A Tale of Two Parties: Assessing Similarities and Differences Between the Rise of France’s *Front National* and the United Kingdom Independence Party

Master’s Research Paper

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Abstract:

Followers of European politics will surely have noticed a trend in recent years—the success of far-right or nationalist political parties. For example, in France, the Front National (FN), a party once relegated to the margins of French politics, sent a shockwave throughout the country with a record performance in the 2012 French president elections and won a stunning 25 percent of the popular vote en route to a monumental victory in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections. A similar phenomenon was also seen across the English Channel in the United Kingdom, where the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a party founded on anti-European Union principles, would see similar results by capturing 27.5 percent of the vote and over a third of the seats en route their own victory in 2014.

Although both parties have seen unprecedented success at both the national and European level, a review of the historical trajectory of both of these parties demonstrates significant deviation and uneven development despite their similarities. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the commonalities and differences between the emergences of these two parties. More specifically, I focus on three major points: first, examining the ideological agendas of the two parties, second, explaining as why to the Front National emerged before UKIP or any far-right comparable in the United Kingdom and third, determining as to why UKIP has seen consistent growth since establishment compared to the FN’s volatility. In addition, I will also address the extent to which both parties have been able to influence their country’s political agendas beyond their results at the ballot box.
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1. Introduction

Followers of European politics will surely have noticed a trend in recent years—the success of far-right or nationalist political parties throughout the continent. For example, in France, the Front National (FN), a party once relegated to the margins of French politics and thought to be in decline, sent a shockwave throughout the country with a record performance in the 2012 French presidential elections and won a stunning 25 per cent of the popular vote en route to a monumental victory in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections. A similar phenomenon was seen across the English Channel, as in the United Kingdom (UK), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) a party founded on anti-European Union principles, would see similar results by capturing 27.5 percent of the vote and over a third of the seats en route their own impressive victory in 2014.

Although it is important to acknowledge that the emergence of nationalist parties across Europe has been uneven or in some cases, have been slow to challenge more moderate left/right parties, polling results indicate that this phenomenon is not just limited to France and the United Kingdom and is instead taking place throughout much of Europe. Indeed, other far-right parties such as Hungary’s Jobbik, the Netherlands’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), Denmark Dansk Folkeparti (DF), Greece’s Golden Dawn, Sweden’s Sverigedemokraterna (SD) and Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPO) have also seen impressive results in both national and European elections in the last five years.¹ Even in Germany, a country whose dark fascist legacy has historically stifled the growth of far-right parties, the anti-immigrant Alternative für

¹ See appendix 1. Not captured in the data is the cancelled April 2016 presidential election result by the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPO), in which the party finished a close second losing to incumbent Norbert Hoffer by approximately 30,000 votes. Due to breached electoral rules however, the results were annulled and a re-vote has been scheduled for October 2016.
Deutschland (AfD) has fared increasingly well in public opinion polls and municipal elections despite the party’s very young age.²

Though the specific reasons behind the increased support for these parties may vary from country to country; concerns over immigration, security, a perception of cultural erosion, and the uncertain economic future faced by many Europeans have resulted in widespread dissatisfaction with both traditional ruling parties and European institutions and have often been offered as explanations for the rise of these radical anti-establishment parties.³ As many of these countries find themselves continuing to face the above challenges of the 21st century, it remains unlikely that any of these far-right parties will be pushed back to the political periphery any time soon.

My paper will focus on the rise of two of these increasingly popular parties; the Front National, and the United Kingdom Independence Party. There are multiple reasons for selecting the FN and UKIP as the subjects of my Major Research Project (MRP). First and foremost, the availability of sources played an important role in case selection. It would be difficult, if not impossible to accurately write on other parties such as the Netherlands’ PVV, or Hungary’s Jobbik without knowledge of either country’s native language. In addition, it was also decided that the FN and UKIP would make particularly interesting research subjects given that both countries are culturally alike, face similar challenges and are geographically close to one another meaning that linkages between the success of both parties might be more apparent. Furthermore, while it was initially proposed that other right wing-parties be selected for an even broader study, it was determined that the relatively brief nature of the MRP was best suited for a comparison between two cases, as opposed to three or four.

³ Ibid. 482.
My paper is divided into three sections. First, I will begin with a detailed history of the *Front National*, a party inspired by and created out of elements from the Vichy Regime which ruled France for much of World War II. This section will detail the beginnings of the post-WWII far-right movement in France, beginning with the anti-tax *Poujadists* and detail the rise of the hugely controversial *Front National* founder Jean-Marie Le Pen. Throughout I will track the evolution of the FN from a marginalized figure in French politics, to its emergence in the 1980s as a viable political option that has grown increasingly popular under the more careful and pragmatic leadership of daughter Marine Le Pen.

My second section will take a similar approach by examining the development of the far-right in the UK, with particular emphasis on the United Kingdom Independence Party, a party that has successfully portrayed itself as relatively moderate, dodging the fascist labels that plagued and prevented the growth of far-right parties in the UK for much of the 20th century. As will be discussed in far greater detail below, while UKIP is a much younger entity and for much of its existence would see slow growth, has nonetheless seen a consistent, steady rise in the polls, a significant contrast from the more turbulent growth of the *Front National*.

After examining the trajectories of both the Front National and UKIP through an extensive historical overview, I will review the similarities and differences between the development and rise of the two parties. After a concise, yet detailed ideological comparison which reveals a number of similarities between the agendas of both, I offer a number explanations regarding the deviations between the trajectories of both parties, namely determining as to why the *Front National* emerged before the UKIP (or any far-right comparable) in the United Kingdom and exploring UKIP’s consistent growth compared to the FN’s track record of volatility. Finally, I will also argue that both parties have wielded their growing influence in order to shape the
political agenda far beyond their limited presence in the national legislature and results at the ballot box.

2.0 The Front National: Modern Historical Development

2.1 The Modern Far-right in France: Marginalization and Emergence of the French Far-Right (1940-1971)

Following the conclusion of the Second World War there would be an aversion to far-right politics throughout Western Europe that persisted for several years. Ultranationalist and fascist ideologies such as Nazism had brought years of destruction across the continent making it unsurprising that a marginalization of the far-right would ensue. This phenomenon was also true in France, a country particularly sensitive to the far-right, given the occupation by Nazi Germany under the authoritarian Vichy regime from 1940 to 1944. The authoritarian Vichy government, led by Marshal Philippe Pétain, had widely collaborated with the Nazis by abusing military prisoners, deporting French Jews to German concentration camps and perhaps most harmful of all; helped stifle the French resistance. While Pétain was eventually convicted of treason and would die in jail soon after the war, the memories of Vichy collaboration with Nazi Germany lived on in the country, resulting in far-right political parties and Vichy sympathizers being pushed to the periphery in the immediate aftermath of the war.

Although marginalized, there were attempts throughout the 1950s and 1960s to grow the far-right movement into a political option that would bring change and counter rising modernization.

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in the country. Among the most notable of these was the creation of the Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans (UDCA) in November 1953 by merchant Pierre Poujade, a staunch anti-parliamentarian who had become notable for his role in organizing anti-tax blockades against government inspectors in the département of Lot.

The UDCA was a populist party supported by conservatives who were generally poorly-educated, working-class Frenchmen who opposed modernization and held great resentment for political elites who they felt were behind the transformation of the country. While the Poujadist movement initially began as a protest against the economic restructuring of France after WWII, many of its supporters had greater concerns over the decay of rural France, the erosion of “traditional” French identity.

By 1955 the UDCA had grown from a regional protest group into a larger political movement with a substantial presence across France. The party organized massive rallies, produced widely circulated propaganda and reportedly boasted membership of nearly 340,000 people. In the 1956 legislative elections, the Poujadists under the banner of the Union et Fraternité Française (UFF), campaigned on a platform that appealed to the electorate’s dissatisfaction with the unpopular Pierre Mendès-France government. With Poujade’s stated goal being not to win, but to shake up the establishment and fight for common folk, the UFF finished sixth by winning nearly 2.5 million votes (11.6 percent) and 52 seats (11 of whom were eventually disqualified)—an impressive showing for the young party. Unlike mainstream

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9 Post-WWII France saw several economic changes including the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1954.
parties who ran more issue-oriented campaigns, the UFF’s platform of dissatisfaction and anger with the transformation of the country led the party to draw upon support from disillusioned members of both the left and the right.\textsuperscript{13}

While initially impressive, the political success enjoyed by the \textit{Poujadist} movement at the 1956 elections would end up being very short-lived. As Jacques Isorni, a prominent French lawyer who frequently represented the far-right recounts; “[the \textit{Poujadists}] were incapable of drafting a formal proposal or delivering a speech” making them largely incompetent as parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{14} The movement would also come to be characterized by the xenophobic views of many of its members, evoking memories of the anti-Semitic Vichy government. Many \textit{Poujadists}, including Poujade himself, were particularly hostile towards the country’s Jewish President, Mendès-France, who was the subject of numerous thinly-veiled racist insults which called into question his French identity and blamed his administration for decolonization and the decline of France.\textsuperscript{15}

The party’s lack of political experience and an inability to shed labels of far-right extremism would greatly hinder the UFF’s ability to push forward their signature issue of tax reform. This relegated the party to nothing more than an outlet to voice anger and frustration in lieu of a legitimate agent that would bring change to the country.\textsuperscript{16} Amongst the UFF politicians elected to the French Parliament that year was a young Jean-Marie Le Pen; head of the UFF’s youth-wing and future leader of the \textit{Front National}. Although \textit{Poujadist} parliamentarians were ineffective in their legislative roles, Le Pen proved to be a notable exception, showcasing his

\textsuperscript{13} Shields, 2007. 73-74.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}. 
ability as a talented communicator and skilled politician by establishing vast networks of far-right thinkers that would serve him well in the future.\textsuperscript{17}

While an inability to play a role in the political process limited the influence of the UFF, infighting and division would also be a major issue for the movement. Le Pen, well known for his ultranationalist views and controversial belief that Vichy collaborators could be “rehabilitated”, would often take radical stances on issues such as pensions, agriculture and foreign policy that placed him at odds with many of his UFF counterparts and Poujade. While the party was split over the ideologies of the more moderate Poujade and a hardline Le Pen, the movement would disintegrate over the contentious referendum that would eventually establish the French Fifth Republic in 1958. At this time, members of the UFF dispersed amongst other right wing groups fracturing the far-right just four years after their surprising success.\textsuperscript{18}

While the establishment of the French Fifth Republic proved to be the wedge that would break up the Poujadist movement, the potential loss of colonial “Grande France” proved to be such a divisive issue in greater French society that it pushed the country to the brink of civil war and energized the far-right. The threatened loss of Algeria coming on the heels of France losing Indo-China, Tunisia and Morocco would serve as a unifying issue for deeply conservative far-right groups such as Jeune Nation and Fédération des Étudiants Nationalistes (FEN) who held common beliefs that keeping Algeria as a part of the French Empire was a “patriotic imperative”.\textsuperscript{19} Other far-right groups like Occident became increasingly active during this time and the paramilitary l’Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS), who counted Le Pen amongst its

\textsuperscript{17} Shields. 2007. 71-72.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. 90-93.
organizers, launched attacks against revolutionaries in Algeria, attempted to assassinate French President Charles De Gaulle, and stirred up anti-left sentiment in France throughout the crisis.\textsuperscript{20}

Suffering from the loss of Algeria and an inability to influence the country’s path through political means, Le Pen tried to unite the far-right by forming the \textit{Comité d'initiative pour une Candidature Nationale} in 1963. The goal of the committee was to “bridge the gap between older and younger generations”, appeal to moderates and come forward with a far-right nationalist candidate that would challenge De Gaulle for the presidency in 1965.\textsuperscript{21} Le Pen’s newly created committee would eventually select Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour as their candidate. Tixier-Vignancour, an Algerian-born lawyer active in the Vichy regime, along with Le Pen and Jean-Pierre Stirbois serving as his campaign managers, travelled across France criticizing de Gaulle and his referendum which gave independence to Algeria.\textsuperscript{22} Despite the endorsement of far-right groups, promising results in municipal elections and early favourable opinion polls, Tixier-Vignancour and Le Pen’s relationship would become increasingly fractured as the campaign went on and the independent far-right candidate would finish in fourth place with 5.2 percent of the votes in the presidential election.\textsuperscript{23} The disappointing electoral result served to confirm the marginalization of the far-right and would lead le Pen into a self-imposed political exile that lasted several years.

\textbf{2.2 The Modern Far-right in France: Formation of the FN, A Search for Identity and Early Struggles (1972-1980)}

Despite the disappointing fourth place finish by Tixier-Vignancour and the failure to prevent the independence of Algeria, radical far-right groups including \textit{Occident}, along with \textit{Groupe

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. 93-94.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. 125.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. 127.
\textsuperscript{23} Rydgren. 2004. 17-18
Union Défense (GUD) and Ordre Nouveau (ON), the largest of the three, would continue to carry out anti-left activities. Le Pen, motivated by a desire to block the left from power by uniting the far-right, signaled his return back to politics with the creation of the Front National in 1972. The Front National, a merger of a number of the aforementioned far-right groups and former Poujadists, represented a “modern, forward-looking” party that would soften the militant perception of the far-right and appeal to as many people as possible.

The party’s manifesto was inspired by ideas of the influential Nouvelle Droite movement and most notably the Groupement de recherche et d'études pour la civilisation européenne (GRECE), a collection of academics and journalists that wrote on ethnonationalist issues and a hierarchical “system between social groups and individuals reminiscent of pre-revolutionary, anti-egalitarian France. As the rise of the Soviet Union represented an important issue at the time, anti-communism would take primacy in the party’s initial agenda. Other issues including immigration were only mentioned in passing and omitted from the party’s ten major points. Le Pen, seen as a “relative[ly] moderate” member of the far-right, was hence considered electable and as a result would be chosen as the party’s first president with the hardline François Duprat serving as his deputy.

The Front National contested their first legislative election in 1973 where their campaign was met with disappointing results. The young party, which suffered from disorganization, did not win any seats and garnered a minuscule 0.5 percent of the vote. Despite Le Pen’s talents as a skilled orator and pedigree as a former parliamentarian, he did not fare much better in his own Paris constituency by winning only 5 percent of the vote. The adoption of a platform which

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24 Le Bras. 2015. 34.
26 Ibid. 149.
27 Ibid. 170-185.
varied little from those of mainstream right wing parties also proved to not only be a hindrance in mobilizing support, but also was a contentious internal decision leading to a tug-of-war over the party’s agenda.\textsuperscript{28} The return to violent activities by the \textit{Ordre Nouveau} would lead to many ON supporters being banned from politics in 1973, presenting Le Pen with an opportunity to further consolidate his control over his party.\textsuperscript{29}

In the following presidential elections Le Pen once again was unable to find a signature campaign issue that resonated with voters and failed to garner much support. Despite promising to repeal the Évian Accords which granted Algeria independence, the FN won just 0.75 percent of the vote in 1974 and was hurt by the loss of ON members and allegations that Le Pen had taken part in torture during military operations in the Algerian Revolution.\textsuperscript{30} With two poor electoral results under their belt and an inability to differentiate themselves ideologically from the mainstream right, the \textit{Front National’s} electoral hopes would be further damaged with the creation of the \textit{Parti des forces nouvelles} (PFN), a similar far-right political party made up of disillusioned former members of the FN and the \textit{Ordre Nouveau} who had grown frustrated with poor results.

In an attempt to differentiate themselves, the introduction of the PFN led the \textit{Front National} to introduce a more right wing platform at the urging of Duprat which emphasized the economic danger posed by immigrants, argued for a free-market economic system and cited the pitfalls of an egalitarian social system. Despite this radicalization, the introduction of a second party that also drew upon the limited numbers of the far-right electorate would end up splitting the far-right

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid. 183.
\textsuperscript{29} DeClair, Edward G. \textit{Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the French National Front}. 39.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. 190.
vote and both parties would fare poorly in subsequent elections.\textsuperscript{31} Duprat, one of the party’s most influential thinkers, would be assassinated in 1978 by unknown attackers.

2.3 The Modern Far-right in France: From the Fringes to the Mainstream (1981-1995)

Although the 1960s and 1970s were marked with marginalization, heavy electoral defeats and a changing identity, the 1980s would represent a period in which the \textit{Front National} would make significant gains and would serve as a springboard for future successes. The decade would begin poorly for the party however as both Le Pen and the PFN’s Pascal Gauchon were embarrassingly unable to run in the 1981 presidential elections due to new laws that required candidates to have at least 500 signatures from elected officials.\textsuperscript{32} While the inability of the FN or PFN to put forward any candidates likely had little effect on the eventual outcome, Le Pen was reduced to being a bystander as François Mitterrand’s \textit{Parti Socialiste} (PS) would not only win the presidential election, but would also capture an overwhelming majority of the seats in the legislative election the same year. The absence of the PFN on the ballot would deal a crushing blow to the party which ceased operations soon after and made the \textit{Front National} the primary voice of the far-right once again.

Recognizing the need to wrestle power back from the PS, Le Pen formed a series of alliances with the mainstream right in municipal elections in an attempt to stop the left’s momentum. While the topic of an alliance with the FN was contentious issue for mainstream politicians, the FN had largely shed its fascist elements with the death of Duprat, making the FN a far more palatable partner in the eyes of moderate parties.\textsuperscript{33} In 1983, a coalition of the FN, the mainstream right \textit{Rassemblement pour la République} (RPR) and the centrist \textit{Union pour la Démocratie}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{shields2007} Shields. 2007. 184.
\end{thebibliography}
Française (UDF) fueled by a worsening economic crisis, an increasing crime rate and widespread unemployment, contested municipal elections to relative success. Criticizing failed socialist economic policies, and the government’s decision to offer illegal immigrants amnesty and release prisoners, Le Pen would be elected to the local council of the 20th arrondissement of Paris garnering significant media attention.

The momentum and help of mainstream parties would also lead the FN to a key electoral victory in a by-election in the commune of Dreux where Stirbois, the FN’s general secretary and champion of the anti-immigration cause, would win in the second round and serve as deputy mayor. Dreux, once a socialist stronghold, had seen a wave of immigration which made the FN’s “French first” anti-immigration agenda which called for reviews of naturalization laws particularly appealing. The developments at the municipal level, however small they may seem, would lend significant media attention and credibility to the far-right thus proving to be a turning point in the fortunes of the Front National.

The biggest gains made by the far-right and the Front National in the 1980s however would occur soon after the result in Dreux. In the 1984 European elections, on the heels of a successful television interview on the popular L’Heure de vérité, Le Pen’s Front National would win nearly 11 percent of the vote and send ten representatives to the European Parliament in Strasbourg signaling the arrival of the Front National as a veritable political force. The elections in Dreux would greatly help the FN’s European effort as the party successfully poached a number of notable politicians from the mainstream right including Jean-Marie Le Chevallier who managed the party’s 1984 campaign. Right wing academics such as Bruno Gollnisch and Jean-Claude Martinez would also join the party at this time thus strengthening the intellectual backbone of the

35 Shields. 2007. 196-203.
party. Combining forces with far-right counterparts across Europe, Le Pen would be president of the European Parliament’s “Far-right” group, giving the movement a voice within Europe by gaining valuable speaking time and the right to table parliamentary motions.\(^{36}\)

With the party’s “Les Français d’Abord!” slogan resonating with many voters, applications for party membership swelling, and a record high of 19 percent of French holding favorable views of the party; the Front National would also do well in several cantonal and regional elections throughout the mid to late 1980s winning several seats by securing a loyal voter base in the South-East and amongst blue-collar workers in cities with high immigrant populations.\(^{37}\) The establishment of a secure base of support and the continued addition of notable politicians after the party’s successes at the municipal and European level would propel the FN to thirty-five seats at the 1986 legislative elections. Although the evolution of the party’s platform to focus on limiting crime and curtailing immigration deserves much of the credit for the party’s positive result, the Front National were also helped by the introduction of a proportional representation system by President Mitterrand which greatly benefited smaller parties like the FN.\(^{38}\) Mitterrand, who changed the electoral system in order to split the vote of the mainstream right and keep Jacques Chirac’s RPR out of power, did indeed end up keeping control of the French parliament at the cost however of energizing the Front National.

With Le Pen and the FN firmly entrenched as the solitary voice of the far-right and the emergence of an anti-immigration doctrine as the party’s signature issue, prospects for a positive showing in the 1988 Presidential elections appeared high. His campaign was managed by Bruno Mégret, a highly capable, former member of the RPR who had just won election to the French Parliament as a new member of the FN. With Mégret at the helm, Le Pen was able to paint

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\(^{36}\) Ibid. 197.
\(^{37}\) Ibid. 212.
\(^{38}\) Rydgren. 2004. 17-18
himself as an outsider who would represent the people against the four major French parties, drawing significant attention on television and strong support at political rallies. Major campaign issues at the time included worries over law and order, unease over high levels of immigration, and a sluggish economy.\textsuperscript{39} Responding with a tough on crime agenda that would introduce the return of the death penalty, a promise to severely restrict immigration and propose tax reforms that would stimulate the economy, the FN’s “national preference” messaging resonated with voters as Le Pen would win 14.4 percent of the vote in an impressive fourth place finish—a far cry from the 1981 campaign that never got off the ground.\textsuperscript{40}

Despite the 1980s marking the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Front National as a political force, the 1988 snap legislative elections did not go as well as the party leader would have liked. Hurt by anti-Semitic comments made to a newspaper that trivialized gas chambers a “detail” of the Second World War, the departure of a number of prominent FN politicians, and the return to the traditional two-ballot majority voting system, the FN was reduced to 9.8 percent of the popular vote and only won one seat in the election.\textsuperscript{41} Despite the electoral setback and the loss of Jean-Pierre Stirbois in a car accident, the 1980s proved to be a formative period in the history of the Front National and would serve as a springboard for future electoral successes in the decades to come.

Much like the 1980s the early 1990s would prove to be a very successful period in the history of the Front National despite the limited presence in the French legislature. Capitalizing on increasing anti-Islamic sentiment in France, and the controversy around the “affaire du voile

\textsuperscript{39} Le Bras, 2015. 51-54.
\textsuperscript{40} Shields, 2007. 212.
the FN was able to turn increasingly negative views of Islamic culture into significant support. At this point, the demographic balance of France was changing, with North Africans making up a more significant part of the population. Many of these newcomers to France lived in dilapidated suburbs of major French cities resulting in deeply segregated ethnic ghettos. This would prompt many questions by the FN over the inability of new-world immigrants (though Muslims in particular) to integrate into French society and to greater questions regarding the compatibility of Islam with Western values. While the 1993 legislative elections would result in the loss of the FN’s single seat, the party once again did well by registering 12.58 percent of the vote. Similarly, Le Pen would also have a strong presidential campaign two years later finishing a close fourth with nearly 4.6 million votes and 15 percent of the overall share in the first round. The strong performances in the legislative and presidential elections in the early 1990s were significant as they would serve as proof that the FN’s anti-Islamic and anti-immigration agenda were issues that resonated with voters leading them to be adopted into mainstream political discourse. Given the decline of the Soviet Union and the nullification of Communism as a national threat, the FN would at this point omit communism from their platform in favor of continuing their highly divisive rhetoric which centered on French identity and the perceived dangers associated with immigration.

2.4 The Modern Far-right in France: A Far-Right Divided and the Perseverance of Le Pen (1996-2002)

While the last several years had been enormously successful for Le Pen and the Front National, the party would encounter a major stumbling block at the turn of the millennium. On

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42 The scarf affair became a national issue when three Islamic girls were suspended for refusing to remove their hijabs at school. Although the suspensions were overturned, it was argued that the hijab represented a violation of the laïcité (secularism) principle in French public schools. Polls show that most in France were supportive of the schools and a ban would be formally introduced in 2003.
43 Shields.2007. 237-238.
44 Ibid.
the heels of a similar performance in the 1997 legislative elections which saw significant support but no seats won, many influential members of the party favored a tactical alliance with the moderate right which Le Pen was opposed to. At this point, it was clear the FN was divided on how to move forward. Making matters worse was that Le Pen would not be allowed to stand for election for two years over his assault of a socialist candidate in 1997. The internal crisis hit a nadir when at the party’s 10th congress in 1999, Le Pen refused to designate Bruno Mégret as his successor despite his impressive credentials, demoting him to number two on the party list and dismantling the Mégret-led FN youth group. Le Pen, fearing the rising influence of Mégret in the party, would make his untested wife Jany, head of the party’s list for the upcoming European elections.45

Mégret, both offended by Le Pen’s snub and frustrated by the direction of the party, would breakaway from the FN taking many party members with him. Mégret would found the Mouvement national républicain (MNR) which would immediately come under heavy fire by the FN. The split meant that for the first time in several years, the far-right was now significantly divided thus weakening both parties. Indeed, with one of its most capable members leaving to create a new party, the far-right vote would be split in the 1999 European election with the FN recording their lowest share of the vote since 1984 and winning only 5 seats. The MNR would also fare poorly, failing to win any seats in the European Parliament.46

Despite many predicting the decline of the FN given the split, Le Pen’s greatest moment would arguably occur in the 2002 French presidential elections. While most expected the final round of the presidency to be contested between incumbent President Chirac and socialist candidate Lionel Jospin, Le Pen would shock the country by finishing slightly ahead of Jospin.

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45 Rydgren. 2004. 17-18
and moving on to the second round with 16.86 percent of the popular vote.\textsuperscript{47} The focus on security as a central election issue in the aftermath of the September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 attacks and a 10 percent rise in the national crime rate would play directly into Le Pen’s “zero tolerance” anti-crime agenda which sought to reintroduce the death penalty and curb illegal immigration.\textsuperscript{48} Le Pen was most helped however by the vast number of leftist options which would split the vote and hurt the \textit{Parti Socialiste}.\textsuperscript{49} Le Pen’s first round victory predictably resulted in a wave of attention, culminating in widespread anti-FN rallies across France which drew approximately 1.5 million protesters. While large numbers of the working class and unemployed continued to support Le Pen who championed the anti-establishment cause, the second round was much less kind to the FN, resulting in an overwhelming 82-18 landslide victory for Chirac’s RPR.\textsuperscript{50} While much of Le Pen’s success in 2002 must be attributed to the fractured nature of the left, the progression to the second ballot would unquestionably mark the party’s finest hour to date.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{2.5 The Modern Far-right in France: Struggles and a New Leader for the FN (2003-2010)}

While 2002 represented a landmark year for the \textit{Front National}, the period immediately after the election was far less kind to the far-right. The FN was unable build off its impressive result, faring poorly in the 2002 legislative elections and the introduction of a two-round voting system in the 2004 regional elections would see the number of FN elected counselors nearly halved despite receiving virtually the same share of the popular vote that it had in 1999. The 2004

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.} 281.
\textsuperscript{48} Shields. 2007. 283-284.
\textsuperscript{49} Rydgren. 2004. 22.
\textsuperscript{51} Shields. 2007. 281-282.
European elections were largely non-descript for the party as well, with the FN only winning 9.8 percent of the vote and just seven seats.\textsuperscript{52}

The lack of progress after the promising results of the 2002 presidential election would see Le Pen join forces with ally-turned-rival Mégret in time for the 2007 presidential and legislative elections. Although a fourth place finish in the former was considered a disappointment and the legislative elections would once again result in zero seats for the party, Le Pen managed to shift eventual winner, cabinet minister Nicolas Sarkozy, to the right by continuing to highlight the threat posed by illegal immigration and Islamic values, a phenomenon later described as a “victory of [Le Pen’s] ideas”.\textsuperscript{53} Despite his background as a moderate, Sarkozy’s “us versus them” rhetoric during the campaign was surprisingly close to that of the \textit{Front National} as Sarkozy pushed hard to court the far-right vote. While Sarkozy would win the election with ease, it would occur at the cost of further propelling the \textit{Front National’s} right-wing populist message into the mainstream.\textsuperscript{54}

Despite the FN’s ability in influencing the political agenda, the sharp decline in support and poor results resulted in crippling financial difficulties for the party and many to predict its inevitable decline. This would lead Le Pen to sell the \textit{Front National’s} headquarters, his armored car and lay off several employees. Although the regional elections of 2010 would result in a surprising third place finish, an elderly Le Pen would shortly step down as FN president where he would endorse his daughter, Marine Le Pen as his successor. Marine Le Pen, who vowed to

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. 300.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. 22-40.
“soften” the image of the FN with the goal of creating a more electable party,\textsuperscript{55} would easily beat FN executive vice-president Gollnisch to become leader in January 2011.

2.6 The Modern Far-right in France: The Rise of Marine Le Pen (2012-present)

The election of Martine Le Pen as party leader would prove an immediate boon for the Front National. The party captured 15 percent of the popular vote in the 2011 cantonal elections, a drastic increase from the 4.5 percent won just three years before. The 2012 presidential election would also see favorable results for the party as Le Pen campaigned heavily against radical Islam, proposed cuts that would see legal immigration cut by 95 percent, vowed to withdraw France from the EU and revert back to the franc. While her father’s policy of “national preference” continued, there were elements of her electoral programme appeared leftist in nature including an increase in worker’s wages and frequent attacks on big businesses.\textsuperscript{56} While Le Pen at various points was shown to lead the race in the first round, she would finish third in the election to Sarkozy and eventual winner, Francois Hollande of the PS. While the FN failed to make it to the second round as they had in 2002, the 17.8 percent share of the popular vote actually bested her father’s 2002 first round tally and represented a dramatic improvement over the very disappointing 2007 election. Later that year, the party would also return to having a presence in the French parliament winning two seats, one of which was won by 22-year old Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, granddaughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen and niece of Marine who with her election, became the youngest Member of Parliament in modern French history.\textsuperscript{57}

The success of the Front National under Marine Le Pen would not stop after the results of 2012 as there were signs that general opposition to the party’s ideology was declining. A January

\textsuperscript{55} In France it has been referred to as a platform of dédiabolisation or in literal terms, “de-demonization”.
\textsuperscript{56} Kowalsky, Wolfgang, and Peter Scherrer. Trade Unions for a Change of Course in Europe: The End of a Cosy Relationship. N.p.: European Trade Union Institute, 2011.
2014 poll indicated that 34% of respondents agreed with the party’s platform, the highest result since polling began in 1984.\(^{58}\) In 2014, the party would win the European elections with nearly a quarter of the votes (roughly double that of the Parti Socialiste) and twenty-four of the seventy-four seats allotted to the country. The election would be marked by very high abstention indicating dissatisfaction with politics and the pervasion of anti-EU sentiment—both of which played into the party’s hands.\(^ {59}\) The very next year, and despite the expulsion of party founder Jean-Marie Le Pen over anti-Semitic comments, the 2015 regional elections would also see the FN capture a plurality of the votes in the first round, only to be shutout in the second round by a coalition of mainstream parties and emerge empty handed.

Despite the inability to reach the second round of the most recent French presidential election or win any regions in the latest regional elections, the Front National has made substantial inroads since the introduction of Marine Le Pen as party president in 2011. Whether the FN has truly taken more moderate stances on the issues has been debated by scholars and will be elaborated upon in far more detail in section three, there is little doubt that FN appears poised to make a strong run at the presidency in 2017. Capitalizing on chaos in the Eurozone, failed economic policies of the widely unpopular Hollande administration, and several high profile attacks by Islamic terrorists over the last year and a half, numerous opinion polls have shown the Front National in first place as the party attempts to win the presidency for the first time in its long and detailed history.\(^ {60}\) While the chances of FN victory in 2017 are debated amongst scholars as there remain numerous obstacles the party must overcome before thinking of victory,

one phenomenon remains certain—that after years of marginalization the FN has firmly cemented the far-right as a political force in France and is unlikely to be pushed back to the periphery anytime soon.

3.0 The Modern Far-right in the United Kingdom: Historical Development

3.1 The Modern Far-right in the United Kingdom: The Origins of the Modern English Far-Right (1932-1966)

As Hitler’s fascist Nazi Party gained power in Germany in the 1930s, groups sympathetic to the fascist movement grew increasingly popular across much of Europe. While these groups were initially small in England, Oswald Mosley, inspired by the works of Thomas Hobbes, founded the British Union of Fascists (BUF) in 1932 in an effort to unite the fascist and far-right movement. The BUF, which primarily drew upon support from disillusioned Tories despite Mosley’s Labour roots, was an organization designed to pressure politicians into adopting far-right positions while holding the core belief of a social hierarchy based on inheritance and culture.\(^6\) Economically, the group favored a protectionist policy and was fervently anti-communist. The BUF was also concerned with the “decadence” associated with a modernizing United Kingdom and what they saw as an erosion of traditional British values.\(^7\)

Given the limited support for fascism in the United Kingdom, the BUF did not run candidates in elections and was purely a lobbying movement. Despite this, the BUF was able to increase its recognition during the Great Depression and was believed to have a peak membership of

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approximately 50,000 members.\footnote{Olechnowicz, Andrzej. "Liberal Anti-Fascism in the 1930s: The Case of Sir Ernest Barker." \textit{Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies} 36.4 (2004): 643.} Despite its growth from a small organization to a larger movement in the late 1930s, the adoption of a radical anti-Semitic platform combined with the aggressive foreign policy of Nazi Germany would predictably lead to the group being ostracized. While the general public generally rejected the movement’s views, the BUF would also come under government investigation for supposed linkages to fascist Germany and Italy and for conducting violent activities against anti-fascist protestors, fueling fears of subversion.\footnote{Copsey, Nigel, and Dave Renton. \textit{British Fascism, the Labour Movement, and the State}. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 39-40.} Despite a return to a more palatable agenda, the BUF would be hit hard by “fifth column” accusations and the group would eventually become banned in 1940 with many of its most prominent supporters interned for the duration of WWII.\footnote{Goldman, Aaron L. "Defence Regulation 18B: Emergency Internment of Aliens and Political Dissenters in Great Britain during World War II." \textit{Journal of British Studies} 12.2 (1973): 120.}

While the BUF’s notoriety was short lived and their stated goal of pushing politicians to the right was largely a failure, the party made a significant mark on the future of British far-right politics by serving as inspiration for future organizations. Though the 1940s and 1950s would see small far-right groups fail to gain traction, in 1960, the White Defence League (WDL) and the National Labour Party (NLP) would belatedly spawn out of the banned BUF and merge to form the British National Party (BNP). While the WDL was largely a pressure group focused on racial issues, the NLP, while small, had entered into local politics and enjoyed some promising results in municipal elections lending the BNP a certain level of political credence. The BNP’s agenda was primarily anti-immigrant, focusing on the waves of immigration from Asia and Africa which followed the breakup of the British Empire in the 1950s and 1960s. The group also reserved particular hatred for Jews, railing against what they saw as a Jewish controlled financial
and political system while advocating for the immediate deportation of British Jews to Madagascar or Israel. 

While the party saw favorable initial results in London elections, the movement would grow increasingly fractured over questions regarding the party’s platform. While some elements of the party led by John Bean wanted to adopt a more mainstream agenda in order to be as electable as possible, others in the party continued to openly endorse policies reminiscent of Nazi Germany and unapologetically embraced hard line fascism. The best evidence of this was during public rallies in which a number of supporters openly displayed neo-Nazi paraphernalia. The divide between ideologies and an effort the rid the party of its neo-Nazi image would eventually lead the BNP to split in 1962 with Colin Jordan and John Tyndall being the most notable individuals forced out of the party. The exclusion of Jordan and Tyndall would leave the party firmly under the control of Bean. Bean, a BNP co-founder of the group, instantly began a softening of the party’s image. This would involve reshaping the agenda which now prioritized the mandatory integration of immigrants rather than their removal. While the switch to a more mainstream agenda did not result in any elected officials for the party during the 1963 local elections, BNP candidates received 13.5 percent in Glebe and 27.5 percent in Hambrough, two highly respectable results for a party that was struggling from both infighting and a lack of funds.

The momentum created by positive results in local elections would lead Bean to run as a candidate in the parliamentary constituency of Southall during the 1964 general election. Southall, an impoverished London suburb home to a large first-generation Indian population and

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68 Ibid. 35.
70 Ibid. 52.
British working class, would lead Bean to once again shift the party agenda to the right campaigning on a platform that would end all “coloured” immigration and offer government assistance only to those who agreed to accept future repatriation. Despite the return to a far-right agenda, Bean polled fairly well by receiving 9 per cent of the vote—at the time the best result for an openly racist candidate.⁷¹

While Bean’s positive result showed that there was potential for the far-right to grow in Great Britain, the movement would soon face a significant hurdle as political dialogue shifted from immigration, the far-right’s signature issue, following the 1964 election. This move from immigration as the country’s central political issue would lead politicians and parties with anti-immigrant agendas like the BNP to be marginalized. While Bean’s share of the vote in Southall would decrease to around 7 per cent in 1966, some Tory politicians with anti-immigrant views would either see their margin of victory significantly narrowed or lose their seats entirely as their opposition to immigration simply did not resonate with voters anymore. The changing political landscape of the country would force the British National Party to reorganize and look outwards for support.⁷²

3.2 The Modern Far-right in the United Kingdom: Violence and End of the National Front (1967-1981)

Following the decline of the BNP after the 1964 general election, the expelled John Tyndall approached the BNP with the idea of merging the struggling party with the Greater Britain Movement and the Racial Preservation Society, two smaller groups which held similar ideologies. While Tyndall’s former colleagues within the BNP initially rejected the idea, poor results in local elections and an inability to fundraise would see far-right parties fail to win back

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⁷¹ Ibid. 53.
their deposits and would place the future of the movement in question. As a result, it became clear that an attempt to unify the far-right was the only chance for the movement to grow and gain influence in the country. Faced with little choice, the groups would come together and form the National Front (NF) in 1967. The merger of the parties and the reemergence of Tyndall would see John Bean become a periphery figure in the far-right for many years.\textsuperscript{73}

The party’s agenda advocated “white values”, stopping the spread of communism in society, opposing the European Economic Commission and the revocation international treaties that they saw as being harmful for the country. The party’s central campaign issue however would be banning all non-white immigration and repatriating non-whites who had settled in the country. Predictably, their platform would be described as being neo-fascist by observers and the party would face constant allegations of Nazi ties.\textsuperscript{74} The NF’s largest base of support would come from blue collar workers and the unemployed who felt that foreign laborers were stealing jobs.\textsuperscript{75}

The support from this base and the reemergence of immigration as an important campaign issue would see Allan Webster, the party's National Activities Organizer, receive 16.2 per cent of the vote in a 1973 by-election in West Bromwich West. While Webster did not win the election, the results were considered positive and resulted in a significant boost in attention for the young party. Given this renewed focus from the media and the party’s penchant for organizing popular anti-communist demonstrations (many of which turned violent), membership would swell to approximately 20,000 by 1974.\textsuperscript{76}

Despite an inability to make a breakthrough in general election, the party would continue to do well at the local level. The NF would also attempt to spread the far-right movement abroad as

\textsuperscript{74} Wilkinson, Paul. The New Fascists. London: Grant McIntyre, 1981. 73.
\textsuperscript{75} Fielding. 1981. 46-50
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid. 38.
chapters (which were largely unsuccessful in cultivating any support) in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and Canada were set up in 1974. Despite the international expansion of the party and impressive membership numbers, the NF would be the subject of numerous controversies in 1974. The first of these occurred when an ITV documentary on the party featured audio of Tyndall and Webster making pro-Nazi remarks, contradicting their denial of their Nazi links. In addition, the party would also be subject to considerable backlash after anti-fascist university student Kevin Gately was killed during a NF rally in London making it difficult for the party to credibly maintain assertions of decency. Despite the setbacks, the party remained resilient and would see its best result in the May 1977 Greater London Council election winning nearly 120,000 votes and finishing in fourth place with 5.3 per cent of the electorate.\(^77\)

After the group’s positive result in the London Council elections in the face of adversity, separate violent events in London would bring about the decline of the party. In August 1977, 5,000 BNF members rallied in the racially diverse suburb of Lewisham with many wielding signs which referenced false “black on white” crime statistics and slogans which opposed multiculturalism. At a time when racial tensions were high, the signs were seen as highly provocative and a large riot would ensue resulting in over 400 injuries and the near destruction of the local police station. The negative publicity associated with the riots combined with Margaret Thatcher’s comments concerning minorities “swamp[ing]” the United Kingdom and receiving preferential treatment would mean that many NF members would leave the party to join with Thatcher’s Conservatives who were willing to re-open the debate over immigration and culture.\(^78\)

Faced with the optics of a declining party, Tyndall would spend heavily on the 1979 general election nominating candidates to give the NF a chance to contest 303 seats. While Thatcher

would win, Tyndall’s gamble would not pay off as the party fared extremely poorly and lost significant money by failing to make back any of its deposits. This desperate move by Tyndall would lead to several questions surrounding his leadership and his status as NF leader would be challenged the same year. While Tyndall would initially remain as head of the party, in the following year, several influential NF members would leave the party over given their frustration with the NF’s stagnation. Also adding to internal discord was that the party was rocked by allegations that Allan Webster had made sexual advances on male party members, a particularly contentious issue given the party’s homophobic agenda. After resigning as party head in 1980, Tyndall would later a second iteration of the British National Party (BNP) out of several small far-right parties in 1982.79


The emergence of the British National Party (BNP) in 1982 would mark the far-right’s most united organization since the BUF in the 1930s. Recognizing that Nazi links and violence played a large role in the downfall of the NF, Tyndall would immediately try and soften the image of the far-right by denouncing links to fascism and calling on supporters to obtain from violence. Despite an effort to appear more moderate, the early years of the party were marred by electoral disasters, jail time for Tyndall over charges of inciting racial hatred and poor financial decisions that would lead to party to teeter on the brink of extinction by the late 1980s.80 While the 1980s proved to be a tough period for the young party, the decline of the National Front would prove a boon for the BNP as many far-right supporters would flock to the party. This increase in party

membership and the loss of a political rival would culminate in the party’s first electoral victory in 1993 as Derek Beackon, a last minute stand in for another candidate would win a city council seat in Millwall by seven votes. The party ran on a “Right for Whites” platform which promised to reversed what the BNP saw as favorable treatment for ethnic minorities when it came to council housing and other social programs.\footnote{Barberis, McHugh, and Tyldesley.2000. 178.}

Despite the party’s first local victory, the creation of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) out of the Anti-Federalism League by historian Alan Sked in 1993 would cut into the BNP’s share of the vote in the 1997 general election and prove a thorn in the side of Tyndall’s effort to grow the party. While the BNP’s platform centered around changes to the immigration system and despite their best efforts to claim otherwise, was frequently alleged to be fascist, UKIP’s platform primarily focused on the country’s place in Europe. Sked was a vocal opponent of the Maastricht Treaty (which created the Euro) and favored Great Britain’s exit from the European Union. Sked’s UKIP was seen as a much more moderate alternative to the hardline ideology of both the BNP and the NF. While all three parties were against EU-membership and opposed to immigration, the BNP and NF distinguished themselves by being openly racist, banning non-white party members (in BNP’s case, this would only be reversed after a 2010 court order) and continuing to advocate the forcible relocation of immigrants. While UKIP rejected violence, many BNP and NF members continued to embrace it as a political tool. As a result, Sked’s comparatively moderate platform leading the party to being frequently described as populist, a contrast with the fascist far-right label attributed to the BNP and the NF.\footnote{Abedi, Amir, and Thomas Carl Lundberg. "Doomed to Failure? UKIP and the Organisational Challenges Facing Right-Wing Populist Anti-Political Establishment Parties." \textit{Parliamentary Affairs} 62.1 (2008): 78.} Despite
Sked’s best efforts to maintain an electable appearance for the party, the party founder would leave UKIP shortly soon after the 1997 election over concerns his party was becoming racist.\textsuperscript{83}

While Tyndall increased his attempts to soften his party’s image, the BNP would win just 0.1 per cent of the vote in 1997—a disappointing result in particular when compared to the younger UKIP’s 0.3 per cent. In an effort to reassert themselves as the leading far-right party, the BNP would elect Nick Griffin as party leader in 1999, easily defeating Tyndall by a margin of 40 per cent. Griffin, previously an editor of the party’s \textit{Spearhead} newsletter, was seen as more moderate than Tyndall and continued to urge the party to drop its fascist links in a speech in which he said the party must “rid [itself] of the three H's, hobbyism, hard talk and Hitler”.\textsuperscript{84}

Indeed, Griffin would eventually to drop the mandatory repatriation of immigrants from the party’s platform and instead calls for strict limits on immigration and the implementation of a voluntary repatriation system that would offer £50,000 to those that accepted the offer.\textsuperscript{85}

While often enjoying comparatively strong results compared to the BNP and the NF, for much of the 1990s UKIP saw very little success given the split nature of the anti-EU vote which was divided amongst Tories, fascist parties and UKIP. In addition, the anti-EU vote would be further split by the emergence of the single issue Referendum Party, which called for a national referendum that would aim to see the UK withdraw from the EU. Evidently, the fact that both UKIP and the Referendum Party had two similar goals and shared similar platforms would make the two into direct competitors.

With the death of Referendum Party leader James Goldsmith and the subsequent dissolution of the party in 1997, many supporters would join UKIP, reaffirming the party as a leader of the

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Ibid.}
UKIPs good fortunes would continue as the introduction of a proportional representation system in 1999 would lead the party to make a significant breakthrough by winning three seats and capturing approximately 7 per cent of the vote in the European elections. Among the politicians named to European Parliament in Strasbourg that year was former Tory Nigel Farage, elected to represent South East England.

3.4 The Modern Far-right in the United Kingdom: The Growth of the BNP and UKIP (2000-2011)

The early 2000s would represent a period of considerable growth for the far-right in the UK. Buoyed by 9/11 and July 2005 terrorist attacks in London by Islamic terrorists, the BNP would see their support rise to historic levels as many members of the far-right National Democrats would join the party and concern over security and immigration became leading campaign issues. In response to the rising profile of the party, an undercover BBC journalist would “infiltrate” the BNP in 2004 where several disparaging comments about Muslims from party leadership were recorded and revealed to the public in a documentary called The Secret Agent. The controversy would see the party have its financial assets frozen and lead to Griffin facing trial for inciting racial hatred—charges he would eventually be acquitted of in 2006.

Despite the controversy surrounding the party’s leader as well as untasteful advertising which used pictures of the 7/7 public transit bombings, the British National Party would indeed have their best ever results soon after the attacks. Griffin asserted that political correctness and Labour policies on immigration and security were in large part to blame for the terrorist attacks. In the

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2006 local elections, the rise of the party was undeniable by winning 32 council seats, easily besting UKIP who were reduced to winning only one seat.

In 2009, the BNP would also see a breakthrough in the European Parliament by winning 6.2 per cent of the vote and their first two seats. By this point, the party’s platform had grown from being virtually solely anti-immigration to focusing on other issues as well. While opposing the perceived “Islamization” of the UK remained the central issue in BNP campaigns, the party also vowed to end Britain’s role in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

While the party had seen its best ever results in recent years and had made an impressive breakthrough at the European level a year earlier the BNP were able to build on these results in the 2010 general election. The party finished in fifth place with 1.9 per cent of the vote and did not win any seats. Most notably however, is that the BNP was outpolled by UKIP who finished with a modest 3.1 per cent of the vote. The poor results would carry on to the local elections in which the party would lose nearly half of their local councilors. On the heels of poor results at both the national and local level, questions surrounding Griffin’s leadership would soon follow. While Griffin would hang onto his leadership after a 2011 internal vote, his margin of victory over second place finisher and fellow MEP Andrew Brons was only nine votes. In addition, party membership after the general and local elections would dwindle as small breakaway groups including Britain First and the Britannica Party would enter the political playing field.

While the British National Party would see moderate success before encountering several setbacks during this timeframe, UKIP would enjoy an even more impressive rise and eventually

88 Ibid. 175.
89 Ibid. 67.
90 Ibid. 4.
come to supplant the BNP as the leading far-right party in the country. The 2004 European Elections would see UKIP win a record 12 seats and win approximately 16 per cent of the vote under leader Roger Knapman, easily besting all previous results and propelling the party to the brink of the political mainstream. \(^{92}\) With the party unable to maintain their momentum in the 2005 general elections, Knapman would step down and pave the way for Farage to be elected party leader for the first time, marking a formative event in the party’s development. Farage promised to both modernize and diversify the party’s agenda by focusing not only on removing Great Britain from the EU, but adopting populist policies which also included keeping taxes low, limiting immigration, widening selective education policies and reforming international trade treaties. \(^{93}\) The end result of Farage’s overhaul has been the transformation of UKIP from a largely single issue party, to a party which more resembled the traditional big three of British politics and lent UKIP a greater sense of electability. \(^{94}\) The transformation of UKIP under the charismatic Farage would lead Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, evidently threatened, to attempt and delegitimize the party by labelling them “[mostly] fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists”.

Farage’s modernization of the party would quickly payoff. Fueled by a parliamentary corruption scandal and aided by a significant donation by businessman Stuart Wheeler in protest over Cameron’s European policies, UKIP finished with 16.5 per cent of the vote in the 2009 European elections and won 13 seats. While the record result was seen as a strong initial performance for Farage, the party leader would briefly resign as UKIP in 2010 in order to contest Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow’s seat. During this unsuccessful bid which

\(^{92}\) Abedi, and Lundberg. 2008. 72-87.
\(^{93}\) Ibid. 83-84.
\(^{94}\) In The United Kingdom, Labour, Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party are considered the big three party based on their consistent electoral record of finishing first to third for several decades.
would have seen Farage elected as UKIP’s first MP, Lord Pearson of Rannoch served as the party’s leader. While Farage would fail to defeat Bercow in the 2010 general election, the fourth place finish by UKIP overall demonstrated that the party was not only growing, had supplanted BNP as the country’s most influential protest party.95

While Lord Pearson had guided the party to a strong fourth place finish, Pearson would resign as leader in August 2010 citing distaste for party politics. The resignation of Pearson result in Farage’s return as head of UKIP in an overwhelming electoral victory which saw him win over 60 per cent of the vote. During the leadership convention, Farage re-iterated his disdain for an ineffective “political class”, reserving his most heavy criticism for the Cameron government which he felt had done nothing for Britons, by adopting pro-European policies described “surrender, surrender, surrender”.96

3.5 The Modern Far-right in the United Kingdom: The Decline of the BNP and UKIP Success (2012-present)

Despite poor organization by UKIP in the 2011 local elections, the party would see its best days soon after. By adopting a campaign strategy that would attempt to appeal to college graduates and not just blue collar workers, UKIP would rebound in the 2013 local elections winning an average of 23% of the vote in areas where it had nominated candidates. The share of the vote and increase in sitting councilors from 4 to 147 would mark the party’s best result at the local level and the best ever result for a party outside of the traditional big three since the Second World War.97 More impressive however would be UKIPs landmark results in the 2014 European

elections. Farage’s UKIP would win 26.6 per cent of the popular vote and send 24 members to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, more than any other party and marking the first time a party other than Labour or the Conservative had won in a country-wide election. While the party would fare best in the South and North East parts of the country, UKIP was unable to make a breakthrough in cities with high levels of immigration. Also in 2014, the party would also see its first ever elected Member of Parliament, with Douglas Carswell winning nearly 60 per cent of the vote in the Clacton by-election. Carswell, an anti-EU Conservative who became frustrated with David Cameron’s policies had defected in order to join UKIP, thus triggering the by-election.98

While UKIP has unquestionably been on the rise in recent years, the opposite has been true for the BNP. The party would see significant infighting since their success in 2009 leading to the departure of MEP Andrew Brons from the European Parliament, leaving Griffin the party’s sole representative in Strasburg. Griffin would later lose his seat in Strasburg in the 2014 European elections as the party would finish with slightly over 1 per cent of the vote, a sharp decrease from far cry from the 6.3 per cent won by BNP five years earlier.99 The catastrophic loss in large part due to the rise of UKIP would signal the end for Griffin as BNP leader where he was replaced by Adam Walker. Walker would shortly ban Griffin from all party activities for verbally assaulting a number of his opponents shortly after his defeat in the leadership election and creating disharmony. As party membership dwindled down to a paltry 500 in 2015, the party was predictably decimated at the 2015 election winning only 1,600 votes in the entire country despite focusing resources on eight key ridings. The rise of UKIP and Farage’s ability to capture approximately a third of voters that previously supported BNP would see the party fade into

obscurity. Indeed, BNP would embarrassingly become deregistered as a political party in January 2016 only to be re-registered a month later.\textsuperscript{100}

While the registration fiasco and poor membership numbers have all but confirmed the demise of the BNP, UKIP has been able to continue their success to the 2015 general election where the party would again see favorable results. Despite only winning one seat, with Carswell holding on to the Clacton constituency in Essex, the party would win close to four million votes, or 12.7 per cent of the total share, a surprising result that has placed them third, above the Liberal Democrats. The party’s 2015 manifesto which serves to further confirm the transformation of UKIP from single-issue party, entitled “Believe in Britain” has stated that if elected, the UKIP would implement an immigration points system, a five-year ban on unskilled labour, renegotiate the EU trade agreement and the deport of any foreigners that commit crimes in Britain.\textsuperscript{101}

In the year since the election, the party has also become one of the most vocal backers of the “BREXIT” movement which aims to see Great Britain withdraw from the EU. While unsurprising given UKIP’s formation as a party that was founded over opposition to the European Union, Farage has argued that in the face of terrorism and concerns over security, the need to control the country’s borders is paramount and that the EU is an undemocratic institution that has hurt Britain’s national interest.\textsuperscript{102} With a membership referendum on the horizon, it remains to be seen whether what impact UKIP’s lobbying will have on the result, and what a withdrawal from the European Union would mean for the emerging party.

4.0 Comparing the Rise of the Front National and UKIP

The preceding overview of the historical development of the Front National and the United Kingdom Independence Party reveals that both have risen from the political fringes to the mainstream.\(^{103}\) The above also demonstrates that there are a number of similar factors that contributed to the rise of both parties. For example, both the FN and the UKIP have used an “us versus them” narrative that has called into question both the volume and values of immigrants, manifesting itself in each party’s rhetoric and national preference policies. While the FN has largely focused these attacks on Muslims and their perceived incompatibility with liberal democracies, UKIP has also targeted Eastern Europeans by tying them to crime and deteriorating social services. Somewhat related, both parties have been able to portray themselves as a voice for the “left behinds” in society—the economically disenfranchised that have grown frustrated with the inability of institutions and traditional political giants to address social and economic ills.\(^{104}\) \(^{105}\) As a result, both the FN and UKIP are seen as a means to voice dissatisfaction and a vehicle to bring about political change.

Despite these similarities, the accounts provided in the previous sections also point to some significant differences between the rise of the FN and UKIP. This is further evident in reviewing their electoral accomplishments over the years, as summarized in Figures 1 and 2. In particular, three points of contrast stand out: first, the much earlier emergence of the FN and second, the turbulent electoral trajectory of the FN in the late 1990s and 2000s, compared with the much steadier growth of UKIP. In addition, what the graphs do not indicate is the extent to which both parties have been able to exert influence on the political system above and beyond their electoral results—and in particular, the outsized role that UKIP has played in the historic UK debate over continued EU membership.

**FIGURE 1: National Parliamentary Election Results (% vote share)**

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<td>UKIP</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN (National Assembly, 1st round)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN (Presidential, 1st round)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
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<td>16.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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4.1. Ideological Similarities and Differences

A comparison of the Front National and the United Kingdom Independence Party reveals that both parties that share both a number of similarities and differences from an ideological standpoint. Despite the best efforts of FN leader Marine Le Pen to draw links between France’s most influential far-right party and UKIP for the purposes of forming an alliance in the European Parliament, Le Pen’s offer was soundly rejected by Nigel Farage who despite praising her leadership, has voiced concerns about the FN’s legacy of racism and has frequently distanced himself from the FN. Fearing that an alliance with Le Pen would tarnish the “populist” UKIP brand at home, Farage has instead opted for an alliance with several smaller Eurosceptic parties (most notably Italy’s Five Star Movement) called Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy.  

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While an examination of the party’s platform says otherwise, Farage has also rejected assertions that his party is far-right, instead rebutting that the “millions of voters who support UKIP are not "far-right" but decent, patriotic people who love their country”. 107

While Farage has dismissed the overtures of the Front National and rejected far-right labels, an examination of the party platforms and rhetoric indicates that, as Le Pen has argued, the two parties perhaps share more in common than Farage has admitted. While both parties admittedly vary greatly when it comes to economics and the size of government, the two have portrayed themselves as champions of the “left behinds” and used an “us versus them” narrative which demonstrates similar positions on immigration and the status of the European Union—an institution seen as the root cause for the challenges faced by both countries.

While the Front National has championed the anti-immigration cause since the days of Jean-Pierre Stirbois in the 1980s, UKIP have also emerged as strong advocates for restricted immigration using it to strengthen their anti-EU dialogue. Indeed in 2013, Farage described immigration as the “the biggest single issue facing this party” while prior to the 2015 election, said he would make it “the central part of [UKIP’s] general election campaign”—statements that help justify the party’s anti-EU stance. 108 109 In 2014 Farage made controversial remarks that “any normal and fair-minded person would have a perfect right to be concerned if a group of Romanian people suddenly moved in next door” further attempting to justify his statement by adding that there is a “real problem” with Romanian criminality. 110 Given this stance, it is unsurprising that immigration reform played an important role in the party’s 2015 electoral

107 Farage, Nigel (@Nigel_Farage). "Millions of voters who support UKIP are not "far-right" but decent, patriotic people who love their country." 17 August 2015, 1:43AM. Tweet.
platform with UKIP calling for an annual cap of 50,000 to be placed on incoming skilled laborers, the introduction of selective immigration system that would closely mirror the immigration strategy of Australia, and called for the introduction of legislation that would make it harder for companies to hire non-Britons.\textsuperscript{111} While Farage has portrayed Eastern European immigrants as both a threat to the national economy and culture, UKIP has also mobilized anti-Muslim sentiment as by speaking to the “illiberal” values of Islam and has criticized the government’s support for a “doctrine of multiculturalism”.\textsuperscript{112} In the wake of the November 2015 Paris attacks, the UKIP leader would ramp up this divisive rhetoric by accusing British Muslims of having “split loyalties” while introducing the notion of an Islamic fifth column present within the country.\textsuperscript{113}

The manifestation of Islamaphobia and anti-immigrant policies in UKIP is very similar to the platform used by the \textit{Front National}. While UKIP emerged from a single issue party to one that placed greater emphasis on the immigration issue stance in recent years, the \textit{Front National} has long railed against Muslim and Islamic values since the late 1980s by tying the country’s large Muslim population with rising unemployment, crime and delinquency.\textsuperscript{114} Though Jean-Marie Le Pen had previously called for a complete stop to immigration and advocated repatriation, as a part of the FN’s “de-demonization” strategy Marine Le Pen has instead adopted a less radical platform that calls for a renegotiation of European movement treaties and would greatly limit immigration, capping it at 10,000 per year in order to “reinforce the French identity”.\textsuperscript{115} In addition, the FN’s current platform also calls for the elimination of dual nationality and

\textsuperscript{114} Shields, James. 2007. 283-284.
deportation of illegal immigrants and criminals. To an even greater extent than Farage, Le Pen has also talked about the danger that Islam poses to France, highlighting crime, terrorism and in particular what she has seen as illiberal views towards women as well as an inherent incompatibility with democracy and secularism. As a result, both parties have been strong voices against the accession of Turkey to the EU. Indeed, Le Pen’s anti-Muslim messaging and opposition to pluralism has at times proven so fiery, that she would face trial (and eventually was acquitted) in 2015 for inciting racial hatred over comments comparing Muslims praying in the street to Nazi occupiers.\(^{116}\)

In both cases the *Front National* and UKIP have portrayed themselves as agents of change, capitalizing on rising distrust and frustration with traditional political parties and institutions which is most prevalent amongst the working class. Support predominantly coming from the economically disenfranchised or “left-behinds”, has led both take similar positions on the European Union, an institution seen as undemocratic and believed to be responsible for high levels of immigration and subsequent economic depressions.\(^{117}\) While the *Front National*’s recent messaging on this issue has varied from a renegotiation of numerous agreements with the European Union to calling for a national referendum, with Le Pen most recently calling herself “Madame Frexit”,\(^ {118}\) there is a clear element of Euroscepticism in the FN’s agenda and rhetoric. Conversely, UKIP’s position has been far more consistent and unambiguous since its formation calling for a referendum that if successful, would see the United Kingdom negotiate to leave the EU.


While both hold similar ideas when it comes to the immigration and the EU, where the parties differ most however is in the realm of economics. Since the party’s creation, UKIP has often been described as classic economic liberals and libertarians, influenced heavily by the economic policies of Margaret Thatcher.\textsuperscript{119} For example, the party’s most recent general election platform argued in favor of a flat tax system, while also advocating the lowering business tax below 20 per cent. Farage has also pledged to downsize the scale of government, eliminating agencies deemed to be superfluous and rerouting funds towards the National Health Service (NHS) which he argues has been placed under unnecessary strain by immigrants.\textsuperscript{120, 121}

The \textit{Front National}’s economic strategy varies significantly different from that of the United Kingdom Independence Party. Le Pen has also stressed the need for tax reform, arguing in favor creating of three new tax rates that would see the highest income individuals pay nearly 34 per cent of their income, perhaps ironic given the party’s roots in the anti-tax \textit{Poujadist} movement.\textsuperscript{122} The FN has also promised to raise inheritance tax while UKIP has called to abolish it. Although both parties have argued that the poorest members of society should pay less in the way of taxes, though Le Pen’s way of compensating for this is to adopt protectionist trade policies and raise the tax on France’s highest earners—an platform that Farage described as “socialist” and being from the “extreme left” in an interview with \textit{Le Figaro}.\textsuperscript{123} Unsurprising given her aversion to the EU, Le Pen has also called for France’s return to the Franc, arguing that

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sovereign fiscal policy is impossible in the Eurozone, an idea that Farage has backed Le Pen on.124

4.2. The Later Emergence of UKIP Relative to the FN

Perhaps the most notable difference between the development of both parties is the later rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party when compared to the Front National. While the Front National has trended towards the political mainstream since the 1980s, far-right parties with similar ideologies to the FN in the UK were unquestionably marginalized at this time.125 Although the FN made electoral inroads in the mid-1980s, registering nearly 10 per cent in the legislative elections of 1986 and 1988 and 14.4 per cent of the presidential vote in 1988, comparable parties including the British National Party and National Front were barely registering in national elections with less than 1 per cent of the vote in 1987 and were also struggling to make any kind of political breakthrough at local levels. To further highlight the rise of the FN at a time of far-right stagnation in the UK, the FN would elect 10 MEPs in both the 1984 and 1989 European elections, presenting a sharp contrast to the far-right’s fortune’s in the UK, with the BNP not fielding any candidates and the NF faring miserably, registering only a few thousand votes in the same elections.126

While the far-right in the UK clearly remained on the periphery at a time where the Front National began to establish themselves, the United Kingdom Independence Party, the ideological equivalent to the Front National would not be created until 1993—a number of years until after

124 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
the FN had become an influential force in French politics. There are a number of reasons behind this later growth of UKIP and the far-right in the UK compared to the *Front National*.

One of the greatest factors behind this phenomenon is that throughout the 1980s many far-right supporters saw the BNP and NF as redundant, instead choosing to vote for Thatcher’s Conservatives (1979-1990) who they felt adequately addressed their concerns. Despite significant ideological differences between these far-right parties and the Conservatives, Thatcher was well known for her description of arriving immigrants as “a swamping [of the UK by] an alien culture”, took hard positions on immigration and was very popular at the time given her role in the Falklands War. Thatcher’s popularity and tough agenda with regards to immigration and citizenship would result in already miniscule far-right parties with anti-immigrant platforms like the National Front and British National Party being squeezed out elections given their perceived similarity by the public, with many who saw immigration as an important issue choosing to support the Tories.

In contrast to the right-wing Thatcher government which delayed the growth of the far-right in the United Kingdom by championing immigration and citizenship reform, the unpopular socialist François Mitterrand government (1981-1995) that dominated French politics in the 1980s and early 1990s did the opposite, inadvertently presenting the *Front National* with a forum to spread their ideas and their alternative policies. While then-president Mitterrand’s decision to implement a proportional representation voting system in the 1986 elections would result in a significant (albeit temporary) FN presence in the national legislature, the inability of the socialist government to adequately address the economic crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, failure to quell concerns over rising crime rates and the absence of a coherent immigration strategy would

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give Jean-Marie Le Pen an opportunity to spread his ideas and proved to be highly conducive to FN growth.

With Mitterrand’s erratic economic record which saw the Franc frequently devalued and unemployment rates fluctuate under his watch, Le Pen was able to capitalize on the failures of the traditional parties by presenting himself as an alternative to the establishment by pushing his deeply anti-immigrant 50-point agenda which among other ideas, sought to introduce a policy of “national preference”, review all naturalization cases since 1974 and repeal anti-racist legislation. While the mainstream parties were able to recoup support by borrowing some elements of the FN’s radical agenda, a phenomenon explained in greater detail in section 4.4, the general failures of the Mitterrand government to address worsening ethnic relations and economic malaise would lead non-traditional parties like the FN to see early success in the 1980s as a “protest vote”, drawing on heavy support from a growing segment of society that was economically disenfranchised. The combination of electoral changes aimed at keeping the Parti Socialiste in power, combined with the scandal-plagued and often ineffective Mitterand administration has often been blamed for legitimizing the party; propelling the Front National to new heights and giving the FN a chance to grow. Indeed, the party consistently polled around 10 to 15 per cent during the Mitterrand years as opposed to barely registering in elections prior (see figures 1 and 2). Sure enough, the former president would later admit that in hindsight he had “underestimated” the radical right-wing party, believing at the time that Le Pen was a “lightweight with no political future”.

While the varying political climates in France and the United Kingdom in the 1980 and 1990s affected each parties’ emergence, with the far-right in the UK being initially stifled by the

129 Shields. 2007. 237-239.
130 Ibid. 211.
131 Ibid. 196.
popularity of the Conservatives and at the same time, the FN’s ability to capitalize on the failures of the socialist Mitterrand government, it is also important to note that, each party’s raison d’être would resonate at different times given the varying attitudes in each country and can also be used to explain the uneven growth between the far-right in France and the United Kingdom.

The immigration issue, unquestionably at the core of the FN’s agenda, became politically salient in France in the 1980s during an economic crisis resulting in rising xenophobia—particularly against North African Muslims who were portrayed as outsiders. Unsurprisingly, the emergence of immigration as a campaign issue and the unpopular response by the socialist government would help propel the Front National and their anti-immigrant platform to success during this era. In the UK however, support for the European Union remained generally high in the 1980s and 1990s with polling data showing it at 54 per cent in favor of remaining in the EU in 1993, the year the anti-EU UKIP was formed. In addition, few Britons saw immigration as a major campaign issue for much of the 1990s with 5 per cent finding it very important in 1993 and 3 per cent holding the same view in 1997, explaining the slow takeoff of UKIP. In response to the EU’s expansion to Eastern Europe, terrorist attacks in the country and the economic recession which disproportionately affected the working class, these issues central to the far-right would gradually become more important in the 2000s, which coincided not only with the very brief period of success enjoyed by the BNP, but also would mark the beginning of UKIP’s period of more rapid and sustained growth.

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135 Goodwin, 2011. 57.
immigration, while 25 per cent in 2000 would view the issue as very important in deciding which party to vote for, this number would grow to 50 per cent in 2007 and according to Ipsos MORI data, would be the number one issue for voters in 2016. Simply put, in the 1980s and for much of the 1990s, the political climate in the United Kingdom was not conducive to UKIP’s platform as the central ideas in their agenda such as immigration and Euroskepticism were not yet politically salient and would only become so in the 2000s. In France however, given the importance of these issues some time earlier in the 1980s—there would be much more room for a far-right party like the Front National to grow.

4.3 The Steady Growth of UKIP versus FN Turbulence

Another observation is that UKIP has seen steady growth throughout the party’s history. Indeed, as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the party has increased its share of the vote at both the national and European level in every single contest resulting in a slow, yet consistent rise. This contrasts with the development of the Front National which has instead been marked by turbulence and volatility. There are a number of factors that explain this difference.

Differences in leadership styles between the two parties have played an important role. In the case of the Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen was a deeply divisive character who was at times a liability for his party. While polling results show that Le Pen was able to tap into discontent and his deeply controversial messaging at times propelled the FN to success, it is also important to note that the Jean-Marie Le Pen era was also marked by outrageous xenophobic and racist

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140 Goodwin. 2011. 57.
statements that confirmed labels of fascism in the eyes of voters and limited the *Front National*’s ability to grow even further. The senior Le Pen also made numerous contentious internal decisions, the most notable involving the selection of his politically untested wife Jany over more qualified candidates to head the party’s election list, a move which fractured the party prior to the hugely disappointing 1999 European Parliamentary Elections (see figure 2). As noted in Section Two, Le Pen would also face legal troubles as a result of his hard line leadership style and was convicted on a range of offences including assault and inciting racial hatred. Even at the height of his success in 2002, a public opinion poll showed that 61 percent of respondents held a negative view of the party leader and 70 per cent saw the *Front National* as a danger.\(^{142}\)

Although Jean-Marie Le Pen deserves credit for the initial growth of the FN, the emergence of Marine Le Pen as party leader has resulted in even better and more consistent results in large part due to her more careful tone and pragmatic leadership style. Marine Le Pen has not only been able to win over party members and avoid the infighting that hurt the FN for much of its history, but the softening of the party’s rhetoric and platform and the “polishing” of its image has greatly helped the party and made them more electable.\(^{143}\) Marine Le Pen’s focus on the party’s image led her to “exile” her father over comments which trivialized Nazi gas chambers and attempt to make amends with the Jewish community. While the extent to which the party’s agenda has truly been softened has been debated by scholars,\(^ {144}\) at the very least an appearance of de-demonization appears to have paid off. Opinion polls point to the party now being more favorably received under her than her father, with 52 per cent in 2016 seeing the party as a danger (a historic low) and sizable decrease from her father’s days as party head. Furthermore,


polling data from TNS-Sofres reveals under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s guardianship, an average of 73 per cent were in “total disagreement” with the party—numbers that compare with the average of 62 per cent that have disagreed with the Front National under Marine Le Pen.\footnote{“Baromètre 2016 D’image Du Front National.” TNS Sofres. N.p., 5 Feb. 2016. Web. 11 June 2016.} Given the improving image of the Front National, it is therefore unsurprising that she has guided the party to stability and new heights, in sharp contrast to the peaks and valleys under the mercurial leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen.

While the Front National was limited by its turbulent leadership until recently, UKIP’s leadership has traditionally been consistent and pragmatic with previous leaders being described as “emollient” and “calming”.\footnote{Daniel. 2005. 74.} While pragmatic UKIP leadership has also continued with the election of Nigel Farage in 2006, Farage has brought additional qualities to UKIP as unlike his successors, has been described as “undoub[edly] charismatic”, possessing “star quality” while turning in excellent performances at political debates and has unsurprisingly maintained a high profile in the media.\footnote{Mason, Rowena, and Ben Quinn. “Nigel Farage Quits as Ukip Leader but May Return after Break.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 8 May 2015.} Farage’s leadership style shares much more in common with the more calculated Marine Le Pen than her rash father and has seen the party grow at an unprecedented rate at the ballot box as a result. In fact, Farage has been so closely associated with the development of his own party that there have been no serious challenges to his leadership and internal elections have always resulted in levels of overwhelming support. Indeed, Farage’s resignation in 2015 as party leader was unanimously rejected by UKIP members who saw him as the party’s “biggest asset” and recognized the importance in keeping him on given the party’s more rapid growth with him at the helm.\footnote{“Farage Stays as UKIP Leader after Resignation Rejected.” BBC News. 11 May 2015. Web. 11 June 2016.}
Another key reason for the electoral volatility of the Front National has been the emergence of breakaway parties or parties that share very similar ideologies, something that UKIP has not had to deal with. First, the creation of the far-right Mouvement pour la France (MPF) in 1994 would continuously siphon off votes from the Front National limiting their access to unhindered growth. Second, in response to a series of internal disagreements that would see the high profile Bruno Mégret passed over as Jean-Marie Le Pen’s appointed successor (a hugely questionable leadership decision by Le Pen), Mégret created his own political party, the National Republican Movement (MNR) in 1999. The emergence of these parallel far-right groups have fractured the vote and was a major reason for the FN’s poor showing in the 1999 EP elections in which the party would see its worst ever result. 149

Since the late 1990s, UKIP has done better than the Front National in European elections, yet has generally not done as well in UK parliamentary elections. A likely explanation for this is that while the proportional representation electoral system for European elections applies in both the United Kingdom and France, the electoral systems are very different in national elections. In particular, in the UK voters face a single round first-past-the-post system that determines not only the composition of Parliament, but who will serve as Prime Minister. In France by contrast, elections are contested in a two round run-off voting system and the President is chosen in a separate ballot. It therefore seems likely that British voters are less willing to risk their single national vote on a smaller party. 150

4.4. Ability of the FN and UKIP to Set the Political Agenda

150 Indeed, as is discussed in Emanuele Ottoleghi’s Why Direct Election Failed in Israel, Israel provides an interesting where the introduction of a direct ballot for Prime Minister resulted in vote splitting and increased vote share for smaller parties.
Despite their impressive rise from the margins of politics, neither the *Front National* nor UKIP have been able to win massive voter support or a significant number of seats in national elections. However, despite this limited presence in national legislatures, both parties periodically have been able to shape the political agenda far beyond their results at the ballot box would suggest.

In the case of France, the *Front National* has been able to both bring to light and influence the immigration debate on numerous occasions and remains one of the party’s “greatest achievements”. In 1984 Prime Minister Laurent Fabius conceded that Le Pen “asked the right questions” with regards to immigration and identity. Five years later, President Mitterrand agreed with Jean-Marie Le Pen by stated that “tolerance threshold [in matters of immigration] had been exceeded”, lending a hint of credence and legitimacy to the *Front National*’s anti-immigrant platform. Furthermore, Le Pen’s anti-Islamic rhetoric, once largely confined to the campaigns of the *Front National* and the far-right, would enter the political discourse of some mainstream politicians in the 1990s.

Similar to his predecessors, Sarkozy employed hard line, if not racist, rhetoric in the 2007 election when it came to immigration and plurality issues embracing ethno-nationalist positions. While Sarkozy is admittedly a member of the moderate right, this was seen as uncharacteristic given the similarities between his dialogue and the *Front National*’s. This discourse echoed that of the FN and was used in an attempt to win over far-right voters, resulting in the label “Nicolas Le Pen” by the media. By and large this shift to the right by Sarkozy was successful as data shows that up to 38 per cent of Le Pen voters in 2002 switched their allegiances to Sarkozy’s

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152 DeClair, 1999, 93.
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) granting him victory.\textsuperscript{154} While the FN’s low vote tally of 10.4 per cent was seen as disappointing, a renewed focus on the issue of immigration and the acceptance and legitimization of far-right dialogue represented a victory of the FN’s ideas. This legitimization of the far-right by French leadership has historically created a platform for the party to grow as seen by recent successes in the 2012 and 2014 elections.\textsuperscript{155}

UKIP’s ability to influence the United Kingdom’s agenda is perhaps an even more significant example of a far-right political party exerting a disproportionate amount of influence.\textsuperscript{156} One example of this is in the 2015 general election in which the Conservatives campaigned on a promise to call a national referendum on the country’s membership in the EU. While always the favourite to win the election, David Cameron’s Conservative Party appeared uncertain to reach a majority. In addition, the Conservatives were bleeding supporters and MPs following the defection of Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless to UKIP over Cameron’s personal pro-EU stance on European membership.\textsuperscript{157}

The loss of MPs and threat of failing to reach a majority would force Cameron into not only addressing the European dilemma in order to appease rising anti-EU sentiment within his party and the country, but promise to call a referendum on the issue. Cameron’s strategy worked in the short term, giving him a slight majority and momentarily stopping parliamentary defections within his party. Although Cameron had both previously rejected calls for a referendum before (2009, 2014) and had dismissed the notion of a UKIP coalition, the growing influence wielded by UKIP made him do a complete reversal. Cameron would call a referendum on EU

\textsuperscript{154} Mondon. 2013. 37.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid. 40.
membership for June 23, proof of how UKIP, a party that had only two MPs, was able to set the political agenda and force the Prime Minister into taking a position at odds with his own beliefs. Indeed, Farage would later praise his party for “chang[ing] the political agenda” and call Cameron’s referendum pledge "[UKIP’s] proudest achievement to date". Moreover, UKIP and Nigel Farage have been extraordinarily prominent in the Brexit debate and “Leave” movement—and, regardless of the outcome, certainly have played a key role in mobilizing opposition to continued British membership in the European Union.

5.0 Conclusion

The historical development of both parties reveals that the Front National and United Kingdom Independence Party have emerged from being members of the political periphery. In the Front National’s case, the party was founded out of numerous far-right elements, struggled to make a breakthrough in the 1970s and would begin to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s. After a brief period in which the party saw mixed results in the 2000s, the election of Marine Le Pen as party leader has resulted in a reversal of the party’s fortunes. Unlike her father who had a penchant for rash comments and questionable decisions, Le Pen’s strategy of “de-demonization” and her more careful leadership style which has focused on the party’s image has guided the Front National to new heights.

In the case of the United Kingdom, the far-right was long dominated by neo-fascist parties that were never truly embraced by the electorate. These parties faced competition from Margaret Thatcher’s Tories who successfully squeezed out the far-right by their ability to court the anti-

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
immigrant vote. These violent and racist parties would be marginalized for much of their history and contrast heavily with the relative success of the more moderate UKIP. While UKIP struggled to make a breakthrough as a single issue party in the 1990s, the diversification of their party platform to focus on more than just the European issue has seen the party grow increasingly popular. The calculated and charismatic qualities of UKIP leadership, best personified by the energetic Nigel Farage, has result in a steady, increase in support, with each election at the European or national level representing a new high for the party.

While section three indicates that the parties have a number of ideological similarities, figures 1 and 2 confirm that there has been uneven development when the trajectories of both parties are compared. UKIP’s much later emergence can be traced to the success of the Conservative party in capturing the far-right vote and the fact that the party’s anti-immigrant, anti-EU platform would not truly resonate with voters until the mid-2000s, with comparatively few Britons not viewing immigration or the European question as an issue of high importance in the 1990s. In the case of the *Front National*, the rising saliency of immigration in France in the 1980s, the issue at the very core of the party’s platform, coupled with the unpopular Mitterrand government explains why the FN’s rise began comparatively earlier.

In addition, the steady growth of UKIP when compared to the turbulent nature of the *Front National*’s development can be attributed to a number of factors. The first of these is that the historically mercurial leadership style of Jean-Marie Le Pen compared to the more moderate and pragmatic nature of UKIP leaders led to a turbulent trajectory for the FN compared to UKIP. Also explaining this phenomenon is the presence of breakaway parties or parties with similar ideologies which have frequently taken a share of the far-right vote and competed with the *Front
France’s two round run-off voting system has been particularly conducive to FN success.

Finally, both parties have also been able to influence the political agendas in their countries far beyond their limited presence in the legislature. In the case of the Front National, this has involved bringing attention to the immigration issue in the 1980s, which would not only lend the party heightened legitimacy, but present the party with a platform for future successes. A more recent example of this is Nicolas Sarkozy’s rhetoric and immigration platform in the 2007 election which was partially similar to that of the FN and used in an attempt to win over far-right supporters.

While the FN has influenced the tone when it comes to the country’s immigration debate, UKIP have perhaps exerted even greater influence. This phenomenon is most clearly witnessed in the case of the European Union referendum, the issue that the party was founded on in 1993. Despite Prime Minister David Cameron’s pro-European views, the increasingly unpopular European Union and UKIP’s continued use of an anti-EU message has led Tory supporters and some Conservative MPs to defect, or at the very least consider UKIP as an alternative. The influence of UKIP has forced Cameron to call a referendum in June 2016, a decision very much at odds with his personal beliefs.

Although it is difficult to accurately predict the future for these far-right parties, the outcome of the United Kingdom’s EU referendum could have a significant impact on not only the United Kingdom Independence Party, but the Front National as well. In UKIP’s case, a successful referendum and the beginning of negotiations that would result in a “BREXIT” could mean that voters see the party as no longer necessary and lead to a period of decline. Conversely, a victory for the “Remain” side could also pose problems for the party as it would demonstrate that voters
have rejected the very goal of UKIP’s existence. In either case, both the results and the campaign will no doubt be followed closely by similar far-right parties, including the Front National as they potentially ponder their own European exit—a development that would no doubt push the European Union into an even greater state of disarray.

Appendix:

Appendix 1: Selected Parliamentary and European Results of Far-right Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Most Recent Parliamentary Vote Share (%)</th>
<th>2014 European Election Vote Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik (HUN)</td>
<td>20.22</td>
<td>14.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid (NED)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti (DEN)</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Dawn (GRE)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sverigedemokraterna (SWE)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (AUS)</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography:


Farage, Nigel (Nigel_Farage). "Millions of voters who support UKIP are not "far-right" but decent, patriotic people who love their country." 17 August 2015, 1:43AM. Tweet.


