Ethnic Conflict and Contemporary Social Mobilization: Exploring Motivation and Political Action in the Sri Lankan Diaspora

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the MA degree in Political Science.

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Abstract

Members of the diaspora are conflict actors with an agency that is important to include in conflict theories and analysis of international relationships. Scholarship suggests its origins, and thereafter changes in the conflict cycle effect decision-making and mobilization in the diaspora, but the conditions and mechanisms that inform these processes are undertheorized. The Sri Lankan conflict and its Toronto based diasporas are used to explore processes of diasporization and mobilization in the context a changed political landscape. A series of semi-structured interviews and a short survey asks respondents to assess their motivations for mobilization. The comparative work is within and between ethnic groups. New Institutionalism underscores this project. Butler’s (2001) epistemology, Brinkerhoff’s (2005) identity-mobilization framework, the political process model and insights from the New Social Movement literature are used to situate politicized identities and political activism directed toward the homeland. Attention is paid to factor processes.

Les membres de la diaspora sont des acteurs de conflit avec une influence qu’il est important d’inclure aux théories de conflits et à l’analyse des relations internationales. Les études suggèrent que leurs origines, et subséquemment les changements dans le cycle de conflits affectent le processus décisionnel et la mobilisation au sein de la diaspora, mais les conditions et les mécanismes qui sont à la base de ces processus ne sont pas contenus dans la littérature. Le conflit au Sri Lanka et sa diaspora torontoise sont utilisés afin d’explorer le processus de diasporisation et de mobilisation dans un contexte de transformation du paysage politique. Une série d’entretiens semi-directifs et un court sondage auprès des répondants permettent d’évaluer leurs motivations pour une mobilisation. Le travail comparatif s’effectue au sein et entre les groupes ethniques. La théorie néo-institutionnelle renforce ce projet. L’épistémologie propre à Butler (2001), la perspective identité-mobilisation de Brinkerhoff (2005), le model de processus politique et les apports de la théorie du Nouveau movement social sont utilisés afin de situer l’identité politique et l’activisme politique envers le pays d’origine. Une attention a été portée aux facteurs de processus.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>GSL</td>
<td>Government of Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLFP</td>
<td>Sri Lankan Freedom Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNP</td>
<td>United National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>TGTE</td>
<td>Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<td>GTF</td>
<td>Global Tamil Forum</td>
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<td>COR</td>
<td>Country of Residence</td>
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<td>COO</td>
<td>Country of Origin</td>
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<td>Political Process Model</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>IRB</td>
<td>Immigration and Refugee Board</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration Canada</td>
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Acknowledgements

I wish to express profound gratitude to my supervisor and committee chair, Professor André Lecours, without whose guidance, encouragement and support this thesis would not have been possible.

To my committee, I thank them for their time and insights. I thank Professor Hélène Perrin whose advice informed the direction, and subsequent refinement of this research project.

The Office of Research Ethics and Integrity at the University of Ottawa approved and supervised this project. Input from the Research Ethics Board improved both the quality of research instruments and, I believe, experiences in the field for participants and for this researcher. The Political Studies Department at the University of Ottawa was supportive and encouraging. I am grateful for their enthusiasm to see this effort realized.

It is with great appreciation that I acknowledge all research participants whose contribution to this project cannot be overstated. I thank each for their time and their knowledge.

I am obliged to colleagues who have edited, inspired and supported. To them, I am indebted and thankful.
Chapter One: Diasporas in International Politics

For thirty years the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) waged a sophisticated insurgency with significant resources, connected through international networks and implicating members of the Tamil diaspora. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) framed the conflict as a war on terror necessitating military solutions. The conflict was marked by fluctuations in the protest cycle. Tamil politics “became transnational in the course of the war” as the LTTE derived substantial power from its diaspora populations (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 63). The origin and nature of the conflict, its internationalized dynamics and the role played by ‘new diasporas’ (Klandermans 2002) suggests the Sri Lankan case is a specific type of identity conflict in the current era.

In the years spent interviewing Sri Lankan refugee claimants and preparing their claims for asylum, patterns of identification and behaviour emerged. These experiences coincided with a period of intensified gang violence in Toronto between Canadian youth of Tamil and Sinhalese descent, and among rival factions within each community. Attention was drawn to a relationship between identity, experience and behaviour.

What motivates diaspora identification and mobilization toward the country of origin is the general research problem that informs this thesis. Theoretical tension between descriptive and prescriptive definitions of diaspora problematizes this question. Divided research prioritizes, sometimes rejecting, different themes and processes, and this matters because what a group is informs what a group does.

Scholars have shown how governments, political entrepreneurs, and everyday migrants are implicated in the “decoupling of identity and territorality” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 502). Governments acknowledge their diaspora constituencies and via state policies, like dual citizenship or multiculturalism, deliberately institutionalize transnational practice. Immigration policies can institutionalize identities and group narratives. The ‘diasporization of ethnic and religious groups’ (Sheffer 1995; Safran 1991; Weinar 1986) reflects the “self-
conscious efforts of political entrepreneurs [...] to use this new environment to articulate, politicize and activate various diasporic identifications and practices” (Basch et al. 1994 in Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 498). And it is institutionalized by migrants who “take actions, make decisions, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more places” (Ibid: 500).

The connection between non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions is well documented (Rise-Kappen 1995).

To stress the consequences of mass movements of people and communication advances on contemporary political structures is predictable. Nevertheless, “geopolitical repartitioning, restructuring of the global economy, and patterns of warfare [...] create large refugee and exile populations” (Butler 2001: 190). The agency of these transnational factors “may now play more of a role in forcing people into diasporas than the core triad of the homeland, hostlands and the departing group” (Van Hear 1998 in Butler 2001: 211). Modern works situate diaspora formation and development in transnational factors, and in the “interstitial spaces of existing structural configurations of internal politics” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 496). This triad of spaces, in-between places and globalized conditions “may affect the manner in which diasporas are formed and their trajectories of development” (Butler 2001: 211). The ‘shocking omission’ of diaspora in IR literature (Brinkerhoff 2008) belies the fact that “international migration ranks as one of the most important factors of global change (Castles 2009: 5), and that diasporic practices are politically significant to the “larger social world within which states are embedded” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 493).

Diaspora problematize the notion of nation. The “original nation is no longer ‘homogenous’. Dual citizenship and multiple loyalties abound” (Koinova 2005, 150). Distinguishing what is ‘internal’ to the state from what is ‘external’ to it is complicated by the shifting boundaries of national identity (Waterbury 2010; Koinova 2005). Diasporas “defy the conventional meaning of the state” as “challengers of its traditional boundaries (Cohen 1997), as transnational transporters of cultures (Clifford 1992), and as manifestations of de-territorialized
communities (Smith 1993)” (in Shain and Barth 2003: 450). Diasporic practices “can cumulatively lead to shifts in the relationship between states as institutions and the ideational and cultural structures that define symbolic boundaries of collective membership and belonging” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 496). They are “among the most prominent actors that link international and domestic spheres of politics” (Shain and Barth 2003: 451).

The ‘paradigmatic Other of the nation-state’ (Toloyan 1991), “diasporas - geographically outside the state, but identity-wise perceived (by themselves, the homeland, or others) as ‘inside the people’ (Shain and Barth 2003: 451) underscore, as Peter Katzenstein explains, the "social environments that affect state identity link international and domestic environments in a way that defies the reification of distinct domestic and international spheres of politics" (1996 in Shain and Barth 2003: 460). IR considers debates about national identity comparative politics. But the “transnational processes of diaspora mobilization have led to an increasing disjunction between the geopolitical boundaries of the state and its symbolic boundaries of national belonging” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 505). As above, identity conflicts are internationalized (Brun and Van Hear 2012) and in international politics, migrations and diasporas “open a political space for people to make an impact on politics” (Dudley and Lloyd 2006).

For Lapid "IR's fascination with sovereign statehood has greatly decreased its ability to confront issues of ethnic nationhood and political otherhood" (1996: 10 in Shain and Barth 2003). Anthromorphizing the state (Wendt 1999), as do state-centric versions of social constructivism, “prohibits an investigation into a wide range of transnational processes and practices and thus inhibits the understanding and analysis of deeper structural changes in the international system” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 494). According to these authors, the state as society, territory and identity does not capture the complexity and diversity of identities, the transnational agency of factors impacting those identifications, nor the potentially transformative agency of
micro-practices that inform the development of identifications, politicizations and mobilizations, and their consequences on macro-structures of governance.

Constructivism and liberalism “acknowledge the impact of both identity and domestic interaction on international behavior” (Shain and Barth 2003: 451). Both IR theoretical approaches link identity to preferences, and each suggests that identity and preferences are determined by social interactions embedded in a larger social context (Shain and Barth 2003). For these authors, this is sufficient ‘theoretical space’ to incorporate diasporas into IR theory as a “permanent feature in the imperfect nation-state system” (Shain and Barth 2003: 457 and 450). Ruggie’s (1998: 26-7) call for a “transformationalist version of constructivism […] that “seeks to map out and explain changes in the organizational make-up of political space” lends theoretical import to IR research that considers “the nature of ‘unbundled territoriality’ under current historical conditions” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007:495).

Diasporas are ‘potentially transformative agents’ (Ruggie 1998) but conflicting empirical and theoretical accounts of diasporas as radicals and as moderates highlight the complexity of situating these actors, and their orientations. In 2000 Collier and Collier concluded: “civil wars with strong diaspora involvement are highly likely to continue to perpetuate, especially if the diaspora has large concentrations in the US” (Koinova 2005: 152). Kaldor, in 2001, came to the same conclusion after comparing new (intrastate) wars with old (interstate) ones. He determined “diasporas are crucial to sustaining intra-state conflict” (Koinova 2005: 152). Only a few years earlier Anderson (1999) offered ‘long distance nationalists’ to describe an intransigent group who perpetuates conflict.

Combined, these studies [Byman et al. 2001; Hockenos 2003; Biswas 2004; Wayland 2004; Adamson 2005; Fair 2005; Lyons 2006; Orjuela 2008] suggest a group that “mobilises for radical causes in transnational spaces;
broadcasts hate speech and nationally intolerant messages, fundraises and sponsors radical groups, and takes up arms to fight for the homeland” (Koinova 2005: 152).

The moderate side, however, cites demonstrable support for liberal ideals and democratizations. The works of Cochrane 2007, Lyons 2006, Koser 2007, Natali 2007, Zunzer 2008; Shain 1999; Biswas 2007 and Koinova 2009 have all identified constructive purposive action undertaken by diaspora and directed at their country of origin. It describes diasporas as necessary development actors, moderating warring parties, ‘humanizing’ foreign policy (Byman et al. 2001) and rebuilding war torn societies.

Importantly, and citing two large $n$ studies, Chandra stresses “relations between politicized ethnic groups […] are characterized more often by the absence of violence than its presence” (Chandra 2001: 344). And not everyone is involved. Desipio (2000) suggests only 20% of immigrants and fewer of the second generation participate in the politics of the sending country” (Castles 2009: 289). Guanizo et al. (2003) conclude it is the well-placed third generations that are more likely to participate, and to support violence. And yet, according to Ogelman (2003), “for many, if not most, expatriates, the country of origin and its politics remain the foremost concern” (Castles 2009: 278).

These contradictions inform the primary research question: why and under what conditions are members of a diaspora motivated to mobilize in the politics of their country of origin as it relates to the conflict and peace building efforts? In turn, a general research problem is highlighted. If interviews identify themes relevant to each definition, can they hierarchialize and relate those factors, and by so doing differentiate between two theorizations, prioritizing one over the other? More practically, can they adequately explore and connect the factors that effect outcomes in this specific case study?
As a case study, this Master’s Thesis refers to the Sri Lankan conflict and its Toronto based diasporas to explore the conditions that precede mobilization, and that inform the direction and nature of purposive political action.

The Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam’s separatist struggle, marked by 30 years of violence and insurgency, created a significant ‘conflict generated’ diaspora (Fair 2005). Outside South Asia, the largest percentage of that population now resides in Canada (ICG 2010). The Sri Lankan Government (GSL) defeated the LTTE in May 2009. This is a profound change in a conflict understood largely along ethnic lines.

The Sri Lankan conflict and the activities of various members of its diasporas are cited in the conflict literature as ‘prototypical’ of diasporic engagement (e.g. Fair 2005; Shain and Barth 2007; Cochrane et al. 2009; Orjeula 2012); their activities are varied and range from ideological and material support for terrorism to activities that suggest the role of crucial peace broker and development actor. On the whole, Sri Lankan conflict literature suggests this is a volatile and engaged demographic whose contributions to conflict are crucial to understand, if only to negate, their role in conflict.

As an exploratory project, this thesis relies on scholarship and interviews with participants to explore why and how ethnic identities are politicized and mobilized in these diasporas, and with what effect. It first defines and situates diaspora and the antecedents of diasporan politics. It situates ‘identity’ as a political force and proposes, as per the scholarship, that the label ‘exile diaspora’ is a significant one with implications for mobilization. The second chapter introduces theories of social mobilization to explain episodic political activism, and relates them to processes of diasporization. The case study, hypothesis and methodology are introduced in the third chapter. Data and analysis are presented in the fourth chapter. The final chapter offers some concluding remarks.
Diaspora and Transnationalism

Diaspora is a problematic term. It is often conflated with transnationalism. Diaspora and transnational (migrant or ethnic community) are used interchangeably to describe similar contexts, processes or agents. The concepts “overlap and intersect” (Faist 2010: 16) and “form an unruly crowd of descriptive, interpretative terms […] that jostle and converse in the modern lexicon of migration studies” (Clifford 1994: 303). And yet, in both academic and everyday language, the connotations are different. At its simplest, diaspora is “the dispersal of a people from its original homeland” (Butler 2001: 189). For many, this is too broad (Safran 1991; Tololyan 1996) and too vague “both for theoretical purposes and for empirical operationalization” (Weinar 2010: 86).

Generally there are three areas of difference. Transnationalism is broader in scope and form than diaspora. The latter refers to religious, ethnic or national groups whereas the former can include a variety of social movements and multinational corporations. A diaspora implies a form of “transnational organization spanning specific countries and host” whereas a focus on transnational community often includes reference of borderlands, or cross border communities (Faist 2010: 21). In short, “all transnational communities encompass diaspora, but not all transnational communities are diaspora” (Ibid).

A second area of difference concerns identity or mobility. Diaspora studies focus on collective identities, origins and ties to host and homeland. It is often about nation-building. Transnationalism is interested in cross border mobility. It studies ‘mélange, hybridity and translations’ in the context of “geographic mobility [as a] ubiquitous phenomena of general societal importance” (Faist 2010: 20).

Finally a temporal dimension is highlighted. Diaspora is multigenerational (Butler 2001), and scholars tend to focus on the long durée. Transnationalism, according to Faist (2010), pays little attention to historical continuity focusing instead on recent migrant flows.
Transnationalism, then, is more abstract. It refers generally to “processes that transcend international borders” (Faist 2010: 13). It refers to spaces, fields, formations and identities that are connected by “relatively stable, lasting and dense sets of ties reaching beyond and across borders” and that inform the “everyday practices of migrants” (Ibid). It not as politicized, despite being political (Keck and Sikknick 1998). Diaspora, on the other hand, is used to mobilise support for group identity and political projects; it encourages financial investments and political loyalty (Faist 2010: 1).

Defining diaspora

In the classic definition, the criteria for a diaspora was “a strong relationship to the homeland and the aspiration of return” (Safran 1991). His list includes: (1) dispersal to two or more locations; (2) collective mythology of homeland; (3) alienation from hostland; (4) idealization of return to homeland; and (5) ongoing relationship with homeland (in Butler 2001: 191). Cohen (1997), by stressing ethnonational consciousness, places greater emphasis on the nature of the dispersal, and option of returning ‘home’ to the definition of a diaspora (Ibid: 192). In both, at a minimum, three basic features are used to identify a diaspora.

The first, referring to dispersal, insists on scattering as a

“necessary precondition for the formation of links between the various populations in diaspora; the internal networks linking the various segments of a diaspora are a unique feature that differentiates them from communities that result from other types of migrations” (Butler 2001: 192).

The cause of migration is emphasized. Orientation and emotion are implicated in dispersal. Isolation, anger as well as “hostility to reconciliation and moderation” are often understood to flow from ‘diasporic trauma’ (Koinova 2005: 162). In the classic view, migration is forced; it is exile. Voluntary migration is now included, displacing the importance of exile, but emigration, “the cumulative result of individual initiatives […] is typically the result of intolerable economic conditions” (Butler 2001: 201). And should not, perhaps, be equated unqualified with volition.
The second feature refers to the relationship, actual or imagined, to the homeland (Brinkerhoff 2008). It focuses on the ‘cross border experiences of homeland from the destination country’ (Faist 2010: 12). The construct of homeland ‘anchors’ the diasporan identity (Butler 2001: 204) and “provides the bond from which diasporan identity may develop” (Ibid: 192). Earlier formulations stressed internal organization, newer conceptions highlight a sense of collective identity. Symbolic and sentimental attachments as well as material transactions connect people residing in one country with people and institutions in the home country, and in other states. A return to homeland and myth of return is emphasized, even if that longing does not reflect an actual belief in the viability of return. Newer scholars stress linkages, ‘dense and continuos’ lateral ties to spaces and people not necessarily linked to a specific territory. The dense and continuous networks can also point, not to return, but to “circular exchange and transnational mobility” (Faist 2010: 13).

The third condition involves the self-awareness of the group; it must see itself as part of an ethnonational group. This “consciousness binds the dispersed peoples not only to the homeland but to each other” and is therefore “pivotal to their survival as a cultural unit” (Butler 2001: 192). It assesses migrant integration in the hostland. In the old view, diasporans do not adapt; they make or maintain boundaries that separate them from the hostland society. Domestic policies determine, to a degree, the ability to assimilate and thus effect identification with, and orientation toward, the homeland. Newer definitions stress hybridity (Bhabha 1994) where distinctiveness, not discrimination, characterizes diasporic identity. Scholars are also looking beyond ‘distinctiveness’ to ‘processes of cultural innovation’ (Faist 2010: 13).

In some ways, “membership in a diaspora now implies potential empowerment based on the ability to mobilize international support and influence in both the homeland and hostland” (Clifford 1994 in Butler 2001: 190). It represents a ‘re-orientation of identity from within the community itself’, one that embraces the diasporan discourse as an alterative to situating itself within a context of ‘majority-minority’ relations (Ibid). It implies an orientation, and a re-orientation, derived from a subaltern status.
An often-included fourth feature is the temporal-historical dimension that “combines the individual migration experience with the collective history of group dispersal and regenesis of communities abroad” (Butler 2001: 192). Russell King argues a diaspora demonstrates “historical continuity across at least generations” (2010: 172). Cohen insists “time has to pass before migration becomes diaspora” (1997: 185) and Butler concludes “diasporas are multigenerational” (2001: 192).

This last component encompasses the others and implies historical causation and methods of reproduction. It suggests that choices made in particular settings at specific moments in history affect the identification and politicization of subsequent generations. Analytical focus is drawn to the construction of identity, the boundedness and self-awareness of groups and how these social forces [and political projects] are passed down over generations, and in changing circumstances.

Theorizing diaspora

Diaspora, like ethnicity, nation and race has been “expressly conceptualized as a ‘basic operator in a widespread system of social classification’ and as a ‘practical category’” (Brubaker et al. 2004: 33). The tendency is to take

“discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogenous, and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis. Ethnic groups, races, and nations continue to be treated as things-in-the-world, as real, substantiated entities with their own cultures, their own identities, and their own interests” (Ibid: 45).

The classic definitions (Clifford 1994; Safran 1991) and the “refinement and deconstruction” that has followed (Anthias 1998; Brah 1996; Brubaker 2005) “tend to portray a static entity: a historical process of spreading and scattering to produce a particular ‘ethnic’ population distribution and a ‘state of being’ or ‘diasporic consciousness’” (Russell King 2010: 181). This tendency to treat ethnic groups or diasporas as static entities
(Faist 2010), and the ensuing critiques, draw attention to competing conceptions of ethnogenesis and diasporization.

Koinova (2005) links conceptual problems theorizing and operationalizing diaspora directly to the difficulty defining the unit of analysis. Are they “bounded groups, or are they conglomerates of elites and individuals functioning within a bounded group”, or are they networks or enduring discursive patterns (Ibid: 150)? “If the unit of analysis can itself not be taken as fixed, the task of analysis becomes that much more difficult” (Chandra 2001: 345). Faist (2010) clarifies these issues by identifying three theorizations of diaspora formation and development; each define the processes that inform the construction of a diaspora, as a form of social organization differently and, in turn, stress different mechanisms for constructing and sustaining the collective identity and orientation that perpetuate the social organization and informs its behaviour.

Focus is drawn on “the interplay between self-identification and external categorization; and drawing attention to the various levels (individual, interactional, and institutional) and contexts (informal and formal) in which categorization processes occur” (Brubaker, et al. 2004: 32). Researchers focus on the mechanisms that induce stability (Chandra 2001). If we cannot take forms of social organization as ‘real in this world’, we need to understand the mechanisms by each they are felt and practiced as real in this world, and what sustains the self-ascription and self-awareness that inform identification, politicization and mobilization.

In the first realm of meaning, the descriptive-analytical, a diaspora comes from family trees; it is ancestry linked to a geographic space. They present “essentialist notions of organic social development” (Faist 2010: 17). It is associated with primordialism.

The second realm conceives diasporas as socially constituted formations. It “refers less to a social condition than to [the] empirical reality […] of dispersed ethnic groups who are connected by transnational networks and
practices” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 499). It begins with the categorization of spaces and identities arguing that diasporas are (a) “characterized by a distinctive set of identities and practices vis-a-vis country of settlement”, and (b) participation in certain transnational practices is predicated on the extent of incorporation into the country of settlement (Faist 2010: 17). The focus on state action politicizes agents and practices, and thus politicizes the concept diaspora. The focus on categorization processes translates diaspora formation and subsequent developments into political work. The construction and maintenance of boundaries, and of an identity that marks that difference, are political projects dependent on a number of conditions, including integration in the hostland, and the ability of political elite – ethnic entrepreneurs – to successfully “attribute[e] groupness to a diaspora […] enable[ing] them to form into a body eligible for projects” (Ibid: 18). Historical Institutionalism (HI) and social constructivism often underlies empirical work informed by this theorization of diaspora.

The focus is on the “historical, political and institutional studies of official, codified, formalized categorization practices employed by powerful and authoritative institutions – above all the state” (Brubaker et al. 2004: 33). In this view, ethnic identities [or diasporan ones] are constructed and “reconstructed mainly though major historical and institutional transformations” which implies “ethnic group preferences and boundaries should be stable in the short term, in between these transformations, but may be unstable in the long term, across these transformations” (Chandra 2001: 345). Foucault and Bourdieu are often cited here.

In the third realm, diasporas reflect socio-cultural conditions. Unlike socially-constituted formations wherein groups, identities and goals are often understood as inherently national, or transnational, this formulation avoids “essentialis[ing] conceptions” by focusing on “how diasporic political mobilization and solidarity are created and maintained and how the boundaries of diaspora are constructed/constituted” (Faist 2010: 19). As a “social condition or form of consciousness” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 499) diasporic practices as “bottom-up forms of resistance to pressures for cultural homogenization that emanate from the nation-state, from dominant
discourses about race and ethnicity, or from processes of globalization” (Ibid). The literature on New Social Movement and postmodernist approaches find expression in this theorization. Here “lie those [...] who argue that ethnic groups occupy a ‘zone of occult instability’ even in the short term” (Chandra 2001: 345). Research “comprise[s] ethnographic and micro-interactionist studies of the unofficial, informal, ‘everyday’ classification and categorization practices employed by ordinary people” (Brubaker et al. 2004: 33).

In the latter two realms (1) identity is constructed and (2) interactive social processes with political, historical, economic, linguistic and symbolic meaning inform mobilization around a collective identity. Difference centers around notions of stability and the mechanisms that (re)produce it. Where the first sees implicated processes as long term, relatively stable and inherently political; in the second, identities and interests informed by social legacies and cultural meanings are always unstable and cannot be treated as static. In either case, a process of historical contingency and of ongoing negotiation by internal and external actors is implied as the boundaries of groups and the content of difference are given salience across time and in different settings.

The conflict literature, half of the social mobilization literature as well as much of the scholarship on processes of diasporization and ethnogenesis, all now largely informed by constructivism, develop political arguments. It is a broad framework for understanding “interactive human agency and its effects on the definition of social identities, national interests and behavior (the causal effect)” (Halabi 2004: 36). It encompasses “Weberian interpretative sociology, Symbolic Interactionism, variants of Marxism, Veblenian institutionalism, post-structuralism(s) and hermeneutics” (Palan 2000: 576) and assumes “what actors do in international relations; the interests they hold, and the structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and ideas, rather than by objective or material conditions” (Jackson 2004: 338). The process of construction is a political one (Wendt 1999) which is to say it is a conflict over the power or “authority to determine the shared meanings that constitute [...] identities, interests and practices” (Shain and Barth 2003: 456). It is a political struggle to frame the political choices and to determine the social norms that inform behaviour.
Constructivist approaches view diaspora [and ethnicity] as a “category of practice, project, claim and stance, rather than as a bounded group” (Brubaker 2005 in Koinova 2005: 150). They draw attention to the ecological, social and internal processes that constitute identity, and which presuppose interest (Wendt 1999). These approaches

“question the assumption of group homogeneity by pointing out that shared symbolic frameworks associated with any ethnic category are artificially, and often superficially, imposed upon a collection of dissimilar fragments. They question the assumption of group stability by pointing out that the ethnic categories that individuals identify with are constructed and change across time” (Chandra 2001: 345).

The nature and salience of a collective identity and thus the ability to be eligible for political projects and mobilize in pursuit of group interests depends on “how different historical and social contexts tip social processes one way or the other” and how these circumstances “produce boundaries to the field of action” (Gil-White1999: 815). To this end, *new institutionalism* (NI) informs much of this project. It is chosen to give content to constructivist accounts. Two branches of NI, *historical institutionalism* (HI) and *organizational or sociological institutionalism* (SI) capture dynamics stressed in the latter two realms of meaning.

Relying heavily on historical causation, constructivist accounts favour *historical intuitionalism* with its dual model of institutional change that focuses attention on power, contingency and “how structures of political opportunity will shape the strategies of organized interests and their beliefs regarding the efficacy of different types of political action” (Immergut 1998: 21). The emphasis is on elites and it is a top-down process. This focuses analytical attention on the decision-making that affects long-term social processes and ongoing political ones. It is well chosen because its ‘aim is to analyze why […] actors choose one particular definition of their interests and not some other equally plausible alternative’ (Ibid: 7); it tries to explain why certain identities and interests are politicized and mobilized. This narrow political focus assumes social collectives and the institutions that bind them are relatively stable. It avoids psychological or cultural accounts to explain this
stability, or the political outcomes that may be possible because of it, preferring instead to focus on power differentials in the face of changing conditions and institutional stability.

North’s (1990) definition of an institution “posits them as ‘rules of the game in a society or [...] the humanely devised constraints that shape human interaction’” (Mackay et al. 2010: 576). The most effective “incorporate a normative system of informal and normative rules” (Levi 1990 in Mackay et al. 2010: 576). They condition and constrain (Capoocia and Kelemen 2007), but “even when defined in the broadest sense—neither mold human perceptions to such an extent that individuals are incapable of recognizing competing definitions of identity and interests nor do they force human action along a single track” (Immergut 1998: 26). Institutional actors are social (relational) and act in habitual ways “following a ‘logic of appropriateness’” (March and Olsen 1989 in Mackay et al. 2010: 575). These logics and the institutional arrangements that shape (and are shaped) by them are not determinative; these relationships are “highly-interactive and [reflect the] mutually constitutive character of interactions between institutions and individual actors” (Hall and Taylor 1996 in Mackay et al. 2010: 578). Institutions “be they the formal rules of political arenas, channels of communication, language codes, or the logics of strategic situations – act as filters that selectively favor particular interpretations either of the goals toward political actors strive or the best means to achieve these ends” (Immergut 1998: 20). HI sees “complex configurations of factors as being causally significant [...] Mental constructs, economic and social institutions, and politics interact” (Ibid: 19). Interactive, contingent events that loosen or tighten windows of opportunity within a specific political setting are casually significant.

What is compelling about socio-cultural accounts is the “relatedness of socioeconomic injustice rooted in society’s political-economic structure and cultural or symbolic injustice rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication” (Fraser 1997 in Bernstein 2005: 53). Status identities have “cultural dimensions and meanings but are also linked to concrete material and structural locations” (Bernstein 2005: 53). Theorizations of diaspora, and of social mobilization, stress the contextual and interactive dynamics
of both processes. A movement’s cultural framework matters (Caren 2007); it’s history, language, social institutions (law, ethics, family, civil society, state etc.), habits, morality and psychology condition the range of possible actions, and outcomes (Ibid). Within these sets of ecological, social and internal processes, actors – institutions, elites and everyday people - make decisions.

Social reality is always ‘perceived’ (Klandermans 1984: 584), and

“patterns of interaction follow the categorical cleavages and not the other way around (cf. Tilley 1997). [...] Thus, what motivates the behaviour of ethnic actors is not some calculation of their interests, but rather the history that binds them, as they themselves perceive this history” (Gil-White 1999: 802).

The practical impossibility of dislocating agents from their ‘situatedness’ with its accompanying bundles of logics, interactional routines, cognitions and bodies of knowledge from the material conditions and formal political institutional arrangements within which they are embedded is complicated. This project introduces insights from the SI literature to include discursive, symbolic, ideational and familial influences on mobilization. It is an attempt to introduce culture, to emphasis consciousness and to include those affected by what is characterized as a top-down process. Of course, social institutions may be as constraining, maybe more so than political ones, but this SI acknowledgment counters some of the elite, political and structural biases of HI. More controversially, it is a deliberate attempt to deal directly with the emotive, moral and psychological forces that inform what Glick-Schiller (2010) describes, respectively, as ‘modes of belonging’ and ‘ways of thinking’, and what Polletta and Jasper (2001) insist are causal forces in social mobilization.

SI broadens the conception of institutions to include “not only formal rules and practices, but also the ‘symbols systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human behaviour” (Hall and Taylor 1996 in Mackay et al. 2010: 575). SI “emphas(es) the social and cognitive features of institutions, rather than the structural and constraining one. [...] Institutions reflect shared understandings of ‘the way the world works’ (Mackay et al. 2010: 575). In this view, “culture, language and symbols may provide
interpretive frames that facilitate mobilization” (Immergut 1998: 21). Yuval-Davis and Anthias emphasis “the significance of consciously teaching and transferring the cultural and ideological norms of ethnic and national groups” that begins in the family (in Silva 2003: 150). In the diaspora literature, communal ties create ‘well beaten paths’ where family, social and ethnic networks are (re)produced and significant (Salimano 2010: 24). Indeed, “almost everywhere, the biggest groups of immigrants consist of relatives of those who have already arrived” (Ibid). And “even if there is no conscious effort to overtly promote the dominant ideologies, it is evident at a subtextual level”; they point to culture (Silva 2003: 150). The trajectory is maintained by mechanisms of stability (or reproduction) that include, sometimes implicitly, the social institutions that emerge from migration. The role-played by ideational, familial and cultural institutions “generating meaning, institutional scripts, symbolic codes, norms and the ‘logics of appropriateness’” (Immergut 1998: 15) is necessary to understand the rationales for action.

The answer to the research question then lies in how institutions, the “enduring legacies of largely contingent events and political struggles” (Mackay at el. 2010: 575), and “social structures and processes generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals” (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 42). It is about power and the outcomes of earlier choices. The causal effect, or political significance lie in how the environment, the cultural framework as well as relational and cognitive dynamics sustain these arrangements and inform subsequent decision-making.

A diasporan trajectory

Scholarship suggests that an exiled population – escaping an ethicized conflict and resettling in a democratic state – is more likely to develop and deploy a politicized identity, to have self-awareness of itself as a group with the accompanying organizational strength to mobilize significant resources intended to change conditions in the homeland.
According to Butler (2001), a diasporan identity and trajectory of political engagement is shaped by the reasons and conditions of the initial dispersal. This shapes an ethos – “the shared memories and myths around which this unique type of imagined community is built” (Butler 2001: 199-200). Brinkerhoff (2008) who uses Butler’s (2001) four-dimensional epistemology of diaspora to build an identity-mobilization framework to explain transnational purposive political action, argues the characteristics of the diaspora – its origins, generational composition, and religious identity – “combine to inform the negotiation of new identities and potential mobilization” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 71). Its origin “may inform diasporans motivations and sense of potential efficacy; that is, their perceived ability to assimilate in the host country, influence the home country, or both” (Ibid). Origin, in her view, reflects the demographic composition of a diaspora and yields the myth that is basis of an identity (Ibid), which impacts interrelationships within it, including political struggles over the possible articulations of identity and interest.

These systemizations reflect complicated politics mediated, first, by the reasons for and conditions of its dispersal [1st dimension], and then by the diaspora’s ongoing relationships with the homeland, the hostland and within the community itself [2nd, 3rd and 4th dimensions respectively] (Butler 2001: 195). Like triad, or fields [below], any framework used to explain diasporas and diasporic political activism must take into account relationships across a number of dimensions, or spaces. Each builds HI frameworks. The orienting principle, contingency, insists conditions across dimensions are “separately necessary and jointly sufficient for divergence to occur” (Soifer 2012: 1573), that is, for diasporization and mobilization outcomes. The first dimension encompasses the antecedent conditions of both processes. Norms, policies and practices in Canada [the third dimension], changing conditions in Sri Lanka [the second dimension] and interrelationships within the diaspora [fourth dimension] may change “the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or contingency and thus the prospects for divergence” (Ibid: 1574) or, in the face of these loosened constraints, shape the value given to these opportunities and the outcomes that are possible (Ibid: 1575). In other words, migration to other places without the same opportunity structures might present a different range of options, or ‘scope condition’,
influencing the “causal relationship between the productive condition and the outcome” (Ibid). Interpreting and acting upon loosening and tightening windows of opportunity to influence outcomes in Sri Lanka, depend on “the possibility space bounded by the permissive condition” as set above (Ibid). Academic focus on stability – implied by trajectory – focuses attention on the mechanisms of reproduction, or those “factors that are sufficient to keep an outcome in place after the factors that produce it have disappeared” (Ibid: 1577).

Designating associated variables as part of a ‘relationship’ implies a series of interactional, situational conditions that can change over time. Relationship, like field, encompasses a range of social positionings, stressing the “multifaceted, intersectional, shifting and contradictory’ nature of those positionings” as well as the tensions that may exist between and within fields of social relations (Stoetzler 2002: 325). It situates the practices that impact (and are impacted by) identification, politicization and mobilization in relationships embedded in multiple spheres and can apply the notion of ‘unbundled territorially’ to examine the micro-processes that impact macro-structures. It takes into account agency and structure, and associated power and status dynamics. Finally, stressing relationships over conditions makes room for subjectivity and devotes serious analytic space to emotional and moral imperatives.

The first dimension [and by most accounts the first condition necessary for mobilization outcomes] is the historical narrative; it stresses historical causation to processes of diasporization, and to political activism. This is why the label ‘exile’ matters. Identified as the point of departure, this dimension insists identification, politicization and mobilization do not begin with a blank slate. The first dimension expresses trajectory – the beginning of the path – and implies stability and momentum. It encompasses identities and orientations as well as institutional (political, social, cultural, linguistic, symbolic) arrangements that inform decision-making. The first dimension is integrated into the larger framework as the background context [institutional arrangements and logics] that inform perceptions, relationships and decision-making. This is not to say to the first dimension is determinative, but rather constitutive whereby the original trajectory, encompassing “self-understandings,
social organization and political claims” (Brubaker et al. 2004: 34), informs (but is also informed) by changing conditions

Much of the conflict and diaspora literature makes this point. Scholarship suggests conflict generated diasporas are manifestly different from groups formed from economic or voluntary forms of migration (Faist 2000; Shain 2002; Scheffer 2003; Lyons 2006; Smith and Stores 2007; Baser and Swain 2008). The former “maintain traumatic identities attached to homeland territory and the myth of return, barring them from seeing potential avenues for conflict resolution” (Koinova 2005: 152). For diasporas, these

“conditions are akin to the traumas of childhood; they mark the diasporan group and inform the direction of its development. The historical circumstances of the relocation determine the sector of society from which the diaspora originates, its demographic composition, and even the more amorphous realm of political orientation or attitude” (Butler 2001: 203).

In cases of emigration from ‘intolerable economic conditions’, it “may take an extended period of time for the group to develop a diasporan identity and intergroup relationships, if these develop at all” (Ibid: 201-202).

The choice of identity and the articulation of an ethos “place institutional arrangements on particular paths or trajectories that are then extremely difficult to alter or reverse” (Collier and Collier 1991 in Mackay et al. 2010: 577). According to Pierson, once chosen these “trajectories […] are then very difficult to alter [because] once a particular path is taken, institutions become self-reinforcing or ‘sticky’” (Pierson 2004 in Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 342). Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 4) suggest “the idea of persistence of some kind is virtually built into the very definition of an institution” (in Mackay at el. 2010: 577). In other words, the nature and content of identity and interest, as well organizational and political logics each with the attendant and re(constructed) “socialized norms or tendencies that guide human behaviour and thinking” (Wacquant 2005: 316), “shape the outcomes that emerge and were ‘locked in’” after the initial wave of dispersal stopped (Soifer 2012: 1575). Each is informed by migrants’ relationship with the homeland [2nd dimension]. In short, a diaspora may, by its own definition, answer part of the research question.
A second condition, and the third dimension, stresses the causal importance of the hostland regime and domestic policies in that receiving state. The argument is simply that migration to a democratic hostland is a necessary condition of diasporization (Shain and Barth 2003). It includes foreign policy capture “encompassing the totality of a host country’s foreign policy agenda” and its ‘permeability’ to diaspora objectives (Shain 1995 in Godwin 2012:166). Policies in the receiving country affect the size and composition of the group, and to the degree integration effects identity and orientation bears directly on the formation and development of a diasporic identity and ethos. Research shows those who “experience discrimination tend to identify even more with their ethnic or racial group” (Operario & Fiske 2001 in Brinkerhoff 2008: 85) but also experiences in liberal, federal democracies may empower groups or (re)orient identity constructions and interests toward the hostland (Brinkerhoff 2008). It is fundamentally about political rights. Like Brun and Van Hear (2012) who stress the role played by the hostland in a diaspora’s constitutive triad, scholars point to the inclusivity and receptivity of that state to describe how dispersal and migration are shaped by conditions in that place with implications for the construction of identities and interests.

The construction of collective identity and articulation of interests (together informing political orientation and political activism) that are possible given conditions in these spaces are “dependent on agents’ and institutions’ ability to mobilise both within and outside the field [or dimension], drawing on their various sources of ‘capital’” (Bourdieu 1991 in Brun and Van Hear 2012: 62). Bourdieu’s (1991) notion of political field as “a site of competition for power which takes the form of mobilizing the right to speak and act in the name of others” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 62) introduces a power dimension to explain relationships (or outcomes) between local political fields and the diasporic one (Ibid: 63). It stresses a contingent and interactive dynamic between identified dimensions to explain divergent outcomes.
Power is necessary to explain the operation and outcomes of institutional interactions; it draws attention to “the contested authority that determine the shared meanings that constitute identities, interests, and practices of states” (Shain and Barth 2003: 54), and non-state actors. It “highlights the interrelation between the local and the transnational” and “explore[s] the ways groups emerge in different fields and struggle for power and influence” (Thompson 1991 in Brun and Van Hear 2012: 62). It draws attention to conditions within the diaspora’s control, and those outside it. In the next chapter, this dynamic is critical to explain receptivity and opportunity in social mobilization as well as to trace the effects of implicated factor processes.

A diasporan trajectory includes politicized and transnational identities, orientations and practices. Despite a disempowerment that is sometimes seen as normative (Butler 2001), it implies political space to operate, and the empowerment, to do so. The self-understanding, internal organization and political ethos (with goals, strategies and tactics) that characterize a diaspora encompass the identity, networks and ‘social stock of knowledge’ (Andreouli and Howarth 2012) that, as we will see in the next chapter, are critical to social mobilization. That chapter picks up notions of identity, institutional organization, political context and cultural framework to explore theories of social mobilization.
Chapter Two: Social Mobilization in the Diaspora

Political opportunities and contingent circumstances

The circumstantialist concern (expressed in constructivism, in HI and in the models built upon them)

“with structural variables in ethnic mobilization […] is an important topic because ethnies do not always mobilise, and not always in the same ways. […] ethnic statuses are used strategically and politically” (Gil-White 1999, 807).

Nor is violent competition between ethnic groups normal (Chandra 2001) or moments of mobilization typical (Polletta and Jasper 2001). The emphasis is on the “systems that support or oppose” a movement to explain the emergence of any form of social organization, its orientations and, ultimately, its actions (Caren 2007: 1). In cases of diasporization or ethncization “by way of underscoring the social-structural (as opposed to primordial) bases of mobilization, specific conditions that nurture and contribute to the development of ethnic awareness and political organization must be analyzed” (Allahar 1996: 13). As institutional outcomes and institutionalized relationships, diasporization and social mobilization depend on the interaction of contingent political, economic and social factors, and cognitive processes.

To explain divergence and often cited as “orienting contemporary social movement analysis, theories of social mobilization introduce a ‘confluence of factors’: political opportunity, a cultural framework, and resource mobilization” (Travaglino 2014 in Edwards and Kane 2014: 206). As an expression of HI, the political process model [PPM] (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1996) integrates these components into a framework of collective action that is, by this definition, “a political process” (Shain 2007: 137). It is well suited to explore diaspora as a category of political practice contingent on factors within and beyond its control. PPM posits three factors: political opportunity, mobilizing structures and framing and it is the confluence of these factors that explains motivation and mobilization (Tilly 2001). Confluence refers to interactions between movement attributes (i.e. organizational strength) and political opportunities in a broader context. It is the “interaction between three components – interests, organization, and opportunity – [that] explain a contender's level of mobilization and
collective action” (Tilly 1978 in Caren 2007: 1). They describe ‘contentious politics’ as the outcome of interactive environmental, relational, and cognitive mechanisms (Ibid).

This model stresses ‘the central role of opportunity’ (McAdam 1982). McAdam argues political opportunities emerge from “any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured” (1982: 41), and according to Tarrow (1994) even “poorly organized groups can take advantage of generalized opportunities” (Buechler 2011: 138). The structure of political opportunities, equated to opening or loosening of specific institutional arrangements in a particular historical context, “will shape the strategies of organized interests and their belief regarding the efficacy of different types of political action” (Immergut 1998: 21). HI and PPM define these as political results, prone to variation caused by elite power struggles, shaping (and shaped by) interactions with the implicated institutions (Ibid: 7), or owing to political opportunities, mobilizing structures and the resonance of frames - each of which shapes (and is shaped by) the practices of elites and interactional routines in a specific setting.

In a competition model, “life in society revolves around competition over scarce resources […] when [it] occurs along ethnic lines it facilitates the process of ethnic mobilization and will often result in ethnic conflict” (Nagel and Olzak 1982 in Allahar 1996: 12). Competition can occur over non-economic goods like “political rights, the status of a group’s language and culture, and the differential distribution of political power and prestige” (Bélanger and Pinard 1991: 450). And “whereas material advancement can be measured both relatively and absolutely, the status advancement of one group is entirely relative to the status of others” (Horowitz 1985). It is “often plainly impossible to draw a line at which all the rights of the minority are fulfilled but at the same time none of the rights of majority violated” (Ibid 1997 in Chandra 2001: 341). Grievances, as per Buechler (2010), matter and political opportunities to effect these relations may motivate and mobilize groups.
Changes in the conflict cycle are equated to loosening or tightening windows of political opportunity to effect outcomes in the homeland and with that the probability of mobilization and its likely nature. The relationship between the diaspora and the homeland is expressed as receptivity (Shain and Barth 2007) or permeability (Godwin 2012) to diasporan initiatives and is in large part a reflection of the presence, and relative influence, of elite allies (Koinova 2012).

In periods of violence, when identities and groups are under threat, groups “almost unconditionally support the local actors who best advance nationalist goals” (Shain 2002), in-groups draw tighter lines around themselves and in opposition to the Other (Volkan 1997) and the more radical hold more political clout (Koinova 2005). A larger range of options is available to participants – including options about how to understand and why politicize an identity or an event in a particular light - during downturns in the political protest cycle. Esman (1994) distinguishes between defensive and offensive mobilizations, underscoring a motivational difference between opportunities and moral shocks. He hypothesizes “‘defensive mobilization’ in response to clear and present threat to a group’s established position will produce more rapid and aggressive collective action than ‘offensive’ mobilization to exploit opportunities for uncertain future benefits” (Esman 1994 in Brinkerhoff 2008: 78). In other words, “individuals are more likely to mobilize for protest if they perceive that the group they identify with is treated unjustly” (Klandermans 2002 in Brinkerhoff 2008: 77). At the same time, the end of conflict may effectively foreclose opportunities to influence outcomes (McAdam 1977), and by so doing lessen the probability of social mobilization.

Migration to a democratic state is an opportunity structure. The literature identifies this type of migration as a necessary condition in the formation and development of a diaspora (Shain and Barth 2003). As one of the constitutive agents implicated in processes of diasporization (Van Hear 2005), opportunities created and present in this place are part of the underlying context necessary to explain how politicized identities and status
categories become salient in a particular setting. Political rights, immigration policies and multiculturalism in practice are stressed in the literature.

Like expressions of subaltern or oppositional identity politics, many writers point to socioeconomic marginalization to explain diasporas, and groupism more generally. Gitlin (1995) describes “the recognition of collective hurt” and Feher (1996) a language of victimhood to explain the emergence and persistence of movements organized around status identities. Brown (1995) argues “that marginalization forms the basis for the culture of identity groups” (in Bernstein 2005: 50). Brinkerhoff concludes “the direction of identity mobilization is at least partially informed by social marginality or isolation” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 76). In this view, economic, political and social deprivations in the country of residence “strengthen cultural and nationalist sentiments” in the diaspora (Russell King 2010: 174). At the same time, political rights [i.e. citizenship, voting, lobbying, fundraising] empower groups and may provide the confidence necessary to participate in diasporan projects (Thirurajah 2011).

Presenting distinct political opportunities [or not] to influence domestic and foreign politics, foreign policy capture is a second external condition effecting mobilization in the diaspora (Godwin 2012). As an indication of the receptivity of the host state and the relative balance of power between it and the diaspora, the strategic convergence and relative permeability criteria [i.e. “if diasporas promote policies that the government already favors, or if diasporas are able to find points of ‘permeability of and access to the government’” (Koinova 2012: 435)], foreign policy capture suggests the COR plays an important part in episodic mobilization. Without foreign policy capture, the diaspora is less likely to be effective and therefore less likely to mobilize (Bernstein 2005; Brinkerhoff 2008; Godwin 2012).

Differentiating between, or even identifying an opportunity or opportunity structure is not straightforward. It seems like much can be included under either heading, or taken out from under it and considered a resource, a
movement attribute or a factor process. There is something incredibly uncomfortable about considering genocide, moments in war or devastating natural disaster as opportunity structures, or unique opportunities. Jasper (1997) distinguishes between opportunities and moral shocks for some of these reasons and the distinction seems more humane. That said, and perhaps more importantly, the processes and outcomes linked to opportunities or shocks may be the same. Ultimately, we are left looking at political opportunities as fluctuations in the conflict cycle (relationship with homeland), features of the hostland regime (i.e. the relationship between the migrants and the host; and between the host and home governments) as well as events affecting the balance of power between communities within the diaspora (interrelationships).

**Politicized identity: movement attribute and opportunity structure**

Identity, according to Polletta and Jasper (2001) plays a role in all social movements, and “status identities can sometimes socialize individuals into activism and make them available to mobilize for a variety of political purposes” (Bytstydzienski and Schacht, 2001 in Bernstein 2005: 63). A movement that cannot create an identity from which to mobilize cannot produce a political claim (Klandermans 1992).

Collective identity is “an essential process in the emergence of all movements, an indispensable means to build solidarity or cohesion in any and all collective actors” (Young 2001: 105). It is necessary for mobilization because it maintains group boundaries, “develop[s] a political consciousness that defines and analyses interests, and negotiat[es] everyday symbols and actions as strategies of personalized resistance” (Bernstein 2005: 58). A politicized identity is a necessary condition effecting mobilization.

The consulted scholarship describes identity as a “property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions” (Wendt 1999: 225). It is a causal force. Defined as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution” (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285), collective identity, on any grounds, is a ‘cognitive process of identification’ that claims (and may
deliberately exclude) members from different social categories (Wendt 1999: 228). The content and salience of these constructions are probably ‘domain-specific’ (Gil-White 1999: 800), or situational; “identification is usually issue-specific and rarely total (though may come close in love and patriotism)” (Wendt 1999: 229).

Identity is constituted by internal and external forces (Wendt 1999). It depends “on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an intersubjective or systemic quality” (Wendt 1999: 224). Through ecological, social and internal processes, “identity is continuously molded”, renewed and renegotiated by the relations between actors and their environment, among themselves and by the internal characteristics of the actors themselves (Shain and Barth 2003: 450). In other words, the nature and content of identity, and the criteria of belonging, will depend on the degree to which those ideas are shared and practiced in a particular setting. Social facts like the “label applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristic” and the “sharing of expectations […] institutionalized in social structures that pre-date particular interactions” inform self-understandings (Wendt 1999: 225, 227). By shaping the construction of identity, both self and other, memberships effects behaviour.

What matters is the self-ascription and self-awareness of an “agglomeration of people who, at a minimum, represent themselves as vertically reproducing historical units implying cultural ‘peoplehood’” (Weber 1978 in Gil-White 1999: 813). The emphasis is on the nature and content of the collective identity as well as the mechanisms of boundary making and maintenance because, “far from being self-perpetuating, [this identification, groupness and accompanying narrative] require creative effort and investment” (Hoben and Hefner 1990 in Allahar 1996: 8).

Much of that effort and investment is political, and is therefore substantially informed by power. All constructions of identity are, according to Butler, based on power, explicitly or implicitly.
“People gravitate toward identities that hold some benefit”, and that benefit “depends on the system of valorization of the individual, and it may include spiritual, social, and economic considerations. Further, articulations of identity express an individual’s choice of self-determination within a given society, as opposed to being solely a function of socioeconomic or ethnic factors” (Butler 2001: 213).

In cases of migration, Castles suggests a dual process of other-definition and self-definition where the self-definition includes an “assertion and recreation of ethnic identity, centered upon premigration cultural symbols and practices” (2009: 40), and that is significantly influenced by conditions is the hostland.

The mobilization of ‘essentialized identities’ depends on the political context (Calhoun 1994), which in turn “depend on how power or ‘the relations of ruling’ (Smith 1997) are expressed in everyday life” (Bernstein 2005: 60). Drawing on the feminist literature, she suggests conceptualizing identity politics “as a way to produce knowledge that derives from the material conditions, lived experiences, and social location of participants” (Bernstein 2005: 60). In other words, “self-definition and the creation of knowledge through the development of a standpoint” (Collins 1998) is part of political activism that, “through collective interpretation and analysis”, reflects the “distribution of power and prevailing interactional routines in the political field” (Bernstein 2005: 60). Social mobilization literature refers to cognitive liberation or subjective engageability (McAdam 1982), conscious constituencies (Goodwin et al. 2009; 2014), the situatedness (Stroettzer and Yuval-Davis 2002) or vantage point (Haraway 1991) of a self-aware collective. They stress the current environment and the social and political legacies that constitute this space. Subject to political opportunities, political work and everyday negotiations, individuals and groups are able to situate themselves within the constructed context, acknowledging power and status variations, and developing strategies to change these relations and valuations. For a diaspora, the trajectory assumes this work – though ongoing – has already constructed and deployed a collective identity. It suggests key actors, networks and orientations are established.
Identity politics is used to “describe any mobilization related to politics, culture, and identity” (Bernstein 2005: 48) but it remains a short hand for “ethnicity as a contemporary form of politics [Ross 1982]”, for violent ethnic conflict [Meznaric 1993], and nationalism more generally [Alund 1995] (in Bernstein 2005: 47). The conclusion is that conflicts “embedded in a larger view of identity” are intractable because “they cannot be confined to single, discrete issues” (Dahl 1966 in Chandra 2001: 344). They become “conflict over a basic conception of the self” (Chandra 2001: 344) and therefore ethnic politics is a zero-sum game played by ethnic (or diasporan) actors motivated by competition in these ‘lifelong games’ (Horowitz 1985). In the face of “identities and intergroup tensions forged in violence” (Hall and Swain 2008) and (re)established in migration, “ethnic and racial identities continue to flourish, to shape opportunities, and consequently to inform political action or mobilization” (Allahar 1996: 12).

The answer to the research question is then and in part, as Brinkerhoff bluntly puts it, “diaspora participation in transnational violence is fundamentally about identity” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 68). The identity and self-awareness associated with a diaspora finds expression in theories of social mobilization as movement attributes that affect the probability of outcomes. Opportunities are generally understood as those conditions that privilege things [opportunity structures] or as sudden changes when actors’ agency counts for more [moments of opportunity] (Buechler 2011). The diasporan trajectory is an opportunity structure that reflects political opportunities in multiple places and includes a collective identity shared by a self-aware group. In short, “members whose association to their community is strong, and whose attachment to their home country is equally durable, ensure that collective mobilization for a common goal is conceivable”, but not guaranteed (Godwin 2012: 165). The presence of intra-community conditions that are largely within the control of the group “can be enhanced or diminished by external factors beyond the control of diaspora groups” (Ibid: 166). Piven and Cloward (1977) argue much of the success of a movement is external to its attributes and depends on “the receptivity of the economic and political systems within which the movement operates and from which it hopes to extract concessions” (Caren 2007: 2). The importance of political opportunities in movement scholarship suggests
inclusivity, receptivity and elite allies are critical concerns. What is more, contingent political opportunities inform not only the quality and quantity of resources but also the timing and effects of their use.

**Movement attributes**

Opportunities and opportunity structures are “highly dependent on diasporans access to power resources […] economic, social, political, and physical resources” (Uphoff 2005 in Brinkerhoff 2008: 76). Even the ability to respond to moral shocks depends, to a degree, on available resources. Resources, as per McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) play a greater role informing mobilization choices does the “level of repression levied against the movement” (Caren 2007: 1-2).

Capital, resources and movement attributes all express essentially the same point, that is, the value of “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1984 in Pettit 2011: 4). More simply, resources are “anything that can be mobilized” (Caren 2007), or the internal characteristics that affect the organizational strength of a social movement.

Fuchs describes material and non-material resources as, respectively, “money, organizations, manpower, technology, means of communication and mass media” and “legitimacy, loyalty, social relationships, networks, personal connections, public attention, authority, moral commitment, and solidarity” (2006: 82). Resources by this definition include material goods as well as “aspects such as organizational strength and the presence of elite allies” (Caren 2007: 2); it is the aggregation of resources that reflects the organizational strength of the group (ibid). Fuchs concludes resources define behaviour in political processes (2006: 82). By all accounts material resources and therefore material power is important but more important is the ‘fungibility’ of these resources or how well they connect with non-material resources like ideational power (Ibid). As he explains, agency is not limited to the amount or size of material resources per se but rather depends on the ability to convert resources
into movement attributes that “determine[s] actor-specific material power (Ibid). Non-material resources are highlighted in the literature, and this emphasis is reflected in the importance attached to a movement’s organizational strength.

To “discuss the actual mechanics by which ethnic antagonism can be harnessed to bring about ethnic mobilization and conflict”, Allahar (1996: 17) stresses resources, namely

“the relevance and importance of the right leaders and appropriate infrastructural supports: pre-existing ethnic organizations and opportunity structures; charismatic spokespersons; effective network of communication; specific grievances and oppositional ideologies, all of which can come together and pose a credible challenge” (McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; Klandermans 1984 in Allahar 1996: 17).

Rephrased, these are movement attributes encompassing the identity, organization, mobilizing structures and framing expressed in the classic definition of diaspora, and in PPM.

Elites and everyone else

The literature divides members into three categories: core, passive and silent (Shain and Barth 2003: 452). The emphasis is on elites as the ‘main mobilizers’ (Paerregaard 2010) to construct, politicize and mobilize the salient identity, to interpret opportunities and direct action.

Core members are the ‘organizing elites’ (Shain and Barth 2003), they include ethnic entrepreneurs and it is the study of their decision-making processes that informs much of the scholarship on mobilization. They are “intensively active in diasporan affairs and in a position to appeal for mobilization of the larger diaspora” (Ibid: 452). As mechanisms of stability, Chandra points to “political entrepreneurs who stand to benefit from stable groups […] might deliberately restrict the set of alternatives between which individuals choose in order to induce stability” (Chandra 2001: 350). Their choices are, in actuality, the agency that shapes outcomes (Thelen 1999 in Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 354).
Passive members are “likely to be available for mobilization when the active leadership calls upon them” (Shain and Barth 2003: 452). Silent members are a “larger pool of people who are generally uninvolved in diasporan affairs (in the discursive and political life of its institutions), but who may mobilize in times of crisis” (Ibid). Often “existing only in the minds of diasporan political activists, as well as those of home or host governments” (Ibid), silent members are part of the 'imagined community' and ‘of the people’, but equally the group most likely to be ‘claimed’ by political elites and externally categorized by non-members (Faist 2010).

Networks

Godwin (2012) connects the extent a group can be mobilized to the networks that facilitate, or socialize individuals to, activism. Effective mobilizing structures will reinforce the identity and the ethos. These structures are part of the institutional arrangements that inform behaviour and influence outcomes. They are mechanisms of reproduction.

Pre-existing social organizations contribute to the organizational strength of any social mobilization, and translate into a capability to take advantage of discrete opportunities, and opportunity structures (Oberschall 1995 in Buechler 2011). Mobilizing structures may “involve long standing, traditional ties with symbolic or moral overtones that link people together”, and that may arise on the basis of religion, culture or ethnicity (Buechler 2011: 112). They engender trust (Coleman 1990), generate the shared identity required for collective action (Ostrom 1990), and “represent bonding social capital and encompass solidarity and community identity” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 76). These associations make it easier to put social pressure on individual members, overcoming the free rider problem and making people available “for bloc recruitment and quick mobilization” (Buechler 2011: 112). Mobilizing structures are the crucial links between leaders and the periphery.
SI highlights the role of the family as the first site of socialization (So Hee Chi Kim 2007). Family is ‘privileged’ (Ahmed 2007) because “group memory begins from the point of familial transfer of embodied experience to the next generation” (So Hee Chi Kim 2007: 348). They are implicated in environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms that inform a movement’s cultural framework, and from which it interprets political opportunities and mobilises resources. They are part of the interactive and interpretative processes of identity construction and social mobilization. Insights from SI are critical to develop the trajectory identified by Butler in the first dimension, and to explain why that trajectory is maintained, adapted, or changed in the face of conditions present in the second, third and fourth dimensions. These institutions and processes are included, if sometimes unspecified, in social constructivism and historical institutionalism.

Dynamics like the transgenerational transmission of trauma (Volkan 1997) or the family structure of inheritance (So Hee Chi Kim 2007) are relevant. Both explore the effects of trauma on subsequent generations, including the cognitive and emotive impacts of that transferal on identity formation, preferences and goals. The familial structure of inheritance is a means of accessing the bridge between experiences and political activism. Inheritances include the “social, cultural, and psychical orientations […] that put certain things within reach, such as styles, capacities, aspirations, techniques, habits in addition to physical objects” (Ahmed 2007: 154). The “chain of inheritance often does not stop with the second generation”; the “transfer of diasporan postmemory and identification” includes social and cultural practices of boundary maintenance as well as identification with already-formed parental identities and ideologies that can effect articulations and practices of long distance nationalism (So Hee Chi Kim 2007: 350). It is passed down. The experiences of the first generation become part of the second, and subsequent, generations’ narrative in terms of understanding their political identity and ‘sense of self’ (Reynolds 2008), and may engender identities and interests that favour mobilization.
These ‘concrete exchanges’ between close relations signify “the production of the social bond within the framework of interactive relations in familial space” that can expand to include members of the same community (So Hee Chi Kim 2007: 348). They are socially constructed as a result of shared history and result in distinct social groups (Bernstein 2005: 50). The conscience collective identified by Durkheim relies on the physical assembly of the group with its known and shared focus of attention to “fuse cognitive and moral unity” leading to feelings of solidarity, emotional energy for individual participants (enthusiasm and energy), investment in symbols and feelings of morality (Collins 2001: 28). As communities of feeling pre-existing social organizations may, according to Geertz (1973), rely on ritual display “as a kind of ‘sentimental education’ in its use of emotion for cognitive ends”, the political significance of which is performative, thus it is experiential and “as a form of action […] representation […] ritual points in the direction of action” (Berezin 2001: 93). Communities of feeling or public political rituals “serve as arenas of identity, bounded spaces, where collective national selfhood is enacted. […] repeated experience of ritual participation produces a feeling of solidarity, […] and lastly, it produces collective memory” (Ibid). And since “conscience constituencies may be, in part, residues of earlier social mobilizations, the emotional self-presentation of a social movement will succeed or fail to just the extent that a historical sequence of social movements leaves adherents in one emotional frame or another” (Collins 2001: 42). “Long-lasting moods and affective ties […] may make people more susceptible to certain beliefs and understandings” (Goodwin et al. 16).

**Cognitive liberation**, “the altered responses of members to a particular challenger [that] serve to transform evolving political conditions into a set of ‘cognitive cues’ signifying to insurgents that the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to change” (McAdam 1982: 49 in Goodwin et al. 2001: 7) is the process of collective attribution that marks a group’s subjective perception that a situation is unjust, and required to turn grievance into political activism; it is likely reinforced by pre-existing organizational ties (Buechler 2011). Together, they account “for mechanisms like loyalty to group and responsibility to principle that can become powerful spurs to participation” (Ibid: 126). Inheritances, symbols, concrete exchanges and ritual, like the
family or culture more generally, are “constitutive, structuring and constraining institutions” (Bernstein 2005: 49-50). The implicated institutions and associated networks are implicated in the formation and development of diasporan identity and trajectory. As mechanisms of reproduction or stability, they are relational and cognitive dynamics that inform the interpretation of changing conditions and effect mobilization outcomes. Part of the cultural framework, they point to sociological institutions to maintain the trajectory.

The political opportunities, sociological institutions and movement attributes described above are contingent on context; they are vulnerable to change over time as a consequence of their interpretive and interactive nature, or as the result of sudden changes to the underlying context. And so while Tarrow (1994) notes that “changes in the structure of political opportunities can have a decisive impact on the ebb and flow of movement activism” (in Buechler 2011: PG) Snow and Benford (2000) argue these ‘objective conditions’ alone cannot explain mobilization.

Factor processes and power in social mobilization

Before turning to the case study, it is important to look at two factor processes relied on it the literature. The role played by these mechanisms clarifies the logics of institutional interactions, and the context of political decision-making, specifically the relational and cognitive mechanisms operant in a particular environment. It is also necessary to connect what is ‘in actuality decisions of the political elite’ with actual social mobilization.

Research “has settled on two major distinctions of relationships: power and status” that can be treated either as structure or as behaviours (Kemper 2001: 60-61). Variation in these basic relational or structural conditions can explain influences and outcomes. In the IR literature, Petersen (2011: 9-10) identifies hard power, soft power, and smart power as well as compulsory power, institutional power, structural power and productive power; she distinguishes between conflictual and consensual power; dispositional and episodic power, as well as between symbolic power and communicative power. She finds distinctions made between normative power and network
power as well as between the ‘power over’ vs. the ‘power to’ or ‘power with’; in short, it is a debated and contested concept. At its simplest, power is the ability of one actor “to realize his or her interests in interaction with another actor, even over the opposition of that actor” (Weber 1946: 181 in Kemper 2001: 60). It includes the power “to speak for and act in the name of others” as above, but also the power to define identity and interests (Wendt 1999).

The second relational dynamic, status, is “the form of relationship in which one actor willingly complies with the actual or supposed interests or wishes of another actor, without threat, intimidation, or coercion, and without an expected quid pro quo, such as occurs in relations of social exchange” (Kemper 61 in Goodwin et al. 2001). In part, this means that power “doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no… it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse” (Foucault 1988: 119 in Yuval-Davis 1994: 186). Treated as behavior these arrangements would “tend over time to lead to structures” (Kemper 2001: 60-62).

Power, as per Bourdieu, is “culturally and symbolically created, and constantly re-legitimized through an interplay of agency and structure”; it is expressed through *habitus* “the socialized norms or tendencies that guide human behavior and thinking” (Wacquant 2005 in Navarro 2006: 16). The social result of the interplay of structure and agency over time, *habitus* is defined as “the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting disposition, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel and act in determinant ways, which then guide them” (Ibid). It is “shaped by past events and structures, [...] shape[s] current practices and structures, and also [...] condition[s] our very perceptions of these” (Bourdieu 1984: 170 in Pettit 2011: 4). *Sens pratique*, habitus involves “a sense of how to act, how to play the game, that is never altogether conscious or purely reducible to rules” (Calhoun 2001: 53). Calhoun (2001: 53) argues we should “follow Bourdieu in seeing the habitus as a result of the individual’s inscription and not altogether portable and interior to the individual”. In other words, these logics of appropriateness are produced intersubjectively, “not from isolated
psyches but in communicative social agency” (Barker 2001: 193); they are “always situational and relational” (Ibid). NI incorporates this dynamic.

Habitus, and the institutional arrangements it embodies, are “not fixed or permanent, and can be changed under unexpected situations or over a long historical period” (Navarro 2006: 16). It is socially constructed and path dependent (Hochschild 1983 in Whittier 2001: 235). And as explained by Immergut (1998: 22) “contextual factors may affect the functioning and salience of institutions” and associated dispositions.

The second factor process, framing, is “integral to social movement scholarship” (Koinova 2005: 156). All social movements rely on process factors like framing to “influence diasporans’ incentives to mobilize” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 77). Scholars like Wayland (2004), Adamson (2005), Brinkerhoff (2006), Smith and Stares (2007) and Koinova (2009) have applied this process to explain dynamics of diasporization.

A frame is an “interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford 1992 in Koinova 2005: 156). It is a fundamental mechanism necessary to explain the choice of preferences and behaviours. Responses are not automatic, but “related to moral intuitions, felt obligations and rights, and information about expected effects, all of which are culturally and historically variable” (Goodwin et al. 2001: 13). They do not operate in a vacuum; “they are dynamically related to political and cultural opportunities and constraints” (Koinova 2005: 157).

Framing is the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996). Movement elites (a resource) use frames to mediate the “interests that motivate action” and the “political structures [that] open and close to encourage or discourage this action” (Young 2001: 103). Framing in PPM is instrumental and
strategic, a product of elite manipulation. In HI, it is a factor process used by “strategic actors capable of acting on ‘openings’ provided by such shifting contextual conditions in order to enhance their position” (Thelen 1999 in Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 354).

Effective frames, according to Keck and Sikknick (1998) are able to show that the status quo is not natural, they identify the responsible party and propose credible solutions” (Ibid: 156). They are the mechanisms by which movements articulate a problem and attribute an identity to each of the affected parties; the group itself, those responsible for the problem, and those who can fix it (Bernstein 2005: 58). Framing is thus implicated in the choice of identity, of strategy, and of goals that emerge in response to the problem as it is framed. Successful issue framing focuses attention and enables effective coordination (Benford and Snow 2000). It “supports consensus on the direction of collective energy, including what is acceptable and what it not” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 77). It also inspires confidence; it “generate[s] a sense of efficacy and subsequent impact” that is necessary to sustain motivation (Ibid: 77). Efficacy relates to psychological empowerment (Ibid: 77), and framing processes inform processes of cognitive liberation (McAdam 1995?), oppositional consciousness (Mansbridge and Morris 2001), standpoint (Bernstein 2005), and diasporization.

The explanatory power of frame alignment theories “rests with the interaction between cultural schemas embedded in preexisting social networks and the skills of movement entrepreneurs to successfully transform these schemas into mobilizing structures” (Young 2001: 104). Groupness, then, is not only ‘the content of representations’ meaning the degree to which frames stress the unity and coherence of a ‘pure’ entity, but also “the distribution of such representations within a population, on their accessibility or ease of activation, on their relative salience once activated, and – not least – on the relative ease with which they ‘slot’ into or ‘interlock’ with other key cultural representations” (Brubaker et al. 2004: 46-47).
And this is where everybody else comes into the mobilization question. The above must be ‘cognitively persuasive’ and ‘experiential commensurable’ (Buechler, 2011) with the identities, interests and experiences of those they seek to motivate.

Factor processes relate to expressions of power; agents negotiate all the identified practices and processes through the available frames that reflect a particular expression of habitus. Frames must express and reinforce habitus to be salient and by so doing habitus is practiced and re legitmised. This translates into habitual ways of seeing, thinking, feeling and acting, as well as institutional (political, social, cultural) arrangements (and logics) that are ‘resilient’. Combined, factor processes help explain why individuals “as members of social groups with shared belief systems that frame memories and shape them into narratives” (See Ho Chi Kim 2007: 347) choose one definition of their interests over another (Immergut 1998) and are mobilized in the politics of their country of origin. These cognitions and contexts are likely to “constrain the hypothesis-space and the perception-space of actors (Quine 1960; Bloom 1993), making them more susceptible to the acquisition of certain ideas than others concerning the ‘objects’ so categorized” (Gil-White 1999: 801). Broadly, embedded in interactional routines, these factor processes [relational and cognitive mechanisms] inform part of the relevant political and cultural frameworks.

The totality of the literature stresses the contingent and interactive nature of social mobilization in the diaspora toward the country of origin. The contingent, or temporal, dynamics of mobilization refers to conflict cycles, institutional path dependency, generations of migrants and social processes in the longue durée. The literature recognizes three spaces that impact motivation and mobilization: home (country of origin), host (country of residence) and the diasporan (or transnational) space. Within these spaces, particular attention is paid to the social and political landscape of the country of origin; the reasons and conditions for dispersal; and then to integration in the host country, the factors that effect settlement and integration in that place, and to the “strategic convergence” and “relative permeability” of foreign policy in the COR. These are the political
opportunities and environmental factors that effect mobilization. Owing to the interpretative, interactive and situational nature of these dynamics, relational and cognitive mechanisms are implicated in these emotion-identity mobilizations (Koinova 2012). These are the conditions that inform the framework; they are the constitutive forces this thesis project explores.

**Theoretical conclusions from the first two chapters**

The first point is that group formation and activism are interactive, situational and intersubjective processes, where structure conditions agency, and power is distributional and aggregative but also disperse, affirming, concerted and comprising all manipulations of identity and resources. As social and habitual actors, ‘appropriateness’ is a category of action, and hierarchy, ‘assigned’ roles and status influence perception, and therefore action.

The ‘no blank slate’ of historical institutionalism and the focus on the situatedness of the socially embedded actor both signal, as a point of departure, the context that informs identification, politicization and mobilization. This includes the antecedent and contemporary socio-political exigencies, internal and external conditions, that constitute the institutional makeup and meaning making of a community. Conceptualizing diaspora as an overarching institutionalized social structure means tracing the conditions and effects of various relationships and their impact on a trajectory of community politicization. The rules and relationships that historicize and contextualize perceptions, interactions, and outcomes means diasporas and their politics are explained by reference to those rules and relationships that precipitated its formation and sustain it over time.

The historical-political (and socioeconomic) conditions that constrain and condition actor decision-making, which include external conditions outside the group’s control as well as the power of small numbers of key actors to yield decisive influence over the nature and content of key concepts like identity, membership, strategies, tactics, and goals is important because structure is important. PPM starts here. It focuses on the
outcomes of formal politics, on opportunities afforded by the conflict cycle and on those existent independent
of the country of origin, including conditions in and across various host states, and among the diaspora itself.
Sequence and timing are critical to explore contingent outcomes dependent on opportunities and degrees of
social organization.

Establishing the social-structural context begins with the group’s origins: the reasons for dispersal and the
composition of the departing group. Different ideational and political trajectories are hypothesized from
variation in these experiences. The legacies of the departing group, their identifications, interests, orientations
and attitudes, are manifest in (re)constructed identifications, social networks and norms, symbolic systems,
ideologies and ethics, and includes political goals, strategies and tactics. These legacies establish mechanisms
of stability or reproduction that sustain the trajectory by maintaining identity, ‘groupness’ and group boundaries
as well as political orientation and attitude across generations and amid changing political circumstances.

Both the formation of diaspora and any subsequent mobilization depend on political opportunities in two
significant ways. In the first, conditions that hinder or facilitate the emergence and politicization of groups, the
choice of identity construction and political strategies, the availability of resources as well as the nature and
content of political objectives and activism will necessarily effect what a diaspora is and what it does. In a
second significant way, political opportunities indicate the presence and relative influence of elite allies,
changes in the conflict cycle of one country or the foreign policy of another, and speaks to shifts in international
or national discourse and norms that may facilitate or hinder movement activism. Both stress structure by
linking political outcomes to those things that change the context, and actor calculations.

The ability to take advantage of political opportunities and contextual changes depends on the group’s own
attributes, that is, the degree to which identities, social organization and resources favour and practice particular
definitions of identity, group and interest, as well as legitimize the dispensation of resources toward a particular
agenda. As a social construct and political project diaspora reflects the organization of political life in a particular context, and is a definition that lends itself to the *rmt, ppm*, and institutional models of group formation and behaviour.

The view of people toward that organization of political life is an inherent dimension of the mobilization question. Popular politics necessitates exploration of what the group means to its members. The second strand of research, that is diaspora as consciousness, stresses the interpretative factors associated with mobilization, and conceives diaspora politics as the relationship between experience, culture, identity, politics and power. The focus is on identity, subjectivity and lived experience to situate and explain contemporary politics; it highlights agency.

History, trauma and personal, symbolic attachment are stressed in the classic definition, and in much of the literatures on diaspora, conflict, and social mobilization. The social framework includes identifications forged in the familial spaces; affective and ideational networks; social relations, social norms and shared values; symbolic and discursive systems; and is manifest in song and ritual. These traditions and expectations, implying psychological alignment and everyday praxis, have causal significance. The links between private and public identifications and expressions, between the force of political institutions and that of social rules that social actors can ignore or contest, implies an exploration of what coheres and why. It suggest diasporization and mobilization is not only an elite concept, but phenomenologically, it insists the relevant social-structural context is manifest as formal politics as much as it is as other aspects of culture, including cognitive meanings, symbolic systems, emotive frameworks; it is subtextual and reproduced in familial spaces. It implicates more actors, and introduces new mobilization variables. These conditions and processes may facilitate episodic mobilization because they do not suddenly (re)emerge when opportunity allows; they exist as cultural politics, associational networks and ideational trajectories operant in everyday practice. These may be the critical factors that sustain a movement and explain the strength of episodic mobilizations.
Chapter Three: Case Study, Hypothesis and Methodology

The Sri Lankan Case

The ethnic make up of Sri Lanka according to the last census [1981] is 74% Sinhalese, 12% Tamil, 7% Muslim, 6% Indian Tamil, 1% other (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 63). The 2015 data used by Itmyaz and Mohamed-Saleem (2015:187) suggests Sinhalese represent 82% of the total population and are predominantly Buddhist. Sri Lankan Tamils, mainly Hindus, are the largest ethnic minority and represent 12.7% of the population. Muslims, constitute 8% of the population and comprise several ethnic groups, the majority being Moors. Christians comprise 7.5% of the population and are the fourth largest religious group in Sri Lanka (Ibid: 189).

A peculiarity of Sri Lankan demographics is the regional concentration of ethnic groups in specific areas historically separated by a dry ‘buffer’ zone (Perera 2001). Hindu Tamils are largely concentrated in the Northern Province but also a statistical majority in the Eastern Province (Ibid: 5). That province, though mixed, is home to a significant Muslim population. Sinhala Buddhists comprise the majority population in every province except the northern and eastern provinces (Ibid). In Sri Lankan history, regional prejudices, compounded by ‘strong caste prejudices’, favoured an ethnic identity over a national one (Cheran 2009).

Constructivist accounts explain ethnic or religious conflict in multicultural societies as a response to socio-economic and political stress. Despite longer histories, scholars identify British colonialism with its ‘divide and rule policy’ as a system of “communal representation” (Nissan 1996) that “revitalized and manifest” ethnic politics in the 19th and 20th centuries (Perera 2001). The legacies of decolonization processes and post-colonial nation-building institutionalized discriminatory policies in education, employment, land ownership and access. Competition, especially in hard times, the collapse of a buffer zone between communities and the history of inequitable access to education, employment and land are roots causes of the conflict, and later reasons for...
dispersal and diasporan mobilization. And while empirically “exploitable immediate causes always existed” (Ibid: 8), what matters in HI, and what Sri Lankan scholars stress are the political power struggles, the elite divisions and the “creations of vote-seeking politicians” that have in successive waves institutionalized an interpretation of history with significant emotional content that suggests an almost irreconcilable conflict (Ibid). As precursors to the recent conflict, these choices inform interpretations of the past, popular perceptions and mass politics.

Historically the northern and southern populations have been physically separated by tropical jungle, creating a buffer zone “so entrenched it prevented free and fluid interactions between Sinhala and Tamil masses”, and may also have prevented “regular inter-ethnic conflagrations, which became somewhat endemic in the 1970s and 1980s” and culminated in the intermittent civil war thereafter (Perera 2001: 19). Before independence the Ceylon Tamil Congress, a political party, worried about Sinhala colonization in the northeast (Nissan 1996). In 1956 PM Senanayake warned of the dangers of Sinhala ‘colonization of the north’ (Ibid). Twenty-four years ago Tambiah noted the “unfolding pattern of dry zone colonization has fuelled the ethnic conflict” (1992: 69). As ongoing and post-war nation building projects, the ‘creeping Sinhalization’ and ‘new colonialism’ of the northeast continues to inform land disputes and the ethnic conflict (ICG 2010).

Post-independence elections “inevitably produced governments that favoured the Sinhalese majority” and “successive Sinhala governments consistently discriminated against Tamils and other minorities” with legislations and other “constitutional manipulations designed to roll back the dominant position of Tamils in state employment and education” (ICG 2010: 3). Political pacts meant to address Tamil grievances have collapsed because of “the general lack of political will on the part of national level Sinhala political leadership” (Perera 2001: 19). The Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam Pact 1957 was rejected “under relentless pressure from UNP dominated Sinhala nationalist opposition forces” and the Dudley - Chelvanayagam Pact 1965 rejected “under pressure from SLFP led Sinhala nationalist forces” (Ibid). These failures, consequence of
elite divisions, mark a significant loss of confidence in the parliamentary system and provide a compelling example of domestic politics effecting international behaviour. The United National Party [UNP] and the Sri Lankan Freedom Party [SLFP] remain the dominant political parties.

National language is a “dominant theme in both religious and political spheres” (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015: 188). In post-colonial Sri Lanka the resolution to make Sinhala and Tamil official languages was affirmed by Sinhala-dominated legislatures in 1944, 1945, 1946, 1953 and 1954, and signals a “lack of ethnic overtones in the issue of official languages at this stage” (Kearney 1967: 63 in Perera 1991; 2001: 9). According to these scholars, and “contrary to Tamil nationalist claims and some contemporary academics, politics of language have not always been a reflection of inter-ethnic rivalry” (Ibid). Rather, it was divisions within the Sinhalese elite, namely between the educated rural elite “whose nationalist aspirations for cultural transformation, power and status did not automatically materialize with independence” and the English educated urban ruling elite (Ibid). That said, language was the critical issue that led to the split from the UNP and formation of the SLFP. The ‘Sinhala Only’ Bill was enacted in 1956 and no status was given to the Tamil language. The non-violent Tamil protests that followed ended in the first wide scale anti-Tamil violence.

According to Uyangoda (1999) “militancy and violence took off in the 1970s against the background of unemployment between Sinhalese and Tamil youths” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 63). Ethnic riots in 1957, 1977, 1978 were organized by nationalist actors with “delayed or no action to stem the violence on the part of the law and order apparatus” (Perera 2001: 20). Then in July 1983 the “worst civil disturbances in Sri Lanka’s history”, “marked the beginning of Eelam War I, the first phase of the prolonged civil war” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 64). Subsequent to Black July, “more Tamils were recruited to the Tamil militant movements”, and “support for the LTTE and a separate state increased among the Tamil population both nationally and among the Tamil diaspora” (Ibid). Gunaratna (1998) describes a more militariesed political discourse where “political and constitutional developments further marginalized Tamils in formal political process” and where “ Taml
politicians played only a minor role in the unfolding of the crisis to follow” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 64). By the end of the 1970s the LTTE emerged as the “dominant [insurgent] group and the ideological powerhouse of the Tamil separatist cause” and throughout the 1980s consolidated its position by marginalizing or eliminating other Tamil militant groups (Hoole et al 1990).

According to Perera “the notion of the ‘traditional Tamil homeland’ became a potent component of popular Tamil political imagination” (2001: 18). Subsequent political maneuvers were ‘too little, too late’; the idea of separation once planted, flourished among segments of the Tamil population (Sabaratnam 2001), and the idea of Tamil Eelam captured the popular imagination (Perera 2001). As a consequence of the LTTE’s monopolization of the Tamil political voice, “Tamil politics [...] concentrated on the national question which overshadowed the more immediate needs and rights of the Tamil people” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 64).

Nationalist historical interpretations are reproduced in school textbooks, “which is an important agency of social and political socialization in contemporary Sri Lanka” that effects nation-building, interethnic relations, and in the continuation of the conflict (Perera 2001: 8). Falling under government jurisdiction, “the contents of texts must necessarily reflect state policy or thinking” (Ibid: 14). Sinhala language readers create a sense of “Sinhala Buddhist hegemony [...] other ethno-cultural communities have been literally pushed into the margins of the texts or completely removed from them”; Tamil language readers depict a “very northern (Jaffna) centric sense of Sri Lanka reality” and Christian and Islamic texts “create a relatively exclusive portrayal of their own religious communities without any reference to the Sri Lanka’s multi-religious reality” (Ibid). They reflect the “voluntary and relatively segregated routine life of most Sri Lankans” (Ibid: 13) and the manifest “ethnic divisions and animosities [...] are much more long lasting and far more insidious than the more visible ethno-linguistic discrimination of the 1970s” (Ibid: 12).
The 1993 assassination of the Sri Lankan President Premadasa by the LTTE precipitated the 1994 election of President Kumaratunga who began peace talks with the LTTE the same year, marking the end of Eelam II (Roberts 2001). It lasted one hundred days before the LTTE sunk a naval craft and six years of civil war, Eelam III, followed (Ibid). This phase ended with the Norwegian backed 2002 ceasefire. And while the Government of Sri Lanka [GSL] never acknowledged a separate state, it “at least in the form of local government structures, recognized the strength of the LTTE in the political field” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 65). That is until the 2004 Karuna defection and the 2006 government offensive to regain control of the Eastern Province (de A. Samarasinghe 2009). With the 2002 ceasefire still in effect, competition within the group was dealt a significant blow when Karuna, commander of the Eastern (Province) faction of the LTTE, split from the group “weaken[ing] its capacity to maintain control over both Tamils at home and abroad” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 64). At the same time, the Tsunami devastated the northern province and dispute over the use of resources “hastened the breakdown in relations between the LTTE and the government and the escalating resumption of hostilities as 2005 wore on” (Hyndman 2007 in Brun and Van Hear 2012: 64). An ‘unofficial war’ was fought between 2005 and 2007 before the government announced the end of the ceasefire in January 2008 (Godwin 2012); both sides resumed (or continued) military operations (de A. Samarasinghe, 2009). The local population “was unable to contribute much more” for the ‘final war’ when fighting resumed in 2005 and the LTTE turned to the diaspora (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 67). That war ended decisively in government victory in May 2009.

Gunawardena (1987) warns against essentializing a historicized process whereby “cultural and linguistic consciousness, ethnic identity and representation, and communalism cannot be simplistically or retroactively applied into the past” (in Alwis 2003: 18), nor projected into the future. These conflicts “hardly were the result of long and well-established antagonisms” (Perera 2001: 7) nor inevitable owing to primordial differences (Chandra 2001), but are more rightly explained by reference to economic, political and geographic factors, and to the systems that sustain these arrangements (Caren 2007).

The armed struggle was never mass-based;
“it reduced people to the status of ‘observers’ or contributors to the coffers of the ‘sole protectors’. Those among the ‘people’ who were inclined towards national reconciliation and accommodation were branded as ‘traitors’. In addition, the ‘battle’ was no longer against the state and its organs. Non-combatant civilians, particularly in the ‘border areas’ became legitimate targets” (Loganathan 1996: 189).

Before the total collapse of the LTTE, criticisms of the organization “would have been confined to private conversations or voiced publicly by the few brave enough to confront them” (ICG 2010: 9). According to one American Tamil activist, “No one would defy them, no one wanted to be called a traitor” (ICG 2010: 9). For many years the diasporan political field was equated with the LTTE because it had such a “tight hold on the diaspora, that when an ordinary Tamil irrespective of his or her stand on the Tigers wanted to express their dissatisfaction with the Sri Lankan government, they were forced to do so through the LTTE” (ICG 2010: 5).

According to the President of the Sri Lanka United National Association of Canada in the early 1980s, at the beginning of the Sri Lankan conflict, there were only 2000 Tamils residing in Canada (Godwin 2012: 167). After the 1983 riots, “the Canadian government swiftly processed Tamil refugee application en masse” (Godwin 2012: 169). The Canadian government institutionalized the identity and the exile narrative, effecting the size and composition of the group. According to Statistics Canada (2009) Tamils account for 2.7 % of Canada’s South Asian population. Canada hosts the largest population of Tamils outside South Asia (ICG 2010). At 300,000 the Tamil Hindu community is substantially larger than the estimated 50,000 individuals of Sinhalese descent and the lesser numbers of Sri Lankan Moors and Tamil Christians residing in Canada. As a matter of policy, immigration processes, like spousal sponsorships or family reunification claims, favour people already here. Economic migrants and temporary foreign workers also rely on previously established networks.

Butler defines hostlands as “one of the primary agents in the formation and development of diasporas” (Butler 2001: 206). The “host country political structure and receptivity to diaspora groups are critically important
considerations” that effect mobilization (Godwin 2012: 166). He specifies three: host country inclusivity, foreign policy capture and competition between rival groups (Ibid).

Canada recognizes dual-citizenship, allowing, if not encouraging, formal political identification with one or more nation-states. As a bundle of rights multiculturalism translates into a right to “maintain a connection to the cultural, religious and ethnic beliefs of their countries of origin, including the right to be politically engaged with the homeland” (Thurairajah 2011: 131). Citizenship, and the accompanying political rights, “lends significant influence to diaspora groups” who can mobilise; they may vote en bloc (Godwin 2012: 166).

Today, the Canadian Tamil Congress operates as a “nation-wide non-governmental organization mandated with representing Tamils to Canadian government officials” (Canadian Tamil Congress 2011 in Godwin 2012: 169). The ability of non-government organizations to operate relatively unencumbered in this country also meant that until 2006 the LTTE “operated and organised in Canada, raising vast sums of money and meeting with politicians and decision-makers” (ICG 2010). ‘Taxes’ were levied against Tamil families. In Canada that amount was $30 a month while in Switzerland that number was higher, ranging from $50 to $100 a month (ICG 2010). Incredibly, LTTE agents worked, unbeknownst to authorities, as interpreters for the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, framing asylum claims and intimidating claimants (HRW 2006). The Sri Lanka United National Association of Canada represents Sinhalese interests, and has “long accused the Canadian government of abrogating its responsibility to ban terrorist organizations by allowing the LTTE to operate in Canada” (Godwin 2012: 169). The World Tamil Movement operated until 2008 when it was banned for its links to the LTTE.

The community’s collective resources are hard to quantify, “but their funding network is extensive” (Godwin 2012: 167). And it is “one of the most significant aspects of the relationship between the Tamil diaspora and the Sri Lankan state” (ICG 2010: 5). Remittances to Sri Lanka were often paid through undiyal, an informal money
transfer system that distributes money to family back home (Cheran 2005). It is an ‘established and highly organized network [that] also served to fund LTTE operations as well as advocacy efforts in the host country” (Godwin 2012: 167). The ICG confirms this, adding “funds raised abroad were used for destruction and reconstruction alike” (ICG 2010: 5), but Colombo’s “paramount concern about the diaspora has always been its financial support for the Tigers” (Ibid: 10).

Before the final war or the street protests in Toronto, the Canadian Tamil community already had a ‘formidable organizational apparatus’ (Hyndman 2003). Hundreds of village and alumni associations connect Tamil diasporans (Aiken and Cheran 2005). The cheetu system, a communal social safety net, pools resources of people from the same village or kin group and redistributes it to members of the ‘cheetu’ most in need (Godwin 2012: 167). Together these associations, and others, reproduce Sri Lankan social structures, “suggested not only personal attachment to the homeland via remaining family members, but also a continued attachment to social constructs and means of organization” (Godwin 2012: 167). And this is significant of a diaspora groups capacity to mobilise (Ibid).

In three broad ways, the Sri Lankan case captures relevant concepts from the literature and may helpfully be used to situate and relate conditions in a framework of social mobilization.

The Tamil diaspora is linked to a prolonged and internationalized identity conflict, and in the literature, conflict generated diasporas are unique. This case study is an opportunity to compare communities, their reasons for dispersal and the initial institutionalizing processes that inform processes of diasporization, and later mobilization. Divergent mobilization outcomes are opportunities to ‘trace back’ the movement attributes and interactional routines that shape outcomes (Capoccia and Keleman 2007). Interrelationships between the diaspora and the homeland, and the role played by dispersal and by political opportunities in the country of origin may be highlighted.
Comprised largely of first, second, and some third generation migrants, the relative newness of each ethnic community in Canada represents, in historical terms, incipient processes of ethnic community formation in this place. It is an opportunity to explore emergent processes of diasporization with particular attention to group formation and political trajectories. Each is positioned as migrants in Canadian society, and with that label comes suppositions of integration and orientation. Liberal, federalist and multicultural policies may inform strategies and rationales for action. The Tamil community is, however, positioned differently within Canada owing to its greater relative size and to asylum processes that have institutionalized refugee status to successive waves of Tamil migrants. This study is therefore also an opportunity to develop the role of a host government in processes of diasporization. Toronto is a fitting place to begin this project. Canada hosts the largest population of individuals of Sri Lankan heritage among OECD countries, of approximately 300,000 people concentrated in Greater Toronto Area (Van de Voorde 2005: 194).

The literature stresses contingent political opportunities and the dynamics of conflict cycles to explain instances of mobilization. War is over and the LTTE is eliminated as a credible fighting and political force. The Sri Lankan government is triumphant, insistent “there are no minorities” in the new Sri Lanka (ICG 2010). Provinces remain militarized and the government’s reconciliation efforts are debatable. The international community did not respond forcefully to alleged human rights abuses committed by any side. In a public sphere that was previously understood either in reference to the LTTE or in opposition to it, its demise opens space for contestation, leading perhaps to alternate definitions, and politicizations, of identities and interests. Responses to the collapse of the LTTE may provide some insight into the processes that maintain the collective identity and political orientation. Interactions between political, economic, social and cultural spheres, or interrelationships within the diaspora may be noted. Undertaken four years after the war ended, this project applies, imperfectly, a retrospective analysis that focuses attention more specifically on the timing of events, linking mobilization (or the lack thereof) with changed circumstances directly.
Hypothesis

Research anticipates the Tamil community will be, and will self-identify as, a diaspora. The expectation for the other communities is that they are informed by successive waves of segmented emigration and will not have the collective identity, internal organization or empowerment that constitutes a diaspora. The insurgency and migration undoubtedly informed the choices of Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Moor migrants but does not constitute a critical juncture in the formation of respective diasporas. It does not therefore yield the collective identity or the ethos necessary to constitute this first dimension as critical antecedents of later mobilization. Consequently a politicized collective identity and political orientation toward the homeland is not anticipated. Constructing a politicized identity from which to mobilize will be necessary political work that must precede mobilization.

This project hypothesizes two mobilization trajectories. In the short run, radically changed political opportunities have destabilized mobilizing structures because they were LTTE mediated, built for conflict or limited to one geographic area. This calls into question the credibility and legitimacy of a number of collective action frames, or reaffirms them. Elites from all three groups may be divided as they adjust to new political realities. Institutional arrangements and interactional logics are presumed shaken by recent events, but, expressed as trajectories, imply momentum with much invested over time to bind people together, and to present a worldview that can incorporate recent events. Motivation for mobilization and the conditions that inspire it suggest reduced political engagement at this time, but not necessarily a fundamental reorientation from homeland politics. The urgency of the final months of the war may serve as continued inspiration for some but lack of progress in the interim may feed disillusionment, disempowerment, and disengagement. Alternatively, affirmed GSL narratives and actions may inspire complacency and disengagement.

In a longer view historical, sociological, and psychological dimensions suggest a cyclical lull in mobilization at this time and not necessarily changed identifications, orientations or interactional logics.
The Tamil Case

It is easier to hypothesis about the Tamil diaspora owing to the greater amount of literature. This group “belongs to a universe of cases of conflict-generated diasporas mobilized for political projects in the homeland, on par with the Israeli, Palestinian, Sikh [...] diasporas” (Koinova 2012: 434). The history of trauma engenders solidarity and loyalty to the group (Volkan 1999). That personal history of trauma translates into a diaspora that remains ‘very much engaged in the fate of Tamils at home’ and who ‘remain very active in shaping events in Sri Lanka’ (Fair 2005: 147).

Mobilizing structures were once controlled by the LTTE; their efficacy was apparent. The Tamil diaspora raised millions of dollars annually; it successfully lobbied western governments for intervention and drew 30,000 to 45,000 protestors into the streets of Toronto and Ottawa in the spring of 2009 (ICG 2010). The organizational strength of networks, its significant resources and the resonance of frames are inferred from these behaviours. Within the diaspora, elites are divided and promoting competing post-LTTE political projects, including the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) and the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), both diasporan initiatives that purport to be representative (ICG 2010: 15). This fragmentation undermines mobilization structures and hinders the effective dissemination of coherent frames.

Instances of intimidation and harassment of the diaspora by the LTTE are well documented (HRW 2006) and suggest political networks capable of exerting significant coercive pressure. Diaspora networks penetrate various political, social, and cultural contexts (Koinova 2012: 435). Implicated organizations, though informed by the LTTE legacy and embracing the narrative, will act as habitual, concerted and affective networks. Oberschall’s pre-existing organizations, as relational and cognitive mechanisms [and as mechanisms of reproduction or stability], remain a resource to explain mobilization.
The literature specific to the Tamil diaspora stresses the importance of events like *Pongu Tamil* [Tamil Uprising] an annual event in support of Tamil political rights or at *Heroes Day* an annual event that marks the lives of lost LTTE fighters, in the articulation and maintenance of a collective identity and political orientation (Godwin 2012). Given the size, resources, the salience of shared collective identity and intervening years of political work since the formation of the diaspora, these rituals are presumed unique to this community. The assumption is that participation in these events reaffirms and reinforces the identity and the ethos as well as group boundaries and goals. It signals solidarity with the group and is presumably empowering. Social capital and status are likely implicated. At the same time, they may be emotionally and politically taxing, financial burdens and a hindrance to adaptation in the hostland. Over successive generations language barriers and a different set of cultural symbols may prohibit effective participation. Given the relative newness of this diaspora, and in light of recent events in Sri Lanka, the former is preferred but evidence of the latter may be emergent.

The effects of postmemory, of the intellectual and emotional investments, and the implications of a cultural identity intricately linked to Tamil rights (Fair 2005) suggest long term processes that eclipse changed political opportunities. Highlighting the enduring roles of traumas, institutional logics, elite and social networks, and individual identity linked to the group, the argument here suggests one of three results. A cohort keenly aware of its resources, motivated by recent events and who maintain significant engagement in the face of decreasing political opportunities; a large group who remains available for bloc recruitment owing to a shard collective identity that persists in the face of current conditions; and a group disillusioned with politics and disengaged from transnational practices. In short, core, passive and base member boundaries are still drawn, and largely unchanged.
The other cases

Similar conditions do not exist in the Sinhalese, Tamil Christian and Moor communities. Without the same antecedents, a greater range of identity construction strategies, of group membership criteria, and of interpretative schemas is possible (Brinkerhoff 2008). The effect of which is political activism that varies by individual and situation (Ibid). Neither a politicized identity nor pre-existing networks are, in these cases, likely to constitute opportunity structures for movement activists.

The Sinhalese and Moor communities are sizably smaller than the Tamil one. Small, segmented and scattered population is not conducive to mobilization (Godwin 2012). Regardless of efficiency, cohesiveness or resonance, a small group may lack the sense of efficacy or empowerment necessary to mobilize (Thirurajah 2011). Mobilization in the direction of the homeland is imagined only in unusual and urgent circumstances, or by core and some ‘active’ passive members.

The Sinhalese case

Less was available in the literature on the political engagements of this group. The hegemonic power and the demographic majority in Sri Lanka, the legacies of trauma, of victimization and of myth of return are not associated with this group. The solidarity, consensus and collective identity that typifies conflict generated diasporas does not apply here, reducing the probability of political engagement. This does not mitigate the experiences of war, nor does it exclude group binding.

The literature refers to triumphalism, narcissism, and patriotism indicating frames, feelings, and social pressures that equate dissenting opinion with disloyalty and victory with righteousness (Jayawickreme et al. 2010). The implications and consequences of such positioning, and of the emotional investment that underlies it may extend beyond the war period, suggesting disengaged mobilization following this period of decreased
threat, and sporadic mobilization motivated by feelings of nationalism [and chosen glories (Volkan 1997)], and stemming from social obligation and habit.

The war motivated an exodus and surely impacts how this group sees the conflict, the Tamil minority and diaspora, as well as their own political obligations, but unlike the Tamil diaspora, most Sinhalese in Canada are considered economic migrants. Sinhalese migrants are minorities in Canada and change in status may inform identification and orientation. At the same time, this community is projected, as per the literature, to have higher education attainment and to be fluent English speakers, factors that aid in integration, minimizing an alienation that is said to orient migrants to homeland politics (Castles et al. 2009). Integration encourages orientation toward the host country, or favours civic engagement with the home country (Brinkerhoff 2008).

The treatment of this diaspora is focused on elite contributions and says little about the average person or second-generation migrants. Members of this diaspora lobby on behalf of the state and campaign against the LTTE (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 95-97); pro-government protests were staged in western capitals and petitions were made to the UN. Allegedly some members are in routine contact with embassies, reporting on the movements of other expatriates (Samuels 2011). In Toronto, members of the Sri Lankan United National Assembly and from the Sri Lankan Youth of Canada staged pro-government protests that included a plane circling above the Tamil protests with a trailing banner that read: “Protect Canada – Stop the Tamil Tigers” (Mathieu 2009). Toronto police describe the move as provocative (Ibid). The political engagement of this group was limited to the context of war. Mobilizing structures are presumed loosened since the end of the war because addressing claims against the GSL is less urgent. Ongoing international calls for investigations into the conduct of the war and demanding greater reconciliation efforts from the state, however, suggest ongoing calls for diasporic engagement. Some members are ‘active’ and will likely derive benefit from that participation motivating ongoing engagement. The elite focus suggests a group tied to the interests of the state, but does not preclude divisions within the elite. The diaspora includes intellectuals who fled the country fearing political
persecution. The literature suggests that as motivations vary for leaving, so will motivations for mobilizing. A segmented community may hinder processes of identification, politicization and mobilization.

The political space opened following the end of the war (and absent in significant ways in post-conflict Sri Lanka) plus experiences living in a federal democracy with significant minority protections might encourage a reassessment of objective conditions and the resonance of government frames, though the group is presumed still “very much influenced by mainstream southern Sri Lankan politics” (ICG 2010: 10). What is more, in the last ten years Canadian policies and discourse imply greater receptivity to the GSL narrative.

The arguments for this group suggest disengagement with politics in Sri Lanka in the present period, with the ongoing dissemination and resonance of frames affirming the government’s actions. A percentage is hypothesized to engage in issue-based activism that reflects personal values and experiences. Successive generations are not anticipated to actively participate in homeland politics.

The Moor Case

This community is neglected in the literature and it is difficult to hypothesis about motivations and activism undertaken by members of this group. The migration story is mixed. Minority rights in Sri Lanka are the basis of significant grievance, and this diaspora includes a notable refugee contingent, but also includes large numbers of economic and professional migrants (IRB 2014).

For Sri Lankan Moors, the political environment in the homestate is characterized by marginalization and discrimination in political processes and resource distribution (ICG 2010). Reassurances from both Tamil and Sinhala authorities for Muslim security have been inadequate (Lewer and Ismail 2011). The identity “chosen by the Muslim community is a reaction not only against Tamil nationalism but also against the close ties between the country’s majority Sinhalese population and their Buddhist religious beliefs” (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-
Saleem 2015: 187). Both the ICG (2010) and Ismail and Lewar (2001) note identity forming along religious lines in face of the inability to get issues addressed in Sri Lanka from either Tamil or Sinhalese parties. Religion, rather than ethnicity, is presumed to be the most salient identity construction.

Sri Lankan Moors are forecast to be either more engaged with an international Islamic movement than one tied specifically to the national politics of Sri Lanka per se, or to focus on personal, cultural and religious transnational engagements as opposed to political projects. Global movements like Jammathu Islami (a political Islamic organization) and Tabligh Jamaat (a largely religious movement) stress a pan-Islamic identity and influence Muslim identity constructions (Itmiyaz and Mohameed Saleem 2015: 191). This appeal to a collective religious identity focuses diasporic political activity on religious engagement in a localized setting, one of Brinkerhoff’s (2011) seven pillars of diasporic practice, but others suggests that any mobilization among this cohort is likely to turn to international Islam and eschew the politics of the nation state (Itmiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015).

In October 1990 the LTTE forced the relocation of large numbers of Muslims from the Northern Province (ICG 2007a). Internally displaced, the Muslims population is concentrated in the Eastern Province where recent fighting was concentrated (Brun and Van Gear 2012). Mostly Tamil speakers, Sri Lankan Moors have, alternatively, been lumped in with the Tamil minority or been victims to that group’s monopolization of minority issues in Sri Lanka (ICG 2007a). In 2015 anti-Muslim violence in the capital, led by Buddhist monks, went unchecked by police, who were unable or unwilling to stop the violence (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015). It reinforces the belief that these incidents are sanctioned at higher levels (Ibid). In all, the available literature suggests insecurity, and frustration with Sri Lankan domestic politics.

The conflict narrative excludes this population and Moors have not “had a significant voice in political discussions (Jayawickreme et al. 2010: 218). International understanding of the conflict plus the greater relative
strength of the Tamil diaspora has focused political projects in the Northern Province to the neglect of the Eastern Province (Ismail and Lewer 2001). Moor political engagement is likely to focus attention on the Eastern Province and to encourage redevelopment in that area. Mass mobilization is not anticipated.

Methodology and Fieldwork

As an exploratory work this project employed a variety of methods to sketch the relevant factors and their interactions; it uses fieldwork as a corollary to research. Interpretative methods (hermeneutic, historical and qualitative methods) are necessary “in getting to grips with the complex nature of social relations” (Kurki 2006: 203). Three kinds of data collection were employed: “interview, observation, and documents, this in turn produce[d] three kinds of data: quotations, descriptions, and excerpts of documents resulting in one product: narrative description” (Geznuk 2003 in Feldman et al. 2004: 150). As interpretations of actions that have occurred in a particular sequence (Fisher 1987), narrative analysis provides “rich data that express movement, interpret ideas, and describe from the storyteller’s perspective how things used to be and how they are, as well as how they should be” (Feldman et al. 2004: 150). They are able to provide insight into sequence, interaction and contingency when describing the contexts and key actors that inform decision-making. Narrative is also how participants are most likely and most comfortably able to share information (Barthes 1977).

The University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board (REB) approved this project, and the methods used herein. REB directed the recruitment procedure, stressed the importance of participant rights and demanded specificity of method. An informal, conversational approach minimized the risks of distress. Information about social, legal and medical services was available.

Fieldwork consisted of one-on-one interviews, a survey administered after each interview and attendance at two community events. To design research devices, the congruence procedure begins by “formulating theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination in each case” (King et al. 1994: 45). It stresses
“concreteness and specificity in language and thought” (Ibid: 26), and the “‘maximization of concreteness’ of
the ‘encompassing qualities’ of theories” (Kurki 2006, 195-6). With input from my thesis committee and REB,
lead and probe questions were constructed to capture key concepts in the literature. The order of interview
questions reflects the importance attached to each concept, and attempts to capture the interaction of these
factors.

Fieldwork explored key concepts in the scholarly literature with members of the affected communities. It was
an opportunity to look beyond the elite focus of the literature. This study 'piggybacks' off key informants, who
distributed letters of introduction to potential respondents. They were asked to contact the researcher directly.
Interviews took place in the Greater Toronto Area in October and November 2013. Fieldwork included
attendance at a Tamil sponsored NGO event in Toronto in November 2013 and at a March 2014 protest in
Ottawa organized by the Sinhalese community. Both events were an opportunity to observe identification,
politicization, organization and mobilization.

The sample size is not statistically significant, nor is it representational. It does identify a participant from each
of the four main ethnic (and religious) groups, and managed a sample varied by gender, generation, date of
arrival and legal status, as well socioeconomic difference. It managed a minimal cross-section of Sri Lankan
society in Canada. One Tamil Christian, one Sri Lankan Moor, one Sinhalese and ten Tamils (all from the
Northern Province) between the ages of 18 and 45 years old were interviewed. Five women and eight men
participated and all were fluent English speakers.

A process of ‘reporting back’ was used throughout the interview process “to confirm it [was] an accurate
representation and, or to give the respondent the opportunity to contextualize or alter aspects of it” (McMillian
2005: 175). Given possible language difficulties, the ambiguousness of studied concepts, and to probe implicit
meanings, this process improves the quality of data.
Defining, operationalizing and then ensuring adequate and appropriate coding and analyses was guided by scholarship but ultimately interpretive. To code and analyze narratives Feldman et al. began their study with a “list of relatively concrete, descriptive categories” (Feldman et al. 2004: 165). For this study, narratives were coded to identify the variable, to mark the frequency with which it was cited and to assess the significance attached to it. Special attention was paid to how respondents linked variables to other factors, and with what effect. Coding charts detail these responses and note interactions or rankings between them as indicated by respondents' verbal communications as well as by their non-verbal cues. Participant observations were situated within a line of questioning. To the degree these narratives are corroborated by the literature, it was an effective method.

This study has no pretenses; it speaks only to those few who were interviewed and uses those interviews only in conversation with the amassed literature. It does not purport to have external validity. Fieldwork was undertaken to better understand the scholarship. The validity of those instruments may be sufficient given respondents addressed the issues those measures were intended to explore. The narrative analysis and survey data that inform the conclusions of this project accurately inform some understanding of implicated mechanisms and their consequences.

There are evidently pitfalls. Garson (2007) identifies one that weighs heavily on this project. He writes “ethnographic focus may overestimate the role of community culture and underestimate the causal role of individual psychological or of sub-community (or for that matter, extra-community) forces” (2007). Few interviews with members of a prototypical diaspora may overestimate all of these factors. Additional study at a later date, employing a “cross-cultural replication of this methodology” (Gil-White 1999: 793) and with a significantly larger sample are needed to make any point beyond this assignment.
Chapter Four: Data and Analysis

Diaspora is a problematic term, not least because only two participants had ever heard it. This project began with the assumption that the outwardly politicized Tamil community would be familiar with the term. Scholarship suggests it is a prototypical exile diaspora, and given this extensive categorization, it was assumed Tamil respondents would identify as such. They did not. The term is evidently not used within any of these communities to express identity, orientation or political practices. Unfamiliarity serves to highlight how often and how easily the label is externally applied.

What follows are four sketches of the conducted interviews. As a presentation of collected data, summaries and analysis show diasporization as an emergent process made possible by political opportunities in multiple spaces, informed by the political and social legacies of its origins, and its elites, and where “knowledge claims are socially embedded and dependent on the conceptual and linguistic categories we inherit” (Kurki 2006: 210). Gender, generational and regional segmentations underscore how knowledge and practice are differentiated along these lines, drawing attention to collectivities as “social constructs whose boundaries, structures and norms are the result of constant struggles and negotiations, or more general social developments” (Yuval-Davis 1994: 181). The experiential differences of migration and integration further shape respondents’ views of the conflict and provide insight into the formation and development of diasporan engagement.

Participants describe politics as voting in elections, or running in them. This formal definition contrasts with the broad and informal definition of politics used to premise this project. The definition of politics should have been more sensitive to strict, formal conceptualizations. The reluctance at the outset to consider diasporic or personal influence as necessarily political, and therefore influential, should caveat the rest of the data. The timing of interviews may be pertinent, and might account from some cynicism. That said, the conceptualization of politics and influence implies some exclusion from formal channels, and a lack of efficacy outside them. It
implies, perhaps, a ‘politics by other means’ as intended by PPM, but underscores a distance and relative powerlessness to influence outcomes, suggesting a less effective, secondary form of politics. One that is not always understood in strictly political terms; identity, cultural and language issues are interwoven and politicized but not always understood as politics.

Three Sketches: constructions of identity, home and politics

For the Sinhalese respondent (male) ‘we are a community, not a diaspora. Politics – need this for unity and organization’ (Sinhalese interview 2 October 2013). For him, the term is pejorative no matter how ‘fair’ some criticisms may be. He rejects the label diaspora as a disavowal of LTTE tactics, of the ‘unreasonable’ demands of this group on the Sri Lankan polity, and for any undue influence they hold in the West that could force international investigations or sanctions undermining the reputation, sovereignty and economy of Sri Lanka. In short, he equates diasporan practices with violent separatism and zero-sum ethnic politics from abroad. He provided historical and economic details in support of his claims. He was careful to distinguish between Tamils and the LTTE at the beginning of the interview, but could not maintain the distinction in conversation. He did not acknowledge any other minority group. He describes ‘being Sinhalese’ by reference to the ‘the culture [our language and history] and religion’. He suggests ‘economics is key’ to understanding the conflict and to finding its solutions. At the same time, as he explains, participation in diasporan politics, or more importantly, participation in Sri Lankan economic, political or social networks that are organized significantly around ethnicity – that are ‘business as usual’ or ‘the way it is’ – suggests institutional arrangements and interrelational dynamics that, in the short term anyway, will be hard to overcome.

To his mind, much depends on what happens in Sri Lanka, a point that will become increasingly important as later generations are less engaged in the country of origin. He describes cousins raised in Canada who are unlikely to engage in Sri Lankan politics because ‘they are happy here’. And while he was initially reluctant to speak of his family, he later described a significant rift surrounding his departure, which he describes as necessary having run afoul of powerful political forces in his country. His father is disappointed and frustrated, and the respondent evidently distressed. He is cynical of politics and in the language of migration, spoke of reduced social capital and associated feelings of well-being. He described an insular community and social isolation.

The Moor respondent (female) explains ‘Muslims [are] not like Tamils. Don’t have organization because no unity’ (Moor interview 5 October 2013). She expresses some frustration her community has so far failed to develop an identity and ethos similar to that of the Tamil community who ‘care about their people’. This she suggests reflects ‘too much attitude toward religion’ where ‘selfish, in-fighting over religion’ is an obstacle to building collective identity and unity of purpose within her community. The absence of a ‘leader who can impress’ exacerbates these problems. Her description of the Tamil diaspora stresses the reasons for its dispersal and migration to Canada to explain its coherence and mobilization in this place. She draws particular attention to a type of diasporan politics that is a likely outcome of significant psychological trauma. She adds multicultural policies mean ‘people live more together there than here’. In Sri Lanka, ethnic communities have lived together peaceably but when ‘racialism comes, you don’t know, you cannot trust Sinhalese’. When asked how this happens, she answered blandly: ‘religion, culture, society’ adding ‘the wrong people are always in charge, money matters, they don’t care about the villagers’.
She continues that distrust, trauma and opportunism explain not only ongoing diasporan engagement, but the war itself. She described the violent incident that led her to leave the country and she refuses to participate in Sri Lankan politics explaining ‘I suffered; I don’t want any more. I just don’t want to be involved’. That said, ‘people expect their rights’; she referred firstly to minority protections for language, religion and culture and then to social safety and security and economic opportunities. With an intermittent call to prayer in the background, she questioned me about my life and appears eager to move on with hers. She quipped that ‘distance helps disobedience’ but also provided examples of censure by community members, known and unknown to her, who criticize her religious attendance and participation, and with the power to ‘report back’ to family in Sri Lanka. Her identity is informed by reference to her family, her religious community, but also ‘language is key’.

The interviewed Tamil Christian, daughter of parents raised in England and herself born and raised in Canada, is closest to a third generation respondent this project interviewed. She is middle management in downtown Toronto, active in her church and sponsors a Tamil child in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. She identifies as ‘Sri Lankan Tamil, I don’t know why people think I am Canadian’ (Tamil Christian interview 21 November 2013). She describes language, religion and cultural expressions like singing and cooking as important factors shaping her sense of self. She referenced her parents’ birthplace. At the same time she drew careful and consistent difference between her community and the Tamil Hindu community, ‘who you cannot blame…they lost everything’. She did not mention the Muslim minority in Sri Lanka. She disavowed politics and admittedly knew little of the conflict, the political administration or the actions of Tamil diasporans. She identifies religious cultural institutions as those most relevant to shaping collective identity and movement goals. As a Christian she does not attend ‘Tamil events’ and is subsequently not included in these discussions.

She does not have ‘a very Tamil name’ and so her family was never targeted by the LTTE, who according to her relied on the phonebook to target Tamils in the GTA. She raises an important point unremarked by other respondents that is ‘unless you can go there and see what the money does, you can’t know’. She suggests the intentions of senders’ matters only up to a point, and that actors on the ground and opportunities there effect what actually happens. The resources (and wishes) of the diaspora are contingent on these forces, and therefore participation in diaspora politics reflects imperatives motivated by the senders attempt to ‘to feel good’ in an ‘I am big’ way where philanthropy (or other contributions) are social capital, or, and importantly, because ‘you are doing something; anyone can sponsor a child but would you [asked to the researcher] sponsor a Tamil child’.

These interviews are points of departure for analysis of diaspora formation and development. Three points are introduced: (1) the classic definition of a diaspora, (2) identity constructions and homeland politics, and (3) political cynicism and powerlessness.

The classic definition of a diaspora

Politics, unity and organization, though implied in both definitions provided, are not actually expressed in either. Sinhalese, Moor and Tamil Christian respondents define their communities by what they perceive distinguish them from the Tamil one; they stress politics, unity and organization as well as grievance and trauma. They describe the Tamil Hindu community in Canada by reference to the classic definition of a
diaspora. This is significant, suggesting the politicized classic definition is salient, at least to those outside the community.

These interviews hint at the role of the conflict cycle and the importance of political opportunities to explain instances of mobilization. Respondents argue political, social and economic institutions, and group histories, in the COO shape the identity and the outlook necessary to participate in diasporan politics. They insist grievances in that place matter; economic inequities and democratic deficits in Sri Lanka informs Tamil social mobilization in Canada. Having each experienced some of the traumas associated with migration, Sinhalese, Moor and Tamil Christian respondents suggest exile would be worse. They agree serious psychological trauma can be expected from people who have lost everything; you cannot blame Tiger supporters because ‘hate’ was born after ‘home [was] ripped away from them’ (Tamil Christian Interview). They still have ‘anger inside, need revenge so continue to terrorism’ (Moor Interview). They are sympathetic to the consequences of trauma, and believe psychological factors to be, somewhat paradoxically, a significant source of stability in the Tamil diaspora. Trauma, grievance and exile unites the diaspora and informs its politics. Only the male respondent suggests those effects could be mitigated by economic considerations. The lone Sinhalese respondent affirms government narratives: highlighting “unfair demands on the Sinhalese polity in the past” (Jayawickreme 2010: 211), and, for the majority 75% Tamils “must not try to, under the pretext of being minority, demand undue things” (Gen. Foneska as cited in Ibid: 212).

These interviews also underscore the constitutive role played by the COR. Permitting ethnic groups to fundraise, to promote nationalist causes by assembly and by lobbying, and by leveraging those interests in elections at the provincial and federal levels, respondents suggest empowerment effects subsequent and successive decisions to mobilize. More critically, they indicate levels of isolation and insulation that are possible in multicultural societies with consequences on interethnic relations.
Identity constructions and homeland politics

In Senake Bandaranayake's analysis of ethnicity in Sri Lanka,

“what ethnic group signifies is a historically defined, self-conscious community, which has its own distinctive history and culture, of which language and religion often constitute important aspects, and which has or had definite territorial affiliations, in the present and/or in the past” (1987 in Alwis 2003: 18).

In these interviews, the minority-majority discourse and historical accounts present an image of the group as ‘pure’ with an authentic, essentialised language, culture and history; each is a unique social unit. The stressed ‘entiativity’ of each community reflects how “minority and majority relations have been conducted in the recent past, and the manner in which different ethnic groups perceive the past colored by the ethnic tensions of the present” (Perera 2001: 5). Gunawardana (1990) documents the evolution Sinhala identity and its origin myth concluding the term Sinhala referred to different groups at different times, and only much later in the island’s history did it come to mean the group now included in its membership. Similarly scholars have traced the evolution of ‘nationalist historiography and mythmaking’ within the Tamil community and concluded it wasn’t until the 1980s that its nationalist discourse became “much stronger and more dynamic” (Perera 2001: 6). In short, “identities and their constituent components have changed considerably over time” (Ibid). Despite these socio-historical insights, nationalist histories, myths and origin stories are “replete with inaccuracies […] which the few critical scholarship on the subject have not yet been able to dispel” (Ibid). And they were evident in fieldwork. Some of these inaccuracies and omissions are highlighted in this chapter; they draw attention to the actors and processes that construct, disseminate and maintain these myths.

The content and nature of identity constructions and of group membership reported in fieldwork correspond to the scholarship. Buddhist bhikkhus (monks) “play a leading part in the socio-political life in Sri Lanka” (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015: 188) and Sinhalese identity “derives from (1) the Sinhala language and (2) the Buddhist religion” (Ibid). Muslims prefer “to be characterized by their religious and cultural identity” (Ibid: 188). For Silva,
“the rise of ethnic-centered nationalisms was a defining characteristic of Ceylon even in the early years of anti-colonial resistance. [...] The agenda of the nationalist ideologues was not simply to construct and maintain a distinct, and what they felt was a pure, ethnic identity but also to police the boundaries of their groups” (2003: 148).

And “since independence, Sri Lankan society has become increasingly ethnicised, as cleavages between the groups – particularly between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority – have grown in significance” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 63). In practice, this means “significant inequalities, consistent across dimensions and widening over time, coupled with political exclusion lead to and sustained the conflict” (Stewart 2006: 34).

Traditional patron client relationships and political affiliations with the ruling political parties (UNP and SLFP respectively) are important indicators of success (Perera 2001: 16). A ‘bloated public sector’ (Mitra et al. 2006: 374) includes a disproportionately large military, staffed predominately by rural Sinhalese (ICG 2007b). The perception of unfair employment advantages remains (Perera 2001). To conduct everyday business or get a job in the public sector requires access to politicians, and constitutes ‘business as usual’ (Sinhalese interview). The government of Sri Lanka framed the war as one motivated by economic underdevelopment, “denying the political and ethnic nature of the conflict” (Jayawickreme et al. 2010: 212). At the same time, major Sinhalese political parties “have frequently competed for power by playing up the ‘Tamil threat’ in order to mobilize support” (Ibid). The government suppresses media coverage, manipulating information and ensuring that it “retains the support and trust of the Sinhalese community” (Ibid). In politics, Sinhala nationalism and regional economies prevent the elusive southern consensus necessary to address acknowledged grievances (ICG 2007b).

Language is “one of the most important elements in the creation of ethnonational identity” (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015: 188). In the colonial period, Tamil and Sinhala politicians pushed for swabasha, a concept that translates into ‘native languages’ and the history of this demand suggests a class issue more than an ethnic one (Perera 2001: 9). It is a point unremarked by all respondents. It was also the critical issue that led
to the formation of the SLFP (Ibid). In fieldwork, all respondents stress language rights. It is a critical grievance and significant boundary marker. In academic and popular explanations of the conflict the ‘Sinhala Only Act’ (1956) is an example of institutionalized discrimination, and evidence of Sinhala dominance. And while the 13th constitutional amendment (1987) makes Tamil an official language, there remains a ‘vast gap’ between official status and actual practice. In language and education policies, a “unitary state that has ben over-identified with Sinahla Buddhists interests” is the result of an “ethnic majoritarian construction of state power” (Uyangoda 2006), and as Perera explains “the damage caused by the politics of language generally remain un-addressed” (2001: 10). In December 2010, news circulated that Tamil schoolchildren were forced to sing the national anthem in Sinhalese to an assembly of the ‘conquering army’ (ICG 2010). It was untrue, but was popularly reported, and believed. Language remains a “permanent and thus far irreconcilable issue in the Sri Lankan interethnic conflict” (Perera 2001: 9).

The war in Sri Lanka “is a story heavily coloured by identity politics” (Bastian 1999: 24). There are “significant parallels between extremist ideologies of Tamil nationalism and extremist Sinhala nationalism highlighting primordialist interpretations of ethnicity and a claim over land” (Ibid). In short, socio-cultural markers like ethnicity and religion “often play a vital and even divisive role” in political processes because these markers are used to define and interpret the ‘authentic history’ of each community, and that “has much to do with how the conflict is understood at the popular level” (Perera 2001: 3) with an effect on mass politics. Jayawickreme describes, in the Sinhalese community, ‘glorifying myths’ that “claim entitlement to land and power through a selective recounting of a group’s history have been widespread in the south of the country” (Jayawickreme et al. 2010: 214). For these scholars, “nationalism in Sri Lanka have always been tied up with notions of ethnicity, and political discourse has been dominated by ethnic considerations” (Ibid). In other words, the ‘way it is’ (Sinhalese interview) significantly informs expectations and behaviours. Sinhalese, Muslim and Tamil Christian assessments of ethicized and exclusive political, economic and social landscapes are affirmed in the literature.
The evolution of identity and of corresponding narratives is the most significant insight into the research question. Linked by analysts to political and economic events, and geographic factors, the nature and salience of identity constructs and group boundaries change over time. As socially-constituted formations (and political projects), processes of ethnicization and diasporization reflect these conditions and the mechanisms that ‘lock’ these outcomes in place.

**Political cynicism and powerlessness**

The political cynicism of these respondents is an interpretation of conditions in Sri Lanka, the perceived hypocrisy of western states and liberal institutions, and the corrosive role played by elites. The failure of successive pacts and ceasefire agreements [referenced by the Sinhalese and later by Tamil respondents] exemplify their rejection of formal politics. Female respondents, citing the role played by politicians and the insecurity and distrust that remains between episodes of violence, disavowed politics altogether. As one respondent put it, ‘*the war is over, they will start it up again*’ (Moor interview). The militarization of Sri Lankan politics and “thereafter the extent and destruction of that militarization signal an almost complete loss of faith in conventional politics” (Perera 2001: 25) that is echoed in both the academic record and in interviews.

It appears also to be a reflection of their relative disempowerment in comparison to the Tamil Hindu community. Muslim, Tamil Christian and Sinhalese respondents agree only those actors on the ground can effect outcomes. Collectively they argue, the limited agency of the migrant actor is obvious because without the ‘real’ power associated with access [i.e. elite allies; formal political or winning military power; money], any effort is (a) inconsequential or (b) subject to reconstitution in the local political field. It would be interesting to compare this assessment to earlier periods when the LTTE, and the Tamil diaspora, were more powerful agents. Only non-Tamil respondents highlight the importance of the receiver’s intentions and their behaviour on
outcomes. Brinkerhoff (2005; 2008) makes this point in her analysis of diasporan motivations and outcomes, and in fieldwork it signals an important difference between the Tamil Hindu community and the others.

The inference from this description of powerlessness is that in each case, the specific ethnic community – or diasporan political field is weak(er) relative to the local political field, here and there. It cannot therefore effectively leverage its interests against the Sri Lankan state. Mobilization is thus pointless. By contrast, their description of the Tamil diaspora suggests its financial resources and close personal connections to the LTTE contributed to the militaristic and therefore political power of that institution, and by so doing contributed to the diasporas’ own agency, effecting mobilization outcomes.

The fourth sketch: a diaspora

By stressing the features of the classic definition to locate themselves and their politics, and by the simple fact that interviewed Tamils never mentioned Sinhalese and Moor migrants in Canada or elsewhere, it is likely Tamil respondents do not consider either of these communities as constituting a diaspora similar to their own.

Interviewed Tamils approve the diasporan label and prefer the more rigid second definition. They endorse the self-awareness, internal organization and shared political aims, with the resources to accomplish them, that feature in the classic definition. Tamil respondents born in Canada, or those who migrated as small children (generation 1.5) stress a strong emotional component that encompasses traumas endured by family members, and violence perpetrated against the group. It includes symbolic attachments to culture (esp. language) and recounts a specific history.

All respondents stress local (or national) place to anchor identity constructions. Adamaly, Cutter & Veketeswar (2000) estimate 25% of the Sri Lankan Tamil population live in diaspora, and Wickramasinghe (2006) estimates that 90% of the diaspora are from the northern Jaffna peninsula, the area that “essentially constitutes the Tamil
heartland” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 64). In fieldwork all Tamil respondents identify as Sri Lankan Tamil; they distinguish themselves from Indian Tamils, both in Sri Lanka and in India. They refer mostly to the Northern province, occasionally to the Eastern province and to Colombo, the capital, but only as shorthand for the government and the Sinhalese majority. As Thurairajah explains “while the community is from Sri Lanka, they primarily identify with the Tamil provinces” (2011: 132). And unlike other “complementary sources of common identity (e.g. language, religion, phenotype) that are the typical markers of ethnicity, […], it is the connection to place [that] is a hallmark of diasporan identity that differs from constructions of ethnic identity, which can be constituted on virtually any basis” (Butler 2001: 204). The composition of the departed group is characterized primarily by ethnicity and local place.

Hansen (1952) suggested the first generation is focused on acculturation and survival, the second rejects difference as they embrace the host country and it is the third that is “most likely to emerge as champion for the home country culture” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 72). First generation respondents confirm this focus. First generation migrants – from all ethnic groups – describe conditions in Sri Lanka as their motivation for leaving. They critique political and legal systems and describe a minority-majority set of institutional relations as well as cultural and ideational arrangements that inform an ethnic identity and a particular habitus, all bound within the nation-state. They offer historical analysis of colonial and post-colonial nation building. They describe economic uncertainty, ethnic riots and failed political solutions. [Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam Pact 1957 and Dudley - Chelvanayagam Pact 1965 both collapsed because of political rivalries between the dominant Sinhala parties, a point stressed by Perera 2001 but unacknowledged by non-Sinhalese respondents, who attribute these failures to Sinhala ideologues without distinguishing factions or allies within the Sinhala polity]. They describe the 2002 ceasefire with its accommodations for regional autonomy, and talk about language policies and changes to the education system (Tamil interviews; Sinhalese interview). By describing how ‘people lived more together there than here’ (Moor interview), by charting events either codified in law or failing under the weight
of political intrigue, or by noting ongoing economic and nation-building projects, first generation respondents provide examples of institutionalized relationships and logics that separate people and support the conflict.

They display the most instrumental conception of identity. They relate the construction and expression of identity to nation-building, political projects and business transactions. They suggest an ethnic identity is social capital, necessary to participate in Sri Lanka’s ‘active’ [read ethnicized] politics. It is also pride, nostalgia and cultural empowerment amid ‘stronger communities’ (Tamil Interview 2 October). From each community, first generation respondents explain identity and ethnicity, in part, as historical choices taken by significant political actors. They highlight tensions (or even factions) within the community and were critical of homeland politics, diasporan motives and western ideologies.

First generation respondents stress ongoing financial obligations that refer not only to remittances, but also pressure to survive and support families here. The Canadian materialism and individualism that each first generation respondent addressed means second and subsequent generations are ‘not going to work two jobs for that’ (Tamil interview 4 October). Trying to move forward, the identity and political orientation (or priorities) of first generation respondents suggests decreased social status outside community organizations, concerns about loosening ties to home and homeland culture and, generally, a stressful period marked by financial pressure and uncertainty.

Later generations are expected, alternatively, to express a stronger bond to the country of residence, and to be ‘champions’ of the country of origin (Castles 2009). Often this is expressed as being mutually exclusive. The literature on the second-generation suggests an identity construction strategy that “reject[s] homeland cultural characteristics to minimize differences, but without an affinity for the host culture, embrace[s] the appearance of it instead” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 80). Fieldwork refutes this contention.
Among the second-generation Tamil respondents, each describes being ‘chest out Canadian’, chastised for their use of English at home and immersed in the western lifestyle. Amarasingam (2008) concludes Sri Lankan Tamil youth in Canada feel an attachment to their Tamil identities, often expressing this connection through linguistic, cultural and religious practices. Freidman (1994) suggests this identity construction pattern is “highly unstable and can easily switch over to religious or ethnic solutions” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 80) but interviewed second-generation Tamil participants express flexibility in identity, highlighting a situational and interactive dynamic. Only the interviewed Tamil Christian rejected hybridity. That said, second generation Tamils identify as Canadian and describe a ‘passive’ ethnic identity, or private, personal one that did not include a political dimension until it was ‘activated’ (Butler 2001: 191).

For diasporas, “return is part of aetiology of the concept” (Russell King 2010: 171). At issue is the relationship between the diaspora and homestate where changing conditions there can effect the idea of return. More than half of 1.5 and 2nd generation Tamils interviewed had returned with their families to Sri Lanka during the 2002 ceasefire, a testament to the importance of place and to effect of the conflict cycle on the relationship with the homeland. They describe the impossibility of permanent return given years of ethnic violence, systemic discrimination and the legacy of traumas that forced their parents to leave. And while each respondent shared a story, some harrowing, of violence, they also describe ‘whimsical retirement plans’ (Tamil interview 7 October), plans for their (or their parents) ‘twilight years’ (Tamil interview 4 October) and a reasonable, if idealized, description of living (briefly) in northern Sri Lanka under LTTE rule, or rather, ‘the rule of our own people’ (Tamil interview 27 October).

A recurring theme among second generation Tamil respondents is the need to ‘be worthy of it’ (Tamil Interview 27 October); a responsibility to do well in Canada and to support Eelam as an acknowledgement of the sacrifices in war and in migration of older generations. They talk about it amongst themselves (Ibid). Most refer to community cultural events, or draw attention to songs with strong emotional and symbolic content. And
while Weinar suggests diasporans support for restrictive definitions is “especially pronounced among third generations who stressed the emotional links” (2010: 79), second-generation respondents unambiguously support both the restrictive definition and its emotional component.

This generational difference speaks to emergent political processes. Wickramasinghe (2006) notes “the imagined nation of Tamil Eelam is subject to a reconfiguration and remaking in the diaspora” (in E. Jayawickreme et al. 2010: 217). Whereas first-generation respondents offer a description more akin to homeland actually, for the second-generation, representations of homeland are “part of the project of constructing diasporan identity, rather than homeland actuality” (Butler 2001: 205). Interviewed Tamils, representing first and second-generation migrants, may have expressed ‘home’ differently but they express a shared vision of Eelam.

The ICG’s 2010 report suggests significant continuity within the community; pro-tiger elements “constitute the vast majority of the diaspora” (ICG 2010: 1). Fieldwork, biased in its sample, can only agree. One respondent said “Tamil is the LTTE, it is not about religion. It is language, history and the LTTE” (Tamil Interview 4 October 2013). Asked about support for the LTTE within the Tamil community another answered the “Tigers [are a] huge part of the community. 80% support them” (Tamil Interview 27 October 2013). Another suggested at the outset of the interview “most everyone supports LTTE” and ended the interview explaining “everybody supports the LTTE” (Tamil Interview 7 October). At work, another boasted, “they call me Tiger; its ok because LTTE and Tamil together; the same” (Tamil Interview 2 October). As an American Tamil activist explained “the Tigers have become an integral part of our culture. To deny the LTTE would be to deny our history. It is something we cannot do” (ICG 2010: 19).

That same work maintains “most Tamils abroad remain profoundly committed to Tamil Eelam” (2010: i). In interviews Tamil respondents argue: ‘the means [are] questionable but the goal is clear, a separate
state’ (Tamil Interview 4 October), ‘Eelam is still the end’ (Tamil interview 27 October 2013), the ‘goal [is] the same, means change’ (Tamil interview 2 October). Beside the symmetry of these answers, it is interesting to note the LTTE temporarily abandoned its demand for Eelam as part of the 2002 ceasefire (Uyangoda 2011), a fact unremarked by Tamil respondents. Also unremarked by all respondents were the dire economic circumstances that precipitated the 2002 ceasefire (Ibid). Equally important, no respondent mentioned the role played by the diaspora in Norway, which is credited in the literature with forcing their government to negotiate the 2002 ceasefire between the GSL and the LTTE.

In interviews, the reluctance to address LTTE abuses, the presentation of ahistorical ‘authentic’ history, the continued support for Eelam, and the “social significance of the idea of martyrdom” (Perera 2001: 25) are politically significant. Most in the Tamil diaspora acknowledge militancy failed and the struggle for an independent state should continue non-violently (ICG 2010:12). This change of perspective, the report continues, “should not be viewed as a change of heart; many would still prefer the LTTE to be fighting for Tamil Eelam” (Ibid). It describes an acknowledged shift in strategy, not sentiment (Ibid), and those respondents questioned about the LTTE and the future of Tamil Eelam agree.

First generation Tamils mention the ‘unreasonableness’ of Tamils, how ‘nothing will be enough now’ explaining economic and democratic conditions may improve but cannot guarantee that militant Tamil nationalism does not ‘still exist inside hearts’ (Tamil interview 4 October 2013). Another suggests, “even if given 50% they would still want more. It is impossible to satisfy Tamils who have learned this way” (Tamil Interview 2 October 2013). A third, as matter of confidence, explained that privately, individual Tamils may “be willing to compromise” but group dynamics – including the role played by elites as well as years of financial and emotional investment (ICG 2010) - and conditions in Sri Lanka prevent it (Tamil interview 27 October). The 2009 referendum organized by the diaspora on the future of the Tamil Uprising, as an example, presented only two choices: affirm the Vaddukodai Resolution, the declaration of the Tamil Nation’s demand for a separate
state, or don’t. Fair (2005) suggests “diaspora institutions built specifically for conflict purposes rather than adapted for a nationalist struggle are more effective at fostering radical attitudes” (in Koinova 2012: 434). At the same time, Chandra identifies elites with a stake in conflict as a mechanism of stability that ‘lock-in’ diasporan orientations and objectives. In sum, the legacy of these political processes, and of the LTTE as an institution comprising the elite actors, continues to constrain the options.

Together first generation respondents from all communities hint at segmentations within the community; they acknowledge individual difference and point to a role for elites. They connect the strength of some diasporan engagements to the presence of allies in Sri Lanka. They highlight path-dependent legacies that include the expression of Tamil nationalism, insular networks and institutionalized political violence. Second generation Tamils do not raise any of these issues nor do they suggest any significant ideological differences within the community. They only segmentation they identify within the community is between the elites, who gain both social and financial capital from their participation in diasporan politics, and ‘everyone else’ (Tamil interview).

Fieldwork also notes an unexplored gender dynamic manifest across communities that suggests despite the diverse situations of women touched by this conflict, they are each, to varying degrees, circumscribed by gender norms that undermine their sense of political competence and subsequently their ability to participate in this ‘political’ sphere. They were less confident and did not consider their answers representative of the group; each questioned her ability to contribute to this project [though this was not true of second generation female Tamil respondents]. Female respondents did not speak to the “hard” politics of territory, economy or government but to the ‘softer’ side of conflict politics, namely protecting and preserving family, home, community and culture (Tamil Christian, Moor and Tamil Hindu interviews). This division speaks to distinct public and private realms of knowledge, competence and influence with women being relegated to and champions of the latter (Samuel 2003: 167). The political expediency and cultural implications of such demarcations suggest mobilizations that are non-threatening to prevailing political power and gender structures
(Ibid). It speaks to internalized notions of competency and value that affect individual and sub-group decisions to mobilize as well as the content, goals and strategies of those mobilizations (Silva 2003: 39), that may be changing in the face of new conditions and ongoing contestation within each community as evidenced by the difference noted among second generation respondents. Together these segmentations within the community (and across them), point to political work undertaken in the intervening years to maintain the collective identity and narrative in the face of changing circumstances and in-group difference.

**Movement Attributes**

**Elites: leadership, allies and everyone else**

Much of the literature stress outcomes are “in actuality the decisions of elites” (Immergut 1998), and the consequence of systems that oppose or support them (Caren 2007). Mobilization is more likely where ethnic organizations and capable leaders are already established (Allahar 1996: 14). Minimizing elite divisions and creating allies depends, up to a point, on the quality of its leadership. As a movement resource, effective leaders unite (or marginalize) different factions within the community, effecting its membership and orientations. Theorists identify nationalist and religious movement leaders as “the best placed identity entrepreneurs to mobilise diaspora groups into collective action” (Ostergaard-Nielson 2003 in Godwin 2012: 165).

The Moor participant suggests a charismatic leader is able to unite people. An effective leader would settle the ‘in-fighting over religion’ (Moor interview). Divided by language, “made up of different ethnic groups” and “scattered all over the island”, the Muslim elite have struggled to form, and unify, an ethno-religious political party (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015: 188-189). Intra-community disagreement extends to support for ruling Sinhala parties, notably the UNP, from whom concessions have been granted (Ibid) or support for the Muslim National Alliance or the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress.
The interviewed Sinhalese respondent, opposed to the Rakapska regime, argues that with M. Rakapska, or his family, in power (or behind it) nothing will change. Tensions between the ruling UNP and SLFP are well documented and draw attention to urban and rural divisions within the Sinhala polity (ICG 2007b). The arrest and trial of General Fonseka, a presidential candidate in the post-war election, speaks not only to a bitter election process but also to significant divisions within the Sinhala elite. The Rajapaksa administration is said to have done more to support its diasporas abroad; “embassy and consular staff, often with the assistance of Sinhalese diaspora groups (who are very much influenced by mainstream southern Sri Lankan politics), report back to Colombo on suspected pro-Tiger individuals and organizations” (ICG 2010: 10). Pro-government protests by Sinhalese groups took place in a number of places including in Toronto and Ottawa (Ibid).

For state elites, the diaspora was “almost regarded as defectors” (Basch et al. 1994) but for government, “shift in official rhetoric and public perceptions [is a] new form of nation building” that tries to access political, economic and social contributions from their populations abroad (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 501). Both are prone to variation according to the conflict cycle. The March 2014 Sinhalese protest in Ottawa is interesting in this light. Coinciding with Canadian parliamentary debate on an American Resolution to the United Nations on the conflict in Sri Lanka, and including, comparatively, only a small number of protestors, this protest underscores the importance of defensive mobilization (Esman 1995). It suggests that absent other internal attributes, mobilization is possible when exogenous shocks destabilize normal practices. But without the movement attributes, the presence of elite allies and “without combative issues, a movement has a much harder time keeping up its energy and its solidarity, not least because it needs things to do which bring the members together in collective action” (Collins 2001: 41). In short, the Sinhalese diaspora has “very little impact on political decision-making on the island” (ICG 2010: 2).

1 With significant strength in the local political field, state elites are presumably less reliant on diasporan influence.
For these two communities, the local political field was always stronger given rival constituencies in both the local and diasporan fields. The balance of power between migrant actor and domestic forces in Sri Lanka favours the latter over these smaller communities without the politicized collective identity and resources. The power of local actors to resist, dismiss or channel diasporan interventions does not present an opportunity (or empowerment) for these actors in Canada to influence domestic policies in Sri Lanka.

From the beginning LTTE leadership was autocratic; leader Velupillai Prabhakaran did not tolerate dissent or any semblance of plurality of political ideas (Hoole et. al. 1990: 76-77). Militant LTTE practices, including intimidation and harassment of diasporan Tamils (HRW 2006), as well as its monopolization of the Tamil ‘voice’ (Brun and Van Hear 2012), reflect the hierarchal and coercive nature of this network. References to Prabhakaran were expected, and reflect a complicated relationship between Tamils and the LTTE founder. Children are named after him. By the estimates of one respondent, since the end of the war, it accounts for 40% of new baby names in Tamil Nadu, an Indian province with a population of 50 million Tamils (Tamil interview 27 October 2013). His image is displayed in private homes; he earned the “love and hate” of the people he claimed to represent (Tamil Interview 2 October 2013). In interviews only first generation Tamils were critical of the LTTE leader. Where the second generation mentioned LTTE abuses, they did so vaguely and without reference to the leader himself. The ICG argues that many, particularly youth, view the LTTE and Prabhakaran as symbols of resistance (ICG 2010: 22).

Ethnic entrepreneurs within the Tamil diaspora appear compelled to demonstrate their commitment by “reiterating their rebel credentials” (ICG 2010: 19). It gives them credibility. Orjuela (2008: 446) writes “success within the [Tamil] diaspora may depend on expressing explicit sympathy – if not support – with the more radical positions of terrorist groups in the homeland.” The TGTE, for example, draws “heavily on

2 It also highlights, briefly, a demographic and a geopolitical factor 50kms of the coast of Sri Lanka, and of consequence to the Sinhala majority.
scholarly discourse on transnationalism and diaspora” thanks to the influence of the younger cohort, but its elected representatives are largely drawn from the old guard (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 71), who “realistically, […] may be the only ones with the credibility to move the organization away from its past” (ICG 2010: 19). Elites are not distinct from the communities they represent. Leaders “never shaped the whole development alone. […] only in practical interaction with many others could they explore the possible meanings and viability of their orienting idea and give it concrete shape” (Barker 2001: 193). At the same time, telephone ‘cold calling’ (HRW 2006) suggests an organization that is not as monolithic or representative as some would suggest. Equally suggestive, 30,000-45,000 participants at the protest amounts to 10-15% of the total Tamil population in the GTA; it does not account for all members.

Respondents from all communities are unambiguous about the poisonous role elites play perpetuating the conflict. One responded: ‘people are ok, politicians are the problem’ (Tamil Interview 2 October); another suggests Sri Lanka’s ethnic communities have lived together peaceably but when ‘racialism comes, you don’t know’ (Moor Interview) because ‘racists and opportunists dominate’ the political system (Sinhalese Interview). There was no political choice: politicians have power, the rest go along for cultural, community and historical reasons (Tamil Interview 4 October 2013). Another respondent, visibly frustrated, asked rhetorically ‘who are these people? I don’t know’ (Tamil Christian Interview). Simply put, the ‘wrong people are always in charge. Money matters, they [civilian leaders here and there] don’t care about the villagers’ (Moor Interview). The system is ‘racist’ and ‘appeals to reason, logic, even appeal to others, or faith in an impartial system’ is foolish because ‘other racists and opportunists’ will step in (Sinhalese Interview). All respondents use self-interest to describe the role of elites. As intermediaries between fields, elites ‘make money off the war, off the diaspora. His livelihood depends on it’ (Tamil interview 27 October 2013). Respondents acknowledge the import of the primary power struggle, that is, the one between different self-interested elites “who claim to belong to a diaspora community” (Paerregaard 2005: 92).
Citing repressive, undemocratic conditions, the diaspora presents itself as representative (ICG 2010; Koinova 2012; Brun and Van Hear 2012; Godwin 2012, Fair 2008). Fieldwork forcefully expresses this point. Tamil Christian, Muslim and Tamil respondents insist the diaspora is acting on behalf of an oppressed minority. No respondent distinguishes between Northern and Eastern Tamils, or between local Tamils and diasporan ones; they describe a homogenous group with shared interests. On the island, suggestions that the diaspora can decide the future of the Tamil struggle “without giving Tamils in Sri Lanka a veto” is arrogant and dangerous (ICG 2010: 13). An activist in Sri Lanka was clearer, “let these people come tell the Vanni IDPs (internally displaced people) that they are speaking on their behalf for a separate state. They will be physically assaulted for sure” (Ibid: 17). There is a clear discord between those in the diasporic field who maintain “within Sri Lanka, Tamils can’t articulate their views freely, but outside Sri Lanka they can” (Tamil interview 27 October; NGO interviews), and those within Sri Lanka who insist the diaspora “cannot make decisions on their own and enforce it on people here. That is unacceptable” (ICG 2010: 13). Tamils in the Eastern Province who have “lost far more of its young people and children in this war [Eelam IV] than any other Tamil region – [have] largely abandoned its support. The Jaffna peninsula in the north has been largely uninvolved for more than a decade or so in the separatist cause; there, the vast majority […] have submitted to uneasy cohabitation” (in Brun and Van Hear 2012: 72).

The Eastern Province is not included in this analysis. The final stage of the war was largely fought in the Eastern Province, representing a new wave of migration with a different experience. The UN issued an ‘early warning’ in 2005 to indicate deteriorating conditions in that province and Tamil asylum claims from the Eastern Province increased between 2007-2009 (IRB 2014). This segmentation distinguishes “rooted and established diaspora [who] often have little in common with new migrants” who form “new and distinct communities” (Weinar 2010: 84). The regional dynamic in this conflict and the concentration in the diaspora of Tamils from one region but with segmented arrivals over the course of thirty years of war and most recently a wave of migration from a different province, represent a heterogeneous group with different experiences of the
conflict, of the LTTE, and with the diaspora. Geographical, generational and socioeconomic differences as well as different immigration statuses and competing political projects may, without the LTTE as intermediary, constitute and empower rival factions that may challenge the collective identity and dominant narrative.

Once the ‘lost generation’, then ‘saviours’ and now ‘a disjointed, leaderless diasporic field’, factions within diaspora are currently jostling of power (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 71). A “crowded field within one diaspora dilutes the effectiveness of the community as a whole”; the “absence of rival constituencies within a specific diaspora” is the second internal condition of mobilization (Godwin 2012: 166). This is critical given the vulnerability of political identities to contingency; “[they] fracture into local, regional, and national identities [Agnew and Brusa 1999] as well as ideological identities [Cohen 1985]” (in Berezin 2001: 97). The relationship between the conflict cycle, processes of migration and diaspora outcomes is underscored. Interviews minimize these differences and suggest little room for debate on key issues. Nevertheless, divisions are apparent between the northern and eastern province; between the diaspora and co-ethnics in Sri Lanka, and in regards the direction of Tamil nationalism, suggesting strained relationships between the diaspora and the homeland, and within the diaspora. A lack of elites allies in the COO (and at that time in the COR), and ongoing power struggles within the diaspora reduce the probability of mobilization.

Institutionalized violence and insular networks

Strategic self-interest applies equally to passive and silent members, and networks are a resource to pursue personal, strategic interests (Buechler 2011). Respondents describe their participation at a political humanitarian event as, simply, ‘he supports us, we support him’ (NGO interviews 25 November). At the same event, others describe their participation as fulfilling a family obligation or building their resumes with charitable and political works (NGO Interviews).
All participants stress the insularity of their social networks, organized largely around cultural institutions that reflect the ethnic divide that permeates Sri Lankan society, and that is reinforced in Canada. Respondents suggest homogenous, hierarchical and transnational networks with coercive, concerted and affective dimensions. Networks are identified within families, within the community, and for the Tamil community associated with the LTTE. Fieldwork underscores the importance of homogenous, mutually exclusive networks to the stability of groups, to collective identity, to the efficacy of frames and relevant to practical logistics; they are therefore critical to mobilization.

The institutionalization of political violence is an important dynamic sustaining the conflict (Jayawickreme 2010; Bastion 2006; Fair 2005). Perera (2001: 20) argues “violence has been ritualized and glorified in some sections of Tamil society in the north and east particularly as a result of LTTE’s ideological and strategic considerations”. The legacies and logics of which are (re)configured in the COR. In the diaspora, this is manifest as (1) continued support for Eelam and the acceptance of violent tactics; (2) LTTE mediated networks; (3) coercive and censoring familial and community dynamics; and (4) ritualized in community events. In all cases mobilizing structures, specifically pre-existing organizational networks, are implicated.

Political engagement often blurred with socio-cultural events sponsored by pro-LTTE groups but not overtly political in the nature (Cochrane, Baser and Swain 2009: 694). Outside the family, participants and scholarship suggest, “cultural expressions and events provide the backbone for more conventionally political activities and, […] constitute strategic collective action” (Bernstein 2005: 65). Brun and Van Hear (2012: 68) point to temples, schools, housing bodies, and cultural and sports organizations to show “the LTTE’s assertion of control over institutions in the Tamil diaspora”. Attendance at events like Pongu Tamil or at Heroes Day are more than just fundraising networks but important strategic (and emotive) expressions of identity and ethos. Indeed, “many of the rituals and ceremonies that bound these communities together and provided a sense of collective identity were linked to the LTTE” (E. Jayawickreme et al. 2010: 217).
The “emergence of wayside shrines for fallen LTTE martyrs and the social significance of the idea of martyrdom within the organization” is significant of the institutionalized violence that pervades segments of Tamil society (Perera 2001: 25). Heroes’ Day in Toronto, for instance, is held annually at the Skydome (Godwin 2012). This event transforms the sports centre into a mock cemetery. This is political work with significant symbolic overtones, and is a considerable financial and emotional investment. For respondents, like the scholarship suggests, “rituals affirm, by communicating affirmation. They enhance solidarity, binding participants more closely to the shared purpose” (Barker 2001: 188). The public display of symbols and “ritual are collective means of emotional communication, ways of formalizing shared feelings” (Ibid). As a description of symbols – their nature and content as well as an indication of the relationship between symbols and the people who interpret them within a structure (Ostertag and Ortiz 2014), participation at these events points to culture and its ‘almost’ autonomous, causal quality (Ibid).

In all but one interview, participants answered a question about disagreement within the community or within the family with a story of violence. Spousal violence, fistfights among friends, and physical altercations that became ‘very ugly for that family’ (Tamil Interview 4 October) were unprompted stories of violence that stress the coercive power of social institutions. In each case, difference was not resolved; ‘they don’t maintain contact’ (Tamil interview 7 October) or ‘he was kicked out of the family’ (Tamil interview 27 October). Fieldwork revealed instances where community members have chastised respondents for their lack of attendance at community events or for manner of dress, indicating a concerted and coercive social force.

What is more, given exclusive networks organized by geography and the transnational links that bind them, community members are able to ‘report back’ to family in Sri Lanka who can exert greater leverage (Muslim and Tamil interviews). Physical violence and concerted social power suggests that while expressions of difference are possible, they are costly. The criticism that SI accounts “frequently ignores or overlooks power
conflicts” is an important one (Thelen 1999 in Mackay et al. 2010: 575).

The literature on the Tamil diaspora describes sophisticated, organized and pre-existing social structures that act as networks connecting members of the diaspora. Embedded within these networks is an ‘existing communications infrastructure’ (a resource unto itself) that includes newspapers, websites, radio stations, television channels as well as of social media technologies (Godwin 2012: 171-2). Tamil respondents agree this infrastructure ‘spreads the message’, encouraging mobilization: one participant highlighted the free advertising for protest offered by three radio stations and television channels (Tamil Interview 27 October 2013). ICG identifies privately funded radio and television stations that “isolate the diaspora from the realities of Sri Lanka’s politics through biased programming” (ICG 2010: 18); they “espouse the LTTE’s separatist agenda while ignoring its glaring failure” (Ibid). Evidently the narrative resonates and is widely disseminated.

The political developments since the defeat of the LTTE, including the TGTE, the GTF and the 2010 referendum, “appear to be more concerned with reinforcing feelings of victimization within the diaspora than seeing justice served” (ICG 2010: 15), and fieldwork more convincingly expresses the former.

The importance of social media and text messaging were reported by the media at the time, and were, as implied by this Tamil respondent, “organized mainly by youth” communicating via Facebook, Twitter (Uduagmpola 2010 in Godwin 2012: 172). He, however, suggests social media and text messaging were more important to individual decisions to participate because it was through these channels that family and peer groups committed to attend, and where the logistics of participation was organized (Tamil Interview 27 October 2013).

Almost exclusively interviewed respondents explain personal connections determine their engagement. They suggest pre-existing social networks have influential ideational and affective dimensions. As Daniel Bell (1975) notes “ethnicity has become more salient because it can combine an interest with an affective tie” (Allahar
1996: 18). Politicization and mobilization reflect ‘personal pressure, [can] apply to them from personal contacts’ (Moor Interview 5 October 2013); ‘my dad’ who could at a word demand action from his son, who in turn would phone and go online to connect with extended families and close friends (Tamil Interview 27 October 2013). More specifically, they would: ‘call my cousins’, ‘call my friends’, ‘maybe talk to their friends and family’ or ‘put something up on facebook’ with the expectation they would ‘to join me’ (Tamil Interviews).

The extensive linkages between families and local communities expressed in these connections points to immigration policies and the constitutive effect of the COR as well as conditions in Sri Lanka that influence the value given to these connections and to the interpretations of political opportunities.

Respondents describe affective ties based on trust and respect, and ones that support their sense of self. They stress networks that empower, affirm and support their identities, values and understanding of the way the world works. Participating in these networks, unlike more coercive ones, represents bonding social capital and encompass solidarity and community identity” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 76). Intimate ties “offer moral support and encouragement” (Goodwin and Pfaff 2001: 287).

Even those who disavow politics, who describe self-interested participation, familial pressure [e.g. ‘we support each other’s causes’, or ‘I need a reference letter’ or ‘I am here for my uncle’ (NGO interviews)], or who admit the inconvenience of protest or other ‘obligatory’ group events (Tamil Interview 27 October 2013), were keen to express the pleasure they derive from these events. Attending can be ‘fun’; friends and extended family are often present and together they are able to express solidarity and power. Like other expressions of self-identification and national belonging, respondents suggest attendance prioritizes a salient ethnic identity, increases perceptions of efficacy (individual and collective), informs motivation, and is thus critical to mobilization.
As an assertion of agency, “participation per se expressed moral outrage, asserted a claim to dignity, and gave grounds for pride” (Wood 2001: 268). And like those interviewed by Woods, Tamil respondents who participated at the 2009 protests suggest what was initially a response to moral outrage was later pride and pleasure of agency (Ibid: 273, 279). The “emotional benefits […] only available to participants” reflect a “more profound role for agency” (Wood 2001: 268). Participation involves “the development of new social and political identities, and a self-recognition of themselves as history-makers” (Barker 2001: 180). These respondents describe events and emotions that empower the group, reminding them of their numbers, organization, and solidarity. Participation was catalysts among younger respondents, who recognize their power, derive social capital from their political contributions and community involvement. In turn, motivation and perceptions of efficacy are effected and these feelings inform future instances of mobilization (Brinkerhoff 2008: 76). All second-generation Tamil respondents express a desire to be more politically engaged. Elites, aware of this development, are keen to develop this resource (ICG 2010).

Fieldwork suggests “the personal relations among the individual members play[s] an especially important role” (Findeis et al. 1994 in Goodwin and Pfaff 2001: 287). Second generation Tamil respondents suggest these networks serve as support mechanisms for the children of victims of trauma, deepening the affective ties and the emotional investment between participants. The ‘transfer of diasporan postmemory and identification’ may be ‘handed down’ but owing to their imaginative quality, the emotional component, and in the face of the critical last few months of the war, these have taken ‘concrete shape’ (So He Chi Kim 2007). Duty and obligation along with pride and dignity inform this discourse, and direct action. These memories and the networks they encompass represent cognitive mechanisms and relational dynamics that interpret current events. In short, “one never remembers alone” (Halbawachs 1950).

Networks indicate frames – prognostic, diagnostic and motivational (Snow and Benford 2000) built around these ideas and histories. Smith proposes subjective engageability (1996: 167) to explain how information that
is cognitively accessible provokes a reaction that reflects that individual’s values and identity, and where “the cultural and social values connected to a group identity may infuse this information with a sense of urgency and a compelling need to respond” (Nepstad and Smith 2001: 166). Likened to Geertz’s concept of common sense or Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, implicated normative emotions (Reddy 1973) or emotive conventions can ‘tip the balance […] shaping how people feel’ and “often point toward a specific political course of action” (Gould 2001: 140, 142). Feelings are “contextual and connected to larger cultural systems” (Whittier 2001: 234); individuals and collectives “operate in contexts with emotional norms and structural constraints not of their own choosing” (Hochschild 1983 in Whittier 2001: 235). Wary of separating emotions from cognitions, or values from politics, this project notes the potential causal influence of emotions on perceptions, decision-making, and, eventually, action. In that light, emotions – the concept of being worthy or attendance at certain community events as examples – imply “situational and relational” dynamics (Barker 2001: 193), which are mechanisms of reproduction. Like legacies or inheritances, they indicate “the extent that a historical sequence of social movements leaves adherents in one emotional frame or another” (Ibid). The trajectory must be maintained.

Survey results stress tangible resources. Discussions of power and the cost of political work means money matters. The Moor participant suggests resources are a determinative factor, and the Tamil Christian insists ‘you have to follow the money’ to explain diasporan engagements and outcomes. The Sinhalese and Tamil interviews present resources as financial, or the ‘how’ of the ‘why’ question of motivation and mobilization. It is the means by which people execute the decisions they’ve already made, and not a factor that influences that decision-making. And yet, survey results indicate resources are ‘very important’ to this decision-making. The inference is that interviews present motives as well as the moral and intellectual reasoning that inform decision-making but when confronted with a checklist, the reality of actualizing decisions focused attention on material resources.
Research and fieldwork suggest mobilization is more likely where leaders, resources, collective identity and pre-existing social organizations are already established. As movement attributes, they represent political work, financial investment and significant emotional commitment; they are causal forces and indicative of its organizational strength. Internal to the group, these actors, institutions and processes are mechanisms of stability, or reproduction, which reinforce and reaffirm the dominant identity, narrative and political orientation. By reference to (a) a politicized identity, and (2) organizational strength the research question is partly answered. A politicized community and collective identity is a necessary condition of social mobilization that quantifies resources toward specific political projects. It does not, however, explain episodic mobilization, nor does it adequately describe the environment from which these identities and claims can be made. That environment must be conducive, both permitting identification, politicization and mobilization in the diaspora, and providing the reasons to do so.

**Political Opportunities in the host and homelands**

**The hoststate: political rights and foreign policy capture**

Migration from conflict areas does not always or necessarily lead to diasporization, or more specifically to the formation and development of a collective identity and shared political ethos. This project uses the absence of this type of diasporization in three other ethnic communities to explore this outcome and subsequent mobilization. Absent the exiled reasons for and conditions of dispersal, migration is not sufficient to explain politicized collective identity or homeland orientation. At the same time, migration to other places without the same opportunity structures present a different range of options from which the organizational logics, resources and political orientations of the group develop.

Many (HRW 2006; ICG 2010) have drawn attention to LTTE abuses and intimidation in the diaspora, and in places like Canada and Norway “where no oppositional groupings emerged […] support for the LTTE seems to have been more monolithic” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 67). Canada, according to two Tamil respondents, is an
'immigrant country’ when compared to “France or Switzerland which are not immigrant countries so the culture is stronger, it is more intact” and that, according to these respondents means more support: it means “most of the money [for the LTTE] comes from there” (Tamil Interview). The ICG disagrees and asserts most of the money was raised in North America (ICG 2010). The US State Department estimate the LTTE earned between $100-$200 million a year worldwide during the war (HRW 2006). And while some reject that number saying it is an impossible sum for first and second immigrants (Ibid); others suggest that through community, temples, cultural and political events like Pongu Tamil or Heroes Day plus taxes collected by and for the LTTE, the sum is possible. It is hard to imagine a population of 40,000-50,000 (FR) and 47,000 (SWIT) respectively could raise more money than the Canadian Tamil population of 300,000; it does however raise an interesting point about the political structure of the host country, and the effects of integration on mobilization.

Respondents from all four communities suggest Tamils are ‘more hardcore about the message here; it is worse than [at] home’ (Moor Interview 5 October 2013). The academic literature on diasporas and ethnic violence makes the same point. Multicultural policies in this country encourage ethnic enclaves (Castles 2009). They may “inhibit the development of national citizenship by fostering a commitment to the solidarity of subgroups” (Bernstein 2005: 52). The ‘ethnic divide that pervades Sri Lankan society is also reproduced to a large extent among the diaspora’ (Van de Vooorde 2005: 183), and ‘multiethnic diaspora political groups […] are extremely rare’ (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 95). A point underscored by the approximately twenty people questioned at the NGO event, who all identified as Tamil Hindu while the NGO itself purported to be a multi-ethnic. One of the interviewed volunteers said ‘I don’t even know a single Sinhalese’ (NGO interview). Given this is one of the few openly multiethnic diaspora groups operating in Toronto it is instructive. Safe from the actual deprivations of war, (re)constituted social and political networks insulate groups and may, in the face of changes in the conflict cycle, harden the group boundaries drawn in Sri Lanka.
The size of the Tamil diaspora is an advantage because “smaller, cohesive and more concentrated numbers allow for greater control over agenda-setting, group decision-making and messaging” (Godwin 2012: 168). This ‘size advantage’ is enhanced by the spatial concentration of Tamils in Canada. According to Wayland (2004), 90% of Tamils in Canada live in the Toronto area, and this concentration translates into political leverage “beyond its size” (ICG 2010: 15). As one Canadian MP explains, this spatial concentration “make it almost impossible for politicians seeking election to ignore Tamil issues” (Ibid). This mobilization condition connects an ability to influence foreign policy in the adopted country to a group’s concentration within certain political districts (Saideman 2002). The advantages of the Tamil community in Canada have “to some extent mitigated the impact of groups seeking to present other perspectives to political elites on issues related to Sri Lanka’s conflict” (Godwin 2012: 169).

Successive conservative governments in 2006 and 2011 lessened these effects. Tamil constituencies concentrated in ‘safe’ liberal ridings (Godwin 2012) means that while the community is “numerous enough to affect decision makers’ electoral calculations” (Smith 2000), they did not affect the calculations of these decision makers. Political rights and organizational strength increase the space for mobilization in favour of a policy outcome but do not guarantee mobilization, or success. Two developments in Canada are significant of narrowed windows of opportunity to influence foreign policy. Each is cited as indicative of changed discourse and practice in Canada with significant effects on mobilization in the Tamil diaspora.

The 2006 decision by the Conservative government to ban the LTTE signaled a closing window of opportunity to influence Canadian foreign policy, and outcomes in Sri Lanka. This decision is cited as a factor that (a) lead people onto the streets because they didn’t feel the government understood them or the situation, and (b) reduced participation for fear of failing on the wrong side of the law (Thurairajah 2011). Brinkerhoff suggests the “higher the costs of a particular agenda to status and security in their adopted country, the greater the likelihood that the diaspora community will split or fail to mobilize” (2008: 77). On May 14, 2010, a Tamil
Canadian was the first person charged under anti-terrorism financing legislation (Carter 2010 in Thurairajah 2011: 133). Before this legislation and the ‘chill’ of the first arrest, diasporan Tamils “could support Eelam without feeling disloyal to Canada” (Ibid). She concludes, “in labeling the Tamil Tigers as terrorists, Canada was taking an official stance on the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka” (Ibid). Second-generation respondents agree. The Canadian Government, less receptive to the demands of the diaspora, shapes a new chapter in the official diasporan narrative. Immigration status in this country may be significant here, as are the strength of an individual’s social networks given the stated effect of personal relations on mobilization outcomes.

With the arrival of the MV Sun Sea of the coast of British Colombia in August 2010 “Canada […] became a dramatically less welcoming country for refugees” (Canadian Counsel for Refugees 2015). Before the boat arrived, then Public Safety Minister Vic Toews labeled some of the passengers “suspected human smugglers and terrorists” (Ibid). Jason Kenny, Immigration Minister at the time, described a more aggressive approach as necessary “to create a deterrent for future arrivals” (Quan 2015). The rhetoric changed from refugees to ‘irregular arrivals’, ‘criminal syndicates’, ‘smuggling boats’ and ‘large-scale human trafficking operations’. Legislative changes followed rhetorical ones. The Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act (itself framed in suggestive language) was introduced in October 2010. Detention is now mandatory for ‘irregular arrivals’ and refugees must now wait five years before applying for permanent residence (Canadian Counsel for Refugees 2015). Spousal Sponsorships and Family Reunification immigration applications, both dependent on permanent residence status, will necessarily be delayed a minimum of five years as a consequence, with effects on the size and composition of the group.

Tamil respondents describe the changed Canadian political landscape as a “consequence of Sinhala propaganda and the international community’s capitulation to Sri Lankan government pressure” in the post-war on terror world (ICG 2010: 18). Tamil respondents insist there is ‘lot of misrepresentation – in Sri Lanka, in Canada, in
the media –and a lot of fear’ about the LTTE (Tamil Interview 27 October 2013). Self-identified as ‘moderate extremists’ (Ibid), respondents stress ‘the means might have been wrong, but who else? No one in Sri Lanka, no one in the international community is fighting for the Tamil people’ (Ibid).

The presence of the LTTE flag “confused the identities of the protestors with terrorists and discredited their message and actions” (Godwin 2012: 176). Its presence “allowed the Canadian government to distance itself from the protestors and avoid conciliation” (Ibid). Combined with the controversial takeover of the Gardiner Expressway and ongoing discourse on security and terrorism, the suggestion is that “tactics viewed by the public as illegitimate” (Uslander 1998 in Koinova 2012: 435), reduced the sympathy of the wider Canadian polity and discourages ongoing mobilization (Ibid). The political significance of the above suggests neither the “strategic convergence” nor the “relative permeability” criteria are met. Without foreign policy capture the probability of mobilization is reduced.

Interviewed Tamils describe betrayal and disappointment. RCMP interventions at the protest made one respondent feel censored by government authority: it made him feel less Canadian. Another Tamil complained bitterly about the lack of international or Canadian engagement in the violence in Sri Lanka, dismissing both and concluding ‘I am not represented so this is not my country’ (Tamil Interview 2 October 2013). The ICG report concludes that the devastation of the war and “the seeming indifference of western governments and the United Nations, many Tamils, particularly the younger generation born in the West, grew deeply disillusioned” (ICG: ii). Participants express this disillusionment directly and have no easy answers. The ICG report suggests “governments with large Tamil communities have been worried this might lead to new forms of militancy” (ICG 2010: 10).
Second generation Tamils (and the interviewed Sri Lankan Moor) explain various movement dynamics by reference to liberalism. It was a ‘duty’, an ‘obligation and like a responsibility’ to speak for Tamils trapped in those conditions. ‘They can’t speak and here, with our rights and freedoms, we must speak for them. [...] I have to because I know what my parents went through, and I have still have family there’ (NGO interview). Living in Canada entails certain rights ‘we take for granted’ (NGO interview). Tamils living in Canada and in other western countries have ‘a responsibility’ to look out for Tamils in Sri Lanka who are ‘second class citizens in their own country’ (NGO interview). The associated narrative incorporates liberal language to rationalize LTTE tactics, and legitimize past choices. It would however be disingenuous to dismiss or instrumentalise the liberal influence; as expressions of minority rights, representative government, sovereignty and self-determination, these values are ‘real and important’ (Tamil interview).

**Homeland: Content and Conflict Cycles**

New migrant communities typically reestablish the social structures and organizational logics of the homeland as they adapt to conditions in the host country (Castles 2009). (Re)produced in Canada, they are substantially informed by social segmentation in Sri Lanka (Godwin 2012; ICG 2010). This segmentation applies to each community and is largely informed by ancestry and place of residence. As a prerequisite for group membership, ancestry is exclusive (at least in the short term); it is generational. And geography, particularly when based on local or regional territories, is limiting. (Re)produced social structures are equally likely to contain a set of institutional arrangements that guide behaviour and that reflect dominant constructions of the conflict, of identity and of ‘Other’. These are the political outcomes of institutional arrangements and ‘modes of belonging’ in COO, (re)constituted in the host by the departing groups and in light of political opportunities in the COR. Comprising the antecedent conditions of migration, the COO informs the formation and development of a diasporan trajectory. Inherited or (re)constituted logics continue to shape self-understandings and interrelationships and effecting perceptions of political opportunities, efficacy and action.
The argument here is that the country of origin influences diasporan outcomes because it informs (1) the reasons for and conditions of dispersal as well as the composition of this group; (2) identity constructions, ideational institutional arrangements and interrelationships; (3) political ambitions and logics; and (4) captures moral or exogenous shocks that motivate action. In short, the COO is the background environment, implicated in the cultural framework and the source of opportunities to engage in unfinished political projects.

Return trips to Sri Lanka during the ceasefire underscores parental attachment to place, and the importance of timing [or the conflict cycle] to explain diasporan relationships with the homeland. Experiences there were mixed: second generation Tamil Canadians lived amidst a political and social structure that reflects their own ancestry. They were proud. Traumatic experiences at checkpoints underscored the insecurity of person and the derogation of group that motivated their parents to leave, and that inspired the insurgency. Experiences in Sri Lanka politicized what had been, more simply, the family’s ethnic background as understood and practiced in Canada i.e. it was everyday experiences with food, language, music, family relations and participation at cultural events.

For some these trips were politicizing events. For all the conduct of the final months of war comprised a series of moral shocks, and was an “essential motivating factor” (Nepstad and Smith 2001: 173). These felt experiences reordered individual hierarchies of identity, translating the Tamil identity into a hypergood and “feelings of national [Tamil] belonging” into a salient politicized identity (Berezin 2001: 96). These interviews highlight, as per Tololyan (1996), the difference between “a symbolic, ethnic identity of ‘being’ and a more active, ‘diasporan’ identity requiring involvement” (Butler 2001: 191).

The 2009 Toronto protests “involved more than one fourth of the entire Tamil population of the city” including many ‘traditionally non-engaged members’ suggesting a “high degree of awareness and mobilization” (Godwin 2012: 171-172). In the last months of the war, “even people that never came to rallies or supported the LTTE
before came around to them out of necessity” (Tamil activist in ICG 2010: 9). Western governments, international organizations and NGOs allege both sides perpetrated war crimes during the final phase of the civil war (ICG 2010). The radicalization of the diaspora reflects the increased levels of violence seen in Sri Lanka during the final months of the war.

According to the ICG “as the civil war dragged on, increasing amounts shifted away from humanitarian aid towards sustaining the insurgency” (ICG 2010: 5). This is in keeping with the conflict literature that suggests, “during violence diasporans unconditionally support the local actors who best advance nationalist goals (Shain 2007); and under “violent conditions, radicals usually hold more political clout” (Koinova 2005: 153). Her conclusion: “radicalization in the diaspora is more likely to occur if high levels of violence exist in the homeland, and lower levels of homeland violence are associated with moderation” (Koinova 2012: 450).

The passion with which Tamil respondents recount the protests is in sharp contrast to how they describe current sentiment. After the demise of LTTE, the protest message changed, focusing on humanitarian considerations (Godwin 2012: 174). The protests also grew progressively smaller as fewer and fewer Tamils participated (Ibid). In the face of little chance of effecting outcomes in Sri Lanka and in light of a closed window of opportunity to influence policy in Canada, participation fell off.

The end of conflict signals a closed window of opportunity in the present period. In his victory speech, then President Mahinda Rajapaksa, said,

“There are only two peoples in this country. One is the people that love this country. The other comprises the small groups that have no love for the land of their birth. Those who do not love the country are now a lesser group” (E. Jayawickreme et al. 2010: 212).

Diaspora entrepreneurs are less likely to act radically during the prevention or termination phases of a conflict (Koinva 2012: 435). The Tamil diaspora, “humiliated and confused about the future of a struggle that they were
both emotionally and financially invested in” (Jayawickreme et al. 2010: 216), is fragmented, “and unlikely to achieve much on their own or collectively” (ICG 2010: 12). Without political opportunities to influence outcomes in the COO, Tamil respondents are no longer publicly prioritizing the ethnic identity, nor engaged in purposive political action directed toward the country of origin.

Mobilization, or political opportunities, are not just a reflection of the conflict cycle but indicative of “the strength of the linkages between the main secessionist elites and the diaspora” (Koinova 2012: 451). In her account, mobilization and radicalization (or moderation) “coincides with the political line [taken by main secessionist elites] in their homeland” (Ibid: 435). At a London conference in 1989 for the Sri Lankan diaspora, the LTTE leader Prabhakaran described them as “those who had left the homeland, pulam peyarnthor, or worse, those who had deserted Tamil Eelam at a critical point in its history” (Brun and Ban Hear 2012: 66). But the war continued and more fled. The second and third phases of the conflict [Eelam II 1990-1995; Eelam III 1995-2002] marked a period of “diaspora consolidation in the affluent countries of the west, as the various waves of arrivals embedded themselves in these societies” (Ibid: 67). This development, produced by conditions in Sri Lanka and permitted by immigration and political policies in CORs, marks a “period when the diasporic political field rose in importance. […] The diasporic political field had become crucial for the organization’s very survival” (Ibid 68). As early as 1989 the main secessionist elite in Sri Lanka addresses the diaspora, highlighting its “underestimated nonmaterial dimension” (Koinova 2012: 450). That is,

“diasporas are not the only actors to ‘think locally and act globally’ (Lyons and Mandaville 2010), but homeland-based secessionist elites do so as well. [...] They consider diaspora entrepreneurs residing in a global state with major decision-making capacity over the sovereignty struggle as highly important” (Ibid).

The LTTE was the main secessionist ally, and it is in disarray. Political opportunities are necessarily affected. The relationship between the diaspora and the homeland is dependent on conditions in multiple places, but substantially informed by the balance of power between elites in the COO. Elite receptivity to the diaspora can be traced back to conditions in Sri Lanka. The main secessionist elite is marginalized and the agency of other
local actors is now stressed. That political field is tipped decisively in favour of the GSL. The diaspora, whose
linkages were mainly through the LTTE has fewer familial, associational and political ties to the Eastern
Province where most political and military maneuvers, and humanitarian actions, have been and are now
focused. The diaspora, independent of the LTTE, is therefore less able exert an influence. With reduced
perceptions of efficacy and frayed, disempowered mobilizing structures linking these places, mobilization in the
diaspora is less likely.

The end of the war reinforces the local political field – the Sri Lankan state writ large. All respondents stress the
(temporary) end to fighting has done nothing to address the grievances that precipitated and sustained it. The
demise of the LTTE and the hardline, triumphalist post-war policies of the GSL only consolidate power in the
local field over the transnational one, entrenching institutional arrangements, and reducing both the probability
and efficacy of mobilization from any of the consulted ethnic groups. As a source of moral shocks, or as new
opportunities to influence Sri Lankan politics, conditions in this country and the timing of these developments
will continue to inform the salience of particular identity constructs, and diasporan activism.
Modern diasporas are “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin – their homelands” (Sheffer 1986 in Brinkerhoff 2008: 67). They are “deterritorialized and network based-based collectivities […] held together by national, cultural or other identity claim” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 491). By “operat[ing] in ways that transcend specific territorial boundaries and identities” (Appadurai 1991: 192), they represent organizational and spatial logics as well as “ideational structures of meaning and collective belonging” that impact the structure of the international system (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 491). The political significance of which is how national identities and group boundaries shape, and are shaped by, spaces, strategies, and interests at local, national, international and transnational levels, and ‘in-between’ places. The outcomes of these processes effect demands for recognition, representation and responsibility in domestic and international politics. Central to our understanding of politics and yet “acutely undertheorized” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 490), the “shocking omission” (Brinkerhoff 2008) of diasporas from IR studies obfuscates the study of nationalism and national belonging in international politics.

The Sri Lankan Canadian Case

This Master’s Thesis began by questioning the conditions that inform mobilization from within three ethnic communities and directed at their shared country of origin. It became a project about exile, emergent processes of diasporization and is largely focused on the Tamil community. Informed by the scholarship and in consultation with members of the affected communities, it presents an overview of implicated conditions and mechanisms in a framework of social mobilization applied to an important case in the Canadian political landscape, and with ramifications for the Sri Lankan polity.

This work cannot presume to speak in generalizable terms; the limited number of participants, its ‘prototypical’ focus, and the comparative paucity of research on the other three communities preclude much comparison. That
said, research and the conducted interviews suggest an exile group in a democratic state is a unique category of practice, and so a unique unit of analysis. A diaspora is more likely to possess movement attributes that can, under specific circumstances, be successfully mobilized toward the politics of the country of origin. This “outcome persists over time” (Soifer 2012); the diasporan trajectory implicates mechanisms of reproduction [or stability] that continue to inform the identifications and interactions of diasporan Tamils. As a category of practice, the diasporization of the Tamil community in the classic sense reflects its origins and the historic choices made by diasporan and other actors that inform perceptions (or influence the value) of changing conditions. It will “play a causal role” (Soifer 2012) interpreting future events and effecting mobilization outcomes.

The collective identities “formed by contemporary migration processes” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 490) are informed by the “core triad of the homeland, hostlands and the departing group” (Van Hear in Butler 2001: 211). Each dimension proved constitutive in the formation and development of the Tamil exile diaspora. Where this diasporan trajectory failed to develop, that is in Sinhalese, Tamil Christian and Moor communities, the divergent path is traced back to conditions in the home and among the departing group, which are institutionalized and empower in the hostcountry. The characteristics of a diaspora or the features of classic definition, i.e. collective identity and consciousness, internal organization and resources, encompass the environmental, relational, and cognitive mechanisms that precede social mobilization in PPM. In other words, “by affecting the choice of identity, structural and contextual factors as well as strategic decision-making affect future activism (Beckwith 1996 in Bernstein 2005).

Cohen (1997), Scheffer (1986) and Safran (1991) categorize diasporas to stress the divergent trajectories origin and composition will yield. More recent epistemologies and most empirical accounts rely on, as a causal point of departure, the reasons for and conditions of dispersal (i.e. its type and membership) to situate diasporan politics. Baubock (2006: 15) describes diasporan citizenship, linked to unfinished nation-building, as a “much
stronger basis for political mobilization than other kinds of transnational linkages”. Volkan (1997), Koinova (2005), Shain and Barth (2008), Brinkerhoff (2008) and Brun and Van Hear (2012) each conclude diasporan politics can be partly explained by reference to its origins and composition; that is, to its identity and ethos (Butler 2001).

In simple and board terms, there are two perspectives to explain mobilization in the diaspora and its outcomes: one focuses on opportunities and the rationalist pursuit of interests, which presuppose identity (Wendt 1999) while the other begins with a sense of identity that motivates action (Carroll 1997). Both begin with two preliminary premises: (1) identity is constructed (Chandra 2001) and (2) “diaspora participation in transnational violence is fundamentally about identity” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 68).

Historical Institutionalism explains political opportunities and political outcomes (like ethnogenesis, diasporization or social mobilization) as part of a series of conditions that are contingent on specific contexts and choices (Mackay et al. 2010). The reasons for and composition of the initial wave of migration as well as the choice of destination sites “close of alternate options and lead to the establishment of institutions that generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes” (Cappocia and Keleman 2007: 341). These include political, social, cultural, ideational, linguistic and symbolic structures. Collier and Collier suggest the choices made at these critical moments in history “produce distinct legacies” (Ibid) that according to Mahoney are taken in light of “antecedent historical conditions” (Ibid). In other words, choices related to migration produce distinct diaspora or ethnic communities depending on the reasons for and conditions of dispersal, and the inclusivity and receptivity of the host state.

The monopolization of the diaspora by the LTTE and the institutionalization of political violence that was characteristic of the conflict impact the organizational base. A heterogeneous group, it is also motivated by affective and moral considerations, a sense of empowerment derived from political rights in the COR, and from
its historic ability to influence politics in Sri Lanka through the LTTE and its own transnational linkages. These are productive conditions operating in the possibility space created by migration from conflict to a democratic state that inform mobilization outcomes in this place. The collapse of the LTTE and its lessened ability to influence politics in Sri Lanka [and a lack of foreign policy capture in Canada] are significant in this light.

This project began by identifying diasporas as socially-constituted (or constructed) formations. In this view, “diaspora as a category of practice” redefines and remakes the world (Brubaker 2005: 12). It is political practice, contingent on factors within and beyond its control. A diaspora reflects an “overarching cognitive frame of sometimes very diverse groups” (Weinar 2010: 76); it can re-orient existing self-identification of relevant groups” (Ibid: 85). This is political work. The identity and the overarching frame depend on ethnic entrepreneurs who engage in framing processes to classify issues, and to politicize and mobilize their respective populations. In the academic record and in fieldwork, the nature, content and timing of diasporan engagements are explained by contingent opportunities, changes in the conflict cycle and the relative power of elites and institutions.

Diaspora identity is characterized by hybridity: “it is neither completely one nor the other, but a mix of characteristics from the homeland, the hostland, and lived experience” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 68). Fieldwork suggests situational and contingent expressions of identity and interest. Political identification and orientation is influenced by political and social structures that constrain and coerce but also affirm and reflect concerted efforts by individuals and communities. The reasons for and conditions of dispersal are highlighted as the constituting event that informs the identification and politicization of a community. But alone cannot explain diasporan identities, orientations and episodic mobilization. Conditions in the host country are significant: immigration polices, political and social rights, integration, and foreign policy substantially informs the salience of an ethnic identity, the composition of the group and its political objectives. The home country, while informing the reasons for and conditions of dispersal, significantly informs social organization and ways of
knowing that are (re)produced in the new country. These are processes of ongoing contestation and negotiation. The country of origin is thereafter the source of moral shocks or, and in accordance with fluctuations in the conflict cycle, presents opportunities to engage with local politics and effect outcomes in that country.

The conversations and research undertaken for this project point very clearly to political opportunities, reinforced through overt political maneuvering and substantially dependent on economic power. Concentrated in ‘safe’ liberal ridings, successive conservative were unreceptive as evidenced by domestic and foreign policy discourse and legislation which signaled closed windows of opportunity. With the 2004 defection of the LTTE’s Eastern commander, the LTTE had less influence in that province and the Tamil diaspora, with fewer family links to that province, did too. International (and western) inaction, the demise of the LTTE and competing institutions in the diaspora like the TGTE and the GTF that operate with an “increasing number of dissenting voices” (Brun and Van Hear 2012: 73), further transfers power to the local field. The final war in Sri Lanka, the trial of General Foneska, the re-election of incumbent president M. Rajapaksa all indicate closed windows of opportunity and balance of power tipped decisively toward the home state. Tamil protests in Toronto reflect these dynamics.

Integrated approaches oppose the “separation of the political economy from the realms of culture and identity that bifurcate movements into expressive, cultural, and identity-oriented movements on the one hand, and political, instrumental, and strategic movements on the other” (Bernstein 2005: 65). Like equating state with nation, the analytical ‘convenience’ is illusory (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 490). Diasporization is an “emergent process characterized by embeddedness” (Schiller et al. 1995: 48), and “the ways in which social representations become salient, dominant or normative can only be understood with reference to their context” (Jovchelovitch 2007 in Andreouli and Howarth 2012: 362). As “artifacts of history” social institutions “induce particular behaviors” (Immergut 1998: 6) and “ideas, meanings and reasons are important in the social world precisely because they are causal” (Sayer, A. 1992: 11). Together they “play a role ‘constituting’ the
meaningful context of social action” (Kurki 2006: 1994). Otherwise expressed as sociological institutional arrangements and legacies, the logics of appropriateness, or as habitus, “intergroup relations of conflict, tolerance and cooperation are also predetermined by the social norms of the context” (Minard 1952 in Andreouli and Howarth 2012: 362). Conceived as stakes or ties, “studying migrants’ social networks and organizations as well as their cultural and religious identities is still crucially important since these are among the most important factors influencing their political opportunities and activities” (Baubock 2006: 5). According to the collected scholarship, “mental constructs, economic and social institutions, and politics interact” to produce different behaviours in specific contexts (Immergut 1998: 19) and “social influences impact the choice of identity constructions strategy and whether or not diasporans mobilize and for what purpose” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 78).

To be categorized as a diaspora immediately politicizes a community and its politics. It assumes individuals and the collective have, and share, an ethnicised identity, or at least can deploy a situational one when motivated by changed conditions, or by ethnic elites. It necessarily applies an attachment and an orientation to homeland. It assumes grievance and trauma, and a degree of intractability that links the homogenous presentation of group interests and the stability of group boundaries to its origins (and identity) in dispersal. And yet, “each of these components is subject to social influence and is a product of individuals perceptions. Efficacy is a product of opportunity structures as well as issue framing and psychological empowerment” which vary by individual and over time (Brinkerhoff 2008: 78). Agency still matters; according to Brubaker, “a common thread in studies of everyday classification is the recognition that ordinary actors usually have considerable room for maneuver in the ways in which they use even highly institutionalized and powerfully sanctioned categories” (Brubaker et al. 2004: 35).

The notion of ‘being worthy of it’ is interesting in this light. It speaks to the coercive and concerted nature of social institutions like the family and, more generally, of practiced culture as much as it does to the political and
historical legacies of conflict and migration. But expressed as a strong statement of gratitude, it is misrepresentative to dismiss these conversations as social learning and political outcome. It does however suggest a mechanism of reproduction or stability, or relational and cognitive mechanisms, that ‘lock-in’ identity, interests and interrelationships. By all accounts, and especially if ‘objective’, empirical reasons for grievance persist, this type of mechanism will be hard to overcome in the near future. Like with rituals, socio-psychology, uncomfortable in IR, is nevertheless a factor that affects political outcomes. Trauma, like historical processes of nation-building and disporization, are generational factors embedded in top-down political processes and everyday actions.

Grievances are subjective: even if objective grievances are persistent and widespread, the subjective process of interpreting them is a variable that is crucial to explain episodic collective action (Buechler 2010: 133). The issue “is not merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusions of those interpretations” (Benford and Snow 2000: 466). The legacies and institutional arrangements (social, political, economic and cultural) implicated in the expression of Tamil nationalism or a diasporan identity are presumably resilient enough to absorb new developments and incorporate them into larger narratives of nation-building. But elites, implicated in the production and maintenance of norms that inform self-identification and who are integral to the overarching frame (Barnett and Finnemore 2004 in Weinar 2010: 76), are divided. The groupness (and grievances) attributed to a diaspora reflects the primary power struggle, that is, the one between different self-interested elites “who claim to belong to a diaspora community” (Paerregaard 2005: 92). In the diaspora and within the local political field, these are ongoing.

Relational dynamics between groups informed by years of conflict are unimproved, at least in the diaspora, and do not suggest the likely emergence of bridging networks capable of constructing and disseminating alternate and inclusive narratives, identities or orientations. Homogenous, hierarchical networks provide fewer
‘structural holes’, or opportunities for “information diffusion, where individual actors act as bridges between diffuse sources of information” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 76). Creating solidarity across identities depends on the ability to talk about them (Lichterman 1999). This ‘identity talk’ is culturally constructed through interactional routines and can exacerbate and mitigate tensions between identity claims” (Bernstein 2005: 63). Everyday social knowledge becomes “shared and objectified by community members and helps to typify social relations and roles… [it] becomes a tool for sustaining and legitimising social institutions (Berger and Luckmann 1966 in Andreouli and Howarth 2012: 365). Highlighting the voluntary and regularized segmentation of Sri Lankan society (Perera 2001), ‘ways of thinking’ and ‘modes of belonging’ are (re)produced in the diaspora (Glick Schiller 2003). And while multicultural policies may “tend to promote intercultural dialogue and a strategy of engagement” (Andreouli and Howarth 2012: 365), multiethnic Sri Lankan “diaspora political groups are extremely rare” (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 95).

Changed political opportunities, the potential of network associations and the increased legitimation of multiple identities in this setting suggest some cause for optimism and the potential for diaspora to ‘create new reality’ (Bopage 2010). Diasporas participate in “cross-ethnic mobilization for peace, as well as to challenge hard-line nationalist postitions” (Orjeula 2008: 450). Fieldwork suggests skepticism. All respondents express group entiativity and accept entrenched group boundaries. With all non-Tamil Hindu respondents disinclined to participate in homeland politics, and with all Tamil Hindu respondents outwardly committed to the goals and strategies of previous generations, it is hard to imagine in what space this new reality might be created. This project misses the input from Tamils who did not participate the 2009 protests; it is a significant omission.

Interviews with second-generation Tamil respondents suggest some optimism for new leaders. Like their male counterparts young, second-generation female respondents do not express hesitancy and were confident in discussion with me. Both articulate political rights forcefully and describe a commitment to liberal ideals. That said, this generation appears isolated from members of the other communities. Informed by exclusive ethnic
social organizations in Canada, interviewed second generation Tamils, of both genders, consider their answers representative of the group and display significant in-group bias. They share a commitment to the politics of their parents. It speaks to a significant degree of insulation from alternate views.

It may be easier to deflect alternate narratives coming from the GSL, Sinhalese or Moors, Canadians or the international community, as “the evidence suggests the Tamil community is well-suited to deflect different narratives for the conflict” (Godwin 2012: 176), than it is those from Tamils migrating from the Eastern Province. It may mean a fractured community less able to promote its interests. Like the manifest (but unexplored) gender dynamic, the regional and generational segmentations serve as reminders of the heterogeneity of groups and the political work required to maintain a politicized identity and group boundaries. How the community reconciles these developments points to the nature and probability of future mobilization.

Mobilization is “not a universal good” (Brinkerhoff 2008: 78). Empowerment in the Tamil diaspora may lead the group to overestimate its influence, risking disappointment, but also encouraging it to maintain its objectives in the face of changed realities on the ground (Ibid). This is the intransigence that persists despite changed realities and attitudes in other quarters (Anderson 1997). In most cases, Sri Lankan expatriates reside in countries closer to home: in India, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Gulf States (Mitra 2006). How perceptions of the conflict and the role of diaspora in it are expressed in these places is a critical question. More comparative work within the Tamil diaspora located in these states is needed to better understand the relationships between the diaspora and the country of residence and the effects of interrelationships within the diaspora itself on identification, politicization and mobilization outcomes.

Much is written about the changed nation-state in the 21st century. The “transnational processes of diaspora mobilization have led to an increasing disjunction between the geopolitical boundaries of the state and its symbolic boundaries of national belonging” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 505). As form of citizenship “that
divorces rights from territory” (Soysal 1994 in Berezin 2001: 95), the above suggests “nation-states move the epistemological – citizenship as category – towards the ontological – citizen as felt identity” (Berezin 2001:86). And it is an important issue to participants who express rights and responsibilities owed, and owing, in multiple places. And while it is hardly ‘post-national’ (Soysal 1994) in the sense that identities and interests are tied to national – often local – places; it is significant of the importance of feelings of national belonging to demands for recognition and representation. Despite the impacts of globalization and technological advances, territoriality, national identity and the state remain “the crucial signifiers in the articulation of political identities in international politics” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 492). The language of host and home, complicated concepts and contested language in this study, imply differentiating rights and responsibilities. Though unaddressed in this project, this is, ultimately, the critical issue.

Engagement, where it matters in IR, is political. The new administration of President Siriseena (2016) has improved bilateral relations with western states (Devonshire-Ellis 2016) and signaled interest in international assistance with reconciliation and reconstruction efforts (UN News Source September 2015). It has also lifted the unofficial ban on the Tamil language version of the national anthem, a ‘giant’ symbolic step on the road to reconciliation (Malawarachi 2016). These are important and constructive steps. Opposition to each of these measures (Ibid), and groups like Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS) whose members “hail from middle and upper class backgrounds in urban areas”, are represented in the current parliament, and who contribute to a “more militant, violent and ultimately more intolerant” political and social landscape (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015: 187), less so. The ‘underestimated nonmaterial dimension’ (Koinova 2012: 450) of the Tamil diaspora is proven, and it is unlikely any actor in Sri Lanka can comfortably ignore this demographic without addressing its concerns. The outcomes of these domestic and transnational political struggles will influence diasporan behaviour, and effect international politics.
Members of a diaspora exercise their political rights in the country of residence by advocating for their homelands (Ostergaard-Nielson 2001). The new Canadian government will likely be more receptive to the Tamil community, and the community able to exert greater leverage. Diaspora lobbying in support of the new Sri Lankan President’s initiatives, something they are likely to do, may be successful given this stage of the conflict requires small detachments of legal, forensic and administrative experts. Diplomatic and technical engagements could be relatively neutral and inexpensive endeavours, commensurate with the general foreign policy agenda. The outcomes of domestic policy considerations, dependent on the receptivity of the Sri Lankan state and in all probability contingent on actions undertaken by other states and international actors, these policy outcomes highlight the interactive, situational and interdependent nature of diasporan engagements and mobilization outcomes.

Concluding Remarks

Diaspora is descriptive and prescriptive; reflecting and constructing histories, knowledge, assumptions and trajectories. Outcomes and constitutive forces are contingent and contextual.

As an epistemology or typology of group formation and behaviour, the classic definition of diaspora is still salient. The classic definition is politicized and psychological because both are relevant. To reject the unfinished nation-building (including issues of representation and redistribution) and the ‘trauma’ criteria, that is to neutralize the concept and naturalize self-interested rationality, misses and minimizes key points.

To historicize, contextualize and humanize outcomes and effects, diaspora is also lived experiences of war, migration and integration; phenomenologically and individually, processes of diasporization and mobilization, differentiated by age, gender, class, and a number of other factors, describe human lives marked by huge events but also by their everyday experiences.
An elite drive concept in a framework that limits itself to elite decision making processes insists diasporization serves a political agenda by quantifying members without their consent, or active participation. We are reminded that no participant was familiar with the term diaspora and that the total numbers at the protest encompass only a portion of the total population. Framing the debate to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ resolutions, the avowed self-interest of participating elites at the NGO event, and the obvious influence of significant actors within the diaspora on group objectives and mobilization outcomes highlights a politics from above.

Citing authentic histories, natural group boundaries and with appeals to essentialist definitions of identity, the identified grievances are redistributive, based on territorial claims, socioeconomic opportunities and self-representative government. As political agents, they operate where permissive national conditions exist and address their claims to national governments and to the nation’s polity. They are neither post-national nor post-material.

The self-conscious, deliberate and strategic efforts of political entrepreneurs (amid the departing group and as subsequent political work) plus the role played by factor processes, characteristic of relational/institutional functioning, points to a power to distort preferences and coerce decisions. The emergence and maintenance of deterritorialized ideational based social organizations that brings resources under community control to advance shared interest, the effect of networks and the strategic construction of ‘authentic’ claims, ritualized performative practice and the deliberate use of language are all examples of an unfinished, and ongoing, nation-building projects that can be traced back to key figures, important decisions, and the contemporary socio-political exigencies.

The social networks established in migration shape long-term outcomes; the nature, content, and organization of pre-existing networks are critical relationships necessary for social mobilization. Family is often the bridge because of the concreteness, the embodied force, and immediacy of its exchanges. These are critical to the
formation of identifications and perceptions, and therefore influence behaviour. Exclusive social networks, those defined by ancestry or geography, as mechanisms of stability and as opportunity structures isolate members from alternate views and concentrate the power to define identity, interests and agendas in few hands. They facilitate the policing of group boundaries and member behaviour. Communication technologies provide instant but often exclusive connections to maintain cultural, affective and political ties. Like exclusive social networks, these may insulate members from divergent opinions and concentrate power.

A highly contested transitional political field can exist within a diaspora social structure and public space as the debates between the TGF, TGTE and other strategies indicate. There is tension between public and private expressions of goals, strategies and tactics.

The social construction of re(constituted) national symbols, practices and identifications by social elite is neither their effort alone, nor is it simply maintaining pre-existing cultural and affective ties. Elites and diasporas, as individual members and collective actors, produce and sustain these social constructions independent of specific state actors, and point to a participating bloc also implicated in the definition and representation of interests. Interpretative, interactive and concerted dynamics underscore this point. Diaspora as either a social condition or as consciousness is a heterogeneous unit of analysis, marked by the fluidity, contestation and negotiation of identity, groupness and interest.

People experience migration and integration differently. Segmentations within the group, with implications on the content and nature of identity, the boundaries of group, the political competency and the political efficacy of those affected, is a critical dimension of analysis. It is necessary to historicize and contextualize perceptions, motivations and behaviours in the diasporan context. It is necessary to question what coheres, and why, across diverse populations to explore the practices and processes that motivate mobilization in a larger population.
History, politics, economics, sociology and psychology all cited in the academic literature, empirical record and project fieldwork. Diaspora is a complex concept, and exploring what a group is and what it does requires multiple levels of analysis.
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Appendix: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The interview questions are listed in the coding chart below.

Interview Coding Chart and Directions

The interview process and research questions are designed to elicit two kinds of information: a narrative and behavioural analysis. Accordingly, the researcher is expected to note the chronology of events and the importance ascribed to specific factors by the respondent, inductively mining the narratives generated from the interviews for themes that have been a priori determined. Those themes are recurrent in various literatures relevant to this study and believed to be causally significant in explaining motivation and mobilization. Those themes are: Resources, Political opportunities, Pre-existing social organizations, Individual identity, Collective identity, Morals and emotions, Family socialization, and Norms and habits.

The aim of the interview is to be conversational, and will not be recorded. The researcher is anticipated to make brief written notes during the interview and to report back her understanding to ensure accuracy of the response. Respondent may elect to review the notes of the interview. Those notes will be provided via secured email file. The respondent will be able to add to or clarify their responses.

Behavioural analysis requires that the interviewer been attuned to non-verbal responses. These include but are not limited to tone, volume and pitch of speech, body language, gestures, facial expressions and eye contact, as well as findings that indicate a changed attitude toward the questions, the project or the interviewer from previous responses.

Immediately after the interview, a second coding chart for the interview is to be completed. This second chart, distinct from those notes taken in the interview, builds of the first chart and adds further comments and details from the recollection of the interviewer. Themes, and their relative import, should be determined at this stage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL POLITICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. What does diaspora mean to you?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a. Do you consider yourself part of the diaspora?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. Do you feel the diaspora has a positive or negative impact on the daily lives of Sri Lankans?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c. Is it a necessary political force?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What is politics to you?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. Do you feel you have an impact on the shape of Sri Lankan politics?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This document asks respondents to rate the themes being explored in this project. The survey presents the 8 themes being investigated and asks respondents to rank them in order of importance. Additionally a second survey asks respondent to compare the present period with their motivation and mobilization during the final stages of the war (January to May 2009).

### FAMILY POLITICS

1. Is your family involved in Sri Lankan politics?
   1a. Which members of your family participate in Sri Lankan politics?
   1b. How are they engaged? (political, cultural, religious, familial, philanthropic)

2. Do they encourage you to be politically active in Sri Lankan politics?

3. How are political differences (goals, strategies, tactics, ideas), if any, resolved?

### PERSONAL INTEGRATION

1. Are you happy or comfortable in Canada?
   1a. Do you feel accepted in Canada? By other Canadians? By the government?
   1b. Do you feel other Canadians understand what it means to be Canadian-Sri Lankan?

### FAMILY INTEGRATION

1. Do you feel your family is happy or comfortable in Canada?
   1a. Do they feel accepted in Canada? By other Canadians? By the government?
   1b. Do they feel other Canadians understand what it means to be Canadian-Sri Lankan?

### CENSUS STYLE BACKGROUND QUESTIONS

1. Level of education for you? For other members of your family?

2. What would you estimate your family income bracket to be?

3. Languages spoken by you? By other members of your family?

4. How much family do you have in Canada? Who remains in Sri Lanka?

5. When did your family come to Canada? What is their current immigration status in this country?
Survey Questions and Instructions
The following eight (8) themes impact motivation and mobilization in politics. They are presented here in a random order. Please rank them in a scale of 1 to 8 where 1 is the most important and 8 the least important factor that explains your motivation and mobilization in Sri Lankan politics. Your answers should reflect your motivation today and the current political climate.

### Research Survey

Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I mobilise when I believe that my group has the necessary resources to meet some of our goals.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. My family shapes my political mobilization.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mobilization expresses who I am.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I mobilise when the conditions are right: when political opportunities and timing make it possible for my group to meet some of its goals.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mobilization expresses who I am and my commitment to the group that I am a part of.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I mobilise because I feel strongly about it and because it is the right thing to do.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I am politically active because my friends, family and community members are active.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. My political motivations and mobilizations reflect the traditions of my community.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. To the best of your recollection, has this ranking changed between now and the period between January and May 2009? If so, how? Rank those changes. [The same survey is administered].

The survey results (the rankings) will be compared to the themes stressed in the respondent’s narratives and to behaviours presented during the interview. Behaviour during the interview will be used as additional data in support of, or in contradiction to, the stories presented in the interviews and to rankings completed at the end of
the interview. The consistency between the three sets of data, and then between and among ethnic groups will serve to underscore the causal significance of a particular variable (in this case, the eight pre-determined themes).