize the country beyond the level of threat that it actually poses. If this was indeed an optimal course of action

83 Petrasek, David, 2013.
against countries that had grave human rights situations, the Harper administration would have made a strong effort to discuss these issues in other countries and subsequently severed relations. However since Iran was subjected to this treatment while others committing similar violations were not, it shows the deliberate intention behind Canada’s end of ties with Iran.

II. “Shelters and materially supports terrorist groups, requiring the Government of Canada to formally list Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.”

This statement does have merit. Indeed, Iran does supply non-state organizations with support politically and materially. However, Iran’s support of such organizations is done with a limited scope, not necessarily for an ideological purpose but rather with the aim to increase the reach of the Islamic Regime and thereby provide some form of deterrence. This is an important point as such type of support is not uncommon conduct by other states in international relations. Political or material support of organizations such as Hezbollah or Hamas have the effect of posing Iran as the champion of the Palestinian cause and also act as deterrence, given their proximity to Israel. Furthermore, in the case of Iran, no evidence exists to show that Iran will provide these organizations with an independent capacity for mass destruction, particularly if such support would lead back to Iran. Specifically, this is because Iran is not the authority or full decision-maker for these organizations, therefore it will not provide means that may later harm itself. Countries are not in full control of the organizations they support and therefore cannot predict their behavior.

In effect, Iran acts as many other states do, particularly in the region, to strengthen their own safety. Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, support their own non-state organizations for their own security benefit. In fact, one of the major events that contributed to the current culture of fear around terrorism and to many extents shaped many people’s current understanding of what a terrorist attack is was the tragic events of 9/11. This attack was carried out by Saudi Arabian and other nationals. The ruling families in Saudi Arabia have been active for decades in funding and expanding Wahabism, which has arguably led to the extremist form of Islam we see today. However, Saudi Arabia has never directly supported such terrorist acts and thereby direct links have not been officially established. Given this fact, and the close economic and political/security ties to the US and even to Canada, it can be understood as to why its practices have been largely ignored. In addition, Saudi officials have often taken measures to condemn terrorist activities in the West and champion themselves as fighters against terrorism in the Middle East, despite their own activities or conditions in the Kingdom. Similarly, Western powers, particularly the US in more recent years, have supported particular groups that they believe will work to their strategic advantage in various regions of the world through methods such as providing arms. All these states continue the same practices today.

As identified in the human rights argument, Iran was simply singled out among many similar states in a pragmatic move. Justifying the cutting of ties with Iran given its funding of organizations linked to terror activities is therefore a political move. If this funding was indeed the real reason why Iran was so problematic, similar action should have been taken against other states that also provide support to terror-linked organizations.

Identifying Iran as a state-sponsor of terror under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act achieved a similar political move of singling out one country among many others. As previously explained in this paper, identifying Iran as a state-sponsor of terrorism under this Act allows victims of terrorism to pursue financial compensation as it causes the state to lose immunity in Canada’s civil jurisdiction. Furthermore, the use of this legislative approach has rendered the possibility of any future relations with Iran very difficult. Acts of terrorism have occurred in many countries by numerous states and non-state actors in all continents, yet the Harper administration did not identify all of these states or entities under this act.

III. “The Iranian regime is providing increasing military assistance to the Assad regime.”

The third claim made to justify the ending of relations with Iran falls short for very similar reasons as the previous two arguments. The anti-Assad movement that picked up movement after 2011 has been very much linked to his presentation as dictator who violates the rights of his own people and runs a corrupt government. As such, Canada, among many other states has identified the Assad regime as one that is bad and should not have power. However, Syria is one of the few limited-extent allies of Iran and Iran has an interest in supporting the Assad regime for its own security and political strategy. As stated in section II, this type of support is no different from what many other countries in the region and others in the world provide to organizations and states that they believe will somehow politically advantage them. Therefore it is acceptable that Canada disagreed with the leader and government of Syria, and was unhappy or even condemned Iran for supporting it, but this was not sufficient to single out

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Iran for a political strategy that is similarly pursued by many others and therefore shows that the approach taken to Iran indeed followed the securitization approach. Identifying Iran as a threat to international peace and security for this reason seems shallow and reveals other political motives behind it.

IV. “ Routinely threatens the existence of Israel and engages in racist anti-Semitic rhetoric and incitement to genocide.”92

Iran’s threat to Israel is on the surface indeed a legitimate concern, particularly given the numerous and continuous remarks that Iranian officials have made against Israel. However, a logical analysis of the strengths and capabilities of Iran in comparison to Israel, and the Islamic Regime’s interest in self-preservation would reveal that despite its rhetoric, Iran would not attack Israel as the costs are too high for its own security. In fact, examining the rhetoric of Iran can reveal that although it may seem threatening to Israel, there were many other reasons to actually strategically pursue this behavior. Whether it be to present itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause,93 or as stated by President Obama, occasional talk of strikes against Israel to serve its interest of driving up the oil prices.94

To begin, let’s briefly examine the military strengths of both countries. Iran has a large population, and therefore has a very large enrolment in its army which is significantly higher than that of Israel.95 However, given the arms embargo on Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, it has very outdated military equipment and technology.96 Furthermore, since its last war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran has proven to follow a no first-strike policy and has had no direct

92 Ibid.
93 Juneau, Thomas, 2014, p. 98.
94 “The US, Israel and Iran.” The Nation, March 26, 2012, p. 3.
95 “Military power comparison results for Iran vs Israel.” Global Fire Power.
confrontations. Conversely, Israel has been engaged in numerous military fights with its neighbours throughout its existence and therefore has practical experience. Given the geographical distance between the two states, any military confrontation would likely have to involve the air force. An air strike would also involve going over the airspace of another rival, Saudi Arabia, who will probably not be keen in allowing Iranian military planes in its airspace. Similarly, a route over Jordan will be unlikely to be received well given the kingdom’s pro-American stance and mistrust of Iran. Given its aged equipment and technology, this is yet another reason to hold Iran back. Although one could argue that Israel can face the similar challenges in an air strike against Iran, it is important to note that Israel also has the strength of nuclear weapons and long range missile warhead. The analysis of Israel and Iran’s military capability is important as it reveals the significant imbalance of military might and the ultimate negative outcome for Iran if it did ever decided to strike Israel. What this therefore reveals is that given the Islamic Regime’s interest in maintaining power, they would not attack Israel, despite their rhetoric, because the decision would not be rational and would in fact lead to their own destruction.

In addition to the limitations above, and although both Israel and Iran face tensions from other regional rivals, Israel enjoys enormous support from the international community, whereas Iran continues to carry a very isolated existence. Given the support for Israel, strengthened through means such as their very strong lobby groups in the US, Iran has yet another reason not to risk direct confrontation with Israel.

97 Ibid.
99 Ibid, p. 5.
Due to the reality facing Iran, it is important to use a lens of logic to interpret the rhetoric of the Regime. Despite hateful remarks, the Islamic Regime has always shown an interest in its continued survival and acted rationally to this end.\textsuperscript{100} Remarks against Israel are indeed hateful and threatening. Iran does support proxies that are threatening to Israel, but Iran refrains from doing everything in its power to harm Israel, whether directly or through proxies, because such an act would indeed amount to collapse for the Islamic Regime given all the reasons identified above.\textsuperscript{101} In other words, although Iran is a threat to Israel, it refrains from posing a certain level of threat to Israel due to its own strategic reasons. This very claim, that the threat from Iran is not imminent given its catastrophic ends for Iran, is one that has been made from within Israel, such as by the chief of Mossad, Meir Dagan.\textsuperscript{102} Thus the argument here that Iran is the biggest threat to international peace and security and therefore Canada should not have any relations with it does not hold ground.

The Harper administration’s close ties to Israel could have been better supported through maintenance of a relationship with Iran. By engaging in dialogue, Canada could have had the opportunity to act as a mediator in the region and perhaps attempt to ease some of the hostilities.\textsuperscript{103} Although this capacity as a mediator may have been limited for Canada, it may still have been beneficial to keep this option available. In the process of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran, Canada could also have worked as a mediator, given its allied relationship with the US and ability to push for standards against Iran that would ease and further favour Israel. For all the reasons identified above, the decision to end relations with Iran given its threat to

\textsuperscript{100} Waltz, Kenneth N., 2012.  
\textsuperscript{101} Beinart, Peter, 2015.  
Israel was not a logical or optimal course of action. What it reveals is that the securitization of Iran was indeed a political move, in this case one made to favour the relations with Israel.

V. “Refused to comply with UN resolutions pertaining to its nuclear program.”

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities has indeed been a popular topic of discussion by world leaders and media outlets. Canada was in no way a minority in expressing concerns over the potential of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. However, we must again assess Canada’s response of ending relations with Iran given this justification.

In compliance with UN resolutions, Canada implemented several economic sanctions against Iran. The weight of the international sanctions had crippling effects on Iran’s economy; therefore in effect, it can be argued that the sanctions accomplished what they set out to achieve. Additional options to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, assuming that it was done for the pursuit of weapons-grade, were either a military attack or negotiations. Canada’s closest allies, including the US, chose negotiations whereas Canada chose to distance itself and end all political engagements with Iran.

I argue that the Harper administration erred in its course of action and evaluation of the nuclear aspect of Iran. In retrospect, it is now easy to make this claim knowing that the negotiations between the P5+1 led to the successful JCPOA. However, even in 2012, the reasons for supporting negotiations with Iran were valid and the best course of action. At the time, several credible views were expressed, such as by the US Director of National Intelligence, that

105 Mundy, John, 2013.
Iran had not made the decision to actually acquire nuclear weapons, but rather to build capability.\textsuperscript{106} The Islamic Regime however maintained that the program was for peaceful purposes. Given the mistrust between Iran and the West, it is easy to accept the views of those who had doubts in Iran’s sincerity. But even if Iran was pursuing its program in the hopes of one day obtaining nuclear weapons, a process of negotiations was still the best course of actions due to the various challenges with alternative approaches, as further explained below.

It is true that the Islamic Regime continued to mistrust the US, particularly given the heavy sanctions they faced and other provocative facts such as the American decision to delist the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran as a terrorist organization.\textsuperscript{107} However, Iran was at the time ready to engage in discussions. This may have been due to the international sanction regime that was imposed on Iran, and the successful economic deterioration that these sanctions had achieved, pushing Iran to negotiate for its own survival. Although more conservative members in the Islamic Regime may have not been in favour of any discussions and had internal disagreements or clashes with the moderate members of the Regime, the fact remained that Iran would continue to have a struggling economy without external income sources.\textsuperscript{108} Therefore, the opportunity for negotiations with Iran was present. To pursue the alternative, such as a military campaign against Iran, would have been problematic for several reasons; the most important of which was the lack of a legitimate authorization such as a UN resolution; followed by the economic cost of an intervention; the cost of lives of innocent civilians in Iran and other humanitarian aspects such as refugee and food crisis; the cost of lives of Western military personnel; the damage to infrastructure and historical sites in Iran; and not to mention the risk of

\textsuperscript{106} “Weighing concerns and assurances about a nuclear agreement with Iran.” \textit{Iran Project}, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{107} “Behind the rants, uncertainty grows; Iran.” \textit{The Economist}, September 29, 2012.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
becoming tangled in another long war in the Middle East due to escalation resulting from a military campaign in Iran. In addition, recent interventions in the region, i.e. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, were clear examples of the aftermath of interventions or preemptive wars. Finally, a direct military attack on Iran may have pushed the Islamic Regime to ensure the pursuit of nuclear weapons to defend itself.  

Through negotiations, limits could have been placed on Iran’s program and this would be a more optimistic course of action, as opposed to ending relations with Iran and cutting all communication. Iran would indeed have been very interested in some sort of compromise, despite mixed messages coming from the Regime at various times, given the economic advantages. In addition, given the high level of scrutiny on Iran by the international community such as through the IAEA, and by individual states such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iran would have to follow through with any compromise it made as failure to do so would be immediately be caught and return the country back to its economic struggles. The risks of this approach are significantly lower than a military one, or in turn a complete disengagement. Thus Iran’s failure to cooperate with resolutions against its nuclear program should have been met by Canada through support to our allies in their negotiations, as opposed to securitization of Iran and a complete end to any communication or engagement.

VI. “The Iranian regime has shown blatant disregard for the Vienna Convention and its guarantee of protection for diplomatic personnel. Under the circumstances, Canada can no longer maintain a diplomatic presence in Iran. Our diplomats serve Canada as civilians, and their safety is our number one priority.”

110 Ibid, p. 10.
The threat for the security of diplomatic personnel in Iran is one that for many can link back to the Hostage Crisis in 1979 when Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Iran and took 50 hostages for 444 days. More recently, this threat links to the 2011 attack on the UK Embassy in Iran by protesters. Following this specific event, a report was completed for security of the embassies in Iran to assess the level of threat to Western diplomats. What is significant is that the report found that although there was political tension between Iran and the international community at the time, there was no tangible threat to Canadian diplomatic members in Iran and that various meetings with Iranian officials displayed their interest in maintaining diplomatic ties with Canada. Thus at most, if a particular threat had been identified, the safety of diplomatic personnel could have led to a reduction in staff size for a temporary period, but it did not justify ending relations with Iran. If specific threats had been identified, temporary measures could have been taken to ensure the safety of personnel without completely cutting all ties.

Former diplomats from Canada have been among those to express disagreements with this decision, stating that it is important for Canada to have a presence in Iran and that this move was motivated by the Harper administration’s belief in not having relations with difficult countries. Furthermore, the absence of an embassy means that Canada no longer has any direct access to communicate or convey its interest in Iran, regardless of how limited this may have been in the past. Diplomacy should not be reserved for working with like-minded countries, but rather one that is used to deal with difficult countries. Diplomatic relations are not a symbol of

112 “The Iranian Hostage Crisis.” US Department of State.
115 Ibid.
approval of another government. Specifically, Canada has an interest in easing regional tensions given its relations with Israel and also due to the safety of Canadian citizens who were in prison, some on death row, in Iran. In the past, Canada had a reputation for using diplomacy. “Canada’s tradition to be one of the last countries to leave in a crisis not the first.” However, the decision to cut ties with Iran showed this administration’s desire to shift Canada’s approach and image. This shift in approach was achieved through the securitization of Iran and identification as a threat, as opposed to working towards ways of cooperation and negotiation.

VII. “Canada’s position on the regime in Iran is well known. Canada views the Government of Iran as the most significant threat to global peace and security in the world today.”

Identifying Iran as the most significant threat to global peace and security shows a deliberate attempt to inflate the reality of the level of threat that Iran actually posed. Iran was absolutely not the most significant threat to global peace and security. As detailed in the previous sections, some of the actions of the Islamic Regime were in fact problematic, such as Iran’s opposition to Israel, support for Syria and funding to organizations such as Hezbollah. However, these facts did not place Iran on the level of being the greatest threat in the world. Iran’s threatening actions were largely pursued in the interest of self-security and self-preservation, therefore harmful actions to the international community would be limited. Furthermore, as previously outlined, Iran’s aged military equipment and severe economic situations further removed the possibility of Iran being on the scale of the most significant threat to global peace and security.

118 Ibid.
In reality, the greatest threat that the Islamic Regime presented was that of the violations of rights and freedoms to its own people, which would in fact beg for increased diplomacy and pressure from countries such as Canada, as opposed to the severing of ties. However, diplomacy is an approach that the Harper administration neglected in the case of Iran. Instead, the securitization of Iran was pursued and the country was deliberately labeled as the biggest threat to peace and security, despite factual evidence. Identifying Iran as the most significant threat to global peace and security provided a justification for cutting ties since Iran was painted as being evil and therefore not a government that Canada can communicate with. However, this argument goes against the very goal of using diplomacy with states that you have disagreements with and to work through tensions and hostility.

This begs the question: why was Iran securitized to this level? Of course, it is impossible to objectively define the full intentions and explanations for this process of securitization. However, given the analysis of speeches and statements from former Prime Minister Harper and various ministers, I argue that this stance on Iran was specifically pursued given Harper’s personal convictions of wanting to categorize states as good or bad, and thereby whether or not to communicate with one or not. This stance derives from the view that diplomacy should not be practiced on rogue states because that will legitimize their behaviour.  

Furthermore, the securitization of Iran was heavily influenced by Harper’s connection and beliefs of Israel as a state fighting for the right cause and with the right values, in addition to his friendship with Benjamin Netanyahu. This friendship and unconditional support of Israel has been proven through numerous statements and actions, as discussed in previous sections of this

paper. Given this friendship, threats to Israel are transformed as threats to Canada: “an attack on Israel would be considered an attack on Canada.”121 Iran’s threatening language and opposition to Israel rendered it as a threatening state in Canada’s view and therefore one that Canada must not have any relations with.

This is proven when analyzing the Canadian support of Israel in other realms as well. Prime Minister Harper took additional measures to stand with Israel at the UN and criticize other Western powers who identified Israel’s violations of international law. What this shows is a blindness to the reality that it is not Israel’s territory that is being criticized by the international community, but its violations of international law, which are in fact against the very values such as human rights that Prime Minister Harper preached about. This behavior then shows the unequivocal support for the state of Israel as run by its current administration given the personal friendship of its leaders. Furthermore, this support and failure to acknowledge the grave wrongdoings of Israel worked to present Canada as a strong supporter of only one side in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Though this course of action may have influenced many decisions of Canada, one significant one was the securitization of Iran.

The decision to end diplomatic relations with Iran ultimately did not really benefit Canada. It moved Canada away from its more traditional policy of leaning towards diplomacy while also distancing Canada from the approach of its closest allies. Conversely, the decision did not have detrimental effects on Canada either as Iran was never largely involved with Canada. The most affected groups were the Iranians in Canada who no longer had, and continue to not

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have access to consular services, and Canadian citizens in Iran; some of whom were in dire circumstances, having been jailed based on unfair trials.

Severing ties did not push Iran to change in the way Canada wanted. Canada was interested in a regime change, which of course, did not happen. Today, given the successful JCPOA agreement, it may be argued that the regime, headed by its moderates, seems to be opening up to the international world specifically for economic purposes. However, there is no indication that the regime will lose power or that it will even change in any drastic way. In addition, given that the relations between Canada and Iran were always small in a political and economic sense, the actions of Canada alone would never have had significant effects.

**Going Forward**

Since the elections in 2015, Canada is operating on the new priorities and policies of the Liberal government. As it relates to Iran, the government specifically stated that it would lift sanctions against Iran and consider reestablishing relations should the JCPOA prove to be successful and should Iran abide by the agreement.122 This has not yet occurred, but it continues to be the best course of action going forward.

Since the implementation of the JCPOA and its success so far, many states and foreign companies have been quick to show their economic interests in Iran, a country that’s seen as a largely untapped market with a lot of potential, particularly given the young and educated portion of its population. Although the gold rush to the Iranian market that some had predicted

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did not occur, due to factors such as continuing US unilateral sanctions which impact financial arrangements with Iran and corruption within the Iranian environment, many positive advances have taken place. In 2015, the British Foreign Secretary attended a ceremony in Iran in recognition of the reopening of their embassy; a move that was directly linked to the success of the JCPOA and its revelation of Iran’s interest in cooperation.\textsuperscript{123} Despite some difficulties in the Iranian business environment, there is interest and prospect for foreign investment in the country in a many sectors.\textsuperscript{124} In Italy for example, many firms have engaged in deals such as Saipem and its agreement to upgrade oil refineries in Iran and Danieli’s agreement for heavy machinery and equipment.\textsuperscript{125} In France, Airbus has signed a $25 billion agreement to sell planes to Iran; a deal which will not only help Iran upgrade its aged planes, but also help the Airbus company that has been struggling in recent years,\textsuperscript{126} while its car maker Peugeot Citroën signed a joint-venture agreement with Iran Khodro car manufacturer.\textsuperscript{127} Some of the agreements have yet to be finalized given difficulties with the bank system as a result of remaining US unilateral sanctions on Iran.\textsuperscript{128} Nonetheless, there is interest in Europe to find ways of working with the Iranian economy. As with these European countries, Canada should reopen relations with Iran and use it to its economic advantage. The reality is that European firms had closer ties with Iran prior to the international sanctions regime and were therefore in a better position to reengage with Iran. However, Canada lacked the economic connections with Iran, and it now continues to fall behind given its failure to reengage.

The renewal of engagement with Iran is also important for reasons more significant than economic ones. Canada, like many other states, has political interests in the Middle East region. Without relations or an embassy, Canada has no direct eyes on the ground and therefore very limited capability or influence on any issues that may involve Iran. Finally and as previously stated, Canada has a very large Iranian diaspora community and therefore has an interest in establishing diplomatic and consular ties with Iran for the sake and harmony of this population.

Some delays in reestablishing ties with Iran are understandable and expected given the obstacles that had been put in place by the previous government, such as listing Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, by failing to reengage with Iran in a timely manner, the current government is in effect continuing in the footsteps of its predecessor. Without a step forward and diplomatic relations, Canada is continuing to identify Iran as a threat far beyond the threat that Iran actually poses. With the success of the JCPOA and the current moderate Iranian president revealing interest in engagement with the West, Canada should not allow any further delays in action.
References


