Evolutions in Transnational Authority:
Practices of Risk and Data
in European Disaster and Security Governance

Christopher C. Leite

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School of Political Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Ottawa

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The scholarly field of International Relations (IR) has been slow to appreciate the evolutions in forms of governance authority currently seen in the European political system. Michael Barnett has insisted that ‘IR scholars also have had to confront the possibility that territoriality, authority, and the state might be bundled in different ways in present-day Europe’ (2001, 52). This thesis outlines how modern governing authority is generated and maintained in a Europe that is strongly impacted by the many institutions, departments, and agencies of the European Union (EU). Using the specific cases of the EU’s disaster response organisation, the DG for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), and the hub for EU internal security policy management, the DG for Home and Migration Affairs (HOME), this thesis understands the different policy areas under EU policymaker and bureaucrat jurisdictions as semi-autonomous fields of practice – fields that are largely confined to the groups of bureaucratic, diplomatic, corporate, NGO, contracted, and IO that exist in Brussels, decidedly removed from in-field or operational personnel. Transnational governance authority in Europe, at least in these two fields, is generated and maintained by actors recognised as highly expert in producing and using data to monitor for the risks of future disasters and entrenching that ability into central functional roles in their respective fields.

Both ECHO and HOME actors came to be recognised as central authorities in their fields thanks to their ability to prepare for unknown future natural and manmade disasters by creating and collecting and managing data on them and then using this data to articulate possible future scenarios as risks. They use the resources at their disposal to generate and manage data about disaster and security monitoring and coordination, drawing on these resources to impress upon the other actors in their fields that cooperating with ECHO and HOME is the best way to minimise the risks posted by future disasters. In doing so, both sets of actors established the parameters by which other actors understood their own best practices: through the use of data to monitor for future scenarios and establish criteria upon which to justify policy decisions. The specific way ECHO and HOME actors were able to position themselves as primary or central figures, namely, by using centralised data management, demonstrates the role that risk practices play in generating and maintaining authority in complex institutional governance situations as currently seen in Europe.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ARGUS – A privately run, general European rapid alert system
BENELUX – Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg
CECIS – Common Emergency Communication and Information System
CIRAM – Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
Cool – Consular Crisis Management Division, Consular Online
CRED – Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
DG – Directorate-General
EAS – Europol Analysis System
EASO – European Asylum Support Office
EC – European Communities
ECB – European Central Bank
ECCPM – European Community Civil Protection Mechanism
ECHO – DG Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
ECP – European Civil Protection
ECSC – Economic Coal and Steel Community
EDRIS – European Disaster Response Information System
EEAS – European External Action Service
EEC – European Economic Community
EFAS – European Flood Awareness System
EFFIS – European Forest Fire Information System
EM-DAT – An International Disaster Database run by CRED
EPP – European People’s Party
ERCC – European Response Coordination Centre
EU – European Union
EUBGT – European Union Border Guard Team
EUMETNET – Network of European Meteorological Services
EURATOM – European Atomic Energy Community
EUROSUR – European Border Surveillance System
FRONTEX – European Union Border Agency; from French ‘frontières extérieures’
GDACS – Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System
GFDRR – Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction
HOME – DG Migration and Home Affairs
IDAS – Interactive Disaster Analysis System
IO – Intergovernmental Organisation
INTCEN – Intelligence Analysis Centre
IPCR – EU Integrated Political Crisis Response committee
JRC – Joint Research Centre
MACC – Maritime Analysis Coordination Centre
MIC – Monitoring and Information Centre
MOVE – DG for Mobility and Transport
NDRRMC – National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines
OSOCC – On Site Operations Coordination Centre, a project from UN OCHA
PDC – Pacific Disaster Center
RABIT – Rapid Border Intervention Team
RAU – FRONTEX’s in-house Risk Analysis Unit
S&D – Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SCAN – EUROPOL’s Scanning, Analysis and Notification system
STAR – Strategic Analysis and Response Centre
TEU – Treaty on European Union
UN – United Nations
UN OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDAC – United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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Figure 5.1: Categories of ERCC Monitors

Figure 5.2: The ERCC’s position in the Field of Disaster Response
INTRODUCTION:

AUTHORITY, RISK, AND GOVERNING MODERN EUROPE

On 26 December 2004, a 9.1-9.3 magnitude earthquake and resulting tsunami ravaged South Asia. States from the European Union (EU) wanted to immediately assist in any ways they could, but they had no standing ability to coordinate a quick deployment of disaster responders, as the tsunami caught them completely unaware. Moreover, they had a number of citizens unable to travel home because of the mass disturbances caused, so individual countries were left trying to return their citizens home at great expense (Interview 3). This was the first time that almost all of the EU was trying to respond to a disaster simultaneously. Without pre-existing coordination efforts, however, the response was a mess: ‘[we heard] stories of huge cargo planes leaving Europe half-empty – and then leaving South Asia completely empty! This was while other teams had to find ways to pay for their own transportation out of pocket and having civilians stuck abroad!’ (quote from Interview 3, but a shared sentiment in Interviews 1, 6, 9). By the time an earthquake levelled Haiti on 12 January 2010, in contrast, EU disaster response had become so coordinated that ‘[the earthquake] occurred…at night [Brussels] time, and we were there by the next evening…with a full urban search and rescue team…it was impressive’ (Interview 1); there was a complete reversal in response capabilities.

Changes like those seen in coordinating EU disaster response happen because patterns of cooperation through transnational governance institutions, and the relationships of authority that define them, evolve. Areas with a historic lack of EU integration, for example, are now pinnacles of transnational cooperation; disaster responders representing the EU went from a non-existent body to shared mantra of ‘where there is a need, we deploy’ (Interview 1). It used to be that EU-
level cooperation in disaster response was difficult, as disaster response and civil protection were seen as the capabilities of states, usually their foreign, defense, or interior ministries.

This relative lack of cooperation is similar in the field of European internal security provision and transnational policing: despite monumental developments over the last decade in plenary information sharing among police and intelligence agencies, operational information-sharing has been strikingly under-developed in both military and police settings, as information security procedures have remained intensely-protected state capacities. Similarly, while standard risk and threat analysis reports are widely distributed, for example, their methodologies, the ways that state governments calculate these risks, remain tightly-guarded secrets. We are, however, beginning to see cooperation happening in ways that make it progressively more appealing for Member States to work together in specific, targeted policy areas. For example, military and civilian analysis-sharing has begun to increase. This is a remarkable development, especially given that as recently as 2012, joint civil-military capability sharing between European states was virtually non-existent (Pannier and Schmidt 2014).

Increases in European security cooperation are happening because European and EU security institutions have changed the way they understand themselves and their roles in maintaining sovereign authority in Europe. European security institutions do not see integration as eroding sovereign authority through increased cooperation¹. Instead, state authority is being complemented by new forms of transnational governance relationships. This general increase in cooperation has led to a situation where disaster response and internal security provision negotiations are not so much about whether or not coordination and mutual assistance will happen, but how to professionalise and establish that coordination before a disaster or crisis situation occurs

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¹ As argued, for example, by Davis Cross (2011).
The desire to cooperate in disaster and security response operations is now considered the best way to mitigate the effects of disasters or crises. This reversal in patterns of transnational governance and changes in the orientations of actors in the disaster governance and internal security cooperation fields raises complicated questions about the relationship between institutional change and authority, specifically in relation to Europe’s EU-dominated transnational political system but also in the functioning of authority in transnational settings more generally.

How can we make sense of evolutions of authority relationships in the myriad transnational governance institutions in Europe? What underlies the modern form of authority seen in democracies with advanced bureaucracies? How is authority generated and maintained in modern transnational political systems?

To answer these questions, the current project uses the specific policy areas of disaster governance and internal security provision as windows into larger sets of processes of transnational authority-building, trying to account for both the general nature of authority in European politics and the specific role that the logics of disaster management play in claiming that authority. The central argument is that EU actors use data to monitor for potential disaster risks and these practices enable actors to generate pockets of authority in their specified policy areas. Actors performing practices of data analysis are then able to maintain their authority by reconfiguring their policy fields to centralise their own risk monitoring practices. Making this argument recognises authority as a social relationship, rather than a possessive or unitary quality, and engages with International Relations (IR) approaches to authority in the EU that often suffer from three limitations: an assumption that authority merely exists separate from the processes of its own generation; a misunderstanding of the daily workings of EU departments and what they actually do; and missing the fact that actors in Europe are always competing with each other over authority.
In order to look at the specifics of a policy area like disaster governance and its natural orientation towards mitigating the effects of future events, this project also engages with existing accounts of the political role played by risk, similarly finding this literature hesitant or unable to properly address the impact of risk in social contexts – of risk ‘in-situ’. This project is thus, at its core, fundamentally about the relationship between authority and institutional change, in particular highlighting how disaster governance and risk change the way transnational governance institutions produce and maintain their authority when more traditional sources of authority like democratic legitimacy or legal constitutional recognition are not readily available.

In official settings, risk usually refers to preventive/mitigation risk, preparedness risk, response risk, or recovery risk (Public Safety Canada 2012, Interviews 5, 10). These four typologies reflect ‘traditional governmental strategies [which] have always sought to reduce, tame and calculate the unknown through practices of risk’ (Aradau and van Munster 2012, 7). As explored in chapter two, however, risk needs also to be seen as a malleable practice that varies widely according to its context and application. It is a catch-all concept that outlines the attempt to (at different times) mitigate, prevent, prepare for, respond to, or recover from unknown disaster scenarios.

Likewise, the term ‘disaster’ is sometimes placed on a spectrum that ranges from emergencies, crises, disasters, and catastrophes\(^2\). While thinking about disasters in relation to these other concepts is useful, I want to highlight one particular aspect of ‘disaster’, as a concept, that sets it apart: a disaster is when the expectations of an event exceed or surpass one’s ability to confront, deal with, cope, or manage that event or its effects. In this light, a medical emergency is a failure of one individual’s body’s ability to successfully withstand or cope with a trauma or

\(^2\) For example, as in Aradau and van Munster (2012, 5-6).
disease – a medical emergency is a localised disaster. A crisis is when response capabilities to an event similarly are unable to deal with a situation – another disaster. A catastrophe differs from a disaster mostly in scale, as a ‘catastrophe is generally seen as the intensification of disaster on a gradual continuum of destruction’ (Aradau and van Munster 2012, 5). Linking these sociological definitions of risk and disaster, disaster governance practices transform the logics of formal risk management techniques and turn them into part of everyday governance processes: impact assessment matrixes, monitoring levels of change, automated reporting, and centralised communication, to name a few.

Building from these definitions, I develop a framework that can explain the specific role that disaster governance risk logics play in accounting for the generation and maintenance of authority in transnational settings and with it, an interpretation of changes in the orientations of transnational institutions. In doing so, I draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practices in fields, specifically using it to think of risk in terms of what forms of resources of capital it entails, in terms of how it frames understandings as a base of knowledge, and in terms of its role in shaping behaviours as a category of practice. This approach engages with the insights of Political Sociology to emphasise the practices and social roles taken by transnational political actors, but is careful to both remain rooted firmly in International Relations – in particular security studies and global governance literatures – and frame the project within debates that are central to European Integration literature.

The field of EU disaster response has evolved as the actors who use data to monitor for natural disaster risks have become (at least partially) recognised as authorities in the disaster governance field. These actors use their authoritative status to reconfigure the preferences and understandings of the other actors in their field so that cooperation in data usage is normalised and considered best practice. This method for generating and maintaining authoritative positions has
also circulated to the internal security provision policy area. In both instances, the use of data to monitor for future risks has allowed EU-level experts to generate a type of authority that subverts but does not replace the authority traditionally assumed to reside in the transnational European context, namely in the Member States. EU governance authority is a set of relationships that are generated and maintained by European policymaking actors in specific, localised contexts. By accounting for the particular way EU actors use data and risk in claiming and establishing authority in these two policy fields, this project challenges some fundamental assumptions about what types of authority are vested in transnational governance institutions, especially those institutions that are entwined with the daily political workings of their constituent states.

GOVERNANCE AUTHORITY IN EUROPE

Where does the EU’s authority come from? What are things that EU departments and agencies do that makes the idea of ‘the EU’ seem legitimate or have authority? For the early years of European integration, the answer was an almost universal narrative: European integration entailed peace and prosperity, rooted in its role in making former enemies into allies and then spreading democracy across Europe in the 1990s. In this view, the EU is the result of states integrating their political and economic policies dating from the end of the Second World War. Beginning as an American project to both bolster post war rebuilding efforts and stem the western spread of Communism in Europe, early European integration projects ‘encourage[d] the creation of joint economic organizations in order to create economic interdependencies that crossed over the traditional lines of hostilities between European states’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 184).
Within this initial group of European bodies, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established with the Treaty of Paris and coming into force in July 1952, became the real forerunner of what eventually became the EU. The 1967 Merger Treaty, or Brussels Treaty, combined elements of the ECSC with those of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) under the larger rubric of the European Economic Community (EEC) to create the European Communities (EC). The EC expanded from its original six members (France, West German, Italy, and the BENELUX countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) to include Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986.

This period also saw the growth and consolidation of EC institutions, as well as the initial moves to create the European Single Market undertaken particularly by European Commission President Jacques Delors. Entering office during a period of integration stagnancy in 1985, Delors succeeded in implementing a number of institutional reforms aimed at improving integration by emphasising the need to eliminate the de facto lack of free trade amongst EC members. He built support for these changes by first pitching, perhaps half-heartedly, a renewal of an EC standing defence force – a fairly unrealistic goal at the time – and then suggesting a second but more tenable option of closer economic and monetary union as a compromise. This allowed EC integration to build from the existing economic institutions in place at the time. His work culminated in the February 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty, or the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which came into force on 1 November 1993 and formally created the European Union.

There has been a relative surge in academic analyses of the establishment and functioning of the EU since the early 1990s, in particular trying to make sense of the way the onset of the formal EU would change governance arrangements in Europe. Despite the growing attention, and
after five decades of integration into continental-level governance institutions and a basic shared understanding that ‘the EU’ acts as a function of the European states of which it is comprised, the academic literature looking at the nature of authority in transnational European politics remains relatively lacking, however. Evolutions in EU authority have received relatively little serious analysis within the field of International Relations in particular.

IR has often had trouble accounting for the source and exercise of political authority by the EU other than by relegating it to a technical or (neo)functional process (Haas 1958, 1964, 1976, Mitrany 1965, 1976, Scholte 1993, Caporaso 1998, Hooghe and Marks 2008), a delegated legal prescription stemming from European states (Moravcsik 1998, 2002, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, Collard-Wexler 2006), or the product of pre-existing shared notions about what the EU is ‘about’, for constructivists (Duchêne 1972, Rosamond 2000, Manners 2002, Schimmelfenning 2003, Checkel 2005, Meyer 2005, Diez 2005, Smith 2005, Sjursen 2006, Howorth 2007, Giegerich 2008) and poststructuralists (Walker 2000, Bigo 2001, Walters and Haahr 2005a, 2005b). Despite their insights, these accounts have not examined the precise details of key transformations in the authority of the EU. Notably, existing IR accounts of EU authority tend to overlook the specific strategies and techniques that EU agencies and departments use to achieve authority in diverse policy areas, the importance of the daily activities and practices of EU structures, and the way European political actors are always competing over, enacting, and practicing authority when they are negotiating and implementing policy directives.

Events since the 2007-2009 financial and sovereign debt crises have further distorted the source and exercise of transnational governance authority in Europe, as accountability and transparency in EU institutions have come under increasing scrutiny. Questions were raised in 2011, for example, when Italian President Giorgio Napolitano was pressured by European Central
Bank (ECB) lobbyists to unilaterally appoint former EU Commissioner for Internal Market Mario Monti to be the Italian Prime Minister, citing Monti’s pro-austerity stance and reputation for being a technocrat and budget guru. Similarly, Ireland spent much of 2011 and 2012 in a series of Presidential and parliamentary elections that split the country over how to best repay an EU/IMF joint bailout package, before finally agreeing to an EU-backed repayment plan in November 2012 that the country had previously – and resoundingly – rejected in the February 2011 election.

Greece’s case is even more striking. First, in response to the massive strikes and protests to his announced austerity programme in 2011, on 31 October Prime Minister George Papandreou announced a referendum on how to best approach Greece’s debt problem. Eurogroup leaders knew that the referendum would resoundingly reject the measures, so they pressured Papandreou to amend the referendum to focus on Greece’s participation in the Euro. Recognising that Eurogroup leaders were putting him in a position to fail publicly, he called off the referendum on 3 November, before formally resigning on 10 November. Then, in the face of a massive budget crisis and inability to repay an IMF loan, a referendum took place in early July 2015 over whether or not to accept the EU’s bailout package. The resounding rejection of the bailout by the Greek public was ignored in that referendum and the European Parliament and ECB put pressure on Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to eventually accept a package with even more severe cuts to Greek social services. His subsequent resignation echoed what was seen by many as the EU yet again meddling in the democratic wishes of one of its constituents.

In these cases, democratic processes were overruled or otherwise impeded in favour of EU bureaucratic expertise or technocratic decision making. These interventions have led to renewed calls to challenge the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU. Despite increased attention to the lack of transparency and accountability in EU governance, EU institutions are still the de facto
authorities in a number of policy areas, often governing more aspects of a European citizen’s everyday life than their own home states. When trying to better understand these tensions and how they impact governance authority in Europe, however, the majority of IR analyses treat the EU as either an international organisation, a state-like actor, or some form of hybrid governance, and as a result cannot adequately address the genesis of the EU’s ongoing authority in light of its encroachments on the will of its constituent members. Indeed, EU authority is difficult to understand in part because we lack the analytic tools necessary to fully account for or understand the nature of authority in modern Europe.

Part of the issue lies in how analysts define ‘the EU’. The EU is clearly not synonymous with Europe. In fact, defining ‘the EU’ is precisely one of the important contributions that this project makes to the study of modern European politics. The EU should be understood as a complex set of actors where the contemporary political context is relatively unique in the world – particularly the relationship between European state bureaucracies and governments and the myriad transnational formal organisations and informal institutions that combine to govern daily life in Europe. The EU is a collection of different national and international actors, representing governments, bureaucracies, agencies, international organisations, NGOs, and private corporations. These actors are governed according to overlapping sets of local, national, regional, and continental legal frameworks and each policy area includes its own specific sets of norms of conduct for every type of actor involved. The complexity of the combined sets of actors, norms, and frameworks make the EU a collection of specific sets of institutional actors in international politics.

When taking seriously the complexity of the EU, as well as the specific way it brings together actors of different types and scales to be part of the decision making process, it becomes necessary
to pay close attention to the social positions that various EU actors take in the governance process (Bigo 2005, Bigo, Bonditti, et al. 2007, Georgakakis and Weisbein 2012, Adler-Nissen 2014).

‘The EU’ acts in completely different ways on different issues. It contradicts itself, its Member States, its associated Participating States, any perceived idea of EU-identity, or any sense of liberal governing program; it is both a set of processes and a constantly changing collection of actors.

‘The EU’ governs through interactions between various different collections, sets, and types of actors depending on the particular types of governance and policy area.

Rather than focusing on traditional questions of delegation and representation usually assumed to be at the heart of any discussion of authority in modern Europe (Posen 1993, Pollack 2003, Wallace 2005), understanding daily processes of EU governance thus requires that analyses look instead at the relationship between specific institutionalised relationships and logics behind the generation of authority – the logics at work in sorting how authority is recognised and generated relationally. This project draws inspiration from more sociological accounts of authority and the state in international politics to do just that.

This entails clearly drawing on Weberian conceptions of authority and state governance, as embodied in everyday institutions. The project takes up Bourdieu’s reformulation of Weber’s definition of what makes a state: the state is comprised of the monopoly of physical and symbolic violence (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994, 3). Without focusing too closely on the specifics of their two definitions, the authority of governance institutions rests precisely in realigning and framing structures of thought so that those same institutions of governance are treated as givens or seen as normal facts of life: ‘By realizing itself in social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the instituted institution makes us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts
of *institution* (in the active sense) and hence has all appearances of the *natural.*’ (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994, 4; emphases in original).

Building from these works, a number of analysts have argued that authority is a form of recognition generated in specific contexts based on the material and immaterial resources in a given social setting – which Bourdieu referred to as accumulating *capital* in a social *field* (Madsen 2011, Adler-Nissen 2014, 2016). This differs, of course, from assuming ‘ideal-typical sources of authority’ (Sending 2015, 38), where authority rests in some form of legal or pre-supposed rationale of legitimacy. Looking at practices of diplomacy, Sending understands authority as a deferential relationship that exists between a subordinate and superordinate actor, necessarily involving a competitive relational and sociological dimension (paraphrased from Sending 2015, 15); political authority is a sociological relationship based on context-specific logics of governance. While this project does not necessarily engage with accounts of authority in general, Bourdieu’s work provides a framework for interrogating specific pockets of authority.

A sociological approach to EU authority emphasises how actors circulate between different social fields of power within and through ‘the EU’, performing similar types of practices that reinforce particular position-taking strategies in these fields of power (Bigo 2005, Bigo, Bonditti, et al. 2007). These changing, circulating practices alter their new contexts, and with that, have political implications. Bringing these dynamics to light is essential in understanding the governance effects and authority of ‘the EU’ and its place in international politics. Using a theory of practices in fields informed by Bourdieu’s works allows us to highlight the multiple practices performed by different types and classes of actors coalescing in different fields (Bourdieu 1998, 2005, 2011 [1977]). In settings populated with different categories of actors, particular types of practices allow sets of actors to assume more favourable positions in these fields than others and
to be recognised as authorities based on their use of the resources available to them. This renewed focus on the modern institutional politics of present-day Europe means relying on analytic tools that capture how transnational governance processes work as multi-sited, hybrid, and future-oriented sets of practices.

The overlaying institutions of the European Union’s myriad constituent bodies need to generate and assert their authority in the different policy areas under EU jurisdiction. Following this, contestations for authority in European governance are played out as debates over how to govern a specific object (read: policy area) through an agreed-upon base of knowledge. Being able to best mobilise this base of knowledge allows for a specific, powerful claim to authority to happen because it carries *symbolic capital*. Symbolic capital, for Bourdieu, refers to the prestige or honour or recognition that allows actors who possess it to be seen as authorities in a given social field – it is the relationship of one set of actors being recognised as having authority over another in a particular social setting (Bourdieu 1998).

In this light, EU authority can only be properly understood by understanding how it is enacted in the relationships that exist between the policy actors in individual policy areas and looking at the way that some actors have assumed positions of authority vis-à-vis others. With this claim though, there is a very clear divide between the implementation side of a policy area (‘on the ground’) and what happens in Brussels – a cataclysmic divide, in some cases. Both the policy-making field in Brussels and disaster responders responding to a forest fire are part of the same ‘disaster governance’ policy area. There are completely different sets of dynamics at play, though, when discussing authority for decision makers in Brussels and operational personnel responding to disasters. In response situations there are the in-field competitions between EU and national
operations experts, as well as the legal blow back of, in some cases, having foreign soldiers help with response situations, among a myriad of other subtleties outside the remit of the current project.

These operational dynamics are distantly removed from the social fields that exist almost exclusively within Brussels in what might be called a ‘Brussels Bubble’\(^3\), where there is a world of bureaucracy and bureaucratic entwining that includes all manner of corporations, non-governmental organisations, academics, media, bureaucratic workers, diplomatic personnel, and politicians. ECHO and HOME actors being recognised as holding positions of relative authority in these fields is understood relative to the narrow fields of ‘disaster response governance decision makers’ and the ‘internal security provision decision makers’ in Brussels – their authority exists within the spheres of endless meetings and consultations and negotiations between the multiple types of actors that exist with this Brussels Bubble. It is within those Brussels fields that ECHO’s ERCC personnel and HOME’s STAR analysts are authoritative – it is there that they have made the field to be oriented around disaster logics of risk management.

To this end, the project studies the specific area of disaster governance and how disaster response actors within the EU have become authorities in their policy field by controlling the production and access to data used to monitor risks. The project then uses these insights to highlight how other actors in different policy fields, namely that of internal security provision, have begun to use the same strategies for assuming authoritative positions in their fields. Not only are disaster response and internal security provision actors using their resources to generate authority, but they are also changing the way their respective policy fields work on a daily basis. In both fields, EU actors control access to the types of data needed to claim authority and thus dominate the ability to claim authority in modern transnational governance situations. This

\(^3\) I am indebted to William Walters for helping me clarify and define this concept.
‘disaster governance model’ of using data to generate and maintain authority has circulated to at least the field of internal security, where authority relationships follow a similar trajectory.

The growing authority of EU disaster response actors can be seen in even a cursory reading of the most widely distributed EU communiques. The 2010 Internal Security Strategy (ISS) of the EU, for instance, notes that ‘The concept of internal security must be understood as a wide and comprehensive concept…including natural and man-made disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods, and storms’ (Justice and Home Affairs Council 2010, 8). This is a considerable change from the earlier 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which focused primarily on more traditional, albeit expanding, areas of security: law enforcement, armed conflict, border protection, social instability, and the effects of poverty (High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2003). With this shift, the ISS links traditional areas of internal security – transnational organized crime, terrorism, and human trafficking – with a wider set of health, social, and civil protection services.

As a part of these developments, the Directorate-General responsible for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) has become a leader in the implementation of the ISS, notably by upgrading its civil protection capabilities to develop a centre designed to both monitor and coordinate responses to a widening set of disaster situations, the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). Similarly, in a move directly and explicitly designed to copy the success of ECHO’s ERCC, the DG responsible for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) has established its own Strategic Analysis and Response Centre (STAR) to monitor and coordinate responses to a wide range of internal security risks. ECHO and HOME are now tied closely together in the wider field of EU internal security as well.
Strategic Objective 5 of the ISS explicitly attempted to marry the management of natural and man-made disasters – something on-paper done at ECHO, but not being practiced. The *Second Report on the Implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy* clarified this desire into a concrete set of prescriptions for further institutional co-ordination and marked two important developments. First, it emphasised how important opening *both* the ERCC and STAR had been in reducing the effects of natural and man-made disasters – the first time the two had been linked in official discourse. Second, perhaps more interestingly, it called for the ‘first cross-sectoral EU overview of natural and man-made risks’ (COM 179 2013, 15). So, while this definitely did not represent a foregone conclusion that ECHO and HOME’s activities will be or should be linked institutionally, it certainly suggested a general ambition of the EU executive to move in that direction.

This trend not only has implications for the politics of EU security governance, but also raises more general questions about how authority is generated in any policy area: the formal linking of an EU-level authority in one policy area (disaster governance) represents a shift towards establishing EU-level security actors as authoritative in their own policy field. The importance of the evolution of ECHO and HOME institutions thus goes beyond their individual mandates. The specific disaster response practices performed by ECHO are circulating into the wider field of EU internal security provision and this is not merely a coincidence. Changes in the formal understanding of the institutional relationship between these two organisations also indicate how actors in one particular institution of the EU, DG ECHO, were able to gain a central position in their field of disaster governance policy because of their perceived capacity as risk minimisers. The ECHO actors’ approach to generating and using data about possible future disasters and using this data generation and use to position themselves as authorities in the field of disaster governance
by demonstrating their ability to respond to these disaster risks has circulated to another field of EU competence in internal security provision.

By examining these trends in detail, the current research extends practice theory approaches to the EU by pointing to the techniques or strategies by which sets of actors assume positions of authority in EU governance across different policy fields. Notably, the fact that the practices of disaster governance actors are being copied elsewhere demonstrates that what we might term the ‘logics of disaster’ or ‘disasterfication’ are becoming powerful tools for modern governance in other policy areas in Europe. Technocratic or expertise-heavy ‘securocrats’ have become authorities at DG HOME precisely because DG HOME actors have had to respond to the increasing ‘disasterfication’ of EU security politics. By ‘disasterfication’ I refer here to the fact that both policy fields share a base of knowledge that transcends these specific cases: governance authority in modern transnational institutional contexts rests in the ability to produce and collect data in order to anticipate and mitigate unknown future disastrous risks before they occur.

The theme of ‘disasterfication’ highlights the importance of risk in contemporary political practices. Risk is generally studied in IR through one of three sets of theoretical approaches: frameworks of managing objectively-existing risks (Solomon and Ruiz 2012); social constructivist approaches honing in on the use of statistical probabilities to frame social action (Hacking 2010 [1990]); and more critical approaches that focus on the political implications of managing social conditions of inherent, systemic radical uncertainty (Blyth 2002, 2006, Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe 2009 [2001]). In these accounts, however, too little sustained attention has been paid to how practices of minimising the effects of systemic uncertainty work in specific fields of practice. Taking this as a starting point, this project argues that risk is endemic to institutional action in ECHO and HOME and risk management has practical implications outside of simply formally
minimising risks. Therefore, understanding the institutional governance processes of EU institutions means accounting for the role of risk in governance processes, recognising that risk has a practical nature and plays a role in institutional action that is dependent on the specific context in which risk management practices are being used.

For example, ECHO actors have a particular way of dealing with the risks posed by future natural and man-made disasters: creating sophisticated monitoring systems that produce disaster data, using this data to anticipate and prepare for future disaster scenarios, and then taking advantage of a central or privileged role in European emergency communications to coordinate a response intervention. This model has circulated to DG HOME, in that DG HOME actors are similarly a customer of risk and intelligence data from various EU and other European agencies and organisations, compiling and re-analysing this data to monitor for and anticipate future security disasters, and then using HOME’s privileged institutional position to coordinate or initiate a response.

Central to this circulation is the idea that future disastrous scenarios can be managed if only the ‘right’ institutional structure can be used to mitigate the risks these future scenarios pose. This leads to an endless stream of institutionalised risk management processes, always aimed at quelling some as yet unseen crisis. There has been a considerable amount of research into the logics of institutional risk models (Amoore 2006, de Goede 2008, van Munster 2009, Oels 2011, Aradau and van Munster 2012). Considerably less attention has been paid, however, to institutional practices that are based on these risk assessments⁴, to the institutional role that practices of risk management play in creating policy, or to the role that using data to monitor for disaster risks plays in institutional politics and the recognition of authority.

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⁴ With the notable exceptions of de Franco and Meyer (2011) and McGoey (2012).
Recognising ECHO and HOME actors as authorities in their fields is important. Authority is a sociological relationship that is imbued with power. Bourdieu gives us useful language for understanding how relationships structure and are structured by their social settings; in this case, his work lets us see that authority is a form of symbolic capital – a resource of recognition when actors are seen by others in their fields as the best at doing something in a certain way that carries legitimacy in that field. The present project pays particular attention to how ECHO and HOME actors generate authority by using the data they produce and manage to define risks that they alone are recognised as being able to best mitigate, using this ability to place themselves centrally in their respective fields.

In focusing exclusively on data production and information sharing in claiming positions of authority and restructuring fields to maintain that authority, the subtext is that data-led decision making is more authoritative or carries more weight (read: capital) than experiential decision making. This should not be read as a universal claim and is merely the form of decision making that is most effective for the present. One can reasonably suspect that this favouring of data-led decision making will not be the only way that EU actors claim and maintain positions of authority moving forward. Formal and informal arrangements in the EU system change all of the time – hierarchies are always changing drastically and relatively quickly. Despite its reputation as being a cumbersome set of bureaucracies, EU bodies have proven to be remarkably malleable. This is to say that while the specific reliance on data to assume positions of relative authority will eventually give way to some other form of decision making structure, the basic pattern of dynamics currently be seen will still be evident: internal divides over how best to do things; new ways for ensuring that one set of actors control the monopoly over how decisions get made (not over decision making, but over the parameters by which decisions get made), a struggle over the limits of DG jurisdictions
and partnerships, and institutional changes made to support and entrench this new way of doing things.

This highlights the three sociological functions that risk management plays in positioning actors so they become recognised as authorities among their social fields. First, the ability to define, monitor, and best mitigate disaster risks has become a resource in itself. EU-level actors’ ability to monitor and anticipate risks has come to be recognised as an authoritative resource or symbolic capital in disaster governance. Second, framing best practices around monitoring also means that the ability to generate and use data about perceived risks has become the base of knowledge for transnational governance in the EU. This has meant that using data to define and monitor risks has become a crucial way that EU-level actors come to be recognised as authorities in their fields. Third, using capital resources of monitoring risk by creating and using risk-oriented data has led to specific types of practices of centralisation, where actors who are using data to monitor risks are increasingly able to become central, key figures in their respective policy areas. That a specific form of capital and a base of knowledge are being mobilised in order to explicitly assume a central field position points to how risk should also be seen as a category of practice that allows its performers to be understood as authoritative.

**A NOTE ON METHOD**

The recent ‘turn to practice’ in social theory has also become more prevalent in IR research, notably because of its focus on the daily, mundane, or seemingly innocuous behaviours and actions of institutional actors. This approach offers insights into how the minute, routine, or everyday actions of institutional actors are both prescribed by their institutional settings, and in turn are also
prescriptive of what future institutional settings will be – an approach some refer to as constructivist structuralism or structural constructivism (Bourdieu 1987, Mérand 2008, Mérand and Pouliot 2008), broadly grouped with the set of approaches collectively referred to as ‘International Political Sociology’ (IPS). The IPS approach, briefly, refers to a set of approaches to International Relations that aim to understand the relationships between everyday practices and forms of knowledge production and dissemination in institutional settings, as well as excavating the wider socio-political implications of this process (Bigo and Walker 2007). In operationalising this type of practice-focused IPS research, the emphasis lies firmly on the relationship between theoretical orientations and methodological implementation.

An IPS approach is ‘sociological’ in two senses: it draws inspiration from the work of sociologists, but it also takes into account the ways international or cross-national political units interact socially – literally, how and why the patterns of interaction between evolving political units institutionalise in the ways they do. This places studying the specifics of institutional behaviour – as constantly evolving representations of why and how political units are interacting – at the very core of IR research.

The opening up of IR in the late 1980s to a number of other different approaches, largely grouped together as ‘critical’, has been catalogued elsewhere (Lapid 1989, Waever 1996). The most important contributions of this ‘Third Debate’ in the study of international politics was the introduction of more reflexive, post-positivist methodological approaches to understanding the interaction of political units internationally (Ashley 1988, Shapiro 1989, Connolly 1989, Walker 1993). These works pioneered questions about the foundational assumptions not only of the international system, but the very nature of how political groups were formed and what the
implications of studying them as homogeneous units meant politically for our understandings of inter-group interactions.

Since then, we have seen the emergence of works that are increasingly interested in implementing critical insights and theoretical innovation into practical, concrete, empirically-driven research. In fact, this is a view put forth by numerous contributions to a September 2013 special issue of the *European Journal of International Relations* devoted to the ‘End of International Relations Theory’. The various arguments made therein agreed that as a discipline, it was time that IR moved away from testing hypotheses, providing theoretical justifications, and being obsessed with methods, as these preoccupations have meant the field has lost focus on actually implementing theoretical ideas into meaningful empirical social science research (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, Lake 2013, Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, Williams 2013).

Building from these methodological insights, the approach to data collection taken up in this project follows the prompt by many IPS works to render critical insights into actionable practical studies of how things work in the actual daily operation of international politics. Following James Scott’s example, the best way to disentangle the various processes that have created institutional structures – in the present case, in the fields of disaster response and internal security – is to focus on the daily institutional practices that make up those processes. Looking at practices allows this research to contribute toward implementing the theoretical innovations that have taken place in IR over the last two decades by constructing an international political sociology of critical and yet actionable, empirically-driven research.

This emphasis on problem-oriented research informs the case selection for this project as well. The research began with a goal of making sense of how EU institutions have developed the authority to deploy operational teams in either military or civilian capacities. Given that DG ECHO
and its European Civil Protection (ECP) Teams have had some of the most success in joint training and deployments – as opposed, for example, to the stalled and failed European Union Battlegroup military intervention teams – I was immediately drawn to the interactions between ECHO and the Member States leading to the success of these ECP teams. This led to a sustained focus on ECHO’s monitoring capabilities, which in the course of the fieldwork led to emphasising other similar monitoring centres from around the EU.

The fieldwork uncovered the close operational and planning relationship between personnel from ECHO’s ERCC and HOME’s STAR centre, ultimately cementing those two institutions as the focus of the project. It should be noted as well that while the project does discuss parallel processes taking place in two EU institutions, they are not ‘even’ case studies. Rather, the case of DG HOME is more illustrative, used here to bolster the wider arguments being made about the nature of authority generation and maintenance as seen by DG ECHO personnel. This is not to discount the importance of DG HOME or its employees, but instead to emphasise one specific approach to generating maintaining authority and illustrating that it is an approach that is circulating and evolving to fit other policy fields as well.

Implementing an IPS focus into concrete steps of data collection, the project broadly followed three stages, according to a framework of ‘retroduction’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007). This includes a discourse analysis of how risk logics impact the fields of disaster governance and internal security provision, a practical analysis to see how these logics are mobilised by actors within the field through their practices, and a retroductive analysis to try and tease out the interrelationship between the discourses and practices in the reconstitution and evolution of the fields over the roughly fourteen years between 1998 and the present – spanning the consolidation of disaster response capacities within EU institutions.
In the first stage, I conducted initial exploratory ‘helicopter’ (Hajer 2006) interviews with DG ECHO personnel by phone from Ottawa. The interviews at this stage included a small set of individuals who acted as ‘actors (“helicopters”) that are chosen because they have the overview of the field be it from different positions’ (Hajer 2006, 73). Subsequent to these initial interviews, I conducted a discourse analysis of official EU policies, EU Commission press releases, and EU inter-Commission/department memos about deployments and operational cooperation, leading me to focus on disaster governance. Using the ‘QDA Miner’ qualitative discourse analysis software, which allowed me to highlight and code sections of texts manually and then compile basic sets of data from that coding, I used this analysis to uncover what language was being used to highlight or mask the presence of integrated practices being used in the disaster governance field – which in the end were decidedly oriented around risk management despite not using the language of ‘risk’ per se. While the combination of helicopter interviews and discourse analysis were useful for helping me develop an understanding of the disaster governance field, they did little to provide actual insights into how that field worked and thus their results are largely absent from the final project.

The second stage of the research entailed borrowing more specifically from Bourdieu-inspired approaches to participant observation. Forming the bulk of the data found in this project, the participant observation field research I conducted in Brussels included interviews, attending EU Parliamentary Committee meetings, and sitting in on and participating in a handful of plenary and negotiation meetings. Most of my interviews were held with the upper echelons of the DG ECHO and DG HOME hierarchies (Heads of Unit, Directors, and one Director-General), but also included the trainers and staff working in ECHO’s ERCC and three employees from HOME’s STAR. In total, twenty-three interviews (formal and informal) were held in Brussels, followed by
four hours of phone interviews with ECHO and HOME personnel conducted while I was a Visiting Research Fellow in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. Supplementing the interviews, I was invited to participate in four plenary or negotiation meetings either held at DG ECHO’s offices or otherwise hosted by DG ECHO personnel.

All of the interviews drew on my existing or growing personal network of European policymakers. To access this personnel, I used a variety of formal and informal contact methods: emails, LinkedIn messages, formal appointment requests, and phone calls to office numbers worked best. My EU citizenship (Portugal) was crucial for granting me access to the non-secured DG ECHO office buildings, which was key in allowing me to observe the types of NGO and corporate personnel that frequented the hallways at DG ECHO. I often used formal interview scripts from the university’s research ethics department in an attempt to display my credibility and I secured consent to record the majority of my interviews. While my interlocutors remain anonymous, their specific contributions and generosity were welcome support, as many were happy to put me in contact with their counterparts in other departments, leading to a very successful snowball sampling approach.

The final stage of the research relied on Glynos and Howarth’s (2007) approach to retroduction, allowing me frame my arguments about risk, authority, and institutional change as abstractly as possible – for example, instead of prescribing a case of ‘change looks like this’, I reviewed all of my fieldwork, interview, and discourse analysis data to ask ‘what does change look like?’ and ‘is that even change?’ I used this method because neither deduction nor induction fit the project’s goal of exploring the evolution of a logic as it pervaded different institutional settings. ‘Explaining’ and ‘predicting’ what the outcomes of a problem would be are part of the deductive framework, differing only in their temporal dimension, and I remain wary of induction’s tendency
to posit conclusions and coding variables that serve to fit a predetermined hypothesis, which in this case would be presupposing that I know how actors within each institution were going to use risk to achieve some level of authority. Retroduction here allowed me to maintain my focus on uncovering how and why actors were positioning themselves in the ways they were, fitting well with Bourdieu’s own views on the importance of grasping the ‘separation [of researcher-object] which is the hidden condition of all academic activity’ (Nice 2011 [1977], vii).

**OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT**

The project develops its argument in three large steps over five chapters. In the theoretically-driven part one, chapter one looks at existing IR accounts of EU authority, highlighting key aspects of functionalist, neorealist, constructivist, and poststructuralist takes on authority in the EU. The chapter draws out three limitations in these accounts: an assumption that authority merely exists *sine qua non*; a misunderstanding of the daily workings of EU departments and what they actually do; and missing the fact that actors in Europe are always competing with each other over authority.

Chapter two then outlines existing accounts of the political role that risk plays by looking at three dominant approaches to risk: realist, constructivist, and poststructuralist. Underlining the impact of risk in social contexts, the project introduces a theoretical approach that can best account for the relationships between different types of actors in diverse settings: a risk-oriented theory of practices in fields, inspired by Bourdieu. Building from this form of practice theory, the chapter concludes that risk should be thought of in three ways: as a form of resource or capital; as a base of knowledge; and as a category of practice.
Part two forms the empirical base of the project. Chapter three looks at the first of these forms of risk, as a resource, by examining the daily workings of actors at DG ECHO and their role in the field of disaster governance. It starts by looking at the two main sources of struggle at ECHO and the field of disaster governance – an internal struggle over the policy direction of ECHO and an external struggle over how to regulate without imposing strict standards – before outlining four sets of resources that governing disasters entails: equipment (material), coordinating transportation (economic), networks (social), and monitoring and information (cultural). The chapter finishes by highlighting how ECHO actors turned these resources into symbolic capital by establishing a ‘standardisation from below’ method of coordinating material specifications and by training and professionalising disaster responders – and with this, how ECHO actors came to be recognised as authorities in the field of disaster governance.

Chapter four examines risk as a base of knowledge. It begins by outlining the key struggles taking place in the field of internal security provision as a result of the spread of disaster management governance techniques, before drawing out the four sets of resources HOME actors mobilise in governing EU internal security: security communications and databases (material), security funding (economic), networks of security personnel (social), and controlling security intelligence (cultural). The chapter then outlines the key role that data plays in making claims to authority, looking at the way both ECHO and HOME actors control the production, use, and analysis of data in anticipating future disaster scenarios – an approach that lets both sets of actors become recognised as authorities in their respective fields.

Part three is the analytic section of the project, with chapter five taking up the final approach to risk: as a category of practice. The chapter begins by looking at the way structures of transnational fields evolve in order to best serve the dominant actors in those fields, before
outlining the evolving field dynamics seen in the disaster governance and internal security provision fields thanks to the practices performed by ECHO and HOME actors. The chapter then outlines the strategies of centralisation that ECHO and HOME actors used to place themselves at the centre of their respective policy fields, before commenting more generally on the role of strategy and centralisation in maintaining transnational governance authority.
CHAPTER ONE:  
IR ASSESSMENTS OF AUTHORITY IN THE EU

This chapter argues that most prevailing approaches in IR lack an adequate vocabulary for understanding competing claims to authority and competing attempts to entrench authority relationships through institution-building in the EU. In the European context, with its multiple levels of government regulation, overlapping governance institutions, and responsibilities that readily shift between local, state, regional, and continent-level governing bodies, this limits IR’s ability to understand complex – yet still quotidian – political governance environments. This general difficulty with EU authority is underscored by much of the literature’s inability to understand the competitive dimensions behind how specific policy capacities are developed and entrenched at the level of EU institutions. If IR struggles to account for EU authority in general, then it certainly has difficulties accounting for EU authority in individual policy areas. This chapter illustrates these general and specific limitations by looking at the wider IR work that examines EU integration processes, as well as the specific development of one particular EU policy competency: disaster governance capabilities. Each reveal a distinctly limited ability to address the way competing claims for governance authority have shaped how issues such as disasters are governed in Europe.

How then does IR understand the dense layers of institutional governance seen at the European Union? The EU, as a set of different bodies, agencies, and institutions, is an interesting case for IR. It has the conciliation and normative attributes of a supranational organisation like the UN, the World Bank, or the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
but also has characteristics more similar to individual states: issue-area ministries/commissions, a diplomatic presence, or a shared policy and legal status in some jurisdictions, for example. EU bodies act, have effects, produce ideas, and generally interact with other political or social actors. The EU is not a single actor, but often has governing effects usually attributed to single actors – i.e.: states. It is not an international organisation (IO), but has the regulatory and liaison capacities of an IO. This perhaps explains why the EU has been woefully under-theorised in IR – and what work does exist is at best marginalised and relegated to ‘EU studies’ or comparative politics (i.e.: generally not considered part of IR-proper). As a set of political collectives, the types of institutions and the forms of governance seen in Europe do not sit comfortably in even the most critical of understandings of what IR is about.

In the first decades following the growth of the EU’s predecessor in the 1950s, the European Coal and Steel Community, IR scholarship about European integration was dominated by three groupings of theories: neofunctionalism, neorealism, and forms of liberalism. Since the late 1980s, two newer theories of the EU have emerged: constructivist and governmentality or poststructuralist approaches.¹ This chapter looks at each of these literatures in turn, as well as the work that more specifically looks at EU disaster governance authority.

The chapter explores how these different approaches explain European governance authority’s conceptual messiness and highlights three central limitations in relation to understanding EU authority. First, EU authority in specific policy areas is assumed to exist separate from the processes of its own generation. Second, IR approaches often take for granted or misunderstand the structure of how EU politics actually work in practice. Finally, as a result of

¹ This is not to downplay the various other approaches to understanding the EU, for example the Bureaucratic Politics lens, the Quasi-Federalist approaches, or the various Multi-Level-Governance theories. While perhaps more popular in other fields, the five approaches explored here represent the dominant understandings of the EU in IR.
these two previous points, IR approaches do not account for the contestations for authority that enable, shape, and direct how EU policy capabilities are practiced in individual European-level institutions. The current chapter frames these critiques of IR understandings of EU authority around an understanding of authority as a deferential relationship between a subordinate and superordinate actor, necessarily involving a competitive relational and sociological dimension (paraphrased from Sending 2015, 15). These critiques about the limitations of IR approaches to EU governance thus lay the foundation for a more integrative theoretical approach, which will be outlined in the second chapter.

EXISTING IR ACCOUNTS OF EU AUTHORITY

This section outlines the dominant IR approaches to understanding integration and authority in the EU. This includes the initial academic debates about how to study institutional integration in post-war Europe – including neofunctionalist, neorealist, and liberal approaches – and more recent theoretical trends that have entered studies of European institutions since the early-mid 1990s – constructivism and poststructuralism.

**Neofunctionalism**

The first wave of theories about the EU can be grouped under the rubric of neofunctionalism, which arose in the early post-Second World War years and built upon the functionalism of the inter-war years to explain how pan-European organisations encouraged continued integration. For this approach, integration in certain key areas had a ‘spill-over’ effect leading to further integration in other areas, or to a logic of issue linkage guiding integration processes. A commonly-cited
example is integrating safety standards on automobiles; while beginning as a very specific point of integration, this would necessarily also lead to integrating or harmonising the type of rubber used on the tires and the metal used for the frame and from there, chemical production plants and labour standards for metal workers and machinists, respectively. Because of the specific ways policy development in the early European Communities (EC) built from previous policies, for a number of years neo-functionalism remained the primary way scholars accounted for the development of EC policy capabilities.

For neofunctionalists, authority lies in what EU institutions can ‘do’ – what tangible effects they have for Member State actors. The idea behind integration, in this approach, is to ‘create a high authority without the distracting baggage of national interests to oversee the integration process and give it the ability to act as a sponsor of further integration…[to] seek the most effective route for the fulfilment of their material interests’ (Rosamond 2000, 51-52). These entrenched institutions, thus, should be understood as both venues that facilitate further cooperation between states and as actors that impact this cooperation. Regardless of the question of actors though, authority for neofunctionalists is temporarily vested in institutional arrangements: ‘the articulation of authority across jurisdictions at diverse scales’ (Hooghe and Marks 2008, 2). States negotiate to allocate authority to EU institutions if those institutions help states achieve their specific policy goals in the most efficient way possible – authority is fundamentally about sorting how to make policy decisions and who should make them.

Early pioneers of neo-functionalism, including Ernst B. Haas (1958, 1964, 1976) and David Mitrany (1965, 1976), emphasised the procedural way functional integration happened thanks to processes inside of transnational institutions. Haas argued that earlier processes of European integration were driven by ‘incrementally-informed decisional institutions’ (1976, 182) of the
European Communities. He highlighted that European institutions were often seen by both researchers and practitioners to develop policy fields by slowly evolving their own internal structures to be more closely coordinated. Focusing on these types of institutional spill-over effects, Haas argued, meant researchers often missed the larger meaning behind this ‘disjointed incrementalism’: it represented a vision of integration wherein European institutions were all stumbling slowly forward towards a Western European federal state (1976, 176).

Attempting to shed the teleological undercurrents of ‘spill-over’ understandings of integration, Haas instead emphasised how the decisions to integrate and cooperate through EC institutions were made as a form of ‘holistic decision-making rationality’ (1976, 177) and he developed a ‘fragmented issue linkage’ approach that highlighted the way decision making favouring closer integration was built into the way policies were developed in Europe (1976, 180). Into the early 1990s, a second wave of neofunctionalist scholars paid particular attention to these decision-making logics, emphasising how different policies and policy-outgrowths were helped along or blocked by the different types of EU institutional frameworks. Either by situating regional integration within global structures of institutional linkages (Scholte 1993), or by using institutional linkages to try and anticipate future policy cooperation (Caporaso 1998), these works spawned subsequent research into the ways different EU policy areas have been more or less hospitable to policy spillover (Gourlay, et al. 2006, Mounier 2009, Hynek 2011, Marchi Balossi-Restelli 2011).

**Neorealism**

Until the mid-late 1980s, the field of European integration theories was dominated by the debate between neofunctionalism and its American counterpart, neorealism, as well as its later
incarnations as transgovernmentalism and late-stage neorealism. Neorealist research into EU authority built on earlier intergovernmentalist work looking at the empirical puzzle posed by European integration: on one hand, European-level bodies began to govern increasing areas of political life, but on the other, European transnational institutions ‘help preserve the nation-states [of Europe] far more than [they] force them to wither away’ (Hoffman 1982, 21). This led to later works that emphasised how European states drive specific aspects of integration based on the power relations amongst themselves (Keohane and Hoffman 1991, Hoffman 2000, Hill 2004, Menon 2004). How states are seen as able to drive EU policy integration varies according to the specific theoretical framework, but examples include the transgovernmental approach of accounting for the intensity of interaction between different levels of different types of governments (Wallace 2005) or the neorealist approach of focusing on the specific state representative negotiations and how they were indicative of internal balancing between the strongest European countries (Posen 1993, 2006, Hyde-Price 2006).

The EU, for neorealists, is a venue where the ‘real’ sources of authority (i.e.: states) can impose their will. This of course still means that there are detailed neorealist works looking at how European institutions shape and alter the way that powerful states interact within the framework of the EU; for example, the EU can represent, for some neorealists, ‘a semi-hierarchical ordering principle’ (Rosamond 2000, 134). For these researchers, ‘the EU’ is a mode of interaction between states in a shared condition of anarchy who are engaging in a ‘progressive assignment of powers and authority to the Community level’ (Collard-Wexler 2006, 406) because it may help them further their own goals in their persisting condition of anarchy – a central and always pre-existing condition for most neorealist thinking.
By taking the concerns of states as primary, in these theories the EU is limited as a forum in which Member States negotiate policy decisions that are in their interest. The EU should be seen, for neorealists, as a temporary alliance of convenience arising from the security competition between Europe’s strongest powers – the United Kingdom, France, and Germany – and their shared position between their strongest ally, the US, and their greatest threat, the USSR and Russia (Mearsheimer 1990, 7). For many researchers in this approach, any action taken by the European Communities or the later EU should be understood as a particular representation of the distribution of material capability – understood as power – of the Member States, primarily these strongest ones. As a temporary alliance that stabilises multipolarity in Europe, the EU project’s inherent power inequalities between members will mean that ‘stability would be undermined further’ (Mearsheimer 1990, 7).

Despite the pessimistic outlook about the long-term viability of the EU, neorealists understand the EU as providing a smooth, even forum for actors of different power and capabilities to interact in a setting which they can influence as they see fit, and thus as a source of its instability. Others have argued that the EU can minimise the effects of strong state actors in favour of consensus-building, by being a site that allows processes of bandwagoning and balancing to take place. Mérand (2008, 21) offers the example of how some neorealists have seen Germany’s membership in many different European-level security arrangements as a case of free riding (Mérand 2008, 21).

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Another American-inspired approach to understanding the EU is a specific form of intergovernmentalism that has grown into an approach of its own: liberal intergovernmentalism.
Those following a liberal approach to the EU see it as a series of patterning interactions between the most-powerful state representatives (Moravcsik 1998, 2002). These representatives are explicitly tasked with using the EU as a forum for establishing international or multi-national agreements that will maximise the interests of their home states by minimising the costs of interacting and pooling resources. In this light, liberals see the EU as type of actor whose authority to perform certain functions has been delegated by the Member States, assuming that those functions will always be in the interests of those same Member States who band together and delegate that authority – the EU must always act in the collective interest of the Member States that make it up. Some of the most interesting work from this school was interested in how this intergovernmental pooling acted as an explanation for the bulk of EU integration processes (Moravcsik 1993), namely how EU integration could spread to include new areas of previously-undelegated authority.

Regardless of the specific issue focus, for liberals the EU is an actor that facilitates cooperation, maximises shared or pooled interests, and provides a venue for states to cooperate. As with intergovernmentalism more generally, though EU institutions may don actorness and legal status, they still operate under the authority of the ‘real’ actors: states. Those liberals focusing on the transaction costs and exchanges that drive integration often try to distance themselves from the more general ‘intergovernmental’ assumptions that cooperation decisions are only driven by power-politics assessments. Liberals instead choose to emphasise the collective self-interest – or otherwise, the rational benefits – in having a neutral forum that facilitates long-term cooperation, often highlighting the processes of one actor (predominantly, states) delegating authority to another (a supranational institution or formal organisation) (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Though similar to the neofunctionalist understanding of temporarily allocating authority to an institution
for functional reasons, the distinction here is that the delegation and withdrawal of authority is only one of the many ways states maintain control of the structure or form that transnational institutional authority can take (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 422). By emphasising the way transnational institutions alter inter-state bargaining behaviour, these approaches speak to the intergovernmental tradition of understanding EU integration through the EU’s ability to minimise the transaction costs of cooperation in given policy areas.

The liberal approach thus begins from the premise that the EU allows the Member States that make it up to manage their preferences and power relations. Moravcsik refers to this when describing the EC as an ‘intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy coordination’ (Moravcsik 1993, 474). The liberal intergovernmental approach combines liberal theories of national preference formation with intergovernmentalist understandings of inter-state negotiations (Moravcsik 1993, 480). It looks at how the EU allows Member States to coordinate and help each other meet national policy preference obligations, while still cooperating to meet shared interests (Moravcsik 1993, 483). The EU allows integration, specifically economic integration, to be seen as an aggregated interest of all of the constituents, since policies negotiated through the EU can better coordinate the flows of ‘goods, services, factors or production, and economic externalities more effectively than unilateral policies’ (Moravcsik 1993, 484-485).

This type of liberal intergovernmental approach to the EU sees integration processes as ‘sustained by the development of causal connections between three factors: transnational exchange, supranational organization, and European Community rule-making’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, 297) and specifically ‘privileges the role of transnational exchange in pushing the EU’s organizations to construct new policy and new arenas for policy-relevant behavior’ (Stone
Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, 298). Moreover, another popular strand of studies about the EU from the liberal perspective focuses on the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ present in the EU. Democratic deficit literature itself is a cottage industry within EU studies, sharing a belief that the legitimate authority of EU institutions is inherently tied to the democratic representativeness of those institutions. For democratic deficit theorists, EU bureaucratic control of policymaking processes has increased, while national parliamentary control has decreased (Follesdal and Hix 2006, 534); while there are European Parliamentary elections, those elections are less about the policy direction of the EU and more about the discussions about how to manage that ongoing policy process (Follesdal and Hix 2006, 536). These democratic deficit writers argue that the authority of EU bodies becomes eroded as a result of these parallel trends that favour bureaucratic governance that presupposes citizen consent in EU-level policymaking approaches.

**Constructivism**

In the 1990s, a new broad set of social constructivist theories of European integration became popular, somewhat tracking wider developments in IR at the same time. Constructivism’s wide network of theoretical approaches focused on the linking and spreading of ideas of centralisation through interactions of official and unofficial state representatives. The emphasis on the ideas that shape structured interactions found fertile ground in a field of scholarship that was coming to grips with new levels of as-yet unheard of European integration, in particular with the 1993 implementation of the Maastricht Treaty – also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The EU is understood by constructivists to be a norm-producing authority. It reflects and appropriates the language and ideas of its constituents and uses them to foster new areas of cooperation and integration. Viewing the EU as a delegated, but independent authority,
Constructivist approaches use process-tracing to assess how exactly the EU can be both a construction of its constituent Member States and an independent authority in some legal and policy areas (Rosamond 2005, 3-4).

Constructivism’s wide net entails a number of different approaches to European integration, from emphasising the impact of individuals and how the EU shapes their own learning and behaviour (Rosamond 2000, Howorth 2007, Giegerich 2008), focusing on the EU’s role in the larger international sphere (Duchêne 1972, Manners 2002, Diez 2005, Smith 2005, Sjursen 2006), or focusing on how harmonisation entails processes of socialising member states to act in closer unison (Schimmelfenning 2003, Checkel 2005, Meyer 2005). Related to Pollack’s idea of delegating authority, and counter to the liberal principal-agent understanding that the EU can only act in the interest of its constituents, Manners (2002) looked at how being representative of Member State interests actually imbued the EU with a type of ‘normative power’ – the power to control how things are normatively understood or thought about.

Constructivists see the EU as a set of formal and informal institutions that have undergone and continue to experience ‘mission creep’ (Caplan 2004, 55), thanks to the fact it is always collecting capabilities. Giegerich (2008) offers a clear explanation of how this happens with his work on EU military crisis response capabilities. He traced how individual diplomats and soldiers are seconded from their national settings to operate in Brussels as EU representatives and begin to work according to the logics and norms of behaviour seen in those EU institutions. They then spread these norms by going back to their national settings and performing the same behaviours. In this way, EU ‘ways of doing things’, norms of EU policy governance, get spread to the Member States, who in turn begin to treat these types of behaviours as best practices (Giegerich 2008, 66-71).
The EU is thus a much more important entity for constructivists than it is for neorealist and liberal IR approaches. For constructivism, the EU is simultaneously representative of the ideas or goals that Member States attribute to it, but also is an extension of those ideas and alters how MS actors behave and understand the EU itself. It is a facilitating entity that allows MS actors to interact, but because it has the ability to reshape how MS actors understand their own goals and preferences, it is also a norm-generating actor in itself, framing and reframing how MS actors understand, interpret, and respond to EU action. Constructivists honing in on this point specifically point to the ‘constraining or constitutive effects’ (Checkel 2005, 815; see also Keohane, Nye, and Hoffman 1993 or Moravscik 2000), or the otherwise ‘socializing effects’ (Checkel 2005, 806; Schimmelfennig 2003), of European governance institutions. In this light, the EU is seen as an independent actor among many varied ones in international politics and is thus much more complex than in neofunctionalist, neorealist, or liberal accounts, in part because of the close attention paid to the association between inter-actor relations and authority.

Poststructuralism

Poststructuralist approaches to the EU are related to this larger constructivist move. Despite disagreeing about important epistemological points, the two camps share a focus on specific ideational structures that drive integration processes. The two also share a basic assumption that our ability to understand anything about the world around us is inherently framed by our own personal, subjective interpretations of what is valuable or important in that world (Connolly 1989, Wendt 1995). Constructivists diverged, though, by stressing the limits to scientific inquiry posed by this subjectivity and thus tried to develop an approach to research that emphasises taking objective stances in the service of grounded scientific inquiry. Wendt argued ‘it is harder to sustain
the subject-object distinction if society is ideas all the way down, since that means that human subjects in some sense create the objects their theories purport to explain’ (Wendt 1999, 39).

The poststructuralist challenge to this epistemological realism stresses first the inherent inability to separate one’s self from the research we conduct (Shapiro 1989) and second the implications that shared linguistic definitions have for the way we interpret political action (Campbell 1992). For the current purposes, poststructuralists interpret EU authority as being cultivated by the way EU agencies try to adopt the status of a sovereign state by using the discourses of governance and security traditionally associated with nation-states. This has led to research looking at the EU’s governance regimes in different policy areas previously associated with being in the remit of nation-state governance, including works looking at EU border security (Balzacq and Carrera 2006, Neal 2009), visa and migratory policy (Guild 2007), and integrated policing practices (Bigo 2001).

Another dimension highlighted in the poststructuralist approach to understanding the EU is the emphasis that the EU is not a singular, tangible, or physical ‘thing’ – it is not a government in Brussels, not a single shared idea of European interconnectedness, but a series of ideas of how governance should work in liberal societies that are bound together politically (Walters and Haahr 2005a, 2; see also Walker 2000). This is not say that the EU as a political entity does not exist, but that it is not a readily-available concept with a single, unproblematic meaning: ‘the EU’ does not mean the same thing or refer to the same set of governance processes to everyone. Instead, for poststructuralists ‘the EU’ is a series of political beings acting in particular ways to instill a sense of the larger network of European institutions all representing a singular or coherent polity. In doing so, poststructuralists understand EU institutions as embodying processes that create a stable sense of identity that supplants other types of identity-formation that were previously restricted to
being state-driven – for example, introducing the notion of being a ‘European citizen’ while still remaining a Portuguese citizen (see Carrera 2009 for a similar argument).

Seeing diverse political actors as having a desire to portray themselves as a singular entity is largely inspired by the French philosopher Michel Foucault and his concept of ‘governmentality’: the rationality of governance or the art of governing (Walters and Haahr 2005a, 3). The act of governing, for poststructuralists following Foucault, is explicitly designed to naturalise a political grouping; in other words, making a political entity seem like an inevitable and necessary collection of political actors is a primary aim of governing itself. Sending and Neumann (2006) define governmentality as ‘an analytical concept aimed at grasping government as a form of power’ (656). The act of governing, and the logic that drives the act of government, ‘has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its conditions, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.’ (Foucault 1991 [1978], 100). Sending and Neumann argue that collections of political actors bind together and legitimise their continued shared existence by demonstrating how they perform acts of governance (Sending and Neumann 2006, 656). Walters and Haahr (2005a) are particularly interesting in this light, because they highlight what this definition of governing means for understanding governance projects by international or cross-national entities, similar to the processes of governance taking place in and by the EU institutions.

Walters and Haahr specifically point to Jean Monnet’s approach to building Europe-level projects via ‘concertation…a flexible, non-authoritarian and relatively inclusive vision of international planning’ (Walters and Haahr 2005b, 297) as a form of governmentality. They continue that this approach to building European-level institutions ‘defines a particular Europe in such a way that its claim to represent that Europe appears quite natural’ (Walters and Haahr 2005a,
4). Moreover, Walters and Haahr see this form of governance-naturalising as indicative of what governing looks like in liberal high modernism: a shared governing of self and other simultaneously, until all are governing for the same ends, if not by the same means (Walters and Haahr 2005a, 5-6).

These arguments are particularly important when trying to account for the authority wielded by EU institutions. For poststructuralists, the EU governs specifically by trying to present itself as a natural growth of progressive or positive European political interaction; think of the way that Europe’s violent past is used as a caution against anyone who speaks ill of the EU for an example of this. In doing so, the EU thus also plays on the discourse commonly attributed to the other most commonly taken-for-granted entity in international politics, the nation-state: it has a ‘Parliament’, an ‘Executive’, and its own court system, all things usually seen to be core building blocks of a state. Similarly, sources of EU governance are treated as given and predestined, erasing the way EU actors have developed these capabilities – a specific technique of treating authority as merely existing when it was actually the result of highly contentious and power-latent political circumstances. Poststructuralism teases out the processes by which the EU governs and claims the authority to govern in different policy areas by presenting itself as a normal part of politics; the ability to point this out makes poststructuralism a promising, still-emerging approach to understanding the EU’s place in wider international processes of politics. Its inattention to how this authority became vested in specific actors and sets of processes, though, is a key limitation of existing poststructural analyses of EU integration, as will be discussed further below.
EU Authority in Action: EU Disaster Governance Literature

The lack of consensus over understanding the nature of EU authority in general is accompanied by an equal inability to account for EU authority in specific policy areas, such as the development of an EU disaster governance capacity explored in this project. Studies of the EU’s disaster response capacities generally see them either as a set of intergovernmental EU policy framework agreements between states (Attinà 2012), as a set of pooled, institutionalized, and delegated set of capacities in a given policy area (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013), or as representing a shared constructed understanding of a public good (Bossong and Rhinard 2013, Rhinard, Hollis, and Boin 2013). In arguably the most comprehensive look at EU crisis response, Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard (2013) map capabilities in a number of crisis-related policy areas, arguing that these EU capacities have emerged as central facets of European crisis management thanks to their ability to build on and allow closer cooperation between Member States (2013). They also argue, though, that the EU still lacks a crisis management ability ‘with teeth’ (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013, 17), meaning that while the EU may hold a policy capability in managing specific crises, authority for governing crises more generally still falls under the traditional remit of national governments.

Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard (2013) see the development of crisis management as a process of cooperative negotiation between Member States and EU bureaucracies that aims to build shared understandings of appropriate disaster policy action. Larsson, Hagstrom Frisell, and Olsson (2009) likewise argued that EU disaster governance has not yet developed its own ‘self-image’. They, too, emphasise that the structure of EU governance – bound to the core concerns and whims of Member State policymaking participants – constrains the authority that any particular EU institution can embody in a given policy area and argue that these constraints are the result of the
EU’s own historical and uneven development of capabilities led by key Member State actors. Similarly, Bremberg and Britz (2009) argue that there is no institutionalised logic of civil protection at the EU level, because of the diverse Member State approaches to disaster response. All of these studies echo much of the older works looking at the EU’s ability to co-ordinate disaster response, usually falling back to focus on how ECHO’s disaster response capabilities represent a tension between ‘solidarity’ and ‘sovereign’ crisis management capacities (for example, as in Ekengren, et al. 2006).

Given the transnational character of most disastrous events, assessing the general, everyday transborder politics of European cooperation is crucial to understanding the stakes involved in responding to crises. Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard have a chapter devoted to looking at ‘transborder’ issues but their focus is on crises that affect multiple states simultaneously, thus missing the important daily practices and social contexts that shape and frame how those states will be able to coordinate a joint response. This means that Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard, and much other work studying EU disaster governance, miss how a disaster or crisis response capacity exists within the larger context of EU politics and its overlapping contestations for policymaking authority. Moreover, these works do not situate the development of disaster response capabilities within the larger sphere of transnational politics more generally. The following section will unpack the limitations posed by not accounting for the generation of authority at the EU level, in general, and in the case of EU disaster governance, specifically.
LIMITATIONS

The EU challenges fundamental assumptions of IR as a discipline, in particular because it raises questions of how transnational and institutional authority is generated, maintained, and practiced. In its blurring of the lines of authority and shifting authority into new types of political structures, yet clearly not subverting or undermining the authority of individual Member States in a direct way, the EU illustrates the limits of existing IR theoretical frameworks for understanding different types of institutional governance authority. The rest of this chapter outlines three key limitations of these approaches. The first of these limitations involves existing IR theories of EU authority in a given policy area tend to ask questions that highlight the effects of individual institutions’ authority and thus cannot account for the competitions that exist between different overlapping governance bodies operating in the same policy sphere, nor the generation of that authority in the first place. Second, in much of the IR literature, European Member States (MS) are often treated as the driving forces of the EC and then the EU – based on the often-unchallenged dictum in Brussels that ‘the EU does not exist separate from the MS’ (Interviews 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9) – which does not adequately address the actual daily functioning of EU policy governance and the relationships of authority that shape these processes. Third, and most importantly, IR work on the EU tends to neglect how the actual process of EU governance is much less about state representatives dictating policy frameworks and much more about the competitive struggles between different MS, local, regional, and multiple EU-level institutional actors over both who governs and what is it that needs to be governed in any given policy area.
EU Authority in Disaster Response – and other Policy Areas – is Readily Assumed

The solidarity-sovereignty debates underlying much of the EU disaster response literature frame the development of disaster response capabilities as the outcome of zero-sum negotiations among cooperating partners, but offer little when accounting for the status, symbolic power, or different cultural biases between the different partners. These latter concerns lie at the heart of how authority is generated, assumed, and maintained in the relationship between the representatives who delegate specific policy capabilities to the European levels. For much of IR, the negotiations that make up the development of an EU policy capacity do not happen between equal parties: Member State representatives know that they are the key permissive parties to the negotiation (Abbott and Snidal 2000), as legal authority for policymaking in Europe remains in the hands of Member State policymakers.

That being said, state representative legal authority is simultaneously off-set by the authority created inside of the EU as a result of these policy capability negotiations – the two types of authority do not supplant each other, but coexist and apply and are practiced in different contexts. Once the ‘even playing-field’ approach assumed by much of IR is destabilised, and both Member State and EU institutional representatives are understood to have their own different forms of authority, the development of EU policy capabilities comes to be seen more as structured relationships between actors with different forms and amounts of power. This helps us understand processes of prolonged or uneven capability development, let alone the logics or knowledges that are competing when the EU disaster response capacity was being developed.

Moreover, the literature on EU disaster response capabilities privileges the roles of Member States in developing EU-level disaster response policy. In doing so this literature takes for granted that crisis governance projects developed the way they did precisely because they were addressing
ongoing crises; EU-level response capabilities emerged to address specific holes in existing crisis response cooperation. This inattention means that existing EU disaster governance research does not explore the important role that the specific nature of disaster and crisis played in developing an EU disaster response capacity – they do not account for the specificity of disasters and crises themselves as phenomena requiring different policy interventions than other policy areas. Establishing an institutional mechanism for managing disasters or crises meant that a particular set of practices and actors have been agreed upon and given the authority to govern risks posed by disasters and crises; not accounting for the authority held or embodied in these practices and the logics of risk behind them is perhaps this work’s most serious omission.

This is not to criticise authors like Boin, Ekengreen, and Rhinard for not anticipating or predicting the core themes around which EU disaster response has coalesced. For one, the Boin, Ekengreen, and Rhinard volume was for the most part written in 2011, and as such does not anticipate the central, pivotal role that specifically entrenching EU disaster monitoring capacities into DG ECHO would play – despite absolutely recognising the central role of monitoring capacities in building an EU disaster response capability more generally. Second, while the previously-mentioned works on EU disaster response clearly begin by outlining that crisis management or disaster response are part of the larger spectrum of EU security operations, their linking of these capabilities with larger political contexts ends there\(^2\) – perhaps another sign of when they were writing, as more substantial institutional linkages happened in late 2012. Regardless, omitting a serious analysis of the practices and logics behind how EU governance authority is enacted in the disaster response policy area is symptomatic of a larger concern: inattention to how EU politics actually functions.

\(^2\) The notable exception to this is Bossong and Hegemann’s (2015) edited volume *European Civil Security Governance: Diversity and Cooperation in Crisis and Disaster Management.*
IR Misunderstands the Structure of How the EU Actually Works

Of the above approaches to understanding institutional governance structures like those in the EU, the latter two, Constructivism and Poststructuralism, offer perhaps the most interesting or nuanced insights. These two approaches understand EU policy action as an instance of interplay between individual action and entrenched regimes of understanding about the way European institutions have or are seen to have the capacity to act. That being said, the way EU institutions operate, daily and in different policy realms, are still not fully captured by these approaches. In paying particular attention to specific elements of European institutional governance – as a function of other actors, as an actor, as a norm entrepreneur, etc. – these approaches miss some of the more fundamental, routine governance processes that happen throughout Europe. This often leads to understandings of the EU that suppose it to have a type of unity that it does not have and assume that the institutionalisation of capacities is a given end of political interaction, instead of a series of ongoing processes.

Towns (2012) sees institutional governance practices as the processes by which institutional norms both establish standards for behaviour, but also draw on and create social hierarchies that allow those behaviours to be perpetuated. Weiss and Wilkinson (2014) similarly argue that the exercise of authority by an institution is not the same as a transnational governance concern – a distinction crucial to understanding why actors cooperating or coordinating does not simply get labelled an instance of transnational governance. This is what sets European institutional governance practices apart from other forms of governance understood by much of International Relations. Weiss and Wilkinson argue that governance in global politics is specifically the interplay between ‘the structure of global authority… [as well as] how regional, national, and local
systems intersect with or push against that structure. A concern with multiple levels of governance is not enough although it is a good start’ (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014, 207; a similar argument can be found in Bache and Flinders 2004). Moreover, Weiss and Wilkinson argue that institutional governance also includes the processes and logics behind how systems of power are created, maintained, and perpetuated, as well as ‘the causes, consequences, and drivers of change’ to that system ‘over time’ (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014, 207).

When trying to account for the relationship between the various structures of the EU system and how these relationships increasingly govern daily lives of individuals, IR as a field of study has seen ‘less agreement on exactly how [these structures of the EU system] have effects’ (Checkel 2005, 801). Michael Barnett has argued that ‘IR scholars also have had to confront the possibility that territoriality, authority, and the state might be bundled in different ways in present-day Europe’ (Barnett 2001, 52). He continues, though, to say that the EU is understood to be either ‘nothing more than an institution…[or] the EU represents a step on the road to a supranational state’ (Barnett 2001, 52-53). Similarly, John Ruggie has said that the European integration project has created a ‘multiperspective polity’ (Ruggie 1993) – as in, a singular political grouping with multiple types of actors, members, or perspectives. Walters and Haahr, when attempting to show the contingent nature of European governance, argue that ‘the EU can be seen as merely the most recent political project to speak in the name of Europe’ (Walters and Haahr 2005a, 4; emphasis in original).

This emphasis on the authority effects of specific sets of institutions thus comes at the expense of interrogating the sources of the ability to have effects in the first place. If a set of EU institutions are seen to have effects on state behaviours, that ability comes from a recognition that EU institutions possess some claim to authority. IR literature often sees authority as being
inherently vested in governance institutions in Europe *sine qua non*, thereby tending to underplay the non-unified or messy nature of the EU. As a result, these approaches miss the opportunity to unpack the implications of modern configurations of authority and governance in Europe.

Despite its relatively small number of employees\(^3\), the institutional structure of the EU and its various decision-making processes are notoriously convoluted. Even the most cogent attempt at mapping institutions of governance in Europe (Wallace, Wallace, and Pollack 2005a) needs 500 pages to explain how policy decisions are made and implemented, outlining ‘the extraordinary and ever-increasing diversity of “policy modes” whereby the preferences of national governments, sub-national actors, and supranational organizations are changed into common policies’ (Wallace, Wallace, and Pollack 2005b, 3). The concluding chapter in that volume argues that ‘One of the oddest aspects of American international relations scholarship about the EU is that it imagines a political system so much more tidy and structured than what one may observe in Washington’ (Wallace 2005, 493).

These challenges to understanding EU policymaking exist beyond the academic study of its processes. EU diplomatic missions abroad often hand out *Europe in 12 Lessons* pamphlets that try and compare the EU’s multiple decision-making bodies and processes with local contexts (Fontaine 2010). Moreover, despite EU bodies setting policy and offering funds that seem to augment or supplement local projects in much of Europe, ‘the EU’ and ‘Brussels’ are often the object of the patriotic scorn of nationalist political parties, the harbingers of aggressive services-

\(^3\) Despite acting as the (albeit constrained) bureaucratic services for a total population of 507.4 million, the EU only employs around 24,500 permanent or contracted personnel. This is a remarkably small amount of bureaucrats. By comparison, the Government of Canada employs roughly 263,000 civil servants for its population of 35 million. Though the US system counts bureaucrats differently, a common estimate is that there are 2.1 million civil servants for its population of 319 million.
cutting austerity policies for left-wing parties, and a budget-inflating monstrosity of bureaucracy-run-amok for fiscal conservatives.

There is variation to the ways that EU-level institutional regulations happen, or to how European-level institutions affect policy change. This is precisely because the EU is not a single, limited, or unitary quantity – a point that poststructuralism has particularly drawn attention to. Despite highlighting this lack of coherence, though, the poststructuralist tendency to emphasise a singular logic of governmentality operating through the myriad of EU institutions ends up paying too little attention to the diversity of practices that take place within and amongst European governance institutions. The EU cannot be reduced to a singular actor or governance logic; looking at the various types of memberships in these densely layered European institutions highlights that who exactly is part of the EU is a constantly moving target (Walker 2000).

The ‘EU’ can simultaneously mean the twenty-eight formal Member States of the European Union, the twenty-six members of the Schengen visa-free travel area, the eighteen members of the Eurozone, or the thirty-one members of the European Economic Area. Add to this the varying participation of non-EU European states in other specific policy areas under EU jurisdiction – thirty-two in disaster response, a different thirty-two in the EU Customs Union, or forty-seven in the Council of Europe, for example, and the picture becomes increasingly baroque. Most importantly, in addition to the different membership numbers, being part of one group does not necessarily mean membership in another: Croatia is the newest official Member State of the EU, yet it is not part of the Eurozone regulated by the EU, nor the Schengen Area governed by the EU Commission’s DG HOME; Switzerland is a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, but is not part of the EU-proper, the Eurozone, or the European Economic Area; Norway is not an EU member, but is part of both the Schengen area and the European Economic Area, and plays a substantial
role in both the EU External Action Service and the EU’s disaster response Commission, DG ECHO.

While governmentality approaches highlight a number of important aspects of the EU, this complexity makes it difficult to claim that there is *an* EU governmentality (Walters and Haahr 2005a, 2005b), or that there is a singular ‘normative power’ EU (Manners 2002), when ‘the EU’ label refers to completely different things and acts in completely different ways on different issues. The EU contradicts itself, its Member States, its associated Participating States, any perceived idea of EU-identity, or any sense of a unified liberal governing program. The ‘EU’ is not a single entity that can be accepted or rejected, nor is it a single, limited, or unitary quantity; it is a set of processes; it is a constantly changing collection of actors that coalesce into formal organisations and informal institutions of governance.

Despite the wealth of research looking at the workings of the EU, analysts have generally not yet taken seriously enough the complexity of the dense layers of institutional governance structures in Europe and the ability of EU institutions to possess governance authority that does not infringe on Member State authority, but exists parallel to it. This means that IR approaches to the EU assume far too much unity of action in how European-level policy is developed – and with that, assume European-level policymaking to be a singular process of ‘EU’ and ‘Member State’ negotiation, instead of the myriad of different types of actors that at any time are recognised as representing ‘the EU’ or ‘Member States’. The above frameworks lose the complexity of ongoing processes that create different understandings of ‘the EU’ by treating it as a single actor or organisation. Despite the expanse of IR theoretical literature looking at institutional behaviour, these approaches struggle to account for the growth of new organisations or formal institutional bodies separate from the discussion of the spread of norms or governmentality originating in the
Member States, both of which requiring the EU to be framed as having some semblance of singularity.

Assuming this unity of action leaves the above IR approaches unable to deal with questions about modern evolutions in transnational and institutional authority, as well as the governance effects that come from these evolving forms of authority. IR analysts understand the authority developed in new organisations or formal institutions as forming a zero-sum relationship with the forms of authority vested in states. They understand these new forms and relationships of authority to be eroding, reconfiguring, or somehow challenging the sovereign authority vested in Member States.

These missteps represent a crucial misunderstanding about the nature and functioning of political authority in Europe. Governance in the EU is not a zero-sum relationship between Member States and EU actors and bodies, but part of a larger structure of authority-competition and -allocation that supports certain types of collections of actors performing certain types of governing logics, all which depend greatly on specific issue-areas and contexts. The processes by which EU governance capabilities expand are important indicators of the more complex, competitive nature of authority amidst important transformations of the global governance processes seen in modern politics.⁴

**IR Misunderstands Contestations for Authority Itself in the EU**

The complexity of the modern European political landscape is particularly relevant for the present purposes because it highlights that authority is not a static quantity in Europe. With layers of policymaking institutions stretching from the local to the continental level, it is no longer a

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⁴ See both Sending and Neumann (2006) and Biersteker (2012) for a similar argument.
given fact that Member State executives are in sole possession of legitimate governance authority. Authority cannot be thought of as residing either in state or trans-state hands – it is contested, moving, and varies according to the specific policy field in question. The complexity of the European system breeds multiple claims to authority, claims that are not instances of who ‘wins’ authority between Member States and the EU, but instead form an ongoing, relational, and self-reinforcing production of different types of authority for different policy areas. Put another way, authority in the EU is not about the EU ‘winning control’ of things from MS, but parsing who will decide how policies will be enacted by which actors.

This is the key shortcoming of much of the more traditional IR approaches to studying the EU. Neofunctionalism leaves aside questions about why particular authoritative arrangements are sought out, why they take the forms that they do, and who ‘holds’ the ability or authority to initiate or dissent from existing authority arrangements. Neofunctionalists focusing on integrating issue areas also miss the complex negotiations that often happen to maintain previously-integrated policies. The increasing capacity of the EU to delegate and initiate policy objectives, similarly, represents a core ‘difficulty of neorealism at explaining the EU’ (Collard-Wexler 2006, 397). Neorealists firmly understand authority to be solidly residing in the sovereign governance ability assigned to states, which neglects the question of how authority resides in any one location and gets enacted in the first place – the relational and competitive dimensions of authority’s genesis. Likewise, liberalism fails to account for why states are necessarily the primary sources and manipulators of authority in Europe. Constructivists’ focus on the pooling and transmission of norms of EU conduct similarly downplay the important interplay between strong and weak norms – and more importantly, why some norms become dominant (i.e.: state-centric authority) instead of others (positive-sum understandings of authority relationships).
This is why being clear about the complexity of the EU system is so crucial – and why understanding and mapping this complexity is central to understanding how authority in European politics cannot be merely assumed to reside *only* in any one type of institution, regardless of historical legitimacy. European states are members of various different European-level governance institutions, outlined above, and the states send representatives to these governance institutions to act on their behalf in a given policy area. These delegated representatives populate the governance institutions which collectively are recognised as ‘the EU’ – and in doing so they begin representing more than merely their home state’s ‘interests’. ‘The EU’ should be understood as a collection of institutions, each with their own social dynamics, internal logics, regimes, collections of actors, and, most importantly, claims to authority. As representatives attune themselves to these internal dynamics, their roles and functions change. Collectively, ‘the EU’ should thus be seen as both a set of actors and a set of forums that are working to enact different types of authorities in different policy contexts. The EU allows things to happen, it has effects, but it also is a space for other actors to have effects. It is not a constrainer, nor a facilitator, but a little of each simultaneously.

As Georgakakis and Weisbein (2012) argue, the EU and its bodies can only be understood as a set of fields of interaction that operate at both political and social levels, arguing that what is needed is ‘a political sociology paying more attention to the sociological dimension of the people involved in formal and informal EU political processes, which provides a way to revisit and enrich some of these approaches while significantly expanding the scope of EU studies’ (Georgakakis and Weisbein 2012, 94). Their approach highlights the specific and minute ways European governance entities (Member State and EU representatives) coalesce into wildly complex and convoluted collections of different types of institutions, which in turn draws attention to how the
contradictions or tensions present in EU policymaking processes are precisely the sites of European-level governing and politics.

In common parlance, ‘the EU’ often refers to the four governing bodies of the EU – the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the European Council, and the European Commission – or the three functionary institutions of the EU: the European Central Bank, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Auditors. The first four are the most interesting for the present purposes, since in addition to being the sites of daily EU governance processes they bring together the widest range of personnel and activities in the EU and are thus the more illustrative examples of the variety of actors that participate in EU governance.

The European Parliament is made up of the Members of European Parliament elected by popular ballot, with seats allocated to representatives from each Member State. It is considered to be the lower house of the bicameral legislature of the EU, with a President who is usually the head of the European political party or party group with the most representatives sitting in Parliament. The other legislative branch, the executive branch, is the Council of the European Union, usually just called ‘the Council’. With a Presidency rotating every six months, the Council is made up of the Members of national state executives, sometimes including the heads of government or state, but usually cabinet ministers. It meets regularly on specific issue-areas; for example, if the Council was to meet to discuss a European transportation issue, the ministers in charge of transportation from the twenty-eight Member States would be present – as well as the EU Commissioner for Transportation in a non-voting role. The European Council is the meetings of all of the heads of state or heads of government from the Member States of the European Union. Called ‘EU

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5 Both of which are not to be confused with the Council of Europe, a separate and broader, more inclusive body.
Summits’, these meetings are held twice every six months, presided over by a President, and are designed to be more plenary, offering policy direction to the European Commission – often simply called ‘the Commission’.

The Commission is the most interesting of the EU bodies, especially when understanding the EU’s ability to act on policy issues. The Commission has twenty-eight Members, one from each Member State. Based on the results of the most recent European Parliamentary elections, the European Council will propose a potential Commission President to the European Parliament, who will vote to approve the appointment. This new Commission President will then be tasked with forming their Commission. These twenty-seven remaining Commission positions are each appointed to be the head of a respective Directorate-General – an issue-area department, best seen as an EU-level ministry. These ‘Commissioners’ each have their own Executive team who act as the political face and offer direction to their Directorates-General (DGs). The DGs in turn are the actual bureaucracies that implement EU policy, often called ‘the Services’.

So, what is referred to as ‘the EU’ includes in essence five Presidents and decision making bodies (Parliament, Council, European Council, Commission, and European Court of Auditors), a bicameral legislature, a separate executive plenary function, and an involved, yet relatively-small bureaucracy. Add to this a President of the European Central Bank and the President of the European Court of Auditors and the situation gets much more complex. By this description, the EU may appear as a unitary – if extremely-convoluted – political entity. There is more messiness however. As mentioned above, in any given policy area, non-EU states have representatives who are active in Parliamentary debates, are non-voting parties to Council decisions, are present in EU Summits, are diplomats meeting with Commission executives, or are bureaucrats actively working for the Commission and Directorates-General (DGs). Amidst this complex system, and as
evidenced by the EU’s own history of state-driven integration, the only way any given body of the EU gets anything done is by working closely with representatives of each of the Member States, as well as these extra-state representatives, private industry, and other international or civil society organisations.

This is why the EU should never be seen as one coherent entity: the various representatives, diplomats, and negotiations are what practically make up ‘the EU’ and what make it a moving target that is difficult to pin down as any one type of political actor. This fluid, changing collection of actors at any one time represents exactly what the ‘EU’ is. Some of these actors or representatives act on behalf of a particular DG or office when negotiating a policy position – much like a state representative does in any other context. These negotiations are hosted at DG offices and include far more than the primary stakeholders in a given policy area. They are not exclusively EU-Member State negotiations, as much as cooperative governance negotiations between EU bureaucrats and diplomats, state bureaucrats and diplomats, non-governmental organisation representatives, international organisation coordinators, corporate contractors, and if needed, operations experts. This collection of actors, as well as their contributions to creating and implementing institutional governance regulations, make the EU more than merely a set of forums or state-like actors.

Only through an endless stream of meetings are any decisions on EU-regulated policy made at all. That the EU is seen to ‘do’ anything comes specifically from the daily processes of interaction in these sets of meetings. Present at these meetings at any given time are Member State or Participating state diplomats, private industry actors, International Organisation actors, Civil Society or regular citizen members and, of course, bureaucrats from the DGs and the Commission Executive offices. These various actors negotiate positions, develop competencies, and jointly
make decisions at the different stages of the policymaking process: whether a new policy is needed, how a policy can be implemented, what is needed to win over stakeholders not participating, and generally perform every function of developing, creating, implementing, and enforcing regulations and directives. This, in short, is the ‘meat’ of EU governance; this is how EU bodies affect change; this is how policies happen in ‘the EU’.⁶

These complicated policymaking procedures are crucial when accounting for how even multiple EU actors in any given policy field are all claiming specific types of authority. Looking at the primary institutions of EU governance highlights this. While debates and formal decision-making happens within the European Parliament and the Council, it is the bureaucratic Directorate-General Services that suggest, prioritise, frame, research, write, negotiate, and ultimately implement policy decisions. The DGs represent the core structures for institutional governance in any one area. The different DGs have the most important role in creating and enforcing what comes to be seen as an ‘EU capability’ and thus represent some of the most important sets of actors in a given governance process. While arguments can be made about the abstract forms of authority wielded by the EU Parliament or Court of Justice, the daily running of European bureaucracies is invested in the DGs – and they are thus important loci of authority-forming in European politics. As a result, it is important to unpack exactly what a DG is and how different types of governance institutions function in and through the DG Services.

A typical DG has three or four directorates. Each directorate is made up two to five units. Each unit is made up of one to ten offices, staffed with five to thirty-five different desks. Some directorates or units have quasi-independent departments as well, with their own different internal configurations. This is all in addition to the various administrative and support staffs who liaise

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⁶ For a more detailed description of the overall policymaking process, see Wallace, Wallace, and Pollack (2005a); for a more detailed outline of a policymaking process in a specific policy area, see Chapters Three and Four.
between units, departments, directorates, and elsewhere. While each DG nominally has its own policy area of expertise – meaning the various meetings about a set of policies that it will host – these policy areas often overlap. Policy areas and the various Commissions do not necessarily line up evenly either.

An illustration of how policy capability and DG structure are not necessarily synchronised is the DG for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE). This Commission has stakes simultaneously in a number of different policy fields: EU internal security personnel who aim to minimise possible terrorist or criminal attacks on the EU transportation network; disaster managers needing to be aware of routes available in the event of needing to transport disaster responders in an emergency; environmental bodies interested in monitoring the effects of different types of transportation innovations or regulations; and enlargement officials, cohesion policy writers, and air transportation regulators. All are among the actors with a potential stake in the decisions made at MOVE’s meetings.

Because of the different overlapping responsibilities of institutions like MOVE, even the DGs cannot be seen as singular, unitary actors or institutions. Multiple levels and types of actors, including different departments, offices, and personnel, interact at any given time to represent EU MOVE, as do various corporate, Member State, or international partners. Moreover, all of these actors interact within structural constraints: limited resources, state representatives worried about ‘giving up too much state capability or flexibility’ (Interview 5), private industry and civil society actors trying to make sure their concerns are considered as well, and other international organisations eager to share the burden of coordinating shared projects. This breakdown highlights the dense sets of actors involved in European policy areas. In particular, it highlights how one DG may work with governance institutions of different policy areas and wield different types of
authority regardless of whether these institutions exist within its formal structure. It also demonstrates how policy areas in Europe can be understood as governed by overlapping sets of institutions, layered both vertically – low- to high-level DG, technical, bureaucratic, and diplomatic state representatives – and horizontally to include different types of non-state, non-‘EU’, or non-bureaucrat actors.

In addition to these overlapping institutions, the daily processes of governance within the DG Services include an endless stream of working meetings, plenary meetings, plenary meetings for the plenary meetings, stakeholder meetings, briefing meetings, and consultation meetings. In addition to all of the different types and levels of actors trying to represent their DG at any given point, though, there are also those extra international coordinators, corporate contractors, media personnel, and Member State diplomatic and bureaucratic representatives all participating in the decision-making process with each of the different types and levels of actors within EU structures.

In order to understand EU governance effects or sources of authority, it is imperative to account for the institutional combinations of actors, who are also cooperating with other types of actors while also ensuring their own voices are heard and needs met. Tensions between EU actors and Member State and other international actors impact the way policy capacities are developed and policies come as the result of these EU-Member State and EU-international actor combinations. Navigating never-ending meetings amidst institutional complexity is of course hardly unique to the EU though. Corporations, national ministries or bureaucracies, universities, and NGOs all have internally-structured-yet-variable hierarchies of personnel.

Authority in the EU is different precisely because it is visible in defining how these actors relate to one another to create policy. Member States have one form of legal authority vested in their sovereignty, but EU institutions have another form that is produced through their ability to
include the sets of actors it hosts and framing how governance policies are developed. This necessarily means that different types and sources of authorities interact and relate to each other. Even if authority ‘starts’ from MS delegation, it becomes something else – EU authority takes different forms because of the ways actors in the EU interact. EU authority then lies precisely in the process of defining how other actors use EU channels and resources to produce policies. Not only is authority enacted and practiced in the EU, but authorities in the EU also compete over ‘ways of doing’ – how things are done in a given policy context is the result of different claims and types of authorities interacting relationally, allowing one actors’ claim to define how all other actors relate to one another.

CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined the ways that major IR approaches to the EU understand authority in that set of institutions, as well as looking at literatures concerning EU authority in one specific policy area. The chapter then proceeded to highlight three key limitations to this IR literature: an assumption of pre-existing EU authority, a lack of accounting for the variable nature of the EU, and the fact that the EU’s authority is specifically produced because of this variable nature and its actors’ abilities to influence how policymaking relationships work – again varying according to policy area. The core takeaway point from outlining these three limitations is that to understand EU authority, greater attention must be paid to both the relationships between the different actors participating in a given policymaking enterprise and the logics being mobilised by the actors in those relationships.
One particular set of institutional logics have become increasingly apparent in European governance institutions: an increasing reliance on formal risk management procedures and informal risk management logics to frame decision-making processes. As chapter two will argue, accounting for authority in the specific field of disaster response means looking at both the way EU institutional actors frame the policymaking relationships in the field of disaster governance and the logics they use to do so. Developing a disaster response capability in Europe is fundamentally the process of determining and regulating how, what kind, by whom, and when there will be responses to disasters; assessing this policy development means engaging with the underlying logics at work in making those decisions. Establishing authority relationships in disaster governance means accounting for the risk management thinking they embody.

This is separate from formal risk management – as in assessments of how much risk is acceptable before action is necessary. This is why when one asks a disaster response bureaucrat what kind of risk management techniques they use, their response is that there is a separate department or process for managing risk, or that ‘risk’ is something separate from the everyday attempts to manage future scenarios. Disaster governance practices transform the logics of more formal risk management techniques and turn them into part of everyday governance processes: impact assessment matrixes, monitoring levels of change, automated reporting, centralised communication, etc. These practices are performed by actors of various types all actively participating in the everyday functioning of governance, regardless of whether a disaster has taken place or not.

Finally, in order to fully account for EU authority in general and its authority in the specific field of disaster governance, chapter two will develop an approach to studying the EU that accounts for the contestations about the governance object of EU policy fields and argue that if risk is
becoming important to the way EU actors maintain the authority to define how actors in their respective policy fields relate to one another and develop policy, then we need a new way of thinking about risk and the practice of risk that are taking place inside of EU institutions.

Accounting for EU governance requires not taking for granted the current structures of EU competencies in specific policy fields – and as a result not treating the EU as an international organisation and thus simply yet another form of non-state but still pivotal or central actor in international politics. It entails recognising that EU authority is not a given, but a carefully negotiated process. It also means recognising that the internal variation of positions, approaches, and authorities within EU structures actually shape how that authority is negotiated and parsed out, as well as that these negotiations are de facto competitions for authority in the development of an EU competency, instead of mere debates about functional policy provision. Drawing from these prompts, the chapter will argue that contestations for authority are always debates over how to govern a specific object (read: policy area) through an agreed-upon base of knowledge; if risk management has become the base of knowledge for the governance of disasters, then what this means for EU disaster governance policymaking authority needs to be unpacked.
CHAPTER TWO:

STRATEGIES OF RISK AND FIELDS OF PRACTICE

Chapter one explored the dense combinations of actors that participate in institutional governance processes at the European Union (EU), drawing particular attention to how one policy area of EU competency, disaster governance, highlights the field of International Relations’ (IR) limited ability to understand the relational and multiple nature of authority in the EU. The current chapter argues that understanding authority in EU disaster governance, and transnational governance more generally, means taking into account the practices and logics that European political actors use to assume and be recognised as being in positions of authority. This chapter understands governance authority in Europe as the by-product of densely layered institutions and collections of actors working through them to make and frame policy decisions. The competing goals, desires, and methods of governance between different actors practicing governance through European governance institutions are salient aspects of the EU’s bureaucratic Directorate-General (DG) meetings. Because of the wide array of personnel and actors included in developing a policy capacity, making sense of the authority in any governance or policymaking process in any given issue area is about including the collections of actors in that social field and framing the logics they use in navigating their many overlapping tensions, stakes, and relationships.

The development of a disaster response capacity in Europe serves as an illustrative example. It provides specific insights which apply to wider questions about how authority is generated and maintained in the European political system. The EU’s development of disaster response capabilities was the result of the internal decisions that helped actors from the Directorate-General
(DG) for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Response (ECHO) become leaders in the field of disaster management, with its personnel occupying central roles amongst disaster responders. ECHO actors were able to assume these centralised roles because they came to be seen as competently mitigating or managing the effects of disaster-based risk through the various institutional innovations they made to disaster response. This can be seen as the ‘ECHO model’ for creating a policy capability that is informally yet de facto coordinated through EU actors because they are more competent risk managers, a method which has since been copied in other policy areas. Similar types of practices have circulated to other EU-level governing institutions, in particular EU internal security institutions, which have begun using a similar policymaking approach. In order to understand the importance of disaster management and risk logics becoming central features in how governance and authority are practiced in Europe, we thus need to develop a more comprehensive framework to account for risk’s role in governance.

This chapter argues that the actors brought together in governing disasters are taking on key positions in governance processes more generally due to their ability to competently manage the risks posed by disasters. These abilities to use their available resources to produce and use data to define and manage risks allow them to assume central roles in the types of complex, densely layered institutional governance arrangements currently seen in Europe and elsewhere. Although risk management has become a central facet of how institutional actors get things done and claim authority, it is not something that features heavily in most of the analytic literature on risk, which has often focused on discourses or governmental logics rather than detailed analyses of how risk management practices are deployed in institutions. In contrast, conceiving of risks as practices within social fields aimed at claiming recognised authority allows us to understand the spread of disaster governance techniques to other European institutions as an important evolution in
institutional governance practices. The fact that ECHO’s policymaking model has circulated elsewhere, as explored in more detail in subsequent chapters, also indicates that there is a particular set of governance practices that permeate governance institutions more generally, which seem to be informed by mitigating the future risks posed by disastrous events. This chapter will first introduce practice theory and what it can tell us about how authority is contested and claimed through everyday practices of European governance, before turning to look at the political role of risk as it is understood in IR and other academic literature. Finally, these two points will come together by developing a framework for understanding risk as a form of practice that has practical implications in making authority claims.

**PRACTICES**

Accounting for authority amidst the dense layering of governance institutions and governing logics in Europe represents an important transition in thinking about transnational governance. Others have noted the ‘particular’ nature of EU governing, which favours ‘voluntary performance standards, rather than compulsory regulation’ (Eberlein and Kerwer 2002, 1). Standards-driven governance has become the topic of recent studies looking at the processes by which performance standards are set, by whom, why, and to what effect. Hamieri and Jones have called this evolution the rise of the ‘regulatory state’ (Hamieri and Jones 2013, 465). Leaving aside the question of the state itself, regulatory governance refers to a specific type of institutional governing that relies on individual sets of issue-specific governance practices involving a combination of formal and informal standard-setting processes. In the specific European context, because of the myriad legal and political limitations on formal EU-level standardisation, informal yet still powerfully
productive benchmark making processes are what link the various distinct ways that European policy areas are governed. The myriad areas of European policy focus, as a result, establish similar forms of European-level cooperation yet do so distinctly, each policy area existing as its own highly-specialised and institutionalised social field composed of actors of varying types.

Emphasising regulatory approaches through institutionalised fields or spheres of capacity-building runs counter to previous narratives about the EU’s ability to affect policy as being ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ – for example, as in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2011). Accounting for multiple forms of integration, different types of institutional processes, and varying collections of institutional actors means recognising that EU governance is similarly not a linear process, as was thought in a set of earlier works on ‘Europeanisation’ (Jacquot and Woll 2003, Megie and Ravinet 2004, Radaelli 2004). Accounting for overlapping collections of governance institutions also, perhaps most importantly, runs counter to common notions that the EU somehow represents a singular ‘post-sovereign’ approach to governance (Wallace 2005, 493), where delegating governance capacity to the EU means sovereign states have relinquished control of their home populations – an absurd proposition when considering the way EU-led policy actually gets created and implemented by both Member State and EU-level bureaucracies.

To account for the complexity of how governance decisions are made through informal benchmarking processes in the densely overlapping governance institutions of Europe, this section looks at a theoretical lens that understands EU institutional governance as part of a larger reconfiguration of competitions over transnational and institutional governance authority: theories of practices in fields. The section will outline some key elements of practice theories and what they can explain about the functioning of dense layers of institutional governance processes. Approaching the EU as a set of institutions in which social actors cooperate and coordinate
governance processes while also competing with each other for authority in policy governance, practice theory sees institutional governance as a question of how authority is made visible through practices in institutionalised social fields, explored below.

**Theorising Practices at the EU**

There are a number of existing works that emphasise practice theories when studying governance in the European Union. They focus on the many dimensions of ‘the EU’ as a set of practices or otherwise use a theory of practices in fields to understand EU policymaking processes (Bigo, Bonditti, et al. 2007, Madsen 2011, Georgakakis and Weisbein 2012). These works offer much in terms of analytical depth into specific cases of EU policy action and are particularly interested in mapping the trajectories of the personnel that ‘perform’ the EU. For example, Bigo looks at the particular creation of EU security experts and how they perform practices understood to be part of the field of EU security management (Bigo 2000, Bigo, Bonditti, et al. 2007); similar to Georgakakis and Weisbein (2012), Cohen looks at the bureaucratic wrangling that makes up most EU decision making and how this creates a field of experts at navigating EU bureaucracies (Cohen 2010).

These approaches show some of the ways that practice theory can be used to grasp policymaking and governance in the EU. Beginning with the notoriously opaque, messy, nuanced, and complex processes of governance taking place at the level of European governance institutions more generally, practice theories hold that more can be gleaned about how and why things happen inside sets of institutions if we look at the everyday workings of these bodies. Building from their roots in critical social theory and sociology, practice theory approaches start from the premise that the normative underpinnings, or the power relations embedded in the process of institutionalising
a process or norm, are things that can be interrogated by looking at the specifics or minutiae of how these processes work.

Practice theories, and particularly theories of practices in fields, highlight how competition between actors and ongoing processes of transformation are specifically what politics and the act of governing entails – the _stuff_ of governing and politics is precisely in the tensions and contestations that shape the policymaking process. Long the dominant name in practice theory used in critical security studies, and increasingly becoming the more popular approach to practice theory in IR circles, the work of Pierre Bourdieu has spawned research that focuses on the creation and maintenance of antagonistic fields of practices to understand processes of structured interaction, such as seen in transnational policymaking.

Bourdieu argued that all structured or iterative social interactions reflect _fields of practices_, where practices are mobilisations of types of _capital_. These practices are understood by other actors in the field based on their internalised understanding – _habitus_ – of the formal or informal rules of the field – _doxa_ – and are attempts by the actors performing practices to improve or maintain their place in the relational power distribution of that field. Bourdieu’s work has inspired IR research that either focuses on the creation of social fields (Bigo, Bonditti, et al. 2007), on the practices that take place in given fields (Pouliot 2010, 2016), or on the effects of capital to provide more nuanced understandings of social processes (Williams 2007, Mérand 2008, Mérand and Pouliot 2008, Pouliot and Mérand 2012). Similarly, there are works that challenge the way ‘the international’ acts as a field that dictates the practices of its constituent members (Leander 2011, Bigo and Madsen 2011, Adler-Nissen 2013). Others use Bourdieu’s definition of an antagonistic field to account for the new types of security practices seen in recent shifts in security governance.

In all of these works, the emphasis is less on how to understand one ‘thing’ – a social actor or a particular policy – but instead to highlight the way tensions and contradictions mean that actors and policies are always engaging in processes of actor-making and policy-competing and how these in themselves are forms of governance. For the present purposes, particular attention should be paid to the types of practices that take place in fields, as well as the authority that other actors in a field recognise those practices to have. This is because things that appear as tensions or contradictions at the surface should be understood as indicators of a particular field’s normal, functioning dynamics. Contradictions and competitions are what make up fields. These competitions are over what gets recognised as authoritative. In the context of this project, ‘what is recognised as authoritative’ refers to competitions over the best way of doing something or the best way of understanding something. Practices that best tackle or most clearly illustrate a problem are the practices that are recognised as authoritative or most useful. There is a connection between specific forms of practices and recognised authority, or put another way, specific sets of practices are understood to carry authority or provide actors with types of authority.

Practice theory gives us the vocabulary to account for these competitions for material and immaterial resources in a given social field. If we take into account and trace how a specific set of practices are signifiers of particular context-dependent knowledge, interests, understandings, and structures, then ‘we can understand how practices are often internally contradictory or constituted differently. These misunderstandings can be productive, in the sense that they can create separate communities around the same event, or even communities in conflict with each other’ (Duvall and Chowdhury 2011, 347). This is why at given times, certain ‘types’ of practices are seen to be more
useful in a given field than others (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 311). This is the tipping point, in a sense: when specific sets of practices are considered to be ‘given’, they are accepted and recognised as authoritative, or as the best way to accomplish something (Gheciu 2014).

Once a set of practices and the actors performing them are recognised as authoritative by the other actors in their field, those practices and actors, and the particular way of doing things they represent, are seen as normal and natural. What is treated as normal or natural in a given social context is doxa – the underlying rules or assumptions that dictate or structure interaction in a given field. But this recognition of an authoritative set of practices or actors is not fixed or static – what gets recognised as authoritative in a given social field is always changing. This is why doxa is not a fixed or natural thing, but is created through those competitions over how to best do something – the doxa is created by the competition for relative power-positions in a field.

Focusing on doxa is a side of Bourdieu’s work that has not received sustained analysis in IR as yet, despite his work inspiring research that focuses on the creation and maintenance of antagonistic fields of practices that are constantly evolving and changing. This focus on doxa is also the basis of Bourdieu’s emphasis on competition over being recognised as a source of authority. The current research specifically takes up this focus, interrogating the conceptual intersection between competitions over ways of doing or practicing disaster governance, the way specific practices of disaster governance have become recognised as natural or normal dimensions of managing disasters, and the types of authority generated by these sets of practices. This emphasis on competition does not mean that there is a rigid or closed formula that dictates all social interactions to be competitive, but rather provides a conceptual language by which specific types of structured interactions can be understood. Before highlighting what practice theory
highlights about institutional governance in Europe and its myriad processes of policymaking, some key concepts will be defined.

Key Concepts in a Practice Theory of Fields

Bourdieu’s theory of social fields, with its focus on contestation, offers a way to understand and talk about the various institutional governance bodies in Europe and what they do, without getting stuck in a discussion about whether or not the EU is an actor, if so what kind of actor, or if it is a set of institutions. A field, for Bourdieu, is a set of embedded social relations, a specific configuration of relations between agents and structures. These relations are premised on the formal and informal laws and conventions which guide social behaviour within that field and are almost always based on a set of oppositions that constitute the defining boundaries of the field. These oppositions are crucial, as they frame and limit what actions should be considered part of the field, as well as how actors within that field attempt to improve their relative positions. Despite working to structure the boundaries and limits of the field, however, these oppositions do not represent fixed or static positions of difference as, for example, in some forms of structuralism. Instead, Bourdieu stresses that these oppositions represent relationships of interaction, or relationships of struggle or contestation, which he calls ‘a relation of homology between relations of opposition (man-woman; sun-moon)’ (Bourdieu 2005 [1990], 88).

An example is useful. In modern EU Parliamentary politics, the two largest and most ideologically-centrist political groups, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), use a variety of pro- or anti-EU rhetoric, and champion a mix of market- or government-run policy solutions. Their use of these discursive oppositions has little to do with championing ideological positions though. Instead, by using these
discursive oppositions to juxtapose their position on an issue against the other’s, the party groups can better-articulate their relative position in the field of EU Parliamentary politics. The oppositions allow the party groups to reaffirm the parameters of the field (areas of EU legislative action) and offer a short-hand for their respective courses of action. These are not fixed or absolute positions: one can imagine a scenario where a further-right, anti-EU party group holds a position of some relative power in the field, leading the EPP to functionally become a champion of ‘more-EU’ in order for it to maintain its position as a popular centre-right party. In this example, the oppositional set of ‘how much EU’ structures the way party groups (actors) relate to each other in that field. Bourdieu refers to this pliability of position when saying that these oppositions can apply to ‘generative schemes different from those that can be used to generate other homologies into which one or another of the terms in question may enter’ (Bourdieu 2005 [1990], 88).

Seen another way, the field is the distribution of power attained by actors under conditions of intense competition over status and resources amongst other actors, all having a shared goal or sense of what is valued, and all sharing the stake or series of stakes of the game, leading to a form of institutionalised social interaction. In Bourdieu’s vision, a field is thus also ‘defined by volumes of capital, compositions of capital, and change in these two properties over time’ (Bourdieu 1984, 114). The field is the realm of social interaction amongst the actors that make it up and it is constituted by the practices of interaction that it defines – which also serve to constitute it. In terms of understanding relations within a field, capital is a way of understanding the distribution of power in a given field. The field, then, should be seen as the arena in which various forms of resources or capital – ‘economic’, ‘cultural’, ‘symbolic’, etc – are all mobilised by actors within that field in order to maintain or alter (for whatever reasons) the current distribution of capital (Pouliot and Mérand 2012).
These forms of capital are the resources which actors in a field mobilize to alter or shape the field and its rules in ways that benefit\(^1\) themselves. Altering the way that something is done in a field also means changing the doxa, the internalised rules that govern how actors interact in a field. Bourdieu outlines how being able to control doxa in a given social field means engaging with a higher-order type of practice. In addition to providing an illustrative set of language for understanding the social behaviour of actors in institutions, this may be the most important insight worth drawing from his work. Certain *types* of behaviours have the ability to change how other subsequent field interactions happen at all – they are deemed to be authoritative and thus alter the distribution of capital in a given field.

Finally, merely having social interactions does not mean a field exists – this is a key point. For example, the fact that ongoing, even structured and iterative meetings take place in different EU bureaucracies, with their own language and rules of behaviour, does not mean that these meetings are sets of actors performing practices in social fields. For them to be understood as fields, in Bourdieu’s sense of the word, there have to be a set of contestations and struggles to define that field and how things are done in that field, as well as common interests and objects that are struggled over. In some cases of EU policymaking, the actors tacitly agree that they are indeed competing over how to best create policy about issues of a shared concern – but this is no necessarily the case due to variable nature of fields and how their dynamics shape the preferences and practices of field actors. Because a field is inherently a place of contestation and social interactions are never clear-cut, a field is a messy, not-easily delineated sphere of social interaction.

The field is made up of largely-iterated or reproduced social interactions, in which those reproductions entail an explicit struggle for position of relative power or dominance. It is defined

\(^1\) ‘Benefit’ here is a loose term that reflects the field’s dynamics and is not necessarily synonymous with ‘accumulation’; asceticism in some contexts can be understood as a benefit, for example.
conceptually according to oppositional logics – different ways of approaching, doing, seeing, or understanding some thing. It is not simply a conceptual tool, but a social constellation of action and actors, who share an understanding of the fact that they are interacting in a structured, iterative way to achieve some goal – governing a disaster, establishing shared fashion tastes, setting pricing standards, etc. In these structured interactions, the boundaries of a field themselves become objects of contestation as well – what a field is ‘about’ or what a set of actors are aiming to ‘do’ are as much sources of contestation as debates over how to achieve that stated goal. These contestations happen by actors mobilising different types of resources or capital towards improving their own approach or position to that ‘thing’ – which in Bourdieu’s terminology is a practice.

For Bourdieu, practices are defined by the dual internalisation of rules and behaviours that he defines as the habitus and the external projection of the embodiment of those rules once negotiated through internalisation, thereby reshaping the rules to be re-internalised in a new or different way (Bourdieu 2011 [1977], 72). On this basis Bourdieu argues that practices cannot be separated from lived experience (Bourdieu 2011 [1977], 4). Moreover, by actors performing practices, the ‘rules of the game’ for a field are reproduced, negotiated, and struggled over. This means that even what should be considered as a legitimate practice in a field can be in a state of flux. This nods to a more fluid definition of practices, where practices can be thought of generally as systems of action or techniques for taking specific types of action that either reproduce or challenge the status quo (Best 2014).

Practices have five dimensions: they are performances, so there is a process in performing a practice; they are patterned, in that they are loosely iterative and performances that are repeated over time; they need to be competent, needing to be recognised by others as a practice in order to be considered a practice, meaning they are inherently social; they reveal and are motivated by
background knowledge, because they embody, enact, and reify previous understandings in new ways; and they are both discursive and material, since they link ideas and the material representations of those ideas (Adler and Pouliot 2011b, 7-8). Despite this prescriptive definition, Hansen reminds us that because of the inherently unstable definition of practices, they can only be understood through the political or power-influenced decisions that allow them to be discernible, essentially combining these five dimensions. As she puts it, ‘practices might also not be routine,…there are instances when specific practices are sought to be performed as if they are routine, when in fact they take place on a terrain that is much more contested and unstable’ (Hansen 2011, 280).

Analysing what practices are and what they are doing includes its own hazards – thus Bourdieu’s insistence that researchers remain mindful of their respective position toward (or even in) the fields they are attempting to examine. Regardless, the point here is not that actors mechanically repeat practices, but that actors form a reciprocal relationship where the practices shape the actor and the actor reconstitutes the field through practice. This is based on the actors’ habitus, which for Bourdieu is a quasi-conscious corporeal structure that processes and gives meaning, in the broadest sense, to social interaction. Actors then interact with a field through practices, which are combinations of that actor’s understanding of what their social field is, the mobilisation of the distribution of power/capital, and the structures of the field itself; another way: ([habitus] + [capital]) + field = practice (Bourdieu 1984, 101).

In terms of focusing research on practices and fields, the recent rise in the use of Bourdieu’s concepts in IR research can be seen as creating a spectrum, bracketed by Adler and Pouliot’s (2011a) approach on one hand and Bigo and Madsen’s (2011) on the other, spanned therein by Pouliot (2010), Mérand (2008), Williams (2007), Leander (2011), and Bigo (2011). A key
difference between these two sets of approaches to Bourdieu lies in the analytical weight given to
two of his central themes: the field and the practices that constitute it. For Adler and Pouliot
(2011a), the focus is on the deductive capacity of practices (‘these are the practices we are seeing,
and they thus lead us to predict that...’), where the field in which these practices operate is not
itself prioritised as a focus for research. For Bigo and the Paris School of Security Studies (Bigo,
Bonditti, et al. 2007), the analytical primacy lies in the field over its practices, with their focus on
‘accounting for the boundaries and hierarchies that structure relations between professionals of
security...It facilitates the analysis of the interdependencies between different professionals’ Bigo,
Bonditti, et al. 2007, 8). As such they tend to focus on the (re)constitution of the field of EU
security experts, the context in which they exist, and less on precisely what practices are present
in that (re)constitution.

The present research situates itself somewhere between Mérand and Williams, in that it
follows the Pouliot approach of pinning down or taking for granted, at the outset, the field being
looked at – in this case, the fields of EU disaster managers and internal security providers – in
order to focus on the practices that make up those fields. Following both Mérand and Williams,
though, there is a period of ‘retroduction’ built into the project, allowing for re-interrogating this
field that is pinned down initially. This means that the interest in this project is on how actors use
practices to restructure fields, or otherwise, taking for granted the existing contours of fields, but
then looking at how actors reproduce and/or alter those fields. The following section pre-empts
this and outlines how the different policy areas of EU governance should in fact be seen and
understood as semi-distinct fields.
Authority, Symbolic Capital, and Field Logics

As the previous chapter outlined, European transnational governance institutions challenge broader assumptions of authority in International Relations, which are unable to account for how authority works amidst the dense, complex layering of governance institutions in Europe. To counter this limitation, we should recognise that EU governance operates as several overlapping fields of practices. Seeing EU governance comprised of fields allows for a closer look at the EU-level governance happening in the one specific case of disaster governance, which in turn provides a window into the larger context of transnational institutional politics in Europe. This represents a significant step in understanding EU governance.²

In fields of EU governance, security and market actors interact, as bureaucrats, diplomats, corporate trainers and contractors, and international coordinators collectively govern Europe through practices such as working group meetings and plenary coordination meetings. As a set of actors, a set of formal and informal rules, and as forums, EU bodies create fields of transgovernmental, trans-societal, and trans-political interaction of social and political entities. The rules and tensions – the things precisely at the core of the various debates about the usefulness or accountability of the EU – of these fields become entrenched, instantiated as ‘ways of doing EU policy’. Moreover, in each field of EU competency-building, the rules or tensions may be different, but their governing is similar: procedural formal and informal interactions of similar types of collections of actors (IGOs, civil society, private industry, the UN, and of course state representatives) across different policy or issue areas.³

² A similar call for a ‘practice turn’ in the study of EU integration was recently made by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2016).
³ This is the emphasis of existing works using theories of practices in fields studying EU governance, which are less interested in the specific practices that actors perform as part of field-building and often emphasise the important relationships between actors themselves (Georgakakis and Weisbein 2012).
Aside from specific studies of the EU, works looking at the field practices of evolving structures of authority in other instances of transnational institutional governance include: practices of state authority mixing with public and private actors to change the way authority is allocated and understood (Abrahamsen and Williams 2012); private industry interacting with legal authority in novel ways which change basic understandings of state security provision (Gheciu 2014, Cutler 2010); and transnational governance practices increasingly being seen as instantiated in local settings in diverse ways (Sassen 2008, Frowd 2014). All of these works focus on practices of hybridities – of actors and function – using specific practices to challenge core political concepts like ‘the public’ or ‘democracy’, for example (Walters 2002, Best and Gheciu 2014, Abrahamsen and Williams 2014).

Sending (2015) in particular has emphasised that looking at practices in the fields that make up governance processes ‘opens up for analyses how the substantive contents of governance arrangements are endogenous to the construction of – and competition over – positions of authority’ (Sending 2015, 14; emphasis in original). He argues that emphasising practices necessarily means interrogating the logics of the practices taking place – the types of practices collections of actors are performing are what imbue their policies with any type of legitimate authority to be seen as governance policies that should be taken seriously.

This reading and application underlines a key benefit of using a theory of practices in fields to understand transnational governance situations. Once we begin to think of governance as fields of practices, where each policy area usually lines up to be its own distinct field of practices, it raises important questions about the configurations of authority within those fields and policy areas. This is because field theory destabilises the taken for granted narratives about why and how
authority is enacted in and across fields, precisely because pre-existing power relationships are unpacked and not treated as given or objective fact.

Authority relationships are generated and maintained by relationships of recognition between actors – recognition of super- and sub-ordination of different actors based on their ability to amass and use resources that ensure their continued recognition as being authoritative. Practice theory argues that actors generate these relationships by competing for material and symbolic forms of capital in a given social field. Being recognised as being in a position of authority, for Bourdieu, is achieved by amassing different types and amounts of capital relative to the valuations of capital structuring the field. All actors in social settings look to improve their positions and ‘strive for recognition’ (Sending 2015, 38) in their respective social milieus or fields. In doing so though, ‘some actors will always have access to more resources (material and symbolic) with which to impose the categories and evaluative criteria to which others must refer in seeking recognition from others’ (Sending 2015, 38). As a result of this uneven ground, ‘we need a shift in analytical focus, from ideal-typical sources of authority to the claims advanced by various actors in their efforts to be recognised by others as authoritative’ (Sending 2015, 38). Amassing resources, in this light, is a technique that allows those who are recognised as authoritative to continue be recognised as such. So, if we want to focus on the generation and maintenance of recognised authority, there is a missing link here; our question necessarily becomes: what types and collections of resources are most useful for being recognised as an authority?

Capital is the resources that actors use to try and improve their relative positions in their fields. This is not to say that actors are only interested in the ‘primitive accumulation of capital – that is, accumulating capital for its own sake’ (Bourdieu 2011 [1977], 187), but that actors internalise the currency that different types of economic, social, or cultural capital have in a given
field. In this internalisation, however, one other particular form of capital is perhaps most instructive and important for how fields work on an ongoing basis. Bourdieu outlined that ‘Symbolic capital is any property (any form of capital whether physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value’ (Bourdieu 1998, 47). Symbolic capital is when resources or other forms of capital are turned into recognition by others in that field – when certain configurations and types of resources illicit so much deference in their legitimacy and usefulness that they are imbued with a new level of meaning.

In this sense, symbolic capital relies on other previous field relationships to have meaning – the doxa and habitus of the field need to already align with the specific form of capital being practiced in order for it to be recognised as symbolic, meaningful. This is a key element of Bourdieu’s argument: recognition of the symbolic meaning of actors using particular resources relies specifically on the field producing ‘dispositions necessary for [actors] to feel they have obeyed without even posing the question of obedience’ (Bourdieu 1998, 103). This is the basis for how authority relationships can be understood to be created.

Competitions that make up a field are competitions over how things are done – what types or ways of mobilising resources and capital are more valuable and authoritative in a given social context. When actors in a field begin recognising a certain type of practice as authoritative, then that type of practice and the resources it represents becomes treated as doxa – that particular configuration is understood by all field actors as being the normal or proper way the field operates. In order to account for the types of claims to authority being taken as normal and doxic, then, we must look at the way those resources are being mobilised as practices: the logics that drive the specific practices that generate forms of authority.
For Bourdieu, authority is a relationship of obedience that does not question the need to obey – it is formed by the habitus aligning such that certain practices are unquestionably seen as being the best able to win a specific field competition over how to best accomplish something, thus being recognised as the best and deserving of an authoritative position. This ‘is not an explicit belief…but rather an immediate adherence, a doxical submission to the injunctions of the world which is achieved when the mental structures of the one to whom the injunction is addressed are in accordance with the structures inscribed in the injunction addressed to him…it went without saying, that there was nothing else to do’ (Bourdieu 1998, 103).

I want to hone in on one aspect of symbolic capital’s role in the creation and recognition of authority. Once a field begins to have a relatively stable structure – that is, once a field has a clearly delineated object over which different ways of addressing that object can compete – and the arrangements of symbolic capital are established, this arrangement becomes difficult to change, because it is based explicitly on ‘instruments of knowledge and categories of perception’ (Bourdieu 1998, 104). This is absolutely crucial. Authority comes from possessing symbolic capital and the recognition by others in the field of possessing it. This balance of certain types of capital being recognised as authoritative and justifying obedience itself relies on specific knowledges and categories of perception being recognised as symbolic – there are certain ways of thinking and understanding that have been internalised by others in the field as the most important or effective.

Every field has a base of knowledge – a shared, constructed, and pre-conscious understanding that underlies how the field operates. This is one of the logics of a field, underwriting how a field works. The other core logic of a field is its object, or object of governance – the particular thing that actors tacitly agree that needs to be addressed. The present research is
thus specifically interested in the impact of the base of knowledge and object of governance in the field of disaster governance – and making the larger link to how these two logics are acquiring symbolic capital in different fields of European transnational governance.

Highlighting the base of knowledge and object of governance of the field of disaster governance reveals how a specific set of risk-imbued logics have permeated European transnational governance processes across different policy fields. This has resulted in a reconfiguration in how authority is practiced by EU-level institutional actors. In accounting for EU governance processes, the goal by EU-based policymakers and bureaucrats is to keep governance capacities at the EU-level and a base of knowledge for doing so is risk mitigation. This means that EU-level actors seek out the resources to best mitigate risks and thus keep governance in a given policy area at the EU level because risk mitigation practices carry with them powerful symbolic capital. In terms of generating authority, mitigating risk effectively allows EU level actors to be recognised as having the access to the most resources involved in that mitigation (research centres, new technologies, etc).

Competitions over how governance authority is generated in Europe are best understood by practice theory and outlining how to focus on the specific practices and the logics that influence them is the concern of the rest of this chapter. In the case of governing disasters, the logic of practice that has come to be seen as most authoritative is risk management, as mitigating risk drives much of the institutional restructuring that has taken place in EU disaster governance. As this institutional structure and underlying logics have begun to circulate to other policy fields as well, the logics of mitigating risk have circulated as well. In this, risk has become a rationale that permeates the ways actors perform practices in fields of EU governance.
RISK AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

Despite the wealth of work looking at the logics behind why risk-driven policies are used, there has been noticeably less work looking at how policy practices that mitigate risk are used in situ – thus underestimating the ways that managing risk allows actors to claim authority in institutional settings. Beyond mapping the different ways of understanding risk, this section points to the inability of risk literature to account for risk’s impact or influence when used in specific institutional settings to make claims to authority. This section will examine three literatures on risk, before looking at what the existing literature reveals – or neglects – about risk’s use in making authoritative claims in institutional settings.

Realist Conceptions of Risk

Realist approaches to risk see it as independently existing, and focus on the seemingly straightforward ways that risks are minimised. Morgenthau’s second principle of political realism identifies risk in this way: ‘only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success’ (Morgenthau 1993 [1948], 7). Usually starting by having something already-articulated and generally accepted as being a risk, this thinking is driven by the idea that a perceived risk can be eradicated. This logic focuses on the management of pre-existing risks, as well as the attempts to minimise their effects. It is the type of risk logic seen most prominently, for example, in loss-prevention procedures, workplace safety guidelines, or hazardous material storage. In each case, there are clearly-defined risks: the loss of value of a certain amount of product, the loss of personnel due to workplace-related injury and the amount of money paid out in compensation, or
the effects of toxic materials to surrounding environments, respectively. Then, the management of that pre-existing risk is merely a matter of choosing the most appropriate option for minimising the specific risks: theft-prevention sales approaches, clearly indicating sources of potential injury and training workers to understand those indicators, or storing materials in containers strong enough to avoid leakage, respectively.

Notably, when discussing authority and governance, taking risk as a pre-existing condition is a mainstay in the study of economics. In financial risk management, the risk of loss is treated as a pre-determined fact: all investments may represent a loss of investment if returns are not yielded which cover the initial costs. Some of this is seen most prominently in the wealth of work that looks at how foreign direct investment levels are calculated based on the assumption that risk will occur (Solomon and Ruiz 2012); how return rates should be calculated by assessing acceptable levels of risk (Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens 2009); how in general finance decisions are made based on differing understandings of acceptable levels of risk (Pixley 2012); or how the ability to even categorise or create risk management portfolios is flawed because the levels of their uncertainty varies so widely (de Vries, Verhoeven and Boekhout 2011) – to name but a few examples.

There is something intuitively attractive about this realist approach to risk: a potential problem exists and it can be handled with expertise that negates the problem. Pioneers of risk studies Douglas and Wildavsky cautioned against this understanding of risk, however, arguing that because of the way most professionals use the term, risk has become a synonym for ‘danger’, drawing attention to how risk is a social calculation about how much change can happen before it gets deemed ‘dangerous’: ‘Since no one can attend to everything, some sort of priority must be established among dangers’ (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, 3). This leads to a situation where risk
calculations are treated literally as assessments about how much change can happen to a current situation – current stock value dropping or threat levels raising – before a response action is needed or before a response is no longer possible. Douglas’ hesitation with this type of formal risk management lies in the fact that by declaring something to inherently be a danger and claiming the authority to mitigate the effects of that danger, a specific form and type of authority is being created: an expert-led claim to authority that excludes anyone without the ability to understand and mitigate the perceived risk⁴ – a critique that Shrader-Frechette (1991), among others, have shared with Douglas and Wildavsky.

Understanding risk as a pre-existing problem allows risk managers to assume positions of authority based on the perception that they effectively mitigate the effects of risks. Making these claims to authority through risk management expertise relies on understanding the risks as given facts that need to be eradicated⁵. Not all risks are pre-existing, though, only they are treated as such. Think for example of how stagnating European birth rates have been used to frame immigration from underdeveloped countries as a risk in guerilla social media campaigns; immigration itself is not a risk, but the population data on birth rates is used to frame increased immigration patterns as a risk for predominantly-white European populations.

We make decisions all the time about what counts as a risk, about what cannot be changed, about what might be vulnerable to change, about what we do not want to change. When it comes to policies and perceived risks, we make decisions about what levels of change or disruption constitutes a risk. Managing risks means understanding that risks are contingent to our relation to

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⁴ There are some potentially interesting links that could be made here between scientific realist understandings of risk and the work in Securitisation Theory about how articulating something as dangerous permits types of expertise and forms of political action that are not otherwise available in, for example, and normal functioning democracy (Williams 2003).

⁵ In addition to being the subject of this project more generally, a deeper exploration of the relationship between expertise and claiming authority can be found in Sending (2015) and Villumsen Berling and Bueger (2015), who both argue that expertise is a technique for claiming authority.
them, so labelling something as a risk shapes how we deal with it. Those same risk managers are the ones that decide what counts as a risk and thus something needing the risk management expertise which only they can provide. The fact risk managers define the risks needing management destabilises the perceived value of risk manager expertise and undermines the claims to authority that their expertise allows them to make. This is something emphasised by the social constructivist approach to risk, which emphasises how risks are constructed by probability-calculating actors.

**Social Constructivist Understandings of Risk**

The social constructivist approach to risk emphasises the way risks are defined and framed, seeing risk management as relying on calculations about what constitutes a risk and how these metrics are conceived and applied. Probability calculation is the act of using involved statistical means to determine the potential sources of risk. Instead of treating risks as merely existing, this approach to risk looks at the ways probabilistic calculations of future events determine what things are considered to be risks. Ian Hacking traces the early use of this type of risk management. Looking at how detailed population-census data was used to pre-determine potential risks – high population densities representing risks of a disease outbreak, or a lack of investment in building churches being a risk for civil revolts – he examined how calculations of future probabilities informed decision-making processes of early state institutions, outlining that by the late nineteenth century, the most legitimate way to make political decisions was to base them on census data in some way (Hacking 2010 [1990], 198).

This desire for basing governance decisions on data led civil servants to begin keeping detailed statistics of populations; using these types of data about populations to anticipate and
mitigate risks allowed states and their bureaucracies to be perceived by their citizenry as having a legitimate claim to governance authority. The early formation of modern states specifically meant bureaucrats developing the ability to measure population needs, leading to formal bureaucratic institutions being created to help in these measurements: ‘The population...was not a measurable quantity. Only institutions could make it one’ (Hacking 2010 [1990], 18). Just as population data was being used by governments to be recognised as sources of authority, there was a growing use of insurance as a mode of bolstering the trade of the expanding European empires, legitimating their prestige at home based on their ability to establish and maintain profitable trade routes around the globe (Lobo-Guerrero 2012). This entailed insurance companies calculating the probability of certain types of shipments being attacked or stolen in different areas of the world and issuing an insurance plan whose value was determined by those calculations. In both instances, the ability to calculate, frame or create, anticipate, and mitigate risks – either by observing trends in population data or in shipping and trade costs – was an important mechanism in how states claimed authority over their population.

As Hacking also illustrates, though, probabilistic decision making, such as governing through population data or regulating trade through insurance, creates its own legitimate conclusions based on internal formulations of consistency and expectation; it is thus tautological and blind to the uncertainties that are built-in to those calculations (Hacking 2010 [1990]). While representing a lively and fruitful study of risk, probability-calculating in itself is a potentially-dangerous and incomplete way of determining risks. There is always uncertainty, aspects that are simply incalculable, when attempting to determine all possible probabilities. To use former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s famous articulation, there are always ‘unknown unknowns’, things that cannot or will not be captured in attempts to determine a probability. The
nature of uncertainties more generally then, and how managing uncertainty is a key dimension of risk, has seen some of the most fervent critical scholarship.

**Critical Approaches to Risk**

Policymaking and governance have as their underlying motivation the notion that sound policy based in rational assessments of future probable scenarios can mitigate and even predict future conditions, however impossible that may be to do with perfect certainty. This is why bureaucracies that were seen as competent experts in managing population demands were recognised as being legitimate sources of governance authority. As part of a more general drive to destabilise established ‘historical structures’ of power and authority (Cox 1981), critical approaches to risk management emphasise that one of the central aspects of risk – that we can never be certain of how much change we can withstand, which is why we calculate some of that uncertainty into probabilities – gets put aside if we only focus on studying the effects of those probabilities. These approaches understand risk managers as performing a similar function as early state bureaucrats because of their ability to articulate some limited areas of the radical uncertainty of everyday life as risks and then managing them: they are able to make authority claims based on the recognition that they have the expertise to articulate some uncertainties as risks. In this way, highlighting how some uncertainty is calculated and managed as risk is the primary way that more critical scholars tend to study risk, due to their interest in understanding structures of authority.

Mark Blyth writes at length about uncertainty in risk management, outlining how financial advisors use past trends to predict future behaviour and can do so quite successfully (Blyth 2006). They cannot, however, predict massive shocks or disturbances to the system that would or could overhaul the process of prediction itself (Blyth 2002, 2006). The fact that they cannot make these
predictions does not usually matter for them. The fact remains that actors act as if they have mastered these disturbances and side-stepped uncertainty, meaning shocks are written off as external hindrances and therefore not seen to undermine the actual fact that they could not be accounted for. The logic behind this is that, when calculating risks, ‘Sampling on [previous] outcomes suggests that an agent can compute risk insofar as sampling the past tells us something meaningful about the likely probability distribution that we face’ (Blyth 2006, 495) – external hindrances do not ‘count’, quite literally, because they were not part of the risk calculation, which is itself based on a previous event. Others have noted, as well, that we actually cannot predict anything reliably, because in these calculations there is always inherent uncertainty that cannot be escaped (Gardner 2008).

Bounding and trying to manage specific uncertainties is the aspect most-heavily interrogated by critical approaches to risk management. Best outlines how the ambiguity or uncertainty that was once central to IR thinking, especially in critical thinking, has gone by the wayside in favour of a focus on the pre-emptive or anticipatory mitigation or calculation of that ambiguity through risk (Best 2008). Best continues to say that ‘the calculative technologies of defining and mitigating risks works to constitute ever-growing areas of social life as the objects of a particular kind of government’ (Best 2008, 359), thus neglecting the importance of uncertainty in those formulations. Best’s prompting is important, as the limitlessness of uncertainty – the fact that social life is filled with radical uncertainties, from employment uncertainty to the potential for radical freak weather events – places clear boundaries on what can reliably be managed through risk management, yet IR scholars do not address the contingent or arbitrary decisions behind framing some of these uncertainties as manageable risks.
Put another way, there is a universe of things that we simply cannot know or anticipate; risk management is the process of taking tiny slices of these uncertainties and trying to mitigate the effects of what we cannot anticipate through preparation, contingency planning, monitoring, etc. The inherent contingent or arbitrary nature of ‘things’ that are framed as risks drives why critical research on risk tends to draw heavily on Foucault’s concepts of governmentality or biopolitics and with it, a focus on seeing risk as a technology or way of thinking about governance. This work is usually done at the intersections of data collection (Salter 2004, Amoore and de Goede 2005), surveillance (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, O'Malley 1999, Amoore 2009), privacy (Amoore 2006, de Goede 2008), threat probability and calculation (van Munster 2009, Oels 2011), and the limits of sovereignty (Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 2009, Neal 2009).

A specific focus on uncertainty, the politics of uncertainty, or general interrogations of the limits of knowledge has thus become the central way that risk is studied critically. This set of work is interesting because it looks at the political implications of managing uncertainty: it unpacks the fact that there is a political decision involved in articulating and managing risks. The ‘politics’ of this decision is that there is a particular type of knowledge and expertise that is treated as legitimate and authoritative, by deciding what types of uncertainties need to be managed, enabling particular types of governance decisions and decision-making processes as a result. Works approaching risk from this critical angle thus point out the political role of risk by highlighting the way risk management is a privileged type of expertise and knowledge that is seen as legitimate or authoritative, illustrating that risk has a socio-political role in how governance decisions are made.

What this work leaves open, however, is why this ability to manage risks has come to be understood as authoritative. Some works point to how risk logics fit particularly well with neoliberal governance logics, highlighting that neoliberalism has used risk to emphasise ‘victim-
focused, individualistic and “responsibilising” approaches to criminality (O’Malley 2008, 55; see Rose 1999 and Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe 2009 [2001] for similar arguments). This approach, while encouraging, can perhaps be extended though, as it does not go far enough in detailing how and why articulating and managing specific, in situ risks has become a source for legitimate claims to authority. Moreover, chastising risk scholars for focusing on the limits of risk policies found when interrogating uncertainties, or for focusing on how probabilities are calculated, may appear to be a similar argument to Frank Knight’s central premise (2006 [1921]): if only we can better-account for uncertainties and come up with better probability-calculation techniques, then we could ‘get risk management right’.

The key point is not that we need better techniques to account for uncertainties, but instead that we need to learn from Hacking’s close interrogation of the probability-thinking behind early risk calculations in building state bureaucracies (Hacking 2010 [1990]) and uncover how risk logics are being used politically and institutionally. The need to study the specific ways that risk logics or thinking get mobilised into policy practices is essential because they involve serious political implications in terms of which actors are part of the policymaking process, how their risk management functions are institutionalised into bureaucracies, and what this means for understanding relationships of authority present in these institutional settings. Risk is the basis of a discursive vocabulary for understanding what uncertainties mean for a social field. Risk is the way uncertainties move from being merely ‘things we do not know’ to being ‘things we need to worry about’. Risk is the more general way something moves from an unknown to something that needs to be acted on – it is an umbrella term. Accounting for how risk becomes part of an accepted institutional governance process then means understanding risk’s influence and role in social contexts – how risk changes or alters the social contexts in which it is deployed and why.
Risk’s Social Contexts and Effects

Emphasising the role that risk plays in social contexts implies a more concerted focus on what exactly risk does (Kessler 2010). Risk has effects. It produces changes in the ways individuals interact by not just assessing those interactions, but by also offering predictions or assessments of best ways forward and therefore swaying how those interactions will continue to take place. Put another way, looking at the transposition of risk models without accounting for their ‘environmental’ impact, the ways they actually change the ways things are done, does not make any sense. As Porter (2009) has shown in a different context, if a risk analysis is done on a bank’s investment practices, highlighting some possibly vulnerable areas, that bank will alter its future practices to reduce that risk – thereby undermining or negating the results of the original risk analysis. Therefore, risk management has effects contingent upon the social context of its deployment, which transcends simply mitigating perceived risks.

Critical analyses of risk focus on the social dynamics of risk, or what problems risk knowledges breed socially and/or politically. The strength of this focus lies in its emphasis on the fact that managing risk is a sociological and political process of deciding what types of uncertainties are classified as risks and as such, worth managing. This focus comes at the expense, though, of looking at how these decisions over risks and their management actually get enacted and implemented – and thus, what their social effects are. Despite the substantial insights generated by analyses of risk, there have been too few rigorous studies of what risk management does when it is used in the social contexts specific to policymaking practices.

By moving past an exclusive focus on the thinking behind risk, this project looks at how these processes exist in action. Studying different ways of practicing risk management in social
contexts places front-and-centre the practical implications of risk management and what risk does in action. This allows us to see what risk does when deployed in institutional contexts such as those seen in transnational governance settings and, more specifically, what the practical implications and political reasons are for risks being defined to deal with some forms of uncertainties, but ignoring others. This involves looking at the practice of risk, for instance, instead of focusing on how certain people are treated unfairly because of risk-driven policymaking, moving towards uncovering why certain people are systematically and repeatedly treated unfairly because of that type of policymaking. Looking at the specific implications of risk management in turn allows for a more detailed examination of how risk changes the way actors in European institutional contexts deploy risk management techniques in attempts to assume positions of relative authority – they use risk both when making decisions to act on some issues but not others and in framing these decisions as legitimate.

Risk is based on a specific political reasoning, a way of thinking about things politically – namely, the fact that we can either know everything about the future or manage the parts we do not know\(^6\). While it is clearly useful to highlight the problems associated with not taking seriously the dynamics driving the logics behind risk, doing so without systematically looking at the way different types of practicing risk management are used on a daily basis misses half of the picture. Risk can comprise a coherent form of practice, one that can migrate between different social fields while still remaining recognizably a ‘risk’ practice. Thus, by looking at practices of risk themselves we can see what risk actually does socially or institutionally.

\(^6\) Often, this is reflected upon as the fundamental condition of modern political life: the conquering of nature by man (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, Arendt 1998). There has been enough work devoted to unpacking the links between modernity, facets of risk logics, and the political implications being represented or obscured with its thinking (O’Malley 1999, Aradau and van Munster 2012).
Future events are politically mediated by present practices: ‘the concern with catastrophic futures has given rise to a new mode of governing where imagination and sensorial experience play an increasing role’ in governance practices (Aradau and van Munster 2012, 2). This highlights how risk is part of a larger way of understanding how institutional action happens. Aradau and van Munster (2012) argue that institutions pre-emptively managing as-yet-unrealised scenarios – as future crises, disasters, and catastrophes – is primarily about being ready to respond to a given event that is understood as a threat. Managing future scenarios is about the processes whereby political institutions are brought to the point that certain types of action will be inevitable because the event had previously been articulated as a possible source of concern or threat. Aradau and van Munster (2012) draw on Williams (2003) to make this argument, outlining that in the case of future sources of insecurities, the actual securitisation, the articulation of something as a threat needing action, is readied politically, but not yet present. So, when the event occurs, it is simply a matter of formally identifying it as the event that everyone had been waiting for, or as an event never-before-seen. Key here is the fact that the disaster and the preparedness policies for it are thus seen in a different light, both being part of a much larger framework of policymaking and governance. This is true in policy areas other than disaster governance as well.

The act of governing refers to the processes by which policymaking and decision-making happen and are managed in institutionally-structured fields of interaction between governmental, civil societal, industrial, and bureaucratic actors. Policymaking entails deciding on a course of action for a polity; at some level, this means anticipating what a socio-political need will be and being ready to meet that need. As Hacking (2010 [1990]) outlines, institutional decision-making is an attempt to calculate or account for the future in order to make action possible, and then acting on those elements of the future that can be acted on. When a Parliament outlines the policy
direction for its term, it is making a statement of what future events will need Parliamentary oversight. When military or emergency responder organisations conduct training missions, they are making a decision about what types of events will require an intervention and prepare for them. In all dimensions of political decision-making, action is always in response to some form of perceived expectation or calculation about what a future scenario will be.

As such, policymaking is an inherently future-oriented process. Calculations about potential or likely future scenarios are weighed against present capabilities, and decisions are made about whether or not present capabilities will be enough to mitigate the effects of a future condition. In making these calculations or decisions, actors use a number of statistical, intuitive, or experiential data methods to try and predict what these future scenarios will be. Most recently, the socio-political impact of data and its use in future-oriented, risk management driven policymaking has become a popular topic of academic research. In addition to Ian Hacking’s work already cited at length here, Alain Desrosières (1993) and Michael Oakshott (1967) both in very different ways traced the development of the notion that the world can be readily calculated and acted-upon, attempting in different ways to discredit the rise of ‘Liberal Instrumental Reason’ and ‘rationalist’ policymaking and decision-making. Similarly, Theodore Porter (1995) has argued that data and statistics are used to justify social decisions and root them in an appeal to ‘objectivity’ – this of course presupposes that objectivity itself is a legitimating factor in policy implementation⁷.

Actors are relying on this data, however, in situations of incomplete information, because they can never anticipate all possible scenarios or outcomes – they operate in conditions of inherent systemic uncertainty, as the critical studies of risk highlight. As such, some academic work has also stressed the fact that a reliance on governing through the use of data has created ‘blind spots’

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⁷ This is also the driving logic behind how support is garnered for transnational governance projects (Krause Hansen and Porter 2012; Rocha de Siqueira 2014).
in policymaking, because of the inherent incalculability of the social world (Amoore 2014). Others have similarly noted that despite the rapidly increased reliance on data in governance decision-making, the rampant uncertainty of everyday life means that new or different ways of understanding governance institutions is needed (Callon et al. 2009 [2001]).

Understanding how decisions get made in the context of increasing reliance on data and the complex interweaving of actors involved in the process reveals how governance is performed and practiced as institutional performances. In practices that manage risk, risk simultaneously refers to the potential for loss, danger, or threat, but also indicates the modes of thinking of mitigating future uncertainties. It is more than an extension of threat-thinking; it is an ordering principle and base of knowledge for governance decision-making practices. Risk is a type of knowledge, a mentality that frames action. Our ability to ‘know’ a risk is about our ability to understand it or what it is thought to represent or do in the future. In order to account for transnational authority practices, then, there is a thus a profound need to explore what happens when risk management techniques are understood as part of the more general way institutional action happens. This is particularly important in institutional settings where authority is being negotiated and contested, as well as where risk management plays a role in the shape of that authority.

To grasp these dynamics, we need to look at the ways risk gets practiced: what material capabilities are altered or changed, what decisions are open to actors, or what capabilities are now available with (or thanks to) the management of either an articulated risk, or in articulating something as a risk. The specific aim here is to articulate how risk works in a specific field of practice and why it works the way it does, especially in relation to how authority is recognised. The following section will use the insights provided by practice theories to help understand the role risk management plays in these contestations.
RISK PRACTICES

Thus far, this chapter has argued that the theory of practices in fields allows us to understand the way knowledges and logics of managing forms of capital are central components of how authority is generated and, second, that risk produces social effects on the actors engaging with it. Building from these two points, actors who govern EU-level disaster response policy do so by performing practices that best manage the risks posed by transnational disasters; in doing so, these actors become recognised as authoritative in their respective fields precisely because they are seen to be the most competent or best managers of risk in their field. This section outlines how this has happened, arguing that risk plays three roles in institutional settings.

First, the ability to define, monitor, and best mitigate disaster risks has become a resource in itself. EU-level actors’ ability to monitor and anticipate risks has come to be recognised as an authoritative resource or symbolic capital in disaster governance. Second, framing best practices around monitoring also means that the ability to generate and use data about perceived risks has become a base of knowledge for transnational governance in the EU. This has meant that using data to define and monitor risks has become a crucial way that EU-level actors come to be recognised as authorities in their fields. Third, using capital resources of monitoring risk by creating and using risk-oriented data has led to specific types of position taking practices of centralisation, where actors who are using data to monitor risks are increasingly able to become central, key figures in their respective policy areas. That a specific form of capital and a base of knowledge are being mobilised in order to explicitly assume a central field position points to how
risk should also be seen as a category of practice that allows its performers to be understood as authoritative.\footnote{Chapters three, four, and five, respectively, take up these three threads.}

**Risk as Capital: Institutionalising Risk through Monitoring**

The struggle amongst actors in fields is the result of institutional bodies trying to work to further their own mandates, ensure their own budgets, maintain their own existence, and to do what they think is best – meaning that these tensions do not necessarily mean that overt relations between or within institutions are ‘conflictual’ or that they consciously try to undermine each other. In this struggle over resources or capital, the primary resources of a field can be categorised as material or physical capital (what you own or use), economic capital (money), social capital (networks), and cultural capital (access to information, expertise, or data) (Bourdieu 1986, 47)\footnote{For an elaboration on Bourdieu’s definitions, see also Thompson 1991, 14, Guillory 2000, 29, Abrahamsen and Williams 2011a, 102, Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 312, 328.}.

Managing risks, especially in disaster governance, is about using available capital resources to mitigate effects of unknown future scenarios. It involves spending and investing in present technologies or abilities to combat future problems and minimising future costs. Managing risks is about using networks of expertise to amass as much expertise and material resources as possible to be ready to respond to any type of future scenario. Those actors who best use these resources to combat risks when they materialise into actual events become recognised as authoritative – as possessing the symbolic capital of being the ‘go-to’ experts on risk management, by virtue of their ability to centralise and monitor all of the risk mitigation data amassed through these other resources.
The subsequent chapters will explore how actors from DG ECHO successfully mobilised these resources to assume and maintain its pre- eminent position in the field of disaster governance by using its disaster monitoring centre, now called the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), to monitor and manage the effects of disaster risks. The resources of this monitoring centre include, for example, having access to sophisticated instruments and equipment that monitors for disaster scenarios (material capital), the ability to reduce the collective costs of disaster response by coordinating burden-sharing training and deployment between contributing states, as well as working with insurance and private actors to create a European catastrophe insurance market, all based on the information found in this monitoring centre (economic capital). ECHO actors also are active in networks of disaster responders on site in disaster situations (social capital). This is in addition to maintaining a presence in networks of aid personnel for situations needing longer-term interventions and scientific experts that ECHO actors rely on to create their in-house monitoring systems (social capital). Through all of this, ECHO actors use the information generated in their monitoring centre to play active roles in developing disaster response training modules and coordinating bottom-up standard-setting, as well as choosing and maintaining a list of deployment-ready civil protection experts from around Europe (cultural capital).

More than simply having access to resources, the concentration and use of different forms of capital resources of risk mitigation produce symbolic capital or recognition of expertise. ECHO actors have been particularly adept at transforming the use of disaster risk monitoring resources into symbolic capital: third party governments now provide disaster information to ECHO’s monitoring centre willingly because they know ECHO can help in disastrous scenarios, and states
contributing to ECHO’s disaster governance projects continually participate in training, secondment, and in-field exercises.10

This process of granting recognition is crucial because it points explicitly to the generation of authoritative relationships. In disaster governance at least, mitigating the risks of disasters leads to recognition of being an authority and ECHO actors are recognised as authorities, deferred to when a disaster occurs. This authority was generated and maintained by formally institutionalising disaster risk monitoring into the workings of the disaster governance field in Europe. While formal institutionalisation is not necessary to entrench an authority relationship or a recognition of capital as symbolic, it is significant because as, Bourdieu also stressed, ‘there is a shift from a diffuse symbolic capital, resting solely on recognition, to an objectified symbolic capital, codified, delegated and guaranteed by the state, in a word bureaucratized’ (Bourdieu 1998, 51; emphasis in original). In the specific case of disaster governance in Europe, formally institutionalising monitoring was a way for DG ECHO personnel to explicitly entrench a particular authority relationship within the European system and provide those authority relationships with formal legitimacy precisely because the EU system relies on and privileges clearly-delineated institutional hierarchies.

The crucial element in generating authority in disaster response in Europe was the explicit bureaucratisation – the formal codifying – of a particular approach to governing disasters through monitoring disaster risks. This formal bureaucratisation meant that the symbolic capital associated with risk monitoring became accepted as given or as the best way to mitigate disasters – again, because modern European political systems particularly favours clear institutional structured hierarchies. Recognition in at least one EU policymaking field is expressed by entrenching a

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10 Subsequent chapters will explore these resources and their use in more detail, as well as how similar practices have migrated to other EU-level institutions and to what ends.
particular approach into a DG hierarchy – and in the case of disaster governance, this includes bureaucratising and formalising risk monitoring into the daily running of DG ECHO. That this process is happening in one field (disaster governance) simply points to the functioning of that particular field. But that is not all that is happening. Exactly the same resources have been mobilised into practices in the field of EU internal security as well, and as a result, actors performing nearly identical processes of risk-led monitoring and response capabilities have become the de facto authorities in that field, too.

The fact that this particular approach to EU-level governance of a policy issue circulated to other policy fields in the European governance system indicates that this favouring of risk monitoring practices came to be recognised as legitimate in larger EU policymaking fields. Practices of risk management are not only catalysts for how things should be done in a specific policy area, but they are reforming the very way in which policymaking is deemed legitimate. The circulation of risk practices to other fields indicates that these practices are becoming a way of thinking and understanding what good EU-level policymaking is fundamentally about; in short, they are changing the very base of knowledge of what counts as good policymaking in fields of EU governance.

**Risk as Base of Knowledge: The Circulation of Data-Driven Governance**

In the competitions for resources that make up a social field, in the jostling back and forth over how best to do something and thus to be seen as authoritative, there is a shared base of knowledge. As actors compete for authority recognition, there is a tacit internalisation of the logics that underpin what types of practices are recognised as authoritative, based on the rules and structures of the field. The ascendancy and institutionalisation of risk management into everyday
practices performed within EU institutions represents this base of knowledge: competing to be recognised as an authority now means competing over who can be seen and recognised as the most competent mitigators of risk in at least the disaster and internal security fields of transnational European governance. Risk has become a primary base of knowledge for how transnational governance actors compete to establish authority in institutional settings.

Building on existing work on ‘security practices’ (Balzacq, et al. 2010), security management can be understood as a series of political processes by which particular definitions of who is a threat, who is wrong or a danger, what behaviours are appropriate, or what needs acting-upon, are all created and reinforced. Scholars applying the concept use those definitions to understand how one social category is empowered over another – usually empowering governance institutions over a population. Extending this definition to include risk allows me to apply this work on security practices to non-fixed, contentious, or unknown points of action.

This bears further unpacking. Security practices are the practices actors perform to best quell security threats – the base of knowledge in the field of security is that threats need to be managed and the field is aligned around how best to do just that, as its object of governance. By shifting the base of knowledge of a field defined by risk, such as disaster governance, the base of knowledge evolves into risk itself. This is because the object of governance – those things the field of disaster governance is trying to mitigate or best manage – is of an unknown source or unknown nature because the time, location, and type of disasters are impossible to predict. The field of disaster governance is made up of actors trying to best mitigate future scenarios that are impossible to anticipate; amidst this uncertainty, actors can only compete to be the best at mitigating possible future disasters, i.e.: risks, so parsing authority in that field is about drawing attention to how and
why specific actors use their resources available in attempts to manage unknown futures and how other actors in that field recognise and interpret those practices.

As the basis of practices in the field of disaster governance, practices of risk management are the increasingly central ways that institutional actors are recognised as having authority: centralised decision-making and communication, diffuse responsibility, favouring technical and statistical expertise, and automated response mechanisms. Practicing risk management thus fundamentally changes how things are understood in that particular field and re-orienting the very basis of the field by inserting risk as a core logic. In Bourdieu’s terms, this involves the re-orienting of a doxa – the underlying rules or laws that govern behaviour in a given social field and define what actions should be deemed ‘practices’. Risk practices are not only influential or have some form of causal ability to enact change: they redefine the basis by which change can be made at all.

Being recognised as having symbolic capital (and thus as authoritative) leads other actors in a field to accept that the logics of your practices are definitive and natural. Pouliot would call this a case of practices being doxic, referring to Bourdieu’s concept of homology: ‘when an agent’s habitus mirrors the configurational hierarchy of which they are part…[its] inclinations become in perfect tune with the structure of positions and the rules of the game’ (Pouliot 2010, 46). When something becomes considered normal or taken for granted, it is ‘doxic’ – part of the doxa – and with that, risk becomes the knowledge and the underlying doxic structure through which other practice is understood – all practices in a field come to be understood in relation to risk management.

Risk acts a base of knowledge in the sense that all other understandings in the field are framed through it. Understood as ‘objectivist knowledge’, in Bourdieu’s sense, ‘[it] constructs the objective relations (e.g. economic or linguistic) which structure practice and representations of
practice, i.e., in particular, primary knowledge, practical and tacit, of the familiar world’ (Bourdieu 2011 [1977], 3). Objectivist knowledge is that knowledge about how to do something in a field which is taken as given and for granted, as natural: ‘objectivist knowledge can establish both the structure of the social world and the objective truth of primary experience as experience denied explicit knowledge of those structures’ (Bourdieu 2011 [1977], 3; emphasis in original). Similarly, Bourdieu argues that ‘By realizing itself in social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the instituted institution makes us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts of institution (in the active sense) and hence has all the appearances of the natural’ (Bourdieu 1998, 40; emphasis in original). Put another way, risk has become institutionalised both formally in the EU bureaucratisation sense and informally in that it is treated as an objective structure or natural part of the field of disaster response and, subsequently, the field of EU internal security. Moreover, it structures how actors understand these fields in such a way that trying to govern disasters or internal security separate from the logics of risk are no longer viable possible options for field actors.\footnote{Bourdieu outlines that recognition ‘distinguishes [objectivist knowledge] from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs’ (Bourdieu 2011 [1977], 164); recognition eliminates the possibility for other possible options.}

Practices in risk-oriented fields, then, refer to the daily processes of governance that rely on the same logics of data management, pre-emption, calculation, and probabilities-management as formal risk management assessments, but apply them to other regular aspects of governance, to the regular function of how a field works. Aspects common to formal risk management, like risk matrixes, centralised monitoring, decision-by-statistical-basis, and impact assessments are being used by an increasing set of governance actors in the fields of disaster response and internal security provision. Decision matrixes and impact assessments are now common features of the
behaviour of actors who otherwise would never consider themselves to be ‘managing risks’. For example, DG ECHO actors eschew labelling unknown future possible disasters as ‘risks’ because ‘risk’ has political linkages in Europe to police and counter-terror intelligence work. Despite the rhetoric – which will be explored in subsequent chapters – risk management techniques have now become internalised and institutionalised in settings that do not even acknowledge the risk-driven logics behind them. The argument here, then, is that forms of statistically- or data-driven practices of governance have coalesced into a specific set of practices, allowing actors best able to produce and use advanced data and statistics in order to be seen as mitigating the effects of risks to gain the most prominent central positions in their respective fields precisely because those fields are structured formally and informally in such a way as to promote these processes.

**Risk as Practice: Bureaucratic Centralisation**

EU disaster governance and internal security actors leverage practices strategically to position themselves in the middle or as the central nodes in the daily functioning of their respective policy fields. Their ability to assume central positions stems from their ability to use their risk- and data-oriented base of knowledge or their internalised understandings of field dynamics strategically. Actors using practices strategically to improve their relative positions in their respective fields indicates the need to explore the relationship between the internalisation of knowledge (habitus), doxa, and the nature of strategy itself (Mérand and Forget 2012).

Strategy, in this sense, specifically reflects the habitus and the forms of capital that operate in a given field. Action in the fields of disaster and internal security governance is increasingly being considered through the lens of risk strictly because those in positions of authority have reoriented the field in such a way that using risk comes to be seen as the rational or natural choice
one needs to make to improve their lot. Studies emphasising the role of strategy have traced the ways the career paths of individuals who move through those fields have the ability to change institutional practices (Bigo, Bonditti, et al. 2007). These evolutions of practice are understood to be more than mere changes in institutional norms or material capabilities though. They represent something much more profound and important: changing understandings and forms of power, which allow actors to perform new roles and change the way political relations like authority relationships get formed (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 311).

Actors perform these practices to gain new forms and amounts of capital and thus improve their relative position in that field; they are strategic: ‘[t]his involves…looking at strategy…as a category of analysis…a practice and also as the result of social practices.’ (Mérand and Forget 2012, 94) This does not mean that actors consciously use risk practices to strategically assume positions of authority though. In Bourdieu’s formulation, the language of ‘strategy’ clearly skirts rationalist tendencies, but does not slip into rational instrumentalism. Bourdieu was very clear that actors perform those practices that will best help them to assume positions of authority in their fields – but he stressed that they were not making a wholly conscious decision to perform certain practice over others. Rather, actors internalise the base of knowledge of a field as part of their habitus. They then act to best mobilise this knowledge towards achieving their objectives within a field. Bourdieu outlines this as strategic action without a conscious strategy: even the most ritualised of action has an element of strategy, but this strategy is as unconscious as it is conscious (Bourdieu 2011 [1977], 7; 1998, 131).

Important insights into these issues can be gained by looking at recent research in global climate change governance that similarly understands risk as ‘a political technology to govern the future that is embedded within broader political rationalities’ (Rothe 2011, 331). In these analyses,
risk is understood as the political and social mobilisation of a way of thinking of and managing an uncertain future. Risk is a packaged set of different social practices that mitigate and manage uncertainties. Practicing risk management thus entails mobilising a set of political rationalities enacted to have effects in a specific social setting – in Bourdieuian language, this would be improving one’s relative position in a field by strategically leveraging one’s knowledge of how the field works. As a set of practices, because risk fundamentally alters the relations of a social field, new understandings of how that field operates can are formed, are internalised, and are key in framing how actors alter how they navigate said field.

This is why institutions set up for one function, with time, will shift and change to be focused on something else: the conditions that ensure their survival change and actors within them begin to develop other understandings of what will help them assume positions of relative authority. NATO’s post-Cold War shift towards post-conflict peacekeeping operations in the 1990s is a commonly-cited example of this (Williams 2007, Gheciu 2008). The shift notably ran counter to the EU’s then-growing humanitarian intervention framework – de facto meaning many European states had to choose which security institution to support with military involvement, with most choosing the older and more entrenched NATO framework.

It is through this institutional competition that certain ‘practices of community’ form, where at given times, certain ‘types’ of practices are seen to be more useful or dominant in a given field than others and particular ways of doing things are entrenched and taken as given (Pouliot 2010, 79-81). Actors use their internalised knowledge of the field and its evolving dynamics – their habitus – to know what types of practices are appropriate or useful at a given time – not as a rationalist cost-benefit calculation but as an internalised understanding of what it means to navigate a field at all. Treating it as a category of practice, risk should be studied in terms of how
institutional actors use it ‘to reinvent themselves and establish their relevance’ (Williams 2007, 5) in situations where their own modus operandi have changed, usually because of external circumstances; this perhaps may explain why practices of risk management are becoming so prevalent in fields outside of disaster governance.

Instead of merely stumbling forward towards bureaucratic reproduction though, this process is not linear but dynamic, changing course as the consensus understandings of the field change and evolve over time. Returning to the fact that in the transnational context of modern European politics, being recognised as an authority means being institutionalised formally into the DG bureaucratic system, this poses an interesting analytic dimension. In both DG ECHO and DG HOME, their abilities to anticipate and manage risks have not only been institutionalised into their respective monitoring centres – the ERCC for ECHO and the Strategic Analysis and Response (STAR) centre for HOME. These centres have also institutionalised themselves as central features in how their respective fields operate on a daily basis – receiving information updates and disseminating monitoring reports among the other members of their fields. By *de facto* centralising their risk mitigators in the everyday operations of their respective fields while being formally bureaucratised in sub-units of their DGs, actors at DGs ECHO and HOME have ensured that even if the formal framework or mandates for their operations change they have oriented the rest of their fields in such a way that they will remain central features as long as risk management practices are recognised as authoritative.
CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined an approach to transnational politics in Europe focused on fields of practices where different types and collections of actors debate how to best do something or best govern a given policy area. In EU policy-making, for instance, these include bureaucratic, diplomatic, civil society, or corporate actors who are nominally operating on behalf of local, national, or transnational entities. Seeing European transnational politics as being driven by field logics, the chapter pointed to how resources used to manage the risks posed by disastrous scenarios in one field have become central features in how collections of actors compete in policy fields more generally. While the specifics of how this happened will be discussed in subsequent chapters, it was largely thanks to risk management being understood as a type of capital, a base of knowledge, and a category of practice itself.

Fields are continuously contested, meaning that every actor in that field, that social sphere, is attempting to realign that field in a way that improves their own relative power or importance in that field. Actors seek to restructure their social fields by performing practices – types of behaviours, or ‘ways of doing’ things – that reflect the structure and valuations of the field. This means interacting with the complex sets of other actors that make up their fields, which often include different types of actors. Thinking of risk management and its presences as practices provides a way to account for how institutional actors use the desire to mitigate uncertainty as a way for particular practices to be taken with more weight and thus help to reinforce that institutions’ position in relation to others performing similar roles. Risk practices are the not-always-conscious effort to institutionally gain position or authority in a given social field by selectively choosing what types of future events must be mitigated and defining how that will happen. They are a powerful tool for getting things done. In their ability to enable things to happen,
risk practices change and define how future decisions within fields are made. Risk entails more than just having a kind of capital that influences institutional decision-making. Being able to manage disasters (i.e.: manage risks) is a trait that allows specific types of governance actors to be seen as legitimate and authoritative.

As an analytic tool, looking at risk management practices combines an examination of the specific configurations of actors that coalesce in social fields to govern and create policy dominated by the ‘risk’ base of knowledge. By moving the risk category of practice outside of one specific field (such as disaster management) and tracing its presence in other fields, we can understand how competitions for authority in fields of transnational governance are impacted by the symbolic capital of risk, as actors compete to be recognised as the most proficient at using risk management techniques. The following chapters take up the implications of this process by respectively outlining each of the three roles that risk plays: forms of capital, a base of knowledge, and a category of practice. Chapter three looks at the way various forms of capital coalesce to manage the risks posed by disasters, and how actors best able to do so generate authority, before outlining how that authority relationship is formally institutionalised into the transnational European political system. Chapter four looks at the logics of disaster risk management and how they have circulated to the field of internal security, exploring the way decisions about risk and disaster are made based on the creation and use of data. Chapter five talks about how the actors producing and using data are using risk mitigation practices strategically assume central roles or positions in their respective fields.
CHAPTER THREE:

DG ECHO ACTORS AS DISASTER GOVERNANCE AUTHORITIES:
TURNING RESOURCES INTO RECOGNITION

The previous chapter argued that seeing transnational European and European Union (EU) politics as made up of fields of practices draws attention to how specific policymaking processes happen and how authority is generated as part of these practices. It outlined that risk allows actors to perform three types of social functions: risk should be seen as a form of capital that bestows, and is recognised as having, authority; risk management techniques should be seen as a basis of knowledge for framing and understanding how things are done in a given social setting or field; and risk management processes are a category of practice that work to structure and frame how actors position themselves strategically in social fields.

The present chapter builds on the first of these points. Looking at the case of how actors from the Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) became authorities in the field of disaster governance, it highlights the way that risk is seen by that field as a resource or form of capital – one that ECHO actors were able to transform into symbolic capital and recognition of authority by formally institutionalising disaster risk management into the governance of disasters. The chapter looks at what shapes the object of governance in the field of disaster response, including what things actors in that field struggle or compete over, how things are done, and what resources are used in practices of mitigating disaster-based risks. In doing so, the chapter argues that ECHO actors have become authorities in the field of disaster governance because they are recognised as being the best mitigators of risk in that field – they demonstrate
that they are the best at mobilising the resources available to them to manage disaster-based risks by institutionalising their ability and authority into a monitoring centre housed at DG ECHO. While these resources individually may not be seen as ‘risk management techniques’ in a formal sense, they are combined in their social settings to have the effects of mitigating risks.

This chapter thus outlines the development and institutionalisation of a particular policy process in DG ECHO: the use of a monitoring and communication centre. The aim is to demonstrate how the EU’s disaster management capabilities, largely concentrated around DG ECHO actors’ use of monitoring capabilities to manage the risks posed by disaster scenarios, have asserted the DG’s position as central in European and international disaster management – a field crowded by national agencies, international organisations, and ad hoc cooperation operations. This is because the monitoring centre has allowed ECHO actors to perform specific practices that allow ECHO to offer capabilities that no single disaster manager or participating state can provide on their own.

Performing these practices and being recognised as an authoritative actor in a policy field means bringing together different types of actors – which causes conflict or struggles and produces tensions both internally and externally. Tensions and conflicts between the various actors in a given field over how best to do something are indicative of the regular functioning of a social field and are found in debates over how to best do something like managing complex international disasters. These struggles breed specific types of practices or ways of doing things which mobilise resources – or capital – of which different combinations and concentrations can be used to influence or impact the way others in that field interact. Capital, and specifically the capital involved in institutionalising the managing of risks posed by disasters, is the explicit focus of this chapter.
The chapter proceeds in three steps, first looking at two sources of competition that frame the field of disaster governance: an internal struggle at ECHO over whether or not resilience or disaster monitoring and response are the best ways to manage disaster risks and a struggle between ECHO and Member State actors over the processes of standardisation in disaster response capabilities. The chapter then outlines the practices ECHO actors performed in becoming central figures in the field of disaster governance, paying particular attention to the resources or capital on which they relied. Finally, the third section highlights the way they were able to turn their existing resources and forms of capital into symbolic capital and thus be recognised by other actors in their field as authorities in disaster governance.

THE FIELD OF DISASTER GOVERNANCE

A social field is never value-free; it is always being contested, redefined, and realigned. For Bourdieu, actors engage constantly in struggles in their fields. In these struggles, they mobilise material, economic, social, and cultural capital to perform practices, aiming to gain a position of dominance in a given social field (Bourdieu 1998, 2005, 2011 [1977], Sending 2015). To paraphrase the previous argument, actors are always looking for techniques that will allow them to position themselves favourably vis-à-vis others in their social fields, usually by providing, or being understood as providing, valuable (and valued) services that no other institution can offer. Importantly for the purposes here, institutional actors are also always trying to further their own specific mandates, doing so to ensure stable funding for example.

ECHO is no different. ECHO acts as a unitary body in the field of disaster response, as a collection of interrelated actors in negotiations with other EU bodies and its participating states,
and yet also internally houses a number of different departments and offices with competing interests. Analysing ECHO in light of the theory of practices in fields brings daily institutionalised behaviours to the foreground and unpacks the key points of conflict, struggle, or disagreement within a particular context in which routine processes and actions take place. In ECHO’s case, two levels of struggles structure its action in its field of disaster responders.

First, there is a struggle inside ECHO over its mandate of minimising the effects of unknown future disasters. The growing importance placed on disaster monitoring and response in an effort to minimise disaster-based risks has meant that ECHO’s other mandate, humanitarian aid, has lagged somewhat. Combined with the seeming rise in resilience-oriented aid policies, the development of ECHO’s in-house monitoring centre has had serious implications for how ECHO actors approach disaster mitigation and the role humanitarian aid plays inside of ECHO’s hierarchies. Second, there is a struggle whereby ECHO’s internal coordinators need to ensure that its participating states and other EU partners all agree on developing capabilities that will mitigate the risks posed by disasters by emphasising rapid response, while not seeming to overstep its mandate of coordinating disaster response. The establishment of a monitoring centre, and specifically the training practices that it allows ECHO to perform in establishing response teams, has raised very vocal concerns about the limits to role that the DG can play in establishing those regimes and in particular its ability to set formal training and equipment standards for responders. These two sets of struggles structure the conditions in which ECHO and other disaster response actors govern disasters.
The Struggle over How Best to Mitigate the Effects of Future Disasters

One struggle that defines the field of disaster governance is between civil protection approaches to mitigating the effects of as-yet-unrealised disasters and attempts to mitigate the effects of disasters through humanitarian aid, development funding, and infrastructure building partnerships, most recently gaining popularity as either ‘resilience’ or ‘disaster risk reduction’ (DRR) projects. While ECHO may have begun as an office producing development policies, its institutional transformations since at least 2007 clearly demonstrate an internal shift towards disaster mitigation through civil protection, including monitoring, anticipating, and responding to disasters.

ECHO was designed at its outset to be the developer of EU humanitarian assistance policy. Its role within the EU is to ‘save and preserve life, to reduce or prevent suffering and to safeguard the integrity and dignity of people affected by humanitarian crises by providing relief and protection’ (European Commission 2012a, 2) – this is the umbrella within which its mandate of mitigating the effects of disasters falls. In doing so, however, it historically left the DG for External Relations (RELEX) to oversee the implementation of humanitarian assistance projects. With time, ECHO came to play a growing role in civil protection – responding to the effects of disasters as they are occurring. By 2007, ECHO was given the twin tasks of monitoring and coordinating both civil protection and humanitarian assistance. As the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), ECHO’s original disaster monitoring facility, became more formalised and the European Civil Protection (ECP) teams were transferred into ECHO’s hierarchy from their original home as part of DG ENVIRO, the need to explicitly monitor and coordinate humanitarian assistance programs declined as the MIC’s monitoring systems incorporated this information in the more general surveillance of possible future disaster situations.
Looking at the institutional organisation of ECHO reveals how central the monitoring systems have become. The organisational hierarchy of ECHO is split into directorates and then into units. While the units are specialised into particular policy areas, the directorates are more broad-level groupings. As of winter 2014, there were three ECHO directorates: one devoted entirely to logistics; a second concerned with policy implementation, of which three of five units are geared towards the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM); and a third, ‘Humanitarian and Civil Protection Operations’, with one unit devoted to emergency response, and four devoted to personnel for region-specific policy. This third directorate and its emergency response unit play the most important role in ECHO’s daily activities because it houses the ERCC – the centre of ECHO’s monitoring practices. In addition to being the primary function of ECHO, the organisational location of the ERCC is interesting because although technically run from the emergency response unit, it also draws its training from units from the policy implementation directorate and its communication technology services from the logistics directorate. Coupled with the expansive communications technology it houses and manages, the ERCC’s running de facto spans in some form throughout most ECHO units – nine of fourteen total units having at least some personnel devoted to running the ERCC.

With the rising role of monitoring and civil protection at ECHO, the focus on developing humanitarian aid policy has diminished. The coordination of humanitarian assistance teams was shifted as a sub-set of the operations run through the EuropeAid agency at the DG for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) in 2011. This is not a wholesale change, as ECHO still engages in a wide number of food aid programs and ECHO’s Commissioner – the public, political face of the DG – is extremely active in a number of international humanitarian conferences and programs. Regardless, ECHO personnel interviewed agreed – often grudgingly – that the daily running of the
DG has become oriented more around civil protection, and with it, the monitoring of disasters and the management of their responses (Interview 1, 3, 4, 5). Interestingly, though, while the DG services were very excited to discuss ECHO’s activities, the Commissioner’s executive team made it clear that they were not going to discuss any policymaking procedures that happen at the DG, and that they would not be willing to discuss the discrepancies between the Commissioner’s apparent focus on humanitarian aid and the DG’s emphasis on civil protection.

In the context of this apparent divide between managing the effects of disaster through humanitarian aid or civil protection policies, there has been a noticeable spike in the use of ‘resilience’ as a guiding principle in bolstering the perceived need to develop humanitarian assistance policy, both by the Commissioner’s office and the remaining humanitarian assistance workers in the DG (European Commission 2012a, 2012b). ECHO remains the official head of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy. In this role, it is at least superficially concerned with resilience-oriented humanitarian projects, most notably as they have been rolled out in two of its policy packages: the ‘Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience’ (SHARE) project and the ‘Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience’ (AGIR) partnership in the Sahel region.

In setting up these policies, ECHO defines resilience as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as drought, violence, conflict or natural disaster’ (European Commission 2012b, 5). Its actors define resilience in two ways: the strength of a body’s ability to resist the stress and its ability to bounce back from that stress (European Commission 2012b, 5). Enacting these SHARE and AGIR resilience policies meant using the language of local capacity-building to gain more support for projects, usually because resilience projects are seen or understood to be

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1 Itself easily explained by a desire to let the policymakers discuss the making of policy.
less costly and to not require as much time from donors. ECHO’s resilience policy documents outline some key areas for resilience policy implementation, focusing on different ways of allowing local populations to bounce back on their own from disasters. These policies generally aim to build different types of infrastructure, whether it is entrenched watering-provision to remote areas to avoid droughts, or natural and man-made flood barriers. They include improved roads to combat mudslides and road closures and are designed to establish local, national resilience policies, thus training more local-level primary responders – all of which being aimed at professionalising local experts.

Resilience-oriented policies currently include some economic, social, and cultural capital that come with increased investments, a growing network of mostly Western development managers touting its merits, and a nascent group of, again, Western resilience policy self-styled experts. This capital is due in part to resilience’s recent popularity in academic and international development circles (Chandler 2013, 2014, Howell 2015). Despite these forms of capital and its popularity, resilience policy has not yet been recognised as an authoritative approach to implementing development policy, nor is it a primary logic of ECHO development projects (as of Spring 2015). The economic, social, and some elements of cultural capital associated with resilience has not become recognised as symbolic by the EU in-situ development actors, in part because a large portion of the necessary expertise or cultural capital in actually defining what a resilience policy could be has not materialised.

As a result, resilience policymaking seems to have stayed at the level of policy discourse in DG ECHO: it continues to carry economic capital because it can generate increased funding from international partnerships, but this capital, nor its other forms, rarely becomes accepted or embedded as a fundamentally different way of doing things in ECHO-involved on-the-ground
projects. Despite the deluge of resilience discourse from ECHO, these approaches find only limited translation into action on the ground in their respective regions. In the Horn of Africa, the projects are often too narrowly-defined to be actionable by the policy implementers – for example, spelling out specific agricultural drainage programs that need to be installed, but listing farm locations that have been turned into sprawling villages. These types of oversights tend to not reflect enough knowledge about local situations – the cultural capital associated with expertise in region-specific language, ethnic tensions, religious traditions, etc.

The failure to implement AGIR projects is even more striking. The AGIR policy is largely a reaction to the 2012 food shortage and famine the Sahel, a situation which was exacerbated by political turmoil in Mali. The response was the delivery of food aid, after a protracted campaign by former ECHO Commissioner Georgieva to draw attention to the issue via social media outlets, press releases, and speeches, i.e.: a response drawing on the ECHO Commission Executive’s social capital. Despite noble intentions and a surge of popularity, humanitarian assistance approaches to mitigating the effects of disasters by using policies aimed at building local-level resilience capacities have fallen flat. The economic capital gained by the influx of international development funding for resilience has been offset by the relative lack of cultural capital to actually turn resilience policies into actionable implementation projects.

Civil protection policymakers at ECHO actually argue that most countries, even in the Global South, are actually less resilient now than ever before, in particular because the promise of international economic and cultural capital influxes to mitigate the effects of disaster scenarios led to local defunding and abandoning of existing mitigation efforts (Interview 1, 3). The situation is exacerbated by upgrades to make critical infrastructure so interwoven internationally that all states are more susceptible to the effects of catastrophic destabilisations. This only begins to scratch the
surface, as well, of the economic impact of disasters now being much larger than ever before, also as a result of increasing levels of interconnectedness (Interview 1, 8).

In a total of over twenty hours of interviews held at the ECHO offices in Brussels, the word ‘resilience’ was never mentioned as a core concern of ECHO operations. In follow-up interviews, it was clarified that resilience is used in a very specific way within the DG. It is accepted as a buzzword that helps get wary or hesitant participant parties on board for policies they are not eager to adopt (Interview 1, 3, 5, 8, 9) – again a nod to the forms of capital that resilience does carry. One bureaucrat even explicitly said that the latest ECHO resilience policies in the Horn of Africa and the AGIR projects were actually simply a re-selling of programs already in place in the region, in order to bring the language of ECHO’s policies in line with others in the field of humanitarian aid provision (Interview 8).

This conflict in approaches to mitigating the effects of future disasters – the existing risk monitoring system versus the growth of resilience-oriented projects – persists in part because of the way that ECHO is organised internally. The Directors regularly meet the Commission Executive team, the political face of the DG and its representatives in the EU Commission. The Director-General is part of those coordination meetings as well. It is there that the overall mandate for the DG gets decided, but how it gets implemented falls to the Heads of Units. The Heads of Units are also the recipients of the minutes of the endless stream of coordination, cooperation, working group, and plenary meetings, using them as the basis for running their particular units. In this sense, the Heads of Units are the actors that form the closest relationships with both the DG’s executive and its personnel, acting as liaisons between the different levels. The different Heads of Units are transferred within the DG for different experience every few years (ranging from two to five, according to those interviewed).
Heads of Units are usually promoted from within a DG as well, rising to the Deputy Head of Unit wherever they were originally hired and then after some management training, moved around the DG for wider experience. The heads of units tend to bring a few personnel with them from previous appointments, or as part of their home countries’ delegations, meaning support staff tended to be the same nationality as the policy officers they reported to, but for the most part there was wide variation. They can be transferred in through a procedure called ‘In the Interest of the Service’ – where normal hiring procedures are put aside to select specific individuals for specific positions. All of this is to say that the fact that the Heads of Unit, the key personnel in the implementation of policy, that were interviewed for this project all universally shunned the presence of ‘resilience’ approaches is indicative of ECHO’s leanings.

The language of resilience and disaster risk reduction then does not pervade ECHO, because the policy officers or their direct managers simply do not see them as useful concepts to work with or use to gain support from participating actors. Resilience’s capital in the field of international development does not carry over into the civil protection field pervading ECHO offices and as such it is not recognised as a useful policy option. Rather, the outward-facing political executive of the DG seems intent on maintaining the aura that ECHO is engaged meaningfully in these types of activities. It seems that this is a tactic by which to continue receiving support from international bodies and the media for disaster mitigation projects, despite there being no real effort to actually implement these approaches internally. While this of course poses interesting questions, interrogating the reasons for this divide is outside the scope of the current project.

The struggle between how best to mitigate the effects of future disasters is, in a sense, about long term versus ad hoc disaster response, with a similar logic pervading both approaches: risk mitigation. Indeed, the source of tension here, really, is over how to mitigate the risks posed by
disasters. The resilience and disaster risk reduction approach emphasises developing local infrastructure and capacity building to allow communities to be able to withstand disasters and minimise the effects disasters have. While these approaches do little to mitigate the effects these disasters have as they are occurring, they are not counter to the growing reliance on civil protection capabilities. Indeed, ECHO actors’ ability to effectively monitor, prepare for, and respond to a disastrous situation specifically relies on working with different types of local settings and with some reliable knowledge of in-situ infrastructural capacities.

ECHO has ventured further towards a civil protection focus, with an explicit recognition that the risks posed by disasters are best mitigated when they can be anticipated, prepared for, and responded to immediately. The divisions this shift have caused inside of ECHO have dictated how ECHO actors frame building civil protection monitoring and response as technical questions, instead of political ones – a tension that continues to constrict how ECHO actors have worked to assume authoritative positions in the field of disaster governance. Civil protection capabilities have pushed humanitarian aid ones out of ECHO’s daily running, leading to at least one source of tension between the Commissioner’s office and the DG, another between the majority and minority of the DG itself, and a third between ECHO actors seeking monitoring and response capacities that could be seen as political versus ones seen as technical.

The Struggle over How to Standardise Training and Equipment

Another tension or source of struggle exists between ECHO’s actors and their liaison partners and counterparts in the various states participating in ECHO programs – called ‘participating states’ – when developing training and equipment standards. ECHO, like all EU Commission services, operates through an endless stream of meetings. Of the meetings attended
for this research, the attendees present were varied in both occupation and institutional role. On the ECHO side, there were institutional cooperation personnel – whose sole occupation is to meet with members of other EU bodies – and experts working with or for the Commission in varying capacities: engineers, lawyers, pilots, firefighters, etc. They were largely meeting with members of other EU bodies, notably the EEAS, DEVCO, and ENVIRO, but representatives from UN agencies, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination group (UNDAC) were present at times, as well as professional association representatives and other researchers.

The largest contingent at these meetings was participating state representatives. These meetings bring together national civil protection agencies, members of the ministries of interior and defence, as well as representatives from national development and aid agencies. Also, most other DGs would have a number of lobbyists present at these meetings as well, in varying degrees of official capacity. The only strictly-private sector or corporate representatives who are sometimes present at ECHO-hosted meetings are representatives from the private transportation brokerage with whom ECHO has a standing framework agreement. Similarly, when an extended disaster response mission is planned, personnel from the insurance companies covering the mission may be present.

The task of the ECHO actors, then, is to get all these different types of actors with different agendas, mandates, and responsibilities to agree to any given aspect of developing an ECHO-based disaster monitoring and response capacity. More importantly, ECHO actors need to do so without being seen as setting formal standards that participating states would have to adhere to. This is because ECHO is similar to many EU institutions in that it originally lacked a formal legal mandate to impose standards on its participating partners. Despite this status coming into flux over time
because of certain emergency capacities being transferred to the European Cross-Border Crisis Management Directive in 2012, there still exists at the state level a deep suspicion of EU-imposed standards. Often, EU institutions will actually refuse to impose standards even in areas where their jurisdiction may allow it simply because it may hinder future cooperation efforts in areas where standards or participation are not mandated.

ECHO actors have taken an approach of not imposing, but rather jointly creating, standards for its participating states. ECHO officials were very clear about the fact that when establishing training regimes for the ECP disaster responders, in particular, the DG does not in any way set standards for training programs. This was emphasised often without prompting, and upon follow-up it became clear that when the ERCC was being established a recurring fear on behalf of the participating states was that ECHO would begin to mandate training standards and impose training programs unilaterally (Interview 5). Despite now having the mandate – in select instances – to dictate standards, ECHO personnel are still reluctant to do so for fear of that possibly tarnishing their relationships with Member State representatives long-term.

ECHO has assumed such an authoritative role in the field of disaster governance that there is a genuine fear by participating state actors that its representatives might break with the formal decision-making process – through constant consultation meetings with participating states – and begin making decisions on its own, especially given that it was awarded the legal basis to do so in the above-mentioned 2012 European Cross-Border Crisis Management Directive.² This also appears to be the reason behind another change. Upon its unveiling in May 2013, ECHO’s in-house monitoring centre, the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) was simply called

² Admittedly, the Directive is more of a product of the European sovereign debt and banking crises of 2007-2009, but it specifically was framed to be able to create different types of cross-border crises responses – financial, disaster, or security being the most prominent.
the European Response Centre. The website and domain name were developed as ‘ERC’ and during the first spring and summer of monitoring operations, it was consistently referred to as the ERC. As part of a debate that started in late 2012, however, participating states pushed back and petitioned ECHO’s Commission Executive offices to refer to the centre as the European Response Coordination Centre and, indeed, communiqués and press releases starting simply calling the centre the ERCC, not even spelling out the entire name. By October 2013, visitors to the ECHO website could access the ERCC Portal and webpage, but on the ERC domain name – the name of the domain and the individual sites did not even match, because the name was such in flux. By December 2013 though, all documentation and websites universally used the ERCC moniker.

Though relatively innocuous cases, both the fear of establishing standards and this in-flux naming of the ERCC clearly underscore the fact that ECHO was seen to have assumed an informal managerial role in a formally-level and equal field of actors – it was beginning to bend the field of disaster governance to better fit its policy aspirations. ECHO actors’ effective implementation of standards by subverting the standardisation process and relinquishing the name of their new centre ceded essentially a non-issue in terms of operational capacity (naming the ERCC) for the larger benefit of having this new centre established formally into the DG ECHO organisational hierarchy.

The way these linked struggles or sources of tension were navigated is nominally interesting for understanding the Member State-EU relationship, but is secondary to what this tension points out: any decision that ECHO actors make, again regardless of whether or not they have the legal or political mandate to make that decision, needs to take into account the Member State representatives that are formative parts of ECHO’s response capability. More importantly, this relationship and the struggles in entails structures the way that ECHO actors – as well as all of the other actors in the field of disaster governance – understand their abilities and roles, as well as
structuring how policy gets formed in that field. While the field of disaster governance may share an object of governance (minimising the effects of disasters), actors in that field use the resources available to them precisely to compete over being recognised as the authorities in how best to govern that object.

**MOBILISING RESOURCES FOR DISASTER RESPONSE**

In light of the struggles defining the way actors in the field of disaster governance compete to determine how best to manage disasters, ECHO actors draw on the material, economic, social, and cultural resources (or capitals) available to them in order to try and become recognised as the best managers of the risks posed by disasters. These forms of capital are, respectively: their access to sophisticated instruments and equipment to monitor disaster-based risks; their ability to minimise the collective cost of deploying disaster responders; their growing networks of international disaster monitors and responders, as well as their networks of humanitarian aid agencies and personnel; and their ability to both develop specific monitoring instruments and control the flow of information among the rest of the field of disaster governance. In each example, it becomes clear that even if the specific capabilities possessed by ECHO personnel are not types of formal risk management, ECHO actors use these resources to manage the effects of potential future disasters – the resources are used to manage the risks posed by future disasters by categorising and defining the various disaster scenarios that ECHO personnel can also best respond to.
Access to Equipment – Material Capital

The most apparent parts of ECHO’s ability to manage the risks posed by disasters lie in the access its actors have to sophisticated instruments and equipment that monitor for disaster scenarios. The ERCC is a state of the art facility, filled with a wall of high resolution screens, rows and banks of smaller screens and individual computers, and a map wall. It houses a closed network communication system, called the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) and it amalgamates disaster monitoring and response capability data from around the EU, allowing its around-the-clock duty officers to monitor and coordinate the logistics for any disastrous scenarios that may arise.

The ERCC provides ECHO actors with large sets of disaster monitoring data at their disposal – information that is helpful in their ability to quickly and effectively coordinate a response to an ongoing or imminent disaster scenario. Similarly, these systems allow ERCC personnel to safely manage disaster response operations because ERCC systems track in-field deployments in real time. As outlined on the ERCC website, ‘the ERCC also supports a wide range of prevention and preparedness activities, from awareness-raising to field exercises simulating emergency response’ (ERCC Portal 2014). These technologies are a type of material resource or capital that the other actors in the field of disaster governance simply do not have.

The ERCC systems allow ECHO to engage in both pre-emptive risk mitigation and operational risk management: their monitoring and tracking systems allow them to respond to a disaster scenario before it happens or while it is ongoing and their operational tracking systems allow them to manage response teams dynamically. Advanced monitoring and communication technologies like those housed at the ERCC are thus key resources in managing disaster-based
risks. While they may not be recognised as ‘risk-driven’, they certainly have been implemented with two core principles of risk management: an anticipatory logic that drives the need to monitor where and when a potential disaster will occur and a strategic logic that in-situ response is most safely managed through one communication channel.

**Coordinating Deployments – Economic Capital**

The ability to deploy response teams quickly is a crucial element in mitigating the risks posed by disasters, especially those that threaten infrastructure. ECHO’s ECP teams offer a standing body of dedicated experts and personnel, ready to deploy in a disaster situation anywhere in the world – something that other international monitors can only hope to accomplish as they often struggle for personnel to intervene when needed. The coordinating role that the ERCC allows ECHO actors to play is highlighted when it comes to quickly deploying disaster responders – specifically, responder transportation capacities. Senior ECHO operations personnel outlined the process as follows:

[Transporting assistance] is not centralised…they [the states] are sensitive about that.

It is each and every member state that is responsible for the transport of their own assistance, as the basic principle. However, in transporting assistance, there is a lot of scope for sharing and pooling of capacities – and we try to exploit this, and we try to encourage this, as much as possible. So we have a little bit of a coordinating role in the sense that we exchange or share information among all Member States of available transport capacities. So if one member state offers assistance and has additional cargo or additional space on a plane or additional capacity available, they would normally

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3 One Head of Unit was clear that ‘it might be a question of language here, because we do not really do risk here’ (Interview 1).
inform the Commission offices, and we would make sure that all member states are informed of that, so whoever can make use of it, can make use of it. The other situation equally happens: whenever a Member State is in need of transport capacity, they can let us know, and we will find a transport capacity from other Member States, or we will find transport capacity with a private broker. We have a framework contract with a transport broker that can give us a transportation capacity to anywhere in the world at any moment (Interview 3).

While the coordination of disaster response deployment is something that ECHO actors have controlled since before housing the full European Civil Protection team deployment process, this fact does not negate how central the ERCC is in the deployment of these responders, coordinating the access of both European and private transportation capabilities when needed.

The ERCC also signals its economic capital by offering individual states access to a variety of things being monitored: buoys in the Atlantic Ocean for early tsunami detection, soil testing to predict crop yields, or satellite radar to anticipate severe weather storms, for example. Through this, the DG sees itself, and indeed portrays itself to its Member States, as providing an ability that they otherwise would not be able to afford. When pressed on this, three different ECHO officials cited the same example (something perhaps revealing in itself). The Italian coast guard and maritime rescue forces have a large area that they need to monitor for potential disasters at sea, in addition to the coast guard’s other duties around customs and irregular immigration. While they are still the best-suited, in terms of political past and operational capabilities, to respond to situations taking place across the Mediterranean, they simply do not have the capacity to monitor both their own situations and others’ simultaneously. ECHO’s ERCC then offers them the ability
to monitor patterns both internal and external to their own state, without the Italians having to actually monitor the external dimension themselves at all (Interview 1, 4, 5).

Finally, in times of large-scale or persistent emergencies, the ERCC hosts ad hoc consultations with international relief agencies and individual countries in order to put together emergency aid packages. These meetings were at one point hosted by Commissioner Georgieva herself and any ERCC participating states can stay informed of the proceedings, as well as notified by any funding requests, via the CECIS communication system. ECHO chooses which relief agencies are invited to these negotiations, as well as what types of emergencies warrant such a consultation. This means that ECHO actors control both the agenda-setting ability and the ability to decide which relief actors are worthwhile or legitimate in a given situation, by means of whom it invites. These meetings are often held in the DG building, in close physical proximity to the ERCC itself. This offers ECHO yet another means by which it can coordinate the response to given emergency, thanks in large part to the data it collects from the ERCC.

The costs to European states of responding to disaster situations individually are particularly staggering when an event requires capabilities outside the normal purview of a state’s internal response capacities. This was highlighted by both the Izmir earthquake and the south Asian earthquake and tsunami, which were terrible shocks to EU disaster response capabilities – not only because of the loss of life involved, but because of the sheer material cost of the response efforts. Between response spending overages in transportation and duplications of capabilities, responding to these events constituted significant blows to disaster relief budgets. The fact that the costs could be reduced just by coordinating efforts exasperated the relief communities as well. This is one of

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4 It is unclear at the time of writing whether Christos Stylianides, the ECHO Commissioner who took office in November 2014 as part of the Juncker Commission, has been or will be continuing to host these meetings personally.

5 For example, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies alone donated £4.5 million to try and help cover some of the in-field response expenses (Tang 2000).
the reasons that under the Civil Protection Mechanism, ECHO mandate was not only to coordinate responses to a specific disaster or set of disasters, but the coordination instead was ‘about the economies of disasters, the preparedness levels, the major universal or more broad interests and issues related to disasters – and so minimising the effects of disasters’ (Interview 5).

The practice of coordinating transportation information is a crucial part of what ECHO actors do and speaks to the economic resources at its disposal. By being able to share or disperse the costs of transportation, by ensuring information was shared, and by having access to an emergency transportation broker, ECHO actors were able to make sure that transportation would not be an impediment to participating states wanting to contribute responders in a given disaster scenario. This is a clear case of ECHO actors minimising the financial risk of other participants in the field of disaster governance. Investments into disaster preparedness are not designed to receive a direct return in the same way that securities or stock exchange investments do. Instead, civil protection investments allow states to avoid having to spend more in the future, when a disaster eventually does occur – preparedness and response investments operate according to assessments of current expenditures weighed against possible or probable future expenses.

ECHO’s ability to offer coordinated and communal transportation then works in step with the general desire to tighten public spending while not increasing the probability of increased future expenditures. In a trend that pre-dates the late 2000s but has obviously accelerated since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and elsewhere, the participating states are clear that they do not want to spend money on duplicated capacities. Since then, with public budgets under severe stress, the common mantra at ECHO was the need to do more with less money and by sharing the costs of transportation – and with that, the costs of disaster deployment – it maintained
its level of financial commitment from participating states without asking them to assume more possible risk of future spending.

While the ERCC affords ECHO actors a means to formally manage disaster risks through its material resources, the impact of coordinating emergency transportation for disaster scenarios is more subtle yet equally important. Pooling transportation is an economic capital resource for ECHO actors helping manage the financial risks posed by disasters. Coordinating deployments meant that individual states did not have to invest heavily in developing transportation capabilities, allowing ECHO to offer the benefit of deploying personnel and as a result dispersing the risk of having to pay for expensive disaster response deployments from already-stretched national budgets. Transportation coordination thus provided ECHO actors with an added resource of being able to minimise the risks posed to individual state disaster relief budgets if they were to try and respond by themselves.

**Bringing Together Networks – Social Capital**

ECHO actors can only hope to capture some of the activities undertaken by the different groups it coordinates in any one area, as each of these groups arguably has greater access to monitoring for their one specific type of disaster. For example, the Filipino earthquake and tsunami monitoring system has more experience in monitoring the potential effects of earthquakes and tsunamis than ECHO possibly can. So, instead of trying to be more specialised, the ERCC allows ECHO actors to do the opposite, taking steps to bring diverse monitoring bodies together and offering incentives for working together. The situation is somewhat different for appearing valuable to the responders. As mentioned, the reality is that since at least 2008, countries are reluctant to spend additional money on disaster response teams, especially if they are not seen to
be immediately useful in their own home countries. Thus, in order to maintain its status in how disasters are monitored and responded to, ECHO and its ERCC capabilities are seen to provide competencies to the rest of the field, which none would otherwise have.

In terms of the social capital of networks and relationships that ECHO actors control or have access to, the DG has been helping to implement humanitarian aid policy since 1993. ECHO actors have a long history of working with humanitarian aid groups over the last two decades and ERCC workers are able to draw upon these networks of in-situ personnel when planning for the deployment of civil protection responders. The disaster response capabilities the ERCC provides are also enabled through ECHO’s pre-existing network of transportation providers and in-field knowledge of many disaster sites requiring intervention. In this light, ECHO’s ability to cut costs in deployments is only thanks to the social capital that it mobilises in its assistance networks and relationships with IGOs, NGOs, and states. These networks are a key resource in minimising operational risk – the risks posed in specific disaster response scenarios. ECHO actors use these networks to access knowledge of on-the-ground situations but without having to bring these resources into the regular functioning of civil protection capacities. Networks of development experts are also one of the ways in which it is clear that despite the internal divide within ECHO between humanitarian aid and civil protection actions, each rely on the knowledge of the other to effectively minimise the dangers posed in-situ. ECHO actors’ continued use of resilience discourse in developing humanitarian aid policy, explained above, is linked to the popularity of resilience in a number of international development and aid agencies. Maintaining this link with the development and aid field is crucial to how ECHO actors manage disasters.

By maintaining a footing in the international development field, ECHO actors maintain relationships with that community in order to continue drawing on the networks therein when
deploying civil protection capabilities. Bourdieu was referring to precisely this form of network maintenance in his definition of social capital as ‘the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119; emphasis added). Put another way, ECHO personnel in the past used some combination of capital resources to develop a network of development NGOs, IGOs, and government or corporate partners; present ECHO personnel benefit from this as a form of social capital from which they can draw upon to help in their present field of disaster governance.

ECHO has further developed its social capital resources by drawing on another network that other individual disaster responders cannot access: scientific monitoring. ECHO actors have been able to sell monitoring integration specifically because of the access it has to a network of scientific researchers at the Joint Research Centre, as well as other international expert communities. EU-level monitoring capabilities were first developed at ECHO in the early 2000s in areas to which ECHO actors knew would be easiest to persuade the Member States to agree. EU departments in charge of aid missions and civil protection both began relying on monitoring during the early 2000s, as well. The monitoring of aid projects was a losing battle, though, because aid projects need diplomats and considerable long-term investment – and not all states were willing to contribute much of either.

On the other hand, natural disaster monitoring was easier to integrate because of the focus on technical experts and one-time investments to develop the systems – once a system was in place, it needed only to be maintained periodically. For participating states, this represented low cost access to increased anticipatory risk management resources – monitoring resources that would help them better manage the effects of disaster by anticipating their occurrence were suddenly
accessible without having to pay for the systems wholesale. As the monitoring systems expanded to a widening set of disaster scenarios, ECHO actors were able to continuously draw on a type of resource that the others simply did not have or have access to in the form of the technical specifications and expanded scientific research capabilities through the JRC. Indeed, between the networks of development expertise and the scientific research community, ECHO actors access two sources of social capital that no other disaster monitoring or response agency could possibly access alone, further highlighting the singular value-add that ECHO and ERCC personnel contribute to the debates over how to best mitigate the risks posed by disasters.

**Developing Monitoring Analysis Systems – Cultural Capital**

ERCC employees act as intermediaries concerning disaster communications and centralising reports from diverse agencies and, as a result, control what information gets sent out to be acted upon – controlling disaster related communications allows ERCC personnel to decide what disasters require a response by the ECP teams. ECHO actors have developed their own in-house disaster monitoring systems, which are both implemented into the ERCC and shared with other monitors to use independently. According to high-ranking ECHO officials, the DG contacts the Joint Research Centre and illustrates a specific need – for example, a need to assess tsunami early-warning capabilities. The JRC then acts as a liaison with the scientific community most involved in developing these systems (e.g.: seismologists, and/or oceanographers, in the case of tsunami monitoring), develop a model, and pass it on to the requesting DG.

Again, the JRC is the research arm of the Commission, operated as independent DG and Commission offices just like the other DGs. It is physically run from six sites around the EU, with one each in Brussels and Geel, Belgium, Karlsruhe, Germany, Petten, Netherlands, Seville, Spain,
and Ispra, Italy. The Ispra facility is where ECHO’s monitoring systems are developed in consultation with the natural scientific community before being installed at the ERCC in Brussels. The JRC analyses and systems are scientifically rigorous and often based on emerging and new technologies. The process by which JRC monitoring systems are created, though, are pre-determined: the parameters by which JRC systems conduct their analyses are inherently tailored to ECHO’s range of operations.

As a result, while the systems themselves may be highly-specific and quite precise, the definition of what is being studied at all comes from a policy decision that has already taken place at the DG. By virtue being an EU body, ECHO is the sole set of actors in the disaster response field with the ability to devise this type of highly-sophisticated monitoring system. ECHO personnel then bring the results of these studies to training consultation meetings with participating states to illustrate and define what kinds of experts will need to be trained. As previously discussed, ERCC-based monitoring provides participating states access to an anticipatory risk management resource that they otherwise would never be able to afford on their own. Being the only actor with access to the JRC and its expertise is also a carefully-maintained resource of cultural capital of ECHO – the scientific networks represent a social capital, but the expertise that ERCC workers can draw from, the knowledge itself, is a form of cultural capital exclusive to ECHO’s actors.

The ERCC also allows ECHO personnel to coordinate disaster response by controlling the flow of disaster-relevant information. Every morning, the ERCC team gathers data from its global monitoring systems and publishes anything of note in its ‘ECHO Daily Flash’. Additionally, in the ECHO Daily Flashes published every morning, the ERCC includes information beyond that which has been gathered from its own monitors: data from international monitors, government reports, and news agencies are also included. These Flashes include, three categories: ‘International’,
‘Europe’, and ‘Fact Sheets’. Under the first two headings, anything that the monitors have picked up gets listed, as well as supplementary information – history of disasters in the region, background on conflict-caused human displacement, etc.

The ‘Fact Sheets’ are usually detailed maps or briefing notes with even more information about a given ongoing situation – number of people affected, other potential hazards nearby, etc. This centralisation of information allows ECHO and its ERCC to act as coordinators for multifaceted disasters – for example, the food shortage effects of a flood that destroys crops – in a way that most of the other more niche international bodies cannot – except maybe UNDAC, with whom ECHO works very closely. These Daily Flashes highlight the fact that the ERCC is the lone node through which disaster risks of varying kinds can be monitored simultaneously, again emphasising ECHO personnel’s cultural capital found in their expertise at anticipating the risks posed by impending disasters.

If a disaster requires a response, the ERCC has at its disposal the above-mentioned CECIS, the Common Emergency Communication and Information System. CECIS is a peer-to-peer communication system, which works as a text-based messenger service, operating on a closed communication network, meaning it only works with people on the network – it does not send messages to regular email addresses or mobile phones. Signing in to CECIS is through the online ERCC Portal and it is directed in-house from the ERCC, which outlines how it can be used, when it can be used, or who has access, which at least nominally means it is connected with disaster responders in all participating states of the ERCC, as well as some international responders. CECIS is also used to make a ‘Call for Tender’, mentioned above, where the ERCC puts out a general request to those connected to the network and the participating agencies submit the CVs of individuals ready to be deployed. This means that all disaster response communications are
physically run through the ERCC. In addition to controlling the primary mode of disaster-related communication, the ERCC also uses CECIS to control and coordinate in-field disaster responders through a field-headquarters, once a response team has actually been mobilised and deployed.

Coordinating disaster personnel allows ECHO actors to provide another type of strategic and operational risk management resource to the participating states and other disaster response actors. The ERCC coordinates and assumes responsibility for disaster response teams when they are deployed. The responsibility for managing in-field operations is taken away from individual participating states and other IGOs who are seconding their personnel to be deployed. The ancillary costs and insurance plans for disaster responders are also run through ECHO, decreasing the liability of the participating states. Decreasing the liability in particular ensures that ERCC plays at the least a mediating role in how a deployment works while underway, as well as controlling the call for a deployment in the first place – two roles afforded it by the ERCC’s capabilities and turning those capabilities into risk mitigation resources.

Controlling the flow of information and knowledge about disasters and coordinating the communication amongst disaster responders affords ERCC personnel cultural capital in the sense that all legitimate disaster communication is now understood to be disaster communication that flows through the ERCC. In establishing this arrangement, the ECHO has created a new class of expertise in disaster governance: only those disaster responders and response agencies deemed legitimate by the ERCC and ECHO actors gain access to this disaster-relevant communication, de facto creating a closed set of disaster experts. By both creating this expert class of disaster response actors and publishing disaster monitoring and response information in the Daily Flashes, ECHO personnel are able to demonstrate their expertise to their counterparts in the rest of the field of disaster governance.
TURNING DISASTER GOVERNANCE RESOURCES INTO SYMBOLIC CAPITAL

To effectively mitigate the risks posed by disasters, ECHO actors have mobilised a range of resources. They have material capital in their access to sophisticated instruments and equipment that monitors for disaster scenarios, as well as economic capital in being able to reduce the collective costs of responding to disasters by coordinating burden-sharing training and deployment between contributing states. ECHO actors also are active in networks of disaster responders, as well as maintaining a presence in networks of aid personnel for situations needing longer-term interventions and scientific experts that they rely on to create their in-house monitoring systems – key dimensions of their social capital.

The ways that ECHO actors developed standards and professionalised civil protection experts are not formal risk management practices per se, but they are driven by resources that anticipate and try to minimise the effects of future disaster events. ECHO actors use the material, economic, social, and cultural resources at their disposal to be the best mitigators of the risks posed by disaster scenarios. Moreover, being the primary risk mitigators has meant that ECHO actors have used the four types of capital to become recognised as having an additional resource: prestige or recognition as being leaders at performing a certain task – i.e., as possessing symbolic capital. What makes these other forms of capital become symbolic capital is the recognition by other actors in the disaster governance field that these ways of doing things represent the best way to deal with the object of governance of a field – in this case, the risks posed by disasters.

Through all of this, ECHO actors also play active roles in monitoring and centralising the flow of information within the field of disaster governance, displaying their wealth of cultural
capital by using access to this information to create a class of legitimate or expert disaster response actors. While all of these capabilities were keys for mitigating the effects of disasters, ECHO actors are able to turn these resources into something more influential: symbolic capital, or recognition of authority. The two ways ECHO actors have done this are by using these capital resources to develop disaster response training modules and coordinate bottom-up standard-setting, as well as choosing and maintaining a list of deployment-ready civil protection experts from around Europe. In achieving recognition in these two areas, ECHO actors have come to be seen and recognised as authorities in the field of disaster governance. This section will take these two themes up in turn.

Developing Standards

One of the primary struggles of the field of disaster governance is over how ECHO actors can establish guidelines that the participating states will adhere to. An anecdote underscores this fear. The only area in which ECHO has implemented formal standards for ECP training is for search and rescue helicopter pilot certification – for a variety of legal and insurance reasons, EU-level regulation was needed. The way this happened is revealing. The participating states had already made it very clear that ECHO was not going to be allowed formally to set standards – this was the practice under the older MIC-run disaster response deployments and was not going to change with the evolution into the ERCC. During a consultation meeting between ECHO training program developers and participating states, ECHO officials explained that due to international insurance and licensing rules, the only way that a pilot would be able to work outside of the EU was if they met certain international training criteria. One national delegation adamantly rejected these criteria, arguing that their helicopter pilots were the best trained in the EU, and refused to submit to any other standards. The only way that they were brought on board was by the ECHO
representatives pointing out that the key training curriculum points they were looking to set were much less demanding than the standards that state self-imposed on their pilots.

Aiming for the lowest possible standards is not something that ECHO strives for in all areas of disaster response, however, so a new tactic was needed. Since the participating states clearly were not interested in being told how they had to train their responders, ECHO actors introduced the notion of training ‘levels’, based on a combination of their other resources including scenario planning, data from monitors, and training exercises, whereby ECHO personnel could outline in detail exactly what types of functions the disaster responders would have to perform (Interview 5). Then, the individual training schools in the participating countries would be able to train their personnel however they would like to ensure they could perform those functions.

An example of how this ‘levels’ strategy was used can also be seen in how the training of flood barrier engineers was harmonised by ECHO actors. Instead of setting a standard for the types of specialties or training the engineers needed, ECHO employees merely outlined what materials their ECP teams would use in constructing flood barriers. It was then up to individual national training schools to train their own engineers, ensuring they would be able to use the materials ECHO’s personnel specified. While the functional result – establishing training parameters – was the same, this method meant that the participating states at least felt that they maintained control of the training process.

Another example is perhaps more illustrative. In 2012, ECHO representatives wanted to establish a unified water pumping capacity to respond to floods in areas with poor drainage infrastructure. They attempted to standardise a specific type of pumping module, but there was immediate push back from the participating states, who were afraid that ECHO would begin imposing strict standards (Interview 5). The DG’s employees of course have never attempted to
impose standards, so they immediately eased off the issue to appease the state representatives – despite the DG’s then-newly awarded legal basis to do so. Instead, ECHO’s actors established technical specifications about how these modules would pump, at what volume they needed to remove water, and what type of fuel they would have access to. They then let the participating states develop whatever pumping modules they liked – so long as they could match the specifications that ECHO said were needed in a crisis situation.

This tactic established something that resembled standards. The way that ECHO actors were able to work around the restrictive norms of not imposing standards in a field that inherently needs cross-national standards to work was a keen use of ECHO personnel’s cultural capital in the form of their knowledge of EU institutional politics. In an institutional cooperation member’s words, they ‘reversed the problem: instead of establishing standards from above, they established requirements from below’ (Interview 5) by setting minimum sets of requirements and letting the participating states translate that into a standardisation of ends, if not means.

Moreover, ECHO actors were able to assume this position of centrality and indirectly establish standards also relied on using their material and economic capital of the technology available to them through the ERCC to show that they are the best-suited to decide what the appropriate ‘levels’ would be – they used the models and scenarios generated by the ERCC systems to illustrate why a particular pump required a certain capacity, for example. In this instance, ECHO workers were able to use the forms of capital they did have at their disposal in order to get the other actors in their disaster governance field to recognise that the ECHO approach to setting ‘levels’ was best practice for the other actors in that field – where recognition itself is symbolic capital. By turning existing forms of capital into recognition, ECHO personnel had assumed a position of authority vis-à-vis the other actors in their field.
Training and Professionalising Participants

ECHO actors’ roles in developing training programmes are another resource of symbolic capital that ECHO maintains. Training is interesting because it explicitly links economic capital – paying for training programs – with cultural capital and other forms of knowledge. ECHO personnel play a role in developing training curricula, as discussed above, but ECHO does not have to pay for the actual training taking place in participating state responder schools. The Heads of Units interviewed especially seemed to emphasise that training was the central element that has allowed ECHO’s civil protection capabilities to happen at all. Controlling the way responders were socialised and socialising with one another was crucial to ECHO being understood as the de facto centre of the field of disaster responders – as possessing symbolic capital of recognition as the leaders in their field. This is something that the DG workers are incredibly conscious of: ‘That informal network between the disaster operations specialists has been the backbone of this mechanism’ (Interview 3).

Drawing from the network of disaster operations specialists in the monitoring process allows ECHO employees to select and coordinate how many of each type of expert are needed as part of the standing pool of disaster responders, based on cooperation from the participating states. Making decisions over what types of experts are needed involves ECHO personnel having a substantial say in establishing disaster responder training programs, as the training curricula for the ECP disaster responders are decided through consultations between the participating states and ECHO disaster monitors at the ERCC, even though the actual instruction of disaster response experts is done by the participating countries themselves. ECP training usually is held at dedicated
disaster response academies and ECHO’s programmes currently revolve around twelve different courses, involving between 500 and 800 personnel in 2012.⁶

ECHO monitoring and forecasting methods rely on transnational expertise from the JRC and other disaster monitoring agencies. Because of their ability to draw on and highlight their access to these forms of expertise during training consultation meetings, ECHO actors are able to demonstrate to the participating state representatives at these meetings that the ERCC coordination processes are an indispensable part of effectively responding to a disaster situation. While the consultation meetings formally emphasise parity between EU and state representatives, the guidelines put forth by ECHO’s representatives necessarily are able to carry significantly more weight precisely because the participating state representatives recognise the wealth of expertise and information that ECHO actors are drawing on to inform their guidelines.

The important role that training plays is most apparent in the selection process for a deployment team. When a team is needed in-field, the ERCC officers issue a Call for Tender, where the participating states submit the CVs of all of the disaster personnel that might be needed in given a case. ECHO managers then decide which responders get deployed in which types of situations, based on these CVs. In selecting the responders to deploy as an ECP team, ECHO managers prefer to use experts that they have trained through their existing programs, or who have agreed to undergo such training in the future, and they place particular emphasis on leadership training programs as important qualities for all experts to have in-field. Preference is given to these personnel ahead of even UNDAC-trained disaster experts, especially as the DG has a ‘general interest in its [internally-established] leadership development practices’ (Interview 5). Additionally, this process is justified by saying that ‘we have our own interest at the European

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⁶ Training is conducted in individual Member States, so exact numbers for who is being trained as an ‘EU responder’ and who is trained for internal operations is carefully guarded by some Member States.
level in making sure that certain training levels are met, when deploying’ (Interview 1) and that they want deployed personnel to know both the technical specifications and the organisational structure of a given deployment taking place (Interview 5).

The cumulative result of these practices is to imbue ECHO with the ability to decide on the criteria by which legitimate disaster responders are created: those that are the product of a training program created to respond to specific types of forecasted disasters. By controlling and deciding what is normal or appropriate in the creation of disaster responders, by framing legitimate curricula only in terms of that which is the by-product of these scientific analyses, ECHO can claim a type of expertise that the Member States simply cannot: the ability to use advanced, scientific monitoring and evaluation techniques to decide what response services are needed. Through this, ERCC and ECHO officials see themselves as offering a professionalisation of participating states’ disaster response capabilities – something repeated by every high-ranking ECHO official interviewed (Interview 1, 3, 4, 5).

One of the benefits of these training courses, repeated by two Heads of Units in ECHO, was that at the end of the course, experts from different Member States ‘would go home having each others’ mobile phone numbers in their pockets…to contact each other and stay in touch’ (Interview 3). In fact, the ECHO training programmes are specifically designed to train roughly 2000 disaster response experts to ‘build a fantastic network of disaster response people, who know each other, who have done training courses together, who have had a beer together…and who basically talk to each other whenever they’re in trouble’ (Interview 3). This use of specialised monitoring capabilities allows ECHO to frame the very parameters by which others in the field of disaster response determine what legitimate monitoring and response co-ordination entails. Again, this ability to draw on existing resources to gain deference by the other actors in the disaster governance
field is an example of the recognition created by ECHO employees – as with establishing standards, ECHO personnel used the existing capital afforded them to develop the symbolic recognition of being an authority in deciding on training curricula categorising legitimate disaster responders.

CONCLUSION

The ability to best use disaster risk monitoring information has fundamentally changed a field’s orientation and altered what it means to be an authority in that field – an important and notable development. More than risk logics or knowledges becoming important in a transnational policy field, the actual tangible implementation of the ability to monitor risks is having practical implications for how policy fields work on an everyday basis. The processes and issues involved in day-to-day disaster governance are often mundane or seem to simply be highly-specific quirks of how that field operates. The cumulative impact of these daily processes, however, is that ECHO employees are recognised as the leaders in managing the effects of disasters because of their ability to control access to monitoring data and response personnel. By seeing these monitoring and response practices as instances of garnering recognition from their field counterparts, the daily workings of ECHO challenge our common assumptions about what authority means and is in a transnational governance setting.

This chapter first outlined that the field of disaster governance is comprised of two contestations involving ECHO actors: an internal institutional struggle over mitigating the effects of future disasters and a struggle over how to best standardise training and equipment for disaster response teams. It then looked at the way the risk informs the resources or capital that ECHO
actors used in establishing the ERCC and developing its monitoring and communication coordinating capabilities; this pointed to the specific resources that ECHO actors use to manage the various types of risks posed by disasters. Most importantly though, the chapter outlined how ECHO actors turned these resources into recognition and authority, becoming the central figures in the field of disaster governance by changing the way other actors in that field understood that the best approaches to disaster governance entail working through and with ECHO’s ERCC.

Turning resources into recognition is what sets ECHO actors apart from the other actors in the field of disaster governance and changes the way that cooperation and training works at the EU level. The reason ECHO actors turning their resources into recognised authority changes the way things work in the field of disaster governance is because these practices change the structures by which other actors in the field understand themselves and their own positions – these changes entail a shift in the way that disaster governance is thought of, i.e.: the knowledges behind it. The next chapter will explore these risk knowledges and how they are circulating from this field to others. Doing so, the chapter will look at the practical implications this entails for the role of ECHO actors in the larger field of EU internal security provision by highlighting the role risk knowledges have played in the circulation of similar disaster response practices from the field of disaster governance to the larger field of EU internal security provision.
CHAPTER FOUR:
CIRCULATING PRACTICES OF DISASTER GOVERNANCE:
DATA, RISK, AND KNOWLEDGE IN EU INTERNAL SECURITY

The previous chapter began by looking at how EU actors generate authority in different settings by becoming recognised as effectively mitigating the risks posed by disasters. The chapter highlighted the resources or forms of capital that actors in one particular institution, DG ECHO, use to manage disaster risks and assume positions of authority in their disaster response policy field. Building from this, the current chapter argues that EU personnel who manage the effects of natural and man-made disasters use disaster monitoring data to control knowledge production in their fields, in order to both frame core policy concerns and control how policy problems are understood and addressed in those fields. The chapter underscores that the ability to use monitoring data to define and manage risks has become a base of knowledge or a foundational element to how authority is generated in institutionalised fields of transnational governance.

The chapter makes this argument by looking at how the institutionalised practices of risk management performed at DG ECHO have circulated and are performed by actors at DG HOME, the EU’s Directorate-General tasked with internal security and migration policy. As a small part of the wider EU institutional linking of disaster management and security, EU disaster governance and internal security actors demonstrate to their field counterparts that they are best able to use the data available to them to minimise security risks. ECHO and HOME personnel use this ability to manage risk and threat data in order to be recognised as authorities in their fields. Risk has come to be seen as a way of doing things, forming the base of knowledge for the fields of EU disaster
governance and internal security provision and allowing ECHO and HOME actors to frame how appropriate action is understood by the other actors in that field.

Others have pointed to the contentious role of contracted experts as being a defining struggle in the field of EU internal security politics (Bigo 2000, 2005, Martin-Mazé 2015). Building from these arguments, the chapter explores the production and use of security risk data as a clear example of this growing reliance on contracted or external expertise at DG HOME. The current analysis does not seek to evaluate this shift, however. Instead, the chapter points out that this trend towards expert-led security policy exists within much wider evolutions in EU institutional politics. By treating security problems increasingly as disaster risks that can be monitored and anticipated by using increasing sets and types of data, DG HOME personnel are adapting to maintain their authoritative position in the field of internal security provision in much the same way ECHO personnel are. Thus, the chapter looks at how the formal linking of the disaster and internal security provision fields has become the primary source of contention that defines the field of EU internal security provision, in particular the struggle over the treatment of security threats as disasters or disasters as security threats.

As in the case of DG ECHO, HOME actors are recognised as assuming authoritative positions in their policy fields thanks in part to their ability to use material, economic, social, and cultural resources to be seen as possessing authority or symbolic capital thanks to their ability to competently monitor and anticipate disastrous security risks. HOME actors’ ability to be recognised as risk monitoring experts, and thus authorities in internal security provision, stems primarily from mimicking one particular dimension of DG ECHO personnel’s approach to claiming authority: HOME actors participate in the production and use of security risk and intelligence data, just as ECHO’s ERCC team relies on the production and use of disaster risk data
to assume their authoritative status. HOME actors’ use of data to anticipate disastrous scenarios has become the main way that HOME personnel have likewise become authorities in the field of European internal security provision.

The chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it highlights the key struggle in the field of European internal security provision, namely how to integrate ECHO actors into the HOME-dominated field of internal security provision – along with the new types of practices that ECHO actors have brought with them. The second section then looks at the practices that mobilise material, economic, social, and cultural resources or capital that DG HOME actors use to maintain their authoritative positions in their field, teasing out the way risk management logics have worked to shape these practices. The third section examines how DG ECHO and DG HOME actors turn the resources they have at their disposal into symbolic capital and recognition of authority, by looking at disaster risk data and how it impacts recognised authority, as well as how HOME actors anticipate security disasters by using data in a similar way.

**THE DISASTERIFICATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROVISION FIELD**

Some analysts have suggested that the primary struggle at the heart of the field of EU internal security is between expert-driven technocratic policymaking in the name of ‘more security’ and transparency or accountability measures favouring ‘more liberty’ (Bigo, Carrera and Guild 2009, Huysmans and Ragazzi 2009, Burgess 2010, Guild and Carrera 2011). Many others have noted the increasingly ‘technical’, ‘expert-driven’, or ‘depoliticised’ (Barry 2006, Adey and Anderson 2012, Best 2014) nature of transnational institutional politics more generally. These works offer various explanations about why this trend towards a professionalisation of European bureaucracies
is happening. While I agree that a tension exists between expert-driven and more traditional bureaucrat- or politician-driven security policymaking, security politics in Europe are also increasingly driven by the collection and analysis of security intelligence data by security experts – the expert-bureaucrat tension is no longer the determining feature of the field.

This emphasis on expert-led bureaucratic governance has happened in key connection to the growing use of disaster oriented risk management practices in European security politics, couched primarily in the production and use of data to manage future unknown disaster scenarios. Through the use of data management, risk has become an entrenched and taken-for-granted way of understanding institutional governance processes. Security threats are increasingly understood through the analysing of sets of data to determine potential future disasters that need to be anticipated and mitigated by disaster management experts. The logics behind disaster management have become the base of knowledge for how security politics are understood by actors in the field of security provision. Disaster management personnel and logics have already begun to infiltrate the security field, despite the relative lack of attention paid to this shift by academic analysts.

ECHO actors play much more central roles in the EU’s general security policy than is often recognised, roles that reflect their ability to improve their position in their own policy field by operating relatively inconspicuously, as outlined in the previous chapter. The fact that ECHO does not garner serious research attention as a key element of European security is even more baffling when looking at the Eurobarometer statistics compiled to celebrate the 20th anniversary of ECHO, in 2013 (Eurobarometer 2013). Coordinating disaster response is a clear priority for EU citizens: 79%-92% of respondents agree that coordinating efforts is better in almost every scenario of disaster response. Broken down, clear majorities agreed that: states need to work together in response situations (92%), the EU needs to send experts to help internationally whenever needed
(89%), the EU needs to manage disaster response because of the cross-border effects of most disasters (89%), coordinated responses are better than individual ones (82%), and pooling resources is more cost effective than individual ad hoc contributions (79%). Noticeably, EU citizens at least appear to whole-heartedly support ECHO’s mandate as being both pragmatic and useful – even if only four in ten are informed of the fact that the EU actually does coordinate on these issues.

In addition to general agreement that EU-level cooperation or coordination is central to improving disaster response capabilities, another set of statistics is even more revealing. 75% of Europeans are either ‘Very Concerned’ or ‘Fairly Concerned’ about man-made disasters such as oil spills or nuclear accidents. Only 64% are concerned about terrorist attacks or their effects. While 24% of respondents indicated they were ‘Not Very Concerned’ or ‘Not Concerned At All’ about man-made disasters, far more were not concerned about the possibility of terrorist attacks: 35% (Eurobarometer 2013).

Despite these statistics, EU security scholars are very quick to focus on the effects of counterterrorism, border control, and transportation security policies, while there has been much less academic work written on ECHO’s role in EU internal security – despite its pivotal role being made clear in the EU’s internal security strategy and its implementation reports, for example as seen in COM 179 2013’s explicit reference to increasing the operational link between the two policy areas. There is a thus a fundamental disconnect between what citizens of the EU feel threatened about and what security scholars think are important avenues of security research.

\[1\] To be fair, concern about natural disasters, such as earthquakes or damaging floods, was relatively similar to terrorist attacks (67% for natural disasters compared to 64% for terrorist attacks), but this is probably more reflective of the fact that continental Europe has a far lower likelihood of experiencing widespread natural disasters than other regions of the globe. All of this is still significantly higher than the 59% who are concerned about the outbreak of armed conflict.
Because DG ECHO is not an explicit or traditional security-oriented institution in Europe, there is a profound disconnect between the increased awareness about disaster response needs and practices and the dearth of academic or media attention paid to DG ECHO being a security provider. With the formal linking of the policy areas under ECHO and HOME’s jurisdictions, however, the situation will undoubtedly change. Indeed, as a result of Commission directives aimed at linking the two policy areas together, the relationship between DG ECHO actors and practices and DG HOME’s security providers represents the key tension and point of struggle that defines the field of European internal security provision. As the rest of this chapter will illustrate, as ECHO processes become more and more a part of the general field of EU internal security, the authoritative actors within that field traditionally dominated by DG HOME have begun to use practices of disaster risk management to maintain their authoritative roles.

There is little reason to assume that the circulation of disaster governance practices to the field of EU internal security provision is an example of the ‘expansion’ of security and security practices to include other institutional arenas, as well. Instead, a closer look at the institutional practices of disaster and security governance reveals that the matter is reversed: we are in fact seeing a ‘disasterfication’ of security politics. Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) would call this hypsersecuritisation – the securitisation of something based on an exaggerated playing-out of all the possible disastrous scenarios – but their emphasis is on how a series of specific potential disasters are being used to articulate one specific thing or group as threats. The current aim is not that there are a number of disasters being securitised or that a number of disasters can arise from not securitising something. Instead, the everyday practices of transnational institutional politics that work to securitise an object are oriented around disaster-response. Disaster management practices are circulating from the field of disaster governance to internal security provision. The
main practices included in this circulation are: developing and implementing analysis systems; training standing response personnel; integrating emergency communication systems; and establishing manuals of ‘command’ hierarchies to coordinate different types and sets of disasters.

These pushes to harmonise disaster and internal security policy are not wholly new ideas of course. ECHO members point out that in the run-up to establishing the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), and even during the earlier implementation of the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) at ECHO between 2007 and 2010, the negotiation processes cannot be separated from the coordinated responses to the Madrid Bombings, the London Tube attacks, the South Asian tsunami, and Hurricane Katrina in the US (Interview 1, 3). When the disaster monitoring capability was being established, and again when it was being augmented, the original goal was indeed to include a counter-terrorism element of risk analysis, only the terrorism side of the processes got eventually put aside as politically unfeasible.

Then, when the ERCC was officially unveiled on 16 May 2013, it was introduced jointly by the Commissioners of ECHO, ENVIRO, and HOME. HOME’s presence is notable, as it reflects the way that DG is increasingly portrayed itself as a non-contentious body engaged in general emergency response. The main way that HOME has built this role is through the use of ECHO’s institutional model for monitoring in its own field. HOME has mimicked the ECHO model of maintaining a monitoring centre that acts as the hub for HOME internal security operations. Moreover, a key development of the EU’s 2010 Internal Security Strategy was linking the management of natural and man-made disasters – something on paper done at ECHO, but not being practiced. In response, HOME has developed its Strategic Analysis and Response (STAR) Centre to link these two areas.
STAR was established in 2012 and is designed to mimic ECHO’s ERCC precursor, the MIC, as the coordinator in the EU’s field of security intelligence and risk analysis. STAR is supposed to be the means by which HOME monitors a variety of security and political situations both within Europe and beyond. Portraying itself as a ‘customer’ of intelligence and risk analyses – a fact emphatically clarified by more than one HOME bureaucrat – STAR has already started acting as a filter for the analyses conducted in various EU agencies and offices, passing on relevant risk data or security information to policy-makers for further action when needed. In fact, interviews with HOME officials confirm that the actual template for their own institutionalised risk monitoring was based exclusively on the practices at ECHO (Interview 2, 6). This combination of capabilities and risk monitoring logics have combined to afford STAR actors with privileged authoritative recognition that they are the de facto leaders in coordinating the field of European transnational internal security provision.

Rather than only seeing the securitisation of disaster management, we are seeing a distinct set of practices of disaster governance beginning to circulate to the security field and being the primary source of conflict and basis for understanding action in that new field. This can be clarified by examining how risk-informed practices of disaster governance have impacted the performance of EU security politics. The introduction of these practices into the larger realm of EU security policy is not so much about looking at the same practices in a new case study, but tracing the circulation of these practices into different settings and unpacking how actors performing them were also able to gain or maintain authority in their field.
PRACTICES OF INTERNAL SECURITY PROVISION

In the struggle marked by the spread of disaster management into EU security governance and DG HOME actors’ existing authority in the field of internal security provision, DG HOME actors mimic DG ECHO’s model to maintain their authoritative position in the field of EU internal security provision. This specifically means using the material, economic, social, and cultural resources, or forms of capital, offered to them in their daily management of the EU internal security field. They do this by, respectively, having access to security communications and databases, commanding a sizable budget and controlling joint protection teams, maintaining a network of security providers from around Europe, and centralising and controlling security information from a number of EU and non-EU European institutions.

Access to Security Communications and Databases – Material Capital

DG HOME’s STAR is a specialised centre that collects security intelligence and risk information from a number of other security monitoring departments and agencies from around the EU. In addition to these analyses and reports sent daily or hourly, DG HOME also houses a number of other sensitive databases of security-related information such as the Schengen Information System (SIS II) which tracks all movement of peoples into the DG HOME-governed Schengen Zone. These software and the secured communications devices used to share this information are material instantiations of DG HOME’s role in EU security – they are material resources of the security provision field that only designated or approved DG HOME personnel have access to. The fact that these materials are restricted from the public – including other security actors – highlights how carefully guarded a resource they represent. Access to DG HOME and this
equipment is rigidly protected by some of the most visible security measures employed at EU-run buildings.

While the hallways and offices of DG HOME look similar to other DGs (labyrinthine hallways colour-coded by taped lines on the buffed floors or painted onto walls and doorways, offices accessed by at least two or three doors, motivational pro-EU posters throughout, etc.), gaining access to HOME is much more difficult. Entering the DG HOME building, one is met with a bank of security guards behind protected glass, with another guard waiting for you to immediately empty your pockets into a bin to be scanned while you walk through a metal detector and are physically checked. Before being even allowed to begin the entrance security procedures, though, visitors must fill out a short credentials identification form (in my case, asking for my University affiliation) before handing it in to the bank of glass-covered guards along with your EU citizenship card or passport, all of which are checked, presumably against the DG HOME-managed security databases.

Once through these procedures and armed with a visitor’s sticker, one cannot simply walk around the building (as at other EU offices) – someone from the DG must escort you at all times. Rigidly protecting the access to or information about DG HOME’s security equipment is interesting both as an example of a cultural resource – controlling access to security knowledge – but also highlights the exclusivity of the security equipment itself that DG HOME actors access to conduct their risk assessments. For example, only a very select few DG HOME personnel are able to get the clearance necessary to enter the STAR offices – a separate security clearance is needed to enter the STAR department than that needed, for instance, to enter the European External Action

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2 In fact, for some of the interviews conducted for this research, despite following all of the security protocols, I was denied entry into the building for unnamed reasons, being forced to conduct interviews in the ground floor lounge area surrounded by vending machines and lounging HOME personnel.
Service’s Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), further highlighting how access to the material equipment of security intelligence is a carefully guarded resource.

**EU-Wide Security Funding – Economic Capital**

Though DG HOME only represents 1% of direct EU operating budgets, it commands a sizable chunk of funding resources from secondary agencies and collectives of the European Union. For the budget period 2014-2020, DG HOME will receive roughly 25% of its budget, or 3.1 billion Euros, from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, as well as 3.8 billion Euros from the Internal Security Fund for another 41% of its budget. While it is outside of the scope of the current project to delve into the sources of all of this funding, for the present purposes it is enough to say that access to this secondary funding is a gauge of how the security field understands DG HOME actors and their role. HOME’s position at the head of all internal affairs and migration policing actions, combined with its institutional cooperation agreements and various institutional cooperation personnel who act as liaisons between the HOME executive and EU agencies, all work to give the DG access to the funding of all internal security providers around the EU.

HOME plays a role in how funding is allocated to these specific institutions, based on what types of monitoring they do. HOME has a seat in the budget meetings of any agency with which it has an institutional co-operation agreement – including any of the agencies that forward their risk or intelligence analyses to STAR. Budgetary discretion allows HOME to play a role in framing how the individual agencies conduct their analyses, by outlining what it deems to be important information, and what are funding-worthy monitoring practices.

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3 All budget figures collected from fieldwork interviews and verified through EU Commission budget disclosures.
STAR personnel do not directly coordinate or fund security responses themselves, though part of their tasks include sharing the information they constantly receive from other internal security providers with the rest of the DG HOME hierarchy. The information that is shared supports the DG’s role in overseeing specific internal security operations: border guards deployed to the Greek-Turkish border, ships patrolling the waters between the Canary Islands and the African continent, drug seizures at airports, or undercover sting operations in organized crime networks in the south of France, for example. More than simply being a networking resource, being an integrated part of the DG HOME bureaucratic hierarchy means that STAR and its personnel are firmly entrenched into the decision-making processes for funding the DG’s various agencies and operations capabilities. Because most direct EU funding has to be approved by the Parliament, the DG’s ability to collect and redistribute money for internal security provision becomes a powerful resource in having a central role in the way internal security is governed in Europe.

Networks of Security Providers – Social Capital

While the ERCC coordinates monitoring amongst numerous international, EU, and Member State disaster management bodies, STAR’s role is more specified. Its focus lies primarily in coordinating EU-level threat assessments by receiving regular intelligence and risk assessment reports from monitors around the EU, sorting through the information for any event that requires a response, and then coordinating that response. STAR does not develop any of its own in-house monitors; it sees itself as an intelligence ‘customer’. One STAR member even went so far as to say ‘I want to be very straightforward and clear: we are not doing any intelligence, because it is not the mandate of the Commission…From this comes the concept of being an intelligence
“customer”’ (Interview 5). Thus, it is specifically interested in collecting intelligence and risk analysis reports from a diverse set of monitors from around the EU.

STAR’s personnel can only perform this role because they are carefully integrated into wider networks of risk and intelligence analysis personnel. I was only able to access STAR personnel because of their position in these networks. When I first attempted to contact an analyst from STAR, I was immediately shut out and refused any comment or time. After interviewing risk analysts from the EU’s FRONTEX border agency, crisis response monitors from ECHO, and two intelligence analysts from the EEAS, my interviewees were all able to introduce me to their ‘friends’ at STAR. These secondary security monitors unanimously referred to STAR members as their friends or their colleagues – yet when meeting with STAR members and inquiring about the interviewee who had put me in touch, all semblance of familiarity was absent. Knowing that STAR personnel were chosen specifically because of their varied EU institutional backgrounds, it seems clear that the STAR personnel carefully cultivate their networks of analysts.

These networks not only allow STAR personnel to do their jobs efficiently, but close ties and existing partnerships in both internal security and military defence analyst networks allows STAR actors to possess a social capital resource that other actors in the internal security field simply cannot. Their relationship with established networks represents a resource in itself: STAR personnel possess a capital resource in the form of their privileged access to the networks of security and military intelligence gatherers. These networks themselves afford STAR personnel a

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4 ‘Yes I understand that is how they see us, but the feeling is not necessarily mutual’ was a response from one STAR member, a sentiment that seemed to be shared by at least two other members. The disconnect here is illustrative of the fact that while STAR personnel are firmly integrated into the wider network of EU risk analysts, they see themselves as being somehow removed or above or otherwise operating separately from that network, only drawing from that network as needed.
specific resource of intelligence and risk information as STAR’s analysts personally know and have worked with their counterparts in other institutions.

**Security Knowledge – Cultural Capital**

Finally, STAR has the privileged position of being the body who decides what information gets to the decision-makers – it is both the filter that allows specific risk and intelligence assessments to reach decision-makers and the conduit for communication of threats between the agencies and HOME. This position of being the gatekeeper for internal security information is a powerful cultural resource: allowing STAR members to control security information in one physical location allows them to de facto manage how security events are monitored and responded to in Europe. STAR’s institutional position is a form of cultural capital: they have a level of prestige that affords them a key role in the everyday running of the field.

In terms of coordinating how this information is stored and who has access to it, STAR actors’ primary duties include receiving weekly, daily, or even more frequent risk or intelligence packages from individual agency analysis centres. They are positioned as a security customer and thus act as filters through which policy decisions are made based on previously-compiled assessments. STAR actors receive sometimes-hourly updates from those centres, decide if action is needed, and if so, who should be taking or leading that action. In doing so, STAR’s actors are only ones in the field of internal security provision that have the most overall say in how personnel deployments are decided, by virtue of being the lines of communication through which emergencies are communicated between the field.
There is a direct relationship between the types of resources at HOME briefly mentioned here and the risk monitoring performed by DG ECHO actors outlined in the previous chapter. That is to say, there are clear homologies between the practices and institutional-field positions of ERCC and STAR personnel: both sets of actors have developed and continue to draw on an array of material, economic, social, and cultural resources in order to perform similar institutional functions of assessing future risks in their respective fields. Using the resources available to them, institutionalising the use of data to mitigate perceived risks is something that both ECHO and HOME personnel were each able to draw on in becoming leaders in their respective fields. The parallel capacities each institution and its actors possess are key in how they both orient themselves in these fields. This section will briefly compare the two institutions and their approach to generating recognised authority, before exploring each DG’s use of data in anticipating risks.

Comparing the Practices of DGs ECHO and HOME

Some of the practices at DG HOME seem different from those performed at ECHO – funding hierarchies play a much bigger role in HOME than they do at ECHO, for example. At their core, however, they are remarkably similar: both ECHO and HOME actors rely on access to advanced technologies as a material resource; both ERCC and STAR personnel use their roles in wider networks of other institutional experts and actors to guide cooperation processes; and both sets of disaster and security actors use their privileged access to monitoring and operational knowledge as a way of maintaining their positions in their fields. The similarities in turning these resources into recognised authority, though, exist precisely due to the shared base of knowledge that shapes each field. Paraphrasing Bourdieu (1979), the homologies between the practices performed at
ECHo and relative positions ECHO personnel were able to assume in their field, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the practices performed at HOME and their relative positions, exist because each field and set of actors share a base of knowledge: governance authority in modern transnational institutional contexts rests at least substantially in the ability to produce and collect massive amounts of data in order to anticipate and mitigate unknown future risks before they occur.

The circulation of practices from one institution to another highlights how the base of knowledge found in the risk management logics behind DG ECHO actor’s use of anticipatory and pre-emptive monitoring data are also key to how HOME actors interact in their security field. The material, economic, social, and cultural practices performed by ECHO and HOME in both fields are transformed into recognised authority (symbolic capital) because risk management logics (the base of knowledge) frame the way these practices are perceived by other actors in those fields. The different forms of capital available to ECHO and HOME personnel are combined to generate recognised authority by orienting these resources of data use towards improving ECHO and HOME personnel’s ability to analyse or anticipate disaster or security risks. The previous chapter outlined how ECHO actors were able to achieve this by reshaping the perception of their practices by the rest of their field – the habitus of the other actors in their field – so that the ability to mitigate disaster risks was considered a best practice in disaster governance. DG HOME actors have similarly maintained their status as internal security authorities because they are able to use their different capital resources of data management to become recognised by others in their field not only as competent mitigators of risks, but in shaping a shared perception that using data to mitigate risk was the best way to provide internal security in a modern transnational setting.

This recognition arises most notably from the way STAR actors use their networks and monitoring mandate to develop their secretive ‘new methodologies’ as a set of disaster risk
knowledge, using these methodologies to interpret risk and intelligence data from other actors and pass on information to the DG HOME executive when needed. Despite the number of interviews and lengthy discussions about how these ‘new methodologies’ are used and why, my interviewees were strictly forbidden to discuss what exactly they are, in any level of detail. The only insight offered was that STAR personnel often have considerable experience in advanced mathematics or statistics, ‘for a reason’ (Interview 2). Even with this enhanced secrecy, the use of data by the unit’s analysts is notable: they draw on their networks of information providers (social capital) and their position in the internal security funding hierarchy (economic capital) to develop and use entrenched technologies of intelligence quantification (material capital) to consolidate data on possible future risk (cultural capital). Being the pivot through which security information travels in Europe’s transnational setting uniquely affords STAR’s parent organisation, HOME, with authoritative status in the security field thanks to the control and use of data their capital resources allow them to maintain.

These uses of capital resources are instances of institutionalised risk management – maybe not formal risk management per se, but the logics of anticipating and minimising the effects of a future event are the underlying logics. What makes these resources translate into authority or symbolic capital is the fact that the other actors in the internal security field recognise this as the best way to use these capital resources – that is crucial. Other actors recognise the legitimacy of STAR’s authority in monitoring for and responding to future security events – so much that they are willing to send hourly updates about whatever security event they may be tracking themselves. That recognition of HOME actors’ authority is in itself an expression of symbolic capital. The ability of HOME actors to turn their various other resources into this recognition is how they have maintained this authority – and doing so in the way that they have builds directly from the way
that actors at DG ECHO have similarly maintained the external recognition of their authority by using data in a similar way to assess risks.

**Disaster Risk Data and Recognised Authority**

ECHO actors have an important hand in setting the parameters for the production of the data they use to monitor for the risks of specific disaster scenarios. According to high-ranking DG ECHO officials, DG personnel contact the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and articulate a specific need – for example, a need to assess tsunami early-warning capabilities. The JRC then act as a liaison with the scientific community involved in developing these systems (i.e.: seismologists and/or oceanographers), develop a model, and pass it on to the requesting DG. These JRC analyses and systems are scientifically rigorous and often based on emerging and new technologies. Nonetheless, the parameters through which they conducting their analyses and set up their systems are tailored to DG ECHO’s range of operations. As a result, while the systems themselves may be highly specific and quite precise, the definition of what is being studied at all comes from a pre-existing policy decision by the DG.

The data used by the leaders in the field of disaster response at ECHO are thus controlled in every way by those same leaders – the JRC designs data-generating monitoring systems based on specifications from DG ECHO. Some of these systems include the Meteoalarm Europe system, the system linking the Network of European Meteorological Services (EUMETNET), the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS), and the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), as well as a system for collecting data from third party data producers such as the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and the Radioactivity Monitoring Centre. The data collected by these different JRC systems comes from sources as diverse as buoys off of
the French coast automatically measuring wave heights, soil dryness evaluation data that is manually entered in centres in Spain and Portugal, and seismic sensors throughout Eastern Europe to sense tectonic plate shifts, to name only three examples. These data are then transmitted through constantly-evolving spreadsheets, charts, maps, and graphs that are sent to DG ECHO through the Interactive Disaster Analysis System.

Once the data reaches Brussels, it is all centralised through ECHO’s monitoring centre in the ERCC. The ERCC allows DG ECHO actors to control the flow of disaster-relevant data in its ‘Daily Flashes’5. Moreover, all disaster data and coordination information is run through the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS). In terms of how this data is actually used, the JRC and international monitor data centralised at the ERCC sets automatic triggers in motion when a disaster scenario has occurred, alerting the duty officers to call for a response based on pre-approved thresholds – water levels for floods, wave heights and frequencies for tsunamis, wind speeds for hurricanes, etc. The ERCC also uses its monopoly on disaster data and its in-house CECIS to coordinate disaster responders in their deployment and through a field headquarters once on the ground. This ensures that the ECHO actors in the ERCC play a mediating role in how a deployment works, as well as controlling the call for a deployment in the first place – two coordinating roles afforded it by the ERCC’s capabilities. In the field, CECIS is used to share ongoing data updates run through the ERCC. This ongoing sharing of data allows DG ECHO and its ERCC to act as coordinators for multifaceted disasters – for example, to monitor the food shortage effects reported by the World Food Program when a flood destroys crops – in a way that most of the other more niche disaster response bodies cannot.

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5 These were explored in chapter three, but are daily summaries of disaster monitoring data that the ERCC monitors picked up in the previous twenty-four hours and published every morning.
Disaster monitoring data influence the way disasters are governed. Disaster monitoring data are clearly not purely objective and are actually intricately tied to the socio-political processes behind their generation and use. Data allow phenomena to be quantified and qualified as needing a policy response. A buoy measuring wave heights off the coast of Portugal is not only calculating probabilities of tsunamis occurring, but represents a physical space delineated as worth protecting (Portugal, or Europe more generally) and outlines the types of scenarios that are worth mitigating (Atlantic tsunamis). The data produced and transmitted by the buoy translate these preferences and choices into a clear, tangible policymaking goal: Portugal and Europe must be protected from the effects of tidal wave heights that indicate potential tsunamis.

The data used in disaster governance are thus never just ‘facts’ to help monitor and coordinate events – these data are carefully cultivated sets of practices that allow ECHO and ERCC personnel to claim the legitimate authority to govern disaster management. They can claim this legitimate authority precisely because of the data they create: disaster monitoring data turn natural phenomena such as earthquakes and floods into actionable areas for interventions that they themselves coordinate. It is important to think of how disaster monitoring data exists socially: ERCC personnel exist as a node within a larger network of civil protection experts and coordinators. They generate and manage data by and for this relationship of actors in order to allow ERCC personnel to do their jobs and legitimate the particular institutional approach to disaster response that they represent: voluntarily seconded personnel, trained according to ECHO-negotiated specifications, and deployed and coordinated from the ERCC. The creation and use of disaster monitoring data should thus be seen as a technique of ERCC and ECHO actors stabilising their influence or roles in the way disasters are governed in Europe. For disaster governance, using
data to perform assessments of future scenarios allows ERCC actors to claim and assume a position of authority in the way disasters are governed more generally.

**Anticipating Security Disasters through Data**

Actors at DG HOME have similarly begun controlling the production, access, and use of data about (im)migration and internal security threats to maintain their status as the de facto leaders in the field of EU internal security provision. Neither HOME’s interior offices nor STAR produce data themselves, but rather are collectors of data produced by others. Along with the long list of agencies, centres, and departments producing the data that STAR manages, its personnel are primarily concerned with sifting through this data and finding what sets represent scenarios needing a response by using their in-house ‘new methodological approaches’. Whether it is determining thresholds of lives loss, cost to EU institutions, or simply the likelihood of an event taking place, STAR develops the methodological approaches by which all other data is examined once reaching the STAR secured offices in Brussels. In this process of developing methodologies for interpreting the information sent to STAR by its partners, the STAR actors apply disaster risk logics to their existing resources in order to be recognised as authorities in the field of internal security provision.

Hourly and daily, risk analyses and intelligence reports are sent to STAR for enhanced examination. If the likelihood of those events happening passes a different, STAR-determined threshold, the information is passed on to the Commissioner Executive offices to determine how to proceed or react. This gives STAR and HOME a powerful agenda-setting ability in establishing the parameters by which crises are mitigated. While ECHO contacts the JRC to develop monitoring systems it requires, STAR receives risk or intelligence assessments conducted elsewhere and
develops what its members call ‘new methodological approaches’ to analyse them, developing ways to frame and understand those assessments. Whether it is determining thresholds of lives loss, cost to EU institutions, or simply the likelihood of an event taking place, STAR members develop the methodological approaches by which all other assessments are examined once they reach the secured STAR offices in Brussels.

STAR personnel use the statistical technologies at their disposal to sort through these massive amounts of data, apply their own measurement methods to this data, and make decisions based on what these secondary analyses predict for possible future events – their material capital comes to be seen as a tool for risk management by how it is used. Similarly, HOME’s capacities at STAR are designed to monitor for possible future events and prepare response protocols in the interest of minimising the cost any one member state would be met with if they were to monitor and respond to security disasters on their own. This is of course similar to the way ECHO actors use their ability to monitor for possible future disasters and pool disaster response capabilities in order to demonstrate the economic capital they possess in the form of minimising costs of disaster response.

STAR actors use their existing networks of security experts to anticipate what kind of responses will be needed in the event of a security disaster, building on, managing, and using the massive amounts of security and risk data they have in order to anticipate when future disaster events may occur (Interview 2, 6). In addition to the highly advanced statistical applications STAR personnel use to ‘re-read’ data sent from other security actor monitoring sites, actors from DG HOME are creating new understandings of what combinations of events or circumstances may result in a security disaster for European countries. The social and cultural resources available to
DG HOME actors thus come to be seen as tools for entrenched risk analysis techniques in the security field.

The individual monitors that forward information to STAR have their own sophisticated expertise in a given issue area, which they use to determine the likelihood of a given event taking place – a sudden mass-migration, a rapid influx in illicit drugs, or the spread of an organized crime network, for example. They then base both their operating procedures on these calculations, and rely on them for funding requests from their parent institutions – which for each monitoring body, except the Member State ones, lies in the EU Commission offices. To reiterate, just as the ERCC and ECHO personnel set the parameters for the type of data they need the JRC systems to produce, STAR and DG HOME actors have developed their own in-house methodologies for determining what parts of their massive stores of data need to be acted upon.

The different roles these data play are key in establishing STAR’s recognition as an authority in its field. For example, FRONTEX’s Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) collects data about political upheavals in countries targeted as potential sources of migration, using their in-house Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) to analyse their data and decide what political events might trigger a mass migration. The RAU then sends this data to STAR for secondary analysis. STAR personnel then take this information and combine it with the data sent from the European Asylum Support Office data about countries of origin for asylum seekers. If this new combination of data can be made to show, again for example, that a coup taking place in a North or West African country will trigger mass migrations into the EU via Spain’s enclave border cities in Northern Morocco, then STAR will push these ‘findings’ up to the HOME executive for them to develop a political response – requesting FRONTEX to step in with its border guard teams, bolstering Spanish border guards with third party EU national guards, etc.
At STAR, personnel use the same sets of data to look for potential problems or indicators that are different from those examined and analysed by the sources of these data: ‘we then look at this data again, this material again, but this time we are looking for something different than what the data was originally used for’ (Interview 6). The data literally play two different social functions: one function in their original site of production and use and another function at STAR. When STAR personnel mention the ‘new methodological approaches’ they use when trying to assess a set of data, they are translating the data set so that it represents a new social phenomenon that better fits with what HOME is tasked with managing. Data not only allow actors to claim authority, as seen in the way data are used to let ERCC personnel claim and assume positions of authority in the field of disaster governance; the way data sets are used at STAR demonstrates both that data are created with specific social purposes in mind, and that data can be changed and altered to fit new and different social purposes – in this case, to establish STAR’s authority in its field by demonstrating how it is a reliable mitigator of possible future security risks.

For this reason, the production, management, and use of data in these contexts should be understood as part of the wider way in which risk is becoming a central feature in establishing authority in transnational governance. The production, management, and use of data used to anticipate future scenarios and preemptively act are tools by which actors become recognised as being competent at mitigating risk in their respective fields. They use data in order to construct and frame risks, before then demonstrating that they are the most competent mitigators of risk, thereby generating policymaking authority for themselves.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined how awareness of disasters and their effects is now greater than ever before, with approaches to their management bleeding into different policy fields. Despite this growing significance, little real attention has been paid to the EU’s disaster response institutions, the ways they have gained and maintained authority in their policy field, or the impact of these evolutions on the field of EU internal security provision. This has led to a situation where a point of contention framing the field of EU internal security is the role of ECHO and its disaster managers, more specifically, how their practices from one specific field have circulated to the larger field of EU security, where security problems are being treated as disasters and their risks managed through the use of data. Paying attention to the role that risk plays highlights the evolution of the central struggles of the field from being over the control of expertise into how to best mitigate disastrous security threats. By examining the introduction of new techniques of anticipating future security events into the field of internal security, the chapter has sought to show how actors at DG HOME have come to be recognised as legitimate authorities in managing security in Europe. More importantly, by drawing out the way each institution’s actors used data to assume authoritative positions in their fields, the chapter highlighted the important role that data and their management play in generating authority in transnational institutional settings.

Not only has the use of data to anticipate future disaster scenarios changed the way HOME manages the internal security field in Europe, but this role of data has realigned the habitus of the actors in that field so that the use of data to manage risks is understood to be the best practice in internal security provision, just as it has in the field of disaster governance. This use of data allowed DGs ECHO and HOME actors to transform their capital resources into symbolic capital to assume the authoritative positions they now hold – thanks to their use of the disaster risk logics that
originated in the disaster governance field. ECHO and HOME actors have achieved this recognition of authority due to the disaster management anticipatory logics behind using data for monitoring and coordinating. Practices of managing risk data allow actors to assume specific types of field positions and perform position-taking practices. These position-taking practices are central to how actors in transnational settings who are seen as mitigators of risk can be seen as *maintaining* authority, something not yet addressed. The next chapter will argue that there is something about risk as a category of practice, as an accepted way of doing things, which lends itself to both generating and maintaining the claims to authority that DGs ECHO and HOME personnel have made.
CHAPTER FIVE:

DATA CENTRALISATION

AND MAINTAINING TRANSNATIONAL AUTHORITY:

RECONFIGURING FIELD STRUCTURES

The previous chapter looked at the circulation of disaster risk management practices and the role that these practices play in framing the base of knowledge for internal security governance. It argued that using data to manage unknown future risks is an established way of doing things that actors recognise as legitimate and worthy of deferential authority. This chapter continues by unpacking the implications of disaster governance and internal security provision actors using data-driven risk management to gain authority in their fields. The chapter argues that using data to manage risks is a category of practice that helps actors situate themselves centrally, in that the use of data to manage risks allows select actors to hold central, pivotal institutional positions within their respective fields. The emphasis here is on how the use of data has generated new forms of authority relationships, as made evident by the way data has allowed disaster governance and internal security personnel to assume central field positions – the way these actors use data creates specific categories of practices aimed at achieving centralisation. Centralising risk monitoring data in a social field has become a specific strategy by actors in these fields, and with it, its own category of practice.

This direct foray into actor position-taking looks at the result of the data oriented risk management practices performed by DG ECHO and DG HOME personnel: European and transnational political institutions are being rearranged and oriented around centralised data hubs.
or centres to better facilitate governance through data. Some scholars have noted that transnational governance bodies increasingly run policy coordination projects through ‘command centres’, ‘monitoring hubs’, or ‘coordination offices’ (Lavallée 2011) – centres like the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the Strategic Analysis and Response (STAR) Centre, where governance through monitoring and coordination is managed centrally through the use of data, yet responsibility is devolved to arm’s-length actors for implementation. The ways DG ECHO and DG HOME use data centres to monitor for risks are two specific cases of this trend towards institutional centralisation. In the instances of the ERCC and STAR, and in European transnational politics more generally, data driven risk management techniques are a category of practice in institutional governance – a way of doing things that places the actors who are best at performing these practices into central institutional roles, further highlighting their positions of recognised authority.

Competing to be recognised as an authority in the field of disaster governance means competing over who can be seen and recognised as the most competent at using data to mitigate risk. As explored in previous chapters, these competitions have included the institutionalisation of risk management techniques such as automated control centres, monitoring, and decision-making matrices into everyday bureaucratic behaviours of EU disaster governance institutions, as well as the ascendancy of the actors performing these practices to prominent positions in their fields. If, however, the disaster governance ‘model’ is circulating to other policy areas of the EU, as seen with STAR and the field of internal security provision, its wider implications for EU policymaking authority demand further attention.

Actors at ECHO and HOME entrenched their risk management practices into EU institutional settings, particularly by focusing on the production and generation of data about risks
and then centralising the management of these data into information hubs which have relative autonomy from their formal organisations. More importantly, the specific way ECHO and HOME personnel came to be recognised as authorities is due to their proficiencies at mitigating risks through their use of data in centralised information hubs. Not only were ECHO and STAR actors able to assume central positions in their respective fields, but they were able to reconfigure their respective fields in such a way as their place at the centre was de jure entrenched and difficult to change – thus ensuring their continued monopoly on access to risk monitoring data and exclusive ability to be recognised as authorities.

Both institutions were able to centralise or coordinate the production, management, and use of data into monitoring centres. These centres are small parts of their parent organisations, but play pivotal roles in governing their respective policy fields. This centralisation of data into hubs is the key strategy that ECHO and HOME actors have used to assume and maintain authoritative positions in their fields. They first introduced data as a way to manage risks, convinced the other actors in their fields that their approach was the best at governing their particular policy areas, as a result realigning the way actors in those fields understood competent action, and then were able strategically place themselves as the central pivots in their fields, ensuring a continued monopoly on the way those fields assigned authority by exclusively controlling the data needed to monitor for future disaster scenarios.

The disaster governance practices shaping the base of knowledge in the disaster governance field have become the base of knowledge in other policy fields; the symbolic capital associated with being seen as effective at managing risk in the field of disaster governance is becoming a transposable quantity, becoming a standard for assuming authority in other fields as well. The fact that data oriented risk management is a base of knowledge that has been transposed to new policy
fields and new institutional settings points to a powerful category of practice – a set of practices that draw on shared logics and are recognised as being authoritative because of these logics. Practices of using data in monitoring for disaster risks have shifted the structure of the fields in which these practices occur. Actors who use data for risk monitoring are strategically assuming and entrenching themselves in central positions in their newly-realigned fields and are using these central positions to maintain the authority that their data use has afforded them.

To make this argument, the chapter first looks at the way DG ECHO and DG HOME personnel participated in restructuring the disaster governance and internal security provision fields. The chapter then outlines the primary strategy of institutionalised risk management practices performed at both DG ECHO and HOME (as well as elsewhere in the EU system): centralising data collection and use into governance hubs and monitoring centres. Finally, the chapter demonstrates that these risk-oriented practices of governing through data are seen recognised as valuable techniques or strategies for actors to generate and maintain new types of authority and authoritative positions in fields of transnational governance, especially as seen in Europe.

**CHANGING DISASTER AND SECURITY FIELD STRUCTURES**

Analyses of EU responses to the global financial crises, the earthquake in Haiti, and Russian aggression in the Ukraine often assume that the EU itself is a single entity, and that its response to crises, disasters, or emergencies are temporary policies. Instead, ERCC approaches to disaster response reveal the different collections of actors and practices involved in entrenching the ongoing mitigation of future uncertainties as everyday governance processes at ECHO. The
practices performed by these actors have led to data centralisation and have moved from their original field of disaster response to a more general one. Not only are actors who are best at using data to pre-emptively manage the effects of future, unknown, and uncertain disastrous events seen as authoritative, but in doing so they are able to assume positions in their fields that entrench their exclusive ability to claim authority. The specific practices performed by DG ECHO and DG HOME actors are indicative of this shift and point to the power of how producing and using data to anticipate and prepare for future unknown events alters the structures and relations of social fields, including how actors assume the field positions that they do.

**The Evolving Structure of Transnational Governance Fields**

The growing prominence of using data to manage risks has led to a tacit internalisation of what types of practices are recognised as legitimate for the disaster governance and internal security fields. Accounting for how the disaster and security fields have evolved because of the practices performed by actors within them is crucial to understanding transnational governance institutions in terms of social fields. The field of disaster governance is centred on or oriented around mitigating the possible future effects of not-yet realised disaster scenarios – its base of knowledge is necessarily imbued with risk management logics. These logics are separate from formal assessments of how much risk is acceptable before action is necessary.

When asking a disaster response bureaucrat what kind of risk management techniques they use, their usual response is that there is a separate department or process for managing risk, or that ‘risk’ is something separate from the everyday attempts to manage future disaster scenarios: ‘I think it may be a question of terminology here, because we do not do risk here’ (Interview 1) was how one senior ECHO bureaucrat put it. Despite the resistance to formal risk management,
institutionalising processes of data collection and analysis aimed at minimising risk into regular governance practices inserts the logics of formal risk management techniques into everyday governance: impact assessment matrixes, monitoring levels of change, automated reporting, centralised communication, etc. These practices are performed by actors of various types all actively participating in the everyday functioning of governance, regardless of whether a disaster has taken place or not.

With the circulation of these practices to new venues, EU institutions have come to rely on their ability to be recognised as leaders in minimising the effects of unknown future disaster scenarios – from economic crises to terrorist attacks and from natural disasters to transportation network blockages – to generate and be seen as being in positions of authority. Authority in these fields is generated and recognised according to how well an actor can be understood as mitigating risks. The process of using data to minimise risks has become doxa or the underlying assumption of what normal behaviour looks like. The underlying structures of understanding that make up a doxa in a field is not universal, however; in order to be treated as a taken-as-given, unspoken-but-tacitly-understood frame for navigating a social field, doxa is shaped by the specific histories and contexts of relations within that social field.

The recognition of authority afforded ECHO and HOME actors who use similar practices in different social fields thus lies in the fact that practices are attributed meaning based on the specific contexts – histories, shared understandings, for example – in which they are performed; they may perhaps exist in different physical settings, but these practices include similar sets of understandings of institutional structures. Actors and recognition are not bound to these specific contexts though. ECHO and HOME personnel represent similar communities of practices, in that the contexts in which their practices are recognised as authoritative are evolving. Practices can and
do often move to new settings and as a result are understood differently until they work to shape
the doxa of their new fields. Practices move, for example, when the actors performing them move
from one social situation to another (Bigo, Bonditti, et al. 2007), playing off of and building on
the histories, ways of thinking, and shared understandings in these new or different types of
settings.

These practices challenge the doxa of their new social fields and settings when they move
and circulate. For Bourdieu’s theory of practices in fields, the slow evolutions that appear at the
surface as tensions or contradictions between actors or ways of doing something within a field
should be understood as indicators of a particular field’s normal, functioning dynamics, though.
Contradictions and competitions are what make up fields. Contradictions between ‘ways of doing’
exist due to the fact that sets of practices are signifiers of particular context-dependent knowledge,
interests, understandings, and structures. By accounting for the contexts and structures of actors in
a social field, ‘we can understand how practices are often internally contradictory or constituted
differently. These misunderstandings can be productive, in the sense that they can create separate
communities around the same event, or even communities in conflict with each other’ (Duvall and
Chowdhury 2011, 347). To reiterate, these ‘communities of practice’ exist when particular ways
of doing things are entrenched and taken as given, where all actors of a given field are performing
practices according to the same logics or according to the same rules of the game – when at given
times, certain ‘types’ of practices are seen to be more useful in a given field than others
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 311).

These competitions or points of conflict are, in fact, over what gets recognised as
authoritative – as the best way of doing something or the best way of understanding something.
Practices that best tackle or most clearly illustrate a problem are those recognised as authoritative
and in turn provide actors with recognised authority. In forming the communities of practice that include this recognition of some practices and actors as authoritative, actors do more than simply share a collective identification; a field conditions how actors act and reveals how this action is shaped by and shapes the relationships within that field. ‘Practices develop, diffuse, and become institutionalised in such collectives [of communities of practice]. A community of practices is a configuration of a domain of knowledge that constitutes like-mindedness…’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011b, 17), in that communities of practice share elements of culture, values, interests, knowledge, or discourse, among other sociological dynamics.

Pouliot explains the concept of a community of practice by using the example of social science researchers, pointing out that ‘Objectivity and validity are not the primordial properties of certain facts or theories: they are socially devised criteria upon which practice communities of social sciences happen to agree’ (Pouliot 2010, 80). The structures within which communities of practice are formed evolve and change and realign over time, though, as the actors performing them begin to perform new types of practices.¹ To extend Pouliot’s example, Flyvbjerg outlined that while objectivity and validity were at one point crucial, authoritative criteria for the field of academic social science research, social science researchers began to expand their repertoire towards different philosophical traditions, realigning what types of criteria were authoritative in that field (Flyvbjerg 2001).

Changes to the structures of a field – and to its doxa, in turn – occur when the dominant forces within that field perform practices which realign the parameters by which the dominated or subjugated actors in that field understand their own positions and practices, usually in relation to the practices and positions of the dominated. The authoritative actors in a field are the only ones

¹ As Mihai puts it, ‘political change comes with changes in the objective world’ (Mihai 2016, 37), where ‘objective world’ here refers to one of Bourdieu’s synonyms for social fields.
with enough combined forms of capital to change the perceptions of the other, dominated actors in that field. While all practices of course alter the relations and structures of a field, the practices performed by recognised authorities most-clearly shape the way that all other actors in a field understand their own and the authoritative relative positions in that field. With this in mind, the realignment of the social structures of the fields of disaster governance and internal security provision are important events in modern transnational governance in Europe. Both ECHO and HOME’s monitoring centres have not only allowed actors in these institutions to assume positions of authority in their fields, but have changed the way other actors in their fields understand the central doxa of those fields, precisely because the structures of the fields in question have evolved as new communities of practice, based on data and risk logics, have emerged and become prominent.

**Changes in ECHO’s Field Dynamics**

Despite their recent success in taking positions as the leaders of disaster response, it used to be that EU-level cooperation in disaster response – as in many policy areas – was difficult. ECHO’s rising status changed that situation, which is why its practices and base of knowledge being circulated to the field of internal security provision is so noteworthy. Disaster response and civil protection were always seen as the capability of states, usually their foreign ministries – thus leading to the plethora of stalled integration projects of the 1990s. The practices of controlling the production of data and using that data to anticipate future disaster scenarios helped ECHO actors normalise the way transnational disaster response was performed in Europe by making it appealing for Member States to cooperate in specific, targeted policy areas without being seen to sacrifice sovereignty.
This has been most notable in the hesitancy of European states to second disaster response trainers to other institutions, which comes from the fact that most training schools are run from the individual Ministries of Interior, or sometimes even the Ministries of Defence – two areas where, in general, bilateral Member State cooperation is lacking. So, when they are asked to train another set of disaster response personnel, whether it be a complimentary force or with members from their own home ranks, they naturally are suspect.

Now, though, it is seen as quite normal to rely on ECHO’s capabilities: since 2007, 92 inter-EU disaster management actions have been coordinated by ECHO, out a total of 186 confirmed disasters. 58 of these were active responses run through ECHO (ECCPM 2012). This list includes, for example, separate calls for assistance occurring for the same event: from 20-22 July 2007, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia, and Greece all requested assistance for the same range of spreading, uncontrollable forest fires; from 29 July to 1 August 2008, Romania and Moldova both requested assistance in response to floods; on 25 and 26 January 2010, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands requested salt for roads, as both countries were hit with a severe snowstorm that depleted their salt stockpiles. In none of these instances was ECHO seen to be infringing on the sovereignty of these European states or understood as anything other than a pooled capability service provider offering extra assistance to states in need, indicating that coordinating disaster response through ECHO at the EU-level has become the norm for how the effects of disasters are managed.

We cannot account for the recognition that ECHO actors are attributed as possessing (in the form of symbolic capital) by looking solely at ECHO personnel themselves. Instead, the real evidence of ECHO actors’ authority is found in how their practices have changed or altered the other actors in their field in such a way that these other actors’ practices reinforce or support those
performed by ECHO personnel. Moreover, the types of position-takings that the other actors in that field can engage in are limited and structured by the doxa, as it is reframed to best reinforce the authority of ECHO actors.

Bourdieuian practice theory helps us understand the implications of ECHO actors’ practices changing the way other actors in their field interact. Fields change according the transformative capacity of practices – fields change because the practices performed within them evolve. Elaborating on the impact of symbolic capital and change in light of practice theory, Adler and Pouliot outline that ‘because practice is suspended between agency and structure, we posit three possible domains of change: in subjectivities (e.g. preferences, dispositions, or intentionality), in practices themselves, or in social orders (e.g. structures, domination patterns, or discourse)’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011b, 18).

The type of change seen in the field of disaster response represent all three types of the changes listed by Adler and Pouliot. Not only are state actors now understanding their own best practices as ones that include ECHO personnel and processes (a change in subjectivities or preferences), but state representatives are communicating and conducting training through ECHO and the ERCC (a change in practices of disaster response) and recognise ECHO training and informal standards as being conducive to best-mitigating the effects of disasters (a change in social orders). Pouliot draws specific attention to this ability to affect change across all three dimensions by specifically highlighting how symbolic capital becomes a kind of ‘meta-capital’, in that it allows actors to ‘change or maintain the rules of the game and endow these rules with a doxic aura of naturalness and legitimacy’ (Pouliot 2010, 34; similar to Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 114).

ECHO’s interactions with other actors in the field reflect these shifting dynamics. The most revealing illustration of ECHO’s recognition as the leader in disaster response is the way the
organisation develops its capacities on a completely voluntary basis. Again, almost all interviewees insisted that keeping the entire process and all participation voluntary was crucial to pushing through even the more drastic advances in developing ECHO’s capabilities. On the fact that ECHO is still a product of the participating state desires, DG personnel are unequivocal: ‘We are coordinating, but we are fully-reliant on participating states’ (Interview 1). While acknowledging their prevalent role in the disaster response field, they insist that the states still control the process.

Side-stepping the common debates about agency in the EU, this point in no way negates or contradicts the Bourdieusian argument here: because all action is a mixture of structural constraints and agential decision-making, the fact that participating states continually participate in an EU project that is instead completely voluntary is incredibly revealing. As one ECHO Head of Unit put it:

In the earlier days of [the Civil Protection Mechanism negotiations], anytime I went to the Council and used the phrase “European coordination”, I would get a *beating* from the Member States, who would say that “[disaster response] is the Member States responsibility, and should not be done at the EU level”. Now, though, whenever I use [the phrase], I get an applause. They all want EU coordination, they all want to work together on this…they all understand the added value of cooperating on something like this (Interview 3).

In fact, the desire to cooperate in these areas is now rarely in question. Negotiations are not so much about whether or not coordination and mutual assistance will happen, but how to professionalise and establish that coordination before a disaster situation happens (Interview 3, 5).
ECHO personnel have thus established and use other actors in their field to maintain a specific set of doxic rules for that field. The habitus and dispositions in the field of disaster governance have been changed to incorporate the idea of voluntary cooperation. What counts as voluntary is not only the rational decision in the interests of an actor, but it is also the structure that helps frame what ‘rational’ and ‘interests’ are for that actor. In this case, the emphasis can or should be on the minimising of disaster response or civil protection as a security (read: important or intensified) issue and instead understanding disaster response as a technical set of operations best tackled cooperatively. Approaching disaster governance as a set of technical questions highlights the structures of knowledge around disaster governance, pointing to how the doxa and shared understanding of the goal of the field of disaster response is no longer about controlling all aspects of disaster response policy (usually in a debate or negotiation between ‘EU level’ and MS representatives), but thinking about it in terms of minimising the risks associated with operations and implementation procedures.

Disaster governance was once understood to be the exclusive purview of national defense or public safety ministries and as a result, cooperation in disaster response operated on a military-security logic of home-based capabilities to respond when a disaster arose. The introduction of anticipatory monitoring for disasters in the ERCC, as well as ECHO personnel’s ability to use this monitoring to demonstrate an ability to mitigate the risks posed by disasters, has altered this military-security logic. Instead, a risk logic for governing disasters has come to reconfigure the field of disaster governance. Reorienting the field of disaster governance around risk logics of anticipation and information collection has led to a situation where the ECHO personnel who are best able to demonstrate their ability to monitor and anticipate the risks of disasters are understood to be authorities in that field. Recognition of ECHO actor authority is made evident by the way
that the other actors in that field are also beginning to change their dispositions and practices in order to better accommodate and bolster the risk monitoring capabilities of ECHO, in turn changing how state representatives understand what it means to cooperate in EU-level disaster governance projects.

**Evolving Field Structures of Internal Security Provision**

In much the same way that ECHO actors’ authority rests in the ability to use data to frame what disasters are and how to best respond to them, HOME’s STAR unit is similarly bringing together sectors of state governments, private industries, and civil society groups that have never shown any interest or progress in cooperating before. HOME actors are using their ability to produce and use data to define security disasters and then demonstrate that they are best suited to coordinate the management of these security disasters. In doing so, HOME personnel are altering the field of internal security provision so that cooperation between security agencies is increasingly becoming a sought-after resource in itself – their practices of data production and management have altered the doxic structures of the field of internal security provision so that cooperating is now considered normal.

The lack of cooperation is especially salient as the transnational security governance field in Europe has been historically reticent to cooperate in any profound way. Policymaking in the highly-scrutinised field of internal security provision traditionally incorporates a much wider range of actors than disaster response: military intelligence and operations experts, policing information and operations personnel, lawyers, human rights activists, intense media scrutiny, infrastructure and critical infrastructure analysts, civil engineers, city planners, airport security companies, border guard agencies, private security firms, airline industry actors, rail and roadway management
companies, academic think tanks, policy tanks, and political party partisan consultants. The list goes on. To this list can be added the layer of DG HOME personnel who are reluctant to share much about their security policymaking procedures with even their other EU counterparts (Interview 1, 3).

These actors are all notoriously secretive and have rarely opt to work together on joint projects larger than a few key stakeholders, or for longer than a year or so. Information sharing for example has a varied history in Europe, with military intelligence cooperation seeing somewhat of an awakening in the last two decades (Pannier 2013, 2015). Police intelligence sharing through Interpol and Europol has long been a source of pride (Europol 2011; see also Den Boer, Hillebrand and Nolke 2008 and Argomaniz 2009). Migration control information has also become relatively standard in the decade since the EU border agency FRONTEX was established (Lavenex and Kunz 2008, Neal 2009, van Munster 2009, Léonard 2010, Williams and Balaz 2012). General EU ‘data directives’ have begun to regulate the flow of information between Member State and EU levels (Bellanova 2014). Even despite these monumental developments in plenary information sharing, though, operational information-sharing has been far less developed, both at military and police levels. Information security procedures remain intensely-protected state capacities. For example, while standard risk and threat analysis reports are widely distributed, their methodologies, the ways that state governments calculate these risks, remain tightly-guarded secrets.

Contrasting with this history of only-limited internal security integration, the field is beginning to look significantly different, due to the restructuring of some of the EU’s pinnacle institutional management rules under the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of governing through disaster risk management data at STAR. One example of this shift has been the increasing roles seen for centres like the Maritime Analysis Coordination Centre (MACC), based in Lisbon, which
shares its information with STAR in Brussels. The MACC is not an EU body, but it represents seven European countries, plus the US. It includes both military and civilian analysis-sharing not only amongst its members, but also with the rest of Europe thanks to its relationship with STAR.

Information sharing on this scale, especially between European and American counterparts is remarkable. First, it is a wholly new development, given that as recently as 2012, joint civil-military capability sharing between European states was virtually non-existent (Pannier and Schmidt 2014). More importantly though, it signals a profound evolution in the structure of the field of internal security provision, in that information sharing is now considered more important than any lingering notion that sharing security information infringes on a state’s sovereignty. Where the doxa of internal security provision was once characterised by limited cooperation and hesitant ad hoc partnerships, it is now shaped by formally institutionalised information sharing.

An additional example of the realignment of the security field is that, by virtue of ECHO now participating in general crisis management tasks, ECHO has been set up as a supporting institution to DG HOME when it comes to internal EU crisis management operations. These realignments of the two fields have implications for the ‘Solidarity Clause’ of the Lisbon Treaty, which outlines the parameters by which Member States are obliged to offer or provide assistance to another Member States if they need it – where ‘assistance’ can mean a variety of things depending on the instance. While the specific meaning of a ‘call for assistance’ is still debated by European lawmakers (Interviews 4, 6), EU Parliament personnel are indicating that ECHO’s ERCC will act as an ‘entry point’ (Interviews 6, 8, 9) for mobilising the Solidarity Clause due to its role in coordinating emergency response. Key to this institutional linkage is ECHO actors’ current ability to monitor an emergency situation and use CECIS to coordinate a response amongst the Member States as needed. In this arrangement, STAR’s members will liaise closely with the
ERCC and act as the filter through more sensitive data will pass up to Commission-level executives (Interview 6; COM 179 2013, 15-16).

Another recent case illustrates this ongoing restructuring of the field. In November 2013, Bulgaria appealed to both the EU’s FRONTEX border agency’s European Border Guard Teams (an agency and response team under DG HOME’s jurisdiction) and ECHO to help cope with the growing refugee crisis caused largely by Syrians fleeing their home country’s civil war – the first time that a Member State had appealed for the intervention of both of these institutions simultaneously. The Bulgarian case highlights that in a field which has long been reluctant to share any operational data, it is becoming a ‘new normal’ for Ministries of the Interior to share their police intelligence gathering and risk assessment methods both with each other and STAR, but also with the ERCC – an institution that would never have previously been included in security response negotiations. The broadening of who counts as a legitimate responder to security crises, in this case an institutions set up to monitor for natural disasters, represents a notable evolution in the previously-closed off field of internal security provision in Europe.

These field restructurings have been the specific result of ECHO and HOME placing themselves in central positions in their respective fields and doing so in such a way that their input or guidance is now required in the normal functioning of those fields.

**STRATEGIES OF CENTRALISATION**

The fields of European disaster governance and internal security provision are being restructured because of the types of practices actors perform in them. Practices that are recognised as authoritative are not only altering the perceptions of other actors in fields, but realigning the
structures of fields themselves so that those authoritative practices continue to be understood and recognised as authoritative. The use of data for risk monitoring at ECHO and HOME have created their own category of practice for how to become an authority in modern transnational governance settings, involving centralising a field around a new set of practices recognised to be authoritative. ECHO and HOME data monitors accomplished this by ensuring that their respective fields were restructured in such a way as to place their monitoring personnel directly central so that all future field relationships are framed in terms of their ability to use data to anticipate risks. Actors from these two DGs deployed a strategy specifically designed to ensure their practices of data production and use in anticipating future disaster scenarios became intrinsic parts to their respective fields.

Linking the practices of mitigating disasters with the practices for mitigating other forms of threats means treating two very different types of phenomena in an increasingly similar fashion. Disaster response is treated as a technical issue requiring data sets to account for risks, thus sidestepping questions about legitimacy in favour of efficacy. This has meant that ECHO has been able to partially restructure their field to ensure the other actors are in favour of standardisation, integration, and coordination, something that has been more successful at ECHO than in more immediately-contentious policy areas. Now that these practices of technical implementation have begun to migrate or circulate – not necessarily copied, but transposed, merged, and re-used – in the more politically-salient field of EU internal security, relying on the ‘technical’ or ‘apolitical’ nature of these practices is suspect and no longer viable. Things that appear to be mere technical quirks or specific trends, are in fact intrinsically social, power-laden practices of jostling for position in a political field of international actor-EU actor-state actor negotiations.
These fields have been restructured around using data to monitor risks, leading the actors who are seen as most competent at using data to monitor risks to become authorities. More than that though, the restructuring of the fields also determines how those authoritative actors maintain their positions of authority. It now makes more sense to cooperate at the EU-level because the type and volume of risk data that can be processed at the transnational level is so much higher than that which can be done in any one state. ECHO, and then HOME, actors strategically assumed central positions in their fields, institutionalising and formally entrenching their central positions and roles legally if necessary, in order to monopolise their access to risk data. These actors assume central positions in their fields by using their authoritative practices as a strategy of maintaining that authority – their authority begets the restructuring of the field’s dynamics and relative position-taking to beget more of their own authority.

**ERCC as Central Authorities among Disaster Monitors and Coordinators**

ECHO provides an excellent illustration of these dynamics. ECHO actors built upon their existing social capital and networks to develop agreements and partnerships with a host of international disaster monitoring bodies, all of which run their monitoring systems through the ERCC. These monitors can be broadly classified as General Disaster Monitors, Specific Disaster Monitors, Disaster Mapping Services, Emergency Communications Systems, and Emergency News Agencies. Some General Disaster Monitors include the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), the ARGUS centre, International Charter, the JRC-developed Interactive Disaster Analysis System, the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), and most importantly, the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) – Figure 5.1 demonstrates which monitoring bodies fit under each category. The more Specific Disaster Monitors, usually
designed by the JRC specifically for the ERCC, include Meteoalarm Europe, the Network of European Meteorological Services (EUMETNET), the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS), the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), the Radioactivity Monitoring Centre, and even the EEAS Consular Crisis Management Division, Consular Online (COOL). This is in addition to partnership monitoring done with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Disaster Monitors</th>
<th>Specific Disaster Monitors</th>
<th>Disaster Mapping Systems</th>
<th>Emergency Communication Systems</th>
<th>Emergency New Agencies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS)</td>
<td>Meteoalarm Europe</td>
<td>UNOSAT</td>
<td>Commission Emergency Communication Information System (CECIS)</td>
<td>EXIM Breaking News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGUS Centre</td>
<td>Network of European Meteorological Services (EUMETNET)</td>
<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>Virtual OSOCC</td>
<td>Reuters’ AlertNet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Charter</td>
<td>European Flood Awareness System (EFAS)</td>
<td>Seithel</td>
<td>European Disaster Response Information System (EDRIS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interactive Disaster Analysis System</td>
<td>European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS)</td>
<td>CRED’s EM-DAT International Disaster Database</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Disaster Center (POC)</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)</td>
<td>Copernicus Emergency Mapping system</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)</td>
<td>Radioactivity Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Consular Crisis Management Division, Consular Online (COOL)</td>
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**Figure 5.1: Categories of ERCC Monitors**

Once one of these monitors has picked up an unfolding disaster, the material capital of the ERCC comes into play, as the centre houses a number of other monitoring systems that are then referred to for more information. They include the Disaster Mapping Services, such as the UNOSAT and UNITAR maps in support of humanitarian assistance, developed at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the East and South Asian Satellite Disaster Mapping
system, Sentinel, CRED’s EM-DAT International Disaster Database, or the Copernicus Emergency Mapping system – the satellite mapping system, a joint venture between the European Space Agency and European Environment Agency. After these additional monitors are consulted, the ERCC begins putting together its emergency communication package, run through CECIS, the Common Emergency Communication and Information System, to prepare for a responder request. This process also includes comparing the conclusions the ERCC is drawing from its monitoring tools with those gathered from other Emergency Communications Systems: the UN’s version of CECIS, the Virtual OSOCC, as well as the European Disaster Response Information System (EDRIS). If needed, they also refer to their two integrated Emergency News Agencies: EMM Breaking News, which is updated every ten minutes, and Reuters’ AlertNet.

These monitors all run through the ERCC, though some of them were part of the old MIC. Of course, all of these ERCC-based monitoring systems are in addition to those in individual countries, even outside of the EU, which have their own monitoring systems that are often linked through the ERCC. One example of this is the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) of the Philippines; this was particularly useful with the onset of Typhoon Haiyan on 7 November 2013, allowing the ERCC to have two responders on the ground in the country by the morning of 8 November – a medical expert to assess health services needs and a medical administrator to begin establishing an on-site triage centre.

In addition to using their social and material capital and transforming it into a central, authoritative position among disaster risk monitors, the ERCC allows ECHO actors to build on their cultural and economic capital to take a central role in the way disasters are responded to. This

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2 Some of these older systems are EUMETNET, the EFAS, the EFFIS, the IDAS, the EDRIS, and even the actual screens being used now coming from the older ARGUS – which, interestingly, was set up in 2005 to perform the exact function that the ERCC does now, as a holistic centralised disaster monitor for the EU, but ended up focusing only on severe weather systems.
means drawing on the expertise of a number of disaster response agencies run through the ERCC. First, the Disaster Mapping Services, Emergency Communications Systems, and Emergency News Agencies listed above also help the ERCC co-ordinate disaster response efforts. Whether it is by helping the ERCC generate its own maps of ongoing crises, putting the ERCC in touch with other disaster responders, or disseminating the news of a new disaster, all three help the ERCC respond to a situation, in addition to their roles contributions as information-sources for monitoring.

In the actual deployment of disaster responders, ECHO works with two other bodies: the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR), which coordinates political pressure, media attention, or more general press releases of how the EU’s bodies are responding to a crisis, as well as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The OCHA is an umbrella office that runs a number of disaster-mitigation programs, including the UNDAC monitoring system listed above, as well as UNDAC’s operational-response teams. Being a UN office, however, means that despite the relatively substantial financial support it receives, its actual capacity to provide responders is completely reliant on countries offering their support and is often too slow for the types of disasters concerned. These connections are further supplemented by the longer-term disaster responders that ECHO coordinates with, such as ReliefWeb (also a part of UNOCHA) or the UN Financial Tracking System, which tracks international aid flows – information that ECHO uses when trying to establish the areas most in need when affected by a disaster. Figure 5.2 illustrates the position that the ERCC allows ECHO actors to take in the field of disaster response, thanks to these monitoring and response capabilities.
The ERCC’s response coordination role exists in tandem with other international disaster responders and the participating states of the ERCC, who have their own responder competencies usually based on specialized training programs. Each participating state tends to have areas of response training and operations they are particularly known for – for example, the Portuguese and Spanish schools are known for having reputable forest fire and tsunami response training programs, while the German schools tend to be seen as being more efficient in urban search and rescue training (Interviews 1, 5). Because of this differentiated expertise, the participating state academies are encouraged to cooperate and trade training program instructors. This hands-off method of coordination again underscores the ECHO approach of being able to instill support and cooperation without instilling strict regulation – another capability afford to ECHO actors because of the central role their training programmes play within the field. In this light, the ERCC is
transforming an opportunity cost – an economic resource – into recognition, in that it amalgamates and creates teams of disaster responders with different types of training, thereby letting individual states not worry about the cost of training their personnel in every type of disaster response capability. This transfer of the costs also confers upon the ERCC a type of legitimacy by the participating states, that they can trust their trainers to be seconded to an ERCC training or deployment mission and know that it will be a benefit.

**STAR is Central to Internal Security Provision**

Unlike in the case of DG ECHO, DG HOME actors do not fully control access to the data they receive, as this data originates in third-party agencies. Instead, DG HOME actors have worked to centralise all of this data through STAR and restricted who has access to the full sets of amalgamated data. This is explicitly STAR’s mandate: its primary function is receiving weekly, daily, or even more frequent risk or intelligence packages from the individual centres. Being in a position to control access to this data is an example of the central role that STAR occupies, as operational information sharing has been very hesitant throughout EU-level institutional partnerships at both military and police levels. Information security procedures remain intensely protected state capacities. While standard risk and threat analysis reports are widely distributed, their methodologies and technologies used to develop the ways that EU and it member state governments calculate these risks, remain tightly guarded secrets. That all of these types of reports are sent to one location is a pivotal moment in the way EU institutions gather and store data.

Given the EU’s Byzantine institutional structure, STAR is situated centrally amongst a number of diverse security actors. Just as monitors working through the ERCC can be organised by the functions they perform, monitors working through STAR can be broadly broken down into similar categories. First, the Intelligence Monitors that send regular foreign, domestic, and military
intelligence reports to STAR include the External Action Service’s (EEAS) Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), the Europol Analysis System (EAS), and individual MS intelligence agencies – most prominently the various UK, French, and German intelligence agencies. Second, the Border Security and Migration Tracking monitors that regularly report border-crossing information to STAR include the FRONTEX border agency’s Risk Analysis Unit (RAU), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). These three units work closely with the reporting bodies from the different Member State border agencies and share this information with STAR, as well. Third, of course, there are the monitoring updates from more traditional sources of internal security provision, the General Policing agencies, which include EUROPOL’s Scanning, Analysis and Notification (SCAN) system, Interpol’s international criminal-tracking system, and the various levels of Member State policing and paramilitary agencies.

In addition to these monitors, STAR also collects regular intelligence or risk analyses from more specific issue-areas. This includes, for example, Drug Trafficking information from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU), or the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), as well as receiving updates from the EEAS Consular Crisis Management Division, Consular Online (COOL) – which, interestingly, is linked through to the ERCC as well. STAR also collects updates from less-obvious internal security actors: the DG for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) and DG ENER – responsible for EU energy policy – both send regular updates. MOVE sends reports from its numerous agencies: the European Maritime Safety Agency, the European Aviation Safety Agency, the European Railway Agency, and the Trans-European Transport Network Executive
Agency. ENER similarly sends reports from the Euratom Safeguards Office, monitoring nuclear safety in the EU.

When it comes to responding to a crisis or situation as it arises and is tracked by STAR and its constituent bodies, STAR does not call for a personnel deployment itself – it does not have that mandate. The centre is run, officially, under HOME’s Crisis Management and Fight against Terror unit, part of its larger Risk Assessment and Analysis Directorate. It does not have a ‘legal basis’ – which means it does not act independently of the unit to which it belongs – and instead is bound to the institutional agreements HOME has with other EU agencies. This means that while it cannot directly call for or control a deployment in a given situation the way the ERCC can, STAR is responsible for communicating the need to respond to other security providers, and passing on the information it deems relevant to allow them to respond.

In practice, this means HOME lies at the heart of the individual responding capacities of the agencies and Member States that it cooperates with as well. It holds this central position by collecting the flagged reports or assessments from STAR and using its institutional cooperation personnel to work with the responders, passing crucial information through those channels. These responders include FRONTEX’s teams, the various EUROPOL task forces, EEAS-run intervention teams, which can combine military with civilian personnel as needed, and of course, the various individual Member State police, paramilitary, military, and border guard forces.

For both HOME and ECHO, these acts of centralisation, accompanied by the logics of risk that underpin them, have contributed to why ECHO and HOME are seen as valued among actors in the various fields of EU institutional governance. Actors who use data to manage risk and then centralise this data use into central or pivotal institutional positions have both generated their own authority and defined how the other actors in those fields recognise authority. Other actors defer
to those in ECHO and HOME because ECHO and HOME have entrenched data governance in these central hubs and use the resources available to them to become such pivotal figures in disaster response that every decision and all data passes directly through them. This positioning is the crucial part of how ECHO actors – and with their approach circulating to other areas of the EU, other EU institutional actors as well – were able to not only establish recognition as authorities, but define what practices would lend themselves to authority recognition.

**GENERATING AND MAINTAINING AUTHORITY**

Actors at ECHO and HOME leveraged their status as recognised authorities to entrench their processes centrally in their respective fields. This is what makes the circulation of risk-oriented practices to the field of EU internal security provision so interesting, not for what it says about EU internal security itself, but as a trend for how wider political institutions are beginning to operate, both inside and outside the EU: data is being centralised into ‘command centres’, ‘monitoring hubs’, or some other form of centralised governing unit in order to anticipate what type of policy response will be needed to manage an unknown future situation. These centralised monitoring hubs – seen in organisations as different as the EEAS, HOME, ECHO, and MOVE, and elsewhere in transnational politics like the World Bank’s GFDRR – coordinate their larger organisations and are usually small sub-units or small departments located at the very bottom echelons of the organisational charts. These minor formal positions contrast heavily with their de facto relative positions in their respective fields.

These hubs often act as central managers of information and data within their organisations and impact the way their organisations interact with other institutions. Although appearing to be
insignificant departments, these centres usually have access to all the information and data of their organisation and are thus much more central to decision making structures than their formal organisational positions would suggest. Indeed, they are central not only to the flow of information within their own organisation, but also to the way their organisations interact with other organisations, since the principle institutional cooperation personnel are housed there as well. While previous chapters outlined the specific ways that the ERCC and STAR actors positioned their centres at the core of the data flow of their respective fields, comparing their functional position with their official organisational position provides a further set of insights into their larger impact and authority in their respective policy fields.

All of the practices and positioning by ECHO actors should be understood as a strategy of position-taking that allowed them to control the flow of the data used to manage risks. That is the key element of this centralisation of data governance: practices of centralisation are understood as collecting information and data to best monitor for and anticipate future events; the centralisation itself is about positioning to better use information to govern through risk. Practices of risk management, in the form of data management, are part of how authority is claimed in European transnational politics. ECHO actors centralised the production, management, and use of data into its ERCC to be seen as the best mitigators of the risks posed by natural disasters and as a result, have an exclusive claim over how their own authority will be maintained in that field. Following that model, HOME actors created the STAR centre to centralise and reproduce, manage, and use risk and intelligence data in order to decide what types of data posed the most significant risks to EU internal security. In both cases, actors were using data to receive the recognition that they are the best in their fields at doing something and then placing themselves in a position so that the daily workings of their fields operated through them and used their data.
This is a clear strategy that both sets of ECHO and HOME actors have used, centralising themselves in their respective fields in order to maintain their authoritative status. To reiterate, strategy here does not mean rational calculations of cost-benefit, but refers to decision making by these actors to use the resources available to them in order to establish themselves and maintain their status as authorities in their fields. Strategies are neither ‘obedience to a norm explicitly posited and obeyed [nor] of regulation exerted by an unconscious “model”’ (Nice 2005, 15).

Without being a rational judgement or a subconscious automated response, dominant or authoritative actors in fields do use the forms of capital to which they have access in order to ensure that the field structure benefits or supports their continued assumption of their authoritative positions.

The approach used by ECHO and HOME personnel to achieve this followed four steps, which can be seen as a four step strategy for generating and maintaining authority in European transnational modern political settings. First, they were able to have their practices recognised as authoritative, as possessing symbolic capital, based on their displayed expertise at minimising the effects of unknown future events. Second, they changed the way other actors in their fields understood and interpreted legitimate or productive action in fields by altering the base of knowledge of their fields. Third, they restructured the field to entrench their practices centrally, institutionalising them formally into favourable functional positions within their respective legal organisational structures. Finally fourth, these restructurings monopolise the access to data that this central position affords ECHO and HOME personnel, allowing them exclusive continued access to the forms of capital that helped them assume positions of authority in the first place.

Being recognised as possessing symbolic power in the disaster governance and internal security provision fields relies on both being seen as the best at doing something and defining how
all others recognise what is the best approach for doing that same thing. Being the best risk mitigators is not enough to be attributed symbolic power. Using data to produce, manage, and mitigate risks is key: by defining the risks through controlling the production and dissemination of data, EU-level actors can then display themselves as being the best at mitigating risks. By establishing the base of knowledge for a given social field, these actors are not only accessing symbolic capital, but defining how it is distributed. These authoritative actors, in turn, can then entrench and institutionalise their relative positions into the normal, everyday working of the field so that the capabilities they possess are considered to be authoritative moving forward – effectively negating any competing claims for authority.

CONCLUSION

The trend towards centralisation currently seen in the disaster governance and internal security provision fields further highlights that authority in transnational politics, especially of the kind seen in Europe, needs to be thought of more carefully. New technological advances allow data to play an ever-growing role in how authority is understood, generated, and maintained in European transnational governance settings; data are also tools enabling other logics and knowledges of governance authority generation to take root. While ‘dynamic’ may not be a word used to define EU politics in most circles, when taking seriously the day to day workings of how EU-level decisions are made, it is clear that processes of EU authority are not static, but dynamic, generative, and relational. Looking at the use of data to enable risk management practices to take hold highlights the need, then, to understand the sociological dimension of how authority is generated and maintained.
This chapter argued that risk management should be understood as a broad category of practice and that by demonstrating proficiency in entrenching and institutionalising the effective management of risk, actors are generating relationships of authority that break with more traditional narratives coming from International Relations (IR) scholarship on modern European politics. Using the trend towards collecting the production, use, and dissemination of data into central hubs as a basis, the chapter argued that DG ECHO and DG HOME actors were able to establish themselves into positions so that their status as recognised authorities in their respective fields is maintained. The concluding chapter will unpack the major themes of authority, risk, and EU institutional politics explored thus far and argue that it is only by reorienting its understanding of authority as a pre-given quantity can IR understand the impact on understanding power relations that modern trends such as an increasing reliance on data to frame policy decisions are having.
CONCLUSION:

RISK, DATA, AND CHANGES IN TRANSNATIONAL AUTHORITY

The authority vested in European transnational disaster and internal security governance institutions is a dynamic, evolving relationship between social actors possessing differing levels and types of power and resources. By approaching policy areas of transnational concern as semi-distinct social fields, changes to these authority relationships can be seen as changes in the structure of how policy fields work – and with them, changes to the orientations and positions of the actors that populate those fields. We need to differentiate and specify forms of authority in Europe and their bases, their generation and endurance, and in doing so, eschew grand narratives about authority being vested in abstract or traditional social norms of ‘democratic legitimacy’ or ‘legal sovereignty’. Definitions or assumptions of authority cannot be separated from the context-specific ways in which authority is enacted by specific actors and based on specific histories of relationships between different types of actors. The project used the cases of DG ECHO and DG HOME to illustrate how EU institutions are using data to monitor for risks in an attempt to generate and maintain relationships of relative authority over the other actors in their policy fields.

Disaster governance was once a field with almost no systematic coordination between state and transnational institutions, but actors from DG ECHO were able to use their ability to anticipate and mitigate the effects of disaster risks to become recognised authorities in their field. They were able to maintain these authoritative positions by reorienting the preferences of other actors in their field. ECHO actors restructured their field so that the ability to develop and use data to mitigate the risks posed by future disasters was understood by the other actors in their field as authoritative, as a form of capital worthy of an authoritative position. This conceptual reorientation led to the
disaster governance field itself being de facto restructured so that all disaster monitoring and response coordination practices included DG ECHO processes and personnel – ECHO actors were placed centrally in the functioning of that field.

Similarly, transnational coordination in internal security provision has long been a weak area of EU integration or bipartisan cooperation more generally. Thanks the homology created between ECHO actors and personnel from DG HOME, which meant a shared preference for producing and managing data about future risks, HOME actors similarly established their own data monitoring centre. The new centre allowed HOME staff to collect data to assess the risks of possible future security disasters. Deploying data management for monitoring practices was a specific strategy by which HOME employees were likewise able to become recognised by the other actors in their field as authoritative. Their authoritative status meant they were able to restructure that field so that their use of data in risk monitoring was a central or key feature to how that field operates, with all risk data produced by other actors in that field flowing through HOME’s monitoring centre.

While the substance of the negotiations for implementing risk monitoring systems were specific to these two cases, the conclusions that we can draw from these processes are illustrative of larger transnational evolutions in authority relationships, especially as they are understood in the contemporary European political system. Transnational authority in these settings is contingent on the ability to use advanced data to monitor for future risks and mitigate the effects of these risks accordingly. This ability is housed in monitoring centres that coordinate the production and use of the data used to mitigate risks. The common thread between these types of centres is that they rely on modern advanced bureaucracies to have the capabilities to develop the types of data production systems needed to monitor for risks.
In addition to the centres explored in this project, the European transnational system has seen a particular proliferation of these centralised monitoring centres, from the External Action Service’s Intelligence and Situation Centre to DG MOVE’s Connecting Europe Facility to FRONTEX’s Risk Analysis Unit. While there are analysts approaching these centres as some form of middle ground approach to security integration (Davis Cross 2011) or a dispersed responsibilisation governance technique (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010), the insights from these approaches do not often stretch beyond the confines of the EU. EU studies as an academic discipline remains treated as marginal to IR – a vibrant field on its own, but one largely isolated from other areas of political science. This is unfortunate since questions at the heart of much of EU integration studies (power dynamics of inter-group cooperation, actor identification, structure-agent problems, and most importantly, how patterns of authority change over time) are central to the larger study of IR.

The present dissertation challenged this divide by using a specific series of events in EU politics – DGs ECHO and HOME each establishing centralised monitoring centres to produce and manage data about future natural and manmade disasters – to draw parallels to a larger evolution in the function of transnational authority in Europe. This concluding chapter explores what these transformations can reveal about the daily, quotidian operations of European Union institutions in Europe and about the changing character of authority both in the European political system and in its study by IR.
THE ARGUMENT

Much of prevailing IR theory has difficulty accounting for authority in the EU. Often assuming that governance authority rests solely in the traditional sovereignty of the Member States (Hoffman 1982, Mearsheimer 1990, Keohane and Hoffman 1991), or else seeing EU authority as a legally delegated, prescribed entity (Moravcsik 1993, Abbott and Snidal 2000), many IR analysts of the EU and its authority suffer from some combination of three limitations. First, IR research does not always properly address the genesis or maintenance of authority in specific policy areas. Second, many IR works either do not take seriously or do not fully appreciate the importance of the daily workings of EU policymaking, which is done through a series of ongoing meetings and consultations with a wide number of actors. Third, many IR studies of EU authority discount the way that authority in Europe is in a constant state of flux as a result of the daily workings of EU institutions and their differentiated policymaking processes. These three inadequacies of course limit what IR research can reveal about EU governance.

Understanding authority as a relationship between different types of actors in different types of relative social positions, however, counters these limitations in IR literature. Accounting for relationships of authority necessarily changes the scholarly focus from what authority ‘does’ in a causal way towards highlighting the specific practices that generate and maintain authority in any given setting. Bourdieu’s theory of practices in fields is a useful analytic tool for accounting for this process, because it helps us to interrogate the specific concepts or logics at play in a social field to understand how authority is generated and maintained in those social fields. In the specific fields of disaster governance and internal security provision, risk is that logic – the ability to manage risks plays a crucial role in establishing and reinforcing authority relationships. Accounting for what risk has done in those two fields means understanding that risk has an
inherently social dimension – it changes the social relations of actors deploying is logics and implementing its practices. Understanding risk’s impact also entails approaching risk as a form of resource or capital, as a base or mode of understanding, or as a category or strategy of practice, where risk performs these sets of functions in establishing authority relationships in the disaster governance and internal security provision fields – the two case studies used in this project.

Personnel working at the DG ECHO generated authority by establishing the ERCC to monitor for the risks of future disasters. This led to a situation where the actors who have access to specific resources or forms of capital are understood by others in that field to best minimise the risks posed by disasters – and as a result, to be recognised as authorities in the disaster governance field because of this perceived ability to manage risks. Putting aside the concern that these same actors define the risks they are seen as mitigating, the resources they mobilise are crucial. Having the capacity to manage risks should be approached as a set of resources that may not include explicit risk management logics, but which are combined to instill the effects of mitigating risks when they are deployed in their social settings.

After the successful integration of EU-coordinated disaster governance, a policy area assumed to be staunchly under the purview of Member State jurisdiction, a similar integration model has been seen at DG HOME. In a conscious, deliberate attempt to mirror the changes happening in the disaster governance field, DG HOME personnel established their own information hub which collects risk data from a number of different sources around the EU. Personnel at this STAR unit analyse data through their own in-house metrics and use it to justify policy responses to socio-political phenomena happening around the world. This circulation of practices, or this use of similar institutional position-taking, not only allowed STAR employees to become internal security authorities because of their access to sensitive data, but this also drew
extra attention to the key role that data and the control of data’s production and use plays in how both ECHO and HOME personnel were able to become recognised as authorities in their respective fields. What binds these two fields together in their reliance on data is the logics behind the data’s use, namely the way actors produce, collect, and rely on this data to anticipate future natural and manmade disasters and acting pre-emptively to minimise the effects of these unknown future scenarios.

Once ECHO and HOME actors were able to secure recognised authority from their counterparts in their fields, they used their information centres to reconfigure how their respective fields operated so that those hubs were de facto central to the daily running of those policy areas. In ECHO’s case, the ERCC collects data from various disaster monitoring systems, uses its in-house communication system to alert response personnel when a disaster situation has occurred, and then coordinates the deployment of disaster responders on the ground – granting it the position of being the central pivot through which disaster governance turns. Similarly, HOME’s STAR personnel collect and analyse constant risk and intelligence data and when a security crisis is underway or looming, they alert their superiors who can call for an operational deployment if need be, similarly placing STAR as the central filter through which security risk data flows in Europe. Because both disaster governance and internal security provision are areas with historically low levels of transnational integration, the central positions assumed by these institutions is noteworthy because both ECHO and HOME actors were able to restructure the field so that not only are state actors now understanding their own best practices as ones that include EU-level ECHO and HOME personnel and processes (a change in subjectivities or preferences), but state representatives are communicating and conducting training through the ERCC and STAR (a change in practices) and
recognise EU-coordinated activities as being conducive to best-mitigating the effects of disasters and security crises (a change in the structure of the social orders).

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU, AUTHORITY, AND BEYOND**

The evolution of EU disaster and internal security governance practices to use centralised data to monitor for risks challenges common conceptions of politics in Europe. With that, ECHO and HOME actor authority generation and maintenance entails three implications: for how we understand authority to be practiced in the modern European system; for the relationship between data and the ability to generate and maintain authority; and for moving beyond the limitations posed by existing IR approaches to complex and multi-level transnational governance concerns.

The changes outlined above to the European disaster governance and internal security provision fields are evolutions in the structural relations that define those fields. While a number of different practices of data management allow expertise and authority claims to be recognised by others in their fields, actors from both DGs were able to use their authority to restructure their fields to justify policy decisions that they themselves are set to benefit from. What these actors did in each case was take advantage of their positions as authorities – as having the capital to be understood as authorities – in order to change the structures and preferences of actors within those fields so that using data to monitor for future risks was seen as the best practice for governing their respective policy areas – thus ensuring their sustained exclusive claim to authority in those fields.

Importantly, this ECHO method of generating authority is not only a question of economic resources. Reducing the costs of disasters is an important part of pooling capabilities at the EU level, but is far from the only or most important reason. Put another way, for example, pooling the
costs of disaster response emergency transportation is not in and of itself why ECHO actors became recognised as authorities. When pooling transportation costs is placed within the larger context of coordinating emergency transportation centrally, though, ECHO actors can be understood as minimising the risks posed by disasters because of an enhanced deployment capability. By combining their material, economic, social, and cultural resources to provide an enhanced disaster monitoring and response capability, ECHO personnel have been recognised as minimising the risks posed by disasters – and with it, they have become recognised as authorities in the disaster governance field thanks to that perceived ability.

The latest attempts to build an EU disaster governance capability, explored in this project, were successful because they paired cutting costs with a display of established expertise in other areas in order to gain ‘buy in’ from the other actors in their field. The other actors in that field needed to recognise ECHO personnel as being experts in a number of different areas, which included reducing the costs of deployment, in order for ECHO actors to be understood as authorities in that field. Expanding this beyond the current scope, understanding transnational cooperation is not just about calculating tangible opportunity costs, but is arguably more about the symbolic recognition of best practices by other actors in your field.

Authority in transnational governance settings is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated through the everyday ways that state, IO, NGO, and corporate representatives interact. By not being attuned to these processes, much of IR has limited what transnational phenomena it can properly address. More than a mere trading bloc, the patterns of transnational governance institutions currently seen in Europe span radically different policy areas and represent different types and levels of transnationally-rooted authority relationships – i.e.: authority relationships that exist beyond the confines of individual states. While some EU bodies may enjoy
a specific legal basis for their integration, the patterns of negotiating authority in individual policy areas are remarkably similar across the different EU institutions, regardless of their legal status: supranational institutions oriented around inclusive negotiating; consultative policymaking approaches; or variable levels of participation, integration, and implementation of policies. IR often misses detailed accounts of these processes by assuming political authority lies in a prescribed legal or normative basis rooted in sovereignty, and as a result, some IR accounts tend to misunderstand the specific fluctuations and contestations for authority between state, transnational, corporate, or other representatives happening in the most advanced of modern democracies.

This project used the cases of DG ECHO and HOME and their evolving, spreading roles in institutional governance fields to unpack the major themes of authority, risk, and transnational politics in European politics. The scholarly field of International Relations must reorient its understanding of authority as a pre-given quantity in order to understand the impact that modern trends of data use in policymaking are having on the relationships between polities of different types. Relying on antiquated notions of authority vested in abstract legal or democratic norms means IR misunderstands the myriad forms that legitimate authority takes in modern advanced democracies. These are types of wider implications that make the current focused, specific, context-dependent work so important.

The use of data or information to make policy decisions is hardly noteworthy. Questions do arise, though, when the production and use of massive amounts of data is geared specifically towards justifying specific policy capabilities. The two cases examined in this project traced the way data is analysed through a logic of risk in order to generate authority for these analysts, importantly noting the fact that this is an approach shared between disaster governance and internal
security provision policy fields. This linking of disasters with the wider array of security concerns is troubling, though, especially in light of the consistent ‘ratcheting up’ (Ericson 2007) of security procedures in the name of the global war on terror. As more policy decisions are based on data, and data is likewise produced and used to justify policy decisions, particular attention should be paid to the role of data more generally in transnational politics. The production and use of data, its provenance, in particular should be of concern for international political studies as agencies continue to use data in varying and complex ways. It is one thing to have evidence-based policymaking, but it is quite another when evidence or data is being specifically tailored to legitimise or expand the existing policy capabilities of transnational governance institutions.

Far from being an endorsement of data-driven approaches to generating authority then, the current project sought to expand understandings of authority in order to elicit further sustained academic scrutiny on modern forms of governance that transcend borders and are not bound to national jurisdictions. Modern politics, especially in advanced democracies, has become increasingly deterritorialised and is evolving. In order for IR as a discipline to be able to track these changes, the field must rethink its assumptions of principle actors, sources of legitimacy, and conceptions of power – all of which are concepts too-often taken as having static or unproblematic meanings. Recognising the inherently fluid, dynamic, and changing nature of modern international politics draws attention to how problematic these static concept definitions can be.

Particularly troubling with regard to these static definitions is that any approach to research that interrogates and tries to develop a general account for the relationship between actors representing different polities needs to properly account for what this means in the everyday minutiae of how governance in these polities actually works. Many frameworks focus on the outcomes of interactions, methodologically-speaking, instead of the driving factors of those
interactions. They are interested in results, outcomes, and how things end up between different types of political actors. With this focus, these approaches lose important aspects of why a particular way of doing things came about at a specific time, as well as the inter-organisational nuances that dictate and influence behaviour in the first place. The current dissertation sought to circumvent these pitfalls through an emphasis on processes and practices, informed by a reflexive theoretical stance, in order to understand how a logic of governance actually works and impacts the social fields in which it takes root. This is the benefit of using the theoretical framework emphasising practices in fields, which allows researchers to trace the actual daily use of a governance approach in the settings they want to explore. By accounting for the types of practices that take place in fields, as well as the meanings that field actors give to those practices, things that appear as tensions or contradictions at the surface can actually be quite easily understood as indicators of a particular field’s dynamics.

Paying attention to authority as a generated relationship between actors points to some of the other basic suppositions of IR. For one, if we recognise that authority is a relational quality that defines or structures interactions between socio-political units, it forces us to confront the reality that evolutions of institutions and institutional behaviours are much more fluid than their formal organisational changes would indicate – we cannot necessarily look at changes in formal international organisational structures as being indicative of all of the institutional changes they purport to represent. Whether analysing hegemonic trade monopolies of the World Trade Organization or the creeping governance control of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the transnational governance relationships must be recognised as ongoing negotiations of authority and control between actors of different types.
These challenges to core IR concepts underscore this project’s International Political Sociology approach, opening up central tenets of current thinking about international politics for further research as much as foreclosing discussion or drawing specific, narrow conclusions. In eschewing formal EU studies literature in favour of rooting the project in IR, the IPS approach allowed this dissertation to use the insights about a specific EU case study to highlight current inadequacies in IR understandings of modern European politics. By broadening or contributing to the expansion of IR’s ability to understand and account for EU politics, the dissertation challenged taken for granted definitions in order to uncover patterns and meaning in political groupings, all while avoiding the pitfalls of trying to establish overly-general theoretical conclusions from isolated, context-dependent cases – an exercise that would be a welcome sight in larger IR research.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


