Remembrance Forgotten: Seventy Years of Neglect and Our Obligation to Canadian Forces Veterans

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Abstract

Military service places demands upon serving members unparalleled in civilian life. Serving in the Canadian Forces (CF) is no different. The sacrifice required to wear a CF uniform extends far beyond the commonly understood injuries and fatalities of military combat, peacekeeping and routine training accidents. Like all militaries, the CF employs complex cultural, psychological and socialization processes that molds and reconditions civilians into highly disciplined and moralized individuals willing to enter harm's way and kill or be killed. Although these complex processes may be beneficial to military objectives, they can be highly detrimental to successful reintegration into civilian society. Yet Canada has never articulated a tangible universal obligation to assist CF veterans in overcoming or compensating for the consequences of military service. Do we have a universal obligation to our CF veterans? Why? What would be the nature of a universal obligation to our CF veterans? This thesis seeks to answer these questions.

Contrary to popular perception, military life is a moral life. Such morality is the bitter enemy of duplicitous rhetoric and government inaction. These deeply indoctrinated moral values are also the measuring stick for the highly unequal sacrifice that CF members have endured on behalf of Canada and Canadians and the complete absence of any obligation we have reciprocated for their service. For these reasons and more, as a nation and as individuals, we have a substantive universal obligation to all our CF veterans to comprehensively assist them in making their life out of uniform at least as successful and rewarding as it was in military service.
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Finally, I humbly preserve my deepest appreciation to Carolina and Wilfred, my wife and son, who have endured the lion’s share of sacrifice in supporting me. Their love of me and of life is the main reason I have been able to finish my studies and this thesis. While darkness has been ever present in my post-military career, everyone helped me believe in myself again.
Preface-A Note of Caution for Readers (Particularly CF Veterans)

This was a difficult thesis to prepare academically due to the dearth of work on the obligation to veterans. It was also difficult personally. Like many journeys through post-graduate work, mine would become my *Heart of Darkness*. In exploring the obligation to veterans, I had to intimately understand the powerful forces of indoctrination and identity stripping to which, like all military members, I was subjected. I lost much of me 33 years ago when I joined the military at the age of 17. What I did not lose in the intense indoctrination of military service could not develop in an environment that suppresses the individual to sacrifice always for others, never for myself.

Such loss carries much indescribable hidden pain. That pain emerged as I progressed from understanding the various tools and effects of military culture through the most difficult research: a profound awareness of the characteristics, intention and consequences of military’s indoctrination and socialization processes. After I wrestled with the prolific flashbacks, I sobbed, wailed and sometimes howled through a retroactive picture of how subconsciously agonizing it was for me to surrender all that was important to me in the service of others.

*This is my caution to readers who have or are serving in the CF:* This thesis could trigger deep emotional reactions. I recommend that the thesis be read in small doses, with professionals available to assist with the strong emotions being elicited.

The path of my thesis, however painful, has been rewarding. For the first time in over 30 years, I can see myself and the world far clearer than I had ever dreamed possible. I feel considerably lighter. I also have a much deeper understanding why so many veterans struggle with their identities decades after taking off the uniform.
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Introduction: Canada and Its Veterans at a Crossroads

Over the past five years, Canadians have been attending Remembrance Day ceremonies in unprecedented numbers. The Royal Canadian Legion, the only Canadian entity allowed to create and distribute the poppy symbol, sold a record 19 million poppies in 2014 (Abedi, 2014). During Canada’s longest war, the Afghanistan War, Canadians initiated Red Fridays, placed magnetic yellow ribbons on their vehicles, lined the Highway of Heroes to pay respects to Canadian Forces (CF) fatalities and generally Canadians raised their awareness of such sacrifices. Slowly, the image of wavering World War Two veterans has encompassed a younger, modern veteran on Remembrance Day.

What has not occurred is a translation of this overflowing support and interest into tangible and lasting improvements in how veterans are cared for by not only government but by Canadians in general. Why this disconnect? Can we do more than remember for an annual two minutes of silence? How can Canada capitalize on this renewed recognition of military service and the veterans who emerge after the uniform comes off? More pointedly for this thesis, what do we owe those Canadians who wore a CF uniform on our behalf?

2010: A Pivotal Year

2010 became a critical juncture in the Canadian government’s longstanding neglect of its CF veterans, a cohort which currently stands at 600,000 (Veterans Affairs Canada [VAC], 2015c). Previously, periodic headlines featured a small but growing number of veterans willing to break a near universal paralysis of the military, even once retired, to publicly criticize government’s disregard of CF veterans.
Prior to 2010, veteran public advocacy was in large part spearheaded by just two veteran advocates: Lt (N) Louise Richard in the mid-1990’s, and, later, Captain Sean Bruyea in the late 1990’s. At the time, no government agency existed to publicly advocate for veterans. This changed in 2007 with the appointment of Canada’s first Veterans’ Ombudsman.

The office remained largely silent in the public domain for most of its first three years of operation. This radically changed midsummer 2010. Five years of intransigence to change the veterans’ benefit program known as the new veterans charter as well as other unaddressed issues contributed to Canada’s first outgoing ombudsman making damning allegations of mismanagement and neglect by senior federal bureaucrats (Pugliese, 2010).

With the public’s attention focused upon Canada’s care of its military veterans, Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC), the department mandated for the “care, treatment or re-establishment” (Canada, 2015e) of veterans, and their families was profoundly shaken by revelations from Sean Bruyea. Departmental bureaucrats broke the law by widely circulating the advocate’s private medical, psychiatric and financial information to discredit him. The Privacy Commissioner confirmed the illegality of the breaches and announced a systemic audit of Veterans Affairs Canada (Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 2010).

These events gave additional momentum to the first nationwide demonstrations by Canadian veterans and their supporters in almost a century. On November 6, 2010, "thousands" of veterans demonstrated throughout Canada to protest unjust treatment of veterans, RCMP and their families (CTV, 2010). Also that year, the Supreme Court of Canada reinstated a class action lawsuit by disabled veterans who had their pain and suffering payments deducted from their long term disability income (Supreme Court of Canada, 2010). As
2010 came to a close, for the first time, the number of CF veterans receiving benefits would exceed the number of traditional World War II veterans receiving benefits (Stewart, 2010).

2016: Why Has So Little Changed in 70 Years?

Since 2010, the public but more so the media have come to understand that the term veteran encompasses members of the CF who served after World War II and the Korean War. Although Canada has come to embrace the understanding that the term veteran refers to all those who served in Canada’s military (VAC, 2015b), government has adroitly used sleight-of-hand tactics to restrict debate about CF veterans to only those who are the most injured. Certainly this cohort deserves special attention and care. However, even by 2025, the most injured will represent less than one per cent of all CF veterans. What about the remaining 99% of CF veterans? Currently, only 12% or 84,000 of the 600,000 CF veterans and approximately 100,000 serving members are receiving any assistance from Veterans Affairs (VAC, 2015a, p. 8).

Beyond financial compensation for military service-related injuries, most have not received any re-establishment assistance whatsoever.

This is in clear contrast with Canada’s proud legacy after World War II. Each and every one of Canada’s more than 1.1 million returning traditional war service Veterans received comprehensive assistance to re-establish themselves in their renewed civilian lives. Education, training, financial re-establishment assistance, business start-up, farm and land settlement as well as business and farm upgrades were some of the options available for these veterans. The investment that Canada made in its traditional war veterans would play a key role in Canada’s

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1 Veterans Affairs Canada employs the term “traditional war service Veterans” (VAC, 2014a) or “traditional veterans” (VAC, 2015b, para. 2) for those veterans with service in World War II and the Korean War. Those with military service after World War II and who did not serve in the Korean War have been termed “modern-day veterans” (VAC, 2015b, para. 5).
unprecedented economic and social progress made in the subsequent decades (Veterans Affairs Canada-Canadian Forces Advisory Council, 2004a).

Canada missed the opportunity to make an investment in its CF veterans and reap the rewards. Canada also failed to carry out the most basic demographic research affecting 70 years of CF veterans let alone meaningful research to determine the needs of these veterans beyond the obvious needs of those injured in military service. Why?

Elected politicians and senior bureaucrats, have carried out what Gilles Paquet (2009) has termed a “methodological or epistemological coup” (p. 134). Government convinced not merely Canadians but the overwhelming majority of CF veterans that they deserve to receive far less than traditional war veterans. This reality was poignantly demonstrated when individuals representing organizations consisting largely of traditional war veterans unanimously supported replacing lifelong pensions with one-time lump sums for CF veterans whereas traditional war veterans continued to receive their tax-free pensions for life (Senate of Canada, 2005). Furthermore, no debate on the public record over the last 70 years has transpired that universal re-establishment benefits granted to traditional war veterans should be extended to CF veterans. The coup has been highly successful.

Denying CF veterans the same or similar universal benefits required to assist war veterans in re-establishing is an unjustifiable oversight. If anything, the exigencies and social context of serving in the CF over the last 70 years justify granting greater assistance to all CF members in their re-establishment, irrespective of military-related injuries. We devote many resources and much time to reconstruct civilians into CF members. However, besides limited
employment seeking assistance in the past 30 years, Canada has provided nothing on a
universal basis to transform CF members into civilians.

Thesis Question and Statement

This thesis argues that Canada has a universal obligation to our CF veterans in their re-
establishment as civilians, irrespective of clearly identified military-related injuries. This thesis
asks why we have a universal obligation to our CF veterans and what might that obligation look
like. The highly unique cultural and psychological context of military service that all CF
members experience justifies a universal obligation. Additional social context of recruitment
and military service over the past 70 years provide further justification. This thesis proposes a
universal obligation for all CF veterans in return for their sacrifice on our behalf.

Methodology

For those who know of the demands and hardships of military service, it would be
natural to ask how can public ethics and a discussion of morality in any way rise to the occasion
in addressing an issue as important as the life-and-death culture of military members and their
subsequent transformation to civilian life. Preeminent expert on military culture, James Burke
(2005) emphasizes that military service

is a soul-changing pursuit. Neither the language of the market nor the language of
science can comprehend, much less legitimate, what that means for members of the
military or for those who recruit and deploy them. A moral vocabulary is needed. (p. 56).

Military service is a moral service of the highest order as this thesis will show. Military service is
also a psychological and cultural journey that affects emotion, cognition, and identity through
complex socialization and institutional processes. History has long understood what science is beginning to understand.

In this context, this thesis will draw upon the disciplines of history, psychology, sociology, geography, as well as ethics and philosophy. Since government and the public are crucial for transforming the debate from one of obligation to the injured into this thesis’ focus on a universal obligation, media and government sources are widely consulted. The thesis is divided into four chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter 1

Chapter one elaborates upon the concepts of obligation, morality and ethics. These concepts are demystified then intertwined with the concept of a “moral military”. Two boundaries are established which help frame the argument justifying a universal obligation to Canada’s CF veterans. Framing of the obligation contrasts the plethora of government rhetoric surrounding obligations to veterans, rhetoric that is questioned by the substantive questions of this thesis.

Chapter 2

Chapter two pulls together multidisciplinary research into military culture and relates it to serving in the CF. The current and historical contexts of military culture are first discussed followed by a close look at the components of military culture as described predominantly by James Burk. These components are familiar to anyone who has served in the CF: ceremonial displays, etiquette and discipline as well as the most powerful forces of military culture: professional ethos, cohesion (group bonding) and esprit de corps. The discussion on military
culture provides essential background leading into the discussion on psychological context of military service in Chapter 3.

**Chapter 3**

Chapter 3 takes a novel look at a number of components of the psychological context of military service. The psychological tools of military service and their effects are tied together to reveal their impact upon not just military service but upon the experience of becoming a civilian. It is in their impact upon the lifelong transition experience wherein the justification for the universal obligation truly emerges. Popular culture’s take on military service is followed by the historical insight into what many researchers have forgotten to be the psychological context of military service. The first and perhaps most powerful psychological tool to be discussed is indoctrination, its fascinating processes, and its short and long term effects. The remaining psychological tools, (total institution, learned helplessness, identity change and belonging), and their effects are tied into the experience of indoctrination. When seen together with military culture, they paint an unprecedented research picture into the comprehensive, potent and enduring effects of military service, long after the uniform comes off.

**Chapter 4**

Chapter 4 tackles the issue of the universal obligation through a number of approaches. It first asks the central thesis question: why a universal obligation for CF veterans? Historical precedent and the risks of serving set the stage for a contentious policy and ethical question: why has charity not fulfilled the universal obligation? The universal obligation is then discussed in the social context of recruitment and military service. The *anti-intellectual* leanings of the CF
and its recruitment from marginalized populations further buttress the argument for a universal obligation. The social justification continues by looking at the research and policies in place that pointed to the need for universal assistance in transitioning out of the CF.

With the social, psychological, cultural and historical justifications established for a universal obligation, Chapter 4 shows a pragmatic morality and policy justification for the universal obligation. Military’s highly moralized life provides a solid foundation for a *quid pro quo* in reciprocating service obligations with care obligations, but what happens when that *quid pro quo* is violated? Finally, a proposed obligation emerges with five guiding principles.

**Conclusion**

The conclusion brings all the complex and varied pieces of the thesis argument together to justify Canada’s universal obligation to all CF veterans. In spite of the scope and breadth of this thesis, there still remains much research to pursue: further exploration of additional obligations to CF families and the injured as well as how a universal obligation would influence and guide the creation, implementation and administration of consequentially developed programs for all CF veterans and families. We must also ask: what is the relevance of these powerful tools of indoctrination in a society of rapidly changing values and rights?

The conclusion also answers the question: Does this thesis research have international relevance or is it limited to the Canadian context? Some final comments place the thesis question into perspective wondering: why we have taken so long to ask difficult questions about service in our moral military?
Chapter 1: Moral military-Obligation and morality

"It strikes you how much we are in your debt," Former Prime Minister Paul Martin speaking to D-Day veterans (Clark, 2004, para. 5)

“On this day, at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month - Canada, as a nation, strong and free, comes together and remembers. The debt of gratitude we owe our veterans must always be honoured but can never be repaid.”
Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2008 (SooToday.com)

1.1-Obligation more than Words

“This ethic of service and sacrifice continues...In honour of all our veterans, past, present and future, we give them our eternal gratitude.” Former Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Rob Nicholson, (Office, 2014).

Outside the private and public worlds of finance, the word debt is invoked perhaps more often in reference to veterans than to any other group or institution. Setting aside the purely financial definition of debt, Dictionary.com defines debt as “a liability or obligation to pay or render something” (Debt, n.d.). When we owe something, we are obligated to repay, to give something in return. Merriam-Webster online uses “obligation” in the definition of, and as a synonym for, debt (Debt, 2015). Indeed, Canada’s politicians have often used debt and obligation interchangeably. It has become an explicitly spoken and century-long ritual that Canadians and their governments, especially on Remembrance Day, universally acknowledge the existence of a debt or obligation that Canada and Canadians owe to our veterans in recognition for their service and sacrifice. The acknowledgment of an obligation may be explicit but the nature and details of that obligation are so fleeting as to not even meet the criteria of being implicit.
Explicit statements of an obligation to veterans with loosely guiding principles exist in Canadian law, particularly the Department of Veterans Affairs Pension Act (Canada, 2015f, s.2) and more recently (2015) have been added to the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act (Canada, 2015b, s.2.1) otherwise colloquially known as the new veterans charter. Nevertheless, these statements are insufficient as to the scope, detail and perhaps, more importantly, justification for an obligation not to mention what the nature of that obligation is. First, we must understand why there is an obligation before we can articulate what that obligation actually is.

To understand why, we must go beyond limited legal guidance. This is difficult because of the multitude of synonyms, descriptors and claims that politicians, government, media, and veterans invoke when discussing the obligation. For example, cabinet ministers speak of “a great debt” (VAC, 2014b). The Veterans Ombudsman calls it the “eternal debt of gratitude” (Veterans Ombudsman, 2012) and the Royal Canadian Legion talks variously of the “moral debt” (Adams, 2012) and “social contract” with veterans (Legion, 2013). Some veterans have called it a “sacred obligation” and the former New Democratic Party Veterans Affairs Critic Peter Stoffer called it a “moral, social, legal and fiduciary responsibility” (Zilio, 2013). Even the Americans have embraced the term obligation but have been more specific as to what this “moral” and “sacred obligation” entails (Langley & Parker, 2014; Taintor, 2014).

It is unlikely that cabinet ministers, the opposition, the Royal Canadian Legion, veteran advocates or President Obama were basing their sense of an obligation to
veterans upon the varying and contradictory academic philosophical arguments of “moral obligation” (Anscombe, 1958; Darwall, 2003a-d; Prichard, 1949; Seidler, 1991; Turner, 1924). There is a sense that the social and political actors quoted above believed there is something concrete in what that obligation or responsibility may be. By concrete, I mean that there is some tangible depth to what Canada and Canadians owe their veterans, something government, citizens, and veterans can clearly understand, act upon and, thereby, repay. The tangible nature of this obligation and its justification are the basis of this thesis.

It has taken a relatively long time for the debate to emerge regarding an obligation to our Canadian Forces (CF) veterans. The reasons for this delay can be attributed to various factors such as an absence of an agreed upon definition of or clearly defined criteria and justification for this obligation. Furthermore, the delay has been exacerbated by successive governments vacillating on the issue, typically to avoid paying the cost of the obligation. Nevertheless, the boiling point reached in 2010 was a culmination of growing national awareness which would eventually result in the inclusion of veterans’ issues by all parties in the 2015 federal election, a first in nearly a century. Three of the national parties, the Liberal Party of Canada (2015), the NDP (2015), and the Green Party of Canada (2015), included relatively detailed promises in their party platforms. In spite of the controversy and often national condemnation of the Conservative government’s handling of veterans’ issues since 2006, it did not table any official veteran platform.
1.2-Moral military

“Those who give public service do so not for themselves alone but for the society of which they are a part. Therefore, each citizen should share equally in the suffering which war brings to his nation.” Major John L. Todd, 1919. (p. 499)

The debate on this obligation has been mostly limited to injured serving and retired military members. As will be discussed later, an obligation, moral or otherwise, only to this well-deserving group is far too narrow a recognition as an obligation only to the injured excludes those CF members and veterans who are not medically labelled as injured. Ultimately, it is a tragic policy coup to have abandoned the vast majority of CF veterans and serving members. Whether injured or not, all those who enter military service endure much sacrifice as this thesis shows. To only recognize the injured and ignore the remaining CF members and veterans is, therefore, a betrayal of what all veterans and serving members endure as a consequence of military service.

Before discussing the nature of this betrayal in the final chapter, the question is: how are morals, ethics and obligation related? An obligation, at its heart, is a requirement to do or not do something. In the case of veterans, it is the obligation of Canada and Canadians to do something in return for what has been done by CF veterans on behalf of, and for, Canada and Canadians.

What we should or shouldn’t do, especially when such expectations are not codified in law, are really questions of morality or ethics, although the rightness or wrongness of a law or the absence of a law is also fair game for moral/ethical interpretations. Moreover, both “law and morality resemble one another in numerous
and striking ways” (Kar, 2006, p. 877). They both employ “special normative vocabulary” such as “ought,” “duty,” “right,” and “obligation” (Kar, 2006, pp. 931-2). The confluence of law and morality in the obligation to veterans will be discussed later. Nevertheless, in spite of their complexity, discussing laws and the legal system seems far less intimidating or uncomfortable than discussing moral theories. The very concept of morality can be frightening in a world that has disavowed much that was comforting (and imprisoning) in codes of moral universality (Taylor, 1991, pp. 2-4). However, a grasp of the pragmatic morality of military service is fundamental to understanding the nature of this obligation, not to mention, the nature of military service itself, which provides the inherent justification for that obligation.

Morality or ethics has been and continues to be the cornerstone of military service. Perhaps the majority of us never perceived an organization which legitimizes violence as being a moral institution. Rethinking this oversight is crucial but not sufficient to understanding why we have an obligation to our veterans. Western societies, Canada included, generally perceive the military as being a stalwart and reliable institution that can be called upon in national and international emergencies, whether the emergency is natural or manmade. The military is often viewed as highly practical, relatively unencumbered (or at least less encumbered) by the emotions, egoism, petty conflicts, and self-interests which appear to infect other institutions. Canada has relied upon the military, to act rationally in the face of crises and stresses during actions that are not typically military missions but which might otherwise render others helpless and paralyzed. Evidence of Canada’s trust in the military during such crises has manifested in
various humanitarian missions given to the military such as assisting in the flooding in Sherbrooke (1994), the Saguenay (1996), and the Red River valley (1997)” as well as ice storms in Quebec and Ontario (1998-9) or the “gruesome recovery of human remains following the crash of Swissair Flight 111 in September 1998” (Veterans Affairs Canada-Canadian Forces Advisory Council, 2004b, p. 53).

Far from perfect, military members and those who eventually physically remove the uniform, i.e., military veterans, are often figuratively placed, if not on a pedestal, they are typically viewed as being apart from society. Their rapid and mechanical reflexes, perceived to be absent the moral dilemmas of emotional conflict, are both admired and feared. Partially or poorly developed histories, movies, television, gaming and even our own myth-making perpetuate these perceptions of robotic efficiency. Even such misperceptions tell us something about our understanding of military’s moral life, i.e., that it has components of strict, inflexible, and deeply imbedded codes of conduct. There is much truth to this but many misperceptions leave out the most important part: the human being beneath the rigid behaviour. As we shall see, such rigid behaviour has a personal and a social cost that must be addressed in any obligation.

For the onlooker’s part, we struggle to understand the extremes for which military members get the job done while willing to unquestioningly sacrifice on our behalf or on behalf of international others in foreign lands whom our men and women in uniform often never meet. Meanwhile, we see military training and its product, the military member, as approaching the world in a less nuanced and more direct manner, a world
view or *Weltanschauung* which is more black and white than that held by civilian counterparts. For civilians in a liberal democracy, if we are not uncomfortable with such polarized thinking, we either fixate on two-dimensional aspects of military service or distance ourselves from trying to understand an institution’s members whose *raison d’être* is to fight wars, to kill and injure while possibly being injured or killed themselves.

Civilians generally have a more nuanced, morally-conflicted world view. We may appreciate the tradition of military members holding a more polarized view of the world in order to do their job but at some level we find this certainty unfamiliar, even disturbing given its violent context. As a consequence, we not only psychologically distance ourselves from the logic of war, but we often distance ourselves socially and/or physically from the military and veterans, limiting our interaction to *thank you for your service* and a brisk handshake once a year on Remembrance Day. This approach has similarly distanced us from the military experience and hence limited our understanding of military life and stunted the necessary foundation we require in understanding why we have an obligation to our military veterans.

There is much for Canadians and veterans to learn about military service and, by extension, what we owe veterans as a nation and as individuals. Once we understand the rich and prolific moral, cultural and psychological life of being a military member, we can, at the very least, better understand the ubiquitous use of moral language to articulate Canada’s obligation to its veterans. Canadians, the military, and veterans themselves use such morally charged words in a century-long struggle to articulate an obligation:
sacrifice, eternal, duty, honour, gratitude, sacred, solemn, moral, responsibility, obligation, and, of course, debt. These words are also at the heart of debate within that area of philosophy which we know as moral philosophy or ethics.

Likewise, this is language to which military veterans are subconsciously attached. This moral language inherently carries a gravitas which attempts to recognize what we ask of those Canadians who join the military. We have long limited our understanding of that sacrifice to the horrors of war, death, and injury. However, the obligation we have to veterans is not just about the ultimate sacrifice, i.e., death, or injury but must embrace the myriad of other sacrifices Canada has demanded of those who serve in uniform to unquestioningly carry out Canada’s bidding.

1.3-Demystifying moral language and framing the argument

“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’” (Carroll & Tenniel, 1911, p. 221)

1.3.1-Moral or ethical?

Politicians and bureaucrats like Humpty Dumpty may have their own unique take on what they mean. Such certainty is also a component of the perpetual and wide-ranging debates of moral philosophy, though academia can be counted upon to have far more substantive arguments. The rest of Canada and especially its veterans may have a certainty about the existence of an obligation but there is far more disagreement and uncertainty as to what is meant by an obligation; moral, ethical or otherwise. Before further exploring the notion of obligation, we need some common ground on what is meant by morals and ethics.
Throughout western democracies, official or widespread recognition of a unified moral code which applies to all citizens has been in steep decline, if not non-existent (Louden, 1992, p. 3). Morality has become a dirty word often associated with religion or present-day fanaticism. Ironically, as official recognition of morality has declined, ethics have exploded in all walks of life including government agencies, companies, customer service institutions, charities, not-for-profits, social services and community groups (Joyner & Payne, 2002). Due to a widespread handwashing of morality and its trappings, morality is in a sense “up for grabs” (Louden, 1992, p. 4). This also helps to explain the lack of public discourse on issues of morality.

There may be a public disavowal of morality but it is alive and well in at least two of Canada’s public institutions. Canada’s Department of National Defence and the Department of Veterans Affairs, known as Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC), have long used morally charged language in reference to their duties and activities. In addition, both departments, like the rest of the public service, have been required to develop and ostensibly abide by values and ethics codes (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2015).

We often struggle to define ethics and morality let alone explain the difference between them. The word “moral” originates from the “Latin mores, which means custom or habit, and it is a translation of the Greek ethos, which means roughly the same thing” which in turn is the origin of the term “ethics” (Hare, 2014, para. 2). Some philosophical theorists use the terms interchangeably (Held, 2006, p. 169, n.1; Louden, 1992, p. 167, n.20). I shall do likewise but I will also point to a definition. As Louden tells us regarding a
definition of morality, “[t]here exists no detailed, univocal definition of the term that is employed faithfully by all who have professed to be moral theorists” (Louden, pp. 6-7). Academia’s failure should not deter us. At the heart of any code of ethics or morality is essentially a “set” of “do’s or don’ts” (Donagan, 1977, p. 54). Others define ethics as “the theory of conduct of human life” (Rendtorff, 1986, p. 33). This is helpful as the military is all about the conduct of human lives. For the purposes of this thesis, morality, morals and ethics are essentially how to conduct oneself and how things are done in the military, and how things should be done with respect to the obligation to veterans.

Military life is a moral life. This assertion, as mentioned, may carry an inherent contradiction. The primary function of militaries, including Canada’s, is “conducting military operations” (Duty with Honour, 2003, p. 13, hereafter cited as Duty) in the “ordered application of military force in defence of the state and its interests” (Duty, 2003, p. 7) and that armies “exist first and foremost to fight wars” (Bercuson, 1996, p. 60).

Fighting wars or the ordered application of military force may not strike us as inherently moral acts. However, it is not the right or wrong of military actions that concern us. What concerns this thesis are the demands placed upon the individual members by the military institution. Military life is a moral life particularly because of the great responsibility in committing oneself to be “professionals in violence” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 3). The military has been and continues to be replete with espoused as well as unarticulated expectations as to how members are required to morally conduct themselves: training for and fighting wars is a dangerous and nasty business.
Comprehensive and strict codes of conduct have been used in Canada’s military, as in those of other nations, to comfort, guide, and protect with the aspiration to succeed in the role to fight wars. It is the deep embedding of morality in the cultural and psychological life of military service which is central to this thesis as it is fundamental to understanding and articulating what obligation Canada has to its CF veterans.

There are however two moral boundaries to this thesis. First, references to the often esoteric academic world of moral theory shall be limited for two reasons. First, military service and the existing rhetoric around our obligation has sufficient enough explicit and implicit moral life of its own. Second, as Prichard (1949) wrote in 1912, for

“...most students of moral philosophy, there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction on the subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure.” (p.1)

Perhaps the context of Prichard’s comments may not be entirely relevant to today’s debates on moral philosophy. However, when juxtaposed against the certainty of military life, the immediacy of military do’s and don’ts having life-threatening implications, and the solemn responsibility of taking human lives, the unconvincing arguments of moral philosophy, even today, still fall short of the gravitas required to place into sufficient context the pragmatic morality and sacrifices of military service. However, this thesis will delve into ethical theory when it can buttress the rich moral lives lived by the military and veterans or fill in the gaps when the is of military life does not always directly translate into the ought of fulfilling an obligation to our veterans.
The second boundary is this thesis will not delve into the rightness or wrongness of the following: wars, combat missions, military deployments, military service itself, its consequences nor its ample moral life, except insofar as military service directly translates into a need to rebuild veterans’ lives or compensate for some loss. Instead, this thesis addresses whether the sacrifices and obligations fulfilled by and demanded of each and every Canadian who enlists in the CF are reciprocated in kind by Canada. As the thesis progresses, the descriptive nature and consequences of military service are intended to point out how military members endure a dramatic and fundamentally different life from mainstream civilian occupations. This different life has unique contexts and consequences which can hinder military members’ attempts to fully rejoin Canadian society as civilian veterans. These hindrances or obstacles to transitioning have been identified to a very limited degree in the literature but many have not been explicitly linked to a need that can be addressed by various assistance measures.

Nevertheless, these hindrances and obstacles and their resulting needs are the justification for an obligation that Canada and Canadians have in order to compensate for the nature of military service and assist in transitioning, fully and optimally, to a new life as a civilian. The full nature of an obligation due veterans will be explored once the emergent needs reveal themselves.
1.3.2-Framing the obligation

In June 2004, Prime Minister Martin commemorated D-Day in France with Canadian veterans:

It strikes you how much we are in your debt...I’m sure you hear this every Armistice Day, when the Last Post is played and people do stand up and younger people come up to you and say, “We’re in your debt and thank you very much.” And then they go. But I want you to know that they really mean it. (Clark, 2004, para. 5)

One year later, the Liberal government under Paul Martin passed the most controversial veterans’ benefit legislation in the past century, legislation reflecting the greatest change in how injured veterans were treated since at least 1944. This new legislation colloquially known as the new veterans charter created additional classes of veterans in terms of entitlements and benefits. In replacing lifelong pain-and-suffering pensions with one-time lump sums, the new veterans charter provided a decade-long as well as ongoing lightning rod for veterans’ outrage. The result was a proliferation of veteran advocates and advocacy groups. One existing online community, Veteranvoice.info, became the first organization to call for a universally accepted standard with which government should treat all injured veterans (Author²). Because of the new veterans charter, CF veterans applying for disability benefits on or after April 1, 2006 were treated profoundly differently than those who had applied for benefits previously (Canada, 2015a, 2015b).

² Having served in the Canadian Forces from 1982 to 1996 as an Air Force intelligence officer, I have knowledge of the military stemming from my direct experiences that may not be available in currently published material. I have also been active in the public policy and advocacy debate concerning veterans since 1999. This likewise provides me with knowledge and experience related to veterans’ policy issues which are not publicly accessible. When I refer to this knowledge, I shall cite “Author”. I was the first to publicly call attention to the inequities and injustices stemming from the new veterans charter. Veteranvoice.info collaborated to disseminate this message.
The *new veterans charter* directly resulted in veterans’ benefits being on the election agenda a decade later in 2015, the first time since 1920’s, but it also prompted a highly limited debate about *what is* the obligation to veterans. Is this obligation more than sincere words (*they really mean it*), the annual playing of Last Post, and showing up for Remembrance Day and other days of commemoration or is it something more? If so, how binding is the obligation? How long shall it be owed? *Eternal gratitude* is a long time. Surely there must be something of substance behind this gratitude. Words and thoughts do not reassemble the lives of veterans nor can they provide meaningful or enduring recognition for what veterans have sacrificed for Canada and Canadians.

Before these questions can be answered we cannot lose the central component of the obligation, i.e., the veterans themselves, in a flurry of policy discussions or academic theory. World War II sociologist, Willard Waller appropriately reminds us that “[i]f we are to understand the veteran, we must learn what he [and she] experiences as a soldier” (1944, p. 18). In Chapter 2, we provide some insight into military culture and its effects upon military members while in Chapter 3 we discuss the psychological context and consequences of service in the CF. Once we understand what veterans experience while in military service along with the social conditions surrounding military service, a natural and logical sense of a proposed obligation emerges in Chapter 4 along with a greater understanding of how to fulfill that obligation.

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3 In the military, the term *soldier* is generally restricted to those who serve in the army as opposed to airman in the air force and seaman in the navy. Generic terms for members of the military are often cumbersome and service-specific terms can be gender limited. Outside the military, *soldier* is increasingly accepted as a term for anyone who serves in the military. I shall attempt use the term military member or CF personnel but when the term soldier is used, it shall refer to anyone in military service unless indicated that it is restricted to those in the army.
Chapter 2: Military culture

“The military... a class of men set apart from the general mass of the community, trained to particular uses, formed to particular notions, governed by peculiar laws, and marked by peculiar distinctions.” William Windham (1750-1810) (as cited in Loomis & Lightburn, 1980, p.17)

2.1-The Military profession

“There is satisfaction in service, there is satisfaction in an ordered life, there is satisfaction in the progressive mastery of complex skills, and there is satisfaction in professional association with men of a high average level of integrity.” General Sir John Hackett (1983, p.208)

Military service is perhaps one of civilization’s oldest institutions. As a codified profession, it has less continuous historical roots than say doctors or lawyers. However, even during the historical hiatuses when soldiers were not professionals, military culture has shown notable continuity. The professionalization of militaries in the past 200 years has propagated military cultures which have made growing demands on the intellectual, social and psychological resources of their members. The reasons for the increased demands relate to technological, accompanying tactical as well as civilian social developments. The details of these developments are not important for the purposes of this thesis. However, the details of military culture itself and the consequent demands it makes upon individual members are highly relevant to establishing an obligation to veterans. These demands are the obligations that military members must fulfill in serving Canada and Canadians. In turn, these obligations establish a basis for a reciprocal obligation Canada has to its military veterans. The nature of this reciprocity will be discussed later. First, it is necessary to understand life in the military.
Military culture is a complex phenomenon with traditions, beliefs, values and morals. The relative permanence of military culture is central to an individual’s experience when in uniform. This culture deeply affects all aspects of a military member’s life: physically, professionally, socially, psychologically, emotionally and spiritually. Military culture is ultimately intended to prepare the individual and the institution to fight a war: “the veteran has been used as a means, as an instrument of war, and has often suffered some damage in the process” (Waller, 1945, p. 175). Sociologist Willard Waller was referring to American veterans returning from World War II but the damage to which he refers applies both to war and peace as well as to most nations’ military veterans including CF veterans. This damage is nuanced. What may be beneficial to the military, the mission and the member during combat, may be negative for the military member during peacetime or after release. The comments of one Canadian military member during a 1994 research study on serving in the military shows how profound and varied the effects of military culture can be:

They make you feel dependent on it. Once you’re in, they make you feel like you can’t make it out there... “You do what we want and we’ll do everything for you.” That’s the attitude. “You can’t do anything for yourself.” ... Well, after a while it’s just like a child with a parent. You don’t want to disappoint them, you’re afraid to. You don’t know what the consequences are going to be, so you do it. You do what you’re told. (Harrison & Laliberté, 1994, p. 22)

This is just one aspect of the effects of military culture. Many continue long after the uniform comes off and are pervasive enough to affect more than just the veteran. The families are directly affected by military culture as well as indirectly through the military family member. Deborah Harrison’s and Lucie Laliberté’s 1994 ground-breaking study
delves into the multifaceted impact of military life and culture upon the family members.

They argue that military wives are:

...a group of women of whom considerable unpaid work is expected but who have almost no control over how often they see their husbands, how long they live in one place, what kinds of jobs they have, how long their friendships last, how many disruptions their children experience, whether their accounts of battering are believed, or whether they will have enough money to live on after their working lives end. (p. 7)

Certainly military culture has other impacts which are positive. Over the years military culture has been intended, although not always successfully, to maximize military effectiveness in times of war. There is also no doubt that the culture has had positive impacts upon the military members themselves but likely less so for their families. What concerns this thesis are those impacts, and consequences of military culture that, positive or negative, can become maladaptive strategies in civilian life, predisposing veterans and their families to struggle to fully integrate into, or fail to achieve their full potential for, a successful civilian life.

Irrespective of the actual experience of war, military culture itself demands much of each and every military member during peace, war and all operations in between. Understanding military culture is salient to establishing a sound justification for Canada and Canadians to honour a fulsome obligation to our CF veterans and their families.

2.2-Military culture: Recent Canadian historical context

More than six decades have passed since Canadians fought a World War. At that time, war touched every Canadian in some manner: family members and relatives in
uniform, civilian employment in wartime production as well as food, manufactured goods and resource rationing as industries dedicated production to the war effort. Immediately following World War II, Canada’s military shrank considerably while veterans and civilians returned to civilian concerns. Even though post-World War II Canada had the largest professional standing military in its history, up until the early 1990’s much training and preparation for a potential Third World War occurred in Europe. This physical and psychological reality distanced Canadians from their military (Horn & Bentley, 2015).

Other training and missions such as peacekeeping resulted in considerable casualties but these too were outside the wider public concern.

Although fighting world wars continued in the memory of civil society, the military’s role during this apparent peacetime seemed either lost or unimportant to most Canadians. Reasons for military service and its accompanying culture were correspondingly lost to the majority of Canadian civilians but continued to live vibrantly in CF members who volunteered to serve in uniform after the Korean War.

The Canadian military like most nations’ militaries were and are indeed peculiar in the sense that the military is relatively separated from Canadian society both physically but more so psychologically. British researchers articulate this separation as a “military virtue,” identifying it as “the right to be different” (Snider, 1999, p. 12). As social geographer Deborah Cowen elaborates in her study of the Canadian Forces, “The professional soldier is the citizen whose existence is dedicated to labouring in the space of
the state of exception. The solder becomes a *figure of exception* in the way that war becomes a *state of exception*” (2008, p. 16, original italics).

Although civilian influences and control grew during the post-World War II era, the military became progressively distant from civilian society for various reasons. The result was a paradoxical civil-military gap. Although senior military management methodology became more civilianized, military culture, spearheaded by senior officer leadership, became more entrenched in a growing conservatism resisting the changes which were happening in Canadian society around the CF. As Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley tell us: “Canadians have never believed in large standing armed forces and regarded the inherently conservative professional military with mistrust” (2015, p. 24). Central to this conservatism and to the military’s *peculiar* nature is military culture.

2.3-Military culture: The basics

What is culture? Allan English in his 2004 Canadian perspective on military culture notes that there may exist up to 250 definitions of “culture” to date (p. 15). Since the military is an organization, one of the earliest researchers into organizational culture, Edgar H. Schein (1992), provides a helpful and military-relevant definition of culture:

A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and external integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to the problems. (p. 12)

The military has a most significant *problem*: how to fight and win wars. Certainly there are other important functions such as aide to the civil power including domestic disaster
relief or foreign humanitarian operations. However, even in western democracies, the principal mandate of the military remains to prepare to fight wars (Loomis & Lightburn, 1980, pp. 16-17). Militaries exist to defend the territorial, institutional and spiritual integrity of a nation principally through preparing to and actually engaging in combat for the purposes of winning wars. This has been a growing uncomfortable truth for many Canadians since World II. Nonetheless, we must remember that Canada’s military is subordinate to and receives direction from a civilian government. Ultimately, the significant problem of fighting wars has at stake the life and death of not just the military members but the life and death of the nation (or allied or friendly nations) that the military is defending.

What may seem a most ominous yet easily identified problem of fighting wars requires the military to address a myriad of lesser problems within the organization. The military must determine how to direct the minute details of daily life in all aspects of military activities including basic training while adapting newly recruited individuals to willingly accept this direction to enter harm’s way in an effective manner. This is all carried out through the multiple facets of indoctrination of military culture, aspects of which help to “control anxiety about facing war” (Burk, 2008, p. 1247). This indoctrination continues long after enlistment training is complete. Weapon systems, logistics and personnel must all be constantly and continually coordinated for training, “operations other than war” (English, 2004, p. 141) as well as for war itself. In this context, military personnel understandably must be highly motivated to work together, willing to risk their
lives for the mission and for others, while suppressing or putting aside their own needs and wants. All of this is accomplished through the varied dimensions of military culture.

What is military culture? The concept of military culture has attracted multiple, often complex, definitions and perspectives over the relatively brief period which it has been studied in the post-World War II era. Morris Janowitz in the midst of the Cold War noted that unlike “a free-enterprise, profit-motivated society, the military is oriented to duty and honour” (as cited in Loomis & Lightburn, 1980, p. 17). Canadians began to study and articulate the military culture of the CF in more comprehensive detail in the 1970’s. It was not an easy task. Enlightened CF officers noted that “duty and honour means that we are dealing more with a secular ‘religion’ or calling than with a business, more with a family than with a corporation or union, and more with a way of life than with a contracted set of obligations” (Loomis & Lightburn, 1980, p. 17; also see Cotton, 1982/83).

Inherent to religion, family and a way of life are moral obligations far more emotionally and spiritually demanding than corporate ethical codes of conduct or any accompanying employment obligations. How do these moral obligations manifest themselves in military culture? Sociologist James Burk (2008) tells us “warfighting still determines the central beliefs, values, and complex symbolic formations that define military culture” (p. 1243). Burk (2008) notes at least four elements of military culture:

1) professional ethos;
2) esprit de corps and cohesion;
3) ceremonies and etiquette; and
4) discipline (p. 1243-1249).
These four elements all contribute to a highly normative or moralized way of life in the military. Taken together, they are so encompassing that they essentially comprise much of what the military means as an institution as well as the near totality of what it means to be a military member. If culture is a “system of norms” telling us “the way in which things should be done” (Horton & Hunt, 1968, p. 49), military culture is replete with obvious, espoused, hidden and legally binding norms (Burk, 2008; Horton & Hunt, 1968). The professional ethos is the sphere around which all elements of military culture revolve and to which these elements ultimately serve.

2.3.1-Professional or Military Ethos

“An ethos is the outcome of social processes embedded in the military community.” (Cotton, 1982/83, p.15)

After more than two decades of impetus and debate, for the first time in 2003, the CF officially articulated an ethos emphasizing “[t]he military ethos is the foundation upon which the legitimacy, effectiveness and honour of the Canadian Forces depend” (Duty, 2003, p. 25). Even taking into account the tendency of the military to overstate elements of their profession in characteristic bluntness, we shall see that the military ethos is extremely important to the functioning of the CF, as well as to any professional military.

How important is an explicit ethos if it was not produced until 2003? Does that imply that the Canadian military had no ethos whatsoever until 2003? How did Canada achieve its successes on the battlefield such as Vimy Ridge or Normandy and in peacekeeping during the prior century without an articulated ethos?
The military ethos has been not always readily apparent but is all the more influential for its often indiscernible nature which operates on an “unconscious level” (Schein, 1992, p. 17). Edgar Schein points out that organizational “culture can be analyzed at several different levels, where the term level refers to the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer.” There are three levels according to Schein. The first, “artifacts... include all the phenomena that one sees, hears, and feels” (Schein, 1992, pp.16-17). As an organizational culture, the military is replete with far more artifacts than likely any other culture. Most obvious artifacts would be the use of uniforms with rank, medals for professional achievements and conduct as well as the multitudinous weapons of war which stir emotions at different extremes for onlookers.

The next level is “espoused values, which predict what people will say in a variety of situations but which may be out of line with what they will actually do in situations where those values should, in fact, be operating.” (Schein, 1992, pp. 20-21) One recent example of such discrepancy lies in the CF commitment to “respect the dignity of all persons” by “helping to maintain safe and healthy workplaces that are free from harassment and discrimination” (Code, 2012, p. 9). This commitment, especially in the context of sexual harassment of females, has been prominent in CF literature and public statements since the early 1980’s. Nevertheless, sexual harassment scandals continued to erupt during the subsequent years culminating in the most recent condemnation of a still
prevalent culture of machismo and denigration of female military members (Deschamps, 2015).^4^ At the deepest level, we find the “values in use” or what some researchers call “basic values” or “theories-in-use” (Schein, 1992, p. 22). Schein (1992) calls them “basic assumptions” or “the implicit assumptions that actually guide behavior, that tell group members how to perceive, think about, and feel about things” (p. 22). Basic assumptions “tend to be those we neither confront nor debate and hence are extremely difficult to change” (p. 22). The inventory of basic assumptions in a culture directs members of a culture on “what to pay attention to, what things mean, how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what actions to take in various kinds of situations” (Schein, 1992, p. 22). Ultimately, basic assumptions are extremely difficult to see and articulate, for both members of the cultural group as well as onlookers. However, deciphering them is key if we wish to redirect or transform a culture, understand the culture or correctly interpret the more superficial components of a culture.

The CF military ethos is both an espoused value as well as a basic assumption with differing gaps between the two such as the discrepancy between firmly condemning sexual harassment while allowing, at some levels, its continued presence in the CF. In this section, I focus upon aspects of the ethos which have been values in use or basic assumptions in the CF since post-War II or earlier. These are the values or ethics by which

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^4^ The discrepancy between espoused values and “values in use” has profound implications for the morale of the members and the operational effectiveness of the CF. This thesis will expand upon these implications under the sections dealing with moral consistency, non-contradiction and moral injury.
military members lived and continue to live by even if military members or veterans cannot recognize or articulate them.

2.3.1.1-Military ethos: The CF context

"Ethos is the heart of the military profession and operational effectiveness."
Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Final Report (Duty with Honour, 2003, p. 25)

For the CF, like most western professional militaries, the military ethos “was based upon the hard lessons of warfighting learned in the two World Wars and Korea…” (Capstick, 2003, p. 50). Prior to World War II, Canada (and the US) did not rely upon large standing militaries. However, the exigencies of the Cold War required that Canada and other western nations maintain large professional militaries. Canada and other NATO nations prepared to fight the next World War with the lessons of World War II. The predictability of fighting previous wars on large battlefields between large formations of troops, required little flexibility or self-reflection. In spite of Canada’s growing involvement in peacekeeping, training and operating to fight a European-based World War III with the Warsaw Pact was considered “real soldiering” by most in the CF, unlike peacekeeping (Capstick, 2003, p. 50).

As long as Canada focused upon its NATO role of defending Europe, there seemed little need to articulate a military ethos. However, by 1980, a confluence of factors forced the issue of an articulated military ethos to the foreground. By 1969, Canada had begun changing its role in NATO from a fixed component of the land forces in Europe to one of “flexible response” (Cotton, 1982/3). Flexible response was a euphemistic attempt to
maintain the NATO role with fewer resources. The continued cutbacks not only affected operations but also the quality of life for military personnel. Recruitment plummeted as the military struggled with the growing influence of civilian values and their divergence from military values: “officers were in danger of becoming defence bureaucrats rather than professionals in violence, of equating organizational efficiency with military effectiveness and bureaucratic management skills with leadership” (Cotton, 1982/3, pp. 10-11). Officers and enlisted personnel along with potential recruits increasingly saw the military as an “occupation” rather than a professional “vocation” (Cotton, 1988; Loomis & Lightburn, 1980).

The response of CF leadership was to further entrench traditional military values and adopt a narrow view of Samuel Huntington’s theories on the “management of violence” (1985, p. 13). Huntington’s seminal work was the “only work on military professionalism known to the vast majority of Canadian officers of the period 1960 to the present” (Horn & Bentley, 2015, p. 44). There was a clear lack of intellectual diversity with a notable “entrenched anti-intellectualism” in the CF officer corps, especially up until the late 1990’s (Horn & Bentley, 2015, p. 17). The CF perpetuated a narrow interpretation of Huntington that the military, although always subordinate to civilian control, must remain autonomous, a “closed shop” with an “inward-looking nature of the military profession” (Horn & Bentley, 2015, p. 45). Along with entrenched anti-intellectualism, the inward-looking CF cultivated the conditions for repeated leadership disasters culminating in the 1993 Somalia Affair and the 1997 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Horn and Bentley, 2015).
Since the leadership of the officer corps has and continues to dominate and perpetuate military culture, particularly the ethos, the result is a Canadian military that has resisted fundamental values prevalent in civilian society such as openness, diversity, human rights, equality and tolerance (Bercusson, 1996; English, 2004; Friedland, 1997; Horn & Bentley, 2015). Central to the military ethos is the ethical foundation and framework that allows the military to remain a closed shop, resisting outside influences. This separateness and distinctness from civilian society is reinforced by the paradoxical yet intimate connection to civilian society: the obligation to defend civilian values and institutions with one’s life. Perhaps it was the paradoxical relationship with society along with the conflicting civilianization trends in the CF which contributed to the lengthy struggle to define a Canadian military ethos. Nevertheless, Canada was not alone in this “crisis in command” (Kasurak, pp. 109, 122). However, a 1980 military task force staffed with general officers still could not prompt the CF to take action 10 years after senior officers had first identified the leadership crisis with respect to defining an ethos:

The dilemma facing the Forces as a profession is that civilian standards and values are displacing their proven military counterparts and, in the process, are eroding the basic fiber of Canadian military society. At the risk of overstating the situation, the Forces are facing a crisis of the military ethos. (as cited in Kasurak, 1982, p. 113)

The peculiar and exceptional nature of military service was perceived as being contaminated by the values of the very civil society which the military existed to defend. Perhaps the complexity of the task also prevented concerted action on defining a military ethos. At that time, researchers consulted the Concise Oxford English Dictionary for the following definition of ethos: “a characteristic spirit of a community, people, or system”
Seeking agreement on what appears to be a simple definition has long caused complex problems for the CF. The reasons for these problems were also due, in part, to sociologists and the military specifically viewing the concept of a professional ethos as a descriptive term. However, like military culture, the professional ethos for the officer corps is “a set of normative understandings, [that] defined its corporate identity, its code of conduct, and (for the officers at least) its social worth” (Burk, 2008, p. 1245).

Western proponents of the military ethos such as Morris Janowitz and Samuel P. Huntington both articulated a military ethos in the context of pertaining principally to the officer corps (Huntington, 1985; Janowitz, 1960). Their ground-breaking works influenced the eventual articulation of a CF military ethos in 2003. In an enlightened initiative, the CF would consider all its members to be “military professionals”, resulting in an ethos that applies to “[a]ll uniformed personnel fulfilling operational, support or specialist functions” regardless of rank (Duty, 2003, p. 10).

There is little difference between an ethos and a professional ethic. Huntington used the word ethic instead of ethos (Huntington, 1994, pp. 62-64; Kasurak, 1982, p.122). Others use ethos and values interchangeably or define ethos in terms of a set of “core values” of “duty”, “integrity”, “courage”, and “professionalism” (Capstick, 2003, pp. 51-2) while others proposed “pride”, “concern”, and “commitment” (Cotton, 1982/83, p.13). Much rests upon how these values are defined. It is important to emphasize that these are values in the normative sense. Certainly these values have much worth to military members but ultimately, these values tell military members “the way in which things
should be done” (Horton & Hunt, 1968, p.49). They are therefore moral values just as the professional ethos is an ethical or moral code of conduct.

2.3.1.2-CF Ethos: What about subcultures?

The CF is not entirely a homogeneous organization in spite of attempts to unify the members in one uniform in the late 1960’s. Even while all members wore the colour green for two decades, those in the Air, Sea and Land elements all continued to cultivate different cultures (English, 2004). These strong subcultures eventually resulted in the return of distinct uniforms for all three elements even though the central command, National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, continued under a unified civilian-military command structure. Prior to, during and even after unification, subcultures within each of the land, air and sea services prospered. Squadrons, ships, and regiments all retained different cultures, even different from other squadrons, ships and regiments. Within regiments, such as the infamous Canadian Airborne Regiment, each battalion developed strong subcultures different from the other battalions (English, 2004; Winslow, 1998).

However, a unifying ethos permeated all services and units. Each could recognize the other in what could be called the “military way” (Cotton, 1982/83, p. 10). In fact, sociological studies indicate “that in the military-in contrast to civilian organizations—indeed something like a supranational culture exists. This supranational military culture is more collectivistic, more hierarchy-oriented, and less salary-driven than the average civilian working culture” (Soeters, Poponete & Page, 2006, p. 16). As a “consequence”, not only are military members from the same country, and from different units and services
able to easily work together but military members from different countries “can often function and get along with each other without experiencing too many problems” (pp. 16-17). Notably, this supranational culture allows military members to function in certain situations with international counterparts easier than military and civilians, even from the same country. (Soeters, Poponete & Page, 2006, p. 17).

2.3.1.3-Summarizing the CF ethos

Until 2003, there may not have been a formalized written ethos but anyone who has served in the military would likely be able to cite fundamental characteristics of what we would call an ethos. These characteristics would not be unique to Canada’s military:

- the group is valued over the individual;
- soldiering is a vocation, a calling, rather than an occupation;
- honour is more highly regarded than material gain;
- the military community is paternalistic;
- symbols, ritual and myth are valued; and
- the military community is necessarily separate from the civilian society which it protects (Kasurak, 1982, p. 124).

Sociologist Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Cotton also contributed much-needed clarity and helpful guidance to the ethos. In addition to Kasurak’s list, Cotton (1982/3) emphasized the greater societal connection of the military in volunteering to “serve” Canada, acknowledging the “political, social, cultural and military institutions” as well as having “concern for the welfare and integrity of all citizens, both in and out of uniform” (p. 13). Most importantly, Cotton explicitly acknowledges a “commitment” to the concept of “unlimited liability” (1982/83, p.13), a term first coined by Sir John Hackett (1983) as early as 1963 and later published in his book *The Profession of Arms*:
The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves, he will never be a civilian. (p. 202)

This selfless commitment to “accept and understand that they are subject to being lawfully ordered into harm’s way under conditions that could lead to loss of their lives” (Duty, 2003, p. 26) has always distinguished military members from any other occupation or vocation in society. When the remaining characteristics of the values in use over the past sixty years are viewed in this context, one readily can see the categorical requirement of placing oneself subordinate to all aspects of military service. The individual is fully dedicated to the primacy of the mission, the other members of the military, the institution and its units (regiments, squadrons, ships), the defence of Canadians and Canada and all for which they represent. The individual exists as a highly effective and important but profoundly subordinate and selfless component of the preeminent military mission and its team concept. Cotton notes his 1979 report emphasized “the historical truth that the spiritual dimensions of military systems are more important than the physical” (as cited in Cotton, 1982/83, p. 10). This is the power of the military ethos. It is a professional ten commandments reinforced by a complex and enduring military culture.

Given the proliferation of ethos, mission and values statements throughout the public and private sector, it would be understandable to dismiss the military ethos as just another organizational values statement which can be freely ignored. This is the case with the federal public service. By 2003, the CF would develop a code of ethics which was
adopted in turn by Ottawa’s public service (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2015). The requirement for public servants to follow the code is overshadowed by a more dominant organizational culture where “whistleblowers are ignored, sidelined and silenced” (Cutler, 2012; also see Brennan, 2010; Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2014). Although both the CF and the public service share the same code of ethics, consequences for public servants who break the code have been negligible due to the largely toothless enforcement legislation known as the Public Servants Disclosure and Protection Act (Canada, 2011b) which has been overseen by successive weak Public Service Integrity Commissioners.

In stark contrast, the code of ethics within the CF is buttressed by powerful cultural influences of basic assumptions along with immense social pressure as well as the all-encompassing disciplinary and punitive framework of military law. Along with the other supporting pillars of military culture, these cultural and psychological forces are highly effective at indoctrinating and molding Canadians into compliant group members who deeply identify with the collective military establishment. No other secular institution, including the public service, exerts such powerful influences upon its members or employees.

Since 1953, the CF accepted the basic assumptions of the values in use ethos as a way of life. As the recruitment advertisements for the military from the latter part of the 20th century proclaimed, there really was and is “No life like it” (Harrison & Laliberté, 1994, book title). It is a life, a vocation, not just a job. Even for veterans, this life and its
ethos continue well after the uniform comes off. Many veterans choose to wear the uniforms of veterans’ associations like the Royal Canadian Legion or the regalia of regimental associations. All veterans seeking to don military medals after leaving the CF must follow detailed guidelines issued by the Chancellery section of the Governor General of Canada.

For the purposes of Canada’s obligation to veterans, the ethos provides one side of the bargain between Canada and her serving military: the obligation of military members to devote all their personal resources to the service of the military and the nation. We must view each successive aspect of military culture and the nature of military service in light of what military members are asked to endure in the CF on behalf of Canada and Canadians, and whether the cultural aspects of that service will hinder or help veterans to live successful lives as civilians.

Now that we better understand the basic assumptions, we can more correctly interpret the artifacts of ceremonial displays and etiquette, discipline as well as cohesion and esprit de corps.

2.3.2-Military culture: Ceremonial displays and etiquette

“They are the totems around which one’s military identity and purpose are formed.” (Burk, 2008, p. 1247)

If there is one aspect of military culture with which civilians are familiar, it is that of ceremonial displays and etiquette. During peacetime, these are also the most noticeable aspects of military culture. However, the psychological and sociological reasoning (i.e., basic assumptions) of military ceremonial displays and etiquette are poorly
researched. Janowitz (1960) tells us that the “prescribed rules” and “actual practice” components of ceremonial displays and etiquette “supply a frame for molding social behavior” (p. 196). He notes that “no other occupation, with the exception of professional diplomacy, is so concerned with courtesy and protocol” (p. 196). Whereas ceremonial displays and etiquette for diplomats are required usually during diplomatic interactions, the “elaborate rules of [military] etiquette and ceremony” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 196) touch all aspects of military life. Janowitz (1960) further notes that:

“These rituals are but one of the devices of a profession which must control its anxiety due to its concern with death. The fact that these specialists in violence are so concerned with etiquette is a paradox, explainable only in that the elaborate forms of personal intercourse are designed to hide harsh realities, as well as boredom from endless routine.” (p. 196)

The codes of etiquette and ceremony are “designed to fuse the official and private sphere, since such fusion is a basic feature of professional military life” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 199). For career military members post-World War II, especially for officers and their wives, these codes of etiquette and ceremony dictated “appropriate behavior for every phase of the life cycle” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 200). From the frequent promiscuity of bachelorhood (and even married life) in the CF (Bercuson, 1997, pp. 53-7), marriage ceremonies, promotions, social and even family life especially if residing on military bases, retiring from the military, socializing during retirement via commemoration events and veterans' fraternal organizations and even death, the military culture has provided official and unofficial guidelines of appropriate behavior.
Burk (2008) explains the role of ceremonies and etiquette as rituals “to control or mask our anxieties and ignorance” but also to “affirm our solidarity with one another; and to celebrate our being usually in connection with some larger universe” (p. 1247). He emphasizes the psychological component of war and the necessity for such rituals:

No matter how it’s fought or when, war presents harsh realities of death, disease, and destruction, realities that have not grown less harsh over time. These are difficult to experience and, once experienced, difficult to contemplate, much less to comprehend. They can only be approached at a distance, through the filters of social forms. (2008, p. 1247)

These rituals “that mark collective identity and group affiliation” (Burk, 2008, p. 1247) include the myriad of military protocols and displays such as flags, regimental, squadron and naval colours, uniforms, military rank and professional achievements such as medals, ribbons and badges. Further rituals include ceremonies of reveille, lowering of the flag at sunset with trumpet or bagpipes, piping officers aboard ships, the ubiquitous salute, official and unofficial initiation (and unsanctioned hazing rituals), complex mess life protocols including formal mess dinners, endless military acronyms and idioms, and of course, marching drill and parades.

These rituals often take on a deeply religious tone. The quarter-deck of ships “has been considered a territory almost hallowed in nature” (Russell, 1980, p. 7). Successors to Roman standards carried into battle, standards, colours and flags are treated as sacrosanct in the military. Past battle honours sewn onto the material and are escorted by colour guards, often armed. Military members are required to salute the colours and
when the colours are “retired”, they are often placed in churches with clergy being instrumental to these conspicuous ceremonies (Russell, 1980, p. 184).

Ceremonies and etiquette pervaded the daily life in the three officer training institutions which operated after World War II, of which only Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston Ontario remains open. Young cadets, typically 17 or 18 years of age when they enter the colleges, were and are exposed to a unique daily litany of ceremonies and rituals during their four-year university education (five-years if entering College Militaire Royale via Quebec’s provincial education system). Some of these rituals included *reveille* which was called out every weekday morning to wake cadets along with morning announcements. During their first year, Cadets in Kingston were required to carry out a ritualized run to cross the parade square, often in class uniform. Those cadets accommodated furthest from dining facilities ran further than others. After three months in 1982, more than 80% of these cadets suffered lower limb injuries (Author). Other rituals at RMC required saluting “Brucie”, a bronze statue of a cadet, and every evening at 10pm, all studies ceased for an hour while cadets hungrily plunged into “kye”, a late night snack (Author; Russell, 1980, p. 50).

Burk (2008) rightly points out that these rituals and etiquette are not “an anachronistic persistence of tradition into modern times” (p. 1247). They serve multiple purposes beyond the visual or ritual experience. Awards, uniforms, ceremonies and other public displays create a two-fold paradoxical effect. They “connect the burdens of military service with the larger society the military serves” (p. 1247). They also “hope to convey
the full meaning of military service, to show how central military service is to the life and well-being of the country” (Burk, 2008, p. 1248). However, they also show the rest of society that the military is very different and separate from civilian society. These rituals provide:

[s]ubstance and motivation within a culture where one’s self-selected and self-abnegating service to country can be sustained, can be deemed sufficiently worthy as to overcome the increasing degradation of the historic career incentives such as income, medical care, and retirement benefits. (Snider, 1999, p. 18)

In the Canadian context, the separateness was emphasised by dedicated military hospitals for CF members and their families, relatively inexpensive base housing, free leisure travel on military aircraft, base schools and daycare and substantially discounted prices at dedicated military retail outlets (Author). Even with the disappearance of these perks, ceremonies and etiquette still provide powerful “totems around which one’s military identity and purpose are formed” (Burk, 2008, p. 1247).

Nevertheless, these rituals of ceremony and etiquette are profoundly connected with the past. They provide a continuum of military accomplishment, an intimidating and ever-present ghost of military honour, tradition and duty which hangs over every squadron, regiment and ship as well as the Canadian Forces as a whole. They also have powerful meaning which is deeply internalized; thereby hanging over every veteran long after military service is complete. These symbols and rituals further deepen the emotional connection of individuals to the collective military whole, establishing their identity and affiliation with the military, hence becoming integral to something bigger than themselves. Simultaneously, these symbols urge members to sacrifice on behalf their
closely connected peers, their unit, the military institution and the nation. All this reinforces the concept that the military profession is special, unique and separate from any civilian experience or institution. It is a stamp which is deeply implanted upon each and every military member to varying degrees for the rest of their lives.

How can a veteran successfully reintegrate into civilian society when they are expelled from the deeply spiritual and religious experience of military service that subordinates military members and their sense of self, 24 hours a day, seven days a week for years if not decades? Is severance pay, perhaps a retirement pension and job application training enough to ensure CF members fully optimize their potential as a civilian when their vocation has told them that they are fundamentally different from civilians? How does one transition out of a military vocation and into a profession or into a job? Keeping such questions at the forefront puts into perspective the long term consequences of military culture including the remaining elements: discipline, cohesion and esprit de corps.

2.3.3-Military culture: Discipline

“An individual who feels unfairly treated may register an after-the-fact protest called a redress of grievance. However, the appeal process is so long and cumbersome and usually entails career costs, even though the regulations governing redress state otherwise.” (Harrison & Laliberté, p. 25)

Rituals and ceremonies, like the salute and marching drill, serve another purpose: they are “indispensable to Service discipline” (Russell, 1980, p. 5). As Burk (2008) explains, “discipline, of course, is a means of social control” and a key pillar of military culture (p. 1245). Modern military cultures have assumed an ever increasing level of discipline since
the 17th century but the approach has moved away from “harsh corporeal punishment to a more positive leadership by persuasion, manipulation, and example” (Burk, 2008, p. 1245). However, there are still strong elements of coercion with punitive elements in espoused values as well as basic assumptions. In this context, discipline has three components: a system of military justice, self-discipline of each military member (Capstick, 2003, p. 51) as well as an important component little discussed in the literature: normative expectations otherwise known as how we do things around here.

2.3.3.1-Discipline: Military justice

“The objective of maintaining ‘discipline, efficiency and morale’ is rationally connected to dealing with criminal actions committed by members of the military even when not occurring in military circumstances... The behaviour of members of the military relates to discipline, efficiency and morale even when they are not on duty, in uniform, or on a military base.” Supreme Court of Canada, 2015 (as cited in Dias, 2015, para. 5)

The first component, military justice, is the most apparent element of discipline. In the CF, it is known as the Code of Service Discipline, a component of the National Defence Act. The code is the “basic legal framework” which is “supplemented” by the Queens Regulations and Orders (QR&Os), Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs), Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs) and “other orders that are promulgated under the authority conferred” by the National Defence Act. (Letourneau & Drapeau, 2011, p. 6). These are dauntingly large documents. The annotated version of the QR&Os created by Letourneau and Drapeau (2011) alone comprise more than 900 pages of fine print. CFAOs change so frequently and are so large that this is one of the reasons DND no longer publishes them on line as they consume far too much manpower to update (J.
Lamirande, DND public relations, personal communication, August 13, 2015). In addition, military members are also subject to Canada’s *Criminal Code* and the *Geneva Conventions*.

The unique military justice system has its own internal mechanisms for prosecution: the summary trial and the courts martial, the latter reserved for more serious offences and intended to be punitive in nature. These systems have long fomented the Canadian accusation of military justice being an “oxymoron” (Walker, 1994). By the mid-1990’s fewer than 100 courts martial but up to 4,000 summary proceedings were occurring annually in the CF (Friedland, 1997, p. 72). Whereas “courts martial can impose greater sentences than summary trials...[t]he summary trial is...generally used as a means of instilling military values and reintegrating the member into the military culture” (p. 72). As a government brief on military justice states: “the summary trial is meant to be corrective with the goal of socializing members to the habit of discipline, while at the same time fostering morale, esprit de corps, group cohesion, good order, and operational effectiveness and capability” (Friedland, 1997, p. 72).

These goals can be achieved with the less coercive punishments available to a summary trial such as extra work and drill (marching), stoppage of leave, confinement to ship or barracks or a formal warning (Letourneau and Drapeau, 2011, p. 328). However, the more serious punishments available to a summary trial appear more coercive, and far less enlightened than the military claims and include: fines, reprimands, “severe reprimands”, “forfeiture of seniority” (delays eligibility of promotion), reduction in rank, and up to 30 days detention in military jail (Letourneau and Drapeau, 2011, p. 15). Many
of these are meted out for infractions which would not be punishable in corporate employment or civilian courts.

“[T]he chain of command is central to the military justice system”, Friedland (1997) writes, and it is up to the discretion of the “commanding officer of the offender’s unit who decides how a matter will proceed” (p. 72). The objectivity of such a process is questionable especially given that the accused cannot object to the presiding officer even if the officer has a clear conflict of interest or has been emotionally compromised with the accused. Neither is the accused permitted an appeal (Friedland, 1997; Letourneau and Drapeau, 2011 ). In spite of the laudable stated goals by the government brief, the summary trial process can resemble more one of humiliation, disempowerment, subjugation and isolation. Meanwhile, “there is still considerable uncertainty about the constitutionality of the system of summary justice” (Friedland, 1997, p. 4).

This purpose here is not to examine whether military discipline achieves its goals nor question the appropriateness of denying full constitutional rights to military members. However, by not granting the same constitutional or judicial rights to military members as civilians enjoy when such rights are fundamental to the democratic principles for which military members are willing to die, this inconsistent situation further degrades the sacrifices of military members. How just is it that military members must die for something they cannot enjoy? This inconsistency also sends the message to military members that they are less important than the demands of the collective institution not to mention less deserving than the civilians for whom they sacrifice.
Nevertheless, in Canada’s post-World War II military, strict discipline did not always take such formal routes. Within army regiments, non-commissioned officers “counselled” repeat offenders “behind the barracks” (Bercuson, 1996, p. 61) or offenders received anonymous reminders by peers with “blanket parties” (Capstick, 2003, p. 50), both forms of unofficially sanctioned physical assault. Navy justice for theft could result in suspicious closing of hatches on an offender’s hands (Author). All this serves to disempower the individual military member subjugating him or her to a system which is often arbitrary and places the needs of the institution far above the rights of the individual.

2.3.3.2-Discipline: Self-discipline

“He stared down Lasagne because of parade training, not because of his superior intellect. He stared him down because he had been in a parade, and you don’t move, you don’t move, you don’t move. And when Lasagne spit at him, he didn’t move. That was parade training, that was conditioning...” Soldier speaking of the 1990 Oka standoff (as cited in Harrison & Laliberté, p. 26)

Immediately following World War II, scholars noted a growing trend away from the strict notions of discipline as embodied by the CF military justice system and the “arbitrary, informal methods of punishment” (Capstick, 2003, p.51) towards more persuasive means that encourage added self-discipline. In the U.S., Janowitz (1959a) termed this “from domination to initiative”, a trend which affected most western militaries, especially as they transitioned to large professional standing militaries (p. 480). Janowitz (1960) notes that “military organization is rigidly stratified and authoritarian because of the necessities of command and the possibilities of war” (p. 8). However the “military establishment has undergone a slow and continuing change” (p. 9) with a “shift
from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus” (p. 8). This partly reflects the revolution in civilian society but is also a necessity of “the technical character of modern warfare [which] requires highly skilled and highly motivated soldiers” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 9). Such trends were noted in World War II and arguably were a factor in Canadian tactics at the Battle of Vimy Ridge in 1917.

Nevertheless, the trend towards manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus results in an internalization of organizational demands, identity and norms. As discussed below and in Chapter three, such modern techniques of discipline arguably have far greater impacts upon the diminishment of autonomy, self-care and self-advocacy than the more brute forms of discipline such as corporal punishment utilized by past militaries.

2.3.3.3-Discipline: Normative expectations

“I wait every day for a car accident… I think ‘can somebody please flip your car so I can save your life…’ I’m looking for a rush, I’m looking for a reason to help people, I want near-deadly experiences, I want an apocalypse of this world, I want everything to go bad, I want you all to [expletive] need me to [expletive] save your life.” CF veteran interviewed for research (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 78)

The fading of traditional harsh, rigid or coercive disciplinary measures imposed from without gradually saw the cultivation, even in the CF’s often anachronistic military and informal justice systems, of increased self-discipline. As Burk (2008) tells us; “authoritarian discipline was no longer effective” in post-World War II militaries (p. 1245). Discipline instead becomes a group experience which helps to “ritualize the violence of war” (Burk, 2008, p. 1244). In following these complex and comprehensive normative guidelines, “discipline reassures soldiers in combat and defines when and how they are
‘authorized’ to violate the normal societal prohibitions against killing and violence” (Snider, 1999, p. 15).

Military forces and individuals have increasingly operated in more dispersed environments (as opposed to side-by-side in the trenches or in marching ranks), cultivating enhanced group cohesion which can operate in such dispersed environments. This has necessitated the inculcation of added self-discipline and internalization to serve the greater good: first the mission, protecting the unit second and finally caring for oneself. This internal discipline that serves the military and the mission may be beneficial to elevated unit cohesion and combat effectiveness. Nevertheless, how can a veteran with such powerfully indoctrinated sense of others, even when operating far from the military family, exercise initiative to care for oneself in the civilian world? Clearly the deeply internalized moral and disciplinary military messaging must be resilient to withstand isolation and operations in hostile environments. Likewise, such resilient internalization would be highly resistant to the more benign influences of civilian life. How difficult would it be for veterans to throw off this messaging to sacrifice for others while ignoring one’s own needs when there are few if any influences in civilian life that can match the psychological and sociological forces in the military that created such messaging in the first place?

Caring for oneself as a veteran requires a fundamental and difficult paradigm shift. Veterans must undergo a near impossible about-face from an external locus of control that has been deeply ingrained with strong normative expectations to care for the mission
and others while suppressing most of one’s individuality, to an internal locus of control of caring for oneself. The worldview of military members is the military world, not individual wants and needs. Yet identifying and advocating for such wants and needs is central to succeeding in civilian life. Shifting from defending others to advocating for oneself requires a powerful sense of autonomy and independence. Such individually-focused capacity is soundly, thoroughly and profoundly rejected by the collective military culture. Other cultural influences serve to further suppress the skills and practice of caring for oneself.

2.3.4-Military culture: Cohesion and esprit de corps

“An armed force is a body of men organized to achieve its ends by irresistibly coordinated action. Cohesion is, therefore, the essence of its being.” J.C.T. Downey (as cited in Cotton, 1982/83, p. 11)

“The problem is to retain group coherences and a rational pattern of discipline and command without relying on moribund features in the social structure.” General Sir John Hackett. (1983, p. 197)

Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton in a 1982/83 article points out that it is the coordinated action aspect of cohesion and other components of morale “which is as elusive as a statement of military ethos” (p.11). In this age of technological battlefields, it is still the spiritual that often has far more influence on the outcome than the material. In 2015, Iraqi national forces were better equipped and materially supported, had trained longer than the forces of the “Islamic State (IS)” and occupied a favourable defensive position in the city of Ramadi. However, when attacked by IS, the Iraqi forces crumbled in disarray (Naylor, 2015). The words of Canadian senior officers Loomis and Lightburn are still valid 35 years later: “On the battlefield...it is a fundamental truth that the outcome is more
dependent upon man himself than in any other factor” (1980, p. 17). Discipline coupled with morale is critical to military effectiveness, and cohesion is central to morale.

Burk (2008) argues that “morale is a product of cohesion and esprit de corps; and these are intangible, highly changeable elements of military culture” (p. 1248). Cohesion and esprit de corps are the organizational glue:

Military cohesion refers to the feelings of identity and comradeship that soldiers hold for those in their immediate military unit; it is an outgrowth of face-to-face or primary group relations or, in formal terms, of horizontal integration. Esprit de corps, in contrast, refers to the commitment and pride soldiers take in the larger military establishment to which their immediate unit belongs; it is an outgrowth of secondary group relations or, again formally, of vertical integration. (p. 1248)

In addition to being the organizational glue, these two salient features of military culture are rife with basic assumptions that are “primarily matters of belief and emotional attachment” (Burk, 2008, p. 1248). They are the foundation of the close fraternity of the “brotherhood in arms” and the strong sense of a military family in more than merely figurative terms. Together, cohesion and esprit de corps are also the engine of military action as they refer to the “soldiers’ willingness to fight” (Burk, 2008, p. 1248).

It was long believed that the factors affecting cohesion and the reasons why soldiers’ persevered in battle were primarily due to ideological, political or cultural reasons such as Nazism, communism, patriotism, God, King and Country, etc. Such beliefs “may have had some positive effect on esprit de corps, providing a vague sense of the justice of one’s cause and the basic goodness of the society for which one fought” (Burk, 2008, p. 1248). These beliefs or ideologies have also been powerful enough to bring
citizens to recruiting centres. However, other factors contributed far more to soldiers fighting cohesively and, therefore, effectively.

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz in their 1948 ground-breaking work discovered that “the values involved in political and social systems or ethical schemes do not have much impact on the determination of a soldier to fight to the best of his ability and to hold out as long as possible” (1948, pp. 164-5). They based their research upon comprehensive studies and interviews with World War II German Wehrmacht Prisoners of War. The researchers discovered that even while facing overwhelming Allied forces that cut off many smaller German units from larger ones, German units continued to fight effectively and did not readily disintegrate. Burk (2008) aptly summarizes Janowitz’s and Shils’ findings that group cohesion was far more influential to fighting effectiveness than “commitment to Nazi ideology”:

More important, they argued, was the capacity of the soldiers’ immediate unit, their company and platoon, to meet their basic needs for food and shelter, and for affection and esteem. These were more important because war posed a genuine threat to their sense of security and the recognition of their worth as human beings. So long as these needs were met, soldiers believed themselves part of a powerful group and felt responsible, even empowered, to fight for their group’s well-being. When these needs were not being met, soldiers felt alone and unable to protect themselves; the unit disintegrated and finally stopped. (p. 1248)

The importance of the primary group in motivating soldiers to continue to fight in the face of atrocious conditions, barbarity, immense stress and even poor leadership has been part of the Canadian experience. Barry Broadfoot’s (1974) oral history of World War II quotes a Canadian veteran who maintained that he fought “for your outfit, the guys in your
company, but especially your platoon...You did things to protect your buddies...They were more than your comrades, because they were your brothers” (pp. 208-9). More than 60 years later, CF veterans of the war in Afghanistan would voice near identical sentiments:

What ultimately matters to you most are the guys in your section. The thing that people forget when they watch World War II footage... you see these faceless soldiers in black and white and in uniform, but what you’ve got to remember is that these guys are friends, these guys know every detail about each other’s lives... what keeps you going is that you’re there to look after each other. (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 65)

If cohesion is low, and *esprit de corps* high, military units quickly disintegrate. However, cohesive units, as in the German case, can fight effectively even when *esprit de corps* in the larger command structure or mission is low. Bercuson (1996) amongst others have observed that CF members deployed to Bosnia in 1994 were furnished with inadequate, failing and out-of-date weapons and equipment while bound to rules of engagement which were too restrictive, a common theme for CF members deployed on UN peacekeeping missions throughout the post-World War II period. Poor coordination and questionable quality of CF, NATO, and UN senior leadership exasperated CF soldiers on the ground. In one particular incident, after finding themselves under heavy enemy fire between two heavily armed sides, a small section of eight men persevered over a week or more, two members later being decorated for their bravery. One of them, Sgt. Tom Hoppe became “one of the most highly decorated Canadian soldiers since the Second World War” after rescuing three young boys (Bercuson, 1996, pp. 148-53).

These bonds often last a lifetime either in military members attempting to continue or replicate their fraternal experience after military service in the form of
veterans’ associations or in the more poignant enduring memories of comrades lost and
the haunting memories which either continue or reawaken in veterans as they age.

In spite of the obvious importance of cohesion and *esprit de corps*, their
interrelationship with, “competence”, “chain of command” as well as expertise and
leadership “are seldom noted, much less analyzed, in today’s debates on military culture”
(Snider, 1999, p. 19). Less understood is the effect upon the individual of forming such
comprehensive and powerful primary group bonds as well as extraordinary connections
to an institution which has momentous influence and control over these same individuals.
Also poorly understood is what happens when these bonds are broken and military
members are released into a civilian world that understands little of these powerful
primary bonds let alone the complexity and richness of this unique military culture.

2.4-Military culture: Final words

“It’s hard to care about things you should care about in civilian life.”
“There was just an overwhelming sense that nothing mattered. Either nothing
mattered or everything mattered way too much.” Two CF veterans speaking about
civilian life after the military while being interviewed for research study (as cited in
Rose, 2015, p. 71)

Deeply indoctrinating military culture upon CF members is not the only reason
why Canada has a correspondingly profound obligation to CF veterans. There are other
reasons, but military culture is first and foremost both the *bedrock of military
effectiveness* and the foundation for Canada’s obligation to her military veterans. If we are
to meaningfully care for military members once they take off the uniform and become
veterans, it is imperative that we understand the tools involved to inculcate military
culture as well as the short and long term psychological and sociological effects of these tools upon military members and veterans. The next chapter develops this understanding by delving into the greater psychological context and consequences of military service.
Chapter 3: Psychological context of military service: The psychological tools, their consequences and impact upon transition

“Until we begin to assess militarism’s everyday human costs, we will miss a crucial part of militarism’s picture and lack a realistic basis from which to judge whether militarism’s benefits exceed – or fall short of – the enormous price taxpayers and human beings pay for them.” Deborah Harrison & Lucie Laliberté (1994, p. 242)

3.1-Introduction

Unlike most NATO nations after World War II, Canada relied solely upon volunteer recruitment as opposed to conscription. The Canadian Forces (CF) therefore has had to compete with the civilian marketplace for manpower. Since 1953, even with a combination of sometimes comparable salaries, early retirement pensions, housing and non-monetary benefits coupled with the emotive appeal of the unique nature of military service, the CF frequently fell short of enlistment targets. Military planners may have been operating “on market principles” during the last sixty years (Pinch, 2000, p. 176), but for the individual military member, “the military profession is not simply a market-based or scientific occupation. It is a soul-changing pursuit” (Burk, 2005, p. 56).

From the preceding chapter, we see the military institution as replete with a plethora of distinctive cultural characteristics. James Burk (2008) contends that “military culture is an elaborate social construction” (p. 1244). This social construction places immense demands upon the psychology, emotions and soul of each military member. These demands result in poorly understood consequences which may or may not justify an obligation that Canada has to its releasing military members. Essential to justifying this obligation is an understanding of these specific demands. In that context, what are the
demands and tools of military socialization employed by the military to remake Canadian civilians into soldiers? Why are CF members unquestionably willing to sacrifice themselves for Canada, the CF and their comrades-in-arms? In other words, 1) how does the military effect change to one’s soul, 2) what is the nature of these changes, and 3) what are the negative impacts upon a successful transition to civilian life?

3.2-Popular culture and the psychological context of military service: A window on sparse research

“Every Veteran Is at least Mildly Shell-Shocked” (Waller, 1944, p. 115).

A host of Hollywood productions have portrayed the reconstruction of civilians into combat military members. Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (Harlan & Kubrick, 1987) takes a decidedly dark approach whereas National Lampoon’s Stripes (Goldberg & Reitman, 1981) contains far more levity. These two extreme approaches and the gamut of movies in between illustrate how individuals are fundamentally changed by military indoctrination. As early as 1928, Eric Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front examined the unique life and impacts upon individuals serving in uniform, mostly in combat situations. Many other books and productions have also explored these issues. However, there are far fewer works that explore the difficulties of transitioning out of the military. Some of these works include the 1946 oscar-winning movie The Best Years of their Lives (Goldwyn & Wyler, 1946) which presciently identified many issues affecting World War II veterans. The Deer Hunter (Cimino, Deeley, Peverall, Spikings & Cimino, 1978), Coming Home (Hellman & Ashby, 1978), Born on the Fourth of July (Ho & Stone, 1989) and even action films such as First Blood (Feitshans & Kotcheff, 1982) subsequently
explored the reintegration of Vietnam War veterans into American society. More recent movies such as *Thanks of a Grateful Nation* (Neidenthal & Holcomb, 1998), *Jarhead* (Fisher, Wick & Mendes, 2005) and *Brothers* (De Luca & Sheridan, 2009) portray the difficulties of American soldiers returning from wars in the Persian Gulf.

These popular venues have all cultivated widespread awareness in the public of the unique nature of military service and the psychological complications it presents in transitioning out of uniform into civilian life. There is similarly a preponderance of research literature on how combat affects military members whose symptomology attains a threshold sufficient for a clinical diagnosis of a psychological disorder or a physical injury. However, in Canada, 88% of Canadian Forces veterans are not recognized for any injury, physical or psychological, related to military service (VAC, 2015a, p. 15). Of the 700,000 CF veterans and serving members, 14,850 or 2.1% have met the clinical threshold for a service-related psychological injury (VAC, 2015a, p. 31).

Medically diagnosable injuries provide an extremely limited picture as to how military service has impacted military veterans over the past seven decades. Given the popular, if not sometimes superficial awareness of military service, it is striking that there is a dearth of empirical studies dedicated to three areas portrayed in popular culture: 1) the psychological tools employed to indoctrinate civilians into military members, 2) the psychological effects of those tools, and, 3) how these effects impact transition into civilian life. If we have a universal obligation to our CF veterans, its foundation rests upon understanding, accepting and addressing how the military experience impacts transition
to civilian life. Before delving into these three questions, it is beneficial to look deeper at the psychological context of military service in general as well as in the CF specifically.

3.3-Historical insight into the psychological context of military service

“Militarization almost ranked as a disability itself.” (Segsworth, 1920, p. 67)

Almost a century ago, the father of modern psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud (1921), noted the similarities between the military and organized religion: “that in these two artificial groups each individual is bound by libidinal ties on one hand to the leader (Christ, the Commander-in-Chief) and on the other hand to members of the group” (p. 95). Freud asked but did not answer how these “ties are to be described psychologically” (p. 95). However, he provided us a frustratingly tantalizing observation of the psychological effect of military service when he wrote:

It would appear as though we are on the right road towards an explanation of the principal phenomenon of Group Psychology-the individual’s lack of freedom in a group. If each individual is bound in two directions by such an intense emotional tie, we shall find no difficulty in attributing to that circumstance the alteration and limitation which have been observed in his personality. (Freud, 1921, p. 95)

In spite of Freud’s observations, surprisingly very little research has been published regarding the psychological effects of military service outside the pathology of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and other psychological combat injuries. In addition to the effects of indoctrination discussed above, we have insight as to the psychological effects of military service from: historical observations, studies on psychological injuries as well as inferences that can be made from related research and observations.
One year prior to Freud’s observations, Walter Segsworth (1920), head of vocational training for Canadian veterans of World War I, prepared a report for the federal government, observing the following:

When a civilian entered the army, everything was done to make him a small unit in a large organization. He was taught to obey rather than to think; he was for the most part relieved of the care of his dependents; clothing, food and a place to sleep were provided for him. If he was guilty of a misdemeanour he was punished, but he was not deprived of the necessities of life, whereas in civil life he would have been discharged. Thus the whole system, for the time being, tended to reduce the action of his own will and relieve him of all sense of responsibility. (p. 67)

Meanwhile, a WW I Canadian government pamphlet advised how to interact with returning soldiers: “[m]ost of the men come back with sluggish mental action.” The document explained further that “[t]hey have been under military discipline so long, clothed, fed and ordered about that they have lost independence” (as cited in Morton, 1998, p. 19).

Although other aspects of Canada’s military culture changed over the succeeding century, key features of culture and training that tended to reduce the action of his own will have remained consistent. Liberal society increasingly encouraged independence and autonomy over the past century. By contrast, the CF preserved a culture of collectivity by: 1) suppressing individualism, 2) nurturing a culture that fosters camaraderie as well as loyalty to the military institution, to a hierarchical organizational structure, to its mission as well as to the nation, and 3) having all military members focus upon goals and tasks, typically to the exclusion of the needs and/or wishes of individual military members.
By the turn of this century, these relatively immutable aspects of military culture had all become codified in a lengthy military ethos, best summarized “with the professional precept of ‘Mission, own troops, self’” (Duty, 2003, p. 30). Central to this professional (as well as psychological, sociological and moral) code is the concept of unlimited liability. This three-part precept requires that every CF member dedicate all of their physical, social and psychological resources to prioritizing the accomplishment of the mission first, caring for and supporting their own troops in their immediate unit or proximity second, and then lastly caring for one’s self. Acting upon this code requires that individual needs and wishes are fully subordinated while the individual accepts unlimited conditions on his or her own body and mind to fulfill this obligation (Duty, 2003).

Once this sacred commandment of service in the CF is understood, one can place more effectively into context the three primary and “specific goals” of the socialization process which continues throughout one’s military career:

1) to remove characteristics that are detrimental to military life (that is, to subordinate self-interest to follow orders);
2) to train individuals to kill when necessary; and
3) to enable recruits to view themselves in collective terms (McGurk, Cotting, Britt & Adler, 2006, p. 14).

Socialization is defined as “the process whereby one internalizes the norms of his groups, so that a distinct ‘self’ emerges, unique to this individual” (Horton & Hunt, 1968, p. 98). From this traditional definition, military socialization is idiosyncratic to a certain extent in that it seeks to supress those unique characteristics of the distinct self which may conflict with the collective goals of the military. As sociologist Willard Waller pointed
out in 1944, in becoming an “interchangeable” part of the greater machine, the individual “must shed some of his personal characteristics and the army must ignore the rest” (p. 19). In so doing, the military “must partly annihilate and partly ignore the soldier’s private will” (Waller, 1944, p. 19). Although “military socialization penetrates more deeply the longer one serves...even the relatively brief periods of service typical of mass recruitments may be sufficiently long to shape conscripts’ basic attitudes and allegiances” (Krebs, 2004, p. 91).

Waller was observing the massed American armies of WW II but the suppression of personal interests that conflict with military duties has been a consistent requirement of putting on a CF uniform. Sociologist and senior CF officer, Charles Cotton, noted in 1981, that although the civilianization of the military was a recurring theme, there was still a strong vocational pull to the effect that “[i]f doing one’s duty interferes or conflicts with personal, family or other interests, the military’s claim over the person in uniform has primacy” (p. 101). That primacy was (and still remains) in effect 24 hours a day.

Although the military has been far more accommodating to personal and family needs since the 1980’s, the CF reinforces an ethos that “personnel derive a collective unity and identity from the unique function they perform” (Duty, 2003, p. 20). It cannot be emphasized enough that this unique function, at its core, requires a willing and voluntary commitment to “unlimited liability and service before self” (Duty, 2003, p. 20). As one CF senior officer who served in Afghanistan stated in a Defence Research study:

I am a professional; I eat, sleep, and breathe the profession... I believe the warrior ethos ... It’s all about discipline and commitment and self sacrifice... this feeling of
greater good...I had always upheld that you die for the regiment. Battalion first, yourself second. I remember thinking on patrol, “I am a (CF REGIMENT),”...I think it was that feeling of greater good. (Thompson, Thompson & Adams, 2008, p. 4)

Senior officers have by virtue of their rank, served longer in the CF and are largely older than more junior officers and junior non-commissioned members. A 2004 study of army culture determined that older as well as more senior ranking CF members have a “stronger sense of duty and ethics” (Capstick, Farley, Wild & Parkes, 2005, pp.15-17). The same survey as well as an accompanying Army Climate Survey noted that senior officers and older CF members had more buy-in to the professional values of the CF.

Does this mean that the junior ranks comprising the overwhelming majority of CF personnel do not have the same commitment and therefore are not as psychologically manipulated and/or persuaded by the system? Not necessarily. When compared to the general Canadian population, all army soldiers “tend to be more conservative...concerned with duty, loyalty and do not rebel against structure...and a tendency to look to others for guidance rather than be guided from within” (Capstick, et al., 2005, p. 24). Almost all rank levels in 2004 had increased their commitment from 1979 to go into combat if ordered (Capstick, et al., 2005, p. 34). Steve Rose in his 2015 doctoral dissertation, Applying Durkheim’s theory of suicide: A study of altruism and anomie among Canadian veterans of Afghanistan, noted that even with civilianization influences, the CF continues to remain a highly distinct institution. As one interviewee stated, “It’s not a job, we’re always military” (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 69).
3.4-Psychological context: Psychological tools

How does one become *always military*? This is accomplished through a variety of psychological, cultural and environmental tools found in militaries such as the CF. These tools include but are not limited to: *indoctrination*, *total Institutions*, *learned helplessness*, *identity change*, and *belonging*. Each is a highly persuasive and powerful psychological mechanism with enduring consequences that combine to bring about an identity change until one becomes *always military*. CF members are subjected to all five tools. Therefore, a substantive understanding of each tool and its effects are essential to identifying why any military member, including those in the CF, would require assistance transitioning to civilian life. The first and most well-known psychological tool is indoctrination.

3.4.1-Psychological tools: Indoctrination

*The aim of an army is to impose its will upon the enemy. Before an army can succeed in this purpose, its leaders must first impose their will upon the men in their organization. They must mold the common soldiers and the officers into perfect instruments for expressing the will of the leader.* (Waller, 1944, p. 19)

Various instances of indoctrination since World War II have fascinated and horrified Western societies. These include Nazi Germany’s ideological basis to commit horrific acts of inhumanity, North Korean successes in forcing American prisoners of war in the early 1950’s to self-denounce, various American religious sects such as David Koresh and the Branch Davidians as well as Patty Hearst and the Symbionese Liberation Army’s self-destructive and anti-institutional paths, and more recently, the influx of recruits from around the world into the Islamic State. Originally labelled and still known as
“brainwashing” (Farber, Harlow & West, 1957), the concept of indoctrination continues to carry a negative connotation (Rose, 2015).

Meanwhile, government and society-sanctioned indoctrination has been and remains the foundation of any member joining a nation’s military. Indoctrination is the primary vehicle by which military culture is comprehensively and deeply internalized by military members. Indoctrination also facilitates greater effectiveness of the other psychological tools of military service. Therefore, understanding military indoctrination and its consequences is at the heart of understanding why we have an obligation to our military veterans. First we might ask whether all indoctrination is the same.

The difference between ideological or cult-like indoctrination and military indoctrination is that while both prepare individuals to kill or potentially be killed or injured themselves, military indoctrination aims to develop “more traditionally accepted standards of conduct and socially accepted values” (McGurk et al., 2006, p. 15). Nevertheless, McGurk et al. (2006) propose that the techniques, stages and psychological consequences are essentially the same. In this context, “indoctrination represents an extreme form of persuasion, in which the goal is to persuade an individual to perform some behaviors that before the indoctrination experience would have been considered ludicrous” (McGurk et al., 2006, p. 22). The similarity between military indoctrination and cult indoctrination is that they both fit under the rubric of what Baron labels “intense indoctrination” (2000, p. 238; also see McGurk et al., 2006, p. 14). As such, military indoctrination becomes an intensely extreme form of persuasion that convinces civilians
volunteering for military service to “engage in behaviors that represent a radical departure from their prior experiences and worldview” (McGurk et al., 2006, p. 15). McGurk et al. (2006) identify two such behaviours in the military context: “(1) killing someone else in the service of a mission to protect one’s country, and (2) the willingness to subordinate self-interests, including survival, in the service of group goals” (p. 15).

For the CF, the first installment of a career-long intense indoctrination process has been typically carried out during basic training or *boot camp* as it is popularly known. Prior to unification of the three services in the late 1960’s, the Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Canadian Navy and Army each provided their own basic training. This allowed each service to indoctrinate recruits into the specific culture of that service. Since unification, all Canadians joining the military, whatever their eventual occupation or trade category, have undergone basic training in unified CF recruitment schools (Bercuson, 1996). Officers and non-commissioned members were and are still separated. Basic training has lasted typically from six to 15 weeks depending on various factors including whether one was enlisted as an officer or a non-commissioned member. A shorter basic training of six weeks for officers attending one of the military colleges was then augmented with an additional six weeks of recruit indoctrination at the assigned college (Author). Currently, basic training for officers is 15 weeks and for non-commissioned members, 14 weeks (Lee, McCreary & Villeneuve, 2011, p. 778).
Baron and others identify various stages of the intense indoctrination process, stages which are also applicable to the military context. The four stages are: softening-up, compliance, internalization and consolidation (Baron, 2000, pp. 240-1).

3.4.1.1-Indoctrination: Softening-up Stage

More commonly known as the stripping or tearing down phase, recruits are isolated from previous civilian connections. This isolation is reinforced by carrying out training in remote or isolated bases wherein recruits are subjected to regimented communal living, eating and sleeping in military barracks or dormitories. Recruits are subjected to numerous psychological and physical stressors such as sleep deprivation, disorientation, demanding physical regimens, ever-present fear of individual failure and group condemnation, constant training stimulus, repetitive mental activity, “information overload” as well as the strict codes of dress and comportment (Baron, 2000, pp. 241-7).

Even with more relaxed training standards over the past four decades, current CF recruits are still confined to base for an initial four week period, are not permitted visitors for the entire duration of training, have strict rules about use of communication with the outside world and are forbidden any “alcoholic beverages” and “food stuff (fruits, chips, candy, etc.) and drinks, including supplements” on their person or in their quarters. Daily schedules are fully occupied with prescribed activity from 5:00 am to 11:00 pm (Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School, 2014, pp. 8, 12-13). As Harrison and Laliberté (1994) observe, “[t]he strategy of basic training is constant drill, accompanied by constant negative reinforcement, until the recruit is ready to crack” (p. 22).
Recruits are stripped of their individual and previous civilian identity, with all aspects of living controlled by the military where comportment, dress, hairstyles, rooms, personal effects, manner of walking, speaking as well as professional and athletic training are to conform to exacting military standards. Recruits have been typically addressed with a generic title like “recruit” or by a numerical identification while often required to refer to themselves in the third person (Burke, 2004, p. 6). The goal is that “[p]revious achievement, family, and individuality are ignored, and the institution’s own indicators of achievements, reference group, and status are demanded in their place” (McGurk et al., 2006, p. 19). As Baron (2000) observes, this “period of initial stress apparently increases the effectiveness of an intense assault on an individual’s attitudes, beliefs, and values” (p.241). Even “more subtle procedures” that are also utilized by today’s military are sufficient enough to “prepare individuals for effective indoctrination” (Baron, 2000, p. 241).

3.4.1.2-Indoctrination: Compliance Stage

Once softened or “ready to crack”, the recruit “tries out’ some of the behaviours requested by the group...going through the motions or paying lip service to many of the demands made by the group ” (Baron, 2000, p. 241). In the case of the military, lip service still requires inflexible obedience to military authority. Social pressure plays an ever increasing role beginning in the compliance stage. Recruits are humiliated publicly for having let down the group standard with various punishments such as push ups, running, extra marching or confinement to barracks. Often the entire group is punished for the
infraction of single individuals. “[E]ager to avoid more punishment,” Harrison & Laliberté (1994) maintain “...members will vigorously police one another’s conformity” (p. 28). Even compliance through politeness may “render” recruits “more susceptible” to the indoctrination (Baron, 2000, p. 243). Various techniques are employed such as “appeal to authority”, repetition and reinforcement of doctrine and activities which although recruits may perform for extrinsic reasons initially, these techniques increase the opportunities to internalize the indoctrination (Cialdini, 2009). Authority is particularly powerful in the military context. Rank is prominently displayed at all times in both uniform and attitude, and there are strict values in use about publicly addressing those of higher rank. Group activities such as physical training, scrubbing floors, entering the “gas chamber” filled with tear gas, parade drills which “condition relentlessly” (Harrison & Laliberté, 1994, p. 26) and rhythmic chants also reinforce the indoctrination messages and sense of group belonging (Burke, 2004; McGurk et al., 2006, p. 21).

3.4.1.3-Indoctrination: Internalization Stage

Recruits begin to re-evaluate old beliefs and internalize the group’s “belief system” through curiosity, powerful and “persistent social pressures” and “the need to justify prior compliance” (Baron, 2000, p. 241). Prior compliance includes taking the military oath, the emotion-filled process of leaving family, friends and opportunities as well as enduring public punishments. Prior compliance accumulates the longer one stays in the military. Training, courses, accumulating commitments to the institution and to peers as well as the increasing emotional acceptance and identification with military standards and
expectations further solidify one’s compliance with institutional expectations. Those that
joined the military for “relatively extrinsic reasons” such as monetary gain or “parental
approval” will be unlikely to experience internal changes (McGurk, et al., 2006, p. 20) and
have a greater likelihood of leaving the military. However, those who begin to internalize
the values will be intrinsically motivated to behave in a manner consistent with the
expectations of the military (Ryan & Deci, 2000). As the term suggests, internalization
moves the powerful external motivations to obey and conform into one’s internal world
of identity, meaning and self-worth.

3.4.1.4-Indoctrination: Consolidation Stage

In this final stage, “the recruit solidifies his or her newly acquired allegiance to the
group” with a “total acceptance of group doctrine and policy with a minimum of close
examination” (Baron, 2000, p. 241). Any conflicting information about the group is met
with “denial and rationalization” and the recruit will be “highly resistant to persuasion
from those outside the group” (p. 241). One of the core messages which solidifies the
commitment of the recruit to the group is a firm belief in the ““messianic’ group purpose”
and “stereotypical depiction of nonmembers as evil or misguided” (Baron, 2000, p. 241).

Service and sacrifice to others and one’s nation qualifies as a “messianic” or
“transcendent cause” (Baron, 2000, p. 250). In most militaries, what begins in the initial
stages of recruit training as isolation from previous civilian lives and contacts grows into
turning one’s back on civil society: “The civilian is looked down upon, reluctantly accepted
if at all, and disparaged” (Mullan, 1948, p. 279). One of the most disparaging insults
against military members at any stage of their career is to accuse them of doing something like a *civvy* (derogatory for civilian) whether it be marching like a *civvy*, being lazy like a *civvy* or thinking slowly or ineffectively like a *civvy* (Rose, 2015; also Author). Disturbingly, throughout Canada’s post-war history, up to and including today, an equal or more denigrating insult is being labelled a “girl” or “pussies” or other derogatory names for women, their body parts or behaviours (Deschamps, 2015, pp. 15, 19, 22-3). Not surprisingly, one of the most menacing threats to recruits or military members is to be involuntarily released and forced to become a disparaged civilian once again (Bruyea, 2011a).

The reintegration into civilian society of CF members who undergo such intense indoctrination raises several questions. Would deeply indoctrinated individuals in a macho culture taught to mistrust and look down upon civilians, especially females, not be at a disadvantage in re-integrating back into this more gender equal civilian culture? Does Canada not have an obligation to help them readjust to a culture they despise, disparage and mistrust? These questions are easier answered once we understand the potent and enduring psychological effects of military indoctrination.

### 3.4.1.5-Indoctrination: Effects

Research into indoctrination identifies differing stages, attributing various effects to the identified stages (Baron, 2000; Lifton, 1961; McGurk et. al., 2006; Sargant, 1967). Nevertheless, most research agrees that the effects of indoctrination are consistent as a whole. For the purposes of this thesis, in addition to those effects identified above, I have
organized the effects of military indoctrination into two areas: those affecting cognitive capacities, which I call *dumbing down* and those that contribute to the military member becoming more *malleable*.

### 3.4.1.5.1-Expressway to indoctrination: *Dumbing down* the military member

Denigration of the outgroup serves the ultimate purpose of training soldiers to kill. McGurk et. al. (2006) note that in preparation for the chaos and fear of war and the possibility of death, indoctrination uses “processes to shape attitudes toward killing” (p. 21). These processes are integral to indoctrination and include stripping away other group as well as one’s own personal identity while stripping away the identities of the enemy so that they may be dehumanized or even demonized (McGurk et. al., 2006). Along with indoctrinating a “desensitization to discharge weapons”, such stereotyping helps to overcome an assumed “inherent reluctance to kill” (McGurk et al., 2006, p. 21).

To carry out the daunting responsibilities of taking the lives of others while risking one’s own life to protect others, fundamental changes to one’s world view and identity occur. Furthermore, cognition is dramatically affected by the intense indoctrination process. The process is more detailed than described herein but the result is the same: an inevitable reduction in cognitive ability and capacity or a *dumbing down* so that what was complex and had context is now reduced to more simplified, black and white, terms.

As civilianization management models have permeated western militaries, some may claim that military socialization is similar to that of joining the public service or a highly motivated private enterprise. However, Baron (2000) emphasizes intense
indoctrination like that utilized by the military, is a “qualitatively unique form of social influence” (p. 245). For example, “the internal states produced by intense indoctrination impair attentional capacity thereby dramatically enhancing the effectiveness of various psychological processes” (Baron, 2000, p. 245). Depleting “attentional capacity” is a “key process leading to successful indoctrination” (p. 245). Attentional capacity allows individuals to process the veracity and merits of incoming information. Sleep deprivation, physical fatigue, “high rates of activity”, time pressures, “information overload” and “emotionality” have all been known to lower attentional capacity and increase stress (Baron, 2000, p. 242).

The presence of physical stress in the recruitment stages has been well-established in the Canadian context (Lee, McCreary & Villeneuve, 2011) as well as in the American experience (Martin, Williamson, Alfonso & Ryan, 2006; Williams et al., 2004) with notable physiological and psychological markers present in similar stressful military training environments (Taylor et al., 2007). Stress peaks in the initial period of training but both stress and arousal are present or result in changes in “internal states” through all stages of the indoctrination process (Baron, 2000, p. 242).

The increased stress and resultant lowered attentional capacity of the softening-up stage therefore prepares the recruit to be more susceptible to and internalize “poorly supported arguments, social pressure and the temptation to derogate nongroup members” (Baron, 2000, p. 251). Furthermore, the stressful nature of intense indoctrination discourages “prolonged and recurrent examination” of group doctrine
resulting in a “categorical acceptance of that doctrine” (p. 251). These changes become “relatively impervious to attempts to dissuade them from their newly acquired beliefs” (Baron, 2000, p. 251).

The diminished attentional capacity results in the recruit taking cognitive shortcuts or heuristic processing of information. Stereotyping of outgroup members is just one example of heuristic processing. The opposite of heuristic processing is systematic processing which “requires more ability” (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997, p. 84). Such ability is a scarce resource for a recruit during basic training. The military inculcates other cognitive shortcuts such as the “consensus implies correctness” and “experts statements can be trusted, hence bypassing “more detailed processing of information” (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997, p. 84). Moreover, countering such heuristics requires “cognitive capacity” to “excel in that domain” of processing information (Forbes & Schmader, 2010, p. 741), a domain of military training wherein the recruit’s credibility and individuality is continually under assault and immense pressure from “unanimous group consensus” (Baron, 2000, p. 245). This “total institution” environment (Goffman, 1961; also see total institution discussion below) depletes cognitive capacity and prevents the independent thought necessary if one hopes to excel in countering the cognitive short-cuts, biases and stereotypes or military indoctrination.

Furthermore, these “[c]apacity limitations prevent us from acting rationally and force us to rely on heuristics, which are considered a source of judgemental errors” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 457). Since language becomes polarized and loaded
with “thought-terminating cliché[s]”, the individual becomes “linguistically deprived”
resulting in the individual’s “capacities for thinking and feeling” being “immensely
narrowed” (Lifton, 1961, pp. 488-9). This “milieu control” as described by R.J. Lifton, is a
“profound threat” to the individual’s “personal autonomy” (1961, p. 479).

In essence, the intense indoctrination process is so overwhelming that it cannot be
countered effectively or meaningfully to prevent the messages of indoctrination from
being internalized. At the very least, individuals cannot avoid acting upon the messaging.
As one successful civilian professional in his middle ages commented to me after entering
the reserves and undergoing basic training with a group of like-minded civilians:

We were all professionals with our own careers. We knew what they were doing
to us. We sat around and discussed it endlessly. We understood the
techniques…but we couldn’t help but react to it. We were all afraid of being kicked
out. (as cited in Bruyea, 2011a)

Baron (2000) emphasizes that “it would be glib to assume that only certain types of
individuals are susceptible to intense indoctrination…only rare individuals will be
unaffected by a full program of intense indoctrination” (p. 251). No other institution let
alone any occupation employs such powerful psychological tools lending further credence
to the CF motto from the late 20th century, there’s no life like it (Harrison & Laliberté,
1994).

Certainly some of the heuristics of indoctrination are beneficial to the military
member in a military combat environment when fast thinking and reliance upon tried and
true rules can save lives and/or successfully accomplish the mission. The question
becomes: how effective are these cognitive shortcuts when more difficult decisions must be made such as identifying unethical orders or poor leadership judgement which risks too many lives to accomplish the mission. Furthermore, once the military member is required to plan and live a life after the military, such cognitive shortcuts could lead to poor life or monetary choices while hindering optimization of a veteran’s full potential in a far more fluid and dynamic civilian environment. As Baron argues, “attitudes and beliefs changed initially as a result of heuristic message processing will become solidified, more extreme over time, integrated into other aspects of self and, as a result, relatively impervious to change” (2000, p. 245). Will the impact of this dumbing down endure long enough to affect the ability of the veteran to optimally and successfully re-enter civilian life? If so, do we not have an obligation to try to compensate for or reverse negative or unhelpful impacts after the uniform comes off?

The persistence of these attitude and belief changes also serves another purpose: minimizing self-reflection and moral responsibility to kill others or care for oneself (Smith & True, 2014). This attitude persistence also makes the military member highly malleable to further cognitive shortcuts prevalent in the military institution.

3.4.1.5.2-A child reborn into the military family: Giving purpose to the malleable

Military recruits in most western nations are treated as “children, scolding these babes in arms because in the eyes of the institution, they do not speak, walk or even eat properly” (Burke, 2004, p. 6). Drill instructors bark orders employing “constant sarcasm and verbal bullying” (Working, 2007, p. 55), forcing recruits to suppress other aspects of
themselves, their anger and their frustration. These are not merely sources of “cognitive debilitation” (Baron, 2000, p. 249), they are attacks directly on the self-esteem of the recruit, made notably worse by the confusion and stress of basic training. The external confusion creates a situation where the recruit is internally confused and must rely upon the external authority of military instructors. Some believe this confusion is to simulate war wherein recruits learn to trust and “follow orders”, thereby making their lives “calmer” when all around is chaos (Burke, 2004, p. 6).

Internally, the lowered self-esteem helps contribute to “confusion about appropriate and viable self-conceptions” (Baron, 2000, p. 250). Making the recruit more malleable, this self-conception confusion paves the way for the most important goal of military indoctrination: identity change. Internal changes, including to identity, come about easier under intense indoctrination as the attacks and consequent changes in self-esteem make “self-conception relatively labile” (Baron, 2000, p. 250). After the recruit has been cracked and stripped down, he or she can now be built up. The reinforcement of the “messianic” or “transcendent cause” of military service also promotes identity change by providing an identity of self-less service, a higher calling, “thereby remedying the very feelings of insignificance and low self-esteem” (p. 250). The fear, stress and external and internal confusion creates conditions wherein authority figures become “powerful forces of influence” and “attractive role models” (Baron, 2000, p. 250). Recruits also identify themselves as a member of the military, the in-group, while being distinct from the out-group (McGurk, et al. 2006, p. 23). The out-group for the CF during basic training is usually limited to civilians, with whom recruits are strongly encouraged to not identify while a
subculture of competing in-groups between different training units helps promote what the military considers healthy competition (Harrison & Laliberté, 1994).

Sargent noted in 1957, the “intense attitude persistence” resulting from intense indoctrination (Baron, 2000, p. 242). Forty years later, Baron observed that “social confirmation... increased the probability that the new attitudes would become well integrated in one’s sense of self” and that such “ego-involving attitudes are indeed relatively resistant to change” (Baron, 2000, p. 242). The impact of indoctrination messaging coupled with strong pressures of social conformity and the multiple techniques causing profound changes in internal psychology and cognitive processing bring about substantial changes in the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and identities of recruits. Indoctrination during basic training, however, is not the only psychological tool to bring about substantial changes.

3.4.2-Additional psychological tools: Total institutions, learned helplessness, identity change, and belonging

“...lessons were reinforced over and over and over again during battle school. Everything was a test, which meant being on your toes all the time. If he thought that basic training was a challenge, it was a treat compared to this. Billy soon learned what PT (physical training) really meant-keep going no matter what. Adapt. Overcome. Never give up. Suck up the pain, and if you are pissed off, then use it as a weapon...It was like basic on steroids...” CF veteran (as cited in Whelan, 2014, p. 33)

3.4.2.1 Additional psychological tools: Introduction

Basic training is not the only period of indoctrination for military members. It is also not even the only period of intense indoctrination. In the Canadian military, as with most modern militaries, training is ongoing. There are two reasons for this. First, since
World War II, warfare has become progressively technological. This has increased the demands upon individual military members to take multiple formal training courses on how to utilize successively complex weapon systems while studying and practicing frequently changing tactics (Janowitz, 1959a, 1959b, 1960).

Second, the CF like most Western militaries have become more bureaucratic in order to adjust to the constant flux and demands of warfare, increasing logistics complexity as well as civilian oversight and accompanying civilian management practices (Bercuson, 1996; Cotton, Crook & Pinch, 1978; Cotton, 1981, 1982/83; Horn & Bentley, 2015; Kasurak 1982). These factors have necessitated formal courses for most promotions, as well as intense and often protracted specific training for the roles each member is assigned, (e.g. artillery, pilot, armour, search and rescue, naval engine or naval combat technician, navigation officer, intelligence operator or officer, etc.). Training courses for these and other roles involve stressful environments wherein members engage in role-playing often in real-time scenarios. There is no civilian equivalent for such formalized and career-long indoctrination through extensive and intensive training.

Indoctrination and training are also dramatically enhanced by other psychological tools used to change the soul of military members and to recondition them from individuals to members of a collective whose identity is deeply enmeshed with that of the military institution. These additional psychological tools are total institutions, learned helplessness, identity change, and belonging.
3.4.2.2- Additional psychological tools: Total Institutions

One cannot consider the concept of total institutions without considering Erving Goffman’s work on the subject (Mouzelis, 1971, p. 113). In a 1957 symposium held at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in Washington D.C., Goffman (1961) presented his paper “The Characteristics of Total Institutions” (p. 312). He summarized the characteristics as follows:

(1) all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority;
(2) [the member’s] daily activity will be carried out in the immediate company of a large batch of others...treated alike and required to do the same thing together;
(3) [daily] activities are tightly scheduled [with all activities] being imposed form above through a system of formal rulings and a body of officials; and
(4) enforced activities [are] designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution (p. 451).

Goffman (1960) identified military barracks and ships as meeting the criteria of total institutions (p. 450).

Although the CF has increasingly dismantled military accommodations over the past two decades, members must continue to live in a total institution setting during basic training, classification (officers) and trade (non-commissioned members) training, military exercises and deployments, isolated postings, the four-year post-secondary education of officers at Royal Military College as well as onboard ships. Although there currently exists only one military college which is located in Kingston Ontario, for much of the post-Korean War era there were three military colleges granting university degrees (Horn & Bentley, 2015).
It must also be emphasized that from the 1950’s to the early 1990’s, current CF veterans while in the military, often lived on bases and were frequently provided retail shopping, recreation, medical, dining and entertainment facilities including the military mess as well as schooling for families. These were not total institutions in Goffman’s strictest sense since schedules were not consistently controlled 24 hours a day. However, such environments for working and living immersed CF military personnel and their families in an omnipresent military culture for much of the last half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, military deployments, especially those related to combat or near-combat missions such as peacekeeping, transformed the military units deployed into functioning more like a total institution, “than during peacetime” due to the “significantly higher levels of social cohesion” (Braswell & Kushner, 2012, p. 33).

What is important for the purposes of this thesis is not the debate about whether one military experience strictly meets the total institution criteria or not. The relevant question is whether enrollment in the CF results in similar psychological effects of being in a total institution as described by Goffman and others. Individuals entering a total institution undergo a comprehensive “stripping process through which mortification of the self occurs” (Goffman, 1961, p. 317, original italics). As noted during intense indoctrination, previous supports and attachments are stripped away. This is similar to Goffman’s observations that through “a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations and profanations” the self is “systematically...mortified” resulting in “radical shifts in his moral career” (Goffman, 1961, p. 317, original italics). The spouse of a CF pilot noted the profound changes in her husband during training:
And when I first met Pete, I said to him one day “Could you fly over a village and bomb?” ‘Cause I’m kind of a peacenik. ... And he said to me, “No, I couldn’t do that.” And about midway through fighter weapons school, I noticed this wall – not towards me or towards anybody – but I noticed something changing. And he was becoming this fighting machine. And I don’t know how they did it, but they did it. And I said to him, “Could you fly over a village and bomb?” He said, “If I was ordered to, yes.” That cold and simple. And I went, “My God, what have I married?” (Harrison & Laliberté, 1994, p. 20)

It must be emphasized that the profound changes in this pilot’s moral career occurred not during basic training or combat but during the course of a typical CF training course.

From the cohesion and discipline aspects of military culture previously discussed, one can see why Goffman (1961) maintains that authority ensures members of a total institution “cannot escape...judgemental officials” (or their similarly indoctrinated peers) (p. 319). Rules are “abundant, novel and closely enforced” resulting in a “chronic anxiety about breaking the rules” and the consequences which may ensue (p. 319). Ultimately, the system “undermines the basis for control that adults...expect to exert over their interpersonal environment” with individuals in total institutions abjuring “certain levels of sociability...in order to avoid” the system of judgemental authority (Goffman, 1961, p. 319).

The system of judgemental military authority includes higher ranks, peers and “subordinates” who live by the code of the “warrior culture” which values “strength, resilience, courage, and personal sacrifice” (Bryan & Morrow, 2011, p. 17). The “close, in-group bonds” of this culture prevent military members from seeking help from “outsiders”, including mental health professionals, who are viewed with “suspicion and
distrust” (Bryan & Morrow, 2011, p. 17). To seek help can be been seen as a violation of the code which “typically results in shaming by other members” (Bryan, Jennings, Jobbes & Bradley, 2012, p. 98). The military encourages self-reliance and strength. Paradoxically, the military often discourages the very strengths necessary for resilience such as self-reflection to uncover “deeply held beliefs” (Reivich, Seligman & McBride, 2011, pp. 26-7). This masculine culture thereby hinders problem solving (Reivich et al., 2011) while denial of necessary self-care can “take a significant toll on the physical and psychological health of troops” (Braswell & Kushner, 2012, p. 533).

This masculine warrior culture coupled with the anti-intellectual environment of the CF perpetuated an internal and external culture of idealizing the CF. By glossing over or ignoring social crises in order to present, what Goffman (1960) describes as an image of “unity, solidarity and joint commitment to the institution” (p. 472), towing the institutional line became endemic in the CF. Media outlets operated by the CF such as newspapers and radio stations did not report on issues of significance that directly affected military families such as “local wife assaults, rapes, or other crimes...nor did it provide discussion on social issues” (Harrison & Laliberté, 1994, p. 201). Isabell Campbell in her detailed study of CF personnel in Europe argues:

In the culture of the Canadian Army, the idea that the public had a right to know, to debate, and to participate in decisions violated principles of military loyalty; loyalty, discretion, and privilege dominated even in matters where security was irrelevant, such as the quality of family life. (2013, p. 113)

Even “suspicious deaths, including several infants and small children with fractured skulls, asphyxia, and multiple injuries” were not investigated (Campbell, 2013, pp. 111-2).
Harrison and Laliberté (1994) maintain that the emphasis on presenting a positive image of the military for insiders and outsiders resulted in ignoring, covering-up or perpetuating pernicious social problems such as wife-battering, prevalent alcoholism or alcohol-related behavioural problems as well as child abuse and child molestation.

In paralleling Goffman’s work, Vidich and Stein (1960) noted that the military member’s “[l]ack of credence or publicly voiced disloyalty are a threat to the fundamental structure of the community” (p. 494). Towing the institutional line to this extent will reach a crisis point. This is exactly what happened to the CF in the 1990’s after decades of cover-ups. Revelations of the Airborne Regiment’s murder and torture of a young Somali teen, mentioned in Chapter 2, allowed a brief glimpse at the CF’s dirty secrets; a glimpse which precipitated many changes in the CF. The underlying institutional controls and methods, however, remained. The question to examine here is to what extent these controls endure once the uniform comes off.

Goffman (1961) claimed that, other than religious institutions, the stripping or other processes of total institutions do not “seem to have a lasting effect” (p. 328). In the context of the military, this statement is not accurate. Freud (1921) saw very close parallels between the profound changes brought about by military and those brought about by religious institutions. Goffman’s contemporary, Morris Janowitz (1959), more versed in the military establishment and well aware of the civilianization trends in the military, argues that the military authority places great demands upon its members: “Military life, is in short, institutional life” (p. 25). Even researchers who question the continued labelling of the military as a total institution note “military service, particularly
in wartime, has often exerted profound effects on veterans’ employment prospects, psychological well-being, and personal relationships” (Krebs, 2004, p. 93).

Others believe that the total institution environment, characteristic of the professional military such as military academies, has a lifelong and profound effect upon those who aspire to make regular military service a lifelong career: “Extreme group consciousness is forever implanted in the personality of the regular-service aspirant when finally he is admitted to the regular corps” with the result that “[h]is lifelong dependency is complete” (Mullan, 1948, p. 280). Mullan (1948) further contends: “security gained by the service individual has been attained only by complete conformity and dependency since teen age, with marked constriction of the scope of personality” (p. 278). More than 65 years later, Smith and True (2014) observed the “high levels of social integration, regimentation and social control” strip each military member of “his or her individuality and agency” (p. 152). These are clear characteristics of “total institutions” and consequently make transition from military to civilian life “formidable” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 152). As a total institution, the military also instills learned helplessness.

3.4.2.3- Additional psychological tools: Learned helplessness

"The reason we do this [simulate confusion] the way we do is to create uncertainty.... From the recruit’s perspective, it appears to be chaos. War is chaos. And then they see this drill instructor--this magnificent creature who brings order to chaos. They learn that if they follow orders, their life will be calmer." Lieutenant Colonel Becket, Commander Marine Corps training centre at Parris Island (as cited in Burke, 2004, p. 6)

That war is chaos is a truism. Military training whether during basic training or throughout a military career seeks to mitigate that chaos by providing tools so that
military members have a sense of control on the battlefield, to fight when all their
instincts would otherwise tell them to flee. The military therefore deeply inculcates more
powerful instincts, “instincts which must be bred, honed and maintained in time of
peace” (Loomis & Lightburn, 1980, p. 18). Instilling these instincts coupled with a rigid and
hierarchical military bureaucracy serves to rob a sense of personal control from military
members.

Culture in the CF requires that “military members must accept the responsibilities
[of the professional ethos] despite a decreased sense of autonomy and self-expression”
(Farish, 2008, pp. 16-17). Farish’s 2008 study looked at the “highly controlled work
environment” and its effect upon naval trainees (p. 20). Interviews revealed “most
participants described situations in which they characterized an external locus of control,
meaning they felt most work situations were outside their control” (Farish, 2008, p. 47).
Based upon the work of Seligman (1998) as well as Spector and Fox (2002), Farish’s study
notes “an external locus of control has the potential to exaggerate people’s perceptions
of lack of control and perhaps increase a sense of helplessness” (2008, p. 146). Military is
all about an external locus of control. The rigid hierarchy and powerful socialization forces
of military service demand obedience while prioritizing the military first and others
second far above one’s own needs. Farish noted the consequential limited autonomy and
opportunities for self-expression “functioned to dampen a sense of connectedness to
their physical environment, social connections and spiritual self” (Higgins & Farish, 2006,
p. 71). These consequential effects of the rigid military socialization process may serve
military organizational goals but they diminish individual capacities necessary for a successful civilian life after leaving the military.

Wortman’s (1975) research shows “perceived control has generally been shown to benefit organisms” (p. 282) with the opposite also being true: “exposure to uncontrollable outcomes can result in profound psychological upset... [with] [m]any kinds of maladaptive behavior... attributed to feelings of helplessness with respect to one’s environment” (Wortman & Brehm, 1975, p.278). Such “learned helplessness saps the motivation to initiate responses” (Seligman, 1975, p. 23). Furthermore, although such helplessness does not seem to affect “responses that are instinctive or well-learned” solving unfamiliar or new problems “does seem to be impaired” (Wortman & Brehm, 1975, p. 291). A new civilian life is awash with unfamiliar and new problems for the military veteran.

Seligman’s (1975) work and that of others also strongly linked the condition of learned helplessness with depression and anxiety. Interestingly, Seligman is leading the way in developing a program in the U.S. Army to build resilience in military members. The goal is to prevent the development of psychological injuries, injuries sustained in part in the context of a controlling military culture which disempowers individual members. Such resilience training also seeks to identify and counter “icebergs” or “deeply held beliefs” as well as “thinking traps” such as to “judge a person’s character through their actions”, to “write people off if they screw up”, “I can handle whatever comes my way” or “asking for help is a sign of weakness” (Reivich, et al., 2011, p. 26). Ironically, military culture has long fostered such cognitive shortcuts under the espoused values of resilience and strength.
Upon reflection, such shortcuts instead promote narrowing perspectives and limit cognitive and emotional capacities to manage dynamic environments and situations.

Although military training and culture empowers members to excel in their military role, accomplish missions and protect comrades, members’ perceived lack of control in a culture which frowns upon asking for help has a number of harmful effects. On an institutional level, CF members can become “disappointed and disillusioned” with military reality, resulting in difficulty retaining and/or recruiting members (Capstick, et al., 2005, pp. 51-2). For individual members, not only is their health at risk in environments which engender helplessness and hopelessness but transition to a civilian career can be problematic. Clearly, military members with poor motivation, limited emotional awareness and impaired problem solving skills in novel situations will have difficulty managing and overcoming the extreme stresses of transitioning to the unfamiliar demands and substantially different values and conditions of civilian life.

Since Canada requires such sacrifices of those who enter the military, does Canada not have an obligation to assist military members in overcoming varying degrees of learned helplessness in order to competently and successfully adapt to a new civilian life? Understanding the role of belonging and how identity is affected by military service reveals even greater sacrifices demanded of those who have donned a CF uniform over the past half-century.
3.4.2.4- Additional psychological tools: Identity change

“The soldier seems to develop a capacity to dissolve himself in a situation and then to find a self consistent with it.” (Vidich & Stein, 1960, p. 505)

Since identities are “essentially socially based answers to the question, ‘Who am I?,” Thoits (1995) argues identities should therefore “serve as sources of existential meaning or purposes in life” (p. 72). As Erik Erikson (1954) who pioneered our understanding of identity tells us, “identity...can describe a double relationship: one can have an identity with oneself and yet at the same time identical with something else” (p. 358). The military seeks to diminish or erase the boundaries between this double relationship by having military members deeply internalize the identity of the military to the point of subsuming much of one’s unique personal identity. Intense indoctrination seeks a mortification or “death” of the original self and a “rebirth” of the new self which identifies strongly with the indoctrinating authority (Baron, 2000; Lifton, 1961). This “soldier identity is further internalized” by experiences of combat (Smith & True, 2014, p. 153) and military values are more deeply internalized the longer one serves in the CF (Captsick, et al., 2005).

Military members strongly identify with the powerful and pervasive force of military culture. Essential to the “military’s culture of self-sacrifice” is the “subordination of the individual to the group” (Braswell & Kushner, 2012, p. 533). Through complex socialization processes noted above, the identity of the military member is “rewritten” (Braswell & Kushner, 2012, p. 533). This process of “depersonalization and deindividuation” strips the individual of “all previous self-definition” (Herbert, 1998, p. 9). The new identity becomes attached to what has been variously described as the “warrior

Fundamental to these identities are the principles or higher calling of: duty, selfless service, honour, integrity and, of course, unlimited liability. There is overlap between these concepts but inculcating all into the identity of the individual military member has the “goal being to create an individual whose conception of self is largely defined by the organization”, i.e., the military (Haynie & Shepherd, 2010, p. 504). In Canada’s case, “all members of the [military] profession share a core identity and a common responsibility that is manifest in the values described by the military ethos” (Duty, 2003, p. 9). In the CF as in most militaries, members “derive a collective unity and identity form the unique function they perform” (Duty, 2003, p. 20) while the CF, “above all,... ensure[s] that military professionals continue to see themselves as distinct from civil society” (Duty, 2003, p. 71). Ultimately, the CF also emphasizes that “[m]ilitary identity must remain essentially defined by the primary function of applying force in the resolution of political problems” (Duty, 2003, p. 72). For the purposes of the individual military member or soldier, “the more strongly an individual internalizes the identity of ‘soldier’, the more likely that individual will act like a soldier under conditions of stress and duress (i.e., conditions characteristic of a combat environment)” (Haynie & Shepherd, 2010, p. 503).
Much research into socialization processes of groups or institutions tells us that “the internalization of a value or belief is the most permanent, most deeply rooted response to social influence” (Aronson, 1980, p. 30). Becoming not just a member but a fully dedicated and believing member of the in-group provides an “intrinsic” reward in that the beliefs are integrated into one’s value system (Aronson, 1980, p. 30). One CF member indicated in a recent study that this intrinsic reward was his “psychological paycheck” (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 70). When a belief is internalized as many beliefs and values are in military members, the belief “becomes independent of its source and will become extremely resistant to change” (Aronson, 1980, p. 30).

The “order, obedience, and collectivism” may serve the military in achieving its objectives. Unfortunately, these “dimensions of military identity…conflict with many dimensions of an integrated civilian identity” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 153). For the vast majority of CF members, there is very little assistance in transitioning between a military identity which is extremely resistant to change to that of a civilian identity which requires flexibility, autonomy, independence and adaptability. The strong primary bonds of military culture serve to further reinforce the identity of military members in being integral and inseparable from the military community. Many members continue to see themselves, long after the uniform comes off, as belonging to their immediate primary groups, such as sections, platoons, battalions, regiments, squadrons, ships, etc.
3.4.2.5-Additional psychological tools: Belonging

“...the individual finds his welfare dependent not upon himself but upon the group. He finds his opinion to be that of the public opinion of the group. He dare not go against the group inclination because he would soon become an outcast. He believes that group disapproval with subsequent expulsion is a threat to his very existence.” (Mullan, 1948, p. 277)

“I was married to my men in Afghanistan.” CF veteran interviewed for research study (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 68)

The military in preparing for its primary role of combat will be more effective, tradition and contemporary doctrine holds, when all members strongly identify with and internalize military values of self-sacrifice, selfless service, unlimited liability and group loyalty. In putting the mission first, other members second and one’s self last, by definition, there are minimal divisive group dynamics stemming from self-interests. The result is the basis of a more cohesive organization. Much research into group cohesion shows the strong connection between group cohesiveness and internalizing group identities. The more that each individual member internalizes or is seen to “embody” the group identity, “the more likely that group will be cohesive” (Grojean & Thomas, 2006, pp. 50-51). The pervasiveness of other aspects of military culture such as “customs and traditions” all serve to reinforce military identity through building “organic unity” (Duty, 2003, p. 20) or cohesiveness. In combat operations, Smith and True (2014) contend that “the sense of self has been converted to the sense of (bonded) selves” (p. 158). Irrespective of combat, military “cohesion, discipline and order can even instill the feeling of being owned by the institution” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 158).
In a modern volunteer military, individuals self-identify far more with the military and their specific roles in the military than previous periods of conscription or mass volunteerism of World Wars I and II (Vidich & Stein, 1960). Overwhelmingly, Canada’s World War and Korean War volunteers and conscripts joined the military temporarily, for the role of fighting the enemy and winning the war. Most were eager to take off the uniform and resume a civilian identity (Morton & Wright, 1987; Neary, 2011). However, the majority who join modern Western professional militaries do so “with enthusiasm for the prospect of improving themselves and/or contributing in some fashion to something larger than themselves” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 149).

Steve Rose’s (2015) research revealed that most participants in his study expressed their longstanding enthusiasm to join the CF. Furthermore, paralleling the discussion of cohesiveness in military culture, it was not “lofty considerations” which figured prominently in training and military deployments but the close bonds of one’s immediate unit (p. 64). As one participant stated, “what keeps you going is that you’re there to look after each other” (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 65).

Cohesion is all about belonging and belonging is central to military culture and military effectiveness. Cohesion’s importance is such that it has been one of the most consistent and persistent characteristics of military service in combat since the beginnings of oral history in ancient Greece (Shay, 1995). Various epithets to describe this close cohesion have made it into popular entertainment and common usage, many with references to close familial bonds such as *brotherhood of arms, mother military* or even
the expression of “love” for one’s closest comrades (Smith & True, 2014, p. 153). The authoritarian drill instructor, a familiar cliché, shouts at new recruits some version of you can forget your old family because I am now your new mother and your father (Author) while treating recruits like “children” (Burke, 2004). Canadian military members, veterans and researchers refer to the “military family” (Harrison & Laliberté, 1994; Pranger, Murphy & Thompson, 2009; Rose, 2015). Members of one’s military unit have become, for many in the military, a “de facto family” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 153).

The importance of these close bonds emerges in the profound experiences of combat. Belonging to the military family often becomes synonymous with one’s own deeply internalized identity:

[T]he risks of war are not individualized but subsumed in and by the group; in the midst of radical danger, the military unit provides a sense of near transcendental safety...[and] that these lethal experiences, and the...safety derived from such solidarity, crystalize the soldier identity. (Smith & True, 2014, p. 155).

The close cohesion fosters courage which in turn reduces fear. Moreover, a “leader’s love for his troops reduces that leader’s level of fear in the face of danger” (Shay, 2002, pp. 210-11, original italics). In placing the military mission and love of his fellow military members above his own interests, the military member often values cohesion to the exclusion or downgrading of his own conjugal family needs.

Much research has shown that the close cohesion with the military family plays havoc with the conjugal family. Frequent separations due to training and deployments in peacetime and war, the 24-hour a day military duty mentality, accompanying workload of
such commitments and the unique stressors of a profession and vocation unlike any other create much conflict with conjugal family demands, even causing adverse behavioural problems in children (Adams, Jex & Cunningham, 2006; Harrison & Laliberté, 1994; Ontario Ombudsman, 2007). It is in war where the close cohesion and other mission demands demonstrate the importance of the military family over the conjugal one. Heidi Kraft (2007) is a clinical psychologist who served with the American forces during the Iraq war. She came to the conclusion that she “would be unable to function in Iraq if my children stayed at the forefront of my consciousness...I decided I could not be a combat psychologist and mother at the same time. I had to be one or the other” (p. 35). She decided to end communication with her family during her deployment (Kraft, 2007).

As noted in the previous chapter, Morris Janowitz in 1959 observed the trend of modern militaries to use increasingly persuasive means to ensure military members conformed to the demands of military service as opposed to the increasingly outdated threats and use of corporal punishment. Janowitz (1959a) called this a trend from “domination” to “manipulation” (p. 480). Small group cohesion is at the centre of the modern military effectiveness. Contrary to popular belief, military members are not robotic automatons. Within the scope of military rules, regulations and training, they must be highly resourceful and relied upon to take initiative in their specialized roles as directed by formal authority (Janowitz, 1959b, 1960, 1991). In order to take initiative, military members must internalize their roles and military identity as integral members of the military collective. As oft-quoted military historian, S.L.A. Marshall noted of World War II U.S. infantry, “I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which
enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade” (as cited in Janowitz, 1959b, p. 65).

The *presumed presence of a comrade* is dependent upon the close family-like cohesion of the primary group bonding. Logically it holds that the military member when operating independently or when separated from members of his or her unit must have such a profound internalization of group cohesion so as to counteract the urge to flee in the face of imminent danger. This internalization must be substantive enough to substitute the otherwise powerfully comforting physical presence of a fellow military member. The CF emphasizes:

> Discipline among professionals is fundamentally self-discipline that facilitates immediate and willing obedience to lawful orders and directives while strengthening individuals to cope with the demands and stresses of operations. It instils self-assurance and resiliency in the face of adversity and builds self-control. (*Duty*, 2003, p. 27)

As Janowitz, Marshall, the CF and others have pointed out, such internal discipline is only possible when one has an overwhelmingly powerful sense of group belonging. There are few if any parallels in civilian society except perhaps the family unit. For many in the military, Harrison and Laliberté (1994) argue, the conjugal family unit, is often relegated to a far lower priority than the *military family*.

Although modern militaries rely less on corporal punishment, the strong sense of belonging to the military family that is deeply socialized in each member is the basis of a very large psychological stick carried by the military: “the threat of exclusion from the group as a control” (Janowitz, 1959b, p. 39). This threat is indeed potent and operates at
all levels of the military hierarchy to maintain control. The military socialization process creates a powerful “linkage between career and identity” (Haynie & Shepherd, 2011, p. 501). For most military members who “cultivate conception of self-identity that is intertwined with the military organization” (Haynie & Shepherd, 2011, p. 501), the threat of exclusion or even the voluntary exit from the military family can create much psychological distress (Smith & True, 2014).

Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) research on belonging tells us that “the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation” (p. 497). The absence of social attachments is related to “both psychological and physical health problems” (p. 520) and “many of the emotional problems for which people seek professional help (anxiety, depression, grief, loneliness, relationship problems, and the like) result from people’s failure to meet their belongingness needs” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 521). Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) research confirms their hypothesis that “a lack of belongingness should constitute severe deprivation” (p. 497) and “that the deprivation of the need to belong is inherently stressful” (p. 508).

The unique and profound demands of military service make transition highly challenging and problematic to emerge from military indoctrination and culture while leaving behind the unequalled bonds of belonging to the military family. Such bonds are the stuff of enduring memory and even legend for the band of brothers who served in the Second World War. Yet these veterans most certainly were enthusiastic to leave behind the military and restart their civilian lives. It cannot be emphasized enough that for those
who joined volunteer professional armies such as the CF, they often could and cannot imagine a life outside the military. Unlike the transition after the Second World War, it has been a far more daunting transition to leave decades-long close bonds of professional soldiering in the CF for an unimagined civilian life in a society that is often perceived as alien, hostile, and inferior to military service.

3.4.3-Additional psychological tools: Their consequences and impact upon transition

“When I first put on civilian clothes again, I felt myself to be the cynosure of all eyes. It was much more strange and embarrassing than the first wearing of a uniform...It took all my powers of concentration, all my will power, to keep me at my tasks. It was not that I wanted to do anything else-I did not know what I wanted to do. It is that terrible restlessness which possesses us like an evil spirit; the indefinite expression of a vague discontent, the restlessness of dying men, little children and old soldiers.” George Pearson in Maclean’s Magazine 1918 (as cited in England, 1943, p. 147)

3.4.3.1-Introduction: Trying to fit a round peg into a square hole

Military culture, training, indoctrination and operations all serve to separate, in varying degrees, the military member either physically or psychologically from civilian society, influences and values. Sociologists studying the difference between military and civilian culture note: “military cultures are based inherently on anti-individualistic and anti-market ideologies and differ therefore in a principal way from the civilian democratic culture and the social organization of modern societies” (Caforio, Haltiner, Jelusic, Moelker & Tresch, 2007, p. 9). Military members have long been taught to denigrate, disparage and even despise their civilian origins (Burke, 2004; Harrison & Laliberté, 1994; Mullan, 1948; Rose, 2015; Smith & True, 2014).
Smith & True (2014) point out that “veterans perceive civilians as being naïve, misinformed, or even worse, judgemental” (p. 155). The deeply inculcated military identity of “order, obedience, and collectivism” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 154) not to mention the comprehensive, functional (vs. idealized) and often rigid moral standards of military life, training and operations are fundamentally at odds with civilian society. Even the persistent military paranoia that they are being civilianized speaks powerfully to the mistrust that military members have with civilian society. In spite of this often irrational fear of assimilation, the civilian-military gap has been widening (Pew Research Center, 2011; Ray & Heaslip, 2011; Ricks, 1997). Civilian culture has been changing far faster than military culture in “post-modern” nations similar to Canada (Nuciari, 2007, p. 226).

Just how successful can veterans be in transitioning between such increasingly divergent cultures especially when successful transition cannot be measured merely by income comparisons but by maximizing ones potential in social engagement, well-being, life satisfaction, sense of belonging and agency? The quantitative metrics on this are few but there are some qualitative observations about how military service impedes a more robust and multi-dimensional successful transition. These obstacles to a successful transition can be categorized as warring identities, leaving the military family, and, institutional mentality.

3.4.3.2-“Warring Identities”

“I would compare the structure of the military to an F-1 [race car] in comparison to the company I am at now...When you come back to Canada, you go from a hero to a zero.” CF Veteran (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 72)
After years and sometimes decades in the “total institution” of military culture which makes “obedience, regimentation and collectivism utmost priorities”, veterans often struggle with understanding how they fit into a civilian culture with often fluid values that are divergent from, or even contrary to, those of the military (Smith & True, 2014, p. 148). Smith and True (2014) call this “warring identities” (p. 148). The military forges civilians into recruits on the anvil of basic training resulting in a “psychic unrest...partly the result of the immense psychic transitions that basic training accomplished” (Vidich & Stein, 1960, p. 498). These immense psychic transitions cannot be so easily undone by merely removing one’s uniform and finding a job. After all, the military is not an occupation but a way of life. Changing careers is difficult enough. One cannot underestimate the difficulty of leaving a deeply internalized military culture and its accompanying powerful identity, morals, close bonding and way of life to join civilian culture which is both at odds with military culture and which military members deeply mistrust.

Meanwhile, civilian culture understands little of what the military member is leaving behind. Take for instance the plethora of awards, decorations, insignia, rank and other recognitions unique to the military. To civilians, these “mean very little if anything at all” (Smith & True, 2014, p.151). How do veterans suddenly remake themselves after investing their complete inner and outer worlds, sacrificing lost opportunities, prior civilian identities and affiliations as well as conjugal family stability while placing great burdens upon the health and welfare of spouses and children? What does it mean to military members to leave the close-knit bonds of the military family, joining a civilian life?
that cannot equal the social context of these close bonds? What are the implications for success in civilian life when much identity and self-worth is entwined with the military experience? How successful can a veteran be looking forward when so much of their psychological being continues to look back? What role does their heavily inculcated military culture, attitudes and behaviour play in a veteran’s attempt to discover a new role?

These questions are integral to what has been called “identity-relevant stress” (Thoits, 1995, p. 72). Burke (1991) argues that the “identity process is a continuously operating, self-adjusting, feedback loop...when that loop is broken, the identity process ceases to function normally” (pp. 840-841). This causes “distress and anxiety” (p. 846) proportional to the degree of “interruption” (p. 836). Burke (1991) identifies four situations wherein the degree of interruption results in “higher levels of stress” or distress:

1) repeated or severe interruptions;
2) when the interrupted identity is highly salient [i.e., more important identity vs. less important identity];
3) when interrupted identity is one to which the person is highly committed; and
4) when the source of the perceived identity (input) is significant to the individual (p. 841, original italics).

Within each of these situations, Burke (1991) identifies other “conditions” that can compound the “distress and anxiety” (p. 846) such as when there is an “incongruence between perceived self-meanings and a highly salient identity...[which] led to high levels of distress” (p. 842). Similarly, “A tightly controlled identity” such as that inculcated by military service “is likely to lead to greater frequency and higher levels of distress” (Burke,
1991, p. 843). It is also important to remember that identity-relevant stress caused by changes in the work environment extends far beyond the workplace or even one’s experience of personal distress. As Latack (1984) observed, “major changes at work mean major changes in personal life structure” (p. 315). For members leaving the military, all of the above situations and conditions are relevant. The result being that the identity feedback loop of military members transitioning out of the military comes under profound threat, attack and inevitable rupture as they transition to civilian life.

The research tells us that it is likely that most if not all military members experience distress in their transition from military to civilian identity (Westwood, Black & MacLean, 2002). Identity distress, however, falls under the rubric of “undifferentiated psychological distress” and therefore can fail to meet a clinical threshold or be swept into another diagnosis such as depression (Lynch, Askew, Mitchell & Hegarty, 2012, p. 143). The result is a profoundly important yet under-researched area not just in Canada but in other nations to the extent that Canadian researchers may be jumping to conclusions by claiming that “some soldiers manage the feelings of disorientation, anxiety and frustration associated with reverse culture shock and negotiate their transition to civilian life successfully” (Westwood, Black & MacLean, 2002, p. 222). Whatever the metric for *successfully* may be in this context, that even successfully transitioning veterans experience *disorientation, anxiety and frustration* clearly shows that the transition experience is one of distress. Other researchers looking at more comprehensive psychological factors found that “combat veterans unanimously experienced the
conflicting identities” and that “the greater the commitment to the soldier identity, the more significant the strain” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 158).

Much overlooked are the sociological differences between military and civilian cultures. In Canada, the CF has long been antagonistic to and/or overwhelmed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) (Bercuson, 1996; Cowen, 2008; Horn & Bentley, 2015). The CF has long been a masculine and predominantly white Anglophone military culture (until enforced bilingualism in the 1970’s), thereby perpetuating a culture different from the diverse, multicultural, multilingual and far more tolerant civilian Canadian values (Bercuson, 1996; Cowen, 2008; Winslow, 2004). The effect that this and other diverging cultural milieus have upon transitioning CF is poorly understood. However, it is probable that these divergences in identity cause further distress when veterans try to establish a new civilian identity.

3.4.3.3: Leaving the military family

“Once you’re out of that environment you realize, okay what do I do now? How can I possibly top that? Where do you go from here? You’re at the top of your game, you were doing something meaningful, relevant, you had a focus, you had direction, you had support, you had comradery… it’s like god, what do I do now, everybody’s kinda sleepwalking through life here, there’s no purpose, nobody stands for anything, life seems very shallow after that.” CF Veteran (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 68)

For military members, transitioning into “civilian society is frequently experienced as alienating and dislocating” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 148). A Canadian research survey of more than 200 veterans found that 53% found transition to civilian life “difficult or fairly difficult” and that 32% of respondents reported struggling with friendships well after their
release from the military (Black, 2007). The cultural shock of becoming a civilian again is deeply felt by the loss of the military family: “The need to be independent after experiencing strong group ties is another basis for distress” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 155).

Once again, this distress may fall under the clinical radar of the health system and may not merely impede a successful transition but has been identified as a contributor to the increased suicide rates, at least in the United States. No such research exists in Canada but Rose’s 2015 qualitative sociological study explored the link. As noted above, by being highly cohesive, military culture can view seeking help as a betrayal of the in-group and a character weakness in the individual who seeks such help. Furthermore, the strong internalized messaging from military service that one not be a drag on the group by being self-reliant contributes to feelings of being “burdensome,” also an indicator of suicide risk (Braswel & Kushner, 2012; Bryan, Jennings, Jobes & Bradley, 2012).

Ray and Heaslip (2011) in their literature review on CF members argue transitioning to civilian life is poorly understood and researched even in the context of those suffering clinically diagnosable psychological injuries. For the U.S. soldier:

“mutual interdependence, trust, and affection forged in the crucible of ongoing life-threatening combat [have] altered his sense of personal and social identity. The abrupt separation from his military unit and reinsertion into the family environment has been a difficult transition” (Friedman, 2006, p. 587).

Despite the masculine and stoic values in use in the military, the “deep caring and love for one another” has been consistently and throughout history, “among the most compelling rewards of serving” in the military (Smith & True, 2014, p.153). Military members can also
become deeply connected with the mission with the consequence that life back in garrison or in civilian clothes can be “boring compared with life over there” (Bélanger, 2015, p. 83). Stéphanie Bélanger (2015) found these feelings of boredom and deep connection with the military prevalent with the members she interviewed in her research: “Finally, and most likely the most tragic, I let Afghanistan become my mistress. A demanding mistress who destroyed my marriage. Even when I was not with her, I was obsessed by her” (as cited in Bélanger, 2015, p. 83).

How does one relinquish such irreplaceable and profound attachments without experiencing or minimizing distress? How can civilian life provide comparable fulfillment and connection? Trying to belong to the new civilian world is difficult for many veterans as Steve Rose (2015) discovered in his study. One interviewee emphasized his alienation with the civilian world: “Coming back to the civilian world, there was no sense of urgency here; people are slack and they are bone-idle... they are unmotivated, and they don’t know how good they’ve got it” (p. 73). While another expressed an inability to both connect with civilians while civilians could not connect with him:

There are no common experiences... 99% of civilians aren’t going to see anything like what I’ve seen when overseas... part of my reason for joining the forces was so that people I cared about wouldn’t have to see those things... but seeing those things creates a barrier between me and civvies. (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 73)

Leaving behind one’s closest comrades as well as an omnipotent and omnipresent military institution while grieving for those lost connections and a sense of belonging are not necessarily clinically diagnosable conditions. Feeling alienated by and from the civilian culture for which one sacrificed also does not necessarily meet a clinical threshold.
However, all cause psychological distress (Smith & True, 2014). When this distress is added to impairments generically brought about by military service discussed previously, we can increasingly see that we have an obligation to help all military members transition back into civilian life. Certainly such assistance takes on a priority of differing degree and intensity when one suffers a clinically diagnosable physical but especially a psychological injury. What is important to emphasize is that even without such debilitating medical diagnoses, military life results in debilities and lost opportunities for all who serve, not just those who have long been financially compensated for injuries directly resulting from or attributed to military service.

3.4.3.4-Institutional mentality: Hobbling successful civilian reintegration

“Like all members of the profession I never had an original thought until I left the service. My mental faculties remained in suspended animation while I obeyed the orders of the higher-ups. This is typical of everyone in the military.” U.S. Marine Major General Smedley Butler, 1935 (n.p.)

When one joins the military or any total institution, Goffman (1961) noted the recruit has his civilian identity and attachments stripped and then replaced by a collectivist culture that looks down upon civilians. Having that same military member establish connections with civilians in this context can cause much distress (Burke, 1991; Smith & True, 2014). For those who experience combat operations, establishing such connections is especially difficult: “Thinking expansively, being relational, and envisioning the future is discouraged, for such mental dispositions make soldiers more vulnerable. Extreme emotional control and a significant degree of dissociation are essential to the identity of soldiers who experience violent combat deployments” (Smith & True, 2014, p.
In addition to discouraging the *relational* capacity needed to establish belonging in civilian society, military’s total institution characteristics greatly diminish much of the autonomy and agency most civilians take for granted as one interviewed CF member told Harrison and Laliberté in their 1994 study:

> They make you feel dependent on it. Once you’re in, they make you feel like you can’t make it out there. ... “You do what we want and we’ll do everything for you.” That’s the attitude. “You can’t do anything for yourself.” ... Well after a while it’s just like a child with a parent. You don’t want to disappoint them, you’re afraid to. You don’t know what the consequences are going to be, so you do it. You do what you are told. (p. 22)

From Walter Segsworth observations in 1920, to Mullan in 1948 who wrote that in the military a soldier “need not make up his own mind” (pp. 278-9) to present day, research and observations have consistently indicated that military institutionalism requires much psychological, emotional and autonomy sacrifice of those who join. These sacrifices are beyond the much repeated loss of life and limb. The CF member is required to relinquish much personal agency and independence while undergoing a stripping of not just his or her civilian identity and attachments but to suppress emotional and cognitive capacities otherwise necessary for self-advocacy and independence prevalent in the civilian market-oriented, dynamic and more emotionally expressive world. In an effort to control the military world and those contained within, Smith & True (2014) argue, military culture encourages members to emotionally “shut down” or withdraw (p. 156). This “limits both assimilation and civilian’s understanding of [the veterans’] experience” (p. 156). Furthermore, “soldiers are trained to be self-reliant, but not self-advocate” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 155).
The military institution controls much of the career management of CF members as well as completing considerable administration on behalf of the military members while comprehensively helping them navigate the bureaucratic processes. After all, military members burdened by paperwork have fewer resources to devote to the mission. Nevertheless, such assistance is rarely provided in the civilian world. Self-advocacy and self-care is essential to a successful civilian life, capacities never more important than navigating the difficult transition from military to a new civilian identity.

Beginning a new life, with new values, new expectations, new standards and new socialization which is highly divergent from those of the military requires an ability to be flexible, learn and most importantly, to weigh one’s needs and resources against the multitude of variables of the civilian world. Lifton (1961) argues that the “ideological totalism” of indoctrination deprives one “of the combination of external information and inner reflection” (p. 479). Erikson (1964) uses the term “totality” to describe “an absolute boundary” in an individual’s psychological and emotional being within which there is an “arbitrary delineation, nothing that belongs inside must be left outside, nothing that must be outside can be tolerated inside” (p. 92). Just as the military promotes a “black and white dichotomized framework” (Smith & True, 2014, p. 158), Erikson (1964) notes that “a totality is as absolutely inclusive as it is utterly exclusive” (p. 92). Although “totalism” is part of “normal psychology” in that it is not a pathology, totalism is a “more primitive way of dealing with experience, and thus has….a certain adjustment and survival value.” (Erikson, 1964, p. 92) The opposite of the black-and-white thinking of the military identity of subordinates/superiors, friend/foe is a more independent and “autonomous…civilian
identity” (Smith & True, 2015, p. 158). For Erikson (1964), the opposite of the polarization is a “wholeness” emphasizing “a sound, organic, progressive mutuality [wherein] the boundaries are open and fluent” (p. 92).

The military promotes a fragmentation of the emotional and intellectual self, making it highly dependent upon hierarchy, regimentation and close cohesion. These are not the characteristics which facilitate success in a more open and fluent civilian world. After World War II, Canada ensured that society and particularly government was geared to help veterans adapt to this new civilian life. Ironically, as our understanding of this divergence between military and civilian cultures has increased, Canada’s universal assistance for CF veterans all but disappeared except for minimally effective job search skills. The limited studies of CF veterans and media reports indicate that CF veterans often pay a heavy psychological and emotional price transitioning to a civilian world so fundamentally different from the expectations of military service.

3.5-Psychological context of military service: Summary

“On one hand the freedom was good, on the other, the freedom was overwhelming as well.” CF veteran (as cited in Rose, 2015, p. 76)

The deep inculcation of military culture and the corresponding internalization of this culture in a military member’s identity result in powerful and persistent changes in the military member’s psychology. How powerful and persistent are these changes is poorly researched in the specific veteran context. Even in the civilian context, there has been very little research focused on the more superficial question as to “how individuals adapt to new careers” (Haynie & Shepherd, 2011, p. 501). We do know that career
transition in of itself has emotional and psychological obstacles of varying degrees with many injured military veterans having “considerable obstacles” (Haynie & Shepherd, 2011, p. 502). We also know that the intense indoctrination of a total institution is extremely persistent. One only need look around on Remembrance Day. Veterans who perhaps spent less than a few years in the military during WW II, Korea or serving in peacekeeping missions decades ago, still wear all the trappings of military culture including uniforms of quasi-military veteran organizations, medals, and berets. They salute, march and relive war stories, if they are able to let the stories emerge from rigid military messaging that talking about emotions is weak.

Veterans often feel rejected both from their military past and their civilian present. We know that social rejection carries profound psychological and emotional consequences not to mention can harm well-being in the short and long term. There are biological reasons for the pain of rejection lending credibility to the common expressions of hurt feelings and a broken heart. Research shows that “rejection really hurts” (Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman & Naliboff, 2006; University of California-Los Angeles, 2003). Would veterans lost in the no-man’s land of being neither serving military or unable to feel part of the often disparaged civilian world not feel the pain of this rejection while perhaps not understanding the reasons for this psychological pain?

Adding to the pain, the close bonds of military comradeship, especially in combat, pervert notions of friendship. Cohesion creates immensely strong bonds. However, the
military’s powerful indoctrination methods suppress one’s identity necessary to cultivate meaningful and lasting friendships. Glenn Gray (1998) astutely argues the existence of:

...a heightened awareness of the self in a friendship and in the suppression of self-awareness in comradeship. Friends do not seek to lose their identity, as comrades...do. On the contrary, friends find themselves in each other and thereby gain greater self-knowledge and self-possession. They discover in their own breasts, as a consequence of their friendship, hitherto unknown potentialities of joy and understanding...While comradeship wants to break down the walls of self, friendship seeks to expand these walls and keep them intact. The one relationship is ecstatic, the other is wholly individual...Comrades are content to be what they are and to rest on their emotional bliss...Friends are not satiable, as comrades so often are when danger is past. (pp. 90-1)

Comradeship is a quasi-friendship or even pseudo-friendship which distorts the notion of friendship for many veterans: “Veterans try to regain such feelings [stemming from comradeship], but they fall short” (Hedges, 2003, p. 116). Friendship takes work, Hedges (2003) argues, unlike comradeship where “[t]here are fewer demands if we join the crowd and give our emotions over to the communal crusade” (p. 116). Unfortunately, expectations can naturally arise in veterans that civilians will provide immediate and similar ecstatic experiences. When this expectation is inevitably unmet and the tough work of opening oneself up to friendship seems impossible, veterans have another reason to hide themselves deep down and far away from their new civilian world.

Canada and Canadians have asked fellow Canadians to join the Canadian Forces. We have asked Canadians to endure the self-esteem and identity stripping process of indoctrination, the inculcation of highly potent collective cultural influences, the subsequent career- and often lifelong subjugation of the self, deployments to combat or
highly stressful peacekeeping missions while sacrificing opportunity as well as personal and family well-being. Once the military has optimized its use of the human resource, the individual must leave behind irreplaceable and often confusing attachments to comrades, the unit and the institution then rejoin a society he or she is deeply inculcated to mistrust and disparage. All this Canadians ask fellow Canadians to do in the service of those who do not volunteer. Those who do not volunteer continue to benefit from such personal psychological, emotional and physical sacrifice by living lives in greater security which Western militaries have provided, especially during the past seventy years of explosive global economic growth made possible in large part because of this greater security.

Does Canada not have an obligation to assist not just the injured but all who must endure a transition which may be forever haunted or burdened by these difficult and often lifelong sacrifices? How do veterans optimize their potential in a new civilian identity, belonging in a society which they deeply distrust and disparage? The next chapter expands upon this notion of the comprehensive and enduring obligation Canada indeed has to care for its CF veterans.
Chapter 4: The obligation and further justification

“We owe a sacred trust to veterans and their families.” Justin Trudeau 2015
(Campion-Smith, 2015)

4.1-Context: Why a universal obligation?

“We all share a solemn obligation to honour their commitment to duty and their sacrifice.” Mark Cohon, Commissioner of the Canadian Football League speaking of veterans (Canada, 2010)

This thesis has examined the cultural and psychological context of service in the CF as well as the effects of service upon military members. Every individual who enlists in the CF is comprehensively exposed to CF culture and its various subcultures as well as the accompanying psychological and socialization tools of indoctrination, total institutions, learned helplessness, identity change and unparalleled cohesive forces of belonging in the military family. I refer to this as the military psychological metaculture. In spite of the differences between various military subcultures, there exists a more universal and profound experience shared by all those who serve in the CF: their exposure to the military psychological metaculture.

Exposure to this military psychological metaculture is a universal experience of each and every Canadian who joins the military. What is not widely understood is the effect of these various cultural and socialization influences upon individuals. The limited research available and thus far discussed shows that the military psychological metaculture has both positive and negative effects upon individuals, with the negative effects manifesting themselves in large part outside military service such as in a military member’s private and/or family life or when military members attempt to establish new
civilian identities during and after transition out of uniform. Some individuals are affected minimally while others are far more debilitated during and well after their release from the military.

One may argue that there is little basis for a universal obligation to CF veterans since the experiences and consequences of the military psychological metaculture over the past 50 years are inconsistent across the CF veteran population. However, Canada has fulfilled universal and substantive obligations to her men and women in uniform previously, obligations based upon highly inconsistent experiences and outcomes. Canada has already established a powerful precedent that justifies an obligation to all those who subsequently served in the CF and who likewise experienced inconsistent consequences of their service. This historical precedent is Canada’s sweeping obligation to all those who served in World War II.

In spite of highly inconsistent experiences, every one of the approximately 1.14 million Canadians who served during World War II was eligible for re-establishment benefits (Granatstein & Neary, 1995; Neary, 2011). The expression “re-establishment” which was originally widely employed during and after World War II, is still used in the encompassing legislation granting “duties, powers and functions” of the Minister of Veterans Affairs for the “care, treatment, training, or re-establishment” of anyone who served in the military (Woods, 1953, p. 495-6; also see Canada 2015e, s.4(a)(i)). The word “training” disturbingly was removed in the year 2000 (J. Summerby-Veterans Affairs Canada [Media Relations], personal communication, October 5, 2015). However, re-
establishment is the more important term for the purposes of this thesis, being the legislative equivalent of the concept of transition and integration in the context of military becoming civilians once again.

4.1.1-World War II reestablishment-setting a precedent for a universal obligation

“A great many of us have a latent tendency toward dependency. Military service strengthens this tendency and gives it an excuse for expression.” (Waller, 1944, p. 121)

Most of those who served in World War II did not see frontline combat. Benefits divided veterans based upon certain service criteria resulting in three classes of World War II veterans for reestablishment purposes. The first two classes were those volunteers who served overseas versus those that served only in Canada. The principle and likely the only difference was that those who served overseas were entitled to higher monetary compensation per given period of time served overseas versus those who served in Canada. Even those who served in the relative safety of the British Isles were entitled to the same benefits as those who served in the battlefields of Juno Beach, the bombers over Europe or the convoys of the North Atlantic. It is worth highlighting, experiences of combat were likewise highly variable between services but also between units and locations in differing military campaigns.

The third class of veterans were those who were conscripted. Almost 15% of those who served in the Canadian military were conscripts (Keshen, 2004, p. 21) of whom only 13,000 were sent overseas, 2,463 serving in “battlefield units” wherein 69 died (Morton, 1981, p. 147). Conscripts were widely disparaged, given the derogatory designation of

Nevertheless, Canada recognized that even for those forced to enlist through national conscription legislation, the nation had an obligation to assist all military members in transitioning out of the military mindset and culture into a successful civilian identity. All veterans, were entitled the entire suite of programs, with one exception, merely for having served in the military. The exception was those who were conscripted and were not deployed overseas. They were not entitled to the cash payouts for time served, benefits known as “gratuities” and the “re-establishment credits” (Neary, 2011, pp. 299-300). Otherwise, all World War II veterans were entitled to a gratuity for time served, free post-discharge medical and dental care, life insurance at a competitive rate, hiring preference in the federal civil service, reinstatement in prior civilian employment as well as a choice of 1) re-establishment credit account for large purchases based upon time served (except domestic-serving conscripts), 2) education to upgrade to a secondary school standard if required and then continue on to trade, vocational or university training, including post-graduate studies; or, 3) granting of land and/or building of a home or upgrading of farm structures. Assistance was provided to establish businesses and purchase tools and equipment. For those who were injured, financial compensation in the form of tax-free monthly payments were provided based upon disability, and for survivors and/or orphans of those killed in military service, a lifelong tax-free pension. Lifelong medical and dental care, with some exceptions, was also provided to injured veterans. For
those who were facing destitution, a means-tested monthly allowance was provided whether injured or not (Bruyea, 2011b; Ives, 1998; Keshen, 1998; Neary, 2011).

Canada’s obligation to World War II veterans was fulfilled even though the overwhelming motivation of nearly all who served was to eagerly shed the uniform and begin a new civilian life. Those who continued to serve in the CF after the war as a career were entitled to all the suite of benefits, receiving them on a deferral basis if desired. Furthermore, all those who volunteered for service in the Korean War were likewise recognized for their service by being granted all of the above World War II reestablishment benefits, even if they continued to serve on in the CF after the Korean war ended (Barrow, 1964).

Yet, if one served in the CF after World War II and the Korean War (1950-53), and one did not suffer a military injury, Canada did not provide any benefits whatsoever unless one served first in those wars. Those CF veterans injured in service were provided with a lifelong disability pension, and survivors and/or orphans of those killed in CF service were also provided with a pension. Otherwise, all CF veterans, including the injured were denied any and all the World War II reestablishment benefits.

Why deny CF veterans already existing re-establishment benefits which would have greatly assisted in their transition? One may speculate that it was the greater perceived risk of death and injury of the Second World and Korean Wars as compared to service in the CF. During seventy years of so-called peacetime service, many Canadians and policy makers likely equate the risks of CF service as being similar to that of being in
the public service or, at worst, being a civilian police officer. However, the fatal and non-fatal casualty rate of serving in the Afghanistan conflict was similar at 5% to that of the Korean war of 5.8%, both rates lower than the almost 9% experienced by those who served in the Second World War. With respect to so-called *peacetime* service in the CF, peacekeeping operations and intensive training took the lives of approximately 1800 CF members in uniform. This represents a fatality rate of 260 per 100,000 who served, 46 times greater than Canadian police who have suffered a fatality rate of 5.6 per 100,000 (Bruyea, 2011c).

Regarding non-fatal injuries, approximately 4.8% of Second World War veterans endured an injury reported during wartime. No publicly accessible statistics exist for the CF from 1953 to present. However, Veterans Affairs Canada grants pensions based upon injuries directly related to military duty or incurred during service in a special duty area or operation such as a peacekeeping mission or a domestic emergency. By 1959, the number of World War II veterans collecting pensions for wartime injuries was beginning to peak at about 103,000 or just under 10% of those who served, and Korean War veterans collecting pensions in 1959 represented about 5.7% of those who served in the campaign (Statistics Canada, 1959, p. 298). By March 31, 2015, almost 82,000 or 12% of Canada’s nearly 700,000 serving and retired CF members were compensated for injuries caused by military duty or incurred during special duty service (VAC, 2015a, p. 15), a higher rate than that of those who served in World War II.
4.2-Entitlement vs. charity: diminishing the obligation and why charity has not fulfilled and does not fulfill a universal obligation

“Charity has become a nauseating thing.” William Lyon Mackenzie King in 1944 (as cited in Struthers, 1998, p. 179)

Service in World War II or Korea carried comparable fatal and non-fatal casualty rates as serving in the CF after 1945 which in turn carried far more fatality risk than being a civilian police officer or working in the federal public service. As shown, CF service had comparable longitudinal development of military service-related injuries to that of WWII veterans. If risk to life and limb is not the reason for denying CF veterans an obligation represented by comprehensive re-establishment programs like those provided Second World War veterans, why have CF veterans been denied the same obligation?

Financial security offered by regular force service is also not the reason for denying CF veterans the same universal obligation. Those who served in and stayed on after World War II or Korea as career CF members, were entitled to the full re-establishment benefits as well as retirement pensions, the latter if they remained in uniform for 20 years or more (Barrow, 1964; J. Lamirande-DND Public Affairs, personal communication, May 6, 2015; Neary, 2011). Yet CF members who did not serve during World War II were not entitled to the World War II re-establishment benefits even if CF members left the military prior to qualifying for a pension. World War II reestablishment benefits would have and still would compensate for lack of pension security. The majority of CF members over the past seven decades have released before their 20th year, the service required to collect a minimum immediately payable retirement pension. The current required years of service changed in 2005 and it is now 25 years to collect a pension upon release (Otis & Straver,
2008, p. 7). Nevertheless, many CF members leave the military before completing 20, let alone, 25 years in uniform.

When unification of the three service components (Air Force, Navy and Army) occurred in 1967, half of the 26,300 members who left the CF were released prematurely (Morton, 1981, p. 186). A National Defence research report also tracked current release trends and noted that more than 17% of non-commissioned members leave the CF in the third year of service (Otis & Straver, 2008, p. 30). Of the approximately 5,000 individuals who release from the CF each year, 38% have five years of service or less, “22% between 6 and 20 years, and 37% between 21 and 35 years” (Bastien, 2014, p. 1). All of these early releasing CF members forfeit the collection of a pension until age 60 or can opt for a return of member contributions (J. Lamirande-DND Public Affairs, personal communication, May 6, 2015). As with World War II veterans, CF members while in uniform have sacrificed years of opportunity in the civilian sector. Once they release from the CF, they likely have minimal directly transferable skills that can be applied in the civilian context. Such lost opportunity has been especially poignant for reserve military members who were not eligible for any pension at any age until CF pension reforms in 2007 (Otis & Straver, 2008, p. 7). Furthermore, reservists can lose civilian job seniority and job placement if they leave their employment for a reserve posting in the CF. Until 2015, reservists injured while in domestic service in the military were given substantially less in income loss than those in the Regular Force (Canada, 2015b).
In spite of the preponderance of military experiences requiring personal and family sacrifice amongst both CF and the World War II members, Canada continues its failure to provide tangible recognition of CF military service to the same degree as World War II service in terms of transition and reestablishment. Unlike many WW II soldiers, CF recruits sought and still seek a career in the CF. Their release, even if voluntary, typically has not been foreseen at the time of entering the CF. In contrast, World War II veterans possessed a mental preparedness for a short military engagement with a full restart of a civilian life once out of uniform. One could argue that World War II veterans were far more prepared psychologically on average than CF veterans to leave the military. Yet, Canada would deny re-establishment assistance to CF veterans who arguably required more assistance than traditional war veterans to psychologically adjust leaving not merely a job, but what most military members correctly view as a way of life. This reduced or absent obligation to CF veterans, when compared to World War II veterans, would have significant consequences sixty years, almost to the day, after Victory in Europe on May 8, 1945.

On May 10th, 2005, the Canada's government tabled the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act. Better known as the new veterans charter, it came into effect on April 1, 2006 (Paré, 2011) after less than 3 hours of Parliamentary consideration, and absolutely no debate in the House of Commons, the year before. Its rapid passage and secretive creation were based in part on “cost containment” (Veterans Ombudsman, 2015) and to control what senior government officials saw as “an alarming future liability scenario” (VAC, 2005). The result was a new
program that “substantially reduced” the benefits and payments available to CF veterans (Scott v. Canada, 2013, p. 2), thereby diminishing Canada's obligation to its CF veterans. The passage of the new veterans charter provoked unprecedented public discussion on the neglect of CF veterans over the past decade. Veterans Affairs has reacted instead by focussing on developing programs strictly for the disabled with changes limited only to the most disabled (Canada, 2011a; Canada, 2015c). Those CF members who do not suffer injuries upon release or which manifest later but are related to military service have been all but forgotten in terms of new policy initiatives.

4.2.1-Canada’s obligation: Delegation to not-for-profit sector

“There is no place for private charity in a plan of relief for war-caused hardship.”
Major John L. Todd, 1919. (p. 511)

While politicians are quick to acknowledge Canada's obligations to veterans, in recent years Canada has quietly transferred the fulfillment of some of those obligations to charities and the not-for-profit sector in an attempt to resuscitate the obligation where government has walked away. Helmets to Hardhats claims to assist military members transitioning into the construction trades (Helmets, n.d.). Canada Company assists military members to “find jobs in Corporate Canada” as well as assisting “families of fallen soldiers with scholarships” (Canada Company, 2015). True Patriot Love funds programs, research and other areas to assist serving members, veterans and their families (True Patriot Love, n.d.), in part, through high profile and expensive trips to iconic destinations like the North Pole, Mount Everest and Antarctica, destinations the overwhelming majority of disabled or healthy will never reach nor wish to reach. Such efforts are funded with expensive
fundraising galas such as $500 per plate “private” breakfasts or even larger amounts from corporate sponsors such as $3500 for four tickets (Brewster, 2014a; 2014b; Canada, 2014b; Gerson 2012; True Patriot Love, 2014). There is no easily accessible and publicly available information regarding a consistent standard of follow-up on how a veteran was helped or harmed by these charities.

Canada’s obligation to its CF veterans is most pointedly emphasized in the reality that CF members train, fight and die for Canada and Canadians, not for the private sector or for charitable foundations. Their care and re-establishment must be reciprocated in a consistent, accountable and meaningful standard by the very authority that sent them into harm’s way: the Canadian government.

4.2.2-Lessons from the past: How to fail and then succeed with a universal obligation while replacing charity with entitlement

“For the first time, a group of mostly poor men approached their government on the basis of a moral entitlement not charity.” Desmond Morton speaking of World War I disabled veterans (1998, p. 22)

Passing the responsibility of caring for veterans onto charities while forfeiting the government’s responsibility and a government standard of follow-up is a sad and near exact repeat of how Canada abandoned its obligation to returning World War I veterans nearly a century ago (Morton, 1998; Morton & Wright, 1987). Then, programs for veterans likewise placed most of the effort on helping the injured over the short term while neglecting the disabled over the long term and likewise disregarding the needs of those without obvious injuries, many of whom had much difficulty in transitioning from the military mindset to civilian life (Morton & Wright, 1987). Great War veterans flocked
to the familiar comradery as well as the quasi-military culture and hierarchy of veterans’ organizations as many during the Depression “tried to forget their troubles by commemoration” (Morton, 1998, p. 28). Sadly, as Morton (1998) writes, “[t]he history of Canada’s World War I veterans ends, like most lives, in disappointment, sickness, and death” (p. 21).

The disastrous experiences of mistreating and neglecting Great War veterans left Canadian government planners determined to get it right the second time around. The comprehensive programs provided to Second World War veterans were seen by government architects as a “form of ‘basic training’ ....for civil life” (Keshen, 1998, p. 70). World War II veterans enjoyed: 1) unprecedented generous programs; 2) government anticipation of potential problems; 3) a Veterans Affairs department overwhelmingly staffed with ex-veterans working afterhours and on weekends; and 4) being accepted into a predominantly supportive and understanding civilian population. Nevertheless, military culture and experiences were such that “veterans often found their transition to civilian life very difficult” (Keshen, 1998, p. 71).

The United States and Canada had similar re-establishment programs. In the U.S., the focus was on education and retraining with more than 51% or 7.8 million American World War II veterans taking “advantage of the education and training benefits of the G.I. Bill” (Mettler, 2005, pp. 7, 42). In Canada, about 134,000 or 12% of the 1.1 million WWII veterans accessed vocational and university training (Woods, 1953). The programs graduated approximately 3,000 doctors, 5,000 teachers and 8,000 engineers (Schull, 1973,
p. 66). Various studies in the U.S. indicate that “veterans who utilized the [education] provisions became more active citizens in public life in the postwar years than those who did not”, regardless of education level or race (Mettler, 2005, pp. 9-10). Although no similar studies exist for Canada, “the extensive wartime planning on behalf of veterans…contributed to…[Canada’s] golden time of economic prosperity” (Veterans Affairs Canada-Canadian Forces Advisory Council, 2004a, p. 15). In spite of the cost of these programs, the social investment in veterans paid off with real social and economic dividends in both Canada and the U.S.

World War II re-establishment was an expensive program but Ottawa recognized that this was an obligation that must be fulfilled. The first Minister of the Department of Veterans Affairs insisted that comprehensive programs for veterans be funded: “Canada … raised $15,000,000,000 for war purposes. The money can likewise be found for peace” (as cited in Keshen, 1998, p. 76). In a post-World War II era of Keynesian economic policies that funded government programs through deficit financing, going into fiscal debt to honour the moral debt owed to veterans was only natural, logical and just. Also just was the understanding that citizenship itself earned rights. This realization prompted the creation and expansion of universal programs such as old age security and family allowances. As Mackenzie King told the House of Commons in 1944, “Charity is a nauseating thing. The new order is not going to have things done as charity. What is to be done will be done as a matter of right” (as cited in Struthers, 1998, p. 179).
Civilians have rights to receive such assistance as family allowances, old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and universal healthcare. By comparison, CF members by virtue of their sacrificial service to Canada and Canadians, must be entitled to full and lasting support in readjusting to their civilian identities. Just as Canadian governments have recognized that universal healthcare and education are no longer the domain of religious and charitable institutions, Canada should not set a lower standard for veterans. If charity is not a sound basis for healthcare or education for Canadian civilians, it is clearly not suitable means of recognizing and validating the sacrifice of veterans and the obligations owed to them. Charity is pity and pity carries no rights. Pity diminishes and devalues those who instead need to be empowered and encouraged. Entitlement is central to recognition and validation of service and sacrifice.

If the comprehensive re-establishment programs were part of a trend of a “more human approach to social and economic affairs” as Jeff Keshen (1998, p. 79) writes, then neglecting for over seventy years almost 600,000 CF veterans who, arguably, are equally deserving can be seen as unconscionable. The inhumanity and insensitivity of abandoning multiple generations of CF veterans can be seen even more clearly when we consider that there are more than just psychological and cultural reasons for an obligation to assist CF veterans in fully transitioning to civilian life. The social context of recruitment, military service and transition to a civilian world that is often anathema to military morality, provide yet further justification for a universal obligation to CF veterans.
4.3-Social Context: Recruiting and Disempowering the Marginalized and Releasing Them into an Alien Civilian Culture

“The military is not an island: its success in the long term hinges upon attracting sufficient numbers of individuals with the required skills and aptitudes and retraining them for lengthy periods. It is more akin to a seagoing fishing vessel which must harvest a variety of species in a year.” 1975 Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit (as cited in Cowen, 2008, p. 159).

4.3.1-CF “Anti-intellectualism”

Bentley & Horn (2015), English (1998), Haycock (2001, 2004) and Morton (2003) as well as others have long noted the anti-intellectual leaning of the CF. As early as 1970, military educators noted that the higher-ranking leadership component of the CF, the senior officers, “suffered from a lack of a ‘command intellect’” and that the situation overall “is tantamount to institutional anti-intellectualism” (Haycock, 2004, pp. 51-2). Historian Jack English (1998) would note that, “[u]nlike US army posts, Canadian army bases boasted no military bookstores” (p. 64). The Chief of Defence Staff, the highest ranking CF member, indicated in 1969 that “without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the best mediocrity; at the worst, disaster” (as cited in Haycock, 2003, p. 50). The failures in the ethical and intellectual development of the CF officer corps over the next 25 years led to the crises of the 1990’s including the violence and torture against the young Somali teen, Shidane Arone (Bercuson, 1996; Haycock, 2001). Military historian Jack Granatstein would advise then Minister of National Defence in 1997, following the wake of the Somali crisis, that “The CF has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in
the Western world”. Even by then, “only half of the Canadian Forces officers held undergraduate university degrees” (as cited in Haycock, 2004, p. 45).

4.3.2-Recruiting the Marginalized

“Soldiers like Philip and Ted didn’t see self-care as part of their duty. It just wasn’t part of their military culture.” (Adams, 2009)

Paralleling this inadequacy and failure in leadership was a corresponding if not consequential crisis in the CF recruiting and training policies in the post-World War II era. Lurching from recruiting crisis to attrition crisis with the periodic recession to boost recruitment and retention, the CF lacked an ability to reach the wider Canadian population to fill its ranks. This became particularly problematic beginning in the 1960’s. Social welfare policy produced universal healthcare and pension plans, improved working conditions in the private sector, and increased expectations of young Canadians. This resulted in the CF’s hierarchical, conservative and poorly adapting culture becoming less appealing to potential recruits (Bentley & Horn, 2015; Cowen, 2008).

Barbara Cowen in her ground-breaking 2008 book *Military workfare: The soldier and social citizenship in Canada*, for the first time makes public a study of the social context of CF recruitment and the novel sociology work done by the Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit (CFPARU). CFPARU was established in the mid 1960’s to address issues like recruitment and retention problems in the CF (Cowen, 2008, p. 127). Cowen’s 2008 book provides key demographic information and observations that bolster the case for a universal obligation to CF veterans. For instance, CFPARU noted that recruits mainly came from a population that experienced greater unemployment and
lower education than the national average with the majority of recruits originating from economically marginalized and rural regions of Canada (Cowen, 2008).

By 1975, only 28 per cent of CF applicants were employed at time of their application to enter the CF compared to a national employment rate of 65 per cent for 17-25 year olds (Cowen, 2008, p. 152). In that same year, 44 per cent of adult Canadians had not graduated high school while 81 per cent of the CF population did not have high school (Cowen, 2008, p. 138) leaving the CF to note “the great majority of recruits are high school dropouts” (as cited in Cowen, 2008, p. 131). Most of these dropouts came from regions such as Atlantic Canada and rural areas, unlike Alberta and other rapidly urbanizing regions which enjoyed “high socio-economic status... based on income and education” (as cited in Cowen In 1975, p. 146). CFPARU reported that youth from the more marginalized areas

...tend to aspire less frequently to higher levels of attainment, and are less likely to complete their education,’ and ‘are more likely to have lower occupational aspirations; and c. are more likely to accept lower status jobs (of which military service is an example), regardless of educational level attained (as cited in Cowen, 2008, p. 146).

The CF would note in that same year “the majority of recruits are persons who are pushed towards application after marginal employment experiences” and that military personnel were “‘fallout’ from the labour force” (Cowen, 2008, p. 151).

The CF’s conservative culture was and still is resistant to most of the changing values in civilian society over the past 50 years. It was not until forced imposition of bilingualism that Francophone members, at 20 per cent in 1966, by 1980 “far surpassed
the 28 per cent quota” with “growing numbers … promoted into higher ranks” (Cowen, 2008, p. 163). However, even by 1989, the CF continued to be both unattractive to and intolerant of other minorities. The CF was composed of 52 per cent and 31 per cent having “British” and “French origins” respectively and only 16.5 per cent not having such origins compared to 45 per cent of the Canadian population (Cowen, 2008, pp. 171-176). Cowen’s commentary on much of the CF research is apt: “The tone of this work was in some ways startling and in other ways fitting for an employer that routinely sacrifices the life of its workers” (Cowen, 2008, p. 152).

As early as the 1947, the CF was a hard sell to most Canadians. Canada managed to put over 1 million men and women into uniform, including almost 750,000 into the army during World War II. Two years after Victory in Europe (1945), the CF had great difficulty attracting volunteers for an army of 13,985 in a total military force of 32,610 (Granatstein, 2002, p. 316). By 1953, in the Canadian Army, “40 percent of soldiers did not have a grade eight education, and grade five or six was about average” and “a wife was a greater liability than a criminal record for a young recruit” (Campbell, 2013, p. 128). By the early 1960’s, initial thresholds for CF administered testing for potential recruits placed the acceptance level at “140”. This was “lowered to 115 and then eventually to 105” and “out of desperation, the army…made the lower standards retroactive; applicants… who had been previously rejected were contacted and offered positions” (Cowen, 2008, p. 121). In many cases the children of military families, pejoratively known as “base brats” (Author), joined the military as they were “one hundred more times likely to serve” than the average Canadian (Cowen, 2008, p. 147).
When contemplating an obligation to CF veterans, remember that current CF veterans often came from these marginalized groups and served at many points since the 1950’s. Young and old, they may still have needs, endured lost opportunity and continue to suffer in many aspects of their well-being because of their CF service. That no obligation was acknowledged or acted upon to assist them in their civilian lives when they have sacrificed much for Canada stands in marked contrast to the rhetoric that Canada and Canadians really care about, or there exists a sacred trust with, their CF veterans. The CF was and still is largely composed of vulnerable populations whose civilian origins were frequently characterized by marginalized employment, education or social experiences. Current and past CF veterans have often been exploited by complex and overpowering psychological and socialization processes which are at odds with Canadian civilian values. The rightness or wrongness of these values is not at issue. The issue is the gulf between them that has been and continues to be unbridgeable for many of the members from these marginalized and vulnerable groups. They require real care in every sense of the word, not rhetoric and unfulfilled obligations.

4.4-The Widening Cultural Gap: Absent Research, Unfulfilled Obligation and Forgotten Veterans

“Speeches, parades, and flags preserve our heritage and soothe old wounds, but words and symbols are never enough. Understanding and opportunity are more important.” (Taylor & Taylor, 2007, p. 163)

According to Desmond Morton (1990), the biggest obstacle facing Canada’s military throughout its history was not the enemy: “Canada’s most durable military problem, manpower” (pp. 237-8). With the perennial problem of recruitment and
retention, one would think that the CF would have helped improve the prospects of military personnel both during military service and through comprehensive transition programs which address some of the more deleterious effects of military’s psychological metaculture. It would be safe to assume that such improved prospects would improve recruitment and retention. Allowing military veterans to optimize their potential in their new civilian identity would assuredly encourage other civilians to view the CF in a more positive light. Certainly, having standards of employment, education and social support that parallel the civilian world would make transition and recruitment much less problematic (Cowen, 2008). Andrew Bacevich (2013) in his withering attack on the American government’s irresponsible use of military members as disposable tools of government policy makes an excellent case for universal military service in democracies. Only then, Bacevich contends, will nations carry out sincere and open public debates that consider and anticipate the true human and other costs of sending citizen-soldiers into harm’s way.

Granted, universal military service is a hard sell in any democratic nation. This thesis instead looks at the opposite end of joining the military. When a Canadian leaves military service, what needs that have been created as a result of the military experience, if addressed, would optimize the transitional experience as one of success in all aspects of well-being? In Canada’s case, bringing about even simple change in the Canadian Forces-Veterans Affairs Canada continuum has been an uphill battle. A conservative and resistant-to-change culture has made the CF and VAC a laggard in progressive social policy in many areas. However, successful transition outcomes encompassed under the broad
rubric of care of veterans is a direct responsibility of the primarily civilian federal public service. One would think that civilians would want fellow Canadians to integrate more successfully when leaving the military. One would also think that a binding universal and comprehensive obligation to care for Canada’s military veterans offers increased security to prospective recruits thus mitigating the manpower problem.

For all the research the Canadian government has invested in studying and addressing the problems of recruitment and retention, there has been virtually no investment in researching the nature of transitioning out of the military. At the same time, the CF Personnel Applied Research Unit produced multiple reports on the growing distance between military culture and “a less militarist citizen” who was “fast-acting and self-interested, and it was increasingly clear that he was not well suited to a military future” (as cited in Cowen, 2008, p. 140, original italics). The CF noted, as early as 1974, the far greater ability the potential civilian to advocate on his or her own behalf, especially in the occupational sphere:

Finally, he has acquired through participation in a market-oriented educational system, a tendency to critically evaluate the opportunities in terms of his interests and background, and to control his movement through the job market in pursuit of more rewards. Typically, for example, he has more knowledge of how to get the job he wants, including a knowledge of a greater number of job-finding methods. In sum, the more educated youth is typically a more sophisticated participant in the labour market, one who is always assessing available opportunities; who knows how to manipulate those opportunities to his advantage and is willing to do so. (as cited in Cowen, 2008, p. 140)
As Cowen (2008) argues, “these trends were clearly at odds with military work” (p. 141).

CF officers and sociologists who worked in the CFPARU were publishing papers in the public domain noting that:

This is the paradox of manpower supply in Canada’s modern [All Volunteer Force]: individuals who are willing to tolerate the vagaries of military life are disproportionately unable to succeed in the demanding training programmes which more and more resemble the civil education system, whereas those individuals who have no difficulty in coping are less willing to tolerate military life and remain for a career. In all military occupations, education level at entry is inversely related to involuntary attrition, and directly related to voluntary attrition. (Cotton, Crook & Pinch, 1978, p. 389, n. 25)

As the CF’s own research showed, many of those less able to adapt to civilian occupational and educational demands, continued to remain sheltered in the CF’s rural, conservative and mostly white culture while the world changed around them. Many more were released without assistance. How have they coped in their transition from the military after short and long periods of institutionalization and learned helplessness, psychological tools of the military experience which could have only exacerbated the very social and psychological context that contributed to their marginalization in the first place?

What about the long term consequences of living and breathing a culture that encouraged alcohol abuse and overlooked and often encouraged conditions for spousal abuse, marital breakdown and anti-social behaviour? These are often “repercussions of experiences of overseas deployments and peacekeeping missions” (Montagne, 2011, p. 167), but even “…internal deployments… [have] much the same effect on his or her
quality of life as an overseas deployment” which does “deploy in harm’s way” (Ankersen, 2004, p. 67). These frequent deployments, even during the Cold War also known as the “forgotten war” (Taylor & Taylor, 2007, p. 113), have increased stress, as the CF noted in the mid-1990’s, raising “concerns over increasing rates of suicide and divorce in the Canadian Forces” (Ankersen, 2004, p. 66). Yet for the 520,000 CF veterans who do not have a visible or marked physical or psychological injury due to military service, they received absolutely no help, compensation or understanding for what they sacrificed for Canada and Canadians. For all CF veterans, there was likewise no specific program or policy assistance in transitioning to a seemingly alien and unwelcoming civilian world, a world which did not understand or appreciate the immense strains, stresses and pressures endured by CF veterans on behalf of civilians.

Some of those who left the military early without the benefit of retirement pensions may have been more educated and more able to transition to civilian life. However, the lack of transition and financial supports for this cohort must have caused identity stress as well as grappling to discard varying degrees of institutionalized mentalities while struggling to grieve the loss of the military family. Little is known of the success rate of their transition, their views on their failure to persevere in the CF and whether they considered that failure to be a source of shame (and an obstacle to the successful development of a civilian identity) or a source of power in becoming the catalyst to a new post-military life.
An examination of the issues of transition raises basic questions: in the case of *base brats* who later joined the military, would a childhood of institutionalizing military influences followed by the institutionalizing forces of military service make such individuals less likely to adapt to a civilian society from which they had been continually uprooted and separated? How can such service members easily adapt to a civilian world of which they know so little and to careers of which they are unfamiliar? In the case of marginalized or undereducated recruits, how could they have received employment in civilian careers for which they were underqualified? Did the consequential frustration result in cascading effects of frustration, relationship problems, and substance abuse or even homelessness? Did officers transition better than non-commissioned members? Did senior officers transition better than junior officers?

We don’t know the answer to all these basic and important questions which are integral to understanding the transition experience. For all the espoused values of caring for our military veterans, Canada’s failure to research military-civilian transitioning indicates that the civilian transition experiences of CF members fails to qualify for any metric of public policy priority. As one CF research participant indicated, “The job of anybody who’s placed in authority is to use people as a resource - to use you up, if you are in the Armed Forces, in the most efficient manner” (as cited in Harrison & Laliberté, 1994, p.38).

The CF deliberately targeted marginalized Canadian citizens for recruitment because of their lower levels of education and socioeconomic status, lower aptitudes,
their origins in socially and/or economically marginalized regions and backgrounds as well as for their less progressive social outlooks. Putting these individuals through a rigorous disempowering and depersonalizing socialization and indoctrination process while further isolating them from progressive social advancements, diminished their capacity for self-actualization, self-advocacy, and adaptation to civil society. These individuals were and still are released without any assistance whatsoever into the civilian world after years of service to Canada. Coming from marginalized backgrounds, these recruits were either less resourceful or had access to less resources with which to begin their military career. As such, they would require more assistance with transition irrespective of military injuries. However, appropriate assistance was and has not been provided. Consequently, not only did the Canadian government view these Canadians as a resource to be harvested, one may safely yet sadly conclude that this valuable resource of humanity, for policy purposes, was viewed as endlessly renewable and quite disposable.

4.5-The Obligation: How does the CF Members’ Obligation to Canada Compare to Canada’s Obligation to CF Veterans?

“You can go into this action feeling assured of this, and as the head of the government I give you this assurance, that you need have no fear that the government and the country will fail to show just appreciation of your service to the country in what you are about to do and what you have already done. The government and the country will consider it their first duty to prove to the returned men its just and due appreciation of the inestimable value of the services rendered to the country and Empire; and that no man, whether he goes back or whether he remains in Flanders, will have just cause to reproach the government for having broken faith with the men who won and the men who died”. Prime Minister Borden to Canadian troops as they prepared for the Battle of Vimy Ridge (as cited in Scott v. Canada, 2013, s.277, p. 7)
“We treat the military very well. They are very well equipped.” Prime Minister Jean Chretien, Kabul October 2003 (as cited in Bland, 2004, p. 105)

4.5.1-Military’s Moral Obligation to Canada and Canadians

“Professional service in today’s Canadian Forces can be summed up in three words: Duty with Honour” (Duty, 2003, p. 77)

Military culture demands that each member accept and internalize a pervasive, powerful and profuse moral life. Ethical codes in civilian life, particularly in the retail sector, throw around ethically imbued words with alacrity. Advertisements today seem empty without ethically charged words such as the commitment, dedication, respect, dignity or we really care. In the military context, deeply internalized ethical standards have life and death implications on a daily basis. Perhaps no ethical concept is so prevalent in the military yet so poorly understood as honour. The horrors and chaos of war have prompted codes of conduct such as the Geneva Conventions by drawing “upon a deeper moral source – the codes of a warrior’s honour” (Ignatieff, 1998, p. 111). Recent DND research categorizes honour in the military as one of the “moral emotions” which are “[s]pecifically linked to situations involving the well-being or interests of others” (Thompson et al., 2008, p. 3). Honour, like other moral emotions, is persistent and integral to an individual’s identity and behaviour (Thompson et al., 2008). In the military context, French (2005) elaborates upon the place of honour in the military:

In many cases this code of honor seems to hold the warrior to a higher ethical standard than that required for an ordinary citizen within the general population of the society the warrior serves. The code is not imposed from the outside. The warriors themselves police strict adherence to these standards; with violators being shamed, ostracized, or even killed by their peers ... The code of the warrior not only defines how he should interact with his own warrior comrades, but also
how he should treat other members of his society, his enemies, and the people he
conquers. The code restrains the warrior. It sets boundaries on his behavior. It
distinguishes honorable acts from shameful acts. ... Accepting certain constraints
as a moral duty, even when it is inconvenient or inefficient to do so, allows
warriors to hold onto their humanity while experiencing the horror of war ... (as
cited in Thompson et al., 2008, p. 3)

Just as important as psychologically inoculating military members from the horrors of war,
honour and their codes prevent war from degenerating into nothing “more than
slaughter” (Igantieff, 1998, p. 112). It is the intense and pervasive military culture which
ensures moral codes are both internalized and acted upon. “It would be almost
senseless”, Gerrard (1994) argues, “to talk about honour abstracted from its social
structure” (p. 70). Honour and the host of other moral ingredients of military’s ethos are
not merely abstract moral ideas or ideals but tangible persistent and pragmatic moral,
and therefore, normative components of a military institutional group and individual
psychological identity. They give real and enduring meaning to life, and to death.

4.5.2-Quid Pro Quo: A Picture is Worth...

“The public, especially the veteran public, needs to be assured that the government
continues to acknowledge the debt owed.” Don Ives, former Veterans Affairs
Canada employee (1998, p. 92)

Canada’s current military ethos contends that military members “accept
obligations and responsibilities that no other Canadian citizen has” and,

[t]hey accept this trust and, in accord with their ethos, strive for excellence within
their areas of expertise. In brief, they reach for the highest standards of
professionalism...Their reward is Honour — but honour can only be bestowed if
they acquit themselves in a manner that reflects the values, beliefs and
expectations of their fellow Canadians. (Duty, 2003, p. 77)
When viewed within the context of military culture and its psychological milieu, honour is an impossibly tall order. Yet this is what Canada expects of those who serve in uniform. As Ignatieff (1998) argues, “to fight with honour was to fight without fear, without hesitation, and, by implication, without duplicity” (p. 112). When military members accomplish this after a short or long career in the CF, they receive an “honourable discharge” (England, 1950, p. 73; CTV, 2013).

Have Canada and Canadians likewise acquitted their obligations to the CF veteran with honour in both substance and degree? Have we reciprocated this tall order? The lack of programs for non-injured CF veterans is a sobering reply to the inundation of state-sanctioned hero propaganda for our veterans. Even the programs for injured CF veterans have been developed, administered and delivered with delays, dismissal and eventually minimalist policy initiatives (Bruyea 2007, 2010, 2011b, 2011d, 2011e, 2014, 2015).

CF members’ obligation to Canada and government’s obligation to CF veterans have been mutually reciprocated on a highly unequal basis. The figure below (Figure 4.1) portrays a spectrum of obligations along a single axis wherein a duty or obligation has the most binding force at the extreme left side of the axis and diminishes in obligation the further right one moves on the scale. In this context, outright rebellion is considered the polar opposite of binding mandatory. I propose that binding mandatory would be considered the most obligatory of duties one could conceivably have in a civilized society like Canada. It would be buttressed by a spectrum of social pressures currently available such as extreme persuasion techniques, comprehensive legal powers and powerful forces
of socialization that are all internalized in the individual to fulfill a duty at any cost or sacrifice, including suspension of basic rights and autonomy up to and including loss of life. For instance, we all must follow laws but do we all internalize those laws on a daily basis in every profession or occupation? Do laws always govern the way we dress and work? Does our workplace and social network remind us on a daily basis that we must follow those laws? If we don’t follow those laws, will we be prosecuted, suffer creative punishments or lose our job, friends, family and community? Are we inundated with a barrage of voices to follow the laws while experiencing sleep and nutrition deprivation as well as humiliated and publicly vilified if we step out of line? Can we be ordered into situations knowing full well we may die? This is the proposed world of binding mandatory.
The military is arguably one of, if not, the only legal institution that can meet the criteria of *binding mandatory* due to the comprehensive powers at its daily disposal, marshalled to force individuals to carry out the CF’s wishes. Even religious orders allow their members to be dispersed within society so that a religious member may distance themselves somewhat from constant socialization pressures of the greater institution and its community. The military works, train, socializes and dies in a military community. In response, Canada professes an often rhetoric-filled obligation to CF veterans.
This above scale is somewhat abstract but it does show relative degrees of obligation including the anti-obligation realm where obligation is neglected, or opposed. Whereas the CF’s obligation to Canada has remained consistent at binding mandatory, Canada’s obligation to its CF veterans has moved back and forth across the axis depending upon various factors such as popularity of the military and the wars they fight, economic conditions, public understanding, and time lapsed since a war or other notable military engagement.

One can see a distinct inconsistency between the obligation that CF members have to Canada and the obligation that Canadians have to CF veterans. Granted, the obligation to veterans has varied over time. The experience of the two World Wars showed that in the heat of battle promises could be prolific and eloquent such as Prime Minister Borden’s “oft-quoted speech to Canadian troops promising that Canada would do all possible for them on their return home” (England, 1950, p. 33; see section 4.7 above). Canada would fail its World War I veterans and then learn from its mistakes to honour its World War II veterans in a universal and unprecedented degree (Morton, 1998; Neary, 2011).

At the same time that the *traditional war* veterans of World War II and Korea were provided with exemplary re-establishment programs, the *modern* veterans who served in the Canadian Forces languished in neglect and anonymity. Canada’s obligation to the non-injured CF veteran has often hovered around the middle to right side of the scale with World War II veterans’ organizations actively advocating to prevent CF veterans from receiving the same benefits given to their members. The replacement of the lifelong
pensions with onetime lump sums to compensate for military injuries is one example which was applauded by these same World War II veteran organizations that continued to preserve access to lifelong pensions for their members (Senate of Canada, 2005). With public pressure mounting over the past twenty years to better care for CF veterans, the urgency to act has increased but the obligation Canada is currently fulfilling to address the problems experienced by CF veterans arguably still lies somewhere between public interest and social pressure.

Meanwhile, the obligation of military members to Canada and Canadians has likely increased the requirements of binding mandatory with an amplified and additional enmeshment of military professionalism, ethical codes, military law and the War Crimes Act (Rouillard, 2011). Even without these added demands, the above scale demonstrates a marked discrepancy between what Canadians as military members sacrifice for Canada and Canadians, and what Canada and Canadians give in return to our CF members when attempting to re-establish themselves as Canadian civilians.

4.5.3-Front and Centre: Government’s Role in the Problem and Solution

“It’s a new concept, that because the state controls the general economy of the nation, it may have some moral obligation to relieve particular hardships which the system it maintains may impose upon some individuals.” Justice Minister (later Prime Minister) Louis St. Laurent, 1944 (as cited in Struthers, 1998, p. 186)

Louis St. Laurent’s assertion continues to be reflected in Canadian social policy today. The “duty to consult” with first nations is but one example of the moral obligation Canada has for hardships it has either imposed or for which it is responsible in some manner, that in turn provide the basis of a legal obligation (Canada, 2011c). In the context
of the CF, the Canadian state controls all aspects of military life as well as where and when military members are placed into harm’s way. The powerful influences of military culture, psychology, socialization and indoctrination techniques have enduring effects upon military members even after they attempt to transition to civilian life. Furthermore, the Canadian state has selected and still selects individuals to join the military who have endured educational, occupational, and social hardships. The military then subsumes these vulnerable and marginalized individuals beneath powerful cultural and institutional influences that diminish autonomy, cognitive resources, and self-esteem outside the military context.

The interplay of all of these hardships with military culture and psychological metaculture has not been researched and is not understood. The growing number of charities and not-for-profits consisting mainly of civilians to assist transitioning veterans indicates that veterans are having significant problems rejoining society. The marginalized population specifically chosen for military service was already having difficulty succeeding in civilian life as testified to by their marginal status. Powerful cultural and psychological forces in the military system further diminish the powers of individuals to succeed and/or successfully rejoin civilian life. Based on previous discussions in this thesis, it is clear that military service would further degrade the capacity of already marginalized individuals to rejoin society. As such, marginalization in the military context would be both a state-created and state-aggravated problem. That is why it is incumbent on the Canadian state to relieve both the original hardship and the aggravation thereof as a consequence of military service. This cannot be delegated to charities, private corporations or contracted
agencies as these have no formal or legal relationship with, and no moral obligation to, CF veterans.

“While it is evident that political theory or moral philosophy has not directly informed the conceptions of obligation used by government” (Moss, 2011, p. 4), Canada’s and other nations’ governments have not hesitated to employ morality and its terminology when referring to the obligation they have to their veterans. In 2014, Minister of Veterans Affairs Julian Fantino (2013) said, “The work our government does each day has been and can be called many things: duty, responsibility, commitment, social contract, obligation, sacred or not, or covenant. Colleagues, I believe it is all of those things” (p. 2). The Minister sidestepped any specifics of the obligation Canada has to its CF veterans. In so doing, while calling the obligation all of those things, he made the government’s obligation none of those things. For military members, including those in the CF, who breathe an ethical life on a daily basis, the “precise use of words” including their context, “grammar, syntax, meanings and understandings can be as important in modern-day operations as are munitions” (Mileham, 2010, p. 37). Words can give or take away those most elusive military combat multipliers of trust, cohesion and morale. They can also give and take away self-esteem, validation and empowerment. The misuse of words can be as morally and spiritually damaging as the misuse of weapons. We already know that CF veterans are a vulnerable population due to the marginalization for which they were originally targeted during recruitment and/or the marginalization as a consequence of (or aggravation by) military service. The military in
turn demands of these individuals increasing dependence upon, and identification with, all things military. The deeply imbued moral culture and loyalty to Canadian authority and the population necessitates that CF veterans profoundly trust what government and Canadians promise in return for sacrificing what little autonomy, civilian identity and attachments they possessed. However, the neglect of CF veterans over the past 70 years exhibits a national abuse of this trust. Exploiting veterans’ trust has allowed various governments to make promises they need not fulfill and/or have no intention of fulfilling. After the mission is over, what bargaining power do veterans have? They have already fulfilled their end of the contract and most do not have the stomach to fight another battle. To fight this battle, especially with the very government and nation for which veterans were willing to sacrifice and with which they entrusted their lives, calls into question whether the nation and the government deserved the soldiers’ sacrifice in the first place. Such existential dilemmas are the wellspring of despair and hopelessness (see moral injury below).

Government has preyed upon such moral purity with the cynical exploitation of veterans as naïve, too loyal to bite the hand that promises to feed them, and eager to receive approval from the very government authority which has betrayed veterans. Yet veterans must endure a lifetime consequence of military’s power to diminish the capacity and autonomy-building capacity of those who serve. There may not exist a written contract between the government and military members, but the psychological contract to absolutely and eternally serve Canada and sacrifice one’s well-being potential is a one-sided contract. Canada does not reciprocate such sacrifice in kind. A pioneer of social-
contract thought, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2003), when referring to humans enslaving others, tells us that such one-sided contracts are “absurd... I make a convention with you which is entirely at your expense and entirely to my profit, which I shall observe as long as I please, and which you shall observe as long as I please” (p. 61). Government continues to manipulate the indoctrinated effects of military service for the lifetime of the veteran through false promises and misleading rhetoric. Furthermore, government has failed to provide adequate tools, recognition, validation, opportunity and dignity to successfully rejoin civilian life as a fully and optimally autonomous, educated as well as a socially integrated Canadian citizen. Government has therefore maintained CF members and vulnerable veterans in a degree of psychological servitude making Rousseau’s observation particularly relevant to Canada’s one-sided contract with those who join the military.

Whatever the intention of elected politicians and bureaucrats, they have created, and are responsible for, the Canadian Forces, an organization that ensures absolute moral commitment as a primary condition of military membership. This moral commitment requires taking commands at face value. For CF members and veterans, promises of care, support, gratitude and debt from the ultimate authority of politicians and senior bureaucrats are moral commitments of the highest order. CF members enter harm’s way with absolute confidence, fully believing that they and their families will be cared for after the consequences of military service have taken their toll. Why would they sacrifice for Canada at the orders of its highest authorities if that sacrifice were based upon false promises? Would such a nation or government be worthy of sacrifice? How consistent is an arrangement wherein the promise of Canadians to sacrifice in uniform is absolute but
the reciprocal commitment to care for them, relieve their hardships, and offer opportunity to be civilians once again is nonbinding if not non-existent by any standard?

Clearly the willingness of Canadians to sacrifice would be greatly diminished if the reciprocal obligation to veterans was understood to be highly contingent, variable and absent any binding authority.

4.5.4-Non-contradiction and Consistency

“...a convention that stipulates absolute authority on one side, and unlimited obedience on the other, is vain and contradictory.” Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (2003, p. 59)

Of course, the civilian world can never reciprocate to CF veterans the demands of a moral life in the military of which civilians know little or have never experienced. Likewise, it would be unreasonable to expect civilians to undergo a process of intense moral indoctrination or otherwise so that they may care for veterans to the same degree that serving members are indoctrinated to carry out the will of Canada and Canadians.

However, we must remember of any moral standard that “[c]onsistency—the absence of contradictions—has sometimes been called the hallmark of ethics” (Andre & Velazques, 1988, para. 1). In ethical theory, non-contradiction is essentially the same as consistency. Immanuel Kant (2013) argues that non-contradiction is the “highest or supreme principle” for all analytic judgements: “All judgements...must conform to the principle of non-contradiction, which is a universal...condition of truth” and that “the principle of non-contradiction is a guarantee of truth” (p. 84).
Moral language and morality is integral to military service. Moral language is also integral to government’s propaganda regarding government’s commitment to veterans. Those who enter the military endure great sacrifice. This sacrifice is made possible by military members’ belief in the truthfulness of the moral language employed by government and the military, truth being that government action and words are consistent and therefore do not contradict one another. Andre and Velazques (1988) highlight the obvious when they emphasize “[e]thics requires that there be consistency among our moral standards and in how we apply these standards” (para. 9) while “[e]thics requires consistency in the sense that our moral standards, actions, and values should not be contradictory” (Andre & Velazques, 1988, para. 2). As such, government must be consistent in not only matching actions to the rhetoric of caring for veterans but consistency requires that Canada’s commitment to veterans must equal the commitment veterans devoted to Canada during their military service.

The word consistency is used no less than 10 times in Duty with Honour (2003), DND’s ethical bible on professionalism in the CF including employing the “principle of consistency” in five instances. Under the heading “Military Identity”, Duty with Honour (2003) emphasizes:

As the factors of change alter responsibility and expertise, they will inevitably shape identity. This process must be guided by the principle of consistency, above all to ensure that military professionals continue to see themselves as distinct from civil society, performing an essential and unique service to Canada while operating according to the principle of reciprocity. (p. 71)
The CF “serves society by exercising control” over CF members (Duty, 2003, p. 67). In turn, CF members adhere to the principle of reciprocity which ensures “an appropriate, principle-based balance of the expectations and obligations both between the profession and Canadian society, and between the profession as a whole and its members” (Duty, 2003, p. 67).

Why are CF members required to adhere so stringently, with life threatening implications, to principles of consistency and reciprocity with Canadian society when Canadian society has absolutely no requirement whatsoever to reciprocate with CF members on any level? At least Canadian society and politicians have been consistent in their grandiose rhetoric while their consistent actions demonstrate a universal non-obligation to CF members.

Rhetoric honouring CF veterans backed up by an absence of universal programs has been the sad legacy of Canada’s neglect of CF veterans. Yet Canada and its federal government clearly require each and every CF member carry out their promise to risk all in defending Canadian interests. There is no reciprocation of any commitment to CF veterans let alone the degree of commitment made by the veterans while in uniform. Lifton (1961) contends that when an institution implements “ideological totalism” or brainwashing, the institution has the “underlying assumption that language - like all other human products - can be owned and operated by the Movement. No compunctions are felt about manipulating or loading it in any fashion; the only consideration is its usefulness to the cause” (p. 489). The Movement, in the context of brainwashing or intense
indoctrination, not only owns and operates human products such as language, the
Movement owns and operates humans themselves. Humans as individuals are
marginalized as mere tools, and thus, subordinate to the cause.

When promises are made to military members so that they may carry out
government’s will and then government does not fulfill the promises once soldiers
become veterans, government has made a lying promise. As Immanuel Kant argues, “he
who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using
another human being merely as a means” (Kant, 2012, p. 458, original italics). Kant’s view
is that each and every rational being is “intrinsically valuable” and that we should not
treat rational beings “merely as useful tools or devices by means of which we can satisfy
our own goals or purposes” (Brown, 2012, para. 10).

Making lying promises and using human beings as mere tools for government’s
own policy purposes is highly inconsistent and contradictory with what government
demands of military members. Using military members as mere tools also violates the
intrinsic value and human dignity of each and every military member and veteran.
Veterans carry the deeply inculcated moral military life into their civilian world and expect
that the civilian world and especially government will reciprocate by adhering to the same
moral standards of military life. To receive, instead, moral perfidy from the nation for
which they sacrificed has grievous consequences, one of which, moral injury, is discussed
in the next subsection.
Military indoctrination along with the intense acculturation and socialization processes diminish the sense of self, the power of autonomy and the ability to critically analyze through systemic processing. Military members do not have unions and cannot collectively bargain for their interests nor can they refuse lawful orders or spontaneously quit their job. Military members must believe in government’s promise of security, support and especially caring when they leave the military. Veterans must deeply believe that Canada and Canadians appreciate the sacrifices military members make in uniform on behalf of Canada and Canadians. This is the fundamental trust which must exist between government and military leadership and military members (Shay, 2002). What happens when the promises are not kept? What happens when the war is not a just war, when veterans’ care is at best a nightmarish bureaucratic labyrinth or when Canada and Canadians pay but lip service with catchy slogans and red t-shirt Fridays to reciprocate the extensive sacrifice of military service?

4.5.5-Violating Moral Consistency: Moral Injury

“We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere and notice it as we notice air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted.” Annette Baier (1986, p. 234)

There exists a gross inconsistency between what CF members are obligated to sacrifice for, and on behalf of, Canada, and what Canada promises veterans on one hand, and what Canada and Canadians actually do (or do not do) in caring for CF veterans on the other. This sets up a tragically ideal scenario for what has been identified as “moral injury” (Shay, 2002) or as Andrew Bacevich (2013) has appropriately termed more generically, “breach of trust” the title of his book. Civilians often do little more than admire military
members through some objectified hero worship, “[y]et admiration [does] not imply mutual understanding, much less intimacy” (Bacevich, 2013, p. 33). This hero worship increases the distance between military members and the society with which military veterans desperately need to connect in order to both re-establish strong social connections and to replace those lost in the military. Otherwise, transition becomes an experience of alienation complicated by moral injury (Shay, 2002).

Moral injury has been defined as “Perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz, et al., 2009, p. 700). This research emphasizes that to suffer moral injury, the individual “must be (or become) aware of the discrepancy between his or her morals and the experience” (Litz et al., 2009, p. 700). The discrepancy between what soldiers give to Canada and what Canada gives to them as veterans is painfully large. In the civilian insurance sector, delays in seeking compensation are “associated with poorer physical health 1 year to 6 years after major accidental trauma” and that the failure to settle compensation is “significantly negatively associated with mental health” (Harris, Young, Rae, Jalaludin & Solomon, 2008, p. 971). Veterans have identified the unfair “insurance company” scrutiny utilized by government as a betrayal, categorizing it under “sanctuary trauma” (Moncur, 2014).

Unfortunately, moral injury and sanctuary trauma both do not qualify as medical diagnoses. As such, veterans suffering at the hands of government neglect and mistreatment receive no assistance, even though the deep moral and psychological
suffering is real. Even if these were recognized diagnoses, current veterans’ legislation would not compensate for the conditions as the injury must have occurred during one’s time in uniform. The discrepancy between sacrifice and government obligation is most pronounced with the CF veteran who is not diagnosed as injured. Government leadership has deemed that these CF veterans are owed nothing to assist in transitioning into a new civilian life, let alone compensate for or mitigate for the consequential moral injury of government delay, inadequacy or neglect. The scarcity of research on the “relationship between leadership and psychological injury is startling” (Shay, 2002, p. 224). This does not mean government’s deficient leadership does not contribute to moral injury. However, the inaction to rectify this betrayal and the absence of research in this important area are further evidence of the failure of government and, to a large degree, Canadians to reciprocate for the experiences and sacrifices of military members.

Canada requires that each and every CF member defend Canadian values (Duty, 2003). These values include “democracy and the rule of law; individual rights and freedom as articulated in the Canadian Bill of Rights (1962); Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982); peace, order and good government as defined in the Constitution Act (1867); and “sustainable economic well-being” (Canada, 1999, p. 3). If military members must sacrifice to defend sustainable economic well-being then certainly CF veterans must be priority beneficiaries of that well-being. However, the complete absence of government-funded transition programs for all CF veterans and the cost-cutting programs for injured veterans as well as the absence of a meaningful articulation of a reciprocal government obligation
to veterans profoundly violate the notion of reciprocity and betray what was sacrificed on behalf of Canadians.

The ultimate authority for military members is civilian society, a notion that has been deeply inculcated in the military of modern democracies including the CF (Duty, 2003). Shay (2002) contends that “[t]here are no private wrongs in the abuse of military authority” (p. 224). When government fails to reciprocate for the sacrifice of every CF member, all veterans and Canadians suffer. *Highway of Heroes, veterans’ highways*, two minutes of silence once a year, and begrudgingly delayed veterans’ programs only for the most seriously injured are a sad reciprocation of all that military members have sacrificed for Canadians. What has been the metric of this betrayal? How have veterans suffered? How has this suffering negatively manifested itself in family life? Once again, we don’t know because we don’t care enough about our CF veterans to find out.

Former Veterans Affairs Canada employee Don Ives (1998) argues that “[e]ntitlement is recognition and recognition is key” (p. 94). Ives (1998) rightly contends that “[i]t is important for veterans to continue to believe in the justice of the cause for which they risked their lives” (p. 94). Likewise, if the cause must be just, a major component of that cause is the moral worthiness of the government. Otherwise, why would a Canadian be willing to die for a morally unworthy government? Wouldn’t such a sacrifice be as morally repugnant as offering up one’s life in an unjust war?

How do we renew the faith of all Canadians, especially the forgotten CF veterans, that not only is Canada worthy of the sacrifice of its military members but military service
is a worthy pursuit? A clear and potent binding obligation to all those who serve must be the beginning of this renewal.

4.6-Proposing a new obligation to CF veterans

“In veterans legislation...entitlement in law becomes a testimony to the value of one’s service.” Don Ives, former VAC employee (1998, p. 93)

In 2015, former Prime Minister Harper honoured those Canadians who participated in the liberation of Holland during World War II: “[w]e owe them a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid” (Canada, 2015d). Beautiful words but they sidestep the reality that the debt can be repaid. The difficulty we have as a nation in understanding the sacrifice of all military members has relegated sacrifice to the realm of rhetoric. Rhetoric distracts from action, with words as soothing platitudes, not action being the goal. This has consequently allowed Canada and Canadians to forfeit on the debt owed to CF veterans. Recent governments have diminished any notion of an obligation to CF veterans. Former Veterans Affairs Minister, Julian Fantino, also a former police officer, placed “himself...and firefighters, and police officers who put themselves in harms [sic] way every day in the same category” as veterans (Rose-Martland, 2013, para. 8). Other ministers, including former Minister of Veterans Affairs Steven Blaney, placed the obligation owed to veterans and first responders on the same level: “Canadians owe them all a debt of gratitude for their courage, selflessness and service to our country” (Canada, 2014a, para 6). Perhaps first responders would not wish to have the same obligation owed them as that given to veterans. Under the Conservative government, the Crown argued that,
At no time in Canada’s history has any alleged ‘social contract’ or ‘social covenant’ having the attributes pleaded by the plaintiffs been given effect in any statute, regulation or as a constitutional principle written or unwritten. (Everson, 2014, para. 15)

In these terms, Canada claims it has no obligation whatsoever to CF veterans, including professed debts of endless gratitude.

Categorizing the obligation owed to first responders as the same to that owed to veterans either diminishes the sacrifice of veterans or unnecessarily elevates the sacrifice of first responders. Unionized first responders with a right to strike, paid overtime and the choice to refuse to enter harm’s way also do not endure the intensely isolating indoctrination, socialization and acculturation processes of military service. Unlike the CF, no other profession has unlimited liability which allows the government and military leaders to order individuals into situations knowing full well individuals will suffer injury or death. In fact, multiple industries suffer higher work-related injuries than first responders including fishing, construction, manufacturing and transportation (Canada, 2008). To truly honour the sacrifices of our CF members and reciprocate all that they give on our behalf, we must avoid the duplicity that military morality and veterans despise. Canada can avoid such duplicity by adopting a clearly stated obligation to our CF veterans.

4.6.1 - A new obligation: What would the obligation look like?

“[Veterans] want – and are entitled to more than just three cheers and a brass band to welcome them home.” Ford Motor Company statement in the Windsor Star, day after VE Day, 1945 (as cited in Stevenson, 1998, p. 95)
In 2015, just prior to calling an election while facing the class action *Equitas* lawsuit and unprecedented public pressure, the federal government inserted the following clause into existing legislation:

The purpose of this Act is to recognize and fulfil the obligation of the people and Government of Canada to show just and due appreciation to members and veterans for their service to Canada. This obligation includes providing services, assistance and compensation to members and veterans who have been injured or have died as a result of military service and extends to their spouses or common-law partners or survivors and orphans. This Act shall be liberally interpreted so that the recognized obligation may be fulfilled. (Canada, 2015a, s. 2.1)

This obligation restricts itself to members and veterans who have been injured or have died as a result of military service as well as extending to spouses or common-law partners or survivors or orphans. Exactly what is owed and to what degree is open to much interpretation. Providing an information pamphlet, a coffee, a hug and $20 during a face-to-face meeting arguably could be seen as fulfilling the obligation as written above. Nor is there any sense of reciprocal debt owed to veterans in respect of what they have sacrificed on behalf of Canada and Canadians. If we were to transpose the obligation above back to 1945, the comprehensive programs provided to returning World War II veterans would not be guaranteed in any manner.

An obligation must recognize the comprehensive sacrifices of all who serve in the CF while respecting the individual potential of each veteran to contribute to and be involved in civilian life. The obligation must also respect the needs of the veteran to be part of civilian society in the fullest sense of well-being including social, spiritual, physical and moral well-being, not merely to be assisted with one-time limited attempts at
employment as is too often the focus. Having sacrificed his or her capacity, autonomy and agency in uniform, the veteran must be empowered to redevelop his or her sense of agency and autonomy as a civilian while being comprehensively assisted to deprogram from military’s powerful indoctrination and socialization processes. If we truly do honour those who serve in the military, a sense of urgency and dedication that characterizes military operations must also infuse the bureaucracy, not the lethargy, apathy and antipathy which has characterised the creation and administration of the limited programs that exist for CF veterans.

Currently, there are, what Rousseau would describe as various *absurd* contradictions in existing programs and policies for CF injured veterans. For example, those deemed the most seriously injured for policy purposes cannot attempt to better themselves professionally as there are no mechanisms for them to receive retraining. They must do this at their own expense. If they attempt to enter the workforce, any employment earnings are deducted dollar-for-dollar against their income-loss programs. Current veterans’ programs are a distinct and humiliating disincentive to better oneself if seriously disabled (Bruyea, 2014). Any recognized existing obligation is limited to the injured with the most seriously injured relegated to a policy prison of lost human potential. The mildly injured as well as the uninjured are likewise provided with little assistance unlike the universal and comprehensive reestablishment programs provided World War II veterans. Even faulty and inadequate World War I programs recognized the human potential of the most severely injured (Morton & Wright, 1987), and since soldiers
and sailors are “citizens, their rehabilitation is a matter of such wide extent that it can leave no phase of social organization untouched” (Todd, 1918, p. 1).

At the grand fiscal policy level, debt owed means that debt must be incurred, if necessary, to repay in kind for the services which have already been rendered. Current fiscal restraint is no excuse to delay or renege on the debt owed for sacrifices made in the past. Yet this excuse has been frequently used to deny or diminish benefits to CF veterans. The 2005 new veterans charter was developed and implemented in large part on the need to cut costs. In defending the Veterans Charter in litigation, lawyers representing Canada’s government conceded “benefits and services formerly available to Canadian Forces members and veterans under the [previous] Pension Act were substantially better than those that are now available to them under the [new Veterans Charter]” (Scott v. Canada, 2013, p. 3, para. 7).

The need to respect Canada’s obligations to veterans on a fiscal level was specifically recognized by Kevin Page, the Parliamentary Budget Officer for Canada’s Parliament, in a largely un-heeded 2008 report entitled Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. It was tabled in the context of Parliament’s consideration of Canada’s participation in the Afghanistan conflict, and called for full cost accounting of all the expenses likely to be incurred, including the “cost of taking care of the veterans” (Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2008, pp. 6, 20-27). Here, perhaps for the first time, a senior government official was telling Canada’s Parliament, that if Canada wanted to go to war, she needed an accurate estimate of the post-war care and transition costs for
veterans in order to be able to budget for and ultimately pay that amount. Such a responsible and principled approach minimizes the likelihood that when post-war care and transition costs are incurred, the government of the day, rather than saying *we are in times of restraint and can't afford it* will be able to say *we anticipated this cost and will be able to cover it fully.*

The Parliamentary Budget Officer report took into account only those programs on the books, that is, anticipated program expenditures for injuries and death incurred due to military service and the care of these individuals and their families long after military service. This unprecedented initiative for government is commonplace in the private sector such as private pension plans as well as insurance companies who have long been legally obligated to set aside money to cover all future costs of claimants. Why is government allowed to sacrifice even the current situation of delayed, mediocre or absent veteran programs on the altar of poor fiscal planning? Equally important, why is government not developing comprehensive universal transition programs that address all aspects of the well-being of CF veterans and serving members? The degree of one’s sacrifice determines the degree one values the recipient of the sacrifice (Axinn, 2009). Quite clearly, government does not think veterans are worthy of sound fiscal policy and planning let alone comprehensive and dignified universal transition programs for CF veterans.

The recognition of all that has been lost in serving Canada and Canadians due to military service is the foundation of what Canada must reciprocate in return to those who
served Canada and Canadians. The lost autonomy, agency, ability to self-advocate, independence and self-awareness are just some of the casualties of the intense acculturation, socialization and psychological indoctrination of military service. These capacities are essential to success in the civilian world. It is only logical that the military as a branch of government that took these capacities away necessitates that government is responsible for ensuring these capacities are rebuilt. Disabled veterans deserve special consideration for they have capacities which can never be rebuilt but these veterans can benefit from rebuilding other capacities. Families, although not discussed at length in this thesis, often suffer the most as they have little or no consequential reward or mitigation for their sacrifice and suffering. They often have to sacrifice promotions or the careers themselves to care for disabilities incurred by their veteran family members as a consequence of government orders. The disempowerment of families has been without any accompanying empowerment let alone compensation similar to what those in uniform receive in being part of the military family.

4.6.2-A new obligation: In concrete terms

“Rehabilitation of soldiers necessarily includes the replacement in civilian life of the uninjured men who will return after the war from service, on shore and afloat, as fast as the ships of the world can carry them. But the term rehabilitation should be used in a broader sense; rehabilitation includes not only sailors and soldiers but the whole community.” Major John L. Todd, 1918 (p. 1)

In light of Major Todd’s remarks from 1918, and the points made thus far in this thesis, I propose for discussion purposes the following obligation:
That Canada and Canadians make a formal commitment to support all CF members, veterans and their families to maximize their well-being and potential and ensure for veterans, a comprehensive, nationally and fiscally committed well-designed re-integration into civil society wherein veterans and families are equal partners with Canada to determine their destiny and ensure measures are implemented to optimize their capacities and potential to fully and independently participate in civil society.

Canada and Canadians will ensure that all CF veterans and families have the proper psychological, social and cultural tools to deprogram and successfully integrate into civilian society.

With respect to those wounded or injured in service, the optimization of their capacity must recognize, compensate, treat and rehabilitate lost lifelong professional and well-being potential. Where restoration is not possible, the member will receive generous lifelong compensation which will be structured in such a way as to promote independence and the greatest possible re-integration of the injured or wounded military member into civil society.

Canada reciprocates the moral urgency and exigencies of military service in fulfilling this obligation. As such, Government and Canadians are fully accountable including committing to, setting aside, and making immune all costs of making war and making peace to fulfill this obligation while ensuring all mechanisms are in place now and in perpetuity to fulfill these obligations. Failure to do so will result in fines, dismissal (including expulsion from Parliament and its bodies), civil litigation or incarceration in proportion to the suffering incurred by veterans and their families and for not reciprocating in kind that which was sacrificed on their behalf. “In kind” includes expeditious and inclusive development, implementation and administration of effective and comprehensive programs to address the needs, gaps and compensation addressed herein.
4.6.3-A new obligation: Guiding principles

“It takes months, sometimes years, to train a good sailor or soldier; it will take months of teaching and many more months of living to undo that training and create habits harmonizing with civilian life. By work, by conversation, by every power of suggestion, men’s thoughts should be turned to civilian life as soon as it becomes certain that they are to be discharged from service.” Major John L. Todd, 1918. (pp. 6-7)

What principles would guide the interpretation and implementation of this obligation?

Reciprocity and non-contradiction demand that we consider key guiding principles:

1) **Highest Priority Timeframe**: Rome was not built in a day. However a substantive universal obligation to Canada’s CF veterans and their families has been delayed for far too long. Just as Canada’s military must deploy rapidly when called upon, so must Canada respond in an extraordinarily timely manner in honouring its obligations to CF veterans. Delay causes needless suffering and lost potential as well as perpetrating and perpetuating moral injury. Creating programs and their administration including the provision of services under this obligation likewise requires that resources be allocated to ensure the highest priority timeframe required in military service also guides all aspects of creating and implementing this obligation.

2) **Nationwide Involvement**: CF members sacrifice for and on behalf of Canada and Canadians. Any obligation to CF veterans and their families must therefore involve the entire nation, not just government planners and purse-string holders. Veterans cannot successfully integrate into a society that does not intimately understand what is being sacrificed on their behalf. Communities and industry must be widely involved.
3) **Categorical Imperative**: Most CF veterans have not studied philosophy or Kant but they most certainly understand and have frequently followed “categorical imperatives”, often on a daily basis. “An imperative is an order, and a categorical imperative is an order that is to be obeyed without consideration of any other goal” (Axinn, 2008, p. 1306). Patrick Mileham (2010) in his study of the comprehensive social covenant the UK has with its military, veterans and their families, believes that Canada demands more than the UK of their respective military members. He argues that Canada’s unlimited liability “is no less than a categorical imperative” (p. 25). We ask our CF members to live a strict and incomparably demanding moral life. In honouring their sacrifice, Canada’s obligation to our CF veterans must be on equal moral terms with their service. The obligation, therefore, must be a categorical imperative, clearly articulated and detailed and backed up by the Hobbesian sword of significant consequence should the obligation not be fulfilled. CF members give no less in the name of Canada and Canadians. That is why Canada’s obligation to CF veterans must have the same or higher status as her obligation to any other group or profession and must be included in federal budgets, immune from fiscal restraint, *cost containment* or other budgetary restriction.

4) **Repercussions for Failure**: How binding would this obligation be and what are the consequences for not fulfilling it? Unlimited liability is central to the “military professional’s philosophy of service” (*Duty*, 2003, p. 26). Yet the Canadian government has shown that it has a highly limited liability to the injured and no
liability whatsoever to those who do not suffer medical threshold injuries.

Canada’s liability to its CF veterans has been shamefully conditional. However, CF members live a rich, strict and comprehensive moral code enforced by powerful legal, cultural, social and psychological forces. Furthermore, if CF members fail in their obligation, they can endure ostracizing, condemnation, legal action, incarceration, expulsion, injury and death. If bureaucrats and politicians fail in their obligation, history has shown that they suffer little if any consequences even for breaking laws (Brewster, 2011) let alone failing to develop programs to care for veterans. Hobbes in 1651 aptly argued that “covenants without the sword, are but words, and of not strength to secure a man at all” (as cited in Mizzoni, 2010, p. 68). A sword most certainly exists to ensure military members fulfill their multitudinous obligations to Canada. Similarly, a sword must exist in fulfilling Canada’s obligation to its veterans. Thus government officials responsible for fulfilling the obligation could also face expulsion from Cabinet, contempt of Parliament or even liable for damages in civil proceedings before a Court.

5) **Care:** Although deserving of a thesis in itself, the concept of care in guiding Canada’s obligation to its CF members, deserves some brief mention here. For the past 75 years, *care* has been at the forefront of the legal obligation of the Minister of Veterans Affairs, who is responsible for the “care, treatment, training, or re-establishment in civil life” of anyone who served in the Canadian military (Woods, 1953, p. 496). What was meant by *care* has been open to much interpretation. In 2002, the CF published a seminal paper detailing the philosophical and other
“fundamentals” of the “Defence Ethics Program”. Central to these fundamentals is
the “obligation of care” that CF members “must continually deal with” while
ensuring that they “reserve a role for empathy in the performance of their
functions and duties” (National Defence, 2002, p. 21). The CF recognizes the power
of the military and that military members are “dependent” upon the greater
military organization, “because military superiors are granted exceptional power
and authority over their subordinates” (National Defence, 2002, p. 15). Most
importantly, the CF recognizes the reciprocal relationship inherent in the
obligation to care:

Subject only to the requirements of the defence mission and the limitations
that resources impose, the obligation of care includes a positive duty to
reciprocate the trust, loyalty, and service of subordinates by providing for
their general welfare and well-being through appropriate policies,
programs, and support services. The power of the defence organization is
felt by military members and employees every day. Being responsible
implies making sure that this power is exercised in a humane and caring
way. (National Defence, 2002, p. 15, emphasis added)

The obligation must recognize that due to the enormous psychological and social
influences of military service, deep indoctrination leaves CF veterans in a position
of subordination with the government and nation that they served in uniform.
Care and the associated empathy require that this relationship is not exploited by
government officials dismissing the concerns of veterans, often with empty
rhetoric, while doing the absolute minimum to address their needs.
Of all the principles above, care is the principle by which all actions related to the obligation are judged and remedied. It is the preeminent categorical imperative of the obligation to CF veterans and includes, as the CF Defence Ethics Program clearly states, a duty to reciprocate all that is given by CF members. As Gewirth (1993) argues,

in contrast to municipal or statute laws, the obligatoriness of a morality is not held to be contingent on institutional enactments but is held to obtain independently of such enactments, and indeed to provide a criterion for judging the obligatoriness of laws and other institutions themselves. (p. 30)

Reciprocating trust, loyalty and service in caring for CF veterans is both the bare minimum of any obligation and the criteria for judging all which is created and acted upon in fulfilling the obligation.

Care is also a “practice”, Virgina Held (2006) and other care ethicists emphasize (p. 36). Just as CF members have a deep social, psychological and cultural relationship and connection with the Canadian Forces institution, “care as practice” is at its core “relational” requiring an ongoing connection between those providing the care and those receiving it (Held, 2006, pp. 36-37) while recognizing that we are all “partly constituted by...social ties” (p. 46). Held (2006) emphasizes that “all care involves attentiveness, sensitivity, and responding to needs. Needs are of innumerable subtle emotional and psychological and cultural kinds” (p. 39) not merely the basic needs of living such as food and shelter. Held (2006) argues,

The care should be sensitive and flexible, allowing for the interaction of care provider and care receiver in such a way that the receiver is gradually empowered to develop toward needing less care when such a decrease is part of a process of growth or training or recovery. When the care needed will be lasting, practices
should evolve that preclude the provision of care from becoming dominating and the receiving of care from becoming humiliating. (p. 70)

Integral to caring relationship is trust between caregiver and care receiver. Ultimately, “caring and trust sustain each other” (Held, 2006, p. 42).

4.6.4-A new obligation: Final words

“It is for the sake of other men’s wealth and luxury that these go to wars and give their lives.” Gracchus 133 B.C. (as cited in England, 1944, p. 285)

A universal obligation must necessarily reciprocate the demands, context and consequences of military service while creating conditions for each and every veteran to optimize their potential and/or compensate for that which military service has taken away. Reciprocity which recognizes what CF members sacrifice on behalf of Canada and Canadians demands that the universal obligation must be fulfilled on a national and community level basis in an expeditious, accountable and caring basis. This must is the “hardness of the logical must” (Gerrard, 1994, p. 80), i.e., the categorical imperative which not only is more binding than laws but provides the standard by which all actions fulfilling this obligation are to be judged and evaluated. In this manner, Canada and Canadians would be consistent in what they ask of fellow Canadians when leaving behind themselves to serve us in uniform. Just as there is no life like it for CF members, military service demands that there be no obligation like it for what we owe our CF veterans.
Conclusion

“The philosophy behind the Veterans Charter was the philosophy that inspired much of the Canadian Welfare state. Moreover, veterans stirred the pot in Canadian society, and the benefits provided for them showed what was possible when Ottawa acknowledged an obligation and mobilized resources in support of a needed social program.” Historian Peter Neary writing about the Second World War original Veterans Charter (Neary, 2011, p. 287).

Canada and Canadians clearly have an obligation to universally and comprehensively care for and re-establish all our CF veterans. This obligation is not codified in law and has never been explicitly stated even though such an obligation was implicit in the comprehensive programs provided to all veterans of World War II. The absence of any explicit universal obligation has not stopped seemingly endless political and bureaucratic rhetoric from proclaiming the existence of an eternal, sacred, solemn or other substantive debt owed to our CF veterans. Nevertheless, service in the CF over the past seventy years has demanded great sacrifice of all who donned a Canadian Forces uniform to serve Canada and Canadians.

This universal sacrifice on behalf of Canada and Canadians necessitates reciprocating a universal obligation that Canada and Canadians have to care for our CF veterans. The complex and powerful socialization processes are unequalled in any secular or non-secular legal institution. In volunteering to wear a CF uniform, civilians must surrender in whole or in part the more obvious professional, financial and/or social opportunities as well as important social and emotional connections with civilian life.

In replacing the civilian family with the military family, CF members must sacrifice aspects of themselves that most Canadians take for granted. Military culture and its
potent tools of intense military indoctrination, *total institution*, learned helplessness, identity change, and belonging bring about profound and enduring changes to the psychological makeup of CF members. The goal is to subordinate the self and self-interests so that the collective military and its interests become far more important than the individual. Autonomy, capacity, self-advocacy, self-awareness, self-interest as well as certain cognitive abilities and potential are sacrificed on the altar of military service. The CF military ethos’ priority of *mission, soldiers, self* ultimately translates into *mission and soldier* since the tools for self-care are subsumed and suppressed frequently into non-existence or non-efficacy. For those recruited from marginalized experiences, they have few self-esteem, cognitive, and psychological resources to resist such powerful influences.

Military service is ultimately moral service in an institution which inundates all aspects of military life in a persistent and overwhelming culture of do’s and don’ts. These normative rules are commandments, categorical imperatives enforced most importantly by immense social pressures to conform. Should one fail to conform, one faces (in increasing magnitude in terms of psychological influence): a byzantine and comprehensive military legal structure which can mete out punishment for the smallest of infractions, condemnation by peers and, ultimately, the possibility of injury or death in training or combat. For a culture which lives and breathes morality and obligation, the most threatening of forces should one not conform is a figurative and living death, the excision and exile from the organization, i.e., untimely discharge from the military family.
As to the physical death in battle, soldiers are promised and deeply immersed in a culture convinced that honour and eternal gratitude are more valuable than physical life. Since “one shows one’s values by the willingness to sacrifice, and by the degree of sacrifice” (Axinn, 2008, p. 1310), CF members indisputably value their comrades, the military mission, the military institution, fellow Canadians and/or the nation far more than they value themselves.

The obligation CF members have to Canada is clear and explicit: unlimited liability. However, Canada has failed to show any sacrifice whatsoever in reciprocating a universal obligation to all CF veterans. Under arguments of fiscal restraint, Canada claims to have met its obligation to CF veterans through program initiatives largely limited to the more disabled while putting bureaucratic obstacles before all of the disabled. These mostly disempowering and limited programs are provided in a begrudging and excessively delayed manner. Government has conducted this process in an atmosphere of meanness, the exact opposite of the caring, betraying veterans’ warranted expectations. Meanwhile the overwhelming majority of CF veterans have been ignored. This has been the extent of Canada’s sacrifice to its CF veterans.

In spite of the overabundance of saccharine rhetoric about a debt owed to CF veterans, Canada shows it resentfully values its wounded CF veterans and ignores the remaining 520,000. This is not reciprocity but duplicity and humiliation. The true cost of this duplicity is unknown because there has been little if any research into this question not to mention other questions posed in this thesis, primarily due to government’s lack of
interest in documenting policy failures or omissions. This fact underscores that beyond lip service, Canada does not seem to value its CF veterans by any metric.

This must change. Recognizing lost potential, building capacity and optimizing one’s wellness in keeping with one’s potential are not only honourable goals of a society that cares, these obligations are becoming commonplace in many areas of developed nations. Canadians who volunteered and continue to volunteer for military service were and are the first to offer up their lives in sacrifice for Canada and Canadians. It is a sad legacy of dishonour that Canada and Canadians are the last to sacrifice in the smallest measure by failing to articulate, let alone fulfill, a universal obligation to CF veterans.

Additional Areas of Research and Regrets

Families and the Injured

Regrettably, the limits of this thesis precluded a more in-depth discussion of two most deserving populations: CF members injured in service and the families of the serving and retired CF members. The experience of injured veterans with government neglect over the past 70 years erupted in the unprecedented outcry which began slowly in the post-Gulf War (1990-1991) years and exploded exponentially in 2010. Prior to, and even after 2010, the few injured veterans courageous enough to have spoken publicly have been met with derision from veterans’ organizations and disdain from bureaucrats and elected officials. The lack of a clear obligation shows much contempt for CF veterans. However, attacks by those in positions of authority upon those brave wounded calling attention to government’s failure to fulfill an obligation has been a psychic wound which
haunts the greater suffering and sacrifices that all CF veterans continue to endure on behalf of Canada and Canadians. The injured endure much suffering that must be understood in all aspects of physical, professional, social and psychological well-being.

The families of serving members have carried a unique and completely neglected burden in supporting the careers of, while caring for, their CF family members. I have included families in the obligation but they deserve separate research. Their distinct sacrifices have been particularly poignant in that they have happened largely in silence through the military’s active encouragement to disempower families over the past seven decades. Harrison & Laliberté (1994) have documented much suffering and hardships experience by the families of CF members. In public conferences as late as 1978, military representatives applauded the “conservative values, re achievement, work, family, life, education, religion, laws, health, and patriotism” including “strong family ties” and the “husband-father figure” who is “king of his castle” (p. 36). That the king was rarely home and left an overwhelming responsibility upon the military wives and mothers seemed lost on the military’s self-congratulatory perspective. Military wives, Harrison and Laliberté (1994) argue “undergo isolation” (p. 151) while “[m]ilitary life provides wives with few benefits for themselves. It uproots them, derails them from their careers, exploits their labour and treats them like superfluous appendages” (Harrison & Laliberté, 1994, p. 231).

The families of the injured are not even granted the respect of accessing benefits independent of the veterans, in spite of repeated calls since the 1990’s by advocates like CF navy nurse Louise Richard (Author). And no CF veteran’s family is compensated
directly for the lost careers or unpaid care labour which the CF has long exploited.

Research is urgently required to identify programs that will rebuild and compensate the lost potential of families.

**Process of Program Creation, Implementation and Administration**

Veterans and their families, except for limited superficial post-priori involvement, have been completely excluded from developing programs or determining the standards of program administration. They have been shut out from a say in their well-being and destiny. At a minimum, CF veterans need to bemeaningfully and widely consulted when programs are created, amended, revised or cancelled. Other groups such as farmers and particularly aboriginals are far more involved than veterans in the policy process. Canada’s obligation to veterans easily eclipses her commitments to farmers and arguably equals that of aboriginals, but for political reasons these other groups have had much more influence around the Cabinet table than do CF veterans. While this thesis provides a basic framework though which to create, implement, and administer programs, a more detailed process which adheres to the principles of the obligation would provide substantive guidance to policy planners, Canadians as well as to veterans and their families.

**Continued Relevance of Military Indoctrination and other Tools of Military Socialization?**

This thesis does not seek to condemn all wars nor condemn military service as many have accused both care and feminist ethicists (Axinn, 2008, p. 1310). The CF itself has increasingly valued the need to care for its military members. If we truly care about
the Canadians who volunteer, we must ask ontological questions which get at the heart of how we create military members. Do we need to continue with such oppressive methods to completely reshape and recondition individuals while soundly suppressing individual resources that will be necessary to re-establish as civilians? Such powerful techniques arguably only began in the post-Napoleonic war period. Were there effective professional and/or citizen armies before? Certainly. Did they require such repressive socialization and indoctrination techniques? Perhaps not. Perhaps we can find more effective tools to create militaries which do not have such high individual and social costs.

**Relevance of this Research Internationally**

CF members’ experience of socialization and indoctrination processes is not unique among the world’s militaries as my research shows. The consequences of these processes are also relatively consistent across international borders. Although the social context of recruitment may not be consistent amongst all nations, military recruits in other nations likely have their own complicating social origins that would further enhance the justification for a universal obligation for their nation to care for their veterans. The United Kingdom and the United States have begun developing *covenants* and increased understandings of reciprocal obligations. Nevertheless, with much humility, I contend that there is no work which replicates or goes into the detail of justification for an obligation as what I have thus far provided. I believe that the universal experience of military socialization and indoctrination practices across international boundaries will allow the proposed obligation and its justification to be applicable to other nations.
Final Comments

“Wilt thou seal up the avenues of ill?
Pay every debt, as if God wrote the bill.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1914 (p. 275)

Developed and undeveloped nations have become increasingly socially conscious since the two World Wars created the largest generations of military veterans in the history of civilization. Caring for veteran populations became national priorities for most nations affected. Canada arguably rose to the occasion better than most after the Second World War. That we have largely abandoned our CF veterans is contrary to those values of compassion and care that Canada has cultivated in other social and policy areas over the past 70 years.

Perhaps having a professional military is like being a carnivore. We derive sustenance and strength as well as consequential well-being from such nutrition. The overwhelming majority of us do not wish to know the true cost of animal culture nor would we wish to visit or know the processes of a slaughterhouse. Similarly, we derive strength and security from having a professional military. We have enjoyed unparalleled economic and social advancement in large part due to the security that professional militaries have provided. Maybe we don’t want to know of the slaughterhouse details of how we reconstruct our fellow Canadians into professional military members. Perhaps we cannot stomach the details of how the autonomy and individuality we so highly value are decimated in the grinder of military recruitment and service. In the same manner, by treating CF veterans as heroes and reneging on our obligation we can sidestep the hard
questions of how we create soldiers and what they sacrifice on our behalf. In that way, we can continue to prosper at the expense of others. Veterans on the whole, after all, are far too disempowered to come knocking on the door to collect on the debt we owe them.

We are, however, moral beings with a conscience. However difficult they may be, these tough questions must be asked. Every single CF veteran deserves not only the answers but our effort to help them rejoin the civilian society that they protected with such dedication. We owe it to each of them to make their lives out of uniform more empowering and fulfilling than the day they decided to wear a uniform for us.
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