News Media Framing of Bill C-51: A Content Analysis

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Abstract
The government introduced a controversial new Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-51) on January 30, 2015, in response to the changing nature of threats to Canadians. This study sets out to examine how the mainstream media framed the debate over Bill C-51 from the introduction of the bill to the government’s introduction of amendments on March 31, 2015. Using agenda setting and framing theories, this study looks at the relationship between the media agenda and the policy agenda. The bill received significant coverage over this period, dominating the media agenda. Using content analysis, this study conducts an in-depth analysis of The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the issue to examine which stakeholders and opinion leaders were most frequently cited, the major arguments for the legislation and the perceived shortcomings and risks associated with the legislation, and the number and nature of the suggested solutions (to make the legislation more acceptable) that found their way into the government’s proposed amendments. Key findings indicate that, although the government introduced amendments that addressed some of the concerns expressed, these amendments did not include the most frequently mentioned concern: the lack of Parliamentary oversight. Evidence of strong message control by the government was displayed in their use of the “threats against Canada” theme, showing up in coverage 18% of the time. Other prominent frames used in the coverage included political posturing for the upcoming election campaign (16%) and critiques of the bill (14%).

Keywords: media analysis, agenda setting, framing, political communication, anti-terrorism, content analysis
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Introduction

The Canadian government introduced new anti-terrorism legislation (Bill C-51) on January 30, 2015, in response to the October 2014 attacks in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa and to the increased threats to the Canadian public from radicalized individuals. The bill aimed to enhance the powers of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and to provide additional flexibility to Canadian law enforcement and national security agencies. According to the government, the aim of the bill was to address the changing threats to Canadians at home (“PM Announces Anti-Terrorism Measures to Protect Canadians,” 2015). Debate over this bill dominated the media agenda for many weeks following its tabling by the government. This study looks at the relationship between the media agenda and the policy agenda from when the bill was introduced on January 30, 2015, to the introduction of amendments to the bill by the government on March 31, 2015. It seeks to examine media coverage in depth by looking at what stakeholders and opinion leaders are mentioned, what argument supporting the bill are mentioned, and what shortcomings of the bill are mentioned in the sampled coverage. It is hypothesized that the significance of the amendments may indicate the influence of the extensive media coverage of the bill and the response of the public. Especially in an election year media coverage of any government activity will surely be monitored carefully.

Two attacks on Canadian soil in October led to the speedy introduction of Bill C-51. On October 20, 2015, two members of the Canadian Forces were targeted and run down in a parking lot, killing Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent. The perpetrator of the crime was Martin Couture-Rouleau. Two days later on October 22 2015, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Corporal Nathan Cirillo, who was standing guard at the National War Museum. From there, Zehaf-Bibeau moved to Parliament Hill where, after firing shots inside, he was killed by security. The next day,
Prime Minister Stephen Harper said that the strengthening of “‘surveillance, detention and arrest’ powers would be ‘expedited’” (Wingrove, 2014). In direct response to the two lone wolf attacks in October, the government began drafting a new bill to give greater powers to Canada’s spy agency and police to better protect Canadians from radicalized individuals. In November, legislation already in the works before October (Bill C-44) was introduced to expand the powers of CSIS. Public Safety Minister Steven Blaney proceeded to announce that the forthcoming anti-terrorism bill will “give new powers to police and spy agencies” (Wingrove, 2014). Even at this time, critics were questioning a perceived lack of oversight and suggesting the new powers went too far.

Public reaction to the proposed legislation came swiftly, with the Privacy Commissioner, Daniel Therrien, expressing strong concerns about an excessive loss of privacy and its failure to balance privacy with safety considerations. Meanwhile, skeptics and opponents continued to express their concerns on social media, using hashtags like #RejectFear and #StopC51. A few months later, public concern was demonstrated during an organized “Day of Action,” with countrywide protests taking place on March 14, 2015. The government introduced amendments to the bill on March 31, 2015, and despite continuing opposition, Bill C-51 was passed in the House of Commons on May 6, 2015 (183 for, 96 against), with the support of the Liberal Party. The Official Opposition, the New Democratic Party opposed the bill.

**Purpose and Rationale for the Study**

The purpose of this study is to investigate how a major Canadian newspaper, *The Globe and Mail*, framed Bill C-51, and to learn more about the extent to which perceptions of the legislation’s shortcomings in the coverage came to be reflected in proposed amendments to the bill. The controversial nature of the bill adds to its interest as a case study insofar as there is high
public interest in the subject, and many different stakeholders and opinion leaders have expressed contrasting viewpoints about the bill. It is important to critically examine media coverage to discover which aspects of stories tend to be highlighted in the media and to consider the potential impact of this focus on government decisions related to the issues. In the case of Bill C-51, the issue of balancing privacy and security is important to the public, and studying how *The Globe and Mail* framed the debate can potentially offer some insight into whether a relationship may be identified between the salience of issue attributes identified in its coverage of the bill and the response of government actors.

Using agenda setting theory, this study will seek to identify the frames used by *The Globe and Mail* in discussing the anti-terrorism legislation. The term *agenda setting* refers to the selection of certain issues or attributes by the media organizations that, over time, achieve a position of similar prominence with the public. An extension of agenda setting theory, framing theory looks at how the media organizations pay attention to certain aspects of a story while ignoring other aspects. In cases where many voices express concern, framing theory can help us to understand the potential impact of these voices on government decisions. In this study, framing theory leads us to examine how *The Globe and Mail* told the story of Bill C-51. As Mahon, Lawlor, and Soroka (2014) state, “Analyzing the media can help scholars better understand the state of public opinion on policy and enhance our understanding of the policy process” (p. 160). Especially with the case of Bill C-51 where the government responded to the criticism and amended the bill, it is especially relevant to analyze the media coverage because you can learn about the types of issues government to which government tends to pay attention.

There is no clear way of gauging how the public received information about Bill C-51. With so many avenues available for gathering information (e.g., social media platforms like
Twitter, personal blogs, and advocacy websites), we cannot know for sure which channels have been accessed most frequently or which, if any, have the strongest influence on readers. In addition, some members of the public still go to traditional media for their information, whereas others combine the use of mainstream and social media, using each for different purposes. Nonetheless, traditional media still draws readership based on its perceived reliability and trustworthiness (Fletcher, 2014). Even young Canadians often view alternative news services as complementary sources of information to mainstream media, not as a replacement (Fletcher, 2014). Therefore, this study limits its focus to coverage by The Globe and Mail. Given that it is a national newspaper with large circulation, it offers sufficient data to enable us to examine the kinds of frames and attributes used to provide coverage of Bill C-51.

The research question guiding this study is: How did The Globe and Mail frame the debate over Bill C-51 between its introduction on January 30, 2015, and introduction of amendments to the bill on March 31, 2015?

Because this study examines the relationship between a media agenda and a policy agenda (rather than the public agenda), it is important to keep in mind the many influences on the media agenda, especially from the government. An accurate interpretation of story frames requires also looking at the state of the relationship between the media and the government at a particular point in time. Prime ministers in Canada have the power to strongly influence and, at times, even define the relationship between the press gallery and the government, to dictate media availability, and to determine the messages communicated from the cabinet. Most political observers agree that Stephen Harper’s Conservative government both values communication and exercises tight message control (see, for example, Blanchfield and Bonskill, 2010; Simpson, 2015; Whittington, 2015).
Although cause-effect relationships are impossible to establish in a study such as this one, it is possible to hypothesize on the basis of larger studies (see, for example, Andrews & Caren, 2010; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Kepplinger, 2007) about the relationship between perceptions about media influence and the job duties of communication officers\(^1\) in federal government communication departments. For example, earlier comprehensive studies in framing have demonstrated the exaggerated influence of print and television media coverage on decision makers in political positions (see, for example, Andrews & Caren, 2010; Gilboa, 2005; Herbst, 1998). Studies of the third party effect have demonstrated that high-level politicians, in particular, tend to overestimate both the impact of the media on their audiences, and how media coverage influences decision makers in setting their political agenda (see Cook et al., 1983; Walgrave, 2008; Walgrave, Soroka, & Nuytemans, 2008).

Davison (1983) hypothesizes “that an individual exposed to a persuasive communication via the mass media will see this communication as having a greater effect on other people than on himself or herself” (p. 4). In other words, people believe that the media influences others more than themselves. This belief can lead politicians and bureaucrats to invest heavily in media monitoring, to follow the news closely, and to try hard to manipulate and influence the media agenda through their communication efforts. Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) propose a preliminary theory of the mass media’s political agenda setting power, noting that it is contingent on a number of conditions: the kind of issues covered, the specific media outlet, and the nature of the coverage. The political context, at the heart of the model, leads to five different types of outputs ranging from no political adoption to fast substantial adoption. Their theory shows how

\(^1\) Canadian government departments hire communication officers to write and circulate daily updates on current news coverage of their issues. These updates are supposed to be on the desks of key government executives by early morning. It is a standard function of government communicators who are charged with media analysis duties.
many different factors need to be taken into consideration when looking at the media’s agenda setting power. However, as noted earlier, the belief that the media have a greater effect on others than on ourselves helps us to understand why governments place so much emphasis on tracking issues in the media and why they seek to control how the media frames the issues.

While some prime ministers and ministers pay more attention and respond more reactively than others to media coverage, it is unlikely that few (if any) ignore strong media responses to their initiatives. And, with such controversial legislation as the anti-terrorism bill, it would be surprising to learn that political figures and bureaucrats had not followed the issue closely in the media. A quick scan of the responses on March 27, 2015, when amendments to Bill C-51 were announced, suggests that promoters of the legislation took the views in the media into account to at least some extent. Hence, this study sets out to explore how The Globe and Mail framed its discussion of the bill and to identify whether the views expressed in its coverage made their way into the government’s decision to revise the legislation.

**Literature Review**

Since the public receive the majority of their information about what the government is doing through the mass media, looking at how journalists make their selections and frame the news can help us understand the relationship between the media agenda and policy agenda. Examining the state of Canadian media, Catherine Murray (2007) claims that, despite the reach of the media and its important role in framing policies, little is known about how the media report, interrogate, investigate, or interpret these public policies in Canada—choices that can involve a variety of sources. The discussion in this section reviews theories of agenda setting and framing, and examines the different factors that can affect the choices made by journalists in reporting on
policy in Canada, including factors such as the state of the relationship between the government and media.

**Role of Media in Shaping Public Policies**

As part of their role in a liberal democracy, journalists are expected to “devote time and space to the public policy agenda in order to reveal to political leaders and citizens the strengths and weaknesses of various policy proposals” (Graber, McQuail, & Norris, 1998, p. 3). Journalistic norms and conventions help determine which stories are newsworthy, including what information to highlight or leave out. By doing so, the media are powerful in shaping what the public think about, and how the public think about a certain issue. Murray (2007) notes that when it comes to reporting on policy the “key methodological approach” relies on typical reporting practices such as identifying “the sources of the problem, the issues, the interests, and policy alternatives available” (p. 538).

The media fulfill a gatekeeping role in society, sorting through vast amounts of information and deciding what to report. Shoemaker and Vos (2009) define gatekeeping as “the process of culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of messages that reach people each day” and identify it as “the centre of the media’s role in public life” (p. 1). With so much information out there, the public relies on the media to play a filtering role. Addressing this aspect of the journalistic function, Bennett (2004) introduces a “multigated model of four factors that interact to shape news content” (p. 284), which incorporates and shows the complexity of the gatekeeping process in a changing political communication system. The four areas he identifies as coming into play as journalists and news organizations create the news narratives are as follows: “(1) the individual reporter’s news sense, (2) the routines and standards of the organization for which the reporter works, (3) the economic pressures that enter the
newsroom, and (4) the technologies that facilitate gathering and transmitting information” (p. 293). The first variable is the notion of journalists as the real gatekeeper of the news, who act independently and use their personal judgment for finding and reporting stories. The second variable is the bureaucratic routine of the newsroom, which guides journalists’ activities. The third focuses on the economic constraints of a newsroom; news is a business that relies on audiences and advertisers. The fourth variable casts the journalist as the transmitter of information, and technology facilitates the production and distribution of information.

Louw (2010) describes the relationship between media and politicians as “a game of impression management” (p. 11). Both sides are trying to grab the attention of the public (or potential voters) and deliver a message. However, the tactics that government use to communicate with citizens make reporting increasingly difficult for journalists, as the government and interest groups manipulate the mass media with ready-made frameworks, with the intention of framing the public’s thinking in a certain way. Lee (1999) says that, in response to government efforts to manipulate the agenda, media personnel have become cynical about government, and this cynicism leads them to concentrate on the negative rather than the positive in covering government activities. He notes how the media use archetypal stories such as the money-wasting bureaucrat, those who fall victim to bureaucratic processes, and the uncaring characteristics of government. In other words, the cynical views of government held by media outlets and journalists lead to frequent use of negative frames when reporting on government activities (see, for example, Capella & Jamieson, 1996; Liu, Horsley & Young, 2012; Trussler & Soroka, 2014).

This study does not examine the motivations and behaviours of journalists as they report on political news. It does, however, seek to identify the frames used by journalists working for
The Globe and Mail in their reporting on Bill C-51. For this reason, it is important to understand constraints on the ability of journalists to gather and interpret information and to accurately report the news.

**Agenda Setting**

Agenda setting is about the “ability to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda” (McCombs, 2004, p. 1). Agenda setting studies attempt to explain why some issues are more apparent to the public and others are not, including “why certain issues are addressed through policy actions while other issues are not” (Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p. 2).

Agenda setting theory proposes that the public will, over time, come to see the issues emphasized in the media as important. McCombs and Shaw (1972) coined the term *agenda setting* in their examination of the 1968 presidential campaign in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. In looking at how the mass media influence the salience of issues among the public, they found the same ranking between the five top issues on the media agenda and the five top issues on the public agenda. McCombs’ and Shaw’s original empirical study launched the study of agenda setting, with hundreds of studies since that time relying on agenda setting frameworks (McCombs, 2004).

There are three main bodies of agenda setting research. First, *media* agenda setting focuses on the importance of an issue on the mass media agenda. Second, *public* agenda setting seeks to identify the hierarchy of issues important to the public (generally found to be set by the media). And third, *policy*, or political agenda setting, looks at the issues to which political actors pay attention and which ultimately lead to policy decisions (generally influenced by the media and public agenda) (Dearing & Rogers, 1996).
There are two interpretations of the mass media’s role in the policy process: either the media drive public opinion about the policy, or the media simply reflect the policy (Mahon, et al., 2014). Cobb and Elder (1972) were the first to look at the impact of media and public opinion on the policy agenda, an impact that they referenced as agenda building. They looked at why some issues make the policy agenda while others do not. Their perspective recognizes a broad range of influences on the public policy-making process whereby the media, the public, and policymakers all pay attention to some issues and not to others. Looking at the U.S. context, Han Soo Lee (2014) looked at the multidirectional relationship between the President, the media and the public to assess who affects whom. He found the media had a stronger effect on the President and the public than vice versa. Other studies have shown that the direction of influence between the media and policy agendas is variable, not unidirectional (Soroka, 2002b; Weaver, McCombs & Shaw, 2004).

McCombs (2004) identified different levels of agenda setting. The selection of certain issues over others to report in the media is the first level of agenda setting. This primary level is about the salience of issues or “the degree to which an issue on the agenda is perceived as relatively important” (Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p. 22). A second level of agenda setting, on the other hand, is about the salience of object attributes—the qualities attached to issues that are salient to the public. Through their selection of details, journalists highlight certain attributes over others. The frequency with which journalists mention the attributes translates into salience (Weaver, et al., 2004). As Ghanem (1997) writes about second level agenda setting: “The way an issue or other object is covered in the media (the attributes emphasized in the news) affects the way the public thinks about that object [and] . . . affects the salience of that object on the public
agenda” (p. 4). Thus, this second level of agenda setting is more about the media telling us *how to think* rather than just *what to think* (McCombs, 2004).

Downs’s 1972 study on the issue-attention cycle found that public attention does not stay on one issue for too long. Agenda setting is a zero sum game; so as one issue rises in prominence, another falls. The public only has the capacity to retain a certain number of frames (or attributes) for any given story. McCombs and Ghanem (2001) suggest that this constraint “almost certainly will be found at the second level of agenda setting as well” (p. 70).

Other studies have sought to identify what makes some issues stand out in the media and public agenda over others. McKuen and Coombs (1981) found, for example, that dramatic events play a significant role in the agenda-setting process. We can see this process at work in the October 2014 attacks on Canadian soil mentioned earlier. Although legislation was already in the works to expand the powers of Canada’s spy agency (Bill C-44), these attacks triggered the drafting of Bill C-51 (Wingrove, 2014). In a similar way, Wanta and Hu (1993), who examined the effects of international news coverage on agenda setting, confirm McKuen and Coombs (1981) argument that “stories with high levels of conflict will produce the strongest agenda-setting effects” (p. 260). As well, Wanta and Hu found that some story frames had stronger agenda-setting effects on the public than others. It is to the issue of framing that our attention now turns.

**Framing**

An extension of agenda setting theory, “framing essentially involves *selection and salience*” (Entman, 1993, p. 52, *emphasis in original*). Entman (1993) provides a definition:

> To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the term described.* (p. 52, *emphasis in original*)
Frames help organize a story and ultimately define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies (Entman, 1993). The emphasis on selection and salience points to the idea that certain features receive attention whereas others are ignored (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Media organizations present stories in frames that “often reflect broader cultural themes and narratives” (Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997, p. 482), and having an understanding and knowledge of concepts helps the reader to interpret the meanings (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Thus, how an issue is presented influences how the public and decision makers process the information. This said, it is important to note that the framing of a message does not result in predictable effects on the audience because framing is not the sole source of influence on any audience (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997).

Gamson and Modigliani (1987) define framing as the “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (p. 143). Frames are considered so essential to communication that it is no longer a question of whether the news is framed, but how it is framed. In fact, whether it is intentional or not, “the media can shape public understanding of policy simply by defining an issue in particular terms or by choosing specific language to illustrate public policy” (Mahon et al., 2014, p. 161). Framing matters because frames “affect the attitudes and behaviors of their audience” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 109). Because media play an important role in informing the public of the government’s message, it is important to examine the story they are telling.

McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver (1997) argue that framing is an extension of second-level agenda setting because how a message is framed influences how the audience thinks about something. In their examination of the convergence of agenda setting and framing theories, McCombs and Ghanem (2001) reword Entman’s definition of framing into the terms of attribute
agenda setting. They define framing as “the construction of an agenda with a restricted number of thematically related attributes in order to create a coherent picture of a particular object” (p. 70). The key point is that “both the selection of objects for attention and the selection of attributes for thinking about these objects are powerful agenda-setting roles” (McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, & Rey, 1997, p. 704). The extent to which a specific attribute or frame reoccurs in media coverage can impact the audience’s understanding of the bill and what they remember. By highlighting certain aspects of an issue (e.g., the sources used), media increases the salience of those attributes. However, the presence of certain frames in a story does not necessarily mean they influence the audience (Entman, 1993). Also, what is omitted from a frame is often just as important as what is included (Ferguson, 2000), and framing studies “have shown that excluding information from a message frame can have considerable effect on how people interpret the message” (Maher, 2001, p. 87).

Not all scholars agree that second-level agenda setting and framing are equivalent. Scheufele (2000) maintains that agenda setting is about the media increasing the salience of issues and facilitating the ease with which these issues can be drawn from memory, while framing is more about the interpretation of the wording used by journalists and the unintended consequences of this interpretation. Agenda setting studies look, for example, at the frequency with which an issue or attribute appears in media coverage, whereas framing studies rely on knowledge of pre-existing schemas in the culture (Kim, Schefuele, & Shanahan, 2002). Despite some level of disagreement on specific points, most scholars accept the existence of similarities between framing and second-level agenda setting theories. As Weaver, et al. (2004) state, “Both are concerned with how issues or other objects . . . are depicted in the media than with which
issues or objects are most (or least) frequently covered” (p. 264). This study sees second-level agenda setting and framing as similar processes.

Studies have identified the news frames that surface most frequently in political news coverage. The main one is the strategic or game frame (also known as horserace journalism). Others include conflict, personality, human interest, and culturally defined story lines (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). The game frame is often used when reporting on political news because it incorporates newsworthy criteria: a two-sided conflict of the elite with winners and losers, personalities, drama and immediacy (Lawrence, 2000; Trimble & Sampert, 2004). Examples of studies examining media framing in Canada include Gingras, Sampert, and Gagnon-Pelletier’s (2010) comparison of French- and English-language newspaper coverage of the Gomery Commission, looking at whether strategic, moral, or issue frames were used, and Cross, Malloy, Small, and Stephenson’s (2015) examination of the Toronto Star’s coverage of the 2011 Ontario Provincial election. The study by the Gomery Commission found that the game frame appeared more often in English-language media, whereas the moral frame appeared more often in French-language media. For the 2011 Ontario Provincial election, the study found the dominance of the horse race frame led to the media choosing which issues to cover (and not being influenced by the parties), influenced the visibility of the parties and leaders (which was relative to their standing in the polls), and led to the exclusion of other political actors in the coverage.

When journalists use the game frame, they tend to focus on the competition rather than the substance of a policy issue (Lawrence, 2000). This can undermine having informed citizens and the ability to hold politicians to account. According to Lawrence, “not all conflict lends itself equally well to the game schema, nor do reporters apply the game schema equally to all types of political conflict” (p. 96). Policy-making becomes newsworthy “when it is marked by clear
conflict that promises a resolution” (Lawrence, 2000, p. 96). Bill C-51 presents a conflict of balancing privacy and security. Depending on one’s point of view the resolution promised is either amending, defeating, or passing the bill in Parliament. With an election on the horizon, the stances of the political parties regarding the bill are important to journalists, who must identify potential winners and losers in the policy debate.

Throughout the media attention cycle of a policy, journalists can play a crucial role in fomenting support or criticism of a particular proposal depending on whether one frame dominates or alternative ideas are provided: “The media can be quite influential at the problem formation stage” (Paletz, 1998, p. 222) when they routinely report on the issue and bring it to the attention of the public. Policymakers, in turn, question “how a government decision will play in the media—or at least the media they care about—and with their political base” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 28).

**How Governments Recapture Control of Policy Agendas**

In the adversarial dance to shape and control the media agenda, one must keep in mind the strategies used by both government actors and journalists. Given the tenuous relationship between the current government of Canada and members of the Canadian Press Gallery, the Conservative Party of Canada has actively sought to bypass the filter of the mass media and to exercise control over the messaging surrounding policy agendas.

In 1998, Jarol Manheim wrote about a third force in news making: “More and more, news is purposefully formulated and shaped with skill and effectiveness in ways that take advantage of the needs and interests of reporters and news organizations, but that serve the interests of other parties altogether” (p. 96). The knowledge of journalistic norms and conventions means government and interest groups can take advantage of media’s requirements
for sources and access to information as they try to shape the news in their favour. Fletcher (2014) points out that governments, which have “found ways to limit access to information . . . and to select the timing and ‘spin’ of public announcements have a degree of authority that news organizations cannot ignore” (p. 30).

The focus on spin constrains the media’s access to information (Murray, 2007). Kozolanka (2006) warns that, “the hyperapplication of strategic communications has shifted focus from substance to image, from information to promotion, and from policy to communications” (p. 344). The tight control over information makes it difficult for journalists to fulfill their role as watchdogs as their news sources try to shape the messages reported by journalists. The increasing importance of communications to the Harper government has led to a reliance on strategic communication tactics to attempt to control the media message, also known as news management (Kozolanka, 2006; Pfetsch, 1998).

In describing the shift towards news management as governments try to control the news agenda using strategic communication tactics, Barbara Pfetsch (1998) distinguishes between media-centred news management and political-centred news management. Media-centred news management, which focuses on creating positive news coverage, involves shaping a government message to conform to media standards. Here, the objective is for the message to be incorporated into news coverage as is. In other words, the substance is secondary to positive news coverage. For political news management, on the other hand, “the strategic political objectives are in the centre of the strategy, and the media are the means but not the ends of the action” (p. 73).

Although not it is not practiced as pervasively in Canada as in the United States, media-centred news management is nonetheless present. This trend can be seen in the strategic communication tactics the government uses when seeking positive public opinion in pre-election
periods. News management tactics are even more important with the need to control the message on a long-term basis, which has given rise to the notion of the “permanent campaign.” As noted by Ditchburn (2014), news management practices make it more challenging for journalists to perform their jobs, influencing both the content of stories and the sources to which journalists turn for information.

When the Conservative government first came to power in 2006, it introduced tighter control over ministers’ staying on message when speaking to the media. It also limited media access to the Prime Minister and cabinet, and delayed access to information requests. With less access to the ministers, reporters were often forced to rely on canned written responses to questions they asked; others rarely received answers to their questions.

The resulting turbulent relationship has frustrated the Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery, who are limited by who can ask questions and what questions they can ask. These efforts at controlling the media agenda have affected the ability of journalists to report effectively on government action (Ditchburn, 2014; Paré & Delacourt, 2014). In an effort to reach specific audiences with their messages, the Harper government also likes to provide interviews to representatives of local media outlets rather than those working for national media outlets (Paré & Delacourt, 2014). Faced with these control tactics, journalists must contend with seeking to provide sufficiently objective and balanced information on policies in order to fulfill their information function and properly educate the public on policy matters.

In a recent news article, Jeffrey Simpson (2015) outlines the various ways the Conservative government exercises tight control over its messages. The ruling Conservative party learns about its voting base, crafts simple, short messages, constantly reinforces these messages, and targets key audiences. As Simpson notes, “they back up policy choices with
messaging that is consistent, targeted and costly” (para. 2). The introduction of the “message event plan” by the Harper government—the requirement that every government event must be accompanied with key messaging—means that every announcement from the government is strategic. For example, rather than introducing Bill C-51 in the House of Commons, where legislation is usually first announced, the bill was announced at a campaign style event in Richmond Hill, Ontario, a city outside of Toronto. This approach can be interpreted as a political event. With an election scheduled for late 2015, it seems plausible that every announcement is likely to have a strategic intention behind it with the government trying to control the message. Indeed, some have argued that the government now operates under a permanent campaign, where the desire to be re-elected informs the strategic intent behind every message communicated, emphasizing issues that are good and downplaying those issues that may be damaging (Elmer, Langlois & McKelvey, 2014; Esselment, 2014; Gidengil, 2014; Kozolanka, 2006). Adding to the government’s control of the message, the proliferation of digital platforms means the government is able to communicate directly with citizens and avoid the filter of the mass media.

The discussion in this section has highlighted how the changing nature of political communication in Canada poses new challenges for journalists charged with reporting on government actions and policies. The key challenges include government news management practices such as the use of spin tactics and tight message control, platform proliferation and the ability of government to bypass the filter of the mass media and communicate directly with citizens, and government’s use of “permanent campaigns” aimed at helping the government to maintain or achieve power. Next, the theoretical framework of this study will be outlined.
Theoretical Framework

Walgrave et al. (2008) found that “the scholarly literature on the mass media’s role in determining the political agenda is overwhelmingly dominated by U.S.-based studies” (p. 816). In Canada, agenda setting studies tend to focus on the policy agenda (Howlett, 1997; Howlett & Migone, 2013; Soroka, 2002a, 2002b) and on elections (Gidengil, 2014; Mendelsohn, 1998; Petry & Mendelsohn, 2004). Election campaigns are key times to analyze the agenda setting process because political parties are fighting hard to set the agenda, and members of the public are experiencing the highest need for orientation as they seek information to help them decide how to vote (Gidengil, 2014).

In their chapter discussing the convergence of agenda setting and framing, McCombs and Ghanem (2001) note that there is considerable agenda-setting research “on the impact of mass media content on the public agenda . . . [but] considerably less attention to the variety of influences shaping the media agenda” (p. 68). As for framing research, McCombs and Ghanem (2001) note “there has been considerable attention to the frames found in the media and sometimes the origins of those frames, with much less attention to the impact of those frames on the public” (p. 68).

Although this study does not explicitly examine the public agenda, the presence of protests across the country, anti-Bill C-51 websites, and the drop in public opinion on this issue (from 82% in favour to 38% in favour of the bill over the time of the study) are a few indicators of the state of public opinion on the issue. Rather than focusing on the public agenda, this study focuses on the relationship between the media agenda and policy agendas. The relationship between the media and its function in policy setting has yet to be extensively examined by communication scholars, although there has been growth in studying the policy agenda in the

In agenda setting research, the media agenda is usually represented by newspapers or television news. This is changing however with social media platforms increasingly being included in contemporary agenda setting research. However, when it comes to confidence in mainstream media, a 2011 report from the Canadian Media Research Council found that nearly nine out of ten Canadians still judge mainstream media to be reliable and trustworthy: “Online news websites and television are the most important sources of information for Canadians” (Fletcher, Logan, Hermida, & Korell, 2011, p. 2). While younger Canadians have greater trust in non-traditional news providers, they still have trust in traditional media as well; and they may be using the new media to access the content of old media. Fletcher (2014) sums up the impact of social media on agenda setting by the traditional media:

Although the emergence of the Internet and social media has changed the public sphere in important ways, the traditional media, especially television news and major daily newspapers, are still the most visible arenas in which the struggle to set the public agenda takes place. (p. 28)

Taking into consideration the changing nature of political communication and the various influences on the capacity of journalists to report on government policy, the research questions guiding this study is: How did The Globe and Mail frame the debate over Bill C-51 between its introduction on January 30, 2015, and introduction of amendments to the bill on March 31, 2015?

Methodology

Research Design

The method used for this study is content analysis. Briefly, content analysis is the “systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf, 2002, p.1). As a
systematic technique, a content analysis needs to count all relevant aspects of the sample. It is an objective process that uses clearly defined criteria to analyze and categorize the units that are tangible and observable (Berger, 2014). This method provides the benefit of breaking down texts to measure the specific attributes and frames that are present revealing how often they appear in the selected period of time. According to Entman (1993), for content analysis, “the major task of determining textual meaning should be to identify and describe frames” (p. 57). Examining how often particular narrative attributes are mentioned can help lead to conclusions about the salience of the attributes. The more often an attribute is mentioned, the more likely the reader will remember this aspect of a story. Agenda setting takes place when there is extensive coverage of an issue. Since this study looks at the issue of balancing security and privacy rights of citizens from a second-level agenda setting perspective to examine the salience of issue attributes, quantifying the types of frames used in a sample of texts with the aim of identifying which attributes appear most frequently is a logical and feasible means of proceeding. This said, it is important to acknowledge that this study cannot infer the effects of messages on audiences. As Berger (2014) puts it “content analysis tells us what is in the material being studied, not how it affects people exposed to this material” (p. 233).

In order to guide the content analysis of a sample of articles from The Globe and Mail the following seven sub-questions were devised in accordance with the work of Ferguson (1994, 2000), who describes the kinds of questions that can be asked in media analysis of issues that is sensitive to the policy choices of decision-makers, who want to know how media organizations are covering their policy issues as well as the manner in which the public is responding to the coverage. The questions are:

SQ1: Which key stakeholders are most often cited in the articles sampled?
SQ2: Which opinion leaders dominate the debate in the articles sampled?
SQ3: *What are the major arguments in support of the legislation in the articles sampled?*

SQ4: *What are the perceived shortcomings and risks associated with the legislation in the articles sampled?*

SQ5: *Who is perceived as most likely to be negatively affected by shortcomings or risks associated with the legislation in the articles sampled?*

SQ5: *What (if anything) would make the legislation acceptable to stakeholders in the articles sampled?*

SQ6: *How many of these proposals found their way into the government announcement of intent to amend the legislation?*

SQ7: *Which arguments contained in the articles sampled were not addressed by the revisions proposed on March 27, 2015?*

When it comes to analyzing media coverage of a policy, the surrounding context can help the reader understand the significance of the issue at hand. The status of spokespersons on any given issue can indicate its perceived level of importance. For this reason, decision makers are interested to know which stakeholders are speaking out about an issue, and whether their commentary is favourable (Ferguson, 1994, 2000). For this study, stakeholders are defined as any group or person affected by or with an interest in Bill C-51. This can include interest groups, opinion leaders, public figures, or other. Since Bill C-51 is so controversial, identifying the actors who dominated *The Globe and Mail*’s coverage may suggest who is dominating the media agenda. Likewise, examining the types of arguments advanced in the pages of this newspaper during sample period may illuminate whether and how media organizations influenced the policy agenda.

**Scope of the Study**

The scope of the content analysis focuses on the period spanning from January 30, 2015 (i.e., introduction of Bill C-51) to April 2, 2015. This time period includes the announcement of amendments on March 27, 2015, and their introduction to Parliament on March 31, 2015. In June 2015, Bill C-51 received Royal Assent, becoming the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015.
The sample for the analysis consists of content gathered from *The Globe and Mail*, the largest national English-language newspapers in Canada with a combined digital and print daily readership average of over 358,000 across Canada (Newspapers Canada, 2014).

**Data Collection Procedures**

In order to ensure reliability and validity of the findings, criteria for the selection of data must be established before beginning data collection (Berger, 2014). For this study, the criteria for data collection were as follows:

- Must be a news, editorial, or comment article published in *The Globe and Mail* during the time period spanning January 30, 2015 to April 2, 2015 (63 days).
- Must be retrieved from the *Factiva* database using a search with the following key words: *Bill C-51* and *anti-terror*.

Using this criterion, the researcher gathered all relevant articles from the *Factiva* database for *The Globe and Mail*. This search returned 158 potential articles for inclusion in the sample. Duplicate articles\(^2\) (n=50) or articles not significantly relating to Bill C-51 (n=27) were removed from the initial returns. Likewise, any article that only mentioned Bill C-51 in one sentence or two was not included. This resulted in a sample consisting of 54 articles. Within this sample, 39 items were news articles, 10 were comment pieces, and 5 were editorials. Almost half of the articles in the sample (49%) were published within the first three weeks of Bill C-51 being introduced, followed by a spike in coverage during the “Day of Action” nationwide protests (e.g., 19% of the articles in the sample were published in mid-March 2015).

\(^2\) The duplicate articles were published online as breaking news before they were printed in the newspaper the next day. Whenever duplicate articles appeared, the version printed in the newspaper was included.
Data Analysis Procedures

Neuendorf (2002) notes the importance of developing categories for measurement before beginning the content analysis in order to retain the scientific rigor of the study. Categories should be “exhaustive and mutually exclusive and an appropriate level of measurement” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 118). A coding guidebook and checklist were therefore created before the coding process began (see Appendix A and B). The identification and selection of variables to analyze for the codebook was based on answering the seven sub-questions presented above and relying on an emergent process to ensure the categories were exhaustive. The categories for analysis were exhaustive and mutually exclusive, with all necessary categories identified and any overlapping categories eliminated. By engaging in a preliminary read-through of the sampled articles, the researcher is able to gather working frames that capture the range of themes present in the content (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 2005). The categories were re-assessed as necessary to ensure they were adequate and the research questions updated to reflect the data.

The following steps were taken to analyze the data:

1. The 54 articles in the sample were arranged in chronological order to prepare for analysis (see Table 1).

2. When reading through the articles, the categories for analysis were determined and modified as necessary. A coding guidebook (Appendix A) and coding checklist (Appendix B) were created to gather data to answer the seven sub-questions. The guidebook and checklist were modified as necessary to ensure the categories were exhaustive.

3. Each article was read again and coded, following the guidebook. An individual checklist was filled out for each article.
4. The data from the checklists were then transcribed into one file to analyze. During this process, the articles were re-read and cross referenced to the checklist sheets to ensure the coding accurately reflected the information present in each article.

5. The results were then analyzed.

### Table 1: Chronological Sample List.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>01/30/2015</td>
<td>Campbell Clark</td>
<td>Security debates are not about posturing in pre-election times</td>
<td>News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>01/30/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase</td>
<td>CSIS to be given new anti-terror powers</td>
<td>News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>01/31/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase, Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Harper's next act: Give CSIS teeth</td>
<td>News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>01/31/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-terrorism Act</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>02/02/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stephen Harper's secret policeman bill</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>02/02/2015</td>
<td>Adrian Morrow</td>
<td>Tories rebuff calls for greater oversight of CSIS</td>
<td>News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>02/03/2014</td>
<td>Bob Rae</td>
<td>Harper got spy powers right, but civilian oversight very wrong</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>02/03/2015</td>
<td>Colin Freeze</td>
<td>Snowden urges caution over Ottawa's proposed security law</td>
<td>News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>02/03/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase, Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>MacKay once backed spy oversight now rejected by Tories</td>
<td>News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>02/03/2015</td>
<td>Ron Atkey</td>
<td>CSIS oversight is alive and well</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>02/05/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>NDP, Liberals at odds over terror bill</td>
<td>News</td>
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<tr>
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<td>02/06/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>An anti-terrorism bill that's anti-everything</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>02/06/2015</td>
<td>Jeffrey Simpson</td>
<td>Questions for Parliament, not a party rally</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>02/11/2015</td>
<td>Colin Freeze</td>
<td>Targeting methods raise concerns about CSIS powers</td>
<td>News</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>02/12/2015</td>
<td>Ed Broadbent, Roy Romanow</td>
<td>Parliament must reject the anti-terror bill</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>02/13/2015</td>
<td>Colin Freeze</td>
<td>Judges at risk of being CSIS pawns: Report</td>
<td>News</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Section</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02/16/2015</td>
<td>Konrad Yakauski</td>
<td>In Quebec, security changes the game plan</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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<td>02/16/2015</td>
<td>Campbell Clark</td>
<td>Flawed anti-terror bill deserves serious scrutiny</td>
<td>News</td>
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<td>02/17/2015</td>
<td>Shawn McCarthy</td>
<td>RCMP express alarm over 'anti-petroleum' ideologists</td>
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<td>02/17/2015</td>
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<td>Taking the 'I' out of CSIS</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
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<td>02/18/2015</td>
<td>Campbell Clark</td>
<td>Public thirsty for action, but key questions remain as Ottawa presses ahead with anti-terrorism bill</td>
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<td>02/18/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>NDP readies opposition to Bill C-51</td>
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<td>02/18/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase, Paul Koring</td>
<td>Ottawa to tout terror bill at Obama summit</td>
<td>News</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02/19/2015</td>
<td>Campbell Clark</td>
<td>Bill C-51 is a national blockbuster</td>
<td>News</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02/19/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase</td>
<td>More jihadist attacks likely, Kenney says, defending anti-terror bill</td>
<td>News</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02/19/2015</td>
<td>Ian Bailey</td>
<td>Harper sees no need for more oversight of national-security agencies</td>
<td>News</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02/19/2015</td>
<td>Jean Chretien, Joe Clark, Paul Martin, John Turner</td>
<td>A close eye on security makes Canadians safer</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02/20/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Questions, questions</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02/23/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase</td>
<td>Kenney spurns calls to increase security oversight</td>
<td>News</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/23/2015</td>
<td>Campbell Clark</td>
<td>Tories play politics with counterterrorism</td>
<td>News</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02/24/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase</td>
<td>Bill would expand border-guard powers</td>
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<td>02/24/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Anti-terror act risks creating 'grey area' with RCMP</td>
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<td>02/25/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Lessons for Canadian Counterpart</td>
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<td>02/25/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase</td>
<td>Harper wants to limit expert testimony on anti-terror bill</td>
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<td>02/27/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Tories agree to increase public scrutiny of Bill C-51 after NDP force their hand</td>
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<td>02/28/2015</td>
<td>Tabatha Southey</td>
<td>Bill C-51: the Nickelback of legislation</td>
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<td>03/02/2015</td>
<td>Sean Fine</td>
<td>Ottawa didn't learn Air India lesson, says ex-judge</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>03/04/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Former PMs not on C-51 witness list</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>03/05/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>RCMP set to show Zehaf-Bibeau video</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>03/06/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>The loss of privacy is clearly excessive'</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>03/06/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Therrien</td>
<td>Without big changes, Bill C-51 means big data</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>03/07/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Video seen as proof shooter was a terrorist</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>03/09/2015</td>
<td>Campbell Clark</td>
<td>Tories find power in the politics of terror</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>03/10/2015</td>
<td>Jane Taber</td>
<td>Trudeau slams Tories for terror rhetoric</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>03/10/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Tory ministers say it's critics, not them, who spread fear about anti-terror bill</td>
<td>News</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>03/11/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc, Chris Hannay</td>
<td>Privacy, security and terrorism: A closer look at Bill C-51</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>03/11/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Ministers try to allay concerns regarding reach of terrorism bill</td>
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<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>03/14/2015</td>
<td>Jessica Lepore</td>
<td>Thousands gather across Canada to protest Bill C-51</td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>03/14/2015</td>
<td>Andrea Woo</td>
<td>Clark calls for balance on C-51 debate</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>03/21/2015</td>
<td>Elizabeth Renzetti</td>
<td>That's the power of protest. Or at least, it is for now</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>03/24/2015</td>
<td>Daniel Leblanc</td>
<td>Tory MP joins calls for more security oversight</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>03/25/2015</td>
<td>Wesley Wark</td>
<td>C-51 has sparked a much-needed conversation about security and rights</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>03/28/2015</td>
<td>Steven Chase</td>
<td>Tories to scale back the scope of Bill C-51</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>04/01/2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>The government has still not made its case</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Findings

Frames/Issue Attributes Emphasized in the Coverage

The coding guidebook (Appendix A) provides the operationalized definitions of each category used for the analysis of the articles in the sample. The major frames or issue attributes emphasized in the articles are references to educational or explanatory remarks about Bill C-51 (see in Figure 1).

Explanatory statements about Bill C-51 include such lines as the following: “The government has tabled Bill C-51, which provides greater power to the security agencies to collect information on and disrupt the activities of suspected terrorist groups” (Article 19). The threats against Canada frame was most often used when the government was justifying the bill and using ongoing terrorist attacks around the world as examples: “Mr. Kenney said Canadians can’t ignore the rising threat after the deadly attacks on soldiers last October as well as similar events in Paris, Sydney and Copenhagen” (Article 25).

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3 Refer to the operationalized definition in Appendix A to see examples of what educational or explanatory references to Bill C-51 includes.
Figure 1: Frames/Issue Attributes\(^4\) (N=54).

Bill C-51 was tied to the upcoming election campaign many times with lines such as: "After nine years in power, the Conservatives are in a rush. It's a rush to chalk up terrorism talking points for this year's election" (Article 30). Discussions of the public opinion polls spoke mostly about high levels of public support for the bill (82% initially with only two exceptions). Article 50 mentions a new poll showing support dropping “with only 38 per cent of respondents now saying they approve,” and article 52 also indicates lower levels of public support. The “other” category

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\(^4\) The category “Other” includes: Government rejecting criticism of Bill C-51; Information about the Air India bombing in 1985; The logistics surrounding getting Edward Snowden to speak to a high school class; Tying Bill C-51 to anti-petroleum protests; Information about President Obama’s homegrown terrorism summit that Minister Blaney attended; Concerns expressed about whether the courts can keep up with the growing requests from police regarding the terrorist threat; Tying terror rhetoric with immigration policy; Information about other similar legislation to Bill C-51 that the Conservative government has passed
(identified with more specificity in Figure 2) includes the frames that do not fit into the other categories.

**SQ1: Which key stakeholders are most often cited in the articles sampled?**

Fourteen key stakeholders were identified in the initial reading of the articles and coded upon a second reading. The stakeholders identified in the sample range from government departments, national spy agencies, political parties, to advocacy organizations. Regardless of how many times a stakeholder was cited within a single article, it was coded for only one appearance since their position in the article remained the same within a single article. In addition to tracking the frequency of appearance of stakeholders, their position (pro or con) regarding the legislation and whether they suggested any changes was registered (see Table 2 and Figure 2). The stakeholder most often cited was CSIS, which was mentioned in 35 articles, followed the RCMP who was mentioned in 27 articles. The third and fourth most frequently mentioned stakeholders were the NDP (n=22), and the Liberal Party of Canada (n=19).

**Table 2: Frequency of Stakeholders Identification.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Support with Changes</th>
<th>Undecided /Neutral</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party of Canada</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
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Simply knowing which stakeholders are cited most often is not enough when examining how the media framed the Bill C-51 debate is not particularly informative. It is important therefore to also identify whether these stakeholders supported or opposed the bill. When the national security agencies were (i.e., CSIS, RCMP, SIRC, CBSA) cited in the sampled articles they were not associated with a particular position because that role is left to the ministers. The most frequently identified opponents of the bill were members of the NDP who were cited in 22 different articles. In 10 of these articles, however, their views fell into the neutral, undecided, or unsure categories. The Liberal Party was identified as supporting Bill C-51 in 2 articles, supporting the bill but with changes in 11 articles, appearing as neutral, undecided or unsure in 5 instances, and as opposing the bill once. One Conservative MP, Michael Chong, was identified as speaking in favour of additional oversight (Article 51). The other stakeholders dominating coverage tended to be more negative towards the bill. For example, the BC Civil Liberties Association was identified 3 times as opposing the bill. Overall, the stakeholders who supported the bill were government, the Liberal Party (but with changes), the Conservative Party, and the
government departments. Over half (52%) of stakeholder mentioned were linked to neutral/undecided/unsure stances with respect to the bill, while 27% supported the bill outright, 14% opposed the bill, and 7% supported the bill with changes.

**SQ2: Which opinion leaders dominated the debate in the articles sampled?**

Noting which opinion leaders or spokespersons are cited in the news coverage and whether they supported or opposed Bill C-51 offers a view of how *The Globe and Mail* framed the debate surrounding this legislation insofar as it identifies individuals deemed to be influential, whether important members of the government, media, legal profession, community, or other. Figure 3 presents the amount of support or opposition to Bill C-51 in the sampled articles, showing that 45% of the identified opinion leaders in the sample reportedly opposed to the bill while 28% were associated with favouring it.

![Figure 3: Percentage of Opinion Leader Positions (N=54).](image)

The information in Table 3 lists the most frequently identified opinion leaders and their stances on the legislation. Prime Minister Stephen Harper was identified 13 times. Justin Trudeau, Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, was identified in 7 instances, mostly in favour of the bill but with a call for changes. NDP Leader Thomas Mulcair was also identified 7 times,
but mostly opposing the bill. Overall, a majority of the opinion leaders identified in the sampled articles (i.e., former Prime Ministers, former party leaders, provincial premiers, former Supreme Court Justices, and legal scholars), were associated with opposing the bill.

Table 3: Spokespersons/Opinion Leaders Identified.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Support w/ Changes</th>
<th>Undecided/Neutral</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Craig Forcese</td>
<td>National Security Law Expert, Professor at University of Ottawa</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Randall Garrison</td>
<td>New Democratic Party Member of Parliament; Public Safety Critic</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Justin Trudeau</td>
<td>Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Minister of Justice</td>
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<td>Liberal MP, Public Safety Critic</td>
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<td>United States National Security Agency whistleblower</td>
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<td>Conservative Member of Parliament, Parliamentary Secretary to the</td>
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<td>Retired Assistant Director, Intelligence at the Canadian Security</td>
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<td>First chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee; law</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>Former Premier of Saskatchewan, former member of Security Intelligence</td>
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SQ3: What are the major arguments in support of the legislation in the articles sampled?

Six main arguments were identified in the sampled articles as being presented by the government in support of the legislation (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Major Arguments in Support of Bill C-51 (N=54).**

The common thread connecting arguments advanced in favour of the bill was the need to reform existing laws in order to enhance security and promote safety.
SQ4: What were the perceived shortcomings and risks associated with the legislation in the articles sampled?

Figure 5 presents ten different shortcomings and risks associated with the legislation that were identified in the sampled articles.

**Figure 5: Shortcomings and Associated Risks (N=54).**

The two most often cited shortcomings relate to the lack of oversight, and threats to the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

SQ5: Who is perceived as most likely to be negatively affected by shortcomings or risks associated with the legislation in the articles sampled?

As shown in Figure 6, the general public was most frequently identified as most likely to be negatively affected by shortcomings and risks associated with the legislation.
Some of the sampled articles noted, for instance, that environmental native activists could become potential targets if engaged in unlawful protests. CSIS (n=3) and the RCMP (n=2) are also mentioned as possibly being negatively affected by the legislation. The author of Article 30, for example, compares potential problems with the secret hearings for CSIS (i.e., one-sided judicial appeals) to the unintended amount of surveillance that resulted from U.S. legislation by referring to the legal justifications used by the National Security Agency to justify its activities following the leaks by Edward Snowden: “In Canada, the new anti-terrorism bill is vague enough to send CSIS in unexpected directions” (Article 30). The author of Article 32 warns that increased powers to CSIS “will come at the expense of the RCMP’s ability to investigate and prosecute terrorists” (para 1). Basically, giving CSIS new powers to disrupt terrorist activities could lead to overlapping responsibility with the RCMP and potential information-sharing problems.

**SQ6: What (if anything) would make the legislation acceptable to stakeholders in the articles sampled?**

Figure 7 shows the changes to the legislation that were suggested by stakeholders and opinion leaders in the sampled articles.
The most often cited suggestion to improve the legislation involved greater Parliamentary oversight (54%).

**SQ7: How many of these proposals found their way into the government announcement of intent to amend the legislation?**

After considerable debate about Bill C-51 in the media and nationwide protests on March 27, 2015 the government announced its intention to amend the legislation. In the time period examined of this study, only one article (#53) discussed these amendments. It must be noted that although the government introduced four amendments, the article in the sample mentioned three. The first was “narrowing the definition of ‘activity that undermines the security of Canada’ to make it more certain that people practising civil disobedience are not swept up in new measures to guard against threats to this country” (Article 53). The word *lawful* was to be removed from
the wording to protect the civil rights of protesters. The second amendment—the removal of “what appeared to be an unlimited licence for government departments and agencies to share personal information about Canadians and commercially confidential details of businesses” (Article 53)—addresses the broad information-sharing concerns. A third proposed amendment added wording to “explicitly guarantee that [CSIS] is not being given the power to arrest people” (Article 53), addressing the breadth of mandate for CSIS concerns. The fourth amendment, not mentioned in this particular article, dealt with wording that allowed the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to direct air carriers to do “anything” in the Minister’s opinion that is “reasonable and necessary” to prevent a terrorist attack to a “specific, reasonable and necessary action” to prevent a terrorist attack (Bill C-51, 2015). Of the seven specific suggestions by critics to make the legislation acceptable, the only one included in the government amendments was greater protection of civil rights of Canadians.

**SQ8: Which arguments contained in the articles sampled were not addressed by the revisions proposed on March 27, 2015?**

The proposed amendments did not address the lack of oversight, which was the most frequently mentioned concern, deemed to make the legislation acceptable to stakeholders who were speaking out about the bill. Nor was a sunset clause included. Although proposals to limit the sharing of information addresses concerns about privacy and the breadth of information sharing, this announced amendment does not quite meet the standards suggested by critics of a “security overseer” or those who argued for clear standards for the collection of personal information.

**Discussion**

As Murray (2007) notes, the key approach to news media reporting on a policy is to identify the sources, the issues, the interests, and the policy alternatives. This study set out to examine how
The Globe and Mail framed the discussion of Bill C-51 and to identify the extent to which the views in this coverage made their way into government decisions regarding revisions to the legislation.

**Issue Attributes Highlighted in the Media Coverage**

Since this study uses agenda setting and framing theories as its theoretical framework, it has been important to examine the relationship between the media and policy agendas. More specifically, this study set out to identify which aspects of Bill C-51 were highlighted most frequently as concerns, expressed in The Globe and Mail’s coverage, and subsequently to assess the extent to which these concerns paralleled the government’s announcement of its proposed amendments to the legislation. Although this study did not attempt to draw cause-effect relationships, it is nonetheless interesting to identify parallels between what appeared on the media agenda and subsequent changes to the policy agenda.

The most often cited frame in The Globe and Mail’s coverage was general references to Bill C-51 highlighting the new powers CSIS will have to combat terrorists. For example, the author of Article 4 noted that "Canada's spy service would become an agency that actively tries to derail terror plots at home and abroad—not just one that collects intelligence and hands it off to the RCMP." This frame helps the audience organize the story and define the problem in a particular manner; one that emphasizes the supposedly positive attributes of the legislation.

Highlighting the potential threats against Canada was the second most frequent attribute emphasized in the sampled articles. This theme ties in with Price, Tewksbury & Powers (1997) suggestion that frames “often reflect broader cultural themes and narratives.” In this particular instance, the Conservatives are using concerns about radicalized Islamists and the theme of terror attacks to emphasize their tough stance on terrorism and security. Their consistent messaging of
the threat of jihadi terrorists falls into a broader cultural theme and narrative that the Conservatives were pushing, something that their electoral base also supports. As the author of Article 43 notes: “Voters already think Mr. Harper will do a better job dealing with terrorism.”

The author of Article 17 argues that the popularity of Bill C-51 in Quebec and the Conservative stance on the security file is helping them politically in Quebec noting, “A leader who’s tough on terrorism is exactly what Quebeckers are looking for—the tougher the better” (Article 17). The author of Article 3 also uses this same theme, writing, “Mr. Harper made it clear Friday he will try to own the security file this election year, while at the same time casting his political opponents as reluctant to follow in his footsteps, both in fighting terrorism at home and the Islamic State in Iraq.” In Article 17 the author notes that the NDP are in a bind if they oppose the bill because they could lose electoral support in Quebec. This theme was consistently present in the sampled articles throughout the entire time span studied. The emphasis on the terrorism threat ties in with the next popular theme: election campaign/politics.

With the pending election on the horizon, journalists’ tendency to use the game frame may appear more often. This means we are more likely to see winners and losers, conflict and drama taking centre stage in the framing of stories. Within one paragraph, the author of article 1 uses the game frame to highlight winners and losers, tying the parties’ different positions to the looming election. He writes, “Mr. Harper delivered this bill with chest-thumping, backed by a giant flag and introduced by two ministers,” while “the Liberals are so afraid of looking soft of security, they won’t raise serious questions” and “the NDP, meanwhile, squirmed uncomfortably, unsure what position to take.”

As Lawrence (2000) noted, policy making becomes newsworthy when there is clear conflict surrounding the issue. Privacy and security issues are usually controversial; and with Bill
C-51, a clear conflict among the three party positions was consistently evident. Although the Liberal Party supports the bill, its members want to see greater Parliamentary oversight. While the NDP is also concerned about the lack of oversight, it stresses how this legislation infringes upon the rights and freedoms of Canadians. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party refused to consider amendments to the bill until two months after its introduction and extensive media coverage, which included critiques of the legislation.

Criticisms of the bill was the fourth most popular frame identified in the sample. To this end, nine percent of the articles mentioned public opinion polls, with Bill C-51 achieving a high levels of public support, especially in Quebec in the early days following introduction of the bill: “More than four in five Canadians—82 per cent—back the new legislation” (Article 24). However, the popularity of the bill baffles some, and in a comment piece criticizing the bill, the author notes: “Its immense popularity is a mystery to me and I wonder if this makes the situation a dream for the PM—he has brought us the Nickelback of legislation” (Article 36). Nearing the end of the time period of this study, however, articles 50 and 52 cited a poll that showed falling public support (down to 38%).

The other frames used included references to the roles and responsibilities of CSIS or SIRC and references to other spy agencies. Also, with organizing efforts for a “Day of Action” planned for March 14, 2015, the frame “public protests” appeared in the media coverage. People began to voice concerns and to express their displeasure with the bill.

As agenda setting and framing theory note, the selection and emphasis on attributes of an issue influence how the audience thinks about it. Highlighting certain aspects increases the salience of those attributes. However, as Entman (1993) warns, the presence of a frame does not necessarily mean that it influences the audience.
The Actors in the Game

Looking at which actors are cited in The Globe and Mail’s coverage helps to identify how it framed the discussion in its pages. Identifying the extent to which stakeholders and opinion leaders supported or opposed the bill, as well as changes that they suggested to make the law more acceptable, enables hypotheses to be formed about the extent to which the government paid attention to this coverage.

With the sampled articles the most vocal stakeholders on Bill C-51 were the political parties and the government agencies and departments that the bill affects. Representatives of CSIS, the RCMP, SIRC, and CBSA did not provide their opinions on the bill because that is left to the prime minister and ministers. The political positions of parties are reflected in the comments of their MPs. As criticisms of the bill escalated, other organizations such as environmental groups (e.g., Greenpeace and the Sierra Club), the B.C. Civil Liberties Association, and an advocacy organization called Open Media expressed concerns about the potential in the legislation for infringement of civil rights. Open Media helped to organize the nationwide day of protest. However, these other organizations were only mentioned one or two times in the sampled coverage.

The leaders of the opposition parties and their critics were cited often in the sample Globe and Mail coverage. Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau supported the bill with changes, and he pushed for Parliamentary oversight and the addition of a sunset clause that would force Parliament to automatically review the legislation before it is periodically re-enacted. Wayne Easter, the Liberal public safety critic, echoed Trudeau’s remarks about oversight, critiqued the government for not sitting longer hours to hear more witnesses, and condemned the government’s use of inflated wording in justifying the need for the bill. Interestingly, both
Trudeau and Easter were cited in the coverage earlier than the NDP, who are the official opposition. Displaying some ambiguity, NDP Leader Thomas Mulcair questioned the government about why it needs a new balance between security and rights before vociferously opposing the legislation and demanding enhanced oversight. The NDP public safety critic, Randall Garrison, followed the NDP line of eventually opposing the bill, questioning whether the bill could have prevented the October attacks, and expressing concerns about oversight and the need for more debate on the bill.

As noted above, some 45% of the opinion leaders identified in the sample opposed the bill. This list included national security experts and law professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, who critiqued the bill and provided suggestions for amending it. They were particularly concerned about the bill creating a new concept of “terrorist propaganda” and about judicial authorizations wherein "the burden of responsibility passes from politicians to judges through a new class of advance warrants" (Article 16). Speaking to high school students in Toronto, whistleblower Edward Snowden critiqued the bill and warned that it is difficult to undo laws once they are made (Articles 8). Other notable opinion leaders opposing the bill included former Supreme Court Justice John Major, who led the Air India inquiry. He recommended a security overseer be put in place to ensure information sharing takes place between CSIS and the RCMP to avoid the mistakes that happened leading up to the Air India incident (Article 37). The Privacy Commissioner of Canada also expressed concerns, noting the potential for excessive loss of privacy for Canadians. He also warned that the bill provides no balance between security and safety (Article 41). Four former prime ministers (Jean Chrétien, Joe Clark, Paul Martin, and John Turner) wrote an open letter criticising the bill, providing recommendations to improve Parliamentary oversight, and requesting that effective review mechanisms be put in place
(Article 27). Their critiques are cited, as well, in two additional articles. With many prominent experts critiquing the bill, it seems plausible that this may have impacted the government’s decision to amend the legislation.

Experts who were identified as supporting the bill included Ray Boisvert, a retired assistant director of intelligence at CSIS, and Ron Atkey, the first chair of SIRC and a law professor. When authorities such as these individuals support the bill, it is a good sign for the government insofar as these are qualified and reputable experts supporting the bill, which should provide some credibility to the legislation. Of course, other vocal supporters of the bill were the Prime Minister and ministers. This latter point leads to an examination of the government’s use of message control with respect to this issue.

**Government Message Control**

The Prime Minister and four cabinet ministers spoke in favour of the bill. Following news management practices, each time they spoke about Bill C-51, the strategy of tight message control was evident because they all stuck to the same messaging: jihadi terrorists are a threat to Canada, we must pass this legislation to protect Canadians, and the Conservatives are the party to protect you. Twenty-three articles consistently cite the ministers perpetuating the same message over and over, reinforcing the government message. The stress on this messaging was so extreme that even Finance Minister Joe Oliver was talking about the war with jihadi terrorists instead of fiscal matters, and Health Minister Rona Ambrose mentioned the Islamic State in her health care speech (Article 43). With the threat against Canada theme being cited 18% of the time in 30 different articles, as agenda setting theory posits, it seems plausible that the consistency of the messaging and emphasis on these attributes may have influenced how Canadians initially thought of the legislation.
The Prime Minister was the most often cited opinion leader in the sample, indicating that the issue was important enough for him to speak to the media about it. Also, the ministers for various departments that relate to Bill C-51 were also cited more than the departmental spokespersons for their respective departments; another indicator of the importance of the issue. However, there is additional evidence of these control tactics in the behaviour of Harper at events covered by the media. The author of Article 6 notes that, at one public event, Prime Minister Stephen Harper would not take any questions from the media, presumably to avoid addressing criticisms of the bill. Instead he chose to have his caucus members defend the bill through other media channels.

**Shortcomings Reflected in the Amendments**

The fact that amendments to Bill C-51 were introduced, when the Conservative Party has a majority in Parliament, may be an indicator of some concern about public perceptions of the bill. One shortcoming addressed in the amendments was a narrowing the definition of activity that undermines the security of Canada by removing the word *lawful* so that acts of civil disobedience and protestors are not potentially caught up in any monitoring by CSIS. This suggested amendment addresses some of the concerns about the possible infringement of civil liberties and threats to the rights and freedoms of Canadians. Removing the appearance of an unlimited licence for government departments and agencies to share information incorporates the concerns and critiques about the broad sharing of information, although it does not set out clear standards for sharing, using, and retaining the personal information of Canadians. As well, the amendment that changes the wording to explicitly guarantee that CSIS is not being given the power to arrest people addresses concerns about the vague wording of the bill, the breadth of the
mandate being given to CSIS, and the diversion of this agency from its original mandate of intelligence gathering.

However, the most often cited suggestion, the need for greater Parliamentary oversight was not included in the amendments. The government argues that there is sufficient oversight in place with SIRC and judicial approval for warrants. However, having a one-sided judicial appeal was also found to be a shortcoming with the bill.

When comparing the frequency of arguments favouring the bill versus those opposing it, we see that shortcomings were more often cited or mentioned. Favourable arguments were mentioned a total of 57 times, while shortcomings or risks associated with the bill were mentioned 115 separate times, meaning the negative attributes of the bill were highlighted more. There was a similar trend with respect to providing recommendations to correct the shortcomings. Stakeholders and opinion leaders were more likely to critique the bill (115 mentions) than to provide recommendations to correct that shortcoming (37 mentions for how to correct the shortcomings).

**Media and Policy Agendas**

One of the goals of this study was to examine the relationship between the media agenda and the policy agenda. The general idea is that political actors pay attention to certain issues in the media and public opinion polls, which lead to policy decisions (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). By examining the coverage of a single policy in depth, we can see the potential impact of the media agenda on the policy agenda. The introduction of amendments by the government could arguably be associated with the amount of criticism the bill received in both *The Globe and Mail’s* and other media organizations’ coverage, dropping public opinion of the bill, and nationwide protests.
According to the government, the legislation was initially introduced to address the changing nature of threats to Canadians and to better protect them. With high public support initially, the Conservatives quickly introduced the bill and quickly moved it through the House and committee stages, limiting debate and the number of experts to be witnesses during the Committee stage of the bill. However, as opinion leaders became more vocal and active on the issue, a nationwide day of protest was planned, and criticisms appeared more frequently in media coverage, public opinion changed. The change in public opinion might mean that someone won the framing contest (Reese, 2010).

Conclusion

Examining the media coverage of one issue in depth is a large undertaking. Even with the many limitations placed on this study, I would narrow it even further next time. There are so many different aspects to take into consideration when analyzing media coverage that it can be difficult to adequately cover them all. I would include the role of social media in the study, though limiting the scope of that would be difficult.

Given time and resource constraints, this study was limited to analyzing mainstream media content from one newspaper. This means that the findings can only be applied to The Globe and Mail and not generalized to other newspapers across Canada. A larger study could include a comparison of news coverage appearing in newspapers across Canada. Although this study used agenda setting and framing theories as its framework, it does not look at public opinion on the issue to examine the salience of issue attributes.

As for recommendations for future research, this study did not look at the role of social media in the policy agenda arena. Canadians are increasingly using social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to seek out news, and these sites are becoming “a personalized news
stream for Canadians of all ages, with news selected and filtered by family, friends and acquaintances” (Hermida, Logan, Fletcher & Korell, 2011, p. 1). Hermida, Fletcher, Korell, and Logan (2012) found that “sharing is becoming central to the way people experience the news” (p. 821). These personalized news streams allows people to pick and choose the sources of news they want to see and share, which often “means that users bypass professional editors and instead receive news based on the recommendations of people they trust” (Hermida et al., 2012, p. 822). Incorporating social media into future studies would be beneficial to see how it affects the relationships among the media, policy, and public agendas.

Another option could be to compare news coverage of newspapers from different regions of Canada or English-language and French-language papers. As well, comparing the coverage in *The Globe and Mail* to the coverage in the *National Post* could be another avenue for research. Doing a historical or comparative study could help to put the current study in perspective (Berger, 2014). A longitudinal study would allow us to see changes occurring over time in how the issue was covered. Also it could be interesting to compare the coverage of Bill C-51 to coverage of the introduction of CSIS in 1984, or the passage of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act after September 11 to see whether similar issues were raised.

The relationship between the media agenda and the policy agenda is complex, making analyses difficult. Many variables come into play such as the political context and the specific issues at hand. In this case study, the upcoming election may have led the government to pay closer attention to media coverage because they would be eager for positive news coverage and Bill C-51 began as a popular bill. As public opinion dropped and criticism increased, this arguably may have contributed to the introduction of amendments to the bill. Privacy and security issues are always controversial, drawing widespread attention from the public. In this
instance, a large number of opinion leaders commented on the bill. This study identified which aspects of Bill C-51 were highlighted most frequently, as expressed in *The Globe and Mail’s* coverage, including which stakeholders and opinion leaders supported or opposed the bill and the changes they suggested to make the law more acceptable.
Bibliography


Critical communication perspectives (pp. 240–261). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.


Appendix A: Coding Guidebook

Research Questions:

RQ1: How did The Globe and Mail frame the debate over Bill C-51 between its introduction on January 30, 2015, and introduction of amendments to the bill on March 31, 2015?

SQ1: Which key stakeholders are most often cited in the articles sampled?
SQ2: Which opinion leaders dominate the debate in the articles sampled?
SQ3: What are the major arguments in support of the legislation in the articles sampled?
SQ4: What are the perceived shortcomings and risks associated with the legislation in the articles sampled?
SQ5: Who is perceived as most likely to be negatively affected by shortcomings or risks associated with the legislation in the articles sampled?
SQ6: What (if anything) would make the legislation acceptable to stakeholders in the articles sampled?
SQ7: How many of these proposals found their way into the government announcement of intent to amend the legislation?
SQ8: Which arguments contained in the articles sampled were not addressed by the revisions proposed on March 27, 2015?

Coding Protocol: Operationalized Definitions

A. Article ID: Each article will have an assigned number. The coder should write the number as it appears on the article. A sample of 54 articles is being used for this study. Each article will have a number between 1-54 located above the headline on the top right hand corner of the article.

B. Date: The date of the article should be coded with a two-digit month, two-digit day, and four-digit year. For example, January 5, 2015 should be coded as 01/05/2015.

C. Type of Article: The coder should indicate the type of article as noted at the top of the article. The coder will place the corresponding number for the type of article as follows:
   - News – 1
   - Editorial – 2
   - Comment – 3

D. Frames/Issue Attributes: Frames are used as a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). The following themes are present in the articles. The coder should indicate a “1” for appearance and a “0” for non-appearance. At least one anecdotal example should be noted next to the attribute during the coding process.
   - Election Campaign/Politics: Any mention of the upcoming election campaign and any mention of political positioning related to the bill
• **Threats against Canada:** Any mention of the October attacks on Canadian soil, jihadi terrorists or the jihadi war, mention of other terrorist attacks around the world or references to radicalized individuals; references to the need to prevent attacks against Canadians

• **Privacy Concerns/Critiques:** Concerns related to improving accountability or oversight, broad and vague definitions, information sharing

• **Educational or Explanatory Statements:**
  i. **General References to Bill C-51:** Any general information about the bill such as procedural information about the debates of the bill (number of hearings, committee time, witness lists, and speed of debate)
  ii. **References to the Roles and Responsibilities of Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC):** Any explanatory statements about CSIS and/or SIRC such as their role and responsibilities, any references to their past or the history of CSIS (such as the bill that created CSIS)
  iii. **References to other countries’ spy agencies:** Any mention of other countries’ spy agencies and how their processes work (usually mentioned in comparison to what Canada does or should do)

• **Public Opinion Polls:** Any mention of polling firms/polling numbers with respect to how the Canadian public views the bill

• **Public Protests:** Any mention of public protests being organized and held across Canada against Bill C-51

• **Other:** Any other relevant point that does not fit into the above categories (to be explained in annotated form)

E. **Stakeholders:** Any organization or group affected by or holding an interest in Bill C-51.

• **Department of Public Safety**
• **Department of National Defence**
• **Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)**
• **Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)**
• **Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)**
• **Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA)**
• **Conservative Party of Canada**
• **New Democratic Party of Canada**
• **Liberal Party of Canada**
• **Green Party of Canada**
• **BC Civil Liberties Association**
• **Environmental groups**
• **Open Media**
• **Other:** Any organization that does not fit in the above groups

Whenever a stakeholder is cited or mentioned, you should identify the perspective of that stakeholder on the legislation. If the stakeholder supports the law without any proposed changes, indicate the number 1 beside the name. If the stakeholder supports the law with changes, indicate 2 beside the name. If the stakeholder appears undecided, neutral or
unsure of whether to support the law or the article fails to suggest the stakeholder’s stance on the legislation, indicate 3 beside the name. If the stakeholder opposes the law without offering any suggestions for changes that would make it acceptable, indicate 4 beside the name.

F. Prominent Spokespersons/Opinion Leaders: An influential person who is quoted, cited, or otherwise referenced in an article. This individual may be an important member of the government, media, legal profession, community, or other. The person might be a security expert, a Supreme Court justice, or even a celebrity figure. References to these figures may appear as direct or indirect quotes or as mentions. For example, a direct quote might appear as “Minister Blaney says…” or an indirect quote as “According to Minister Blaney…”.

Whenever a spokesperson or opinion leader is quoted, cited, or referenced, identify his or her perspective on the legislation. If the spokesperson or opinion leader supports the law without any proposed changes, indicate the number 1 beside the name. If the spokesperson or opinion leader supports the law with some proposed changes, indicate 2 beside the name. If the spokesperson or opinion leader appears undecided or neutral or unsure of whether to support the law or the article fails to suggest the person’s stance on the legislation, indicate 3 beside the name. If the spokesperson or opinion leader opposes the law without offering any suggestions for modifications that would make it acceptable, indicate 4 beside the name. Annotations beside the names should also indicate the specific changes (if any) required to make the law acceptable for passage.

G. Major Arguments in Support of the Bill: The coder should indicate “1” for appearance and “0” for non-appearance.

- Promotes safety of Canadians
- Gives greater powers to CSIS to combat terrorists
- Makes it easier to arrest someone who might commit an act of terrorism
- Requires judicial approval for warrants
- Has public support
- Oversight already in place (SIRC)

H. Shortcomings and Associated Risks: Shortcomings refers to any inadequacies or weaknesses that have been noted with respect to the bill. Risks refer to the more dangerous aspects of the bill that may endanger the public. The coder should indicate “1” for appearance and “0” for non-appearance.

- Lack of oversight
- Vague wording
- Potential for overly broad or excessive sharing of information
- Too much power to security agencies
- Breadth of mandate (e.g., does more than fight terrorism; creates a new concept of terrorist propaganda; profiling ordinary citizens)
- Secrecy of processes implied in legislation
• One-sided judicial appeal
• Overlapping powers with respect to CSIS and RCMP
• Potential to divert CSIS from its original mandate
• Threats to rights and freedoms of Canadians (infringement of civil liberties)

I. Stakeholders Who Are Most Likely to Be Negatively Impacted by Shortcomings in Legislation: The coder should place “1” for appearance and “0” for non-appearance.

• General public
• RCMP
• CSIS

J. Changes Required to Correct Shortcomings: The coder should place “1” for appearance and “0” for non-appearance.

• Greater Parliamentary oversight (i.e., a committee of MPs to oversee Canada’s security agencies)
• Inclusion of a sunset clause or automatic review after a period of time
• A more limited and focused bill
• Greater protection of civil rights of Canadians
• Clear standards with respect to sharing, using and retaining personal information
• A “security overseer” to ensure information sharing between CSIS and RCMP
• None that are acceptable (i.e., call for total withdrawal of bill)

K. Amendments Suggested in Government’s March 27, 2015, Response to Critics: The coder should place “1” for appearance and “0” for non-appearance.

• Narrowing the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada” so that civil disobedience does not get caught up in monitoring
• Removal of the word lawful so that protestors are not potentially included
• Removal of the appearance of an unlimited licence for government departments and agencies to share personal information
• Changing the wording to explicitly guarantee that CSIS is not being given the power to arrest people
Appendix B: Coding Checklist

A. Article ID: ______

B. Date of Publication: ______________

C. Type of Article: ______

D. Frames/Issue Attributes
   1. Election Campaign/Politics
   2. Threats against Canada
   3. Privacy Concerns/Critiques
   4. Educational or Explanatory Statements
      a) References to Bill C-51
      b) References to CSIS/SIRC
      c) References to other spy agencies
   5. Public Opinion Polls
   6. Public Protests
   7. Other

E. Stakeholders
   1. Department of Public Safety
   2. Department of National Defence
   3. CSIS
   4. SIRC
   5. RCMP
   6. CBSA
   7. Conservative Party
   8. NDP
   9. Liberal Party
   10. Green Party
   11. Open Media
   12. Environmental Groups
   13. BC Civil Liberties Association
   14. Other

F. Prominent Spokespersons/Opinion Leaders
G. Major arguments in support of the Bill
   1. Promotes safety of Canadians
   2. Gives greater powers to CSIS to combat terrorists
   3. Easier to arrest potential terrorists
   4. Judicial approval for warrants
   5. Has public support
   6. Review mechanisms already in place

H. Shortcomings and Associated Risks
   1. Lack of oversight
   2. Vague wording
   3. Broad sharing of information
   4. Too much power to security agencies
   5. Breadth of mandate
   6. Secrecy of process
   7. One-sided judicial appeal
   8. Overlapping powers with RCMP
   9. Diverting CSIS from its original mandate
  10. Threats to rights and freedoms of Canadians

I. Stakeholders Who Are Most Likely to be Negatively Impacted by Shortcomings in Legislation
   1. General public
   2. RCMP
   3. CSIS

J. Changes Required to Correct Shortcomings
   1. Greater Parliamentary oversight
   2. Sunset Clause
   3. More limited and focused bill
   4. Greater protection of civil rights of Canadians
   5. Clear standards for collection of personal information
   6. A “security overseer” for information sharing
   7. Withdrawal

K. Amendments Suggested in Government’s March 27, 2015, Response to Critics
   1. Narrowing the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada” so civil disobedience does not get caught up in monitoring
   2. Removal of the word *lawful* so that protestors are not potentially included
   3. Removal of the appearance of an unlimited licence for government departments and agencies to share personal information
   4. Changing the wording to explicitly guarantee that CSIS is not being given the power to arrest people